

1970 REPORT ON THE WORLD SOCIAL SITUATION

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UNITED NATIONS

New York, 1971

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E/CN.5/456/Rev.1
ST/SOA/110

UNITED NATIONS PUBLICATION

Sales No.: E.71. IV. 13

Price: \$U.S. 4.50
(or equivalent in other currencies)

PREFACE

The General Assembly, in resolution 2215 (XXI), requested the Secretary-General, the Economic and Social Council, and through it, the Commission for Social Development, to submit periodic reports on the world social situation to the General Assembly for consideration every three years. The first report in this new triennial cycle was issued in 1967.¹ The General Assembly, in resolution 2436 (XXIII), requested, *inter alia*, the Secretary-General to issue the next *Report on the World Social Situation* in 1970 and also requested the Economic and Social Council to ask the Commission for Social Development to consider at what intervals thereafter the report should be produced, in order to accord with the timing of national development plans and the need to assess the world social situation at the middle and end of each development decade. At its twentieth session, the Commission for Social Development discussed the desirability of issuing the report at quinquennial rather than triennial intervals and the subject was referred to the Council for its consideration.² The Council considered the question of the periodicity of the reports at its forty-sixth session and, in its resolution 1410 (XLVI), requested the Commission, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 2436 (XXIII), to discuss the question at its twenty-first session. At that session it was generally agreed by the Commission that a four-year periodicity of the *Report on the World Social Situation* would be a logical arrangement in view of the new cycle of biennial sessions of the Commission. It was agreed that following the 1970 report, the next report would appear in 1974 to be considered by the Commission

in 1975.³ At its forty-ninth session, the Council's attention was drawn to the Commission's recommendation and the Council unanimously agreed that the report should in future be issued every four years.⁴

This review is concerned mainly with social development during the latter half of the first United Nations Development Decade and considers social trends in both the developed and the developing countries by sector and by region. Part One—chapters I to VII—is devoted to regional surveys of trends and programmes in Asia; Latin America and the Commonwealth Caribbean; Africa; the Middle East; Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union; Western Europe; and North America, Australia and New Zealand. Part Two—chapters VIII to XVI—reviews on a sectoral basis the changes of levels of living and the policies and measures adopted to improve social conditions.

This report was prepared in the Social Development Division in co-operation with the Population Division, the Centre for Housing, Building and Planning, the Division of Social Affairs of the United Nations Office at Geneva, the Economic Commission for Africa, the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East, the Economic Commission for Europe, the Economic Commission for Latin America, the United Nations Economic and Social Office in Beirut, the International Labour Organisation, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization and the World Health Organization.

¹ United Nations publication, Sales No.: E.68.IV.9.

² *Official Records of the Economic and Social Council, Forty-sixth Session*, E/4620, para. 116.

³ *Official Records of the Economic and Social Council, Forty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 7*, para. 127.

⁴ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 3*, paras. 231 and 232.

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INTRODUCTION

The 1970 *Report on the World Social Situation* presents information on global trends and developments in the social field, over a period that corresponds roughly with the latter half of the first United Nations Development Decade. It thus provides a vantage-point, not only for retrospective evaluation of world-wide social change and progress, but also for consideration of social problems which remain to be dealt with in the Second United Nations Development Decade.

One of the most striking features of the world social situation in the late 1960s was the continuing rapid alteration in the size and composition of the population. According to the latest projections, the world's population may surpass 3,630 million in 1970, representing an increase of about 340 million since 1965. By far the greater part of this growth has taken place in the developing regions, where the over-all rate of natural increase is slightly more than double that of the more developed. Some 70 per cent of the world's population now lives in the developing regions, with Asia alone accounting for a fraction over 50 per cent of the world total. The outlook is for further acceleration of the rate of population growth during the 1970s, followed by gradual slow-downs thereafter; thus the Second United Nations Development Decade may well witness the fastest increase in human numbers in all history. Regional demographic differences have also become increasingly marked in terms of age-structures. It is estimated that about 42 per cent of the population in the developing regions consists of children and young people below fifteen years of age, while the age-groups fifteen to sixty-four years and sixty-five years and over constitute 55 per cent and 3 per cent respectively. The corresponding proportions in the more developed regions are in the order of 28 per cent, 63 per cent and 9 per cent respectively. These relationships are not expected to change radically over the next decade and they have major implications for productivity and priorities in economic and social investments. The developing regions are confronted by immense requirements for the expansion and improvement of facilities for education and training and for the development of employment opportunities, while the more developed must give relatively greater attention to the needs of their ageing populations.

These contrasts in growth rates and age-structures reflect the virtual stabilization of both fertility and mortality rates at low levels in the more developed regions, while in the developing regions, the maintenance of high fertility has been accompanied by a continuing and fairly steady decline in mortality. The Governments of many developing countries see in this imbalance a serious threat to their efforts to speed up economic and social development, and by mid-1969 about thirty of them (accounting for roughly 40 per cent of the total

population of the developing regions excluding mainland China) had inaugurated national family-planning programmes. Also by mid-1969, there were some nineteen other developing countries in which family-planning programmes were being carried on by privately sponsored agencies, either with or without official government support. So far, however, very few of the developing countries (mostly in East Asia and in some of the Caribbean Islands) have exhibited any noticeable tendency towards declining fertility, and it is even then recognized that a reduction in national birth rates following the inception of national family-planning programmes is not necessarily evidence of a cause-and-effect relationship. Knowledge of the factors that influence the desire to limit family size (as distinct from knowledge of contraceptive technology) is in fact still very imprecise, and this shortcoming indicates a need for further research over a broad range of subjects and disciplines. Particularly little is known about the effects upon fertility of social and economic policy measures (in the fields of income distribution and social security, for example) other than those immediately concerned with population control.

While it is not possible to form a completely accurate picture of recent trends in population movement, it is clear that migration has continued to constitute a major demographic phenomenon. By comparison with the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, overseas migration has lost much of its momentum, although internal migration within politically divided continents remains substantial. However, the most significant feature of recent migration is the unprecedented flow of population from rural to urban areas in virtually all parts of the world, regardless of their levels of development. It is probable that by the late 1960s, about one third of the total world population was urbanized. While the level of urbanization is highest in the more developed regions, the rate of urbanization is greatest in the developing regions. Nevertheless, the numerical increase of rural population in some of the developing regions, particularly South Asia, is still considerably larger than the increase of urban population, despite the great speed at which urbanization has taken place. An increasingly large proportion of population in the more developed regions is in urban "agglomerations", that is to say resident in localities with 20,000 or more inhabitants; in all the major world regions except Europe "big cities"—centres with 500,000 or more inhabitants—account for a growing share of the urban population, and this trend is creating social, economic and environmental problems of forbidding dimensions.

Changes in levels of living, during the period under review, display further important variations between the developing and more developed regions, and testify to the persistence and even growth of interregional welfare

disparities in certain basic respects. The broad trends may be presented along the following lines:

(a) In all regions, *per capita* incomes have risen, but the trend is impressive only in the more developed regions; in the developing regions (with important exceptions in a small minority of countries) the increases have been merely nominal and in many instances have been more or less cancelled out by inflation. Especially but by no means exclusively in the developing regions, the impact of rising *per capita* incomes is further and still more seriously weakened by major distributional inequities. There is evidence to suggest that disparities of income and wealth between richer and poorer population strata have in many countries tended to widen in the process of economic growth and technological development. Given the fact of rapid population increase, this implies that growing numbers of people have been excluded from the benefits of development and relegated to a position of marginality in welfare terms. This problem has become particularly acute in many developing countries, but has been to a lesser degree experienced in some developed countries as well, and its solution poses one of the most difficult but nevertheless urgent tasks of future planning for development;

(b) The employment situation also presents fundamentally different trends according to regional levels of development. In the more developed regions, entries to and withdrawals from the labour force have approximately balanced out, and in some countries the numbers of new entrants have fallen below those of retiring workers. Unemployment, where it has occurred, has been due mainly to counter-inflationary measures taken by Governments, and has given rise to an expansion and acceleration of programmes for vocational retraining and rehabilitation. In the developing regions, on the other hand, the dimensions of unemployment and underemployment have become absolutely (and probably also relatively) larger than ever before. It is very difficult to appreciate the true magnitude of these problems—especially underemployment—from the statistical evidence, which is extremely inadequate, but there is good reason to believe that in many developing countries the underutilization of the labour force amounts to some 30 per cent of the total. This represents a welfare problem and a waste of human resources at least as serious in scale as that which prevailed in industrialized countries during the business depression of the 1930s. It is noteworthy that overt unemployment in the developing regions is most marked among young people, and especially educated youth. Without very radical remedial action, the discrepancy between the employment situation of the developing and more developed regions is likely to widen much further during the 1970s, when the labour force in the former regions will grow by about 55 million only, contrasted with 225 million or more in the latter. The problem facing the developing regions is all the more formidable inasmuch as this “explosion” of the labour force is taking place at a critical stage in which agriculture absorbs a decreasing volume of manpower while the capacity for transfer to non-agricultural employment is still limited;

(c) No spectacular progress has been made in the field of health, but the generally steady trend towards improve-

ment in terms of falling mortality rates, rising life expectancy and more effective communicable disease control has been confirmed. Advances in public health consciousness, in financial support for health programmes, and in medical knowledge itself, have also taken place, and there has been a notable increase of awareness of the close links that exist between better health and environmental sanitation. But there are immense difficulties still to be overcome. In the developing regions, control of the major communicable diseases, particularly malaria, tuberculosis, smallpox and cholera, remains one of the highest health priorities, as does the problem of ensuring a clean water-supply and sanitary waste disposal in rural as well as urban areas. In the more developed regions, chronic and degenerative diseases, as well as mental diseases, drug addiction, alcoholism and accidents are causes for increasing concern, especially as they tend more and more to affect younger as well as older age-groups; and there is a growing preoccupation with problems of the total environment, including water and air pollution, noise, overcrowding, traffic congestion and the destruction of recreational facilities. In all regions, there is a continuing trend towards the systematic planning of health programmes, often in some sort of relationship to national development plans, where such exist. The spread of planning has helped to focus attention on serious weaknesses that persist in the provision of health services, particularly the problems of excessive centralization, inordinately high cost and shortage of professional and auxiliary medical personnel. In very many countries, but most of all the developing ones, these shortcomings have the effect of excluding significant segments of the populations from access to adequate medical care;

(d) The possibility of improvement in health conditions has been recently enhanced by considerable progress in food production, notably in a number of Asian countries: owing to the “green revolution” the threat of large-scale famine, which loomed over the developing regions in the early 1960s, has somewhat receded and there is evidence of a gradual increase in *per capita* calorie consumption in many developing countries. Nevertheless, malnutrition and undernutrition continue to constitute basic causes of ill-health and low productivity in the developing regions, where lack of purchasing power is an even more important factor than ignorance in preventing the low-income masses from obtaining better diets. The persistence of grave nutritional deficiencies has proved particularly damaging to children and youth, whose health is most susceptible to inadequate food intake. In view of the fact that access to a more nutritious diet is to a large extent determined by earning capacity, it must be noted that the recent rapid technical progress in agriculture is not an unmixed blessing, since in the absence of balancing measures it is quite likely to aggravate problems of unemployment by reducing the need for agricultural labour;

(e) Although an annual construction target of eight to ten dwellings per 1,000 inhabitants has been estimated as minimally necessary for the developing regions, available statistics suggest that actual housing achievements in the late 1960s fell far short of this goal, probably in the range of 0.5 to 3.0 units annually. Thus, while the housing situation in more developed regions has

generally improved or maintained approximate stability, it has elsewhere declined sharply from the already inadequate levels prevailing in earlier years and, in the wake of rapid population growth, has led to a vast expansion of squatter settlements and urban and rural slums. Under these circumstances, it is becoming increasingly obvious that conventional sectoral approaches to housing development cannot serve to meet the immense needs of the developing regions and that an urgent search for realistic new solutions is imperative. Moves in this direction have been made in some developing countries, where greater emphasis is being placed on attempting to improve—rather than completely to rebuild—existing low-income settlements, utilizing the co-operation of the inhabitants. There is also some evidence of a disposition to give increasing priority to the amelioration of rural housing conditions, especially through the improvement of water-supply and waste-disposal facilities;

(f) Social security programmes in the more developed regions have undergone continuing modifications, mainly in the directions of further extensions of coverage, inclusion of new types of benefits and improvements in the quality of service; the possibility of introducing some form of guaranteed income for the general population has meanwhile come under active public discussion in a number of industrialized countries. Growing numbers of developing countries have introduced or extended social security programmes. In these countries, however, coverage is still for the most part restricted to small groups (such as government employees and workers in large-scale industries) within the modern sector, and the programmes are often only partially effective owing to unstable financing and the inadequacy of supporting facilities such as clinics and hospitals. Services for the rehabilitation of the disabled (who are reckoned to number some 300 million in the world at large) have been further expanded, but again mainly in the more developed regions;

(g) Social welfare services have continued to grow in scope and coverage, and in many of the developing countries have focused upon the problems of women, children and youth and disadvantaged minority groups. In some countries, the services have also been utilized as vehicles for family planning programmes. In all regions where such services exist, there is increasing agreement among social work authorities that traditional objectives and methods—which have stressed adaptation of the individual to his environment—should be tempered by much greater concern for fundamental social reform and for the prevention as well as the correction of welfare problems. Attempts are also being made to find ways of providing social welfare services with more specific development orientation, while at the same time preserving their essential concern for the individual. Social defence services have evolved towards a similar emphasis upon preventive and developmental functions; current interest in this field centres upon efforts to solve the problems of juvenile delinquency and urban crime;

(h) Global educational progress has been most clearly manifested in a general trend toward longer schooling and in further enrolment increases at secondary and higher levels; primary school enrolment has almost everywhere grown at a relatively slower pace, and in some advanced

countries has actually declined. Education has become increasingly available to females, among whom the growth in enrolment rates has been faster than for males. Government financing of educational programmes has tended to rise at a proportionately higher rate than the size of school-going populations, but in the developing areas generally, this has not prevented a decline in educational quality, nor has it led to a significant amelioration of the high incidence of school drop-out and other forms of wastage. Nor has the growth of educational facilities and budgets measured up to the implications of rapid expansion in the school-age population. Despite all recent efforts, there is an absolutely larger number of illiterates in the developing regions (and therefore in the world) than ever before. Furthermore—despite widespread commitment to the ideal of linking educational plans to plans for general development—most of the developing countries are experiencing a serious lack of correlation between the output of their educational systems, on the one hand, and the needs and opportunities created by their economies, on the other. One result is rising unemployment among the newly educated, coupled in many instances with a substantial drain of high-level manpower to various advanced countries. In the more developed regions, meanwhile, educational systems have come under increasing criticism—mainly from student youth—for an alleged lack of relevance to the realities of contemporary life. These systems, it is charged, are overly concerned with the transmission of received wisdom and technological knowledge and do not adequately contribute to the realization of democratic freedom and individual fulfilment in modern society. In the context of such challenges, educational development has taken on immense political significance, and has reached a point at which its aims and methods require extensive redefinition.

In all regions, changes in socio-economic structures have followed the main patterns of the earlier period, chiefly in terms of a continuing shift of labour and production towards the manufacturing and services sectors. This development has been associated with further increases in the size and importance of groups classified as wage and salary earners, technicians, professionals and *entrepreneurs*—in other words, the importance of “blue-collar” and “white-collar” occupations has continued to grow, while that of traditional forms of manual labour has relatively declined. But closer analysis of the trends reveals important differences between the developing and more developed regions. In the latter, where both manufacturing and agriculture have reached advanced levels of modernization, the steady growth of the services sector and other changes in labour force characteristics signify further advance towards a “post-industrial” era of material affluence and technological diffusion. In most of the developing countries, however, the situation is quite dissimilar: despite the general expansion of the manufacturing sector, agriculture has not undergone extensive modernization, and the growth of the services sector is less indicative of economic dynamism than of the failure of manufacturing to absorb more than a small part of the labour force increment. These problems can be traced to a number of interrelated causes, one of which is the tendency of industrialization strategies to place

greater emphasis on the promotion of large and technically-complex enterprises (which call for heavy capital investment but relatively little labour input) than on the strengthening of small-scale to medium-scale enterprises, which require less capital and employ more labour in the aggregate. Other leading factors include the slow pace of structural and institutional reforms in the rural sector and the displacement of labour as a consequence of technological innovations in agriculture. These influences have contributed to an intensification of under-employment and to an enlargement of the welfare gap between the narrow upper stratum of progressive farmers and the mass of impoverished peasants at the subsistence level.

Structural dualism—while a far from unknown phenomenon in advanced countries—has thus emerged more plainly than ever as a crucial dimension of the social situation in developing regions, where it is manifested in severe and generally growing disparities between higher and lower income groups, between the *élite* and the masses, between urban and rural areas, between regions within countries, between the modern and traditional sectors and above all, between the minority who enjoy full remunerative employment and the vast majority who lack adequate (or any) means of earning a living. By depriving large population groups of equitable shares in the material fruits of progress, in opportunity for advancement and in political influence, such dualism has in some countries posed a rising threat to stability and social integration, while also constituting a major disincentive to popular participation in development plan implementation. These are the realities which underlie the observation, made by a recent United Nations meeting, that the concept of dualism is more appropriate than that of aggregate growth models as a framework for understanding the social problems and social aspects of development.¹

Among the numerous institutional problems of development, two in particular have been attracting increasingly close scrutiny in recent years. One of these is the question of agrarian reform in the developing regions, in some of which land tenure systems are still for the most part grossly inequitable, and (even in areas where a tangible measure of reform has been introduced, or where there is no tradition of tenurial inequities) rural and agricultural progress remains severely hampered by the feebleness of local government and other supporting institutions. The other major question turns upon the nature and effectiveness of public administration and political leadership, and the responsiveness of these institutions to the people. This has large implications in all regions, regardless of their developmental status. In the developing regions, it is apparent that administrative and political shortcomings have had much to do with the serious difficulties experienced in plan implementation and in the marshalling of popular participation in development. In the more developed regions, material and economic progress is not so much at stake, but it is scarcely less evident that a crisis of confidence

¹ United Nations, "Social policy and planning in national development: report of the Meeting of Experts on Social Policy and Planning held at Stockholm from 1 to 10 September 1969" (E/CN.5/445), para. 11.

has arisen between the public authorities and important segments of society—particularly educated youth, who have begun to emerge as a distinctive and articulate political force. In very many countries the alienation of the young, superimposed upon widespread apathy among the older population, has reached proportions which suggest an urgent need for political and administrative reforms in the interest of social harmony and healthy development. This is most obvious with regard to the developing regions, where people under twenty-five years of age comprise nearly two thirds of the total population, and where energetic human commitment must be heavily relied upon to compensate for shortages of financial resources for development; perhaps more subtly, but not less forcibly, it applies to most of the highly developed regions as well.

Growing international awareness of all these trends has led to a wider recognition of the need for some sort of purposeful planning to cope with the problems of people and to ensure social progress. As a result, the social components of many existing national development plans have been enlarged or elaborated and even in countries which possess no national plans as such, numerous efforts have been made to systematize approaches to the improvement of levels of living, the promotion of social integration and the control of the undesirable consequences of economic, technological and social change. These initiatives have involved not only social action in the conventional sense—that is to say, through social legislation and the extension of social programmes—but also to an increasing degree the use of economic policies affecting the distribution of income and other developmental benefits and the incorporation of social objectives into programmes for rural, urban and regional development. At the same time, intensified attempts have been made to identify strategies and methods of achieving more effective public participation in development policy formulation and planning, from the local level upward. In this connexion, it is noteworthy that community development and community organization movements have begun to shift their emphasis in the direction of greater concern for basic social and institutional reform, and towards closer association with planning for comprehensive regional development.

Ironically enough, however, these conceptual and methodological innovations have been for the most part developed and applied in the advanced countries, notwithstanding the fact that many such countries lack even an indicative framework of over-all planning. In the greater number of developing countries—despite their generally strong formal commitments to the principle of comprehensive planning—what is termed "social planning" still tends to be quite nebulous in conception, in substance and in application, and to be confined for practical purposes to a few sectors (notably health and education, and sometimes also housing and social welfare) which are traditionally regarded as central to the enhancement of levels of living. Relatively little systematic attention is given to integrative welfare strategies. Employment promotion and income redistribution, for instance, are set forth as fundamental objectives in many of the national plans, but are rarely translated into concrete policies and programmes, and experiments

in urban and regional planning are characterized by an almost exclusive focus on physical and economic factors. To a much more serious extent than in the advanced countries, there tends also to be a lack of balance and co-ordination between the social and economic aspects of development policy; social policies are often too imprecise and insubstantial to serve as effective guidelines for planning and the welfare impact of economic and fiscal policies is frequently negative. Meanwhile, recognition of the need for developmental change in institutions, attitudes and social structure is widely obscured by an excessive emphasis—in “social planning”—upon strictly sectoral interpretations and approaches. Although most of the developing countries are actually devoting very substantial financial resources to the support of their social services, they are investing comparatively little effort in the planning and execution of social and administrative reforms, even though many such reforms do not require substantial financial outlays. An insufficient effort is being made to measure and appraise social (as distinct from strictly economic) progress as a yardstick of achievement and as a guide for future action; information on the social aspects of development remains gravely inadequate for virtually all of the countries, especially in terms of such basic indicators as the distribution of income and the levels of employment.

This summary account of recent world social trends points to a number of broad conclusions regarding priorities for national and international action in the Second United Nations Development Decade. Each of these conclusions is related to the pressing need to reduce inequality and dualism, which as indicated, have become more pronounced (or politically less tolerable) in the period reviewed in this report.

Reduction of inequality and dualism in their international dimensions—that is, between the more developed and developing regions respectively—presupposes among other things a substantial rise in the incomes of the developing countries, and hence a more liberal approach by the wealthy countries to the questions of trade and aid. At the present time, however, public opinion in many of the advanced countries is greatly preoccupied with domestic social issues, and seems to have reached a plateau so far as interest in the welfare of the developing regions is concerned. To an important extent, therefore, prospects for trade and aid liberalization appear to depend upon the degree of success enjoyed by the wealthy countries in efforts to solve their internal problems. A large part of the resources necessary for this purpose and for large-scale expansion of international assistance could be realized from a drastic reduction of military expenditures, which even in some very rich countries have reached almost ruinous proportions. Quite apart from its intrinsic importance, the elimination of the enormously wasteful arms race is accordingly a major condition of reduction in international welfare disparities in the years ahead.

However, augmentation of the capital and technological resources available for peaceful development will not by itself suffice to overcome inequality and dualism within countries, even though it may help to accelerate economic growth in some respects. There is abundant evidence that, far from leading automatically to social progress (as was once widely taken for granted) economic growth

often intensifies dualism and leads to serious deterioration in the welfare status of marginal groups. This has been borne out in countries at all levels of development, at one time or another, but it is particularly true of the developing countries where distributive systems are weak and where the economic, social and political structures are highly conducive to centripetal patterns of growth. Moreover, economists and development thinkers increasingly acknowledge that dualism ultimately tends to restrain—sometimes even to reverse—economic growth, by undermining political stability. By the same token, it is recognized that greater equality in development can be favourable to long-term growth, since it enlarges both the opportunities and the incentives for mass participation in economic activity.² It is therefore essential that future national development strategies should, as a matter of priority, endeavour to promote integration and social justice as well as economic growth; this would be a necessary counterpart of the effort to reduce disparities between countries.

While the need for an organic or unified approach to development can be persuasively demonstrated, it is much less easy at the present time to prescribe specific policies and planning methods capable of giving operational expression to the integrative ideal. This difficulty is due basically to the present state of development theory, which has concentrated upon highly selective concepts of economic growth, and has given less attention to qualitative and human factors. An additional factor has been the lack of suitable methodological tools for integrated planning. This had led to the creation of plans and planning organizations in which such factors are usually only superficially accounted for, within a narrow sectoral framework. Early and vigorous efforts must therefore be made at national and international levels alike, to create clearer understanding of the interaction between economic and other forces in the development process and to provide the means for the reconciliation of growth and welfare objectives in development policy-making and planning.³ A significant step in this direction has been taken with the recent advocacy of an “institutional approach” to planning and development, giving prominence to political, administrative and human factors, as well as to considerations of material growth.⁴ Combined with the work being carried out by the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, this could contribute to a major advance of knowledge and understanding in the coming years.

² See, for example, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), *Partners in Development: Report of the Commission on International Development* (New York, Praeger, 1969), p. 54 and the report on the sixth session of the United Nations Committee for Development Planning, *Official Records of the Economic and Social Council, Forty-ninth Session, Supplement No. 7 (E/4776)*, pp. 10 and 11.

³ This has been specifically recommended in the “Report of the special rapporteurs appointed to undertake a review of technical co-operation activities in social development” (E/CN.5/432), pp. 16-18; resolution 3 (XXI) of the Commission for Social Development and resolution 1494 (XLVIII) of the Economic and Social Council. The need for a unified approach to development and planning was also repeatedly stressed in the “Report of the Meeting of Experts on Social Policy and Planning”.

⁴ Gunnar Myrdal, *Asian Drama: An Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations* (New York, Pantheon, 1968), 3 vols.

The urgent need to strengthen national development strategies through the incorporation of measures aimed at promoting more purposeful social and institutional change, has far-reaching significance for future United Nations activities. A general implication is that, as recently recommended by Sir Robert Jackson, "... more attention should be paid to the social dimensions of development" in the United Nations programme of assistance.⁵ Not less important, however, are the implied questions as to the conceptual and organizational frameworks within which an amplified programme would be developed. In this connexion, there are two fundamental and closely interrelated problems which require early resolution in the interest of greater effectiveness in the social development activities of the United Nations system:

(a) Until now, the United Nations approach to social development matters has had a predominantly sectoral (or "levels-of-living") emphasis and has not been balanced by adequate attention to questions of social policy *per se*, or to the social aspects of economic policy. This question has lately been discussed by the Commission for Social Development and by the Economic and Social Council. At its twenty-first session the Commission expressed regret over the separate consideration of economic and social policies in the United Nations itself, in both the Economic and Social Council and in the General Assembly. This situation had resulted to a great extent in the practical isolation in United Nations policy-making bodies of social development questions from those in the economic field, thus paradoxically setting back the very movement for a concerted development approach consistently promoted by the Commission for Social Development and the Economic and Social Council.⁶ The Council, in its report to the General

⁵ *A Study of the Capacity of the United Nations Development System* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 70.I.10), p. 138.

⁶ *Official Records of the Economic and Social Council, Forty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 7 (E/4809)*, p. 42; see also *Official Records of the Economic and Social Council, Forty-sixth Session (E/4620)*, p. 23.

Assembly at its twenty-fifth session, also reaffirmed the need for progressive integration of social and economic goals and programmes.⁷ Failure to adopt a unified approach would seem to have impeded the impact of United Nations recommendations at the country level in the field of development policy and planning. It has been suggested that the United Nations development system is "... particularly suited for co-operation in the broad fields of development policy formulation and in the creation of those types of basic infrastructure where the human element is paramount..."⁸ This further underlines the importance of elaborating a unified approach to planning and development, since the conceptual limitations of prevailing development theories are underlying reasons for the present insufficient appreciation of social policy factors;

(b) The problem of functional fragmentation and weakness in policy co-ordination, which has been emphasized repeatedly in the "Jackson report" is especially acute in the social field, where so many different agencies have either a direct or partial interest. This has had important feedback effects on the other problem mentioned above, and has diverted attention particularly from the need to deal forthrightly with issues such as those of human resource development and institutional reform, which are either multisectoral or super-sectoral in character.

Determined action to deal with these questions cannot be long postponed if the United Nations system is to enlarge substantially its contribution to the improvement of world social conditions in the Second Development Decade. At the international as well as at national levels, decisive advance in the social field will of course depend primarily on the political commitment of each and every Government concerned.

⁷ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 3*, p. 33.

⁸ *A Study of the Capacity of the United Nations Development System* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 70.I.10), p. 138.

Part One

SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT IN ASIA ¹

The region covered in this chapter is much larger in population size—it contains slightly more than half the world population—and is ethnically and culturally more diversified than any other dealt with in this report. Unlike some other regions—such as Latin America or North America—Asia as a whole has no positive unifying characteristics to speak of. It is actually a composite of at least three relatively cohesive subregions, each properly deserving individual treatment in a survey of this type. The three subregions in question are: East Asia (1968 population 893 million) comprising China (mainland), China (Taiwan), the Democratic Republic of Korea, Hong Kong, Japan, Macau, Mongolia, the Republic of Korea and the Ryukyu Islands; South-West Asia (1968 population 696 million) including Afghanistan, Bhutan, Ceylon, India, Iran, the Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sikkim and South-East Asia (1968 population 270 million), comprising Brunei, Burma, Cambodia, the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines, Portuguese Timor, the Republic of Viet-Nam, Singapore and Thailand. The only real justification for attempting a general discussion of developmental trends in Asia rests on the fact that most of the countries are extremely poor, which is to say that their levels of living and productivity are very low by the standards of the wealthy regions of the world. But even in this respect there are important variations, most strikingly illustrated by Japan, which stands clearly apart from the rest of the region by virtue of its “western” levels of economic development and social integration; furthermore, some countries (such as India and mainland China), which rank very low according to the indicator of *per capita* income, are in terms of indigenous technological development, considerably in advance of certain other Asian countries which stand considerably higher on the scale of economic prosperity. Generalization about the state of development of the region is therefore a risky business in the best of circumstances, and is apt to obscure almost

as much as it reveals. Concerning the social aspects of development in particular, generalities are rendered all the more uncertain by serious gaps and inaccuracies in statistical information. For example, no countries other than Japan—and to some extent the Philippines—can offer anything resembling comprehensive time-series data on changes in household income distribution, and for many countries even much simpler statistical information is either entirely lacking or is so suspect as to be practically useless for analytical purposes. In the latter respect, a cardinal difficulty is the almost total absence of recent statistical information on mainland China and its population of over 700 million.² This shortcoming is obviously one of such enormous dimensions as to divest large parts of the following discussion of any genuine regional applicability.

THE BACKGROUND OF CHANGE IN DEMOGRAPHIC, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL STRUCTURES, AND RELATED CHANGES IN LEVELS OF LIVING

The selection of demographic data presented in table 1 serves to point up the salient characteristics of the regional population: its immense size, its rapid over-all rate of growth, its youthfulness and its predominantly rural locale. The estimated 1968 regional population total of some 1,860 million is fairly closely in line with the United Nations “medium variant” projection, which further predicted a total of nearly 1,940 million by 1970;³ the population of Asia may therefore exceed 2,000 million by the time this chapter is in print. In view of the dubious reliability of most Asian statistics, the growth rates shown in the table should probably not be taken too literally, especially in comparing the two periods for which information is given, since it is quite possible that for some countries the indicated changes are largely accounted for by improvements in the collection and analysis of data. A rising trend of growth is nevertheless evident in most countries, the most important exceptions being Japan (for which the statistics are of course very reliable), mainland China and just possibly Pakistan. The generally rapid rate of growth is clearly reflected in the patterns of age-distribution shown in the table, from which it will be seen

¹ This chapter is a sequel to several others on social development in Asia which have appeared in previous *Reports on the World Social Situation*, most recently the 1967 report. It is also related to a series of reviews of Asian social conditions and problems published periodically by ECAFE in the *Economic Bulletin for Asia and the Far East*. So far as availability of data permits and the logic of discussion allows, attention is focused on the period beginning in early 1966 and ending in late 1969, but it will frequently be necessary to ignore this time-frame. The countries nominally covered are these which make up the Asian part of the ECAFE region (excluding Australia, New Zealand and other ECAFE member countries in Oceania) but the discussion will concentrate on some of the larger countries about which information is more readily accessible.

² The Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China has published no comprehensive official statistics since 1957 and none of any description since 1960.

³ *The Asian Population Conference, 1963* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 65.II.F.11), table 5.1, p. 85. New regional projections being prepared by the United Nations were not available at the time of this writing.

TABLE 1. SELECTED DEMOGRAPHIC INDICATORS FOR COUNTRIES IN THE ECAFE REGION

Country	Estimates of mid-year population 1968 (millions)	Average annual rates of population growth (percentages)		Estimated population in urban areas (percentages of total population) 1970	Proportions of children and youth (percentages of total population)			Expectation of life at birth (both sexes)	
		1950-1960	1963-1968		Year	0-14 yrs	15-24 yrs	Period	Years
Afghanistan	16.1	1.8	2.1	6.7	1960	43.2	16.5	—	—
Bhutan	0.07	—	—	0.0	—	—	—	—	—
Brunei	0.1	6.2	3.6	44.1	1960	46.6	15.6	—	—
Burma	26.4	1.9	2.1	15.8	1967	40.0	17.5	1954	42.3
Cambodia	6.6	3.2	2.2	12.8	1962	43.8	17.6	1958-1959	43.7
Ceylon	12.0 ^a	2.3	2.4	16.6	1963	41.5	18.0	1962	61.6
China (mainland)	730.0 ^b	1.6	1.4	23.5	—	—	—	—	—
China (Taiwan)	13.5	3.4	2.9	64.4	1967	43.3	16.9	1965	68.1
Hong Kong	3.9	2.9	2.3	100.0	1967	39.6	16.8	1968	70.0
India	524.0	1.9	2.5	18.8	1961	41.0	16.7	1951-1960	41.2
Indonesia	113.7 ^a	2.1	2.4	17.9	1961	42.1	16.1	1960	47.5
Iran	27.0	2.2	3.0	39.3	1966	46.3	15.1	—	—
Japan	101.1	1.2	1.1	83.2	1967	22.4	20.0	1966	70.9
Korea (Democratic Republic of)	13.0 ^b	—	2.5	21.9	—	—	—	—	—
Korea (Republic of)	30.5	1.9	2.5	39.0	1966	42.4	18.1	1955-1960	52.4
Laos	2.8	3.2	2.4	13.4	1960	43.0	17.0	—	—
Macau	0.03 ^b	—	-1.0	100.0	1960	38.1	12.2	—	—
Malaysia (East)	1.5	2.8	3.5	18.0	1960	44.0	15.0	—	—
Malaysia (West)	8.8 ^b	2.9	3.0	45.8	1957	43.8	18.0	1965	63.2
Maldives	0.1 ^b	—	2.2	11.9	1967	44.4	14.2	—	—
Mongolia	1.2	1.9	3.2	51.6	1960	39.3	14.6	—	—
Nepal	10.6	1.4	1.9	5.0	1961	39.9	17.0	—	—
Pakistan	109.5 ^a	2.1	2.1	15.9	1961	44.5	15.9	1962	51.2
Philippines	35.9	3.1	3.5	23.2	1967	46.7	19.2	1966-1969	51.1
Portuguese Timor	0.05 ^b	—	1.6	10.4	—	—	—	—	—
Ryukyu Islands	0.1	—	1.1	39.5	1965	38.0	16.6	1960	71.3
Sikkim	0.02 ^a	—	1.9	8.8	1961	39.5	20.2	—	—
Singapore	2.0	4.8	2.3	100.0	1960	44.9	15.1	1957	62.7
Thailand	33.7	3.1	3.1	13.0	1960	43.1	18.7	1965-1965	58.5
Viet-Nam (Democratic Republic of)	20.7 ^b	2.2	3.1	23.9	1960	37.7	—	—	—
Viet-Nam (Republic of)	17.4			2.6	26.1	—	—	—	—

SOURCES: Col. (1): United Nations, *Population and Vital Statistics Report* (Statistical Papers Series A), vol. XXII, No. 2 (New York 1970).

Col. (2): *The Asian Population Conference, 1963* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 65.II.F. 11) and *Demographic Yearbook, 1968* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: E/F.69.XIII.1).

Col. (3): Kingsley Davis, *World Urbanization 1950-1970*, vol. 1, Population Monograph Series No. 4 (Berkeley, University of California, 1969).

Cols. (4) and (5): United Nations *Demographic Yearbook 1968*; ECAFE, *Statistical Yearbook for Asia and the Far East 1968 — Special Supplement on Children and Youth* (E/CN.11/879); and UNESCO, *Progress of Education in the Asian Region: A Statistical Review, 1969*.

^a Provisional estimates.

^b United Nations estimates.

that there is no major country other than Japan where the population under twenty-five years of age comprises less than 55 per cent of the total population; in some countries the proportion is considerably higher (culminating in the Philippines, where approximately two-thirds of the whole population is less than twenty-five years old) and in most it is increasing. For the entire region, the age-group 0-14 years alone totals some 745 million, or well over a fifth of all humanity. Complete information on the breakdown of age-distribution by rural and urban residence is not available, but generally speaking there are proportionately (as well as absolutely) more young children and aged persons in rural areas, and proportionately more adolescents and young adults in urban areas; this difference between rural and urban areas has

important implications for productivity, since it means that rural dependency ratios are higher than the already high national averages.⁴

The real extent and momentum of urbanization in Asia is not easily appreciated from the data in table 1, which shows a heavy preponderance of rural population

⁴ For instance, a recent socio-economic survey of a fairly typical *tambon* (village district) in north-east Thailand showed that 49.0 per cent of the total population of some 12,000 was under 15 years of age, as against the national average of 43.1 per cent; the potential labour force was estimated at 49.3 per cent of total population, in contrast with the national average of 54.1 per cent—Kamol Janlekha, *Saraphi: A Survey of Socio-Economic Conditions in a Rural Community in North-east Thailand* (London, Geographical Publications Ltd., 1968), table 1, p. 18.

in most of the countries, including all of the largest, apart from Japan. The regional level of urbanization (rising from about 15 per cent to nearly 21 per cent of the total population over the period 1950-1970) is actually lower than for any other major world region except Africa. In the strictly numerical sense, however, Asia is by far the most urbanized region, since by 1970 its total estimated population in urban localities will amount to over 480 million,⁵ that is to say considerably more than the entire population of Africa or Latin America or North America. The process of urbanization in Asia is on the whole highly uneven, since it is biased towards the biggest cities, many of which have grown at rates varying from 5 per cent to more than 10 per cent annually (compared with an average annual population growth rate of slightly more than 2.0 per cent for the region at large). In some countries, rapid expansion of major urban agglomerations has occurred side by side with the relative stagnation, or occasionally decline, in the growth of small urban centres in outlying regions. The disproportionate growth of metropolitan areas is most pronounced in medium-sized countries with only one primate city: a striking instance is Thailand, where in 1968 the population of the capital city municipal area (Bangkok-Thonburi) was estimated at 2.7 million, or more than thirty-two times the size of the second largest city (Chiangmai) where the population was given as 84,000.

The conjunction of rapid population growth (both by way of natural increase and rural in-migration) with widespread unemployment and family poverty has led to a further precipitous decline in urban living conditions, which in many large Asian cities have reached a state of depression and disorder that practically defies description. Much of the population growth in the larger cities is in fact accounted for by increases in the numbers of squatters and slum-dwellers. In the Philippines, for example, the population of metropolitan Manila grew by 4.5 per cent annually between 1948 and 1957 (and at a fractionally higher rate thereafter) but the slum and squatter population is estimated to have increased by about 12 per cent each year over the period 1950-1967; in metropolitan Manila, squatters and slum dwellers are now said to account for more than a quarter of the whole population.⁶ The slum population of Calcutta is thought to amount to nearly half the entire city population, while it is estimated that 600,000 people in the city live on the pavements without shelter of any kind.⁷ Elementary urban services—water, sewerage and transport in particular—are nowhere nearly adequate and, in many of the great cities, have approached or passed the point of collapse so far as most low-income residents are concerned: ordinary tap water is usually unsafe for drinking purposes (and is often not available at all); drains are obsolete and

only intermittently serviceable, and back streets are littered with uncollected waste. Although the immediate surroundings are of course much better in high-income residential and commercial districts, general environmental pollution from industrial development and road traffic is a rapidly growing general hazard in many large urban areas. Urban transport has proved especially vulnerable in the face of population pressure. In Tokyo, peak rush-hour loads on the rapid transit systems commonly amount to 300 per cent of planned maximum carrying capacity, and in the developing countries (where buses remain almost the only form of urban public transport) the situation is often much worse. In Taipei, for instance, the number of passengers travelling by bus has been recently increasing by more than 60 per cent yearly, without any remotely corresponding increase in the number of vehicles available.⁸

Housing is not of course an exclusively urban problem, but the needs are most obvious and acute in the urban setting, and here again the picture is one of rapid decline in the face of extreme demographic pressures. As long ago as 1960 (the last year for which a comprehensive estimate is available) the housing shortage in Asia—exclusive of mainland China and several small countries—was placed at about 145 million units, of which 23 million were needed in urban areas.⁹ To attain the rate of construction required to overcome the shortage it has been estimated that most of the countries would have to make annual investments in housing of at least 5 per cent and optimally 8 per cent of their national incomes. However, actual investments have fallen far short of this level, with a rough regional average of only about 3 per cent in the years around 1966.¹⁰ Even this low figure tends to create an unduly favourable impression, since for virtually all the countries it includes disproportionately high investment in quality private housing for the rich: the amount of investment devoted to genuine betterment of low-income housing (as distinct from the construction of mere shanties) is very minor by comparison. As a result, the shortage of housing is continuously mounting—in India, for example, it is said to have increased by nearly 50 per cent during the 1960s, and in Pakistan by approximately 100 per cent.¹¹ The only Asian countries in which low-income housing conditions have shown any clear improvement are Hong Kong, Japan and Singapore, where fairly heavy financial backing has been given by the Governments to low-cost housing schemes—but even in Japan there still remain serious housing shortages and deficiencies.

⁸ "Urban planning and transportation systems in the cities of the ECAFE region" (E/CN.11/I&NR/Sub. 4(9)/L.4).

⁹ "Status, patterns and trends of urbanization in the countries of the ECAFE region, and their social and economic implications" (E/CN.11/I&NR/Sub. 4(9)/L.9), p. 7.

¹⁰ "Review of the housing situation in the ECAFE region" (E/CN.11/I&NR/Sub. 4(9)/L.6), p. 5.

¹¹ "National development planning and its relationship with the form and structure of urban and regional systems in the countries of the ECAFE region" (E/CN.11/I&NR/PURD/L.2), p. 32. In most of the government reports, references to "housing" are really to dwelling units: in practice, much of the existing housing consists of one-room dwellings in each of which ten or more people, or even as many as three families, may be living under conditions of unspeakable discomfort and lack of sanitary facilities.

⁵ Kingsley Davis, *World Urbanization 1950-1970*, vol. I, Population Monograph Series No. 4 (Berkeley, University of California, 1969), table A, pp. 69-75.

⁶ *Report of the Asian Population Conference* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 65.II.F.11), table 4.3, p. 82, and *Action Now*, vol. 1, No. 5 (Manila, Social Communications Centre Inc., October 1968), p. 4.

⁷ "National development planning and its relationship with the form and structure of urban and regional systems in the countries of the ECAFE region" (E/CN.11/I&NR/PURD/L.2), p. 44.

By economic standards, Asia is still the poorest of the developing regions. Average *per capita* income for the whole of Asia was estimated at approximately \$US 150 in 1967, the last year for which an aggregate computation is available. However, this figure includes the national income of Japan which (with only about 6 per cent of the regional population) accounts for nearly one third of total regional production.¹² If Japan were to be excluded, average *per capita* income for the remainder of the region would have amounted to about \$US 100 in 1966, and may have since risen to the neighbourhood of \$US 105. Of the three major "subregions", South-East Asia is considerably wealthier in terms of average *per capita* income than South-West Asia or East Asia (the latter again excluding Japan). An income classification of Asian countries, based on the data in table 2, gives the following distribution:

Classification of Asian Countries by level of GNP per capita, 1967
(US dollars)

<i>Group I</i> \$1,000 and up	<i>Group II</i> \$500-\$1,000	<i>Group III</i> \$200-\$500	<i>Group IV</i> \$100-\$200	<i>Group V</i> under \$100
Japan	Brunei Hong Kong Singapore	China (Taiwan) Iran Korea, Democratic Republic of Malaysia Mongolia	Cambodia Ceylon Korea, Republic of Philippines Thailand Viet-Nam, Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam Republic of	Afghanistan Burma China (mainland) India Indonesia Laos Nepal Pakistan

It will be noted that most of the countries are below the level of \$US 200, and that all of the largest are either below or (in the case of Pakistan) only slightly above the level of \$US 100. In terms of population, the concentration at the lower end of the scale is therefore more extreme; the countries in group V contain an aggregate population which makes up more than four fifths of the total population of Asia.

Since the beginning of 1966, the rate of regional economic growth has improved considerably over the sluggish performance of the early 1960s, although the recovery has not been experienced or sustained in all countries. The most rapidly expanding economies throughout the period 1966-1968 were those of China (Taiwan), Hong Kong, Japan and the Republic of Korea, all of which recorded average growth rates of 9 per cent or higher. Several others grew at rates exceeding 5 per cent per annum. The largest countries of the region were among those with the slowest rates of growth. Although India gradually recovered from two successive years of agricultural decline and stagnation, over-all performance re-

mained modest. Pakistan's growth was in the range of 5 or 6 per cent per annum and the Indonesian economy had only begun to recover as rampant inflation began to be brought under control. (The economy of mainland China, which accounts for well over one third of the population of the region, is widely thought to have undergone a serious slump after 1966—that is to say in the period corresponding with the most active phase of the Cultural Revolution—but there is some evidence that a fairly substantial recovery took place in 1969.)¹³ It is however quite possible that the growth rates are overstated for several of the developing countries where, as the flow and quality of basic data improve, there is a tendency to classify as "new" certain long-established but previously unrecorded economic activities, thus contributing an illusory element of growth to the national balance sheets.

More serious reservations arise from the fact that an unmeasured but nevertheless substantial part of recent economic growth in certain South-East and East Asian countries has been directly stimulated by heavy inflows of foreign capital and hard currencies in connexion with the Viet-Nameese conflict, whose most acute phase coincided with the period under consideration here. In this respect, the buoyant economic conditions that have prevailed in some countries since the middle of the decade are reminiscent of the boom catalysed by the Korean conflict in the early 1950s, and to that extent may be quite temporary in character, at least as far as the lesser-developed beneficiary countries are concerned. For this reason, it cannot be assumed that the high growth rates recorded in recent years indicate that the countries concerned are in a sound state of economic health. On the contrary, there is reason to fear that, in the absence of early corrective action, some of the national economies may encounter serious setbacks when the level of military expenditure in the region slackens off, as it now seems likely to do; the danger is all the more real in view of the fact that the free flow of external funds resulting from

¹² In 1957 Japan contributed slightly less than one fifth of total regional production; more than half the economic growth of Asia from that year until 1966 was accounted for by Japan alone.

¹³ See Tillman Durdin, "China's economy gaining unevenly", *The New York Times* (7 June 1970).

TABLE 2. SELECTED ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL INDICATORS

Country	Gross National Product per capita (US dollars) 1967	Average annual percentage rate of growth of GDP (constant prices)	Percentage distribution of GDP by industrial origin ^a			Percentage of economically active population in agriculture, 1967	Total educational enrollments as percentage of total population, 1967	Average rate of increase in total educational enrollments by level 1960-1965			Percentage of population illiterate (15 years of age and over)						
			Period	Rate	Year			Primary	Secondary	Tertiary	1st level	2nd level	3rd level	Year	Total	Male	Female
Afghanistan	70	—	—	—	—	87.0	3.3	15.1	22.9	14.1	1965	94.0	88.0	99.0			
Brunei	800	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—		
Burma	70	1964-67	2.4	1967 ^b	34.3	12.8	52.9	4.2 ⁱ	8.9 ^j	6.4 ^j	1954	42.3	16.6	66.2			
Cambodia	130	1963-66	2.3	1966	40.8	16.8	42.4	7.1 ^e	18.0	33.7	1962	59.0	30.1	87.3			
Ceylon	160	1965-68	7.2	1967	45.1	13.9	41.0	2.7 ^f	4.8	22.7 ⁱ	1963	24.9	14.6	36.3			
China (mainland)	90	—	—	—	—	63.0	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—		
China (Taiwan)	250	1965-68	9.5	1967 ^b	23.5	28.8	47.7	3.6	13.3	19.5	1956	46.1	29.9	62.5			
Hong Kong	620	—	—	—	—	7.0	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—		
India	90	1964-67	1.5	1967-68	45.3	22.1	32.6	7.3	8.6	6.4	1961	72.2	58.5	86.8			
Indonesia ^e	75	1965-68	3.6	1967	51.8	17.7	30.5	12.0	11.2	19.4 ^k	1961	57.1	42.8	70.4			
Iran	280	1965-68	9.6	1967	21.6	42.7	35.7	8.8	11.7	7.9	1966	77.0	66.9	87.6			
Japan	1,000	1965-68	12.5	1967 ^b	11.9	45.5 ^d	42.6	27.0	3.8	9.3	1960	2.2	1.0	3.3			
Korea (Democratic Republic of)	230	—	—	—	—	70.0	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—		
Korea (Republic of)	160	1965-68	11.5	1967	35.6	27.9	36.5	6.4	6.5	7.0	1960	29.4	16.6	41.8			
Laos	90	—	—	—	—	81.0	6.9 ^e	10.1	11.7	11.0	1962	72.0	70.0	73.0			
Malaysia (East)	290	1964-67	6.0	1966	29.2	25.6	45.2	55.0	21.0	17.5	15.8 ⁱ	77.5	67.3	88.2			
Malaysia (West)	410	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	53.0 ⁿ	34.1 ⁿ	73.5 ⁿ			
Mongolia	70	—	—	—	—	59.0	15.9 ^g	7.4	5.1	16.5	1962	30.0	21.0	39.0			
Nepal	90	—	—	—	—	92.0	4.6 ^e	11.2 ^m	7.1 ^m	11.4 ^m	1961	91.2	83.3	98.5			
Pakistan	180	1965-68	5.8	1967-68	46.1	17.5	36.4	9.5 ^e	6.2	10.9	1961	81.2	71.1	92.6			
Philippines	600	1965-68	4.7	1967 ^b	32.8	23.6	43.7	57.0	21.8 ^h	11.5 ⁱ	1960	28.1	25.8	30.5			
Singapore	130	1965-68	9.8	1967 ^b	4.1	18.2	77.7	7.0	5.1	14.5	1957	50.2	32.3	70.8			
Thailand	100	1965-68	8.1	1967	29.6	23.0	47.4	78.0	16.8	3.3	1960	32.3	20.7	43.9			
Viet-Nam (Democratic Republic of)	120	—	—	—	—	80.0	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—		
Viet-Nam (Republic of)	120	1963-66	6.4	1965 ^b	29.2	13.3	57.4	85.0	13.5 ^e	18.2	1962	84.0	77.0	90.0			

SOURCES: Column 1: IBRD, *World Bank Atlas*, 1969, except Indonesia: national sources. Columns 2 and 3: United Nations, *Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics*, 1968, and national sources.

Column 4: FAO, *The State of Food and Agriculture, 1968*. Columns 5, 6 and 7: UNESCO, *Progress of Education in the Asian Region: A Statistical Review, 1969*.

Notes: ^a Agriculture, industry and services (including transport, storage and communication). ^b Current prices. ^c Excluding West Irian.

^d Including transport, storage and communication. ^e 1966. ^f 1964. ^g 1965. ^h 1963. ⁱ 1960-1964. ^j 1960-1963. ^k 1961-1963. ^m 1961-1965. ⁿ Former Federation of Malaya.

the military effort has in certain countries led to the postponement of painful but ultimately unavoidable decisions on urgent issues of development policy, and to an expanded demand for imported luxury goods, which cannot be sustained under more normal conditions.

The decline of foreign capital imports associated with the Viet-Nameese situation has already begun to confront a number of Asian countries with the realities of the region's worsening position in world trade; based on 1963 = 100, the unit value index of Asia's terms of external trade declined from 110 in 1960 to 99 in 1967.¹⁴ In the late 1960s efforts made by developing Asian countries to secure a larger share of world trade met with repeated disappointments, symbolized by the inconclusive—some say abortive—second session of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development held at New Delhi in 1968.¹⁵ In the absence of major concessions from the developed regions, the developing Asian countries are suffering with increasing severity from the instability of the world market for primary products (which constitute their main sources of external income) and at the same time from the inadequacy of overseas outlets for their rising industrial production. The trend of external aid is also discouraging: after the long upward movement of the 1950s and early 1960s, there has been no major increase since 1965 in the volume of financial assistance directed to Asia as a whole, and it now appears that the level of such assistance is bound to decline, at least over the next few years. Reduction in external aid receipts has been paralleled by a steady rise in repayment liabilities for development loans contracted in earlier years, so that by 1969 several countries were either approaching or had actually passed the point at which debt service liabilities equalled new aid receipts, thus cancelling out or reversing the inward flow of aid funds.¹⁶

Although the contribution of manufacturing industry to Asian economic growth continued to expand during the period under review, this development was overshadowed in many countries by an even more rapid growth of the services sector. As table 2 shows, there are several developing countries in which the proportion of national production contributed by the services sector is nearly as large as in Japan, although none of them has anything like the manufacturing capacity of Japan. In the Republic of Viet-Nam, the services sector is larger than in any other country of the region, including Japan. Infla-

tion of the services sector indicates that, in terms of employment generation, the growth of manufacturing industry is not keeping pace with urbanization and the increase of the labour force; those who cannot find work either in agriculture or industry tend to be absorbed by a multiplication of marginal occupations, such as petty merchandising and provision of minor personal services, and to some extent by the overstaffing of civil (and sometimes also military) bureaucracies. A more clearly favourable feature of recent Asian economic growth has been a general resurgence of the chronically ailing agricultural sector, including a marked increase in total food-grain production; in certain countries, such as India, this has been the principal factor of economic recovery in the period since 1965. This "green revolution" in agriculture reflects the successful introduction of new agricultural technology involving the use of high-yielding seed varieties and the intensive application of fertilizers. The threat of massive food shortages, which was openly feared in the region only a few years ago, has been at least temporarily staved off, and several countries claim to have graduated from a persistent food-deficit situation to one of surplus. The significance of this development, and the urgent need to sustain its momentum, are clearly brought out by the data in table 3, which traces the stagnation of Asian food productivity over the forty-five-year period leading up to 1967.

The extremely low productivity of Asian agriculture is also borne out by table 2, which reveals that in most of the developing countries the contribution of agriculture to total production is minor in relation to the very high proportion of the labour force engaged in the primary sector.

Although systematic supporting evidence is lacking, informed observers in the region express wide agreement that disparities of income and wealth are very large and are tending to increase within all but a few developing Asian countries. The existence of large disparities is implied by several of the indicators in the tables set out above, since in a broad way income inequalities go hand in hand with disparities in levels of living and of productivity. But beyond such indirect indices, the data on income distribution are scanty and sometimes misleading. In very few countries have serious efforts been made to put together anything resembling a comprehensive picture of income distribution, and the rare studies which exist are open to fundamental criticisms. For example, the only official study of family income distribution in India¹⁷ is based mainly on income-tax returns (which in 1960-1961 affected only 0.74 per cent of the national population), plus a limited amount of information from sample surveys of consumption expenditure. For what they are worth, the Indian data show that in 1960 the top tenth of urban tax-paying households had 42.4 per cent of pre-tax income, while the share of the top decile of rural households was 33.6 per cent; the aggregate shares of the five lowest deciles, in urban and rural areas respectively, were 17.5 and 20.7 per cent.

¹⁴ ECAFE, *Statistical Yearbook for Asia and the Far east: 1968* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 69.II.F.5), p. 2. The index does not take account of the external trade of mainland China and several small Asian countries.

¹⁵ *Proceedings of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development—Second Session, New Delhi, 1968 (TD/97)*, vols. 1-5 (United Nations publication, Sales Nos.: 68.II.D.14-18).

¹⁶ Although Asia is both the largest and the poorest region (in terms of population and *per capita* income respectively) its share in the world-wide flow of external aid is relatively the smallest—around 40 per cent of the total. Moreover, external aid has been very unevenly distributed within the region, with little correlation made between socio-economic needs and aid shares. On a *per capita* (and in some cases an absolute) basis, a number of quite small countries have received the largest portions of aid; at the other extreme, mainland China (with the largest population and one of the lowest *per capita* incomes among Asian countries) has received one of the smallest shares of aid over the long term, and none at all in recent years.

¹⁷ Government of India, Planning Commission, *Report of the Committee on Distribution of Income and Levels of Living—Part I: Distribution of Income and Wealth, and Concentration of Economic Power* (New Delhi, 1966).

TABLE 3. TRENDS IN RICE AND WHEAT YIELDS FOR SELECTED ASIAN COUNTRIES, 1923-1967
(Quintals per hectare)

Years	Rice				
	Burma, India, Pakistan	Thailand	Philippines	Indonesia	
1923-1927	14.3	18.6	11.7	—	
1928-1932	14.5	16.3	12.0	—	
1934-1938	13.9	12.9	10.9	—	
1948-1952	12.0	13.1	11.8	16.1	
1953-1957	13.2	13.6	11.6	17.1	
1958-1962	14.3	14.0	11.7	17.8	
1963-1967	12.4	16.3	13.2	18.5	

	Wheat						
	1923-1927	1928-1932	1934-1938	1948-1952	1953-1957	1958-1959	1963-1967
India	7.5	7.0	7.1	6.6	7.4	8.0	8.3
Pakistan							
				8.5	7.5	8.0	8.1

SOURCE: "Problems of planning and plan implementation in the ECAFE region: 1950/51 to 1967/68" (E/AC.54/L.34).

According to a study based primarily on household sample surveys, the aggregate pattern of family income distribution in the Philippines in 1961 was fairly close to that of India, with about 40 per cent of all income going to the top decile and 20 per cent to the lowest five deciles.¹⁸ The Philippine survey also agreed with the Indian findings that income disparities were wider in urban than in rural areas, and the same conclusion was reached in a more recent survey carried out in the Republic of Korea.¹⁹ The only other developing country form which reasonably comprehensive information is available is China (Taiwan): these data indicate that in 1964 the top decile of households received about 26 per cent of all family income, as against approximately 28 per cent for the five lowest deciles, and they also show that income inequalities had been practically eliminated as between urban and rural areas.²⁰ The relative equality that prevails in Taiwan is probably due above anything else to rapid advances in agrarian reform and rural development from the early 1950s onward; no other developing Asian country has made comparable progress in these areas, so it is likely that the income distribution patterns in India and the Philippines are much more typical of the region as a whole.

The studies cited here (other than the Taiwan survey) substantiate the view that income disparities are increasing with the passage of time. The most startling evidence of the trend comes from the above-mentioned Indian study, which shows that the income share of the top

quintile of tax-paying households rose by 25 per cent between 1952-1953 and 1956-1957; information on what has happened subsequently is unfortunately not available. Setting aside the tiny group of income-tax payers, a recent Indian plan evaluation study²¹ has given evidence of worsening living conditions among the low-income masses. The study found that, in most of the states of India, at least one third of all rural families are living below a household "poverty line" set at 100 rupees (Rs) monthly (compared with the national monthly *per capita* income of about Rs40 in 1966); although expenditures below this level are, in the words of the study, considered to be "inadequate for decent living for an average family",²² there were at least six states of India in which the proportion of rural households receiving less than Rs100 monthly ranged between 50 per cent and 73 per cent of the total. A no less significant revelation is that average monthly *per capita* consumption expenditure was almost exactly the same in 1963 (rural = Rs22.4; urban = Rs32.8) as in 1951-1952 (rural = Rs23.1; urban = Rs31.7), even though the official consumer price index registered a net upward movement from 125 to 132 over the twelve-year period.²³ Distribution of income is of course closely

²¹ Government of India, Planning Commission, *Regional Variations in Social Development and Levels of Living—A Study of the Impact of Plan Programmes* (New Delhi, 1967), 2 vols. This study is remarkable both for its candour and for the thoroughness of its coverage; no other developing Asian country has produced a comparable evaluation of the actual effect of planned development upon everyday living conditions.

²² *Ibid.*, vol. I, p. 31.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 32 and table XXXIV. Efforts are now being made in India to establish a "poverty line" for purposes of planning assistance to disadvantaged sections of the community. For this purpose it was recently estimated that nearly 35 per cent of the Indian population is living in poverty (for example, with a monthly *per capita* expenditure of less than 15 rupees in rural areas and 24 rupees in urban areas)—Indian Institute of Public Opinion, *Monthly Commentary on Indian Economic Conditions: Annual Number 1968* (New Delhi, December 1968), p. 46.

associated with the distribution of real wealth, which under Asian conditions means agricultural land in particular. It has been reckoned that in most of the non-communist countries except China (Taiwan), Japan and the Republic of Korea, the proportion of agricultural holdings under tenancy ranges from 40 per cent to 60 per cent of the total;²⁴ however, if the calculation were made relative to land area, if "hidden tenancy" were taken into account and if allowance were made for the widespread tendency of the Governments to underestimate the extent of tenancy, the ratio of tenancy would probably turn out to be even higher than this.

There are also considerable income differences between regions within countries; incomes are highest in regions that include and surround major cities, where industrial facilities are tightly concentrated, and highest of all in capital city regions. Thus, in the Republic of Korea in 1965, the Seoul-Kyonggi Do region had a *per capita* GDP of about 36,000 won, compared with roughly 20,000 won in some outlying provinces.²⁵ But if regional incomes are disaggregated, the differences can become very much greater than this: a 1962 household survey in Thailand showed that 70 per cent of rural families in the populous and predominantly agricultural north-east region had annual cash incomes of less than 3,000 baht, as against an average family income of nearly 39,000 baht in the national capital city municipal area.²⁶

²⁴ "Problems of planning and plan implementation in the ECAFE region: 1950/1951 to 1967/1968" (E/AC.54/L.34), pp. 54-55. In most Asian countries, of course, large groups of the rural population do not have even tenancy rights: in India, for instance, the Jayaprakash Narayan Study Group on the Welfare of the Weaker Sections of the Village Community found that 27 per cent of rural households did not operate any land at all, while a further 15 per cent operated holdings of less than one acre in size (Indian Institute of Public Opinion), *Monthly Comentary on Indian Economic Conditions: Annual Number 1968*, op. cit., p. 45.

²⁵ Politics and Economic Research Institute of Korea, *The Structural Analysis of Local Government Finances and Policy Recommendations* (Seoul, 1967).

²⁶ Government of Thailand, National Statistical Office, *Household Expenditure Survey—Buddhist Era 2505 (1962)* (Bangkok, 1963).

In the Philippines, where the Government has divided the country into ten regions for purposes of socio-economic analysis, the substantial interregional differences tended to widen between 1956 and 1961. For example, average family income in the richest region (Metropolitan Manila) increased from 4,255 pesos to 4,790 pesos over the period, while the poorest region (Eastern Visayas) the rise was only from 928 pesos to 1,166 pesos; in two of the regions (Ilocos/Mountain Province and Cagayan Valley/Batanes), average family incomes meanwhile actually decreased by four to seven percentage points.²⁷ In India, the percentages of population living below the "poverty line" referred to above varied from 9 per cent in Assam to nearly 45 per cent in Kerala; apart from Kerala, the States of Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Madras, Maharashtra, Mysore, Orissa and Uttar Pradesh all exceeded the national average in terms of the proportions of their populations living below the "poverty line".²⁸

The regional distribution of developmental benefits other than direct income is also quite distorted in the greater number of developing Asian countries, although in this respect comprehensive indices are again lacking. The fullest and most recent data come from India and show that, despite a large average increase in the availability of various social and economic facilities considerable regional disparities remain; some relevant indicators are given in table 4.

Regional maldistribution of developmental facilities and services is commonly accentuated by socio-economic factors which have the effect of channelling the benefits disproportionately in favour of higher-income groups. For instance, it is widely reported from Asian countries that government-subsidized farm credit tends to be monopolized by relatively small numbers of rich cultivators who can offer the required security, who understand the administrative procedures for obtaining loans, and who

²⁷ T. D. Chan, "Income distribution in relation to economic growth in the Philippines" (Manila, 1967), table 3, 11, unpublished.

²⁸ Indian Institute of Public Opinion, op. cit., p. 48.

TABLE 4. INDIA — INDICATORS OF INEQUALITY BETWEEN STATES IN THE DISTRIBUTION OF DEVELOPMENTAL BENEFITS

Indicators	Highest value	Lowest value
Percentage of agricultural land irrigated	42.0 (Punjab, 1959-1960)	5.9 (Maharashtra, 1959-1960)
Kilometres of rural roads per 100 km ² of rural area	49.9 (West Bengal, 1960-1961)	4.4 (Jammu and Kashmir, 1963-1964)
Number of hospitals and dispensaries per 100,000 rural population	12.4 (Jammu and Kashmir, 1963-1964)	1.4 (Rajasthan, 1964)
Percentage of children, aged 6-11, enrolled in classes I to IV of primary school	95.5 (Madras, 1963-1964)	45.0 (Bihar, 1961-1962)

SOURCE: Government of India, Planning Commission, *Regional Variations in Social Development and Levels of Living, A Study of the Impact of Plan Programmes* (New Delhi, 1967), vol. I.

often have privileged personal contacts with local government officials. Similarly, the benefits of free government extension services tend to be monopolized by prosperous farmers who have both the educational and the financial resources necessary to make best use of the technical advice.²⁹

Because of the extreme heterogeneity of the region, it is more than ordinarily difficult to make valid generalizations about the changes in social class structures that are accompanying demographic and economic development, beyond the rather obvious fact that the social pyramids in the majority of Asian countries are assuming an increasingly "modern" character, wherein traditional *élites* are gradually yielding place to the rising upper-middle class of bureaucrats, entrepreneurs and professionals. Among the last-mentioned substrata, the civil (and occasionally the military) bureaucracy, inheriting the "mandarin" tradition fostered over the centuries by independent and colonial régimes alike, usually has the greatest prestige and political authority. However, the three groups are by no means discontinuous, and are in fact often found to be closely linked to one another—and to the traditional *élite*—by birth, intermarriage or economic interests. This is substantially true even in South-East Asia, where commercial and industrial development are largely in the hands of more or less assimilated aliens (notably those of Chinese origin) whereas the bureaucracies are under exclusively indigenous control. At its lower fringes, the upper-middle class merges with a petty *bourgeoisie* of small but prosperous businessmen (again predominantly alien in South-East Asia), middle-level farmers and landowners, technicians and middle managers. Below, and at a considerable economic distance from these groups, there is a much larger and rapidly growing lower-middle class (if such is the appropriate term) of marginal shopkeepers, poorly-paid clerical workers and minor government functionaries, which overlaps or blends into the massive base of the urban and rural proletariat.

In recent years, a good deal of discussion has centred on the developmental role of the higher-middle classes—the new *élite*—and speculation as to whether these classes are capable of providing technical and organizational leadership in development seems to have been persuasively answered in the affirmative. A question of lesser currency but greater interest is whether the new *élites* have the commitment and the will to lead broad movements of democratization that would draw the inert masses actively into the development process. The point is a crucial one, since in most Asian countries the large majority of the population is marginal in the sense that it plays no conscious part in development, either as a mover or as a beneficiary. This situation is the socio-political counterpart of the dualism which (even though it is nowhere absolute) deeply divides the traditional from the modern sectors in many of the national economies, and which is widely deplored in Asian development literature. Although the question eludes a categorical answer, it

must be said that the position of social and economic privilege enjoyed by the new upper-middle class *élites* seems to militate rather strongly against any hope that they will enter easily into such a leadership role. In general it is precisely these *élites* which have profited most from the tendency towards an increasing concentration of income and other developmental benefits; however, the cost of any effective effort to broaden the base of popular participation in development would inevitably involve a reversal of this centripetal trend and a surrender by the *élite* of some large part of their accumulating advantages. Added reservations arise from the closeness of interest which in many instances prevails between the new and the traditional *élites*, and which consequently inhibits the former from leading an attack upon institutional forms of feudalism: this inhibition is most obvious in the generally feeble enthusiasm shown for broad agrarian reforms, by the new and old *élites* alike.³⁰

Except in the few highly industrialized and highly urbanized Asian countries, the spectacular rise of the upper-middle classes has so far greatly outpaced the growth of a modern working class, as an organized and articulate political force. However, there are multiplying signs of self-consciousness, of demand for political participation and of challenge to the hegemony of the new and old *élites* on the part of the hitherto inarticulate low-income strata, including some segments of the peasantry. This trend seems to be attaining greatest momentum in the countries which have already experienced a limited developmental breakthrough—that is to say, where economic growth and change have been real enough to be noticeable, but not sufficiently well distributed to meet the popular expectations of social justice aroused by the parallel development of education and communications. Although most of the countries possess formal parliamentary political institutions through which the interests of different pressure groups can be theoretically represented and reconciled, the effectiveness of such institutions in carrying out this function is widely vitiated by the persistence of feudalistic social and economic relationships at the village or grass-roots level, and in some countries also by systems of political checks and balances which in practice give decisive influence to the bureaucratic and business *élites*. In the absence of more genuinely responsive institutions, the rising strength of proletarian demands and the apparent inability of the *élite* to adjust spontaneously to such demands foreshadow a future of sharpening political polarization and conflict. Prospects of movement in this direction are heightened by the increasingly militant opposition to the political,

³⁰ The Asian countries that have carried out the most thorough and comprehensive agrarian reforms, including radical redistribution of land holdings, differ enormously in their political complexities, but in one way or another their political leaderships have been able to divorce themselves from the restraining influence of the traditional rural *élite*. This is self-evident in the case of the four communist countries, where elimination of landlordism was a major policy objective in itself. It is less widely realized, however, that implementation of the highly successful land reform programmes of the Republic of China and Japan were also carried out by political authorities who were able to stand aloof from the rural landlords. In Japan, the initiative was taken by the post-war military occupation authorities, and in the Republic of China, by former mainland officials who had little or no prior commitment to the rural landowners of the island province.

²⁹ In India, there is some evidence that this tendency is also positively associated with caste status, with higher castes deriving the greatest proportion of benefits. See, for example, M. M. Bhallerao and R. S. Dixit, "Caste dominance in co-operatives", *Kurukshetra*, vol. XVIII, No. 2 (New Delhi, November 1969), pp. 12-14.

economic and social *status quo* being expressed by large segments of educated youth, especially university students. The evolution of youth as a political force to be reckoned with has been scarcely less rapid in Asia than in the developed regions, and it seems more than likely that the scale and range of the intervention of youth in the affairs of Asian countries will gather force in the period lying immediately ahead. The educated youth—of whom increasing numbers come from lower middle income groups, in consequence of the rapid expansion of educational enrolments—may eventually supply the mass leadership which has not so far been forthcoming from the recognized *élite*.¹¹

Patterns of social stratification and structural change in the Asian communist countries exhibit fundamental variations from those that have been summarized above, the main difference being that as a matter of official policy the power of the traditional *élite* has been for all practical purposes eliminated. It would also appear that in the communist countries—which avowedly aim at the establishment of “classless” societies—the economic and social gaps between various population groups are less pronounced than elsewhere in the region. However, in mainland China at least, the existence of socio-economic cleavages and inequities, leading to the alienation of the educated and bureaucratic *élite* from the masses, evidently became an urgent concern of the highest political authorities during the period under review. There is consensus among many observers that the recent Cultural Revolution, spearheaded by the Red Guard youth movement, had to an important extent the purpose of undercutting the positions of privilege being established by bureaucrats, professionals and technicians, and thus of preventing the return of a highly stratified society in modern guise. A major implication of the Cultural Revolution is that, in contrast to prevailing currents of thought in most other developing Asian countries, the present leadership of mainland China apparently regards the politically mobilized proletariat, rather than the essentially middle-class technocrats, as the mainspring of developmental dynamism.

MAJOR GOVERNMENTAL RESPONSES: STRATEGIES, POLICIES AND PROGRAMMES

The range of strategies through which social objectives are implied or deliberately pursued, and through which social problems are directly or indirectly dealt with, is a very wide one; the strategic approaches briefly examined

¹¹ Noting that wealthy *élites* dominate the political structures of most Asian countries, one popular journal goes on to remark: “But the influence and authority of the upper and middle class are steadily eroding. The . . . drift of population to the urban centres is swelling the ranks of the long-suffering underprivileged lower middle class. Everywhere, this section of the middle class seeks a greater measure of the national wealth and opportunity. . . . Education is rousing the conscience of the young to the inequalities all around. Outside the cities, nationalists and young radicals are attacking the promiscuity, the conspicuous consumption, and the exploitation and perpetuation of privilege by the [upper] middle class.” See “The middle class”, *Asia Magazine*, vol. VIII, No. 18 (May 1968), p. 3. In another article in the same journal (p. 14), “The middle class in politics”, the comment is made that: “Speaking generally . . . the crux of Asian tensions and turmoil rises from the inability of new social forces to share meaningfully in political power.”

below are those to which Governments in Asia have given the greatest prominence in recent years.

Population policies and programmes

During the 1960s, the much-discussed demographic explosion brought Governments to a dramatic realization of the need for determined efforts to deal with their problems of population growth. In contrast to the situation ten years ago, there is now scarcely any national Government which has not expressed some degree of explicit concern over this problem. In a number of the countries, population policies have been officially enunciated and are receiving substantial administrative and financial backing from the Governments.³² Official concern in this area rose very sharply in the wake of the serious setbacks to development plan implementation—and hence to economic growth—that were encountered in the early 1960s. For this reason, the population policies tend to be more “economic” than “social” in inspiration and intent. In practice, they do not deal comprehensively with the demographic problem as a whole, but focus almost exclusively upon the single aspect of fertility control. Such closely related issues as urban and regional development, the development of human resources and the improvement of family levels of living, are not prominently considered or accounted for in the policy statements and frameworks. Implementation of the policies has therefore come to depend very heavily upon programmes of family planning characterized by technical emphasis on the dissemination of knowledge of contraceptive techniques. No appreciable effort has been made to deal in a co-ordinated way with problems of the socio-economic environment which are conducive to high fertility patterns, or with the social after-effects of rapid population growth. (It is worth noting that, after a great deal of soul-searching among aid-giving countries and organizations, family planning achieved rather sudden respectability in the 1960s as an object of development assistance; however, the assistance given in this field has tended strongly to encourage—even if it did not actually inspire—the highly selective and technical approach to which reference has just been made.)

Although it is too early to judge whether the population policies formulated upon such a restricted basis will suc-

³² In Japan, in contrast to most other Asian countries, there is said to be a growing feeling in some official quarters that the rate of population growth should be slightly speeded up. (The net reproduction rate in Japan has remained slightly below 1.0 for almost every year since 1956, generally at a level between 0.9 and 1.0.) A recent report by the Population Problems Inquiry Council, a cabinet-level advisory group, acknowledges that a high rate of population increase would be undesirable but suggests that the present rate of reproduction is too low and should be maintained at an annual rate of 1.0 in order to alleviate incipient problems of labour shortage and of aged dependency. However, this view is by no means unanimous, and there remains in Japan a substantial body of opinion which maintains that the country is already seriously overcrowded and that a higher rate of population growth should therefore not be encouraged. Essentially the difference of views seems to be one of economic *versus* social priorities, that is to say between those who are concerned over the negative effects of labour shortages and higher costs of old-age maintenance upon the economy, and those who are prepared to sacrifice some economic growth in return for more living space. See Philip M. Boffey, “Japan: a crowded nation wants to boost its birthrate”, *Science*, vol. 167, No. 3920 (1970).

ceed in their primary aim of achieving major reductions in fertility rates, it must be said that results to date—at least as far as they are reflected in the second column of table 1—give small grounds for encouragement so far as most of the countries are concerned. Of the very few developing countries for which declining rates of population growth are indicated, there are only three—China (Taiwan), Hong Kong and Singapore—for which the statistics are sufficiently reliable to be accepted and where it can be said with any degree of assurance that family planning practices have taken a wide and permanent hold among the populations at large (and not merely among higher-income groups). The fact that all three countries are well ahead of other developing Asian countries in respect of general levels of living and institutional modernization, suggests that the effective popularization of family planning is to an important extent dependent upon prior or concomitant improvement of mass living conditions. This conclusion is further supported by accumulating indications that—even in Asian countries where general socio-economic conditions are much less favourable and where population growth rates are either still rising or remaining stable at a high level—family planning is widely practised by the urbanized middle classes—that is to say, by those social groups which have had greatest access to the material benefits of development or to the influences of modernization and innovation, or to both.³³

It can be and has been argued that the levels of welfare and institutional development attained in Hong Kong and Singapore are due to special circumstances that are beyond immediate emulation by most other developing countries, and that their experience consequently offers no really useful guide for population policy formulation elsewhere. In so far as it refers to the unique degree of urbanization in these two relatively small countries, the objection has considerable merit, but it clearly loses much of its validity when extended to China (Taiwan), where basic conditions—especially for the preponderance of the rural population—are not at all atypical of the region. In any event, the objection itself implies some sort of recognition that the successful implementation of technical programmes to encourage limitation of family size is heavily conditioned by the socio-economic environment within which they operate. If it is in fact true that the widespread and permanent adoption of family planning practices depends upon parallel institutional changes and improvements in mass levels of living, then a high proportion of Asia's population policies (which rest largely on the assumption that fertility control must precede any substantial advance in general living conditions) would require early reconsideration and modification in order to enhance their prospects of success. For the time being, however, the full nature of the interrelationships between over-all development and fertility decline, and the policy implications that flow from these interrelationships, remain to be satisfactorily analysed and identified.

Efforts to undertake planned rural development in the Asian region have been distinguished by several shifts of approach and emphasis. At one stage, the basic corrective to rural and agricultural backwardness was widely believed to rest upon the reform of land tenure systems, since it was frequently observed that the feudalistic nature of the prevailing tenurial systems offered a major disincentive to any rapid increase in agricultural productivity, and that low productivity in turn lay at the roots of rural poverty. For the most part, however, the approach through tenurial reform proved unfruitful, either because of successful resistance on the part of rural landlords and their allies or—where some measures of reform actually carried out—because other anachronisms of the agrarian structure prevented the full realization of the benefits of land redistribution and more equitable conditions of tenancy. Among non-communist countries, only China (Taiwan) and Japan have noticeably succeeded in using tenurial reforms as a springboard to accelerated rural development, basically because the reforms in question were not only fully implemented but also because they went beyond the mere redistribution of land and tenancy rights, and were closely articulated with a comprehensive range of other measures directed towards the modernization of rural structures in their entirety. These other measures prominently included the encouragement of active farmers' associations, the use of government financial and legislative power to place credit and marketing systems on a sound, equitable basis, and the generous provision of technical extension services, together with an abundant supply of fertilizers and other agricultural inputs at reasonable prices.

Another major approach to rural development has revolved around the concept of community development, which was envisioned as an organized, multisectoral effort to promote mutual self-help in economic enterprise and social reconstruction at the village level; community development was often linked with the idea of institution-building in both the social and economic spheres. Some of the main reasons for the failure of the community development movement in its wider purposes were discussed in the chapter on Asia in the *1967 Report on the World Social Situation*. It will suffice to recall here that these reasons prominently included the practical divorce of the movement from broad measures of agrarian reform, the paucity of material resources at the level of the typical village, the confused organizational concepts upon which most community development programmes were based, and the inadequate technical qualifications of many community development practitioners.³⁴ While community development programmes were running afoul of such

³⁴ It should be noted that, although actual community development programmes did not exist in the crucial periods of post-war rural development in China (Taiwan) and Japan, certain basic principles of community development were successfully applied in the execution of agrarian reforms in both countries, particularly through farmers' associations and *kominkans* (community associations) in China (Taiwan) and Japan respectively. This was the reverse of the situation in many other countries where, as indicated above, attempts to apply community development principles through formal programmes were largely ineffective through lack of substantive backing.

³³ This observation specifically includes the urban middle classes of the Philippines, where Roman Catholicism is the predominant religion, and where the Government has only very recently begun to advocate a reduction in the rate of population growth.

difficulties, many of the parallel attempts at institution-building encountered no-less formidable obstacles—efforts to set up producers' co-operatives, for example, were widely hampered by the low level of literacy and the lack of management skills among the co-operative members, while co-operatives that did succeed usually proved to be of benefit only to the more prosperous landholders and tenants.

The newest—and in terms of its productivity effects, the most successful—initiative in planned rural development focuses upon delivery of a package of key agricultural inputs—improved seed varieties, fertilizers and irrigation—coupled with the selective use of crop insurance and price guarantees. The implementation of such package programmes has been a major factor in the “green revolution” which, as noted previously, led to a brisk revival in Asian agricultural production in the period after 1965. But, without in any way minimizing the significant short-term impact of the package programmes, it seems far too early to conclude (as some writers already have) that this approach has brought Asian agricultural problems within sight of solution, much less that it constitutes an adequate framework for the comprehensive development of the rural sector. It has been pointed out, for example, that the very ease with which the first results of the “green revolution” were gained is tending to divert attention from the serious problems of agricultural and rural development which remain to be tackled, and which—if left unattended—will prevent the new technology from spreading nearly as quickly or as widely as many national planners are now inclined to assume.³⁵ A number of agricultural experts have laid strong emphasis on the following obstacles to further rapid dissemination of the new technology: (a) the severe shortage in most Asian countries of adequately irrigated land—the new high-yielding seed varieties require careful water control throughout their growing cycles, and to ensure a sufficient water supply for this purpose will entail enormously increased expenditures on new and existing irrigation systems; (b) the widespread inadequacy of crop storage and marketing facilities, and shortages in the supply of economically priced agricultural inputs, especially fertilizers; (c) the general lack, among the poorer peasant farmers, of the technical knowledge and substantial financial resources needed to support successful cultivation of the new seed varieties; (d) the reluctance of subsistence or semi-subsistence producers to experiment with new crops when failure may threaten the very survival of their families; and (e) the continued hesitation and reluctance of many Governments to implement institutional reforms in the rural sector.

It is clear that aside from their strictly economic implications, all these obstacles (and the three last mentioned in particular) conspire against participation by the mass of subsistence producers in the “green revolution”, which has been so far carried forward almost entirely by the minority of prosperous farmers possessing the best land, the highest educational qualifications and the financial

³⁵ This view is forcefully presented by Clifton R. Wharton in “The green revolution: cornucopia or Pandora's box?”, *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 47, No. 3 (April 1969), pp. 469-476; and in greater detail in “Problems of planning and plan implementation in the ECAFE region: 1950/1951 to 1967/1968” (E/AC/54/L.34).

resources needed to obtain and effectively to use larger material and technological inputs. Exclusion of the marginal peasantry in this way would of course aggravate the condition of inequality and dualism that already characterizes the rural sector throughout most of the Asian region. Wharton draws attention to the dangers of the situation in these words:

“As a result of different rates in the diffusion of the new technology, the richer farmers will become richer (and may) capture food markets previously served by the smaller semi-subsistence producer.... This raises massive problems of welfare and equity. If only a small fraction of the rural population moves into the modern century while the bulk remains behind, or perhaps even goes backward, the situation will be highly explosive.”³⁶

A number of Asian countries are giving serious attention to industrial as well as agricultural policies as instruments of rural development; this marks an important departure from earlier thinking, which tended to visualize a competing rather than a complementary relationship between the development of industry and agriculture, and which led many Governments to favour the building up of sophisticated large-scale industries at the expense of agriculture and medium-scale and small-scale industry. Whatever the virtues of the latter policy, it has had several grave disadvantages, particularly including its tendency to accentuate structural and sectoral dualism. Most of the new industries have been set up in the larger cities, thus helping to accelerate the process of urbanization and the growth of urban-rural income disparities; they have not succeeded in generating new employment on a scale commensurate with their large requirements for capital investment;³⁷ and they have not generally been geared to meet the demands of rural economies based on small-scale agriculture.

A strategy of support for medium- and small-scale industries, especially those turning out producer and consumer goods needed by small farmers, is now coming to be viewed as a means of strengthening the structure of industrial development at its foundations, of providing for wider dissemination of knowledge of manufacturing and marketing technology, and of simultaneously encouraging industrial decentralization and the maximization of

³⁶ Clifton R. Wharton, op. cit., pp. 467-468.

³⁷ One economist estimates that, although large-scale capital intensive industries and associated infrastructure activities have accounted for a major part of Asian economic growth over the past fifteen years, unemployment rates (measured against a 40-hour work-week as a standard of full-time employment) have been rising by an average of about 0.5 per cent annually, and that unemployment levels now amount to 10 per cent or more of the labour in most Asian countries. The same writer points out that, failing more strenuous efforts to increase employment opportunity, this level will rise sharply in the 1970s, when the Asian labour force will grow at rates as high as 3 per cent annually, or double the rate experienced during the 1950s—H. T. Oshima, “The role of small industries in the acceleration of Asian growth”, *Small Industries Bulletin for Asia and the Far East*, No. 7 (1969) (ST/ECAFE/SER. M/25). A strong case for the maximization of employment through emphasis on labour-intensive, medium- and small-scale industry is presented by the same writer in “Employment maximization and accelerated growth in Asia”, paper prepared for the Eleventh World Conference on Development, New Delhi, 14-17 November 1969.

employment opportunity. At the same time, special interest is being shown in the promotion of agro-industry—that is to say, in developing facilities for the initial processing of agricultural products on or near their actual sites of production, with the intention of lowering manufacturing costs and at the same time providing rural workers with more opportunity to supplement their incomes through either off-season or part-time employment. But these strategies, it must be emphasized, are as yet more at the stage of discussion than of planning and implementation; the only developing Asian country in which agro-industry has reached an advanced stage of growth and integration is China (Taiwan) where industrial development policy originally gave priority to the strengthening of medium- and small-scale industry (on a basis of modernized agriculture), and is only now turning to the promotion of large-scale industry.

Urban and regional development

In a few developing Asian countries that were formerly under colonial rule, some limited attempts at urban planning were made as far back as fifty years ago, when schemes were drawn up for the improvement of certain capital city districts. The most ambitious scheme and the only one to be extensively implemented, was that which led to the creation of the city of New Delhi, from the early 1930s onwards. But these approaches to urban planning were almost exclusively concerned with the physical development of show-piece administrative enclaves, and were therefore of little relevance in anticipating or meeting the complex of economic and social problems which have attended the urbanization process in the post-war period of independence. Subsequent efforts to deal systematically with the pressures of rapid urban growth have met with very little practical success. There is certainly no shortage of urban development plans, at least as far as the major metropolitan areas are concerned, and some large cities have had more than one plan.³⁸ However, most of these plans are advisory rather than mandatory, and very few of them have achieved more than token implementation: the major obstacles to implementation include the excessive numbers of local authorities with overlapping (and sometimes conflicting) powers and jurisdictions,³⁹ serious financial weaknesses at the level of local government, and lack of appropriate land policies, town planning legislation and machinery for legislative enforcement. Moreover, most of the plans (like the schemes of the colonial era) are aimed essentially at physical improvement, and do not effectively recognize or provide for the social and economic requirements of comprehensive urban development. The crisis of urbanization discussed earlier in this chapter is gradually leading Asian Governments to take a more urgent view of the need for remedial action and, in association with increas-

ing awareness of the complex causality of urban growth, it is leading also to a clearer recognition of the need for co-ordinated policy solutions. Urban planning by itself is no longer seen as the main line of approach to the problem, and it is widely acknowledged that corrective action confined to the cities alone is likely to achieve little beyond encouraging an even greater influx of migration from rural areas. Instead, discussion and planning are now couched increasingly in terms of integrated strategies by means of which efforts to cope with the effects of rapid urban growth would be closely linked with other measures designed to accelerate the development of non-metropolitan regions, and thus to help restrain the migratory flow at its sources.

Growing official interest in strategies of regional development is not motivated by concern over rapid urbanization alone, however. No less importantly, these strategies are increasingly viewed as antidotes to regional political disaffections, which in a number of Asian countries have assumed sufficient momentum to challenge seriously the authority of the central Governments. The rising vigour with which regional claims have been asserted against those of national authorities is indeed one of the most striking features of the period under review, and it is incidentally one of the main factors underlying the decline in prestige which central planning concepts and agencies have suffered over the past five years. The growing strength of regional feeling has no single cause, but it plainly owes much to resentment—fired by improved communications and education—over the increasing metropolitan concentration of developmental benefits and national political power. In some of the countries, such resentment is further aggravated by close association with ethnic and cultural rivalries that originated long before the present national States were created.

Increasing government awareness and public discussion of the issues involved have pointed up major deficiencies in past attempts to promote development at subnational levels. In some countries, responsibility for regional development has been assigned to central government agencies concerned with “town and country planning”, that is to say with physical, but not economic and social, aspects of regional development; in others, regional development has been given no organizational focus at all, and has taken the form of loose groups of projects at the regional level, rather than co-ordinated plans to deal with the needs and circumstances of particular areas. Although many of the countries possess specialized organizations charged with the planning and development of water resources, opportunities for utilizing these agencies for comprehensive regional development have on the whole not been well exploited, and their activities also have been largely confined to the planning and construction of individual physical projects. The creation of effective regional planning bodies and the implementation of regional development schemes has been widely hampered by shortages of appropriately trained planning and operational staff—most Governments report that the supply of such personnel is already too small to meet the requirements of aggregative national planning and development. Beyond these difficulties lies the fact that regional planning, even more than national planning, lacks an adequate theoretical framework, especially in

³⁸ Cities for which “master plans” have been projected include Teheran, Karachi, Delhi, Bombay, Calcutta, Colombo, Rangoon, Bangkok, Singapore, Djakarta, Saigon, Manila, Taipei, Seoul, Tokyo, Osaka, Nagoya and others.

³⁹ For example, there are more than seventy statutory bodies (including municipal corporations, municipal councils, improvement and development trusts, planning bodies and utilities boards) operating within the Calcutta Metropolitan District.

terms of a systematic demonstration of the relationships between physical development, economic growth, and social change at the regional level. Although a number of countries have recognized the futility of attempting planned regional development on a piecemeal basis and are moving towards the creation of comprehensive regional planning machinery,⁴⁰ and although efforts are being made to strengthen facilities for the training of suitable planning and operational personnel, the long-term success of these endeavours will ultimately depend upon the evolution of regional planning concepts that are far more cognizant of the social and institutional prerequisites of development than those which have so far made their appearance.

Human resources development

The concept of human resources development began to command serious attention in Asian countries in the early 1960s, marking the first important qualification of the dominant notion that "economic development"—meaning the promotion of physical growth and the concentration of financial investment to that end—constituted the principal if not the exclusive function of development planning. Since that time, economists and planners have been rediscovering the significance of the so-called "residual factors" in development; although never entirely excluded from consideration, these factors had previously received only slight attention in development theorizing and model-building, mainly because they were thought to be unquantifiable and therefore beyond the reach of planned intervention. The new conceptual departure arose partly from the planners' growing concern over problems of plan implementation and the parallel realization that shortages of trained manpower often lay at the source of such problems, and partly from the accumulation of research in which educational contributions to the development process were defined and at least tentatively expressed in quantitative terms. From this point onwards, there was a rapid transition to the belief—now widespread—that the "residual factors" in development can be largely understood in terms of the availability of technically-skilled and professionally-educated manpower. Unfortunately, this interpretation takes no proper account of other and as yet unquantified factors (such as those of a political, administrative or attitudinal character) which are at least as important as education in the influence which they wield over the development process. Thus, although the content of human resources develop-

⁴⁰ A particularly interesting initiative in this direction is being carried out in Thailand where a Regional Planning Centre has been established for—and what is no less important, physically within—the north-east region. The Centre is charged with assisting and advising the fifteen provinces of the region in preparing integrated development plans, monitoring plan implementation, evaluating plan results, and assisting in the establishment and use of channels of communication among the provincial planning staffs and the operational agencies concerned with economic and social development. The problems of north-eastern regional development, and the processes of administrative experiment which led up to the creation of the Centre are ably described and analysed by Phaichitr Uathavikul in "Regional planning as a tool for development: the case of Thailand", paper presented to the Third International Symposium on Regional Development (Tokyo, 16-18 September 1969).

ment has still to be clearly defined by its proponents, it is by now evident that what many of them have in mind is not so much the comprehensive improvement of social conditions which the term ostensibly suggests, as the manipulation of educational systems in order to produce the trained manpower required to carry out specific development programmes, particularly in the economic sectors; in practice, therefore, the "human investment" approach amounts to a tactical rather than a strategic modification in the orthodox capital investment theory of development, and by no means represents a conversion of planners to the idea that development is fundamentally a process of institutional change.

It is already becoming apparent that, notwithstanding the ambitious claims originally made on its behalf, this narrow and utilitarian concept is incapable of providing an effective platform for planned social development, let alone for the integration of the social and economic aspects of development planning. Even if the underlying thesis (that education is the critical non-economic input in development) is accepted, it requires only cursory consideration of, for example, the massive problem of primary-school dropout and wastage to see that the value of educational investment is itself called in question by a variety of other social factors, including widespread family poverty (reflecting low levels of employment and large income disparities), which militate against both the desire and the ability of parents to maintain children in school. But current human resources development theory makes hardly any intelligible analysis of these factors, nor does it point to any useful policy conclusions beyond proposing certain purely technical adjustments in teaching curricula, text-book content, and grade promotion practices.⁴¹

Another questionable feature of existing Asian approaches to planned human investment is their general tendency to give increasingly high priority to the production of middle- and high-level manpower, and at the same time to assign relatively low importance to the improvement of basic education—both in and out of school—for the mass of the population. One serious disadvantage of this approach is that in the more rigidly stratified societies of the region, almost all the opportunities for advanced education accrue to higher-income groups, and thus accentuate existing inequality or dualism. Moreover, since educational expansion is hardly anywhere closely linked

⁴¹ During the period under review, many influential spokesmen (Asian and other) of the utilitarian educational approach to human investment gave strong support to the idea that rural primary education should be more specifically oriented towards the problems and needs of the agricultural sector, both through the revision of existing course content and through the addition of new courses on various aspects of simple agricultural technology. Logical and attractive as it appears, this proposal is hardly realistic so long as the wastage problem (which is mainly manifested in the rural areas) remains unsolved, and the rural schools are unable effectively to transmit the fundamentals of permanent literacy. But even if it were technically feasible, an emphasis on agricultural education would be unlikely to attract wider public support for the rural schools, failing thorough-going modernization of the whole structure of the rural economy and society: the available evidence suggests that whatever support the rural schools now receive from low-income groups is based largely upon belief that education offers an important avenue of escape from the poverty and backwardness of rural life.

with plans for employment promotion, the growing emphasis on middle- and high-level education is in many countries leading to inflation of trained manpower reserves to levels that are inconsistent with real demand, and thus to a waste of investment and a heightened potential for political instability. There is certainly a striking conflict between the widespread insistence on the need for accelerated output of skilled and professional manpower, and the no-less widespread phenomenon of educated unemployment and "brain drain" to the more developed regions.

The pronounced youthfulness of the population is increasingly viewed as an especially important consideration in Asian approaches to human resources development planning. Particularly since the early 1960s, Asian Governments have avowed considerable concern over the developmental problems implied by the massive numbers and rapid growth of the younger generation, and there have been several conferences and seminars, at both regional and national levels, aimed at investigating and elaborating the requirements of planning to meet the needs of children and youth.

The emphasis of this endeavour was originally placed primarily on infants, pre-school children and adolescents; the scope of interest has progressively expanded to include young adults as well. While focusing attention on the necessity of relating planning to the needs of specific age groups in the population, the technical meetings have not succeeded in providing sufficiently concrete guidance for effectively integrating children and youth within the framework of over-all national development planning.⁴²

A cardinal weakness of past Asian attempts to work out an effective approach to the development of children and youth has been a pronounced tendency to concentrate upon planning and action in the conventional social sectors, including particularly the services catering to public health, social welfare and formal education. Although this represents a significant step beyond the prevailing concept of human resource development (which as already pointed out relates almost exclusively to the expansion and improvement of formal education systems), it falls far short of confronting the fundamental problem of extensive family poverty and the need to promote a radically improved distribution of family income and purchasing power in the interest of children and youth.

In order to make planning for children and youth a worthwhile exercise, it is evident that in Asian countries, which do not yet possess an over-all framework of social development, it will be necessary to spell out more clearly the nature and interrelationship of social and economic policies needed for the development of the younger generation, as well as the organizational and administrative requirements.

Development of social services

In virtually all Asian countries, the public social services have long been viewed by Governments as the chief

⁴² These deficiencies are noted, and a series of specific proposals is offered, in M. V. Bhatawdekar, "Planning for children and youth in Asia", *The Indian Journal of Social Work*, vol. XXX, No. 3 (Bombay, October 1969).

direct means of raising mass levels of living; only very recently, however, has it become possible to make even a partial comparative estimate of the importance attached to such programmes in terms of financial investment. The main findings of a recent ECAFE inquiry⁴³ into the financing of social services in Asian countries are presented in table 5. Although the data are far from complete, they provide the basis for a number of interesting general observations, of which the first is that government expenditures on social services have on the whole demonstrated a rising secular trend and, for the latest year reported, amount to a very substantial part of total government outlays. Among the countries for which comparable information is available, there are few in which total central government expenditure for social services falls below one quarter of expenditure for all purposes; in some countries the proportion considerably exceeds one third of central government expenditure for all purposes. (On the other hand, levels of government expenditure on social services are relatively much lower in India and abnormally low in Pakistan.)

Although expenditures on social programmes account for so large a part of most national budgets, there are considerable differences between expenditures on various kinds of social service programmes. In all of the developing countries for which data are available, education takes by far the largest share—rarely less and usually much more than 50 per cent of whole and central government expenditure on all social services. Educational expenditures also exhibit a generally rising trend, most notably in the Republic of Korea, where their share leaped to the present level from barely 17 per cent of whole government expenditure on social services in 1957; only in Pakistan is there clear evidence of a decline in the proportion of resources devoted to this sector. Among the other social services, it is extremely difficult to distinguish any clear pattern of priority; in some countries the second largest share goes to health services, in some to social security programmes and social welfare services, and in others to a residue of social services which mainly include public housing programmes. Judging from the very scanty evidence, relative levels of expenditure on health services have barely maintained stability in most of the countries, and in some have actually declined. On the other hand, the shares of expenditure devoted to the remaining categories of social services have tended gradually to rise, often from very low levels. The latter tendency is probably due mainly to the growth of social security and subsidized housing programmes in a number of countries. With the exception of Japan, however, the social security programmes are not normally broad-based but serve mainly specialized groups such as government personnel and employees in State industries, as do many

⁴³ *The Planning and Financing of Social Development in the ECAFE Region*, ECAFE Social Development Series No. 1, 1969. Altogether seventeen Governments replied to the questionnaire on which the survey was based. The definition of "social services" given in the United Nations *Manual for Economic and Functional Classification of Government Transactions* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 58.XVI.2), was offered as a model for the preparation of replies, but could not be followed sufficiently closely to permit full comparability in the resulting analysis.

TABLE 5. PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE BY FUNCTIONAL CLASSIFICATION

Country	Year	Social services					Other government services
		Total	Education	Health	Social security and special welfare services	Other social services	
<i>Whole government</i>							
Hong Kong	1956	31.6	14.0	8.3	1.0	8.3	68.4
	1961	37.8	15.7	10.4	1.1	10.6	62.2
	1966	37.7	15.1	9.1	1.0	12.5	62.3
India	1954	17.7	7.9	4.0	4.9	0.9	82.3
	1955	n.a.	8.3	3.9
	1960	n.a.	9.3	4.55
	1965	n.a.	8.7	3.8
Korea, Republic of	1957	2.1	0.4	0.9	0.7	0.1	97.9
	1961	20.8	14.1	1.2	3.6	1.9	79.2
	1966	36.7	27.9	2.1	4.3	2.4	63.3
Malaysia, West	1960	17.3	10.1	4.5	1.5	1.2	82.7
	1965	20.8	13.4	5.0	0.4	2.0	79.2
Singapore	1956	37.4	18.3	11.9	3.9	3.3	62.6
	1961	30.9	14.8	10.1	2.7	3.3	69.1
	1966	35.6	19.1	9.8	1.7	5.0	64.4
Pakistan	1956	9.6	6.4	...	0.1	3.1	...
	1961	7.8	5.2	...	0.2	2.4	...
	1966	9.6	5.7	...	0.2	3.7	...
<i>Central government</i>							
Afghanistan	1961	17.1	9.9	3.7	—	3.5	82.9
	1966	19.5	12.9	2.8	—	3.8	80.5
Ceylon	1956	35.4	14.3	9.4	— 11.7 —	—	64.6
	1961	38.8	15.1	7.8	— 15.9 —	—	61.2
	1966	37.9	15.1	7.1	— 15.7 —	—	62.1
India	1966	6.5	1.9	1.3	— 3.3 —	—	93.5
Japan	1956	32.6	9.3	7.3	15.3	0.7	67.4
	1961	36.8	10.0	9.9	16.2	0.7	63.2
	1966	41.0	10.9	13.7	15.3	1.1	59.0
Korea, Republic of	1957	1.1	0.4	0.5	0.2	0.1	98.9
	1961	20.3	13.4	1.0	4.3	1.6	79.7
	1966	26.1	17.9	1.5	5.6	1.1	73.9
Malaysia, West	1960	17.7	10.8	4.8	1.4	0.7	82.3
	1965	21.2	15.1	5.5	0.4	0.2	78.8
Philippines	1956	31.7	23.9	6.1	— 1.7 —	—	68.3
	1961	36.9	26.7	7.5	— 2.7 —	—	63.1
	1966	39.2	32.0	5.8	— 1.4 —	—	60.8
Thailand	1959	26.4	19.5	2.9	3.2	0.8	73.6
	1961	24.7	16.6	2.7	4.0	1.4	75.3
	1966	27.3	16.5	3.6	3.8	3.4	72.7

SOURCE: *The Planning and Financing of Social Development in the ECAFE Region*, ECAFE Social Development Series No. 1, 1969.

of the housing programmes in countries other than Hong Kong, Japan and Singapore.⁴⁴

In strictly financial terms, the over-all record of social programme implementation is ostensibly good, since most Governments report a fairly consistent expenditure of close to 100 per cent of their total allocations. But here again, analysis by type of programme reveals significant differences. Broadly speaking, expenditure targets have been most nearly met (and occasionally over-fulfilled) in the fields of education, health and social security, whereas performance in other fields (particularly the social welfare services) seems to have been considerably less satisfactory. In any event, the financial yardstick does not by itself provide an altogether satisfactory measure of implementation. As some of the countries concerned have experienced substantial inflation, their success in meeting the expenditure targets set for the development of social programmes must have been partly due to rising costs.

Many Governments report that they have encountered serious obstacles to implementation in the form of severe staff shortages, particularly at the operational level, but also at the levels of administration, training and programme planning. A frequent complaint is that the physical construction aspects of programme development tend to run far ahead of personnel preparation—schools, clinics and welfare centres may be planned and built with reasonable despatch, only to stand empty or under-utilized for lack of suitably-trained staff. This problem is evidently most acute in rural areas, where professionals and the more highly-trained technicians are notoriously reluctant to serve.⁴⁵

A particularly interesting finding of the inquiry upon which these comments are based is that increasing investment in social programmes seems to have been governed by the growth rate of government revenue and not, as is widely assumed, by restraint of public capital investments. There is evidence that these two types of investment can simultaneously undergo rapid expansion. Therefore, if Governments can effectively mobilize internal resources, it should be possible for them to expand their social programmes steadily without hampering their ability to undertake necessary capital investment in the economic sectors. However, the survey also suggests that there is not necessarily any close correlation between improvement in levels of living and increasing investment in social programmes expressed either as a proportion of government revenue or gross national product (GNP). Thus, while further increases in spending on social programmes may be easily possible, the need for more effective planning and adminis-

tration seems to deserve the most urgent attention at the present time. Earlier studies⁴⁶ of social developments and trends in the region have repeatedly pointed out that social programmes in most Asian countries suffer from serious technical, qualitative and administrative shortcomings, especially in terms of their relevance to major welfare problems. At the present time, the correction of such deficiencies would appear to depend more upon better planning and more efficient use of resources than upon mere increases in expenditures. Above all, the usefulness of the social programmes in contributing to the improvement of mass living conditions will depend upon the extent to which these programmes are founded upon and integrated with a purposeful set of economic and social development policies. As matters now stand, such organic integration between social programmes and the larger framework of government policies is to say the least exceptional in Asian countries.

THE CONCEPTUAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE FRAMEWORK OF PLANNED SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT: PROBLEMS OF THEORY AND POLICY AND THEIR GENERAL IMPLICATIONS

The implicit (and sometimes explicit) assumption that has dominated Asian development planning up to the present time is that development is above all else a matter of accumulating financial capital and of investing it for directly productive purposes, particularly the expansion of large-scale modern industry and related infrastructure. It has been further widely assumed that only factors which can be quantitatively expressed in monetary or material terms, of to which a monetary value can be attached, are subject to purposeful manipulation—in other words to planning. The importance of other factors (frequently described rather disparagingly as “residuals”) is quite often given general acknowledgement in the preambular parts of development plans, but these factors are subsequently almost entirely left out of account in the design of specific strategies, policies and programmes, in the apparent belief that they cannot be quantified and hence cannot sensibly be modified through planning. Thus—save for some very limited acknowledgement of the value of investment in human resources—development has come to be viewed as an essentially economic process, which in point of time at least would have to take precedence over progress in other spheres;⁴⁷ in practice, therefore,

⁴⁶ See foot-note ¹ above.

⁴⁷ However, a radically different theory of development, in which the social framework is viewed as actually the prime determinant of economic growth, is evidently maintained by the present leadership of mainland China, as implied by the following dictum: “. . . the changeover from individual to socialist, collective ownership in agriculture and handicrafts and from capitalist to socialist ownership in private industry and commerce is bound to bring about a tremendous liberation of the productive forces. Thus, the social conditions are being created for a tremendous expansion of industrial and agricultural production”.—*Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-Tung* (Peking, Foreign Languages Press, 1966), p. 26. In the past, some other Chinese leaders have evidently held views much closer to the capital-investment theory of economic growth; the resulting clash of opinions is widely regarded as having played an important part in the events which led up to the Cultural Revolution—see Jean Robinson, *The Cultural Revolution in China* (Harmondsworth, Middlesex, Pelican Books, 1969).

⁴⁴ Because of differences in methods of budgetary classification, there are a number of countries in which expenditures on items such as sewerage facilities, water-supply and local roads (which according to the United Nations *Manual for Economic and Functional Classification of Government Transactions*, op. cit., come under the separate heading of community services) are included with expenditures for certain social services, particularly health services, and sometimes housing and social welfare services. This obviously leads to a somewhat exaggerated impression of the priority being accorded to these services.

⁴⁵ It is reported that in mainland China (which was not covered by the ECAFE survey) efforts are being made to overcome deficiencies in rural social services by large-scale transfers of medical and teaching personnel from urban to rural areas, as part of an official policy aimed at levelling economic and social disparities between the rural and urban population. See Tillman Durdin, op. cit.

development planning in the region generally tends to be highly mechanistic and lacking in a serious consideration of institutional and human problems. (It may be noted in passing that these restricted concepts of planning and development are less realistic, and in a very real sense less modern, than the ideas of the original eighteenth-century economists—or, as they more precisely described themselves, political economists—who took pains to emphasize that economic growth is merely a single aspect of a unified process of change in which political, cultural, institutional and human, as well as material variables, are intimately bound together in an organic relationship.)

The narrowly economic approach to development is both reflected in and furthered by the organizational structures and the staffing patterns of practically all national planning bodies in the region.⁴⁸ The typical national planning body consists of two main parts: a supervisory board (usually at the political level) which advises the Government on matters of development policy and presents the development plans for government approval, and a civil-service-level secretariat which is responsible for the gathering and analysis of information and for detailed preparation of the plans. It is significant that, in practically all instances, the official titles of the policy boards or councils refer to economic functions alone. In only three countries (India, Iran and the Republic of Viet-Nam) is reference made simply to “planning” or “development”. In fact, most of the development policy boards amount to standing expert committees on economic policy; there are no known instances of equally elaborate arrangements to discuss and recommend measures of social policy. In the planning agencies where economic functions are especially stressed, social development interests are poorly represented—sometimes not represented at all—at the policy level, and the agencies’ terms of reference are defined with far more emphasis on economic than on social questions. For example, the basic terms of reference of the National Economic (*sic*) Council of the Philippines refer six times to “the economy” or to “economic development” but only once to “social development”; similarly in Pakistan the two primary functions of the National Economic Council are defined only with reference to economic matters, while (despite its broader designation) the National Planning Commission is principally charged with research and advisory functions in the economic field. At the secretariat level, some national planning agencies (such as those of Afghanistan, the Republic of China and the Republic of Viet-Nam) make no specific arrangements to deal with the social aspects of planning, leaving this task almost entirely to the functional “social” ministries, but in most other countries the central planning agencies contain one or more subordinate units for this purpose. However—and this is an extremely important qualification—these units are almost without exception concerned solely with programme or project planning in the social sectors, in liaison with the functional ministries. Thus, even where “social planning” is administratively recognized as a special function, it is interpreted very largely in terms of conventional sectoral approaches to the improvement of levels of living

(and hardly at all from the viewpoint of promoting structural and institutional change) and it is seen also as a function entirely subordinated to “economic” planning, which invariably constitutes the major designated concern of the planning secretariats.

As indicated by the national plan literature, concepts of social development differ widely among Asian countries; in some of the plan documents, social development is viewed simply as the systematic improvement of levels of living, but most of the plans take at least some account of the need for other kinds of directed social change, particularly with regard to the reduction of income disparities. A few Governments take an all-embracing view of the scope of planned social development—in the Philippines, for instance, this is seen as including: “... such aims as the promotion of social and institutional change, income redistribution and employment promotion, as well as the improvement of levels of health, nutrition, education and housing”.⁴⁹ However, it is becoming increasingly obvious that the advancement of even the most conventional social objective—that is to say, the raising of mass levels of living—has not been effectively supported by the practice of entrusting social planning to sectoral units more or less loosely attached to the main economic planning organizations. Some countries possess quite large “social planning” units of this type, but have achieved very little real improvement in mass levels of living, while a few others (China (Taiwan) and Singapore are good examples) have recorded significant social progress in terms of both material development and structural change, even in the absence of specific arrangements for social development planning. It does not, of course, follow that there is a lack of justification for the creation of special machinery, within the general framework of national planning organizations, to deal with particular aspects of social development planning, but there is clearly a need for the Asian countries to undertake a thorough reconsideration of the meaning and scope of social development, the relationships which exist between social and other aspects of development (especially the economic, administrative and political aspects) and the means by which social and other developmental objectives might be simultaneously advanced through a single planning mechanism.

In recent years, there have been some signs of reaction against the prevailing tendency to minimize the importance of social and other non-economic factors in development and to leave them out of practical account in policy-making, planning and programming. To some extent this is due to concern expressed by social critics and reformers (usually outside the government structures) over the slow pace of improvement in mass living conditions, but more importantly it seems to reflect uneasiness within planning circles over wide discrepancies that have appeared between the ambitious intentions of many national development plans and their all-too-often erratic implementation and meagre economic results. Such a reaction also owes much to growing recognition by political auth-

⁴⁸ Hong Kong and Singapore are the only Asian countries which do not have formal national planning agencies of some description.

⁴⁹ Communication from the Government of the Philippines to the ECAFE secretariat, cited in *The Planning and Financing of Social Development in the ECAFE Region*, ECAFE Social Development Series No. 1 (1969), p. 8.

ortities that existing patterns of development have in many instances failed to promote social integration on a national scale, and that in some others—as demonstrated by recent civil upheavals in a number of Asian countries—they have even contributed to instability by accentuating dualism and inequalities. At the same time, a new stream of developmental analysis has begun to flow from the pens of social scientists, journalists and other writers familiar with the problems of the region. The most comprehensive and so far the most authoritative work of this kind is that of Gunnar Myrdal,⁵⁰ which appeared in 1968. As a result, regional discussions of development and planning have begun to take on a faint but nevertheless refreshing tinge of introspection, coupled with some indications of increasing willingness to reconsider basic tenets of development theory in the light of actual experience. The intellectual assumptions that have dominated Asian planning for the past twenty years are still vigorously enunciated, it is true, but with somewhat less dogmatism than before, and the *ex cathedra* pronouncements of the senior generation of theoretical economists and planners, which were until recently received with almost unquestioning reverence, now fall upon more sceptical and impatient ears. With fewer inhibitions to free discussion, a variety of new or radically modified hypotheses of development is emerging and serious efforts are being made to focus attention upon a range of problems which previously received little or no direct consideration in development planning. Some principal features and implications of these new trends of thought, and some of the further questions to which they give rise, are outlined below, particularly as they bear upon matters of special interest from the viewpoint of social development policy-making and planning.

Significance of social progress

The idea that development is a process in which social progress is not only a “factor”, but in many important respects actually an arbiter and prerequisite of economic growth, is gaining respectability among the rising generation of Asian development planners and theoreticians and is most commonly expressed in terms of support for an “institutional” approach to development, for which Myrdal has made a powerful case. As already pointed out, however, this concept is not yet adequately reflected in the structure and staffing of national planning agencies, which remain organizationally wedded to the assumption that the “social aspects of development” relate only to the improvement of levels of living and the palliation of social dislocations consequent upon economic change, mainly through the medium of the public social services. In actuality, economic planning and social planning are still widely regarded as dichotomous disciplines and development is not yet fully appreciated as an organic process calling for unified planning in which economic and non-economic variables are simultaneously accounted for. At the national level, “social planners” are widely identified in the minds of the informed public with the specialist technicians responsible for programme planning in such fields as health, education and social welfare

(even though such technicians are not necessarily aware of or committed to the need for structural and institutional change). At the international level, possibilities of evolving systematic methods of social development planning have been eagerly canvassed, but again largely along traditional sectoral lines, and thus at the cost of obscuring the fundamental need for strategic integration of the social and economic aspects of planning. From the viewpoint of development theory and planning techniques, the present period is less one of real innovation than one of transition between old formulations that have been found inadequate and often irrelevant, and new ideas that have yet to attain systematic definition and complete understanding. The usefulness of this rising but still rather formless intellectual ferment will ultimately depend very much upon the degree to which it succeeds in laying the foundations of a genuinely integrated discipline of socio-economic development planning, and in presenting clear guidelines for common approaches to the basic training of all aspiring development planners, regardless of the subsequent field of specialization. These complex and onerous tasks have barely begun to be dealt with in the Asian region.

Economic variables

Whereas planners and theoreticians have been prone to regard non-economic variables in development as non-quantifiable, and hence as “residuals” beyond the reach of model-building and practical plan formulation, it is now being recognized that these variables are not so much unquantifiable as unquantified, and that (as Myrdal and Hagen among others have maintained) many of them can be expressed in concrete terms if they are subjected to sufficiently rigorous research and analysis. However, a major obstacle to such an analytical effort is the serious lack of organized facilities in most developing Asian countries for policy-oriented research into the non-economic aspects of development. This in itself is partly the result of the earlier disposition, on the part of Governments and planning organizations, to relegate social considerations in development to the background of their interests, and to provide only feeble (if any) support for research in this field. Consequently, many important research tasks remain untouched, and a great deal of vital information lies unused for want of means to process it.⁵¹ But quite apart from shortcomings in governmental support for research as such, social science research institutions and individual social scientists are in most Asian countries seriously out of touch with one another. There is an urgent need for improved institutional arrangements through which they can exchange knowledge, identify research undertakings of high priority, and co-ordinate their work at both the national and regional levels. Added difficulties lie in the working methods and professional attitudes of many social

⁵¹ It is not intended to suggest by these remarks that more purposeful action to deal with non-economic problems of development is entirely obstructed by present deficiencies of scientific knowledge, real as those deficiencies are. Considerable discretion must in fact be exerted to ensure that the need for more research is not used as an excuse to postpone or evade reforms which are necessary for development but distasteful to established power groups.

⁵⁰ *Asian Drama* (New York, Twentieth Century Fund, 1968), 3 vols.

scientists who are not economists—these have so far evinced little interest in adapting their investigations to the exploration of major issues of national development. These social scientists often complain of being neglected by the planners, but they seem rarely aware of their own failure to provide convincing proofs of the practical relevance of their specialized knowledge and skills.⁵² In the interest of overcoming these problems, there is clearly great scope for expanded consultation and co-operation between government authorities (especially the national planning agencies) and universities and other institutions responsible for the training of social scientists and the conduct of academic research. This is an area in which the organs of regional co-operation could play a particularly useful promotional and liaison role; so far, however, very few of the regional organizations have risen vigorously to the challenge.

Unique Asian considerations

There is growing conviction that strategies of development in many Asian countries have been based on quite uncritical extrapolation from Western experience and economic theory, with insufficient or no allowance being made for the fundamentally different circumstances of the Asian societies. One of the most serious (but only recently recognized) weaknesses of western development theories is that they more or less take for granted the existence of political, social and cultural frameworks conducive to economic growth, and hence discount these elements as subjects of development policy and planning. In many Asian countries, however, such frameworks do not yet exist or have only begun to emerge, so that when attempts are made to apply western theory and technology without prior structural and institutional reforms, there often takes place a kind of "rejection reaction", rather similar in principle to that which has hampered medical science in its efforts to transplant human organs.⁵³

⁵² A Ceylonese social scientist has suggested that this weakness is indicative of psychological dependence carried over from the colonial era: "The tendency of the best minds to shift to abstract, theoretical research, rather than grapple with concrete reality is understandable; their writings were invariably addressed to an invisible jury located in some intellectual centre of gravity in the West. The so-called "brain-drain" is a fulfilment of their aspirations, for they have been trained to the dysfunctional in their own environments." See Ralph Pieris, "The implantation of sociology in Asia", *International Social Science Journal*, vol. XXI, No. 3 (UNESCO, 1969). Greater relevance in social research, in the view of a prominent Indian social worker, calls not only for new working methods but for new commitments as well; the effective researcher, he argues, must be "... angry with the system around him and not willing to accept it as it is. He must revolt against it". See V. M. Kulkarni, "The research smokescreen—a rejoinder to John Mays", *National Herald* (New Delhi, 6 July 1969).

⁵³ Failure to appreciate the societal differences between developing Asian countries on the one hand, and the advanced industrialized countries on the other, has proved a serious weakness in much of the outside advice tendered under technical assistance programmes, which have worked upon the assumption that development could be set in motion by the injection of technical expertise at various "critical" points, and have generally disregarded the absence of institutional conditions hospitable to technical modernization. There is now a growing awareness of the symbiotic relationship between the technical and societal aspects of development and a tendency to look more critically at the actual function of technical assistance within social structures of the tradition-oriented type; some commentators have pointed out that in certain instances,

Realization of this problem is awakening interest in the need for critical re-evaluation of the structures and institutions of Asian societies, with a view to determining their suitability to development, to eliminating or modifying those features which impede development, and (not least important) to strengthening those others which can be utilized to support development. That many traditional institutions can be effectively harnessed for developmental purposes is emphatically proven by experience in Japan where, particularly from the time of the nineteenth-century Meiji restoration, development has been greatly facilitated not only by modern technology and socio-economic reforms, but also by the selective use of certain seemingly archaic institutions and behaviour patterns. Many concerned Asians are now looking to the Japanese experience for guidance in meeting the problems of their own countries, where the necessity for rapid development is even more urgent than it was in Japan one hundred years ago.⁵⁴

Social justice

Incipient appreciation of the dynamic importance of social progress, and especially its significance for economic growth, is helping to create some influential sympathy for the idea that the pursuit of social justice should be much more than a verbal flourish added to national development plans (as has been customary in the past) and should be a central feature of state concern. At the same time, it is also becoming more fully appreciated that social justice in the broadest sense cannot be attained through the medium of public social services alone, but must be regarded as an integral goal of all development programmes and especially of general development policies. In particular, the need for major efforts to reduce the glaring inequities of income distribution that characterize most Asian countries is beginning to be viewed as a central issue in the quest for social justice, and this is involving reconsideration of the conventional wisdom which holds that extreme income inequalities are justified by a supposedly greater propensity to save on the part of high-income groups. This notion is now regarded by many authorities as being extremely questionable on empirical grounds, and there is an increasing feeling that a judicious redistribution of income in favour of the poorer strata may not only serve to promote

technical assistance has had the effect of reinforcing the socio-economic *status quo* by deliberately treating symptoms rather than causes. See, for example, B. Nussbaum, "Did Christ have a crew-cut?", *Far Eastern Economic Review*, vol. LXV, No. 39 (Hong Kong, 21 September 1969).

⁵⁴ Although Myrdal's *Asian Drama* has been widely praised in the region, one of the more cogent criticisms advanced against it is that the author restricts his analysis to South Asia (that is to say to South-East and South-West Asia in terms of this chapter) and does not deal with the East Asian part of the region, and specifically not with the supremely interesting case history of Japan. Some of the Asian writers who have pointed out the importance of investigating the Japanese experience incidentally register an acute awareness of the broader social implications of modernization and industrialization, as shown in the following remark: "Whatever their purpose, all organizations are first social and only second devoted to whatever goals they are created to serve. Japan's genius is in recognizing this and acting upon the fact by creating socially sound organizations devoted to economic ends", GNP (*author's pseudonym*), "Myrdal's missing message", *Bangkok World* (15 October 1969).

productivity (by helping to raise levels of health, nutrition and so on), but may also serve as a vital psychological incentive to public participation in development efforts.⁵⁵

The practical necessity of basing development strategies upon objectives of equity, and not on those of economic growth alone, has been strongly emphasized by the United Nations Committee for Development Planning, which held its fifth session in Bangkok in 1969. Noting that rapid development requires pervasive social reforms and institutional changes, the Committee asserted that measures to reduce maldistribution of income and wealth in Asian and other developing countries are needed in the interest of social justice and efficiency alike. The Committee added that: "It is fallacy that a more rapid growth and a better distribution of income and wealth are necessarily competing elements. It is most desirable that economic development measures should be appraised from the viewpoint of income distribution."⁵⁶ From the standpoint of social development planning, a highly significant aspect of the Committee's discussions is the strong indication that solutions to the problems of social inequity are to be found primarily in the area of institutional reforms—particularly agrarian reforms—and of basic policies, notably those relating to employment promotion, taxation and other aspects of economic management. While the Committee also took note of the need for the intensification of social programmes as such, the primary emphasis which it assigned to the role of institutional and economic policies serves to underline the doubts already expressed in this chapter as to the relevance and effectiveness, under Asian conditions, of the present essentially sectoral approach to planning for social development.

Popular participation

The promotion of widespread and enthusiastic popular participation in development is increasingly seen as a common strategic objective of economic and social planning. Asian Governments have to some extent always recognized the need for mobilizing public enthusiasm and active support for national development efforts, and have organized a wide variety of programmes—notably those classified under the headings of community development and institution-building—to serve this purpose. But such programmes have been carried out almost entirely on a fragmentary local basis, and have been rarely

⁵⁵ Conventional claims as to the high-income groups' propensity to save assume, but do not convincingly prove, a consequent propensity to invest in undertakings of national importance. As a matter of fact, a great deal of the surplus income of wealthy individuals and families in Asian countries is frequently dissipated—in luxury consumption, in land speculation, in high-interest personal lending, in investment in short-term domestic enterprises yielding quick financial returns, and in investment in the developed countries. On the other hand there is accumulating evidence to suggest that a greater real propensity to invest exist at the lower ends of the income scale. In India, for example, one survey of farm investment showed that poor farmers invested proportionately more of their assets than rich farmers (*All-India Rural Debt and Investment Survey 1961-62*, cited in ECAFE, "Problems of planning and plan implementation in the ECAFE region: 1950/51 to 1967/68", op. cit., table 3.17).

⁵⁶ *Committee for Development Planning: Report on the Fourth and Fifth Sessions (Official Records of the Economic and Social Council, Forty-seventh Session, document E/4682)*, p. 8.

supported (too often, in fact, negated) by other lines of government policy and action, especially at the national level. As a result, the impact of the programmes has been generally weak and, so far as conscious involvement in planned development is concerned, the mass of Asians remains inert and indifferent. In the currents of thought that are now emerging, the galvanization of popular attitudes and motivations towards development is viewed as a problem involving the whole of society, and not merely individual communities, and therefore as one whose solution is bound up much more with the nature of national policies and the quality and style of national leadership, than with the purely local initiatives that have hitherto pre-empted the attention of planners in this area.

The new emphasis on popular participation assigns central significance to the role of economic and social incentives, since there is a growing awareness that, whatever gains have been registered in terms of aggregate national production and income, substantial segments of the populations in many Asian countries have benefited little or not at all, while the welfare of additional large groups may have actually suffered in the development process. To this extent, earlier development policies and plans have in effect failed to provide a convincing demonstration of relevance between the interests of the common people and the wider national interests, as interpreted by planners and political leaders, and have consequently incurred the penalty of public apathy towards plan implementation. Progress towards the mobilization of massive popular participation in development thus presupposes strenuous efforts to attain a far greater measure of economic and social equity than most Asian countries now enjoy. Fulfilment of this need—which dovetails with the rationale of social justice enunciated by the United Nations Committee for Development Planning—would entail important shifts of purpose and emphasis in many areas of national policy, especially those which bear most closely upon the distribution of developmental opportunities and benefits. Most particularly, it would impose heavy burdens of responsibility upon the political and administrative leaderships. If these groups are to marshal substantial popular support in pursuit of their announced aims of national modernization, they must prove their own preparedness to oppose vested interests and to sacrifice privileges inconsistent with the claims of equity and social solidarity.

Youth participation

There is a spreading consensus that socio-economic reforms and new directions in leadership are especially necessary if young people are to be mobilized for participation in development. The growing restiveness of educated Asian youth evidently stems from even deeper causes than the young people's lack of confidence in their prospects for employment and personal advancement; more fundamentally, Asian youth protest movements (like those in the economically-advanced countries) seem to be concerned with the advancement of demands for broad social, economic and political reforms, and with organizing opposition to forces which are thought to obstruct such reforms. The young people themselves

apparently do not perceive the "youth problem" that is ever more anxiously canvassed by Asian Governments, but trace their discontents to the faults of the adult world which, in their minds, perpetrates injustice and corruption not only upon the younger generation but upon society as a whole.⁵⁷ For this reason, the mélange of "youth programmes" now being hastily organized in Asian countries does not seem very likely to make articulate young people become more tractable to the wishes of authority, especially as the programmes in question are to all intents and purposes designed and administered by adults alone. Many educated Asian youths indeed tend to reject suggestions that they should participate in the implementation of planned development unless they are also encouraged to take part in the processes of development policy and decision-making, and unless the credentials of adult leadership accord reasonably well with youthful standards of commitment and idealism. Here again, issues are raised which greatly transcend the narrow limits of conventional approaches to social planning and development.

Public administration

Of all the non-economic aspects of development now being subjected to critical reconsideration, none is attracting greater interest than the factor of public administration. There is an impressive consensus that the poor quality of public administration in most Asian countries has acted as a heavy restraint upon the Governments' proclaimed intentions of rapidly accelerating economic and social progress, and that shortcomings in this area have probably been more directly responsible than anything else for the serious shortfalls in development plan implementation experienced in one form or another by most countries in the region. Administrative obstacles and failures have repeatedly been found to underlie problems of implementation affecting the entire range of development policies and programmes, and discussion of the issues is heavily charged with lamentation over countless instances of bureaucratic temporization, inefficiency and malpractice.

It can hardly be said that the need for effective public administration, as a vital adjunct of planned development, has been overlooked by Asian Governments: most of the official plan documents take cognizance of the problem—often at some length—and the need for administration to be "development-oriented" (as distinguished from its traditional concerns with revenue collection and the maintenance of law and order) is repeatedly emphasized, while the absence of such an orientation is almost as frequently decried. In this respect, however, the plans are rarely more than hortatory, and they fail either to provide satisfactory analysis of the deeper causes of administrative weakness, or to incorporate systematic and comprehensive measures for administrative reform. Although a number of Asian

countries have undertaken programmes aimed at streamlining both the structures and the procedures of public administration, few of the programmes have been closely related with the national plans, and their usefulness has usually been limited from the outset by preoccupation with purely technical desiderata of administrative modernization. These efforts (frequently assisted by expert advisers from the developed countries) have resulted in the preparation of many ideal organization charts and in numerous affirmations of support for text-book principles of sound public administration—but to very little practical effect, as the continuing criticisms make plain.

The small but growing body of scholarly research in this field offers many indications that earlier attempts at reform have been gravely undermined by lack of attention to the pressures placed upon the public administration systems by their social, political and economic environment.⁵⁸ This "ecological" interpretation suggests, for example, that rising demands for employment—which cannot be satisfied by the prevailing patterns of economic growth—have been more decisive than increasing workpressures in bringing about the rapid expansion of civil (and often also military) services that has taken place in virtually all Asian countries. Hence, it is not only politically difficult for the Governments to reduce their bureaucratic establishments—an act that would enlarge the already ominous proportions of the educated unemployed—but difficult also to streamline cumbersome bureaucratic procedures which provide a rationale for excessively large staffs working at low levels of individual efficiency. At the same time, however, as the Governments cannot afford to pay adequate salaries to the majority of their employees, the employees are accordingly forced to take on outside employment, and very frequently to engage in irregular practices, in order to supplement their meagre official income; this naturally leads to a further downward spiral of efficiency.⁵⁹ Obviously, a solution to problems of such complexity can never be found in administrative reforms alone, but among other things must be related to herculean efforts to expand job opportunities outside the public services, and hence to the total strategy of planned development.

⁵⁸ A leading exponent of this hypothesis is Fred W. Riggs; see especially his *The Ecology of Public Administration* (New Delhi, Asia Publishing House, 1961) and *Public Administration in Developing Countries: the Theory of Prismatic Society* (Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1964).

⁵⁹ It is not all uncommon for Asian public officials—including many at senior levels—to hold several jobs outside their government positions, and to spend relatively little time on their official duties. Pressures to increase income-earning opportunities for civil servants seem to have frequently served (along with better-publicized reasons of state) as a rationalization for governmental participation in economic activity, especially in the manufacturing and commercial sectors. This tendency is by no means confined, as some writers have supposed, to countries which espouse total or partial nationalization of the economy on ideological grounds: it is also widely encountered, albeit in more covert forms, in many of the so-called "mixed economies", where Governments may intervene extensively in private enterprise through control of licensing, possession of large blocks of shares, the seating of senior public officials upon company boards of directors, and other means. It is relevant to add that one substantial reason for government officials' well-known aversion to service in rural areas is the severe limitation which this places upon their opportunities for supplementary employment.

⁵⁷ The depth of disillusionment with adult leadership felt by many young people in the region was summed up by one student agitator who, upon being admonished to eschew anarchy and confine himself to constructive criticism, bitterly replied: "In our situation, anarchy would be constructive", *Asia Magazine*, 24 September 1967, p. 30.

A no less important cause of administrative inefficiency—and one which raises even larger questions about the basic strategies of development—is that, due to the persistent grip of traditional power structures and the consequent absence of effective mechanisms of popular control, most of the Asian bureaucracies are under no strong obligation to submit to rigorous public accounting and questioning of their actions (or lack of action) and behaviour (or misbehaviour). Hence, the ultimate sanction of public criticism and dismissal for gross inefficiency or misuse of power is effectively lacking and the bureaucracies are free to further their internal objectives, even though these may be at wide variance with broader social and national interests.⁶⁰ They are free also to engage in numerous forms of official corruption which have assumed major and dangerous proportions in many countries of the region, with devastating effect upon public morale.⁶¹ It appears that the corrective to this situation can ultimately be found only in a combination of more resolute leadership with greatly increased measures of responsible popular participation in the political processes through which administrative direction is carried on. How far existing approaches to development planning serve to meet these requirements, and to bring about necessary changes in social structures, institutions, attitudes and motivations, is once more a highly relevant subject of inquiry. Such fundamental questions remain to be thoroughly explored and acted upon before it will be possible to think realistically of imparting an effective “development orientation” to the public administration systems of the Asian region.

Regional co-operation

One of the most striking trends in the period covered by this survey was a continuing revival of interest among Asian countries in possibilities for regional co-operation,

⁶⁰ This point has been almost completely overlooked in discussions of the problem of lack of co-ordination between government agencies, which is recognized as a serious obstacle to integrated development in most Asian countries. The numerous attempts that have been made to promote co-ordination through elaborate technical devices, such as interagency committees, have generally had very little effect since, in the absence of strong pressure from the public, the individual agencies tend to continue functioning as separate fiefdoms whose primary function is self-promotion rather than public service. Under these circumstances, the tendency towards proliferation of committees nominally devoted to “co-ordination” has often served little purpose but to increase agency demands for staff, and to increase administrative costs, while the fundamental problem has remained untouched.

⁶¹ In many of the countries it is customary for government officials to demand special personal payments for carrying out functions which they are supposed to perform free of charge—a whole vocabulary of euphemisms, such as “squeeze”, “speed-money”, “tong”, “tea-money” and so on, has grown up around this practice. Although excused by some observers as a practical (even if regrettable) means of speeding up the machinery of public administration, it has been pointed out by others, including Myrdal, that the real effect of such practices is to put a premium on administrative obstruction and delay, inasmuch as they encourage administrators to neglect their duties in the expectation of irregular payments. While periodic campaigns against corrupt officials have been launched by some Asian Governments, these efforts have been almost without exception directed only at the lower levels of the bureaucracies, and have stopped short of punishing the most senior officials involved, even though the latter are not infrequently the greatest offenders.

and this has important although still unrealized implications for social development.⁶² Although the published objectives of practically all the Asian regional and sub-regional groupings (including SEATO, which is primarily a military alliance) include references to the promotion of economic and social progress, this particular aim is usually stated in a vague and general way; ⁶³ there is a noticeable lack of dedication to specific goals, especially in terms of institutional and structural change, and of agreed strategies or policies—such as broad agrarian reform and the reduction of income inequities—on the basis of which economic and social development might be articulated. There is as yet no framework of Asian regional agreements that would bear comparison with the 1961 Charter of the Alliance for Progress, whereby the majority of Latin American Governments publicly bound themselves to the achievement of certain major social reforms, in concert with their efforts to accelerate economic growth.⁶⁴ The passive attitude of Asian regional groupings towards fundamental social problems seems to reflect the fact (referred to previously in this survey) that most of the national plans themselves display a seriously inadequate grasp of the social dimensions of development, and particularly fail to appeal to the aspirations of the common people. It is therefore quite possible that, unless they are reinforced by commitments to major social objectives, current efforts to strengthen regional co-operation may eventually encounter setbacks as severe as those which have been met at the level of national development. The need to invest regional co-operation with genuine social purpose and appeal assumes special importance in view of the likelihood that pressures from educated young people will lead to rising demands for satisfaction from institutions at the international as well as the national level. Regional groupings would be poorly-placed to command the support of youth unless they could present themselves as spearheads of social change and progress, and are almost certain to forfeit such support if they come to be popularly regarded as strongholds of a static social philosophy.

⁶² In addition to ECAFE (founded in 1947) and its principal off-shoot, the Committee for Co-ordination of Investigations of the Lower Mekong Basin (established in 1957), the main regional and subregional groupings in Asia at the present time are, in chronological order of their foundation: the Colombo Plan (1950), the South-East Asia Treaty Organization (1954), the Asian Development Bank (1965), the Asian and Pacific Council (1966), and the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN-1967). Two other regional groupings, the Association of South-East Asia and MAPHILINDO (comprising Malaysia, the Philippines and Indonesia, and founded in 1963) have for all practical purposes ceased to exist, but some of their objectives and functions have been taken over by ASEAN.

⁶³ One of the very few regional agreements which offers even a partial exception to this rule is that which governs the South-East Asia Ministers of Education Secretariat (SEAMES) created in 1966. However, the objectives of SEAMES have been defined only in terms of a number of specific projects for educational development, without any clear indication as to how these might fit into a systematic framework of socio-economic development strategy.

⁶⁴ From the social standpoint, the contrast between Asian and Latin American approaches to regional development is also illustrated by the absence, in the Asian Development Bank (established 1965), of any counterpart to the Social Progress Trust Fund of the Inter-American Development Bank.

SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE COMMONWEALTH CARIBBEAN

SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA ¹

The period 1967-1969 represents the gradual completion of a stage in the struggle for development identified with the 1960s and the Alliance for Progress, and the beginning of a transitional period of search for more effective development strategies.

Although much activity and many events took place in Latin America during the 1960s, it is clear that none of the forecasts of fundamental structural changes made at the beginning of the decade and reflected in the Latin American chapters of the 1963 and 1967 reports on the world social situation has been fully borne out—but neither has any been conclusively removed from the range of possibilities for the future. The main forecasts made at the beginning of the 1960s can be summarized as follows:

(a) Steady economic growth (at national rates of not less than 2.5 per cent *per capita* annually), to be accompanied by social reforms and programmes insuring a more equitable distribution of the fruits of development. Such growth was to be brought about through the long-term planning of the allocation of resources, the raising of the rate of investment, and a dependable flow of external aid on an unprecedented scale. By the end of the 1960s most countries of the region should have attained a self-sustaining momentum of growth and should have begun to narrow the gap between their incomes and those of the “developed” world. Faith in the feasibility of this kind of transformation has been apparent in the Punta del Este Charter of 1961 and numerous other intergovernmental declarations;

(b) The revolutionary destruction of existing political, social and economic structures, brought about by the inherent incapacity of these structures to satisfy the demands of the urban masses, the peasants and the educated youth: this possibility was continually invoked by proponents of the first model for the future as a disaster that would surely come to pass if the requirements for orderly development in terms of external aid, acceptance of the discipline of planning, and shared sacrifices were not met.

¹ The present chapter is the fifth analysis of Latin American social trends in the series of *Reports on the World Social Situation*. See the reports for 1952, 1957, 1963 and 1967. It draws upon an extensive recent study by the secretariat of the Economic Commission for Latin America for the Second United Nations Development Decade: *Social Change and Social Development Policy in Latin America* (United Nations publication, Sales No. 70.II.G.3).

At the same time, it was insisted upon by one country, Cuba, as the indispensable prerequisite to authentic development within a socialist framework, and was adhered to in many variations by important sectors of opinion in most countries;

(c) The implantation of conservative authoritarian régimes backed by military force, owing to the incapacity of the State to accelerate development and redistribute the benefits thereof sufficiently to satisfy—within a democratic framework—the increasingly diverse demands made on it, and to the determination of dominant external and internal forces to maintain privileged positions at any cost; this alternative was also evoked as a threat. It was rarely advocated openly but as the decade advanced it was undoubtedly looked upon with sympathy by important groups who were unconvinced by the optimistic “developmentist” argument, hostile to higher taxes and agrarian reform and alarmed by the revolutionary threat. At the same time, as both the developmentist and the revolutionary paths encountered delays and frustrations, the advocates of both viewed this third possibility with increasing alarm.

The real economic, social and political trends during the 1960s have been indecisive and equivocal. Several countries have attained or surpassed the target agreed upon at the beginning of the decade—a 2.5 per cent annual increase in the product *per capita*—but the greater number have fallen behind. The annual *per capita* rate of growth for the region as a whole (2.2 per cent in 1960-1969) is only a little better than in previous decades and far below the average for the economically advanced regions. In 1968 and 1969, however, the rates—over 3 per cent—showed a marked upturn. The disadvantages of Latin America’s dependent position in world economic relationships have become even more inhibiting. The structure of exports has not changed very much from the traditional range of raw materials in spite of domestic industrial growth; the region’s share in world exports has declined and the relation between prices of exports and imports has become more unfavourable. Debt servicing and other remittances abroad increasing offset capital inflows, and the industries on which the main hopes for development have been placed have fallen rapidly under the control of external interests.²

² See “Some basic aspects of development strategy in Latin America”, in *Economic Survey of Latin America, 1969*, chap. I (E/CN.12/851).

Public social action, especially in education, has expanded considerably, and numerous institutional reforms and measures intended to contribute to income redistribution have been initiated, but—for the most part—have not yet demonstrated the ability to make the strategic contributions to development and human welfare originally claimed for them.

Even the countries with the most favourable growth rates and the most impressive social efforts find themselves confronted by the same problems as at the beginning of the decade, along with relatively new ones generated by the very patterns of growth and change.³ Present trends seem more likely to lead to an impasse than to a dynamic and self-sustaining process of enhancement of human well-being. The lack of consensus between classes and interest-groups is as conspicuous as at the beginning of the decade, and is accentuated by disillusionment over the fruits of the recipes for development and social progress that have been attempted. Political violence is on the rise and is taking new forms. Nevertheless, the second alternative described above has hardly become more convincing, whether in terms of solutions offered or of support received, while the practicability of the third as a means of protecting vested interests has also come into question. In the present stage of the regional debate over development policy, four currents can be distinguished in varying combinations and these are described below.

(a) There is a renewed insistence that the social tensions and insufficiencies of development—particularly the problem of structural unemployment—can be overcome only if the rate of growth can be raised well above the still unattained target set for the 1960s. Target rates of

growth of 6, 7 or even 8 per cent, amounting to 3, 4 or 5 per cent *per capita*, have been proposed. Such objectives suppose greatly increased effectiveness in raising the rate of investment, compressing the superfluous consumption of the upper-income strata and implementing other measures urged during the 1960s. They also require more generous and flexible co-operation in trade and aid from the high-income countries, particularly in terms of better export markets and relief from part of the burden of debt service. During the past two or three years, the countries have made increasingly vigorous efforts to form a common front in negotiating the terms of co-operation with the high-income countries;

(b) There is an impatience with further diagnosis and an insistence that Latin American problems are sufficiently well known. What is needed are practical strategies for action and resources to back up the strategies;

(c) There is a widening dissatisfaction with the conceptions of development accepted up to the present and with their practical implications of dependence and imitativeness in technology, industrial organization, consumption patterns and culture. The social consequences of the kind of growth attained in Latin America up to the present, along with the current trends in the high-income countries themselves, are fostering doubts whether the models for development offered by the past and present of these countries are either desirable or accessible for Latin America;

(d) There are continuing attempts to identify some class, interest-group or institution having sufficient strength, coherence and dynamism to impose a given conception of development or revolutionary change. At present, disillusionment with other candidates for this role is leading to a strong interest in the capacity of the State itself to do so, through the initiative of the development-minded sectors of the bureaucracy or the military, or both.

The first two of these currents of opinion suppose a continued striving for development along lines rather similar to those of the past. The last two imply far-reaching changes in the kind of development that is being sought and in the ways in which it is being sought. The first two imply that the stage of diagnosis is or should be ended, while the last two imply that understanding of the processes of change is still far from adequate as a guide to action. For the most part, however, the differences among currents of opinion are far from clear-cut or consistent. A single presentation is likely to combine an insistence on the need for greater autonomy in decision-making with a demand for more external aid, an attack on "impractical" diagnosis with a questioning of the previously accepted conceptions and formulations of objectives.

The most significant expression of the new trends is the appearance of régimes that identify themselves as "national revolutionary" and draw a line between their objectives and those of the previous "developmentist" and "social revolutionary" currents. The policy declarations of such régimes emphasize autonomous, national decision-making and a deliberate struggle against economic, cultural and political dependency; reconciliation of heightened nationalism with Latin American solidarity,

³ Recent messages by Presidents of several countries in which growth rates have been relatively favourable indicate their preoccupation with the deficient character of this growth. In Bolivia, for example, the product *per capita* has grown by about 3 per cent annually in 1960-1969. However, this growth is judged unsatisfactory, "both as regards its rhythm and as regards the extent to which different economic sectors and social groups have participated in it. . . . If this form of growth continues, it means that we shall be widening still further the existing gap between high-income and low-income groups, and we shall also be perpetuating our position of economic, financial, and political and cultural dependence." (*Realizaciones, Objetivos y Propósitos del Gobierno Revolucionario de Bolivia*, message of 31 December 1969 from the President of the Republic, General Alfredo Ovando Gandía, La Paz, Ministry of Information, Culture and Tourism, Department of Information.) In Mexico, growth rates have been still more favourable and over a longer period. However, "there are now symptoms of problems characteristic of more advanced stages of development, even though the problems of the stages we have already passed through are not yet disappearing. . . . We are facing acute urban problems in the more developed regions; thousands of Mexicans are leaving the countryside, attracted by remote possibilities of employment, and are forming a large subproletariat in the towns; some sections of the middle class are improving their lot and expanding, while others—due to the very nature of under-development and also to the concentration of economic activities and the introduction of modern marketing systems—are facing certain decline or disappearing and integrating themselves with other social strata or classes. . . . There would seem to be a risk that all this, accompanied by an imperfect distribution of the national income—ranging from extreme indigence to a superfluity which gives rise to irritating and ostentatious prodigality—may degenerate into a permanent poverty situation." (*Quinto Informe que rinde al Honorable Congreso de la Unión el C. Presidente de la República, Gustavo Díaz Ordaz*, 1 September 1969.)

or solidarity with like-minded régimes; rejection of the previous systems of political compromise as corrupt, dependent and inauthentic expressions of the popular will, and a quest for new forms of popular participation in development and the recognition that this implies a redistribution of power as well as income.

The preparation of yet another brief survey of social trends in Latin America at present faces various practical questions. The phenomena of rapid population increase and urban concentration; of an insufficient generation of productive employment and consequent "marginalization" of part of the population; of a highly uneven distribution of incomes, social services and opportunities to participate in the national societies, and differing traits of urban and rural poverty—all have been described so often that it would seem to serve little purpose to do so once again. All of these negative traits have persisted through the record of growth and change of the 1960s, and although their characteristics and scale are undoub-

tedly changing, there is little dependable recent evidence of these changes. The analyst seeking statistical information is at a particular disadvantage at the end of a decade. A new round of decennial censuses is beginning and the data needed for a quantitative assessment of social trends during the 1960s will not, at best, be available before 1973 or 1974.⁴ Table 1 summarizes the more recent available demographic, social and economic indicators for the various countries, following the order of the table presented in the 1967 *Report on the World Social*

⁴ Unfortunately, the deficiencies noted in the 1963 and 1967 reports in regard to the 1960 round of censuses seem likely to be repeated in the 1970s. Several countries will probably hold their censuses late or not at all because of budgetary and political problems, and the extreme slowness in tabulation and publication of census data seems likely to be repeated. For all the emphasis in recent years on the need for more complete and up-to-date information for planning and the measurement of progress, very few countries seem to give a high priority to this need in the practical terms of adequate budgetary support and the staffing of statistical offices.

TABLE 1. LATIN AMERICA : DEMOGRAPHIC,

Countries	Population (mid-1970)	Density per km ² (1970)	Birth rate (1965-1970)	Life expectancy at birth (1965-1970)	Degree of urbanization (percentage of population in localities with 2,000 or more inhabitants) (1970)	Annual rate of population increase 1965-1970	Age structure in 1970 (percentages)			Primary enrolment as a percentage of the population 7-14 years of age (1967)
							0-14	15-64	64 and over	
Argentina	24,352	8.8	23.0	67.4	77.6	1.8	29.3	63.4	7.3	97.2 ^a
Bolivia	4,658	4.2	44.0	45.3	35.5	—	42.6	54.4	3.0	66.4
Brazil	93,244	11.0	37.8	60.6	47.8	3.1	42.0	54.5	3.5	64.4
Colombia	22,160	19.5	44.6	58.5	55.9	3.2	47.0	50.4	2.6	60.2 ^c
Costa Rica	1,798	35.5	45.1	66.8	33.8	4.0	47.9	48.9	3.2	89.8
Cuba	8,341	72.8	27.3	66.8	61.3	2.1	34.5	60.5	5.0	103.1 ^a
Chile	9,780	12.9	33.2	60.9	70.6	2.8	39.3	56.1	4.6	106.0
Ecuador	6,028	21.3	44.9	57.2	48.3	3.0	46.9	50.2	2.9	76.3 ^c
El Salvador	3,441	160.8	46.9	54.9	38.0	2.8	47.1	49.9	3.0	72.0 ^c
Guatemala	5,034	47.6	43.2	51.1	30.1	3.1	45.7	51.3	3.0	47.7 ^c
Haiti	5,229	188.1	43.9	44.5	17.6	—	42.5	54.5	3.0	35.3 ^c
Honduras	2,583	23.0	49.0	48.9	27.8	3.0	46.7	50.9	2.4	63.5 ^b
Mexico	50,718	25.7	43.2	62.4	61.8	3.1	46.4	50.3	3.3	83.8
Nicaragua	2,021	15.5	46.0	59.9	39.4	2.6	47.1	49.8	3.1	59.1
Panama	1,406	18.6	40.5	63.4	50.4	2.9	44.7	51.7	3.6	85.7
Paraguay	2,419	5.9	44.6	49.3	34.6	2.7	46.5	50.3	3.2	82.5
Peru	13,586	10.6	41.8	58.0	49.2	2.2	45.0	51.9	3.1	92.5
Dominican Republic	4,348	89.3	48.5	52.1	38.3	3.6	47.6	49.9	2.5	75.3 ^c
Uruguay	2,889	15.5	21.3	69.2	78.6	1.7	28.2	63.2	8.6	94.5 ^c
Venezuela	10,755	11.8	40.9	63.7	72.1	3.7	45.2	51.9	2.9	79.7
Barbados	270	675.0	29-32 ^e	65.1 ^f	—	—	38.8	54.4 ^g	6.8 ^g	...
Guyana	757	3.5	40-41 ^e	61.0 ^f	—	—	—	—	—	115.9 ^c
Jamaica	1,840	167.3	39-40 ^e	64.6 ^f	—	1.5	46.0	49.6 ^g	4.4 ^g	94.1 ^c
Trinidad and Tobago	1,129	221.4	37-39 ^e	64.2 ^f	—	—	43.3	53.1	3.6	109.1 ^c

- SOURCES: (1) Latin American Demographic Centre (CELADE), *Boletín Demográfico*, year 2, vol. 4, table 1 (Santiago, Chile, July 1969).
 (2) Area: ECLA, *Statistical Bulletin for Latin America*, vol. VI, No. 1, table 7; Population: *Boletín Demográfico*, *op. cit.*
 (3) *Boletín Demográfico*, *op. cit.*, table 4.
 (4) CELADE, *Boletín Demográfico*, year 2, vol. IV, table 4 (Santiago, Chile, July 1969).
 (5) ECLA estimates for percentage of total population living in centres with 2,000 inhabitants or more.
 (6) ECLA estimates. Use second column of table 9, chap. IV, of "Social change...".
 (7) (8) and (9): *Boletín Demográfico*, *op. cit.*, table 2. Percentage of total population in each age group.
 (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) and (15): ECLA calculations based on UNESCO sources and official statistics.
 (16) Organization of American States, Centro Interamericano de Estudios de Seguridad (Inter-American Social Security Study Centre). Ricardo Moles, *Seguridad Social y Planificación Nacional* (Mexico City, March 1969).
 (17) and (18): ECLA, based on official statistics.

Situation, but omitting various columns based on the 1960 round of censuses. It should be kept in mind that, while the economic indicators are based on new primary data, the demographic data continue to consist of projections from these same censuses.

In these circumstances, it has seemed preferable to concentrate the present chapter on certain important trends that have not been treated in detail in earlier chapters of this series, and to limit the discussion of questions that have been treated before to a few aspects that now seem of particular significance. While there is not much new primary information on social questions, many attempts have been made, through the manipulation of existing data, to produce coherent quantitative estimates or hypotheses and to project trends, particularly in regard to population, employment and income distribution. The present chapter will draw on this work, with appropriate cautions to keep the calculations from being mistaken for new information.

The shortcomings of generalizations applied to Latin America as a whole have long been obvious. Among analysts trying to derive coherent patterns from the bewildering combination of factors making for similarity and diversity, these shortcomings have stimulated a continuing interest in the construction of typologies of countries. The typologies proposed up to the present have been intended to serve many different analytical purposes, and have selected their criteria accordingly, but most of them have in common their reliance on a combination of statistical indicators, and their portrayal of types that are essentially static, representing situations or structures at a given point of time.

The heuristic value of such typologies has many limitations:

(a) The types are influenced by the statistical indicators selected. The analyst faces the dilemma of limiting him-

SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC INDICATORS

Secondary enrolment as a percentage of the population 15-19 years of age (1967)	Higher enrolment as a percentage of the population 20-24 years of age (1967)	Average annual growth rate of enrolment in 1962-1967			Percentage of economically active population covered by social security schemes	Gross domestic product per capita 1969	Annual growth rate of gross domestic product 1965-1969	Percentage of central government expenditure on		Central government tax revenue as a percentage of gross domestic product (1968)	Gross agricultural product as a percentage of the gross domestic product (1968)	Variation in consumer price indices (rate of growth of annual averages) 1965-1969
		Primary	Secondary	Higher				Education (1968)	Health (1968)			
41.1	14.3	2.7 ^a	5.6	6.5	(1961) 81.9	895	3.5	17.7	4.8	9.4	15.5	20.4
25.0 ^b	4.7 ^c	5.9	10.0 ^b	10.7 ^d	(1965) 6.4	191	6.0	31.3	9.1	8.4	23.3	6.4
29.1 ^c	2.8	5.6	13.1 ^d	14.5	(1965) 23.4	337	6.8	7.2	3.0	8.4	26.4	30.0
27.7 ^c	3.3 ^c	5.4 ^d	13.2 ^d	13.2 ^d	(1965) 11.1	357	5.4	15.9	5.2	8.5	31.4	10.7
41.9	7.2	6.3	11.1	9.8	(1966) 29.3	517	7.6	29.8	10.1	10.6	32.3	1.9
35.4 ^c	4.4 ^c	2.9 ^d	8.3 ^d	7.5 ^d	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
43.2 ^c	6.8	7.0	7.1 ^d	9.4	(1965) 66.8	593	3.8	20.1	2.0	20.0	10.5	24.2
24.9 ^c	3.8 ^c	7.0 ^e	10.7 ^d	9.6 ^d	(1965) 12.6	287	4.5	17.4	3.3	8.9	32.5	4.4
21.8	1.6	6.0 ^e	10.9	4.6	(1966) 7.2	312	3.9	25.2	13.1	9.6	28.6	0.5
12.8	2.6 ^{a f}	6.1 ^e	10.4	12.1 ^{d f}	(1966) 25.2	334	5.1	13.5	8.2	7.2	26.9	1.2
5.1 ^b	0.4 ^g	3.0 ^{g h}	2.2 ^b	3.2 ^b	(1966) 1.5	89	1.9	15.3	13.1	5.3	45.9	2.6
10.8 ^g	1.5	8.9 ^b	12.1 ^h	7.0	(1966) 4.2	231	5.2	20.2	8.5	10.0	41.1	2.5
23.9	4.1	7.7	12.8	8.8	(1965) 19.0	649	6.5	25.3	6.3	6.8	14.6	3.1
19.6	2.9 ^c	6.9	17.6	18.3 ^d	(1966) 11.4	331	4.2	19.4	5.2	9.7	30.9	—
47.8 ^a	11.0	4.0	7.0 ^d	17.1	(1965) 26.1	632	6.9	28.3	15.7	11.2	21.9	1.2
19.3 ^b	2.8	3.3	9.3 ^b	6.0	(1966) 8.5	262	4.1	15.1	4.3	9.4	36.7	1.6
41.2	8.3	8.8	16.3	17.8	(1965) 22.8	378	3.6	29.9	5.2	12.4	18.9	11.0
27.9 ^b	3.0	5.9 ^g	11.8 ^b	12.8	(1966) 8.2	205	6.4	14.0	7.8	14.4	25.0	0.5
69.1 ^b	7.7 ^{a g}	2.8 ^g	8.1 ^b	2.9 ^{a h}	—	655	0.4	23.3	—	12.0	19.9	72.3
39.2 ^a	8.5	3.5	9.8 ^a	12.7	(1966) 16.1	740	4.2	14.0	8.8	13.2	7.7	1.4
...	2.2 ^g	—	—	—	9.9	6.0	—	—	—
...	0.5 ^g	5.5 ^d	...	4.4 ^h	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
...	1.4 ^g	3.6 ^d	...	16.0 ^h	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	3.8
...	1.9 ^g	3.4 ^h	—	—	—	17.8	8.7	13.3	—	4.1

(19) (20) and (21): Inter-American Development Bank, Social Progress Trust Fund, *Socio-economic Progress in Latin America*, ninth annual report, 1969.

(22) Figures prepared by the National Accounts Section of the Statistical Division of ECLA for the *Economic Survey of Latin America*, 1968 (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 70.II.G.1, in the press).

(23) International Monetary Fund.

^a Provisional estimates.

^b Estimates provided by the Statistical Division, ECLA.

^c 1966.

^d 1962-1966.

^e See ECLA estimates for the period 1960-1965 in the *Economic Bulletin for Latin America*, vol. VI, No. 1, table 9.2.

^f See United Nations, *Demographic Yearbook 1967*, mortality tables for the period 1959-1961.

^g 1965.

^h 1962-1965.

self to a few readily available and reasonably accurate indicators, which are insufficient to bring out the patterns he is seeking, or of trying to quantify all the relevant factors on the basis of unreliable or indirect evidence;

(b) The real meaning of each indicator depends on its place within the over-all national pattern; the construction of types from an averaging of levels according to isolated indicators is likely to be misleading;

(c) There is no *a priori* reason to believe that the Latin American countries fall into clear-cut types; the typology is likely to be accorded more correspondence with real divisions than it deserves;

(d) All of the larger countries show very wide differences between internal regions. It is arguable that the nation-state is not the most appropriate unit for a typology and also that it is misleading to include very large and very small countries within a single type on the basis of similar national statistical levels;

(e) Most of the countries are undergoing various kinds of relatively rapid change; it can be expected that the identity of the countries falling into different types and the appropriate criteria for dividing them into types will both be unstable. Nevertheless, it would be misleading to identify the types with stages through which the countries will pass. Both the internal characteristics of the poorer countries and the differences in the current patterns of international interdependence (into which they are inserted) rule out the possibility of their evolving so as to duplicate the characteristics of the Latin American countries that are relatively advanced in terms of urbanization, income levels, etc.

The typology presented below tries to take into account directions and rates of change as well as interrelations between indicators, at the cost of introducing criteria that cannot be expressed more precisely than by rating some countries "high" or "low" in comparison with others. Its principal objective is to contribute to a better understanding of the differing combinations of situations and trends that generate pressures, set limits, and create opportunities for the evolution of development policy in general and social development policy in particular. It is assumed that other typological criteria and groupings would serve better for other purposes.⁵

Six main national patterns are distinguished. The first four of these are set forth in table 2. In these patterns, differing economic levels and rates of growth combined with differing processes of social and demographic change (among which urbanization in a broad sense now seems to have a dominant role) imply differing capacities for development and the application of policies, but within a more general framework common to all the countries. Most countries of Latin America conform more or less closely to one of these types, although it would be misleading to fit all of them into a typological bed of Procrustes, since several present intermediate situations or anomalies deriving from special political or economic

circumstances.⁶ Types V and VI comprise countries that require other kinds of criteria for classification; in reality, they fall outside the typology.

Type I is made up of countries with levels of *per capita* production and income that are well above the regional average, but with relatively low average rates of economic growth over the period since the early 1950s.⁷ Sixty per cent or more of the national population lives in cities having more than 20,000 inhabitants, and the middle strata constitutes a relatively high proportion of this urban population. The middle strata are also important within the rural population, which is not the case in other types, but the really rural population represents only a small part of the total. Population growth has slowed down, the urban marginal strata are relatively small and the rural-agricultural population no longer constitutes a disproportionately large reservoir of potential cityward migrants. Educational public health and social security programmes reach most of the population, however unevenly they may be distributed. These sectors of public social action already absorb high proportions of the national product and their internal momentum for further expansion is strong. Since the low rates of economic growth limit the growth of public revenues and the latter are subject to claims from many sectors, the satisfaction of social sectoral claims becomes increasingly difficult. The need for planning and reform of the social programmes is admitted by national policymakers and the technical capacity of the public administration to carry out such reforms is adequate, but these needs do not generate pressures from within the society strong enough to offset the momentum for expansion within the traditional channels. The results of this contradiction are particularly striking in the educational sector. The pressure for more education, particularly at the middle and higher levels, is irresistible but the occupational demand for the output of the educational system is weak. The private sector can absorb only a fraction of the graduates and the public sector can do so only at the price of budget deficits and the expansion of an already excessive body of public employees. In such countries the emigration of professionals and technicians can be expected to reach important dimensions. In varying degrees, three countries of the Southern Cone of South America (Argentina, Chile and Uruguay) conform to type I. They account for about 13 per cent of the regional population. (While membership in other types coincides with population size, type I thus includes one large, one medium-sized, and one small country.)

Type II corresponds to countries with medium *per capita* income levels and fairly high rates of growth in relation to the regional average, with national figures concealing particularly wide internal disparities, with urbanization and the size of the urban middle strata rising steadily but still some distance below the levels characteristic of type I, with urban marginal strata large and

⁵ Costa Rica and Panama, for reasons that cannot be explored here, are particularly hard to classify. They combine some traits of type I with others of type III. Together, they account for little more than one per cent of the regional population.

⁷ Since these countries have relatively low rates of population increase, the lag in *per capita* growth rates is smaller than the lag in gross rates, in relation to the rest of the region.

⁵ This typology is presented in chapter III of *Social Change and Social Development Policy in Latin America* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 70.II.G.3), and is used in other chapters of that study.

TABLE 2. TYPOLOGY OF NATIONAL SITUATIONS ^a

<i>Characteristic</i>	<i>I</i>	<i>II</i>	<i>III</i>	<i>IV</i>
Level of <i>per capita</i> product . . .	High	Medium	Low	Low
Rate of growth of <i>per capita</i> product	Low	Medium-high	Medium-high	Low
Size of national population . . .	High-low	High	Low	Low
Rate of national population growth	Medium-low	High	High	Medium
Proportion of population in the lowest age groups (0-14)	Medium-low	High	High	Medium
Degree of industrialization and economic diversification	Medium-high	Medium-high	Low	Low
Level of urbanization and size of urban middle strata	High	Medium	Low	Low
Rate of urbanization and growth of urban middle strata	Medium-low	High	Medium	Low
Importance of marginal strata within urban population	Medium-low	High	Medium-high	Medium-high
Percentage of population in agriculture.	Low	Medium	High	High
Proportion of population able to participate in the political process through votes and organized demands	High	Medium	Low	Low
Degree of development and income inequality between internal regions	Medium-low	High	Medium	Low
Degree of inequality in income distribution	Medium-high	High	High	Medium-high
Absorptive capacity for professions and specialized skills	Low	High	Medium	Low
Importance of the public sector as a source of employment and investment	High	Medium-high	Low	Low
Coverage of educational and other social services and proportion of national products allocated to such services	High	Medium	Low	Low
Rate of growth of coverage of such services	Medium-low	Medium-high	Medium-high	Low
Internal pressures for growth of services along present lines . . .	High	Medium-high	Medium	Low
Pressures for reform and equalization of services	Medium-low	High	Medium-low	Low
Technical capacity for planning and reform of services	High	Medium	Low	Low
Ability of public sector to increase allocations to social services . .	Low	Medium	Medium-high	Low

^a "Low", "medium" and "high" refer to the Latin American average, not to international norms.

subject to incalculable further recruitment from the rural population and the backward internal regions. (The percentage of the population living in cities with more than 20,000 inhabitants ranges between 35 and 45, except in Venezuela, where the percentage is already over 50.) The social programmes are expanding with some rapidity from previously low levels of coverage, but their resources are concentrated disproportionately upon the middle strata within the large cities. These countries have reached

stages of industrialization and economic diversification at which shortages of professionals, technicians and literate, stable, healthy workers readily absorbable by industry appear as obvious bottle-necks in the capacity for further development. At the same time, public institutions experience real needs for qualified administrators, economists, social specialists etc. (As the data from Colombia below indicate, however, the immediate demand for these skills may still not measure up to the development need.)

Here national capacity for allocating increased resources to social programmes is good, though far from unlimited. The internal momentum for expansion is strong but confused, with the urban marginal strata and the rural masses making increasingly insistent demands for a fairer allocation of services. The technical capacity of the public sector—with its existing human resources—to carry out general reforms under conditions of rapid expansion of the programmes is relatively limited. The result is likely to be the appearance, under both public and private auspices, of a wide variety of new and unco-ordinated social initiatives intended to meet urgent needs. In particular, new educational and training mechanisms are set up to meet immediate demands for specialized skills in the public sector as well as in industry, while the remainder of the educational system continues to grow in some disorder and with considerable internal conflict. Five of the six most populous countries of Latin America to varying degrees approximate to type II. Brazil and Colombia belong here, with Mexico and Peru, in spite of the fact that the economic growth of Colombia has been relatively slow during the 1960s; so does Venezuela, in spite of its very rapid transition from rural to urban predominance, and its relatively slow economic growth during the 1960s. These five countries contain more than 67 per cent of the regional population.

Per capita incomes in the countries of type III are in the same range as those of type II and are also for the most part growing at fairly satisfactory rates, but industrialization and economic diversification are more limited and growth is more dependent on exports of a few raw materials. Urbanization and the size of the urban middle strata are growing at roughly the same rates as in the countries of type II, but from lower previous levels. Percentages of population in centres with more than 20,000 inhabitants are still under 30. The predominance of rural population thus remains higher than in type II and the urban marginal population is less prominent. The coverage of the social programmes is also expanding at rates similar to those of the type II countries, but from much lower levels in the recent past, so that their scope and their share of the product are still low. Here the apparent requirements for larger social allocations are very high if assessed by international norms, but both the internal momentum for expansion and the external or occupational demands for the potential contribution of such programmes to human resource development are only moderate. The specialized character of economic growth and the limited functions of the public sector do not generate a strong demand for highly qualified human resources, and the demand is likely to be more in balance with supply than in the other types. The technical capacity of the public sector to reform and direct the expansion of social programmes is low. While the modest percentages of the national product devoted to social programmes indicate a good capacity for expansion, the ability of the public sector to capture a larger share of the product for the financing of such programmes is also likely to be weak. Most of the smaller Spanish-speaking countries of Latin America conform in varying degrees to type III.

A country in type IV has a low *per capita* product and little or no economic growth. Urbanization is limited, the

urban middle strata are small, and their rate of growth is low. The population is overwhelmingly rural, and rural poverty has not yet generated an important expansion of urban marginal strata, since the cities, lacking job opportunities and social services, exert only a weak attraction for migrants. The percentage of the population in centres with more than 20,000 inhabitants falls as low as 15. Coverage of the social services, allocations to them, and their rate of expansion are all very low. Ineffective pressures for such services from the different social strata, weak demands from the occupational sectors for better-qualified human resources, the inability of the public sector to obtain resources for social programmes and low technical capacity to direct such services all coincide. In terms of ideal developmental requirements, the educational and other social needs of a country of this type are enormous, but the capacity to meet the needs and the capacity to absorb improved human resources are feeble. Such a country thus paradoxically shares with the countries of type I particularly high rates of loss through migration of the few professionals and technicians it does produce. At present, only one or two of the small countries of Latin America approximate closely to type IV, but many of the traits have emerged in other small countries during periods of political upheaval or depressed export markets. In the absence of effective Latin American integration, the possibility of becoming trapped in this kind of low-level stagnation seems particularly threatening for small countries with specialized economies.

Types III and IV include most of what have come to be called the “relatively less-developed countries”. While they include nine of the Latin American countries (if the anomalous cases of Costa Rica and Panama are set aside), together they comprise less than 13 per cent of the regional population. (The fact that Costa Rica and Panama, as well as Uruguay and the English-speaking Caribbean countries, with *per capita* incomes well above the Latin American average, have identified themselves with the “relatively less-developed” group, indicates a feeling among them that narrowness of the productive base and relative economic vulnerability associated with small size are just as important for their classification as current levels of income, urbanization and social services.)

Cuba, at the beginning of the 1960s, approximated to type I in *per capita* income level, urbanization, size of middle strata, characteristics and coverage of social services, and also in the slowness of its economic growth. In some other traits, particularly the extreme dependence of its economy on a single export crop produced through the plantation system, it resembled type III. Since then, Cuba has deliberately changed its economic and social patterns to such an extent that it constitutes a type V that cannot be ranked according to the criteria used for the first four types. The kinds of middle strata characteristic of the other countries, with their typical status, occupational and consumption demands, have been practically eliminated. Determined efforts to equalize incomes, levels of living and access to educational and other social services, along with economic concentration on “industrialized” agriculture, have wiped out most of the differential advantages—between city and countryside

and among internal regions—that have determined the forms of urbanization found elsewhere. The phenomena of structural unemployment and marginalization have been replaced by chronic labour shortages that have necessitated the drawing of most of the adult population into part-time manual labour, particularly in the sugarcane harvest. Through all of these changes, the rate of growth of the product seems to have remained low, but presumably for reasons quite different from the economic stagnation of the 1950s. Cuba, as type V, comprises about 3 per cent of the regional population.

The Caribbean countries and territories (other than Cuba, Dominican Republic, Haiti and the Spanish-speaking countries bordering on the Caribbean) can provisionally be identified as type IV. While this sub-region has many historical ties with the adjoining parts of Latin America, differences in administrative systems, language and culture have kept it apart, and it has not been discussed in the Latin American chapters of previous *Reports on the World Social Situation*. However, the winning of national independence or internal self-government by most of the Caribbean territorial units has been accompanied by the establishment of many links with the larger Latin American regional system. It may thus be worth while to consider in some detail the differences and similarities between the Caribbean situation and the types discussed above.

Geography, economic specialization and the vicissitudes of colonial domination have left in the Caribbean area a situation of governmental and territorial fragmentation that cannot be paralleled in any other part of the world of comparable size and population. The subregion comprises:

(a) Four English-language sovereign States with a total population of just under 4 million;

(b) Twelve English-language territories, self-governing in internal affairs, six of which belong to the Associated States of the West Indies, with a total population of under 800,000;

(c) Three departments of France, with a total population of under 700,000;

(d) Two Netherlands Associated States, with a total population of under 600,000;

(e) Two Territories linked with the United States, one the largest unit of the area, with 2,700,000 people, the other with less than 60,000. Thus, some twenty-three countries and Territories have a total population of about 8.7 million, while the twenty Republics that constitute the rest of Latin America have 270 million. If all the Caribbean units are considered part of Latin America, they total only 3 per cent of its population.

All except four of the units are islands or groups of islands. The four mainland units have abundant land that is nearly empty, most of their people being concentrated in a small part of the territory. The island units are all small and densely populated, if compared with the density of the other Latin American countries.

A detailed comparison of the units would reveal many differences among them, but they have the following important characteristics in common:

(a) A recent background of colonial administration, in many cases preceded by a history of domination shifting from one metropolitan power to another through conquest or purchase, with independence or self-government dating no farther back than the 1940s, the 1950s or even more recently. Even today, bilateral economic and cultural ties with the different metropolitan countries are closer than ties with other territorial units in the sub-region or with the rest of Latin America;

(b) A background of plantation economy, with the Territories valued for their production of a few export crops, mainly sugar. The economies have diversified only very recently and mainly in the larger units, through the rise of mineral exports, tourism and, in the case of Puerto Rico, manufacturing. The composition of the population has been determined by the ways in which labour was imported to produce plantation crops (first, through slavery, from Africa; later through indenture systems, from Asia), with a rigid status and ethnic barrier between the labouring population and the metropolitan minority of plantation owners, administrators and merchants. In several of the units, this heritage has left the population divided along ethnic lines in the competition for employment and political power;

(c) Natural rates of population increase as high as in the countries of types II and III (around 3 per cent per year). In several units in quite recent years, however, fertility rates have begun to decline, and high rates of emigration have brought the net increase down to quite moderate levels. In a few of the larger units, the net rate has fallen from 2.5-3.0 per cent around 1960 to about 1 per cent around 1968. Since this trend depends on continuing opportunities for emigration, and thus on the policies and economic situations of the countries receiving migrants, major short-term fluctuations in rates of population increase are likely. The differential emigration of young adults also introduces the likelihood of significant distortions in the age structures, sex ratios and skill levels of the population;

(d) Specific patterns of population mobility and occupational preferences deriving from the heritage of plantation slavery, along with other factors, including the small size of the territorial units and the consequent ease of communication and movement between the rural hinterland and the principal towns. Rural localities lack cohesive community structures; peasant attachment to the land is weak or lacking; agricultural work is shunned. The rural population groups have been called "agricultural communities that do not like agriculture";

At present, there is a wide gap—in the larger territorial units—between the wage levels in new high-productivity occupations—mainly in mineral processing and tourism—and those in the rest of the economy. The results include a strong movement of rural population to the towns, rejection of the low-wage job openings, primarily agricultural work, and, high rate of unemployment. In many of the smaller units, lacking a domestic high-wage sector, internal migration is replaced by migration to the more prosperous units, despite legal restrictions on such movement. Open unemployment is more prominent in the Caribbean countries than in the rest of Latin America,

while the various forms of underemployment seem to be less important;⁸

(e) Nearly complete coverage of primary education and high literacy rates, with secondary and higher education relatively limited and very little technical-vocational education. There is a wide gap between occupational aspirations from education and real opportunities, contributing both to local unemployment and to high rates of emigration from the region of professional and skilled manpower.

The above summary suggests a number of traits found in the remainder of Latin America, but in different combinations and probably with different causes. The Caribbean countries and Territories combine some features of type I with others of types III and IV. Income levels and rates of growth are extremely varied and erratic from year to year, with most of the larger Caribbean units having an advantage over the smaller. As in the type III countries, these incomes are so narrowly based on a few exports that they cannot be assumed to have any clear relation to levels of welfare, except that it appears that in the Caribbean a larger share is captured by the State for social purposes. Smallness of size and newness of national organization introduce a number of differences from even the smaller Spanish-speaking Latin American countries that cannot be explored here.⁹

⁸ In Trinidad and Tobago, 14 per cent of the labour force is unemployed, and about the same percentage is believed to be underemployed.

"In spite of a very high rate of economic growth over the last fifteen years, the percentage of the labour force unemployed has increased steadily... Our problem is what is known as 'structural' unemployment, which arises from an excessive supply of labour in relation to the amount of capital available; the type of technology used in production; the availability of the right kind of skills; the preferences of the labour force for... different kinds of jobs; and the capacity to produce locally, instead of importing, a wide range of goods and services... Structural unemployment also has its roots in our pattern of wage-rates, itself the product of the dominance of petroleum in the economy. The high wages resulting from the high output per man in the petroleum industry have put an upward pressure on wages in other sectors, particularly the public sector. This leads to less employment than would otherwise obtain because employers in the low-productivity sectors cannot find the offer of work economic at such wages and because labour itself (particularly the young entrants into the labour market who have received a secondary education) is unwilling to work at less than a certain minimum rate of reward."

Government of Trinidad and Tobago, *Third Five-Year Plan 1969-1973* (Government Printery, 1970), pp. 6-7.

⁹ For example,

"... besides the more common hurdles like shortage of trained manpower... the most serious obstacle to development encountered in the field of administration in many of the Caribbean countries was the uncertainty of retention of highly trained personnel in the public service. This was not only due to unattractive salaries relative to qualifications and limited promotion prospects, but also—and more importantly—because of the comparatively small scale of operations. Social factors resulting from smallness of size had their own effect on administration... personal contacts sometimes exercised a degree of influence which was not conducive to the building up of an efficient service... Criticism became more personalized mainly owing to the direct and close contact with members of the community. Decision-making became more closely associated with personal risk, leading to the search for 'acceptable' substitutes."

United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America, *Report of Caribbean Regional Workshop on Integrated Rural Development* (Kingston, Jamaica, 6-11 October 1969) (E/CN.12/846).

For many of the smaller units, tourism represents perhaps the only hopeful avenue to economic growth. However, the prospects of the cultural adaptations required for a future as a playground for tourists from the high-income countries, who would be very numerous and very affluent in relation to local population, is hard to reconcile with objectives of national identity and autonomy. A few of the larger units have embarked on developing mining and secondary industries; and in the case of at least one unit, the results in terms of growth in GNP have been very impressive during the last decade. However, in many cases, the social benefits that should accrue to the society as a whole as a result of this economic growth do not seem to have been satisfactorily realized, owing to failure to achieve a more equitable distribution of income.

The types of national situation that have been described correspond in the main to differences in demographic patterns, and certain inferences can be drawn that are relevant to the present region-wide debate over population policy.¹⁰

In the countries approximating to types I and V, the demographic transition to low mortality, moderate fertility, and moderate rates of increase is either completed or visibly under way. International migration, which contributed heavily to the population growth of several of these countries in the past, is very unlikely to regain its importance. Urban concentration through internal migration may continue, but the increasing dominance of urban ways of life (although taking very different forms in the two types) and the slow rates of over-all population increase imply that the disruptive features of its impact will decline in importance.

In countries approximating to types II, III and probably VI, comprising more than 80 per cent of the regional population, the gap between fertility and mortality promises to remain very wide for years to come, and high rates of natural increase will thus persist. The consequences for the three types are presumably quite different, although it is reasonable to assume that the developmental problems of all of them would be eased by lower rates of increase. In the countries of type II, the scale of the increase, the accompanying potentialities for disruptive geographical mobility, and also for utilization for the expanding population are highest. In the countries of types III and VI, particularly the last, these potentialities are much more limited, and the need to find some means of lowering the rate of increase is correspondingly more urgent.

In the countries of type IV, rates of population increase up to the present have been kept moderate by high mortality, and geographical mobility has been limited by lack of job opportunities or vacant lands. Under present conditions, it would seem that even moderate population increase contributes mainly to deeper poverty in *mini-fundio* agriculture.

The types of national situation coincide to some extent with differing positions and potentialities within the world system of economic interdependence, but in this

¹⁰ For a more extensive discussion of the demographic implications of the typology, see chapters IV and XVIII in *Social Change and Social Development Policy in Latin America*, op. cit.

area resemblances between national problems may be more important than differences. The countries of types I and II stand apart from the others in the degree of diversification of their economies and in the extent of import substitution through domestic industries. Foreign trade naturally accounts for a higher proportion of economic activity in the small countries of types III and VI, the range of exports is narrower, and manufactured consumer goods are more prominent among exports. Chronic inflation is most characteristic of the countries of type I, and has affected the countries of type II more than the others. None of the types, however, has been able as yet to change significantly the traditional dependence of the balance of payments on exports of raw materials or to raise exports of manufactures to a leading role. External domination of economic activities remains important in all types except V and, to the extent that industrialization and economic diversification come to the fore in types I and II, such domination shifts its emphasis from production of raw materials to industry and domestic commerce.

*Regionalization of development*¹¹

One of the many explanations for the insufficiencies of Latin American development has attributed a large share of the blame to several kinds of mutually reinforcing centralization and the extremely uneven spatial distribution of power, economic activity, technological and social modernization, and population. Decision-making is centralized in the upper reaches of the public administration in the national capitals, with a consequent lethargy or paralysis of initiative in the organs of local government and sectoral administration in the rest of the country. In this respect, the large commercial and financial institutions follow patterns similar to those of the public sector. The upper-income strata, constituting the main markets for the new consumer-goods industries, live in the great cities, and the industries themselves fall into patterns of concentration governed by their markets and sources of financing. Higher education, modern medical facilities, mass communication media and the manifestation of culture have been concentrated in the same way and along with them the more lucrative and prestigious sources of employment. The great cities receive the lion's share of public expenditures on social programmes such as housing. Lastly, on a scale that threatens to negate the advantages of concentration for the cities themselves, comes a flood of migrants seeking crumbs from the concentration of wealth, sources of employment, and sources of social assistance. With the partial frustration of

earlier recipes for development planning that ignored problems of spatial distribution and regional inequalities, and with the emergence of threatening political pressures both from the backward regions and from the migrants, the above diagnosis has rather rapidly come to the forefront of governmental preoccupations. The increasing influence of theories linking under-development to dependence has brought additional reasons for viewing present patterns of urban concentration with disfavour. The great cities are looked on as links in the chain of dominance and dependence, sucking resources from the national periphery, while they themselves feed resources to the world centres, acting as entry points and centres for the diffusion of economic, cultural and political influences that perpetuate the patterns of dependence.

Such interpretations of urban concentration as a hindrance to authentic development have been refuted or qualified from several points of view. In particular, it is argued that for low-income, predominantly rural-agricultural countries a high degree of initial concentration is necessary to get a development process under way; moreover, that all known development processes have been highly uneven spatially and have depended on the capture and investment of the surpluses produced by the weaker internal regions and social classes. Such arguments, however, usually contain a supposition that at some stage the pattern of concentrated development will be reversed, whether spontaneously or through redistributive tactics of the States; the urban centres will acquire sufficient dynamism to irradiate the benefits of their development to new centres.¹²

Whatever the reasoning followed and whatever the stress given within over-all development objectives, the authorities of all the larger countries of the region and most of the smaller ones have by now accepted in principle the proposition that something must be done to redress the balance between internal regions, and are trying to take the spatial aspects of development into account in their policies and plans.

Until quite recently, these attempts were rather restricted both in their geographical coverage and in the factors to which they addressed themselves. The following types of plan or approach can be distinguished:

(a) Investment plans for regions or growth poles with special unexploited potentialities for irrigated agriculture, hydroelectric power or heavy industry based on mineral resources. In these regional plans the objective of increased production has inevitably been foremost, and it has been assumed that the investment capacity of the

¹¹ This section depends mainly on studies prepared for two seminars co-sponsored in 1969 by the Economic Commission for Latin America: Second Inter-American Seminar on Regionalization of Development Policies in Latin America, September (with the Pan American Institute of Geography and History); and Seminar on Social Aspects of Regional Development, November (with the Latin American Institute for Economic and Social Planning and the United Nations Office for Technical Co-operation). See, in particular, "The social aspects of regional development in Latin America" (ST/ECLA/Conf. 34/L.1); Walter Stöhr, "Materials on regional development in Latin America: experience and prospects" (ST/ECLA/Conf.34/L.4); and "Draft report", Seminar on Social Aspects of Regional Development (ST/ECLA/Conf. 34/L.8).

¹² "The increase in the density of urban settlement and the creation of new development centres and zones are, thus, regarded as means of resisting external pressures and creating the machinery necessary for promoting internal economic expansion and improving competitiveness in external markets. This is because it is essential to have a sufficiently large economic 'mass' in order to produce the conditions in which the transfer of resources and capacities essential for the creation of new development centres can be effected. Thus, the increase in urban concentration and the conquest of new economic frontiers are two complementary aspects of the same policy of development accompanied by integration and autonomy." (Eduardo Naira Alva, *La regionalización de la política de desarrollo en América Latina*, Working Paper No. 3, Second Inter-American Seminar on Regionalization of Development Policies in Latin America.)

public sector would dictate concentration on very few zones at a time. Most such plans have been administered by public corporations or other institutions located in the national capital. Local decision-making has received very little scope, partly because most of the zones affected had at the beginning either a very sparse population or a rural population without political influence. The social implications for the migrant population attracted by new jobs and the peasants displaced by reservoirs were generally ignored until the later stages of the plans;

(b) Investment plans for internal regions suffering from particularly severe poverty and economic stagnation. Here the main emphasis, in principle though not always in practice, was on the creation of new sources of employment through public works and incentives to new industries, and on the raising of intolerably low levels of income, nutrition, health and education;

(c) Investment plans for the extension of highway networks into empty or backward regions, in the confidence that development would follow the roads;

(d) Measures for what might be called "special problem and pressure regions", zones receiving special treatment and aid from the national authorities because of frontier location, remoteness, natural catastrophes, ability to exert political pressure or threaten revolt or secession. In most of these instances there has hardly been even a pretence of planning. The zones in question have received free-port status, tax exemptions, special sources of revenue, differential advantages for the attraction of industries, public works programmes etc., according to the strength of their pressures on national authorities, the character of local interests, and the possibilities for satisfying demands through concessions not calling for allocations of national public funds. With widely varying degrees of vigour and effectiveness, all the municipalities and other local units in all of the countries exert pressures of this kind. The newspapers of Latin America are full of appeals from local bodies demonstrating their poverty and demanding as a right that the national authorities "solve their problems";

(e) Measures for the general invigoration of existing provincial and municipal authorities through the granting of subsidies from national revenues, additional taxing powers, and planning functions;

(f) Measures intended to discourage further concentration in the main national urban centre, through differential taxes, requirement of permits for the establishment of new industries, decentralization of administrative functions to provincial centres etc.

In their aggregate, the plans and measures listed above have already had a significant influence on the distribution of economic activities and social programmes in many of the Latin American countries. Entirely new growth poles of great economic dynamism have been created, as in the case of Ciudad Guayana in Venezuela. New zones of irrigated agriculture have made extremely important contributions to national food production, particularly in Mexico. Federal subsidies to states and municipalities have done something to reduce the extreme inequalities in distribution of public services among regions, especially in Brazil.

The achievements, however, have been limited or distorted by the one-sided character of most of the measures and their inability to foresee or plan for unwanted side-effects. The new growth poles have attracted unabsorbable influxes of unskilled labour and reproduced the phenomena of urban marginality already well-known in the older centres. The flow of national public subsidies into the impoverished regions has been offset by an outflow of private investment funds—including profits from the subsidized industries—to the national centres or abroad. (In this respect, the relationship between the national centre and the internal underdeveloped zones has been quite similar to the relationship between the countries themselves and the world centres, with external aid offset by the outflow of private capital.) In many instances, the new industries, set up and managed by companies of the national centre or foreign enterprises, have introduced the most modern labour-saving technologies, and thus have had practically no direct impact on the problem of unemployment they were supposed to alleviate. The piecemeal granting of special concessions in response to localistic pressures has also resulted in inefficient and badly located industries incapable of surviving without permanent special privileges, public works projects with very low benefits in relation to costs, and a proliferation of "universities" in provincial centres quite unable to attract qualified staff and students.¹³ Some of the new roads have opened up internal regions with high development potential and stimulated flows of settlers into the interior, but others have incurred costs out of proportion to their foreseeable utilization and left the State saddled with burdensome debt service and maintenance costs. With some exceptions, the planning functions devolved upon the existing provinces and municipalities have remained on paper.

These shortcomings and contradictions have naturally stimulated national policy-makers to seek more systematic and efficient solutions to the problems of spatial distribution of development, decentralization, and enlistment of popular participation. The more general dissatisfaction with the results of national development planning and the quest for new strategies that have marked the last years of the 1960s have also helped to direct attention to this policy area. The objective of replacing the programmes for special-purpose regions, the separate decentralization of sectoral activities, and the various forms of aid allocated to local governments, by means of dividing the whole country into regions for planning purposes have very recently gained wide government backing. While semi-official studies and proposals for regional-

¹³ "The demand for a local university is presented not as an aspiration on the part of any particular social sector but as a 'claim' in terms of regional prestige, as a challenge to centralism, as an affirmation of the importance of the Department, and also in other terms reflecting a scale of values in which regional considerations predominate. It is therefore very difficult for local political leaders—who will be responsible for the legal establishment of the university and the provision of the necessary funds—to offer any objections to the proposal." Many of the resulting universities in small provincial cities "do not deserve to be called universities, since their equipment and standards of teaching are not even comparable with those of a good secondary school". (Germán W. Rama, *Educación universitaria y movilidad social; reclutamiento de élites en Colombia, Eco: Revista de la Cultura Occidental* (Bogotá, 116, December 1969.)

ization are not new it is only since 1967 that the national authorities of all the larger countries have either formally decreed the existence of regions covering the whole of the national territory (Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Venezuela) or have under study schemes expected to be granted similar official status (Colombia, Mexico and Peru). Several of the smaller countries are following the same course. All the schemes provide for planning machinery located in the regions and linked with the national planning bodies.

The application of this approach is too new to have achieved measurable results as yet. The planners working on regionalization schemes have complained that they still lack adequate theories for the identification of regions and the specification of their functions within national development. They have encountered jurisdictional difficulties on the one hand and methodological difficulties on the other in reconciling the new regional approach with the pre-existing centralized planning machinery and doctrines and with the pre-existing state or provincial governments, which in several cases have retained planning machinery of their own. The new regions are generally made up of groups of states or provinces, although the boundaries of the latter are far from ideal for this purpose. The planners have had to allow for local political preferences as well as economic and geographical considerations, and in many cases no clear principles have been stated for the fixing of regional boundaries, although the criteria seem to have been highly pragmatic. Most of the schemes identify one or more growth poles or development centres within each region as areas for concentration of investment but it is not clear whether in the long term the regions are to maintain static boundaries or to be continually redefined according to the changing networks of economic and social relationships radiating from the growth poles.¹⁴

For the most part, the newly defined regions do not have any well-defined tradition of regional consciousness, although some attempts have been made to take this into account in their definition. The loyalties that exist are much more localized—to cities or provinces. These territorial-political entities frequently resist incorporation in the larger regions, and seek to retain their traditions of direct dependency on the central authorities combined with an unending struggle to pry money or special privileges from these authorities. Instances have already appeared of fierce local resistance to attempts in the name of regional planning to change the previous local distribution of subsidies or public works allocations. A higher degree of internal regional solidarity seems to be one requisite for success in the present schemes—provided that it is accompanied by a higher degree of regional self-reliance. Regionalization does not by itself show how to resolve the policy dilemma between concentration of investment resources on grounds of efficiency and dispersal of resources on grounds of equity and political expediency.

Up to the present, the strength of localistic pressures has been limited by the small size of most of the localities and their lack of information. The national authorities have been able, if they wanted, to concentrate resources

on a few zones judged especially promising or specially needy, without making their criteria explicit or overtly denying the claims of other zones. Such a tactic becomes harder once all parts of the country possess regional planning machinery with participation of the organized interest-groups and the elected local authorities, as is generally envisaged. No region is likely to submit voluntarily to being accorded a low priority in the national development strategy, and the struggle for a larger share of public sector resources would be transferred from the weak local bodies to relatively powerful regional bodies. This kind of consideration has in the past made some national planning bodies reluctant to encourage nationwide regionalization, once the success of a few special-purpose regions had made the idea popular.¹⁵ It has been suggested that the dilemma could be resolved by combining a deliberate concentration of productive processes in the centres best meeting criteria of economic efficiency with a redistribution of resources for consumption to the periphery.¹⁶ In practice, the pressures to which the national authorities are now exposed imply that they probably cannot avoid following this tactic in an intermittent fashion. The trouble is that current income levels, power relationships and administrative capacities do not permit them to do so on a scale and at a level of efficiency and dependability capable of overcoming the disadvantages of the periphery.

In any case, the primary regions into which the countries are now being divided are too large to provide an adequate framework for the objective of reducing spatial inequalities in income levels. Several of the schemes envisage their division into subregions: in Brazil, 360 "homogenous micro-regions" have been defined within the five main regions, and Mexico is considering seventy socio-economic regions within eight main zones.

Planning for rural localities

Whether regional planning is broken down by such subregions or by the pre-existing provinces and municipalities, the problem remains of strategy for allocation of resources to the rural areas, which have traditionally been discriminated against even at the municipal level, particularly where rural ways of life have been combined with "Indian" cultural separateness. It is here that the great

¹⁵ This seems to have been particularly true in Venezuela, where the creation of planning bodies at regional initiative acquired considerable impetus prior to official approval of nation-wide regionalization in 1969. "The desire to get ahead, and the claim for better treatment and a better distribution and allocation of the resources available to the central authorities, led to the creation of regional movements—some of them local and some of them covering wider areas—which demanded a greater measure of assistance and an ever-increasing incorporation of the regions in national development programmes. This resulted in the emergence, from 1964 onwards, of regional agencies and corporations with structures reflecting the particular characteristics of the territorial areas which had given them life and vigour. As there were no regional boundaries, the spatial breakdown was based in some cases on existing administrative boundaries, and in other cases on arbitrary delimitations which were dictated more by the interests of the communities or groups concerned than by technical factors." Marco V. Salas Méndez, *Los aspectos sociales en la política de desarrollo regional en Venezuela*, reference document No. 2, Seminar on Social Aspects of Regional Development.

¹⁶ See Eduardo Neira Alva, op. cit.

¹⁴ See Eduardo Neira Alva, op. cit.

reservoirs of poverty, low productivity, under-employment and exclusion from any voice in national or local decision-making are still to be found. These phenomena and the present trends of rural social change need not be described again at this point.¹⁷ At this level, the dilemma between allocation of resources according to calculable returns and according to equity reappears in a new form. In many rural zones, particularly those of *minifundio* cultivators, land resources are so scanty in relation to population and have so deteriorated from over-use that even the best-conceived programme of rural development cannot be expected to improve the lot of the inhabitants very much until a high proportion of them can be shifted to other forms of livelihood. Land tenure reforms and the opening up of new lands can solve part of the problem but not the whole of it, and the extent of urban unemployment and marginality rule out a more rapid shift of the surplus rural population to the cities, at least as a policy objective. At the same time, since the poorest parts of the rural population live dispersed in tiny hamlets or by single families economic justification for the opening up of rural roads is lacking and thus the provision of access to educational and health services would be prohibitively expensive.

Mexico seems to be in the lead in confronting this problem and stating principles for the allocation of resources within a general policy of redistribution in favour of the rural population. A 1963 study showed the following relationship between size of locality and family income—a relationship that is probably paralleled in most of the other countries in Latin America:

Localities according to number of inhabitants	Percentage of national population	Percentage of national income	Relation to national average income (100)
Less than 2,500 inhabitants	45.1	25.6	57
From 2,500 to 10,000	15.0	12.3	82
From 10,000 to 150,000	19.5	22.2	114
From 150,000 to 500,000	4.2	6.2	148
More than 500,000 inhabitants	16.2	33.7	208

The 1960 census defined the first category of localities as rural and revealed that 9 per cent of the rural population lived in localities with fewer than 100 inhabitants, 37 per cent in localities with 100 to 499 inhabitants, and 54 per cent in localities with 500 to 2,500 inhabitants. It was decided to concentrate public action on the third category of rural localities for the following reasons:

“In the first place, experience has shown that the total cost of works to provide basic public services—potable water, education, electrification etc.—generally does not vary significantly within this demographic range. At the same time, the cost per inhabitant for construction and operation of these services increases considerably as the localities become smaller.

¹⁷ See the Latin American chapters in the 1963 and 1967 *Report on the World Social Situation*; chapters VII and XIX in *Social Change and Social Development Policy in Latin America*, op. cit.; and Lawrence B. Moore, “La definición de áreas intraregionales de desarrollo rural” (ST/ECLA/Conf.34/L.5).

“In the second place, it could be hoped—and it seems to be happening thus—that governmental investments in the larger rural localities would be an element of demographic attraction for a part of the rural population that lives in more than 70,000 minuscule and dispersed localities. Thus, through a process of demographic aggregation it was hoped that a higher proportion of the population living in the countryside could be served.

“Finally, the rural atomization itself generally signifies extreme poverty of natural resources, so that the very small hamlets could hardly convert themselves into centres for demographic attraction.”¹⁸

The Mexican Rural Infrastructure Programme based on these criteria was initiated in 1968, and in 1969 comprised about 5,000 local projects in ten States. It is intended to have a directly redistributive effect among the major regions of the country, since the poorest regions have the highest proportions of population in localities of 500 to 2,500 inhabitants. Co-ordination takes place at the federal level, however, among nine public agencies responsible for different kinds of infrastructural works, and the programme does not seem to have been linked organizationally to the scheme for regional and sub-regional division of the country.

Programmes of this kind invariably count on local popular participation and are made up of measures that offer both threats and opportunities for manipulation to the traditional local power structures and to the emerging newer groups of small-town commercial middlemen, political organizers etc. The Mexican programme, for example, places a good deal of emphasis on the multiplication of local warehouses for agricultural produce, to be constructed and managed by the organized population nuclei from which produce can be sold directly to the state agricultural purchasing agency at guaranteed prices. It is probable that in much of Latin America the diffusion of education and mass communication media and the widening ties of the rural population to urban society and to national political structures have made policies of this kind more workable and less susceptible to manipulation than in the past, especially in the kinds of relatively large rural nuclei that the Mexican Programme is intended to reach. The realization of these possibilities, however, will depend in part on a real disposition on the part of the national sectoral agencies and regional planning bodies to welcome authentic and organized popular participation, in the face of the complications this may produce from the standpoint of the more technocratic current formulae for regional planning and micro-planning.¹⁹

Moreover, if a policy of concentration of the rural population is to accomplish more than facilitating the

¹⁸ Manuel Aguilera Gómez, “Los aspectos sociales del desarrollo regional en México”, documento de referencia No. 1, Seminario sobre Aspectos Sociales del Desarrollo Regional.

¹⁹ A recent publication incorporating reports on local investigations in several Latin American countries documents the incompatibility between the participatory objectives of many rural programmes and the local and national settings into which they are introduced, see United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, *Estudios de la Realidad Campesina: Cooperación y Cambio* (Geneva, 1970), preface by O. Fals Borda.

provision of services and the distribution of surplus foods, it must find ways of generating productive non-agricultural employment in the rural nuclei. As the *hacienda* system weakens, it is probable that concentration and dispersal of the rural population will proceed simultaneously. Some of the population expelled from the *haciendas* and the existing *minifundios* congregate on the periphery of the small towns, and some scatter to more remote marginal lands. The plight of the surplus rural population is such that any real benefits should tip the balance in the direction of concentration, but the problem of livelihood for the population thus concentrated will be very hard to solve.

Employment, human resources and income distribution

In all the countries of different types in Latin America, as much in the countries that have attained satisfactory rates of economic growth as in the others, deficiencies in employment and human resources utilization have increasingly come to the fore as central shortcomings in the current patterns of growth and change.²⁰ The main features of the problem revealed by statistical studies are the following:

(a) The population of working age (15 to 64 according to the conventional definition) is low as a percentage of the total population. Except for Argentina, Uruguay and Cuba, in which the population of working age is now 60 per cent or more of the total, the percentage in this age group elsewhere is below 55; in most countries it is closer to 50. Moreover, the percentage has been declining slowly over the past half-century, with the widening of the gap between fertility and mortality. In comparison, the percentages in the age group 15 to 64 are 65.0 in Western Europe, 63.0 in the Soviet Union, and 59.7 in the United States and Canada;²¹

(b) The economically active population is much lower as a percentage of the population of working age than in the economically advanced regions. The reason is a very low participation rate among women, which is found even in the Latin American countries in which fertility rates and the ratio of children to adults are low. Between 55 and 56 per cent of the population 15 to 64 is estimated to be economically active in Latin America as a whole, compared to 67.3 per cent in Western Europe. In both regions, around 90 per cent of the men of working age are active, but in most of Latin America the participation of women is below 20 per cent, rising to 25 per cent in the

countries with low dependency ratios, while it is nearly 60 per cent in Western Europe.²² (Since a significant number of persons younger than 15 or older than 64 actually work, the ratio of the *total* economically active population to the age group is somewhat higher in Latin America as well as elsewhere.) There is evidence for a few countries that participation rates have fallen in recent years, but it is not clear whether this is true more generally;²³

(c) The population classified as economically active is under-utilized. This deficiency is much harder to quantify than the first two, since it takes several different forms and the measurement of some of these depends on controvertible assumptions concerning developmental requirements. Any quantitative standard for "full employment" or "full utilization" is arbitrary unless it derives from a clearly defined development strategy and an image of the kind of social order toward which development is directed. The forms of under-utilization include unemployment, underemployment in terms of abnormally small numbers of hours or days worked in a given period, employment at skill levels not corresponding to the worker's qualifications, employment in low-productivity or superfluous occupations that, it is judged, would disappear if development generated a more vigorous demand for manpower. In a recent study taking into account all these forms, it was estimated that in 1960 more than 40 per cent of the active population of Latin America was under-utilized, and that this under-utilization represented the equivalent of an unemployment rate of 27.4 per cent of the active population. The same study calculates that the degree of under-utilization has been slowly increasing and that the present unemployment equivalent would be over 28 per cent. About half of the under-utilization in absolute terms is found in agriculture, although here the estimated rate is only slightly higher than that for the active population as a whole. The highest rates of unemployment equivalent are naturally found in the services (32.8 per cent) and unspecified activities (67.0 per cent) which, as is well known, have in recent years absorbed the bulk of the persons unable to find a livelihood elsewhere.²⁴ Other sources give much

²² In the Caribbean countries, female participation rates are significantly higher (36 per cent in Trinidad and Tobago in 1968) and are rising. This does not mean a fuller utilization of human resources, in view of high unemployment. The Government of Trinidad and Tobago has expressed concern that cheaper female labour is being substituted for male, and that rising female participation is thus accompanied by rising male unemployment (*Third Five-Year Plan, 1969-1973*, op. cit., p. 106).

²³ In Colombia, according to census data, the participation rate fell from 58.56 per cent in 1951 to 54.63 per cent in 1964. The drop was entirely accounted for by the male workers, while the women slightly raised their low participation rate (from 20.60 to 21.06 per cent) (Colombia, Departamento Nacional de Planificación, *El Empleo en Colombia: Diagnóstico y Recomendaciones de Política* (Documento DNP-394-URH-Rev.1, junio de 1969).

²⁴ These estimates derive from a study conducted jointly by the Latin American Institute for Economic and Social Planning (ILPES), and the Latin American Demographic Centre (CELADE), with co-operation of various national research institutes. Preliminary findings are presented in documents prepared by ILPES for a Seminar on National Development with Integration, Mexico, August 1969. See in particular, "Elementos para la elaboración de una política de desarrollo con integración para América Latina, síntesis y conclusiones" (INST/S.4/L.2).

²⁰ Different aspects of the employment problem are discussed in numerous documents of the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Latin American Institute for Economic and Social Planning. The present section is able to touch on only a few of the important factors. See chapter VIII in *Social Change and Social Development Policy in Latin America*, op. cit.; the 1968 and 1969 *Economic Surveys of Latin America: Education, Human Resources and Development in Latin America* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 68.II.G.7); *Consideraciones sobre Ocupación Industrial*, and Esteban Lederman, *Los Recursos Humanos en el Desarrollo de América Latina* (No. 8 and No. 9 in Serie II, Cuadernos del Instituto Latinoamericano de Planificación Económica y Social, 1969), also the joint Latin American Institute for Economic and Social Planning (ILPES), Latin American Demographic Centre (CELADE) studies cited below.

²¹ For detailed statistics and sources see chapter IV in *Social Change and Social Development Policy in Latin America*, op. cit.

higher estimates for under-utilization of the active population in agriculture. It is particularly significant that in Mexico, a country with consistently favourable rates of growth both in national income and in agricultural production, the under-utilization of labour in agriculture has been calculated at 71 per cent;²⁵

(d) The part of the active population that has attained relatively high levels of formal occupational qualifications does not find a consistently strong offer of employment making use of these qualifications and providing commensurate rewards, in spite of the oft-repeated arguments concerning lack of skills as hindrances to development. This problem has many aspects and is still harder to quantify. One must keep in mind such factors as the gap between formal qualifications and real qualifications deriving from the chaotic expansion of low-quality secondary and higher education, and the continuing importance of ascription and class solidarity (however camouflaged behind regulations requiring open competition or academic degress) in filling the more desirable professional posts. The unemployment of some professionals and technicians is notoriously accompanied by multiple job-holding by many others, either because they possess outstanding real qualifications or because they enjoy preferential access to the sources of professional employment. This form of under-utilization is most conspicuous in the countries of type I, but is also beginning to appear in most of the other types. In Chile, a study by the Oficina de Planeamiento de la Educación has reached the conclusion that in 1969 the supply of higher level personnel was about 102,000 and the demand 89,000; for 1975 a supply of 161,000 and a demand of 127,000 was forecast. The only sizable shortages in both years were for certain types of technicians and these shortages (4,672 in 1969 and 6,952 in 1975) were not enough to reduce the over-all surplus very much.²⁶ In Colombia, high-level administrators constitute the only specialization for which demand is now in excess of supply. This situation of generalized excess of professional and skilled manpower is said to be relatively new in Colombia; it has been suggested that the educational system is now producing a supply greater than the demand, although lower than that required by developmental needs.²⁷ It is generally agreed that the balance between different levels and types of advanced qualifications imparted by the educational systems is unsatisfactory, and that the quality

²⁵ The potential working capacity of the rural active population was calculated at 11,900.5 million of man-hours and the number of man-hours applied to production at 3,454.7 million, leaving 8,445.8 million man-hours wasted. The calculations apply to 1960, but the situation does not seem to have improved (Manuel Aguilera Gómez, *op. cit.*).

²⁶ Ernesto Schiefelbein F., *Oferta y Demanda de Personal de Nivel Superior* (Superintendencia de Educación, Oficina de Planeamiento de la Educación, Santiago, Chile, septiembre de 1969). In both years the largest excess of supply over demand (18,907 to 6,670 in 1969 and 30,916 to 9,950 in 1975) was in a miscellaneous category absorbing mainly persons with incomplete higher education (salesmen, various kinds of employees etc.) but engineers, social workers, secondary and vocational school teachers etc. were also in excess.

²⁷ Colombia, Departamento Nacional de Planeación, *op. cit.*, citing a Rand Corporation memorandum by Robert L. Slighton, "Relative wages, skill shortages and changes in income distribution in Colombia".

is often too low to make the holders of certificates attractive to employers. It is also agreed that part of the apparent surplus derives from the refusal of professionals and technicians to accept jobs in the more remote and uncomfortable parts of a country, and that the high-income countries are exercising an excessive attraction for many types of professionals by means of pay and living conditions that the home countries cannot match. In any case, there is evidence that technicians and skilled workers with the specializations supposed to be most in demand, and with real qualifications high enough to insure them well-paying jobs in such countries as Australia and Canada, are beginning to leave Latin America in appreciable numbers, partly because of inability to find jobs at home that make full use of their skills.

How is this formidable range of deficiencies to be explained? Why has it not had a more inhibiting effect on economic growth and a more inflammatory effect on social unrest? Why are the deficiencies similar in quite different types of countries and in countries with high as well as low rates of economic growth? What should be the objectives for employment and human resource utilization within a development strategy?

The central problem does not seem to lie in the high dependency ratios that are frequently cited as explanations for low productivity and lagging output. These ratios do not explain why a high proportion of the potential labour force remains inactive or why the active population is so poorly utilized. The explanation that frequent child-bearing keeps many women out of the labour force must have some validity, but does not explain why the rates of female participation are nearly as low in urbanized countries—with fertility rates and dependency ratios similar to those of Europe or the United States—as in Argentina and Uruguay. Differences in cultural expectations concerning the proper role of women cannot be of much importance in these countries, whose populations are largely of recent European origin. The main inference seems to be that the demand for labour is so weak that women are not attracted to economic activity.

Nor can the fact that a high proportion of the men as well as the women who do work are confined to marginal, insecure, intermittent and poorly paid occupations, be attributed mainly to the low levels of education and skills. Throughout Latin America, except in the few national situations approximating to type IV, educational levels have risen impressively during the past decade, without any general effect on occupational opportunities except to raise the minimum education requirements for all kinds of jobs, except in marginal self-employment. In fact, the worker with a few years of primary education may now be at a greater disadvantage in seeking stable employment than the completely illiterate worker of a few years ago. Nor does the increased supply of persons with higher occupational qualifications seem to have had the expected benefit in removing bottle-necks in the hiring of persons with lower skills. Bottle-necks in the supply of skills for industrial expansion can be readily identified and call for expanded technical training but, as the Chilean estimates indicate, this real demand is quite limited in scope. The high rates of increase of the active popu-

lation presumably make its absorption much more difficult, but the problem of under-utilization of human resources is particularly acute in Uruguay, which has the lowest rate of increase and one of the highest educational levels in Latin America.

It follows that the current patterns of economic growth are quite compatible with low rates of utilization of the potential labour force, and it is arguable that these patterns ensure the under-utilization and marginalization of part of the labour force. Some of the reasons are obvious. In industry, agriculture, construction, commercial and financial services, and even in the public administration, the technologies now being introduced into Latin America present opportunities for increases in production combined with reductions in the labour force, opportunities that are limited only by the inability of the small internal markets to absorb production on the scale called for by the most modern methods.

Within these patterns of growth, economic arguments and formulae for full employment policy lose much of their point. There is no reason to believe that a strategy designed to bring a maximum proportion of the working age group into the labour market would be the most efficient way to raise production. This could be accomplished more cheaply and rapidly by technological and managerial innovation, with a stationary but better qualified labour force. Calculations that have been made of the capital investment required for each new job in industry or agriculture, on the basis of the technologies now available, lead to disheartening conclusions on the practicability of absorbing the great mass of under-utilized labour in this way. Within the existing patterns, moreover, there is no reason to believe that the additional jobs would be forthcoming if the whole population of working age were trained and motivated to seek them. The result might be general frustration and even more unmanageable pressures on the public sector to satisfy the employment expectations thus aroused. Lastly, in the absence of the kind of income redistribution to be discussed below, coupled with a real breakthrough in the drive for exports of manufactures, there is no reason to believe that there would be a market for the increased production.

The really convincing reasons for regarding low participation rates and the under-utilization of human resources both intolerable and remediable seem to be quite different and to call for far-reaching changes in the objectives of development, the patterns of economic growth, the functions envisaged for employment and the distribution of power in society.

Employment is an indispensable mechanism for income distribution and also for participation in society, as well as for the attainment of a satisfactory level of production of goods and services. Ideally, if an economy can produce more with less human labour, the society can set out deliberately to redistribute the resulting income and enhance human well-being in several ways: (a) through shorter working hours, longer vacations, later entry into the labour force and earlier retirement, so as to ensure that income-earning employment is within reach of the entire adult population during part of the life-span; (b) through subsidies to the population unable to earn a minimum livelihood, irrespective of employment status, supported by progressive taxation (guaranteed annual income, or negative income-tax); (c) through public educational, health, cultural, recreational and other social services. The last approach would serve the double purpose of providing creative employment for a large part of the adult population not needed for production and of raising the quality of life of the whole population.

In practice, a wide range of measures along these lines have appeared in the Latin American countries, and their further piecemeal growth seems inevitable, but the results often have been economically disastrous, inequitable and self-defeating in relation to declared purposes. The State lacks the political backing and administrative capacity to provide adequate services, to maintain a floor under the levels of living for a large non-productive population, or even to regulate equitably the distribution of access to employment. Moreover, the present patterns of supply and demand associated with extreme under-utilization of human resources have inherent limitations that would prevent production from reaching a level at which subsidization of the surplus population could be afforded. On the one hand, further economic growth is stunted by an inability to distribute incomes through employment in a way that would widen the domestic markets. On the other hand, the State is increasingly compelled to try to remedy this deficiency through measures of public assistance and job creation, which lay a heavy burden on the productive activities without really meeting needs or alleviating social tensions.

Some calculations made for the joint Latin American Institute for Economic and Social Planning (ILPES) and Latin American Demographic Centre (CELADE) studies already cited bring out the former limitation, although the conjectural nature of the figures and the wide differences between countries should be kept in mind. These calcu-

Category	Percentage of total population composing group	Percentage of total personal income received by group	Average personal income per capita		Monthly family income (in \$U.S.)		
			Percentage relation to general average	In \$U.S.	Average	Limits	
						From	To
I	40	8.8	22	77	0	66	
II	20	10.2	51	179	67	102	
III	35	49.7	142	497	103	473	
IV	5	31.3	626	2,190	474	and over	

lations arrive at the following conjectural distribution of income in 1960 among four population groups.²⁸

These four incomes groups naturally spend their incomes quite differently:

income, its contribution to saving for investment is low, and much of its saving is diverted abroad.

It has been repeatedly pointed out that the upper-income minority models its consumption on the standards

*Percentages of demand for private consumption of goods produced in each sector, accounted for by the different income groups
(All percentages rounded)*

Sectors of production	Income groups				
	I	II	III	IV	Total
Unprocessed foods	59	12	26	3	100
Processed foods, beverages and tobacco . . .	3	15	57	25	100
Clothing and footwear	10	11	53	26	100
Furniture	5	11	69	15	100
Chemical products	7	18	57	18	100
Metal products and machinery	1	3	45	51	100
Transport equipment	—	2	42	56	100
Petroleum products and miscellaneous manufactured goods	26	19	47	8	100
Services	6	11	51	32	100
Importance of the demand of each group as a percentage of total consumption . . .	10.5	11.5	50.1	27.9	100

The lower 49 per cent of the population, with less than 9 per cent of the income, is important as a market only for unprocessed foods. (It is notorious that this group is nevertheless ill-fed, and it is also arguable that public policies aimed at keeping food prices at a level permitting it to purchase a minimum subsistence act as a disincentive to the production of staple foods.) The next higher 20 per cent of the population also has a very limited, although more widely distributed, purchasing power. The upper-middle 35 per cent constitutes the main market for most goods and services, but the upper 5 per cent dominates in relation to the two categories on which industrial growth has concentrated in recent years—automobiles and other durable consumer goods. This 5 per cent of the population receives more than 30 per cent of the personal income, compared to about 20 per cent in the United Kingdom or the United States and 15 per cent in some Scandinavian countries. While it is the only group for which the share in consumption falls below the share in

of the economically advanced countries, especially the United States, with the significant addition of abundant domestic service. Since the average family income within the upper 5 per cent is not particularly high in comparison with the average middle-class income in the countries imitated, and since automobiles and other durable consumer goods are much more expensive in the Latin American countries, the low level of saving is easily understandable.

The concentration of demand for manufactures in the upper-income minority produces distortions and restrictions in the internal market for consumer goods that would not be overcome even if Latin American integration greatly increased the size of the market. It has been noted that each of the import-substitution industries producing durable goods, after an initial rapid spurt, falls into stagnation once it has satisfied the upper-income market for refrigerators, television receivers etc. According to the ILPES-CELADE studies, less than 60 per cent of the installed industrial capacity in 1960-1963 was utilized. Industrialization advances not by broadening the domestic market for mass-produced goods, but by diversification—that is, by continually offering new kinds of goods to the small upper-income market.

The under-utilization of human resources and income concentration are thus parts of a vicious circle. The low-income majority exerts little demand for goods and services because earnings are low and intermittent, and must be stretched to provide subsistence for a large dependent population. Employment is scarce because demand concentrates on durable goods that are unavoidably capital-intensive in production techniques and that require imported equipment and materials.

The above is a deliberately over-simplified picture excluding many important factors that enter into the under-utilization of human resources and the marginaliz-

²⁸ The extreme unevenness of income distribution in Latin America and its implications for development have been discussed in a series of ECLA studies. The most recent findings of these studies are summarized in the 1969 *Economic Survey of Latin America* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 71.II.G.1) and are also to be presented in full in a publication on income distribution in Latin America. The table reproduced here is based on statistics collected by ECLA but makes use of a different breakdown into groups. The latter breakdown is used here because it permits a comparison with the calculation of consumer demand, which is based on family budget studies in several countries. While the above calculations refer to 1960, and over-all income levels are now higher, it is probable that the percentage distribution has not changed very much except in one or two countries. The change would not affect the regional average significantly. The ECLA publications give the top 5 per cent of the population an even larger share in 1965, that is, 33.4 per cent of total income.

ation of part of the labour force.²⁹ Consumer demand among the lower-middle and even the marginal strata, under the influence of the mass communication media, is acquiring traits rather similar to upper-income demand: a taste for novelty and diversity in manufactured goods that diverts much of the limited purchasing power away from what might be considered more basic needs. The ubiquitousness of transistor radios, plastic products and some other artifacts in remote rural zones as well as urban marginal settlements indicates that the poor somehow enter the market for new consumer goods when the lure is strong enough, and some industries do cultivate a demand from these strata.

Institutional factors that make labour costly and troublesome to the employer (such as the entangled protective and job-security legislation and the social security systems) and artificially cheap capital (such as subsidized credits and especially favourable exchange rates for imports of machinery) influence choices between labour-intensive and capital-intensive techniques in the direction of the latter. Motivations and values also enter into the picture, as do the physical and mental traits of the "marginalized" and chronically under-nourished part of the population of working age. Population groups that have adapted themselves to marginality, acquiring a range of expedients and attitudes that enable them to survive and obtain some gratification, cannot be expected to respond promptly to opportunities that would require them to face new kinds of challenges and make a more disciplined work effort. This would be as true of superfluous public employees as of groups subsisting through street occupations, casual labour and public assistance.

Nevertheless, the diagnosis of the relationship between under-utilization of labour and income concentration seems to be close enough to reality to lend plausibility to the conclusion that the vicious circle of stagnating production, underemployment and poverty can be broken only through simultaneous action on several fronts. The structure of production will not shift towards the cheap consumer goods needed by the masses, adaptable to production by relatively labour-intensive methods, and absorptive of domestic raw materials, until the masses have purchasing power to absorb the goods. The masses will not have purchasing power until they have productive employment, much of which must be provided by economic activities producing goods and services (including housing) for their own consumption. The case for large-scale and rapid agrarian reform is closely related to this general proposition.

The practical problems in the way of a national policy aiming to change simultaneously and in a mutually-

supporting fashion the patterns of production and of income distribution are many, and cannot be discussed here. For present purposes it is important to point out that an authentic attempt to implement such a policy would go to the heart of the problem of popular participation in development. The strata with low purchasing power and restricted to marginal ways of livelihood are, almost by definition, the strata that have least power to obtain from the national society policies favourable to their needs. The strata deriving benefits from the present structures of production and incomes, and the externally-controlled enterprises that increasingly dominate production for the upper-income market, cannot be expected to accept drastic changes in expectations, rewards and ways of life simply because one school of analysts and planners demonstrates that the existing patterns of growth are unlikely to generate self-sustaining development or serve human welfare. Moreover, if the marginalized strata gain sufficient power to compel attention to their needs, it is very problematic whether they would accept the roles as producers and consumers—at earning and consumption levels well below those attained by a few occupational sectors with high productivity or high bargaining power—that the proposed approach allots to them.

Youth and the labour market

Under conditions of a chronically slack demand for labour, it might be expected that the hardest hit would be the youth seeking jobs for the first time. This is probably true for most of Latin America, although there are very few data bearing on their situation within the wider picture of under-utilization.³⁰ With the youthful age structures found in most of Latin America and the high rates of population movement out of agriculture, it can plausibly be conjectured that the new entrants to the non-agricultural active population each year amount to about 7 per cent of the size of the existing active population, and that a very high percentage of the total labour force consists of young people with brief work experience. It may be worthwhile to present some conjectures concerning different implications of this situation:

(a) First, the slack demand for labour might be expected to push upward the average age of entry into the labour force, and to strengthen pressures for expansion of secondary and higher education, partly to provide better qualifications and partly to keep the unemployed youth occupied. This seems to be happening in the countries of types I and VI, and in a more limited way among the middle strata in types II and III, but more generally the urban youth from the lower-income strata continue to seek a livelihood from marginal activities supplemented by aid from the family;

(b) Secondly, the expansion of education during the past decade has changed the relative advantages of youth from the different social strata very little. As indicated

²⁹ See the discussion of marginality and marginalization in the Latin American chapter of the *1967 Report on the World Social Situation* and in chapter V of *Social Change and Social Development Policy in Latin America*. Field investigations of marginal groups now being undertaken by the secretariat of ECLA and by several other institutions in Latin America are expected to contribute to a more adequate understanding of this very complex phenomenon. The preliminary findings of a research project carried out under the auspices of the Centro de Investigaciones Sociales, Instituto Torcuato di Tella, Buenos Aires, are of particular interest. See José Nun, "Superpoblación relativa, ejército industrial de reserva y masa marginal", and other articles in *Revista Latinoamericana de Sociología*, vol. 2 (julio de 1969).

³⁰ According to sample surveys in the main cities of Colombia, Colombians tend to enter the labour force early, but 70 per cent of unemployment is found among persons under 34. Among those unemployed for over a year, persons seeking work for the first time are disproportionately represented. (Colombia, Departamento Nacional de Planeación, op. cit.)

above, the educational requirements of all kinds of jobs except the most marginal have risen, and to the extent that labour supply has exceeded demand, they have risen faster than educational levels and act as a screening device and a means of restricting the more desirable jobs to the social strata previously monopolizing them. In this way, certain groups retain preferential access to the qualifying levels of education;

(c) Thirdly, the disadvantages for youth entering the labour market may be offset—in the countries in which educational expansion and socio-economic change have both been rapid—by their possession of educational levels considerably higher than those of the older generation. In Venezuela, sample surveys among the rural population indicated that illiteracy has fallen to only 5.5 per cent in the age group 7-14, while nearly a quarter of the population 15 years and over is illiterate. It is probable that similar discrepancies exist at higher educational levels and even between closely adjoining age groups. To the extent that technological change forces urban workers to seek new occupations, the youth should have an advantage—assuming that education has equipped them with the relevant qualifications;

(d) Fourthly, the signs of saturation of demand at most levels of the job market suggest that the more highly educated are going to face frustrating difficulties as well as the under-educated. Up to the present, educated unemployment has not been a major problem in most of Latin America, partly because the distribution of education has been closely associated with power and wealth, and the families able to give their children protracted education have also been able to exert pressure for the creation of sufficient jobs for them, whether in the public service or in private commercial and financial sectors. By now this recourse is reaching the saturation point, and secondary and higher education have expanded far beyond the circles able to exercise it effectively. The youth with academic secondary education or incomplete higher education are likely to find themselves in a particularly frustrating situation. The alternatives open to them, aside from continued dependence on their families and continuing pressure for expansion of office employment, are to accept previously unwanted jobs in remote parts of the country, to accept jobs with lower status—thereby displacing less-educated candidates—and to emigrate. The first and second courses are resorted to only reluctantly.³¹ The third is open only to a limited proportion with qualifications wanted in the high-income countries;

³¹ "One often sees, for example, that young men with secondary education refuse jobs such as foreman, truck driver or field supervisor that imply having to take off their grey jackets and act away from a desk. This occurs in spite of the fact that in these occupations the income is generally better than that of an office worker. Many consider the acceptance of such jobs which, although they involve working in the field, are not really manual labour as an insult to the education received. This seems to be most frequent among persons of lower or middle-class origin who have interiorized certain middle-class images concerning 'correct' or 'decent' occupations. As a result, whole generations are condemned to petty posts as office workers." (Pablo Huneeus, Director, Servicio Nacional de Empleo, Chile, *El Problema de Empleo y Recursos Humanos: Ideas para una Política* (Santiago de Chile, Editorial Andrés Bello, 1970).)

(e) Fifthly, the process of urbanization might be expected to make unemployment and underemployment among youth much more visible and potentially disruptive. Millions of youth are now looking for work in the cities who would previously have vegetated on *minifundios*, or in the families of resident workers on *haciendas* (tolerated as a labour reserve for peak periods), or in small-town family artisanal occupations and vending. In practice, the consequences of this change remain less visible than might have been expected. Marginal means of livelihood and informal mutual aid in the family retain unexpected resilience, and the signs of explosive discontent continue to appear mainly among the youth from the middle strata in the universities and secondary schools prior to entry into the job market.

Generalizations concerning city growth and rural-urban migration continue to rest on shaky informational bases, in the absence of census data revealing what has happened during the 1960s, when the scale and complexity of these processes must have increased enormously. There is no reason to doubt that young adults continue to predominate in migration to the principal cities, with consequent distortions of the age structures of the rural areas and many small towns. The weight of evidence from field investigations, however, is contrary to the view, continually repeated in articles on urban problems, that migrants to these centres are mainly uprooted "peasants" and their children. The direct contribution of the countryside to urbanization seems to have been more important at the level of the small town and provincial city, while these in turn feed the metropolis, partly with migrants born in the countryside. From the standpoint of the modern metropolis, of course, the cultural traits of the small-town migrants might well appear rural. Field investigations along with the course of history over the past decade have also discredited earlier notions that the migrants are invariably the most "marginal" parts of the big city population, or that they are frustrated by their urban experience to the edge of revolutionary violence. Sociological opinion has swung towards a quite different interpretation: that even the more precariously situated migrants feel that their foothold in the city is a real gain, that they are too preoccupied with the endless search for livelihood and shelter to entertain revolutionary purposes, and that they are resigned to playing a minor role in the urban political game in exchange for small concessions and subsidies. Where they have used violent tactics, the violence seems to have been representational—a means to get a hearing for limited grievances—rather than revolutionary in intent.³² Two questions remain open, however: (a) whether present-day migrant youth and the children of earlier migrants to the great cities will resign themselves to similarly limited and precarious participation in urban life; and (b) whether the urban economies will be able to offer them even this little, in view of the marginalizing trends of the labour market and the inability of the authorities to finance and administer adequate social services.

³² For the distinction between types of violence, see Martin C. Needler, *Political Development in Latin America* (New York, Random House, 1968).

During the 1960s most of the Latin American countries have advanced, at widely differing rates and with differing internal patterns, in a "modernization" highly dependent on external influences and models. Some of them, at least, are now reaching the targets for rates of economic growth and rates of expansion of social services that were formulated at the beginning of the decade. Even in these favourable cases, however, the economic and social order does not correspond much better than before to the hopes that were invested in the term "development", and they have reasons for doubt whether present lines of growth can be maintained indefinitely. A new stage is emerging, not yet clearly defined, in which most of the previous objectives and policies are still current, and in fact are being insisted upon with even greater urgency, but in which new conceptions and approaches, some of which bring into question the very meaning of development, are coming to the fore.

This chapter has tried to suggest through a typology the range of national situations and the differing problems and potentialities they imply for further economic growth and social change. It then singles out a few problem areas in which the deficiencies of present patterns are particularly conspicuous, and in relation to which it is particularly the countries in which growth and change have been rapid that now feel a need to rethink their policies and planning systems. The problem areas are: (a) the extreme inequality in development between internal regions; (b) the incapacity of the economies to give sufficient productive employment to a youthful and rapidly growing labour force; (c) the extremely uneven income distribution, with low rates of saving and excessive luxury consumption at the upper end, and inadequate purchasing power in the majority. Other problem areas that deserve comparable attention have been set aside because they have been discussed in some detail in the Latin American chapters of previous *Reports on the World Social Situation*. These include the notoriously rapid growth and urban concentration of the population, and the inability of the existing systems of political compromise to cope with the pressures generated by the struggle of new social strata to enter the compromise and obtain a fairer share of the services and subsidies distributed by the State.

In all these problem areas policy formulae are plentiful, but the difficulties in the way of applying the recipes are formidable. Moreover, there is a good deal of uncertainty as to whether the problems have yet been formulated correctly, whether the underlying causes are understood, and whether symptoms are not being confused with causes. Some of the proposed solutions may be irrelevant, ineffective because they deal only with symptoms, inapplicable within the context of present power structures, or productive of new difficulties when applied in the piecemeal fashion that existing administrative and financial capacities give reason to expect. The brief discussions of the problem areas in this chapter can do no more than outline some of the questions into which policy-oriented economic and social research in Latin America will have to continue to probe during the 1970s.

Among the Commonwealth Caribbean countries, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago and Barbados have had—for the period under review—a comparatively high *per capita* income for developing countries.³⁴ From these favourable figures, it might be inferred that the benefits accruing from the annual rise in GNP of these countries permeates all levels of their population and would be a reliable indicator of the levels of living of the population in general. However, this is not the case. The social situation in the area provides a useful illustration of the premise that *per capita* income is inadequate as a measure of levels of living, although it might be considered a measure of means.³⁵

This uneven situation in living conditions created by the continuing wide gap in income between persons in the upper and middle social levels on the one hand and those in the lower on the other, not to mention the high percentage of unemployed, is reflected to a large extent in the manpower and employment situation. Despite an apparent surplus of trained personnel in some fields, in others there is a shortage of labour, while unemployment and underemployment rates are generally high. Between 1962 and 1968, it is estimated that 85 scientists, 725 teachers, 166 engineers, 136 dentists and doctors and 640 nurses emigrated from Trinidad and Tobago to Canada and the United States.³⁶ While to a large extent many qualified people emigrate from the area in search of better jobs, greater opportunities for research and financial security, there are some, on the other hand, who seem to have emigrated because of a surplus of trained manpower in certain fields.

Jobs in the towns and cities, especially for the unskilled, are scarce and the flow of unskilled job seekers to urban centres continues to increase, resulting in a high unemployment rate. At the same time, a shortage of labour exists in the more traditional agricultural industries such as sugar-cane and bananas. In the sugar industry in Jamaica, sixteen factories were operating in 1968 but by the end of 1969 several had closed down—largely because of the shortage of skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled workers. The low yield of the cane and the need for mechanization also contributed to the deteriorating situation. Rapid urbanization in some of the larger

³³ The term "Commonwealth Caribbean" connotes the four fully independent countries of Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, the territories of Antigua, Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, St. Lucia and St. Vincent, which have now the status of associated statehood with the United Kingdom, and the British Colony of Montserrat. The West Indies Associated States are fully autonomous except that their defence and external affairs are managed by the United Kingdom.

³⁴ The figure for Jamaica is \$U.S.443 (1969), see Central Planning Unit, *Economic Survey of Jamaica 1969* (Kingston, Government Printery, 1969), p. 3; for Trinidad and Tobago, it is \$U.S.633 (1968), see *Statistical Yearbook 1969* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 70.XVII.1), table 182, p. 559; and for Barbados it is \$U.S.409 (1968), see *ibid.*

³⁵ *Social Policy and the Distribution of Income* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 69.IV.7), p. 87 *et seq.*

³⁶ "Outflow of trained personnel from developed to developing countries: report of the Secretary-General" (E/4820), annex I, table 1, p. 50.

countries has contributed to this labour shortage in a few areas while in most rural areas and in the cities the unemployment rate remains high. For instance Kingston, the capital of Jamaica, now has about 25 per cent of the entire population of the island. The drift from the countryside has been accelerated mainly by the desire to find steady, more secure and remunerative jobs in the cities and in the bauxite and oil industries and in a growing number of light industries. While the shortage of labour in agriculture in some areas is a result of emigration from the countryside, there is also a shortage of skilled workers in some emerging industries owing to the lack of a sufficient number of middle-level trained persons and to the outflow. For instance, it is estimated that by 1975 Jamaica will need 59,000 high and middle-level trained persons.³⁷ In 1968 it was estimated that in Trinidad and Tobago 7,600 supervisory workers and 6,600 technicians and craftsmen were needed, and that 16 per cent of the civil service posts were vacant.

Coupled with the question of jobs and manpower in the subregion are such issues as the degree of dependence of foreign investment, the achievement of a satisfactory balance between local and foreign interests, local employment needs in relation to the policies of foreign-based firms, and the granting of due priority to the social needs of the people in locally based foreign investment projects and in working out goals for national development policies and plans. All these questions are basic to the problems of social needs and social development in the Caribbean.

Traditionally, a number of Caribbean island societies have shown a capacity to generate their own momentum for political as well as economic and social change. This capacity has continued to manifest itself in recent years. The momentum, however, has undoubtedly gained through external influences both regional and international. There are those for instance who have expressed their desire for change through slogans borrowed from the "black power" movement in the United States. This development has not, however, manifested itself, except perhaps in one case, in any organized or unified form. In fact, the goals vary in the different countries of the subregion. For instance, in Guyana and Trinidad and Tobago, where there are large East Indian populations and where political affiliations are largely determined by ethnic origin, the black power slogans may be ambivalent. The slogans have been used either to polarize or to cut across issues of ethnic group aspirations such as those of Blacks and Indians. Another way in which the local scene is being influenced by international events is demonstrated by the activities of students from the regional university colleges and some other young people. A number of these students and young people have on certain occasions identified themselves with the causes of lower-income groups, unemployed and underemployed persons in protesting existing conditions and the systems that maintain them.

Trends in regional co-operation and demographic growth

During the 1960s, four of the former British colonies in the Caribbean attained full independence and six others—

³⁷ *The Jamaica Weekly Overseas Gleaner* (7 October 1970), p. 14, cols. 1-6.

small islands of the Leeward and Windward group—became Associated States to the United Kingdom. With independence, these Caribbean countries and territories have shown considerable interest in planning for development.

The historical relationships between individual territories in the region and the metropolitan countries have resulted in strong economic and institutional ties. At the same time, contacts among most individual Caribbean countries have in the past been weak. However, there has been a growing awareness among the Governments of the region of the urgent need for closer regional co-operation. Efforts towards this end have so far culminated in the formation of the Caribbean Free Trade Association (CARIFTA)³⁸ and the establishment of the Caribbean Regional Development Bank. An important feature of the CARIFTA agreement has been the adoption of an Agricultural Marketing Protocol (listing some twenty-two commodities), which requires that member countries import these commodities from outside the CARIFTA region only if they cannot be supplied from within it. The establishment of a Regional Development Agency for Barbados and the Associates States charged with the responsibility of formulating and co-ordinating joint development projects for its member territories is another significant step.

In recent years, closer relationships have been developed with the neighbouring Latin American countries, and three countries in the region have become members of the Organization of American States. These trends in the political and economic fields are significant for over-all social development in the region.

As in the case of several developing countries, the pressure of increasing population poses a formidable challenge to development in the small Caribbean countries and territories. The total population of the Commonwealth Caribbean countries, which was 3.7 million in 1960, was estimated at 4.3 million in 1967. This increase ranged between 5 and 23 per cent. According to rough projections, the total population of the region will have increased to about 5.6 million by 1985. The density of population (according to the 1967 figures) is over 350 per square mile in all but two of the eleven territories in the region; in four of them it exceeds 500. Barbados has a staggering density of 1,482 persons per square mile. Although Guyana has a low density of eight persons per square mile, vast sections of the country are still undeveloped and unsettled and will require large financial investment for their development. The dependency rate was over 80 in all the eleven countries in 1960, while in three of them it exceeded 100. Of the four countries for which data for 1968 are available, two had a dependency rate exceeding 100 and in one case it was 130.

Available statistics indicate that the emigration figures have nearly doubled in a few countries between 1960 and 1967, with a sharp decline in the number of persons migrating to the United Kingdom since 1962 with the adoption of the Commonwealth Immigration Act and an increase in the number of those migrating to the United

³⁸ All the Commonwealth Caribbean countries are signatories to this agreement. British Honduras and the Dominican Republic have indicated their willingness to join the Association.

TABLE 3. COMMONWEALTH CARIBBEAN : SOME DEMOGRAPHIC INDICATORS

Country	Population in 1967 (thousands)	Percentage increase of population from 1960 to 1967	Density per square mile (1967)	Life expectancy at birth 1959-1961		Dependency rate ^a	
				Male	Female	1960	1968
Barbados	246	6.0	1,482	62.74	67.43	83.5	78.8
Guyana	680	21.7	8	59.03	63.01	90.0	...
Jamaica	1,876	16.3	425	62.65	66.63	83.5	101.1
Trinidad and Tobago	1,016	22.7	513	62.15	66.33	89.0	85.0
Antigua	61	13.0	359	60.48	64.32	89.7	...
Dominica	70	16.7	230	56.97 ^b	59.18 ^b	112.1	...
Grenada	99	11.2	756	60.14	65.60	112.1	130.0
Montserrat	14	16.7	457	104.4	...
St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla	60	5.3	392	57.97	59.61	99.3	...
St. Lucia	105	22.1	441	55.13	58.47	96.2	...
St. Vincent	91	13.8	607	58.46	59.67	111.5	...

SOURCES: Official Statistics of the Governments and United Nations *Demographic Yearbook, 1967* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: E/F.68.XIII.1).

^a Denoting the number of persons under 15 and over 65 years of age to every 100 persons in the 15-64 age group.

^b For the years 1958 to 1962.

States of America and Canada. There is also a high rate of migration between the islands, particularly from the smaller islands to the larger such as from Grenada and St. Kitts to Trinidad and Tobago. This migration helps to relieve unemployment at home and brings in sizable sums of money in the form of migrants' remittances to relatives at home. At the same time this outflow tends to siphon off the more educated and trained persons in the population.

It has been estimated that between June 1962 and June 1967, 1,127 engineers and 1,184 doctors migrated from the West Indies to the United States and that between 1962 and 1965, out of every seven newly trained West Indian midwives, four emigrated.³⁹ Of the 3,800 Jamaican emigrants interviewed in 1962, only 2.5 per cent had never attended school, whereas the corresponding figure for the total population of Jamaica was 16 per cent. Fifty per cent of the interviewees who were fifteen years of age and over had had some vocational training, while according to the 1960 census figures only about 10 per cent of Jamaica's population of ten years of age and over had acquired some form of vocational training.⁴⁰ As for Trinidad and Tobago, in 1967 of the total number of permanent visas issued to migrants to the United States of America, about 27 per cent were to professional and technical workers; craftsmen and other skilled workers accounted for about 26 per cent of the total

number of visas and clerical workers for nearly 27 per cent. In other words, some four fifths of the migrants to the United States of America in that year were among the country's better qualified workers in the labour force.⁴¹

Youth

Throughout the region, according to the 1960 census figures, the 10-19 age-group constituted about 21 per cent of the total population. From data available for a few territories, the juvenile delinquency rate⁴² ranged from 3.3 to 9 per 1,000 in recent years, although the rate tends to increase in the cities. In Jamaica, for instance, though the island-wide rate in 1966 for eight to sixteen year-olds was only about 9 per 1,000, the rate for major urban area male juveniles in the age-group 14-16 was about 31 per thousand.

The Caribbean Regional Workshop on Integrated Rural Development held in October 1969 stressed the need for the formulation of national policies on youth, and proposed that such a policy should recognize three basic principles, namely that:

(a) The emphasis should be on positive resources development rather than on problem-centred development;

(b) The approach should be an integral one, covering the various aspects of the question such as social environment, educational system and employment opportunities;

³⁹ See "Outflow of trained personnel from developing countries: report of the Secretary-General" (A/7294), pp. 60 and 26.

⁴⁰ O. C. Francis, "The characteristics of immigrants just prior to changes in the British Commonwealth migration policy", in S. Andic and T. G. Matthews, eds., *The Caribbean in Transition* (Rio Piedras, Puerto Rico, Institute of Caribbean Studies, 1965), pp. 91-121.

⁴¹ Based on official statistics of the Government of Trinidad and Tobago.

⁴² The legally defined age-range of youth, who come under the jurisdiction of juvenile courts, varies in the different territories.

(c) The strategy should be part of the over-all national development effort.⁴³

Some of the Governments of the region have adopted national youth policies. With a view to giving youth a sense of real involvement and participation in national development activities, one Government has established an advisory council, consisting of young people, to the Ministry of Youth and Community Development, and another Government has made provision to nominate a representative of the National Youth Council to the Senate. Yet another Government has decided to expand its present youth camps programme into a national youth service, which would be a voluntary two-year programme for about 2,000 young people. Jamaica has had youth camps for more than ten years, Trinidad and Tobago launched a similar scheme more than five years ago and Guyana established a camp in 1967. The eight Eastern Caribbean territories also have agreed to establish two youth camps on a regional basis and one of these began functioning in November 1969.

Sectoral aspects of social development

Education

The Caribbean territories have continued to increase their facilities for formal education and most Governments are committed to universal education.⁴⁴ In the four territories for which data are available, expenditure on education as a percentage of total government expenditure ranged between 13 and 22 in 1965 and between 14 and 24 in 1968. Figures for primary school enrolment are generally high but have decreased in some cases, while the percentage of children enrolled in secondary schools has increased (table 4). With regard to the pupil-

⁴³ *Report of the Caribbean Regional Workshop on Integrated Rural Development* (E/CN.12/846), pp. 24-25.

⁴⁴ The general resolution of the International Conference of the Ministers of Education and the Ministers Responsible for Economic Planning in the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean, jointly convened by UNESCO and ECLA in June 1966, indicated that "common basic education and real equality of educational opportunities should be ensured to everyone with no limitations other than those dictated by the limits of the individual's ability to study" (UNESCO/ED/225, 1967).

teacher ratio in primary schools, in five of the seven countries the situation had worsened since 1960. In 1968, however, in only two of the seven territories was the ratio greater than 40:1. This has had recognizable effect in some instances on lowering the quality of education. Despite this, a high degree of literacy has been maintained for some time. In 1960, in four countries for which data are available, the percentage of literacy was over 84, and in one case it was as high as 98. Steps are being taken by most Governments to restructure the educational system to make it more relevant to the development needs of each territory.

Health

Of the ten countries in the region for which data are available,⁴⁵ life expectancy at birth for both males and females exceeded 55, and in five cases exceeded 60. In all the territories the rate was higher for females. The infant mortality rate, in seven territories for which statistics are available, showed a rapid decline from 1960 onwards. In Dominica and Grenada, for instance, in 1968, it was about 50 per cent less than in 1960.

The problem of an inadequate number of qualified medical practitioners and hospital beds still exists. In one territory there is one doctor for every 8,000 persons and one hospital bed for each 347 persons.

Government expenditure on health has been relatively high. For the territories for which data are available, the proportion of expenditure on health to total government expenditure ranged between 10 per cent (Jamaica) to 15 per cent (Grenada and St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla) in 1965 and 9 per cent (Jamaica) to 15 per cent (Barbados) in 1968.

Nutrition education is being given high priority by most of the Governments and applied nutrition programmes with UNICEF assistance are under implementation in three countries. The establishment of the Caribbean Food and Nutrition Institute in August 1967 to improve the nutritional level of the population, with the joint participation of the Governments of Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago, the University of the West Indies, FAO and

⁴⁵ Excluding Dominica, where the figures relate to 1958 and 1962. In all other cases the data pertain to 1959 and 1961.

TABLE 4. PRIMARY AND SECONDARY ENROLMENT IN SOME COMMONWEALTH CARRIBBEAN COUNTRIES

Country	Primary school enrolment as percentage of children in age-group 5-14			Secondary school enrolment as percentage of children in age-group 11-19		
	1960	1965	1968	1960	1965	1968
Barbados	61	61	...	36 ^a	38 ^a
Jamaica	67	64	76	5	6	10
Trinidad and Tobago ^b	82	82	79	13	19	22
Dominica	93	12
Grenada	94	...	65	10	...	14
St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla	82	89	96
St. Vincent	91	91	84	7	14	14

SOURCE: Official statistics of the Governments.

^a Percentage of children of the age-group 10-19.

^b The school year is September-July.

WHO/PAHO, has been a significant step in the promotion of nutritional training and research programmes.

Most Governments in the region are concerned with the population problem and some have initiated the promotion of family planning measures. However, there is a need to co-ordinate family planning and public health programmes, including general education for family life.⁴⁶

Housing

Continuous and increasing migration to the urban centres is creating acute housing shortages in the cities and towns. Governments in the region are increasing their outlay on housing and have established various legal and financial instruments to implement their housing policies. Schemes for housing guarantees and tax incentives exist in almost all the territories, such as a tax exemption on rental income from newly constructed houses for a specified period, as well as on the interest and other charges on loans secured by guaranteed mortgage, and government guarantee of mortgages on new houses up to a certain prescribed financial limit. In almost all the territories, there is a comprehensive housing authority. However, despite these measures and the other administrative efforts, modest housing targets have not been attained for a variety of reasons, including high construction costs, the shortage of land and the inadequacy of long-term finance. Housing policy should be made an integral part of national planning.

A welcome development in recent years has been the stress on the need for the maximum utilization of local natural resources in fabricating building materials. In this context, some of the proposals contained in a recent report, prepared jointly for the United Nations and the University of the West Indies on aspects of low-cost housing in Trinidad and Tobago, have special validity and usefulness.⁴⁷ They include the co-ordination of national housing development programmes on a regional basis to focus on increasing intraregional trade in building products, the promotion of national housing programmes in order to utilize to the maximum extent regionally produced materials, and the co-ordination of their activities at the regional level.

Manpower, employment and consumption patterns

Adequate data on unemployment are available only for Trinidad and Tobago, where in 1968 the percentage of unemployed⁴⁸ persons was about 14 per cent of the total

⁴⁶ Education in the mutual responsibilities of family life is particularly important in the Caribbean territories, where common-law unions are quite prevalent. In one of the countries, 1960 census figures for women fifteen years and over who were living in common-law unions showed that although this type of union had increased considerably in absolute numbers since 1943 (72,026 to 95,379), the percentage had increased only slightly (17.4 to 18.8), see O. C. Francis, *The People of Modern Jamaica* (Kingston, Department of Statistics, 1963), p. 5-4, table 5.1.

⁴⁷ Alvario Ortega and P. Selvanayagam, *Report on Some Aspects of Low-cost Housing for the Government of Trinidad and Tobago* (Kingston, University of the West Indies, 1969), p. 64.

⁴⁸ Based on official statistics of the Government of Trinidad and Tobago. The term "unemployed" relates to persons employed for less than half the "standard" full-time number of working hours.

labour force.⁴⁹ In the other territories, it is generally estimated that the figure ranges between 12 and 18 per cent. The unemployment rate is particularly high among the younger members of the labour force.⁵⁰

The long-term solution to the unemployment problem would seem to lie in a transformation of the economy, which is heavily dependent on agriculture, to one in which the secondary and the tertiary sectors are more developed. However, considering the time-lag involved in the process, special efforts are called for in the interim period to provide jobs for the unemployed. One such effort might take the form either of readjusting the outlays on different development projects, taking into account their employment potential and altering their mode of execution so as to increase their labour-intensiveness or implementing special supplemental works projects with main focus on the employment objective, or both.⁵¹ It has also been suggested that the manpower programme should have as an integral part schemes to improve existing skills and to impart new ones to the labour force, since one of the basic problems of unemployment in the region is lack of requisite skills.

The prevalence of high wage-rates in the modern sectors which are highly capital-intensive, as contrasted with low wage-rates in traditional sectors for similar jobs, constitutes a problem in the employment field in the Caribbean. This situation tends to boost wage-rates in the public sector—a large employer of labour—thus reducing its capacity for employment creation. Encouragement to labour-intensive industries using intermediate technology is being actively considered, but some industries cannot afford to pay the wage-rates obtaining in the capital-intensive industries. In view of this situation, some economic planners in the region consider that wage-restraint, both in the public and the private sectors, would assist employment expansion.⁵²

The local pattern of consumption, which tends to be based on that of high-income countries and not sufficiently related to local development needs and priorities, obviously has serious social and economic consequences. Governments are striving to stimulate industrial and agricultural growth by implementing an import-substitution policy. However, with a pattern of consumer demand heavily conditioned by that existing in the affluent countries, these efforts may be frustrated by the

⁴⁹ The draft third five-year plan of Trinidad and Tobago makes the point that in that country there is less "disguised" unemployment than in most other developing countries and that the phenomenon of surplus labour takes the form there of open unemployment rather than the eking out of a precarious livelihood in agriculture. See the *Draft Third Five-year Plan, 1969-1973* of the Government of Trinidad and Tobago, p. 175.

⁵⁰ In 1968 in Trinidad and Tobago, the unemployed in the age-group 15-24 constituted about 53 per cent of the total unemployed persons, whereas this age-group accounted for 29 per cent of the total labour force (based on official statistics of the Government).

⁵¹ See *Report of the Caribbean Regional Workshop on Integrated Rural Development* (E/CN.12/846), p. 24. It should also be taken into account that the Government of Trinidad and Tobago has executed a special works programme for more than five years. The Government of Jamaica has implemented a similar programme on a seasonal basis.

⁵² See William G. Demas, *The Economics of Development in Small Countries with Special Reference to the Caribbean* (Montreal, McGill University Press, 1965), pp. 76 *et seq.*

diversion of investment funds from sectors with high development potential to those with low or even negative development potential. For instance, the number of registered motor vehicles increased by about 84 per cent, 71 per cent and 64 per cent between 1960 and 1967, in Barbados, Trinidad and Tobago and Jamaica respectively.⁵³ The respective total population increase in these countries in the same period was 6 per cent, 23 per cent, and 16 per cent: GDP for these countries in the same time-span increased by 58 per cent in Barbados and Jamaica, and 59 per cent in Trinidad and Tobago.

The increase in the number of television sets has also been phenomenal, although television was introduced in the Caribbean only in 1962. Still, the rate of family ownership of television sets—about 36 and 20 sets per 1,000 persons in Trinidad and Tobago and Jamaica respectively in 1967—is a fairly high figure. Moreover, most of the programmes are foreign-produced and the powerful effects of television as a mass medium is well known. Given the present advertising content of the programmes, they are likely to reinforce the orientation of the local population to the consumer and behaviour pattern of the more affluent countries. It would seem that the effect of this trend on the less affluent and low-income sections of the society has been to induce them to forego expenditure on essential items in order to purchase luxury goods.

Integrative aspects of social development

Most of the development plans of the Governments contain statements of social objectives, such as the provision of adequate social amenities to all, equitable income distribution and improvement in the levels of living of the population. However, the content of social policy has not yet been explicitly enunciated as it has in the case of economic policy. In many cases, social development would seem to be regarded merely as a matter of providing some additional outlay to the sectors of public social action such as education, housing and social welfare. The interrelation among the social sectors and the integration of the economic and the social aspects of development are yet to be fully reflected in national development planning. There is a need to develop a broad social development policy that would reflect a well-conceived intersectoral co-ordination designed to meet the challenges of continuous change.

Social development planning in the Caribbean should give critical attention to achieving a more balanced distribution of the social services. Although some Governments are trying to meet the increasing demands for more social services, the distributional aspects of the services provided have not been given adequate attention to make the services more accessible to the various social groups of the population. For instance, housing schemes tend to be concentrated in the towns—often to the neglect

⁵³ It is interesting to note that in Trinidad and Tobago there were, in 1966, about 59 automobiles per 1,000 population, whereas the corresponding figures for the same year in respect of some Latin American countries, which are more or less in the same *per capita* GNP group as Trinidad and Tobago (\$U.S.500-1,000), were noticeably lower. The figures were: Argentina - 47; Chile - 14; Mexico - 20; Venezuela - 40, *Statistical Yearbook 1968* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 69.II.E.1) and *Social Change and Social Development Policy in Latin America* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 70.II.G.3).

of the rural areas—while social security schemes, in most territories where they exist, are restricted to wage and salary workers.⁵⁴

Tourism is very important for the economic development of the Caribbean countries as a major source of foreign exchange earnings, and rapid development in this field has been envisaged for the coming years. However, unless adequate safeguards are taken, this development could give rise to some acute social problems related to changes in the cultural and social values of the local population. Public policy should therefore be directed to preserving the dignity of the people and the freedom of movement of the local population, while at the same time utilizing tourism for the promotion and projection of local arts, crafts and industry. Some Governments have introduced legislation making provisions for beach control and free access of nationals to beaches and other sites of special interest. However, research and surveys are needed on the impact of tourism on the social and cultural life of the local inhabitants.

If the integration of economic and social policy as well as intersectoral co-ordination within the social field are to be achieved in the Caribbean, social planners must participate in the formulation of development plans. In most of the countries, the planning units are staffed entirely by economists and statisticians, who usually lack experience of, or insight into, the social and institutional aspects of comprehensive planning. Lack of co-ordination between sectors is sometimes further aggravated by the way in which international technical assistance programmes are initiated and implemented. Experts representing the interest of different agencies, in seeking to promote their programmes, too often tend to isolate other sectors from their own operations.

The reorganization of government administrative machinery, coupled with steps to retain highly qualified personnel in the civil services, is an urgent need if the effective implementation of social development plans is to be achieved. Increasing government attention must also be given to the need for adequate, reliable and up-to-date data, especially in some of the countries and territories, to provide a more reliable basis for policy decisions and projections.

Finally there is a trend towards ensuring the attainment of social justice for all segments of the population. In this connexion, one Government of the region has taken steps recently to extend the legal rights and protection of children born out of wedlock. The Caribbean has a high proportion of persons born out of wedlock. Public opinion in Jamaica has become increasingly aware of the need to amend existing discriminatory legislation that deprived these persons of rights of status and inheritance. To remedy this situation, recent proposals submitted to the legislature are designed to amend existing laws and to extend to these children many of the rights previously not shared with legitimate children.⁵⁵

⁵⁴ According to available information, national insurance schemes are in operation in three Caribbean countries and they are confined to paid employees. Three other Governments propose to initiate similar schemes in the near future. These schemes, too, will be restricted to paid employees, although the programme is regarded as the groundwork for a more comprehensive social security scheme.

⁵⁵ See discussion in Shirley F. Hartley's article in *Journal of Biosocial Science*, vol. 2, p. 95, which was referred to in "Findings", *New Society*, No. 403 (18 June 1970), p. 1066.

SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA

POPULATION

Demographic trends

Africa consists of about one fourth of the land area of the world and in 1967 contained approximately 9 per cent of the population or about 326 million. The population is expected to grow to about 400 million by 1975 and to 458 million by 1980. Nearly half of this population is expected to be in the age group 15-60.¹ The average density is about 10 people per square kilometre, compared with 71 in East Asia, 58 in South Asia, 10 in North America and 11 in South America. The rate of population growth, of about 2.4 per cent in the period 1965-

¹ "Africa's economic transformation and implications for educational and manpower development" (E/CN.14/WP.6/18), p. 7.

TABLE 1. SUMMARY OF REGIONAL DIFFERENCES IN POPULATION OF AFRICA

Region	Population 1968 (millions)	Estimated rate of increase (percentage)	
		1965-1970	1975-1980
North Africa	80,710	2.7	3.1
West Africa	105,382	2.6	2.9
East Africa	77,244	2.2	2.5
Central Africa	32,288	1.6	2.4
Other Africa	39,166	2.3	2.5
Total Africa	334,790	2.4	2.7

SOURCE: "Notes on the demographic situation in Africa" (E/CN.14/POP/6), tables 2 and 3.

1970, is second only to that of Latin America and is expected to rise to as much as 2.7 per cent per annum in the course of the 1970s. Regional differences in population and in rates of increase are summarized in table 1.

As a result of continuing high fertility and declining mortality, the rate of population growth is expected to rise during the 1970s, with the highest rate expected in North Africa but the greatest increase in the rate of growth itself expected in Central Africa. About 45 per cent of this expanding population is in the age group 0-14 and it is estimated that these young people will increase in number from about 155 million in 1970 to over 200 million by 1980. One result of this expansion is that an increasing proportion of the resources of African States will have to be allocated to the provision of educational facilities and the already heavy popular pressure on governments to provide more school facilities is not likely to diminish in the immediate future. The most populous countries were Nigeria, with about 61 million; the United Arab Republic, with about 32 million, and Ethiopia with nearly 24 million. These populations are expected to increase to approximately 88 million, 45 million and 30 million respectively in 1980. However, there were, in 1968, some twenty-eight States with populations of less than 6 million each.

Africa as a whole is one of the least urbanized areas of the world, with only some 15.4 per cent of the total population living in urban areas (that is, areas of 20,000 inhabitants or more) as compared, for example, with about 46 per cent in Latin America. African towns, however, are growing at a very rapid rate. Table 2 summarizes some of the main features of this expansion in relation to the five major regions.

TABLE 2. URBAN POPULATION GROWTH IN AFRICA, 1965-1975

Region	Urban population 1965 (thousands)	As per cent of total population 1965	Rate of urban growth 1965-1970	Urban population 1975 (thousands)	As per cent of total population 1975	Rate of urban growth 1975-1980
North Africa	20,415	27.4	4.7	32,240	32.8	4.6
West Africa	12,425	12.8	4.8	21,075	16.5	5.5
East Africa	4,480	6.2	5.5	7,630	8.4	5.4
Central Africa	2,855	9.3	5.3	4,690	12.7	4.9
Other Africa	7,815	21.3	4.0	11,445	24.7	3.5
TOTAL	47,990	15.4	4.9	77,080	19.0	4.8

SOURCE: "Notes on the demographic situation in Africa" (E/CN.14/POP/6), table 5.

Table 2 indicates that the proportion of urban population is estimated to rise considerably between 1965 and 1975; however, by the 1975-1980 period, the rate of urban growth is expected to show a slight decline in all areas except West Africa. Regional aggregates indicate broad trends and in every region the rate of urban growth is very much higher than growth for the population as a whole. But these figures do not indicate the very large differences which occur between countries. These are summarized in table 3.

TABLE 3. NATIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF URBAN POPULATION GROWTH RATES, 1965-1970

Percentage	Number of countries
0-1.9	1
2-3.9	8
4-5.9	14
6-7.9	17
8-9.9	4
10 +	5
TOTAL	49

SOURCE: Compiled from "Notes on demographic situation in Africa", op. cit., table 5.

Note: Some countries do not have any population concentration large enough to constitute an urban area or town and so have not been included.

The largest urban growth rate of 12.5 per cent per annum occurred in Niger, where only 1.5 per cent of the population lived in towns. In Upper Volta, the total population growth rate was 1.7 per cent per annum but the urban rate was 10.8 per cent per annum; in Senegal, the rates were 1.6 per cent and 5.1 per cent respectively, and in Malawi 2.7 per cent and 10.4 per cent. A large part of this very high rate of urban expansion is the result of the migration of people from the countryside into towns, which is taking place in every part of the continent. There is a tendency for this migration to be directed mainly towards one or two of the largest cities in each country, so that the growth rates of cities with populations of 100,000 or more are often higher than the rate for the urban areas as a whole. It has been estimated that about 68 per cent of the total urban population is concentrated in the cities, a percentage that is about the world average.² This trend probably reflects the tendency for industrial development to be concentrated in certain of the larger cities and this development attracts job-seekers.

Since such a large proportion of these urban dwellers are transplanted country folk, this urban migration and settlement are associated with problems of social adjustment, unemployment and overcrowding. To cope with these problems, governments will have to make substantial investments in housing, health, schools and other services.

² "Size and growth of the urban population in Africa" (E/CN.14/GAS.6/3), table 1, p. 5.

The social objectives in African development plans

The idea of planning development on a national scale has spread rapidly in Africa since independence. Of the forty-one independent countries in Africa (excluding South Africa), about thirty have succeeded in formulating national development plans of various kinds. Development planning on a large scale is a complex exercise, requiring precise statistical data as well as highly skilled technical personnel. Generally, both are in short supply in contemporary Africa, though some countries are much better off in these areas than others, a difference that is reflected in the plans themselves. At one extreme is the Somali Republic, which, although deficient in reliable statistical information, has nevertheless prepared a simple plan. Similarly the plans of Swaziland and Lesotho are simple documents, which list proposed development projects and their estimated cost. Other countries have employed more sophisticated techniques. Thus in Uganda, a mathematical model was used for deriving targets for the various sectors of the economy. Zambia has utilized input-output tables, and North African countries such as the United Arab Republic, Morocco and Tunisia use national accounts input-output tables and commodity flow tables.³ In many countries, however, overly sophisticated planning could give rise to later problems of implementation when expatriate planners employed by a number of these governments complete their work and depart, leaving the plan to be executed by civil servants who in some cases may not fully understand all of its implications.

Plans also vary in terms of the ideological orientation of the political groups in power. On the one hand, there is the group of countries—notably Guinea, Mali, the United Arab Republic and the United Republic of Tanzania—which might be described as having a "socialist" orientation, in which the public sector seems to be envisaged as ultimately overshadowing the private sector. Others such as Liberia, Ivory Coast, Kenya and Nigeria allow greater scope to the private sector. Most plans, however, seem to envisage mixed economies of one kind or another, and none appears to propose the complete abolition of private ownership.⁴

In spite of differences in scope, techniques and sophistication in these plans certain common high priority objectives do emerge, such as:

- (a) Raising the present very low *per capita* income;
- (b) Reducing inequalities, both between different ethnic and social groups and also between different regions and provinces;
- (c) Improving social services, including: (i) education, (ii) health, (iii) housing, (iv) social welfare and community development, and (v) manpower training.

Items (a) and (b) involve investment in the various sectors of the economy and also questions of taxation, nationalization in some cases, and the regional allocation of investment capital.

³ "Development planning in Africa" (E/CN.14/CAP/9), chap. I, part 4, p. 16.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 13.

The actual social development programmes themselves may be grouped into two major categories. First, there are those programmes which have a direct bearing upon the production of goods and services in the country, or which directly contribute to the productivity of the individual. In this group may be included programmes of economic development of course, and also community development, health, housing and construction, education and technical and vocational training. The second grouping involves programmes of social development such as arts and culture, welfare of women, children and youth, social security, old-age pensions and preventive and rehabilitative delinquency programmes. The short-term impact of these programmes on economic production is likely to be limited, but they are considered essential for social, humanitarian and political reasons. These programmes of a "social welfare" kind now receive somewhat lower priority than was the case in the colonial period. A number of plans stress the Pan-African ideal. By pooling resources and harmonizing economic policies, these countries hope that it will be possible to widen national markets, ensure rational industrial location and eliminate bottle-necks in capital and manpower.⁵

Perhaps the best way to assess the degree of success of the planning process as a whole in Africa is to compare the planned with the achieved growth rate of GDP. These data are presented in table 4.

TABLE 4. PLANNED AND REALIZED GROWTH RATES IN TOTAL GDP, IN SELECTED AFRICAN COUNTRIES IN RECENT YEARS (annual average compound rate percentage)

Planned rates	Realized rates				Total
	Below 4.0	4.0-4.9	5.0-5.9	6.0	
Below 4.0 . . .	2	—	—	—	2
4.0-4.9 . . .	3	—	1	1	5
5.0-5.9 . . .	2	1	—	1	4
6.0	8	1	1	3	13
TOTAL . . .	15	2	2	5	24

SOURCE: ECA secretariat.

Out of the twenty-four countries listed, eight achieved their over-all targets and three exceeded them. Of the thirteen countries which planned high growth rates of 6.0 per cent or more, only three achieved their targets, and eight of this group managed growth rates of only 4.0 per cent or less. Clearly, most countries failed to achieve their global targets, a third of them by a large margin of 50 per cent or more and a third by smaller margins. However, failure to achieve a plan target does not necessarily mean that considerable progress is not being made, and this is especially true if plan targets are excessively ambitious. Nevertheless, the rate of economic development should be increasing faster than the population increases—at least, if a country is to be considered to be progressing satisfactorily. This problem could probably be more clearly understood by considering the growth of *per capita* GDP.

⁵ A. Ban Amor and F. Clairmonte, "Planning in Africa", *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, vol. 3, No. 4 (1965), p. 481.

TABLE 5. RATES OF GROWTH OF GDP *per capita* IN DEVELOPING AFRICAN COUNTRIES, 1960-1966

Rates of growth (average annual percentage)	Number of countries	Percentage of population of developing Africa
Negative	13	22.0
0-0.9	6	17.4
1.0-1.9	9	33.1
2.0-2.9	5	12.6
3.0-3.9	5	12.3
4.0-4.9	0	0.0
5.0 plus	4	2.6
TOTAL	42	100

It has been pointed out that "the present developing countries should be growing economically by at least 3 per cent per annum if they are to come close to satisfying the aspirations of their peoples; and on this basis, rates of 2 per cent or less can be described as slow".⁶ Thus twenty-eight countries, containing some 72 per cent of the population of the continent, are expanding at a rate which is much too slow to be considered satisfactory.

It is appropriate at this stage to consider some of the reasons why plan targets have not been achieved in so many cases. Effective planning depends upon highly developed administrative capacity, on a comprehensive understanding of the economy and on the ability to evaluate and execute individual projects in a coherent way. These requirements need large numbers of highly skilled manpower and a wealth of accurate information, both of which are often lacking.⁷ Governments do not always seem to understand that the provision of the plan may require the creation of special administrative units to manage it. For example, a Sudanese plan gave agricultural development high priority and earmarked a large part of available investment funds for this purpose. But the Government was slow in creating the agencies needed to implement the new schemes. Another problem concerns the relationship between the planning agency and the rest of the administration. Planning units are generally fairly recent innovations and often do not effectively relate to the real centre of decision-making and policy formation. Sometimes the task of the planning commission ends with the completion of the plan and does not continue into its implementation stage. Thus there are often severe problems of co-ordination between the targets as laid down in the plan and the projects of the individual ministries, and also between central and local budgets.

Different sections of the plan have to be related to each other. For example, many plans mention the need to revise the school curriculum in the light of the needs of rural youth. Exposure to schooling often has the effects of loosening the ties of rural youth to the countryside, causing many to migrate to the city. This trend can only be slowed down through far-reaching develop-

⁶ "Economic conditions in Africa in recent years" (E/CN.14/435), p. 17.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 175.

ment of the rural areas in conjunction with curriculum reform in rural schools. Thus a plan which calls for increased investment in rural primary schools unaccompanied by educational reform to make the curriculum relevant to youth, is likely to have little value and result in increased cityward migration of young people.

Finally, in implementing plans, many African States show an excessive reliance upon foreign capital, preferring this source to the reorganization of their own outdated taxation systems to finance development.

Disappointment with meagre returns have led some critics to suggest that efforts in the field of planning should be abandoned for the present at least. On the other hand, it has been pointed out that the widespread introduction of planning has served to focus attention upon the underlying socio-economic problems.⁸ For the immediate future there is the need to analyse and remodel the institutional, administrative and political framework within which planning takes place.

MEASURES FOR ACHIEVING SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC OBJECTIVES

The most important single objective mentioned in virtually all African development plans is the need to improve the living standards of the citizens of the countries concerned, and a major means of achieving this goal is to increase the wealth of the community. This section, therefore, will be concerned with a brief examination of the results of attempts to promote economic growth.

Attempts to promote economic expansion, as measured by growth of GDP and *per capita* income, involve, broadly speaking, examination of measures and targets in the three main fields: industry, agriculture and services. In addition, the growing importance of regional co-operation in Africa as a strategy for promoting economic development will be reviewed. A convenient point of departure is consideration of targets laid down in the national development plans for industry, agriculture and services.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 176.

Two major factors are important at this stage, the contribution of each sector to the global GDP and the rate of growth planned for such sector.

Most plans in the past decade have envisaged a situation in which the industrial and services sectors would take an increased percentage of the GDP while the contribution of agriculture would decline in relative importance because planned growth rates were somewhat slower in this sector.

Table 6 indicates how fast the different sectors were expected to grow.

Industry, and especially manufacturing, was expected to develop fairly rapidly, while a more modest rate of growth was expected of agriculture. However, agriculture is the largest of the sectors in most African countries, and consequently contributes more to global growth rates than to the other two. It has already been pointed out that about a third of the African countries achieved their global targets while the others experienced short-falls of various proportions.⁹ Twenty-eight of forty-two countries with some 72 per cent of the population are experiencing *per capita* growth rates of less than 2 per cent per annum—too slow to be considered as satisfactory.¹⁰ A large part of these disappointing results must be attributed to sluggishness in the agricultural sector. In view of the impact of agriculture on over-all national production, methods of raising production in this sector will be examined in a subsequent section.

The sectoral analysis in table 7 illustrates the importance of agriculture in African economies. Out of nineteen countries for which agricultural data are available, twelve realized less than 50 per cent of their agricultural targets. Of these twelve, as many as ten realized less than 60 per cent of their global GDP targets. The industrial sector does not show any such close association between sectoral and global achievement because industry is still too small to affect the global picture very much. It is against a background of very moderate economic progress, therefore, that one must examine attempts to promote improvement in the living standards of the population.

⁹ See section on development planning above.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

TABLE 6. PLANNED ANNUAL SECTORAL GROWTH RATES

Growth rate (percentage)	Number of countries	Growth rate (percentage)	Number of countries
<i>Agriculture</i>		<i>Manufacturing</i>	
Less than 3.0	5	Less than 10	7
3.0-4.9	9	10.0-14.9	7
5.0 and over	4	15.0 and over	5
Average: 3.9 per cent		Average: 13.2 per cent	
<i>Industry</i>		<i>Services</i>	
Less than 8.0	3	Less than 5.0	3
8.0-11.9	13	5.0-6.9	11
12.0 plus	5	7.0 plus	5
Average: 10.1 per cent		Average: 6.8 per cent	

SOURCE: ECA secretariat.

TABLE 7. ACHIEVEMENT RATIOS AND GDP IN THREE SECTORS IN SELECTED AFRICAN COUNTRIES IN RECENT YEARS
(A = agriculture; I = industry; S = service)

Global achievement ratio (percentage)	Sector ratios 100 per cent plus			80-99.9 per cent			60-79.9 per cent			50-59.9 per cent			Less than 50 per cent			Total		
	A	I	S	A	I	S	A	I	S	A	I	S	A	I	S	A	I	S
	100 plus	2	1	3	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	-	-	3	3
80-99.9	-	-	1	-	-	-	2	3	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	3	3	2
60-79.9	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	1	1	1
40-59.9	2	1	-	-	1	-	-	3	2	-	2	1	5	-	3	7	7	6
Less than 40	-	1	1	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	5	4	5	5	5	7
TOTAL	5	3	5	-	2	1	2	7	2	-	3	3	12	4	8	19	19	19

SOURCE: "Economic conditions in Africa in recent years" (E/CN.14/435), p. 173.

Agricultural production and its manpower needs

The importance of agriculture in most African economies is illustrated by the fact that during the period 1962-1965 it occupied about 77 per cent of the economically active population.¹¹ In the mid-1960s, world agricultural production was increasing at the rate of about 2.5 per cent per annum. The growth rate for Latin America was approximately 2.3 per cent, for the Far East about 1.8 per cent, and for Africa about 2.4 per cent. Thus, while progress in the developing areas of the world as a whole has been described as disappointing, Africa compares rather favourably with the other regions. African food production, however, grew at the rate of about 2 per cent per annum, but this very slight improvement was somewhat compensated for by an increase of 3.5 per cent in non-food products.¹² There are variations in the performance of individual products and great differences between countries, but when production is considered on a continental *per capita* basis, there was an average annual decline of 0.2 per cent between 1960-1966. The decline more than offsets the *per capita* increase in non-farm production.¹³ The picture therefore is one of very moderate growth in over-all agricultural expansion, and stagnation in the crucial area of food production.

It is not possible to give a simple explanation for what is obviously a very complex problem. One survey of agricultural trends in Africa attributed the slow growth in food production, rice and maize apart, to an inability or unwillingness of farmers to produce more.¹⁴ Another report stated that this was due to a lack of demand stemming from the small proportion of the food-buying population and limited export markets. The report held: "The constraint on agriculture lies more on the demand than on the supply side."¹⁵

In parts of Africa where the much publicized, so-called "green revolution" has taken hold, some spectacular results in food production have taken place. The United

Arab Republic has long had very high agricultural yields, but conditions there differ in many important respects from those in tropical Africa. In sub-Saharan Africa, including the Ivory Coast and Kenya, some notable improvements have taken place. The production figures from Kenya given in table 8 illustrate this point.

TABLE 8. MARKETED FOOD PRODUCTION, KENYA, 1964-1969 (Tons)

Food	1964	1968
Wheat	134,680	216,309
Maize	136,170	352,557
Rice (paddy)	13,210	18,747

SOURCE: Republic of Kenya, *Development Plan, 1970-1974*, p. 31.

Thus, during the four-year period, production increased approximately 60 per cent for wheat, 158 per cent for maize and 42 per cent for rice. Although agricultural expansion and rural development are not necessarily the same phenomenon, they do interact with each other, and it is unlikely that dramatic improvement of the kind illustrated could have taken place without some social change in the rural areas concerned. Agricultural development must be based upon an infrastructure like any other form of economic activity. This infrastructure can be subdivided into categories such as (a) capital intensive aspects such as irrigation, roads, storage and processing facilities; (b) capital extensive such as extension of education; and (c) institutional—involving social structures and organizations of various types.¹⁶ The institutional aspect clearly falls within the scope of the present discussion and will be considered in the section dealing with social reform and institutional change.

To sum up, in contrast to an expanding, although small industrial sector, the large agricultural sector generally has remained relatively lethargic and slow-growing. However, there are a few areas of dynamic growth in this field. This suggests that the situation can be improved and that

¹¹ "Economic conditions in Africa in recent years" (E/CN.14/435), p. 67.

¹² *Ibid.*, chap. 5.

¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 97.

¹⁵ J. Dalton, "Food imports and African agricultural development" (ECA/FAO Joint Division Reference Unit, December 1968), p. 49, unpublished.

¹⁶ H. Southworth and B. Johnstone, *Agricultural Development and Economic Growth* (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1967), p. 110.

given the appropriate human response, practical arrangements and modern techniques, dynamic development could occur in the African countryside.

In spite of the impact of urbanization and industrialization, the total increase in the farm population in sub-Saharan Africa between 1962-1985 is estimated to amount to about 52 per cent, divided between the major regions as follows: Central Africa, 29 per cent; East Africa, 45 per cent, and West Africa, 66 per cent.¹⁷ This large and to some extent dormant rural sector, based upon agriculture, also has acute manpower problems of its own. Indeed, the greatest single obstacle to agricultural development and progress in Africa may well be the shortage of trained manpower. One approach to this problem, affecting in particular the education of future farmers, has been to introduce agricultural studies into the general school system. But these attempts to combine general education with specific training for farming or employment as agricultural technicians have seldom produced satisfactory results.¹⁸

No entirely satisfactory method for assessing manpower needs in agriculture has been devised so far. Manpower needs will vary with the way agriculture is organized and with the average size of the farm family or whatever is the basic group of people which operates a farm. Thus the average size of the farm family has been estimated at 4.5 in Mali and at 6.0 in Ethiopia.¹⁹ But sometimes more than one "family" may operate a farm. There are for example "concessions" in many French-speaking countries and many co-operative settlements in the United Republic of Tanzania. In Dahomey, "concessions" in the north average 2.1 households and about ten persons per farming unit and 3.2 households and about thirteen persons in the south. These arrangements may reduce the work of the agricultural extension services, since there are fewer decision-making heads of farm units with whom contact has to be maintained.²⁰

However, there is some evidence that traditional extended family farms are declining and the trend is towards nuclear family farms, except where the Government may actively support co-operative group farming or ranching. This trend has been noted among swamp rice farmers in Gambia and Sierra Leone,²¹ and also in resettlement areas in East Africa.²²

In calculating manpower needs for extension services FAO estimates that a ratio of one extension field worker to 1,000 farm families is a reasonable target for most

developing countries. In areas with high population densities, where very intensive forms of farming are practised or where special projects are in progress, the ratio might have to be reduced to perhaps as much as 1:500. Most nations have ratios which are much larger than this. Nigeria had an average ratio of 1:2,000 and in some areas as high as 1:5,000. In Kenya and Uganda the ratio can vary from one staff member to 200 farmers to one staff member to over 5,000 farmers.²³ The ratio of senior to field personnel would be 1:5.

Generally speaking, agricultural services in Africa are broken down into different levels and categories and a great many grades within each category. In the opinion of some experts, one of the major objectives of training policy is to reduce the number of formal training levels and increase in-service programmes in order to get men into the field as quickly and economically as possible.²⁴

Women play an important role in agricultural production in most African countries, as well as in the general development of rural communities. One consequence of this is the special need to devise training courses which reflect their needs and patterns of work. There is the need for combining agricultural and home economics courses and, in some fields, to offer greater opportunities for training women to work in the agricultural services.

Industry

One result of independence is the attempt by African Governments to modernize their economies as quickly as possible. It is therefore not surprising that industry has exerted a powerful appeal to these countries. Industrialization has come to occupy a central place in plans for economic development in most States. Although this sector has not always grown as fast as African planners expected, it has nevertheless been the fastest-growing economic sector in most countries, albeit the smallest. Thus at constant prices, the industrial sector has shown an average annual increase of 5.5 per cent as compared with one of 3.7 per cent for total GDP between 1960-1966.²⁵

Developmental strategy in industry has partly been determined by the circumstances in which the various countries found themselves, as well as the ideological orientation of the ruling parties. Some countries such as Zambia, Mauritania and Libya have based a large part of their industrial growth upon mining copper, iron and drilling oil. Apart from these major extractive industries, most African industrial development has been in the nature of light industry, consisting of import substitution and the processing of food and other primary produce for domestic markets.

The development of industry has been sufficiently significant to bring about a modification in the pattern of African trade. There has been a striking growth in the importation of capital goods, notably machinery and transport equipment, and a slight decline in the imports

¹⁷ Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, "Requirements and policies for trained manpower at the professional and technical levels", Indicative World Plan, Africa South of the Sahara (RU: MISC/69/13), p. 354.

¹⁸ Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, "Manpower requirements for agricultural development in Africa" (E/CN.14/WP.6/7), p. 3.

¹⁹ Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, "Requirements and policies for trained manpower at the professional and technical levels", Indicative World Plan, Africa South of the Sahara (RU: MISC/69/13), p. 353.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 354.

²¹ L. Barnes, "Problems of modernization in West Africa", report prepared for ECA, part II, chap. 1 on Senegambia and chap. 2 on Sierra Leone.

²² R. Yeld, "Resettlement in its effects on Kiga patterns of life", *Sociology 1* (Makerere University, 1964).

²³ E. R. Watts, "Agricultural extension services in Uganda", *Uganda Agricultural Society Journal* (September 1969), vol. II, No. 2.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 376.

²⁵ "Economic conditions in Africa in recent years" (E/CN.14/435), p. 104.

of consumer goods. The exports of products such as petroleum products, processed foods and fruit, and wood products have increased rapidly. African Governments have sought to protect infant industries behind the customary screen of protective tariffs, but these have been erected on an *ad hoc* basis and do not as a rule embody a systematic specification of industrial priorities.

Although most African countries have made a promising beginning in their programmes of industrialization, certain basic difficulties have an adverse effect upon progress. In general, these arise from:

- (a) The small size of most internal markets;
- (b) The shortage of skilled and experienced manpower—especially at the managerial level;
- (c) Lack of capital funds.

The solution to the first of these problems is to be found in regional co-operation, to be discussed below. The second involves problems of education and training, while the third involves a number of considerations likely to be beyond the control of African Governments. An important consideration here is the attitude of the respective Governments towards foreign sources of capital, including aid and private investment. African countries are in need of foreign capital without which their economic progress would be severely hampered. Their heavy reliance on external capital may be seen in the plans of twenty-five countries. Among these, thirteen rely on external sources for more than 50 per cent of total planned gross domestic capital formation, nine countries expected to get between 15 per cent and 50 per cent from abroad. This means that nearly all the countries concerned have no real control over the sources of a large part of their investment capital and in the final analysis, the realization of production targets can be undermined by forces over which they have very little control. In these circumstances, the availability of finance for development is determined by the likely margin of profit for the investor, not the desirability of a given project. A major weakness in the developmental strategy of many countries is the excessive reliance upon foreign sources of capital and the inordinate influence that certain foreign companies exert upon the economies of the countries concerned. Nevertheless, African countries themselves could do much to reduce their dependency on foreign capital and a few countries—Mali and the United Republic of Tanzania, for example—have taken steps in this direction.

Regional co-operation

It has been pointed out that the small size of African markets is one of the major factors inhibiting African industrial expansion and general economic development. The most likely way out of this difficulty is through customs unions of various kinds leading to regional planning of development projects. In recent years there have been four major attempts at economic co-operation based on the idea of the customs union: the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, the East African Community, the West African Customs Union and the Equatorial Customs Union (EDEAC). The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (1953-1963) collapsed because of the inequitable distribution of the benefits of the Union, with

most of the benefits going to Rhodesia, and because of the development of mutually incompatible political trends in the three countries.

Similarly, in the East African Community, consisting of Kenya, Uganda and the United Republic of Tanzania, there has been a similar tendency for most of the economic benefits to go to the most developed partner, in this case Kenya. As a result, there has been a progressive restructuring of the organization in order to ensure a more equitable distribution of the benefits.

The West African Customs Union was formed in 1959 and was composed of the former French colonies: Dahomey, the Ivory Coast, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal and the Upper Volta. The union has not made much headway. However, there have been some benefits in the monetary field and in organizing various common services. *L'Union douanière et économique de l'Afrique centrale* (UDEAC) founded in 1965, and consisting of Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Gabon, stresses co-operation in the fields of finance and investment, with compensatory assistance for members receiving less than a fair share of new investment.

There have been proposals for a West African free-trade area, a West African economic community and a West African iron and steel community; in addition, there have been suggestions for a free-trade area involving Guinea, Ivory Coast, Liberia and Sierra Leone; a union of Senegal Basin countries; and efforts on the part of the Mahgreb countries of North Africa to achieve close co-operation in industry, trade, transport and tourism. None of these attempts can be regarded as well established at present.

In spite of relatively slow progress, it seems clear that enough has been achieved to show that economic co-operation in one form or another has a very definite place in the future development of the continent: this was underscored in a recent survey which examined the question: "It is very important that new initiatives in the fields of economic co-operation should be encouraged, for it is only through co-operation that the majority of African countries can attain high growth rates and avoid the wasteful alternative of autarchic development."²⁶

SECTORAL ANALYSIS OF SOCIAL PROGRAMMES AND PROBLEMS

Education

All the countries concerned attach particular importance to education as one of the most important means of lifting their populations out of ignorance and poverty. However, there are both quantitative and qualitative differences in the approach to this field. Quantitatively with respect to the proportion of the investment capital they plan to allocate to this sector and qualitatively in regard to the sort of education they think the youth of the country ought to receive and the way the system ought to be organized.

²⁶ "Economic conditions in Africa in recent years" (E/CN.14/435), p. 196.

All African States were able to spend only relatively small *per capita* sums on education, compared with developed countries. However, there were considerable differences between States. For instance, Gabon spent about \$17.00 *per capita* while four other States spent less than \$1.00 per head. If educational expenditure is considered as a percentage of the total budget, a fairly wide range would again result, with the majority of countries spending over 16 per cent. In short, many countries spend a fairly large proportion of available resources on education, but since these resources are severely limited, the amount available on a *per capita* basis is necessarily small.

At the university level, there is a tendency for students to enroll mainly in the humanities rather than in scientific and technological courses which are regarded as being more relevant to economic and social development. The proportion of students in higher education enrolled in scientific and technological courses in Middle Africa fell from 41.6 per cent of the total number of higher education students in 1960/1961 to 32.2 per cent in 1965/1966, although the comparative proportion in North Africa rose from 38.4 per cent to 42.9 per cent.²⁷

Table 9 summarizes the situation with respect to university enrolment around the mid-sixties.

There is a general interest in expanding education at all levels, however, priorities vary among countries. For instance, the United Republic of Tanzania's second plan places a major emphasis upon primary education. "It is the policy of the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania:

"(1) To give every Tanzanian child a basic education as soon as the financial circumstances of the Government permit-planned to be achieved by 1989.

"(2) To provide further education (secondary, technical and university) only to the extent justified by the manpower requirements of the economy for development."²⁸

²⁷ "Africa's economic transformation and implications for educational and manpower development" (E/CN.14/WP.6/18).

²⁸ United Republic of Tanzania, *Second Five-Year Plan for Economic and Social Development 1969-1974* (Dar-es-Salaam Government Printer), p. 148.

The first plan had stressed post-primary education, while the second shifted the emphasis to the primary stage.

In 1965, only 50 per cent of Kenya's primary school-age population was actually enrolled, although the development plan states that "the highest priority in education is the rapid expansion and diversification of secondary schools".²⁹ Kenya planned to raise its secondary enrolment from 33,500 in 1965 to 65,000 by 1970, an increase of 96 per cent in five years. By contrast, in the fifteen years between 1965 and 1980 the plan was to increase primary enrolment from about 50 per cent to about 80 per cent.³⁰ The strategy here appears to give greater emphasis to economically more effective higher levels. In Togo, to give an example of a very different strategy, the planners refer to the need to restrict the output of BEPC (*Brevet d'études du premier cycle*) and *baccalauréat* holders, to a number for which employment can be found.³¹ The decision is to place relatively strong emphasis on the expansion of primary schooling and on teacher training.

It will be observed that the United Republic of Tanzania also linked the output of secondary graduates to manpower needs and employment opportunities, but did not go so far as to consider actually limiting numbers. The plans of Dahomey and Mauritania also mention this problem, referring to the need to limit the number of BEPC holders in order to minimize the possibility of "intellectual unemployment".³²

While the majority of countries have planned for expansion of education at all levels, many like Kenya have placed a fairly strong emphasis upon the post-primary stages. This preoccupation might appear to conflict with the 1961 Addis Ababa Conference declarations con-

²⁹ Republic of Kenya, *Development Plan 1966-1970*, p. 307.

³⁰ According to Kenya's 1970 plan, primary enrolment expanded by 5.5 per cent per annum during the 1966-1970 period and secondary by 30 per cent per annum, Republic of Kenya, *Development Plan 1970-1974*, p. 25.

³¹ Republic of Togo, *Five-Year Development Plan 1966-1970*, p. 112.

³² Dahomey, *Plan de développement économique et social 1966-1970*, p. 323, and Mauritania, *Four-Year Plan 1963-1966*, p. 46, evaluation of three years of implementation.

TABLE 9. UNIVERSITY ENROLMENT : STUDENTS PER 100,000 POPULATION BY SEX, FIELD OF STUDY AND REGION OF AFRICA (AROUND 1965)

Region	Percentage share in African total		Per 100,000 population			Female science students
	Population	Students	All students	Female students	All science students	
North Africa	24.1	71.1	281	54	91	1.0
West Africa	31.9	6.5	19	3	6	0.5
East Africa	23.3	3.0	12	2	3	0.3
Central Africa	10.6	1.9	17	0.8	2	0.09
Other Africa	4.5	0.5	10	3	4	0.9
South Africa	5.6	17.0	290	71	66	9
Africa as a whole			95	19	29	3
France			804	332	250	76
Israel			181	576	305	54

SOURCES: S. HUGUES, "Some reflections on African Education, July 1969", table 2 (i), (mimeographed) prepared for ECA. North Africa, with 24.1 per cent of the population of Africa, has 71.1 per cent

of all the university students, and the United Arab Republic alone comprises 60.4 per cent of all student enrolment in Africa.

cerning the importance of achieving universal primary schooling. In fact most countries face the major bottleneck—in manpower terms—that only a small proportion of children reach secondary schools (10 per cent or less of the primary intake in many cases) and only a small fraction reach university and other post-secondary levels. In the face of increased demands for middle-level and upper-level manpower necessary for development purposes, many countries have planned for major expansion to take place at the secondary level.

The countries which participated in the 1961 Addis Ababa Conference adopted the global target for primary education of increasing the enrolment ratio from 36.16 per cent to 47.10 per cent. This would have meant an increase in primary school enrolment of 45 per cent over the five years. In fact an increase of 35 per cent was achieved giving an enrolment ratio of 43.85 per cent in 1965. However, the statistics do not mean quite what they seem because of the very high incidence of repeating grades and the high drop-out rate. Of twenty-two countries the average yearly drop-out rate at the primary stage was 21 per cent. In many countries between a fifth and one-third of the pupils in each grade of primary school repeat that grade at least once.³³ These factors distort the educational statistics of the African States and help to conceal the fact that, although nearly all countries can record substantial increases in primary school enrolments, the numbers out of school are increasing.³⁴

Partly because of popular demand for more education, partly because of the problems of the unemployed school leaver and partly because of a genuine belief that school systems of the colonial type now prevalent in the region do not reflect national needs and aspirations, many African States have become concerned with the need for educational reform. This process involves both structural change in the way the system is organized and change in curriculum content, the latter being the most difficult to reform. In some cases reorganization involves decreasing the duration of a particular stage of schooling or combining two stages. For example, Uganda planned to combine the eight-year primary and junior secondary stages into an integrated seven-year course.³⁵ In Ghana similar changes were initiated, with an integrated, eight-year course planned to replace the eight-year primary and two-year continuation schooling which had previously been pursued by pupils not enrolled in academic grammar school.³⁶ The Sudan has introduced fairly far-reaching reforms involving increasing specialization along lines similar to the academic technical and modern schools found in the United Kingdom.³⁷

³³ *Conference on Education and Scientific and Technical Training in Relation to Development in Africa*, report of a conference held at Nairobi, 16-27 July 1968 (UNESCO/OAU/CESTA/10), pp. 1-7, and also S. Hugues, "Some reflections on African education", unpublished paper prepared for ECA (July 1969), pp. 6-8.

³⁴ L. Barnes, *African Renaissance* (London, Victor Gollancz, 1969), chap. 10; and L. Barnes, "Problems of modernization in West Africa", vol. II (1967), unpublished report prepared for ECA.

³⁵ Uganda, *Work for Progress*, p. 137.

³⁶ *Two-year Development Plan, 1968-1970* (Ghana, 1968), p. 83.

³⁷ Republic of Sudan, *Ten-Year Plan of Economic and Social Development, 1961-1971*, pp. 146-147.

A number of countries have taken steps to reorganize their curricula. For example, the Democratic Republic of the Congo has planned the introduction of a *technique rurale* cycle which would stress rural studies at both primary and secondary levels.³⁸ In addition to "ruralizing" its school programme, a Dahomey plan calls for experiments with "co-operative schools" specializing in teaching farm methods and principles of co-operative organization. The United Republic of Tanzania plans far-reaching reforms of its school system around the principles of "education for self-reliance",³⁹ intended to ensure that the rural primary school functions as an educational community centre, thus linking it with adult education and related activities. The educational reforms being considered by a number of these countries seem to be concerned mainly with the introduction of agriculture (under various names) and some commercial and vocational subjects into the schools. While there is a strong case for including some technical subjects in the curriculum, some authorities do not support concentration on vocational and craft training at the school level. They feel that the essential function of the school is to provide general and basic education, which may include some technical subjects.⁴⁰ This is because technical and vocational training can be very expensive, competent teachers are often not available in under-developed countries and because large business and industrial concerns are often not equipped to provide this kind of training.⁴¹ However, schools can teach courses such as biology and chemistry in relation to practical work, as is being done at the English Medium Centre of the Ministry of Education in Zambia, at the University there, and by the UNESCO Science Teaching Programme being carried out in association with the University College of East Africa (Kenya, United Republic of Tanzania and Uganda). Similar programmes are in operation at Njala University College, Sierra Leone, the Regional Textbook Centre at Yaoundé, Cameroon, and the UNESCO Regional Training Centre for Education in Africa, at Accra, Ghana. These programmes combine a "local" African content with up-to-date techniques and methods of teaching. A disturbing feature in this context is a tendency to reduce the duration of courses. This may have short-term economic benefits, but in the long run it does involve the risk that standards may be diluted even further.

The nations which have provided the educational models for African States are now being questioned by their own youth on the value of the education offered. This development may ultimately prove advantageous for Africa. It will mean that educators of all nationalities are being challenged to re-examine their own educational systems from first principles.

³⁸ The Democratic Republic of the Congo, *Plan intérimaire de développement économique et social, 1964-1965*, p. 29.

³⁹ J. Nyerere, *Education for Self-Reliance* (Ministry of Information and Tourism, United Republic of Tanzania, 1967).

⁴⁰ *The Qualitative and Quantitative Improvement of Rural Education* (E/D/WS/133, Paris, May 1969); UNESCO, *Meeting of Experts on Curriculum of General Education*, part III (ED/CS/4/11, Paris, June 1968).

⁴¹ F. Harbison and C. Myers, *Education, Manpower and Economic Growth* (New York, McGraw Hill, 1964), p. 8.

Manpower and training

An important function of any educational system is to produce men and women trained to carry out roles necessary for the growth and development of society. The manpower situation in Africa today is characterized by critical shortages at the middle and upper levels, unemployment and underemployment at the lower level. It has been pointed out in a previous section that a high proportion of children never reach school and many others drop out early. The occupational opportunities of such people are extremely limited and most of them eke out a living in subsistence agriculture, or become part of the mostly unemployed shifting masses who gather in the larger towns and cities. Although the continent suffers from an acute shortage of educated people, increasing numbers of young people complete one or more stages of school and experience great difficulty in finding employment which they consider suitable. Such people tend to seek jobs in the modern sector, and this usually involves migrating to towns in search of work, which all too often is not available. This problem affects most young people who leave school after the primary stage. In some countries it also appears to a limited degree among secondary school leavers and in a few cases among university graduates. Paradoxically, there is an acute shortage of trained manpower at certain levels, most notably among high-level and middle-level trained manpower—especially managers, professional and technical workers of all kinds—and among the skilled industrial workers.

The estimated quantities and categories of trained manpower required as net additions to existing manpower over the period 1965-1975 are listed in table 10.

TABLE 10. MANPOWER NEEDS, 1965-1975

Category	West Africa	East Africa
Managers	4,000	2,500
Engineers and scientists	7,000	4,800
Technicians	26,000	17,000
Clerical staff	35,000	23,000
Skilled and semi-skilled workers	292,600	191,500

SOURCES: "African requirements of trained manpower in critical areas of development activities" (E/CN.14/WP.6/22).

Future manpower prospects for individual countries vary a great deal of course. Thus Zambia, with a relatively buoyant economy, expects a shortage of university graduate personnel of over 5,700 by 1980,⁴² and expects to have achieved self-sufficiency only in the categories of non-science teachers and the legal profession. The United Arab Republic expects to have a slight surplus of managers, professionals and specialists by 1980 and shortages of technicians and skilled workers.⁴³ In

⁴² Development Division, Office of the Vice-President, *Zambian Manpower* (Lusaka Government Printer, 1969), table 18.

⁴³ *Manpower Planning in the UAR* (Institute of National Planning, November 1966), table 60, quoted from A. K. Zikry, "Labour utilization in developing countries with special emphasis on African countries" (MPTR/II/1969).

West Africa there have been signs of an excess of some kinds of university graduates in some countries,⁴⁴ and in Dahomey there appears to be a general surplus of trained personnel. On the whole, however, the greatest shortages are likely to occur among middle-level rather than among the senior-level personnel; the shortage among non-university trained personnel is likely to persist and constitute a serious bottle-neck in development.

In addition, a number of other factors contribute to the difficult manpower situation in which the African States find themselves. Available trained manpower is frequently inefficiently used, owing to political and social constraints, inappropriate and unwieldy administrative structures, lack of proper planning machinery and the prevalence of wage policies that do not provide incentives for young people to go into technical fields where manpower shortages exist. Many countries, moreover, have neglected to develop suitable training programmes for the unskilled portion of the labour force, especially that section which lives in the rural areas.

The characteristics of the labour force may exert a strong influence upon the sort of development that takes place. In many countries, because of the high level of unemployment, there is a need for the promotion of labour-intensive methods of production and of industries which lend themselves readily to these techniques. Because of deficiencies in the work force, not only in terms of skill, but in a lack of extended experience in wage employment itself, a preference for capital intensive methods may be generated in both public and private sectors.

The difficulties outlined are in part due to historical and social factors, but it is important to recognize that they are also partially a product of African education. This has both quantitative and qualitative aspects—quantitative in the sense that there has not been enough education, and qualitative in the sense that many people get the wrong kind of education. In this context, the problems have been summarized in terms of three main factors:

- (a) Internal wastage within educational system;
- (b) Difficulties in matching training with employment requirements, which call for co-ordination between manpower and educational planners;
- (c) The non-acceptance of innovations by educational planners and the resistance of rigid administrative structures.⁴⁵

It is often alleged that African educational systems, like those in most other developing regions, have failed to provide adequate technical education for the young. This is generally attributed to a variety of factors including lack of facilities and teachers, rigid educational systems, and a preference among the young for more prestigious white-collar employment. There is a widely held belief that young people tend to reject technical training in favour of a general "academic" education. This view

⁴⁴ "Trained manpower requirements for accelerated economic development in the West African subregion" (E/CN.14/INR/113), p. 39.

⁴⁵ Report of the second session of the work party on manpower and training" (E/CN.14/WP.6/28).

is disputed by one authority, who states the problem in rather different terms. On the basis of research carried out in Ghana, he rejects the notion of a general prejudice against technical employment as such and attributes unemployment among school leavers in Ghana and other places to the fact that employment opportunities of all kinds tend to lag behind educational output. He points out that student aspirations are determined largely by their perception of opportunities within the exchange sector of the economy and their destinations by the actual opportunities that exist in that sector. The nature of the curriculum has little to do with the process. When technical schools are set up as part of the formal educational structure, pupils regard them as stepping-stones to courses of a professional type, not as leading to artisanal employment. In innumerable cases the expectations and pressures of the students have perverted the intentions of the planners.⁴⁶

There is evidence, therefore, that the educational preferences of students are based not upon prejudice against practical training as such, but upon a shrewd estimate of where the best available vocational opportunities lie. Changes in the school curriculum *per se* are not likely to induce substantial numbers of students to take up vocational studies. The intention is not to suggest that there is no need for curriculum reform, as a strong case for it can be made out on other grounds. Some authorities are of the opinion that vocational training is really out of place in the formal school system as it exists in Africa at the present time.⁴⁷ Such training functions best within the context of separate institutions established for this purpose, which should be closely linked with the industries they are intended to supply.

To sum up, the manpower situation in Africa is characterized by absolute manpower shortages on certain levels and by a lack of co-ordination of demand and supply and training. Strategies of human resources development must vary with the needs of specific countries, which in turn, vary considerably in terms of the level of development, available resources, political orientation and so on. However, in the African context, manpower strategy should include the following basic elements which seem to deserve priority action:

(a) Manpower survey analysis and planning;

(b) Educational development and reform to include: the expansion of secondary education, since this is the source of upper-level and middle-level manpower; curriculum reform including greater emphasis on science and greater relevance to the local environment; the expansion of teacher-training facilities; reduction of cost and improvements in efficiency by increasing the teacher-student ratio at the secondary and higher levels, making fuller use of university facilities, experimenting with less conventional methods (including correspondence courses, programmed learning methods and educational television, etc.), and integrating education planning more closely

with development planning; and elaboration of vocational training facilities, especially on-the-job training;

(c) The reorganization of pay scales, working conditions and other factors which may serve to provide incentives for people to enter occupations where manpower shortages exist;

(d) Regional co-operation, especially for developing multinational training facilities and co-ordinating training programmes;

(e) Increased opportunities for external training;

(f) Machinery for the implementation of human resources development strategy.⁴⁸

Youth

In Africa, as in other parts of the developing world, a large proportion of the population consists of young people between the ages of fourteen and twenty-five. It may be said that this large segment of the population has been particularly vulnerable to the sweeping transformations that have taken place in Africa in the course of the last three or four decades, particularly resulting from political changes, the growth of towns and changes in the traditional ways of life, stemming from the demands of a modernizing society. An ECA report observes that the main general problem facing African countries is the large number of young people who have reached adolescence without any schooling, or with only a short period of primary education, with perhaps a poor foundation of health, with little or no training for the newer types of employment that are becoming available—especially in the big towns and cities—and with great uncertainty as to how best they can be involved in the national development effort.⁴⁹

African Governments have tried to grapple with the problem in a variety of ways, partly by providing special facilities for youth in the urban setting, and partly by organizing programmes designed to induce them to remain in the countryside. A recent survey of African development plans shows that eighteen out of fifty plans specifically list youth programmes of various kinds under the general heading of "social welfare" or some equivalent title. The more ambitious programmes for youth are sometimes listed under a separate heading.⁵⁰ Examples of these programmes include:

(a) Rural training for young boys and girls (including practical work in the fields, community affairs, health and nutrition);

(b) Special programmes for youth dropping out of school in urban or rural areas, so as to provide them with vocational guidance and training;

(c) Youth organizations in urban areas, aimed at encouraging their participation in community activities and providing them with positive guidance and supple-

⁴⁶ P. J. Foster, "The vocational school fallacy in development planning", in C. Arnold Anderson and Mary J. Bowman, eds., *Education and Economic Development* (Chicago, Aldine Publishing Company, 1965), chap. 8, pp. 151 and 155.

⁴⁷ P. J. Foster, *ibid.*; also "Manpower requirements for agricultural development in Africa" (E/CN.14/WP.6/7), p. 3.

⁴⁸ "Trained manpower for accelerated development in Africa" (E/CN.14/WP.6/4), part V.

⁴⁹ Economic Commission for Africa, "Family, child and youth welfare services in Africa" (E/CN.14/SWSA/5), p. 41.

⁵⁰ United Nations, *Social Welfare Planning in the Context of National Development Plans* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 70.IV.11).

mentary training, as well as creating a wholesome recreational and cultural milieu;

(d) School social services aimed at the reduction of drop-outs and the co-operation of the parents in the educational process;

(e) Youth corps for mobilizing unemployed youths and using them for development projects (for example, irrigation, roads, tree planting, land-clearing, etc.) while training them for future work and citizenship;⁵¹

(f) Special land settlement schemes for young people, such as the Nyakashaka Resettlement Scheme in Uganda—a project for the resettlement of unemployed school leavers as tea farmers. In Nigeria, there have been a number of similar experiments. However, these schemes are likely to be expensive.⁵²

A number of countries have introduced school curricula with a special rural orientation, supplemented in some cases with farm training centres, agricultural clubs of various kinds, and other organizations of a similar nature, all designed to increase the young person's ability to contribute to the development of his rural community. The training of a young man in farming may conflict with the traditional practices of the family elders to whom he is expected to defer. Conflicts between generations are not new in contemporary Africa, and contribute to the exodus of youth from rural areas. The development plans of a few African States acknowledge this problem, although they are not explicit about how to solve it.

On the whole, although attempts to promote the development of youth include some interesting and promising experiments, it cannot be said that any generally successful formulae have appeared.

Health

While most western European nations have one doctor to every 500 to 1,000 inhabitants, Africa has an average of one to between 25,000 and 50,000 inhabitants.⁵³ Similarly, a critical shortage exists among nurses and related medical technical staff. These figures represent a global estimate, however, and there are wide variations between different parts of specific countries. The great majority of doctors, perhaps as many as two thirds or three quarters in some places, are concentrated in the towns where the larger hospitals and medical schools are located, in spite of the fact that such larger towns contain only about 10 per cent of the population. Thus, in practice there are large rural areas virtually without any doctors at all.⁵⁴ It is estimated that even when the medical schools currently planned are completed, there will still be only one medical school for about 10 million

⁵¹ *Ibid.*

⁵² R. Chambers, *Settlement Schemes in Tropical Africa* (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969), pp. 33-36.

⁵³ The First United Nations Development Decade included in its health targets approximately one doctor for 10,000 people, one nurse and one technician (laboratory, X-ray etc.) for 5,000, one sanitarian for 15,000 and one sanitary engineer for 25,000. See World Health Organization, *Review of the Second Decade of Public Health Work in Africa* (Brazzaville, Republic of the Congo, Regional Office for Africa of WHO, 1968), part II, "Health protection", pp. 33-52.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 10.

population, and that five countries with 3 to 5 million population will have no medical schools at all.⁵⁵

The shortage in staff and facilities is reflected in high mortality rates throughout the continent. Reliable statistics are not available, but infant mortality rates are estimated at 150 per 1,000 in some countries, and probably considerably higher in other countries of the region. The death rate for the whole population is about 22.5 per 1,000 compared with a world total of 15.9 per 1,000. The main illnesses affecting young children are malnutrition (kwashiorkor), respiratory diseases, gastrointestinal ailments and infectious childhood diseases such as measles and whooping cough. Almost all of these diseases are readily preventable, either through health education, immunization or other means, provided the facilities are available on the spot.⁵⁶

In the field of communicable diseases, malaria remains the most serious problem, with over 270 million people exposed to the risk of infection throughout Africa. It is estimated that nearly all children over three years of age are affected at some time or another, and in some areas an average of 30 per cent of adults may be infected. Other diseases in this category that constitute major problems are tuberculosis, leprosy, trypanosomiasis, smallpox, yellow fever, poliomyelitis, measles, bilharziasis and onchocerciasis. The problem of poor health is also important, because of the detrimental effect on the productivity of workers and the fact that it diverts funds from other developmental efforts.

The fundamental problems, of course, are not so much the diseases themselves as the basically poor environmental and sanitary conditions which give rise to them. These problems are compounded by widespread ignorance of hygienic practices and environmental sanitation. In addition, certain social and cultural factors directly contribute to poor health practices.

The reasons for poor diet resulting in malnutrition vary. *Per capita* food production in Africa has been declining because peasants have been giving greater attention to cash crops, but there are also problems of wastage resulting from poor storage and distribution as well as questions of food habits and preferences, which have the effect that people do not always make the best use of what is actually available.

The percentage of total planned investment allocated to health varies from less than 1 per cent per annum in the case of some countries to as high as 17.1 per cent in Sierra Leone. Most countries allocated about 3.0 per cent to health, which is considerably less than the percentage usually allocated to education. The major priorities of the various States vary considerably, of course, but there is a discernible trend in many towards the development of preventive health measures, which have been somewhat neglected in the past. This involves programmes of sanitation, the provision of pure water supplies, vaccination drives and a considerable amount of educational work on health, nutrition, child care and the like. Such work often involves co-operation among personnel from different departments such as education, public health and community development workers.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 25.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 25.

Most countries are attempting to provide basic medical services for a greater proportion of their population, aiming to reach their more remote communities. The main strategy here is to expand the system that already exists, which consists of a hospital in a major population centre, surrounded by a network of health centres and dispensaries located in the small outlying rural communities. In some cases, these are supplemented by mobile health units. Many States have set themselves the target of at least one hospital in each major province or region plus health centres at the rate of about one for every 20,000 people (and an even larger number of the smaller dispensaries). Some of the less well-developed States, however, have one health centre for 50,000 or more people. A major bottle-neck here is the need for trained staff: Algeria, for instance, utilizes military personnel, but most other countries rely extensively upon overseas aid, including international agencies, to provide trained staff in this field, while trying to develop their own training programmes.

In spite of the high priority accorded to preventive health services, and the extension of basic medical services to the countryside, many countries still find themselves committed to heavy expenditures on hospitals—in major cities or towns—which are needed to carry out specialized treatment and support the outlying units. Thus in Togo, one finds that out of a projected expenditure of about 1,195 million francs, about 725 million francs or nearly 70 per cent is devoted to hospital construction of various kinds. In many countries hospital construction takes up between 40 per cent and 50 per cent of all planned investment in health.⁵⁷ Investing capital in

hospital construction should not be considered unnecessary or undesirable, but, it has as a major consequence the tendency to concentrate medical facilities in large urban areas and towns.

To sum up, African efforts in the health field have shown a trend towards preventive measures and public health. In spite of considerable development in many areas, certain basic constraints continue to impede progress.

Housing

In the plans of most States allocation for housing is larger than that for health, although less than for education. And although the urban population is relatively small in nearly all countries, in the most rapidly growing segment, very often the major portion of funds allocated to housing is directed towards the urban areas. Thus, Ethiopia planned to spend nearly 80 per cent of investment in housing upon urban areas while in Morocco, although the disproportion between the two sectors was less extreme, nevertheless urban housing claimed a very large share.⁵⁸

A variety of strategies are adopted to deal with both urban and rural housing problems. The field of greatest urgency is of course low-cost housing, and Governments are assuming an increasingly active role here. Very often the major instrument of policy is a national housing authority or national housing corporation which administers a variety of schemes, both constructing houses for rent as well as for sale. Some countries, such as Ghana, Nigeria and Zambia, have experimented with the promotion of building societies financed through bank loans. Others, such as the United Arab Republic and the United Republic of Tanzania, have sought to en-

⁵⁷ A great deal depends upon how a particular country classifies different types of expenditures. See examples Togo, *Five-Year Development Plan 18, 1966-1970*; Morocco, *Five-Year 1968-1972*, vol. II, pp. 645-646 and the United Republic of Tanzania, *Second Five-Year Plan for Social and Economic Development 1969-1974*, p. 175.

⁵⁸ See Ethiopia, *Third Five-year Development Plan 1968-1973* (Addis Ababa, 1968), p. 350, and also Morocco, *Plan Quinquennial 1968-1972*, chap. XV.

TABLE 11. PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL PUBLIC AND PRIVATE INVESTMENT IN HOUSING IN DEVELOPMENT PLANS IN SOME AFRICAN COUNTRIES

Country	Plan period	Investment in housing (per cent)	Total investment in social services (per cent)
<i>West Africa</i>			
Niger	1962-1971	7.3	25.3
Togo	1966-1970	15.9	26.9
Upper Volta	1963-1967	9.3	22.8
<i>East Africa</i>			
Kenya	1966-1970	5.3	12.1
Madagascar	1964-1968	14.7	22.5
Malawi	1965-1969	1.8	27.2
Uganda	1966-1971	21.7	32.3
United Republic of Tanzania	1964-1969	17.0	28.0
<i>Central Africa</i>			
Cameroon	1966-1971	4.2	15.8
Chad.	1966-1970	7.9	24.7
Congo (Republic of)	1964-1970	16.5	20.3
<i>North Africa</i>			
Libya	1963-1968	3.0	27.3

SOURCE: African development plans.

Note: Percentage includes some other urbanization services.

courage co-operative housing societies. However, it has been found that these types of institution do not altogether suit the needs of the very lowest income groups, who cannot meet the financial obligations involved.

Consequently, a growing number of countries have been turning to various types of self-help housing schemes as a means of meeting the needs of the very poorest groups in both urban and rural areas. These schemes can be administered through housing corporations, co-operatives or local councils, if need be, but they do need the supervision of people with experience in the various aspects of construction and of social workers, to ensure continuing community co-operation.

Community development

The techniques of community development or *animation rurale* have become a major instrument of policy in an increasing number of African States. Less importance is being given to other forms of social welfare work than was the case in colonial days and there has been a tendency to emphasize programmes which are intended to have a fairly direct effect on the productivity of individuals and communities—hence the increasing popularity of schemes of the community development type.

The organization and administration of social welfare programmes in most African countries have tended to be widely dispersed among various public and voluntary agencies and so effective co-ordination has become a serious problem. This situation is reflected in the development plans, in which the various services may be classified in very different ways. Various social welfare services are operated by ministries responsible for social affairs, labour, health, education, youth and sports, defence, social security, agriculture and rural development. Most countries have programmes related to mother and child welfare, the education of women (home economics, for example), youth services and community work and these are generally the responsibility of many different departments and agencies. In addition, French-speaking countries frequently place emphasis on family health and on social security programmes. In English-speaking countries there is a tendency to emphasize leisure-time group activities, case work and delinquency services and the rehabilitation of socially and physically handicapped persons. Nearly every plan treats these programmes as being of rather low priority and only limited funds are allocated to them.

Community development in its various forms presents a rather different situation and many plans devote a chapter or section to developments in this field, in which the basic strategy is outlined. In other cases, there is heavy reliance upon community development methods in programmes of agricultural expansion and rural improvement in general, although there may not be a specific department or ministry concerned with this type of approach. In spite of the many forms which this type of activity can take, it is possible to identify a fairly limited number of approaches or strategies, in relation to questions of organization and structure. Nearly all countries rely heavily on the use of voluntary workers and the development of local community leadership,

since this is generally regarded as an essential part of the method.

In some countries, and perhaps especially the French-speaking ones, community development is central to the whole process of development in the countryside. This is especially true in Senegal, Guinea and Mali, which place strong emphasis on rural self-help in their development programmes. In some other countries—and perhaps especially English-speaking ones—community development programmes tend to be seen as useful adjuncts to the work of other agencies specializing in agricultural development, health and so on.

All African countries are concerned to help their people to help themselves and to promote the development of local leadership in order to further the broad over-all objective. However, each country has a particular social context, peculiar to itself and with its own problems, which determines in some measure the strategies that have to be adopted. Thus the Algerian plan stresses the need to gather the scattered population together into farming villages and the grouping of these small units into larger communes. The army plays an important role in development work of all kinds. Co-operatives and the idea of collective responsibility and self-help through communes and rural municipalities, are essential elements in the whole process of rural development.⁵⁹ The Senegal plan indicates that a key element in the strategy for rural development is the development of the network of centres for rural expansion. These units are staffed by technicians and community workers who seek to promote all aspects of rural development. There are also training schemes for local voluntary leaders and regional committees to co-ordinate the various programmes and projects.⁶⁰ In Togo social work teams are being developed to work in conjunction with the regional development boards and assist in the co-ordination of the work of various ministries and agencies.⁶¹ A Madagascar plan also outlines a structure of development committees that will be co-ordinated at the top by an interministerial committee of planning and development.⁶² In Kenya plans are being made for a hierarchy of development committees, on the local, district and provincial level. Trained community development officers act as advisers to these committees, which promote local self-help projects and help in the major government land-settlement schemes. In Botswana there are similar committees which act in liaison with local tribal councils.⁶³ The Western Nigerian Regional Plan describes a rather different arrangement. The region is divided into development blocks of about ten villages, each with a community development officer attached to its block, whose functions include the promotion of a pilot integrated scheme of rural development.⁶⁴

⁵⁹ Algeria, *Plan of Constantine, 1959-1963* (1960), later plan not available.

⁶⁰ Sénégal, *Deuxième plan quadriennal de développement économique et social 1965-1969*.

⁶¹ Togo, *Five-Year Development Plan, 1966-1970*, chap. VI, sect. 2.

⁶² Madagascar, *Five-Year Plan 1964-1968*.

⁶³ Kenya, *Development Plan 1966-1970*, p. 326, also *Botswana National Development Plan 1968-1973* (Gaberones, Botswana).

⁶⁴ Nigeria, *National Development Programme 1962-1968*, p. 316.

The Ethiopian plan also emphasizes a type of integrated rural development scheme in the experiments with the so-called "package programmes" which are being carried out with aid from the Government of Sweden.

So far as it is possible to judge from the plans themselves, certain countries do not appear to place very much stress upon the creation of systems of development committees or other types of special organization. Rather, they plan to provide teams of development officers to work directly with local communities, accepting their social organization more or less as they find it, and helping them to develop special committees and other means to meet practical problems as they arise. Others seek to create special structures.

The plans also show subtle differences in orientation on a level quite different from questions of formal organization and structure. For example, in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Ministry of Social Affairs and Community Development views this method as "characterized by a particular form of co-operation between the State and the various communities". Where a community has taken the initiative, the State helps with money and, more importantly, expert assistance.⁶⁵ Similarly the planners in Kenya see professional community development workers as stimulating and guiding self-help in the field and as serving the development committees.⁶⁶ Countries such as Mali, however, have a different ideological orientation and the Government commits the country as a whole to a particular type of development. In this context, the community worker is more likely to be an agent, mobilizing the rural masses in the service of the State, rather than an adviser helping villagers to identify and achieve their own targets.⁶⁷ The Sierra Leone plan provides for the establishment of district development councils under the chairmanship of a representative of the local district council, but consisting of members of ministries and government departments. Quite clearly this represents a different situation from councils or committees composed mainly of local people, advised and assisted by a professional worker.⁶⁸

SOCIAL REFORM AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE

Most contemporary States contain a mixture of "traditional" and "modern" features, which sometimes generate conflict and stress. In terms of political structure, "traditional" African cultures vary from the centralized States of North Africa—Ethiopia, Nigeria and Uganda, for example—to those described as segmentary, made up of numerous ethnic groupings lacking any centralized political organization above the village level. These traditional groupings have had an important effect upon political and social development in ways which are well known. What is more important, they

form rival and older focal points of popular loyalty and identification, as distinct from the State itself, which in some cases have tended to undermine the cohesion of the new African countries.

As by far the greater number of the African population are farmers or herders, it is the impact of modernizing influence upon African agrarian institutions that is of prime importance in the present context. The social structure of peasant communities varies from place to place, but in most of Africa, it is based upon co-operation between individuals who are regarded as belonging to the same group and who have extensive rights and obligations towards each other. Very often the individual's status in the local community is largely determined by his family ties and there is not very much room for individual achievement, though this observation is not universally true and some societies do reward individual achievement. In general, peasant communities in Africa are regarded as being essentially co-operative and many action programmes of development are based upon this assumption. It is not easy to influence members of communities of this type to change age-old habits and customs, for the group exerts a very strong influence over the individual since he is dependent upon it.

The growth of industrial towns also frequently has the effect in the long run of changing traditional patterns of co-operation, for a variety of reasons. The kin group is not easily fitted into patterns of industrial co-operation, which call for teams of individuals having complementary skills, rather than an acceptable degree of relationship with each other. Other organizations such as trade unions, which are more relevant to the industrial setting, compete with traditional institutions for the individual's allegiance and gradually the kin group loses many of its functions as a productive unit. Also the individual has often migrated from the countryside to the town and so is physically separated from most of his kin.

Urbanization is also associated with the emergence of new *élites*, especially those associated with money and education and a western life style. In short, class stratification in the western sense begins to appear and in some cities it may be said that two *élites* exist side by side, the one modern and western in orientation, though rarely entirely so, and the other more traditional, consisting of wealthy traders, chiefs and the like.⁶⁹ There seems to be some disagreement over the significance of the development of the modern *élite*, for some writers stress the importance of the communication gap which is alleged to have developed between the new *élite* and the general population, while others have stressed the interpretive functions performed by the "new men" for the rank and file, which may involve a certain amount of exploitation, but which do help to integrate them into the urban setting.⁷⁰

The foregoing discussion implies that African Governments are obliged to function in a general context of

⁶⁵ République démocratique du Congo, *Panorama du Ministère des affaires sociales et du développement communautaire* (30/6/68P), p. 17.

⁶⁶ Kenya, op. cit., p. 326.

⁶⁷ République du Mali, "Rapport sur le plan quinquennal, 1961-1965" (Ministère du plan et de l'économie rurale).

⁶⁸ Sierra Leone, *Ten-Year Plan of Economic and Social Development for Sierra Leone, 1962-1972*, p. 85.

⁶⁹ C. Meillassoux, *Urbanization of an African Community* (University of Washington Press, 1968), p. 29.

⁷⁰ See H. Miner et al., op. cit., p. 170, and also Ken Post, *The Nigerian Federal Election of 1959: Politics and Administration in a Developing Political System* (London, 1963), p. 48.

rapid social change. In some countries only temporary measures have been applied to these problems, but in others reforms have been introduced which, it is hoped, will lead to changes in basic institutions. The term social change and institutional reform might be said to cover every aspect of national life. However, in the present context one is mainly concerned with two areas: first, attempts to control or eliminate inequalities which have grown up in the past between different sectors of African communities, and secondly, attempts to promote social and economic development in the large, relatively stagnant countryside and, indirectly, to control the growing imbalance and inequality between rural and urban areas.

Measures for the reduction of social inequalities

In the present context, the major dimensions of social inequality are the growing differences between social classes and ethnic groups, between the sexes, and between different regions and provinces. It has been pointed out that in much of present-day Africa differences in class and in the western sense are to be found. There are also in some places traditional *élites* of wealthy traders, chiefs and the like. However, with the exception of Ethiopia and the Moslem States bordering on the Sahara, Africa has lacked the entrenched "landed aristocracy" which is characteristic of so much of Asia and present-day Latin America. It also lacks a large class of indigenous capitalist *entrepreneurs* in the modern sense, although there are a number of traders, especially in West Africa, some of whom may be very wealthy. Most large-scale modern enterprises, however, are in the hands of foreign firms. In fact the modern African *élites* are relatively small in number, recent in origin, and more closely linked with the mass of the population, through extended family relationships, than their counterparts in many other parts of the world. In some parts of the continent, the situation has been complicated by the presence of large immigrant groups from Europe and Asia who have, in the past, dominated the political life of the areas concerned and are still very important in industry and commerce. The

tensions generated by this situation have led to open warfare in some countries such as Algeria, Kenya and Portuguese Africa, and endemic unrest in others. In the past, even in areas without large settler populations, the majority of senior posts in government and private enterprise have been in the hands of expatriate officials.

Thus, in so far as class and ethnic differences are concerned, measures for the reduction of social inequalities have tended to centre around measures designed to promote the advancement of Africans into highly paid administrative positions, previously the preserve of expatriates, and to reduce the large disparity between those with relatively high incomes and the very poor. In a few places, there also have been schemes to promote the growth of an indigenous class of *entrepreneurs*, though most of these might be regarded as marginal to the central problem of reduction of social inequality. Labour unions play a part also, but these are concerned with wage earners in industry, commerce and plantation agriculture, and since these sectors are relatively under-developed, this reduces the scope of their effectiveness; also, in some one-party States, unions tend to be regarded as an auxiliary of the dominant political organization, which limits their freedom of action. On the other hand, since government is frequently the largest employer of labour—especially at the upper levels of education and skill, it is in a good position to influence the distribution of money incomes. The following table indicates the importance of this problem.

By taking the *per capita* national income as a rough guideline of a nation's wealth, and therefore of its capacity to pay its workers of various kinds, then although in absolute terms even the most highly paid African examples listed here receive considerably less than their counterparts in the United Kingdom, they receive nevertheless a much higher ratio in relation to the national *per capita* income than would be the case in the United Kingdom. Partly as a result of this situation, and also because numbers are inflated, a disproportionate part of the budget in many African States is spent on civil service salaries.

Corrective efforts in this direction have not always been successful; indeed civil disorders and even coups have

TABLE 12. ILLUSTRATIVE SALARIES, WAGES AND *per capita* INCOME IN THE UNITED KINGDOM, GHANA AND UGANDA, 1966

Items	United Kingdom		Ghana		Uganda	
	£	Ratio ^a	£	Ratio ^a	£	Ratio ^a
Salaries						
High-level civil servant	5,250	10	2,000	24	2,800	112
Doctor	4,500	9	3,000	35	2,240	90
Engineer	2,000	4	920	11	1,320	53
Wages						
Skilled industrial worker	1,100	2	475	6	350	14
Unskilled industrial worker	800	2	137	2	110	4
Agricultural worker	700	1	100	1	n.a.	—
Messenger	600	1	100	1	110	4
<i>Per capita</i> national income.	525	1	85	1	25	1

SOURCE: P. Clairmonte "Observations on plans, planners and implementation", paper for United Nations Committee for Development Planning, third session, held at Addis Ababa, 1968.

^a Ratio of salaries and wages to *per capita* national income.

been the result of well-intentioned but clumsy attempts to limit the salaries and other privileges of civil servants or the military. The United Republic of Tanzania has succeeded in effecting a salary reduction in the civil service, but most other States have either avoided the problem or employed other, indirect, methods. For example, Uganda has adopted the strategy of planning for graduated increases, ranging from 3.5 per cent for income groups of less than £ 90 sterling to zero for those earning over £ 600.⁷¹ In the United Republic of Tanzania, the Turner Report indicated that the rise in wages and general labour costs since independence had been associated with a decline in the numbers of wage earners.⁷² In consequence government policy has stressed increasingly the number of employed rather than the salaries of wage earners.⁷³

Some countries which attach importance to this problem have set up special bodies to administer government policy in this respect and watch over the movement of wages and salaries. In the United Republic of Tanzania, the Permanent Labour Tribunal performs this function and in Kenya the Industrial Court has been reorganized to enable it to function effectively in this respect. Many countries have minimum wage legislation, but sometimes this merely serves to confirm existing inequalities, since the minimum may vary in different zones of the country as between urban and rural areas,⁷⁴ and also is lower for agricultural workers as compared with non-agricultural workers.

An important means of reducing income disparities between different social groups is through taxation. The tax structures of most States reflect those of the former

metropolitan powers in some degree, but the mechanisms are usually rather antiquated and thus far this method appears not to have been used as a major instrument of social policy in the great majority of countries. Gross disparities in the income of different social groups remain.

The second important facet of this problem concerns interethnic differences arising out of the historical circumstance of immigrant settlement in certain areas, most notably parts of north Africa, east Africa and parts of central and southern Africa. Here the presence of foreign settler groups of European or Asian origin has acted as a barrier against African social mobility by occupying the higher posts in government and private enterprise, and by frequently operating an overt colour bar against the advancement of the indigenous peoples. A further refinement of this problem consists of the ethnic and religious rivalries between different African groups.

To deal with the former aspect of the problem, the domination of the higher posts in administration and business by expatriates, in virtually all parts of the continent has meant that the drive for political self-determination has been associated with a drive for Africanization of the upper reaches of administration and also in some places for the return of large tracts of land to African ownership. In southern Africa, there has been little change, and the *status quo* is maintained in an atmosphere of increasing racial rancour. In other parts of the continent, there have been far-reaching changes which have come about in a variety of ways. In Algeria this has come about as a result of protracted and bloody warfare; in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, local people simply took over the posts vacated by the fleeing Belgians, and in Guinea the French withdrew entirely after the negative Guinean vote—in 1958—on membership in the French community. In other places, more gradual and orderly processes have been initiated and are still going on. These involve the gradual replacement of expatriate officials in the civil services of the countries concerned with their own nationals. In some countries, of course, members of the immigrant communities are now nationals and have remained in the government service, but their numbers are relatively small.

⁷¹ See Uganda, *Work for Progress*, p. 149.

⁷² United Republic of Tanzania, "Wages, incomes, rural development, investment and price policy", Government Paper No. 4 (Dar es Salaam, Government Printer, 1967).

⁷³ United Republic of Tanzania, *Second Five-Year Plan, 1969-1974*, vol. 1, p. 206.

⁷⁴ International Monetary Fund, *Surveys of African Economies*, vol. 1 (Washington D.C., 1968), Central African Republic, p. 148; the People's Republic of the Congo, p. 249; Chad, p. 202; Gabon, p. 303, maintains the agricultural/non-agricultural distinction, but has abandoned regional differences.

TABLE 13. PERCENTAGE OF AFRICANS IN THE CIVIL SERVICES OF KENYA AND ZAMBIA — SELECTED DATES

Position	Kenya		Zambia	
	1960	1969	1960	1968
Administrative and executive	8.9	81.6	0	71
Professional	2.5	47.3	0.6	19
Technical and related	4.4	71.8	2.3	59
Clerical, police, etc.		97.5		82
Teachers (primary)				95
Teachers (secondary)				8
Government teachers		18.5		—
TOTAL (Government)		94.5		76

SOURCE: Based on *Social Reconstruction in the Newly Independent Countries of East Africa* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 66.II.K.5), part II, monograph No. 4 of *Social Welfare Services in Africa*; Development Division, Office of the Vice-President, *Zambian Manpower* (Lusaka, Government Printer, 1969), p. 6; and Kenya, Directorate of Personnel, "Kenyanization survey, July 1969" (Nairobi, 1969), unpublished report.

In most African countries the process of Africanization of the civil services is fairly advanced though many retain large numbers of expatriates in advisory positions. Table 13 illustrates the scope and pace of this change in two African countries which have had relatively large immigrant settler communities. The two sets of data are not strictly comparable because of differences in methods of data classification, and because the Kenya survey refers specifically to Africans as well as to citizens while the Zambian data refers to Zambians only, though it is evident that Africans are being referred to. The process of Africanization is far advanced in Kenya and is progressing in Zambia, which had started from a very small nucleus of African civil servants in 1960. Two areas of relative weakness are the professional category and secondary school teachers; in this context the Kenya survey notes that expatriate teachers were 42.2 per cent of all expatriates employed in the government service.⁷⁵ This situation appears in many African countries. With the coming of independence, teachers—and especially secondary school teachers—constituted the largest pool of relatively well-educated manpower in many States. As the process of Africanization advanced, they transferred in large numbers to better paid posts in administration and related fields, leaving an acute shortage of staff in the educational system, making it necessary for authorities to fill this gap with expatriates on contract terms.

The situation in the professional category in the examples given reflects the general shortage of qualified people in the continent as a whole. The material presented refers to only two countries, but on the whole it is true that the process of Africanization—or “localization” as it is sometimes termed—in the public sector is fairly well advanced in most countries.

The private sector presents a different and more difficult problem. As pointed out previously, sub-Saharan Africa lacks a large class of indigenous *entrepreneurs* and most large enterprises are foreign-owned. Precise information is lacking, but it does seem that although notable advances have been made in recent years, expatriates of one kind or another still exercise a commanding position in the upper levels of the administration. However, in the Cameroon in 1965/1966, local citizens outnumbered expatriates in both the public and private sectors, though the latter predominated at certain grades or levels.⁷⁶ A rather different situation prevailed in 1967, in Kenya as table 14 indicates.

Provincial and regional inequalities

In all African countries certain provinces or areas have advanced more rapidly than others, so that considerable inequalities between regions or provinces within countries exist at the present time. Frequently, development has tended to centre around particular cities or areas which have developed more rapidly than the outlying areas; for example, the area around Dakar in Senegal, the copper-mining zones in the Congo and Zambia, Abidjan in the Ivory Coast and Addis Ababa in Ethiopia. The

⁷⁵ Kenya, Directorate of Personnel, “Kenyanization survey, July 1969” (Nairobi, 1969) unpublished report, p. 1.

⁷⁶ Federal Republic of the Cameroon, *Second Five-year Plan of Economic and Social Development, 1966-1971*, table 3.11, p. 428.

TABLE 14. PERCENTAGE OF HIGH AND MIDDLE LEVEL POSTS FILLED BY KENYA CITIZENS, 1967

Category	Percentage of total posts in category		
	Private sector	Public sector	Whole economy
A	28.2	45.3	34.6
B	46.7	73.5	57.0
C	47.3	72.2	54.5
D	64.3	83.8	70.1
All high and middle grades	52.9	72.9	59.4

SOURCE: Kenya, *Development Plan, 1966-1970*, p. 23.

Note: Category A — Professional occupations requiring university or higher education.

Category B — Subprofessional and technical occupations requiring form IV or VI education with two or more years of training and experience.

Category C — Occupations requiring roughly form IV education and three or more years of job experience.

Category D — Occupations requiring a minimum of form II education and two or more years training and job experience.

problem is that, under *laissez-faire* conditions, the more an area develops and acquires an infrastructure of its own in terms of improved physical and social facilities, the more it attracts further investment and development. Thus a gap between developed and underdeveloped areas within countries may become similar to the gap between the developed and developing countries of the world. In a sense this is just one aspect of the rural-urban gap which exists in Africa and other parts of the developing world, but it involves more than just the differences between urban and rural areas. There are genuine differences in the level of development of regions and provinces in the same country, as illustrated in table 15.

Table 15 points out the considerable provincial differences in levels of development. One means of dealing with this problem is, of course, to channel investment into the depressed areas, and another is to give local areas a share in planning for their own development. Many

TABLE 15. KENYA, *per capita* MONETARY GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT BY OLD PROVINCE, 1962

Old Province	Monetary product (£1,000)	Population (thousands)	Per capita monetary product (£)
Nairobi E.P.D.	79,494	315	252
Coast	28,224	728	39
Rift Valley	23,691	1,049	23
Central	23,404	1,925	12
Nyanza	17,885	3,013	6
Southern	5,481	1,014	5
Northern	1,834	590	3
TOTAL	180,013	8,634	21
TOTAL (without Nairobi and Mombasa)	76,618	8,139	9

SOURCE: Kenya, *Development Plan, 1966-1970*, p. 29.

countries attach sufficient importance to regional imbalances to make some provision for dealing with the problem in their development plans. Others have set up branches of their planning organization which will function at local levels. Thus, in Kenya, each province, district and municipality is expected to establish a development committee composed of officials, and also a development advisory committee composed of local political leaders and prominent local citizens. A similar arrangement exists in Zambia.

Both Ghana and Zambia have set up ministries of rural development, while the latter country has placed a minister at the head of each provincial administration, as well. Other countries have attempted to adapt their administrative systems to the problems of the rural areas by setting up semi-autonomous bodies which specialize in rural development. Examples include development corporations of various kinds and also bodies such as the Société régionale de développement agricole (SORAD) of Togo which perhaps could be regarded as an autonomous body with government backing, responsible for all kinds of rural development. The Compagnie française pour le développement des fibres textiles (CDFT) operates in the Cameroons and a number of other West African countries. As its name implies, it is French managed and concentrates on cotton production. It works closely with local agencies and seeks to provide peasants with up-to-date materials, management advice and marketing facilities. The Compagnie d'études industrielles et d'aménagement du territoire (CINAM), which also functions in Cameroon, is also a French organization, which seeks to apply an integrated approach to rural development in selected areas, in the sense that it concerns itself with social aspects of development such as housing, nutrition and hygiene as well as with credit, marketing and other economic factors. In general, activities associated with rural development are subdivided by the various Governments in a great variety of ways, for example, in the United Republic of Tanzania the technical side of agriculture has been consolidated in the Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Co-operatives, but rural self-help efforts rest with the Ministry of Regional Administration and Rural Development.

But no matter how much reform and modification is carried out on the purely administrative level, it is not sufficient in itself to bring about far-reaching social change and growth unless accompanied by change on another more fundamental level. This may involve measures to achieve a more equitable distribution of wealth and income as well as to provide incentives to peasants to adopt new farming techniques or necessary changes in their system of values. For instance, whereas success brings its own rewards, it may also carry risks; in many parts of Africa where income differences have remained fixed for generations, it is sometimes assumed that the success of an individual is gained at the expense of someone else. Thus, the very successful individual may incur the hostility and even the revenge of his fellows. The villager's behaviour may often seem irrational to the outsider, for he may reject an economic advantage in one situation and spend money he cannot afford in another. But all behaviour is based upon values and promises which are normally culturally determined although they may appear irrational

to the ignorant observer. Changes in these attitudes and ways of life are already taking place under the impact of forces associated with the so-called modern sector of the African economies. A major result of these forces is the development of the urban-rural imbalance which has been mentioned earlier. Thus the author of a recent study commented that:

"A permanent unemployment problem is being created without alleviation of the rural predicament. The growth of towns is, in the main, out of gear with balanced growth in the economy at large, urban development is increasingly unhinged from rural development. An altogether excessive share of development resources goes into towns without bringing in its train any marked improvement in the living conditions of the masses there."⁷⁷

Nearly all African Governments stress the importance of rural development, but in practice this sector tends to receive less than its due share of capital expenditure. In a sense this is difficult to avoid since many facilities which may also serve rural areas are most conveniently located in urban centres. Thus, Zambia has recently created a new Ministry of Rural Development. Another point to be taken into consideration is the fact that compared with rural passivity, the urban population constitutes a politically sensitive segment of the population which Governments might ignore only at their own peril.

Land reform

An important aspect of institutional change in the rural areas involves the question of land tenure. Traditional systems of land tenure vary from place to place but basically land is regarded as belonging to the group rather than to the individual.

The arguments for reform of tenure which has become an important issue in virtually every African country can be summarized as follows:

(a) Farmers are unwilling to invest in permanent improvements to their land under communal tenure because they lack security of tenure;

(b) With assured title they are more likely to adopt more economic attitudes to land;

(c) Farmers could use their land as security for loans.

However, reform of tenure in the sense of providing for individual ownership of land is likely to be an expensive process, for not only do numerous small holdings have to be surveyed, boundaries identified and titles prepared, but scattered holdings have to be consolidated into larger units. This is a time-consuming and delicate task, which can arouse bitter resentment if not properly executed. The question is often raised whether reform of tenure is really worth all the trouble and expense involved. There is also the question of land usage. Under traditional forms of tenure, an individual who consistently fails to make use of land to which he has title is likely to lose his rights to the land and it would be assigned to someone else. With individual freehold tenure, however, an individual may exercise the right not to use

⁷⁷ L. Barnes, *African Renaissance*, op. cit., p. 108.

the land and still retain control of it. Moreover, it has been argued that traditional forms of tenure do not necessarily tend to inhibit improvements, as is shown by the spread of cocoa in West Africa and coffee in some parts of Eastern Africa. Although outsiders usually consider land held under traditional systems of tenure as without market value and not a commodity in the western sense of the term, the traditional African concept of ownership differs from that of the west, and in many parts of the continent land is bought and sold and a lively market does in fact exist within the context of traditional systems. In practice, the lineage heads usually exert a strong influence over what may be sold. In this context, an experienced writer on African affairs has observed that a free real-estate market, with unrestricted right to sell, would appear to be very dangerous because land ownership would quickly become concentrated in the hands of the rich.⁷⁸

Studies have also shown that registration of title does not necessarily give the farmer greater access to credit, because the commercial banks are very frequently reluctant to advance loans to small farmers, with or without titles. Farm credit often requires organizations specializing in this type of service.⁷⁹

In spite of these and other criticisms, most agricultural experts appear to be convinced that the arguments in favour of reform of tenure outweigh those against it. It has also been pointed out that the evidence indicates a trend towards greater emphasis on the nuclear family and greater individualization of land usage, so that official policies may merely be sanctioning and organizing what is likely to occur anyway. In any case, reforms of this nature are still in the initial stages and the vast majority of African land is still held in the so-called "traditional" systems of tenure. Reform of the land tenure system, in most places, involves providing farmers with individual titles to their land. In some places, however, there have been experiments with State ownership and various forms of collective ownership. The best known of the more recent experiments in this direction are probably *ujamaa* settlements in the United Republic of Tanzania. In some places the land may be individually owned, but the farmers are encouraged to farm a portion of it on a common basis so as to gain the advantages of large-scale operation. Systems of tenure vary from place to place but co-operative villages are to be found in Algeria, the Central African Republic, Mali and in many other parts of Africa.

In Ethiopia and North Africa, land reform carries a different connotation. These areas have traditional systems of large landowners and tenant farmers, and in this context land reform means the break-up of great estates and re-distribution among tenants and the landless rural proletariat. Programmes of this nature exist in some States and are probably most advanced in the United Arab Republic.

The question of land tenure, however—although important—is only one aspect of the expansion and modernization of agriculture, which must form the basis of rural development. A number of approaches and strategies exist and very often several function within the same country. Thus there are high-density and low-density land settlement schemes in Kenya, and the Sudan has promoted the development of co-operatives for peasant farmers, but also has a scheme to provide 1,000-acre tracts for middle-class citizens who are to be encouraged to go into agriculture on a fairly large scale.⁸⁰ The Ivory Coast has a sector of foreign-owned plantations, and has also made some progress in subdividing land among African farmers, while the United Republic of Tanzania concentrates its efforts on the *ujamaa* movement, which draws its inspiration both from local traditions of co-operation and also, in some measure, from Israeli experience.

African programmes and methods of development take many forms and only a few can be mentioned here. Community development or *animation rurale* methods appear in one form or another in nearly every country. Another approach encourages the rural dweller to move rapidly into modern commercial agriculture. In the United Republic of Tanzania, this has been described as the transformation approach and can take many forms, from land settlement schemes in which farmers are brought together to form new communities—involving co-operatives of various kinds in many cases—to State farms in which the Government supplies all the capital and initiative and the farmers are virtually state employees. Early attempts in this direction have sometimes been on a relatively large scale, using the most up-to-date methods and equipment, and they have not always been successful. There have been problems because of inexperienced management at the top and unfamiliarity with complex equipment at the intermediate level. Thus the observation has been made that:

"attempts to fit West African agriculture into the western pattern of large-scale, capital intensive, land- and labour-saving agriculture should be abandoned. Rather mechanization should be adapted to existing farm size, methods of farming and crop processing, taking into account the level of local mechanical skills".⁸¹

There have been many errors in the field of rural development, and even more neglect, but there is evidence that some countries have been learning from their mistakes and have been showing signs of willingness to tackle this task in a constructive and imaginative way. For example, it has pointed out that in Kenya production of some cereals rose dramatically between 1964 and 1968, and that this development was related to certain innovations

⁷⁸ René Dumont, *False Start in Africa* (London, André Deutsch, 1966), p. 129.

⁷⁹ This discussion is based on a paper by Beverly Brock entitled "Customary land tenure, individualization and agricultural development in Uganda", *East African Journal of Rural Development* (1969), vol. 2, No. 2, pp. 1-27.

⁸⁰ United States Department of Agriculture, *The Agricultural Situation in Africa and West Asia* (Washington, D.C., Economic Research Service, 1969), p. 20.

⁸¹ J. Gordon, "Intermediate technology in West African agriculture", *World Crops* (June 1967), vol. 19, No. 3, p. 32; and J. Gordon, "State farms in Ghana", *World Crops* (December 1963), vol. 15, p. 465.

in farming practices in the rural areas. This approach to rural development might be summarized by saying that it is based on a combination of the *harambee* spirit—local self-help—and bringing local communities into the process of national planning, partly through the district development committees.⁸² On the economic side, local self-help is supplemented by one of the largest land-settlement programmes in sub-Saharan Africa. In fact there are several schemes, the largest is the so-called million acre scheme, in which some 34,000 families were to be settled on about 500,000 hectares of land by 1970. This is divided into a low density subscheme with an average farm size of about 15 hectares and a high density subscheme with an average size of about 11 hectares. In addition there are the *harambee* schemes, squatter settler schemes and a number of relatively large co-operative ranches. A total of some 900,000 hectares of land have been taken up in these schemes, or about two-thirds of the former European farming areas.⁸³ As a result of all these changes, the small farm (peasant) share of gross marketed production grew from 40.7 per cent in 1964 to 51.0 per cent in 1968. The gross farm income of the small farm sector has been growing at a rate of about 10 per cent per year, as compared with a rate of about 4 per cent per year in the large farm sector.⁸⁴

An attempt has been made to provide a comprehensive range of supporting institutions with key roles being played by the co-operatives, a number of credit organizations, and education through agricultural extension and farmer training centres. More than 80 per cent of the settlement farmers have attended short basic courses at the training centres.⁸⁵ Where possible an effort is made to integrate the settlement programmes with other developmental activities of the country councils and district development committees. Outside the settlement areas, farmers are encouraged to consolidate holdings and obtain registered titles for them, but other services exist in less concentrated form than on the settlements. One important characteristic of the programme is its flexibility.

Finally, the Kenyan approach to rural development involves the development of small urban centres throughout the countryside. In 1948 there were seventeen towns

with populations of 2,000 or more; by 1962 the figure had risen to thirty-four.⁸⁶ Certain small towns have been selected as "growth centres", functioning as foci of trade, social services and communications for the surrounding rural areas.

A contrasting strategy appears in the neighbouring United Republic of Tanzania. Whereas the Kenyan approach might be described as ideologically eclectic, the Tanzanian rests on one form of African socialism, that expressed in the *ujamaa* movement. The ideal *ujamaa* community would farm on a collective basis and carry out most of its community affairs in similar fashion. This represents an attempt to reverse pre-existing trends which, as in other parts of the continent, have been towards greater "individualization" of farming and have been associated with the gradual emergence of a small *élite* of relatively well-to-do (or less poor) individuals.⁸⁷ Collectivization is being pursued in a deliberate but gradual manner.

All new communities founded through land settlement schemes are to be encouraged to produce at least a part of their cash crops on a collective basis and to gradually extend this sector of their operations. Existing villages will also be encouraged to gradually convert their operations in a similar fashion. Extensive training courses for local leaders have been organized to familiarize them with the method of the new approach. It is fortunate at this time that the country has a fairly vigorous co-operative movement. The number of these co-operatives increased from 172 in 1952 to 1,696 in 1968.⁸⁸

Previously these co-operatives were mainly concerned with marketing produce and, more recently, with processing and the provision of agricultural credit. In the future they will be encouraged to develop production capabilities. In addition to the formal method of organization, participants will be encouraged to develop attitudes and methods of self-reliance and self-help on all levels. This approach is not unique, for there have been experiments with various forms of co-operative farming in other countries. It is too early to determine the degree of success or failure which will accompany these schemes. No doubt success will greatly depend upon the effectiveness of supporting organizations, particularly extension services, credit and marketing facilities.

⁸² Kenya, *Development Plan 1970-1974* (Nairobi, Government Printer, 1970), chap. 6.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, p. 202.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 32.

⁸⁵ Kenya, Department of Settlement, *Five-year Review and Annual Report, 1967-1968* (Nairobi, Government Printer, 1968), p. 8.

⁸⁶ Republic of Kenya, *Development Plan, 1970-1974*, op. cit., p. 168.

⁸⁷ United Republic of Tanzania, *Second Five-year Plan for Economic and Social Development, July 1969-June 1974*, p. 26.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 31.

SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST

RECENT SOCIAL TRENDS

Demographic characteristics and their implications for planning

Reliable demographic data are not available in some countries of the Middle East. In some countries, the total population figures are available because of censuses taken; in others, figures must be estimated—often arbitrarily so—because censuses have never been taken, or have been taken so long ago that their value is limited. Even where censuses have been taken, the data are often of doubtful quality, and analysis is always difficult; great care must therefore be taken in their interpretation.

Following a United Nations classification (see table 1), the Arab countries concerned had been grouped into a northern tier comprising Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon and Syria, and a southern tier comprising Bahrain, Muscat and Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Southern Yemen, the Trucial States and Yemen. By mid-1968, these countries had a combined population of about 37 million spread over about 3.7 million square kilometres, or an average density of 10 inhabitants per square kilometre. This low figure, however, conceals contrasting

extremes. Lebanon has a density of 248 per square kilometre—only slightly below that of such densely populated countries as Belgium. Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, had a density of only 3 persons per square kilometre. A better idea of demographic pressure in the region may be obtained, however, by relating the arable land to the agricultural population (excluding nomads), thus making allowance for the size of the major cities as well as the emptiness of the desert.

Using this relationship, it is estimated that in the northern tier countries, the ratio of population to arable land is between 40 and 50, that is, at a level somewhat higher than the corresponding figure for France, with Kuwait and Lebanon standing out as exceptions. The former is a city-state based on oil production and the latter is a small country with about 40 per cent of its population concentrated in the capital city and its agricultural population confined to narrow valleys and the Bekaa plain. In the southern tier countries, demographic pressure on arable land is high in Saudi Arabia and Southern Yemen because the settled agricultural population is concentrated most in oases or small cultivable areas.

TABLE 1. POPULATION DISTRIBUTION AND DENSITY IN COUNTRIES OF THE MIDDLE EAST

Country	Mid-year population estimates 1968	Total area in square kilometres	Density per square kilometre	Settled agricultural population	Arable area in square kilometres	Density per square kilometre of arable land
Northern tier						
Iraq	8,634,000	434,924	20	3,600,000	74,960	48
Jordan	2,102,000 ^a	97,740	22	580,000	11,400	51
Kuwait	540,000	16,000	34	20,000	10	2,000
Lebanon	2,580,000 ^a	10,400	248	1,100,000	2,960	327
Syria	5,738,000 ^a	185,180	31	2,700,000	66,540	41
Southern tier						
Bahrain	200,000	598	334
Muscat and Oman	565,000	212,457	3
Qatar	80,000	22,014	4
Saudi Arabia	7,100,000	2,149,690	2	3,200,000	3,730	858
Southern Yemen	1,195,000	287,683	4	730,000	2,590	282
Trucial Oman	180,000	83,600	2
Yemen	5,000,000	195,000	26
Israel	2,745,000	20,700	133
	<u>36,659,000</u>	<u>3,715,986</u>				

SOURCE: Adapted from *Studies on Selected Development in Various Countries of the Middle East, 1969* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: E.69.II.C.5), pp. 50 and 51.

Note: Data on 1968 total population estimates, area and population per square kilometre of area are taken from *1968 Demographic Yearbook* (United Nations publication: Sales No.: E/F.69.XII.I), table 2, pp. 94-97.

^a Including Palestinian refugees.

Using the population estimates for 1968, information is given below on distribution and density in the region.

As noted in the table, the population of Jordan, Lebanon and Syria include the Palestinian refugees. Exact information on their numbers or dispersal is lacking, but on 30 June 1970 a total of 1,425,219 refugees were registered with UNRWA as living in Jordan, Lebanon and Syria. Of these, 506,038 were registered as being in East Jordan, 272,692 on the west bank of the river Jordan, 175,958 in Lebanon and 185,717 in Syria.¹

Of the registered Palestinian refugees in Jordan, Lebanon and Syria, part are to be found in camps, and part scattered throughout the respective host countries with a concentration in and around the main cities. Thus, in Lebanon on 1 June 1968, there were reportedly 85,261 refugees in camps and 79,754 in and around Beirut, Saida, Tyre, Tripoli and other areas, with 22,766 in the Beirut area alone. On that date, there were 156,178 refugees in camps in Jordan and 401,714 outside; in Syria, there were 25,258 in camps and 124,279 outside.

Although the bulk of the Palestinian refugee population is presumably registered as such, several hundred Palestinians are to be found working in all the Arab States from the Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean. Their numbers are not known, but they are to be found at all levels and in all categories of employment.

Vital statistics are not available for most of the countries in the southern Arab countries and, even where available, are not entirely reliable. It is estimated, however, that the rate of growth of the population for the Arab Middle East as a whole is close to 3 per cent. Within the area, variations exist. For the period 1963-1968, the estimated rate for Iraq was 2.4 per cent; Jordan, 3.3; Kuwait, 6.8; Syria, 2.9; Lebanon, 2.5; Saudi Arabia, 1.7 per cent. In the case of Israel, the annual rate of increase in 1968 was 3.5 per cent for non-Jewish and 2.1 for the Jewish population.²

Projections made for these countries for the years 1975 and 1980 indicate that their populations would be approximately as follows:

Country	Population (in thousands)	
	1975	1980
Iraq	11,572	13,910
Israel	3,253	3,613
Jordan	2,739	3,255
Kuwait	1,084	1,638
Lebanon	3,246	3,771
Saudi Arabia	8,962	10,460
Syria	7,331	8,778

SOURCE: Population Division of the United Nations Secretariat, "World population prospects, 1965-1985, as assessed in 1968", Working Paper No. 30 (December 1969).

¹ Additionally, there were on 30 June 1970, a total of 311,814 refugees in Gaza who were registered with UNRWA. This figure includes about 40,000 refugees still registered in Gaza but who have left since the 1967 hostilities to live in various Arab countries. Apart from the Palestinian refugees, there are the displaced persons within and from the UNRWA areas of operation since June 1967. Estimated newly displaced persons number 246,000 in the East Bank of Jordan, and 100,000 in Syria, with a further 11,000 in the United Arab Republic.

² *Statistical Abstract of Israel*, No. 20 (Jerusalem, Central Bureau of Statistics, 1969), p. 21.

Information on age and sex, which was available for the northern-tier countries, show the relative youth of the populations. The proportion of those aged 14 and less was about 45 per cent for both sexes, for the 15 to 64 age group it was 50 per cent and 5 per cent for the rest. The proportions imply a heavy burden of the young on the potentially active population, the former being in addition a reservoir for future population growth. The age structure in Israel is comparable with that of European countries owing to the steady influx of active people from abroad. In 1968, the percentage of the population in the age category 0-14 was 37.4, for the 15-64 age group 56.6, and for 66 and over, 6.

In these countries, there are about 100 inactive persons for every 100 active ones as against a corresponding ratio of about 60 per cent in the industrialized countries. Participation by women in economic activity is limited, and about half the male population (in Iraq, Jordan and Syria) are engaged in agricultural activities. The industrial sector does not account for more than 15 per cent of the active male population, and another 15 per cent is in the service sector.

Not only is the ratio of active to inactive persons unfavourable for economic growth, but the level of technical skill among the active (male) population leaves much to be desired. The level of technical skill in any country is reflected *inter alia*, by the relative proportions in the total labour force of the professional, technical and related workers, and those employed in an administrative, executive or managerial capacity. When compared to industrialized countries such as France and the United States, where the ratios are 12.5 and 21.2 per cent respectively, the differences are striking; in Syria, Jordan and Kuwait only 2.6 per cent, 4.0 per cent and 7.6 per cent respectively of the active male population fall into those two categories.³

Programmes, problems and plans in the main social sectors

Education

Available data indicate that in 1967 public expenditure on education in relation to total government expenditure, which had been generally increasing over the past decade, continued to increase in Kuwait and Lebanon, but tended to decline in Iraq, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Syria. Of all the Arab countries under review, however, Iraq, with 23.9 per cent, continued to maintain first place with respect to government expenditure on education. The others, in decreasing order, are Syria (18.9 per cent), Lebanon (15.4 per cent), Kuwait (31.1 per cent), Saudi Arabia (7.9 per cent) and Jordan (7.1 per cent). Outlays on education—for non-capital purposes—in Israel from the regular budget for fiscal year 1967-1968 by the Ministry of Education amounted to 13.5 per cent of this budget. Another indicator of the importance given to education in public policy is the expenditure on education as a percentage of national income. For 1966 Israel ranks first with 9.2 per cent, followed by Iraq 6.6 (1965); Syria, 5.4; Jordan, 3.9; Kuwait, 3.7; and Lebanon 3.2 (1965).

³ See *Studies on Selected Development Problems in Various Countries in the Middle East, 1969* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: E.69.II.C.5), p. 56.

Enrolment at all levels of education increased in some Arab countries. At the primary level, Saudi Arabia registered the highest rate of increase, followed by Jordan and Kuwait. At the secondary level, the increase in enrolment has been faster than at the primary level, with Kuwait experiencing the highest, followed by Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Jordan and Iraq (see table 2). At the higher level, Jordan registered the highest increase in enrolment, followed by Iraq and Lebanon, while Saudi Arabia and Syria registered a decline over 1966.

Although enrolment rates have increased in several cases, the actual school enrolment ratios for the primary and secondary school levels of almost all the countries are quite low compared to the estimated population in the relevant age groups. Since the census figures have not been updated, it is not possible to give recent ratios, but the low ratios for the years 1960 and 1965 suggest that the current educational profile, even though it might have improved, is far from satisfactory. In most of the countries, a far too large proportion of the school-age population, particularly girls, does not attend school. In Israel, the enrolment ratios, particularly at the primary level, are high owing in part to the Compulsory Education Law of 1949, which made education compulsory for all children in the age group 5-14, as well as for all young working people in the 14-17 age group who have not completed elementary schooling. Currently underway is a plan to extend compulsory education by two years.

The extent to which drop-out rates affect this profile is difficult to assess. Information on school drop-out rates is scarce, but if Iraq can be considered typical of the region, increased school enrolment rates are of limited significance. A UNESCO mission to Iraq in 1964 found, for example, that for the period 1949-1963, only about 65 per cent of those who entered primary school reached the sixth grade, 29 per cent reached the third secondary, 19 per cent reached the fifth secondary, and only 12 per cent passed their secondary school certificate.⁴

The problems posed by the non-enrolled child and the school drop-out are complex and cannot be resolved merely by increasing the number of schools or passing compulsory school attendance legislation. There are economic problems to be overcome such as the dependence of some parents on their children's assistance as farm hands and there is also the problem of the inaccessibility of some schools. Interrelated social, economic and psychological factors such as the poor educational backgrounds of parents, the traditional seclusion of mature girls in some countries, the financial burden of schooling on parents and the economically active role which children are often called upon to play also necessitate far more comprehensive educational policies than are at present being administered in the countries of the region.

⁴ Report of the UNESCO education pre-planning mission to Iraq, September 1964 (mimeographed). It may be noted also that there are sex and area differences in the drop-out rates; they are higher for girls and higher in rural areas.

TABLE 2. SCHOOL ENROLMENT RATIOS FOR THE PRIMARY AND SECONDARY LEVELS OF EDUCATION

Country	Year	Sex	School enrolment ratios per estimated population in relevant age groups		
			Primary (5-14)	Secondary (15-19)	Primary and secondary
Iraq	1960	M/F	43	21	37
	1965	M/F	41	29	38
	1965	F	25	14	22
Israel	1960	M/F	83	45	74
	1965	M/F	77	41	66
	1965	F	77	44	66
Jordan	1960	M/F	51	35	46
	1965	M/F	57	49	54
	1965	F	50	29	44
Kuwait	1960	M/F	52	55	53
	1965	M/F	51	80	59
	1965	F	46	74	53
Lebanon	1960	M/F	64	28	53
	1965	M/F	52	33	47
Saudi Arabia	1960	M/F	6	2	5
	1965	M/F	15	5	12
	1965	F	7	0.9	5
Southern Yemen	1960	M/F	17	12	15
	1966	M/F	13	12	13
	1966	F	6	7	6
Yemen	1962	M/F	8	0.4	6
	1965	M/F	5	0.4	4
	1965	F	0.6	—	0.4

SOURCE: UNESCO, *Statistical Yearbook*, 1967, table 2.5.

Notwithstanding all expense and effort, the Arab countries in 1967 were still hampered by the problem of adult illiteracy, the problems of maintaining a standard of quality for schools and teachers,⁵ the inadequate balance between different levels and types of education, and the striking differences in school enrolment between the sexes—most conspicuous in Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Yemen. Two of these, the problems of illiteracy and university education, may be mentioned in particular. The former affects a country's productive capacity and the latter has a direct bearing on the output of skilled professionals so vitally needed for a country's economic leadership, management and development.

It is estimated that the percentages of male and female illiterates in the age group 15 and over are 75.8 and 94.7 in Iraq; 49.9 and 84.8 in Jordan; 39.3 and 57.6 in Kuwait and 46.5 and 83.2 in Syria.⁶ Even assuming that women, because of their traditional position in the Arab social system, are not economically active, the extent of male illiteracy is a serious constraint on productivity, particularly since increased productivity is dependent on the use of improved techniques in industry and agriculture. Remedial measures are, however, relatively limited. Special groups are given attention, but there are no national campaigns, for instance, which use the mass media to promote literacy.

The following figures indicate enrolment in institutions of higher education per 100,000 population for 1966:⁷

Israel	1,488
Iraq (1965)	347
Jordan	214
Kuwait	85
Lebanon	954
Saudi Arabia	28
Syria	590

The total personnel at all Arab universities is approximately 85,000, with more of the students in the arts and humanities than the science and medical faculties.⁸ There has been a regional exchange of students—male as well as female—and the programme is serving a very useful purpose. However, the type and quality of university education offered in several countries does not appear to be well suited to training the managerial and technological personnel required by their development programmes.

⁵ Even in Lebanon, which has a more advanced system than other countries in the region, a 1969 survey undertaken by the Ministry of Education indicated that a high number of teachers are poorly qualified to teach; that 81 per cent of the school buildings and rooms are substandard, and that about half the children attending public schools have no benches to sit on. Of the 1,284 schools in Lebanon, for instance, only 644 have directors who measure up to prescribed standards, and of the 11,384 teachers only a small proportion are fully qualified. See *Official Education: Primary, Intermediate and Secondary* (Ministry of National Education and Fine Arts, Directorate of Primary Education, June 1969).

⁶ United Nations Economic and Social Office in Beirut, *Studies on Selected Development Problems in Various Countries in the Middle East, 1969* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 69.II.C.5), p. 61, table 16.

⁷ UNESCO, *Statistical Yearbook 1968*.

⁸ There are, in addition, approximately 34,000 Arab students from these six countries abroad.

Although graduate programmes have been established in a few subjects or departments, research output from the universities is limited since the teaching staff often lack either the time or funds to carry out independent research and there are few full-time research professors on the faculties.⁹ Also, since graduate schooling is limited, there is a dearth of that kind of research which graduate students are expected to produce.

It is estimated that about 95 per cent of those educated in universities in the Arab countries remain within the Arab world.¹⁰ Given the structure and orientation of the universities, however, the increase in managerial and technological personnel is slow. In Israel, of the student body, 29,406 were studying for a degree (with 23,441 at the under-graduate level and 5,565 preparing for graduate degrees). The humanities, social sciences and law accounted for 62.6 per cent of the student body while the science and engineering accounted for 29.9 per cent.

The gamut of problems facing the Arab countries in the educational sector has emphasized the importance and urgency of educational planning, and the plans now underway attempt to deal with some of these problems. Generally, the plans focus on making primary school education universal, expanding secondary and higher education, and expanding and improving teacher-training facilities. Iraq and Jordan envisage universal primary school enrolment for boys within five years, and for girls within ten years. Iraq expects a 70 per cent enrolment of girls during the current plan period (1965-1969), and Jordan expects an 80 per cent enrolment in the final year of the plan (1964-1970). Wide enrolment of both sexes in primary school is implicitly assumed in the plans of Syria (1966-1970) and Lebanon (1965-1969).

Most plans pay attention also to the flow of students within the school system, starting with widespread enrolment at the primary level and proceeding to lower secondary, upper secondary and university levels. In Jordan, for instance, lower secondary education is included in the nine years of compulsory education provided by law. Syria and Iraq plan increases in lower secondary school enrolment, the former by admitting 75 per cent of primary school pupils, and the latter by admitting all willing primary school graduates. Admission to upper secondary education is proposed in Jordan for 12 per cent of the male and 7 to 10 per cent of the female pupils of lower secondary schools; the corresponding figures for Syria and Iraq are 50 per cent and 60 per cent respectively.

Iraq and Syria envisage a re-orientation of upper secondary school education towards science and technology, the former by admitting only one third of the upper secondary school students to the arts division and leaving two thirds to enter the science divisions, and the latter by increasing the proportion of students in state technical schools from 20 to 28 per cent.

All countries emphasize the expansion of university education, particularly in pure and applied science. Jordan envisages an increase in the proportion of science

⁹ A. B. Zahlan, "Problems of educational manpower and institutional development", *Science and Technology*, A. B. Zahlan and Nader, eds. (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1968).

¹⁰ A. B. Zahlan, "Science in the Arab Middle East" (Beirut, American University of Beirut, April 1967), mimeographed.

students in the total university enrolment of 12-29 per cent in the plan period, and Iraq envisages an increase from 53-59 per cent. Syria's plan indicates a similar general objective without specifying figures. In view of the expanding primary and secondary school enrolment, all countries make provision of simultaneous expansion of teacher-training facilities.

Health

Public health expenditure in Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and Syria continued to show an upward trend in 1967, and available data indicate that allocations for health were increased in all countries. In relation to total government expenditure, Kuwait, Lebanon and Jordan showed an increase over 1966, while Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Syria registered a decrease, with that in Saudi Arabia being by far the largest. Kuwait allocated the highest percentage for health services in relation to total government spending, namely 9 per cent, followed by Lebanon, 3.8 per cent, and Jordan, 3.3 per cent.

Efforts were made by all countries to upgrade and integrate health facilities, and special attention has reportedly been given to the development of maternal and child health services. These efforts have included the distribution of basic health services in rural areas, with stress on health education facilities for mothers. These projects are sometimes combined with community development programmes.

Improvement in medical facilities and an increase in the number of medical personnel have apparently been achieved. Except for Kuwait, Lebanon and Israel, the other countries have a very low proportion of medical doctors to population—ranging from one per 13,000 in Saudi Arabia, through one per 5,000 in Syria and Iraq to one per 4,000 in Jordan. A similar situation exists with regard to nurses and midwives. Kuwait, with its ratio of one doctor per 750 population, compares very favourably with the developed countries. Lebanon has a ratio of one per 1,300, but the doctors are concentrated in the three big cities. Israel has a ratio of one doctor to 420 inhabitants. Despite this, there is an imbalance in the distribution of doctors, with shortages particularly marked in the rural and border areas. Many of the doctors who migrated to the country in the 1930s are in a high age-group, and not enough graduates are being turned out to replace them.

The expansion of medical facilities notwithstanding, the familiar pattern of inadequacy and imbalance prevails. In Iraq, the 1965/66-1969/70 economic plan envisaged the construction of ten new hospitals, eighteen regional hospitals and 136 subregional health centres in addition to mobile units serving remote and scattered villages. In Saudi Arabia, the Ministry of Health provides free facilities through its hospitals, dispensaries and health centres. These have grown in number between 1958 and 1967 as follows: hospitals from 33 to 80, dispensaries from 49 to 205 and health centres from 51 to 303. The population per hospital bed in 1967, however, was 1,174. Further, the ratios of medical personnel to the institutions available seem to indicate that many institutions are seriously understaffed. In Syria, the population per hospital bed in 1966 was 884, and it appears

that the quantitative targets set in the first five-year plan (1960/61-1964/65) were not reached. Kuwait and Lebanon have had favourable population per hospital bed ratios for the past few years. In Lebanon, the problem is one of imbalance rather than inadequacy. There has been a moderate expansion in the number and types of hospitals in Israel in the past several years: in 1967 there were 128 persons per hospital bed as against 141 in 1965.

Housing

Up-to-date official information on housing conditions in the Arab countries is meagre. For Iraq, Jordan and Kuwait, some information is available from the censuses of 1956, 1961 and 1965 respectively, and for Lebanon and Syria, some data are available from sample surveys and studies of urban areas, but for Saudi Arabia such information is not available.

With the exception of Kuwait, where the Government within the last ten years has created a new city of detached houses for those displaced from the crowded, mud-walled city of the pre-oil era, housing conditions for median and low-income groups in urban areas are poor. As in other regions, the obsolescence of many housing units, the rapid growth of city populations, and the slow pace of construction of median and low-income housing units, have produced overcrowding, slums and shantytowns.

In Baghdad, it is estimated that 45 per cent of the population is concentrated in zones 1 and 2 of the city, thus giving a density of 350-650 and 150-300 persons per square kilometre respectively. Housing conditions in these two zones are particularly poor where there is a lack of basic facilities such as sewerage systems, sanitary toilets, garbage disposal and street lighting. In Beirut, the Service de l'habitat estimated in 1967 that in one area of the city there were 7,200 families living in 6,500 sub-standard dwellings and that of these families, 43.6 per cent lived in one room, and 4.4 per cent had two rooms. In Amman, a social survey in 1966 indicated that more than half the population lived in one-room or two-room dwellings, and only 23 per cent lived in dwellings of four or more rooms; the average density of population was 2.5 persons per room.

Housing space may be less congested in the towns outside the capitals and main cities, but facilities such as piped water, flush toilets, electricity and garbage collection are less common. For example, the 1961 census of Jordan indicated that only 12.3 per cent of the total of 313,613 households enumerated had inside piped water, and that inside toilets were to be found in only 43.7 per cent of the households.

High-income housing, both of the apartment and the detached-villa type, is available in the capitals of all countries, although the supply varies. Thus, in Beirut, the multistoreyed, untenanted, luxury apartment house is conspicuously present. In Baghdad, Damascus and Amman, high-income housing, usually of the detached villa-type, is not difficult to find although the supply is not plentiful.

Housing needs¹¹ in Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria are hard to determine, but from estimates and projec-

¹¹ Based on a dwelling unit for a median family of 5.6 persons.

tions, it is clear that the needs are far in excess of the resources available to meet them now and in the immediate future. In Iraq, it was estimated that approximately 156,000 new houses (45 per cent urban and 55 per cent rural) are needed by 1970 to accommodate the expected increase in population. There will also have to be a replacement of approximately 550,000 houses which are old and structurally unstable.¹² In Jordan, 15,000 houses (50 per cent rural and 50 per cent urban) will be required by 1970 to take care of the population increase and a further 2,000 units will be required to remedy obsolescence. In Syria, approximately 54,000 units (40 per cent urban and 60 per cent rural) will be required to meet the population increase by 1970.

Current house-building trends indicate that, except in Kuwait, housing needs will remain unmet for a long time. Using as a basis the number of building permits issued, and assuming that 150 square metres of useful floor space is an average for a dwelling unit, it has been estimated that the construction of dwelling units per thousand population in 1967 was 1.51 in Iraq, 0.48 in Jordan (east bank), 2.03 in Lebanon, 23.03 in Kuwait and 1.11 in Syria. Except for Kuwait, this rate is quite low when compared to the rates achieved in some developed, and even developing countries. They are low even when compared to the 8 or 10 dwellings per thousand suggested by the United Nations.¹³

National policy—in the sense of a statement of short, medium and long-term objectives, formulated on the basis of established requirements and resources—does not exist in most of the countries reviewed. There is an awareness of needs, especially the more visible and volatile ones in the cities, but the urgency of these needs is tempered to some extent by the fact that no person in the region can be said to be without some sort of shelter, or by the thought that the shacks and slums of the refugees are but temporary shelters.

During the 1960s, there has been some government response, occasioned by accelerated urbanization and increasing in-migration from rural areas, to urban housing needs. Generally speaking, however, the response has been limited and selective; it has been left to the private sector to provide housing.

In the current five-year economic plan (1965/66-1969/70) in Iraq, there is emphasis only on the construction of industrial housing projects, and the total allocation for housing is only 4,254,000 dinars (\$US 11,911,200). Jordan's economic development plan (1964-1970) recommends only a modest programme for middle-income groups, especially civil servants. In Kuwait, on the other hand, the current economic development plan (1966-1971) allocates 105 million dinars (\$US 294 million) as investment in housing and community facilities, and this has been done on the basis of a projection of needs. It has been estimated that approximately 5,000 new housing units will be required each year; of these, the Government is constructing about 2,000 units per annum. On the basis of building licences granted, it is assumed that the

private sector will build about 2,500 units annually. In Lebanon, the Plan de développement (1965-1969) had as its aim the construction of about 19,000 dwelling units over the plan period but the Service de l'habitat, which was established to study and develop the housing programme, has not been able to implement the plan directives. In Syria, the Five-Year Plan for Economic and Social Development (1966-1970) called for a total investment of approximately 45,650,000 Syrian pounds (\$US 11,950,000) in housing. Under the plan, 3,000 low-cost housing units, 522 apartment units, and 1,396 other dwelling units were to be constructed. The annual rate of 984 dwelling units, however, is far short of annual requirements.

The housing situation in Israel continued to improve throughout the better part of the 1960s as measured by the declining number of persons per room. Between 1960 and 1968, there was a steady gain in the absolute and relative number of Jewish families (for which figures are available) showing a declining number of persons per room. Over this period, the percentage of families having 3 to 3.99 persons per room declined from 10.3 to 5.7, those having 2 to 2.99 persons per room declined from 21.7 to 20.2 per cent, while the figure for those having 1 to 1.99 persons per room rose from 40.9 to 54.8 per cent.

Social welfare

Social welfare objectives in all the countries of the Arab Middle East are becoming increasingly developmental.¹⁴ The new focus, particularly in Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait and Syria, is increasingly preventive and welfare centres are being designed to meet the needs of communities more effectively. Particular attention is given to family and child welfare services, women's education, day care centres and youth activities. The greater volume of social welfare services in most countries, however, is still directed towards the alleviation of immediate individual family distress, and to the needs of special groups such as the physically and mentally handicapped, juvenile delinquents, widows and neglected children and orphans. One example of such services is public assistance which takes the form of financial grants, food and relief work, and emergency relief. Thus, Jordan assisted 995 cases in 1965/66 with total expenditures of 25,920 dinars (\$US 72,576); Kuwait spent in 1966 a sum of 1,958,652 dinars (\$US 5,484,226) to aid 7,520 families comprising 37,461 individuals, and Saudi Arabia spent 7,457,788 riyals (\$US 1,657,286) in 1964 to assist 45,336 individuals in 13,738 families.

Juvenile offenders are being treated increasingly by probation officers who supervise their wards within the familial and community setting; probation is used predominantly in Iraq, Jordan, Southern Yemen and Syria. Foster family care, although on an experimental basis, was begun in Jordan and slowly expanded, and in Leba-

¹⁴ For instance, in Saudi Arabia, the main objective in establishing the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs in 1960 was "to direct the social development in the Kingdom in a balanced way with the aim of raising the citizens' standard of living and to provide them with the basic means for a life of happiness and dignity in a framework of maintained spiritual and moral values..." Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, *Glimpses of the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs* (June 1964), in Arabic.

¹² Based on figures taken from *Government of Iraq: Housing Census of Iraq, 1956* (Doxiadis Associates), vol. 2.

¹³ *World Housing Conditions and Estimated Housing Requirements* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 65.IV.8).

non a pilot project was introduced involving the care of needy children in their families through financial assistance and intensive rehabilitation work with all family members.

Given the reality of endemic disease, poverty and malnutrition, and of family distress caused by the death or unemployment of breadwinners, it is understandable that social welfare programmes continue to be a response to visible need rather than an investment in national development.¹⁵ In Jordan, Lebanon and Syria, social welfare problems are further aggravated by the presence of large numbers of refugees and displaced persons who, for one reason or another, are not assisted under the UNRWA mandate. Thus in Jordan, a little less than one-half the total rations distributed monthly by UNRWA to the government-registered displaced persons are provided at the expense of the Government. In Syria, nearly 100,000 persons displaced from the Quneitra area in the south-west are being looked after by the Government of Syria.

There are some signs, however, that both on a pragmatic and on a planning level, steps are being taken to orient social welfare programmes to national development objectives. Thus in Jordan, it is known that the Youth Welfare Organization is trying to direct its activities from its present concentration on leisure time and sports to participation in nation-building programmes such as civic-oriented work and the preparation of youth for life and work in rural communities.

In over-all planning, the activities now taking place in the social welfare sectors may be regarded as the first tentative steps to the planning and integration of social welfare in national economic and social development. Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait and Syria have development plans¹⁶ incorporating social welfare objectives and corresponding allocations, although none attempts to relate the proposed projects to other sectors or to fit them into an over-all design for development. The establishment of small planning units in the administrative divisions responsible for social welfare, however, is some indication of a move towards integrated planning.

In the provision of social welfare services, it has been inevitable that the Governments concerned have been called upon to play a leading role, although efforts are being made to encourage popular sponsorship of, and participation in, such services. Generally speaking, in Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Southern Yemen and Yemen, the Governments, quasi-public institutions and voluntary organizations provide most services. Jordan, Syria and Lebanon, especially the last, do not depend exclusively on voluntary organization. In Kuwait, the Government has used its oil revenues to create a social welfare system which is generously supported. Voluntary organizations

are being encouraged, with strong financial support from the Government, to take on increasing responsibilities, but the response is reportedly less than heartening. In Jordan, the largest volume of direct social welfare services is provided by a network of voluntary social welfare organizations which in 1966 numbered 232. In Lebanon, where the strongest tradition for voluntary social welfare services exists, the Government confines itself largely to the promulgation of general policies, setting standards for services, training personnel and providing a measure of co-ordination. In Syria, the number of voluntary social welfare organizations reached 374 in 1965; all were financially assisted by the Government.

Planning apart, the administration of social welfare services is currently beset by a number of problems including administrative structures and inadequate numbers of trained personnel, lack of financial resources (except in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia) and poor co-ordination of existing services. Problems of co-ordination sometimes result not only from the multiplicity of voluntary efforts, but also from the fact that government services are provided under a variety of administrative auspices. While the ministries of social affairs and labour carry the major responsibilities, other, and often parallel, services are provided under the Ministries of health, education, municipal and rural affairs, and the *waqfs*.¹⁷ Attempts at co-ordination by formal and informal methods have been initiated but have been confronted by the absence of satisfactory results, and perhaps the underlying difficulty is the absence of clearly enunciated social policies on the basis of which agreement on priorities and allocations can be reached.

Structural change

The evidence from the countries of the Arab Middle East seems to indicate that neither the structure nor the functioning of the family, particularly in rural areas, has changed a great deal in recent years. Large conjugal families are still the norm, although there appear to be variations of this norm in terms of rural-urban conditions as well as denominational and economic class differences. Family planning schemes have not yet received much attention from Governments, and even in the rare instances in which some projects have been initiated—for example, two family-planning clinics in Jordan—they have not yet shown much success and the size of households has remained large. However, the potential benefits which could result from these policies are being recognized. Immediate results may accrue in better health for mothers and children and in improved social status for women.¹⁸ In Lebanon, case studies indicate that the average conjugal family size ranges from 5.50 in the villages of the Bekaa, through 5.76 in the city of Beirut, to 6.60 in South Lebanon and 6.0 in coastal Lebanon. In the city of Amman (Jordan), average family sizes were

¹⁵ The contributory schemes of social security which were begun in Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria in 1964, 1966, 1963 and 1959 respectively are examples to the contrary, but even these schemes are limited in their coverage. In Syria, it was estimated that in 1967 about 200,000 industrial and commercial workers were covered, while in Iraq the number did not exceed 120,000.

¹⁶ Lebanon has no development plan, although there exist capital expenditure programmes for the public sector for a medium-term period. In Saudi Arabia, work towards a national development plan was started recently.

¹⁷ The *waqfs* constitute a form of charitable endowment unique to Islamic countries. They are lands which cannot be divided or alienated, but continue in perpetuity to the descendants of the original owners. The *waqfs* are administered by the State Government Ministries or Departments of *waqfs*.

¹⁸ Arab States Seminar on Children and Youth in National Planning and Development (UNICEF), Beirut, Lebanon, 23-28 February 1970, p. 17.

reported to be 5.60 for the Christian population and 7.00 for the Moslem population. However, increased migration from rural to urban areas has brought about some noticeable changes in family systems in the towns, especially in Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq. A recent study observes:

“Although it has been affected by rural exodus, by a certain degree of women’s emancipation, or by the progressive modernization of some rural areas, the extended family still remains the most prevalent standard of reference in the Arab society. As some participants observed, the reasons for this are demographic as well as sociological: the decrease in general mortality and the extension of the average span of life tend to reinforce family ties and allegiance to the head of the family. This phenomenon is particularly striking among groups which have been transplanted to urban and periurban districts and where, unexpectedly, the relations between the original family remaining in the village and the smaller unit which has migrated to the city remain quite strong.”¹⁹

Residence and education appear to have some depressant effect on fertility rates. In Lebanon, a fertility survey of rural and urban women indicated that the rural women’s fertility rate was higher than that of her urban counterpart, and that the fertility rate of uneducated urban women was higher than that of educated women. Education contributed also to postponement of the age of marriage, with educated women marrying at a later age than uneducated women. A similar causative link seemed to appear in Amman where, only five years after the 1961 census, the proportion of single women under 25 had almost doubled.

More women, both before and at least for a time after marriage, are reported to be economically active outside the home, as studies in Lebanon and Jordan indicate, and it is assumed that this has given them a certain amount of independence. Given the strong patriarchal family system and the restrictive influence of relatives in these societies, however, this independence is probably more apparent than real at the moment. One major change in the status and role of women has occurred in some Arab countries in the region in consequence of the accommodation of the Islamic marriage institution to contemporary social practice elsewhere.

A major change in their way of life seems imminent among the bedouin tribes who still practice nomadism in Iraq, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Syria. Vestigial remnants of tribal and customary practices are still found in the patterns of life pursued in even big cities such as Baghdad, but long years of settlement have altered attitudes and habits. Nomadism has, however, preserved tribal solidarity. In recent years, Government action has been taken to sedentarize the remaining bedouin tribes so as to bring them within the orbit of development efforts, and to raise their standards of health and education. Land settlement projects such as the Harrad (King Feisal) project in Saudi Arabia have had varied success, but where carefully planned and executed, they have reportedly been successful in effecting fundamental

changes in bedouin attitudes, values and practices. A study of a pilot bedouin settlement project in Jordan indicates, for instance, that bedouin have adapted quickly to agriculture, and tend to identify themselves with new ways of settlement instead of with their tribes.²⁰ In the oil-producing countries, the cash income earned by gainfully employed bedouin seems to have been the solvent of tribal fealty.

One force which is gradually beginning to influence existing power structures of the Arab countries in the region is that of the educated *élite*. In the post-Ottoman period, the educated group had been for the most part foreign trained, and invariably drawn from the established families. With the spread of education and the establishment of national universities, the educated group has grown in numbers and changed in composition.

A second force which, at least since June 1967, has made its presence felt in the power structure of some countries of the region, is that of the Palestinian refugees and displaced persons. Although considered full citizens in one country (Jordan) and accepted in all others, the refugee problem remains unsolved in the region. Physically separated but spiritually identified with their former land, these persons have become restless and, though still apparently unco-ordinated in their actions, they have been able to influence Government policy. Adding to this restlessness is the ferment of the large, and steadily increasing, proportion of refugee youth seeking national identification.

SOCIAL ASPECTS OF URBANIZATION AND INDUSTRIALIZATION

Cities in the Arab countries of the Middle East have developed in the small pockets of arable land which exist amidst vast stretches of arid mountain or desert land, at the junction of former caravan routes and in the narrow coastal plains and river valleys. Historical circumstances and, more recently, rural out-migration and industrial development have turned them into the foci of development in these countries. Baghdad has been throughout history the beneficiary of agricultural production in the valley of the Tigris-Euphrates, and its predominance in the country’s economy has become indisputable with the more recent inflow of industry. Other cities such as Basra, Kirkuk and Mosul grew in importance—the latter two in consequence of the discovery and exploitation of oil—drawing in people from the other provinces. Amman was transformed from a village into a capital with the establishment of the State of Transjordan in 1921 and grew with the inflow of migrants and refugees from Palestine. Kuwait mushroomed from a fishing village into a modern city-state with the discovery of oil, as have many of the other Gulf States. Beirut, the capital of Lebanon, is the unquestioned core of the country; location, politics and human ingenuity have contrived to give it enormous stature in the country’s industrial, commercial and cultural life. In Saudi Arabia, the *Haj* (pilgrimage) has ensured the growth of Mecca, Medina

²⁰ Salah M. Yacoub, *Sociological Evaluation of a Pilot Project for Bedouin Settlement: A Case Study* (Beirut, American University of Beirut, 1969).

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 6.

and Jeddah; oil brought Dahrán and Dammam into existence; Riyadh was created as the capital of the country. In Syria, the old trading cities of Damascus, Aleppo and Hama developed, with the growth of trade and industry, into the main poles of the country's development.

According to available census data, all the capital cities have experienced an annual rate of growth of over 4 per cent, which implies a doubling of the population every eighteen years, and in a number of these cities the growth rate has exceeded 6 per cent per year, which means a doubling of the population every twelve years. The cases of Kuwait and Manama cities, where growth has been at the rates of 18 per cent and 15 per cent per year respectively, are exceptional and are largely the result of large influxes of expatriates.

The definition of an urban area in the Middle East is often neither clear nor consistent. Some countries identify an urban area with administrative centres. In others, it is identified with a certain size of a population agglomerate; the size, however, varies. The problem of definition is made more difficult because urban areas may merge into each other although they are administratively parts of non-urban areas. According to national estimates, 44 per cent of the total population in Iraq, 47 per cent in Jordan, 57 per cent in Lebanon, and 39 per cent in Syria are classified as urban.

In Israel, 82.2 per cent of the population was classified as living in urban areas at the end of 1968. A little under one-third of the entire population is concentrated in the three principal cities, in contrast to 50 per cent in 1948. Toward the end of the 1950s and throughout most of the 1960s, there were significant changes in the urban pattern of settlement. A number of new towns were built as part of a development strategy to absorb large numbers of new immigrants, to help reduce population growth in the large established cities and, in line with this aim, to redistribute part of the population away from the coastal plain to the underpopulated northern and southern parts of the country. By 1965, there were thirty-five new towns whose combined population accounted for 20 per cent of the total.

Apart from Israel, the levels of urbanization in the other countries are generally higher than the 40 per cent level, which is more than the rate of industrialization would justify. Industrialization, although emphasized by Governments in the region, is still in an early stage of development in all Arab countries—as may be seen from table 3. Even where petroleum exists, the petrochemical industrial complexes have not yet been fully established, and extraction of oil for export, either in crude or refined form, is still the main industrial activity. The emphasis on industrialization as a major policy objective, however, has led to the establishment of industries such as ceramics, cement, glass, asbestos and steel-rolling in Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and Syria. Such new economic activity has tended to locate, not unexpectedly, in the urbanized areas of these countries.

In the petroleum-producing countries of the Middle East, oil revenue forms a very substantial part of the national income. Oil production in the Middle East has expanded sharply in recent years, and the trade balance of most oil producers has improved considerably, despite

TABLE 3. PROPORTION OF MANUFACTURING IN GROSS/NET DOMESTIC PRODUCT

Country	Year	Proportion of manufacturing in gross/net domestic product
Iraq	1964	11.0
Jordan	1965	8.0
Kuwait	1965	3.0
Lebanon	1964	13.0
Saudi Arabia	1963-1965	Less than 3.0
Syria	1963	12.0

the continued tension in the area and the more exacting terms by concession countries for exploration and productive privileges. The total gain for the region during 1969 was 12.8 per cent higher than in 1967, and the 11,316,000 barrels-per-day figure for 1968 represented more than 29 per cent of the total world output. Kuwait is an example of the transformation that can be brought about by the responsible use of oil royalties. The rise in oil revenues made it possible for Kuwait's 1969 budget of 302.5 million dinars to show a surplus of 68 million dinars, thus enabling this country to continue playing a financial role in the Arab world.

With the exception of the oil-producing countries, the larger proportion of income is still generated in traditional sectors such as agriculture and services. Recent industrial development notwithstanding, the share of manufacturing industry in gross domestic product is small compared with the developed, and even some developing countries.

TABLE 4. PROPORTION OF EMPLOYMENT IN SMALL-SCALE MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES

Country	Year	Percentage of employment	Percentage of value added
Iraq	1964	49.5	30.9
Jordan	1965	80.3	53.7
Kuwait	1965	54.4	...
Lebanon	1964	65.8	63.4
Saudi Arabia	1963-1965	84.2	...

The manufacturing sector accounts for 3 to 13 per cent of the national income in the Arab countries, as compared with Chile (17.5), Colombia (17.7) and India (16.8), which are considered developing countries. In the developed countries, the contribution of the manufacturing sector is approximately 25 to 35 per cent.²¹ Within the manufacturing sector, small-scale industries (those employing 1-49 persons) account for a higher proportion of employment.

There are a large number of small-scale factories of extremely small average size. The great majority of manufacturing establishments engage less than 10 persons each, the proportion ranging from about 84 per cent of the total number in Lebanon to about 98 per cent in Saudi Arabia.

²¹ UNIDO, *A Comparative Analysis of Small-Scale Industries in Arab Countries of the Middle East and in Selected Other Countries* (ID/WG.17/3).

Industrialization in Israel has progressed rapidly and accounts for an increasing proportion of employment and GNP. In 1966, industry's share of the Israeli GNP stood at 22.1 per cent.²² Over the period 1950-1966, industrial production showed an annual rise of 10.3 per cent, and in real terms increased slightly faster than the over-all national product. In recent years there have been increased efforts to rationalize industry through mergers among small firms, the application of modern business technology and marketing techniques and the expansion of export markets. Indicative of this trend, industry and the construction trades expanded their use of computers by more than three fold between 1967 and 1969, the number rising in these fields from four to fourteen. And as part of the programme to expand markets, a five-year agreement was recently concluded with the European Economic Community under which Israeli industrial and agricultural products are to benefit from tariff reductions of 45 to 40 per cent respectively, in return for tariff reductions on products from Common Market nations.

This expansion and intensification of the process of urbanization and industrialization in the region have, on the one hand, heightened Government awareness of the extent and complexity of urban problems and, on the other, created a new industrial milieu in which both labour and management are striving to find new directions.

The movement of people from rural to urban areas in the Arab countries has received much attention inasmuch as it depletes the agricultural sector and causes imbalance in spatial development, while increasing the problems of already congested urban areas. In the Arab countries, no less than in other developing and developed countries, the traditional push factors of the drabness and stagnation of rural life, and the pull factors of urban attraction and anticipated employment, operate to stimulate this movement.

There is a paucity of statistical information on intra-national migration, but the extra rapid growth of Arab cities seems to imply considerable in-migration. For instance, all fourteen provincial capitals (*livas*) in Iraq showed enormous growth between the censuses of 1957 and 1965. The percentage change varied from 21.5 and 39.0 in Amara and Kirkuk, to 140.1 in Kerbala, 126.3 in Irbil and 102.5 in Baghdad. A little more detailed information is available for Jordan, where a recent social survey of Amman revealed that 50 per cent of the growth of the population was due to migration from rural areas and small towns. In Saudi Arabia, it is assumed that the growth of the seven major cities of Riyadh, Mecca, Jeddah, Medina, Taif, Hafouf and Damman has been mainly due to in-migration.²³ In Israel there is considerable population mobility but little of the recognizable rural-urban type. Though there are few studies on population mobility²⁴ for the country, there is considerable evidence that the mobile rural population,

made up largely of young people, moves along a number of different lines. These include movement from older to more newly established towns and from existing communal settlements to border areas for the purpose of establishing new collective settlements. In addition, there is some rural-urban migration which is largely offset by the arrival of new immigrants to the rural areas.

This rural to urban migration in the Arab countries continues to be the predominant trend. In recent years, however, a new migration pattern seems to have developed, namely, that from less developed rural areas to other rural areas that either are more developed or have a potential for future development. In the absence of migration figures, this pattern is best evidenced by the population movements taking place in areas where river basin development and land settlement projects have been undertaken. In Iraq the Dalmaj-Kut (400,000 *mesharas*) and Greater Mussaiyib (335,000 *mesharas*) projects, in Jordan the East Ghor Canal project (120,000 *dunums*), and in Syria the Ghab project (50,000 hectares)²⁵ have attracted peasants from adjoining and other rural areas; common features of all the schemes are the redistribution of land to landless peasants in the area as well as the opening up of newly irrigated land.

It is not known whether these migration movements have depleted the population in the areas of their origin. The rate of natural increase in rural areas continues to be high, and it may simply be the excess rural population which has relocated itself. Whatever the causes and consequences of relocation may be, however, Governments in the countries have become aware of the need for directed change in rural areas, and have taken measures accordingly. These measures include agrarian reform, agricultural extension work, community development work and the establishment of co-operatives, and are intended to improve or at least stabilize the rural sector.

The urban problems are familiar²⁶ and common to many cities in the developed as well as the developing countries. They include physical problems—acute traffic congestion, the physical deterioration of residential and commercial buildings in the older city areas, slums and shantytowns of refugees, overcrowded medium and low-income housing, inadequate sewerage and sanitation systems, and the lack of recreation and park areas—as well as the less visible problems of urban instability and distress occasioned by the pressures of urban living and the difficulties of finding remunerative employment. The persons most affected by these problems are the new migrant from villages of bedouin areas and the refugees from Palestine, who are least able to cope with them.

Urban growth in countries of the Middle East, even though it has often been rapid, does not seem to have resulted in the breakdown of family life and other manifestations of social disorganization often associated with urbanization. The accelerated growth of cities, the development and extension of educational facilities and

²² Israel, Prime Minister's Office, Economic Planning Authority, *Israel Economic Development, Past Progress and Plan for the Future* (Jerusalem, 1968), p. 387.

²³ Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, *An Economic Report* (Riyadh, Central Planning Organization, December 1965).

²⁴ Municipality of Tel Aviv-Yafo, Department of Research and Statistics, "Mobility of the Tel Aviv-Yafo population: 1962-1965", Special Survey, No. 27 (October 1967).

²⁵ Measurements of land areas are: 1 hectare = 2.47 acres = 10,000 squares metres = 10 *dunums* (Jordan, Lebanon and Syria) = 25 *dunums* (Iraq) = 4 *mesharas*.

²⁶ The short-term and long-term urban measures being taken by Governments in the region to resolve some of these problems were reviewed in the 1967 *Report on the World Social Situation* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 68.IV.9), pp. 152-165.

their effects on the status of women, have brought about changes in family life in most urban countries. The extent and intensity of the impact of conglomerate living on the traditional Arab social system has not been closely studied, and perhaps the most that can be said now is that the Arab cities, particularly the capital cities, are in a stage of accelerated physical change, but much less rapid social change.

This urban environment is also the milieu for the traditional and nascent industrial activity in the Middle East. Although some Governments have adopted policies of industrial decentralization and have, as in Iraq and Syria, tried to pursue and implement them systematically, industrial activity has tended to gravitate towards the capital cities and the larger cities. Thus in Iraq in 1965, over 35 per cent of the 22,576 industrial establishments were located in the Baghdad region. Even in the current five-year plan (1965/66-1969/70), the Baghdad area receives a heavy share of the new industries. Similarly, in Syria, the heaviest concentrations are in Damascus and Aleppo. In Jordan, the capital of Amman is the seat of most industrial activity; in Lebanon, it is Beirut and then Tripoli which are the most industrialized, while in Saudi Arabia, the big cities of Jeddah, Riyadh and Dammam are the sites of most of the newly established or projected industries.

The industrial labour force that sustains this new economic activity is by and large drawn from rural migrants who have moved from agriculture and nomadism, and from workers who have abandoned the sector of traditional craftsmanship. In Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, the labour force is largely expatriate, coming from other Arabic countries in the region. Arab emigrants to these two countries are in the age-group of fifteen to fifty and include young college graduates as well as skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled labourers.

Because of the low level of skill and the abundance of unskilled labour, wages continue to remain low. In Iraq, 25 per cent of the agricultural workers are regularly unemployed or underemployed, the percentage rising to 75 per cent after the harvest season and particularly during the winter months. The generally low economic status of the average industrial worker in some Arab countries of the region adversely affects his stability and probably his inclination for training. This is reflected in absenteeism, and in a high job-turnover rate.

Labour unions exist in Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon and Syria. In Saudi Arabia, labour organizations were forbidden by royal decree in 1958. In Iraq and Syria, they are well organized and politically oriented. Lebanon has a well-developed trade union movement, but those in Jordan and Kuwait are relatively weak. The unions have been particularly concerned with wage-levels and related conditions of work and employment. Improvement in social services seems to be an immediate goal, and workers' education and training is also of particular interest, especially among the trade unions in Iraq, Lebanon and Syria. Apprenticeship schemes, accelerated training, and other forms of on-the-job training, as well as after-work adult literacy classes are either fully sponsored or co-sponsored by the trade unions. Some unions, in Lebanon for instance, have started housing schemes for their members. Others provide

certain kinds of welfare services, the most common of which is a benevolent fund for assistance during times of emergency. In Israel, where the trade-union movement is a dominant force, its activities extend to the traditional practices of collective bargaining as well as the provision of social, cultural and health services and the conduct of economic enterprises.

Management and ownership which—traditionally in the countries of the Middle East—once were synonymous, are gradually breaking down. In Syria and Iraq, the pattern is being replaced by nationalized enterprises; in Jordan and Lebanon, where State intervention is for regulation and not control, management and ownership are slowly becoming two distinct functions. In all of the countries, there appears to be an increasing awareness that the sound management of industry requires specialized knowledge in such areas as market analysis and research, sales techniques and sales promotion, cost accounting, quality control and advertising. The need for trained managers has been emphasized.²⁷ The emergence of organized labour also has the effect of fostering the disassociation of ownership and management.

Where management and ownership are not separate, management attitudes towards labour tend to be paternalistic, and paternalism tends to be accepted by the labourer, particularly since he is often a rural or bedouin migrant, used to personal relationships in his work situation. The unionization of labour is usually viewed negatively by management. For instance, a survey in Lebanon of the attitudes of managers towards labour indicated that 47 per cent believed that unions were detrimental or of no use; 37 per cent actively discouraged workers from joining unions, and only 16 per cent indicated that they encouraged workers to join.

In the area of social services, which management is required by law to provide for the workers, there appears to be—in the interest of productivity—a greater effort than is statutorily prescribed. This is particularly the case among the larger industrial enterprises. Many industrial concerns have initiated their own housing schemes, although they are not legally required to do so. Some industries provide health services; some subsidize meals or operate food co-operatives. Some industries provide transport free or at reduced cost. Recreational facilities such as swimming-pools, sports grounds, clubhouses and social centres are sometimes provided by large and medium-sized industries. Traditionally, it has been the oil companies which provided such amenities, but recently the large textile and cement industries in Syria and Lebanon have followed this trend.

However, the industrial worker in the large enterprises forms only a small part of the total industrial labour force; the rest work in establishments where amenities and protection are matters of patrimony. Studies show that little has been done by management of this kind to improve wage levels or working conditions.

The intervention of the State through labour legislation to ensure the provision of social security appears to

²⁷ See, for example, UNIDO, *Industrial Development: Arab Countries, Report of the Symposium* (ID/CONF.1/R.R/4) and the report of the Arab League Conference on Social Affairs and Labour held at Cairo in 1967.

have resulted in somewhat limited coverage that is ineffective in practice because of unrealistic provisions, burdensome administrative procedures and lack of enforcement as well as lack of sufficient funds in non-oil-producing countries. Social insurance schemes exist in Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and Syria. In Iraq, Lebanon and Syria the schemes are compulsory and require contributions by the workers; the Jordanian, Kuwaiti and Saudi Arabian schemes are of the provident-fund type. In Iraq, however, less than 20 per cent of the non-agricultural labour force is believed to be covered by the law since the Iraqi Labour Law of 1958 excludes many groups of workers, including piece-workers, seasonal workers and persons employed in non-mechanized workshops. In Syria, the labour laws exclude workers in small enterprises that employ fewer than five persons. In Jordan, only civil servants are covered.

Occupational health and safety provisions exist in the labour codes of the six Arab countries of the region, but a lack of enforcement personnel tends to make their observance in industrial establishments less than consistent. In most of these countries, the largest number of industrial establishments fall into the small and medium-sized categories, in which the workers are most vulnerable to health and safety hazards because the establishments cannot afford the money for the necessary equipment.

RURAL CHANGE: PROBLEMS AND POLICIES

The agricultural-pastoral sector in all the countries of the Middle East, except Kuwait, Israel and the Gulf States, is by far the most important both in terms of its contribution to the gross domestic product and in the percentage of the population dependent on it.²⁸ In Iraq, the contribution of agriculture to the gross domestic product was 17 per cent of the total in 1964, with agricultural employment absorbing about 65 per cent of the population and 55.8 per cent of the male labour force. In Israel, agriculture's relative contribution to the gross national product rose until 1958 but has been declining since, accounting for 9.6 per cent of GNP in 1966, and employing 12 per cent of the work force. In Jordan, the contribution of agriculture in 1964 was 24 per cent of the gross domestic product, and the sector employed 44 per cent of all economically active males. In Saudi Arabia, income originating from agricultural activity was estimated at about 15 per cent of gross national product in 1961, but 60 per cent of the population is estimated to be rural. In Yemen, it is estimated that in 1968 about 90 per cent of the population depended on agriculture for its livelihood.

Rural change may be viewed from two perspectives: (a) change in location of inhabitants, and (b) change in institutions and practices. Both have implications for national development.

²⁸ United Nations Economic and Social Office in Beirut, "Issues of trends related to rural and community development in various countries of the Middle East" (June 1969). In Lebanon, the contribution was 11.6 per cent of gross domestic product in 1964, and the estimate of manpower engaged in agriculture was 54 per cent. In Syria, the contribution in 1963/64 was 31.7 per cent of gross domestic product, and the sector employment percentage of all economically active males was 53.8.

One of the basic changes attempted has been in the area of land ownership. The traditional pattern of land ownership in the countries of the region has been one of a very large number of small holders, and a small number of large landholders. This pattern still exists in those countries where agrarian reform has not been undertaken. Thus in Lebanon, a sample survey of villages showed that approximately 60 per cent of the landowners had less than 50 *dunums* each, whereas 5 per cent had more than 500 *dunums* each.²⁹

Extensive land reform has been undertaken in Iraq, Syria and Southern Yemen, and to a limited extent in Jordan. In Iraq, where prior to 1958 a feudalistic pattern of land ownership existed, agrarian reform was initiated through a series of legislative measures, and their implementation was entrusted to the Ministry of Agrarian Reform especially instituted for that purpose. From the outset, however, agrarian reform ran into a series of difficulties which have yet to be resolved in relation to three key phases: (a) alienation of excessively large landholdings, (b) temporary management of the alienated land, and (c) the redistribution of such land to landless and dispossessed peasants. In Southern Yemen, the Agrarian Reform Law of 1968 sequestered all lands belonging to the previous rulers, sultans and their families, as well as *waqf* (religious endowment) lands. Land ownership was limited to twenty-five acres of irrigated land and fifty acres of rainfed land. Repossessed land was to be distributed to landless families of those who had died in the cause of independence, agricultural labourers, poor farmers with excessively small plots of land and to nomads and migrants from urban areas who wished to take up agriculture as an occupation. In Syria, where 50 per cent of the cultivable land was held by a few large landowners, the Agrarian Reform Law of 1963 imposed ceilings on land ownership; the excess land was repossessed by the State and later 25 per cent of the total agricultural land was redistributed among tenants, sharecroppers and agricultural labourers. The process is still continuing. As in Southern Yemen, alienated land is to be distributed to landless families of those who have died in the cause of independence, agricultural labourers, poor farmers with excessively small plots of land and to nomads and migrants from urban areas who wish to take up agriculture as an occupation.

In Jordan, although agrarian reform measures were not undertaken on a national scale, they were applied in the case of the East Ghor Canal development projects. The major aim of these measures was to provide each farmer with an optimal landholding commensurate with agricultural efficiency and the generation of a reasonable family income.³⁰

Concepts of community development were introduced in the mid-1950s, and today most of the Arab countries in the region have some kind of programme, usually in the form of service centres dispensing educational, vocational, agricultural and health services. In Iraq, official

²⁹ George C. Fetter, *Attitudes toward selected aspects of rural life and technological change among central Bekaa farmers*, Publication No. 13 (Beirut, American University of Beirut, Faculty of Agricultural Sciences, June 1961).

³⁰ The minimum holding is 30 *dunums* and the maximum 300 *dunums* in most areas.

efforts began in 1959 and have produced in a variety of programmes under the Ministries of Education and of Municipal and Rural Affairs. In Lebanon, the programme of rural social development is carried out under the auspices of an autonomous public agency, the Office of Social Development. In Syria, a programme of community development centres was initiated in 1958 under the direction of the Rural Affairs Department of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour; a limited expansion is underway in the second five-year plan, 1966-1970. In Saudi Arabia, community development centres have been established since 1960. The programme, with a staff appointed by the respective technical Ministries, is co-ordinated by the Central Committee for Community Development representing the Ministries of Social Affairs, Agriculture, Health and Education. In Yemen, no programmes as such exist, but at the end of 1968 the Department of Social Affairs was created as a constituent part of the Ministry of Local Administration, and in this Department a special office for social welfare and community development was established. None of these programmes is really national in scope, however, and, with the exception of Lebanon, all lack sustained participation at the local level. In addition, the chronic shortage of technical staff has further impaired the effectiveness of the programmes.

Much greater success has been achieved with the extension of the co-operative system as a means of providing farmers with needed credit. In Iraq, the number of co-operatives rose from 271 in 1964 to 501 in 1968 with a corresponding rise in membership from 29,000 to 62,000; loans increased from 79,000 to 197,000 Iraqi dinars. These co-operatives are in addition to 250 others which operate outside the agrarian reform areas and serve agricultural as well as non-agricultural purposes. In Jordan, the number of co-operatives increased from fifty in 1953 to 700 in 1965/66; membership increased from 2,000 to 43,000 and loans granted from 44,000 to 1,200,000 Jordanian dinars. In Syria, there were only nineteen agricultural co-operatives in 1957; in 1964 there were 572, with a total membership of a little over 40,000. The capital of these co-operatives however, did not exceed one million Syrian pounds, which indicates that their loan-granting capacity is quite limited. These co-operatives supplement the agricultural credit facilities extended by institutions such as agricultural banks which have been set up in some countries. The difficulties of proving ownership because of lack of official records often force farmers to rely on credit sources exacting exorbitant rates of interest.

Change in institutions and practice in the rural sector is thus slow, and improvement would seem to be contingent on a much greater and more co-ordinated effort by the respective Governments to provide motivation as well as money. There is reason to believe that farmers in the countries reviewed are not averse to changes if they are properly motivated and supported. Thus in Lebanon, a government campaign to introduce a new crop (sunflowers) in some of the least developed agricultural areas had had some success; the pilot project, which began in 1966 with seventeen farmers owning 831 *dunums*, had expanded by 1968 into a project covering nearly 29,000 *dunums* owned by 763 farmers. The high

costs and risks of change, however, cannot be expected to be borne by farmers whose survival depends on the success of the current crops planted.

Apart from the few big agricultural development projects, agricultural crops in the Arab countries of the region are farmed on rainfed land; output is thus subject to fluctuations resulting from variations in weather conditions. In the heavily agricultural countries such as Syria, this can be a major handicap; in lean years, Syria becomes an importer of wheat and barley instead of a major exporter.³¹ The high vulnerability of agriculture to weather has thus to be reduced by greater State investment in irrigation, and by greater extensions of agricultural credit to farmers to carry out their own irrigation, pumping and salinity-control schemes. In countries such as Saudi Arabia and Yemen, such investment and extension of credit would have to be accompanied by heavy investment in physical infrastructure, such as roads and bridges, so that agricultural produce can be marketed.

DEVELOPMENT AND UTILIZATION OF HUMAN RESOURCES

The development and utilization of human resources in the countries of the Arab Middle East must be seen in the context of (a) rapidly growing populations; (b) mounting unemployment in the modern sectors of the economy as well as widespread underemployment in the traditional sectors; (c) shortages of personnel with critical skills and knowledge; (d) inadequate organizations and institutions for mobilizing human effort, and (e) lack of incentives for persons to engage in activities which are particularly important for national development.

Manpower problems manifest themselves at all levels, from that of factory worker to development planner and administrator. At the lowest level, the performance of the average industrial worker is retarded by a lack of adequate schooling and a consequent stagnation in occupational status. Substantial illiteracy is a common phenomenon in all countries, and it is from the illiterates and semi-literates that industry usually gets its labour. At the middle level, that is, professionals, technologists, managers and supervisors, the shortage is most acute as in most developing countries. There are not enough technicians to implement national development plans or programmes and this shortage is aggravated in some countries by a "brain drain". Among high-level personnel, shortages are acute and the situation is being alleviated by the use of foreign advisers. Only among clerical and office personnel does there seem to exist an over-supply of workers.

The deficiencies of personnel are not of the same magnitude, or of the same critical nature, at all levels in all the countries reviewed. Thus, the supply of indigenous literates from which industry and mechanized agriculture can draw its labour is higher in Lebanon, Syria and Jordan than in Iraq or Saudi Arabia, in which latter country it is estimated that 77 per cent of the 138,680 persons who entered the labour force between 1958/59 and 1964/65 had less than six years of formal school-

³¹ United Nations Economic and Social Office in Beirut, *Studies on Selected Development Problems in Various Countries in the Middle East*, 1969, p. 33.

ing.³² Again, the proportion of doctors per population is higher in Lebanon and Kuwait than in Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Syria; the nature of the deficiency in Lebanon, however, is that the doctors are in urban areas. In Israel, two government-appointed study groups, surveying the supply of and demand for engineers, concluded that in the light of current need the country is suffering from a shortage of 500 engineers. It is believed, however, that the shortage should disappear by 1975—assuming that the current projections of the supply of engineers from existing institutions and immigration are correct. If these forecasts are not borne out, it will be necessary, according to the surveys, further to expand the existing educational facilities which should serve as an interim solution for providing the needed number of engineers. Starting in 1976, it is expected that there will again be an imbalance in the supply and demand for engineers, but this should eventually be remedied by the construction of a new school of engineering.

All the countries concerned realize the urgency of improving the quality of human resources in order to allow the acceleration of the process of national development. Efforts in this direction however, are hampered by the paucity or unreliability of demographic data; demographic work is still at the initial stage, and data on the structure and distribution of population are quite poor. Thus, whatever planning exists—whether for the whole economy or for such sectors as industry, education, health and social welfare—is based on insufficient data or qualified assumptions.

Education, health and social welfare (including community development) are considered as vital sectors both from a humanitarian and a human-resource point of view, and all countries have developed plans in these sectors. Since industrialization is a major policy objective in all countries, the industrial sector is also contributing to the over-all effort for the development of human resources.

Sectoral plans in education, health and social welfare have been formulated in Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait and Syria in the context of a global plan for economic and social development. In Lebanon and Saudi Arabia, such plans are in the form of work programmes, pending the adoption of national development plans. Consideration has been given, with varying degrees of thoroughness and sophistication, to the manpower requirements for the implementation of these plans and programmes. Educational requirements received the most elaborate treatment. Projections of numbers of teachers needed during the plan periods, by educational level, are given in the plans for Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait and Syria. In Lebanon, the provisional five-year programme for health projects the need for all categories of health personnel in relation to the objectives of the programme and the financial allocations proposed for it. Requirements for social welfare workers needed for the expansion of social welfare programmes in Jordan are forecast, on a project basis, for the seven years of the plan.

In some instances, these projections are based on questionable or over-ambitious (that is, unattainable in

the near future) standards. For example, ratios of teachers to pupils, or doctors to population, and figures for teachers and medical workers, are given without any breakdown by categories. As training requirements vary greatly from one category of personnel to another, the latter defect could have serious implications for the provision of education and training. Another problem arises from the fact that financial allocations made for training the projected personnel, where provided, are either made without reference to these projections or do not match the requirements. Moreover, the projections apply to only one or two categories of personnel. In the education sector, quantitative estimates are made only with respect to teachers; in health, with respect only to nurses and doctors.

The contribution of the industrial sector to human resource development and utilization may be considered to comprise the on-the-job training provided by both large and small industries to their workers, and the various types of ordinary and accelerated training programmes and seminars provided through trade schools, polytechnics, training centres and other institutions. On-the-job training in the factory still provides industry in the countries reviewed with the bulk of its skilled labour, but the concern for industrialization has led the Governments concerned to make efforts towards preparing people for industry and towards raising the level of training of those already employed.

In Iraq, vocational training projects have been allocated increased budgets in the plan period 1965-1970. The training centres in Iraq include the following: (a) a centre for the accelerated training of workers, sponsored by the Ministry of Industry, and (b) centres to train new workers for three main industries, namely, electrical equipment, agricultural machinery and textiles. Skilled technicians, practical engineers and teachers in the vocational schools are trained mainly at the High Technical Institute and at the Industrial Engineering Institute attached to the University of Baghdad. In Jordan, the Development Board has proposed the planning of technical training programmes to meet the needs of the country, and educational programmes are to be strengthened in respect to the vocational training component. In Kuwait, the Government has been encouraging enrolment in industrial schools, and each student is entitled to an extra allowance in case he wants to open his own workshop. Other types of skilled labour are provided through industrial colleges and technical training centres, as well as by practical training programmes through the placement of workers in industries and institutions in the industrially advanced countries. In Lebanon, the vocational educational system is designed to prepare industrial workers at different levels and responsibilities. The lower vocational training stage qualifies the student in four years to get a lower secondary certificate (*brevet*); at the higher stage, four years of education qualify the student for the vocational baccalaureate. In Saudi Arabia, seven secondary technical schools were established by 1964; training is primarily in the fields of road building, transport, electric power and construction. There are also other training centres in the principal cities and the Institute of Technology, which offers short-term training for skilled workers and assistant technicians in addition to its

³² Saudi Arabia, Central Planning Organization, *An Economic Report*, p. 78 ff.

training programme for engineers and vocational teachers. In Syria, preparatory technical schools train students for three years after primary school, and most students follow this up with three more years at the secondary technical schools. Technical schools recently established offer three types of training: (a) industrial apprenticeship which requires three years, (b) intensive training, and (c) special training seminars. Accelerated industrial training for adult workers was introduced in 1964.

The contribution of the industrial sector to the development and utilization of skills must, however, be considered small. In one respect, the industrial sector in all the Arab countries considered is itself small in terms of its contribution to the gross domestic product, and the share of the large industries, which can be expected to provide training in the use of modern machinery, is very small compared to that of the small industries. In another, although there is widespread unemployment in the cities, there is no real incentive for people to get themselves trained for industry; wage differentials between skilled labour on the one hand, and semi-skilled or unskilled labour on the other, are not sufficient to make worthwhile the financial effort needed to become a skilled worker. Other factors which keep this contribution small include the acute shortage of qualified instructors in training institutions, the preference of people for white-collar jobs, and the movement of workers, once they have been trained, to other jobs.

There is a widespread opinion in the Arab countries that, in the long run, it is the general educational system that provides the key to solving the problem of personnel both quantitatively and qualitatively. This opinion insists, however, on the urgent need to reorient general education more directly to the objectives of national development in order to produce a derivative and imperative change in social values and institutions. In spite of many improvements, the traditional and still prevailing educational systems are geared mainly to producing civil servants and providing a literacy base for industrial and agricultural workers.

The need for reorientation is seen in relation to (a) the flow of pupils through the different layers of the educational system, and the relative priorities attached to each level, (b) the methods of teaching and (c) the curricula. With respect to the first, it is considered that priority needs to be assigned to secondary and to university education (in spite of the importance of expanding primary education) and steps are being taken to direct the flow of students at these two levels to subjects that will better prepare them for the requirements of national development.³³ With respect to the latter, the inadequate incentives for workers and civil servants is related to the orientation which they receive while in school, which concentrates on the acquisition of knowledge, and much less on the imparting of skills, especially problem-solving skills. Increasingly, it is realized that the old traditions favouring higher status to non-annual and non-industrial work are not counteracted effectively in schools, and that curricula are often overloaded with non-essential subjects. Jordan, Lebanon and Syria are reassessing their curricula and educational methods accordingly. Difficulties are

encountered, however, in the modernization of educational methods. Thus students in teacher-training schools are taught modern concepts of pedagogy, but have insufficient time and facilities for practical training. Well-trained teachers, when placed in schools with overcrowded class-rooms, lacking adequate equipment and books, and supervised by conservative or poorly trained administrators, frequently revert to traditional methods of teaching.

While the reoriented educational system might be expected to meet long-term development requirements, immediate personnel needs in certain categories are being met through the establishment of specialized training institutions. With the exception of teacher-training schools, which usually form part of the general educational system, such institutions are set up by the government departments responsible for the provision of social and administrative services.

In Kuwait, a training programme is carried out by the Civil Service Administration which concentrates on the training of supervisory and other middle-level employees. In Lebanon, raising the standard of the civil service, and training new civil servants, are the exclusive responsibilities of the Conseil de la fonction publique which carried out its training functions through the National Institute of Administration and Development. Pre-service education, varying in length from nine months to two years, is provided for those who aspire to upper and middle-level civil service appointments. In-service training is provided at three levels, covering the whole ladder of government service, for those aspiring to higher levels. The duration of this training is three to six months, during which the trainees receive full salaries. In Saudi Arabia, a special Institute of Public Administration at Riyadh offers periodic training courses varying in duration from four to six months for clerical and office management staffs and for middle-level supervisory personnel, as well as specialized training in statistics, financial management and foreign languages.

To deal with the acute shortage of nurses, paramedical and auxiliary health personnel, special training institutions have been established by the ministries of health in each of the countries reviewed. To foster rural development and to further agrarian reform, Iraq has established an Institute of Co-operation and Agricultural Extension to train the large number of co-operative supervisors and agricultural extension officers needed in the agrarian reform areas. In Jordan, a Co-operative Institute attempts to strengthen the growing agricultural co-operative movement by training field agents, managers and members. Saudi Arabia is interested in establishing a permanent training centre for community development in Dirr'ya near Riyadh. Syria is similarly considering the creation of an institute for co-operatives and rural development to train co-operative workers, agricultural extension agents, farmers and community development workers.

For middle-level and auxiliary functions, the training of "generalists" or "multipurpose" workers is of particular interest to the Governments of the countries in the region, since they see in it a means for a more efficient utilization of scarce skills. Thus, primary-school teachers can also function as rural development agents, multipurpose health workers can carry out a variety of preventive health func-

³³ See section on education above.

tions³⁴ and community development workers can teach adult illiterates and provide basic agricultural advice as well.

While training institutions and programmes are called into existence to remedy qualitative and quantitative imbalances in skills and cadres in specific areas, and while the general objective of government policy is to raise the

There appeared to be a consensus that the youth category should be defined in terms of education and employment criteria. In this sense, youth is held to cover all those between the ages of six and twenty.

It has been estimated that the youth population in some of the countries in the region at mid-1966 was as follows:³⁶

	Iraq	Jordan	Kuwait	Lebanon	Syria
Male	1,453,068	375,523	81,554	428,552	1,055,931
Female	1,317,433	354,374	58,093	385,667	958,382
Both sexes	2,770,501	729,897	145,647	814,219	2,014,313

educational calibre of the general population, thus raising the potential available to it for development, there is a need to promote integrated policies for the rational utilization of current and future reservoirs of human resources. As already noted, unemployment is generally widespread in the cities, and there is underemployment in the rural areas. Given the emphasis on human resources development through education, it is anticipated that the phenomenon of uneducated unemployed will be replaced by that of educated unemployed.

Estimated annual rates of growth in gross domestic product during the 1950s and the first half of the 1960s have averaged 7.0 per cent in Iraq, 8.0 per cent in Jordan, 8.0 per cent in Kuwait, 9.0 per cent in Lebanon, 8.5 per cent in Saudi Arabia and 5.0 per cent in Syria. Though the rates are comparatively high, the growth process in these countries is of recent origin, and it has not been able to make major inroads into the large reservoir of unemployed and underemployed manpower. It is essential that high growth rates should be sustained in the future if a more significant impact on the unemployment problem is to be made. More importantly, rapid growth should be accompanied by rapid change in the economic structure oriented towards labour absorptive activities, particularly in the oil countries of Iraq, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. In these countries, growth has been sustained primarily by expansion of the oil sector, which is capital-intensive.

Planning for youth

The problems of planning for youth in the Arab countries reviewed is complicated not merely by the paucity and unreliability of statistics on the various age groups commonly subsumed by the youth sector, but by a lack of agreement on what the upper and lower age limits of the youth group are. Five pre-seminar, working group meetings on problems of children and youth in the Arab States³⁵ were organized in preparation for the Arab States Seminar on Children and Youth in National Planning and Development, held at Beirut in February 1970.

Of these, the percentage of those who were uneducated³⁷ was 38.3 in Iraq, 23.1 in Jordan, 23.1 in Kuwait, 22.5 in Lebanon and 40.1 in Syria. In all countries, the proportion of uneducated females is very much higher than that of males.

As was observed in an earlier section, the populations in Iraq, Kuwait, Jordan and Syria (the northern tier countries) are relatively young. As of mid-1966, the 6-20 age group constituted approximately 33 per cent of the total population in Iraq, 37 per cent in Jordan, 29 per cent in Kuwait, 34 per cent in Lebanon and 37 per cent in Syria.

At the Mediterranean region pre-seminar working group meeting on planning, research and training for children and youth in the Arab States, held in Kuwait in October 1969, the consensus was that there is a newly-emergent youth group which has a novel perception of society—more particularly of the nature and conduct of politics—and a need for participation in public affairs. Arab culture has traditionally accorded a rather limited role to the young. The novelty of the outlook, however, could well be regarded as an aspect of development which should be nurtured so that the idealism and energy inherent in it could be used for advancing national development. It was emphasized, moreover, that this dissidence of Arab youth set it apart from contemporary youth groups in some of the developed countries in the sense that it implied not a rejection of society, but rather a claim to be part of it.

The development and utilization of youth resources remains an important challenge. On the one hand, there is the need for education and training and on the other, a need to find jobs. In general, the tendency is towards a project-by-project approach. At best, a sectoral approach has been followed, producing some co-ordination or integration of projects and programmes within the domain of single sectors such as education,

³⁶ Adapted from "Quantitative Data Regarding Out-of-School and Uneducated Youth in the Arab States", working paper prepared for the Eastern Mediterranean Region Pre-Seminar Working Group Meeting on Out-of-School and Uneducated Youth in the Arab States, 5-8 July 1969 (PSWG/OUC/6), table II.

³⁷ Uneducated youth is defined as those who have not completed the primary cycle of education, independent of success or failure in the final examination, *ibid.*, p. 12.

³⁴ For example, in Jordan, twenty-five multipurpose health workers began an eighteen-month general course of training in 1967.

³⁵ Beirut, December 1968; Tunis, February 1969; Cairo, April 1969; Tripoli, July 1969; Kuwait, October 1969.

health, welfare and sports, but this—though an improvement over the project approach—still makes for duplication, fragmentation, competition, waste of resources and the dispersion of human efforts. In these circumstances, attempts are made for interdepartmental or interministerial consultations for co-ordination at the implementation stage, but these efforts only highlight the need for better planning.

There exist in all Arab countries special ministries or departments devoted to youth, but it would appear that as yet these have narrow functions. Because of their cross-sectoral status, however, these particular agencies should provide to an increasing degree programme co-ordination as well as national youth policies designed to bring about the participation of youth in development and, in particular, to deal with the problems of education, training and employment.

The impact of conflict in the region

Although limited progress has been made in all countries since 1967 towards the objectives of national development, the hostilities of that year have undoubtedly retarded even that progress. More important, the subsequent diversion of resources for increased military expenditures, and the gnawing uncertainty of the future, cast an ominous shadow over current development efforts.

Of all the countries in the region which were affected by the events of June 1967, Jordan appears to have been the most adversely affected. The occupation of the West Bank of the Jordan River and of the Gaza Strip by Israel provoked an exodus of at least 246,000 persons³⁸ to the east bank, causing a rapid expansion of the demand for food, shelter and basic services, including health and education. Furthermore, these were mostly poor and unskilled persons, and they cannot be thus regarded as an addition to the productive capacity of the east bank.

The magnitude of the loss in Jordan's economic potential as a result of the occupation of the west bank is indicated by the fact that in 1965 the west bank accounted for 38 per cent of Jordan's total gross domestic product, with particularly high percentages for services (55 per cent), transportation (47 per cent) and wholesale and retail trade (43 per cent). The contribution of the west bank to Jordan's output of some agricultural products was even higher—for example, over 60-65 per cent for fruits and vegetables, and 80 per cent for olives—and although the share of the west bank in total industrial output amounted only to about 20 per cent, the number of industrial establishments there represented about 48 per cent of the total for the Kingdom and employed about 37 per cent of the total labour force engaged in industry. Further, income from tourism and remittances from Jordanians working abroad—two major sources of foreign exchange earnings—declined by about 85 and 50 per cent respectively in 1968.

War fears and the uncertainties of the conditions of political settlement continue to affect production adversely on both sides of the Jordan River. In the vital

agricultural sector, production is disrupted by incessant military activities, which immobilize cultivated areas and interrupt farm work. Private investment in industry, building and construction and trade is at a much lower level. Trade between the two banks continues, but on a smaller scale, particularly because of the erection by the occupying authorities of a tariff wall between the east and the west banks.

In consequence of the disruption caused by the hostilities, and in spite of the subsidy of £ 40 million sterling provided by Libya, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia pursuant to the decision of the Arab Summit Conference held in Khartoum (29 August-1 September 1967), the seven-year programme for economic development (1964-1971) in Jordan has suffered seriously. Several major projects have had to be suspended, and others re-examined in the light of new circumstances. Special emphasis has been placed on labour-intensive projects to alleviate increasing unemployment.

In Syria, the displacement of about 120,000 persons, who moved from their homes in the occupied Quneitra district mainly to Damascus and Deraa, posed urgent problems of shelter, food, clothing, medical services and education.

As a result of the blockage of the Suez Canal, transit trade was materially increased through the port of Beirut to neighbouring Arab countries. On the other hand, the hostilities and the aftermath of political uncertainty affected adversely the tourist and services sectors, which normally make an important contribution to gross national product. The volume of tourism fell sharply in the second half of 1967, picked up in 1968, but reportedly dropped again in 1969. The variation in volume may not have long-term implications, however, unless it is reflective of uneasiness, signalling a change in the pattern of tourist travel in the Middle East. In Israel the results of the war are more mixed. The war and its aftermath have resulted in a heavy burden of taxation on the country. Despite this, industrial and agricultural production are up, and the service and tourist sectors are expanding.

Less visible, but more subtle and threatening than the economic effects are the social and political consequences of the 1967 hostilities. Public sentiment seems to have been polarized on the issue of co-operation with those groups espousing the political ideals of the refugees and displaced persons, thus endangering the delicate concessional balance which characterizes the political functioning of the Lebanese social system.

In the Republic of Southern Yemen, the closure of the Suez Canal brought the activities of the free port of Aden virtually to a standstill and, in turn, has contributed to the persistence of chronic budgetary deficits. The loss of revenue is all the more serious since the Republic covers an area which is 1,500 times larger, and has six times more people, than the small Crown Colony which was served by the port of Aden.

Iraq, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia were not involved directly in, and did not suffer directly from, the hostilities of June 1967, but the budgets and development programmes of these countries have been affected adversely by them and their aftermath. In Iraq, the development programme for 1967/68 was revised; allocations

³⁸ These are UNRWA estimates; other estimates set the figures at more than 300,000 persons.

for agriculture and industry were reduced by about 12 per cent at the expense of schemes not yet under way. In Kuwait, the anticipated expansion in the activities of the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development, established in 1961 for extending long-term development loans to Arab States, was postponed indefinitely. In Saudi Arabia, adjustments were necessitated by a slower growth in the oil income following the closure of the Suez Canal and the assistance which had to be extended to Jordan and

the United Arab Republic; recourse had to be made to past budgetary surpluses held in reserve.

In spite of the adverse social and economic consequences of these hostilities, there is evidence that investments in sectors such as health and education in some countries have had some encouraging results. Trends towards better formulation of social policies are being reflected in national development plans and in such programmes as land reform, co-operatives and housing.

SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

IN EASTERN EUROPEAN SOCIALIST COUNTRIES AND THE SOVIET UNION

POPULATION TRENDS

For the Soviet Union and most countries of eastern Europe, the 1960s were characterized by declining birth rates and decreasing rates of natural growth of population. This trend was owing to many factors, which included the migration of the population, especially young families, from the villages to the cities, the very low birth rate during the Second World War (especially in the Soviet Union), which has diminished the generation now of childbearing age, the rise in the average age of marriage, the imbalance of the sex ratio on the side of women (especially in the Soviet Union) and the proportion of old people in the population. Still other factors were the spread of individual family planning, the channelling of more family income into consumer goods and services and the continuing emancipation of women reflected in their increased participation in economic life.

The population of the eastern European socialist countries is estimated to have reached 125.2 million by mid-1969, an increase of 3.1 per cent since 1965. During the same period the population of the Soviet Union, which was more than 240 million in 1969, increased by 4.3 per cent. Between 1961 and 1969 the population of the countries of the region (excluding the Soviet Union) increased by more than 7.6 million, while during the same period the population of the Soviet Union increased by 22.5 million. However, there are variations in the rates of increase. For example, between 1961 and mid-1969,

the population of Poland increased by 8.6 per cent, compared with a 2.6 per cent increase for Hungary.

As is shown in table 1, during the 1960s the decrease in the rate of population growth was a common trend in all countries of the region (including the Soviet Union), with the exception of Romania, and to some extent Hungary—as a result of gains recorded by these two countries in the latter part of the 1960s. Albania, with the highest birth rate in the region, recorded the largest increase in rate of population growth. However, in the 1965-1969 period, the annual rate of growth in Albania showed a slight decrease from 3 to 2.7 per cent compared with the 1961-1965 period.

It is estimated that in all countries, except Albania, the number of deaths per 1,000 inhabitants increased in the 1965-1969 period due to the aging population; however, infant mortality continued to decline in all countries.

In the second half of the 1960s, the majority of countries enacted legislation for the protection and improvement of the welfare of mothers and children, which has had the effect of encouraging an increase in the birth rates. Such legislation was enacted by Hungary and Romania, in 1967 and 1966 respectively, and since then the birth rates of these two countries have increased. On the other hand, Yugoslavia in 1969 introduced family planning legislation according to which only parents have the right to decide the number and spacing of their children.

According to projections, rates of population growth in the Soviet Union are expected to rise somewhat between

TABLE 1. EASTERN EUROPEAN SOCIALIST COUNTRIES AND THE SOVIET UNION, 1961-1969

Country	Population estimates of midyear (thousands)			Annual rate of growth (percentage)		Number of live births per 1,000 inhabitants			Number of deaths per 1,000 inhabitants		
	1961	1965	1969	1961-65	1965-69	1961	1965	1969	1961	1965	1969
Albania	1,660	1,865	2,075	3.0	2.7	41.2	35.2	35.6 ^a	9.3	9.0	8.0 ^a
Bulgaria	7,943	8,201	8,436	0.8	0.7	17.4	15.3	16.9 ^a	7.9	8.2	8.6 ^a
Czechoslovakia	13,780	14,159	14,418	0.7	0.5	15.8	16.4	15.1	9.2	10.0	11.2
German Democratic Republic	17,125	17,029	17,096	0.0	0.1	17.7	16.5	14.3 ^a	12.8	13.3	14.3 ^a
Hungary	10,028	10,148	10,295	0.3	0.4	14.0	13.1	15.0	9.6	10.7	11.3
Poland	29,965	31,496	32,555	1.25	0.8	20.9	17.3	16.3	7.6	7.4	8.1
Romania	18,567	19,027	20,010	0.6	1.25	17.5	14.3 ^b	23.3	8.7	8.6	10.1
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics	217,989	230,556	240,571	1.4	1.1	23.8	18.4	17.2 ^a	7.2	7.3	7.7 ^a
Yugoslavia	18,607	19,507	20,351	1.2	1.1	22.7	20.9	18.8	9.0	8.7	9.2

SOURCES: United Nations, *Monthly Bulletin of Statistics* (August 1970), vol. XXIV, No. 8; *Population and Vital Statistics Report (ST/STAT/SER.A/93)*; *Statistical Yearbook, 1967* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 68.XVII.1).

^a In 1968.

^b In 1966.

1970 and 1985, while in the eastern European socialist countries, as a whole—including Albania and Yugoslavia—the rates are expected to decline slightly. Thus, a slight further decline is foreseen in the crude birth rate of the eastern European socialist countries, from 17.8 in 1965-1970 to 17.3 in 1980-1985, with variations in different countries. Owing to further aging of the population, the crude death rate will rise during the projection period from 9.2 to 9.9. In the case of the Soviet Union, it is expected that the crude birth rate will increase from 17.9 in 1965-1970 to 20.4 in 1980-1985, and the crude death rate for the same reason given above, will rise from 7.7 to 8.7. These over-all demographic trends are reflected in the discussions on levels of living, indices and trends.

TRENDS IN LEVELS OF LIVING

The expansion of industrial and agricultural output in eastern European socialist countries and the Soviet Union during the first period of the current five-year plan (1966-1970) was accompanied by increases in the levels of living of the population. The annual and long-term objectives for incomes and consumption were generally attained and the 1970 plan targets were subsequently raised in some countries (Czechoslovakia, Romania and the Soviet Union).¹

The distribution of income

An important feature of economic and social policy in all the countries of the region is the attempt to achieve a satisfactory balance between the two components of national income—the consumption fund and the accumulation fund—intended to improve the levels of living of the population concomitantly with the development of the national economies. As shown in table 2, the average annual growth rate for national income was highest in Albania, Bulgaria and Romania. The share of the accumulation fund in national income of these three countries was also the highest. In Bulgaria, the proportion of the consumption fund in the national income was 71.9 per cent in 1968 and 70.3 per cent in 1969,² and in Romania some three-fourths of the national income is allocated to the consumption fund.³

The distribution of services and allowances through the public (collective) consumption funds (free education, health care and health insurance, family allowance, pension security, subsidized housing and others) have had the effect of increasing and equalizing income during the period under review. In most countries this rate of increase in distribution by means of public consumption funds exceeded the rate of increase of wage income. This is seen from tables 2 and 3. The purpose of the higher rate of distribution through the public consumption fund was mainly to prevent large differences in the levels of living between individuals and between categories of the population.

¹ *Economic Survey of Europe, 1967* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 68.II.E.1), chap. II, p. 41.

² "From the people for the people", *Bulgaria Today*, No. 8 (1969), p. 6.

³ M. Vasilescu, "Living standards of the population", *Documents, Articles and Information on Romania*, 21 July 1969, p. 16.

Until the early 1960s the peasants shared to a lesser extent in public consumption funds in comparison with other social groups, and an effort was made to increase the scope of benefits rendered under the public consumption funds for the agricultural population. For all countries measures were taken to improve and expand social security systems with particular focus on persons in agriculture and the improvement of health and welfare services to ensure their more equitable distribution.

In Albania, social insurance comprises pensions for old age, disability, family benefits and special merit benefits. House rent is subsidized and equals 1.7 per cent of family income.⁴ In Hungary and Bulgaria, farmers are also eligible for retirement pensions and in Hungary the proportion of pensioners rose from 6 per cent of the population in 1953 to 13 per cent in 1968.⁵ In Romania, the pension system has been considerably improved and a pension system for peasants has been introduced. *Per capita* state social and cultural expenditures rose from 722 lei in 1960 to 1,826 lei in 1970.

During the mid-1960s, the Soviet Union carried out a number of large-scale measures directed at the improvement of social security, social services and the organization of rest and leisure time of the population. In 1967, 24.3 per cent of the national income and 33.2 per cent of the total fund for consumption were utilized to meet the social and cultural requirements of the population. Expenditures on social security, social insurance and pension payments are growing; for instance, in 1968, the rates of temporary incapacity allowances were increased to 80 per cent of the earnings for workers and employees with a length of service from five to eight years and to 100 per cent of earnings for workers and employees with a length of service exceeding eight years. In 1969, the budget for social insurance reached 14.8 million roubles and the total volume of pensions amounted to almost 15,000 million roubles, representing an increase of more than 41 per cent over 1965. In 1965, pension benefits were granted to collective farmers. Like workers and employees, they began to receive pensions for old-age, disability and loss of family bread-winner. These pensions and allowances are paid out of the centralized State Fund for social security of collective farmers, which was instituted with contributions from collective farms' incomes and annual allocations in the State budget.

Measures have also been taken to improve the living conditions of mothers and their children. For working mothers, liberal maternity leave with pay are given in most countries and mothers are allowed daily leave from work to attend to their children at home. For instance, in Albania, the working woman or employee is normally granted twelve to fourteen weeks maternity leave and receives 75 to 95 per cent of her average monthly pay. Until the child is nine months old, the mother has the right to leave work every three or four hours to feed her child, without loss of pay.⁶ In Bulgaria, women workers

⁴ "House-rent among the lowest in the world", *New Albania*, No. 6 (1968).

⁵ "From the people for the people", *Bulgaria Today*, No. 8 (1969), p. 7; and Egon Kemenes, "The Hungarian economy 1945-1969", *The New Hungarian Quarterly*, No. 37 (1970), p. 41.

⁶ According to Idriz Dhrami, the Secretary of the Central Council of the Albanian Trade Union, *New Albania*, No. 5, 1969.

TABLE 2. CHANGES IN NATIONAL INCOME, PUBLIC (COLLECTIVE) AND INDIVIDUAL CONSUMPTION, AT CONSTANT PRICES
(Percentage change over preceding year)

Item	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969 Plan
Albania						
National income produced	5.8	0.3	9.0	7.5	11.0	16.4
Bulgaria						
National income produced ^a	9.3	7.0	9.6	8.0	6.5	10.0
National income distributed ^a	9.7	4.3	14.3	8.7
Consumption, total ^a	6.0	7.7	6.3	9.2	8.0	9.5
of which:						
Individual consumption ^a	4.8	7.7	5.9	9.4
Collective consumption ^a	19.3	7.8	10.4	7.0
Czechoslovakia						
National income produced	0.6	3.4	10.2	6.9	7	7
National income distributed	1.7	4.4	8.1	6.8	8-9	...
Consumption, total	3.2	5.1	5.3	6.3
of which:						
Individual consumption	3.0	5.1	5.3	4.4	9	6.8
Public consumption	3.7	5.1	5.2	12.3
German Democratic Republic						
National income produced	4.8	4.4	5.3	5.8	5.3	6
National income distributed	4.6	6.1	5.2	3.7
Consumption, total
of which:						
Individual consumption	3.4	3.5	3.8	4.3
Other consumption	9.0	10.3	4.3	6.5
Hungary						
National income produced	4.7	1.1	8.4	8.7	5	5-6
National income distributed	5.9	-2.6	7.2	11.7
Consumption, total	5.7	2.9	4.4	6.4	5	5-6
of which:						
Consumption of the population	5.7	3.0	4.6	6.8	5-6	...
Public consumption	7.4	—	-0.2	—
Poland						
National income produced	6.8	7.0	7.2	5.6	8	5
National income distributed	4.9	8.3	7.4	4.4	7	5
Consumption, total	4.6	6.2	6.1	5.4	6.2	5
of which:						
Consumption for personal income	4.3	5.8	5.9	4.7	5.8	4.8
Other consumption	7.4	9.4	8.1	10.4	8	6.2
Romania						
National income produced	11	10	10	7	7	...
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics						
National income produced ^a	7.4	6.7	7.2	8.3
National income distributed ^a	8.0	6.0	7.2	8.2
Consumption, total	5.1	7.6	6.9	7.9	8.0	...
of which:						
Individual consumption	4.7	8.1	6.6	7.8
Social consumption	8.0	3.4	9.1	8.3

SOURCE: *Economic Survey of Europe in 1968* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 69.II.E.1), table 10.

^a At current prices.

TABLE 3. THE RATE OF GROWTH OF THE CONSUMPTION FUND, 1950-1970
(1950 = 100)

Item	Bulgaria		Czechoslovakia			Hungary		Poland			Romania		Yugoslavia				
	1950	1960	1950	1960	1967	1950	1960	1970	1950	1960	1968	1950	1960	1968	1950 ^a	1960	1967
Personal consumption fund	100 ^a	192	100	167.1	202.9	100	159	210	100	199.5	295.1	100 ^b	233	341	100 ^c	191 ^c	308 ^c
Public consumption fund	100 ^a	226	100	208.4	307.0	...	100	129	100 ^d	173.5	345.1	100 ^{e,f}	202	439	100 ^c	133 ^c	188 ^c

^a In 1952.

^b Index numbers of employees' average wages and salaries (Romanian Statistical Yearbook, 1969), p. 135.

^c Constant prices 1960.

^d In 1955.

^e State budget appropriations for social and cultural purposes (Romanian Statistical Yearbook, 1969), p. 569.

^f In 1955.

and employees are entitled to paid maternity leave—120 days for the first child, 150 for the second, 180 for the third and 120 for every subsequent child. They are also allowed to apply for an extra unpaid leave of 8 months for the first child, of 9 months for the second child, of 12 months for the third child, and 8 months for other children who are born.

Wages and salaries

The increase of wages and salaries in recent years, the reduction and in some cases elimination of income-tax, and cuts in the retail prices of consumer goods have meant increased income for all segments of the population. In Hungary, for example, the real income of the population increased almost two and a half times between 1960 and 1969, owing partly to the stability of consumer prices.⁷ In Poland the average gross annual wage increased from 1,960 zlotys in 1965 to 2,235 by the middle of 1968. The cost of living grew at a slower rate, 2.5 per cent per annum.⁸ In Romania, from 1965 to 1968 real income of wage and salary earners grew by 16 per cent and that of peasants by 13 per cent. In the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, real *per capita* income grew by 28 per cent between 1965 and 1968; by 1969 it had come close to the targets envisaged for 1970.⁹

Different income policies are being followed in different countries. In some cases there is stress on wage equalization. In Albania, measures have been taken twice since 1965 to reduce salaries at the higher levels and to raise low salaries in order to reduce income disparities. Steps were also taken to increase low pensions, to fix a maximum limit on pensions, and to exempt from taxes all salaries of 680 leks a month or less.¹⁰ In other countries there has been an emphasis since about 1965 on raising the lowest wages. In Bulgaria, the proportion of workers earning the minimum wage (60 leva a month) dropped from 45.6 per cent in 1957 to only 3.6 per cent in 1968. The proportion earning more than 100 leva a month (approximately the average wage) rose from 10.6 per cent to 55 per cent.¹¹ In Poland, too, the proportion

of those in higher income groups has also been rising.¹² In Romania, the minimum wage was raised from 700 to 800 lei a month in 1970. Taxes on incomes below 1,200 lei (the average wage in 1970 was 1,400 lei) were reduced by up to 30 per cent and taxes on salaries above 3,000 lei were raised by 16.2 to 19.3 per cent.¹³

In the Soviet Union, in all branches of the national economy there was an increase in the minimum monthly wage of 60 roubles and 70 roubles for certain categories of workers. Low paid workers earning 61-80 roubles per month benefited from tax reductions averaging 25 per cent. Other important measures were the general increase in the wages of co-operative farmers designed to raise the levels of income of the rural population to compare more favourably with the income of urban dwellers.

In general, there has been growing emphasis in the eastern European socialist countries and the Soviet Union on achieving a more consistent differentiation of income according to the social usefulness and the skill and productivity of workers. In Bulgaria, according to the new system of economic management and planning that was fully implemented in 1968, enterprises have the right to set aside, in accordance with established quotas, a part of the profit to be distributed through an additional material incentive fund and the social welfare fund. The main functions of the former are to pay out bonuses to workers and employees for saving materials, for better use of the machines, higher-quality products, etc. The second is designed to finance the social undertakings of the enterprises, as an incentive to the enterprise to make more profit.¹⁴

In the German Democratic Republic, on the basis of the new State planning and management, workers are morally and materially closely linked to the economic success or failure of their enterprise. The personal responsibility of the manager is increasing. In these new conditions, the increased levels of living can be reached by workers and employees only through improving the technology in their factories as well as their own skills, thus leading to greater efficiency of the enterprise and to higher profits. Larger profits mean larger bonuses.¹⁵

⁷ Egon Kemenes, *op. cit.*, p. 41.

⁸ "Wages and costs of living", *Polish Perspectives*, vol. XI, No. 11, p. 78.

⁹ N. K. Baybakov, *O Ghosudarstvennom Plane Razvitiya Narodnogo Khozyaistva SSSR na 1969 Ghod* (1968), p. 32.

¹⁰ *Answers to Questions about Albania* (Tirana, Naim Frashëri Publishing House, 1969), p. 235.

¹¹ "From the people for the people", *Bulgaria Today*, No. 8 (1969), p. 7.

¹² "Wages and costs of living", *Polish Perspectives*, vol. XI, No. 11, p. 78.

¹³ *Scinteia*, 29 April and 1 May 1970.

¹⁴ T. Yordanov, "Foundation and distribution of income", *Bulgaria Today*, No. 3 (1968), pp. 30-31.

¹⁵ R. Göther, "State planning and management in German Democratic Republic", *German Foreign Policy*, No. 4 (1969).

TABLE 4. GROWTH OF REAL *per capita* INCOME OF THE POPULATION OF THE SOVIET UNION (percentage)

Year	1950	1960	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968 preliminary data	1969	1970
1950.	100	187	209	223	236	252	267	282	
1960.		100	112	119	126	135	143	151	
1965.				100	106	113	120	127	130

SOURCE: Institute of Economics, Academy of Sciences, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

In Yugoslavia, an earlier tendency for wages and salaries to level off was replaced by a marked differentiation of personal income.¹⁶

The introduction of a new system of management and the revision of the planning of the economy, as well as providing economic incentives for workers, constitute the most important aspect of social development in the Soviet Union during the second half of the 1960s. And although for the time being these innovations apply only to industry, their impact on many other areas of social and economic development is important. The new approach lays special stress on a more effective strategy for utilizing manpower resources and for solving problems of employment and output. The direct dependence of reward and remuneration on the results of labour and the offering of monetary incentives for work accomplished have resulted in the increase of the income of workers and the reduction of differences in income among various groups of the population. The new approach also allows the worker a greater share in the management of the enterprise.

A typical feature of all countries in the region has been the general increase in the proportion of wage and salary earners. This has resulted in an increase in the proportion of persons engaged in non-agricultural work and a decrease of those in agricultural employment. For example, in Hungary in 1950 the total number of those employed in agriculture amounted to 52 per cent and only 19 per cent were employed in industry. By 1969, however, this proportion had changed to 30 per cent employed in agriculture and 35 per cent in industry.¹⁷ In Romania, between 1950 and 1968 the number of persons engaged in non-agricultural work increased from 25.9 per cent to 47.2 per cent,¹⁸ and the number of wage- and salary-earners increased from 57.6 per cent to 73.3 per cent. This increase was particularly noticeable in the manufacturing, construction and mining industries. In 1968, there were 243 wage and salary-earners per thousand inhabitants as against 130 in 1950. In Yugoslavia, in the sixteen-year period 1952-1968, the number of those employed in the socialist and private sectors increased by 1,853,000 and in 1968 it was double the figure recorded in 1952. The annual increase in employment during that period averaged 116,000 or 4.7 per cent.

Rates of increase of employment in the Soviet Union surpassed the rate of general population growth. During 1951-1967, the total population of the Soviet Union increased by approximately 31.8 per cent; the growth rate of the working age population remained stable, but employment increased by 39 per cent. At the same time, while a marked increase in the number of employees occurred in industry, there was a significant decline in the number of workers in agriculture. For instance, during the period 1950-1967 employment in industry increased by 89 per cent, but in agriculture it diminished by 15 per cent.

¹⁶ See E. Berkovic, "Differentiation of personal income", *Yugoslavia Survey*, vol. X, No. 1.

¹⁷ Egon Kemenes, "The Hungarian economy 1945-1969", *The New Hungarian Quarterly*, No. 37 (1970).

¹⁸ Mircea Bulgaru, "Changes in the social and professional structure of Romania's population", *Documents, Articles and Information on Romania*, 20 June 1969, pp. 8-10.

Public health and medical services constitute an important aspect of the levels of living and figure prominently among the benefits provided by the consumption fund in the eastern European socialist countries and the Soviet Union. Considerable progress has been made in these countries in free, universal health services in recent years.

Changing demands on the public health system in the eastern European socialist countries and the Soviet Union in recent years are best understood in the context of economic growth and social change. Development has generally meant an improvement in the health situation. Better nutrition, less arduous working conditions, better health education, better sanitation and housing, and improvements in the system of public medicine have raised the basic health levels of the general population. In the Soviet Union, the caloric indices of nutrition have now reached the level of other developed countries, though the average consumption of fresh fruits and vegetables, in particular, is still below scientific nutritional requirements.¹⁹ Most serious communicable diseases have been greatly reduced and controlled in all the countries through immunization, sanitation, improvements in safe water supply and sewage systems, education, detection and treatment. Diseases such as diphtheria, tetanus, poliomyelitis, malaria and smallpox have been nearly eliminated in several countries largely by massive immunization campaigns and others, such as tuberculosis, measles, whooping-cough and typhoid have been greatly reduced.

However, the concomitants of development, urbanization and industrialization, have brought new health problems with them. Among these are environmental pollution, occupational diseases and accidents, especially in the factory and on the highway. These are combated by legal measures. Thus in Hungary, occupational diseases are now decreasing as a result of greater hygienic control and the improvement of protective devices. Since 1967, noise testing groups and audiological stations have helped prevent occupational noise damage in Hungary.²⁰ In Poland, regulations have been put into force concerning safe water, sewerage, air pollution, work conditions and noise. Traffic accidents and industrial poisoning are dealt with by an increase in the number of emergency surgical centres and a broader network of blood transfusion services and blood donors.²¹

In the Soviet Union, new public health guidelines which became effective on 1 July 1970 emphasize the elimination of unhealthy conditions. They stipulate that sanitary supervision agencies must approve urban settlement facilities for water supply, etc. The guidelines include requirements for the protection of the environment from pollution and for more healthful working conditions. Violations of sanitary hygienic and anti-epidemic regulations entail legal liability.²²

¹⁹ O. E. Gubareva, *The Sources of Progress of Peoples' Welfare in the USSR* (Moscow, 1968), p. 150.

²⁰ World Health Organization, *Fourth Report on the World Health Situation*, part II (1970), p. 295.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 314.

²² N. Blokhin, op. cit.

In some eastern European socialist countries, a number of communicable diseases are also resisting suppressive efforts or are even increasing. This is true of venereal diseases, the incidence of which increased by 60 per cent from 1964 to 1968 in Czechoslovakia, for example.²³ The underlying causes of this growing problem seem to be urbanization and tourism, but efforts are being made to combat it through education, prevention, detection and treatment facilities.²⁴ Trachoma is still a problem in Czechoslovakia, especially among children aged 10-14 in eastern Slovakia, but an improved programme is coping with the disease.²⁵ Tuberculosis is being reduced in Poland through mass X-ray detection treatment in hospitals, microbiological research, vaccination and the integration of tuberculosis control into basic medical care.²⁶ In the Soviet Union, imported cholera El Tor was combated by mass vaccination of the populations exposed.²⁷ However, in Poland there was an epidemic of polio virus-3 in 1968, owing to the lack of oral vaccine since 1961.²⁸

Industrial development in the region as in other developed regions has been accompanied in some cases by a considerable increase in certain chronic and degenerative diseases and conditions. There has been an increased incidence of cancer (partly because of improved detection and reporting), heart disease and mental illnesses, including alcoholism. In Hungary in 1968 there were nearly half a million examinations to detect cancer in its early stages. Recent measures in Hungary have also been adopted for the voluntary and compulsory treatment of alcohol addicts.²⁹ In the Soviet Union, a mass survey carried out recently by the Institute of Cardiology showed that 4.5 to 5.5 per cent of the adult population suffer from arterial hypertension. Patients found to be suffering from this condition and from heart diseases are placed

under systematic observation. Special attention is also being given to the control of cancer and, through an extensive network of cancer control institutions, there has been improvement in the detection, reporting, diagnosis and treatment of cancer patients. Improvement in the early diagnosis of cancer has reduced the proportion of patients detected with advanced forms of the disease from 32.2 per cent in 1963 to 21.3 per cent in 1967.³⁰

In several countries of the region there is an increasing trend toward participation by local health authorities and the people in public health administration. The Ministry of Health, however, determines policy and provides guidance and supervision.³¹ In most countries of the region, health planning is a part of the over-all five-year plan. In the Soviet Union, public health departments are integral parts of the local administration. Each of the union republics and autonomous republics has its own Ministry of Health, but the central authority for public health administration is the Ministry of Health of the Soviet Union.³²

Housing

In all eastern European socialist countries and the Soviet Union, the number of dwellings completed annually during the 1960s was significantly above the annual average of those registered in the 1950s, and in most countries this acceleration in building activity was considerable. However, in most countries of the region, the period 1960-1961 represented the peak of building construction, followed by a slackening off in later years.³³ In most countries of the region, but particularly in Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary, this slowing down in over-all building activity was largely due to a decline in rural construction, partly, no doubt, associated with a reduced demand in the countryside because of the population outflow.³⁴ In the early 1960s more dwellings were

²³ World Health Organization, op. cit., p. 274.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 314.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 273.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 314.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 350.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 314.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 295.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 350-351.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 311.

³² *Ibid.*, p. 347.

³³ United Nations, *Statistical Yearbooks*, 1960-1969.

³⁴ *Economic Survey of Europe in 1968* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 69.II.E.1), chap. II, p. 59.

TABLE 5. INDEX NUMBERS OF CONSTRUCTION ACTIVITY
(1963 = 100)

Country	1963	1965	1966	1967	1968
Albania	100	114	116	124	...
Bulgaria	100	122	142	166	190
Czechoslovakia	100	113	124	136	143
German Democratic Republic	100	118	122	133	144
Hungary	100	108	120	136	144
Poland	100	114	122	135	147
Romania	100	120	132	157	176
Yugoslavia	100	108	113	120	127
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics ^a	100	115	123	133	142

SOURCE: *Statistical Yearbook 1969* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 70.XVII.1), p. 302-303.

^a Figures relate to cost of construction and installation work by the State and by co-operatives.

built in villages than in towns but later this ratio was reversed, except in the German Democratic Republic and in Romania.

As shown in table 5, in 1968 as compared with 1963, important gains in building construction were recorded by all countries and particularly in Bulgaria and Romania. In 1968, the total number of dwellings completed per thousand inhabitants ranged from around 4 to 5 in the German Democratic Republic, 5 to 6 in Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland and Romania, 6 to 7 in Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia and more than 9 in the Soviet Union.³⁵

The size of new dwellings (number of rooms) and the amount of usable floor space (square metres) per dwelling are, in general, improving in most countries. In 1968, the average usable floor space per new dwelling ranged from 62 square metres in Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia to 44.5 square metres (in 1967) in the Soviet Union. The size of new dwellings increased in all countries of the region (no data for the Soviet Union), with the exception of Hungary. The provision of newly built dwellings with modern equipment, as is seen from table 6, showed steady improvement in Czechoslovakia and Hungary.

The number of dwellings constructed by different investors varied from country to country. By 1968, in most countries as a general rule, the proportion of State-built or State-aided construction and co-operative housing was higher than that built by private initiative. The number of houses constructed through private initiative (covering both unaided and State-aided construction) is also increasing, especially in Hungary and Poland. However, despite the acceleration of the rate of construction, the housing question in urban areas—mainly owing to population outflow from the countryside—remains a problem for most countries.

Hungary has set a target of one million new dwellings to be constructed by 1975 in its fifteen-year building programme (1961-1975). At the same time, it is envisaged that the housing shortage will continue, in view of the

³⁵ In the same period, the total number of dwellings completed in some western European countries and the United States was as follows: Austria 6.9, Denmark 9.2, Sweden 13.4 and the United Kingdom and the United States 7.7, *Annual Bulletin of Housing and Building Statistics for Europe, 1968* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 69.II.E.13), table 4.

rising housing standards demanded and because of the rapid pace in the urbanization process.³⁶ Between 1971 and 1975, Romania plans to build some 500,000 flats—200,000 more than those constructed during the period 1965-1970.³⁷ At least one-half of the apartments to be constructed during the period 1971-1975 will be privately owned and will be financed by loans granted by the State.³⁸ In Albania, in order to accelerate the construction of dwellings, the workers and peasants were assisted in building their houses through long-term State credits. As a result, more than half the peasants now own new houses.³⁹

Housing construction in the Soviet Union continued to expand between 1966 and 1970, when 7.9 million apartments were built with a total space of 309 million square metres, and 33 million people acquired new apartments or improved their housing conditions. The average *per capita* housing for the urban population rose from 8.1 square metres in 1960 to 10.3 square metres in 1967. In comparison with 1961-1965, construction of co-operative housing in 1966-1970 increased approximately by four times. Apartments are granted to workers on favourable terms; payment by tenants for the use of an apartment covers only about one-third of the State expenditures on maintenance, while rent makes up only 3 per cent of the family budget of workers and peasants. Improvements are being made in the planning and equipment of apartments and houses including those in rural areas which are being provided with improved services and amenities.

Education and human resources development

Education in the eastern European socialist countries and the Soviet Union has developed during the last few decades as a result of an effort to adjust the system to the requirements of the society, and today the major concern is to improve its relevance and effectiveness in social,

³⁶ Jenö Fock, "The next twenty-five years", *The New Hungarian Quarterly*, No. 37 (1970), p. 9.

³⁷ Victoria Iliescu, "Housing construction in Romania", *Documents, Articles and Information on Romania*, 7 July 1969.

³⁸ *Ibid.*

³⁹ *Answers to Questions About Albania* (Tirana, Naim Frashëri Publishing House, 1969), p. 220.

TABLE 6. PERCENTAGE OF NEW DWELLINGS EQUIPPED WITH PIPED WATER, FIXED BATH OR SHOWER OR CENTRAL HEATING

Country	Year	Piped water	Fixed bath or shower	Central heating
Bulgaria	1967	62.7	51.2	22.6
	1968	63.8	49.8	22.3
Czechoslovakia	1966	91.1	96.3	69.3
	1968	95.6	98.4	81.8
Hungary	1966	55.1	65.2	25.5
	1968	60.6	67.3	26.1
Yugoslavia	1966	58.3	54.2	16.9
	1968	57.7	53.5	18.1

SOURCE: *Annual Bulletin of Housing and Building Statistics for Europe, 1968* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 69.II.E.13), table 4.

economic, scientific and technological development. This is being accomplished by upgrading the productive capacity of the labour force and by improving the individual's cultural level and his chances of social mobility.

Education receives high priority in the national plans of eastern European socialist societies and the Soviet Union. As table 7 shows, all the Governments spend a substantial proportion of their available resources on education. The percentage of net material product (the most accurate index of total national production) spent on education is about the same in each eastern European country shown. The Soviet Union invests an exceptionally large amount of its national product in education. In 1969 for instance, 17.2 per cent of the State budget was allocated to education and training. Table 7 shows that the amount spent on education has increased sharply over the period.

TABLE 7. EXPENDITURES ON EDUCATION

Country	Year	As a percentage of State budget	As a percentage of net material product ^a	Percentage increase over previous year (current prices)
Albania ^b	1968	9.5	...	+ 9.2
Czechoslovakia	1968	8.4	4.1	+ 8.8
Hungary	1969	6.0	4.0 ^c	+ 9.0
Poland ^b	1969	11.3	4.3 ^c	+18.2
Romania	1968	9.8	...	+ 6.5
Union of Soviet				
Socialist Republics	1968	11.8	5.6	+ 5.0
Yugoslavia ^b	1968	8.5	4.5	+11.8

SOURCES: *Statistical Yearbook 1969* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 70.XVII.1), tables 178, 191 and 201; and in United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization, *International Yearbook of Education, 1968*, vol. XXX.

^a The net material product is the total net value of goods and "productive services", including turnover taxes, produced by the economy in the course of a year. It is used by eastern European socialist countries instead of GNP. *Yearbook of National Account Statistics, 1968*, vol. I (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 70.XVII.2), p. 3.

^b Refers to expenditures for education, science and culture.

^c As a percentage of 1968 net material product.

The number of students has decreased at some levels in the eastern European countries. From 1966 to 1967, primary students decreased by 2.6 per cent in Czechoslovakia, and by 3.6 per cent in Hungary, while in Poland the number of secondary school students dropped by 5.1 per cent and vocational students by 7.9 per cent.⁴⁰ This phenomenon is related to the very low birth rate (see above) and to fluctuations in the birth rate in the post-war period. This has had in some instances the positive effect of permitting teachers more time for training to improve the general quality of instruction, and of permitting the redeployment of some retrained teachers to sectors of the school system where shortages still exist.

Structural reforms and administrative trends

In response to the new demands placed on education by changing economic and social conditions, several

aspects of public education are undergoing reform. Among these reforms are the introduction of programmed learning, the extension of universal compulsory education, the balancing of central and local responsibility for education and increased emphasis on practical and technical education.

There has been considerable interest lately in the educational potential of programmed learning and Hungary, Romania, Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union in particular are working on the introduction of this new technique. In Yugoslavia, a wide range of materials and programmed texts are now being prepared.⁴¹ In the Soviet Union, technical teaching aids are being provided in many schools, for example in the Ukrainian SSR, and teachers are being instructed in their use.⁴²

For several years, eight years of free primary education have been compulsory in the countries studied, ensuring a measure of equal opportunity for advancement for the entire population. There are, however, problems in some cases in the full implementation of this principle. In Bulgaria, for example, the goal of universal basic education has very nearly been achieved; only 3,038 school-age children (0.3 per cent of the total) do not attend school.⁴³ In Hungary in 1969, 91 per cent of those aged 14-16 completed the eighth grade of general school;⁴⁴ in Albania all children attend the first four years of primary school and 90 per cent go on to eighth grade schools.⁴⁵ In Yugoslavia, as in the above cases, children in some rural areas leave school early for a variety of reasons. Efforts are being made there to enable all students to complete an eight-year education, while in Albania it is anticipated that in two or three years the network of eighth grade schools will be so extended that all those who finish primary school (four grades) will be able to continue for the full eight grades.⁴⁶

The benefits of universal compulsory education are also being extended in another way: by expanding the number of years of compulsory education. Thus in Romania, compulsory education was extended to ten years in 1969-1970 and it is expected that this target will be achieved by 1973. Now, after finishing the eighth grade, all pupils choose between a further two years of general education and entering secondary school. The final two years of general education include technical, theoretical and practical training as well as general culture. The extension of compulsory education to ten years in Romania also entails a change in the age for entry into school from 7 to 6 years of age.⁴⁷

In other countries as well, compulsory education has been or will soon be extended beyond eight years. General

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 212-213, 556; S. Zaides, op. cit., p. 16.

⁴² United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, *International Yearbook of Education, 1968*, vol. XXX, p. 488.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 61.

⁴⁴ J. Fekete, "Public education in Hungary in the past 25 years", *The New Hungarian Quarterly*, No. 38 (Summer 1970), p. 95.

⁴⁵ T. Delianá, "Of two million people, 50,000 are pupils and students", *New Albania*, No. 5 (1969), p. 19.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.* and United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, op. cit., p. 558.

⁴⁷ S. Zaides, "Experiments in Romanian schools", *Documents, Articles and Information on Romania*, 15 November 1969, p. 14; and T. Pop, op. cit., p. 14.

⁴⁰ United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, *International Yearbook of Education, 1968*, vol. XXX.

schools in Czechoslovakia offer nine years of education and those of the German Democratic Republic, ten years. Poland also has expanded its educational facilities by adding an eighth year to the primary schools and a twelfth year to the secondary schools. The enlargement of primary schools led to an increase in the number of primary students, despite a decline in the number of children reaching school age. In Hungary, there are plans to extend the general schools to ten grades, in order to increase the level of general culture and allow young people more time to make career choices.⁴⁸

In the Soviet Union, the transition to general compulsory secondary education has already begun. In a number of regions, two years of secondary education after the eight-year primary school are already compulsory and the general transition throughout the Soviet Union is taking place during the 1970-1971 school year.⁴⁹

In most countries of the region, as part of the general Government policy to intensify the involvement and participation of the population and local authorities, a new balance is being sought between the Central Government's authority and responsibility for education and the authority and responsibility of local or regional councils. In Hungary for example, this decentralization of school administration is part of the new economic mechanism, while in Yugoslavia it is related to the increasing self-management of enterprises. In Hungary, the Ministry of Cultural Affairs still has the over-all responsibility for education, establishes norms and gives guidance for the whole country; however, the Ministry no longer directs the county education councils in their work. County, city and borough councils now have taken over some of the functions of operating the schools with greater independence in the use of personnel and funds. At the same time, the two-way flow of information is being increased. This is used by the National Education Council, an advisory body, in setting general guidelines and long-term plans. It is felt that the greater authority granted to local organs allows them to make better use of their knowledge of local conditions and needs of education.⁵⁰

In Yugoslavia, because of the federal structure of the Government, much of the authority for education rests with the various component republics and autonomous provinces, each of which passes its own laws on education. Further, cities and municipalities have their own education councils. The education councils of the republics and localities are composed of leading citizens and make recommendations to the educational administrative bodies. Much day-to-day administrative responsibility lies with the village communes and with the schools themselves. They are thus implementing the principles of self-government and free discussion, while receiving co-operation from the educational authorities at various levels.⁵¹

In the Soviet Union, local authorities and groups are also being given more authority in educational adminis-

tration. For example, in the Byelorussian SSR and the Ukrainian SSR, local authorities' school assistance committees, parents' councils, factory councils and local teachers' groups are all becoming more active in school affairs.⁵²

Pre-school and primary education

The eastern European socialist countries and the Soviet Union have very highly developed systems of crèches, nursery schools and kindergartens. In Poland for example, 656,662 children, over 35 per cent of the pre-school age group, attended nursery schools and kindergartens in 1967-1968.⁵³ In Bulgaria, pre-primary schools are now available for children aged 3 to 7 for twelve hours a day, throughout the year.⁵⁴ In Hungary, nursery schools are beginning to receive children from the age of two and a half instead of three years.⁵⁵ In Czechoslovakia there is now a trend to combine nursery schools (for children 3-6) and nurseries (for children up to three years) in the same administrative unit. The hours of nursery care are set to coincide with the mother's hours of work.⁵⁶ In the Soviet Union in 1969, more than 3,000 million roubles were allocated from the State budget for the operation of kindergartens and crèches. The network of pre-school establishments was expanded to serve 12.5 million children by the end of 1970.

At the primary level, basic compulsory education lasts from eight to ten years in eastern European countries. Of total teaching time for the nine-year primary school in Czechoslovakia, 25.9 per cent is given to language studies, 11.3 per cent to social studies, 27.5 per cent to mathematics and science, 17.4 per cent to physical education and arts, 7.6 per cent to handicrafts, and the remainder to optional subjects.⁵⁷ In Romania, increased emphasis is now being given to foreign languages—in some schools as early as the third grade of primary school. This makes it possible to begin teaching some disciplines in the respective foreign language in the fifth grade.⁵⁸

Several countries of the region are increasing the amount of vocational education given in primary schools. In Yugoslavia, additional vocational training is being given for students unable to continue their studies in secondary school. These courses are given in the seventh and eighth grades or after completion of primary school and prepare the students for work in agriculture, tourism and other fields.⁵⁹

Secondary education

In most eastern European socialist countries the great majority of primary school graduates go on to secondary schools. The proportion is about 67 per cent in Romania,

⁵² *Ibid.*, pp. 69, 486.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, p. 397.

⁵⁴ "Facts and figures", *Bulgaria Today*, No. 9 (1968), p. 18.

⁵⁵ United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, *op. cit.*, p. 215.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 136.

⁵⁷ S. Zaides, *op. cit.*, p. 15.

⁵⁸ United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, *op. cit.*, p. 558.

⁵⁹ Prokofyev, *op. cit.*, and E. Monosyon, "Why the three-year elementary school?", *Izvestia*, 7 December 1968.

⁴⁸ J. Fekete, *op. cit.*, p. 103.

⁴⁹ M. Prokofyev, "The present and future of secondary schools", *Trud*, 16 February 1969.

⁵⁰ United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, *op. cit.*, pp. 212-213.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p. 556.

81 per cent in Yugoslavia and 95 per cent in Bulgaria.⁶⁰ Recent developments in secondary schools will be discussed first, followed by vocational-technical education and part-time adult education programmes.

Several developments are under way in secondary education. Bulgaria plans to make secondary education universal. Because of the high proportion of students already enrolled, this is expected to be achieved by 1975.⁶¹ Beginning in December 1968, Czechoslovakian secondary schools were extended to four years. These new *gymnazia* provide more thorough, flexible preparation for a choice of specialization in higher education. *Gymnazia* graduates are also qualified to hold certain administrative posts.⁶² In Poland, too, secondary education has been extended, with four-year lyceums requiring a total of twelve years for the diploma. In September 1970, lyceum students were allowed, for the first time, a choice of several optional courses in their fourth year.⁶³

Improvements in the curriculum of the general secondary schools are being carried out at the same time as the structural reforms just mentioned. In the German Democratic Republic, recent secondary school curriculum changes have meant greater emphasis on "polytechnical" instruction (general technical, mathematical and natural science subjects) and on social science, especially the processes of social change and social development.⁶⁴ In Romania, special classes, including lectures by university professors, are now given throughout the country for students with special aptitude and interest in physics and mathematics.⁶⁵ In Poland, a similar programme has been organized for mathematics. Also, thirty-three Polish lyceums now promote fluency in foreign languages by devoting extra hours to Russian, English, French and German, and using them as languages of instruction in some subjects.⁶⁶ In Yugoslavia, the Institute of Educational Research is helping to direct the syllabus of the last two years of secondary school more specifically towards chosen specializations such as science or economics.⁶⁷

In the Soviet Union, efforts are being made to improve the scientific level of instruction in order to keep up with current scientific achievements. This has been accomplished in part by the creation of optional courses and special secondary schools in fields such as physics, electronics and computer methods. The theory and practice of labour and production methods are another feature of secondary school curricula in the Soviet Union.⁶⁸

⁶⁰ T. Pop, op. cit., p. 14; and V. Colić, "Enrolment in secondary schools", *Yugoslav Survey*, vol. X, No. 3, p. 119; and G. Ganev, op. cit., p. 4.

⁶¹ G. Ganev, op. cit., p. 4.

⁶² *Sbirka Zádonu CSSR*, part 46, No. 168 (22 December 1968), p. 455.

⁶³ United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, op. cit., p. 397.

⁶⁴ "Law on the uniform socialist educational system", *Gesetzblatt der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik*, part I, No. 6 (25 February 1968), p. 87.

⁶⁵ S. Zaides, op. cit., p. 16.

⁶⁶ United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, op. cit., p. 398.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 558.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 495-496.

Efforts in the Soviet Union between 1958 and 1966 to make secondary school curricula equivalent to specialized professional training proved too narrow an approach and were generally unsuccessful. Since then, secondary school curricula have been based on the principle of polytechnical education, which, while recognizing the importance of professional training, tries to integrate this flexibility with more general secondary education.

Practical education and vocational and technical schools

A major goal of education in the eastern European socialist countries and the Soviet Union is imparting practical productive skills as well as improving the general level of culture, and efforts are continually being made to improve this direct economic function of the schools. In Bulgaria, the Law on the Closer Contact Between School and Life is being put into effect in the form of polytechnical education—that is, by more thorough instruction in natural and mathematical subjects, with emphasis on their practical application, and by labour training in production.⁶⁹ In Romania as well, greater attention is now being given to technical and practical training at the primary as well as secondary levels. In the ninth and tenth grades of secondary school, pupils are taught electronics and technical design, while girls can elect housekeeping courses. Children in the early grades do practical work in school workshops and in enterprises, while those in the villages have hours of agricultural study—adapted to the area—starting in the fifth grade. These experiences are intended also to give children better background for the later choice of professions. Emphasis on practical training continues in the secondary schools with courses in technical design, the study of machine parts, and driving. The proportion of practical work in education has been increased from 9 to 16 per cent.⁷⁰ In Hungary too, it is felt that public education should primarily be useful to life and serve society. But it has also been noted that "public education cannot react at once to all oscillations of society and the economy", and that stability and continuity are necessary for schools to be efficient in imparting general culture as well as technical and practical knowledge.⁷¹

In the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the new syllabi for all subjects pay great attention to the practical application of science, and more time is set aside for practical work. In addition, labour education is being incorporated as a separate subject. In the first stage (grades 1 to 3) this involves manual work, and more technical aspects of labour education are added in succeeding years.⁷²

Practical vocational training at the secondary level is another aspect of education that has been developed in the eastern European socialist countries and the Soviet Union. As table 8 shows, the great majority of secondary school students in almost all the countries of the region are enrolled in vocational institutions. In some countries

⁶⁹ G. Ganev, "Concerning the future", *Bulgaria Today*, No. 9 (1968), p. 3.

⁷⁰ T. Pop, op. cit., pp. 14-16.

⁷¹ J. Fekete, op. cit., p. 104.

⁷² United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, op. cit., pp. 495-496.

TABLE 8. VOCATIONAL STUDENTS AND OTHER SECONDARY SCHOOL STUDENTS

Country	Year	Total secondary students	Vocational students	Vocational as a percentage of total
Albania ^a	1966-1967	33,947	12,827	37.8
Bulgaria	1967-1968	382,097	264,499 ^a	69.2
Czechoslovakia	1967-1968	384,109	267,483	69.6
German Democratic Republic	1967-1968	624,416	508,841	81.5
Hungary	1967-1968	98,549	98,549 ^b	43.3
Poland	1967-1968	1,806,608	1,500,473 ^a	83.1
Romania	1967-1968	544,152	327,642	60.2
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics	1967-1968	...	4,262,000	...
Yugoslavia	1967-1968	639,993	432,947	67.6

SOURCE: *Statistical Yearbook, 1969* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 70.XVII.1), table 201, and United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, op. cit.

^a Including evening and correspondence courses.

^b Full-time only.

technical and vocational schools are, in fact, more popular among the students themselves than the general academic secondary schools. In Romania, the rapidly expanding system of specialized secondary schools for medium-level specialists in agriculture, industry, etc., attracted ten to twelve applicants for every place available in 1969-1970.⁷³ In the past, Yugoslavian grammar schools were the most popular and vocational schools for skilled workers were chosen by pupils with poor performance or by those who could not enroll in other secondary schools. Now, however, schools for skilled workers are the most popular, partly because of the usefulness of instruction for future employment opportunities.⁷⁴

Constant efforts are being made to improve the immediate economic practicality of vocational education. In Bulgaria, almost all technical vocational schools have apprentice workshops in a wide variety of trades, from shoe production to building construction and the manufacture of machinery.⁷⁵ In Czechoslovakia, vocational schools now give two-year training programmes in 288 trades; some courses are being reduced from three years to two, and new, more complex, four-year specialties have been introduced. With the rise in levels of living, greater need is now felt for new courses in services such as maintenance and repair, laundries, housing management, sales, etc.⁷⁶ In Hungary, the general cultural level of instruction in vocational schools was quite low because of the emphasis on simple manual skills. Since the autumn of 1969, however, the curriculum providing a general secondary education has been improved, and technical secondary schools are being integrated into the vocational school system.⁷⁷ In Poland, vocational training was made compulsory in 1967-1968 for youths aged 15-18 who neither attend school nor work. In Romania, apprenticeship at the place of work for students under the age of eighteen began in 1967. They are also given

theoretical training in evening courses or in day courses for two to three months a year, for which they are released by their employers.⁷⁸ In Yugoslavia, strong functional, organizational and financial links have been established between vocational schools and productive enterprises or public services, so that curricula are attuned to the needs of the economy; the facilities of enterprises may be used for training. To counteract the danger that vocational curricula may become too restricted by the current technological and personnel requirements of specific enterprises, a compulsory verification of curricula by State educational authorities has been introduced.⁷⁹

A traditional problem of vocational education in several countries has been that vocational students were not qualified for general secondary education diplomas, and could not easily change their specialization or go on to higher education. Now, however, they can either receive the secondary diploma in a slightly longer, more comprehensive vocational-and-general programme (as in Czechoslovakia) or by enrolling in the final two years of general secondary schools after finishing three years of vocational training (as in Hungary).⁸⁰ With the secondary diploma, capable vocational students are now being given the right of continuing their education in institutes of higher learning, including universities.

In the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, there are about 5,000 technical vocational secondary schools which train 2 million students in more than 700 trades and professions; and these are growing rapidly. However, the CPSU Central Committee and the Council of Ministers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has recently determined that the vocational and technical education system is lagging behind production requirements for industry. Primarily, the increasing technological complexity of many occupations now demands more advanced training. It has been ruled necessary to

⁷³ S. Zaides, op. cit., p. 16.

⁷⁴ V. Colié, op. cit., p. 119.

⁷⁵ United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, op. cit., p. 62.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 137-138.

⁷⁷ J. Fekete, op. cit., p. 96.

⁷⁸ United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, op. cit., pp. 408-409.

⁷⁹ Z. Glavanski, "Development of secondary vocational education", *Yugoslav Survey*, vol. X, No. 2, p. 141.

⁸⁰ United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, op. cit., p. 361; and J. Fekete, op. cit., p. 96.

develop longer courses of three or four years for training skilled workers and to require a secondary education totalling ten years for trainees in the more complicated professions. Vocational school students can earn their secondary diploma either before entering their specialized training course, or by entering a specialized secondary school or school for adults after finishing vocational training. They then have the possibility of continuing in higher education.⁸¹

Adult education

Those aspects of human resources development which concern part-time study by adults or on-the-job training are, in the eastern European socialist countries and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, fully integrated into the formal State system of public education. In fact, much of adult education is an inseparable part of the vocational school system discussed above since much of vocational education takes the form of on-the-job training, night and vacation schools, or correspondence courses in which workers of all ages and levels are enrolled. However, part-time education for adults goes beyond programmes for improving vocational skills. The proportion of the population actively studying is high in part because of the large numbers of adults learning in people's universities, workers' universities, parents' universities, etc.

In Albania, various schools throughout the country began evening classes for agricultural workers in 1968. In almost all the farm co-operatives, evening elementary classes have been opened for co-operative workers. In some areas four-year evening agricultural technical schools have been instituted. In factories, professional evening schools have been set up. Workers are given shorter hours to attend these classes three times a week and are also given leave to prepare for examinations. In this way, about 32,000 people have finished the seven or eight-year general school, 14,300 have finished professional secondary schools and 2,250 working people have graduated from institutes of higher learning.⁸²

In Czechoslovakia, part-time adult education for leading to secondary diplomas is available in regular secondary schools as well as factory institutes. In recent years the enrolment of adults in these courses has declined, since large numbers of the under-educated older generation have completed such courses and reached the desired level. On the other hand, over 38,000 workers were studying in universities in Czechoslovakia in 1967-1968 in order to qualify for higher posts.⁸³

In Yugoslavia there are two types of institution operating exclusively as adult education centres: people's universities and workers' universities,⁸⁴ which together reach about 4 million people through courses, public lectures and various cultural and artistic events. The

work of people's universities is geared primarily to meet the needs of various social environments, especially of rural society. Workers' universities, on the other hand, are now closely tied to the development of workers' self-management. They are working in concert with productive enterprises to provide workers with broadly oriented permanent education, further training and retraining, and preparation in self-management.

In the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, evening and correspondence courses are widely available from the primary through the university levels. Special classes for foremen and workers were recently set up in which they can improve their vocational and technical skills and at the same time complete their general secondary education. Refresher courses for production workers are also being started. Parents' universities, giving general popular lectures on educational topics, now number over 600 in the Byelorussian SSR alone. There are several provisions to making it more feasible for full-time workers to further their education in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Evening students are entitled to from ten to forty extra days' paid leave annually and additional leave is granted for final examinations and the preparation of these.⁸⁵

Higher education

Throughout eastern Europe and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, university education is free. In addition, most students receive State financial help or scholarships. Many use subsidized dormitories and restaurants. In Albania, about 60 per cent of the university students receive State scholarships. In Romania, the figure is 65 per cent. In Hungary, about 50 per cent receive scholarships and 92.4 per cent receive some form of aid; the system is now being changed so that more attention is being given to marks obtained and to parental income.⁸⁶ In Yugoslavia, however, the number of scholarship-holders has been declining since 1965-1966. One reason for this is that more students are being given credits and loans. There are also fewer scholarships granted by economic enterprises, which are now able to find qualified staff without this "investment". Among recipients of credit, students from workers', peasants' and pensioners' families predominate and priority is given to those training for professions where personnel are in short supply. Excellent students may have the whole credit written off.⁸⁷ In the Soviet Union, the proportion of the population in universities is now 176 per 10,000. About 76 per cent of the students in universities and 70 per cent of those in other specialized post-secondary educational establishments are getting scholarships, and more than 53 per cent of those students live in hostels.

Two topics of current interest in higher education are admissions policies and aid to students. Several countries in eastern Europe have recently instituted stricter

⁸¹ "Measures for the further improvement of training skilled workers", *Pravda* (17 April 1969), and op. cit., p. 494.

⁸² Delianá, op. cit., p. 19.

⁸³ United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, op. cit., pp. 140-141.

⁸⁴ Despite their name, these "universities" are not institutions of higher learning; see D. Filipović, "Workers' universities, 1959-1968", *Yugoslavia Survey*, vol. X, No. 4 (November 1969), pp. 119-120.

⁸⁵ *Pravda*, 17 April 1969, and United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, op. cit., pp. 72, 497-498.

⁸⁶ T. Delianá, op. cit., p. 19; and "Conference of the Union of Student Associations of Romania", *Documents, Articles and Informations on Romania*, 30 April 1969, p. 1; B. Köpeczi, "Hungarian university reform", *The New Hungarian Quarterly*, No. 35 (1969), p. 20.

⁸⁷ K. Morendic and V. Colié, "Financial aid to pupils and students", *Yugoslav Survey*, vol. X, No. 2, pp. 143-146.

admission requirements based on academic achievement. In Hungary, as elsewhere in the early days of socialism, admission to university was by fixed percentages on a class basis: 55 per cent of university admissions were reserved for the children of workers and peasants. This policy has been superseded, for the most part, by admissions on the basis of ability, for two main reasons. First, the system led to inefficiencies and abuses, since the most capable students were not always admitted, there was overcrowding and some of those admitted on a quota basis had inadequate preparation or did not apply themselves to their studies. Secondly, and more important, the greater equality of primary and secondary education available for all today, including special remedial classes for students from deprived homes, means that workers' and peasants' children have similar opportunities for higher education, even on the basis of ability alone. This is shown by the fact that today about 45 per cent of university students are of worker or peasant origin.⁸⁸

Regional and rural development

Most Governments in eastern Europe and the Soviet Union have based their efforts in the economic and social development of predominantly rural regions on the policies of (a) balancing the rates of industrial growth in different regions, and (b) the socialization and mechanization of agriculture. In the social and cultural spheres they are trying to improve educational, health, recreational and entertainment facilities, as well as housing and other amenities in the countryside. All of these policies are having major social consequences, amounting to a transformation of the social structure in rural areas, and creating further demands on social policy.

All of these countries have instituted programmes for the economic and social development of rural and backward regions, within the framework of national development plans. Nevertheless, in each country there are some regions that lag behind the national levels of development and require continued government action to close the gap.⁸⁹ In Poland, for example, differences in economic level between regions are diminishing, but the indices of *per capita* gross product in various provinces range from 65.5 per cent to 138 per cent of the national average.⁹⁰ There are similar disparities in social services between regions in each country. Thus in Romania, despite the progress in balanced regional development, in some regions there are from twelve to seventeen high school students per 1,000 inhabitants, compared to others where the rate is twenty-six to thirty-two per 1,000. In 1968, in some regions of Romania there was one doctor for every 1,400 to 1,700 inhabitants as against the national average of 630 inhabitants per doctor.⁹¹

⁸⁸ B. Köpeczi, *op. cit.*, p. 17.

⁸⁹ K. Mihailović, "A summary of regional development in eastern Europe: experiences and prospects" (UNRISD/69/C.55), p. 16.

⁹⁰ A. Kuklinski, "Regional differentiation of the Polish national economy", in *Proceedings of the First Scandinavian-Polish Regional Science Seminar* (Warsaw, Polish Scientific Publishers, 1967), pp. 53 and 67.

⁹¹ N. Ceaușescu, *Romania - Achievements and Prospects* (Bucharest, Meridiane Publishing House, 1969), pp. 557-558.

Industrialization, urbanization and rural development

One concomitant of rapid industrialization is the growth of large urban centres at a much greater rate than the small towns and rural areas, partly through migration from rural areas to major urban centres. In Yugoslavia, the total number of people living on farms actually decreased by about 40 per cent between 1961 and 1969.⁹² It is estimated that about 5 million people have moved from villages to towns in Poland since the Second World War; the rural population dropped from 69 per cent of the total in 1945 to 49 per cent in 1968.⁹³ In Romania, more than 1.2 million people left agriculture and joined the ranks of wage and salary earners in the last ten years.⁹⁴

In the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the urban population has continued to grow; from 1960 to 1969 it increased by 30 million inhabitants. In very recent years, however, the flow of manpower from agriculture into industry has declined, owing to the improved living standards of collective farmers and the availability of jobs in agriculture.

It is especially important to note that in some countries of this region industrialization and population growth have been concentrated in the largest cities, as in other parts of the world. Thus, it has been found in Poland that big cities of over 200,000 population grew at five times the national rate between 1945 and 1965, while villages of under 5,000 grew at a slightly slower rate than the national average.⁹⁵

Two major consequences of industrialization for rural areas, apart from outright migration to the cities, have been the emergence of part-time farmers and the urbanization of rural cultural patterns. The opportunities for non-agricultural employment in light industry and related activities have grown in most middle-sized towns, giving rise to the common practice of supplementing family income from farming by part-time outside employment. On the other hand, the fact that urban housing construction has not been able to keep up with rapid industrialization in some countries has led to the emergence of "peasant workers" who continue to live on their farms or in their villages but commute to work in factories. In Yugoslavia, only 55 per cent of rural households derive all of their income from farming.⁹⁶ These part-time farmers and peasant-workers are agents of urbanization in the countryside, for while living in rural society they are learning to adapt to the requirements of factory employment and develop attitudes of urban culture which they transmit to their neighbours. Thus, part-time farmers were found to spend a larger proportion of their incomes on consumer goods, following urban tastes, than

⁹² D. Tadić, "Changes in the countryside", *Yugoslav Survey*, vol. X, No. 4 (November 1969), p. 9.

⁹³ F. Jakubczak, "Young peasants and their memoirs", *Polish Perspectives*, vol. XIII, No. 2 (February 1970), p. 13.

⁹⁴ N. Bulgaru, "Changes in the social and professional structure of the Romanian population", *Documents. Articles and Informations on Romania* (20 June 1969), p. 9.

⁹⁵ J. Goryński, "Urbanization dilemmas in Poland", *Polish Perspective*, No. 5 (May 1968), p. 33.

⁹⁶ B. Kitaljevic, "Receipts and expenditure of rural households", *Yugoslav Survey*, vol. X, No. 2 (May 1969), p. 133.

their wholly agricultural neighbours,⁹⁷ and they develop more urban aspirations and styles of living.

Agricultural development, in the forms of mechanization and of the socialization of land use through State farms, communes and co-operatives, has also had its impact on rural society. The traditional peasant village, with social stratification based on property ownership, has been integrated into national society, with more homogeneous culture and greater social mobility. This transformation has been attributed to the industrialization of agriculture, urbanization and especially to changes in property relations with the break-up of large land-holdings. Agricultural co-operatives have replaced the village as the most important social unit in rural Hungary.⁹⁸ Similarly, in Poland, it is the farmers with small holdings who take greatest advantage of the opportunities offered by State farms and co-operatives, and the administrative framework of these farms gives them more opportunities for economic and social advancement than those enjoyed by middle-sized private farmers. With the new role definitions, the separate cultural identity of "peasant" is being replaced by the professional consciousness of the modern farmer.⁹⁹

In one sense the migratory flow out of rural areas is not a problem at all, but a desirable adjunct of agricultural development. Mechanization and improved productivity in agriculture have freed many farm workers for jobs in industry. Their departure in turn makes possible a relatively higher *per capita* standard of living for the population remaining who share rural income and services. Even where a drop in farm population has resulted in the undercultivation of private holdings, the solution has sometimes been to accelerate the socialization of agriculture, rather than to try to attract more workers to rural areas. Thus, new land reform laws passed in Poland, where most agricultural land is still in small private holdings, provide for (a) the compulsory purchase for State farms of idle land held by part-time farmers; (b) the consolidation of small holdings fragmented by inheritance and sale, and (c) pension schemes for elderly farmers whose children have moved away, when they sell their land to State farms. The idea is to take advantage of the outflow of rural population by farming units of more efficient size with more productive methods.¹⁰⁰

Raising rural levels of living

All Governments recognize, however, that the present rate of rural-urban migration, which selectively draws off the young and the most talented, cannot continue unchecked without serious social and economic problems. Since choice in employment is probably the greatest single attraction of the cities, all countries are trying to provide a variety of employment opportunities in the countryside. In Yugoslavia in 1969, 50 per cent of the

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 136-138.

⁹⁸ F. Erdei, "The changing Hungarian village", *The New Hungarian Quarterly*, vol. XI, No. 38 (1970), pp. 3-16.

⁹⁹ R. Turski, "The changin gvillage", *Polish Perspectives*, vol. XIII, No. 3 (March 1970), pp. 17-23.

¹⁰⁰ "State farms", *Polish Perspectives*, vol. XI, No. 3 (March 1968), p. 51.

agricultural co-operatives and State farms engaged in some non-agricultural economic activity as well.¹⁰¹

In the Soviet Union provisions were made to increase the income of collective farmers. In 1966 collective farms introduced a scheme for monetary payment of their members and made their wages equal to those of State farm workers. As of 1968, however, the average earnings in agriculture of 9.21 roubles per month (supplemented by household gardens), still remained lower than those of factory and office workers: 112.7 roubles (121.9 roubles in industry).¹⁰² In the Soviet Union the fundamental solution of the problem of low agricultural income is found in the process of turning agriculture into a variety of industrial enterprises, with farmers changing into workers in socialist enterprises.¹⁰³

At present, private family husbandry is a supplement to agricultural production in the Soviet Union but it is expected that as income from work on collective farms grows faster than that from private husbandries, farmers will give up private production in favour of wage labour of their own free will.¹⁰⁴ There has also been a marked decrease in the proportion of collective farmers and co-operative handicraftsmen and their families from 31.4 per cent of the total population in 1959 to 22.3 per cent in 1968. This does not signify the weakening of the functioning of the collective-farm system in the Soviet Union; it is a direct result of the industrialization of the economy, in which agriculture constitutes an important part, as well as of the growth of the number of State farms. In 1960-1967, the number of State farms increased to 73 per cent.¹⁰⁵

Governments have also sought to improve the material, social and cultural quality of rural life by means other than raising personal income from work. In several countries the provision of extra State allowances has meant that total income is rising at a faster rate in rural areas than in cities. The same is true of the provision of other material amenities. In Albania during the 1966-1970 five-year plan, housing construction was expanded by 11 per cent in the countryside as compared to 5 per cent in the cities.¹⁰⁶

In the Soviet Union today, the improvement of rural living conditions is of vital importance, partly because of the need to attract new settlers to development projects in remote areas, but also simply as a matter of social justice. This involves—in addition to higher wages—speeding up housing construction, children's crèches, kindergartens, day-care centres and playgrounds, increases and improvements in schools, hospitals, social and recreation clubs, cultural facilities and entertainment. All of these are rapidly being provided; but to take the question of hous-

¹⁰¹ D. Tadić, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

¹⁰² A. Yemelyanov, "Industrialization of agriculture and overcoming the distinctions between towns and countryside", *Kommunist*, No. 18 (1969).

¹⁰³ G. Glotov, "The collective farm private husbandry and the family: discussion of the draft rules of the collective farm", *Selskaya Zhizn* (25 September 1969).

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁵ M. Ghodu, *Narodnoe Khozyaistvo SSR v 1968* (1969), p. 35.

¹⁰⁶ *Answers to Questions about Albania* (Tirana, Naim Frashëri Publishing House, 1969), p. 323.

ing, for example, it is necessary to consider the traditions and desires of the rural population as well as economic efficiency. Not infrequently, rural people have refused to move into apartment buildings with urban conveniences unless the specifics of rural life are also taken into account, such as the need for having a personal plot of land and space for storing products over the year.¹⁰⁷ Similarly, it is argued that communities should be given the choice of apartments or individual homes, and that architects should consider the aesthetics of traditional construction in addition to calculations of square metres.¹⁰⁸

Regional approaches to rural development

A limitation of industrialization in rural areas is that, after food processing plants have been established, other more complex manufacturing industries require the infrastructural support of large towns or cities to provide maximum returns on their investment in the short run. Indeed, much of the industrialization of lagging regions has been located in regional capitals and former market towns. This situation has led to the pattern of commuting peasant-workers mentioned above, which does have the advantage of directly increasing income in the countryside itself. On the other hand, Governments are also building some industries in the less favoured rural areas, for the sake of providing better rural employment and for profitability over the longer run. In Romania, the current five-year plan includes the acceleration of industrialization in lagging regions, based on the natural and labour resources of each county.¹⁰⁹ Similarly in Albania, factories for processing agricultural products have been set up where the goods are produced, in connexion with the electrification of the countryside.¹¹⁰

In the Soviet Union considerable progress has been made over the years in the industrialization of lagging regions far from the major urban centres. For example, many heavy industries are now in operation in the Urals and in western Siberia. Currently, however, there is a shortage of industrial labour in these regions. It is now seen that the lack of balanced development in these lagging regions does not offer sufficient incentives for the needed flow of manpower into these remote areas. Solutions now being put into effect include improved wages, social facilities and amenities, and the development of light industry and the food-processing industry, where women could find employment.

Policies to eliminate variations in income in the different regions of the Soviet Union as well as the gradual equalization of the levels of living of separate groups of the working population are directly related to the problems of regional planning. The trend is towards the working out of the average indices of levels of living for separate groups and categories of the population (social groups, urban and rural population, families with a different

standard of welfare) as well as for union republics and large economic regions, districts and autonomous republics. The regional regulation of wages is being realized with the assistance of the regional coefficients for wages established in some branches of the economy. These territorial problems relating to levels of living in the Soviet Union will require a great deal more research and planning if adequate assessment of the situation is to be realized.¹¹¹

In the Soviet Union, problems involved in the settlement of remote areas and virgin lands have continued to receive a great deal of attention. Some special problems are encountered in the process of establishing agricultural settlements in remote regions. For example, in the grain-growing "virgin lands" of North Kazakhstan, despite rapid development and large outputs, there remains a serious shortage of permanent agricultural workers as well as of professional personnel. But despite increases in the earnings of farm people—averaging 37 per cent in 1966—there has been a decline in the number of agricultural producers in the region in recent years. This is partly because, as in the case of labour shortages in big cities and in new industries, the push for migration from more densely populated rural areas has eased with general improvements in economic conditions, particularly with recent reforms relaxing the conditions for owning a cow, guaranteeing purchase quotas with bonuses, etc. Many young adults have left rural areas being developed for the attraction of big cities, while others pursue higher education elsewhere. The problem is alleviated somewhat by the construction of industrial towns and by the reinvestments of agricultural profits in services and amenities. But it is not always possible to obtain such amenities with surplus profits from an unexpected bumper crop unless planning and allocations have been made in advance.¹¹²

The provision of better medical and educational services and of social and cultural centres, which with better jobs would narrow the gap between rural and urban standards of living, is limited by the scatter of population in very small villages in some regions. Some experts in Poland see a solution to this dilemma in the improvement of transportation, that is, in encouraging rather than counteracting the commuting of peasant-workers, and in developing urbanized regions of several towns linked together by a complex of shared services and industries.¹¹³

In the Soviet Union, providing the great variety of services usually found in urban centres for rural populations scattered over a wide area sometimes requires choosing between promising villages, which are made into growing centres, and unpromising villages, which must be abandoned so that facilities can be provided for more concentrated settlements. But it has been shown that, while giant collective farms have proved viable social units where developed in the south, in the north with population scattered in many small villages, it may be preferable to build facilities such as clubhouses to serve

¹⁰⁷ A. Yemelyanov, op. cit.

¹⁰⁸ B. Mozhayev, "Who should live where?", *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, No. 8, 21 February 1968.

¹⁰⁹ "New factories in less-developed localities", *Documents, Articles and Information on Romania* (16 March 1970), p. 5.

¹¹⁰ *Answers to Questions about Albania* (Tirana, Naim Frashëri Publishing House, 1969), p. 163.

¹¹¹ *Territorialnye Problemy Dokhodov I Potrebleniya Trudyas-hikhsya* (Moscow, 1966), pp. 3-9.

¹¹² N. Verkovskii, "In the area of the virgin lands", *Novy Mir*, No. 7 (1968), pp. 205-216.

¹¹³ J. Goryński, op. cit., pp. 36-37.

several villages within a three-mile radius, with residents coming on motor scooters and bicycles, rather than to abandon existing villages.¹¹⁴

At present, living and working conditions in most rural areas of eastern Europe and the Soviet Union still compare unfavourably with those of city life, especially for the young who have acquired new values and aspirations. But programmes designed to develop lagging regions and to narrow the gap between country and town are beginning to have some success, as is shown by the figures for non-agricultural employment and the other indices of

improvements in levels of rural living cited above. Moreover, as rural life is modernized and the low status generally attached to peasant life decreases, more professionally trained people are returning freely to the country as teachers and medical, technical and management personnel, thus accelerating the process of modernization and improvement in the quality of rural life. It is expected that the current policies of rural industrialization and agricultural reform, supplemented by programmes to provide more social services, will eventually raise rural living standards in relation to those of urban centres and slow the flow of the best of the rural population to the cities.

¹¹⁴ B. Mozhayev, *op. cit.*

SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT IN WESTERN EUROPE

The continuation of rapid economic development in western Europe during the 1960s led to considerable increases in national and personal incomes virtually everywhere in the region. In so far as the economically active population was concerned, this trend generally resulted in a noticeable rise in material levels of living, although there were differences in the extent to which various social and occupational groups shared in the rise. Low-income elements of the economically inactive population groups did not on the whole receive a commensurate share in the increase of incomes and other benefits. Although persons over sixty-five years of age (who are the largest group of economically inactive persons in western Europe today) are generally provided with old-age security insurance in some form, there are large variations in the amounts provided; in some cases the actual benefits represent only a very small proportion of the pensioners' previous average earnings.¹ In only a few countries have old-age pensions—mostly inadequate to begin with—increased at rates sufficient to keep up with rising prices, which they usually follow only after a considerable time-lag. These discrepancies obviously tend to reduce the share of old-age pensioners in national income.² A similar handicap affects the chronically sick, even when their medical expenses are covered by national health services or medical insurance schemes.

The general picture of an appreciable increase in overall material levels of living in western Europe is also qualified in other ways. As levels of living have risen in the wake of increased production, certain disturbing conditions have developed or become more irksome. Until recently, problems such as urban sprawl, increasing pollution of air and water-supply, the depletion of other natural resources, and traffic congestion have been considered a necessary price to pay for economic expansion. At the present stage of development in western Europe, however, general material abundance is in sight, and the elimination of remaining shortages (such as that of housing), as well as of existing pockets of poverty, appears to be more of a political than a strictly economic question. Public interest is therefore shifting from the quantitative problems of production to issues relating to the quality of life, and "... the notion is gaining ground

that there was in the past too much emphasis on quantitative achievements alone, neglecting the qualitative aspects of growth".³ In this connexion, regional development is being increasingly advocated as a remedy for over-centralization and urban sprawl, and improvement of the human environment has become a matter of national and international concern; in both these areas, practical steps are already being taken, but broader and better co-ordinated action is needed. A way of life characterized by planned obsolescence of consumer goods, by incessant stimulation of human acquisitiveness through mass advertising, and by material possessiveness generally, has contributed to the progressive alienation of many elements of western European society, particularly young people, while the continued domination of power structures which many people now regard as archaic has given rise to growing and sometimes violent protest. As the eighth decade of the twentieth century begins, western Europe has clearly entered upon a critical period of social change.

INCOME DISTRIBUTION AND POVERTY

Although the increase in national and personal incomes in western Europe was considerable in recent years, there have been few significant changes in income distribution since the mid 1950s. Table 1, showing the percentage distribution of personal incomes by decile groups, reveals the striking disparities which existed around 1955. Roughly one third of all personal income accrued to the top decile,⁴ which consists of only 10 per cent of the population, while the share of the bottom decile amounted to no more than 2 per cent (and to less in most countries) of total personal income. In the following decade, inequality in income distribution actually increased in several countries, inasmuch as the share of the highest decile has grown while that of the lowest has simultaneously declined;⁵ elsewhere the reduction in income disparity has been very modest.

³ Statement by the Executive Secretary of the Economic Commission for Europe, at the opening meeting of the twenty-fifth session of the Commission, 14 April 1970.

⁴ The abnormally high income share of the top decile in the Federal Republic of Germany is due to the inclusion, in this group's income share, of undistributed profits of private (unincorporated) companies.

⁵ Trends in Finland and France are particularly significant in this respect. However, lack of information for the years after 1962 may perhaps account for the somewhat peculiar character of data relating to those countries.

¹ International Labour Office, *Poverty and Minimum Living Standards: The Role of the ILO. Report of the Director-General to the 54th Session of the International Labour Conference* (Geneva, 1970), pp. 51-52.

² The relatively generous old-age pensions provided in the Scandinavian countries, and particularly in Sweden, constitute an exception to this statement.

TABLE 1. PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF PERSONAL INCOME, BEFORE TAX, BY DECILE GROUPS: SELECTED COUNTRIES

Decile groups	United Kingdom		Germany (Federal Republic of)		Netherlands		Denmark		Norway		Sweden		France		Finland		
	1954	1964	1955	1965	1952	1962	1953	1963	1957	1963	1954	1963	1956	1962	1952	1962	
Lowest decile.	5.5	2.0	1.7	2.1	1.3	1.3	1.4	1.7	1.1	1.0	2.0	1.6	0.7	0.5	1.0	0.5	0.5
Second decile.		3.1	2.9	3.2	2.7	2.7	3.2	3.3	3.4	3.5	3.6	2.8	2.2	1.4	3.1	1.4	1.9
Third decile.		4.2	3.9	4.7	4.1	4.2	4.4	4.7	4.6	5.3	5.0	4.1	3.3	2.9	4.8	4.8	3.5
Fourth decile.		6.0	5.0	5.4	5.7	5.8	5.8	6.1	6.3	6.8	6.2	5.5	5.4	4.7	5.9	5.2	5.2
Fifth decile.		7.3	7.5	5.9	6.5	7.4	7.8	7.7	7.9	8.5	7.8	7.7	7.7	6.8	7.2	6.8	6.8
Sixth decile.		8.6	9.1	7.1	7.2	8.4	9.1	9.1	9.7	10.0	9.3	9.7	7.8	7.6	9.0	8.6	8.6
Seventh decile.		10.4	11.0	8.3	8.4	10.6	10.8	10.9	11.0	11.3	10.6	11.4	10.3	10.3	10.7	11.1	11.1
Eighth decile.		12.7	12.9	9.2	9.6	11.7	13.3	13.3	13.0	13.1	12.7	13.2	12.4	12.5	13.0	13.1	13.1
Ninth decile.		14.8	14.9	12.0	11.5	14.3	16.2	16.1	15.4	15.6	15.5	16.1	17.0	16.9	16.4	16.8	16.8
Highest decile.		30.4	29.3	44.0	41.4	33.8	28.0	27.1	27.6	24.9	27.3	27.9	34.1	36.8	28.9	32.5	32.5
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Top 5 per cent	21.0	19.2	36.2	33.7	23.6	23.6	18.0	16.9	17.9	15.4	17.0	17.6	22.4	25.0	18.0	21.0	21.0

Source: Economic Commission for Europe, *Incomes in Post-war Europe: A Study of Policies, Growth and Distribution* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 66.II.E.14), chap. 6, table 6.10, p. 15. Total personal income for the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands and France; assessed income for the Scandinavian countries.

Analysis of changes in income distribution by occupational status of income receivers is somewhat limited in feasibility, not only because of conceptual difficulties which affect the international comparability of data, but in most cases also because of the lack of full intertemporal comparability of information collected within individual countries. Only four western European countries (Denmark, France, the Netherlands and Sweden) are recognized by the Economic Commission for Europe as meeting its comparability requirements with regard to both occupational status categories and data on income distribution. Data relating to three of these countries are given in table 2.⁶ Assuming that the trends in income distribution observed up to the mid-1960s have continued since, the following general conclusions may be drawn from the table:

(a) The percentage of wage-earners among income receivers has generally declined, probably reflecting a decrease in industrial employment due to increased productivity;

(b) Wage-earners' income shares have increased slightly in Denmark and in the Netherlands. In France, however, this share has declined more than the percentage of wage-earners in the total number of income receivers, indicating a relative deterioration in the position of wage-earners;

(c) The proportion of salary-earners among all income receivers has risen in all three countries represented in the table; this increase probably reflects growth in the numbers of technicians and service personnel;

(d) The increase in the salary-earners' share in total personal income is less than proportionate to their increased numbers; this may be due to the low salary scales prevailing in commercial and service occupations;

(e) The percentage of the self-employed in the total of income receivers decreased, reflecting an outflow from farming occupations and a decline in the number of small retail merchants;

(f) The rising proportion of the non-active group among the total of income-receivers presumably reflects the aging of the population, the extension of social security schemes and concomitant growth of the number of retired persons.

While the distribution of income in western Europe thus does not show (at least until the mid 1960s) any significant shift in favour of low-income groups, recent increases in national and aggregate personal incomes throughout the region do nevertheless appear to have favourably affected the material levels of living of even the less-favoured income groups among the economically active population. This trend can be illustrated in at least two ways. In several western European countries, for example, the traditionally low wages of agricultural workers have risen sufficiently to narrow the margins between their levels of living and those of industrial workers, and the earnings of fully-employed farm workers now average only 25 per cent less than the median industrial wage, as against an average difference of approxi-

mately 30 per cent only a decade ago. On the other hand, the income share of white-collar workers employed in jobs requiring no specific training—mainly in retail trade—continued to decline. The wage levels of this group are now often lower than those of industrial workers, whereas they once were uniformly higher.

Despite such qualifications, however, western Europe still contains considerable numbers of people who can be described as living in a state of poverty. According to one definition, poverty is the condition of an individual or a family whose income is insufficient to meet minimum vital needs. However, in the modern consumption-oriented societies of western Europe, such a definition now would be widely regarded as too restrictive. It has been gradually recognized that in societies where the satisfaction of basic needs absorbs a constantly decreasing percentage of personal incomes—as illustrated in table 3—and where, therefore, not only the affluent but also those of modest means can afford opportunities, amenities and extras often considerably in excess of their vital needs, the definition of poverty must take into account some additional elements, such as the inadequacy of income to cover minimum "felt needs" of the individuals or households involved. Since minimum felt needs vary according to the wealth of the society to which individuals or households belong, poverty has become a relative concept in countries experiencing rapid economic growth, the acceptable minimum will increase with the growth of national income. The new concept of poverty has been summed up as follows:

"People are 'poor' because they are deprived of the opportunities, comforts and self-respect regarded as normal in the community to which they belong. It is, therefore, the continually moving average standards of that community that are the starting points for an assessment of its poverty, and the poor are those who fall sufficiently far below these average standards. Their deprivation can be measured and their numbers counted by comparisons with average personal income... or with a standard of living currently sanctioned by government... or with average life chances...".⁷

For practical purposes, an objective measurement of poverty is normally based on the comparison of a person's or family's income with average personal or family income, a method that can be applied with relative ease in societies with highly monetized economies, such as those of western Europe. In the United Kingdom, for example, the numbers of the "poor" are periodically ascertained or estimated along these lines in connexion with the British system of poverty relief which, under specified conditions, provides various types of monetary assistance to persons or family units whose incomes are below the "poverty line", determined in relation to the remuneration of the average manual worker.⁸ In 1965, on the introduction of new assistance standards, it was estimated that there were in the United Kingdom approximately 450,000 families below the poverty line; these

⁶ Information for Sweden is omitted from table 2, since there are some special discrepancies between the classification of occupational status categories in Sweden and in the other three countries as a group.

⁷ Social Science Research Council, *Research on Poverty* (London, 1968), p. 5.

⁸ François Lafitte, "Income deprivation" in *Socially Deprived Families in Britain* (London, 1970), p. 10.

TABLE 2. PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF PERSONAL INCOME, BEFORE TAX, BY OCCUPATIONAL GROUPS : SELECTED COUNTRIES

<i>Denmark</i>															
<i>Wage-earners</i>			<i>Salary-earners</i>			<i>Self-employed</i>			<i>Non-active</i>						
1953		1963		1953		1963		1953		1963					
Numbers	Income	Numbers	Income	Numbers	Income	Numbers	Income	Numbers	Income	Numbers	Income				
32.9	30.2	31.7	31.8	18.1	24.1	19.9	29.3	27.9	34.2	22.6	26.3	21.1	10.7	25.8	12.6
<i>France</i>															
<i>Wage-earners</i>			<i>Salary-earners</i>			<i>Self-employed</i>			<i>Non-active</i>						
1956		1962		1956		1962		1956		1962		1956		1962	
Numbers	Income	Numbers	Income	Numbers	Income	Numbers	Income	Numbers	Income	Numbers	Income	Numbers	Income	Numbers	Income
35.3	32.1	30.7	26.3	13.3	20.1	18.6	26.6	31.7	37.8	24.0	30.8	19.7	10.0	26.7	16.3
<i>Netherlands</i>															
<i>Wage-earners</i>			<i>Salary-earners</i>			<i>Self-employed</i>			<i>Non-active</i>						
1952		1962		1952		1962		1952		1962		1952		1962	
Numbers	Income	Numbers	Income	Numbers	Income	Numbers	Income	Numbers	Income	Numbers	Income	Numbers	Income	Numbers	Income
46.7	32.2	45.8	32.1	24.6	28.4	27.7	32.7	18.6	31.7	13.4	25.5	10.1	7.7	13.1	9.7

SOURCE: *Incomes in Post-war Europe: A Study of Policies, Growth and Distribution* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 66.II.E.14), table 6.12.

TABLE 3. DISTRIBUTION OF PRIVATE CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURE
(Percentage)

Country	Year	Food	Clothing and other personal effects	Rent, rates, fuel, light and water charges	Health expenses	Total vital needs ^a
Austria	1954	40	15	10	2	67
	1964	31	14	9	3	57
Belgium	1954	30	10	19	4	63
	1964	26	11	15	5	57
Denmark	1954	27	11	11		
	1964	22	9	11		
France	1954	35	13	8	5	61
	1964	29	12	10	8	59
Greece	1954	48	15	10	1	74
	1962	43	15	13	1	72
Ireland	1954	38	12	9		
	1964	32	11	11		
Italy	1954	47	12	7	2 ^a	68
	1964	42	9	11	6 ^a	68
Netherlands	1954	35	17	12	4	68
	1964	29	16	13	5	63
Norway	1954	32	17	9	3	61
	1964	29	14	11	3	57
Spain	1954	35	11	6	1	53
	1964	36	10	5	1	52
Sweden	1954	30	14	13	2	59
	1964	26	12	14	2	54
United Kingdom . . .	1954	31 ^b	11	13	—	55
	1964	26 ^b	10	15	—	51

SOURCE: *Compendium of Social Statistics: 1967* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 67.XVII.9), table 56.

Note: While food, clothing, shelter and health care are vital needs, the extent to which they are purchased and which is reflected in the above table may, in some cases, be in excess of the vital minima.

^a Including personal care.

^b Including non-alcoholic beverages.

families included almost 3 million individuals—or nearly 4 per cent of the total population—of whom 1,200,000 were dependent children.⁹ According to another measurement, the proportion of poverty “rose from 2 per cent of children in one or two-child families to 11 per cent of those in five-child families and to 20 per cent of those in larger families”,¹⁰ thus demonstrating that “the welfare state has not removed the relationship between poverty and family size”.¹¹ It is estimated that about 15 to 20 per cent of children in the United Kingdom are living in conditions of hardship or poverty.¹² In this connexion, “a succession of reports on housing conditions and costs, [and] on primary, secondary and higher education have all demonstrated that the child from the large family is far more likely to be socially and educationally underprivileged than the child from the small family”.¹³

In Italy, facts about poverty were marshalled and analysed by a parliamentary inquiry in the early 1950s.¹⁴ While most of the data produced by that inquiry are now out-of-date, reference to them must be made since they provide a frame of reference for the study of later developments and changes, including those that occurred during the period under review. A basic distinction is made in the inquiry report between poverty and distress: “... continuous existence at the minimum subsistence income level or at the minimum essential consumption level, is a condition of poverty; a situation below the minimum subsistence income or consumption levels, is a condition of distress”.¹⁵ About 12 million Italians—or a quarter of the population as enumerated in 1951¹⁶—were found to be living in poverty or distress, heavily concentrated in the south of the country. The main causes of this situation were considered to be:

⁹ *Socially Deprived Families in Britain* (London, 1970), table 13, pp. 28 and 29.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 28-29.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 28.

¹² B. Abel-Smith and P. Townsend, *The Poor and the Poorest* (London, 1965), p. 33.

¹³ Richard M. Titmuss, *Commitment to Welfare* (London, 1968), p. 169.

¹⁴ Camera dei Deputati, *Atti della Commissione Parlamentare di inchiesta sulla miseria in Italia e sui messi di combatterla* (Records of the Parliamentary Committee of Inquiry on poverty in Italy and the means of its alleviation (Rome, 1953)).

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, vol. I, p. 61.

¹⁶ Institute Centrale di Statistica, *Annuario Statistico Italiano 1968* (Rome 1968). According to table 7, the population of Italy in 1951 was 47,516,000.

(a) Unemployment (almost 50 per cent of families without an employed head or other member of the family were living in conditions of poverty or distress);

(b) Irregular, occasional or seasonal employment, particularly in agriculture;

(c) Old age and disability;

(d) Numerous dependants.¹⁷

A succession of plans and measures since the mid-1950s has resulted in some alleviation of these conditions.¹⁸ The beginning of the 1960s was characterized by profound economic and social change. The rapid development of production, sometimes termed the "Italian economic miracle", had begun, and *per capita* income and the average levels of living both rose. In the main areas of poverty and distress—that is, in the southern regions of Italy—this improvement was brought about not so much by the opening of new local employment opportunities as through emigration of the hitherto unemployed or underemployed, mainly from rural areas and small towns. While some of this migration went to the highly industrialized countries of north-western Europe, most of it by far moved to the industrialized areas of Italy itself, in particular to the north-western provinces around Turin, Milan and Genoa. This internal migratory flow was not an entirely new phenomenon in Italy, but it became much stronger after 1960. In the process, the incidence of distress in the south was substantially reduced, but the migration led to a reappearance of poverty and even distress in the new areas of settlement.

Poverty in the industrialized areas of Italy is of a quite different nature from that formerly suffered by the migrants, and in a sense it is paradoxical since most of the migrants find themselves earning much higher incomes than they did in their places of origin. However, many of them—having but recently made the transition from a subsistence to a money economy—also find extreme difficulty in coping with the far higher costs of living, which moreover tend to rise quite rapidly under the pressure of fresh migration from the south. Apart from the need to purchase necessities (and unlike the settled inhabitants, the migrants usually have to begin by replacing most of their household equipment), the new environment also stimulates the migrants' desire to obtain goods and services for which no need was felt in the original subsistence society. A cycle of borrowing and indebtedness frequently arises out of this situation, and in many instances becomes sufficiently burdensome to pull the families concerned beneath the poverty line again. This is particularly likely to happen wherever the migrants have only irregular unskilled employment, as is frequently the case. Furthermore the presence of the migrants, and the pressures which they place on housing, health, transport and other social facilities, has made life more difficult for all low-income receivers—especially those who are aged or disabled—in the areas of settlement. Thus, as one writer points out:

¹⁷ *Atti della Commissione Parlamentare* etc., op. cit., vol. II, pp. 47 et seq.

¹⁸ For information on some recent measures concerning southern Italy, see below, "Regional development within western European countries".

"... the 'economic miracle' reduced the extent of poverty and distress due to factors of underdevelopment; on the other hand, it favoured the growth of a poverty problem... in areas of rapid and intense industrialization..."¹⁹

REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT WITHIN WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

As in the 1960-1965 period, recent economic expansion in western Europe has continued to rest upon an increasing demand for industrial goods coupled with rising labour productivity. While industrial production rose during the period 1966-1968 in all countries of the region,²⁰ manufacturing employment declined in all but a few.²¹ The decline in manufacturing employment was the result of complex developments, among which changes on the demand side were only one category. On the supply side, there were in many countries substantial withdrawals from manufacturing employment, reflecting a continuing shift of economically active population to jobs in the rapidly expanding tertiary sector, as well as a general trend towards extended education and early retirement. It is estimated that the extent of these withdrawals and diversions from the labour market exceeded that of the reduction in demand for manpower resulting from the increase in labour productivity. In some countries, however, the declining supply of domestic industrial manpower was partly compensated by immigration from peripheral European areas and from North and West Africa.

For all these reasons, the traditional restriction of industrial sites to localities with an abundant nearby labour supply is no longer operative. In the past, the availability of an abundant labour supply was in itself a prime and often decisive consideration in the siting of new industrial enterprises; nowadays, however, the matching of manpower with industry is a problem that can be solved either by inducing potential employees to follow expanding industries into new locations, or by giving incentives to industry to locate in areas of more or less abundant manpower. The latter solution is of particular importance for countries (for example, Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom) with generally high levels of development, but with problems or risks of structural unemployment in some of their long-established industrial districts; in these countries, efforts are being made to bring new industries into depressed areas. This policy is motivated partly by a desire to utilize the existing infrastructure, and partly by social considerations which are of special relevance in areas where a high degree of home ownership limits labour mobility. In the countries just mentioned and in some others as well, efforts are being made

¹⁹ Luigi Frey, "Poverty and distress in Italy", in *Low-income Groups and Methods of Dealing with their Problems* (Paris, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 1966), p. 159.

²⁰ *Statistical Yearbook, 1968* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 69.XVII.1), table 53, and Economic Commission for Europe, *Economic Survey of Europe in 1968* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 69.II.E.1), table 3.

²¹ *Statistical Yearbook, 1968*, op. cit., table 23, and *Economic Survey of Europe in 1968*, op. cit., table 4.

to create conditions for industrial expansion in areas hitherto less developed but presenting other advantages for large-scale economic activities. The intent and often also the result of all these measures is to achieve a measure of industrial decentralization.

Investigation of the broad relationships between economic and social factors of development has indicated that:

“...improved amenities and social infrastructures have a positive effect on economic growth. Higher expenditure on the health, personal well-being, and the knowledge and skills of human resources is an economically profitable investment for a nation and an area. Countries with higher levels of social well-being also tend to enjoy a higher *per capita* product. The healthier and better educated people are, the higher their hourly, annual and life-time earnings are likely to be.”²²

The results of sectoral studies on housing, health and social welfare institutions point to similar conclusions.²³ Even more detailed research into processes of change in specific localities further suggest that the availability of appropriate social infrastructure, including modern housing, cultural amenities and recreational facilities, are important considerations in inducing both prospective employees and industrial decision-makers to relocate.²⁴ Increasing awareness of these relationships, together with the existing interest in industrial decentralization, has contributed to a growth of co-ordinated planning for the creation or development of conditions favouring the establishment of modern industrial zones, either outside traditional areas of industrial concentration, or in areas where traditional industrial activities are declining. Regional development planning along these lines has become quite widespread in western Europe in recent years.

As far back as the early 1950s, the Netherlands adopted policies aimed at the transfer of industrial activities from the over-urbanized and overpopulated areas on the western coast to other regions, mainly in the east and north. Measured in terms of an increase in industrial employment in the “development areas” and of reduction of migration from these areas to the western part of the country, the results of this early stage of regional planning—or, as it was then called “area planning”—proved quite encouraging. A second phase of regional planning, designed to reduce migration from the “development areas” to an exceptional occurrence, is now under way; the objective is to be achieved by continued decentralization of industrial activities to the “development areas”.²⁵

In France, the chief concern has been to bring about an equilibrium between the Paris agglomeration and the

major provincial cities, in the interest of achieving a more balanced distribution of economic and cultural benefits and a reduction of population concentration;²⁶ steps in this direction involve preferential treatment of certain existing regional cities (such as Bordeaux and Grenoble) in terms of investment in social and economic infrastructure but they are also expected to include the eventual development of a ring of new towns around the outer fringes of the Paris agglomeration. In France, as in the Netherlands, one of the main objectives in the early phase of regional planning was to restrain migration to already overpopulated areas, particularly the Paris agglomeration and the eastern part of the Mediterranean coast between Marseilles and the Italian border. With this aim in view, conditions likely to attract industrial enterprises are being created in the areas earmarked for accelerated development, particularly in the western part of the country. A similar policy has been followed in Belgium, where a rapid flow of private investment capital to the western and north-western part of the country is attracted not only by the proximity of one of western Europe’s busiest commercial waterways (permitting easy access to foreign raw materials at relatively inexpensive maritime freight rates), but also by significant public investment in infrastructure. But contrary to the situation in most other western European countries, where disputes caused by regional and local competition for capital investment have a more limited effect on national policies, the priority given in Belgium to State investment for regional development has assumed considerable political significance, owing to the fact that the regions mainly benefiting from investment priority have a Flemish-speaking population, while the country’s “depressed areas” to the south and south-east—which have growth rates below the national average²⁷ and which claim less success in obtaining government redevelopment assistance—have a mainly French-speaking population.

In the Scandinavian countries, approaches to regional development vary from country to country, owing largely to differences in population distribution and densities. In Denmark, for example, the disproportionately large size of Copenhagen, relative to the rest of the country, compels thinking in terms of developing new provincial centres that would help to contain migration to the capital, and thereby preserve some equilibrium between the latter and the provinces. In Sweden, where the capital city is also overpopulated in relation to the rest of the country and where in contrast to Denmark there are already several important provincial cities, the problem—to a large extent successfully solved—is principally one of reconciling Stockholm’s role as an economic, cultural and administrative centre with the improvement of its housing and traffic conditions. This goal has been pursued by the development of a ring of satellite towns, with self-contained economic and social facilities and easy access to Stockholm. In Finland in the 1950s and in the early 1960s, there was considerable migration from the predominantly underdeveloped and rural central and

²² L. H. Klaassen, *Social Amenities in Area Economic Growth* (Paris, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 1968), p. 9.

²³ United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, *Cost-Benefit Analysis of Social Projects: Report of a Meeting of Experts*, Report No. 7 (Geneva, 1966).

²⁴ Paul Drews, *Ein Beitrag der Sozialforschung zur Regional und Stadtplanung* (Meisenheim a. Glan, Verlag Anton Hain, 1968), chap. B.4.

²⁵ *Mens en Ruimte Vereeniging zonder winstoogmerken (A Summary of Regional Development in Western Europe: Experience and Prospects)* (Geneva, United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, 1969), p. 25.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 24.

²⁷ L. H. Klaassen, *Area Economic and Social Development: Guidelines for Programmes* (Paris, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 1965), tables 2 and 3, p. 31.

northern parts of the country to the rapidly industrializing and mainly urban south. While this migration was largely motivated by the existence of ample employment opportunities in the south, the backwardness of the thinly populated northern areas was also an important factor; as long as it was economically impractical to provide the northern areas with adequate social services and amenities, there was little possibility of halting the migration and the resulting disruption of the regional equilibrium. This difficulty was met by a decision to improve and extend social services in the northern areas, but at the same time to encourage concentration of the population in provincial urban centres where the volume of demand would ensure that the social services could be provided economically.²⁸ In Norway, geographic conditions are such that few areas lend themselves to large-scale development. Most settlements are located between the shoreline and the high mountains rising abruptly from the sea, and the resulting limitation of their hinterlands constitutes an almost insurmountable impediment to physical growth. Moreover, there are great difficulties of physical communication between the few developed areas in the south and south-east and the widely dispersed, less developed areas in the north (and between the latter areas themselves). Industrial and population growth is therefore practically limited to the southern part of the country, particularly around Oslo, where congestion consequently tends to be serious.²⁹

In Italy, the main focus of regional development efforts has been placed on the southern part of the country, the so-called "Mezzogiorno"; this programme provides a particularly interesting example of a major attempt at planned regional development. Two ways of narrowing *per capita* income differentials between the north and the south of Italy were decided upon: (a) improvement of the profitability of farming through agrarian reform and the modernization of agriculture (a process now on the way to completion in some parts of the Mezzogiorno), and (b) an industrial development programme. It was originally intended to give public investment priority to the creation of an adequate economic infrastructure (primarily in the fields of transport, power generation and water-supply) and to attract private investment both by the provision of this infrastructure and through a system of incentives. But in practice, owing partly to historical circumstances and partly to the fact that the response of private capital to the industrial investment incentives proved weaker than anticipated, the extent of government intervention in the industrial development of the region became much larger than initially intended.³⁰

In its social aspects, the Mezzogiorno programme originally gave exclusive priority to sectors, such as

vocational training and housing, that were felt to be closely related to the requirements of industrialization. The inadequacy of such an ancillary strategy was eventually recognized by the Government, which noted that rapid economic and industrial development alone (whether assisted, as in the Mezzogiorno, or spontaneous, as was largely the case in the more developed parts of the country) had been "accompanied by a persistence of sectoral, regional or social under-development and economic retardation for which the general expansion of the economic system is evidently unable to provide a remedial stimulus".³¹ It was further stated that past approaches towards Italy's economic problems appeared inadequate to "solve the problems of social groups which were left on the margin of the market economy and which might have been able to integrate themselves with it only if the traditional economic mechanism had undergone a change".³² As a result, social goals were given primacy in the first national economic plan (for 1966-1970) and were defined as follows:

- "(a) the elimination of the still-existing shortcomings as regards budgetary appropriations and social services,
- "(b) the achievement of a substantial equality between agricultural and non-agricultural wages,
- "(c) the elimination of the differential between the backward regions, in particular the Mezzogiorno, and the developed regions".³³

Actually, the approach to social goals did not change appreciably during the period of the first plan, so that the results achieved were less than significant. During the initial three years of the first plan, scheduled investment in school and hospital construction was realized only to the extent of 22 and 16 per cent respectively of the targets for the full five-year period. The lag was even greater with respect to urban transportation, where only 11 per cent of the investment planned for the whole five-year period was actually realized during the first three years. Only in the public health centre programme were actual investments in the first three years roughly proportionate to those planned for the complete five-year cycle.³⁴ Considerable improvement is expected to take place in the implementation of the second five-year plan 1971-1975, in view of the intended transfer to public consumption of a major part of the anticipated increase in national income, with particular attention to be paid to education and cultural progress, improvement of human skills and public health and social security, as well as to environmental protection and regional development.³⁵

Although more than 1 million industrial and service jobs have been created in the Mezzogiorno since 1951,³⁶ the capital-intensive and technically advanced industries

²⁸ L. H. Klaassen, *Social Amenities in Area Economic Growth* (Paris, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 1968), p. 23.

²⁹ *Regional Policy in EFTA: An Examination of the Growth Centre Idea: A Report of an EFTA Economic Development Committee Working Party* (Geneva, European Free Trade Association, 1968), pp. 117 and 118.

³⁰ Government of Italy, Ministry of the Budget and Economic Planning, *Progetto 80: Rapporto Preliminare al Programma economico nazionale 1971-1975*, published as a supplement to vol. XXIV, No. 16 of *Mondo Economico* (26 April 1969), para. 119.

³¹ *Ibid.*, para. 23.

³² *Ibid.*

³³ *Ibid.*, para. 25.

³⁴ Government of Italy, *Relazione Previsionale e Programmatica per l'anno 1969*, parliamentary paper published as a supplement to vol. XXIV, No. 41, of *Mondo Economico* (12 October 1968), paragraph 22.

³⁵ *Progetto 80*, op. cit., para. 56.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, para. 110, foot-note 1.

established there have been unable to absorb all of the region's manpower surplus, or to increase its share in national industrial production.³⁷ The Mezzogiorno therefore remains one of the main labour-surplus areas in Europe. It is increasingly argued that a further growth of opportunities for non-agricultural employment in the Mezzogiorno depends on investments likely to have a high multiplier effect, and in particular on the development of smaller and labour-intensive industries (as well as tertiary services) rather than on the expansion of large-scale enterprises. In any event, the expansion of employment in the Mezzogiorno, limited though it has been, has already led to palpable improvement in levels of living. While the *per capita* income of the Mezzogiorno region amounted in 1951 to 43 per cent of that of northern Italy, it rose by 1967 to 49 per cent;³⁸ the increase, while considerable in itself, is even more significant in view of the rapid growth in real *per capita* income which took place in the northern industrial areas. However, this average conceals great disparities. For example, while the wages of workers employed in the modern southern petrochemical industries now closely approximate those of many workers in the north, incomes in certain rural areas that have yet to be appreciably affected by the Mezzogiorno programme have grown very little in real terms. The possibility of improving this situation through a more balanced distribution of industrial investment (most such investment has hitherto been directed to a limited number of communities which are either already urban or becoming rapidly urbanized) is now being widely discussed, although official opinion on this question still evidently leans to the side of caution, out of concern lest redistributive measures initiated on political grounds turn out to be excessively costly and economically unfeasible.³⁹

In addition to its economic and social aspects, regional planning and development has important administrative and, occasionally, cultural implications. Inasmuch as decisions concerning regional development are usually taken by government authorities in consultation with representatives of the public and the business community, administrative and socio-economic considerations are in practice closely interrelated. Although regional development and industrial decentralization do not necessarily involve administrative decentralization, the latter has often been recognized as a useful concomitant of the former, and as a process conducive to administrative efficiency, particularly in larger countries. At present, the general tendency in western Europe (where the contest between central authority and regional autonomy has ancient roots) is to decentralize many elements of decision-making to the level of historical regions, with such geographical correctives as may be required to consolidate the smaller and less viable political entities. The revival of the traditional regional (*länder*) governments in the Federal Republic of Germany, and their assertion of pre-

eminence in fields such as area redevelopment, educational and cultural policy, and the conservation of natural resources, is illustrative of the current trend towards administrative deconcentration in a number of western European countries.

Progress towards administrative deconcentration is much slower, however, in some other countries (such as France and Italy) where the supremacy of the central administrative authority resulted from sharp political (and sometimes military) struggles against the pre-eminence of regional power in the feudal and post-feudal periods; consequently there emerged in these countries a centralistic tradition which nowadays tends to hamper the evolution of modern regional administrative and political structures. To the extent that it is taking place in Italy, decentralization is based on territorial entities rather reminiscent of the pre-unification regional political units (or their major subdivisions, as in the case of southern Italy), but it also takes account of economic and social affinities and factors of administrative convenience. The approach is somewhat similar in France, but with less emphasis on the historical regions, which were so long ago eliminated as independent political entities that only a few outlying areas are left with any definable sense of regional consciousness. In both France and Italy, regional administrative structures are slowly being built up, but the outcome of the continuing political struggle over the scope of their authority and financial autonomy is still unclear. At this point, it would appear that the degree of political autonomy likely to be permitted to the Italian regions may allow for considerable administrative deconcentration, but that the disparity of their financial resources would render the effectiveness of this process questionable for some very poor regions, unless the central Government retains enough power and political motivation to come to the poorer regions' assistance. The prospects are even less clear in France, particularly since the regional reform bill of 1969 was rejected by popular vote.

Regional administrative reform is complicated in the larger countries because it involves the interposition of a new layer of authority between the central and the existing (but often largely artificial) provincial authorities, termed *départements* in France, "provinces" in Italy, and *Regierungsbezirke* in the Federal Republic of Germany. Its eventual implementation is easier in smaller countries such as Austria or the Netherlands where the existing provinces are also organic and traditional territorial entities. In Belgium, a situation that was basically similar to that existing in the Netherlands has become complicated as a result of the growing tension between the French and Flemish-speaking areas, which tends increasingly to harden the recent subdivision of the country into three linguistic areas,⁴⁰ with little regard for either history, economics or administrative efficiency.

Although decentralization of administrative authority is the subject of much discussion in western Europe, the relative lack of real progress in that direction is due primarily to the precariousness of the financial base of local

³⁷ The Mezzogiorno's share in total national industrial production actually declined from 14.9 per cent in 1951 to 14.2 per cent in 1962. (Luigi Frey, "Poverty and distress in Italy", in *Low-income Groups and Methods of Dealing with their Problems*, op. cit., p. 153.)

³⁸ *Progetto 80*, op. cit., para. 110, foot-note 1.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, para. 114.

⁴⁰ Brussels and its metropolitan district, where the French-speaking majority and the Flemish-speaking minority cannot be separated, is the third area.

authorities, and to the scarcity of personnel properly trained and willing (at existing local civil service salary levels) to perform the increasingly complex tasks of public administration. Consequently, the main focus of administrative reform has been placed upon improving the efficiency of the local authorities, with the consolidation of smaller municipalities becoming increasingly common—as in France for example. In this connexion, the continued usefulness of the next higher layer of administration, namely the *arrondissement* or *kreis* level, is being increasingly questioned. It is argued that the supervision of fewer but stronger and more efficient municipalities would not exceed the administrative capacity of the *département* or *Regierungsbezirk* layer, and that, in any case, the *arrondissement* or *kreis* level owes its existence merely to the desirability, in the age of horseback travel, of maintaining administrative authority within one day's travelling distance from each municipality. This consideration, it is pointed out, has become obsolete with the development of railway and motor travel.

SOCIAL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL REGIONAL UNIONS

Mobility of manpower

The importance of the western European international regional unions, especially the European Economic Community,⁴¹ in encouraging labour migration⁴² to the industrialized countries of western Europe was pointed out in the *1967 Report on the World Social Situation*. At that time, it was mentioned that the migration had tended to slacken off after 1966. This trend has subsequently continued, due to the significant increases in labour productivity that have been achieved in the principal countries of immigration,⁴³ and the resulting drop in industrial labour demand.⁴⁴ The decline of migration was particularly significant between 1966 and 1967, with the demand for immigrant labour falling off most sharply in the Federal Republic of Germany.⁴⁵ In 1967, only 104,000 immigrant workers were received—less than one-third of the 1966 figure,⁴⁶ which was itself lower than the

figure for 1965.⁴⁷ Meanwhile, manpower migration to the Netherlands and Luxembourg declined by roughly similar proportions, although in absolute terms the reduction was much smaller than in the Federal Republic of Germany. In the case of the Netherlands, however, the decrease was mainly owing to the recession in 1967. In subsequent years immigration picked up although in fact there was some concern about an anticipated medium-term shortage of unskilled labour, particularly in the processing industries. On the supply side, much of the decline in labour migration is accounted for by a decrease of emigration from Italy, continuing a trend going back to the early 1960s, but emigration from Greece, Spain, and particularly from Turkey, also fell off to a marked extent.⁴⁸ However, migration from North Africa appears to have remained close to its previous levels, largely due to the special regulations governing the entry of Algerian workers into France. Finally, migrants from several countries of West Africa (notably Senegal) have in recent years begun to arrive in western Europe—mainly in France, but also in Belgium—in significant numbers.

Reference was made in the *1967 Report on the World Social Situation* to the agreement between EEC countries concerning guaranteed freedom of migration within the Common Market area and the granting of equal rights to immigrants with regard to wages, social security, family allowances, housing entitlement and related matters. Preparations for implementing this agreement were made during 1968, by EEC authorities, and the agreement went into force at the end of that year.⁴⁹ A further provision, establishing the right of any national of a Common Market country to remain permanently with his family in another country of the area, after having been employed there, is now in the process of enactment.⁵⁰ The same right is guaranteed by the European Social Charter, an instrument adopted by the Council of Europe; this would appear to extend the right beyond the Common Market area, since the Governments that have ratified the Charter include six which are not members of the Common Market. In some instances, however, actual implementation of the immigrant workers' "right to remain" appears to have lagged behind proclaimed principles.

Now that immigrant workers' rights concerning equality of treatment under social security and family allowances programmes have been recognized, the EEC has turned its attention to problems of inequity in social security

⁴¹ The European Economic Community (EEC, or the Common Market) consists of Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. The other major economic union, the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), includes Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom, with Finland as an associate member.

⁴² For purposes of this discussion, "labour migration" involves, in addition to a worker's taking employment in a country other than that of which he is a national, permanent settlement in the country where he works. This definition excludes both seasonal migratory workers and daily border-crossers (*frontaliers*), of whom there are significant numbers on the French-Belgian, French-German and French-Swiss borders.

⁴³ International Labour Organisation, *Yearbook of Labour Statistics, 1969* (Geneva, 1970), table 17.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, tables 3 and 6 A.

⁴⁵ In this case, however, the sharp decline in demand appears to have been as much the result of an economic slow-down as of increases in labour productivity.

⁴⁶ Commission des communautés européennes, *La libre circulation de la main-d'œuvre et les marchés du travail dans la CEE - 1968*, publication No. 8222/1/VI/1968/5 (Brussels, 1968), p. 37.

⁴⁷ In both 1966 and 1967, more migrants actually returned from the Federal Republic of Germany to Italy than went there in search of employment. (For 1966 figures, see *Annuario Statistico Italiano 1968* (Rome, 1968), table 48; for 1967 figures, see *Compendio Statistico Italiano 1969* (Rome, 1969), table 37.)

⁴⁸ Commission des communautés européennes, *La libre circulation de la main-d'œuvre dans la CEE - 1968*, op. cit., p. 41.

⁴⁹ Regulation of 15 October 1968 (No. 1612/68) of the Council of the European Economic Community, concerning freedom of migration within the Community area, and Directive 68/360/CEE of the same date concerning the removal of travel and residence restrictions within the Community, applicable to workers who are nationals of countries belonging to the Community and to members of their families. For both texts, see *Journal officiel de la Communauté*, No. L. 257 (19 October 1968).

⁵⁰ Commission des communautés européennes, *Exposé sur l'évolution de la situation sociale dans la Communauté en 1969*, publication No. 4884/2/70.1 (Bruxelles-Luxembourg, février 1970), para. 19, pp. 25-26.

contributions, resulting from migration; in many instances migrant workers contribute to the social security systems of at least two countries, but normally draw benefits from only one. Any remedial measures must obviously be preceded by research, and such research is now envisaged in connexion with the forthcoming major study of comparative social security costs in Common Market countries. While the contemplated future equalization of the social security charges in these countries (both in relation to the general systems and to the specific problems of migrant workers) is considered primarily as part of the over-all problem of removing non-tariff obstacles to economic competition within the Common Market area, it is also expected to bring about a more equitable distribution of the burdens of the various national social security funds. In all matters affecting migration and its social security aspects, the trend is away from bilateralism and toward multilateral agreements within the framework of EEC, and also within the larger area represented by the Council of Europe.

Trends in consumption and costs of living

Most of the countries of western Europe hold full or associate membership in either EEC or EFTA (European Free Trade Association). Although these economic

unions started from different premises more than a decade ago, trade in industrial products within each of them has been almost completely free since 1968; moreover, interunion trade in certain categories of goods has undergone considerable liberalization. The freeing of intra-European and, in particular intraunion trade, has now reached a stage where it is of direct benefit to the consumer, owing primarily to the duty-free admission of merchandise from abroad and the consequent development of additional competition on the supply side. The advantages accruing to the consumer are of three main kinds: (a) wider choice of goods, (b) better service, and (c) more stable prices.

Although costs of living rose considerably throughout western Europe during the late 1960s, there is evidence that regional trade liberalization tended to act as a restraining factor. In the EEC countries, the rise in the cost-of-living index between 1966 and 1969 remained within a range of 10 to 20 points, while in the EFTA countries, the increase was somewhat higher, ranging from 14 to 29 points. But in countries (except Greece) that held membership in neither of the two intraregional unions, the increases ranged from 18 to 37 points (see table 4). It is relevant to observe, however, that although the slower rate of increase in the Common Market area may well reflect the larger extent of international trade liberalization

TABLE 4. CHANGES IN CONSUMER PRICES IN WESTERN EUROPE, 1966-1969
(Index: 1965 = 100)

Country and item	1966	1967	1968	1969
Austria				
General index	102.2	106.2	109.0	112.4
Food	101.3	105.3	107.7	110.3
Clothing	102.6	103.8	105.6	...
Rent	104.4	112.0	119.1	...
Belgium				
General index	104.2	107.2	110.1	113.0
Food	105.0	107.6	109.4	114.5
Clothing	102.8	...	108.0	...
Rent
Denmark				
General index	107.0	115.7	125.0	129.3
Food	105.6	114.9	125.2	133.6
Clothing	103.9	107.7	112.6	...
Rent	109.4	118.8	132.4	...
Finland				
General index	104.0	110.0	120.0	126.7
Food	103.4	108.6	120.7	124.6
Clothing	102.0	106.0	112.2	...
Rent	104.0	108.2	116.3	...
France				
General index	102.8	105.4	110.3	116.7
Food	102.7	104.5	107.7	113.6
Clothing	101.6	103.7	105.3	...
Rent	108.8	120.3	130.2	...
Germany (Federal Republic of)				
General index	103.8	105.5	107.1	110.0
Food	103.1	103.0	102.2	105.8
Clothing	102.8	104.0	104.0	...
Rent	107.9	115.1	123.9	...

TABLE 4. CHANGES IN CONSUMER PRICES IN WESTERN EUROPE, 1966-1969 (continued)
(Index: 1965 = 100)

Country and item	1966	1967	1968	1969
Greece				
General index	105.1	106.8	107.2	110.2
Food	105.8	106.5	106.5	111.0
Clothing	104.5	108.2	108.3	...
Rent	103.5	107.2	112.2	...
Ireland				
General index	103.0	106.2	111.2	118.8
Food	100.6	102.3	108.4	111.3
Clothing	101.4	102.9	109.4	...
Rent	106.3	112.8	120.6	...
Italy				
General index	102.3	106.1	107.6	110.1
Food	102.0	103.7	104.1	107.2
Clothing	100.7	102.0	103.3	...
Rent	104.0	107.0	111.3	...
Netherlands				
General index	105.4	109.2	113.2	120.0
Food	105.3	107.7	110.4	117.7
Clothing	105.4	110.7	114.6	...
Rent	108.2	112.2	120.5	...
Norway				
General index	103.2	107.8	111.6	114.9
Food	102.2	106.7	110.2	114.1
Clothing	103.1	106.4	109.0	...
Rent	103.0	105.4	110.0	...
Portugal				
General index	105.1	110.9	117.5	125.6
Food	107.3	109.1	113.7	119.0
Clothing	102.6	111.3	112.3	...
Rent	100.9	119.2	137.8	...
Spain				
General index	106.2	113.0	118.6	119.1
Food	104.4	108.4	113.3	113.8
Clothing	109.7	122.4	127.3	...
Rent	108.0	117.4	122.8	...
Switzerland				
General index	104.8	108.6	111.5	114.5
Food	104.7	104.7	104.7	106.9
Clothing	102.4	102.4	102.8	...
Rent	108.1	130.1
Sweden				
General index	106.3	111.0	113.1	115.6
Food	106.3	110.0	111.0	113.4
Clothing	104.4	108.1	108.1	...
Rent	108.5	115.3	119.4	...
Turkey				
General index	108.7	124.0	131.4	137.7
Food	109.0	125.7	132.1	139.6
Clothing	109.7	120.0	128.4	...
Rent
United Kingdom				
General index	104.0	106.5	111.6	117.8
Food	103.5	106.2	110.4	119.4
Clothing	102.7	104.1	106.0	...
Rent	106.6	111.6	117.2	...

SOURCE: The indices used in the table have been calculated from data appearing in International Labour Organisation, *Yearbook of Labour Statistics*, 1969, tables 25 A, 25 B, 25 D and 25 E, recomputed on a 1965 base (the source used 1963 as the base year).

within EEC, most EFTA countries have long enjoyed significantly lower consumer price levels than the Common Market countries; as the economic policies which made this possible were gradually changed, prices tended to rise. This may explain the faster rate at which consumers' prices have recently increased in the EFTA countries. Over the 1965-1969 period as a whole, food prices generally rose more rapidly than clothing prices in all western European countries except Spain. Throughout western Europe, however, the most consistent upward pressure on the cost of living came from the relentless rise of housing costs, particularly apartment rents;⁵¹ during the three-year period from 1965 to 1968, the increase in the apartment rent index averaged approximately 25 per cent.

It is widely believed that increases in the food and clothing price indices would have been much greater than they actually were, if the period under review had not been one of rapid change in the merchandise distribution system. While department stores have existed in Europe for many decades, small or medium-size specialty and neighbourhood shops until quite recently constituted the principal retail merchandise outlets. Among the advantages of the old-style retail system were its traditions of personal service, the widespread practice (based on long-time personal acquaintanceship between shopkeeper and customer) of extending informal credit, and the function of the small retail shop as a neighbourhood social centre. However, the cost of this system to the consumer was often heavy in strictly financial terms. The restricted capital available to small merchants enabled them to stock only limited quantities of goods, thus preventing them from taking full advantage of wholesale prices and quantity discounts when replacing their supplies. The retail prices charged by the small shops were thus relatively high to begin with and, since small stocks of merchandise were associated with a low volume of sales, the shopkeepers had to add a higher mark-up in order to cover overhead costs and make a profit. Also, the cost of credit extended to some customers was often recouped not only by charging interest to the debtors, but also by taking it into account when setting the prices demanded of all customers. On the other hand, prices were not significantly lower in department stores of the traditional European type. While these stores were able to take advantage of quantity purchases, their price structures generally remained high due to the need to recoup heavy capital investments in luxurious buildings and expensive central locations, and due also to high costs of operation occasioned by the maintenance of large staffs and a wide selection of merchandise.

Recent years have witnessed a departure from the high-cost distribution system just described, with the development of mass-marketing through self-service, sample and "discount" outlets—particularly the former. Mass-marketing has now reached maturity in western Europe, as it did some time earlier in North America. Since the modern retail outlets try to distribute only fast-selling

merchandise, they not only avoid loading their price structures with the cost of stocking slow-moving items, but to an even greater extent than the traditional department stores they are also able to take advantage of quantity wholesale purchases. Additional means of keeping down costs and prices include the use of horizontal shopping areas to save on the high costs of vertical store construction (typical of the old-style city department stores) and the reduction of personal service to the customer.

Since 1968, yet another factor has tended to widen the difference between the prices charged for identical (or similar) items of merchandise by the old-fashioned retail stores and the volume outlets. This is the value added tax, which has been adopted by a number of continental western European countries, including the Federal Republic of Germany, France and the Netherlands; the tax is charged at each successive stage of merchandise turnover and, since merchandise carried by small stores usually passes through many more intermediaries than that sold by volume outlets (which can buy directly from the producer or the importer), there is a greater tax incidence on goods purchased in small shops.

It would, however, be an oversimplification to ascribe the present difficulties of the neighbourhood retailer solely to the more advantageous price structure of the volume outlets. Many customers would perhaps still be ready to pay somewhat more, in exchange for the advantages of shopping in the near vicinity of their homes with the benefit of the shopkeepers' personal attention. However, the shift of customer preference from the traditional neighbourhood shops to the modern retail outlets is also influenced by a variety of social and technological changes, which have only recently begun to make a full impact on western European society. First, the increasing employment of women, who constitute the overwhelming majority of retail customers, has severely reduced the time available for the traditional daily rounds of neighbourhood shopping, and has created a rapid growth of preference for stores where all purchases can be made in one trip. Another important factor is the common availability of home refrigerators, which obviate the need for daily shopping for small quantities of food. Furthermore, the widening of automobile ownership, by permitting easy transportation of larger purchases over longer distances, has freed many shoppers from the weight and distance limitations which formerly compelled them to make frequent small purchases at nearby retail outlets.

While these changes in the retail distribution system are unquestionably beneficial to the consumer, they have had painful consequences for some groups, particularly the small retailers. In some instances, shopkeepers driven out of business have adjusted by finding paid employment or (among older people) by simply retiring; in any event, few have found easy solutions. In some countries where small shopkeepers are particularly numerous, and where they constitute an influential political pressure group (as, for example, in France), their resistance to change has sometimes erupted in violent demonstrations. Occasionally public authorities have been moved to respond with concessions, mainly by alleviating the incidence of taxation and tax collection methods. However, such relief can be no more than palliative and temporary, since most

⁵¹ The cost of certain services may have risen even faster than apartment rents. However, the validity of international comparisons in this respect is questionable, owing to differences in national habits and requirements for various services.

of the real causes of the small shopkeepers' predicament are beyond the power of public authority to reverse, under prevailing socio-economic conditions.

YOUTH AND THE COMMUNITY

In the period covered by this chapter, and particularly during 1968, the situation of youth captured unprecedented public attention in western Europe, owing to the provocative forms of protest engaged in by young people, the violent reactions which these methods elicited from the authorities, and apparently also to the feelings of insecurity, envy and guilt, which the young succeeded in arousing among the adult population, especially their parents' generation. Theorizing about the causes of youth unrest became a national and international preoccupation and virtually a major industry in both journalistic and academic circles. The fact that young people in other parts of the world were simultaneously exhibiting signs of unrest provided scope for further debate between those who saw in this a significant universal symptom and those who were inclined to associate the outbreaks with specific political, social, economic or ideological problems in individual countries.

It does not seem accidental that much of the youth unrest in western Europe focused around student dissatisfaction with the educational systems. Rapid expansion in these systems has led to considerable increases in the size of educational facilities, resulting in turn in growing anonymity and lack of personal relationships between the teachers and the taught; in many instances, too, insufficient resources have been made available to staff new educational institutions in an appropriate way. At the same time, educational authorities have in the eyes of many young people seemed slow to produce new approaches and reforms in the content and methods of education. Such grievances proved particularly strong in France, where even the creation of new educational institutions led to severe criticism from students on the grounds that the institutional structures remained rigid and outdated, and reflected a materialistic and even commercial view of life rather than the start of a true educational community. Reforms in university education, made in response to such complaints, did not apparently go far enough to satisfy the militant demands of the more radical student groups, and subsequently the authorities introduced additional measures in an effort to restrict violence and material destruction. Similar, although less widespread and violent, manifestations of student discontent were experienced in a number of other western European countries.

The ambivalent status of youth—and in some respects, young people's lack of status—has apparently been one of the more important causes of the unrest and uncertainty. There are to be found within one and the same country different and apparently inconsistent legal age limits governing such matters as the right to vote, the right to marry, liability of military service, protected conditions of work, the right to drive a motor vehicle, criminal responsibility and the liability of compulsory education. Discussions are under way in several countries with a view to lowering the age of electoral franchise, and in two countries—Denmark and the United King-

dom—the age limit has been recently reduced from twenty-one years to twenty and eighteen years respectively. Side by side with this complex legal situation is the fact that social protection of the young tends to be continuously extended in time, so that an ever-increasing proportion of young people begin their "adult" or "working" life later than their predecessors in earlier generations. The gap between the attainment of physiological and sexual maturity, and the point at which the maturity of the individual is socially acknowledged, is one which is wide and growing as far as many young people, especially students, are concerned. Frustration has arisen among many youths in this intermediary situation, since they are seen and treated by the rest of society as dependent and economically non-productive. As one recent publication has pointed out, the long hiatus

"tends to isolate the young within society by keeping them in a situation in which their very exemption from the essential duties of adult life causes them to be largely refused the rights and responsibilities which go with these duties."⁵²

It would also appear that many adults have projected the atmosphere of uncertainty and anxiety in which they live on to their children, who have in turn become anxious and have tried to escape by breaking with the older generation and forming their own society. Emotional insecurity also seems to have been engendered by the fact that the schools tend to present absolute and rigid ethical models, but leave it to young people to discover for themselves the relativity of behavioural principles in the real world. The resulting painful emotional crisis can lead to cynicism and moral nihilism.⁵³ Recognition of this problem has considerably stimulated interest in the provision of counselling services for young people, both within and outside the schools. Increasingly, such services go well beyond giving merely vocational advice, and offer social and personal guidance as well. Parallel with this development, advisory groups for parents have made their appearance in a number of countries, notably France and Switzerland.⁵⁴

⁵² United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, "Report on youth", prepared for the fifteenth session of the UNESCO General Conference (15 C/65), para. 24.

⁵³ Z. Bauman, "Some problems in contemporary education", *International Social Science Journal*, vol. XIX, No. 3 (Paris, UNESCO, 1967), p. 326. However, it is not only the hypocrisy of adult society that confronts and affronts youth, but often also adult ignorance. In a rapidly changing technological society, young people, being the most recently educated, are often much better equipped than their elders with the knowledge and understanding needed to ensure human survival in a dangerous and highly competitive world—but this is not widely acknowledged by the senior generation.

⁵⁴ Contrary to some popular notions about the alienation of young people from their families, research on the family relationships of adolescents suggests that most of them feel that their parents are closer to them, understand them better, and can be relied on more than any other persons. This is especially significant in view of the fact that the amount of time young people spend with their parents is probably less on an average than it used to be, and that the influence exerted by parents over the educational, vocational, political and religious choices of their adolescent children is also apparently less strong than in the past. See L. Rosenmayr, "Towards an overview of youth sociology", *International Social Science Journal*, vol. XX, No. 2 (Paris, UNESCO, 1968), pp. 286-315.

It has been frequently pointed out that the commercialization of leisure, the exploitation of the youth market in consumer society, and the insistent pressures of the mass media combine to encourage young people to seek easy gratification and immediate—even if superficial—fulfilment of their real or imagined desires. At the same time, however, the increasing complexity of modern technology and administration place upon the same young people additional burdens of prolonged study. The resulting conflict of values seems to be another important factor underlying the evident wish of many young people to rebel or to escape. The network of communication among the young is intricate and widespread and operates both openly and underground. Styles of protest, from self-immolation by burning to particular hairstyles, become internationally known and available as models within hours. An underground press, created by young people themselves, has grown up in the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and the Scandinavian countries among others, and has attracted a wide and growing international readership; together with the views and information transmitted on radio and television by personalities linked with the world of “pop” music, these publications constitute a significant means of transmitting the new youth culture. Moreover, rapid transport (including hitchhiking) makes personal contacts easier than in previous generations, and further facilitates the growth of an international youth style. Although it is difficult to tell how far the youth culture is inspired by ideals of international solidarity and brotherhood, it is quite obvious that many young people have real commitments to such principles. The sufferings of people in the developing countries, and the intrinsic unwillingness of rich societies to make sacrifices to aid poorer ones, are among the leading issues of current youth protest against the double standards of the adult world. A major part of the FAO Freedom from Hunger Campaign in the United Kingdom, France, Belgium, the Netherlands and some of the Scandinavian countries has been carried out with the vigorous co-operation of young people, and the active concern of youth has given rise to a number of movements, such as “Third World First” in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands Cane-Sugar Campaign; the existence of movements like these does not conform with stereotyped adult notions about the supposed unrealism and irresponsibility of young people in the modern world.

It is also true, of course, that some young people refuse any kind of commitment or participation, out of partial or total rejection of the values of their own societies, and that others—and possibly still a majority—remain basically interested in the achievement of material comfort and prosperity in the traditional sense.

It is not surprising that in the face of such a complex and unprecedented situation, several of the Governments have taken their existing youth policies under intensive review in an effort to adapt them more closely to the contemporary demands and needs of young people. In particular, it is obvious that any provision made for out-of-school or leisure-time recreation for youth—much of it pioneered by non-governmental youth and youth-serving organizations and subsequently supported and supplemented by national and local government youth services—is now in need of considerable adjustment in view of the

TABLE 5. TELEVISION RECEIVERS ACCORDING TO NUMBER OF LICENCES ISSUED
(Thousands)

Country	1963	1967
Austria	465	978
Belgium	1,206	1,801
Denmark	927	1,182
Finland	476	899
France	4,400	8,316
Germany, Federal Republic of	8,539	13,806
Ireland	201	308
Italy	4,285	7,669
Netherlands	1,574	2,481
Norway	292	662
Portugal	119	271
Spain ^a	850	2,685
Sweden	1,812	2,268
Switzerland	367	868
United Kingdom	12,789	14,463

SOURCE: *United Nations Statistical Yearbook 1968* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 69.XVII.1), table 217.

^a Based on the estimated numbers of receivers in use.

changes that have occurred in educational systems and community structures.⁵⁵

CULTURAL ASPECTS OF SOCIAL CHANGE

Continuing rapid social change in western Europe has had important effects on the form and content of mass media, which have become increasingly dominated by television. Private ownership of television sets has grown considerably since the early 1960s as shown by table 5, and in many of the countries has reached a virtual saturation point. Radio is gradually losing ground; the number of radio receivers has hardly increased in the region since 1965, and has actually declined since then in Austria, France and Sweden. In most European countries, the major radio and television systems are publicly owned, but in some countries, such as the United Kingdom, there are privately owned systems as well.

Ever-increasing demands for additional television programmes have in many countries pre-empted all available channels; the cost of further expansion is generally so large as to be attractive only to private enterprise, which can gain large profits by using television as a medium for commercial advertising. The question of public versus private ownership of the broadcasting media is therefore one which attracts lively discussion and close public attention. One recent proposal, aimed at a compromise solution of the problem, would preserve basic public ownership but would permit time to be sold to private commercial interests, which would retain full editorial responsibility. However, objections have been raised in some quarters that, despite the provision for editorial independence, public authorities might still try to exercise covert political censorship. Widely-voiced fears of the intru-

⁵⁵ For the Netherlands, “The C.O.W.R. Report”, and for the United Kingdom, “Youth and community work in the 1970s”.

sion of political censorship into publicly-owned broadcasting facilities seem to be based not only on suspicion of slanted news presentation, intended to emphasize the achievements of the Governments or political parties in office, but also on the growing practice of using television as a vehicle for the political exposure of prominent personalities associated with the Governments.

So far as the printed press is concerned, change is mainly evident in the appearance of new kinds of publications and in the development of subject matter. In terms of daily newspaper circulation, there has been little growth since the 1950s in most western European countries, and the actual number of titles printed has quite drastically declined (see table 6). High-quality weeklies and monthlies, offering lucid socio-political interpretation and incisive criticism, flourish in all major countries where political conditions are congenial to their existence and in recent years numerous periodicals expressing the new mood of protest and confrontation have joined the ranks of the intellectual publications. There has also taken place in many of the countries a rapid growth of publications specializing in the presentation of frankly salacious material. Even a few years ago, these would not have been tolerated by public opinion, but they are now given practically free rein in the prevailing climate of permissiveness and sexual freedom. Another new type of periodic publication, the so-called "underground" press⁵⁶ is now very active in several western European countries; it tends to be esoteric and largely devoted to astrology and psychedelic illustrations, but it is often also highly satirical and reflective of the new freedom of sexual expression. As noted earlier, the underground

⁵⁶ The present-day "underground" press is not without antecedents. There have been periodicals devoted to astrology, fantasies and satire unlikely to get by the censors as far back as the sixteenth century, but now such periodicals have for the first time reached a mass readership.

press is primarily addressed to the younger generation and is usually also written and produced by young people.

In most western European countries there remains a small number of daily newspapers which take it upon themselves to provide the public with reasoned and mature political comment and which do not seek to compete with the speed of radio and television news reporting. However, the number of such "quality" newspapers is gradually declining, since only those that have large printings and are widely disseminated can afford to exist without entering into compromising dependence on economic and political interests. As pointed out above, however, the quality papers are not the only ones whose numbers are declining; the growing costs of newsprint and labour have to some extent affected all newspapers and periodicals, and forced them to depend ever more heavily on advertising revenue. Since there is keen competition for this revenue from the other mass media, the share obtained by the printed press has tended to diminish. This has led to a steady decrease in the total number of newspapers and also to growing monopoly control of those which remain. This has happened particularly in the United Kingdom, where a good deal of public concern has been expressed over the possible political consequences, and in the Federal Republic of Germany, where the dominant influence of one particular press trust has evoked protest and some violent reaction by students, young workers and other concerned groups. In this process of concentration and elimination, the newspapers which are primarily engaged in interpreting and disseminating the views of specific political parties labour under a double handicap: first, the steady weakening of traditional western European ideological preoccupations, and the consequent decline of public interest in partisan debate, and secondly, the fact that most such newspapers have relatively small circulation and therefore offer but little attraction to commercial advertising. Thus, apart from

TABLE 6. NUMBERS AND CIRCULATION OF DAILY NEWSPAPERS IN SELECTED COUNTRIES

Country	Separate titles exclusive of regional editions		Circulation per 1,000 inhabitants	
	Early 1950s	Middle or late 1960s	Early 1950s	Middle or late 1960s
Austria	35 (1953)	36 (1965)	200 (1953)	249 (1965)
Belgium	39 (1952)	54 (1965)	384 (1952)	285 (1965)
Denmark	127 (1953)	59 (1966)	366 (1953)	354 (1966)
Finland	64 (1952)	68 (1967)	269 (1952)	...
France	151 (1952)	117 (1966)	239 (1952)	248 (1966)
Germany, Federal Republic of	598 (1954)	423 (1967)	242 (1954)	328 (1967)
Ireland	8 (1952)	7 (1967)	237 (1952)	242 (1967)
Italy	107 (1952)	88 (1966)
Netherlands	108 (1952)	91 (1967)	249 (1952)	301 (1967)
Norway	96 (1952)	81 (1967)	396 (1952)	382 (1967)
Portugal	28 (1954)	29 (1966)	61 (1954)	69 (1966)
Spain	104 (1953)	118 (1967)	67 (1953)	159 (1967)
Sweden	145 (1953)	116 (1967)	445 (1953)	514 (1967)
Switzerland	127 (1952)	126 (1966)	300 (1952)	344 (1966)
United Kingdom	114 (1954)	106 (1966)	573 (1954)	488 (1966)

SOURCE: *Compendium of Social Statistics: 1967* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 67.XVII.9), table 40, and *Statistical Yearbook 1968* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 69.XVII.1), table 213.

the few remaining quality dailies, the printed press is increasingly dominated by newspapers which maintain a large circulation by resorting to extensive reporting of intimate details from the lives of prominent personalities and by devoting excessive space to the description of crime and other unsavoury concomitants of modern life.⁵⁷ Although newspapers of this type owe their popularity to their appeal to the non-political interests of their readers, they are nevertheless often used to convey, in a more or less surreptitious way, specific political views to a ready-made mass audience.

Throughout western Europe, the press—whether printed, spoken or visual—is also the prime channel of commercial influence on social behaviour. This influence is not new, but it has considerably intensified during the period under review. While the publicly-owned television and radio systems have so far been able either to avoid advertising altogether or to maintain it within reasonable limits, privately-owned systems base their existence on advertising income and to a large extent also build their programming around the advertisers' requirements. The increasing reliance of the printed press on advertising income has made it, too, highly sensitive to the requirements of the advertising industry. In these circumstances, commercial interests can heavily influence the editorial and news policies of the press by the threat of withholding advertising. In countries where the relationship between business and conservative political interests is particularly close, this situation sometimes leads to an inadequate presentation in the press of liberal opinion. Massive publicity campaigns advertising similar products and services have also tended to create increasing uniformity in consumption habits and some other aspects of social behaviour. Even the existence of large differentials in personal incomes does not greatly hamper this trend, since fashionable gadgets and articles of clothing and adornment, even if expensive in their original versions, can be rapidly reproduced in cheaper but outwardly similar imitations. Moreover, manufacturers make frequent changes in the design of fashionable merchandise in order to create artificial obsolescence and a desire for the latest products. Uniformity of taste and consumption is also fostered by the advertising of relatively economical ways of securing luxury services; the rapid growth of tourist travel through "packaged vacation tours" is a prime instance of this development.

Amidst all these trends, western European society is experiencing far-reaching changes in attitudes towards matters of law and ethics. One area in which the new attitudes are expressed is that of automobile driving, where many otherwise law-abiding people indulge frequently in acts such as speeding, light-jumping and double parking, which are technically illegal but are not generally felt to be offences in the true sense of the word. Similarly,

⁵⁷ The increasing boldness of the printed press in reporting news of a sensational nature has been encouraged by a gradual relaxation or outright abolition of official censorship of the printed word, Denmark and Sweden, for example, have progressively done away with public censorship of both written and graphic material and a similar trend is evident in the United Kingdom and France. In the United Kingdom, stage censorship has already been completely abolished.

it is not uncommon to find people camping in public parks, even though this, too, may be technically illegal; in general, however, neither the campers nor the public at large consider such action as offensive or unethical, particularly if proper camping facilities are lacking. Legally binding regulations concerning public order and cleanliness are also frequently disregarded; this is partly a consequence of growing spatial mobility and the consequent loss of a sense of local "patriotism" and responsibility. Ethical standards also seem to have relaxed as far as recognition of tax obligations is concerned; since tax fraud does not cause obvious and direct damage to anyone in particular, many people whose sense of social responsibility has been undermined apparently do not consider such fraud especially unethical, regardless of formal legal obligations, and therefore do not hesitate to commit it. In much the same way, traffic in certain types of narcotic drugs, such as marijuana, which are widely (even if mistakenly) regarded as in-offensive, is widely practised even though it is legally prohibited. Legality and ethical standards are thus engaged in a process of dissociation, the outcome of which is at present unpredictable.

PROBLEMS OF PARTICIPATION, CONFLICT AND PROTEST

Improved levels of living and the pressure of mass media have conditioned a considerable part of the western European population, including the historically revolutionary working class, to find satisfaction with existing conditions and to visualize change mainly in terms of further personal material improvement and gratification. With only a few exceptions, one of the traditional instruments of working class struggle for collective improvement—the militant political grouping based on personal participation in party life and decision-making—has fallen into disuse or has become transformed into a self-perpetuating organization of professional politicians. The other main instrument of working-class action, namely the trade-union movement, has also tended to become heavily bureaucratized,⁵⁸ with its activities confined to the useful but undramatic function of periodic meetings with the representatives of management in order to reach agreements concerning the division of benefits from rising industrial production. For millions of workers, the living-room with its enthroned television receiver has replaced the union hall and the political club, and spectator participation in competitive sports has diverted some of the energies that formerly went into traditional forms of political activity.

Nevertheless, various socio-economic groups continue to suffer deep dissatisfactions. These groups include

⁵⁸ It is quite exceptional to find any but the older members in positions of official leadership or responsibility within the trade unions, except notably in France and Italy. In some countries, moreover, the trade-union movements have been reluctant to open their ranks to young workers, particularly those below voting age; young workers are sometimes segregated in special branches or sections of the unions. This situation is usually explained by the union establishments in terms of legal technicalities, but it seems to owe more to the senior union-members' apprehensions over the more militant attitudes of the young workers. In any event, such policies of exclusion have undoubtedly contributed to the estrangement of young workers from the trade-union movement.

migrant workers, alien to the places where they live and work, and discriminated against on grounds of national or regional prejudice; small farmers, squeezed between rising costs and the gradual creation of industrial farming serving multinational markets; and small businessmen, afflicted by heavy competition from large businesses, and handicapped by tax legislation which in practice tends to favour the stronger competitors. There are also a number of ethnic, religious or linguistic minority groups who feel their cultural identity threatened by the centralizing tendencies of modern life. These feelings can lead to the eruption of long dormant conflicts, as for example in Belgium and more recently in Northern Ireland. And, as already pointed out in this chapter, a large segment of youth is demonstrating extreme dissatisfaction with prevailing pressures to conform, and with the prospect of an existence in which success is measured by the acquisition of goods and gadgets whose production and disposal foul the human environment and encroach upon the few open spaces which remain in western Europe.

Traditional ways of bringing the views of dissatisfied groups to general attention and of settling grievances have proved largely ineffective under current conditions. Political parties and other mass organizations have in some important aspects become less and less responsive to popular demands, and this had led the dissatisfied groups to experiment with unorthodox ways of making their complaints and wishes known. Where such groups are active in the production process, disruption by means of strikes remains the most important technique of protest. However, lack of empathy among the leadership of labour organizations, with respect to protests emanating from the base, often causes such demonstrations to take irregular forms such as unofficial "wild-cat" strikes in industry,⁵⁹ in which *ad hoc* representatives elected directly by the workers may take positions contrary to those of the official union leaders. "Strikes" by small farmers, over unsatisfactory prices for agricultural products, were in the past usually limited to the interruption of deliveries and destruction of perishable produce, but on a number of recent occasions they have been expressed in the form of general traffic interdictions

⁵⁹ In the United Kingdom, Sweden, France and Italy, many such strikes have been made official by the union leadership, after pressure from the lower echelons. Outwardly similar strikes in Spain have been of a fundamentally different nature, however; they were usually called by the "underground" unions, in the absence of the official unions' willingness to transgress the limits set on their activities by the Government.

in the areas concerned. There has also been a tendency towards radical action by small retailers protesting high taxation and competition from chain stores. In France, for example, the sabotage of tax collection offices and the premises of stronger competitors has occurred. Similar techniques have been employed by activists from ethnic minority groups, with the intensity of action occasionally reaching the stage of pitched street battles.

Demonstrations by youth, and particularly student youth, have assumed a wide variety of forms. Such "traditional" kinds of academic protest as brief sit-ins or boycotts of lectures by unpopular professors have been supplemented by direct action—including physical violence—against faculty members regarded by the students as lacking sympathy towards their point of view. Demonstrations in separate educational establishments have become synchronized and extended in time, and occasionally accompanied by vandalism. Young demonstrators have also made extensive use of civil disobedience and other obstructive tactics in order to register opposition to activities which they consider irrelevant or objectionable. In extreme cases, large areas of certain cities have been taken over by young people and blocked off to others.

In the light of such developments, the authorities in some western European countries have expressed considerable alarm over what they regard as major threats to public order, and strong legal countermeasures have been developed.⁶⁰ However, since legal procedures are normally rather slow, and since courts have traditionally shown considerable solicitude for the constitutional rights of the accused, direct action by the police seems to be regarded as the principal instrument for the suppression of protests and demonstrations. Antagonisms between the police and certain alienated groups, especially radical students, has thus had ample opportunity to erupt, with both sides frequently over-reacting. In some countries, conflict between youth and the police has been intensified by the participation of riot police units specially trained to apply physical violence as a deterrent. On the other hand, there is also evidence of growing alarm, on the part of some police authorities, over the deterioration of communication and mutual respect between the police and the public; in these cases, the authorities have evinced increasing interest in utilizing techniques of public relations and community organization.

⁶⁰ In France, for instance, the so-called *anticasseur* law of 1970 renders leaders (and participants, if arrested on the spot) of unauthorized public demonstrations criminally responsible and liable in civil law for material damage caused by such demonstrations.

SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT IN NORTH AMERICA, AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND

AN OVERVIEW OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC TRENDS

In the period under review, economic prosperity in the countries of North America¹ and in Australia and New Zealand continued to advance beyond the high levels already achieved by the early 1960s. In all four countries, the annual rate of population growth remained below 2 per cent between 1963 and 1967, and over the period 1960 to 1967, *per capita* real domestic product increased by average annual rates ranging from 2.5 per cent for New Zealand to 3.8 per cent for Canada. Despite decreasing employment in agriculture, there was an over-all increase of agricultural production in all the countries, especially New Zealand. Industrial production also grew substantially, owing to expanded employment in manufacturing, coupled with rising output per worker. Over-all economic progress was especially striking in the United States, where in 1968 the economy grew by \$70,000 million while unemployment dropped to 3.3 per cent, the lowest level in fifteen years. Disposable personal income *per capita* reached a record level of \$2,922; and output per man hour rose 3.3 per cent, twice the 1967 rate.² Levels of living recorded incremental improvements in terms of more satisfaction of physical and cultural needs, including leisure-time activities.³ While private consumption as a percentage of gross national product decreased slightly between 1963 and 1967, there was—except in Australia—a noticeable increase in personal savings. On the other hand, general government expenditure during the same period rose, both in the civilian and defence fields. In Canada, however, a slight decrease in defence expenditures was registered. In the United States of America, Australia and New Zealand, most of the rise in civil expenditure was accounted for by education and research;⁴ there was a proportional

decrease in public expenditure on health services in New Zealand and on social welfare services both in New Zealand and Australia. Governments continued to improve and extend national manpower development programmes aimed at upgrading the capabilities of the labour force, fostering conditions in which these capabilities could be productively employed and creating incentives for wider private sector participation in the provision of employment opportunities. Substantial government expenditures on manpower training programmes have become an integral part of economic and welfare policies in all of the countries. Meantime, there was a considerable increase in the proportion of students in higher education, in relation to total population.

The rapid economic growth and the high levels of living achieved by the majority of the population in these countries have in recent years brought into sharper focus the problems of poverty and the conditions of those individuals or groups who are still outside the mainstream of national prosperity despite the policies and trends described above. Although the levels of living enjoyed by some of the poor in these countries might be considered adequate or even affluent, relative to those of developing countries, the indignity of poverty is found to be as great and less justifiable by those who suffer from it. Thus, there has been a growing concern not only about the incidence of poverty (although this is actually decreasing) but also about the social and economic conditions that perpetuate poverty in the midst of affluence.⁵ A recent report of the United States Department of Health, Education, and Welfare on the social situation in the United States⁶ shows that although personal income in the United States is the highest in the world and the number of persons below the poverty line has declined steadily in recent years, the distribution of income has remained practically unchanged over the last twenty years. Many people are poor because they are unable to work—too young, too old, disabled or otherwise prevented from doing so. According to most recent estimates, the persons in working poor families in the United States, which in 1967 numbered about 16.5 million,

¹ In this chapter, the term "North America" includes the United States of America and Canada.

² The economic picture in the United States of America and Canada considerably changed in 1970. In both countries unemployment rose substantially, production was down and price inflation persisted despite restricted credit policies and record high interest rates, *Monthly Labour Review* (January 1969), p. 11; (June 1969), p. 11.

³ In the United States of America, for example, expenditure on recreation and entertainment rose by 20 per cent between 1963 and 1967.

⁴ In the United States, federal obligations for research and development were increased from \$12,482 million in 1963 to \$16,529 million in 1967 (United States Government, *Statistical Abstracts 1969*, table 773). There are signs that federal expenditures on research in 1969 and 1970 have been cut back as part of an effort to balance the national budget.

⁵ There is a voluminous literature on poverty in the United States published during the 1960s, ironically a decade of great affluence. See, United States Government, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, "Poverty studies in the sixties" (Washington, D.C., United States Government Printing Office, 1970).

⁶ United States Government, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, *Toward a Social Report* (Washington, D.C., United States Government Printing Office, 1969), p. 42.

TABLE 1. OVER-ALL SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC TRENDS BY SELECTED INDICATORS

Indicators	Year or period	United States	Canada	Australia	New Zealand
Population (thousands)	1963	189,417	18,925	10,950	2,532
	1967	199,114	20,441	11,810	2,726
Annual rate of population increase (percentage)	1967	1.3	1.9	1.9	1.5
Per capita GNP at current market prices (United States dollars)	1963	3,166	2,121	1,810	1,756
	1967	4,037	2,805	2,253	2,001
Average annual rate of growth of real GDP at market prices (percentage)	1960-1967	5.1	5.7	4.8	4.5
Average annual rate of growth of real GDP at market prices per capita (percentage)	1960-1967	3.6	3.8	2.8	2.5
Index of production in manufacturing (1963 = 100)	1967	128	129	120	125
Index of employment in manufacturing (1963 = 100)	1967	114	116	111	114
Index of production in agriculture (1963 = 100)	1967	105	97	101	116
Private consumption expenditures as percentage of GNP	1963	63	63	64	62
	1967	61	61	63	61
Savings as percentage of personal disposable income	1963	5	9	11	13
	1967	8	10	7	15
General Government consumption expenditure as percentage of GNP	1963	19	14	10	13
	1967	21	15	13	15
General Government civil expenditures as percentage of GNP	1963	9.97	10.86	7.51	11.29
	1967	11.41	12.01	8.62	12.57
General Government civil expenditures on education and research as percentage of GNP	1963	6.1	—	2.56	2.72
	1967	7	—	3.01	3.39
General Government civil expenditures on health services as percentage of GNP	1963	1.11	—	1.20	2.18
	1967	1.19	—	1.31	1.81
General Government civil expenditures on social welfare as percentage of GNP	1963	0.41	—	0.52	0.15
	1967	0.77	—	0.49	0.12
General Government expenditures on defense as percentage of GNP	1963	8.73	3.95	2.52	1.75
	1967	9.32	3.18	4.13	2.08
Number of third-level students per 100,000 inhabitants	1960	1,983	293	785	837
	1965	2,840	1,651	1,159	2,100

are still expected to number about 12.6 million in 1974.⁷ The Economic Council of Canada points out that the distribution of family income has remained almost constant over the last fifteen years, and the share of the total income received by the bottom fifth of families has altered only fractionally.⁸ Surveys in Australia among the aged, pensioners and part-aborigines indicate a considerable amount of deprivation affecting approximately 600,000 people among these groups.⁹

It has become increasingly apparent that among the complex factors that contribute to the perpetuation of conditions of poverty in the midst of so much affluence, the following are of special importance: (a) the concentration of the poor in discrete geographical areas; (b) the limitations on self-improvement and occupational mobility due to the lack of education and skills among the poor; (c) the patterns of institutionalized inequality based on ethnic or racial origin and social stratification, and strengthened by the conditions mentioned above;

(d) the deficiencies in personal and community resources available to the poor, including inability to pay for health services or acquire health protection, lack of access to adequate housing, unavailability of commercial credit on reasonable terms, disadvantages in access to legal services aggravated by lack of knowledge by the poor of their rights, and difficulties of access to educational facilities responsive to their needs and specific conditions; (e) the administrative deficiencies in public and private agencies, which often approach the poor as supplicant clients, perpetuating dependence on welfare; and (f) the absence of a comprehensive income maintenance programme.¹⁰

In the past, private charitable institutions, with only limited government support, were the main source of assistance to the poor. With the advance of industrialization, however, private charity proved increasingly inadequate, and the central and provincial or state govern-

⁷ Information provided by the Office of Research and Statistics, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Washington, D.C.

⁸ Economic Council of Canada, "The challenge of growth and change", *Fifth Annual Review* (September 1968), p. 106.

⁹ R. T. Appleyard, "Poverty the other Australia", *The Bulletin* (May 1965), pp. 26-27.

¹⁰ All these problems are discussed in more detail in the following references: (a) L. A. Ferman *et al.*, eds., *Poverty in America* (University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 1968), pp. 315-321; (b) I. L. Horowitz, *Three Worlds of Development* (New York, Oxford University Press, 1966), pp. 101-112; (c) *Towards a social report*, op. cit., pp. 8-12, 22-26, 46-50, 79-88; (d) W. Bloomberg, Jr. and H. J. Schmandt, eds., "Power, poverty and urban policy", *Urban Affairs Annual Reviews*, vol. II (Beverly Hills, California, Sage Publications, 1968), pp. 9-20.

ments began to assume greater responsibility for providing assistance to the poor by enacting minimum wage and maximum working-hour legislation (initially for the benefit of children and women) and workmen's compensation schemes. The depression of the 1930s, with its attendant mass unemployment, spurred these government to expand the scope of these provisions and to adopt new ones in the form of unemployment compensation and public work programmes. In the aftermath of the Second World War, the governments have attempted to create conditions that would promote full employment. The recognition of poverty as a national problem within the past decade has led to the expansion of existing training and assistance programmes and to the development of more refined policy instruments to deal with the unemployed and minority groups, many of whose members have not benefited from the prosperity of the 1960s. In the United States, the maturing social security system has substantially reduced the number of the poor. At the same time, the persistence of poverty amidst prosperity has contributed to widely shared criticism of welfare policies and has led to proposals to overhaul the entire welfare system; doubts have also been expressed in Canada, where welfare policies have come under critical review at several levels of government.

The promotion of economic growth under conditions of relative price stability has been a cardinal aim of all four Governments. Towards the end of the decade, inflationary pressures intensified, with prices rising by an approximate rate of 5 per cent annually in the United States and Canada. In an effort to keep inflationary pressures in check, the Governments of these two countries have adopted a variety of measures, notably in the fiscal and monetary fields, which in 1969 and 1970 had the effect of slowing down, if not reversing, economic growth and increasing unemployment. In Canada, the slowdown in employment growth and an accompanying increase in unemployment has been particularly marked in the Atlantic region and in Quebec. In the United States the economic decline has been particularly marked in the defence and space-related industries, adversely affecting not only production workers but also professional workers.

It is now accepted that continued poverty, in addition to being socially unjust and unacceptable, is increasingly costly to the national economy. For example, in the United States, where the number of poor decreased from 38,095,000 in 1961 to 26,146,000 in 1967,¹¹ federal funds devoted to programmes assisting the poor increased from \$US 9,800 million in 1961 to \$22,100 million in 1968.¹² It has been estimated that the cost of maintaining one poor person between the ages of 17 and 57 years can cost the public purse in the United States as much as \$140,000.¹³ With the recognition that a disjointed

sectoral and incremental approach as practised in the past is not sufficient to overcome the basic conditions of poverty, the new antipoverty strategies have tended to focus on three major areas of effort: (a) planned concentration of development programmes on a regional or multistate basis for the purpose of improving economic and social conditions in rural or urban communities where the incidence of poverty is most prevalent; (b) improved co-ordination of federal, state and local social services in these areas to facilitate comprehensive approaches to the alleviation of poverty and to increase efficiency and eliminate waste and duplication, and (c) revision of welfare programmes, with emphasis on "humanizing" the services, on preventive rather than curative measures and on increased involvement of the poor and minority groups in planning and implementing programmes which directly affect them.

ADMINISTRATIVE STRATEGIES AIMED AT SOLVING PROBLEMS OF POVERTY

Regional approaches

The United States has pioneered in the application of the integrated, regional approach to national development. The first attempt was the creation in 1933 of the Tennessee Valley Authority, a quasi-public corporation, having jurisdiction in a number of states, with a wide range of economic and social development purposes. Experience gained through limited local development efforts under the Area Redevelopment Act of 1961 helped pave the way to the enactment in 1965 of the Appalachian Regional Development Act, which provides technical assistance and loans or grants for social and economic programmes such as the construction and operation of multicounty health centres, soil-erosion control and vocational education. The beneficiaries of these programmes are states, local development agencies and districts, and non-profit corporations and private citizens. Increasingly, environmental control is seen as being most effectively dealt with through a regional approach, involving co-operation between the Federal Government and the states. The Hudson River Compact Law, linking the Federal Government, New York and New Jersey, gives the United States Secretary of the Interior the power to review federal projects that could harm the Hudson's ecology, beauty and natural resources. These regional and area programmes are supplemented by the model cities programme under the Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act of 1966 and the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968. The combined attack on the social, economic and physical problems of the slums provided for under the model cities programme envisions extensive local planning with Federal technical and financial assistance. One hundred and fifty cities and towns are eligible to participate in the programme, designed to turn target areas into model neighbourhoods containing new and rehabilitated housing with essential community facilities and social services.

In Canada, measures embodied in the Agricultural and Rural Development Act, 1966, supplemented by the Fund for Rural Economic Development, attempt to deal in a comprehensive way with the economic, social and con-

¹¹ United States Census Bureau Study as reported in *The New York Times*, 3 May 1968, p. 37, col. 8. The threshold of poverty as established by the Social Security Administration was a family income below \$3,060 in 1959 and below \$3,335 in 1967.

¹² Office of Economic Opportunity, *Review of Economic Opportunity Programs*, Report to the Congress of the United States (March 1969), p. 22.

¹³ Economic Council of Canada, "The challenge of growth and change", *op. cit.*, p. 105.

servation problems of depressed rural areas. The Area Development Incentives Act of 1963 includes programmes that are largely concerned with subsidizing capital investment in new manufacturing and processing industries, or with expanding existing ones in areas of low income and high unemployment. The Atlantic Development Board (ADB) was established in 1962 and was given responsibility for stimulating economic growth and for preparing, in consultation with the Economic Council of Canada, an economic development plan for the relatively disadvantaged Atlantic region, encompassing four separate provinces with a land area of 193,000 square miles and one tenth of the national population. The regional planning obligation explicitly imposed on ADB marks the first conscious attempt in Canada to tackle development on a comprehensive scale. The Board was superseded in 1969 by a Council with purely advisory functions and the responsibility for stimulating economic development in additional slow-growth areas in the country; a new Federal Department of Regional Economic Expansion was also set up. The creation of this department represented a further step in implementing the Government's policy of reducing regional economic disparities, an objective regarded as no less essential to the preservation of national unity than the implementation of equal language rights for French and English-speaking Canadians, another major preoccupation of the second half of the 1960s. Among its first acts, the department designated a number of special areas for concerted development activities, with special attention to selected urban growth centres. Attempts at comprehensive planning have so far been largely confined to the integration of manpower programmes with industrial and other economic resource programmes. It has proved more difficult to achieve full integration of social programmes in schemes of regional development.

In New Zealand, where the population is being rapidly urbanized, there is a strong trend towards bringing together the several hundred territorial and special purpose authorities (counties, cities, towns and road boards) in unified regions for development. In Australia, there has been little institutional change favouring regional development, although there has been growing discussion on the most appropriate administrative units within which planning for geographical regions could take place, and on the need for greater integration in planning between the different levels of government and between functional agencies. The discussion tends not to be concerned with economically depressed regions, but focussed instead on a re-examination of long-established political and administrative structures, especially in the light of the continuing rapid growth of the major cities and the difficulties experienced by urban authorities in obtaining access to public funds.

Success in the formulation and implementation of national policies in the countries of North America and in Australia and New Zealand depends to a large extent upon the reconciliation of the powers and functions of the central Governments with those of the state or provincial and local governments. In the federal system of government that is common among three of the four countries—the United States, Canada and Australia (New Zealand has a unitary form of government)—national

authority in certain spheres is exclusive, whereas in others it is concurrent with that of the states or provinces, and in still others, states or provinces claim exclusive authority. In the welfare field there is a tendency for responsibility to be shared between the Federal Government and the states or provinces, with the central authority assuming a significant and growing role. In any event, the relationship between the various levels of government is not constant but varies with changing political and economic circumstances. Under the "New Federalism" concept in the United States, a greater role is envisaged for the states as part of a deliberate effort to redirect power away from Washington and towards the state capitals. In Canada, where the power of the provincial governments is generally growing, constitutional reform involving a realignment of the respective powers and responsibilities of the federal and provincial governments has been a matter of national priority during the last few years and the subject of several conferences. Thus, efforts to initiate national social or welfare policies involve a continuing process of political bargaining and negotiation between the central and state authorities, and in all the countries this is further complicated by the not insubstantial powers exercised by local governments. In this process, the aim of the central Governments to promote acceptance of national welfare or other policies is facilitated by the state, provincial and local governments' growing need for external financial support. Thus, financial assistance constitutes one of the most effective instruments available to the national Government to secure co-operation at lower levels of government. This aid, which is often earmarked for specific programmes,¹⁴ is usually provided on a matching basis with the size of the grant as a rule varying inversely with *per capita* income in the state or province concerned. Such a formula is designed to overcome the reluctance of the less affluent states to take full advantage of available federal grants.

TABLE 2. CANADA : *per capita* PERSONAL INCOME AND FEDERAL DEVELOPMENT EXPENDITURES, 1964-1965

Province	Per capita personal income (in dollars)	Per capita development expenditure (in dollars)	Total development expenditure (in \$1,000)	Population (in thousands)
Ontario	2,153	98	746,000	7,306
Atlantic region	1,241	267	534,000	2,000

SOURCE: Economic Council of Canada, "The challenge of growth and change", *Fifth Annual Review* (September 1968), table 7-1, p. 151. The Atlantic region comprises the provinces of Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island and Newfoundland.

In Canada, where there exists a matching formula favouring the provinces having relatively low *per capita* income, some of the richer provinces received a larger absolute share of the total amount of federal aid, although poorer provinces profited more in relative terms. The table above illustrates these differences in 1964-1965 expenditures.

¹⁴ Sentiment at the State level in Australia and in the United States tends increasingly to favour the provision of federal funds in the form of general-purpose grants, not earmarked for specific purposes.

It is of interest that in all regions except the Atlantic provinces (the lowest income region) the largest proportion of federal development expenditures in 1964-1965 was devoted to manpower development programmes, while most of the expenditures in the Atlantic provinces were on transportation and various undefined programmes. In the United States, the distribution of federal grants among the states follows almost the same pattern as in Canada. Although the federal grants as a percentage of state and local revenues is twice as much for the poorer states as that of the richer states, the total volume of grants is almost eight times larger for the richer states. The following table shows this difference.

TABLE 3. UNITED STATES : DISTRIBUTION OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT GRANTS AMONG SELECTED STATES (1968)

State	Rank among fifty states in personal per capita income	Per capita income (in dollars)	Per capita federal assistance (in dollars)	Total federal grants in million dollars	Federal grants as percentage of state and local revenues
New York	2	4,133	101.31	1,824	16.2
California	4	4,012	107.79	2,037	17.0
Arkansas	49	2,304	123.78	247	36.0
Mississippi	50	2,057	120.00	281	33.6

SOURCE: *United States Government, Statistical Abstracts 1969*, tables 405 and 469.

Co-ordination of services

The need for co-ordination between different welfare and development programmes and the need for ensuring that the benefits from these programmes actually reach the poor, have led to the creation of a variety of new administrative structures. In Canada, the first attempt to introduce a broad co-ordinating and planning mechanism at the federal level was a short-lived special planning secretariat attached to the Prime Minister's Office in 1965 with the object of co-ordinating and stimulating anti-poverty programmes among the various departments concerned. In 1967 this unit was absorbed into the Privy Council Office and has become an integral part of Cabinet social policy planning. In 1968, the Prime Minister established a senior Cabinet committee on social policy, charged with comprehensive social planning and co-ordination functions. Another important development has been the creation of advisory councils in the ministries for welfare, rural development, manpower and consumer affairs. It is hoped that these councils will promote participation by persons from outside government in problem analysis and policy planning, but their effectiveness is yet to be proven. The Economic Council of Canada, established in 1963 and reporting directly to the Prime Minister, enjoys much greater autonomy of study and action than the others; in particular it has helped to bring about a better understanding of poverty in Canada. One tangible outcome of the Council's analysis of the poverty problem, in its *Fifth Annual Review*, was the appointment in January 1969 of a Special Senate Committee on Poverty to investigate all aspects of poverty

in Canada and to recommend appropriate action to ensure more effective remedial measures. In recognition of the need to seek out the views of the consumers of services, the National Council of Welfare was established in 1970 to advise the Minister of National Health and Welfare. Among the twenty-one private citizens on the Council, one half are representatives of the poor and of welfare recipients and other disadvantaged groups.

In Australia in 1968, a Welfare Committee was established in the Federal Cabinet. This Committee, which includes the Ministers for Health, Social Services and Aboriginal Affairs, Repatriation, Housing and Immigration, and a Minister representing the Treasurer,

examines for the Cabinet social welfare priority and co-ordination questions. Many non-government social welfare co-ordinating bodies have been established outside of government, although they have tried to gain some form of government participation. The most general of these is the Australian Council of Social Services, which receives a small subsidy from the Commonwealth Government. There is, in Australia, a widening public interest in the whole question of appropriate co-ordinating social welfare machinery.

The United States is the only country of the four possessing a national agency exclusively devoted to the problems of poverty. The Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 established the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) with responsibility for carrying out the programmes of the "war on poverty". These programmes were developed in four main fields: (a) manpower development training and mobility programmes, (b) individual improvement or educational programmes, (c) community action programmes, and (d) income maintenance programmes. Although the funds appropriated for OEO programmes have been small in relation to total federal social welfare expenditures—\$1,800 million out of the total \$22,100 million in 1968—the roles assigned to OEO by law were of great potential importance for the alleviation of conditions that perpetuate poverty.¹⁵ In its initial phase, OEO was largely preoccupied with setting up machinery for administering the programmes authorized

¹⁵ For a summary description of OEO programmes, see: 1967 *Report on the World Social Situation* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 68.IV.9), pp. 204-206.

by the Act, and was not able to devote enough time to the task of co-ordination—which was in any case complicated by

“the necessity of OEO’s influencing the actions and policies of older established agencies; OEO, a new agency of lesser status in the Federal hierarchy, was unable to bring together all programmes related to attacking poverty”.¹⁶

However, OEO has subsequently made considerable headway in its programmes despite the formidable difficulties it encountered, including those of getting programmes under way as quickly as possible, of developing a new organization with suitably trained personnel, of establishing new or modified organizations at the local level, of delays and uncertainties in obtaining Congressional appropriations and working out relationships with other agencies and with local and state governments. To this list should be added the lack of consensus as to who are the poor for the purpose of receiving assistance.¹⁷ In 1970, the Congress extended the Economic Opportunity Act for a two-year period and made only a few substantive changes in existing programmes, including authorization to undertake new programmes in alcoholic counselling and drug addiction, and to expand the Head Start programme and legal counselling services.

On 19 February 1969, the President of the United States of America announced to the Congress the transfer of two OEO-administered programmes, Head Start and the Job Corps, to the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, and the Department of Labor respectively, as of 1 July 1969. He also directed that preparations should be made for the transfer of comprehensive health centres and foster grandparents programmes to the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.¹⁸ The purpose of placing Head Start—an educational programme for pre-school children—in the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare is to strengthen it by association with other child development programmes within the Department and with the research programmes of the National Institutes of Health, of Mental Health and of Child Health and Human Development.¹⁹

In the Head Start programme, it was apparent that children who had participated in the full-year programme made modest gains in social, motivational and educational terms, and were better prepared to enter the regular school system than the non-Head Start children. Some children were found to have benefited from medical, dental and nutritional services and there was substantial parent participation in the activities of the programme. It has not been possible to determine the long-term effect of Head Start or the extent to which the generally impoverished environment to which the disadvantaged child returns, and the present system of formal education to

which he is exposed, will counteract the impact of the Head Start programme.²⁰

Through the Job Corps’ institutionalized training, corps members had an opportunity to develop work skills and good work habits and to further their academic education. After leaving the Job Corps, many corps members have found worthwhile employment, returned to school or joined the armed forces. Yet the high direct cost of their training—\$6,725 per man-year in 1968—and in some cases the waste involved when members discontinue their training—have been causes of concern. Furthermore, while it has been found that the earning power of men who completed the training increased, there are also indications that the unemployment rate among them one year after training was higher than the unemployment rate immediately after training. The transfer of Job Corps programmes to the Department of Labor was done with a view to incorporating the full range of federal job training and employment services in a comprehensive manpower programme to be developed for the entire nation.²¹

The Comprehensive Health Services programmes including family planning services, reached many individuals who had not previously had access to comprehensive medical care; the programme is geared to providing free and full health care to one million residents of impoverished neighbourhoods. It is expected, however, that the transfer of OEO health services to HEW will bring about a more unified approach within the structure of the Department.

The Community Action Program (CAP) has been one of the most far-reaching OEO activities. While CAP was nominally designed to bring about institutional co-operation and programme co-ordination, there have been various interpretations of its major purposes. Some authorities have considered it in terms of social therapy to assist the alienated poor, while others have viewed it as a means of providing jobs for the poor. A third group saw the basic purpose as the encouragement of wide-scale popular participation in the formulation of the poverty programme, whose benefits would not be effectively used without the involvement of the people it was intended to help. In political terms, active participation was thus regarded as a means of transferring power to the poor in low-income areas.²²

A recent evaluation of CAP indicates that, as a catalyst for institutional co-operation and programme co-ordination, it does not show great success. Shortcomings have been attributed to such factors as the reluctance of related interest groups, such as welfare and civic organizations, to commit themselves to undertakings under conditions

¹⁶ *Review of Economic Opportunity Programs*, Report to the Congress of the United States (March 1969), p. 7.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 6.

¹⁸ “The nation’s antipoverty programs”, message by the President of the United States to the Congress, 19 February 1971, *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, vol. 5, No. 8, pp. 282-287.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

²⁰ *Review of Economic Opportunity Programs*, op. cit., pp. 93-94; “The impact of head start” (Westinghouse, Ohio University), prepared for OEO (12 June 1969), Executive Summary, pp. 3-11.

²¹ On 12 August 1969, the President of the United States of America proposed new legislation to Congress for manpower training which would repeal much of the Manpower Development and Training Act of 1962. According to this proposal, responsibility for the administration of manpower programmes would be decentralized to States and metropolitan areas with local or State employment agencies being responsible for the training of job seekers. *The New York Times* (13 August 1969), pp. 1 and 16.

²² S. M. Miller and M. Rein, “Participation, poverty and administration”, *Public Administration Review*, vol. 29, No. 1, pp. 15-16.

which might dilute their traditional independence; it is also recognized that income eligibility requirements for participation in the programme have been either too lax or too ambiguous to secure the benefits exclusively for the poor. Despite these handicaps, however, 6 million people participated in 1968 in CAP activities administered by 1,012 locally controlled and 5,000 delegate agencies.²³ The effects of these experiments in "maximum feasible participation" have been felt in areas other than anti-poverty programmes: the search for direct involvement of the recipients of services in decision-making processes was followed in the new legislation for model cities, and appears to have an impact in the administration of public schools, universities, hospitals and other public institutions as well. Greater popular participation in community action programmes has created in its wake a number of administrative problems. The proliferation of independently run community programmes has produced—at least in the short term—rising administrative expenses and the inefficient use of resources, against which the social gains arising from popular participation have to be measured. There is now a trend to bring these programmes under greater public control and to consolidate them for the sake of administrative efficiency.

The provision of legal services programmes has also had far-reaching effects. During 1968, there were 1,600 full-time lawyers helping to provide legal services for the poor in 267 projects throughout the country.²⁴ Five hundred thousand cases have been handled, and there has been a large increase in the voluntary services provided by graduates of law schools.²⁵ Several court rulings initiated by the legal services have brought about changes in existing welfare legislation, notably with regard to the right of the state welfare agents to conduct home visits to welfare clients, and to state residence requirements as a condition of eligibility for welfare benefits. Increasingly, recourse to the courts has been used by welfare strategists to expand benefits and restrict state power over welfare clients. Providing legal services to the poor and using the law as a strategy to expand social welfare services have attracted a growing number of law school graduates into the welfare-poverty field and have stimulated the development of a body of law responsive to the needs of the poor and the consumer. It is expected that from 1970 onwards, the emphasis of the legal services programmes will be more on helping the poor to establish self-help organizations, such as co-operatives or business enterprises and on advocating appropriate reforms in statutes, regulations and administrative practices that adversely affect the poor.

The Volunteers in Service to America (VISTA)²⁶ has now moved toward recruiting volunteers with specialized skills in the fields of organizing credit unions, city planning, education and medical care. Growing interest in

VISTA has been shown by lawyers, educators, businessmen and the medical professions. Since the success of most of the individual VISTA volunteers depends to a large extent upon the quality of the projects in which they are engaged and on the operating conditions provided by local sponsors, evaluation of the performance of volunteers has been a complex problem, especially as they represent only one of several groups performing similar services in the community. However, the record of VISTA's contributions in the fields of economic development, health, education and legal assistance, among others, is impressive both in terms of services rendered to individuals and in terms of institutional arrangements that could benefit the community on a long-term basis. To improve the efficiency of the services, VISTA has recently taken a number of steps to improve supervision, training and technical assistance in the OEO regional offices.

Trends in social welfare

Development of the present welfare policies in the countries of North America and in Australia and New Zealand has been greatly influenced by rapid industrial growth and urbanization and particularly by the worldwide economic depression of the 1930s, which gave a strong impetus to the expansion of government responsibilities in the field of social welfare. Social welfare policies in these countries assume a variety of forms. Policies concerned with improving the condition of workers, for example, include regulations on labour-management relations and a number of other measures in relation to the health, safety and wages of workers. Tax policies are also a common means of achieving social welfare objectives through the redistribution of wealth and through such measures as tax exemptions and allowances which recognize social needs and provide indirect public subsidies to families and persons with dependants. A third group of welfare policies is embodied in public welfare activities that operate primarily and directly through public spending, either as cash transfer to persons or as expenditures for the production and acquisition of goods and services which are then transferred to the individual. In recent years, social welfare policies have shown a definite trend towards income transfer programmes and towards the expansion of coverage both in terms of the number of persons eligible for assistance and the benefits allowed.

In Canada, major landmarks in the social security system were reached when the new Canada Pension Plan and the Canada Assistance Plan were enacted in 1965 and 1966 respectively.²⁷ The purpose of the Canada Pension Plan is to make reasonable levels of income available at normal retirement ages and to people who become disabled and to the dependants of people who die. Thus, it is not the general purpose of the Canada Pension Plan to provide retirement pensions only. The universal flat-rate pension is now fixed at \$80 a month. It will no longer be adjusted by the Pension Index, which is an index designed to reflect increases in the cost of living with a ceiling of 2 per cent on its annual increase. The

²³ Office of Economic Opportunity, "1968 year end report" (10 January 1969), p. 3. For further details, see "Congressional presentation — fiscal 1970, Economic Opportunity Programs" (May 1970), pp. 54-60.

²⁴ *Review of Economic Opportunity Programs*, op. cit., p. 107.

²⁵ Office of Economic Opportunity, "1968 year end report", op. cit., p. 5.

²⁶ This programme offers opportunities to adults, eighteen years of age and over, to participate in the war on poverty.

²⁷ See *Canada Yearbook*, 1968, pp. 332-333.

minimum age for benefits under the age-related retirement pension plan was reduced to sixty-five years in 1970, but full retirement pensions will not become payable until 1976. In the meantime, the Guaranteed Income Supplement programme which was introduced by the Government in 1967 to take care of those persons not covered by the Canada Pension Plan and until such time as full benefits become payable under the Plan, has now been established as a permanent programme. In 1971 the Guaranteed Income Supplement will amount to \$95 a month for a married couple who both qualify for pensions and \$55 a month for a single person or a person married to a non-pensioner. From 1972 onwards, the combined amount of the universal flat-rate pension and the Guaranteed Income Supplement will be adjusted annually by the Pension Index for those persons eligible to receive the Guaranteed Income Supplement. The concept of a guaranteed annual income as applied to this age group represents an important new feature in Canada's social security system.

Besides retirement pensions, the Canada Pension Plan provides survivors' benefits as well as pensions for disabled contributors who are otherwise eligible and their dependent children, contingencies which were previously provided for under a variety of social assistance programmes on proof of need. While there is a great similarity in basic principles and procedures between the provisions of the Canada Pension Plan and the United States Old-Age, Survivors, Disability and Health Insurance (OASDHI), benefits under the Canadian combined retirement and flat-rate pensions will be much higher in the long run at nearly all levels of income (see table 4, column 4) when compared with the United States benefits

under OASDHI.²⁸ The following table shows total monthly pensions of aged beneficiaries under Canadian and United States programmes at various earning levels as estimated for 1976.

The Canada Assistance Plan is the latest in a series of reforms that have progressively altered the form and structure of assistance programmes, substituting a more flexible integrated approach for the former approach based on discrete categories of need (for example, the blind, the aged, the disabled, widows and dependent children). The plan is a comprehensive public assistance measure which provides, under agreements with the provinces, federal contributions of 50 per cent of the costs of assistance to persons in need and of selected costs of extending and improving welfare services. Costs sharable under the plan include assistance to needy employed persons as well as those outside the labour market; maintenance of children in the care of provincially approved child welfare agencies, health care services to needy persons, and the extension of welfare services (for example, rehabilitation, counselling, homemaker, day-care and similar services) designed to prevent or remove causes of dependency or to assist recipients in achieving self-support.

The only eligibility requirement for financial assistance is that of need, which is determined through an assessment of budgetary requirements as well as of income and resources. Eligibility for welfare services is somewhat

²⁸ *Ad hoc* increases in OASDHI, however, may have narrowed the gap between the two systems according to information provided by the Office of Research and Statistics, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Washington, D.C.

TABLE 4. UNITED STATES AND CANADA : MONTHLY BENEFITS WHICH WILL BECOME PAYABLE IN 1976
UNDER WAGE-RELATED OLD-AGE PENSION PLANS
(United States dollars)

Average monthly earnings	Payable to single beneficiary aged 65 or over		Payable to married couple aged 65 or over at time of husband's retirement ^a	
	Canada ^b	United States ^c	Canada ^b	United States ^c
50 or less ^d	92.96	64.00	172.86	96.00
100	105.50	82.30	185.93	123.50
150	118.09	101.70	198.49	152.60
200	130.65	116.90	211.05	175.40
250	143.21	132.30	223.61	198.50
300	156.77	146.20	236.18	219.30
350	168.34	161.50	248.74	242.30
400	180.90	176.70	261.31	265.10
450	193.46	191.20	273.87	286.80
500		204.20		306.30
550		218.40		327.60
600		234.60		351.90
650		250.70		376.10

SOURCE: *Social Security Bulletin*, vol. 28, No. 11 (November 1965), table 4, p. 11, as revised by the International Staff of the Social Security Administration, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Washington, D.C.

^a Assuming wife not eligible for benefit based on her own earnings record.

^b Maximum amount of earnings creditable under Canadian system.

^c Maximum amount of earnings creditable under the United States system.

^d In the case of Canada, the words "or less" are not applicable.

broader, extending not only to persons in need but also to those who may become needy if the services are not provided. As an anti-poverty measure the Canada Assistance Plan was conceived with the following purposes in mind: to assist the provinces in providing adequate levels of assistance to persons in need; to encourage the development and extension of welfare services designed to help prevent and remove the causes of poverty and dependence on public assistance; to strengthen the efforts of public welfare departments to prepare and motivate assistance recipients to take advantage of measures to help them return to employment; and to encourage the recognition of assistance as a right.

In Canada, both provincial and national health and welfare programmes have been under critical examination during the latter part of the decade. Reports have been submitted by the Castonguay Commission appointed in 1966 to inquire into health and welfare questions. The Canadian Welfare Council, a national voluntary organization, has published *Social Policies for Canada*,²⁹ a far-reaching examination of current objectives and needed changes in policies affecting social rights, social security, the social services and international development and aid. The Council's recommendation of a guaranteed annual income programme has stimulated widespread interest and discussion in Canada.

In the United States, a very important step recently taken by the Government in the field of social welfare is the financing of medical care for pensioners and needy persons. Two major programmes came into being in 1966 as a result of the 1965 amendments to the Social Security Act of 1935. These were Medicare and Medicaid.³⁰ Medicare provides insurance to pay for a portion of the cost of covered medical and related services in the hospital and outside the hospital for persons aged sixty-five and over who are entitled to OASDHI or railroad retirement cash benefits. Services for which protection is provided include hospital in-patient care and certain out-patient services, recuperative care in an extended care facility, home health visits, physicians' services in and out of the hospital and drugs for in-patients. Medicaid provides grants to States to administer medical assistance programmes that benefit: (a) the needy—all public assistance recipients in the federally-aided categories, including the aged, the blind, the disabled and families with dependent children, and those who would qualify for that assistance under federal regulations; (b) at the State's option, the medically needy and people in the four groups mentioned in (a) above who have enough income or resources for daily needs but not for medical expenses; and (c) all children under twenty-one whose parents cannot afford medical care. All States were required to set up Medicaid programmes by 1 January 1970, or forego federal funds for medical assistance now given under public assistance grants.

²⁹ Canadian Welfare Council, *Social Policies for Canada* (Ottawa, 1969), Part One. Part Two will focus on social planning.

³⁰ These programmes are described in more detail in *Catalogue of Federal Domestic Assistance* (United States, Office of Economic Opportunity, 1969), pp. 231 and 235, and *Social Security Programs in the United States* (Social Security Administration, March 1968), p. 41.

While the attitudes and experiences of the Government in the United States and Canada are becoming more similar in relation to most social welfare policies, important differences may be observed, notably in the field of health and medicine. Canada in 1958 adopted a national hospital insurance plan for Canadians of all age groups. While the plan was a subject of much public discussion, it had the approval of every important health association, including the Canadian Medical Association.³¹ All provinces and territories now have hospital insurance programmes in operation and about 99 per cent of the Canadian population is insured for hospital care benefits. Under the Medical Care Act, passed in December 1966 but not made effective until July 1968, the Federal Government contributes approximately 50 per cent of the cost of provincial medical insurance plans and it is expected that by the end of 1970 all provinces will be participating in the plan. The federal commitment to contribute half the costs is contingent upon the medical insurance plan of each province meeting certain minimum criteria related to the comprehensiveness of the insured services, the universality of the coverage, portability of benefits and operation of the plan on a non-profit basis by a public authority.

In the United States, medical care for the majority of the people is provided by physicians in private practice on a fee basis. Similarly, health insurance is provided primarily by private health insurance companies but nearly 40 per cent of enrolments are in plans operated by non-profit organizations. Nearly all persons aged sixty-five and over (about 20 million) are protected by Medicare, while about half of these persons have, in addition, complementary private insurance protection against expenses not covered by Medicare. At the end of 1969, among those under the age of sixty-five, 81.3 per cent had insurance for hospital care, 78.8 had insurance for surgical services, 69.6 per cent had insurance for services of physicians in the hospital and 47.9 per cent had insurance for prescribed drugs outside the hospital. Total premium income for all types of health insurance companies in 1969 was about \$14,658 million. Claims expenses accounted for about 89.2 per cent and operating expenses for about 14.6 per cent, thus producing a net underwriting loss of about 3.7 per cent.³²

The most recent concern of the Government of the United States of America in the field of social welfare is reflected in new proposals for fundamental reforms in the welfare system. Reforms proposed by the President of the United States are embodied in a package of four measures: (a) complete replacement of the present welfare system, (b) a comprehensive, new job-training and placement programme, (c) a reorganization of the Office of Economic Opportunity and (d) a start in sharing the federal tax revenues with the States. The original proposals provided for a guaranteed minimum annual income of \$1,600 for a family of four—plus food stamps that could amount to \$860 per annum—to be provided by

³¹ R. M. Leach, ed., *Contemporary Canada* (Durham, North Carolina, Duke University Press, 1967), pp. 211-214.

³² Marjorie S. Mueller, "Private health insurance in 1969: a review", *Social Security Bulletin*, vol. 34, No. 1 (February 1971), p. 3 and table 3, p. 5.

the Federal Government, with benefits ending at the level of \$3,920. The programme contains incentives to encourage welfare recipients to work. The category of "aid to dependent children" would be abolished but the "adult categories"—aid to the aged, the blind and the disabled—would be continued.

In Australia, the basic social security system has undergone incremental changes, though there has been no over-all examination of the system since the 1940s. All benefits continue to be financed from consolidated revenue, and the great majority are means tested. The main principles of the original 1908 Old-Age Pensions Act remain intact. Increased attention has been given to the possibility of some form of contributory national superannuation scheme, and during the federal election in 1969, the opposition party supported the idea partly to eliminate the means test. Australian social service payments are not automatically linked with changes in the cost of living or changes in average earnings. The income-tax system, which is exclusively in the hands of the Federal Government, provides tax concessions for dependent children; for expenditure on children's education; for wives and certain other prescribed dependants; for medical, dental and funeral expenses; and for life insurance premiums and superannuation payments. Taken together, these represent very substantial transfer payments or social service benefits,³³ though they are of greater value, both relatively and absolutely, to persons in the higher income groups than to those in the lower-income groups.

After mounting public criticism of welfare policies, particularly with regard to what was considered by many as inadequate financial protection against the cost of illness, the Commonwealth Government in April 1968 appointed the Nimmo Committee to review the system.³⁴ The Committee was, however, required to make its recommendations "in the context of a voluntary health insurance scheme". This mandate was interpreted to mean that "individuals should be free to participate in the scheme or remain outside it; that doctors were free to do likewise; that under the scheme a patient should be free to choose his doctor and a doctor at liberty to accept or reject a patient and that the insurance coverage should be provided by a number of approved non-profit organizations".³⁵ The Commonwealth Government is currently (1970) negotiating with the medical profession to implement the main features of the Nimmo Committee's recommendations.

Another important area of social concern in Australia is that of immigrant welfare. Between 1947 and 1966, about half the growth in the Australian population was due to immigrants and their Australian-born children. The absorption of relatively large numbers of immigrants has apparently been remarkably smooth, but recently new concern for their welfare has been evident, partly because of the stronger competition from other countries

³³ T. H. Kewley, *Social Security in Australia: The Development of Social Security and Health Benefits from 1900 to the Present* (Sydney, Sydney University Press, 1965), pp. 376-377.

³⁴ Australian Government, *Health Insurance: Report of the Commonwealth Committee of Enquiry* (Canberra, Commonwealth Government Printing Office, 1969).

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 8.

in attracting and holding immigrants. The Commonwealth Government has recently established an Integration Branch within the Immigration Department, and is tending increasingly to view ethnic organizations as having an important role to play in immigrant welfare.³⁶

Rural-urban conditions

Rising productivity in agriculture and the increasing application of science and technology to farming practices have been integral aspects of the economic progress achieved in the four countries covered by this chapter. In 1968 only 3 million United States farmers, aided by their families and helped by 1.5 million hired hands—mostly their own children to whom wages were paid—produced food and fibre for 200 million persons in the United States in addition to large amounts for sale and other uses in different parts of the world.³⁷ The development of highly mechanized and commercialized farming enterprise has had two particularly far-reaching socio-economic effects in rural areas. These are growth in the size of farms and change in the proportion of young adults (ages 20-29) to older persons (ages 60-69) in the total population.

It is a well-known fact that under pressure for the reduction of labour and the need to increase capital and managerial ability in farming, small-scale farm operation has become less and less economically feasible in the four countries under study. Farmers who have been able to enlarge and expand their scale of operation have remained on the land, maintaining a high level of income as successful business entrepreneurs. Farmers lacking capital and managerial skills have generally not prospered and many have been obliged to supplement their income from other sources. This group constitutes the bulk of the poor in rural areas, and the main source of migrants to the cities in search of better opportunities.

In Canada, the total farm area remained roughly the same between 1941 and 1965, but average farm size more than doubled from 75 to 160 acres during the same period.³⁸ In Australia and New Zealand, because of the emphasis on cattle and sheep farming, large-size holdings have been an important factor in the trend towards a rising scale of production. The average size of a rural holding in Australia was 4,778 acres in 1966-1967,³⁹ while in New Zealand in 1960, 31 per cent of the holdings surveyed were less than 100 acres in size, occupying a little under 3 per cent of the total occupied land, while holdings of 5,000 acres and over, constituting only 1.3 per cent of the total number, covered 38 per cent of the total area.⁴⁰ In the United States between 1940 and

³⁶ Discussed in Harold Throssell, ed., *Ethnic Minorities in Australia: The Welfare of Aborigines and Migrants* (Sydney, Australian Council of Social Service, 1968), and in *Australia's Immigration Programme 1968 to 1973* (Canberra, The Immigration Planning Council, June 1968).

³⁷ T. Lynn Smith, "Some major current rural social trends in the United States of America", *International Social Science Journal*, vol. XXI, No. 2 (UNESCO, 1969), p. 273.

³⁸ Economic Council of Canada, *Fifth Annual Review*, op. cit. charts 5-2 and 5-3.

³⁹ *Yearbook Australia 1968*, p. 852.

⁴⁰ *New Zealand Official Yearbook 1968*, pp. 728 and 729.

1964, farm land area rose by 45 million acres or 42 per cent, while the total number of farms decreased by 2.9 million or 48 per cent. Farms 2,000 acres and over accounted for only 1.9 per cent of all farms in 1964, but occupied 42.2 per cent of all farm lands.⁴¹

As small holdings become less and less economically feasible, government policies relating to credits, subsidies and loans help to encourage larger holdings, since they tend to be distributed among farmers according to their share of production. They thus tend to enrich the more prosperous farmers, leaving the lower-income group in a position perhaps worse than before.⁴² It has been observed that in the United States, an important consequence of the recent trends in agricultural development has been an abrupt decrease in the number and proportions of lower-income and lower-middle-income farm families.⁴³

In Canada the community development approach has been used in a number of programmes to combat rural poverty, the most notable of these being in the provinces of Quebec and New Brunswick. Between 1963 and 1965, the Government of Quebec, with the help of funds obtained under the terms of the Agricultural and Rural Development Act, developed a comprehensive experiment in rural planning and *animation sociale* for a large area of serious poverty in the Gaspé region of Quebec.

The 1967 amendment to the Economic Opportunity Act in the United States gave particular attention to the problems of rural poverty by directing OEO to provide employment and other opportunities for the poor living in rural areas. Yet, considering the dimensions of rural poverty nationally and the fact that the basic problem of poverty in most rural areas is the absence of a sufficiently broad economic base to provide job opportunities commensurate with the needs of the population, it would seem that substantial alleviation of rural poverty is not within the reach of the Act.

Thus the efforts made through the OEO programme have served mainly to ease the hardship of poverty and to prepare some individuals for eventual employment in rural and urban areas. The Migrant and Seasonal Farm Workers Program, through its vocational training programmes, has served a number of migrant workers in preparing them for jobs and helping them find employment. Since the number reached through these special programmes in 1968 was only 212,000 out of an estimated total of 7 million farm workers and their families, the total impact of the programmes was probably not too significant.⁴⁴

Another rural-oriented anti-poverty programme in the United States is the Economic Opportunity Loan Program for Low-income Rural Families, administered by the Farmers' Home Administration of the Department

⁴¹ Figures based on United States Government, *Statistical Abstracts 1969*, tables 895 and 902.

⁴² Economic Council of Canada, H. Buckley and E. Tihanyi, *Canadian Policies for Rural Adjustment* (1967), p. 49.

⁴³ T. L. Smith, "Some major current rural social trends in the United States of America", *International Social Science Journal*, op. cit., p. 280.

⁴⁴ Figures based on Office of Economic Opportunity, *Review of Economic Opportunity, Programs*, op. cit., p. 116 and "Congressional presentation", p. 117.

of Agriculture. An estimated 2 million low-income households are theoretically eligible to benefit from this programme; however, since its inception in 1964 through June 1968, only about 47,000 borrowers have actually benefited. In many cases, the amount of annual loan repayments have been only slightly less than the increased income derived from the loans,⁴⁵ meaning that the difference remaining in the hands of the borrowers has been quite small.

Accompanying the increase in the scale of agricultural production, there has been a significant shift in the distribution of population between rural and urban areas. The decline in farm-rural population as a consequence of rapid technological progress in agriculture and industrial development in urban areas is a trend common to all four countries discussed in this chapter. There are, however, significant differences in the ratio of young adults (20-29 years) to older persons (60-69) in these countries as between the rural and urban areas. On the whole, Canada has the largest proportion of young adults and the United States the smallest, but in both these countries this group is concentrated predominantly in urban centres, whereas in Australia and New Zealand the ratio of young adults to older persons is significantly higher in the rural areas.

The high proportion of young adults in the urban areas of the United States and Canada has been explained mainly in terms of migration from the farms to urban areas in search of industrial employment and urban amenities. Although the high rate of out-migration from farms experienced in 1960-1965 has eased during more recent years, the problems created by the exodus of young adults from farm communities have not diminished in importance. This will become increasingly apparent in future, as the rural dependent population grows with the increase in the proportion of elderly people.

TRENDS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF URBAN AREAS

In the countries of North America and in Australia and New Zealand, 70-80 per cent of the population lives in urban areas. Australia has the highest proportion of urban population, followed by the United States, Canada and New Zealand.⁴⁶

The expansion of the urban population in these four countries shares certain common characteristics, although in Australia and New Zealand there has been a unique tendency for the population to concentrate in a very few large urban centres. In all four countries, however, a common pattern has developed, whereby urban immigration has initially concentrated in the inner or core urban areas, to be followed by out-migration in the second and third generation, to the peripheral urban areas and by consequent expansion of suburban communities. This process, along with a widespread tendency for industry to relocate in suburban areas, has in many

⁴⁵ Office of Economic Opportunity, *Review of Economic Opportunity Programs*, op. cit., p. 121.

⁴⁶ The percentages of urban population in Australia, United States, Canada and New Zealand are respectively, 81.9, 69.8, 69.6, 63.6; see United Nations *Demographic Yearbook, 1967* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 68.XIII.1), table 5.

instances led to serious decay of the core city areas, which are occupied by more recent immigrants and by the lowest urban income groups. In recent years, however, there has been a resurgence of commercial and high-rise residential construction in the central cities, particularly the larger ones.

Trends of urbanization in the United States during the 1960s represented a continuation of those of the preceding decade, but at a slower rate. The metropolitan areas still grew more rapidly than the national population, but the growth was most rapid in the suburbs. On an average, central cities were the slowest-growing areas, and some central cities actually lost population.⁴⁷ These trends were accompanied by important shifts in the social composition of the urban population, with the proportion of blacks and other minority groups rising substantially and that of the whites declining: during the decade, 14 million whites moved into suburbs as compared with only 800,000 blacks. On the other hand, the black population in the central cities, according to the National Advisory Commission for Civil Disorders in its final report in 1968, increased annually by 400,000, eight times faster than that of the black suburban population, which registered an annual gain of 52,000. Thus, while about 12 per cent of the American population are blacks, this group accounts for about 21 per cent of the central cities population and only about 5 per cent of the suburban population.

Recent studies indicate a substantial reversal of this pattern, with blacks moving in sharply increasing numbers into the suburbs. In the second half of the 1960s, black population growth in the central cities had slowed to 262,000 a year, while suburban gains rose to 85,000 annually. Much of this movement is centred in the 20-30 year-old age bracket. There is evidence, therefore, that like the European ethnic groups before them, blacks are tending to spread themselves throughout the metropolitan areas. However, much of this movement is to black communities in the relatively densely populated adjacent inner suburbs. The patterns of residential segregation of the central cities, it seems, are reappearing in the suburbs.

Greater attention has recently been given to improving mobility for blacks and other racial and ethnic minorities by constructing low-income housing in suburban areas. The availability of a suburban option for racial and ethnic minorities, even if unexercised, could, it is believed, reduce some of the tensions associated with ghetto life in the core city areas. This metropolitan approach to the housing, employment and educational problems of the city has encountered opposition in some suburban quarters, where there is fear that the low-income groups would merely bring with them many of the problems associated with the core city. The power of suburban government units over zoning is often great enough to restrict the availability of low-income housing, and thereby to limit the flow of low-income people—many of whom are black—out of the central cities into the suburbs.

Public policies dealing with problems of urban blight have taken a variety of forms, including programmes in the fields of education, welfare, manpower training employment, rapid transportation and housing. In regard to the latter, all the countries covered in this chapter have adopted housing legislation aimed at broad urban renewal as well as the elimination of slum dwellings. In Australia, a report submitted to the Commonwealth Government some years ago directed attention not only to the housing needs of the country but also included recommendations for planning at the national, state and local levels.⁴⁸ A series of Commonwealth-State Housing Agreements were subsequently drawn up whereby the Commonwealth Government has made substantial long-term loans available to the states for the provision of housing. The Government of New Zealand, using the services of private contractors, has a programme for the construction of rental dwellings and grants low-interest loans to local authorities for the construction of apartments for pensioners; it also facilitates the construction of housing for the Maoris under the Maori Housing Act of 1935, as amended.

In the United States, the Federal Housing Administration was established in 1934 to insure loans for the construction, rehabilitation and purchase of housing; the Housing Act of 1949 placed special emphasis on urban renewal. In 1965, a Department of Housing and Urban Development was created, placing federal housing and urban programmes under a single agency. This administrative reform was widely interpreted as an indication of greater national concern for the problems of the cities. Recently the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) has encouraged the greater use of industrial techniques to overcome the worsening housing shortage in many of the nation's cities. Legislation was enacted several years ago providing a modest amount of funds to subsidize rents in public housing for eligible low-income tenants.

In Canada, the outlines of a critical nation-wide housing problem became visible in 1967 with rising land prices, a shortage of mortgage money and a sharp increase in the rate of family formation and non-family households. To the long-standing problem of inadequate housing among low-income groups, a new dimension was added as increasing numbers of middle-income families found themselves unable to afford the sharply rising costs of accommodation. With the extension of the problem to the middle-income group, housing became a political issue of national concern in marked contrast with the public indifference of preceding years.⁴⁹ A federal task force on housing and urban development, appointed in 1968, recommended against the construction of large public housing projects because of their ghetto-like qualities, and also recommended a freeze on urban renewal programmes involving the wholesale destruction of older housing. The task force proposed that consideration be given to a programme of income supplements

⁴⁷ An excellent summary discussion of demographic trends and of urbanization in the United States during the 1960s is presented in D. H. Wrong, "Portrait of a decade", *The New York Times Magazine*, 2 August 1970.

⁴⁸ See John Wilkes, ed., *Australian Cities: Chaos or Planned Growth* (Melbourne, Australian Institute of Political Science, 1966), p. 1.

⁴⁹ See *The Right to Housing* (Montreal, Harvest Housing, 1969), p. 13.

to permit low-income families to rent or purchase homes in the private market. Subsequently the Federal Government announced its intention to devote a larger proportion of funds than in previous years to housing for low-income families, the elderly and the disadvantaged, and made available in 1970 a sum of \$200 million for experimental housing programmes for low and moderate-income families.

Experience gained in the process of urban renewal and rehabilitation has strengthened belief that the problems of modern cities cannot be solved by *ad hoc*, fragmented attempts to improve physical, social or economic environments. The development of cities, it is now widely felt, should be considered in the broader context of regional and state development plans embodying systematic decisions on resource allocation and the co-ordination and management of urban development services. But even assuming the existence of a regional approach to urban problems, it is far from certain that the complex and interrelated problems of urban society can be satisfactorily resolved. Some social scientists contend, in fact, that traditional methods of urban redevelopment are counter-productive and, even with the support of large resources, are likely to produce greater problems than those they were expected to solve. There is evidence, for example, that despite massive investment in public housing in the United States, the over-all stock of low-income housing in the cities has not appreciably increased; the rising incidence of drug addiction in the cities (a problem that is not solely an urban phenomenon or restricted to low-income groups) similarly poses a severe social problem, which has not proved amenable to solution through conventional legal and medical practices.

In the United States, the most recent experiment in comprehensive urban development has been the model cities programme administered by the Department of Housing and Urban Development. The purposes of the programme are to provide financial and technical assistance to enable cities of all sizes to plan, develop and carry out comprehensive, locally-prepared city demonstration projects, to rebuild or revitalize slums and blighted areas, to expand housing, job and income opportunities, to reduce dependence on welfare payments, to improve educational facilities and programmes, to combat disease and ill-health, to reduce the incidence of crime and delinquency, to enhance recreational and cultural opportunities and to establish better access between homes and jobs. These objectives are to be accomplished through the concentration and co-ordination of federal, state and local efforts, both public and private. The model cities programme particularly seeks to encourage widespread citizen participation and the fullest utilization of private initiative.

By May 1969, several cities had completed their comprehensive plans and were about to request federal funds to implement them, while some others were being selected to receive planning grants. While the ultimate impact of the model cities programme remains to be seen, a study by the Department of Housing and Urban Development of the experience of three cities which had completed their preparatory planning indicated that there had been difficulties in meeting the planning requirements due to pressure of time-limits or, in some instances, to

the inability of federal agencies to guarantee the availability of programme funds. The establishment of priorities amid conflicting local group interests has also proved a major problem. One conclusion emerging from the assessment is that objectives such as co-ordination, citizens' involvement and innovation are open to a variety of interpretations under different conditions. For instance, citizens' participation may simply mean dialogue between the public and those in authority or alternatively, actual popular control of programmes. Furthermore, the main objectives of the programme have not always proved entirely compatible: the attempt to gain citizen participation, for example, has sometimes led to delays in the development of co-ordination and planning, and at times has resulted in factionalism that has obstructed or impaired various aspects of the programmes.⁵⁰

INTEGRATION, PARTICIPATION AND CONFLICT, AND THE PROBLEMS OF YOUTH

Minorities

Various strategies for achieving more effective programme co-ordination and improvement in the delivery of social services also reflect policies that aim at reducing general imbalances in social and economic conditions between different segments of the population. These policies are also related to a growing concern about the causes and remedies of poverty among minority groups such as blacks, American Indians, Puerto Ricans and Mexican Americans in the United States; Eskimos and Indians in Canada; aborigines in Australia; and Maoris in New Zealand. Poverty among these groups is rooted in their lack of opportunities for advancement within the social system and by institutional limitations, which affect their employment, social status, educational achievements and health conditions.

In the United States, the Civil Rights Act of 1965, the "Open Housing" Act of 1968 and Supreme Court decisions outlawing segregation in public schools, transportation and other public facilities, removed legal grounds for racial discrimination and provided for integration in schools, equality of opportunity in education, in housing, in employment and the protection of human and civil rights in all aspects of social life. Federal efforts to promote equal opportunity for minority groups have been supplemented by state and local legislation. The effectiveness of all these legislative measures, however, is as yet difficult to assess.

Despite a reduction in unemployment among blacks during recent years, their unemployment rate is still twice that of white workers. In the younger age group, the gap between the unemployment rates of blacks and whites has widened. Between 1961 and 1968, the number of unemployed black teenagers rose by 25 per cent, while the unemployment rate for white youth decreased

⁵⁰ United States Department of Housing and Urban Development, "The model cities programme—a history and analysis of the planning process in three cities: Atlanta, Georgia; Seattle, Washington; Dayton, Ohio" (1969), pp. 89-92.

substantially from 15.3 to 10.9.⁵¹ Efforts by the Federal Government to promote equal opportunity in employment and manpower training programmes under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, and through the Office of Federal Contract Compliance, have not made much headway.⁵² Furthermore, the black is handicapped by lower levels of education due to inequality in educational opportunities.⁵³ In 1968, the median number of school years completed by persons twenty-five years and over was 12.1, but only 9.5 for blacks; 4.6 per cent of whites and 17.3 per cent of blacks had less than five years' schooling; 11.0 per cent of whites and only 5.5 per cent of blacks had four years or more of higher education.⁵⁴ Given similar employment, black workers with the same education as white workers are paid less.⁵⁵ Poverty among blacks is further aggravated by their concentration in central cities and by the continuous arrival in these areas of more unemployed rural migrants. In 1964, of non-white families in central cities, 30.7 per cent were classified as living in poverty, while only 8.8 per cent of white families were in the same condition. Of the 4.4 million non-whites living in poverty in central cities, 52 per cent were children under sixteen and 61 per cent under twenty-one.⁵⁶ Studies conducted by the Census Bureau in 212 major metropolitan areas show improvements in school attendance among young blacks, but also indicate that unemployment among black youths rose from 22.7 to 30.4 per cent between 1961 and 1968.⁵⁷

Some of the long-term consequences of poverty related to unequal earning opportunities and the handicaps of life in urban and rural slums are reflected in lower life expectancy and a higher rate of infant and maternal mortality. For instance, in 1965-1966 it was estimated that life expectancy among whites was 71 years as compared with 64.1 for blacks. Similarly, infant mortality was 20.6 per 1,000 among whites, compared with 38.7 among blacks. The National Commission on Technology, Automation and Economic Progress summed up this problem as follows:

"... the Negro, in comparison to white persons, has more diseases and disabilities; is unable to function at full physical capacity for one-third more days; is sick enough to require bed rest on twice as many days; and loses one and one-half times more days from work because of diseases and disability".⁵⁸

⁵¹ *Manpower Report of the President* transmitted to the United States Congress, January 1969 (United States Government Printing Office, 1969), p. 43.

⁵² Richard P. Nathan, *Jobs and Civil Rights* (United States Commission on Civil Rights, 1969).

⁵³ For a full discussion of this problem, see United States of America Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Office of Education, *Equality of Educational Opportunity* (United States Government Printing Office, 1966), pp. 3-23.

⁵⁴ United States of America, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, *Digest of Educational Statistics 1969*, p. 7, table 9.

⁵⁵ *Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders* (New York, Bantam Books, Inc., 1968), pp. 253 and 157.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 259.

⁵⁷ *The New York Times*, 1 March 1969, p. 1, col. 4.

⁵⁸ *Adjusting to Change. Technology and the American Economy*, the report of the National Commission on Technology, Automation and Economic Progress, Washington, D.C. (United States Government Printing Office, 1966), pp. 111, 135.

American Indians living on reservations number about 440,000 out of an estimated total of over 600,000, including native Alaskans.⁵⁹ Their median family income is about \$1,800 a year, or less than one quarter of the average non-Indian family income.⁶⁰ A detailed account of the problems of American Indians, transmitted by President Johnson to the United States Congress in 1968,⁶¹ shows that nearly 40 per cent of the labour force on Indian reservations is chronically unemployed, compared with a national unemployment rate of 3.5 per cent for that year, and that *per capita* income and level of education, health and sanitation are far below those of the rest of the population. Recent policy proposed by the 1961 Task Force on Indian Affairs reflects three major goals: (a) maximum Indian economic self-sufficiency, (b) full participation of Indians in American life, and (c) equal citizenship privileges and responsibilities for Indians. The Bureau of Indian Affairs has the major responsibility for the development of Indian reservations. However, the Federal Housing Administration and the Office of Economic Opportunity, in conjunction with the Bureau, provide assistance for housing programmes and other forms of support such as VISTA, the Job Corps and Neighborhood Youth Corps. There is also growing interest in industrial development for Indian reservations.

Unlike other overseas immigrants, Puerto Ricans enter the United States not as aliens but with the right to citizenship. They also bring their own language and culture. Geographical proximity as well as frequent and cheap flights between the island and the mainland has facilitated both a large influx of immigrants and constant commuting. There has been an increasing return migration during the last few years. In the United States, the Puerto Rican immigrant usually finds himself with two major handicaps—his lack of facility in English and his lack of industrial skills. As a consequence, he is often restricted to the worst housing, holds the lowest-paying jobs and has to send his children to the most overcrowded schools. In the East Harlem district of New York, where there is a large concentration of Puerto Rican immigrants, the proportion of families dependent on welfare assistance was 18.2 per cent in 1965—three times as high as the city average. The unemployment rate in 1967 was 9.0 per cent.

A growing number of Puerto Rican migrants have been successful in achieving higher social status as managers, officials and proprietors and have merged into the American middle class,⁶² but there is a crisis of identity among many second-generation youths, exacerbated by the discrimination and segregation experienced in the United States. A variety of political movements in Puerto Rico, mainly concerned with questions of inte-

⁵⁹ *Manpower Report of the President*, op. cit., p. 107.

⁶⁰ Alan L. Sorkin, "American Indians industrialize to combat poverty", *Monthly Labour Review*, vol. 92, No. 3 (March 1969), p. 19.

⁶¹ "The American Indian", Message from the President of the United States of America, 6 March 1968, 90th Congress, 2nd session. House of Representatives, document No. 272, pp. 1-11.

⁶² N. Glazer and D. P. Moynihan, *Beyond the Melting Pot* (Cambridge, Massachusetts, The Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1970), 2nd ed., pp. 110-116.

gration and assimilation into the larger American social and political system, also serve to accentuate the crisis.⁶³ This had led, among other things, to the formation of groups such as City-Wide Puerto Rican Action Movement in New York, aimed at influencing decisions affecting Puerto Rican communities. One result of such movements has been the establishment of Puerto Rican studies in most colleges in the New York Metropolitan area and the formation of Puerto Rican youth clubs in high schools in many cities, including New York, Chicago and Newark.

Between 1950 and 1960, the Mexican-American population, which is mainly concentrated in the south-western United States, increased by 51 per cent, compared with a 39 per cent increase in the total population of the region.⁶⁴ In 1960, the median age of Mexican-Americans was twenty years as compared with thirty years for the United States population in general. Between 1950 and 1960, the percentage of the Mexican-American population living in urban areas increased from 66.4 to 79.1. However, out of the total number of males employed in urban areas of the south-west, only 0.5 per cent were in professional occupations, while 76 per cent were in manual jobs. In California, where there are 2 million Mexican-Americans, 33 per cent live in overcrowded and dilapidated housing (as compared with 7.9 per cent of persons of European descent). A recent government report describes the Mexican-Americans as having been "... left behind surrounded by all the implications that non-growth can have in a progressive industrial society".⁶⁵ Farm workers, who constitute 7.7 per cent of the male Mexican-American population (as against 0.6 per cent of Americans of European descent), experience the most adverse working conditions. They are often migrants, moving from one crop to another in various states, and frequently their only homes are in the field camps. Providing adequate education for their children is therefore a major problem, added to the fact that language and other cultural factors prevent the children from integrating easily in English-speaking schools. A number of organizations have recently emerged to assist in the socio-economic development of the Mexican-Americans. Manpower Opportunities Projects, for example, was utilized to help them in solving problems of employment, while improvement of their working conditions is among the interests of several labour organizations, notably the National Farm Workers' Association (NFWA), which was created in 1965.

In Canada there are more than 230,000 registered Indians, occupying 2,276 reserves under federal jurisdiction; their numbers are growing at an average annual rate of 3 per cent. Estimates of the population of mixed Indian and European ancestry (the so-called Métis), and of Indians who do not live on reserves, range up to

200,000.⁶⁶ Two leading factors have affected the socio-economic conditions of the Indians. First, primary industries—particularly fishing, trapping and logging, which are the major sources of employment for Indians—have declined steadily in importance since 1950, and secondly, the consequent shift in the labour market has been followed by a demand for higher educational qualifications, which few Indians possess. In Canada, as in the United States, there have been growing expressions of Indian antagonism against the Federal Government—which is responsible for Indian affairs—for what many Indians regard as its paternalistic and bureaucratic manner of handling their interests. The Federal Government has recently responded by issuing a White Paper on Indian Policy, proposing far-reaching reforms leading to the integration of Indians into the mainstream of Canadian life. In line with this policy, the special legal status of the Indians secured by past treaties would end, and they would be allowed to acquire legal title to their land and dispose of it as they see fit. They would be provided by the provinces with health, education and housing services, and federal funds would be made available for Indian economic development. Also the federal Indian affairs administration would be dismantled.

The situation of Canadian Eskimos exhibits similar problems. There are about 15,000 Eskimos in Canada, living in scattered camps and settlements of twenty-five to fifty people, mainly in the north-west territories, Arctic Quebec, Labrador and northern Manitoba. The structural changes in the Canadian economy, as described in relation to the situation of the Indians, have also restricted the access of Eskimos to adequately remunerative employment. Although it is expected that by 1970 all Eskimo children will be attending school, as compared with only 45 per cent in 1961,⁶⁷ it is also recognized that the education provided will require continual close scrutiny to ensure its relevance to changing cultural and economic needs. A problem that calls for particularly urgent attention is that of helping Eskimo children to adjust to complex social and psychological pressures that threaten to alienate them from both their own and white cultures.⁶⁸

In order to solve the basic problems facing the indigenous minority groups—problems including rapid population growth, declining opportunities to earn a living through traditional occupations, the low economic potential of reservations and difficulties of adjustment to

⁶⁶ Figures from *Canada Year Book, 1969*, tables 35 and 36, and "Equality of opportunity in a federal system: the Canadian experiment", *International Labour Review*, vol. 95, No. 5 (May 1967), p. 390.

⁶⁷ "Equality of opportunity in a federal system: the Canadian experiment", *International Labour Review*, vol. 95, No. 5 (May 1967), p. 393. The effects of marginal existence, which is the common experience of most Indians and Eskimos, are apparent in health statistics. The infant mortality rate in 1968 was 21 per 1,000 live births for all Canadians, 49 per 1,000 for Indians and 89 per 1,000 for Eskimos. Among Indians as a whole, infant mortality has declined during the past decade from three times the national rate to just over twice the rate. It is noteworthy that at all ages mortality among Indians who have left the reserves falls substantially below that of Indians remaining on the reserves.

⁶⁸ V. P. Houghton, "Educational provision for Canadian Eskimo children", *Race Today* (September 1969), pp. 140-141; and *The New York Times* (13 April 1969), p. 22, col. 3.

⁶³ M. Maldonado-Denis, "Puerto Ricans — protest or submission", *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences*, vol. 382 (March 1969), pp. 30-31.

⁶⁴ The statistical data in this section is from "Mexican-American", testimony presented at the Cabinet Committee Hearings on Mexican-American Affairs, El Paso, Texas, 26-28 October 1967 (United States Government Printing Office, 1968), pp. 76 and 62.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 31.

modern society—it has been proposed that more purposeful efforts should be made to promote full participation of the Indians, Eskimos and the Métis in the cultural, social, economic and political life of the nation. The Minister of Indian Affairs has pointed out that the proposed delegation of responsibility to the provinces for the welfare of Indians would be a major step in this direction, since it would in effect provide services to Indians on the same basis as to all other Canadians.⁶⁹ Although the Indians' reaction to this new policy is not yet clear, there is some evidence of opposition to it on grounds that they might lose their identity and lands, as well as compromise their treaty and aboriginal rights.

In Australia the aboriginal population is about 130,000, or only 1.3 per cent of the total population in 1966. Figures from the 1966 census reveal that 55 per cent of the aborigines are under twenty-one years of age, in contrast to 40 per cent of the non-aboriginal population. It is expected that the aboriginal population will double by the end of the century. Despite improvements in social services provided by the State governments following the Second World War, there is a high incidence of illiteracy, malnutrition, disease and infant mortality among the aborigines. At the secondary school level, the number of drop-outs is substantial; in New South Wales, for example, only one aborigine child in ten reaching secondary school stays beyond the second year. For several decades past, the policy of the State governments, which had exclusive jurisdiction over the aborigines, was to bring them into the mainstream of Australian life. In recent years, however, there has been a new policy of encouraging the aborigines to develop their own culture and customs while at the same time ensuring their equality before the law.

As a result of a referendum in 1967, the Commonwealth Government now shares authority over and responsibility for the aboriginal population with the States. There has been established in the Prime Minister's Department a Commonwealth Office of Aboriginal Affairs to co-ordinate government policy. In an effort to improve the economic and social well-being of the aborigines, the Government allocated \$A 10 million in the 1968/1969 budget for an Aboriginal Advancement Trust Account. About half of this was made available to the States for aboriginal programmes, notably in the fields of housing, education and health, on condition that the States continue their expenditure at or above then existing levels. As part of a programme to help the aborigines to become self-supporting, the remaining \$A 5 million was set aside in a capital fund for loans to aboriginal enterprises.⁷⁰

In New Zealand, the Maori population⁷¹ has in recent years continued to move towards adoption of the ways of life of the white population. Since 1921, their numbers have increased, their educational facilities have improved and they have participated in the modernization of agriculture. The Second World War had a marked effect on

the urbanization of the Maoris, when they began to move in large numbers into the cities to work in essential industries. Returning Maori servicemen took advantage of rehabilitation programmes to train as tradesmen, acquire farms and businesses and attend university. The percentage of Maori children attending secondary school began to increase steadily.

A critical problem at the present time is that of the constantly growing number of young Maoris in urban areas. For the most part, they have no vocational training and consequently must accept low-paid jobs, and in some cases remain unemployed.⁷² Young Maoris also have problems of social and psychological adjustment to city life. In the past, strong family ties and traditional rural social values served to draw urban Maoris together and provided them with stabilizing links to their rural origin. Now, however, rural social traditions are in some respects viewed by young Maoris as impeding their efforts to adapt to social and economic advancement within the modern urban milieu, and in contrast to the older Maoris, who seek to preserve these ties, the younger generation is moving away from them. A major attempt to help young Maoris to overcome problems of integration into the urban environment has been made through the provision of language and vocational training; however, the numbers of Maoris receiving education and training at post-vocational levels, leading to the more remunerative types of employment, are still relatively few.⁷³

Social protest and change

Much of the 1960s was a period of unprecedented economic and social change, marked by varying degrees of social unrest in all the countries under review. In the United States, unrest was particularly noticeable among some minorities and student groups. The sense of deprivation widely felt among these minorities was further exacerbated by the incidence of poverty to be found among them. Rising prosperity, in which most members of these groups participated only in a marginal way, had the effect of casting in relief their low economic and social status and heightening their sense of deprivation.⁷⁴

In Canada, Australia and New Zealand, the national Governments have attempted to deal with the problems posed by disaffected national and racial minorities. In the latter two countries, the movement for change came largely from above with the Government enacting legislation to improve the status of the aboriginal and Maori populations respectively, through programmes of economic uplift, the promotion of equality before the law and the development of a greater sense of national identity. In Canada, as was mentioned previously, the Federal Government is proposing to integrate the Indians into the mainstream of Canadian life. In regard to the French-speaking population, which has waged a strong campaign for cultural and economic equality, the Federal

⁶⁹ *Canadian Weekly Bulletin*, vol. 24, No. 30 (23 July 1969), p. 1.

⁷⁰ Between 1962 and 1967 (inclusive) the combined outlays of the Commonwealth and State Government for aboriginal welfare amounted to \$A 46,031,000.

⁷¹ For basic information on Maori affairs, see *Encyclopedia of New Zealand* (Wellington, R. E. Owen, Government Printer, 1966), pp. 74-75, 476-477 and 527-528.

⁷² P. Almay, "New Zealand: giving young Maoris a better chance", in International Labour Organisation *Panorama*, No. 35 (March-April 1969), p. 25.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, pp. 25-26.

⁷⁴ R. Theobald, "The implications of American physical abundance", *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences*, vol. 378 (July 1968), pp. 11-21.

Government is encouraging the greater use of the French language and the promotion of Gallic institutions.

While protests against social, political and economic inequities have a long history in the United States, a number of characteristics set recent protests apart from earlier ones.⁷⁵ They have occurred in a period of prolonged prosperity; they affect not only diverse ethnic groups, but also emerging groups centring around youth, particularly college youth; they have been essentially activist rather than ideological in orientation, and they have resulted in the emergence of some nation-wide organizations particularly among blacks, largely composed of members of the younger generation.

Despite the reforms of the 1950s and 1960s referred to in the previous *Report*,⁷⁶ the pace of social change has not measured up to the expectations of the black community. Though reflecting a minority point of view, many of the militant individuals and organizations no longer view integration as the ultimate solution to solve the problems of blacks, but the establishment of separate black communities and businesses wherever feasible. This approach, however, is rejected by the more moderate elements, who view such an approach as impractical and inconsistent with American values.⁷⁷ There is strong evidence that the great majority of blacks, at this juncture, are committed to the goal of integration. None the less, the more moderate black organizations have not been indifferent to radical trends in their community and are committed to creating a greater sense of self-identity, increased political power and with this greater influence or control over local community institutions, including the police and the public schools.

A similar movement reflecting heightened group awareness and militancy may also be observed among the Indians and Spanish-speaking population, notably Mexican-Americans, Puerto Ricans and, increasingly, Cubans. As among the blacks, the incidence of poverty, illiteracy and deprivation runs high among Spanish-speaking Americans. The Mexican-Americans and Puerto Ricans also strive for economic advancement and emphasize their self-identity and indigenous cultural values, while a small segment advocates political self-determination.⁷⁸

By the mid-1960s there was a confluence of the Civil Rights Movement with the war on poverty. Increasingly, black and other deprived minorities placed greater attention on economic reforms, calling for increased employment, job training programmes and the hiring of members of these groups for intermediate and top management positions. Government and private industry have responded to these pressures although not nearly to the extent demanded by the poor.

⁷⁵ *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences*, vol. 382 (March 1969), p. ix.

⁷⁶ *1967 Report on the World Social Situation* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 68.IV.9), chap. XVI, p. 202.

⁷⁷ For a historical perspective, see J. H. Blake, "Black nationalism", *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences*, vol. 382 (March 1969), pp. 15-24, and Harold Cruse, *The Crisis of the Negro Intellectual* (New York, William Morrow and Co., Inc., 1967).

⁷⁸ J. L. Love, "La Raza: Mexican-Americans in rebellion", *Trans-action* (February 1969), pp. 35-41; see also M. Maldonado-Denis, op. cit., pp. 26-32.

The drive for greater social justice and social mobility, which was spearheaded by Government programmes such as the President's Committee on Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Development in the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, as well as OEO and Model Cities programmes, was also manifested by the development of other protest groups loosely characterized as the New Left, a heterogeneous movement of predominantly youthful people, white and non-white. A major characteristic of this movement is its desire to reform many public and private social institutions of the country, vaguely identified as "the Establishment". This effort has been largely centred on the campus, where students have demanded a greater share in the decision-making processes of the universities and a reorganization of the curriculum to make it more relevant to contemporary society. Responding to these pressures, many universities have restructured their governing bodies to allow for greater student and faculty participation. Notable in this respect has been the establishment of black study centres and courses to enable scholars and students to study the role of blacks in the history of the United States and contemporary society. Reflecting student opposition to the involvement of the United States in Viet-Nam, the movement has been active in organizing resistance to the military draft and to classified research programmes. Students, moreover, have been active in developing closer economic and social ties between the university and the surrounding community.⁷⁹

The generation gap, a term now widely used to describe these sharp differences between age groups (a gap which is itself in dispute), had traditionally manifested itself over specific issues such as whether young people are mature enough to share in the political and social privileges of their elders. The present gap between young and old goes deeper than this, reflecting, to an undefined extent, a discontent with society as such.

A relatively small but apparently not insignificant number of young people have, to varying degrees, become alienated from society. (The permanence or impermanence of this state is yet to be seen.) This dissatisfaction has found expression in the so-called "hippie" way of life, and in excessive indulgence in narcotic drugs. Some young people have reacted by creating new communes of their own in which they live, sharing their goods and regulating their lives according to their own mores. These seem to have been rather transitory.

Changing values and behaviour

The past decade has witnessed near-revolutionary change in the laws and customs governing individual sexual morality and in such areas as family planning, marriage and divorce and homosexuality. Generally, the trend has been to restrict the power of government to legislate morality and to define acceptable standards of sexual behaviour, a shift reflecting popular demands for greater individual freedom. In the United States, the philosophy, if not the movement, of women's liberation—aimed at achieving equal professional and personal

⁷⁹ For an overview of student unrest on the American campus and other countries, see *The New York Times Annual Education Review* (9 January 1969), pp. 49-79.

status for women—has become more widespread. Family planning, which until recently was actively discouraged in the United States and Canada, is gaining acceptance. Publicly funded and privately supported family planning clinics are growing in number and are becoming more accessible to the poor. Within the past few years, Canada and a growing number of states in the United States have liberalized abortion laws in conformity with an increasing tendency to regard abortion as a personal matter to be decided by a woman in consultation with her physician. Professional medical organizations in both these countries are gradually changing their positions to conform with this new public attitude.

In regard to marriage, miscegenation laws in the United States have been held unconstitutional by the courts. Divorce laws are also undergoing change with a marked trend in the United States and Canada to broaden the grounds for obtaining divorce. In 1968, Canada's divorce laws were amended by allowing marriage breakdown as grounds for divorce. In the United States, New York and a number of other states have similarly liberalized laws governing divorce. There is a growing demand in the United States and Canada to reform the laws governing homosexual behaviour by removing such behaviour between consenting adults from the purview of the criminal code. For the first time, homosexuals themselves are campaigning for such reforms as well as for the outlawing of discriminatory practices against them in the economic, social and professional fields. Recently, sections of Canada's criminal code dealing with homosexual relations between consenting adults were repealed. Enlarging on the matter of sexual privacy, the Supreme Court of the United States recently held invalid state laws making it a crime to possess and privately to view obscene matter.

In all the countries under review, but especially in the United States, environmental protection has become a matter of national concern. Air, soil and river pollution are increasingly recognized as direct threats to the physical and mental health of society and ultimately to human survival. Major sources of pollution in these countries are the processes and products of industry. Many kinds of manufactured goods, such as automobiles, have come to be recognized as posing as much of a threat to the environment as some of the industries

that produce them. In response to this problem, new legislation has been adopted at the national, state, provincial and local levels to promote safe air, water and soil standards. In many communities, spontaneously organized citizens' groups are assessing the benefits of industry not in terms of jobs and income only, but also from the viewpoint of the effects on the environment. It is generally recognized that measures taken to deal with the problem—both by Government and private industry—remain inadequate.

The unprecedented availability of consumer goods in the countries under review has become something of a mixed blessing. Apart from its anticipated benefits, mass production and consumption not only contribute to atmospheric pollution, but absorb and waste a large and growing amount of natural resources. Furthermore, despite the undoubted benefits and conveniences of a mass consumption society, it is becoming apparent that material bounty has deleterious physical and psychological effects on the consuming public. There is evidence that, beyond a certain point, the purchase of consumer goods becomes a response to advertising techniques rather than to a felt need, and that ownership of these readily available goods fails to produce an expected sense of satisfaction but rather creates a feeling of ennui from which the individual is conditioned to seek relief through the acquisition of additional consumer goods.

In response to this broad range of consumer-related problems, there has developed in the United States and Canada a consumer movement whose purpose is to educate the public about products which, for lack of foresight or concern, may constitute a hazard for the consumer and the society. Because of the complex nature of consumerism, involving such interrelated issues as the quality and safety of consumer goods, environmental control and conservation, the consumer movement represents a large and disparate constituency, and is waging its campaign across a wide front. Among the objectives it is fighting for are the manufacture of safer automobiles equipped with anti-pollution devices, stricter control of food additives that are a potential health hazards, restriction of the location and operation of industrial projects that mar the landscape, pollute the environment and consume large amounts of limited natural resources, and truth in advertising.

Part Two

WORLD POPULATION SITUATION *

The rapid trend in the rate of increase of the world's population and the effect this might have in defeating the efforts of developing countries in raising levels of living have been emphasized often enough. Both the figures given in this chapter for the past ten years and the estimates for the Second United Nations Development Decade tend to confirm these fears as well as challenge the international community. Demographic trends are summarized briefly and discussed with reference to indices of levels of living, especially in the areas of food and nutrition, housing, education and employment. Projections of the world's population and the proportion of those living in the more developed and less developed regions¹ are given below:

Projection of world population 1965-1985
(Millions)

Year	World	More developed regions	Less developed regions
1965	3,289	1,037	2,252
1970	3,632	1,090	2,542
1975	4,022	1,147	2,875
1980	4,457	1,210	3,247
1985	4,934	1,275	3,659

The annual average rate of increase in the more developed regions would be 1.0-1.1 per cent; in the less developed regions it would be 2.4-2.5 per cent. The world's combined population, therefore, would be increasing annually by 2.0-2.1 per cent throughout this period.

This seemingly very steady growth in global totals masks considerable differences among individual regions and countries, which are growing at different rates, accelerating in some instances and slowing down in others. On the whole, the projections imply accelerations followed by slow-downs; they assume that, sooner or later, the decreases in death rates may be matched or overtaken

* This chapter was originally prepared by the Population Division, with the exception of section F on population growth and levels of living, which was prepared by the Social Development Division.

¹ According to present economic, social and demographic criteria, the following regions have been considered as "more developed": Europe, Northern America, the Soviet Union, Japan, Temperate South America, and Australia and New Zealand. With the further subdivision of Europe into four regions, altogether nine "more developed" regions have been distinguished in the present analysis. For the remainder of the world, fifteen "less developed" regions have been distinguished. The scheme of regionalization is, of course, imperfect and debatable.

by decreases in birth rates. Peak rates of growth may occur in some areas during the 1965-1985 period, and in some areas only after 1985. In countries where birth rates have varied in the past, changes in the age composition of the population would also affect the potentials for future growth. The projections referred to imply slight increases in the rates of population growth in Africa, Latin America, Northern America, Oceania and the Soviet Union, and slight decreases in most of Asia and Europe between 1970 and 1980. On the whole, the general momentum of population growth is not calculated to undergo much substantial change.² Systematic slow-downs would result from the same projections only when they are extended beyond 1985.

Whereas these projections remain debatable in numerous respects, it is significant that they suggest a higher rate of world population growth during the 1970s than has prevailed in any preceding period, followed by gradual slow-downs thereafter. Thus the Second United Nations Development Decade, from 1970 to 1980, may witness the fastest growth of human numbers in all the history of mankind. The absolute numerical increase may rise even in subsequent periods because quite probably the size of the population will increase faster than will the cut-back in the rates of growth.

The correspondence of these results to modifications assumed in fertility and mortality trends will be discussed later, as also the probable consequences in terms of urban and rural population. Because of the assumptions, the population projections imply also various modifications in population age structure. Again, these are more substantial in individual regions and countries than they are in the combined global sums. In the more developed regions, 28 per cent of the population comprised children and youth below 15 years of age in 1965, and that percentage may fall to 26 by 1985; persons aged 65 years and over constituted 9 per cent in 1965, and may amount to 10 per cent in 1985; consequently the segment in the most productive ages, between 15 and 64 years, may remain in the neighbourhood of 63 per cent of the total. In the less developed regions, owing to their higher fertility, 42 per cent of the population were aged under 15 years in 1965, and 3 per cent were 65 years and older, hence 55 per cent were in the ages between 15 and 64;

² In each instance, the current age composition has been taken into account as also past trends in age-specific fertility and mortality rates and their plausible extensions into the future. Alternative trends have also been assumed so as to yield "high", "low" and "constant-fertility" variants of the projections; the figures referred to in the text are those of the "medium" variant.

TABLE 1. ESTIMATED AND PROJECTED AVERAGE ANNUAL CRUDE BIRTH RATES, DEATH RATES AND RATES OF NATURAL INCREASE FOR MORE DEVELOPED AND LESS DEVELOPED REGIONS, 1960-1967, SELECTED PERIODS FROM 1850 TO 1900 AND DECADES FROM 1900 TO THE YEAR 2000
(Rates per 1,000 population per year)

Period	More developed regions			Less developed regions		
	Crude birth rate	Crude death rate	Rate of natural increase	Crude birth rate	Crude death rate	Rate of natural increase
1960-1967 ^a	20	9	11	41	18	23
Selected periods						
1850-1865	39	30	9	40	41	-1
1865-1900	37	27	10	41	36	5
Decades ^b						
1900-1910	34	21	13	41	34	7
1910-1920	26	23	3	40	37	3
1920-1930	28	16	12	41	31	10
1930-1940	22	14	8	41	29	12
1940-1950	20	15	5	40	28	12
1950-1960	23	10	13	41	21	20
1960-1970	19	9	10	40	18	22
1970-1980	19	9	10	37	15	22
1980-1990	19	9	10	33	12	21
1990-2000	18	9	9	29	10	19

^a Demographic Yearbook, 1967 (United Nations publication, Sales No.: E/F.68.XIII.1).

^b World Population Prospects as Assessed in 1960. The long-range population projections beginning 1965 are being revised.

by 1985, the proportion aged under 15 may have diminished to 40 per cent, those 65 years and over may have increased to 4 per cent, and the proportion in ages from 15 to 64 may then amount to 56 per cent.

It is evident that these differences in age structure, especially between the more developed and less developed regions, have important implications for priorities in economic and social investments if the educational and the physical productive capital for rising generations is to be augmented at a desirable rate. The social problems arising from an increased segment of aged persons, on the other hand, are most pressing in the more developed regions. Diverse contingencies and needs will arise at different rates, as can be indicated by projected rates of increase in the particular age segments.

During 1970-1980, the total population of more developed regions can be expected to grow by 11 per cent. During this time, children of pre-school ages (under 5 years) would increase by 17 per cent; school-age children (aged 5-14) by only 2 per cent; persons of working age (15-64) by 11 per cent, and persons of advanced age (65 and over) by 24 per cent. In the same period, the total population of less developed regions may increase by 28 per cent, the number of pre-school children by 21 per cent, school-age children by 28 per cent, persons of working age by 29 per cent, and older persons (65 and over) by 38 per cent.

In absolute numbers the increases calculated for the decade of the 1970s are as follows: the population gain of 120 million in the more developed regions would include an increase by 17 million in the pre-school group, by 3 million at school ages, by 75 million at working ages, and by 25 million at advanced ages. The population gain of 705 million in the less developed regions, on the

other hand, would comprise an increase by 88 million in pre-school age, by 182 million in school ages, by 404 million in working ages, and by 33 million at advanced ages. These summary statements conceal the more diverse conditions that will be experienced in particular regions and countries.

Table 2 which follows shows the four functional age groups in eight major areas of the world, and the expected changes.

FERTILITY

In eight of the nine more developed areas of the world, crude birth rates estimated for 1965 range from 16 to 20 per 1,000, while in fifteen less developed areas, they range from 36 to 49 per 1,000. It is noteworthy how similar the birth rates in the more developed regions have become, while among less developed regions the range is still wide. The estimates take into account the assumption that the birth rate in mainland China is near the lower limit of the high-fertility group and is gradually declining. Certain circumstantial facts seem to support this view, but accurate information is lacking. Elsewhere among less developed regions, the crude birth rate is estimated as 36 per 1,000 in East Asian areas other than mainland China or Japan, 38 per 1,000 in the Caribbean, and 40 per 1,000 in Tropical South America and the smaller islands of the Pacific.³ At the other extreme it is estimated as high as 49 per 1,000 in Western Africa,

³ An estimated birth rate of 25 per 1,000 is also to be mentioned for Temperate South America, a region of substantial economic development but including some areas of less advanced development.

TABLE 2. PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL POPULATION IN EACH OF FOUR FUNCTIONAL AGE GROUPS IN EIGHT MAJOR WORLD AREAS, 1965 AND 1985

1965					
Age	Northern America	Europe	Soviet Union	East Asia	
0-4	10.6	8.7	10.2	12.9	
5-14	20.4	16.7	20.4	24.0	
15-64	59.8	64.1	62.1	59.0	
65 +	9.2	10.4	7.4	4.1	
ALL AGES	100	100	100	100	

Age	Latin America	Africa	South Asia	Oceania	
0-4	16.5	17.7	16.9	11.8	
5-14	26.0	25.8	26.1	21.0	
15-64	53.8	53.7	54.0	59.9	
65 +	3.6	2.8	3.0	7.3	
ALL AGES	100	100	100	100	

1985					
Age	Northern America	Europe	Soviet Union	East Asia	
0-4	10.5	8.6	9.7	11.1	
5-14	18.2	16.2	16.5	20.6	
15-64	61.6	63.3	64.3	63.1	
65 +	9.8	11.8	9.4	5.3	
ALL AGES	100	100	100	100	

Age	Latin America	Africa	South Asia	Oceania	
0-4	15.8	18.1	15.5	12.0	
5-14	25.6	26.9	26.5	20.4	
15-64	54.5	52.0	54.6	60.1	
65 +	4.1	3.0	3.4	7.4	
ALL AGES	100	100	100	100	

SOURCE: United Nations Secretariat, "Report of the Population Commission—World Population Situation: report of the Secretary-General" (E/CN.9/231/Summary/Rev.1), table 2.

Note: Because of rounding, totals are not in all cases the exact sums of the parts.

47 per 1,000 in Northern and Eastern Africa, and 45 per 1,000 in Middle Africa, South Asia and South-East Asia.

In a few of the less developed regions, the beginnings of a break with previously stable high levels can be noted, such as the decreases observed in East Asian areas—for example in China (Taiwan), Hong Kong, Singapore, the Republic of Korea—and in many of the Caribbean islands. With less certainty, small decreases in the birth rates of some other parts of Latin America have also been estimated, and a similar trend has been conjectured for mainland China. No such trend can as yet be discerned among the large populations of most of South Asia and Africa.

It should be noted, on the other hand, that the hitherto very high birth rates among the non-Slavic peoples of the Soviet Union are now reliably recorded as declining.

The available information and conjectures which seem reasonable in the light of present knowledge have been weighed in formulating the fertility assumptions for the population projections already discussed. In the "me-

dium" variant of the projections it is assumed that the annual average birth rate of the more developed regions will continue to hover around 19 per 1,000 from 1965 to 1985, whereas, during the same period, the average birth rate of the less developed regions may decrease from around 41 to about 34 per 1,000, and perhaps even more decisively towards the end of the century. The many speculative elements affecting this estimate must, however, be stressed.

MORTALITY

Estimates of the crude death rate in 1960 ranged from 7 to 11 per 1,000 among the more developed regions, and from 15 to 30 per 1,000 among the less developed regions, again a narrow range as concerns the first group and a wide range in the second. In 1965 the crude death rates in the more developed group also ranged from 7 to 11 per thousand, while in the less developed group they went

from 11 to 27 per 1,000, showing a continuation of remarkable decreases in the latter.

Actually the crude death rates have become insufficient measures of death risks in terms of public health achievements. They continue to be related to health conditions and together with the crude birth rates they continue to determine the rates of natural population increase. But we have already entered a period in which the age compositions of populations, rather than the more specific and partly avoidable risks to life and health, are more directly reflected in the crude death rates. With equal mortality conditions, a youthful population will have a lower crude death rate than one in which there is a larger proportion of older persons. Even if health conditions are not yet comparable to those in the more developed countries, the crude death rates in less developed countries where the high birth rates result in large proportions of young persons, can fall equally low, and sometimes even much lower. In the more developed countries, the proportions of aged persons are considerable or still rising, depending on how long ago the birth rate decreased. In such countries, therefore, crude death rates may no longer fall, and may sometimes even rise slightly, despite continuing progress in public health measures. It should be noted that this has become the case only after a lapse of several decades since the period of greatest fertility decline.

Exceedingly low crude death rates have recently been recorded in limited areas of East and South-East Asia, Latin America and islands of the Pacific Ocean and the Caribbean Sea. For example, the fairly accurate data of 1965 included the following crude death rates: 4.8 per 1,000 in Hong Kong, 5.0 in the Netherlands Antilles, 5.1 in Fiji, 5.3 in the Ryukyu Islands, 5.5 in China (Taiwan) and 5.6 in Singapore. All those are areas of outstanding recent public health achievements in which only small proportions of the population are of advanced ages. Nevertheless, crude death rates of more than twice this order of magnitude were recorded in the following countries, having some of the best health conditions but also considerable proportions of aged persons in their population: 13.3 per 1,000 in eastern Germany, 13.0 in Austria, 12.3 in Luxembourg, 12.1 in Belgium, and 11.5 in Ireland, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. The combination of favourable mortality conditions and, so far, moderate proportions of aged population resulted in 1965 in a crude death rate of 7.2 per 1,000 in Japan, and 7.3 in the Soviet Union. Extreme cases, owing to unusual age composition of the population under otherwise comparable health conditions, can also be noted, such as a death rate of 2.9 per 1,000 in the Panama Canal Zone, and 18.0 per 1,000 in West Berlin.

In view of the strong influence of age composition upon the recorded crude death rate, it is necessary also to compare the estimated expectations of life at birth. These are actuarial measures in which the effects of age composition are eliminated. Expectations of life differ somewhat between males and females. The measures quoted below are averages for individuals of both sexes combined.

In 1965, life expectation at birth was estimated as 69 to 71 years in the more developed regions,⁴ and 38 to

60 years in the less developed regions. These may be compared with estimates of 66 to 71 years for the first, and 35 to 58 years for the second group, in 1960. Whether expectations of life have indeed risen so much within this short recent period remains to be verified by fresh calculations when new census data become available after 1970.

The enormous progress in health, medicine and sanitation implicit in these figures is clear when it is considered that until the second half of the nineteenth century a life expectation greater than 35 years had hardly been attained by any sizable population. Expectations as low as thirty years, and even lower under adverse conditions, were then common throughout the world. At the beginning of this century, many of the most advanced regions of today still had expectations of life no higher than 45 or 50 years.

In the 1950s the radical new improvements in health conditions led to the inference that, except at some of the highest and lowest levels, expectations of life were tending to advance by as much as five years per decade. As a general rule the population projections based on that inference were also borne out by new census results obtained in and around 1960. More recent observations suggest that gains in expectation of life can be even more rapid in a middle range, notably where current expectations are between, say, 45 and 55 years. At lower expectations it may have to be assumed that continuing geographical, cultural or organizational impediments still cause current gains to be somewhat slower. And when high levels are being approached, a slow-down may again have to be expected, because further improvements will then depend on increased expenditures, if not also on new medical discoveries.

The varied age structures should be borne in mind in comparing the crude death rates implied in the population projections for the period from 1965 to 1985. It is estimated that during this period the average death rate of the more developed regions will rise slightly, from about 9.0 to about 9.5 per 1,000, while that of less developed regions may decrease from about 17 to about 10 per 1,000. The gap in expectations of life may also narrow somewhat during that period, though not as much as in the crude death rates. In the group of more developed regions the average expectation of life may rise during 1965-1985 from 70 to 72 years; in the less developed regions, taken as a group, it may meanwhile rise from 48 to 59 years. Again it must be recognized that the future estimates depend on many speculative factors.

Progress in the prevention of avoidable deaths has been distributed unequally among the population according to sex, and very unevenly also among different age groups. The detailed study of mortality according to groups of sex and age draws attention to many particular factors. In most countries the mortality rate for women is lower than that of men but in important areas in South Asia, possibly also in mainland China, this does not appear to be the case. There are also some other areas, for example in Latin America, where until recently at certain ages (sometimes during the child-bearing years and sometimes in adolescence), the mortality rate of women has exceeded that of men. The reasons for differences in the death risks of men and women are many and not

⁴ Sixty-four years in Temperate South America.

easily analysed. On the whole, with recent health improvements, greater gains in life expectancy have accrued to women than to men. Various social, environmental and sanitary factors also cause a different incidence of deaths at different ages. Where mortality is low, the chief remaining causes of death at all ages are malignant neoplasms, cardiovascular and nervous diseases, and, in addition among younger age groups, also the incidence of accidents, such as those caused by motor vehicles.

An important indicator of social and environmental factors is the level of infant mortality. Unfortunately its accurate statistical measurement is often difficult. The widespread acceptance of the loss of many infant lives has sometimes been attributed to a fatalistic outlook on life; it may also have been a cause of fatalistic attitudes. Before the introduction of new methods and the spread of corresponding attitudes, almost everywhere at least 200 or more out of 1,000 live-born infants died in their first year of life. The loss of many new-born infants has probably long been regarded as unavoidable, and had to be accepted as such, in the history of every human society. In some of the less developed regions this may still be the case today. In the more developed regions, where it is measured accurately, average infant mortality had dropped to about 35 per 1,000 live births by 1960, and to 28 per 1,000 by 1965, with a range from 19 to 44 per 1,000 among particular regions. In some of the smaller, low-income countries with good registration statistics, declines of infant mortality to similarly low levels have also been recorded recently. But since there is probably a high correlation between the conditions permitting public health work and those facilitating the establishment of reliable vital statistics, it can be assumed that infant mortality has not declined nearly so much in most of the other less developed regions. In those regions, levels in the wide range from 100 to 200 per 1,000 live births are probably still typical. Despite its often inadequate measurement, this subject has special importance owing to its probable close connexion with motivated attitudes of parents concerning their progeny and their children's prospect in life.

NATURAL INCREASE

As already noted, except in somewhat exceptional areas, both the birth rates and death rates are higher in the less developed regions than in the more developed ones. But the gap in birth rates, between the two sets of regions, is now much wider than the gap in death rates. In recent years, the gap in birth rates has widened further while that in death rates has diminished. It follows that when the death rates are subtracted from the birth rates the resulting rates of natural increase in less developed regions greatly exceed those in more developed regions, and this difference has recently become very large.

In eight more developed and fifteen less developed regions, it appears that in 1965, rates of natural increase ranged from 7 to 11 per 1,000 in the first group, and from 20 to 33 per 1,000 in the second group. How rapidly the difference has widened can be appreciated in the light of the corresponding estimates for only five years before: in 1960 rates of natural increase in more developed

regions ranged from 7 to 18 per 1,000, and in less developed regions from 18 to 29 per 1,000.⁵

In this respect the more developed regions actually comprised two separate groups both in the 1950s and around 1960. For the European regions and Japan, the natural increase ranged between 7 and 11 per 1,000 in both 1960 and in 1965. In Northern America, the Soviet Union and Oceania, however, where rates of natural increase were between 14 and 18 per 1,000 in 1960, they have recently converged to the level of 11 per 1,000. At annual rates in the range of 7 to 11 per 1,000, populations might double within sixty to a hundred years.

For all the less developed regions, with their decreasing mortality, it is estimated that natural increase has risen, except in a portion of East Asia—mainly China (Taiwan) and the Republic of Korea—where the decrease in birth rates may have nearly counterbalanced that in death rates. On the low side, among less developed regions, were Middle Africa, the East Asian mainland and Melanesia with rates of natural increase between 18 and 20 per 1,000 in 1960, and between 20 and 25 per 1,000 in 1965. If such rates persist, populations may double within thirty or thirty-five years. Regions of highest natural increase comprised Northern Africa, South-East Asia, the Middle American mainland and other Pacific islands. These rates were from 25 to 29 per 1,000 in 1960, and from 26 to 33 per 1,000 in 1965. At such rates, populations can double within twenty-five years or less.

The absolute amount of natural increase in 1965 was about 65 million: that is, about 112 million babies were born, and about 47 million persons died. By comparison, a natural increase of 55 million in 1960 was a result of somewhat fewer births (105 million) and more numerous deaths (50 million). But here the trends again differed between more developed and less developed regions. From 1960 to 1965 the number of births in more developed regions diminished from just under 21 million to just under 19 million, the number of deaths, which was about 9 million, increased slightly, and the amount of natural increase diminished from 12 million to less than 10 million. Meanwhile in the less developed regions the number of births increased from 84 million to 93 million, the number of deaths diminished from 41 million to 38 million, and the amount of natural increase rose from 43 million to 55 million.

More diverse conditions obtain when individual countries are considered. In Mexico, for instance, there were 1.6 million births in 1960 and nearly 1.9 million births in 1965, while in both years the number of deaths was almost the same, namely about 400,000. The amount of natural increase accordingly rose from 1.2 to nearly 1.5 million. In Ceylon, births numbered 362,000 and 369,000 in the same two years, and deaths 85,000 and 92,000, leaving natural increase at the level of 277,000. In a growing population, a constant, or even a rising level in the absolute amount of increase can be consistent with a diminishing rate of increase. If the annual amount of increase is also to diminish, the rate of increase would have to decrease rather more rapidly.

⁵ The partly heterogeneous region of Temperate South America may be considered separately. Here, natural increase was estimated at the level of 16 per 1,000 both in 1960 and 1965.

Table 3 shows average annual crude birth rates, death rates and rates of natural increase according to the population projections for 1965-1985. It must be admitted that the more detailed estimates are quite tentative. Many figures will no doubt have to be revised when results of the population censuses to be taken around 1970 become available.

THE CHANGING ROLE OF MIGRATION

In recent decades, migration over long distances has lost much of its previous importance. Overseas migration from Europe, India and China has diminished, while the population in the former settlement regions has itself grown comparatively large. In countries like Australia, Canada, New Zealand and Venezuela, immigration has continued to be a rather important component of population growth in recent years. In certain atypical smaller areas, such as Hong Kong, Israel, Kuwait, Singapore and West Berlin, it has been a major factor, at least during particular years. But some reversals can be observed, such as the immigration into Europe from Northern Africa, Turkey and the Caribbean, and an increased emigration from Latin America to Northern America, in addition to return movements from both the Americas to Europe.

Statistics differ too widely in coverage and concepts to permit a clear measurement of recent trends, but it is probable that people have remained as migratory as they ever were. True, the volume of migration across oceans has become less, but within politically divided continents, notably among countries of Europe and of Africa, inter-

national migration has maintained its previous intensity, subject to varying measures aimed at its control. Internal movements on a similar scale and over similar distances occur also within some of the largest countries, notably in Brazil, China (mainland), India, the Soviet Union and the United States. Though the lack of pertinent data precludes accurate measurement, it is certain that, in virtually all the world's countries, the movement from rural to urban areas has gathered very great momentum. Naturally, the types of migrants involved, and their contributions to economic, social and cultural change, differ in this instance from the long-distance movement—often for the purpose of land settlement—that had been more conspicuous in earlier decades.

Using a very rough gauge⁶ one can estimate that, throughout the world, net population transfers from rural to urban areas amounted to 45 million in the 1920s, 80 million in the 1930s, 90 million in the 1940s, and 170 million in the 1950s. It is probable that this phenomenon has attained an even greater magnitude in the 1960s, but this cannot be evaluated until new census data become available. The rising momentum can be noted in the more developed regions, while in the less developed regions the increase of tempo has been even greater.

Some special types of migration occurring in recent years include the movements of persons leaving areas of political conflict, sometimes in such numbers as to make

⁶ A calculation based on a comparison between rates of growth in urban and rural populations, respectively. For various reasons, the calculation cannot result in accurate estimates of population transfers from rural to urban areas, but the comparative results obtained provide a gauge for an assessment of general momentum and trend.

TABLE 3. AVERAGE ANNUAL CRUDE BIRTH RATES, DEATH RATES AND RATES OF NATURAL INCREASE AS PROJECTED IN EIGHT MAJOR WORLD AREAS, 1965-1985
(Per 1,000 population per year)

Periods	Birth rates	Death rates	Natural rates	Birth rates	Death rates	Natural rates		
			<i>Northern America</i>			<i>Europe</i>		
1965-1970	19.3	9.4	9.9	18.0	10.2	7.8		
1970-1975	20.4	9.4	11.0	17.9	10.3	7.6		
1975-1980	21.7	9.4	12.3	17.9	10.4	7.5		
1980-1985	22.1	9.2	12.9	17.9	10.6	7.3		
			<i>Latin America</i>			<i>Africa</i>		
1965-1970	38.5	10.1	28.4	46.7	21.2	25.5		
1970-1975	37.5	8.7	28.8	46.5	19.1	27.4		
1975-1980	36.6	7.9	28.7	46.0	17.2	28.8		
1980-1985	35.5	7.1	28.4	45.1	15.3	29.8		
			<i>Soviet Union</i>			<i>East Asia</i>		
1965-1970	17.9	7.7	10.2	31.5	14.0	17.5		
1970-1975	18.4	8.0	10.4	29.1	12.4	16.7		
1975-1980	19.8	8.3	11.5	27.0	11.0	16.0		
1980-1985	20.4	8.7	11.7	25.1	10.0	15.1		
			<i>South Asia</i>			<i>Oceania</i>		
1965-1970	44.3	16.8	27.5	24.5	10.0	14.5		
1970-1975	42.8	14.7	28.1	25.6	9.3	16.3		
1975-1980	40.0	12.7	27.3	25.9	8.9	17.0		
1980-1985	36.9	10.9	26.0	26.3	8.5	17.8		

their absorption elsewhere difficult. War refugees, such as the large number of persons forced to leave their homes in South-East Asia, are a particularly severe aspect of this problem. Even numerically small migratory flows, such as the international "brain drain", can have serious social and economic consequences. Much of this movement involves the attraction of highly productive individuals away from developing nations, aggravating the existing imbalance in the availability of trained manpower.⁷

Internal migration for the purpose of settlement in sparsely populated regions is now of significance only in a few countries. Notable examples are the gradual expansion of settlement towards the interior of South America, to the south-west and east in the Soviet Union and to the north-east and north-west in mainland China.⁸

Another common type of interregional migration is temporary labour migration, often periodic or seasonal. This may be international and fairly long-term, as in the case of temporary labour migration from the Commonwealth West Indies to the United Kingdom, the Caribbean and Mexico to the United States, or from southern Europe to north-western Europe. In eastern Europe, the beginnings of temporary international labour migration have recently been noted from Hungary to eastern Germany, from Bulgaria to the Soviet Union, and from Poland to Czechoslovakia and eastern Germany.⁹ Most permanent interregional migration, however, involves movement into areas where the rate of economic and of urban growth is more rapid. Examples are migration from the south to the north of Italy, within the United States to the west and recently to the south, from the interior to the coast of Africa, and from rural regions to urban centres throughout the developing world. This constitutes, then, a part of the general process of urbanization.

URBANIZATION

According to the varied and changing national concepts, the world's population in localities now described as "urban" totalled about 700 million in 1950 and about 1,000 million in 1960, thus coming to comprise one third of the world's population. But while in that decade the urban population grew by 300 million, the general acceleration of population growth has been such that the rural population (1,800 million in 1950 and 2,000 million in 1960), also increased by nearly 200 million.¹⁰ Each of the two groups of regions, the more developed and the less developed, experienced an increase in urban

⁷ A detailed analysis of this complex problem based on case studies and recommendations for action may be found in "Outflow of trained personnel from developing to developed countries" (E/4820 and E/4820/Add.1) and the Committee on the International Migration of Talent, *The International Migration of High-Level Manpower: Its Impact on the Development Process* (New York, Praeger, 1970).

⁸ "World population situation" (E/CN.9/231, September 1969), p. 38.

⁹ International Labour Organisation, *Manpower Aspects of Recent Economic Developments in Europe* (Geneva, 1968), pp. 103-110.

¹⁰ Figures according to *Growth of the World's Urban and Rural Population, 1920-2000* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 69.XIII.3). These figures are not yet revised to agree with the new revision of population projections for 1965-1985.

population of almost 150 million. In the less developed regions, with an initially smaller urban population, this implies a faster rate of growth. But the rural population of the more developed regions actually diminished somewhat in that decade, perhaps by about 25 million; in these regions, therefore, all of the population increase accrued to towns and cities only. In the less developed regions, by contrast, the rural population in that same period registered a gain of about 215 million, and this is considerably more than the urban population gain, estimated near 150 million, which occurred with such great speed.

The revision and fresh projection of those estimates, now in progress, is not yet complete. Use is therefore made of an alternative set of figures referring to "agglomerated" population (in localities with at least 20,000 inhabitants) and "rural and small-town" population (localities smaller than 20,000).¹¹ Different time perspectives concerning modern developments make it appropriate to distinguish trends in Europe (excluding the Soviet Union) from those of other more developed regions, and those of less developed regions.

Europe's agglomerated population came to 160 million in 1950 and 188 million in 1960, and it may attain 214 million in 1970 and 237 million in 1980. The estimated increases in the successive decades are 28, 26 and 23 million, respectively. The rural and small-town population, meanwhile, may amount to 232, 237, 240 and 242 million in 1950, 1960, 1970 and 1980, respectively, indicating only very slight increases. Since small towns would probably continue growing, the more strictly rural population is likely to decrease somewhat. These estimates for Europe, rough as they may be, are interesting considering that at the beginning of this century nearly one half of the world's urban population, and considerably more than one half of the world's bigger cities, were those contained in Europe.

In other more developed regions (Northern America, the Soviet Union, Japan, Temperate South America, and Australia and New Zealand) the agglomerated population is estimated as 185 million in 1950, 262 million in 1960, 332 million in 1970, and 424 million in 1980, increasing by 77, 70 and 92 million, respectively, in the successive decades. These are considerably higher rates than have been estimated for Europe. The corresponding estimates of rural and small-town population are 282, 290, 296 and 291 million, implying relatively little change. Because of faster growth, these regions will surpass the European level of urbanization; by 1980 about half the population of Europe but almost 60 per cent of that of these regions will live in agglomerations.

It has been estimated that for the combination of less developed regions the agglomerated population totalled 190 million in 1950 and 311 million in 1960, and that it may rise to 464 million by 1970 and 693 million by 1980, increasing by virtually one half, and ever rising amounts, in each of the successive decades. By 1980, therefore, the agglomerated population of the less developed regions may have grown to a larger total than that of Europe and all the other more developed regions combined. This conjecture notwithstanding, the rural and small-town

¹¹ *Ibid.*

populations of those regions will also grow very substantially, from 1,468 million in 1950 and 1,704 million in 1960 to possibly 2,036 million in 1970 and 2,431 million in 1980. Despite the fast rate of growth in bigger towns and cities, therefore, the amounts added to small towns and rural localities will loom even larger at least until 1980. In the 1950s agglomerated population in the less developed regions is estimated to have grown by 121 million and rural and small-town population by 236 million. In the 1960s agglomerated population may have grown by 153 million, and rural and small-town population by 332 million. In the 1970s a possible 229 million increase in agglomerated population may be exceeded by a 395 million increase in rural and small-town population. These summary figures conceal wide differences in estimates for individual regions, however. Despite a fast growth in cities and towns, enormous additions to the rural population will still have to be anticipated, especially in South Asia. In East Asia where the total population may grow somewhat more slowly, and in Latin America where the urban population already comprises a large proportion of the total, the tentative projections indicate a gradual tapering off in the growth of rural populations, and this trend may already become apparent in the 1970s.

An increasing proportion of the agglomerated population is in "big cities" (agglomerations with at least 500,000 inhabitants). At the beginning of this century, big cities were more numerous in Europe than in the rest of the world and while they continued growing, cities elsewhere multiplied and increased much faster. The big-city population in Europe can be estimated as 52 million in 1920, 68 million in 1940, and 81 million in 1960. In other more developed regions (Northern America, the Soviet Union, Japan, Temperate South America, and Australia and New Zealand) it is estimated as 41 million in 1920, 77 million in 1940, and 140 million in 1960. In the less developed regions it is calculated as 14 million in 1920, 35 million in 1940, and 131 million in 1960. Big cities of at least 500,000 inhabitants in Europe constituted 44 per cent of the agglomerated population in 1920, 44 per cent also in 1940, and 43 per cent in 1960; in other more developed regions they constituted 49 per cent in 1920, 50 per cent in 1940 and 54 per cent in 1960. In less developed regions they comprised 20, 28 and 42 per cent at the three dates. While it is difficult to project these trends, it is evident that big cities are now rapidly rising to a prominent share of the urban population in the less developed regions also. For an appraisal of the possible magnitudes, table 4 is inserted. In the earlier economic history of Europe, the emergence of big cities, not all of them so very big, appeared to be closely associated with rising levels of industrial development. The more recent observations in many parts of the world show a greater tempo and magnitude of urban growth, though not necessarily accompanied by a similar tempo of industrialization. The character and meaning of city growth, have accordingly undergone some modifications.

The features associated with the urbanization process are so many and so varied among the world's regions that much space would be required to list them and to indicate their probable implications for economic and

social development policies. Cities of historically unprecedented size are emerging in all regions and becoming even more numerous. Regions vary in the composition of their urban populations by large cities and smaller towns, and in the comparative speeds with which cities and towns of different size are growing. They vary in the recruitment of migrants of rural origin as regards their composition by sex, age, family status, education and economic skills. The social processes associated with urbanization are accordingly diverse.

In some countries the growth of urban population is fully paralleled by a corresponding industrialization, development of transport and communications, and by decreases in the relative size, and increases in the efficiency, of the agricultural labour force. In many countries, however, this is far from being the case. All too often the movement of migrants from rural to urban places causes an excessive accumulation of the labour force in marginal service activities, and of families and households in substandard or hastily improvised housing. Nevertheless, judging from the unbroken momentum of urbanization during several decades of the past, even inferior economic and social conditions are rarely a deterrent in this seemingly irreversible movement.

Some policies intended to bring urbanization trends under a measure of control may have partly succeeded in diverting the migratory flow to smaller and geographically more widely scattered cities. However, the general movement from rural to urban areas has hardly ever been slowed down. Very little is known concerning the settlement pattern among small towns, villages, hamlets and dispersed rural localities, or the more detailed prevailing economic and social conditions. Education, agricultural development, investments in industry or improved transport, and most social measures designed to increase well-being almost invariably seem to reinforce the trends towards urbanization, thereby adding even more urgency to the need for further economic and social improvements. Whether intended to assist rural or urban development, an urban bias seems to be inherent in most economic and social policy designs.

POPULATION GROWTH AND LEVELS OF LIVING

Man's dual role in development, both as a source of production and as a consumer, means that population trends are an important factor in economic and social progress. For example, although during the decade 1955-1965 the developing countries as a whole¹² had a higher rate of growth in GDP than the developed countries with market economies¹³—4.8 as against 4.4 per cent—the higher rate of population increase resulted in an over-all annual rate of growth per head of only 2.4 per cent in the developing countries, compared with 3.2 per cent in the developed countries with market economies.¹⁴ In

¹² Countries of Africa (excluding South Africa), Caribbean and Latin America, East and South-East Asia (excluding Japan) and the Middle East (excluding Israel).

¹³ Countries in Europe, North America and Oceania, together with Israel, Japan and South Africa.

¹⁴ *Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics, 1969* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: E.71.XVII.3), vol. II, table 4B, pp. 130 and 131.

TABLE 4. AGGLOMERATED AND BIG-CITY POPULATION IN THREE MAJOR PORTIONS OF THE WORLD, 1920, 1940, 1960 AND 1980
(*Rough estimates, in millions*)

<i>World portion</i>	1920	1940	1960	1980
Total population				
World total	1,860	2,295	2,991	4,318
Europe	325	369	425	479
Other more developed regions	348	442	551	715
Less developed regions	1,187	1,474	2,015	3,124
Urban population (as nationally defined)				
World total	360	570	990	1,780
Europe	150	200	245	310
Other more developed regions	110	185	335	540
Less developed regions	100	185	410	930
Agglomerated population (20,000 inhabitants and over)				
World total	267	432	761	1,354
Europe	113	150	188	237
Other more developed regions	85	154	262	424
Less developed regions	69	128	311	693
Big-city population (500,000 inhabitants and over)				
World total	107	180	352	665
Europe	52	58	81	106
Other more developed regions	41	77	140	237
Less developed regions	14	35	131	322
Multimillion city population (2,500,000 inhabitants and over)				
World total	36	75	142	351
Europe	20	23	24	40
Other more developed regions	16	45	74	146
Less developed regions	7	44	165
Population of super-conurbations (12,500,000 inhabitants and over) ^a				
World total	28 ^b	87 ^c
Europe ^a
Other more developed regions	28 ^b	60 ^d
Less developed regions	27 ^e

^a Estimates for 1980 may be merely accidental results of the method of calculation.

^b New York and Tokyo.

^c Excluding London. Including its overspill, London may then constitute a super-conurbation with more than 13 million inhabitants.

^d Tokyo, New York and Los Angeles.

^e Shanghai and Mexico City.

fact, population growth in some developing countries has more than cancelled out the growth of the domestic product, and the gross domestic product *per capita* has actually fallen. This was the case, for example, in Brazil and Indonesia during the period 1960-1965. In Latin America as a whole, there was on the average a fall of 0.6 per cent in the GDP *per capita* between the five-year periods ending in 1960 and 1965.

Estimates also show that between 1960 and 1968, the developing countries as a group increased their gross domestic product (GDP) by an annual average rate of 4.7 per cent. However, their population increased by 2.6 per cent, which meant that this accelerating rate of population growth held down the rate of growth of GDP per head of population to an average of 2.1 per cent. During the same period in developed countries the average annual growth rate of total GDP was estimated

at 5.3 per cent and the *per capita* GDP at 4.2 per cent, while the population increased by only 1.1 per cent.¹⁵

Food and nutrition

Providing food for future world needs, especially of those developing countries (including mainland China) with population growth rates of 2.4-2.5 per cent a year, will be a serious challenge. By far the greater part of the additional demand for food over the next fifteen years will be due to increases in population, particularly in the developing countries. The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations estimates that the population growth factor will require an increase of two thirds in food supplies over twenty years in the developing

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

TABLE 5. PROJECTED INCREASE IN DEMAND FOR FOOD BY REGIONS, 1962-1985
(Percentage)

Region	Total increase	Increase due to growth in population	Increase due to growth in per capita income	Proportion of increase due to growth in population ^a	Proportion of increase due to growth in per capita income
Asia and Far East	154	78	43	64	36
North-East and North-West Africa	143	87	30	74	26
Africa South of Sahara . .	122	80	24	77	23
Latin America ^b	120	94	13	88	12
All regions	142	82	33	71	29

SOURCE: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, *Provisional Indicative World Plan for Agricultural Development: A synthesis and analysis of factors relevant to world, regional and national agricultural development*, vol. I, chap. I, p. 15.

^a These figures have been derived simply by keeping the proportions the same as in the two previous columns. This appears to make common sense but mathematically it is not satisfactory. In addition to the impact of each factor there is a joint impact, which cannot really be meaningfully allocated. By another (logarithmic) method, the proportions came out at 67 and 33 instead of 71 and 29. The broad conclusion is still the same.

^b Including continental Latin America and excluding the Caribbean Islands.

countries merely to maintain existing nutrition levels and patterns of consumption. The demand for food in developing countries as a whole by 1985 will be about 140 per cent greater than the 1962 level. At least two thirds of the increase will come from population growth. Another third will result from assumed higher *per capita* consumption as income levels rise. In the same period, the past trend in food produced in the developing countries and retained for domestic consumption is between 2.6 per cent and 2.7 per cent. To meet projected demands this figure will need to be stepped up to about 3.9 per cent for the period 1962-1985. Since part of this period has elapsed without such a quickening in growth rates, it is estimated that the increase from 1967 to 1985 would need to be 4.3 per cent a year.¹⁶

Housing

To house the world's growing population, about 1,400 million new dwellings must be constructed by the end of this century. That is, an average of 47 million dwellings must be constructed each year (about ten per thousand people).¹⁷ The housing shortage, however, has continued and even grown worse during the First United Nations Development Decade. Although the goal for the decade called for the annual construction of ten dwellings per thousand people, according to statistics available,¹⁸ for some developing countries, only 0.5 to 3.0 dwellings per thousand inhabitants were completed in 1968. In most developed countries the average has also been below the suggested ten units per thousand

inhabitants. With the projected rate of population growth, shown in table 6, before the end of this century, 1,100-1,400 million new dwelling units will be required in the world. Assuming a medium estimate of 1,250 million, an average annual output of more than 40 million new dwellings are required, about 10 million in the more developed countries and 30 million in the less developed areas.

Education

Rapid population growth has a direct influence on educational problems. As was noted earlier, in developed countries between 1970 and 1980, the population of children of pre-school age is expected to increase by 17 per cent and of school age by 2 per cent, whereas in the developing countries the estimated increase will be 21 per cent and 28 per cent respectively. The fact is that the educational budgets of most developing countries would seem to have reached the limit of their resources as will be discussed later. Moreover, as unit costs have increased, some developing countries have actually begun to hold the line, if not to retreat somewhat, with regard to numerical educational goals at the primary school level. Efforts for improving education in many developing countries are offset by uncontrolled population growth. For example,

"the proportion of illiterate adults fell from 44.3 per cent in 1950 to 39.3 per cent in 1960 in the world, and from 42.8 per cent to 37.0 per cent among UNESCO's member States; but because of the rise in population, the absolute total of illiterates has increased by 40 million in the world and by 20 million in the member States, and if current trends remain unchanged up to 1970 these absolute figures will rise still further, to 70 and 40 million respectively".¹⁹

¹⁶ Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, *Provisional Indicative World Plan for Agricultural Development: A synthesis and analysis of factors relevant to world, regional and national agricultural development*, vol. I, chap. I, pp. 12-13.

¹⁷ For full discussion, see the report of the Secretary-General, "Housing, building and planning: problems and priorities in human settlements" (A/8037).

¹⁸ *Statistical Yearbook 1969* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: E/F.70.XVII.1).

¹⁹ United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, *Educational Planning: A World Survey of Problems and Prospects* (Belgium, 1970), p. 77.

TABLE 6. TENTATIVE ESTIMATES OF POPULATION AND OF HOUSING REQUIREMENTS, 1970-2000
(Millions)

Data	More developed areas		Less developed areas		World total	
	1970	2000	1970	2000	1970	2000
Population ^a	945	1,266	2,647	4,864	3,592	6,130
Housing needs						
Dwellings which should be constructed for:						
(a) Natural increase of households	Minimum 110		540		650	
	Maximum 200		670		870	
(b) Replacement	Minimum 144		346		490	
	Maximum 161		382		543	
TOTAL	Minimum 254		886		1,140	
	Maximum 361		1,052		1,413	

SOURCE: "Housing, building and planning: problems and priorities in human settlements" (A/8037), p. 54.

^a World Population Prospects (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 66.XIII.2). Population estimates according to the medium variant.

TABLE 7. TOTAL POPULATION, LABOUR FORCE AND PARTICIPATION RATES IN INDUSTRIALIZED AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, 1950-1980

Item	1950	1960	1970	1980
Total population (thousands):				
World	2,515,668	2,997,277	3,596,589	4,339,921
Industrialized countries	872,252	994,038	1,109,555	1,233,564
Developing countries ^a	1,643,416	2,003,239	2,487,034	3,106,357
South Asia	697,018	865,247	1,106,907	1,420,257
East Asia ^b	601,479	703,933	809,838	930,398
Africa	221,535	272,877	345,971	448,871
Latin America	162,283	212,430	283,269	378,442
Oceania ^b	1,900	2,167	2,550	3,105
Labour force (thousands):				
World	1,137,827	1,296,140	1,509,224	1,791,414
Industrialized countries	393,328	446,680	497,590	553,284
Developing countries ^a	744,499	849,460	1,011,634	1,238,130
South Asia	302,026	349,110	419,782	520,173
East Asia ^b	302,969	334,339	384,177	453,024
Africa	98,499	112,124	136,348	168,338
Latin America	56,560	71,363	92,212	121,579
Oceania ^c	780	865	989	1,164
Percentage participation rates:				
World	45.2	43.2	42.0	41.3
Industrialized countries	45.1	44.9	44.8	44.9
Developing countries	45.3	42.4	40.7	39.9
South Asia	43.3	40.3	37.9	36.6
East Asia ^b	50.4	47.5	47.4	48.7
Africa	44.5	41.1	39.4	37.5
Latin America	34.9	33.6	32.6	32.1
Oceania ^c	41.1	39.9	38.8	37.5

SOURCE: International Labour Organisation, *The World Employment Programme: Report of the Director-General to the International Labour Conference* (Geneva, ILO, 1969), table II, p. 19.

Note: The projections for total world population appearing in this table differ from those in the text (see the second paragraph of this chapter) owing to differences in the elements covered.

^a The totals given are lower than the cumulative totals for the regions, owing to the fact that a number of industrialized countries have been included in these regions.

^b Excluding Japan.

^c Excluding Australia, New Zealand, Polynesia and Micronesia.

TABLE 8. LABOUR FORCE BY SEX AND BROAD AGE GROUP IN THE MAJOR AREAS OF THE WORLD, 1950-1980
(Millions)

Major areas and age groups	Male				Female			
	1950	1960	1970	1980	1950	1960	1970	1980
East Asia ^a	196.6	221.0	251.9	292.0	142.7	157.5	184.1	216.6
0-14	4.3	4.6	3.0	2.4	4.1	3.7	2.8	1.6
15-19	25.1	26.1	29.4	28.6	22.9	23.8	27.1	27.0
20-64	162.3	184.3	212.1	251.8	111.3	124.9	148.1	180.6
65 and over	4.9	6.0	7.4	9.2	4.4	5.1	6.1	7.4
South Asia	209.0	241.4	292.4	365.4	93.0	107.7	127.4	154.7
0-14	13.4	14.8	15.3	13.7	7.8	9.2	10.0	10.0
15-19	25.6	29.0	36.4	45.6	12.2	14.7	18.5	23.1
20-64	163.6	190.0	231.2	294.5	71.5	81.6	96.2	118.5
65 and over	6.4	7.6	9.5	11.6	1.5	2.2	2.7	3.1
Europe ^b	164.3	180.8	199.2	221.0	106.5	121.3	128.0	135.9
0-14	2.5	1.9	1.5	1.0	1.8	1.5	1.2	0.6
15-19	18.8	15.3	18.1	17.0	15.4	12.5	15.0	13.9
20-64	135.5	156.6	171.0	193.4	85.3	102.8	106.1	114.7
65 and over	7.5	7.0	8.6	9.6	4.0	4.5	5.7	6.7
Africa	63.8	74.3	91.7	114.9	34.7	37.8	44.6	53.5
0-14	3.6	3.7	3.6	3.1	2.1	2.3	2.4	2.4
15-19	9.4	10.5	12.9	16.1	5.7	6.4	7.7	9.4
20-64	48.5	57.8	72.4	92.2	26.1	28.3	33.6	40.6
65 and over	2.3	2.3	2.8	3.5	0.8	0.8	0.9	1.1
North America	47.8	52.8	59.9	69.5	17.9	24.2	30.7	38.1
0-14	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1
15-19	2.7	3.2	4.5	4.9	1.6	2.1	3.0	3.3
20-64	42.3	46.9	52.9	62.2	15.7	21.0	26.4	33.3
65 and over	2.6	2.5	2.3	2.2	0.5	1.0	1.2	1.4
Latin America	46.0	56.9	72.3	93.7	10.5	14.4	19.9	27.9
0-14	2.1	2.5	2.4	1.9	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7
15-19	6.4	7.5	9.6	12.1	1.9	2.5	3.8	5.6
20-64	35.8	45.0	57.9	76.7	7.5	10.8	14.9	21.0
65 and over	1.7	1.9	2.4	3.0	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.6
Oceania ^c	3.8	4.4	5.2	5.9	1.1	1.5	2.0	2.4
0-14	— ^d							
15-19	0.3	0.4	0.5	0.5	0.3	0.4	0.5	0.5
20-64	3.3	3.8	4.5	5.2	0.8	1.1	1.5	1.9
65 and over	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	— ^d	— ^d	— ^d	— ^d

SOURCE: International Labour Organisation. *The World Employment Programme: Report of the Director-General to the International Labour Conference* (Geneva, 1969), table III, p. 22.

^a Including Japan.

^b Including the Soviet Union.

^c Excluding Polynesia and Micronesia.

^d Less than 100,000.

Employment

The labour force does not necessarily grow at the same rate as the population as a whole. It depends on a wide variety of economic, social, cultural and demographical factors, including rates of school attendance, the school-leaving age, the role of women in society and the age structure of the population. Consequently, any projections of the growth of the labour force are bound to be fairly tentative. The total labour force in the world in 1970 is estimated to be over 1,500 million, an increase of about 200 million in ten years. According to projections, the total may be expected to reach nearly 1,800 million by 1980 (table 7).

Between 1970 and 1980 it will be necessary to absorb an increase of 226 million persons in the labour force of

the developing countries, as the labour force will rise by 22 per cent—from 1,012 million to 1,238 million workers. In absolute terms, the bulk of this total will be accounted for by Asia (South Asia and East Asia) where the labour force will increase from 804 million to over 970 million, a probable increase of more than 160 million or roughly 20 per cent. Although smaller in absolute terms, the foreseeable increase in the other regions is relatively even greater: 32 million (23 per cent) in Africa and nearly 30 million (32 per cent) in Latin America. In the industrialized countries, on the other hand, the anticipated increase in the labour force over the same period is about 56 million (11 per cent).²⁰

²⁰ International Labour Organisation, *The World Employment Programme: Report of the Director-General to the International Labour Conference* (Geneva, ILO, 1969), part I, pp. 17-21.

Estimates of unemployment made in different countries may not be strictly comparable since definitions of unemployment vary from one country to another, as do the methods of assessment and margins of error. Moreover, for large areas practically no data at all exist. However, on the basis of the scant information available it may be estimated that around 1960, for all the developing regions, between 5 per cent and 10 per cent of the labour force were unemployed. This estimate states that, taking an average of 7.5 per cent as a basis for calculation (although this figure is probably too low) and applying this rate to the figures given for 1970 in table 7, the number of unemployed in that year would be approximately 76 million.²¹ To these figures should be added the 226 million representing the growth in the labour force between 1970 and 1980. This would mean that for some 300 million more persons, not including dependents, a means of livelihood would have to be provided during the Second United Nations Development

²¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 40-41; the measurement of unemployment in less developed countries is often most difficult to make. Moreover, traditional forms of unemployment are generally pursued under greatly varying degrees of under-employment, which are also difficult to measure.

Decade. These estimates are minimum figures which do not take into account the fact that all "employed" persons are not always fully employed.

Of equal significance is the large number of young workers under the age of nineteen who will swell the world labour force in the next decade (table 8). Even if those under fifteen were excluded from the labour force, there would still be an increase of some 21 million workers in the 15-19 age group. Two thirds of these additional workers will be in South Asia, and their numbers in Asia as a whole will greatly exceed those in the rest of the world together. This age group will represent in 1980 some 15 per cent of the total labour force in Africa, 15 per cent in Latin America and 12 per cent in Asia, as compared with 9 per cent in Europe and 8 per cent in North America, where the "aging" of the labour force is due in part to the increasing numbers of young people attending school and pursuing higher education, and in part to a change in the age structure of the population as a whole. The problem of finding useful and productive employment for young people in the developing countries will be one of the most urgent and challenging for Governments in the years to come.²²

²² *Ibid.*, p. 24.

MEASURES, POLICIES AND PROGRAMMES AFFECTING FERTILITY, WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO NATIONAL FAMILY PLANNING PROGRAMMES

The decade of the 1950s witnessed unprecedented efforts on an international scale to accelerate the economic and social advancement of the less privileged nations of the world. During those years, the emphasis was upon the quality and quantity of investments, and relatively little attention was given to the growth rate and structure of population. But the frustrations encountered in those efforts and advancements made in relevant scientific knowledge led subsequently to widespread recognition of the role of population growth and structure in the achievement of development goals.¹ Taking account of this relationship and of accelerating rates of population increase, many Governments thereafter included measures to regulate population growth as a component of national plans for economic and social development. Thus, just as national planning had gained appreciation and currency during the 1950s as the avenue through which resources could be utilized most effectively for the achievement of development goals in emerging nations,² so it was that in the decade of the 1960s national population planning became widely recognized as a means of facilitating economic and, particularly, social development.

As knowledge relative to national population planning accumulated, it became clear that planning in this sphere concerns aspects of human behaviour that are seldom, if ever, readily susceptible to change. For human motivations and behaviour in respect to reproduction are influenced by the whole structure of society: to change them, it is necessary either to alter appreciably the social fabric or to utilize that fabric to provide the population with sufficient intrinsic motivation to cause its members voluntarily to modify their reproductive behaviour.

Inasmuch as societies or nations, as far as is known, have not previously undertaken organized programmes to motivate their members to moderate fertility, relatively little is known scientifically of the techniques whereby this can be most efficiently accomplished. There is a wide variety of social and other measures that can influence reproductive behaviour, but knowledge has not advanced sufficiently to permit assessments of the separate effects of individual measures, nor of the net effect of a variety of measures. Moreover, the impact of measures and policies thought to influence fertility may vary with the cultural setting and social circumstances. The lack of scientifically derived answers to these and related ques-

tions, particularly as regards fertility change in non-industrial societies, constitutes a serious gap in information relative to the impact of social and cultural phenomena upon reproduction. Any development of needed, useful hypotheses has been handicapped, among other things, by the inadequacy of relevant data. Fruitful work in the area involves research into a great many conditions believed to influence attitudes and behaviour with respect to human reproduction and the application of knowledge gained in many fields.

The spread of national family planning programmes as an instrument of policy aimed at moderating fertility has increased the urgency that attaches to the need for greater comprehension of the effects of various measures and programmes upon fertility. Taking this into account, the United Nations Secretariat in 1968 undertook a study designed to bring together available information on present public and social policies and population action programmes relative to fertility and family size limitation, with a view to enhancing the knowledge of ways in which these policies and programmes may influence reproductive behaviour.³ It was also intended to show how the implementation and effectiveness of fertility-oriented policies may be impeded or facilitated by social and cultural conditions, as well as by the level of science and technology and other related factors.

The report covered the following areas: (a) social, economic and demographic measures that affect fertility; (b) types of official policies in respect to population matters, with emphasis upon their bases, formulation and objectives; (c) health aspects of programmes and methods of fertility regulation; (d) the communications strategy for motivating a population to accept and practice fertility regulation; (e) social, cultural and political factors influencing family size limitation; and (f) the organization, structure and evaluation of national family planning programmes. Although results of the study are instructive for the development and implementation of family planning programmes, and for the formulation of other policies aimed at influencing fertility, the report dramatized the wide gaps in knowledge of the subjects that it addressed and focused on the pressing need for additional information. Selected findings from the report are presented in the statements that follow. They relate to information on social and other measures affecting

¹ *The United Nations Development Decade. Proposals for Action* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 62.II.B.2), pp. vi, vii, 1-7.

² *Ibid.* p. vi.

³ "Measures, policies and programmes affecting fertility, with particular reference to national family planning programmes" (E/CN.9/232).

fertility, including national family planning programmes, and to problems involved in bringing about a voluntary change in reproductive behaviour.

SOCIAL, DEMOGRAPHIC AND OTHER MEASURES AFFECTING FERTILITY

In nearly all countries of the world, government measures favouring high fertility are found along with those likely to have a depressing effect upon fertility. Such measures generally fall into four categories: (a) measures related to the family, such as family allowance programmes, systems of taxation on income, aid to maternity and rewards to mothers; (b) measures of social reform, including compulsory education and child health laws, social security programmes, and laws and programmes intended to improve the status of women; (c) laws relating to abortion, contraception and sterilization; and (d) laws relating to marriage and divorce.

In the developed countries, particularly, measures benefiting the family co-exist with schemes and acts of social reform which lessen parents' need and desire for more children. In many developing countries, however, those among relatively few such measures which have been adopted have often been difficult to implement for lack of financial resources. Liberal and strict laws governing abortion, contraception and sterilization exist in both developed and developing countries, and such laws usually have more relation to prevailing custom and religion than to the intended effect of other social and public and demographic policy measures, including measures designed as instruments of population policy.

Many instances of conflict are revealed therefore between government policy in the field of population and measures enacted that may support or undermine this policy; the possible reasons for adopting any of a great variety of measures in these fields are so diverse that it would be impossible for a country to enact or adopt only those laws and measures that affect fertility in one consistent direction. Nevertheless, in recent years, Governments appear to have become increasingly aware of their ability to influence population trends, and population policies are being supported to a greater extent by social measures.⁴ Consequently, public policy is apparently becoming more systematic. But while Governments may tend more and more to reconcile social and population policy, it is highly probable that some conflicts will continue to exist, in view of the desirability of achieving and assuring other important objectives. The responsibility of Governments for the economic and social development of the nation, for facilitating the realization of human wants and ambitions, protecting the rights of individuals, and promoting the general national welfare may necessarily result in the enactment and implementation of divergent laws and policies. In view of these multiple roles of government, it may be neither possible nor desirable to have a unified policy directed toward a single goal.

⁴ Republic of Tunisia, *Plan Quadriennal 1965-1968* (Tunis, 1965), and Ghana, *Population Planning and National Progress and Prosperity* (Accra-Tema, 1969).

In the past, the enactment of measures to aid the family for example, has reflected social policy but, increasingly, these and similar provisions are intended as instruments of population policy. However, the causal links, if any, between such measures and rational behaviour with respect to childbearing are poorly, if at all, understood. Research needs in this area cannot be over-emphasized.

OTHER RELEVANT POLICY MEASURES

Governments enact laws, adopt policies and implement programmes that intentionally or unintentionally, directly or indirectly, influence the size, growth, composition and internal distribution of population but, as suggested above, it is the fertility component of population change that an increasing number of countries are seeking to manipulate. In the greater number of cases, the aim is to lower the rates of national population increase, although a few countries prefer larger populations and are seeking to achieve the necessary growth through stable or increasing fertility levels. In the first instance, the principal instrument of policy is the national family planning programmes. In the second, the most common measures are those providing incentives to large families though Governments have in some cases applied restrictive measures also, such as banning the sale and distribution of contraceptives.

The national family planning programme

At mid-1969 about thirty developing countries had inaugurated national family planning programmes.⁵ Of these, seven were in Africa, eleven in Asia, nine in Latin America, one in Europe and one in Oceania. In addition national family planning programmes had been initiated in three French overseas departments located in the Caribbean region. Using mid-1968 population data as the base, the combined populations of these countries comprised about 71 per cent of the total for developing regions. If China (mainland) is excluded from those countries with a family planning programme, the figure drops to about 41 per cent. This is not to say that such a large proportion of the inhabitants of developing countries were in a position to regulate family size, only that the Governments were committed to providing information and means that would ensure voluntary parenthood. The situation may be viewed in better perspective, if account is taken also of those developing countries in which an official policy has not been proclaimed, but in which privately organized and sponsored programmes are in effect and flourishing with government support. In still other countries, privately sponsored activities in family planning are being carried out without either government support or interference. At mid-1969, there were some seven and twelve countries, respectively, in these two categories.

The scope of national family planning programmes and their possible influence upon fertility vary greatly from

⁵ An inventory of population and national family planning programmes maintained by the United Nations Secretariat has been published in "Governmental policy statements on population: an inventory", *Reports on Population/Family Planning* (New York Population Council, Inc., 1970).

one country to another. Certainly the degree of government involvement is not an accurate measure of the importance of the programme, nor is its official relationship to the project. Moreover, declaration or announcement of a programme ensures neither its immediate implementation nor its effectiveness. In addition, there are considerable differences within countries in respect to the proportion of the population reached by the programme and the quality of services rendered.⁶

In initiating and promoting national family planning programmes, the Governments of less developed countries have stated various principal reasons. Many have considered that under conditions of unrestrained population growth, it will be very difficult to generate the savings and investments needed to achieve a satisfactory rate of progress in national income or the level of living. No less frequent has been the emphasis on social objectives, as the birth of an undue number of children can be detrimental to the health, social status and economic opportunities of mothers, to the nurture and educational opportunities of the children themselves, and to the dignity of the family. In a number of countries it was felt necessary to combat illegal abortions, frequently resorted to under very hazardous conditions, by making more widely available the use of clinical abortions and of contraceptive methods. Some Governments, particularly in the African region, favoured family planning as an aid to the reduction of sterility,⁷ and nearly all Governments which have in the past few years adopted programmes to promote and aid the regulation of births among their nationals have taken into account specifically the humanitarian principle of voluntary parenthood.⁸

The spread of such programmes as official government policy in recent years has been facilitated by a variety of factors: the general climate of increased awareness with regard to population problems; improvements in contraceptive technology; results of surveys on knowledge, attitude and practice (KAP) with respect to methods of family limitation; and an increase in the reservoir of technical competence and in resources for bilateral and multilateral technical assistance in this field. Moreover, recent experience in a few countries, notably in East Asia, has made it apparent that a rather rapid decline in fertility is a possibility.⁹

Policies favouring more rapid population growth

The Governments of several developing countries have taken the position that a higher rate of national population growth would be advantageous to their economic development. As mentioned earlier, these countries, all of which are in Africa and Latin America, are seeking to achieve such growth rates through either stable or increasing

⁶ One example is offered by L. W. Green and K. J. Krótki, "Class and parity biases in family-planning programmes: the case of Karachi", *Eugenics Quarterly*, vol. 15, No 4 (December 1968), pp. 235-251.

⁷ "Some demographic, economic and cultural considerations in population policies for African countries" (E/CN.14/Pop. 12).

⁸ "Measures, policies and programmes affecting fertility, with particular reference to family planning" (E/CN.9/232), chap. III.

⁹ Analysis of fertility trends in these countries is included in "World population situation" (E/CN.9/231), chap. III.

levels of fertility. In support of this policy, some of these Governments are reported to have banned the sale, advertisement and distribution of contraceptives. The reasons frequently given in these regions for policies favouring higher fertility are low density of population and the consequent problems encountered in efforts to provide adequate facilities and services for a sparsely settled population. While some scholars are of the opinion that the arguments are tenable,¹⁰ the results of some relevant studies have led to questioning of this reasoning.¹¹ Inadequacy of manpower resources and the political disadvantage of a small population have also been given as bases for preferring higher rates of population growth.

Recent policy changes in developed nations

Two trends are evident among the economically more advanced nations. Some of the countries in which humanitarian policies aiding voluntary parenthood have been in force for somewhat more than a decade have recently taken measures to promote higher rates of population growth. At least one of these adopted a unified policy in which means of birth control were restricted and measures were enacted that reward parenthood and penalize bachelorhood and childlessness.¹² But some others among these countries have taken certain steps which ease the burdens of childbearing on the one hand, while taking other actions that further the emancipation of women, thereby generating conflicting currents: measures aimed to achieve the former are associated with high fertility, while the rising status of women is thought to be causally related to lower birth rates.

It is noteworthy that several countries which previously had rather restrictive laws regarding fertility regulation have recently adopted more liberal policies. In the latter cases, the reversals appear to have been motivated primarily by a concern for the well-being of the family, improvements in the status of women and other humanitarian concerns, and not out of consideration for the population growth factor. The Government of one European country adopted family planning as a national policy for humanitarian reasons and as an aid to the reduction of both legally and illegally induced abortions, while another developed nation is seeking to pass legislation that would make family planning official governmental policy.¹³

FACTORS AFFECTING ACCEPTANCE OF FAMILY PLANNING

In those developing countries where they are in force, the family planning programmes are, as previously noted, a population policy measure of which the primary purpose

¹⁰ Relationships between sparse population, population growth and economic development are discussed in *Population Growth and Manpower in the Sudan* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 64.XIII.5), pp. 27-29, 121-126.

¹¹ The relevant views of many Latin American officials and scholars are reflected in *Second United Nations Development Decade: Social Change and Social Development Policy in Latin America* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 70.II.G.3), pp. 340-342.

¹² "World population situation" (E/CN.9/231), p. 194.

¹³ "Governmental policy statement on population: an inventory", op. cit. (New York, Population Council, Inc., 1970).

is the achievement of a reduction of national rates of population growth. But it is widely recognized that a decline in the national birth rate following the inception of a national family planning programme does not necessarily indicate a cause-and-effect relationship.

These programmes are an attempt to implement a relatively new concept based upon new ideas, goals and theories, and they have therefore been implemented without the knowledge that would assure their success. Needs for research encompass a broad spectrum of subject matter and disciplines. The knowledge, attitude and practice (KAP) surveys, for example, have been used to ascertain for many societies the prevalence of the desire to regulate family size. But whether owing to lack of interest or to lack of methodological instruments, less information has been obtained on reasons why individuals do not regulate family size. In other words, there are wide gaps in the knowledge of conditions in which individuals will adjust their behaviour in order to reduce fertility. While there is some evidence that the primary group has decisive influence, very few scholarly efforts seem to have been devoted to studying the ways in which a culture influences decisions as to whether and how fertility should be regulated.

Social, cultural and related factors

The practice of birth control is regulated in various ways at the societal level. It is apparently also affected by the personal characteristics of the individuals. Evidence exists that cultural factors influence the types of fertility regulation methods acceptable to individuals. These factors have much to do with prevailing religious beliefs and institutions, various mores and superstitions and the role of women in society. Levels of literacy also play a part, as the use of different methods requires varying degrees of literacy and knowledge. And these factors, along with such others as the education of husband and wife, socio-economic status and rural-urban residence, the type of family organization, customs relative to marriage, divorce and widowhood, are also associated with the ideal family size and attitudes and behaviour connected with the practice of family limitation. Although these factors are known to be associated with the knowledge and practice of birth control, more information is needed as to how social institutions and cultural values influence the implementation of family planning programmes and other aspects of population policy.¹⁴ Wide acceptance and utilization of birth control methods offered in national family planning programmes will depend upon many factors, known and unknown, including the skilful application of the knowledge that already exists about the relevant customs and

¹⁴ It is general knowledge, for example, that age at marriage affects fertility in an inverse relationship. Cultures often promote early marriage through the pressures exerted by social and economic institutions. But the channels through which culture influences reproductive behaviour are not always so readily identifiable. Some related questions are discussed by J. Davis-Blake, "Parental control, delayed marriage and population policy", *Proceedings of the World Population Conference, 1965*, vol. II (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 66.XIII.6), pp. 132-136.

related characteristics of the people for whom policies are designed.

The status of women appears to be of immense importance as a factor influencing fertility.¹⁵ Communications between husband and wife in matters dealing with reproduction and the family and the educational level of women, the participation of women in the culture and the age of females at marriage are all related with status of women in general. In turn all these factors have a bearing upon fertility. The focus of communications programmes, the selection of contraceptive methods and even the general acceptance of family planning are found to be related in various ways to the status of women. Much more quantitative research is needed in this area also, with emphasis where possible upon central variations on the meaning of status.

Efficiency of the family planning schemes

The organization, structure and administration of national family planning programmes have a considerable bearing upon the receptiveness of eligible couples to the services offered. Most of the programmes have been implemented through the national health service, on the theory that the management of fertility is associated with the management of mortality and morbidity as an important health concern.¹⁶ It is held that the environment of the health service is an effective setting for the introduction of family planning to parents. In some national family planning programmes, however, responsibility for administration has been vested in an authority other than the ministry of health. In these cases it has been considered that, where the structure and administration of health services are inadequate, the programme should be administered by a special authority or by any appropriate existing agency that enjoys the confidence of the people.

Among the activities most crucial for the success of family planning programmes are those aimed directly at motivating individuals to regulate fertility. The effectiveness of these communication schemes depends upon the extent to which administrators are able to adjust their information programme to conditions of literacy, the educational level of the population, the status of women and other related factors. Apart from consistent recognition of the need to make some adjustments to distinctively local conditions, there have not as yet been developed any guidelines or general principles in this field. If satisfactory standards could be developed, their application would reduce the amount of trial and error experienced in national programmes of communication for motivation in family planning and the attendant loss of time and waste of resources, while at the same time allowing for adjustments required in view of certain national and cultural characteristics. Advancements of this order would greatly enhance the quality and efficiency of family planning programmes. One area

¹⁵ See, for example, A. J. Coale, "The voluntary control of human fertility", *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society*, vol. III, No. 2 (June 1967), pp. 164-169.

¹⁶ "Measures, policies and programmes affecting fertility, with particular reference to family planning" (E/CN.9/232), chap. IV.

deserving of research involves the use of incentives to motivate workers of finders of clients and, particularly, finders of prospective family planning clients. Not enough is known of the useful or other effects of such practices.

Family planning programmes yield other benefits to individuals and to society than the possible reduction of birth rates. These programmes, which would interest many people, include improvements in the health and longevity of mothers and children to be derived from the optimum spacing of pregnancies. Family planning programmes also aid the reduction of illegally induced abortions and, when implemented through health services, can be instrumental in reducing the prevalence of venereal disease and consequently in alleviating secondary sterility in populations where this cause-and-effect sequence is a problem. National family planning programmes may therefore be useful instruments of health policy, even

where they are not desired for their possible value as a means of reducing levels of fertility.

As previously mentioned, the recent spread of national family planning programmes as an instrument of population policy has been facilitated, *inter alia*, by advances in science and technology. Research is continuing into many aspects of reproductive physiology, and great strides are reportedly being made in biomedical research relative to family planning, with a view to developing safe, uncomplicated, inexpensive and otherwise widely acceptable methods of fertility regulation. These advances are essential if fertility regulation is to become common throughout the world. In addition, research is under way to perfect techniques of abortion and of sterilization. But studies and investigations at many levels will require support on a continuing basis if currently accepted methods of fertility control are to gain widespread acceptance among diverse population groups.

Chapter X

HEALTH

THE GENERAL STATE OF HEALTH

Although the period under review has not been marked by any spectacular progress in the health situation of the world, the general trends towards improvement which began taking shape during the last decade have been confirmed. Greater knowledge, increased financial and human resources, better organization, increased public health consciousness, changes in medical practices and the growing appreciation of the possibility of preventing disease, have continued to contribute to a slow but steady improvement in conditions of health. However, these advances might appear insignificant when compared to the magnitude of the problems still to be solved and to the efforts still to be made. The list of priority programmes and objectives remains long and urgent in developed and developing countries alike.

Indicators of health

Numerical indicators as indices of the health situation in an individual community or in a country as a whole are, in general, used to measure activity, changes and progress. The most commonly used indicators in the field of health are the crude death rate, the infant mortality rate, the doctor/population ratio and the hospital-bed/population ratio.

The greater number of countries in the African, Eastern Mediterranean, South-East Asian and Western Pacific regions of the World Health Organization (WHO) and in Central and South America, where death rates had been relatively high, showed a declining record of mortality in the past decade. In most of the countries of Europe, in North America and Oceania, where death rates had been relatively low, there was a levelling-off process and in some cases even an increase in annual death rates over the same period. The trend of falling death rates where the rates were high and of levelling off where rates were lower or had even slightly increased, continued during the period 1965-1968. In fact an increased number of countries seem to have reached or are approaching the levelling-off phase. However, with a growing number of older persons surviving in the community, the mortality rates in some countries continue to show a slight increase.

The infant mortality rate is a general indicator of the quality and extent of the child health services provided and a measure of the sanitary conditions existing in a country. Because of the unreliable character of much of the available vital information for the African region,

it is not possible to give an accurate account of the changes in the infant mortality rates in that region. An estimated infant mortality rate of at least 200 per 1,000 live births is characteristic of the majority of the countries in Africa.

In the Americas region, the infant mortality rate is still high, ranging in 1968 from 20 to 146 per 1,000 live births. During the period 1965-1968, the infant mortality rate generally declined, the reduction being around 25 per cent. Seventeen countries and territories recorded a reduction during the period whereas nine showed an increase. In 1968 the majority of the countries had an infant mortality rate ranging between 20 and 50 per 1,000 live births. The rates of two countries were above 100 per 1,000 live births.

Knowledge of the extent of and the changes in the infant mortality rate in the South-East Asian region also is hampered by the lack of reliable vital statistics. Where infant mortality rates are readily available, they range from 31 to 109 per 1,000 live births (1965) and from 27 to 65 per 1,000 live births in 1968. In all countries for which information has been obtained there was a reduction in infant mortality between 1965 and 1968.

Infant mortality rates in the Western Pacific are, in general, not high—ranging from 15 per 1,000 live births in Japan in 1968 to 52.4 in French Polynesia in 1967. These rates declined between 1965 and 1968 almost without exception. The median rate for eleven countries and territories was 37 per 1,000 live births in 1965 and 30 in 1968.

In the Eastern Mediterranean region, infant mortality rates range from 27 to 113 per 1,000 live births in 1965 and from 16 to 116 in 1968. In most countries of the region for which information is available, the rates declined during the years 1965-1968, although very slowly.

In the European region, these rates are usually low, the over-all range being from 14 to 72 per 1,000 live births in 1965 and from 13 to 61 in 1968. During 1965-1968 practically all European countries showed a further decline in the infant mortality rates. The majority of these rates was below 30 per 1,000 live births in 1968 and in eight cases at least they were less than 20.

The doctor/population ratio is accepted as a general but rough indicator of the development level of health services and of progress in the extension of these services.

In the African region, there were 16,000 doctors in 1960, or one doctor for 11,850 inhabitants. In 1967, with 23,000 doctors, the ratio had improved to one doctor for 9,700 inhabitants, and this in spite of the population

increase. This rate of progress is, however, far too slow, bearing in mind the number of expatriate doctors in that region. In the Americas the rate was 1 to 1,070 in 1960 and in 1967 it had improved to 1 to 990. In the European region it improved from one to 750 to one to 640.

In the Eastern Mediterranean region, the ratio improved from one to 6,060 inhabitants to one to 4,730 inhabitants between 1960 and 1967. In the South-East Asia region, the doctor/population ratio ranged from one to 6,290 in 1960 to one to 5,960 in 1967, and in the Western Pacific from one to 1,380 to one to 1,350; but in the latter case the influence of New Zealand, Japan and Australia must be considered.

The general conclusion to be drawn is that the increase in medical personnel has barely matched the population increases in Asia, Africa and the Middle East.

In spite of the considerable efforts made and the new medical schools created, the medical manpower situation has changed very little. The situation is even more critical when considering that the greater proportion of the medical personnel in developing countries is concentrated in urban centres and that the rural populations have correspondingly less service from the professional staff available. Another feature of importance is the loss of trained personnel to the developing countries through migration. The number of dentists in the world has increased from 360,400 in 1960 to 430,300 in 1967, a net increase of 69,900 dentists. Of this total increase, 44,000 or 62 per cent are in Europe and only 25,900 or 38 per cent in other regions, an inadequate figure in relation to the population increases. The number of trained nurses—that is, those who have had three years or more of professional training—increased from 2,519,000 in 1960 to 3,618,000 in 1967, representing an increase of 1,099,000 nurses. Of this increase in numbers, 494,000 were in the European region and 440,000 in the Americas. The increase in the African, South-East Asian and Eastern Mediterranean regions, totalling 54,000 in all, is very small indeed, especially when compared with the tremendous population growth in these regions.

Regarding the staffing of services, only in the developed countries are the increases in population and the development of the health services proceeding in a somewhat satisfactory way. In most of the developing countries the increase in the number of nurses, dentists and doctors barely serves to maintain parity with the population increases and then at a low level of staffing; an immediate increase in services can come only from increased training and the utilization of auxiliaries.

Using hospital bed/population ratios as an indicator of one form of health services, there were in the world 9,961,000 hospital beds in 1960, the equivalent of one bed for every 230 persons. In 1967, there were 11,788,000 beds or one bed per 220 persons. Of this increase of 1,827,000 additional beds, 1,008,000 were in Europe, 51,000 were in the African region, 215,000 in the region of the Americas, 50,000 in the Eastern Mediterranean region, 87,000 in South-East Asia and 416,000 in the Western Pacific. These hospital bed/population ratios indicate that, taking into account the increase in population, the developing countries are either barely maintaining parity at a low level or even falling behind in the provision of this form of medical care.

Incidence and control of communicable and other diseases

The disease pattern in most countries has changed very little during the period under review. Although progress in the control and eradication of many of the communicable diseases has continued, largely as a result of applied research and better organization in the field, there is still great scope for improvement. Even in the more developed countries, the population is still exposed to a wide range of infectious diseases. The present situation with regard to some of the major communicable diseases, as described below, indicates that their control still constitutes one of the highest health priorities in a majority of countries.

Malaria

By the end of 1968, four fifths of the 1,700 million people who lived in originally malarial areas were free from the risk of endemic disease, or living in areas where malaria eradication programmes were in operation.

Out of the 146 countries and territories recorded as having originally been wholly or partly malarious, thirteen areas are now entered in the official register of the World Health Organization of those where malaria eradication has been achieved. An additional twenty-three countries have claimed eradication of the disease from the whole of their territory. In 1968, the Organization assisted forty-seven countries with malaria eradication programmes (a further six were carrying out similar programmes without direct assistance from WHO) and twenty-eight with other anti-malaria programmes.

The twenty-second World Health Assembly, which met in July 1969,¹ recommended that WHO continue to aid the countries concerned in drawing up long-term plans for malaria eradication, taking into account not only the technical, financial and administrative requirements of the attack and consolidation phases, but also the long-term needs for sustaining achieved eradication. It also recommended that the multidisciplinary approach to the biological, epidemiological, economic, social and operational aspects of the question be intensified in order to find simpler and more effective techniques for defeating malaria.

Tuberculosis

The fact that approximately 20 million persons suffer from infectious tuberculosis at present and in turn spread the infection to a further 50 million or even more of the world's healthy population each year, clearly shows the high public health priority this disease retains, particularly in developing countries. It is not the lack of prophylactic or of therapeutic weapons that prevents making an epidemiologically meaningful impact on this world problem within the near future. The crux of the problem is the scarcity of specialized health personnel and even more so the unavailability of general health-service staff in multipurpose institutions who could, using

¹ *Twenty-second World Health Assembly*, part I (Official Records 176) and part II (Official Records 177).

simplified and standardized control techniques, deliver tuberculosis control services at the periphery to the population requiring prophylactic, diagnostic and curative action. Only technical and managerial training and the mobilization of all medical, paramedical and auxiliary manpower available towards meeting the need and demand for permanent and nation-wide implementation of a systematic control programme can lead to a real breakthrough. At the same time, it is certain that research will continue to succeed in providing increasingly powerful, more economic and more acceptable weapons for use against the disease on a global scale.

Smallpox

An accelerated programme of smallpox eradication based on a ten-year co-operative plan was approved by the nineteenth World Health Assembly and initiated in January 1967. The incidence of smallpox declined from 129,000 cases in 1967, the first year of the programme, to 79,000 cases in 1968 and less than 50,000 cases in 1969. The geographical limits of endemic smallpox have progressively been reduced to the extent that at the end of 1969 it was found in only five countries in Asia, eight countries in Africa and one in South America. Special programmes are in progress in all endemic countries except Ethiopia and in many countries which border endemic zones. Freeze-dried vaccine is exclusively employed in all programmes and virtually all vaccinations are being performed by two newly introduced methods, jet injection and multiple puncture employing the bifurcated needle. The strategy of the programme based on systematic vaccination and surveillance with outbreak control has proved highly effective in all areas where satisfactorily implemented.

Cholera

Cholera remains a public health problem of international importance. It is a disease that affects mainly the low-income groups of the population living in overcrowded urban and rural areas with poor sanitary conditions. Although such susceptible communities are rare in developed countries, the fact that they do nevertheless still exist emphasizes the need for proper surveillance to prevent the spread of cholera.

The declining trend of the disease noticed during the 1940s and 1950s was reversed in 1961 with the spread of cholera El Tor from Sulawesi Island in Indonesia first to neighbouring islands, then to other territories. The classical form of cholera is still prevalent in East Pakistan and, to a very small extent, in India. The number of cholera cases reported to WHO during the past few years is not very high, but the disease has now become endemic in more countries in Asia, with greater possibilities of spread due to increasing population movement. In 1969, cholera was reported by at least thirteen countries and reappeared in some countries in Asia which had been free of the disease for several years.

Significant progress has been made in the treatment of cholera, so much so that when treatment facilities are readily available very few patients will die. Awareness of this fact will do much to allay the customary panic when an outbreak occurs. Moreover, though many

members of a community may become infected by vibrios, usually very few actually become ill. Cholera can only be controlled by improvement of personal hygiene and of environmental sanitation, along with the provision of safe and adequate water supply. It is not advisable to depend solely on the vaccine which is currently available.

Veneral diseases

The world-wide recrudescence of syphilis and gonorrhoea has continued and has engendered world-wide concern. It is estimated that there are now in the world 30-50 million cases of venereal syphilis and more than 160 million cases of gonococcal infections. This revival of the venereal diseases is closely linked to social factors such as travel, tourism, urbanization, industrialization, changing sexual behaviour of youth, as well as to the failure of epidemiological reporting, inadequate antibiotic treatment and reduced activities in the area of venereal disease control by health authorities. To achieve better control of venereal diseases, a multidisciplinary, co-operative approach is required between private physicians and national and international health authorities.

A large number of communicable diseases that have not the global importance of those mentioned above nevertheless continue to be serious health hazards with which health authorities have to contend. They include leprosy, trachoma, plague, yaws, poliomyelitis, infectious hepatitis and schistosomiasis. Zoonoses or infections communicable in nature between man and vertebrate animals are coming into greater prominence with the progress in the control of major epidemic diseases and with the greater attention being paid to the health of rural populations.

Leprosy

The number of leprosy patients in the world is estimated at about 11 million of which only 25 per cent are registered and 17 per cent under treatment. Leprosy is mainly prevalent in tropical areas of Africa and Asia and to a lesser extent in Latin America. About one in four leprosy patients develops permanent disabilities, hindering his normal life and causing a heavy burden for the community.

The introduction of sulfones in leprosy therapy made possible the application of leprosy control measures, which are mainly based on early detection and treatment of leprosy cases. The old approach of compulsory and indiscriminate isolation of leprosy patients is no longer necessary, and ambulatory care is normally given. In 1969, leprosy control projects in twenty-three countries were receiving WHO/UNICEF assistance. As a result of intensive treatment, the number of cases released from control is progressively increasing in many countries, but on account of the shortcomings of available leprosy therapy, the control of the disease is a difficult problem. Research in leprosy is essential to improve its control. Current trials on chemoprophylaxis seem to indicate the preventive value of this method, but the effectiveness of BCG vaccination has not yet been established.

Trachoma

Trachoma, of which it is estimated there are at least 500 million cases in the world, is still the world's greatest

single cause of blindness. Research on vaccines continues, but an effective vaccine is not yet available. Effective control can be achieved with well-designed programmes of prophylaxis and treatment with antibiotics.

Plague

Plague continues to occur in endemic areas in the American, South-West Asian and African regions. In 1968, 1,322 cases and 160 deaths were reported in thirteen countries. Human plague became active in Africa with outbreaks in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Lesotho, Madagascar and the United Republic of Tanzania. A total of 145 cases of human plague was reported from Africa in 1968. Five countries in the American region (Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, Peru, the United States) reported an over-all total of 200 human plague cases and 32 deaths in 1968. In Asia, the Republic of Viet-Nam again had the highest number of cases of human plague (784); the disease also occurred in Burma (86 cases and 3 deaths), Indonesia (94 cases and 38 deaths) and Nepal (13 cases and 12 deaths).

The WHO has concentrated its efforts on studying the natural foci of infection in various parts of the world. Research activities comprising the study of rodents and ectoparasites and their resistance to rodenticides and insecticides are in progress and a study of the ecology of the disease is planned.

Yaws

A considerable decline in the incidence of yaws has been achieved through intensive mass penicillin campaigns carried out during 1950-1969. However, the disease is still present in many countries of the world's tropical belt, and is potentially capable of recrudescence, but it is no longer the dreaded cause of continuing ill health of the inhabitants of many parts of the world. The importance of developing rural health services that can participate in or take over the continued surveillance and consolidation needed, has been stressed as indispensable in the case of mass campaigns against yaws.

Infectious hepatitis

Infectious hepatitis is common in all parts of the world and is usually spread by contact and occasionally through contaminated food or drink. Another rarer form, serum hepatitis, is transmissible by transfusion of infected blood or plasma, by tattooing, or inadequately sterilized medical equipment. No specific treatment is yet known, though gamma globulin is effective in its prevention.

Schistosomiasis

Schistosomiasis is one of the most prevalent parasitic diseases in the African, Latin American, Eastern Mediterranean and Western Pacific regions. It is of considerable economic importance because of the amount of chronic ill health which it causes in the working population. On a world scale, control of schistosomiasis has achieved but limited progress. The main factors responsible for this situation are not only the lack of efficient weapons for fighting the disease, but also deficiencies or prerequisites in public health services. A reasonable level

of schistosomiasis control has been achieved only in some areas of the world.

Trypanosomiasis

Trypanosomiasis in Africa, though much reduced in some areas by energetic control, still remains a serious threat and is already epidemic in some regions. In the Americas, trypanosomiasis remains endemic in large areas of Central and South America and appears to be an increasingly major cause of morbidity.

Filarial diseases

Filarial diseases continue to be one of the most important world problems, especially in the developing countries, since these diseases not only show a tenacity to maintain themselves but, in some instances, are actually spreading. In some regions, these diseases produce considerable economic loss, as for instance in the blindness caused by onchocerciasis in Africa and the Americas. Although control methods are available for both filariasis and onchocerciasis, the trained personnel and means for sustained control programmes are generally lacking.

Poliomyelitis

There is an erroneous belief that, since the introduction of vaccination against poliomyelitis, the disease is disappearing everywhere. While it is true that it has been dramatically reduced in Europe, North America and Oceania, it is in fact increasing in most other parts of the world. The incidence of poliomyelitis has mainly increased in countries which lie in warm or semi-tropical and tropical regions. Moreover, poliomyelitis is still an infantile disease in these countries, the higher percentage of cases occurring among children under five years of age. Pending vaccination programmes, for which there are at present no adequate facilities in many of these tropical and semi-tropical countries, every effort must be made in an emergency to vaccinate as high a proportion of the presumed susceptible population as possible without delay.

Zoonoses

More than 150 zoonoses are now recognized. Those for which domesticated animals are reservoirs are problems of considerable magnitude in many countries—for example, brucellosis, bovine tuberculosis, rabies, anthrax, leptospirosis and hydatidosis. The ravages of zoonoses among livestock are a serious drain on the economy and often cause heavy losses in milk, meat, working capacity and other forms of yield from animals.

Notable success has been achieved in eliminating endemic zoonoses confined mainly to domesticated animals (bovine tuberculosis and brucellosis, glanders etc.) where modern survey methods have been employed systematically to detect and eliminate infected animals. Unfortunately, poverty and inability to find clean animals to replace infected ones have prevented the full application of such methods in developing countries. Under these conditions, reduction of infection by immunization of animals as well as of exposed persons has to be practised.

Zoonoses with wild animal reservoirs and hosts are generally more difficult to control—a fact which has been

clearly brought out during recent outbreaks of rabies in Europe and North America. In these areas it has been possible to control rabies in dogs and other domestic animals, thus reducing the risk to man, but wildlife rabies continues to spread despite vigorous measures adopted against it. This failure is attributable to insufficient knowledge of the ecology of the disease in wildlife and of the wild hosts themselves.

Chronic and degenerative diseases

In countries where communicable diseases have lost much of their former significance, chronic and degenerative diseases are becoming a matter of serious concern. Prolongation of the active life-span of man in prosperous communities depends mainly on the ability to control the development of cardio-vascular diseases. These conditions are already becoming a universal health problem. They threaten to become the most common cause of premature death and disability in developed countries. The mortality from cardio-vascular diseases is already extremely high. A disturbing trend in developed countries is that younger age groups are increasingly becoming affected, causing reductions in economic productivity.

Of the cardio-vascular diseases, arteriosclerotic and degenerative heart disease is the most important cause of male deaths in industrialized and urbanized countries. There is an evident association between high living standards and death from arteriosclerotic and degenerative disease. However, there seems to be no such association in younger age groups. Although spectacular and stimulating results have been achieved in recent years in the active intensive care, rehabilitation and surveillance of patients with cardio-vascular diseases, these facilities are offered only to a small fraction of the sick and have not yet been incorporated into the existing public health services.

As the expectation of life increases, so does the likelihood of contracting cancer, for although cancer is found in every age group, it is commoner in the older ones. Advances in medical science have gone far towards improving the prognosis for certain types of cancer. Pre-cancerous conditions can, in many instances, be detected through mass screening, and the removal of such lesions prevents the subsequent development of cancer. A major proportion of all cancer is accessible, and in a number of countries reliable procedures are available for its detection through periodic surveys. Clinical cancer control has become an integral part of the general health services in a number of countries. Considerable attention is being given to the organization of cancer treatment and research in the treatment of cancer.

Environmental sanitation

The close relationships between environment and health have been increasingly recognized and stressed in recent years, especially so in economically developed nations and those now undergoing industrialization. As a result, the aims, organization and functions of sanitation services in these countries are undergoing significant evolutionary changes. The early objectives of their sanitation programmes, a decade or two ago, were confined almost exclusively to the prevention and control of communicable

diseases which were transmitted through clearly identifiable elements of the physical environment, such as water and human wastes. In most developing nations, these original needs remain valid today, but even there the limitation of objectives is not valid. Environmental hazards to human health and well-being are becoming more complex, more encompassing and more subtle. A recent trend has been the shift of emphasis, in several rapidly industrializing countries, to environmental health programmes comprising the control of water- and air-pollution, noise and accident reduction, the amelioration of housing and of physical planning and the control of urbanization. Along with these, attention is being paid also to social and mental strains which are conducive to delinquency and crime in overcrowded and badly-housed areas of cities. As a result of this trend, there is a more definite and increasing involvement of health and sanitation services with housing, city and regional planning, recreational facilities etc., as it is realized that, if the total well-being of man is the ultimate aim, then the total environment must be considered in a positive sense.

In addition to water-supply and waste disposal, special attention is being paid to other aspects of environmental health such as food sanitation and vector control. Similarly, owing to increasing travel facilities, especially by air, there is a growing concern everywhere about possible transmission of communicable diseases, especially those related to poor sanitation, which often prevail in or around the airports and ports of many countries.

Water-supply

There is probably no single factor that has a greater effect on the health, well-being and development of a community than the provision of an ample and convenient supply of good quality water. In towns and cities, water supply is recognized as an essential service, a basic necessity for industrial and commercial processes, vital for the maintenance of public health and the prevention of epidemics; without it, street cleaning, water-borne sewerage, fire fighting and many other municipal amenities are impossible.

In rural areas, the need is equally great, though usually less well recognized. It is significant that at the 1969 World Health Assembly, the delegate from one Government in Asia estimated that water-borne diseases accounted for 40 per cent of all mortality and 60 per cent of all morbidity in his country. The effects of drinking unsafe water containing pathogens or parasites are reflected in the figures of infant deaths, wasted expenditure on education, decreased agricultural output and the burden on the economy of supporting blind or crippled victims of preventable disease.

Rural water-supply systems present problems completely different in nature from those of cities and large towns. Supported by contributions from industry, commerce and a tax structure made possible by a large population in regular employment, an efficiently designed, managed and operated water-supply system serving a compact area can make a city water undertaking a very attractive investment proposition. The WHO has assisted Governments in the preparation of pre-investment surveys for several such installations, international and bilateral lending agencies have shown themselves willing

to advance funds for construction of projects that, as a result of such surveys, have been shown to be "bankable"—that is, investments with a potential for attractive financial returns.

Only in rare instances can the same yardstick be applied to rural installations. Small population units, usually with marginal incomes, scattered over a wide geographical area, unable to call upon the managerial, professional and technical skills of the city, cannot be served by scaled-down urban techniques and supplies. The multiplicity of rural communities—estimated in some countries to total 80 per cent of the total population—make the problem one that requires a concentrated effort, and the only effective solution must be found with the countries concerned.

Assistance is being given to Governments in various ways to take on the problem themselves. Joint assistance by UNICEF and WHO has resulted in demonstration and training projects in more than seventy countries. The WHO field staff in these and other countries work with national staff to give the latter training and experience.

The magnitude of the problem, taken throughout the world, is of tremendous proportions. It has been estimated that at any time the number of people suffering from disabling disease due to lack of clean water is not less than 500 million. In the developing countries, it has been calculated that the proportion of rural dwellers served with safe water is in the neighbourhood of 10 per cent. In order to raise this percentage to 20 per cent—which is the proposed target for achievement during the Second United Nations Development Decade, 1971-1980—the construction expenditure required will be approximately \$1,600 million, of which three-quarters will have to be found by the countries themselves. However, unless this can be done, the situation will deteriorate rather than improve. In some developed countries the quality of the drinking water has also deteriorated owing to increasing chemical and bacteriological pollution not only of surface-water but of ground-water resources.

In many countries, the population growth is outstripping the rate of provision of supplies of water, and the situation gets worse daily. Only a determined effort by the Governments concerned, supported by international and bilateral assistance, can hope to bring about any appreciable improvement. Without it, the resulting human suffering and economic losses will get steadily worse.

Waste disposal

During the period under review, it has become increasingly apparent that long-term plans for socio-economic development, especially in the developing countries, have devoted greater attention to the need for adequate waste management, which has social and economic implications of fundamental importance. Unsatisfactory waste management has much broader economic implications than those generally associated with the health aspects of the problem alone, particularly with regard to industrial growth, development and tourism. This growing awareness on the part of Governments of the need for taking corrective measures before the problem gets completely out of control is reflected in an increasing

number of requests for assistance in the solution of problems related to the management of liquid and solid wastes of municipal and industrial origin and this trend is expected to continue.

The resources of a given community are often inadequate to solve the complex problems arising from the rapid increase in the density of world population, accelerated urbanization and industrialization, such as the increasing accumulation of wastes of all types and the resulting ever more rapid deterioration of man's environment. These wastes ultimately must be returned to some part of the environment and co-operation at all levels is needed to ensure that their management does not create air, water or land pollution or conditions favourable to the breeding of disease vectors or other environmental health hazards. Satisfactory management of these wastes requires not only large capital investment, but also administrative and organizational structures and qualified personnel. A regional approach to waste management contributes to the conservation of economic and manpower resources and is therefore highly desirable.

Housing and urbanization

In an increasing number of countries, the public health administration is becoming conscious of the role which it should play in housing programmes. It is well known that, in recent years, the housing problem has been getting worse in many countries, both as regards the shortage of healthful housing and the deterioration of the sanitary quality of the existing housing stock.

In the field of urbanization, one of the most promising trends of recent years has been the growth of a rational approach to social and economic development in member States. Planning is now widely practised at the national, regional and local levels and several countries have called for assistance, in the past few years, from the Special Fund component of the United Nations Development Programme and from the Centre for Housing, Building and Planning in the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat, in the establishment of national housing and urban development programmes. Health agencies have only recently begun, in some countries, to play their proper role in city and regional planning.

An inherent difficulty that physical planners face in the complex task of thinking constructively about the urban area of the future is the lack of guidelines, standards and justifications, especially regarding environmental health problems. WHO is assisting member States, as well as other organs of the United Nations concerned with urbanization problems, in the study and development of environmental health criteria for use in urban planning, in the formulation of recommendations and in the provision of technical advice.

Air pollution

Air pollution is not merely a nuisance to be tolerated as an inevitable accompaniment of urbanization and industrialization, but it is also directly harmful to health. Public health authorities, mainly but not exclusively in the developed countries of the world, have become increasingly conscious of the need to ensure that the air is as free as possible of noxious contaminants. The

control of air pollution is also a field with which WHO has been much concerned.

In highly urbanized and industrialized regions, air pollution is largely the consequence of the combustion of various types of fuel. Such fuel may be burned completely, as in the efficient equipment used in industry, or incompletely, as in less efficient domestic equipment. In general, the incomplete combustion of fuel gives rise to products which are more varied, complex and objectionable than those produced by complete combustion.

Pollution of the air by carbon monoxide is especially a problem of big cities. Apart from cigarette smoking, the other sources of this pollutant in urban areas are the exhaust gases from motor vehicles and smoke from incinerators, hearth fires, etc. Sudden increases in air pollution are often associated with immediate increases in mortality and morbidity. Bronchitis and possibly lung cancer are considered to be the main delayed effects of air pollution.

Other health problems

Maternal and child health

The current trend is to provide the entire population with at least minimum mother and child health services within the context of the community basic health services, including elementary care, health education and a system of screening to identify high-risk individuals and groups who require more than minimum attention. In order to make essential services as wide in coverage and as efficient as possible, the tendency to associate maternal and child health services with the basic health services is increasingly being encouraged so that much of the work can be undertaken by the multipurpose health worker.

During the past years increasing recognition was given by authorities responsible for social and economic development to family planning as an important and intrinsic component of health services. The development is mainly based on a number of factors: the growing awareness of the significance of high maternal and child mortality and morbidity and of high natality; the large proportion of the population that is in the young dependent age-group and the importance of human development. Experience has shown that family planning services can be effectively provided when they are given in the context of health services, particularly through maternal and child care components. An increasing number of Governments, with the assistance of WHO, are pursuing health care programmes related to family planning. Research in human reproduction and training in family planning are receiving greater attention.

The reduction in the infant mortality rate, that is deaths under one year of age per 1,000 live births, is regarded as reflecting the quality and effectiveness of the services for mothers and children. This decrease is however not the result of these services alone, as many other social, economic and educational factors which have brought about higher levels of living have also contributed to this achievement. Within the period under review, some measurable improvements have been recorded, though two years is too short a period for the registration of significant changes. The reduction in infant mortality

rates in many developed and developing countries indicates that progress is being made towards better chances of survival and health for children in most parts of the world and that there is a rise in the importance of the health services together with greater coverage of the mother and child population.

Nutrition

Although it is not possible to quote figures which indicate the extent of malnutrition, it is probably true to say that half the world's population is still undernourished or malnourished.

Protein-calorie malnutrition is still the most serious nutritional problem in relation to public health that confronts most of the developing countries of the world. In children under five years of age, its prevalence, in its most severe form, varies from 1 to 9 per cent; in the moderate forms, it may range from 10 to 15 per cent. Because of the greater facilities for medical care now available and the better knowledge of treatment, mortality due to malnutrition as well as the total mortality rate in children under five years of age, is decreasing in many developing countries. However, there are no indications that the prevalence of malnutrition follows the same trend. More children are saved from death, but many of them take their place in the community without being completely rehabilitated.

Recently, more attention has been given to infectious diseases as a precipitating factor of malnutrition in young children. Recent studies show that children in developing countries may have ten or twenty infectious episodes in a short period and as a consequence, children of two years of age may have been sick for more than 20 per cent of their lives. The trend towards early weaning in some developing countries is one of the factors which explains the current high prevalence of nutritional marasmus, particularly in children under one year of age. Increased output of conventional food proteins on a world scale will take many years to achieve and the promotion of breast feeding will not be sufficient to prevent protein-calorie malnutrition in all countries. Therefore, new sources of protein, particularly for use during the weaning period, are being developed by international agencies. Examples of these new products are incaparina, developed by the Institute of Nutrition for Central America and Panama (INCAP); and superamina, developed recently in Algeria. WHO is responsible for testing the safety and suitability of these products for human consumption and five centres have been set up for this purpose in the world during the last three years.

In addition to protein-calorie malnutrition in young children, vitamin A deficiency continues to be an important nutrition problem in some developing countries, especially in South-East Asia, as also are nutritional anaemias, particularly in pregnancy and early childhood. However, there have been some gains in this field, as might be seen in the marked decrease in the mortality of children under five years of age in many developed countries and in the increased knowledge of how to bring under control some communicable diseases such as measles, which are closely related to severe malnutrition. The recent discussions at the General Assembly of the United Nations (1968) on the protein crisis are proof of

the present interest of all Governments in the proper nutrition of their growing populations.

Mental health

The magnitude of the problems arising from mental illness and its implications for public health are receiving greater attention. Although mortality from mental disorders *per se* is low, which accounts in part for the low priority formerly accorded to mental health programmes, the morbidity is high and often prolonged. The repercussions on the family and the community, added to individual suffering and incapacity, continue to constitute problems of vast proportions. In all populations the growing number of old persons, highly vulnerable to mental disorders, and the greater expectation of survival of the handicapped through medical progress, will add to the magnitude of the problems to be faced.

Certain studies now indicate that 1 per cent of any population group is incapacitated throughout life as a result of severe psychiatric illness. At a conservative estimate, one person in ten is likely to suffer from illness of this kind at some time in his life. Prevalence rates for less severe mental disorders are much higher. The psychiatric aspects of crime and juvenile delinquency, dependence on alcoholic and other drugs, suicidal behaviour and failure at school or at work contribute heavily to the mental health problems of any community. Moderate, severe or profound mental retardation affects an estimated four per thousand school-age children. The developing areas are not exempt from these problems. The few available studies indicate that severe mental disorders are probably as prevalent in these countries as elsewhere among comparable age groups. The burden imposed on these communities is likely to increase with accelerated urbanization and industrialization, which also appear to lead to a rise in the incidence of neurotic and psychosocial problems.

Recent advances on physical, psychosocial and psychopharmacological therapy have provided effective means for attenuating, if not curing, the syndromes occurring in a wide variety of mental disorders. Various forms of psychotherapy permit insight into the life of mental patients and assist in improving their condition. Family therapy, the development of therapeutic communities and occupational therapy have been effective in preventing or reversing the severe deterioration formerly often associated with the chronic patient in hospital. Effective prevention and treatment are available for a wide variety of mental disorders of known origin, such as certain intoxications, nutritional deficiencies, traumata and general systemic diseases, which still account for large groups of the mentally ill in developing areas.

A wave of optimism followed breakthroughs in the understanding of some metabolic abnormalities leading to mental retardation—such as phenylketonuria and galactosaemia—which can now be treated. Data are accumulating on other disorders of genetic origin for which there is so far no effective prevention or treatment. However, the precise aetiology of many of the most common and disabling mental disorders—particularly the schizophrenias—is as yet unknown. A concerted attack on these enigmas must be made through clinical, biological and epidemiological research.

The effective utilization of existing knowledge and experience in psychiatry depends on adequate organization of mental health services which, in turn, have to be viewed in the framework of the total health services available. Recognition of the magnitude and public health implications of psychiatric problems, together with a well-founded confidence in possibilities of improving the situation, have led some countries to invest heavily in a fundamental reorganization of their mental health programmes.

Rehabilitation, geriatrics and accidents

Rehabilitation of the disabled is a problem relevant to people of all ages and to countries at every level of development. In developed countries, advanced rehabilitation techniques and modern aids and appliances have contributed to alleviate the condition of victims of accidents and crippling diseases. The need and demand for rehabilitation services is, however, increasing rapidly due to the steady increases in chronic degenerative diseases among the aged and in traffic accidents. Rapid industrialization and greater longevity begin to create similar problems in most developing countries, where disability as a result of communicable diseases had always been high.

The aging of a population is a new challenge, confronting certain countries today and others tomorrow. With progress towards higher standards of life, advances in medical science and improved social conditions, the proportion of old people expands. In the highly industrialized countries there is some concern over the rapidly increasing proportion of aged people. In addition to the economic burden imposed by the aged in certain countries, there is a rapidly growing volume of chronic mental and physical sickness which will overload the health and welfare services. From the public health point of view, the problems of aging and the aged concern mainly the health protection of the elderly and the prevention of premature aging. The need for comprehensive care services for the aged, who usually suffer from several diseases at the same time, is clearly recognized by the public health authorities. A great deal has been done in the social and medical care of old people, including such aspects as nutrition, occupation, physical activity, housing, household help, day hospitals, geriatric institutions and mental care. Social and medical progress are helping to slow down the rate of aging and to allow the aged person to remain a valuable element in our society for the longest possible time.

Alcoholism and drug addiction

Alcoholism afflicts a growing number of persons, adult as well as adolescent, in many countries and accounts for an increasing number of admissions to mental hospitals, particularly in developed countries. It can lead to severe health damage, chronic ill-health and premature death. Efforts are being made to develop effective treatment programmes and to train medical personnel and a broad range of other health and social workers to deal with the alcoholic in the community. A major priority in this effort is given to health education and information.

The problem of drug addiction has received much more attention in recent years. There are few statistics on the extent of this problem, but the information available indicates an increasing number of drug-taking adults and young people in many countries. From the public health point of view, a serious problem also arises from the excessive consumption of new drugs in medical practice and from the misuse of medicines in general. Another aspect of this problem is the rising trend in hospital admissions for poisoning. Narcotic addiction is increasingly being dealt with through comprehensive, community-based diagnostic and treatment programmes, involving close collaboration between the social worker and the mental health worker. A growing emphasis is placed on new clinical and research approaches.

Programmes for youth

There has been in recent years a growing awareness of the problems of adolescents and young people. The programmes and services for this population group involve health, medical, educational and social aspects which necessitate the close relationship and collaboration of all categories of health and social workers. The disabilities, the emotional and behaviour difficulties of adolescents that attract so much attention in the developed countries are gradually appearing in the developing countries, where the main concerns are still physical disease and malnutrition. There is need for more knowledge of the influence of the biological, emotional, psychological and social factors during adolescence and youth and for the development of a real partnership between the health and social services.

TRENDS IN THE ORGANIZATION, ADMINISTRATION AND PLANNING OF HEALTH SERVICES

The trends in the organizational and administrative set-up for the delivery of medical and health care, which gradually have been formulated over the last decade, have generally been confirmed and consolidated during the two-year period under review.

Administrative patterns of public health services

It is well known that trends in the administration of the health services are an important factor to consider in the ability of countries to provide total medical and health coverage for their people. That the establishment of a strong administrative framework is the most important contribution towards the provision of better health services is increasingly being appreciated by the national health authorities.

Countries in the early stages of development are very often characterized by a high degree of reliance upon the central government. Decisions for services to be carried out locally are taken at, and implemented from the central level. Such centralized administrative systems are faced with the special problems of adapting central programmes to local needs and interests, and with the difficulty of enlisting the participation of the people directly concerned. Experience has shown that a rigidly centralized government machinery in some countries

hampers the ability of health authorities to offer services of the best available quality to all citizens and prevents progress in the rural areas, where the provision of health services is usually poor. In the health field the concentration of authority and executive responsibility at the central level is particularly harmful, as it very often corresponds to a concentration of the services of specialists in both clinical and public health fields at the top level, depriving the regional and/or intermediate and peripheral levels of the necessary services to meet their health needs.

New concepts of health administration have therefore been evolved, leading, in different parts of the world, to the adoption of a decentralized, regional approach which, it is now realized, allows a more efficient use and management of resources and helps to accelerate development and to make the effects of health programmes lasting. Over the past years, a considerable amount of experience has been gained in some countries with the organization and administration of health services which has led public health administrators to recognize that decentralization is essential for the attainment of the highest level of health by all people. Many health authorities have established an efficient system of co-ordination and clear lines of hierarchy between the various levels of their health services with a proper balance between central administration and peripheral execution. The main functions of the national or central administration are policy-making, over-all planning and organization of health services for the entire country, setting technical standards, research and the provision of highly specialized services. The local level is responsible for the provision of basic health services to the population on a community basis. The intermediate level, that is, the regional or provincial level, provides the institutional and specialist services to assist and supervise the local service.

This decentralized scheme, which ensures a more economic, effective and efficient delivery of services through an articulated system of health service units, has been gradually adopted by an increasing number of national health authorities or is provided for in many national health plans.

The success of decentralized health systems depends very much on the availability of adequate facilities, sufficient trained personnel who can be employed and retained in the rural areas, the readiness of people to accept and discharge responsibility, the state of economic and social development of the country, the national political and administrative structure and particularly the geography of the country and its communications. In some large countries, decentralization is a necessity, particularly when communications are not easy, whereas in small countries the central level may well operate the whole system without harmful consequences.

In many countries, medical care facilities are now also being organized on the basis of the same decentralized concept, for example, the district medical clinic, the regional speciality clinic and the zone specialty clinic. Even in countries where a large number of hospitals and medical practitioners are private, efforts are being made to introduce concepts of regionalization in which both the private and public sectors participate. The organizational structure of regional medical centres developed

along the same lines as the governmental administrative pattern of decentralization within a country can serve as a strong support to efforts to introduce new methods, and for the field training of personnel. Developing countries should avoid the dangers of dealing with curative and preventive services as separate entities. They should become integral components of a unified health system.

Organization of the health services

The very urgent need in most developing countries continues to be well-organized and efficient health services, especially environmental health programmes, and readily available medical care. National health authorities have increasingly become aware of this need and of the fact that success in public health depends on the strengthening of health services at all levels, particularly at the weakest lower level. During recent years there has been a rapid shift in policy and practice in this field. Outstanding efforts have been made by Governments in developing countries in actively developing these services. Particular emphasis is being given to extending health services to rural areas within the framework of comprehensive rural development programmes involving the co-ordinated action of several disciplines (health, education, agriculture etc.). A well-organized network of rural health facilities is capable of assuming responsibility for the execution or follow-up of campaigns against communicable diseases, of organizing services to mothers and children and of providing environmental health services and personal services.

A very recent and still pioneering experiment undertaken by a number of Governments in the field of health services organization is the establishment of national institutes of health or health development institutes. These institutes are planned to become key elements in the reorganization and regionalization of health services and in the study of national health problems and epidemiological data. They will act as centres of reference and technical guidance and provide academic and field training facilities.

Despite considerable progress in recent years, the development and extension of essential health services in most developing countries continues to be slow and difficult, mainly because of the financial obstacles encountered by many Governments and the shortage of trained personnel. The promotion of health services necessitates a growing number of professional and auxiliary personnel. The critical shortage of this personnel, particularly the fully qualified staff, is the main handicap which has to be overcome in developing countries in the creation or strengthening of health services to meet the basic health needs of the total population. Therefore, an increasing proportion of WHO-assisted projects for the development of health services provide for the necessary training of medical and allied health personnel, for training of health auxiliaries and for the reorientation of various categories of professional and auxiliary personnel.

The problem of manpower merits the continued interest of WHO, which advocates a close co-ordination and collaboration between the national health services and the universities and other training institutes in order

to adapt the preparation of physicians and other health personnel to the needs of each country, thus allowing for a balanced preparation of health manpower. It is important that health requirements of a country or of a region be assessed carefully and training planned accordingly. National health authorities are increasingly encouraged to plan their manpower requirements in the light of the widely accepted concept of utilizing personnel as teams rather than as individual health workers.

The necessity of utilizing health auxiliaries to undertake as many functions and responsibilities as are within their capabilities and training is being recognized more and more. With comparatively little additional training, they can acquire great skill in performing particular tasks. This development, however, requires, in a number of countries, a change in attitude on the part of the professional staff.

An allied major problem is the lack of training facilities. This is noted at all levels from the university and medical school to the institutes concerned with training nurses, midwives, pharmacists, sanitarians, technical and auxiliary personnel. The dearth of qualified teaching staff, at all levels, matches the lack of physical facilities and modern equipment.

Health planning

There has been much activity in the field of health planning in recent years. It has been realized that the development of the health services and the solution of many of the existing health problems can be accelerated by scientific and logical planning. By the end of 1968, approximately two thirds of the Governments of developing countries had prepared some form of health plan. This represents a major development if it is remembered that five years ago health planning practically did not exist as a function of the government health departments. Health problems had been dealt with on an immediate and *ad hoc* basis and have not been related to a long-term over-all development.

Today a bridge has been built between economists, general administrators and public health administrators. The attitudes of health authorities have changed in all parts of the world as they now realize that health has an economic value and that planning is an effective tool providing health services with a maximum benefit at a minimum cost. Public health administrators have learnt the language of the economists.

The experience already accumulated in the establishment of national plans for health activities allows a number of conclusions and lessons to be drawn which will provide a valuable basis for improving the planning process. It is now realized that planning must be a dynamic process which takes into account every aspect of the country's resources, both human and material, its activities—agricultural, industrial and commercial—its health problems and its educational needs. To an increasing extent Governments are therefore undertaking health planning in association with their planning for economic and social development. The health plan must be an integral part of over-all development planning, with a definite place in the ranking of priorities and a proper allocation of funds for capital and recurrent expenditure.

In order to give the national health plan its appropriate priority in the over-all plan, it should not represent a simple conglomerate of separate projects of a general statement of desirable goals, but a definite, itemized, quantified and comprehensive document, including well co-ordinated health activities and all components of the comprehensive national health programme.

In order to ensure that the plans are ultimately fully implemented, they have to be prepared on a realistic basis, taking into account the existing financial and human resources. Special efforts have therefore been directed towards the improvement of the quality of vital and health statistics, the collection of data such as indicators of resources and indices of diseases and the preparation of accurate reviews of the national and regional health situations.

The constant development of the planning process and the growing awareness of the importance of health for social and economic development have made it necessary to establish a proper health planning machinery which is well integrated in the over-all planning system. Many

countries have already established national health planning units at a high level in the Ministry of health, thus creating a mechanism through which the various health programmes can be co-ordinated, and a well-balanced plan can be formulated and submitted to the national over-all planning authority.

This health planning machinery is also essential for the constant review of the plan at short and regular intervals in the light of the prevailing economic circumstances. A plan cannot be static but has to be adapted to the general evolution of the social and economic conditions in a country. Health activities must therefore be subject to periodic evaluation and health targets have to be adjusted within a flexible system.

As a result of the growing interest in health planning, considerable efforts have been made in recent years in developing training activities in the field of national health planning. It is now fully realized that health personnel and health administrators who are in charge of, or participate in the planning process must be adequately trained in modern planning techniques.

FOOD AND NUTRITION ¹

The 1967 *Report on the World Social Situation* ² drew attention to widening gaps in food consumption between the developed and developing regions and to near-famine conditions over wide areas of Asia and Africa. That ominous state of affairs, at the mid-point in the First United Nations Development Decade, was undoubtedly a major factor in impressing the Governments of many developing countries—notably in Asia—with the urgent need to attach considerably higher priority than before to the provision of adequate food supplies for their rapidly growing populations. The resulting substantial increase of attention to agriculture, especially food production, has helped to alleviate the situation to some extent and has given grounds for cautious optimism as to future production prospects. Nevertheless, many serious problems remain to be solved: productivity must be still further increased in certain countries and vigorous efforts must be made to ensure that gains in output are actually translated into real improvements in the nutritional status of disadvantaged socio-economic groups.

TRENDS IN FOOD PRODUCTION

Table 1 shows that, while both the gross and *per capita* indices of food production rose rapidly in the developed regions over the decade ending in 1968, the developing regions in general barely managed to maintain parity of output in *per capita* terms. The situation in the developing regions is partly a consequence of their rapid popu-

lation growth, but more directly it reflects the very heavy setbacks in food production experienced in 1965 and 1966, especially in Asia, where more than half the world's population is concentrated. However, there were strong recoveries of cereal production in Asia in both 1967 and 1968,³ and a further (although more modest) rise in production appeared possible in 1969. Recent production trends in other developing regions are much less impressive: while there may have been a small *per capita* increase of output in Africa in 1968, production in Latin America actually underwent a slight decline, and the increase in the Near East was probably insufficient to match the rate of population growth.

Excluding Oceania (where output has been rising steeply), the rate of growth of food production in the developed regions has been recently about the same as that achieved by all the developing regions combined. Given the already very high levels of agricultural productivity in most of the developed regions, however, this moderate expansion was more than large enough to meet basic consumption requirements. In developed and developing regions alike, most of the recent increase in food production took the form of cereals,⁴ while growth in the output of higher quality protective foods was much less marked. Increases in the world production of meat and eggs exceeded population growth by very slight margins only, while the expansion of milk production fell somewhat in arrears of population increase—and growth in the output of all three commodities was largely confined

¹ Factual information in this chapter is drawn primarily from Food and Agriculture Organization, *The State of Food and Agriculture 1969* (Rome, 1969), and from FAO, *Production Yearbook 1968* (Rome, 1969).

² United Nations publication, Sales No.: 68.IV.9, Part One, chap. IV.

³ This statement does not take account of production in mainland China, about which official information is not available. According to FAO estimates, however, 1968 food grain production in mainland China was probably slightly lower than the exceptionally large 1967 harvest, see FAO, *The State of Food and Agriculture 1969* (Rome, 1969), p. 70.

⁴ Except maize, for which world productions has declined.

TABLE 1. INDEX NUMBERS OF FOOD PRODUCTION
(1948 = 100)

Area	Total production			Average yearly rate of increase			Per capita production			Average yearly rate of increase
	1957-1959	1963-1965	1966-1968	1957-1959 to 1963-1965	1963-1965 to 1966-1968	1957-1959 to 1966-1968	1957-1959	1963-1965	1966-1968	1957-1959 to 1966-1968
Developed regions	129	149	167	2.4	3.9	2.9	117	125	136	1.7
Developing regions	131	155	166	2.8	2.3	2.7	111	113	112	0.1
World	130	151	167	2.5	3.4	2.8	112	116	120	0.8

to the developed regions. Partly compensating for these trends, there has been a fairly substantial rise in fisheries production in all major world regions except western Europe.

These developments have taken place against a shifting background of national and international policies affecting food production. In many developing countries there has been a noticeable tendency to pay greater attention to agricultural development as a part of national planning and to provide larger resource allocations for the agricultural sector; a substantial proportion of international assistance, from both bilateral and multilateral sources, has also been directed to this sector. Food production policies in the developing regions have become increasingly oriented towards the objective of self-sufficiency, owing largely to pressures of simultaneously mounting food deficits and drainage of foreign exchange resources into food imports, which were experienced by a considerable number of developing countries in the mid-1960s.

Policies of self-sufficiency in food production and of higher priority for agricultural development have become especially prominent in the Asian region where the food crisis was most acute in the middle years of the decade and have been primarily expressed through the intensified use of fertilizers and new, high-yielding seed varieties, the dissemination of modern farming techniques such as multiple cropping, and the accelerated development of irrigation, farm credit and extension facilities. In Latin America there has been some tendency to accord higher investment priority to the agricultural sector, along with a growth of interest in the diversification of farm production and reduction of dependence on traditional export crops. A number of countries in Latin America, where the scope for such measures is greater than in other developing regions, are concentrating also on bringing new land under cultivation. In both Asia and Latin America, considerable progress has been made in developing the legal framework for agrarian reforms, but with a few notable exceptions Governments have been slow to undertake actual implementation. In Africa as in Asia, many Governments are emphasizing self-sufficiency as a prime aim of food production policy, and in these regions as in Latin America, the diversification of crops both for export and domestic consumption has become an important policy objective. Although the agricultural sector receives a relatively small direct share of resource allocations in most African national development plans, a good deal of the investment being directed to sectors such as transport and electrification is potentially useful for agricultural development; the same may be said of investments for industrial development in those African countries which are giving primary emphasis to the promotion of agro-industries.

In the period under review, many developed countries have found themselves faced with a problem of steadily growing food surpluses—particularly of cereals and milk products—coupled with stiffening competition in world markets; difficulties in this area have been in some instances aggravated by government subsidization of agricultural production. In a number of the more highly developed western European countries, the intractability of the food surplus problem has led to searching re-

appraisals of agricultural production policies. In the less industrialized countries of the region, however, emphasis is still generally placed on the expansion of output. In North America, stocks of several agricultural commodities, particularly wheat, are again building up; expansion of export markets is accordingly a major policy objective of the Governments of both the United States and Canada. Australia and New Zealand face similar difficulties, and the Governments of both countries are promoting the diversification of production while simultaneously seeking the removal or reduction of obstacles to agricultural exports. Japan, too, has begun to accumulate substantial surpluses of rice, for which demand in other Asian countries is either declining or non-existent due to the recent sharp upturn in regional production of cereals.

In eastern European countries and the Soviet Union, a major emphasis has been placed on raising agricultural production, along with measures to bring about both closer income parity between agriculture and other sectors and stronger linkages between agriculture and industry. There has been a noticeable effort to increase supplies of agricultural inputs, to improve credit facilities, to raise prices paid to producers and to streamline administrative procedures in the agricultural sector. Special attention is also being given to the consolidation of food processing industries. The Soviet Union has particularly stressed the creation of greater flexibility in planning and management at the farm level, the establishment of minimum levels of remuneration for farmers, specialization and concentration of agricultural production, and measures to improve the quality of farm lands.

Marked disparities between the developed and developing regions in agricultural productivity are likely to persist for some time to come, but the recovery of cereal production which occurred in Asia after 1966 indicates that progressive reduction of the gap is possible if energetic follow-up action is taken. It now seems clear that the Asian recovery—which was sufficiently dramatic to be described as a “green revolution”—was mainly due to the popularization of the new seed varieties and innovative farming techniques mentioned earlier; in other words, the production gains were not merely fortuitous, but resulted from the extensive modernization of agriculture. This judgement is strongly supported by the fact that the recovery was experienced almost exclusively in countries—specifically China (Taiwan), Ceylon, India, the Republic of Korea, Pakistan and the Philippines—which have advanced furthest in the adoption of the new technology. By contrast, only one African country (Kenya) and two in the Near East (Turkey and the United Arab Republic) have made comparable technical progress. Although a number of Latin American countries have experimented with the new seed varieties and cultivation methods, accurate information on the extent of actual application is lacking. Furthermore, while there is no doubt that unfavourable weather was a prime factor accounting for the nearly stationary level of food production in Africa, Latin America and the Near East in 1968, weather conditions were also poor in many parts of Asia. Nevertheless, the increase in Asian food production in 1968 was actually the second largest apart from 1969, a year which was marked by exceptionally good weather almost everywhere in the region.

It may be noted that because of the substantially increased production of cereals, some former deficit countries in Asia are now accumulating surpluses, and therefore have opportunities to become exporters. At the present time, however, outlets for cereal surpluses in the world market are considerably more limited than they were midway through the decade, so that the trading benefits to these countries may not prove to be very substantial, at least in the immediate future. To compensate for this disadvantage, the existence of cereal surpluses creates possibilities for other improvements in the

food and nutrition situation within the countries concerned; for example, part of the cereal crop may be used for animal as well as human consumption, while some agricultural land previously used for cereal production may be shifted to the production of higher-quality foods.

FOOD SUPPLY AND CONSUMPTION TRENDS

The most recent available estimates of *per capita* food supplies and their calorie and protein content are given in tables 2 and 3. It will be noted that the data for Africa

TABLE 2. *Per capita* FOOD SUPPLIES AVAILABLE FOR HUMAN CONSUMPTION IN SELECTED COUNTRIES
(Grammes per day)

Area	Period	Cereals ^a	Potatoes and other starchy foods	Sugars and sweets ^b	Pulses, nuts and seeds ^c	Veg- etables ^d	Fruit ^e	Meat ^f	Eggs ^g	Fish ^h	Milk ⁱ	Fats and oils
Western Europe												
Austria	1967-1968	258	205	99	12	187	276	182	38	10	555	55
Belgium-Luxembourg	1966-1967	220	327	106	13	207	175	177	39	25	535	82
Denmark	1967-1968	193	260	130	6	112	179	169	32	58	700	76
Finland	1967-1968	227	248	108	7	50	127	106	23	30	934	53
France	1966	235	277	91	15	350	196	221	31	23	607	65
Germany (Federal Republic of)	1967-1968	192	303	97	12	172	308	193	40	16	558	73
Greece	1967	331	161	56	46	382	397	111	29	28	448	51
Ireland	1967	261	354	139	13	161	119	208	40	14	755	51
Italy	1966-1967	360	120	72	26	430	321	106	26	16	418	48
Netherlands	1967-1968	189	247	135	16	218	257	157	31	16	694	74
Norway	1967-1968	197	260	120	11	97	190	115	28	54	693	64
Portugal	1967	357	312	54	44	476	181	74	11	59	152	46
Spain	1967-1968	261	285	68	33	361	296	98	31	39	322	54
Sweden	1967-1968	172	250	114	11	114	246	145	32	56	706	57
Switzerland	1966-1967	230	163	125	30	228	389	183	29	11	661	59
United Kingdom	1967-1968	200	283	135	16	173	139	204	44	26	600	60
Yugoslavia	1966	523	177	67	27	155	181	78	12	2	296	38
Eastern Europe												
Hungary	1967	368	232	88	12	223	193	141	31	3	288	64
Poland	1960-1962	409	548	81	5	25	60	126	21	10	517	37
Romania	1963	520	178	38	37	184	144	85	13	7	352	25
North America												
Canada	1967	186	210	134	12	228	227	250	40	17	638	57
United States	1967	177	133	133	23	269	239	295	51	17	665	61
Oceania												
Australia	1966-1967	219	139	144	14	196	231	283	34	18	618	39
New Zealand	1967	221	153	113	10	247	192	302	49	19	762	50
Africa												
Algeria	1966	365	39	47	11	66	127	23	3	2	58	18
Cameroon	1961-1963	243	775	5	48	49	54	38	1	17	17	14
Ethiopia	1961-1963	394	47	6	58	33	5	57	5	—	241	14
Gabon	1963-1965	56	1,101	11	13	105	13	73	2	12	27	10
Gambia	1961-1963	482	48	32	26	45	21	18	1	40	35	21
Ghana	1961-1963	158	1,147	23	38	84	26	26	1	26	8	11
Ivory Coast	1961-1963	276	799	21	23	44	45	31	1	23	14	11
Kenya	1961-1963	350	334	29	68	64	13	49	2	3	98	4
Madagascar	1961-1963	449	378	20	20	74	42	44	1	10	24	4
Mali	1961-1963	468	71	15	32	51	19	32	1	15	88	8
Mauritius	1967	357	42	108	25	111	46	20	6	16	175	43
Morocco	1966	353	37	69	16	110	156	34	4	4	88	25
Mozambique	1961-1963	258	976	20	56	53	56	15	1	5	5	4
Nigeria	1961-1963	317	655	4	44	37	28	20	2	9	18	19
Rwanda	1961-1963	146	608	—	136	9	230	20	—	—	13	6
Somalia	1961-1963	320	128	33	13	36	41	55	2	—	210	6
South Africa	1959-1960	456	39	112	11	99	108	122	9	24	226	15

TABLE 2. *Per capita* FOOD SUPPLIES AVAILABLE FOR HUMAN CONSUMPTION IN SELECTED COUNTRIES (continued)
(Grammes per day)

Area	Period	Cereals ^a	Potatoes, and other starchy foods	Sugars and sweets ^b	Pulses, nuts and seeds ^c	Veg- etables ^d	Fruit ^e	Meat ^f	Eggs ^g	Fish ^h	Milk ⁱ	Fats and oils
Africa (continued)												
Tanzania (United Republic of, formerly Tanganyika)	1961-1963	345	478	18	47	70	69	35	2	7	39	5
Tunisia	1966	262	38	42	16	187	105	32	7	7	104	41
Uganda	1961-1963	115	1,114	30	63	59	20	32	1	14	63	6
Asia												
Ceylon	1967	373	78	57	79	106	26	5	5	16	46	10
China (Taiwan)	1967	432	144	24	44	152	93	63	7	39	11	18
India	1965-1966	346	39	50	41	—	44	4	1	3	110	9
Japan	1967	380	188	57	45	362	121	37	31	84	118	19
Korea (Republic of)	1966	556	212	4	16	142	28	10	6	36	5	1
Malaysia:												
West Malaysia-												
Singapore	1961-1963	392	113	80	23	97	71	39	10	28	112	26
Pakistan	1966-1967	429	38	51	19	43	128	11	1	5	208	17
Philippines	1967	342	98	46	23	76	123	48	6	45	40	9
Thailand	1963-1965	412	91	29	52	108	128	28	9	19	13	4
Latin America												
Argentina	1966	268	202	90	6	124	229	309	21	8	338	41
Bolivia	1966	282	349	62	8	171	190	69	3	—	76	13
Brazil	1966	269	453	100	88	52	242	74	8	10	145	18
Chile	1966	433	167	90	31	212	120	93	5	11	274	23
Colombia	1966	176	191	131	20	133	374	82	5	4	280	20
Costa Rica	1966	273	114	162	40	36	361	82	7	5	265	28
Dominican Republic	1966	147	219	175	37	26	411	35	7	11	183	24
Ecuador	1966	167	329	84	39	168	644	68	5	9	190	12
El Salvador	1966	326	8	78	22	19	71	27	5	2	135	14
Guatemala	1966	416	16	76	30	66	50	40	5	3	65	17
Honduras	1966	249	116	68	46	13	417	34	9	1	249	17
Jamaica	1966	226	356	70	23	107	602	41	4	26	174	26
Mexico	1966	356	24	109	67	25	187	53	11	9	156	26
Nicaragua	1966	279	182	110	44	40	222	59	8	4	297	19
Panama	1966	348	183	89	31	57	214	104	11	13	137	20
Paraguay	1960-1962	202	702	53	39	43	383	120	2	1	177	13
Peru	1966	268	458	84	23	83	117	67	4	20	162	26
Surinam	1966	407	60	77	32	49	39	40	8	21	104	34
Uruguay	1966	277	150	134	6	108	136	310	13	7	584	36
Venezuela	1966	254	335	106	35	41	295	81	10	32	202	30
Near East												
Afghanistan	1966	441	—	39	1	78	37	31	2	—	88	8
Iran	1966	323	9	71	12	95	169	41	3	—	142	16
Iraq	1960-1962	355	15	81	15	156	196	55	3	2	207	10
Israel	1966-1967	286	98	111	29	316	431	144	60	17	374	50
Jordan	1966	290	43	113	25	309	236	28	8	2	137	26
Lebanon	1966	383	64	112	13	312	379	84	23	6	353	26
Libya	1967	375	13	94	22	212	164	56	3	5	130	26
Saudi Arabia	1966	337	6	29	12	132	406	47	2	5	99	4
Sudan	1966	310	69	33	15	95	99	76	3	4	352	24
Syria	1966	575	21	39	23	146	257	32	4	—	121	26
Turkey	1960-1961	611	105	51	36	288	340	37	5	6	221	22
United Arab Republic	1965-1966	551	38	49	35	292	230	36	4	9	122	19

SOURCE: Food and Agricultural Organization, *The State of Food and Agriculture 1969* (Rome, 1969), annex tables 2F, 3F, 4F, 5F, 6F, 7F, 8F and 9F.

^a Flour and milled rice.

^b Refined sugar including crude sugar, syrups, honey and other sugar products.

^c Shelled equivalent for nuts, including cocoa beans.

^d Fresh equivalent, including processed vegetables.

^e Fresh equivalent, including processed fruit.

^f Including poultry and game expressed in terms of dressed carcass weight, including edible offals.

^g Fresh equivalent.

^h Estimated edible weight.

ⁱ Milk and milk products, excluding butter, expressed in terms of fresh milk.

TABLE 3. ESTIMATED *per capita* CALORIE AND PROTEIN CONTENT OF NATIONAL AVERAGE FOOD SUPPLY IN SELECTED COUNTRIES

Area	Period	Number of calories per day	Grammes per day	
			Total protein	Animal protein
Western Europe				
Austria	1967-1968	2,920	85.6	49.5
Belgium-Luxembourg	1966-1967	3,090	87.5	50.6
Denmark	1967-1968	3,150	88.7	60.2
Finland	1967-1968	2,890	87.2	55.8
France ^a	1966-1967	3,100	100.7	50.9
Germany (Federal Republic of)	1967-1968	2,960	80.9	52.0
Greece ^a	1967-1968	2,900	98.9	43.0
Ireland ^a	1967-1968	3,460	94.1	59.9
Italy	1966-1967	2,860	85.4	35.5
Netherlands	1967-1968	3,080	84.6	53.6
Norway	1967-1968	2,950	81.2	50.4
Portugal ^a	1967-1968	2,770	83.0	31.7
Spain	1967-1968	2,790	81.9	34.8
Sweden	1967-1968	2,850	79.8	54.1
Switzerland	1966-1967	3,170	88.0	52.8
United Kingdom	1967-1968	3,150	87.5	53.8
Yugoslavia ^a	1966-1967	3,190	92.8	21.3
Eastern Europe				
Hungary	1967	3,140	96.4	39.4
Poland	1960-1962	3,350	92.9	37.6
Romania	1960-1962	3,160	97.3	27.9
North America				
Canada	1967-1968	3,180	95.4	64.1
United States	1967-1968	3,200	95.6	68.6
Oceania				
Australia	1966-1967	3,120	90.5	60.6
New Zealand ^a	1967-1968	3,290	107.3	74.3
Africa				
Algeria	1966	1,870	51.7	6.4
Cameroon	1961-1963	2,130	54.4	10.0
Ethiopia	1961-1963	2,040	68.8	14.8
Gabon	1960-1962	1,910	35.9	15.7
Gambia	1961-1963	2,300	60.4	12.2
Ghana	1961-1963	2,160	48.6	10.5
Ivory Coast	1961-1963	2,290	52.3	10.3
Kenya	1961-1963	2,120	64.4	12.1
Madagascar	1961-1963	2,330	52.3	9.4
Mali	1961-1963	2,120	64.2	10.9
Mauritius	1967	2,420	47.9	12.8
Morocco	1966	2,060	54.3	9.7
Mozambique	1961-1963	2,420	47.9	3.8
Nigeria	1961-1963	2,180	59.3	5.3
Rwanda	1961-1963	1,830	56.3	3.1
Somalia	1961-1963	1,780	51.6	16.3
South Africa	1960-1961	2,820	80.2	31.5
Tanzania (United Republic of, formerly Tanganyika)	1961-1963	2,080	58.1	9.1
Tunisia	1966	1,840	52.2	10.8
Uganda	1961-1963	2,070	50.1	10.2
Asia				
Ceylon	1967	2,170	48.0	8.3
China (Taiwan)	1967	2,520	68.2	23.9
India	1965-1966	1,810	45.4	5.4
Indonesia	1961-1963	1,980	38.2	4.5
Japan	1967	2,460	74.7	28.2
Malaysia:				
West Malaysia-Singapore.	1961-1963	2,400	54.3	16.3
Pakistan	1966	2,230	51.5	11.2
Philippines	1967	2,000	50.5	18.7

TABLE 3. ESTIMATED *per capita* CALORIE AND PROTEIN CONTENT OF NATIONAL AVERAGE FOOD SUPPLY IN SELECTED COUNTRIES (continued)

Area	Period	Number of calories per day	Grammes per day	
			Total protein	Animal protein
Latin America				
Argentina	1966	2,920	88.0	58.7
Bolivia	1966	1,980	50.6	13.2
Brazil	1966	2,690	66.3	18.3
Chile	1966	2,830	81.8	27.1
Colombia	1966	2,200	48.9	22.6
Costa Rica	1966	2,610	57.9	21.8
Dominican Republic	1966	2,290	41.7	15.3
Ecuador	1966	2,020	51.5	17.9
El Salvador	1966	1,840	44.2	9.4
Guatemala	1966	2,220	56.8	8.3
Honduras	1966	2,010	51.0	14.5
Jamaica	1966	2,260	52.6	18.7
Mexico	1966	2,550	65.7	15.2
Nicaragua	1966	2,350	59.0	20.1
Panama	1966	2,500	62.9	23.9
Paraguay	1960-1962	2,520	63.3	23.7
Peru	1966	2,340	54.1	19.9
Surinam	1966	2,470	54.3	15.8
Uruguay	1966	3,170	101.6	67.1
Venezuela	1966	2,490	65.9	26.4
Near East				
Afghanistan	1966	1,950	56.4	7.7
Iran	1966	1,890	49.8	11.5
Iraq	1960-1962	2,100	60.7	16.8
Israel	1966	2,920	89.2	41.3
Jordan	1966	2,190	54.9	13.6
Lebanon	1966	2,800	80.8	28.3
Libya	1967	2,660	63.7	14.7
Saudi Arabia	1966	1,850	50.9	12.1
Sudan	1966	1,940	63.9	25.9
Syria	1966	2,600	77.9	10.3
Turkey	1960	3,100	97.5	15.9
United Arab Republic	1965-1966	2,810	80.8	11.8

SOURCE: Food and Agriculture Organization, *The State of Food and Agriculture 1969* (Rome, 1969), annex tables 2G, 3G, 4G, 5G, 6G, 7G, 8G, 9G.

^a Calendar years instead of split years.

are for the early 1960s and therefore may not properly reflect the more recent situation. In the Asian region, owing to the sharp rise in production after 1966, the current food supply situation is in all likelihood rather better than the data in the tables would suggest, but conditions in the other regions are probably not very different from those indicated here.

The tables are particularly instructive when they are compared with similar information presented in tables 1 and 2 of chapter IV in the *1967 Report on the World Social Situation*, first of all in confirming the continuation of very wide disparities in *per capita* food supplies between the various regions. In the period between the two reports, all the developed regions experienced further improvement in the quality of their food supplies, most noticeably in terms of the declining reliance upon high-carbohydrate foods such as cereals and potatoes, and the growing availability of protective foods including meat,

fish, eggs, milk products, fats and oils and vegetables and fruits. In the developing regions, on the other hand, progress was both less marked and less consistent, with a number of countries even suffering reductions in *per capita* supplies of certain essential food-stuffs. For example, at least fourteen developing countries in Asia, Latin America and the Near East experienced a decline in the *per capita* availability of cereals.⁵ Significantly, four of these countries—Brazil, India, Pakistan and the United Arab Republic—are among the most populous in their respective regions.

Further analysis of changes in *per capita* food supplies shows that although the availability of meat, fish, eggs,

⁵ Africa is excluded from the comparison since the number of African countries covered in the tables presented in the *1967 Report* was too small to permit full comparison with those for which data are provided in the present chapter.

and milk tended to rise in the majority of developing countries, the margins of increase were in practically all instances extremely small. Again, India and Brazil figured prominently among the countries where there were declines in *per capita* supplies of these commodities. (It should be noted, too, that the increased availability of milk in the developing regions was brought about mainly by delivery of surplus milk as a form of aid from developed countries.) Supplies of pulses, nuts and seeds tended to remain stable, except notably in India where some decline was recorded; there was a slight rising trend in supplies of fats and oils; and the availability of fruits and vegetables increased in all but a few developing countries.

A study of trends in the calorie and protein content of national food supplies provides a further revelation of regional differences. In virtually all countries in the developed regions, the *per capita* calorie content of national food supplies is either stable or (more commonly) declining since protein-rich and other protective foods have been substituted for cereals and other carbohydrates. In all such countries, moreover, both the calorie and protein content of the food supplies exceed minimum daily *per capita* requirements,⁶ usually by quite substantial margins. On the other hand, although many developing countries experienced small improvements in the *per capita* calorie and protein content of their food supplies, deterioration in these terms took place in fully six countries of the Near East—Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, the Sudan and the United Arab Republic—as well as in Ceylon and India and a number of Latin American countries, including Brazil and Mexico. Furthermore, whatever the over-all improvement in the developing regions, *per capita* calorie supplies in most of the countries still fell short of estimated daily requirements; in this respect the shortcomings were smallest in Latin America and greatest in the Near East.⁷

The information presented in tables 2 and 3 is of course indicative solely of national averages, and it therefore fails to show variations in food supplies among geographical regions within countries and among different socio-economic groups of the national populations. Such variations are known to be considerable even in some of the most highly developed countries, where pockets of malnutrition and under-nutrition have been identified among certain marginal population groups; a case in point is provided by the United States, where it has been authoritatively stated that Negro slums in large urban areas “represent the greatest concentration of anemias, growth failures, dermatitis of doubtful origin, accidents of pregnancy and other signs associated with malnu-

trition”.⁸ In most developing countries dietary inequalities are a far more serious problem, given the fact that the majority of their peoples are living at or below subsistence levels. In East Pakistan, for instance, one study of food consumption by income levels revealed that the daily *per capita* consumption of calories, at a monthly *per capita* income level of 0-99 rupees, was 1,996 in rural areas and 1,549 in urban areas⁹ (compared with a minimum daily *per capita* calorie intake requirement of 2,270 estimated for Pakistan as a whole in 1963-1964).¹⁰ Since average annual *per capita* GNP in Pakistan in 1964-1965 was estimated at 360 rupees¹¹ (or thirty rupees monthly), and was probably even lower in East Pakistan, it is fairly clear that a very large proportion of the population must have been suffering from serious under-nutrition, even though the national average daily *per capita* calorie consumption apparently did not fall too far short of minimum requirements.

A value of more than 8 per cent of NDpCal%¹² is required to meet the protein needs of the young infant. In view of the low NDpCal% values which exist in many developing countries, it is not surprising that such widespread incidence of protein/calorie malnutrition among children is to be found in these regions. This usually results in early stunting of body growth that may be irreversible and that may even cause permanent brain injury. This problem is of such importance and urgency that it calls for intensive and high-quality research in the areas affected.

Protein deficiency is often accompanied by vitamin A deficiency, especially in parts of India and South-East Asia. Pediatricians estimate that in addition to stunting body growth, about one half the blindness among the population is a result of vitamin A deficiency. Deficiencies of iodine and iron are often also acute in the developing countries although their effects are not as widespread as those involving protein and vitamin A.

TRENDS IN FOOD PRESERVATION, PROCESSING AND MARKETING

Wastage of food products due to inadequate preservation and processing facilities is a serious problem in most developing countries, and in recent years a number of

⁸ Philip R. Lee, “Health and well-being”, in Bertram M. Gross (ed.), *Social Intelligence for America's Future* (Boston, Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1969), p. 446.

⁹ *Nutritional Survey of East Pakistan, 1962-1964*; report by the Government of Pakistan and the National Institute of Health, United States of America, 1966, cited in “Social aspects of nutrition” op. cit., table III, p. 7.

¹⁰ Given in the *1967 Report on the World Social Situation*, table 2, p. 36; actual average daily *per capita* consumption for Pakistan as a whole in 1963-1964 was estimated by the same source at 2,220 calories.

¹¹ See the *1967 Report on the World Social Situation*, p. 113.

¹² NDpCal% = Net dietary protein/Calorie per cent which combines both the protein quantity and quality.

$$\text{NDpCal \%} = \frac{\text{Protein calories} \times 100}{\text{Total metabolizable calories}} \times \text{NPU(op)}$$

Where: NPU(op) = Net protein utilization of diets without modification

Protein calories = grammes of protein = 4

⁶ The estimates of calorie and protein requirements used for the comparisons are based on recommendations of FAO and WHO, given in the *1967 Report on the World Social Situation*, chap. IV, table 2.

⁷ Although inequalities among developed and developing regions are even more marked in terms of protein than of calories, average daily *per capita* protein intake slightly exceeds requirements in most developing countries for which information is available. But as much as 80 per cent of this intake is in the form of vegetable proteins, whereas in developed countries the more nutritious animal proteins normally supply at least 50 per cent of average daily intake—see “Social aspects of nutrition” (E/CN.5/446), p. 4.

Governments have been increasing their efforts to reduce the losses.¹³ In India, for example, the national Government has created a special Food Industries Development Council, mainly for the purpose of improving methods of food preservation and processing; Ceylon has set up a Food Industry Advisory Group with similar objectives. In some other developing countries the Governments are providing special loans to assist the establishment of new food preservation and processing industries. Additional measures being taken include exemption of food-processing machinery from import duties, provision of sugar at cost price or reduced rates for canning and other processing industries, tax exemptions for preservation and processing industries and import restrictions on competing products.

In many developing countries, the rapid growth of the urban population and the development of specialized cash-crop agriculture have added greatly to the need for efficient food marketing and distribution services, and in recent years government policies have assigned increasing importance to making improvements in these areas. This trend has been reflected in the extension of public control over trade in food-stuffs through the creation of a wide variety of new marketing boards, trading and regulating bodies, and the strengthening of the scope and powers of existing organizations. Such agencies are often concerned with the improvement of marketing methods, and sometimes with the provision of new services to producers and consumers where private enterprise is weak, but their main responsibility is normally the maintenance of crop price stability; this function is widely recognized as having crucial importance for farm production planning, for the development of producer incentives and for the minimizing of consumer dissatisfaction. In practice, the responsibility of the agencies is usually limited to price control for cereals, which are easily stored; it has been found much more difficult to intervene effectively in the markets for animal products and other perishable food commodities. Experience with public or semi-public marketing agencies in developing countries has revealed considerable difficulties in maintaining standards of efficiency, and Governments are becoming increasingly conscious of the need to organize the agencies' operations so that initiative will be encouraged by incentives, rather than stifled by bureaucracy.

TRENDS IN FOOD PRICES

As indicated in table 4, consumer food prices rose continuously throughout the period 1966-1968 inclusive in most of the 104 countries for which information is available; however, in keeping with a longer term trend, there appeared to be some slowing down in the rate of increase. Price levels remained stable or declined in twenty-five of the countries and rose in only ten. Greater price stability was especially evident in the Asian region,

¹³ Special problems of handling, storing and processing are now arising in certain Asian countries due to large increases of rice production from new high-yielding and short-season seed varieties; due to double-cropping, some of these varieties must now be harvested in humid weather, rather than under normal dry conditions.

TABLE 4. CHANGES IN INDICES OF RETAIL FOOD PRICES, 1966 TO 1968

Change	Number of countries		
	1966	1967	1968
Decline	14	16	14
No change	6	9	11
1-4 per cent increase	42	51	48
5-10 per cent increase	28	15	21
11-20 per cent increase	6	7	5
21-50 per cent increase	5	3	3
Over 50 per cent increase	3	3	2

SOURCE: Food and Agriculture Organization, *The State of Food and Agriculture 1969* (Rome, 1969), table 1-17, p. 29.

partly because of the large production increases noted previously in this chapter and partly because of growing liberalization of food imports. In India, food price increases were held down to 3 per cent in 1968, after rising at an annual average of 10 per cent over the four previous years; in Indonesia, there was a price rise of somewhat more than 100 per cent, but this nevertheless represented a great improvement over the two previous years. The rate of increase in food prices has been higher in Latin America than in any other region, although in some of the larger countries (such as Argentina and Brazil) it was less in 1968 than in the immediately preceding period. In the developed regions, increases in the retail price of food tend to be associated with general rises in the cost of living rather than with changes in the supply situation, which are normally minimal for the major commodities. Food price increases in this context have been widely experienced in North America and western Europe although in most cases they have been less pronounced than increases in the over-all cost of living. In the United States, for example, food prices rose by 3.6 per cent in 1968, as against an increase of 4.2 per cent in general living costs.

POLICIES AND MEASURES NEEDED TO ACCELERATE PROGRESS IN THE FIELD OF FOOD AND NUTRITION

Although the food and nutrition situation in the world at large appears to have improved as a result of recent progress in food production, much remains to be done if estimated requirements are to be met for the expected large increases in world population. The full range of needed initiatives cannot be spelled out in detail here,¹⁴ but the outlines of strategy suggested below will serve to indicate the breadth of approach that is called for.

Increasing food production

In most of the developing regions, the scope for opening new land for agriculture is rapidly narrowing (and in some countries is practically non-existent) while at the

¹⁴ More detailed discussion of the policies and measures required is provided in Food and Agriculture Organization, *Provisional World Plan for Agricultural Development* (Rome, 1969), 2 vols.

same time land development costs are continually rising.¹⁵ For these reasons, it is logical that the intensified utilization of existing farm lands should be the main aim of efforts to increase food production, with a primary although not exclusive emphasis on exploitation of the land of better quality.

An effective approach to the intensification of land use would require comprehensive action along the following lines: (a) a thorough survey of the quality and condition of national land resources; (b) the formulation of a land development programme within the framework of a general plan for agricultural development; (c) the provision for necessary institutional, legal and tax reforms; (d) the promotion of land reclamation, flood and erosion control and scientific water resources management; (e) the allocation of sufficient resources for the development of irrigation facilities¹⁶ and for increased supplies of agricultural inputs and technical services; and (f) the more widespread use of improved cultivation practices, double- and triple-cropping techniques and high-yielding seed varieties. If these measures were to be widely and vigorously implemented, it is estimated by FAO that a production increase equivalent to the output of about 135 million hectares of harvested land could be gained by 1985.

Experience in the First United Nations Development Decade has made it abundantly clear that efforts to stimulate production at the farm level are unlikely to be successful when product prices are unstable and market conditions undependable. Wide price fluctuations discourage innovation and obstruct rational planning at the farm level, whereas reasonable price stability and fair profit margins reduce the risks borne by the farmer and help him to gain the confidence needed to experiment with new agricultural price policies and structures. This involves difficult considerations of balance, for although increased farm productivity should eventually result in lower prices to the consumer, premature price reductions are liable to inhibit producer incentive and to curtail the time available for readjustment by marginal farmers who are unable to take advantage of new farming technology. To minimize this dilemma, and to enable both producers and consumers to reap due advantage from rising agricultural productivity, it will be necessary to adjust the mechanisms of the marketing system with the utmost care.

The need to include agrarian institutional and structural reforms in strategies aimed at raising agricultural productivity has been mentioned already, but deserves re-emphasis here in view of the tendencies in many developing countries to assign low priority to action in this area. Although it may be tempting to pursue higher productivity without such reforms, it is doubtful, to say the least, whether so limited an approach could permanently succeed, especially under the pressure of rapid growth in the agricultural labour force which confronts almost all

developing countries. Painful as the reforms undoubtedly would be to vested interests, failure to carry them out might well give rise to even more painful alternatives in the long run.

Rapid improvement in food production also calls for the extensive provision of education and training and for the creation of institutional systems capable of encouraging effective co-operation among farmers and of fostering close relationships between the agricultural sector and other sectors of the national economy.¹⁷ Food and Agriculture Organization studies of fifty-three developing countries have revealed that shortages of trained manpower are likely to be a major constraint on future agricultural development. In all regions, shortages exist at all levels of training, but particularly at the level of scientific, managerial and technical personnel. In all developing regions, much of the agricultural education being provided is extremely inadequate, frequently of poor quality and orientated neither to practical farming problems under local conditions nor to interpreting the needs of farmers. In the majority of developing countries, moreover, experience shows that there are very serious shortcomings in the coverage and effectiveness of institutions such as credit and co-operative organizations and farmers' associations, which are essential for agricultural modernization. Early and decisive action to meet problems in both these areas is plainly imperative. Special efforts are also needed to foster efficient and responsive administrative structures for rural and agricultural development, with the basic objective of forging close links between national and local government authorities on the one hand, and the farmers' community organizations on the other.

Plans for human and institutional development in this comprehensive sense will obviously require careful tailoring to fit the particular circumstances of individual countries, regions and localities, and thus presuppose a great deal of fact-finding and scientific research into human and institutional behaviour. In the field of agricultural development, this is a necessary counterpart of research into the biological and ecological problems of plant cultivation, animal breeding, soil improvement and so forth. Intensified action in this area is indispensable if agricultural planners and administrators are to avoid potentially costly mistakes arising from decisions based on insufficient knowledge and unscientific preconceptions.

Ensuring adequate staple food supplies and improving the quality of diet

For most developing countries, the provision of adequate staple food supplies will entail accelerating the rate of growth of cereal production. In countries where cereals are not staples, but can nevertheless be economically produced, their substitution for tubers and roots—which are comparatively deficient in protein quantity and quality—is likely to enhance opportunities for dietary improvement. Apart from their importance as the basis

¹⁵ Parts of Latin America and Africa south of the Sahara still offer reasonably good scope for expansion of acreage, however.

¹⁶ Food and Agriculture Organization, *Provisional Indicative World Plan for Agricultural Development*, op. cit., proposes that the percentage of irrigated land in developing regions should increase from the present 19 per cent to about 27 per cent of the total by 1985.

¹⁷ Major areas of need in the development of human and institutional resources for agricultural progress are detailed in *ibid.*, and in FAO, *Toward a Strategy for Agricultural Development*, Basic Study No. 21 (Rome, 1969).

of human diet in most parts of the world, cereals are also the main component of animal feed concentrates that are needed to increase livestock production and thereby augment the quality of food supplies.

Recent progress in the development of high-yielding cereal varieties provides grounds for belief that adequate supplies of staple foods can be attained if certain pre-conditions are met. According to recent estimates, some 5 per cent of cereal acreage in the developing regions is now planted to high-yielding varieties, and this will need to be raised to 30 per cent by 1985. (In certain regions, including parts of Africa south of the Sahara, which are economically or physically unsuited to the widespread use of high-yielding varieties, other stratagems, such as the development of drought- and pest-resistant cereal strains and more scientific cultivation methods, will be required.) Successful, wide-scale application of the high-yielding varieties will depend heavily on a wide range of factors, including reliable and sufficient supplies of water, fertilizers, pesticides, farm equipment and seed stock; ready access to farm credit and technical advisory services; and efficiently organized processing, storage, distribution and marketing facilities.

In developing regions, the main approach to dietary quality lies in the reduction and eventual elimination of protein malnutrition, which is often prevalent even in countries where average calorie intake is adequate. However, it is highly likely that the production of protein-rich foods will continue to lag considerably behind effective demand even fifteen years from now.

In order to make at least some progress in this direction, a variety of measures must be energetically carried forward. Short-term emphasis should be placed on expanded production in pigs and poultry, both of which have short reproductive cycles, and on increasing the output of vegetable protein through the introduction of leguminous crops into rotating cultivation. Over the longer term, it will be necessary to build up ruminant livestock inventories, to develop higher-yielding varieties of grain legumes and to expand both oceanic and inland fisheries' production. Successful implementation of these measures would require (in addition to generally increased investment in agriculture and fisheries) a considerable expansion in the supply of livestock feeds—thus lending additional urgency to the need for rapid progress in cereal production—and the adoption of industrial methods of raising pigs and poultry. At the same time, many developing countries will require continued external aid in the form of milk products, with priority for infant feeding.

CO-ORDINATION OF NUTRITION POLICIES WITH OTHER AREAS OF SOCIAL POLICY

As noted previously in this chapter, problems of hunger and malnutrition are not unknown even in highly-developed countries where food supplies considerably exceed estimated average *per capita* requirements. This fact provides a sharp reminder that such problems cannot be overcome by improvements on the food-supply side alone, but must be countered across a broad front of policy that takes due account of the complex causality of

hunger and malnutrition.¹⁸ To put the matter in rather more specific terms, the effectiveness of nutritional policies is likely to depend very heavily upon the extent to which such policies are integrated with comprehensive strategies designed to raise mass levels of living and to draw marginal population groups into fuller participation in the social and economic life of their local and national communities.

The need for policy co-ordination along these lines is especially urgent in the developing regions, where marginality in terms of welfare and socio-economic participation characterizes a very large proportion (if not an actual majority) of the populations, and where nutritional disparities are apparently quite closely related to large inequities in levels of living and socio-economic structures. Seen from this viewpoint, the problem facing policy-makers and planners is not only one of increasing the availability and quality of food, but also one of ensuring that family poverty is overcome to a degree that will enable the whole population to acquire the means of actually obtaining the elements of an adequately nutritious diet.¹⁹ Fulfilment of the latter objective requires conscious efforts to ensure that the benefits and opportunities created by development are shared on a reasonably equitable basis, and in particular that steady progress is made towards the amelioration of income maldistribution. Nutrition policy can perform a small but useful supplementary function within this framework—for example through the establishment of low-cost feeding programmes in schools, community centres and factories—but the main responsibilities will fall elsewhere, particularly on those responsible for employment promotion through industrial, agricultural and rural development.²⁰ In certain other areas of social development strategy, however, nutrition policy has a more direct contribution to make. This is especially true of the field of human resources development, which has so far been

¹⁸ Recent research has shown that, although there is a fairly high correlation between adequate nutrition (in terms of intake of calories, total protein and animal protein) and agricultural productivity, the correlations are even higher in respect of four other indicators: (a) percentage of dwellings with electricity; (b) newspaper circulation per 1,000 population; (c) *per capita* GNP; and (d) percentage of GDP derived from manufacturing—in that order; see D. V. McGranahan et al., *Contents and Measurement of Socio-Economic Development: An Empirical Inquiry* (United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, Geneva, 1970), Report No. 70.10, table 2, pp. 42-43. This finding does not in itself point to any specific policy conclusions, but it serves in a general way to underline the need for comprehensive appreciation of the factors that bear upon the nutritional situation, and hence for equally comprehensive remedial strategies where nutritional shortcomings are found to exist.

¹⁹ For reasons of ignorance or prejudice (among others), families and individuals who possess such means will not necessarily use them to best advantage from the nutritional standpoint; programmes of home economics and nutrition education accordingly have an important place within the wider framework of social policy. In the absence of purposeful efforts to deal with the central problem of low purchasing power, however, such programmes would be divested of much of their utility.

²⁰ In this connexion, special mention must be made of the need for decisive measures to compensate for the apparent tendency of the "green revolution" to displace labour and to aggravate underemployment and poverty among marginal farmers and agricultural labourers.

interpreted almost exclusively in terms of strengthening plans for manpower training and the development of higher and middle-level education, and has lacked a significant health and nutrition component. This is a very serious weakness from the standpoint of conditions in most developing countries, where large numbers of people are seriously inhibited by problems of ill-health, including malnutrition, from taking full advantage of educational and training opportunities.

In order to formulate appropriate food and nutrition policies and effectively co-ordinate them with broader social policies, Government will require a continuing

supply of accurate and up-to-date information. In the majority of developing countries and even in some that are economically advanced, this will involve substantial improvements in the flow of data on food production and utilization, on the consumption patterns of different socio-economic groups, on the factors that influence these patterns and on general levels of living, including the distribution of income and employment and other developmental benefits. The systematic preparation of food balance sheets, supplemented by information from comprehensive food-consumption, household-budget surveys, will be an essential part of this process.

HOUSING, BUILDING AND URBAN AND PHYSICAL PLANNING

In countries in early stages of development, the high rate of population growth and rapid urbanization have in recent years created housing needs which are extremely difficult to cope with in the face of low levels of output and income, underutilized natural and human resources, and often ineffective administrative and government structures. The movement of workers from agriculture into industry usually involves a physical shift and hence the need for housing not only in a different location but also of a different standard. It is evident that no country has been able to keep up with the human and physical problems resulting from urban population growth. Most countries have failed to establish an efficient system of controlling land use and preventing land speculation. Cities are faced with serious social, economic and physical problems, in both developed and developing countries. The production of a desired number of dwelling units and the mobilization of adequate financial resources require the existence of metropolitan and local plans, an organized building industry, appropriate financial installations and credit systems, and trained, experienced labourers, technicians and administrators.

For the period under review, an annual housing construction target of eight to ten dwellings per one thousand inhabitants had been set for the developing regions of the world, on the assumption that reasonably sound housing stock should be replaced in thirty years in urban areas and in twenty years in rural areas.¹ According to statistics available² for some developing countries, only 0.5 to 3.0 dwellings per thousand inhabitants were completed in 1967.

Regarding building materials and the construction industry, the possibility of using existing local materials is frequently overlooked. In many countries, resources have been wasted by importing expensive and unfamiliar manufactured building materials which, in addition to the purchase costs, must be carried long distances from their ports of entry. The balance of payments of developing countries is negatively affected by the excessive importation of building materials. A factor also to be considered is that local labour may be quite skilled in the use of traditional local materials but unable to handle sophisticated, imported or manufactured components. Increased attention should be given to the transfer and application of scientific and technological advances from one country to another, especially regarding building

materials, methods and designs. Inadequate training and lack of technical and scientific knowledge have resulted in several of the problems discussed. As a consequence, research institutions should be established at the regional, subregional or national levels and links between existing research institutions in developing and developed countries, as well as among developing countries themselves, should be established or strengthened.

HOUSING

Major problems and policy issues

During the period under review, only a few countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America have been able to produce sufficient housing at minimum standards to accommodate a rapidly growing population. In most developing countries less than two houses per thousand inhabitants are being built each year, a figure that is markedly below the desirable range of between seven to ten.³ In Latin America, the housing deficit is about 20 million units; in Asia and the Far East it is about 22 million in urban areas and 125 million in rural areas (as of 1960), with investment in housing approximately 1.5 per cent to 2 per cent of the national income as against the recommended 4.6 per cent.⁴

In industrialized countries the average has also been below the suggested ten units per thousand inhabitants, although production has been above that of the developing countries. The number of dwellings built by regions per thousand inhabitants in 1968 is as follows:

Eastern Europe	5.7
Western Europe	7.9
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics	9.4
United States of America	8.0

An exception is Japan where, during the same year, 11.9 housing units per thousand were built.⁵

In the circumstances, it can be stated that a considerable proportion of the world's population is poorly housed and is likely to remain so because the resources

³ United Nations, "Review of the housing situation in the ECAFE region" (E/CN.11/1/ENR/SUB.4(a)/1.6).

⁴ *Symposium on the Impact of Urbanization on Man's Environment*, held at United Nations Headquarters and United Automobile Workers Union (UAWU) Headquarters, Onoway, Michigan, 13-20 June 1970 (ST/TAO/SER.C/130).

⁵ *Annual Bulletin of Housing and Building Statistics for Europe 1968* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 69.II.E.13).

¹ *World Housing Conditions and Estimated Housing Requirements* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 65.IV.8).

² *Statistical Yearbook 1968* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 69.XVII.1).

that are at present being allocated to the housing sector are modest compared to the rising demand for housing generated by the rapidly growing population.

Progress in the housing sector has been limited by the low priority given to housing within the context of national development plans and programmes. Housing and urban development policies have not been formulated in many countries although construction in general, and housing building in particular, constitute a most important economic activity. Recent studies⁶ for the Middle East, Asia and Latin America show that until now there has been no housing policy as such, but rather *ad hoc* allocations in the economic plans for the construction of a specified number of houses.

There is an urgent need for the adoption of housing policies and programmes to ensure:

- (a) The attainment of compatibility with national investment and development needs and resources;
- (b) The adequate control of land and its distribution;
- (c) The generation of an adequate volume of construction;
- (d) Access by low-income groups to adequate housing.

Secondly, many Governments have not yet found a clear and consistent organizational structure to guide programmes and policies in housing. Not uncommonly, housing agencies undergo frequent reorganizations for political and other reasons. This often has the effect of inducing major shifts in resource allocation, affecting the progress in the housing sector. As a result, the volume of funds allocated to housing has varied considerably. Where this has happened the volume and pace of housing construction have been adversely affected. Under such circumstances, the building industry is hampered in its growth and development.

Thirdly, there is frequently a conflict of priorities within programmes that aim at improving housing conditions of the low-income population. In some countries, for example, housing is provided to public servants or employees of mortgage firms, both groups being among the generally better-off in the low-income scale. The same might be said of the practice of linking meagre government housing programmes to newly established industry, as this benefits a select number of workers whose housing needs might be better provided for by industry as part of its initial capital outlay.

Fourthly, the lack of funds and of skilled manpower, both at the middle and upper echelons, has made the implementation of housing programmes quite difficult. This is especially true in the newly independent countries of Africa and to a lesser extent in some countries of Asia and Latin America.

Finally, although there is urgent need for urban land reform in order to improve the basis for increased housing production, progress in this area has been slow. Indeed, it would appear that rural land reform, which is carried

out in conjunction with programmes of agrarian reform, has made more visible progress than land policies and reforms in the urban areas. The recent Interregional Seminar on Improvement of Slums and Uncontrolled Settlements, held in Medellín, Colombia,⁷ has pointed out the critical nature of this problem. The seminar report suggested that the problem of urban deterioration is in part due to the inadequate supply of urban land to satisfy the housing demand of the medium- and low-income groups. In light of this, it was proposed that measures be adopted governing the use of urban lands within the development plans of cities.

Specifically, the seminar report suggests that progress in housing will be slow unless the following steps are taken:

- (a) The elaboration of master plans for land use to be effected within the context of regional development plans;
- (b) The establishment of property-taxing measures to control speculation;
- (c) The regulation of private property right when these are not adequately utilized;
- (d) The acquisition of land by the public authorities either by voluntary or compulsory methods;
- (e) The acquisition of reserve lands for future urban expansion to be carried out in accordance with plans for land use adopted at local and regional levels.

The question of urban land reform needs to be analysed, especially in conjunction with the future prospect of so-called spontaneous settlements. Such settlements, which have sometimes been called "uncontrolled settlements", have continued to grow at an enormous pace. At Dakar, Dar-es-Salaam and Lusaka, these settlements contain about 30 per cent of the city populations. At Colombo, 44 per cent; in Calcutta, Karachi and Manila, 35 per cent; at Ankara and Izmir, 60 per cent; at Recife, Guayaquil, Mexico City and Maracaibo, between 46-50 per cent and at Buenaventura, 80 per cent. The squalor in which many of them develop could be avoided by positive policies and measures specially regarding land use and tenure. On the other hand, it has been discovered that families living in such settlements have some assets which, if properly used, could become important inputs for development programmes. The Symposium on the Impact of Urbanization on Man's Environment suggested that: "The scale and life style of such settlements provides a more familiar environment and a sense of community to the rural migrant. The trend to squatter settlements, which appears to be an inevitable part of spreading urbanization, can be controlled and converted into a positive development factor instead of being an impediment to healthy urban growth."⁸

Among the key factors that will facilitate this process is an adequate land reform policy that will take due cognizance of the need for tenure security and the provi-

⁶ United Nations Economic and Social Office in Beirut (UNESOB), "Guidelines for housing formulation in six countries of the Middle East" (May 1970, mimeo.), C. B. Patel, "Housing policy guidelines for countries of Asia and the Far East" (New Delhi, March 1970, mimeo.), Economic Commission for Latin America, "Tendencias y perspectivas de la política de vivienda en América Latina" (Santiago, 1967, mimeo.).

⁷ *Improvement of Slums and Uncontrolled Settlements*, report of an interregional seminar held at Medellín, Colombia, 15 February-1 March 1970 (United Nations publication, Sales No.: E.71.IV.6), p. 7.

⁸ *Symposium on the Impact of Urbanization on Man's Environment*, op. cit., "Statement and conclusions", p. 14.

sion of employment opportunities. Clearly such a policy and others conducive to the integration of such settlements into urban life must be made part of a national urban development policy. The seminar held in Medellín suggests three important measures that could be used to bring about a successful integration of slum settlements into the fabric of urban life in contemporary society. These are:

(a) Political measures—the formation of slum associations that can face community problems in a co-ordinated manner and make decisions in co-operation with the local and national agencies;

(b) Economic measures—the slum community is an important market for urban-centred goods and services. In addition, the slum labourer is an essential element in the urban work force. Better organization of the slum community and its labour force would facilitate greater co-operation with the urban centre;

(c) Fiscal measures—even though their income is marginal, the city derives a substantial tax contribution from members of the slum communities through sales taxes, salary taxes and payments for public services. This resource can be used effectively to bring about the steady integration of slum settlements into urban life.

In recent years there has been an increasing awareness of the deterioration of the human environment. So far as urban settlements are concerned, the most serious and urgent environmental problem is the shortage of suitable living accommodations and their necessary supporting physical and social infrastructure. This is specially evident in uncontrolled settlements of developing countries. Governments in many of these countries tend to give low priority to these physical and social needs and devote most of their available resources to industrialization without making due allowance for its social and physical consequences. In reality, meeting the social needs of the people and increasing economic output are interrelated problems. The question is how to achieve balanced resource allocation between the two.

The Symposium on the Impact of Urbanization on Man's Environment recognized that the problems of urban areas cannot be tackled independently of problems that originate in rural areas.⁹ It suggested that adequate attention must be given to the improvement of human settlements in rural areas with a view to reducing the acute pressures of ever-accelerating urbanization and the deterioration of the urban environment.

The need for a comprehensive approach

Although many problems persist, it can be stated that during the period under review, in countries where housing has made headway, there is a trend toward more realistic approaches in the formulation of housing policy. This is borne out by the response to a questionnaire,¹⁰ that was sent out to selected Governments of

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 15.

¹⁰ Questionnaire on social programming in housing and urban development, Centre for Housing, Building and Planning. Replies were received from Canada, Colombia, Ghana, Italy, Israel, Japan, the Netherlands, Romania, Singapore, Thailand, Tunisia, the United Kingdom and Venezuela.

Member States by the Centre for Housing, Building and Planning. First, Governments which replied to the questionnaire have shown a tendency to assume a comprehensive role in the housing field. They have recognized, moreover, that housing programmes can have an instrumental effect on the realization of a broad range of objectives—including the improved distribution of social services, a greater sense of community and economic betterment—resulting from the employment in housing construction and maintenance.

The Governments that responded to the questionnaire show that they recognize housing as a sectoral goal in its broader context, not only as an end, but as a means to other ends pursued in other sectors. The majority of the responses indicated that:

(a) Housing and urban development are included within national development plans;

(b) Programmes in housing and urban development have tended to be designed with some thought as to their effectiveness in generating employment, for providing basic social services, for counteracting economic recessions, for redistributing national income and for promoting geographical shifts of the population;

(c) Programmes also tended to be co-ordinated at the most appropriate level in the government machinery. The commonest levels for co-ordination appear to be the regional and local levels;

(d) Considerable thought is given to the requirements of the people for whom the housing and urban development programmes are designed.

Furthermore, the increasing participation of Governments in the preparation of sites for housing and the provision of services to these sites, indicates a shift towards more practical and realizable goals. Targets fixed on the basis of concepts such as housing deficit and over-all housing needs, have been found to be unattainable, as the resources required to meet them are not within easy reach of many countries. The reduction of housing standards below a certain minimum as a strategy for increasing the number of houses produced every year may also be self-defeating, as it has resulted in an increase in the amount of unacceptable housing in some countries. Consequently, there has been interest in revising standards to make them compatible with requirements and resources. This has been the case in Chile and Hong Kong where low-cost housing standards are being raised.

In many countries, the production of housing is based on the self-help approach. A large proportion of the housing in the United Republic of Tanzania and Ethiopia is produced by this method. This approach has functioned well in the rural areas, but in the urban areas considerable intervention by public agencies has been necessary as the social structure of the urban communities differs from that of the rural. However, in Chile and Colombia, a substantial amount of urban housing has been built with the aid of this method. Government support for self-help and mutual aid projects both in urban and rural areas is likely to continue and to grow as these schemes, together with "site and service" projects, have presented viable methods for the production of housing within the reach of low-income families.

Considering the facts that squatter and uncontrolled settlements, in general, are built up through unaided self-help efforts, it is only logical to harness this important potential by converting it into a force for effective urban development.

Mobilizing resources

The financing of housing remains a subject of great concern throughout the developing countries of the world. In financing techniques, two groups of countries can be identified. First, there are nations, notably in Latin America, where savings and loans associations have grown in terms of numbers, volume of assets, net deposits, mortgage loans and number of savers in both absolute and *per capita* terms. This is the case in Bolivia, Chile, El Salvador, Peru and Venezuela.¹¹ A study carried out by the Centre for Housing, Building and Planning¹² shows that these types of savings institutions established with the aid of external seed capital and technical advice appear to move towards self-financing in a relatively short time. The study further shows that significant economic benefit accrues to the countries from modest provisions of foreign funds. For example, \$1 million in external seed capital is estimated to induce 2,500 new jobs in the construction industry alone and employment in related sectors is expected to be considerably more.

One serious problem affecting both lenders and borrowers in some Latin American countries is inflation. The adverse effect of inflation on housing may be gauged from the following observation:

“The decline in the purchasing power of currency means that funds run out before housing programmes have been completed. In many countries their loss is some 10 per cent per year, while in others, it amounts to as much as 20 or even 30 per cent.”¹³

In the short run, some countries—notably Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay—have attempted to solve this problem by establishing an automatic monetary corrective factor for savings, bonds and mortgage payments for housing purposes. This experience remains to be fully analysed in terms of its effects on the economy as a whole. It is also felt that this procedure has tended to work hardship on lower-income families whose resources grow at a slow pace.

The second group of countries—found notably in the African region—have not yet built up even a rudimentary structure for financing housing or for channelling savings into the housing sector. In such countries progress in mobilizing resources tends to be slow.

Where an isolated attempt has been made to create the machinery necessary for mobilizing resources for home building, as is the case in Ethiopia, Liberia, Malawi, Somalia and the United Republic of Tanzania, too much

has been expected too soon from these institutions. When they have not been able to deliver according to expectations, they have tended to be denied the full measure of government support. The result is that these infant home savings institutions suffer from lack of solvency. During their formative years these institutions need the fullest measure of government support if they are to attain sustained growth. The recent ECA meeting on technical and social problems of urbanization with emphasis on financing of housing, held in January 1969, in Addis Ababa, underscored this point. The waiting list of potential borrowers is long and funds are usually in very short supply.

The variety of experiences with savings and financing institutions have given rise to the view that perhaps only countries at a more advanced stage of development, such as those to be found in Latin America, can expect to derive significant benefits from such institutions while those at lower stages are likely to achieve few, if any, benefits.

Mention should be made of the effect of interest rates on housing production. The trend, thus far, has been for interest rates to rise to higher and higher levels in both developing and developed countries so that whatever progress is made in reducing building costs and in the mobilization of scarce resources for housing purposes is offset by the rising cost of money. At the national level, the significance that housing is given in the over-all national plans strongly influences the progress of home savings and financing institutions and the availability of low-cost credit. Since the financial policies of great powers play an important role in setting the major trends in capital distribution, the effects of such policies in the housing sector need to be more fully studied. It is nevertheless obvious that if housing is to receive its due measure of importance, the interest rate should not place the cost of money out of the reach of low-income families.

Social aspects of housing programmes and problems of management

The results of socially organized housing have, as in the past, been handicapped by the absence of effective management. This is generally because of a lack of importance attached to management or to the inadequacy of resources and managerial skills. According to an expert group meeting,¹⁴ the housing stock, which is usually in the neighbourhood of 20-25 per cent of the national capital assets, ought to command about 2 per cent of the value of the housing stock for maintenance and administration purposes. A recent United Nations publication¹⁵ drew attention to the need for sound management practices. Many housing agencies and institutions have failed to realize that it is as important to maintain housing as it is to produce it. Within this context, the selection of families, tenant education and other measures for inducing social change are of the greatest importance.

¹¹ *A Survey of New Home Financing Institutions in Latin America*, part II, 1969, prepared for the Centre for Housing, Building and Planning by the Washington Savings and Loan Association, Miami Beach, Florida.

¹² See United Nations, “Economics and financial implications of housing finance institutions in developing countries” (August 1968) (mimeographed internal document), p. 3.

¹³ See *Social Change and Social Development Policy in Latin America* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 70.II.G.3), p. 258.

¹⁴ See “Meeting of a group of experts on housing management and tenant education” (ST/TAO/SER.C/61).

¹⁵ *Basics of Housing Management* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 69.IV.12).

Improvement of rural housing conditions cannot in practice be considered in isolation. It is necessary to take into account the complexity of rural problems in order to fit rural housing programmes within the context of rural development. There are some noteworthy examples of comprehensive programmes. In Venezuela a rural housing programme initiated in 1958 has achieved enviable goals. Eighty thousand houses have been constructed providing better living conditions for more than 500,000 persons.¹⁶ Even more important than these figures is the underlying concept under which this programme has been elaborated. It is recognized to be a comprehensive programme in the sense that all of the underlying factors that make for rural deprivation have been considered. Among these factors may be mentioned: (a) lack of opportunity for full employment; (b) inadequate distribution of land tenure; (c) absence of or insufficient educational opportunities and (d) absence of or insufficient health and sanitary facilities. In the rural sector, the deficit in housing units as such tends to be less important as compared to the urgency of improving the sanitary and hygienic standards of the environment. It is revealing that the Venezuelan rural housing programme is carried out by the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare, the Bureau of Malariology and Environmental Sanitation and that it is linked with the Ministry of Agriculture and the Workers Housing Bank.

In Asia and the Far East, rural housing projects were undertaken in Burma, Ceylon, India and the Philippines. An evaluation of these projects indicated that villagers were not able to pay monthly instalments for loans. It became clear that improvement in rural housing conditions had to be related to the economic development of the villages. Unless the earning capacity of the villagers was increased, the rural population could not be expected to repay housing loans. A corollary of this experience is the need to phase rural housing programmes over a long period of time, about ten to fifteen years, to allow for a balanced development of the various components of rural life.¹⁷

In Africa, Ghana, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia, and the United Arab Republic have undertaken large rural housing programmes in which village life has been the focus of attention. Other countries in the region have launched important colonization and resettlement plans in which rural housing plays an important role.

The institution of pilot and demonstration projects is becoming an important tool for promoting the continued growth of improved rural housing. There is under way a demonstration project in South America in which three countries are participating to develop more efficient and rational programmes. The results are expected to benefit the whole region.

As already noted, some Governments have sought solutions for rural housing problems through citizen

participation in self-help projects. Given the dimension of the problems associated with rural housing and the inadequate government resources to deal with them, the self-help approach can be of considerable benefit in increasing the housing supply.

BUILDING

Despite progress, building industries in most of the developing countries are poorly organized and inefficiently run. There is an excessive use of imported building materials with a negative effect on foreign exchange reserves, low labour productivity, unstable employment and extremely low yearly output of housing units. Efforts made by Governments and international organizations to accelerate the training of technicians, to improve building designs, introduce advanced planning methods, increase the production of building materials and rationalize building techniques have proved to be insufficient. It is widely recognized that basic changes have to be made in the building industry if these shortcomings are to be remedied.

Necessary improvements in the building industry should be stimulated by government measures if the volume of construction in general and housing in particular needed for development is to be forthcoming. Governments should elaborate and implement long-term development plans giving high priority to the construction of low-cost housing. Long-term housing and construction plans create a demand for labour and capital over a period of years. The stimulation of housing construction through government planning is essential if the building industry is to prepare a schedule of production for the years ahead. The necessary investments that the industry ought to make, such as the production of building materials, the acquisition of equipment and tools, the hiring of personnel and the training of technicians can then be planned and amortized over a period of time to bring about the lowest possible construction costs. Long-term plans in the building industry, based on long-term government plans, are likely to result in a series of improvements such as the acquisition of equipment and training of technicians. This could lead to a strong industry producing more and better housing at lower unit cost. Such reform could moreover stabilize the industry and provide greater employment opportunities for the urban unemployed.

A number of developing countries have made substantial efforts in this direction. A review of these various efforts may serve to illustrate present trends for the improvement of the building sector.

The goal in developing countries is to accelerate the introduction of industrialized techniques in the building field. Several of the less developed nations have embarked on the industrial production of prefabricated houses. The realization of this objective involves the following stages in the development of the industry: rationalization, prefabrication and mechanization. The following techniques may be considered as industrialization of building when applied to developing countries: (a) mass production on site, which may or may not involve the intensive use of prefabricated components and

¹⁶ *Report of the Interregional Seminar on Rural Housing and Community Facilities*, Maracay, Venezuela, 2-19 April 1967 (ST/TAO/SER.C/103), and Arturo R. Ortiz, "The role of the International and Inter-American Association for Rural Housing and Community Facilities", working paper prepared for the National Rural Housing Conference (Warrenton, Virginia).

¹⁷ C. B. Patel, "Housing policy guidelines for countries of Asia and the Far East" (New Delhi, March 1970, mimeo.).

mechanical building equipment; (b) concrete construction with prefabricated form work; (c) partial prefabrication combined with traditional building methods; (d) open prefabrication consisting of modular components for universal use in different places, and (e) closed prefabrication of components for one specific use. A rationally organized construction of a certain number of housing units built by unskilled labour (as in guided self-help programmes) reduces emphasis on organized mass production and may therefore be considered as one of the first stages of industrialization in building.

The rational design of low-cost housing and community facilities is another important condition for strengthening the building industry. There is general concern on the part of professionals that the design of low-cost houses must take into consideration not only functional factors such as the patterns of living and climate, but also the most economical construction methods resulting from mass production techniques. Attempts have been made in this context to test experimental housing designs in a pilot project in Central America intended to lower building costs through modular co-ordination, the use of new building materials, the improved design of housing units and urbanization.

The efficient production of building materials is one of the most important conditions influencing the development of the building industry. A key requirement is the availability at the local level of raw materials. Until new materials can replace traditional ones, it is necessary for the developing countries to produce locally or within the same region the necessary amounts of cement, steel, aggregates, wood and lime. This could have the effect of reducing imports, which in some countries account for 50 per cent of the materials needed in housing construction. In this connexion, there is still much to be done if it is realized how low the current consumption of cement *per capita* is in some of the developing regions as compared with that of the industrialized ones (50-100 kg *per capita*, as against 300-500 kg), or the fact that African and Asian countries are practically totally dependent on imported iron and steel.

Even if building materials are locally produced, much remains to be done to raise standards of production and to reduce costs. The question of production costs deserves serious consideration, as the costs of locally produced materials in some developing countries is higher than those of imported products. With the introduction of prefabrication, the distinction between building materials and the construction process itself becomes less clear. A number of less industrialized countries have already undertaken the production of precast concrete beams of catalogue standard dimensions and are also producing prefabricated cabinet work, standardized doors, windows and wall panels. One of the most active developing regions in the field of prefabrication is Latin America. A recent study made by the United Nations shows that most of the countries in the area are either experimenting with or applying prefabricated methods in the execution of construction programmes.¹⁸ Cuba has

established a number of concrete prefabrication plants to produce components for housing, industrial construction and infrastructure. Venezuela is experimenting with several locally-developed prefabricated systems. Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Peru are also using prefabricated elements made of concrete, metal and wood on a relatively large scale. However, some of these efforts run the risk of being lost if Governments do not adopt immediate measures to support these infant industries through long-term building programmes, long-term, low-interest loans, tax exemption and special specifications and contracting procedures for prefabricated systems.

URBAN AND REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Urbanization trends and problems

The urban population of the world is increasing at a more rapid rate than that of the total world population and it is certain that this trend will continue. Moreover, the rate of urbanization for the developing countries remains higher than that of the rest of the world. Population growth rates of urban centres often exceed an average annual increase of 6 per cent in many developing countries and sometimes reach 10 per cent or more. This imposes additional burdens on the economies of developing countries, which are already finding it difficult to satisfy the needs of their population.

It is estimated¹⁹ that the world's urban population,²⁰ which was 33 per cent of the total world population in 1960, will be 46 per cent in 1980 and 51 per cent in 2000. Other estimates of this trend are that at the beginning of the twenty-first century, the urban population of Latin America will include 80 per cent of the region's total population, making that region more urbanized than Europe, while the urban population of North America will reach 87 per cent of the total. The other developing regions of the world will remain basically rural in the year 2000, but the percentage of urban population during the 1960-2000 period will grow from 23 to 40 in East Africa, from 18 to 35 in South Asia and from 18 to 30 in Africa as a whole. In the year 2000, it is projected that 62 per cent of the world's urban population will be living in the regions now described as developing. The corresponding figure for 1960 was only 41 per cent.

It would appear that the urban population continues to concentrate mainly in a few major centres in some countries and in one major centre in others. This over-concentration of population in certain urban centres and subsequent overcrowding in squatter settlements and slums in developing as well as developed countries creates problems resulting partly from unbalanced economic development and causing social ills and environmental deterioration. Unemployment, under-employment and the low-income level of the dwellers of these areas—coupled with the problems of social adjustment—aggravate the situation. There is a lack of comprehensive public development schemes required for the improvement of living conditions in these areas. *Ad hoc* programmes of development that

¹⁸ Martin Reig, a United Nations consultant, "New developments in building in Latin America", to be issued as a document of the United Nations.

¹⁹ *Growth of the World's Urban and Rural Population from 1820-2000* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 69.XIII.3).

²⁰ "Urban population" as defined nationally.

many Governments attempt to initiate often fall short of success owing to the complexity of the problem. A sectoral approach to the problem of low-income settlements, such as public housing schemes without the provision of adequate income, training, social services and orientation, has not given satisfactory results. Close examination and comparison of the field experience of several developed and developing countries reveal that a comprehensive approach is needed to deal with urban development problems.

In most of the developing and developed countries similar problems also exist at the regional level. Differences in natural resources and unbalanced development policies of Governments and the growth pattern of the regions create serious disparities between the regions in many countries. The consequences of these disparities are not only political problems and social injustice, but also mass out-migration, which creates over-concentration of population.

Living conditions in congested low-income settlements often constitute a hazard to the human environment. The misuse of land and lack of proper services in these areas have led to land and water pollution, which is becoming a continuous threat to the health and well-being of the population. However, the major cause of environmental problems in the cities is the unplanned process of modernization. Industry and transportation bear the largest share of the blame, since the pollution they cause is often more serious than that resulting from congested low-income settlements. Air, water and land pollution and damage to the ecological balance of the environment have become a major problem of urban settlements in developed countries, and one that is beginning to affect developing countries as well. If effective measures are not taken, the coming years will bring additional, and in some cases irreversible, damage to the human environment.

Urban traffic has become a major problem in developing as well as in developed countries. Between 1963 and 1967, the number of automobiles in the world increased by 32 per cent, although the world's total population increased by only 8 per cent.²¹ The urban traffic problem is not only a problem of traffic congestion but also one of inadequate mass transportation.

The impact of urban development on land is most critical in shaping urban development patterns in developing countries, as is the case in developed countries. Increasing demand for urban land and limitations on its supply, including land speculation and obsolete land regulations, create additional problems. Given these factors, the attitude of the public authorities is very important for the solution of these problems. The choice of realistic policies has proved to be a vital factor in helping to solve urban development problems despite the general shortage of funds and skilled manpower.

Policies and programmes to deal with these problems

The success of urban and regional development depends a great deal on the over-all development policies of a country. In this respect, urbanization is the outcome of national economic and social development rather than an

independent phenomenon, while regional development is also closely associated with the urbanization process. These interdependencies and social and locational aspects of development are often ignored by public authorities and development planners. The spatial consequences of economic and social policy decisions and the causes of population movements are seldom taken into account in economic policy-making.

The institutions of most developing countries are not often designed for coping with the rapid pace of urbanization. This results in a slow-moving decision-making process, which reduces the effectiveness of even well-conceived urban and regional development policies. Lack of technical knowledge in the methodology of analysis and policy-formulation places an additional burden on understaffed government departments. Few developing countries have adequate research and training facilities to support the activities of public authorities in urban and regional development.

The growing concern with environmental protection in the developed countries may result in large-scale operational programmes to control air, water and land pollution and to restore ecological balance. In North America, there is increasing involvement of the public sector in urban and regional development. Environmental control legislation in the United Kingdom reflects the public concern for the conservation of natural resources. Regional planning in France provides an interesting model of the integration of national and regional planning designed to accelerate the development of less developed regions and to relieve the pressure on the capital city. In highly urbanized and industrialized northern Europe, physical planning studies stress the importance of land use planning and control. "New town" developments in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has opened up new territories for industrial and agricultural production.

In most developing countries, the major emphasis is on the development of infrastructure, although many of these countries also have policies for land development, industrial development and decentralization to reduce population pressure in certain urban areas. Many developing countries, however, still lack even the broad outlines of urban development policies. In others, where squatting and uncontrolled urban settlements have not yet arisen, a unique opportunity exists to prepare for future rapid population movements.

Regional development is becoming a major part of national development policies. Although the objective is the same—development—the approach and emphasis vary in country experience in this field. In developed countries, efforts are being made to accelerate the development of those regions which grow less rapidly than others. Regional planning is becoming more widely used as a major instrument of regional development. There are a number of examples of its utilization in the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Japan, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland and the United Kingdom; and in several developing countries such as Brazil, Iran, Mexico, Pakistan, the Philippines, the Republic of Korea, Thailand and Turkey, the importance of regional planning is increasingly recognized. Although a variety of approaches and methodologies are utilized in regional planning, there is one unifying factor common to all of them: this

²¹ *Statistical Yearbook 1968* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 69.XVII.1).

is the comprehensiveness of regional planning, calling into play the economic, social and physical aspects of development. A comprehensive planning approach helps to avoid the problems commonly associated with a sectoral approach in investment programmes such as preparing isolated development schemes for urban centres, developing rural programmes without regard for the inevitable urban consequences, and trying to promote industry without establishing necessary ties with infrastructure and agriculture.

Although there are encouraging signs for future action in the field of urban and regional development on a sounder economic basis and with the necessary social approach, the level of implementation of plans and programmes for urban and regional development remains low. In this respect, lack of capital and low investment capacity, disorganization of the implementation mechanism, lack of skilled manpower, conflicting interests and land speculation are the major barriers.

A recent United Nations seminar summarizes the planning strategy that is necessary to promote regional and urban growth, emphasizing the need to integrate planning at the national level with economic, social and physical planning.²² Within this national context, regional planning should focus on those regions that have a marked potential for economic growth. Every country, moreover, should establish a national urban policy consistent with over-all national and regional development objectives. The construction of new towns, which in the past had been viewed as an important solution to the problem of urban growth, now assumes a more limited place in urban planning; the construction of such towns, with their attendant high cost, is justified only where developed on a sound economic base.

²² *United Nations Interregional Seminar on Physical Planning for Urban, Regional and National Development*, held at Bucharest, Romania, 22 September-7 October 1969 (ST/TAO/C.132).

Chapter XIII

EDUCATION

A brief over-all picture of the current state of education and of the changes in conditions and trends since 1960 was presented in the *1967 Report on the World Social Situation*¹ and in the document entitled "The role of education in economic and social development: report of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization" (E/CN.5/435). Most of the information and data contained in those documents and the future prospects outlined in them are still broadly valid. However, over the past two or three years there has been a new awareness among Governments of certain conspicuous educational problems requiring urgent solutions. This awareness would seem to be a distinctive element in recent trends in education throughout the world.

GENERAL TRENDS

The total world enrolment at the three main levels of education—primary, secondary and higher—and including pre-primary schools, was estimated at 347 million for the year 1960—excluding mainland China, the Democratic Republic of Korea and the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam.² The corresponding figure for 1967-1968 was 480 million, an increase of 133 million or 38 per cent in six years. On an annual average, total school enrolment has increased at a rate of about 4.7 per cent over this period, whereas world population increased annually by about 1.9 per cent. The trend in enrolment reflects the progress made by developing countries particularly in the field of primary education. Africa and Latin America registered the highest average rate of increase in annual enrolment during the period. Enrolment of girls and women at all educational levels increased by over 53 million in the period 1960-1968, an increase of 38 per cent. The percentage of girls and women out of total enrolment was estimated at 43 per cent for 1967/68, the same level as for 1960/61. However, in Asia the percentage of girls and women enrolled increased from 37 per cent in 1960/61 to 38 per cent in 1967/68, and in Africa, the increase was from 36 per cent in 1960/61 to 38 per cent in 1967/68.

There has also been a significant increase over the 1960/61 figures in the enrolment of students at each level of education. By 1967/68, world enrolment had increased at the primary level by 31 per cent, at the secondary level by 59 per cent and at the higher level by 93 per cent. In Africa, where there was the highest rate of increase

in enrolment, the corresponding percentage increases were 48, 107 and 86.

However, primary school enrolment seems to have tended to level off or even in some cases to decrease, especially, but not exclusively, in the more developed countries, while enrolment continues to expand at the secondary level and, even more, at the pre-primary and higher levels. The number of teaching staff is still increasing rapidly, on the whole, but the pattern is often different from that of school enrolment for two reasons: in some countries, especially developing countries, the underutilization of existing trained staff or the need for a rapid increase in school enrolment has resulted in higher pupil-teacher ratio; conversely, in other countries, especially in the wealthier ones, where efforts have been made not so much to increase the number of school places as to improve the quality of education, the pupil-teacher ratio has been lowered. This is only one illustration of the current tendency of Governments, after or simultaneously with a phase of rapid quantitative expansion, to regard the qualitative improvement of educational systems as a basic concern.

In higher education, the extraordinary increase in enrolment and the number of institutions and the new awareness in many countries of certain problems, especially those of orientation and selection, have produced a variety of trends. First, far-reaching changes have sometimes tended to decentralize structures in a number of countries. In addition, the content of education often becomes more interdisciplinary, while the disciplines taught increase in number. Advances in educational technology and changes in methods have also become increasingly frequent.

The development of post-university education in a number of countries should also be noted. In many countries, there has been marked participation in university administration by the different groups which make up the university; also in certain countries, the introduction of management techniques from the private sector into university administration has been noted, particularly in connexion with budgetary administration. In conjunction with this trend, increased importance is attached to the training of administrative personnel in institutions of higher education, the retraining of teachers with a view to eventual life-long education and the integration of non-traditional and extramural forms of education, such as the "open university", into higher education. Naturally, in many cases, this transformation of the structures and methods of higher education is not accomplished without a certain psychological resistance or various practical difficulties.

¹ United Nations publication, Sales No.: 68.IV.9, chap. VI.

² The source for all data, unless otherwise stated, is the UNESCO Office of Statistics.

TABLE I. ESTIMATED TOTAL PUPIL ENROLMENT BY LEVEL OF EDUCATION, 1960/61 AND 1967/68
(Thousands)

Continent	Total	First level (including pre-primary)	Second level (general, vocational and teacher training)	Third level
World total ^a				
1960/61	347,029	271,928	63,927	11,174
1967/68	479,619	356,813	101,268	21,538
AAI percentage ^b	4.7	4.0	6.8	9.8
Africa				
1960/61	21,377	19,070	2,115	192
1967/68	32,951	28,220	4,373	358
AAI percentage	6.4	5.8	10.9	9.3
Northern America				
1960/61	50,954	36,072	11,157	3,725
1967/68	63,464	36,555	19,547	7,362
AAI percentage	3.2	0.2	8.3	10.2
Latin America				
1960/61	32,386	27,934	3,885	567
1967/68	49,101	39,631	8,365	1,105
AAI percentage	6.1	5.1	11.6	10.0
Asia ^a				
1960/61	120,583	97,128	21,325	2,131
1967/68	178,688	141,374	32,724	4,590
AAI percentage	5.8	5.5	6.3	11.6
Europe and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics				
1960/61	118,362	89,260	24,644	4,457
1967/68	151,078	108,153	35,018	7,907
AAI percentage	3.6	2.8	5.2	8.5
Oceania				
1960/61	3,367	2,464	801	102
1967/68	4,337	2,880	1,241	216
AAI percentage	3.7	2.3	6.5	11.3
(Arab States)				
1960/61	(8,745)	(7,337)	(1,248)	(160)
1967/68	(13,955)	(10,915)	(2,734)	(306)
AAI percentage	(6.9)	(5.8)	(11.9)	(9.7)

SOURCE: United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization Office of Statistics.

^a Excluding China (mainland), the Democratic Republic of Korea and the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam.

^b AAI percentage = Percentage of average annual increase (1960/61-1967/68).

TABLE 2. SCHOOL ENROLMENT RATIOS BY LEVEL OF EDUCATION, 1960/61 AND 1967/68

Major regions	1960/61				1967/68			
	Percentage of children of primary school age attending school at any level	Percentage of children of secondary school age attending school at any level	Percentage of children of primary and secondary school age (combined) attending school at any level	Third level enrolment per 100,000 inhabitants	Percentage of children of primary school age attending school at any level	Percentage of children of secondary school age attending school at any level	Percentage of children of primary and secondary school age (combined) attending school at any level	Third level enrolment per 100,000 inhabitants
World	63	34	50	480	68	40	56	772
Africa	34	12	24	70	40	15	28	110
North America	98	90	94	1,875	98	92	96	3,356
Latin America	60	26	45	267	75	35	55	425
Asia ^a	50	22	36	216	55	30	45	395
Europe and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics	96	57	79	697	97	65	85	1,148
Oceania	95	28	66	650	95	30	67	1,191
(Arab States)	(38)	(16)	(28)	(170)	(50)	(25)	(38)	(270)

SOURCE: United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization Office of Statistics.

^a Excluding China (mainland), the Democratic Republic of Korea and the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam.

TABLE 3. AVERAGE PERCENTAGE ANNUAL RATES OF GROWTH BY BROAD AGE-GROUPS FOR THE WORLD'S MORE DEVELOPED AND LESS DEVELOPED REGIONS, 1965-1985

(Medium variant)

Regions and ages	1965-1970	1970-1975	1975-1980	1980-1985
World total				
All ages	2.0	2.0	2.1	2.0
0-4	2.1	2.0	1.8	1.6
5-14	1.6	1.8	2.2	2.0
15-64	2.0	2.1	2.0	2.2
65 +	2.6	2.7	2.5	1.8
More developed regions				
All ages	1.0	1.0	1.6	1.1
0-4	-0.5	1.5	1.7	1.1
5-14	0.4	-0.2	0.5	1.6
15-64	1.2	1.1	1.0	1.0
65 +	2.5	2.4	1.9	0.4
Less developed regions				
All ages	2.4	2.5	2.4	2.4
0-4	2.8	2.1	1.8	1.7
5-14	2.0	2.4	2.6	2.1
15-64	2.5	2.6	2.5	2.7
65 +	2.8	3.2	3.3	3.3

SOURCE: "World population prospects, 1965-1985, assessed in 1968", Population Division Working Paper No. 30 (December 1969), p. 17, table 8.

Many of the problems encountered by Governments during the past two years have been due to the need to meet an ever-increasing demand for education of various kinds and at various levels. Yet, although the educational crises which have arisen in many countries are clearly connected with expansion, they also have other and perhaps more fundamental causes. Education, which has been recognized for a number of years as a factor of economic development, is now seen to be a factor of both economic and social development which must take into account the requirements of society as well as the individual. This approach represents a further step from the concept of education as an item of social expenditure towards that of education as an economic investment. Another result of the education crisis has been to highlight the importance of education as a political factor in national life.

Over the past three years, ministers of education, in examining measures for improving the quality and productivity of their educational systems, have tried to identify priorities. Despite differences due largely to the diversity of levels of development, social structures and political systems, the result of such studies has been a notable measure of agreement in the conclusions arrived at by most countries. This agreement is beginning to emerge as one of the bases for international co-operation in the field of education.

However, although in many countries the resources allocated for education have increased more rapidly than the rate of economic growth, they are still inadequate; educational research efforts, although generally progressing, still need to be intensified. What is even more apparent, is the fact that research, thinking and innovative measures have not yet been co-ordinated into an over-all pattern leading to the formulation of a compre-

hensive strategy for educational development. It may be that educational progress in the coming years will depend on the attention given by each Government and by the international community as a whole to the attempt to establish this comprehensive approach. The primary purpose of the current International Education Year is to meet this need, and the first reports received on action taken by Governments indicate that they are resolved to follow this course.

EDUCATIONAL PLANNING AND SOME RESULTS

Where educational planning is concerned, the concept has been broadened with increasing attention to the qualitative factors. The planning techniques used by the departments concerned have had to be refined to take account of the more numerous parameters and more complex data involved in this more ambitious approach. This more elaborate planning approach increasingly employs the services of sociologists, psychologists and other researchers in formulating solutions. Thus, planning departments are being discouraged from using a planning approach based exclusively on forecasts, projections or quantitative goals established in the light of economic development requirements.

Educational planning in recent years has also taken account of individual aspirations, of the need to adapt types of training and retraining to a constantly changing labour market and of the fact that in many countries, especially developing ones, there is already—in relation to opportunities for employment—a surplus of trained or graduate personnel. Thus, frequently Governments are attempting ways of perfecting techniques and are continually revising plans, improving the training of planners and reducing the discrepancy which is too often noted between planning objectives and their achievement.

The quantitative expansion now taking place must be viewed against a background of democratization. This democratization process, which naturally aims at increasing the number of school places and educational opportunities available, nevertheless involve much more than merely linear, mechanical expansion in numerical terms. First of all, it endeavours to rectify the inequalities in educational opportunity which impede the implementation of the right to education, to the detriment of certain groups or categories of children, young people or adults. Regardless of the inadequacy of the results achieved and the continued existence of situations detrimental to a large number of individuals or groups, great progress towards equal educational opportunity for women has none the less been made over the past three years. This progress has been mostly in the field of literacy campaigns for women and technical and vocational education. Evidence of the willingness of many Governments to move towards real equality in this respect is to be seen, for instance, in the many requests for fellowships submitted in the past three years under the United Nations Development Programme. The willingness of many Governments to increase educational opportunities for certain hitherto disadvantaged categories is also evidenced by the rapid, although very inadequate, growth of special education for the physically or mentally handicapped children and by the importance attached to education in

rural areas, involving both its expansion and its adaptation to the rural environment.

While the demarcation between secondary education and out-of-school education has tended to become less clear, the often arbitrary distinctions between levels of education have tended to lessen or disappear, giving way to the concept of continuous education, while the length of compulsory schooling has, in some cases, been extended. The establishment in many countries of a continuous education system appears to be a step towards the realization of the concept of life-long education. This concept extends the period of acquiring and renewing knowledge throughout the entire lifetime of every individual, taking into account the constant growth of the volume of knowledge and the attendant need for constantly rising standards. Over the past two or three years, Governments have shown a growing interest in this type of education, especially from the point of view of retraining and vocational advancement.

The major effect of these considerations on the different levels and types of education may be summarized as follows: some countries have succeeded in reducing the length of primary education, while the content and level of knowledge have not appeared to suffer as a result. Various developing countries have endeavoured to reorganize primary education as a four-year basic course designed to provide all children with a background which would constitute a common foundation of national culture, followed by a two-year supplementary course to ensure the rational orientation of all pupils by preparing the more gifted ones for the transition to secondary, general and technical education. In this case, provision is often made for flexible post-primary cycles of education for pupils not entering secondary education.

To meet the needs of those who have been excluded from educational opportunities at the primary level, some countries are having to seek more flexible and unorthodox methods, outside the formal school system and outside the usual forms of employment. These solutions attempt to establish a non-conventional educational approach with a close link between general education, vocational training, work and the effective participation of children and youth in development. One such programme provides training that is both cultural and agricultural for children in rural areas who do not attend ordinary schools.³ These structural innovations in primary education are accompanied by programme changes: the introduction of new subjects and the teaching of elective subjects, increasingly frequent instruction in foreign languages at the end of the primary level and the introduction of modern mathematics.

In secondary education, two related trends are apparent: one involves the generalized teaching of a common body of knowledge during a period of orientation, followed by specialized education; the other is the tendency to group together different types of education in single schools termed "comprehensive schools". That must be seen as the manifestation of a twofold concern: to bring technical and vocational education to the same level as general education and to encourage transition

from one to the other. Measures have been taken in some countries to facilitate this transition. The establishment of institutions such as the comprehensive school is also frequently linked with a tendency to promote interdisciplinary programmes. It would be preferable to use the study of the environment, which is being given an increasingly important place in programmes as early as the primary level, but even more so at the secondary level, as a means of integrating the disciplines taught. This type of study, which relates to the ecological and sociological environment, is beginning to deal with problems of particular relevance, such as those of the biosphere.

The development of the new mathematics is also moving towards the integration of different disciplines to such an extent that it is sometimes taught in conjunction with languages. In a number of countries, in addition to the increased importance attached to the mathematics, science, modern languages and social studies programmes, there is a growing trend towards the diversification of programmes in the second cycle of the secondary level.

THE TEACHING PROFESSION

These changes in the structure and content of education are accompanied by the equally rapid development of teaching methods and techniques. Educational technology (programmed learning, radio and television, and soon, at least in some countries, satellites and computers), is developing and gives rise to complex problems of utilization, with profound implications for the training of teachers. The progress of educational television is perhaps the most striking and significant, especially in developing countries where both planning and education ministries view it as a particularly profitable investment. However, the use of such teaching aids as television and teaching machines has not become a significant factor in most countries.

The quality of education achieved and the extent to which the demand for it can be met will depend largely upon the number of qualified teachers available as well as on the ratio of teachers to pupils. In 1967/68, it was estimated that for 480 million students in primary, secondary and higher education, there were nearly 18 million teachers. Since 1960/61, the world average annual growth in teaching staff has been estimated at 3.5 per cent at the primary level, 6.6 per cent at the secondary level and 8.1 per cent at the third level. However, the ratio of teachers to pupils has actually decreased since 1960/61 when it was estimated at 1:30 and in 1967/68 it was at 1:31, meaning that the total world enrolment of pupils has increased faster than the number of teachers.

In some countries, the status of teachers has been the subject of legislation. With the growth of secondary education in one country, a new category of teachers was legally established in 1969 and the status thus given to them is likely to be the first step in the reform of the general methods of preparing all secondary school teachers. In another country a decision has been taken to phase out all unqualified teachers by 1970, and teachers will be given a much greater measure of professional self-government.

Several countries, too, appear to be carrying out reforms to relate the teachers' improved status to improved qualifications and training, for example, by taking steps

³ *Report on Children* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 71.IV.3), pp. 45 and 46.

to raise the level of primary teacher-training centres by raising the standard of entry, lengthening the period of training and providing additional general and professional education. However, in a number of other countries where programmes for accelerated teacher training have been implemented, the results are sometimes disappointing in the quality of teachers produced. Perhaps the most significant recent development in this field has been the acceptance by several countries of the principle that teachers require continuous training. Thus, a wide range of measures has been adopted in some countries to give teachers opportunities for in-service training or to arrange for refresher courses. However, the problem of teacher shortages remains crucial in many countries despite the successful efforts made by some toward solutions. In this regard, technical and vocational schools would seem to be the most severely affected. Yet, very few countries appear to be taking adequate steps to strengthen this form of teacher training. Perhaps one of the most significant needs relates to the training of those who instruct teachers.

In the training of teachers, three major trends have appeared in many countries: first of all, the training of primary school teachers is more and more frequently raised to a higher level and placed under the responsibility of universities. It should also be noted that, despite the importance generally attached to teacher training, most countries have a shortage of teachers. In various countries, special efforts have been made to provide in-service training; in some cases the courses of further training or re-training which are offered are compulsory. Such measures have been supplemented in many developing countries by the adoption of systems in which educational counsellors or the best-trained teachers are utilized for in-service training. In the developing countries, efforts to remedy the inadaptation of educational systems to national priorities and development needs have been reflected in the training of a new type of teacher who is both a school teacher and a community leader. In some teacher-training institutions, multidisciplinary education has been abandoned in favour of interdisciplinary programmes covering various subjects (history, geography, biology, physics and applied chemistry, economic and social matters, cultural themes) within the framework of the study of the environment. Thus, teachers are prepared not only to refer more accurately to the environment in which their pupils live, but also to make education an instrument for the transformation of that environment.

TECHNICAL TRAINING AND EDUCATION FOR MODERNIZING RURAL AREAS

In technical education, together with the raising of levels mentioned previously, a movement has been noted towards increased specialization in the subjects taught, reflecting an effort to train people for well-defined vocational activities. As against this, there is a tendency to place technical education on a more solid foundation of general knowledge. A growing number of Governments, faced with rapid technological progress, have recognized the need for updating and reorganizing knowledge with a view to eventual full-time education.

It might be said that in many developing countries, in particular, the amount and nature of economic develop-

ment are not keeping abreast of educational production. In these countries, the economic growth rate in the modern sections is not accelerating nearly as rapidly as the output of students from secondary schools and higher education. The rapid expansion of civil service employment in these countries is now having to slow down in view of fiscal realities. Even where industries are being established, the capacity of medium- and large-scale public and private enterprise to offer employment to personnel with secondary school or university training is quite limited.

In some developing countries middle-level technicians are helping to create a new intermediate technology based on small plants and local resources and integrating formal technical studies with on-the-job training in new industries. In these countries, technical education is being reformed and diversified for the job of training intermediate development cadres. Moreover, it is now generally recognized that technological training must be based on a broad primary-school background of general education.

But it is the jobless primary-school leavers and the uneducated young who constitute perhaps the most severe unemployment problem in developing countries, and out-of-school education for these young adults is a sorely neglected need.⁴ In only a few countries is the basic problem being attacked by functional literacy programmes followed by on-the-job training.

While rapid urbanization and the decline of the agricultural sector are characteristic of several countries—especially developed ones—it is estimated that 63.0 per cent of the world population in 1970 is rural, as compared with the 1965 figure of 64.9 per cent. However, the rural population increased from 2,135 million to 2,291 million between 1965 and 1970 and the proportion of the rural population in some developing countries is as high as 98 per cent. The importance of the modernization of rural areas, or rural transformation,⁵ is no longer underrated in the larger context of development strategy. The “green revolution” has brought new life to rural areas and has provided the opportunity for a successful rural transformation if full attention is given to the educational and training aspect. Technically, trained persons such as agricultural extension agents or research specialists require particular educational attainments and technical proficiencies, but farmers themselves must also acquire modern agricultural techniques to replace outdated traditional methods of cultivation. Their readiness for the new methods will depend in part on the quality and amount of preparation they have received or can receive in schools.

The neglect of educational planning to develop skills for agricultural development has often been pointed out. Among the obstacles to extending rural education is, in

⁴ A. Callaway, “Out-of-school education and training of young people”, in *Education in Rural Areas*, Report of the Commonwealth Conference on Education in Rural Areas, held at the University of Ghana, Legon, Accra, 23 March-2 April 1970 (London, Commonwealth Secretariat Printing Section, Marlborough House, 1970), p. 110.

⁵ Rural transformation refers to a comprehensive and inter-related set of changes that include not only increases in the productivity and output of agriculture and livestock, but also the emergence of differentiated economic activities such as food processing, storage and marketing and the organization of co-operatives.

TABLE 4. ILLITERACY IN RELATION TO *per capita* INCOME

Per capita income (United States dollars)	Illiteracy rates and number of countries (Percentage)			
	Over 80	50-80	20-49	Below 20
Under 100	23	8	2	—
101-200	8	12	6	1
201-300	—	6	13	3
301-500	1	—	7	4
501-1,000	1	1	1	11
Above 1,000	—	1	—	12
TOTAL	33	28	29	31

SOURCE: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, *Statistics of the Occupational and Educational Structure of the Labour Force in 53 Countries* (Paris, 1969).

the experience of most agricultural workers, the view that formal education, though respected, has no direct relationship with work. Agricultural associations and peasant community organizations do not often support demands for extension of rural education as vigorously as other causes.⁶ A more serious structural obstacle to agricultural development through education lies in the limited capacity of traditional agricultural production patterns to absorb agricultural experts and technicians. However, there has been more awareness of these problems and many Governments have undertaken special programmes to develop agricultural skills. In some African countries, for example, a technical programme specially adapted to the countryside and linked with rural development and agricultural mechanization has been developed. In addition to including some practical agricultural technology in basic rural schooling, some Governments are setting up systems of secondary rural polytechnical colleges combining general courses with agricultural and technical subjects, linked to the agricultural diversification of different production zones. Several countries have also set up national youth organizations combining development work with special training. If the flood of jobless rural youth to the cities is to be stemmed, rural vocational training must be a part of the industrialization of the countryside.

ILLITERACY

According to a recent UNESCO estimate, there are 783 million adults in the world today who are totally illiterate—an increase of 48 million since 1960. Unless special measures are taken, it is further estimated that this number will increase to more than 800 million in 1980.

However, the illiteracy rate has fallen from 39.3 per cent in 1960 to 34.2 per cent in 1970 and is expected to fall to about 29 per cent in 1980. The increase in the absolute number of adult illiterates is mainly due to the enormous population explosion in the period—1,870 million adults in 1960 and 2,287 million adults in 1970. The main regions where illiteracy is prevalent are all in countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America, where school enrolment is lowest and drop-out rates of boys and girls from regular school are highest. Usually those who are most affected by illiteracy are women. Forty per cent of the world's women are completely illiterate as contrasted with 28 per cent of the men. Rural areas form the largest reservoir of illiteracy.

In the economic sphere, there is a significant correlation between illiteracy and the gross national product (GNP). As table 4 shows, in general there is a close relationship between *per capita* income and the literacy rate: countries with high *per capita* income usually have high literacy rates, that is, a much higher percentage of illiterates is usually found in the developing countries.

The introduction of universal primary education so that all children can attend school obviously will help to stem mass illiteracy at its source. But experience has shown that this can be accomplished only by long-term measures—and in this case long-term might mean decades. It took Japan some fifty years of exceptional and constant

effort to eradicate illiteracy through school education. It all too often happens that schooling in areas with a predominantly illiterate population has few lasting results.

This may explain not only the high rate of drop-outs, but also the regression in educational skills among adults (in spite of several years of elementary schooling) and their relapse into illiteracy.

Many countries have launched mass adult literacy campaigns to bring literacy in the shortest possible time to the greatest possible number of illiterates, usually as a corrective measure for the absence of schooling. No doubt over the past twenty-five years mass literacy efforts have enjoyed some success, but on the whole the results have not been encouraging. Some causes of this negative outcome are known, others less known. In fact, it should be realized that illiteracy, and consequently literacy, are complex multidimensional phenomena that can be explained only by a series of factors: historical, geographical, economical, political, cultural, sociological and psychological. It has long been believed that literacy was essentially a question of the expansion of primary education and the organization of mass campaigns. Indeed, the problem of illiteracy in areas where it is still widespread will find a satisfactory solution only within the framework of ongoing development projects and programmes.

Industrialization cannot be undertaken without qualified and specialized manpower at all levels, and industrial training includes skills that cannot be learned without a certain degree of literacy. It is here that functional literacy training has a role to play. By extending its benefits to the largest possible number of illiterate workers, it is possible to obtain greater participation from workers, a higher degree of mobility, a higher global productivity from the industry concerned etc. The modernization of agriculture is also a priority target in a number of countries. Any analysis of the modernization of agriculture reveals the dual necessity of providing appropriate vocational training and raising the basic level of knowledge among agricultural workers. Functional literacy fulfils both these requirements, since it is also applied in certain cases to populations which have benefited from some schooling.⁷ Two recent world conferences on agricultural

⁶ L. Malossis, "Education and agricultural development", *International Social Science Journal*, vol. XXI, No. 2 (1967), p. 249.

⁷ "Literacy training and development", *UNESCO Chronicle*, vol. XVI, No. 3 (March 1970), pp. 123-124.

education and training held at Copenhagen stressed the importance of functional literacy programmes in agricultural development. An experimental world literacy programme consisting of twelve large-scale and diversified projects as well as a number of short-term micro-experiments has been launched in several countries in order to devise and test new approaches and methods related to the insertion of literacy into development.

Finally, the situation and the trends in out-of-school education seem perhaps less clear. In the field of adult education, the main advances have appeared in the form of functional literacy-teaching activities carried out by a growing number of developing countries and, concurrently, vocational advancement and the retraining of adults, to which a large number of Governments are attaching increasing importance in order to meet the demands of the rapid transformation of knowledge and greater geographical, vocational and social mobility.

It also appears that, in various countries, the mass information media—radio and television—are giving a more important place to programmes for adults. While many adult educators are beginning to realize the limits placed upon their activities by certain shortcomings in academic education, it is also probable that the structures of adult education, more flexible, more innovative and less institutionalized than those of academic education, sometimes have a stimulating effect on the latter. In conclusion, mention should be made of two new functions of adult education which seem to be becoming more apparent and pronounced: the training of middle management personnel and the education of parents to enable them to play a more effective role in communicating with their children.

EDUCATIONAL WASTAGE

In the *Report on the World Social Situation, 1957*⁸ a primary enrolment ratio of 60 per cent or more of the five-to-fourteen-year age group was taken as an indication that a country had reached the goal of universal education. At that time, among the 137 countries and territories examined, sixty-two achieved an enrolment of more than 60 per cent, while in seventy-five countries the enrolment was lower than 60 per cent. Today about fifty-seven countries are in the category of less than 60 per cent enrolment. Despite this progress in enrolment, the real benefits of schooling have been greatly diminished by high drop-out and repetition rates.

Educational wastage, including drop-out and repetition, constitutes a crucial problem for school systems in nearly every country of the world today, regardless of their stage of development. It is estimated that in many parts of the world about half the primary school pupils either drop out before completing this level of education or are obliged to repeat as many as three years in order to complete it. A recent UNESCO survey⁹ of educational wastage (repetitions and drop-outs) at the level of primary

and general secondary education, based on 148 replies to a questionnaire sent to 210 countries and territories, shows that in a number of African countries, as many as four out of every five children entering school repeat at least one school year or drop out before completing the primary level. The situation is all the more serious when it is considered that in Africa often as few as one fourth of the children of this school age are enrolled in classes. In Latin America, the proportion of wastage at the primary level runs from 60 per cent to 75 per cent and in Asia from 55 per cent to 60 per cent. But the problem is not limited to the developing nations and for some countries in Europe for instance, particularly at the second level, the wastage figures vary from 20 per cent to as much as 50 per cent.

Apart from loss in education and training essential for preparation in the modern world, the drop-out phenomenon and the high rate of repetition lead to very high education costs for each pupil completing his course. These costs are often tripled in Africa and doubled in Latin America and Asia, because a given group of pupils need many more pupil-years to complete one study cycle or attain a given level of instruction than the minimum required without wastage. Moreover, the effect of such wastage in countries where facilities for education are inadequate is to limit the number of places available for children who have not had a chance to go to school but are perhaps more gifted than the repeaters and those who abandon their studies.

The survey shows, as perhaps might be expected, that in most countries the greatest proportion of school drop-outs is found among the rural population. In one country, it was found that the school attendance rate in rural districts was only 3 per cent, compared with an average of 50 per cent in the towns. Over-all investigation showed that boys coming from centres with more than 100,000 inhabitants showed the lowest drop-out rate, while girls from rural districts or from centres of less than 5,000 inhabitants showed the highest rate.

Causes of wastage are interwoven in a complex network and are difficult to treat in isolation. First, in a number of countries, there is the lack of school attendance control and a failure to ensure effective compulsory education. There are also a number of economic, social, political, religious and cultural constraints placed on the educational systems and on the child. Conversely, there is the lack of relevance of educational systems to economic and social requirements such as inadequate school buildings, inappropriate location, unsuitable curricula ill-related to the surroundings. Other problems include inadequate teacher-training and poor working conditions in schools, such as overcrowding and lack of equipment and facilities. A lack of adequate counselling programmes, guidance, and the use of inappropriate examination techniques are also significant causes of repetitions and drop-outs.

Certain other causes are identifiable, such as the child's age and degree of maturity, his physical and psychological health and cultural environment and socio-economic background. Some parents are not only unable to meet the cost of clothes, food, books and sometimes tuition fees, but are also reluctant to send their children to school if this means financial loss of the children's earnings.

⁸ *Report on the World Social Situation, 1957* (United Nations Publication, Sales No.: 57.IV.3).

⁹ *International Conference on Education, 32nd session* (Geneva, 1-9 July 1970), *Final Report* (ED/BIE/CONFINED 32/REF 1 and ED/BIE/CONFINED 32/4).

EMPLOYMENT, PRICES AND WAGES

EMPLOYMENT

Difference between employment situation in the developing countries and in the industrialized countries

There are few trends in the employment situation which can be said to apply equally to the developing countries and to the industrialized countries. Indeed, the situations are sharply differentiated.

In the developing countries generally (the few exceptions relate for instance to countries with small populations and substantial external revenues from petroleum and other mineral exports), there has been growing concern regarding the poor and often deteriorating employment situation. This deterioration results largely from factors already noted in the *1967 Report on the World Social Situation*,¹ namely: (a) the rapid growth in the working age population produced by the increasing volume each year of young people in the 15-19 age group entering the labour force and the relatively small number of older workers withdrawing from it, and (b) the fact that, even in cases where economic growth is satisfactory, it has not been accompanied by a corresponding growth in employment. In brief, the rate of increase in employment opportunities is not keeping up with the rate of increase in persons wanting to be employed.

In some cases, the problem is aggravated by the long-standing difficulty that many of the new entrants—particularly those who have reached a certain educational level—aspire to jobs in towns, to wage-earning jobs in the modern sector and in some cases, to white-collar jobs far in excess of the absorptive capacity of these forms of employment.

In the industrialized countries, on the other hand, because of generally lower birth rates for the years between 1948 and 1953 and a more even age distribution in the labour force, new entries have not greatly exceeded withdrawals. In fact in a few countries the labour force has even gone down. The broader and more diversified base of economic activity—even, in some cases, with only slight expansion—has normally been able to absorb the increase in the labour force as well as any workers displaced from other employment. In fact, in some countries the small size of the increase in the labour force has been a limiting factor in over-all economic growth. Earlier fears concerning the possibly devastating manpower displacement effects of the introduction of increased mechanization and advanced technology have not proved founded, although in some countries there has been

a decline in the demand for unskilled workers attributable to this cause. Fears of possible long-term effects have not been allayed, however.

Unemployment, where it has existed in significant measure in the industrialized countries, has often been local in character, resulting from the decline of long-established industries such as coal, textiles, iron and steel, shipbuilding—or it has affected certain categories of workers such as older workers, young workers just entering the labour market, persons from socially disadvantaged groups, or it has resulted from the short-term effects of counter-inflationary measures by Governments. In fact, the major problem of employment policy in many industrialized countries in 1966-1968 has been how to reconcile the maintenance of full employment with the avoidance of inflation. This problem is no closer to solution and has even worsened in a few highly industrialized countries. A second problem has been that of smoothly accomplishing the manifold manpower adjustments necessary to meet technological and structural change—both of which have accelerated during these years.

Unless far-reaching action is taken, the gap between the employment situations of the industrialized and of the developing countries will widen. In particular, the difference in the rate of growth of the respective labour forces will be more marked in the 1970-1980 decade than in 1960-1970 (see table 1).

TABLE 1. LABOUR FORCE IN INDUSTRIALIZED AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, 1960-1980
(Thousands)

Area	1960	1970	1980
World	1,296,140	1,509,224	1,791,414
Industrialized countries	446,680	497,590	553,284
Developing countries ^a	849,460	1,011,634	1,238,130
South Asia	349,110	419,782	520,173
East Asia ^b	334,339	384,177	453,024
Africa	112,124	136,348	168,338
Latin America	71,363	92,212	121,579
Oceania ^c	865	989	1,164

SOURCE: James N. Ypsilantis "World and regional estimates and projections of labour force", prepared for the ILO (document ISLEP/A/VII.4).

^a The totals given are lower than the cumulative totals for the regions. This is due to the inclusion of a number of industrialized countries in these regions.

^b Excluding Japan.

^c Excluding Australia, New Zealand, Polynesia and Micronesia.

¹ United Nations publication, Sales No.: 68.IV.9.

According to these estimates and projections, the economies of the developing countries will, during the next decade, be faced with the staggering task of employing some 226 million additional workers, compared with an estimated 56 million new workers for the industrialized countries.

There is little mass movement between the employment markets of the developing and the industrialized countries, and even where there has been a small flow from the former to the latter in the past, there has been a tendency in the last three years in some of the industrialized countries to subject this flow to even stricter controls. For highly-educated persons on the other hand—in particular scientists, engineers and medical personnel—the employment market has become more international, in some cases to the detriment of the developing countries, which have lost high-level personnel who might, under more favourable circumstances, have been able to contribute to economic and social development. There has been widespread discussion, national and international, of the causes of this “brain drain” and of ways of reducing its volume or mitigating its adverse effects.

Within groups of industrialized countries, particularly in western Europe, former restrictions on the movement of workers from one country to another have been largely removed or reduced.

EMPLOYMENT SITUATION IN THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

There has been a tendency in the past to think of unemployment and underemployment as symptoms of underdevelopment, which would disappear as economic growth proceeded. Experience shows that this does not happen (for instance, Venezuela, which enjoyed an annual economic growth rate of 8 per cent between 1950 and 1960, ended that decade with more unemployment than at the beginning). In fact, certain economic models used by the United Nations assume, on the basis of past trends, that a faster rate of economic growth is associated with a slower increase in employment.

In the last few years it has become increasingly apparent to developing countries that employment problems will not solve themselves. In particular, it became clear that the earlier hopes which some countries had placed on rapid industrialization as a provider of plentiful employment opportunities were not going to be realized in the short or medium term.

The employment gap—that is, the difference between the employment opportunities actually available and the total needed to keep the labour force productively occupied—is not precisely measurable. This is not only a question of the widespread lack of statistical data, but of the inadequacy—for the developing countries—of the concepts of unemployment and underemployment developed for analysis of the problems of industrialized countries. Concepts devised to measure the employment situation in a country where 90 per cent of the labour force is in non-agricultural wage employment have little meaning in analysing the labour utilization situation in (to take an extreme) one of the two African countries estimated to have only 1 per cent of the labour force in non-agricultural wage employment.

In countries such as the latter, unutilized labour takes forms other than visible unemployment—chiefly underemployment or sporadic employment in unproductive activities. The measurement of underemployment, both rural and urban, involves particular difficulties.² Subject to all these reservations, a rough approximation of the extent of underutilization of labour in the developing regions seems to indicate that in many countries it amounts to as much as 20-30 per cent of the labour force. It seems probable that the higher figure is the more realistic one. This is equivalent to, or even worse than, the waste of human resources in the industrialized countries in the depression years of the 1930s.

While this underutilization of resources obviously constitutes an economic loss, there are also serious social consequences. In spite of the waste of resources, the over-all economic growth target of the first Development Decade seems likely to be achieved. But, largely owing to the failure of employment to expand, this growth has been unevenly distributed and to millions of people the efforts of the last decade have brought no perceptible improvement in standards of living. People not sharing in the fruits of development cannot feel committed to it. The present disillusionment of many with the process of development is attributable to this cause. There is not only a loss of income but also a sense of frustration, particularly among youth, since the benefits of development are distributed, and a sense of belonging and achievement gained through employment.

By the end of 1968, it was slowly becoming accepted in an increasing number of countries that the strategy of development planning should be reoriented to allow for a greater involvement by those of working age. It was also realized that the expansion of employment opportunities should have its own priority in planning, and, that, if possible, plans should be directed towards a rate of employment growth more rapid than that of the labour force—a reversal of the actual situation. But such re-orientation is anything but easy.

Efforts have been made to analyse the reasons for the failure of employment opportunities to grow at a satisfactory rate. One reason seems to be that this was not clearly set as a goal. Though some development plans have included targets for the number of jobs to be created during the plan period, they have seldom fully considered the steps by which these targets should be attained, or provided the means for attaining them. Not only has over-all investment been far from adequate—often for reasons outside the control of the country concerned—but the available sums have been concentrated on sectors where the investment cost per job is high. Too little has gone to rural areas, where the greater part of the population lives and where, for many years to come, it will have to find work and a satisfying life. In particular, very little attention went to helping rural people produce more for their own needs using the resources at hand.

Where manufacturing industry has been introduced, the technology of the industrialized countries has often been uncritically copied. In some cases this is the economically sound course. In other cases, production methods

² These were discussed at the Eleventh International Conference of Labour Statisticians in Geneva, October 1966.

TABLE 2. ESTIMATED COMPARATIVE GROWTH OF EMPLOYMENT AND POPULATION, 1970-1980

Region	Average annual growth rate	
	Employment	Population
East Asia (excluding mainland China)	2.05	2.50
Middle South Asia	2.00	2.47
South-east Asia	2.30	2.54
South-west Asia	3.05	2.85
Western Africa	2.55	2.86
Eastern Africa	1.80	2.21
Middle Africa	1.70	2.00
Northern Africa	2.75	3.00
Southern Africa	2.05	2.68
Tropical South America	3.00	3.00
Middle America (mainland)	2.85	3.50
Temperate South America	2.00	1.87
Caribbean	2.60	2.46

developed and in intended for countries where capital is plentiful and labour scarce, may be the wrong economic choice for countries where the opposite situation applies. However, they may be adopted because more appropriate labour-intensive techniques have not been developed. It has sometimes been assumed that labour-saving devices are synonymous with efficiency, but this is not automatically the case if trained personnel to maintain and repair the machines is not available. In other cases, the output of labour-saving equipment is too high in relation to the absorption capacity of the local market, with the result that this equipment lies idle a large part of the time. At the same time smaller establishments using traditional methods may not benefit from a fair share of help with loans, management advice and marketing which would help to make them more viable.

In some cases, not enough attention has been given to the preparation of sufficient skilled workers and technicians to permit an expansion of employment which might otherwise have been feasible.

Another effect of the past emphasis on the modern sector is that it has tended to attract the interests and aspirations of the better educated among young people to the neglect of other sectors where development may be just as urgently needed, particularly in the rural areas. Every region continues to report the tendency of the better educated young to drift to the towns. There are of course many other reasons for this tendency, but a number of countries are realizing that the lack of status and attractiveness of essential rural development jobs—which may remain vacant while there is heavy unemployment in the towns—is a contributing cause.

Attempts at forecasting the future growth of employment are hazardous, but various studies suggest that, in some countries at least, unless drastic action is taken, the situation is likely to get worse before it gets better. A recent econometric study,³ based on the past patterns of manpower absorption of the different sectors in countries at different stages of development, suggests that in each economy, there is a period when agriculture begins to absorb a diminishing volume of manpower and when there is very little possibility of the transfer of the manpower so displaced to non-agricultural activities. There is a period of stagnation which includes both the change in direction in agricultural employment and the lull before employment in other sectors picks up. This critical period will shortly be passed in some developing countries; other countries will enter it later in the next decade, often at a time when the labour force is growing fast.

The study has made the following tentative forecast (table 2) of the comparative growth of employment and population in various regions. While of necessity these are only estimates, the general picture presented is probably not far from the truth.

A simpler and more graphic forecast in relation to Africa has been made in the following terms: at the present time, the number of young people coming on to the labour market every year is about twice that of the number leaving the labour force, which means that new jobs need

to be created for about half of them. By 1980, this proportion will probably reach two thirds.

As has been noticed, overt unemployment is most marked among young people, among the better educated young people and among those seeking employment in the modern sector. In India, the Government has calculated that in 1961-1962 the average waiting period between completing education and entering employment for graduates of secondary and university education was ninety-two weeks; by 1975-1976, according to current trends, the average waiting period will increase to 137 weeks.⁴

MEASURES TO DEAL WITH THE EMPLOYMENT SITUATION IN THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

Although they may not always be able to forecast the future deterioration or improvement in their employment situations, most developing countries are well aware of the current problems, particularly those of educated young people in towns who are unable to find proper places in the economy.

In some countries (the United Republic of Tanzania provides a good example) there has been a fundamental reorientation of policy, away from dependence on external investment and capital-intensive industry and towards greater reliance on a fuller use of indigenous resources, including human resources. In India in 1969, a working committee of the Congress Party called for immediate reorientation of the fourth plan, with the main focus on enlarging employment opportunities. It urged that the investment pattern be shifted to intensive rural development—minor irrigation schemes, well-digging, tube wells, the construction of new tanks and desilting of old tanks, lift-irrigation programmes, contour bunding, soil conservation measures, village afforestation, rural works, rural schools and rural electrification.

More generally, in other Asian and African countries, there has been a recognition that rural development has

³ Y. Sabolo, "Sectoral employment growth: the outlook for 1980", *International Labour Review*, vol. 100, No. 5 (November 1969).

⁴ Government of India, *Report of the Education Commission, 1964-66: Education and National Development* (New Delhi, 1966).

hitherto been neglected; there has been a redirection of investment insufficient though it still may be, and attention to the comprehensive development of rural areas. Though this diversion may often have been inspired by other motives, it also holds out a better hope of employment expansion. In this connexion, it may be pointed out that great increases of employment cannot be expected from the expansion of agricultural production for export. Improvement will come rather from the expansion of production for domestic consumption—for instance of protein foods, which, as has been seen elsewhere in this report, is far below what it should be; from better housing and other structures, simple manufactures for local use, improved transport, and improved health and recreation services.

All measures of rural transformation of this kind depend on the training of suitable rural leaders. Recognition of this need is beginning in many countries to affect education and training programmes, and there is a more conscious effort to give young people in rural areas the knowledge, skills and motivation to promote the all-round development of their own areas rather than to give them the stereotyped education of the past, devised originally to prepare the young for employment in public administration or in the urban areas.

It is in this context too that one should view the increasing interest in national youth services of various kinds, ranging from those designed (as in countries of Central and West Africa) to train young people to bring land under cultivation which they will later farm themselves, to those (as in Ethiopia and Iran) designed to carry university students or others with higher education out into areas that have scarcely been touched by development, where they can to some extent help fellow citizens profit from the privileges which they have themselves enjoyed.

In this connexion, interesting experiments have been made in countries such as Tunisia in combining training with production—partly to make training more practical and realistic, and partly to lower the cost so that more participants may profit from the schemes.

The introduction of labour-intensive techniques in industry—and more particularly public works—is arousing increasing interest in several countries, although practical achievements have been limited. This owes partly to a lack of guidance and partly to the absence of purpose-designed, modern, efficient equipment which will use more labour. There is still a big field for research and development here, and the design and production of simple, cheap but efficient equipment remains to be accomplished, either in the industrialized countries or, better still, in the developing countries themselves.

With regard to manpower planning in the sense of directing education and training towards a more effective production of manpower with useful skills, substantial progress was made in the years 1966-1968. There is a much wider understanding of the principles involved and—particularly in Asia and Latin America—manpower planning personnel have been trained and improved institutions have been established which ensure that these problems will receive more attention than in the past.

However, many developing countries feel somewhat helpless in the face of the main problem of employment

expansion, and of its immensity and complexity. They are looking to the international agencies for guidance and help and to their neighbours for an exchange of experience and ideas.

The Employment Policy Recommendation adopted by the International Labour Conference in 1964 contained fairly detailed guidance on policy to deal with the employment problems associated with economic underdevelopment. With a view to coping with the practical problems of implementation in order to achieve more rapid progress in the struggle against unemployment, successive regional conferences of the International Labour Organisation—in America, Asia and Africa in 1966, 1968 and 1969 respectively—decided to set up regional employment programmes for a concerted attack on these problems, under the guidance of the ILO and other international agencies. Because action to attain a higher level of productive employment implies—among other things—changes in economic planning procedures, in fiscal policy, and in policies relating to agriculture and rural development, industrial development, education, international trade and international aid, the ILO seeks to associate the other international organizations concerned, the United Nations regional economic commissions and UNESOB and the regional development banks and other regional organizations with the development of these programmes.

At the International Labour Conference in June 1969, it was decided that regional programmes such as the World Employment Programme, will be the principal focus of ILO action in the 1970s. At the international level, emphasis is on influencing international policies which affect the employment situation in the developing regions, on research on problems common to all regions, on technical support for the regional programmes and on the consideration of international action affecting countries which are not yet covered by a regional programme. The World Employment Programme has already attracted the support of certain bilateral aid agencies which believe that the difficulty of providing useful employment for all those seeking it in developing countries will be one of the major problems of the next decade.

The president of the World Bank has also recommended that “in addition to expanding their growth rates, the developing countries must adopt national policies promoting the right balance between capital and labour-intensive activities, and between the supply of skilled and unskilled workers so as to maximize output through full utilization of the total labour force”.

EMPLOYMENT POLICY AND MEASURES IN THE INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES

The part of the industrialized countries in the World Employment Programme has not yet been fully defined. As aid-giving countries, they will be asked to give more attention to policies and projects which will help to raise employment levels in the developing countries. As importing countries, they will be asked to give preferential or free entry to manufactures or semi-manufactures of developing countries, as advocated by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in

1968.⁵ As technically more advanced countries, they will be asked to help with research applicable to the developing countries, with the development of appropriate technologies and with the provision of experts and volunteers.

However the industrialized countries also have their own problems in promoting "full, productive and freely-chosen employment" (the terms used in the Employment Policy Convention and Recommendation of 1964), primarily those of avoiding inflation and making adjustment to change.

Several countries have found that pursuance of a policy of maintaining employment at the high levels of earlier years—for instance at a level of 97-98 per cent of the labour force—has led to acceleration of the rate of inflation and in some cases to balance-of-payments difficulties. Countermeasures by Governments, in the form of general fiscal and monetary restraints, have then led either to a halt in employment growth, or even to a drop in employment, which has in turn built up pressure on Governments to reverse their restrictive policies. It is generally recognized that these "stop-go" practices are unsatisfactory, particularly as there is sometimes a time-lag of as long as a whole year between the adoption of such measures and their effect on the employment market. It is sometimes argued that these fluctuations could be avoided and a better rate of economic growth achieved by setting a slightly lower target for full employment, say at 95-96 per cent of the labour force.

From a social point of view, the problem is that of the effect on the individual who, because of any restrictive measures, loses his employment or has difficulty in entering new employment. All countries affected by this problem recognize their special obligation to these individuals and all, in addition to improving their social security measures, have given considerable attention to active measures designed to shorten the period during which a person is unemployed. These include better employment information systems and placement procedures (a start has been made in some countries with the use of computers), more generous facilities to help workers move their homes and family to take up new employment, regional planning with a view to the redevelopment of areas with higher unemployment rates, expanded retraining facilities with better financial assistance to participants, and special help to those categories most affected by unemployment, such as older workers or persons from educationally or socially disadvantaged groups.

In the United States and France, for example, a wide range of public and private programmes has been introduced to meet the latter problem. Most of these programmes are rehabilitative in that they seek to qualify the individual for available jobs by training, counselling, remedial education, improved motivation and resettlement. Events have made it clear that the disadvantaged are not willing to settle for menial employment and emphasis is placed on the need to build new career ladders.

Improved assistance to the individual worker in adjusting to changes in the employment market is becoming increasingly important because of the accelerated pace

of change. In the last few years a greater volume of adjustment has been necessary, not only because of technological change but because of changes in employment structure resulting from freer trade and greater competitiveness and from the concentration of undertakings. A number of industrialized countries still face the problem of a smooth reduction of their agricultural labour force.

In addition to job changes for workers already in the labour force, manpower adjustment takes place through changes in the pattern of recruitment of new entrants to the labour force. In this connexion, a significant change has been necessary because of a raising of the age of completion of primary education and the tendency for boys and girls to stay on longer at school. An increasing number of young people accordingly want "careers", not just "jobs". Several countries are striving for better vocational orientation, starting as part of general education in the schools, and a smoother transition from school to work. In the field of vocational training, it has been realized that many of the old forms of apprenticeship need to be brought up to date. Education and training are less and less watertight compartments, and new ways of combining instruction and work experience are being used. Advances have been made in spreading the cost of training over industry or the economy as a whole.

While a certain number of girls are entering forms of vocational training and employment previously followed only by males, it will be some time before this has a significant effect on the occupational distribution between the sexes. However, an increasing number of girls appreciate that, with the growing tendency of married women to stay in employment with interruption only for maternity and child-rearing, they should plan for a long working life.

VOCATIONAL REHABILITATION OF THE DISABLED

In most of the developed countries, the past three years have seen a gradual extension of vocational rehabilitation programmes for the disabled, with greater emphasis being placed on co-ordination with other services—medical, social and educational. In particular, more attention is being given to the rehabilitation of the mentally retarded and mentally restored and their integration into the world of work. Technological progress has opened up new avenues of employment for the blind in such spheres as computer programming, and an increased emphasis on the economic aspects of vocational rehabilitation is directing more attention to sheltered employment for the severely disabled. The application of modern business methods to sheltered workshops and their capacity to undertake carefully selected productive work is enabling severely disabled workers to compete on equal terms with the non-handicapped. Mention must be made too of the increased application of ergonomic principles to ensure that jobs and work-places are safely and suitably adapted for disabled workers. This includes the elimination of architectural barriers such as steps, stairs, narrow doors etc. which in the past have prevented the disabled from participating in normal economic activity.

⁵ *Proceedings of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development—Second Session, New Delhi, 1968 (TD/97), 5 vols.*

In the developing countries, high levels of unemployment have limited the development of vocational rehabilitation services. Nevertheless, there are growing indications that Governments are becoming convinced of the economic as well as the social and humane value of employing disabled citizens. In Latin American countries, notably Brazil and Colombia, vocational rehabilitation services have been established within the framework of social security schemes. In Africa, particularly Kenya and Uganda, ILO experts have assisted in planning and establishing rehabilitation services in line with community development and social service programmes for the general population with particular emphasis on the provision of facilities for the disabled in rural areas. Asian Governments also have recognized that the disabled have the right to share in employment opportunities and ambitious schemes are in being or are being planned in India, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand. It is true to say, however, that vocational rehabilitation facilities in developing countries fall far short of what is required to meet the pressing needs of millions of people handicapped through blindness, orthopaedic disability, leprosy, tuberculosis, mental illness or other disabling conditions.

PRICES AND WAGES

Consumer prices

Inflation from 1965 to 1968, as measured by the consumer price indices of more than 110 countries and territories, exhibited similarities to the 1960-1965 period. In both periods fewer than thirty countries had annual average growth rates of consumer prices of less than 2 per cent. In the 1965-1968 period, these countries were composed almost entirely of centrally planned economies in Eastern Europe and, with the exception of Iran and Nigeria, of developing countries with populations of under 10 million. The same was also true, although to a lesser degree, for the 1960-1965 time span.

At the other extreme, there were in both periods about twenty countries with relatively high annual average increases, 7 per cent or more. There were some changes in composition, as countries such as the Central African Republic, Ghana and Israel brought their rates of increase in consumer prices well below the 7 per cent mark. A number of other countries—Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Laos and the Republic of Korea—improved their performance over the 1960-1965 period, although continuing to suffer from relatively high rates of inflation. There was one country—Yugoslavia—in the 7 per cent-and-above classification.

In general, the upward trend in consumer prices continued during the 1965-1968 period. Countries in the developing regions continued to show a wide range of variation in the rate of growth of consumer prices. The industrialized countries, by and large, had annual average rates of increase in their respective price indices of 3 to 5 per cent. Two—the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy—had rates below this range and three—Denmark, Finland and Japan—above.

Later available data for 1969 show sixteen countries with increases of 10 per cent or more. These were:

TABLE 3. ANNUAL AVERAGE RATES OF INCREASE IN CONSUMER PRICES, 1965-1968

<i>Rate of increase</i>	<i>Countries</i>
Less than 1 per cent .	Cape Verde Islands, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, the German Democratic Republic, Guatemala, Haiti, Iran, Morocco, Senegal, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
From 1 to less than 2 per cent . .	Bulgaria, Cambodia, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Fiji, Hungary, Iraq, Madagascar, Malta, Netherlands Antilles, Nigeria, Panama, Paraguay, Poland, Venezuela, Western Samoa
From 2 to less than 3 per cent . .	Australia, Austria, Cameroon, Ceylon, Federal Republic of Germany, Gabon, Ghana, Greece, Guyana, Honduras, Italy, Kenya, Luxembourg, New Caledonia, Niger, Singapore, South Africa
From 3 to less than 4 per cent . .	Belgium, Burundi, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, France, Gibraltar, Hong Kong, Ireland, Israel, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Liberia, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mozambique, Norway, the Philippines, Puerto Rico, Sierra Leone, St. Lucia, Switzerland, Thailand, Tunisia, United Kingdom, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America
From 4 to less than 5 per cent . .	Barbados, Bermuda, China (Taiwan), Ecuador, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Pakistan, Sweden, Syria, Trinidad and Tobago
From 5 to less than 7 per cent . .	Finland, Grenada, Japan, Libya, Portugal, Ryukyu Islands, Spain, Surinam, United Arab Republic
From 7 to less than 12 per cent .	Bolivia, Colombia, Denmark, French Polynesia, Greenland, Iceland, India, Laos, Republic of Korea, Turkey, Yugoslavia, Zambia
12 per cent and more.	Argentina, Brazil, Chile, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Indonesia, Peru, Republic of Viet-Nam, Uruguay

SOURCE: International Labour Organisation, *Yearbook of Labour Statistics, 1969*.

Notes: The following countries excluded "rent": Cameroon, Cape Verde Islands, Chad, Congo (Republic of), Gabon, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, Tunisia, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia, Grenada, Mexico, Nepal, Belgium, Luxembourg.

The following countries excluded "clothing": Cape Verde Islands and Tunisia.

The following countries specified the population groups covered: Cameroon (European), Central African Republic (African), Republic of Congo (European), Ivory Coast (African), Gabon (African), Kenya (African), Madagascar (European), Mauritania (European), Niger (African), Nigeria (lower-income group), Senegal (European), South Africa (white population), Chad (European), Uganda (African), Zambia (African), Cambodia (working class), Pakistan (industrial workers), and Republic of Viet-Nam (working class).

The following countries included direct taxes: Netherlands Antilles, Surinam and Lebanon.

The following countries excluded "miscellaneous": Haiti and Mexico.

Brazil, Chile, the Republic of Korea, the Republic of Viet-Nam and Uruguay—all with annual increases exceeding 10 per cent for the six years—and Colombia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Iraq, Ireland, Liberia, Niger, Nigeria, Portugal, Sudan, Uganda and Yugoslavia.

Increases ranging from 5 to 10 per cent were observed in twenty-two countries and territories, including Argentina, France, Japan, Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States of America. The rise in consumer prices was between 3 and 5 per cent in thirty countries and territories: ten in Africa, five in the Americas, six in Asia, seven in Europe and two in Oceania.

Thirty-two countries, including Australia, Bolivia, Cambodia, India, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Thailand, Venezuela and nine European States, recorded consumer price increases of 1 to 3 per cent. Prices rose by less than 1 per cent in the Central African Republic, Malaysia, Trinidad and Tobago and St. Lucia, while they were practically unchanged in the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Kenya, the People's Republic of the Congo and Singapore. Consumer price indices fell by 1 to 4 per cent in Cameroon, Guatemala and Syria.

Some countries which had experienced considerable inflation in previous years saw their situation improve substantially in 1969. In Uruguay, which earlier suffered chronic inflation and where prices had more than doubled in 1967 and again in 1968, the strong inflationary pressure was eased. Argentina had a price rise of less than 10 per cent for the first time in more than ten years. Indonesia also appeared to have dampened inflation which had prevailed since the end of 1961.

In several industrialized countries, monetary difficulties had the effect of accelerating the rise in consumer prices. Measures taken by France, the Netherlands and the United States of America did not prevent the level from rising by 6, 7 and 5 per cent respectively, over that of twelve months before—a noticeable acceleration over previous years.

Real wages

The movement of average real wages per worker, as embodied in the real wage index, is often used to indicate in broad terms the trend in purchasing power of the average worker and his family. The index in effect gives a comparison between the percentage change in average money wages per worker during the period considered and the percentage change in the consumer price index. The real wage index, it should be noted, is a measure of only one element of several that may make up an individual's total income.

Table 4 presents the annual average rate of growth of wages in manufacturing industry for 60 developing and developed countries. The statistics in most instances

relate to 15 per cent or less of the economically active population in the developing countries and from 25 to 40 per cent for most of the developed countries. In this regard it should be noted, especially for the developing countries, that the data can be used to draw inference on the growth of purchasing power for only a relatively small proportion of the economically active population.

In several countries—Ceylon, India, New Zealand, the Philippines and Singapore—where wage-earners in manufacturing experienced only a slight increase or even a loss in real wages during the 1960-1965 period, the trend continued. In a few countries—Australia, El Salvador and the Republic of Korea—in which the growth of real wages was also either close to zero or negative during 1960-1965, there was a significant rise in the growth of real wages during the 1965-1968 period.

In China (Taiwan), Greece, Yugoslavia and Zambia, for which data were available for both periods, the annual rate of growth of real wages continued at 5 per cent or more during 1965-1968. In the Dominican Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy and the Netherlands, real wages fell from above 5 per cent annual average growth in 1960-1965 to below that mark during 1965-1968.

Since the end of 1968 the accelerated rise in prices has absorbed part of the increase in money wages, particularly during the last months of 1969. However, real wages in the manufacturing industries have risen in some twenty-five countries for which figures are available. The increase exceeded 10 per cent in Japan. It was between 5 and 10 per cent in nine countries (Australia, Chile, Denmark, Finland, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Ireland, Spain and Yugoslavia). The increase ranged from 3 to 5 per cent in Hungary, Israel, Italy, Norway and Sweden. Real wages of manufacturing workers rose by less than 3 per cent during 1969 in ten countries, including Canada, France, Netherlands, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States of America. In Austria, the real wage grew by an average of 2.4 per cent during the first nine months of 1969.

Wage policies

In the post-Second World War period, almost all the Governments of the major, developed market economies either used or carefully considered the use of wage policies in conjunction with fiscal-monetary policies as a means of coping with price stability and balance-of-payments difficulties. Developing countries have also increasingly resorted to wage policies for the generally held goal of controlling inflation and in certain cases, with somewhat more emphasis than in the developed countries, to improve income distribution and the allocation of human resources.

TABLE 4. ANNUAL AVERAGE RATES OF INCREASE IN REAL WAGES IN MANUFACTURING, 1965-1968

<i>Rate of increase</i>	<i>1965-1967^a</i>	<i>1965-1968^b</i>
Less than zero (decrease) . . .	India, South Africa, Turkey	Mauritius, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Thailand
From 0 to less than 1 per cent .		Ceylon, Colombia, New Zealand, Philippines
From 1 to less than 2 per cent .	Ecuador, Luxembourg, New Caledonia	Hungary, Mexico, United Kingdom, United States
From 2 to less than 3 per cent .	Panama, Portugal, Sweden, Thailand	Australia, Canada, Federal Republic of Germany, Fiji, the German Democratic Republic, Guatemala, Italy, Poland, Venezuela
From 3 to less than 5 per cent .	Dominican Republic	Belgium, Bulgaria, Brazil, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, El Salvador, Finland, France, Israel, the Netherlands, Norway, Puerto Rico, Switzerland
From 5 per cent and over . . .	China (Taiwan), Ghana, Nicaragua, Zambia	Austria, Chile, Greece, Ireland, Japan, Republic of Korea, Ryukyu Islands, Spain, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Yugoslavia

SOURCE: International Labour Organisation, *Yearbook of Labour Statistics, 1969*.

Notes:

^a For 1965-1967 column:

India	Including services, electricity, gas and water. Including salaried employees
Republic of South Africa	Minimum rates. White adult males. September of each year
Turkey	Including salaried employees
New Caledonia	Labourers. Rates per hour
Sweden	Including mining and quarrying
Thailand	July of each year. Including salaried employees
Dominican Republic	Including mining, quarrying and services
China (Taiwan)	Adults only (male and female). Including family allowances
Ghana	Including salaried employees
Zambia	Africans. Including the value of payments in kind. Including salaried employees

^b For 1965-1968 column:

Mauritius	March and September of each year
Sierra Leone	Adults only
Singapore	July of each year
Ceylon	March and September of each year
New Zealand	Including salaried employees
Hungary	State industry. Including mining and quarrying
United Kingdom	October of each year. Adult males only
Australia	Minimum rates per hour. Adult males only
Federal Republic of Germany	Including family allowances paid directly by the employers. Male and female
Fiji	Rates per day. June of each year
German Democratic Republic	Socialized sector. Including mining and quarrying. Including family allowances
Poland	Socialized sector. Including mining, quarrying and sea fishing
Belgium	Male only
Bulgaria	Socialized sector. Including mining and quarrying. Including salaried employees
Brazil	Including salaried employees
Cyprus	October of each year
Czechoslovakia	Socialized sector. Including mining (except coal-mining) and quarrying
Denmark	July-September of each year. Adults only (male and female)
El Salvador	San Salvador, metropolitan area. Male only
Finland	Including mining and quarrying. Male and female
France	Rates per hour. Adults only
Netherlands	October of each year. Male and female
Norway	Adult males only. Including mining and quarrying
Switzerland	Adult males only. (Accident insurance statistics)
Austria	Including mining and quarrying
Chile	April of each year
Greece	Male and female
Ireland	October of each year. Male and female
Republic of Korea	Including family allowances
Ryukyu Islands	Including family allowances
Spain	Including salaried employees
USSR	Socialized sector. Including salaried employees
Yugoslavia	Socialized sector. Including mining and quarrying. Including salaried employees
United Republic of Tanzania	Adult males. June of each year

Developed countries

In the developed market economies with wage-policy experience during the first half of the 1960s, the most striking changes occurred in Finland, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States. The Finnish experience points to the continued possibilities for utilizing income policy with direct government controls to deal with short-term crises. In the other three countries, there are indications that political considerations, among several other factors, weighed heavily on evaluating the long-term viability of continuous direct government action to restrain the growth of prices and especially wages.

Finland's wage policy has been generally characterized as following the Scandinavian pattern in which central negotiations with a minimum of direct government participation are the rule. After the devaluation of October 1967, however, the Government decided that, in order to obtain the full benefits of the devaluation, short-term direct action on prices and incomes was necessary. Negotiations were initiated by the Government between trade unions and producers to formulate a price-and-income policy. The key feature to emerge from these negotiations was special legislation, adopted in April 1968 and expiring at the end of 1969, which established a price and wage council with authority to control prices, wages and other charges except in agriculture. The council set out productivity guidelines for wage increases and by and large only approved price rises related to higher import costs caused by devaluation and prices for agricultural products. The relative stability of the consumer price index since the Commission was established indicates that the Government's income policy has acted as a restraint on inflation.

The Netherlands' hesitant moves towards a wage determination system largely free of direct government participation gained significant momentum during the 1966-1969 period. In particular a reorientation that had been developing for a number of years was put into effect in 1968. It stressed the basic principles of free collective bargaining as a practical measure in this direction and relieved trade unions and employers of the obligation to submit collective agreements to the Foundation of Labour and the Government Board of Mediators. In the autumn of 1969 the Government sent a bill to the Parliament which incorporated the main features of this reorientation with a provision that confirmed the Government's power of intervention in individual contracts when wage settlements are excessive in view of the needs of the national economy. It should be added that, while the Government had agreed in principle in 1967 to minimize its intervention in collective bargaining, it felt compelled to intervene in a 1968 construction-industry wage settlement which was thought to be excessive. In general, however, the trend, as was the case in 1969, is for the Government to abstain from direct intervention in wage determination.

In the United Kingdom, since the period of "stand-still" (July-December 1966) and "severe restraint" (January-June 1967) to the end of 1969, the Government has adopted two pieces of legislation on prices and incomes. These provided a less rigid approach to wage

determination than existed under the statutory wage freeze of 1966/1967. The first bill, the Prices and Incomes Act of 1967, extended the period for which the Government could delay a price or wage claim to seven months and required statutory notification of price and wage increases; the second, adopted in mid-July 1968, extended the period of delay to twelve months and required advance notice. As of late 1969, the future of income policy in the United Kingdom remained uncertain. In April the Government announced its intention to permit the lapse of its strongest weapon—part II of the Prices and Incomes Act of 1966—which originally empowered the Government to delay price and wage claims for up to four months. It is now planned that the Prices and Incomes Board will be merged in 1970 with the Monopolies Commission and present indications are that any new legislation with respect to prices and incomes will diminish government powers directly to affect prices and incomes.

Wage-price guide-posts were introduced in the United States in 1962. The permissible scope for annual average wage-increases was originally specified at 3.2 per cent and remained at approximately that figure until the official abandoning of the guide-posts in 1967. The failure of the guide-posts began in late 1964 for prices and in the summer of 1967 for wages. The reasons most often advanced were the absence of employer and trade-union participation in the initial formulation of the guide-posts and the lack of a vigorous and continued effort to control prices. Since 1967 there has been mention from time to time of resurrecting wage and price controls or guide-posts to assist in the control of inflation, but no serious steps had been taken in this direction as of late 1969.

Canada was the only one of the few remaining major market economies lacking formal experience with an official income policy to take a firm step towards formulation of such a policy during 1966-1969. The disturbing failure of prices to respond to changes in aggregate demand as they had in the past, led the Government in 1968 to propose a new independent public body to be known as the Prices and Incomes Commission. The Commission, which came into being in early 1969, has no authority to enforce its findings and must rely on private discussions with concerned interest groups. Its role, as described in a Government white paper, "Policies for price stability", is "conceived as one of providing information, education and understanding. Its primary influence should be directed to rallying a strong sense of social responsibility on the part of those making price and income decisions...".⁶ The Governments of the Federal Republic of Germany and Japan, despite pressures to announce an official income policy—in the former case from the Council of Economic Experts and in the latter from industrialists—have both for the time being rejected such a course.

Developing countries

Wage determination in the developing countries has increasingly come to be recognized as playing an important role in inflation, unemployment and distributional

⁶ Canada, Department of Labour, "Policy proposals to combat price increases", *Labour Gazette* (March 1969), p. 154.

problems. As a result, wage fixing has, in turn, been increasingly viewed as a process requiring some degree of central guidance. Governments in a number of Latin American and African countries have in recent years formulated and implemented wage policies to cope with the special problems of their economies. Several other Governments including some in Asia, and Iraq and Syria, have requested special studies of wages, other incomes and prices in order to introduce appropriate policy measures to restrain inflation and generally to improve economic efficiency and income distribution.

In four Latin American countries—Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay—wage policies have been adopted as part of economic stabilization programmes. These vary considerably in formulation, although restraint of wage growth is an objective common to all of them. Some of the more recent developments in these policies are described below.⁷

The wage policy in Argentina was initiated in April-May 1967, when the Government froze wages for workers in the public sector and placed a ceiling on wages for workers in private enterprise until the end of 1968. The average wage in 1968 turned out to be 11 per cent higher than in 1967; a significant part of the increase can be attributed to a reduction of 6.7 per cent in personal contributions to social security programmes. On 1 January 1969 the Government permitted an increase of 8 per cent in basic wages stipulated in agreements and extended the wage freeze for another year. The results of the freeze and other stabilization measures indicate striking success during the first full year of the programmes—an increase in the consumer price index of 9.6 per cent in 1968 as compared with an increase of more than 27 per cent in each of the previous three years.

In 1964, the Government of Brazil introduced a relatively complex wage policy to halt the runaway inflation which had plagued the economy for several years. The wage-policy formula adopted was supposed to compensate for half of the estimated increase in the consumer price index for the next twelve-month period—while maintaining the real average wage of the two previous years—and to provide an increment for the annual rise in national productivity. In implementing the policy, the Government consistently underestimated the increase in the consumer price index which, it is generally agreed, resulted in some loss of real wages for workers in industry. In December 1968 the policy of adjustment of wage increases was revised to bring wage increases more into line with actual increases in the consumer price index. In sum, it appears the Government's wage policy has probably contributed to the moderate success of the stabilization programme. The Brazilian rate of price increase declined from more than 80 per cent annually in 1963 and 1964 to about 25 per cent annually in 1967 and 1968. It remains to be seen

⁷ See Economic Commission for Latin America, *Economic Survey of Latin America, 1968*, part two (E/CN.12/285); Pan American Union, Department of Social Affairs, *Wage and Price Policies in Two Latin American Countries* (Washington, D.C., 12 June 1968, UP/SER.H/VII.63); United States Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, "Recent wage policies in Brazil, Argentina, Chile and Uruguay", *Labour Developments Abroad*, vol. 14, No. 9 (April 1969), pp. 1-7.

whether further progress can be made towards price stability, using the present approach to wage restraint.

Chile has had to struggle against inflation for many years. A wage policy was introduced in 1961 which provided for an annual adjustment of wages and salaries to offset completely the changes in the consumer price index during the previous year. In late 1967, an abortive attempt was made by the Government to adopt a new approach to wage policy. Workers were to receive a 20 per cent wage increase with 5 per cent withheld to finance low-cost housing and acquire new industries under worker ownership. In addition, a one-year prohibition was to be placed on strikes. Strong worker opposition forced the Government to withdraw its proposal. The results of the Chilean stabilization policy through 1968 have been only moderately successful. After several years of decreasing rates of inflation, the growth of prices showed a significant upward trend in 1967 and 1968. The increase in the consumer price index in both of these years was above 20 per cent. In December 1968 another approach was adopted. By law only unorganized private employees and public employees who earned only the minimum wage were granted a 100 per cent cost-of-living adjustment; almost all other public employees were granted only a 20 per cent readjustment.

Uruguay's Commission on Productivity, Prices and Incomes (COPRIN) is of too recent origin for an evaluation of its contributions to be made. It became operational in January of 1969 and in July issued a controversial decree (three of the five government members resigned) permitting wage increases of 5-10 per cent in private industry. Employers, according to the Commission, were to absorb the additional wage costs unless given permission to raise prices. The Commission is not only empowered to establish maximum and minimum wages and the prices of essential goods and services, but also to act as a conciliation agency with powers to demand a secret ballot on strikes and to order the continuation of essential work on an emergency basis during strikes.

In Africa, wage policies have been evaluated and adopted with emphasis on a broader variety of objectives than in Latin America. Many of the same type of problems of income distribution and economic efficiency exist in both regions; the difference in emphasis on objectives is very likely attributable to the absence in Africa of the extraordinarily high rates of inflation which have afflicted certain of the Latin American countries. There are a number of countries with wage policies, such as Kenya, which has incorporated basic wage-policy principles into its 1966-1970 development plan; Zambia, which in late 1969 embarked on a new programme of wage restraint; Ghana, which in 1968 set up an advisory Incomes Commission to co-ordinate a national wage policy, and the United Republic of Tanzania, which inaugurated a new wage policy in 1967. Policies of two of these countries—Kenya and the United Republic of Tanzania—will be briefly described to reflect the concerns of African policy-makers.

The second five-year plan of the Republic of Kenya, 1966-1970, has among its primary objectives the expansion of wage employment opportunities. In the context of achieving employment targets, it was stated that a widening of the "income differences between the countryside

and towns with a resulting inflow of job seekers from rural areas" would aggravate existing urban unemployment. The plan called for a policy of "urban wage restraint . . . based on what the nation can afford in higher wages without jeopardizing increases in employment or disrupting the employment process". With respect to rural wage earners, the potentially injurious employment effects of rapid wage-increases on rural employment were mentioned. The plan, however, took a rather different approach to wage policy for rural wage-earners. It recommended "that the rural wage-earners must get their share of the benefits resulting from economic growth and therefore a gradual rise in rural wages must take place."⁸ The plan further states that the major objective of narrowing the urban-rural income differential is expected to be achieved by bringing subsistence farmers into the monetary economy. It is hoped that, by combined policies of urban wage restraint, a gradual increase in rural wages and most significantly by drawing subsistence farmers into the monetary economy, distributional inequities will be resolved and employment promoted.

In 1967 the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania published and analysed, in two separate documents, the findings of an ILO mission on wages, incomes and prices policy.⁹ The Government agreed with the finding in the mission report that wage earners' incomes had increased at the expense of the farmer, and that within the wage-earning group there was a relatively highly-paid group employed in large firms and public

⁸ Kenya, *Development Plan 1966-1970* (Nairobi Government Printer, 1966), p. 79.

⁹ International Labour Office, "Report to the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania on wages, incomes and prices policy", Government paper No. 3 (Dar es Salaam, Government Printer, 1967), p. 45, and United Republic of Tanzania, "Wages, incomes, rural development, investment and price policy", Government paper No. 4 (Dar es Salaam, Government Printer, 1967), p. 25.

services. It also accepted with qualifications the notion that the wage determination system contributed to inflation and the growth of unemployment. The Government put forward a wage policy aimed at reducing income inequities, unemployment and inflation. The institutional framework for such action was set out in an act adopted in late 1967 which established a Permanent Labour Tribunal. Among other powers, the Tribunal was given powers to review voluntary agreements and require changes according to guidelines set down by the Government. Thus, for example, among the initial guidelines from the President to the Tribunal were the requirements that "increases in wage and fringe benefits should not exceed 5 per cent in any year" and the Tribunal could "reject or scale down the claim or agreement where increases in prices and services or redundancy and reduction in employment are likely to result in the industry or sector concerned."¹⁰ The Government also accepted certain of the mission's recommendations on minimum wage fixing to help decrease the disparities between rural and urban incomes.

In Asia and the Middle East wage policies beyond those concerned with minimum wage fixing have not been widely pursued. Governments of three countries—Syria, Iraq and Pakistan—have, since 1966, requested ILO technical assistance missions to advise on wage policy in their respective countries. In India, the majority of a study group for wage policy appointed by the National Commission on Labour reported ". . . no particular mechanism is suggested for restraining wage increases" in view of the small proportion of total income accounted for by wages and salaries and the absence of runaway inflation.¹¹

¹⁰ United Republic of Tanzania, "Wages, incomes, rural development, investment and price policy", Government paper No. 4 (Dar es Salaam, Government Printer, 1967), p. 4.

¹¹ India, National Commission on Labour, "Report of the study group for wage policy" (Delhi, Samarath Press, 1969), p. 125.

Chapter XV

SOCIAL SECURITY IN DEVELOPMENT

This chapter will deal primarily with developments and trends in the social security sector both in developing and developed countries, the major problems encountered in the extension of social security in developing countries, and the policies and perspectives for the development of social security in the coming years.

SOCIAL SECURITY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

In recent years, a number of developing countries have introduced social security programmes. At least some type of social security programme was in existence in 123 countries at the beginning of 1969.¹ Among the ninety-two countries which had old-age, invalid and survivor benefit programmes in 1967, eight were in the Middle East, nineteen in Central and South America, nine in Asia and twenty-three in Africa. Similarly, among the sixty-two countries with family allowance programmes, as many as twenty countries are in Africa, while six are Latin American.² The marked differences among national social security programmes include—particularly in the developing countries—certain major inadequacies in the social security systems.

Trends in social security expenditure

The size of social security outlay, by itself, may not provide a satisfactory indication of the extent of social security development. Yet the magnitude of resources devoted to social security in different countries in relation to their national product would give some idea of the stage of their social security development.

Table 1 shows for selected countries, both developed and developing, the proportion of gross national product devoted to social security and the improvement in this proportion over the period 1955-1966.³ The table serves to highlight the fact that as compared to industrialized countries, the developing countries devoted a relatively small part of their national product to social security which, over the years, has not shown any striking improve-

ment. The relatively low resource allocation for social security in these countries is a reflection of the prevailing inadequacies in their social security systems.

Gaps in social security systems

The gaps in the social security systems of developing countries occur not only in terms of the contingencies covered, but also in terms of the number of persons protected by the existing schemes. Except for six developing countries (four in Latin America and two in Asia), the prevailing unemployment benefit programmes are confined to developed countries. In a number of developing countries, the schemes providing for compensation for employment injuries and occupational diseases continue to be based on the traditional principle of employers' liability. There are still a large number of countries that do not yet have statutory schemes with wide coverage providing benefits in case of old age, invalidity and death. What is more, where social security schemes have been introduced in recent years, they are still in the process of development and to not provide complete protection. This is evident if we examine the scope of protection currently afforded by some major branches of social security in the different countries.

Trends in coverage by social security

An international comparison of the scope of protection provided by social security has a number of limitations. The scope of protection is not only dependent on the extent of the numerical coverage of persons by various schemes, but also on the quality of protection they offer. There are differences not only in the level of benefits stipulated by individual schemes, but also in the qualifying conditions for attaining benefits, benefit-duration, the extent of cost-sharing by beneficiaries (as in the case of medical care schemes), as well as the ability of the systems to synchronize benefits with fluctuations in living costs. Besides, there may be extraneous factors peculiar to a certain country that affect the quality of protection provided. To illustrate, in spite of the generous benefit formula provided in any social security medical-care scheme, protection available to a participant is conditioned to a large extent by the availability and quality of medical facilities which, in turn, depend on the development of medical services in the country. Allowing for these limitations, it is possible to perceive from data given in tables 2 and 3 the differences in coverage by two principal branches of social security in different countries.

¹ United States Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Social Security Administration, *Social Security Programs Throughout the World*, Research Report No. 31 (Washington, D.C., 1969), p. vii.

² Paul Fisher, "Social security and development planning—some issues", *Social Security Bulletin*, vol. 30, No. 6 (June 1967).

³ Comparable international data on social security outlays were not available for years later than 1966.

TABLE 1. TOTAL EXPENDITURE ON SOCIAL SECURITY EXPRESSED AS A PERCENTAGE OF GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT AT CURRENT MARKET PRICES FOR SELECTED COUNTRIES

More developed countries ^a			Less developed countries ^a		
Country	Years	Total expenditure on social security expressed as a percentage of GNP	Country	Years	Total expenditure on social security expressed as a percentage of GNP
Belgium	1955	13.0	Ceylon	1954-1955	2.8
	1960	15.1		1959-1960	3.6
	1966	16.5		1965-1966	3.6
Canada	1954-1955	7.9	China (Taiwan)	1955	0.9
	1959-1960	9.2		1960	1.2
	1965-1966	9.7		1966	1.2
Denmark.	1954-1955	9.8	El Salvador	1955	2.2
	1959-1960	11.1		1960	2.4
	1965-1966	13.2		1966	2.4
France	1955	10.7	Guatemala	1954-1955	1.8
	1960	13.4		1959-1960	2.0
	1966	16.6		1965-1966	2.0
Germany (Federal Republic of)	1955	14.3 ^b	Malaysia (West Malaysia)	1955	2.4
	1960	15.8 ^b		1960	3.0
	1966	17.5 ^b		1965	2.9
Italy	1955	10.8	Turkey	1955	1.2
	1960	12.7		1960	1.3
	1966	16.2		1966	1.7
Luxembourg	1955	13.4			
	1960	14.0			
	1966	16.3			
Netherlands	1955	8.3			
	1960	11.0			
	1966	16.6			
Norway	1954-1955	7.5			
	1959-1960	9.5			
	1966	11.3			
Sweden	1955	11.1			
	1960	12.4			
	1966	16.3			
United Kingdom	1955-1956	9.6			
	1960-1961	11.0			
	1966-1967	12.7			
United States of America	1954-1955	5.0			
	1959-1960	6.3			
	1965-1966	7.3			

SOURCE: International Labour Organisation, *The Cost of Social Security, 1961-1966, and 1964-1966* (provisional data).

^a According to the classifications adopted in the *1967 Report on World Social Situation* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 68.IV.9), chap. I, tables 3 and 4.

^b Including West Berlin.

Table 2 shows, for a number of developed and developing countries, the trends in coverage by medical care schemes within the framework of social security (the number of protected persons expressed as a percentage of the total population) during a ten-year period, in most cases 1955-1965. Table 3 shows for similar periods the trends in coverage by statutory pension insurance schemes (insured persons expressed as a percentage of the total economically active population). These tables are by no

means complete; they contain only those countries in respect of which reliable data on protected persons could be obtained from the various national publications. But they demonstrate the relatively small extent of coverage in developing countries by these two principal branches of social security, as compared to many developed countries. However, the data given in the table also show how, in terms of absolute numbers, the protected persons have increased greatly in certain developing countries. This

TABLE 2. TRENDS IN SCOPE OF PROTECTION BY MEDICAL CARE SCHEMES WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF SOCIAL SECURITY IN SELECTED COUNTRIES

I. More developed countries ^a				II. Less developed countries ^a			
Country	Year	Persons protected (thousands)	Scope of protection: Persons protected as a percentage of total population	Country	Year	Persons protected (thousands)	Scope of protection: Persons protected as a percentage of total population
Austria	1955	4,896	70	Bolivia	1964	378	10
	1965	6,081	84	Burma	1964	156	1
Belgium	1956	6,149	69		1966	154	1
	1965	8,578	91	China (Taiwan) . . .	1956	374	4
Denmark	1956	3,823	86		1964	799	7
	1965	4,462	94	Costa Rica	1955	122	13
France	1955	27,800	64		1965	422	29
	1965	43,070	88	Dominican Republic .	1964	147	4
Germany (Federal Republic of)	1958	45,550	84	El Salvador	1955	35	2
	1965	51,542	87		1965	83	3
Iceland	1956	151	93	India	1955	881	^b
	1964	174	92		1966	12,143	2
Italy	1955	28,827	59	Iran	1966	1,799	7
	1965	43,780	85	Libya	1964	170	11
Japan	1957	67,887	75	Mexico	1960	3,855	11
	1966	97,092	98		1966	8,290	19
Luxembourg	1955	226	74	Nicaragua	1957	11	1
	1965	325	98		1966	110	6
Netherlands	1955	8,379	78	Panama	1957	61	6
	1965	9,112	74		1966	110	9
Norway	1956	3,462	100	Venezuela	1956	543	9
	1964	3,694	100		1966	1,373	15
Spain	1960	14,613	48				
	1966	16,461	51				
Sweden	1956	7,315	100				
	1964	7,691	100				
Switzerland	1955	3,158	63				
	1965	4,893	82				
Yugoslavia	1956	6,906	32				
	1966	19,740	100				

SOURCES: *Protected persons*: annual reports of National Social Security Institutions, National Statistical Yearbooks and Technical Assistance Reports.

Populations: United Nations Demographic Yearbooks.

Note: In the case of those countries that have established national health services (Bulgaria, Chile, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, New Zealand, Poland, Romania, USSR and the United Kingdom), the medical care systems in theory provide complete coverage, though in practice they

are not entirely comprehensive on account of a number of factors including cost-sharing in medicines by beneficiaries, the exclusion of affluent sections of populations etc. (See ILO: *The Organization of Medical Care Under Social Security*, by Milton I. Roemer (Geneva, 1969)).

^a According to the classification adopted in chapter I of the 1967 *Report on World Social Situation*.

^b Less than 1 per cent.

was achieved by the progressive extension of their schemes to new geographical areas, as well as new groups or categories of persons.

Some of the basic problems—such as the low level of economic development and the inadequacy of financial, administrative, and medical resources—that stand in the way of rapid extension of social security are undoubtedly common to most developing countries. There are, however, certain bottle-necks in the programming of social security that are to some extent peculiar to individual regions. The problems, trends and policies of social security development in the developing countries will therefore be discussed by major regions.

AFRICA

The problems

One of the major problems of social security development in Africa is the limited coverage of the existing schemes of social security. Within Africa, there is a wider range of coverage in the French-speaking countries than in the English-speaking ones. Almost all the French-speaking African countries now have family allowance schemes, most of them have employment injury benefits schemes, and a few provide pensions and sickness benefits, mostly based on the principle of social insurance. The English-speaking countries generally provide workmen's

TABLE 3. TRENDS IN SCOPE OF PROTECTION BY STATUTORY PENSION INSURANCE SCHEMES IN SELECTED COUNTRIES

I. More developed countries ^a				II. Less developed countries ^a			
Country	Year	Insured persons (thousands)	Insured persons as a percentage of total economically active population	Country	Year	Insured persons (thousands)	Insured persons as a percentage of total economically active population
Austria	1955	1,938	59	Chile	1960	1,513	63
	1965	2,644	77		1964	1,891	70
Czechoslovakia	1955	5,329	86	Costa Rica	1955	19	6
	1965	6,729	100		1966	76	17
France	1955	18,390	94	Ecuador	1957	132	10
	1964	20,540	100		1966	234	14
Germany (Federal Republic of)	1955	20,370	84	Mali	1966	50	3
	1967	25,791	93	Mexico	1956	670	7
Italy	1955	9,701	47		1966	2,353	16
	1966	19,985	100	Morocco	1966	236	6
Israel	1956	560	86	Panama	1956	60	19
	1965	870	99		1966	110	26
Japan	1960	15,880	36	Philippines	1957	224	3
	1966	43,349	89		1967	1,768	13
Poland	1955	6,779	51	Syrian Arab Republic	1964	69	5
	1966	9,505	63				
Portugal	1957	834	25				
	1965	1,593	45				
United Kingdom	1955	21,990	90				
	1965	21,830	85				
United States of America	1955	57,700	87				
	1965	67,800	85				
Yugoslavia	1955	2,479	31				
	1966	4,235	47				

SOURCE: *Insured persons*: annual reports of National Social Security Institutions, National Statistical Yearbooks and Technical Assistance Reports.

Economically active persons: Estimated from data given in the ILO *Yearbook of Labour Statistics*.

(1) In the case of countries with universal pension programmes (Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, New Zealand, Norway and Sweden) the coverage is assumed to be complete.

(2) In the case of Australia, Barbados, Guyana, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Trinidad and Tobago, all residents are eligible for pensions under a system of social assistance where pension payments are subject to some kind of income or means test.

^a According to the classification adopted in chapter I of *1967 Report on the World Social Situation* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 18.IV.9), tables 3 and 4.

compensation in case of employment injury and, in some cases, maternity and sickness benefits, mostly based on the principle of employers' liability, while some countries have in recent years introduced national provident funds. Except in a few countries, including Algeria and the United Arab Republic, rural workers—other than wage-earners engaged in certain plantations and in other large agricultural undertakings—do not enjoy the benefits of modern social security. In the wake of economic development, the indigenous forms of protection provided by traditional structures, rural institutions or social relations in Africa tend to disappear fast, exposing the workers to new risks. In this situation, the need to extend social protection to rural workers becomes all the more urgent.

Policies and perspectives

The efforts of the ILO have been mainly directed, through its programme of technical assistance, advisory

services and research, to help African countries in reforming their existing social security schemes as well as in establishing long-range social security programmes. Within the African region, the patterns of operational work in social security vary somewhat in different areas. In French-speaking Africa, the emphasis is on aiding in the introduction of new pension schemes, reviewing the existing financial bases of family allowance schemes and, in some cases, adapting the most suitable administrative processes. In English-speaking Africa, the emphasis is on setting up new schemes or revising the existing ones.⁴

⁴ To serve as a basis for starting a broader programme of action in extending social security in rural areas in Africa, a field study was initiated in Niger in 1968. The study is expected to be continued in other African countries in 1970 and the following years. At the request of a number of countries, the ILO is examining the possibility of establishing a regional African social security centre for the eighteen French-speaking countries.

At the international level, efforts have continued to be made to review the special problems of African social security development and to seek their solution.⁵

Trends and developments

During 1966-1968, legislative developments have taken place in certain African countries which had as their objective the consolidation, reform or expansion of existing schemes of social security and, in some cases, the introduction of new schemes. In Mauritania, a new social security act, which came into operation in January 1967, consolidated and made improvements in the social security system. The benefits provided under the new system include birth grants, daily maternity allowances, benefits for industrial accidents and occupational diseases and old-age, invalidity and survival pensions. A similar consolidated act, promulgated in the Ivory Coast in December 1968, brought together all the various enactments in force regarding family benefits, maternity, employment injuries and old-age benefits. In Niger, a national pension insurance scheme, applicable to all wage-earners subject to the Labour Code, was introduced in 1967 and in 1968 a similar scheme was brought into being in Togo. During the period under review, changes had to be made in the family allowance schemes of certain of the French-language African countries in order to restore their financial equilibrium. Reforms carried out in Upper Volta included the abolition of a special allowance provided on the occasion of the birth of the first three children, reduction in the amount of maternity allowance, and the imposition of a maximum limit of six on the number of children qualifying for family allowances. In Dahomey, apart from fixing a maximum limit of six on the number of children for whom family allowances are payable, reforms carried out in 1968 included the levelling of the rates of family allowances payable to public employees and an increase in the rate of contributions payable by employers to finance this branch of social security.

THE AMERICAS

The problems

As far as the developing countries of the Americas are concerned, the most important problem in the social security sector is inadequate coverage by existing schemes. Except for a few countries, including Chile, Cuba, Uruguay and Argentina, where social security programmes were introduced in the 1920s or even earlier, the social security systems have not been able to expand much beyond the categories of urban workers and employees. In the case of a large number of countries in Latin America, the existing schemes of social security afford protection to less than 20 per cent of the economically active population.⁶ The rural populations have, in many

cases, remained outside the purview of social security schemes. Besides inadequate financial resources, the obstacles in the way of extending social security to rural areas are: a lack of infrastructure in terms of roads, communications and allied facilities, a shortage of medical personnel, low wages and low earning capacity among rural workers, and administrative difficulties involved in covering agricultural workers and artisans.

Prevailing financial imbalances in the social security systems of many countries constitute another major problem. In most cases, the basic causes of financial disequilibrium are the high level of existing benefits and large-scale evasion or postponement in the payment of social security contributions by employers and, in some cases, by Governments. A prevailing multiplicity of systems and uneconomic administrative structures and procedures are also considered to be responsible, to a great extent, for losses in the realization of contributions as well as for delays in the dispensation of social security benefits.

Policies and perspectives

The Eighth Conference of American State Members of the ILO, which met in Ottawa in September 1966, adopted a resolution concerning the role of social security in social and economic development in the Americas. This resolution, also known as the Ottawa Programme of Social Security, provided a number of guidelines for the development, reform and improvement of social security in the Americas. The principal components of the Ottawa Programme include: (a) the incorporation of social security programmes in the general economic planning of the States; (b) the encouragement of trends towards the uniform protection of workers in each country to eliminate inequalities; (c) the co-ordination of benefit rights where there is a plurality of administrative entities; (d) the widening of coverage, through legislation, of protected persons in order to include groups not yet covered, such as rural workers, domestic workers, and homeworkers—adjusting, if necessary, the system of contributions and benefits to the special characteristics of such groups; (e) the pursuit of a dynamic policy to extend schemes not only to new geographic areas and to new categories of insured persons, but also to new contingencies; (f) the assignment of maximum priority to the extension of social security to the rural sector; (g) the extension of medical assistance under social security beyond the urban centres and appropriate co-ordination between the medical services of social security institutions and those of public health services and other medico-social services, and (h) administrative reorganization, the revision of inappropriate systems of benefits leading to financial disequilibrium and, where the financial systems provide for accumulation of reserves, the formulation of suitable investment programmes co-ordinated with national economic and development plans.

The ILO will strengthen its technical co-operation activities in the field of social security in the American region. To support its technical co-operation activities, the ILO will also undertake research, particularly in regard to the problems of development of social security in the rural areas in the region.

⁵ International Labour Organisation, "Social change and social progress in Africa", the report of the Director-General to the Third African Regional Conference, Accra, 1969.

⁶ International Labour Organisation, "La seguridad social en las Américas" (Comité Permanente Interamericano de Seguridad Social y Organización Internacional del Trabajo, 1967).

There has been a tendency on the part of some countries of the region to incorporate social security in development plans. In Chile, the National Planning Office decided in 1969 to incorporate social security programmes in its national plans. The Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare of Panama created in 1969 has been assigned, among other things, the task of planning the social policy of the State. In Peru, a five-year plan of development, formulated by the Planning Institute, incorporates various sectoral groups, including social security.

A number of countries in the region initiated steps during the period under review to attain uniformity in legislative norms and to integrate existing schemes with a view to eliminating differences in benefit rights. In Argentina, a 1967 law established uniformity in benefits for all salaried employees. A subsequent law enacted in 1968 established a new structure for the administration of the social security system in the country. Thirteen national social security funds that had been in operation were merged into three. By an enactment of 1966, the six major pension institutes and the Medical Care Home Service in Brazil were merged into the National Social Security Institute. Simultaneously, an Action Plan for Social Security was set up to establish priority programmes and uniform principles. In Colombia, a 1968 decree anticipates the integration of social security institutions in the public sector with those of the private sector. It created a co-ordinating committee between the National Social Security Fund (for workers in the public sector) and the Colombian Institute of Social Security (for workers in the private sector) to promote a more effective integration of their interests. A reform law that came into force in Venezuela in 1967 strengthened the principle of workers' equality in social security by making the provisions of social security legislation applicable to previously unprotected public employees.

During the late 1960s, some countries succeeded in extending their schemes to new areas and categories of persons while others introduced new schemes. In Paraguay, social insurance was extended in 1967 to domestic workers, entitling them to sickness, maternity and employment injury benefits. A programme of territorial extension of social security schemes of the Mexican Institute of Social Security has continued, with the result that by 1968 the scheme covered all municipalities with more than 100,000 inhabitants and more than 80 per cent of those with more than 30,000 inhabitants. In Peru, medical assistance was extended in 1969 to the wives and children of insured persons affiliated with the Social Insurance Fund for wage earners. By an enactment of 1969, workers engaged in sugar cane plantations as well as in certain other agricultural activities in Brazil were incorporated into the general scheme of social insurance. Towards the end of 1968, Guatemala started a sickness insurance scheme, and a pension insurance scheme came into force in El Salvador early in 1969.

In the Caribbean, Jamaica introduced, in April 1966, a national insurance scheme initially covering employed persons and providing cash benefits for old age, invalidity and death. Besides Jamaica, other countries, including Guyana, Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago have in-

itiated steps—with technical assistance from the ILO—for planning the introduction of new social security schemes.

Some countries of the region also initiated steps for the co-ordination of the medical care services of social security institutions. A Council of Social Security was created in Bolivia in 1967 to co-ordinate public health service activities with those of sickness and maternity insurance. In Colombia, a 1967 decree provided for the allocation of 10 per cent of the receipts of the Colombian Institute of Social Security to the National Hospital Funds. The resources so earmarked are jointly administered by the Ministry of Public Health and the Colombian Institute of Social Security with the object of integrating hospital services. A National Council of Health was created in Peru in 1969—consisting of representatives of the Ministry of Health, the Board of Social Security and the various pension funds—to plan the extension of medical services.

ASIA

The problems

The evolution of effective social security has been slow in most of the developing countries of Asia. Some countries of the region still rely on legislation based on individual employer liability for the protection of workers in the case of contingencies normally dealt with by social insurance. Schemes based on employer liability not only fail to provide effective protection to workers, but also create considerable difficulties for employers, particularly those operating small establishments.

Even in those countries where social security schemes have been introduced, the existing schemes have a limited basis because they fail to cover large categories of workers. The bulk of workers in smaller establishments, even if they belong to modern sectors of the economy, are generally excluded from the coverage of existing schemes. Also excluded from their scope are large groups of casual workers and self-employed persons. What is more, the social security schemes so far introduced in most of the developing countries of Asia have been designed for the protection of the wage-earning population in urban areas or industrial centres, while the rural population is by and large unprotected.

In some cases, for want of suitable administrative structures and procedures, large numbers of theoretically protected persons are not protected in practice.

Shortages of medical personnel and facilities and their concentration in urban areas constitute another major bottle-neck in extending medical care within the framework of social security in many developing countries.

Policies and perspectives

Following the recommendations of the ILO Asian Advisory Committee, which held its thirteenth session in Singapore in 1966, the Sixth Asian Regional Conference of the ILO held in Tokyo in 1968 adopted a resolution concerning social security development in Asia. It contains a series of recommendations and suggestions which constitute the basic guidelines for the Asian countries as well as the ILO in efforts to establish and improve social

security protection in the region. The principal elements of the strategy for the future development of social security in the region are indicated below.

In planning the introduction of social security schemes, efforts will be made to determine the type of legislation most suitable to the social and economic conditions of the countries concerned and a scale of priorities will be established according to the social conditions and available resources in relation to total needs.

Schemes based on individual employer liability will be replaced, where necessary, to provide adequate protection by social insurance schemes under which the pooling of financial resources would ensure the effective protection of employees and avoid undue financial burdens on individual employers.

For independent workers and those employees who may not be covered by the first phase of social security development, special protective measures will gradually be introduced in order to pave the way for the ultimate integration of such workers within the framework of national social security schemes. Such special measures may include the participation of these workers through existing organizations of their own, such as co-operative societies, occupational associations, etc.

Efforts will be made to extend social security protection to workers in the rural sectors, taking into account the special characteristics of their social and economic conditions. As part of a comprehensive project, the ILO will shortly commence the study of the problems of extending social security to rural populations in the Asian region. In so far as the extension of social security medical care to rural areas is concerned, the planning of health services demands the closest co-operation between social security institutions, departments of public health and other bodies concerned. For this purpose, the ILO will continue to seek the co-operation of WHO.

Trends and developments

During the period under review some developing countries in Asia have intensified their efforts to introduce new schemes, while some others have improved upon existing schemes. In Iran, legislative enactments were made in 1969 to launch a pilot social security scheme for the rural population. The scheme will provide medical care in selected villages through the improvement of the existing medical-social services and also provide cash benefits in case of invalidity or death. On the basis of experience gained in the pilot projects, the programme is expected to be extended to other areas.

In Pakistan, a social security scheme was introduced in 1967, initially restricted to workers employed in textile industries located in three industrial centres in West Pakistan. Besides medical care, the scheme provides cash benefits to insured workers in case of sickness, maternity and employment injury. The scheme was extended, by the end of 1967, to three more industrial centres in West Pakistan and it is expected that in due course it will be extended to other areas and industries. In Iraq, a social security scheme providing old-age pensions and cash sickness benefits came into operation in 1966. This scheme replaced that of the former National Provident Fund. A compulsory social insurance scheme

was adopted by the legislature of Malaysia in 1969 to protect the wage-earning population in the event of invalidity or employment injury. Amendments made in 1968 to the Labour Insurance Scheme of China (Taiwan) made possible the extension of out-patient medical care to insured persons. Formerly, the medical benefits provided under the scheme included only hospital treatment, surgery and medicines. The Republic of Korea in 1969 initiated steps for planning the introduction of sickness insurance with the help of a joint ILO/WHO mission.

In India, a Committee appointed by the Government to review the working of the Employees' State Insurance (ESI) Scheme, submitted a report in 1966, suggesting a number of measures for the reform and extension of the scheme. Similarly, in Hong Kong, an interdepartmental Working Party, set up to examine the possibility of introducing an effective social security system, submitted its report in 1967.

GENERAL POLICY MEASURES

Social security and development planning

In some recent studies an effort has been made to establish whether or not institutional factors in industrialized countries—including historical, geographical and cultural factors—account for the differences in social security development far more than economic factors.⁷ But one of the major bottle-necks in the rapid extension of social security in many developing countries is an inability, in the existing stage of their economic development, to set apart the requisite amount of resources for the purpose. In the scheme of planned resource allocations, social security does not usually receive the treatment of a "core" item and, in most cases, it remains a peripheral sector in the national development plans. It is also found that many developing countries which have sectoral planning units linked to national planning machinery for education and health do not possess similar planning units for social security.⁸ The creation of such planning cells might facilitate the development of social security policy integrally co-ordinated with plans for economic and social development in the developing countries.

Co-ordination in medical resource utilization

Even when the requisite financial resources are made available, the extension of medical care schemes within the framework of social security in many developing countries of Asia and Africa will necessarily be conditioned by the pace of improvement in medical resources. Recent statistics⁹ highlight the acute shortage of medical and paramedical personnel and institutional facilities that

⁷ Koji Taira and Peter Kilby, "Differences in social security development in different countries", *International Social Security Review*, ISSA, No. 2 (1969), and Henry Aaron, "Social security: international comparisons" in *Studies in Economics of Income Maintenance*, Otto Eckstein, ed. (Washington, D.C., 1967).

⁸ "Social security and development: the Latin American experience", *Economic Bulletin for Latin America*, vol. 13, No. 2 (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 68.II.G.11).

⁹ World Health Organization, *World Health Statistics 1965*, vol. III—*Health Personnel and Hospital Establishments* (Geneva, 1969).

prevails in many developing countries. In such situations, the operation of social security medical care schemes through medical personnel and institutions built up exclusively for a relatively small group of persons protected by social security schemes may not be economical and may be against the national interest. On the other hand, it may not be correct to delay the extension of social security schemes until the medical resources of these countries are developed. The solution appears to lie in a planned and co-ordinated utilization of available medical resources, and for this what is needed most is an improvement in the degree of co-ordination between social security medical care schemes and public medical care services in these countries.

In many developing countries, both public health services and social security schemes presently contribute towards the planning and implementation of personal health services. In many areas this parallel activity leads to an unco-ordinated development of medical services, often resulting in the unsatisfactory utilization of limited available resources. Towards the latter half of 1970, the convening of a joint ILO/WHO Committee of Experts on the broad subject of co-ordination between social security and personal health services was proposed for the purpose of formulating a common policy on the subject and for making recommendations at both the international and national levels on the best means of achieving such co-ordination.

The co-ordination between social security medical care services and public health services in Latin America has been a subject of continuous study in recent years by the Pan American Health Organization. The ILO has been co-operating in these studies through its participation in the various meetings.

Conclusion

During recent years, notwithstanding the numerous bottle-necks in the extension of social security, many developing countries have succeeded in extending and improving existing programmes and, in many cases, have introduced new schemes of social security. Particularly significant is the growing tendency on the part of many developing countries to seek solutions to current problems of social security development and to formulate strategies for the future growth and development of their social security systems.

SOCIAL SECURITY IN THE DEVELOPED COUNTRIES

Trends and developments

As indicated in table 1, many developed countries have in recent years steadily continued to improve the proportion of their national product devoted to social security. Tables 2 and 3 showed how, in so far as two main branches of social security are concerned, a number of developed countries provide coverage for the entire population while many others are progressing steadily towards that goal.

During the period under review, many developed countries took steps to reform their social security systems in order to bring about qualitative improvements in the protection afforded, while some others extended social security to new categories of formerly unprotected persons.

In the Netherlands, the Occupational Disability Insurance Act of 1967 replaced a number of previous enactments. Under the new act, wage-earners are subject to compulsory insurance whatever their wage, with the exception of those employed in the public sector or in the railways, for whom equivalent schemes already exist. Norway in 1967 introduced a new scheme for supplementary old-age, disability and survivors' pensions graduated by earnings and periods of insurance and payable in addition to the basic pension fixed at flat rates.

In the United Kingdom, the most significant development was the replacement of the flat-rate system of benefit and contributions by a mixed system of flat-rate and earnings-related benefits and contributions. Another development is the replacement of national assistance by a system of income guarantees, providing non-contributory benefits at rates comparable to, or in excess of, national insurance benefits.

In France, a scheme was introduced in 1966 for sickness and maternity insurance for workers other than employees in non-agricultural occupations, and in 1967 independent and family workers in agriculture were compulsorily brought under insurance against occupational disease and accidents. Besides, a series of reforms in the social security system was carried out in 1967 for the purpose of making it self-supporting, and to this end, changes were made in the administrative and financial organization as well as in the system of benefits. In Belgium, employment injury and occupational disease insurance was extended to the public sector in 1967, and in 1968 the four pension schemes for wage-earners, salaried employees, mine-workers and seamen were amalgamated into a single pension scheme for all employees. In the Federal Republic of Germany, amendments made in 1967 to the social security legislation extended compulsory sickness insurance to all recipients of invalidity and old-age pensions and extended pension insurance to all salaried employees, irrespective of their earnings. Formerly, only those salaried employees whose monthly earnings did not exceed DM 1,800 were compulsorily covered by pension insurance. Spain in 1966 introduced a new social security scheme for agricultural workers. In Switzerland, the scale of benefits under social security was raised by a series of federal acts in 1966, 1967 and 1969. In the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, a number of improvements were effected in the social security system of 1968. In Bulgaria, compulsory sickness and maternity insurance was established in 1967 for members of agricultural co-operatives.

OTHER DEVELOPMENTS

New international instruments of social security

In 1967 the fifty-first session of the International Labour Conference adopted a convention (No. 128) and a recommendation (No. 131) concerning invalidity, old-age and survivors' benefits. Again in 1969, the International Labour Conference adopted at its fifty-third session a convention (No. 130) and a recommendation (No. 134) concerning medical care and sickness benefits. These new conventions and recommendations, which have

replaced the relevant pre-war international instruments, provide for improved standards in regard to the persons protected and to the methods of measuring the adequacy of benefits. To a great extent, they reflect the development of social security in recent times.

Social security for migrant workers

During the period under review, the ILO has continued to co-operate with the European Economic Community, the Council of Europe and the Organization of Central American States (ODECA) in promoting appropriate social security measures for migrant workers. Within the framework of the European Communities, technical work has been completed for the introduction of certain changes in the manner of administering the regulation concerning social security for migrant workers, and for supplementing its provisions. Work on the draft European social security convention for the eighteen member countries of the Council of Europe has also been completed and the text is now before the Committee of Ministers of the Council for adoption.

In the American region, a multilateral social security convention was signed in 1967 by six member States of ODECA. The preparation of the draft recommendations for the application of the convention is under way.

The ILO will intensify its research activities in regard to the numerous aspects of social security development in the coming years so that it will be better equipped to promote its operational activities on the right lines. The study initiated by the ILO on the organization of medical care within the framework of social security in eight selected countries was completed in 1968.¹⁰ The results of this study provide useful guidelines for the improvement of medical care services under social security as well as for the extension of social security medical care in developing countries. Another study entitled "Problems of income security in the light of structural changes", also completed in 1968, brings out the need for an active policy in the field of social security designed to minimize the cost, in human terms, of the structural changes which inevitably accompany economic growth.

A general international study on social security in agriculture and in rural areas was completed in 1969. During 1970-1971, the applicability of the general conclusions emerging from this study to particular regions and countries will be investigated in depth.

¹⁰ Milton Roemer, *The Organization of Medical Care under Social Security*, ILO Studies and Reports, New Series No. 73 (Geneva, 1969).

REHABILITATION OF THE DISABLED, CRIME AND DELINQUENCY, SOCIAL WELFARE SERVICES AND REGIONAL AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT

REHABILITATION OF THE DISABLED

Trends in the incidence of disabilities and rehabilitation measures

There are some 300 million persons in the world today who require rehabilitation services which either are effectively unavailable or non-existent in their areas. By the most modest predictions of population increase, and taking into consideration improved medical science for saving and preserving life, it is estimated that the increase in the number of disabled persons due to industrialization and the effects of motor transport will be an additional 3 million per year.¹ Figures obtained from various countries on the number of disabled persons show the magnitude of the rehabilitation problem. In the United States in 1968, although 207,000 persons were rehabilitated, more than 300,000 new physical and mental disability cases requiring vocational rehabilitation remained unattended. Moreover, there was a backlog of more than 5 million "unserved", mentally and physically handicapped persons.² In Poland, 100,000 persons are classified annually in some type of disability.³

People in the developing countries also suffer from diseases which if unattended may provoke serious disabilities. According to the 1968 UNICEF *General Progress Report of the Executive Director*,⁴ about 300,000 children have completed treatment for leprosy and more than 850,000 children were under treatment at the end of 1968. However, only a small percentage of all leprosy patients in Asia and Africa can be rehabilitated under present conditions. A pilot study⁵ conducted in Maharashtra, India, estimated that in that region alone there are 300,000 leprosy patients, some in need of rehabilitation for various deformities or special problems provoked by the illness. According to the report of the Royal Commonwealth Society for the Blind for 1966/1967,⁶ there

are an estimated 4 million blind people in Commonwealth countries. Among these are 480,000 blind children and at least 1.5 million blind men and women of working age.

Problems connected with mental illness and mental retardation are matters of serious concern. Recent studies in a variety of industrialized countries have indicated that about one to two persons per 1,000 population are so retarded that they require special care.⁷ The total number of the mentally retarded in Sweden is 400,000 and among these are 140,000 psychiatric cases.⁸ Other illnesses, including epilepsy, cardiac conditions and arthritis, also provoke disabling conditions, some of them permanent. Moreover, in such cases, even after a patient is released from the hospital, he may require special training to cope with his handicap.

Antibiotics and advances in medicine sharply reduced the incidence of once familiar causes of various disabilities, such as bone tuberculosis, but that reduction was offset by an increasing number of industrial, traffic and other accidents as shown by some national statistics published in 1967-1969. An investigation⁹ made recently in Sweden showed the following distribution of vocational rehabilitation measures as applied to various disabilities in 1957 and 1966 respectively:

Handicap	Percentage of all disabled under vocational rehabilitation	
	1957	1966
Orthopaedic defects	29.8	32.0
Hearing disabilities	1.8	1.3
Sight disabilities	3.2	2.1
Tuberculosis of the lungs	10.4	1.8
Psychiatric diseases or mental retardation	17.8	19.4
Other	37.4	43.4

These figures indicate an increase in orthopaedic and psychiatric cases under vocational rehabilitation (usually required for serious disablement) in contrast to a sharp decline in tuberculosis cases. In a WHO document (WHO/VIR/68.7), the incidence of poliomyelitis in different parts of the world in 1955-1966 is compared to

¹ Estimates of the International Society for Rehabilitation of the Disabled at its Eleventh World Congress held in Dublin, Ireland, 17-19 September 1969, *The Irish Times* (16 September 1969).

² Russel A. Nixon, "Rehabilitation—human reinforcement in a troubled world", *Journal of Rehabilitation* (March-April 1969).

³ Based on the report on *The ILO Interregional Seminar on Vocational Rehabilitation held in Warsaw, 16 May-4 June 1966* (ILO/TAP/INT/R.11).

⁴ E/ICEF/573 (New York, 1968).

⁵ "Report on the survey made at Fugewadi of leprosy affected persons", *The Journal of Rehabilitation in Asia*, vol. VIII, No. 4 (October 1967).

⁶ Royal Commonwealth Society for the Blind, "Four million blind people" (1967).

⁷ Rosemary Dybwad and Gunar Dybwad, "Mental retardation: a look at its international rehabilitation aspects", *International Rehabilitation Review*, vol. XIX, No. 2 (April 1968).

⁸ The Swedish Institute, *Rehabilitation in Sweden* (Stockholm, 1968).

⁹ *Ibid.*

that in 1951-1955. This comparison shows that while the incidence of this extremely crippling disease has been dramatically reduced in Europe, North America and Oceania, there had been a three-fold rise in the reported number of cases in a group of tropical and semi-tropical countries. Yet this is only an average, the increase being as much as fifty-six times in Nigeria and fifteen times in Turkey. In Africa, Asia and Latin America, the incidence of the disease has risen sharply.

Although a growing number of rehabilitation centres, institutions for special education, prosthetic laboratories and other facilities served by specially trained personnel are coping with the problems of the disabled, the results so far achieved are still uneven, both in given countries and internationally. For example, available statistics show that in Denmark, since the end of the Second World War, some thirty-five units for industrial rehabilitation capable of admitting a total of 1,000 persons have been established.¹⁰ In the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic alone,¹¹ 78,000 blind persons are employed, including 5,000 blind professional workers, teachers in secondary and higher schools, etc. However, even in the most developed countries, there are still a great number of disabled who are without access to rehabilitation services, unemployed or working in unsatisfactory jobs. In the developing countries the situation with regard to rehabilitation and employment of the disabled is much more difficult and in a number of cases, basic forms of rehabilitation services have only recently been established.

Currently, the development of various services for the rehabilitation of the disabled are being undertaken on a national as well as a world-wide scale to achieve the full integration of the disabled into the life of the community in which they live. However, in spite of a general change in attitude towards the disabled and of achievements in their rehabilitation attained during the period 1967-1969, the plight of disabled persons too often still results in human suffering and withdrawal from active social life. Discrimination against certain categories of the disabled (mentally ill or retarded, epileptics, leprosy patients etc.) and the lack of an appropriate policy with regard to the employment of disabled persons in general, still remain important social problems to be overcome.

Wars and civil unrest, diseases of various kinds as well as accidents caused by traffic, work and other means still force millions of people in the world to spend the rest of their lives handicapped by various disabilities. However, today, the possibility exists for most of them to return to normal active life. According to current medical and social thinking, most of the disabled—if they were to undergo proper treatment—could be rehabilitated. This point was emphasized during the recently held WHO expert meeting on rehabilitation of the disabled,¹² when the aim of social rehabilitation was defined as:

¹⁰ Ministries of Labour and Social Affairs, International Relations Division, *Social Conditions in Denmark—Rehabilitation and Care of the Handicapped* (Copenhagen, 1967).

¹¹ Boris Zimin, President of the All-Russia Society for the Blind, "The education and employment of blind mathematicians in computer centres in the Soviet Union", *The New Outlook for the Blind*, vol. 62, No. 10 (December 1968).

¹² Second report of the WHO Expert Committee on Medical Rehabilitation (Geneva, 1969), p. 60.

"that part of the rehabilitation process aimed at the integration or reintegration of a disabled person into society by helping him to adjust to the demands of family, community and occupation, while reducing any economic and social burdens that may impede the total rehabilitation process".

Rehabilitation of the disabled is a process which ranges from medical treatment, the supply of prosthetic appliances, physical and occupational therapy, vocational guidance and training, placement and ultimate social adjustment to the demands of family, community and occupation. The diversity of such a process requires the United Nations and its specialized agencies to co-operate not only between themselves, but also with numerous non-governmental organizations interested in rehabilitation, especially when the common aim is the improvement of rehabilitation services in developing countries. However, an elaborate development programme in the field of rehabilitation, as a part of over-all social planning in a given country, is a goal yet to be attained. It is important that all the social aspects of the rehabilitation problem be understood since it may affect not only the scope of popular participation in economic and social growth but equally the amount of spending for various pension schemes, social welfare benefits etc.

One such aspect is clearly the prevention of disability. More carefully worked out and more conscientiously applied traffic regulation, provisions for greater safety in the manufacture of automobiles for the prevention of industrial accidents and for immunization against crippling diseases, would mean fewer causes of disability and *a fortiori* a reduction in the burden and expense of rehabilitative procedures.

Another consideration applies particularly to disabled children and young people: the earlier rehabilitative techniques or special education can begin, the better are their chances of overcoming any handicap and taking an active role in society.

These, however, are questions involving a fair amount of sophisticated administrative organization and foresight. In some developing countries, such basic rehabilitation services as the production of simple prosthetic appliances are still to be organized. Other problems are: lack of regulations governing rehabilitation, lack of clear definition of responsibilities for the financing and functioning of various rehabilitation services within the administration in charge of social problems, insufficient knowledge of the scope of the rehabilitation problem and of the number of disabled persons or non-existence of a registry of such persons. In some countries, both developed and developing, rehabilitation of the disabled has not yet been introduced into the curricula of medical schools or training programmes for social workers. Moreover, the majority of these countries are often short of specially trained personnel to fulfil the basic requirements of rehabilitation services. Only limited financial means can be devoted to such a specific aim as rehabilitation of the disabled, in spite of the fact that Governments of developing countries recognize the need.

To establish and promote a national rehabilitation service, developing countries need international assistance, both in training rehabilitation personnel and in organizing

pilot rehabilitation centres, orthopaedic workshops and other facilities. These problems were given serious consideration in 1967-1969 by the United Nations, the ILO, UNESCO, WHO and other interested governmental and non-governmental organizations. Problems concerning the training of rehabilitation personnel exist in both developed and developing countries. In developed countries admission qualifications for such persons are being raised constantly with the result that there is now a shortage of qualified applicants. In developing countries, those who possess these higher admission qualifications for training in the various rehabilitation professions also have other possibilities open to them for training in other fields as well, such as medicine, law etc. The result of both tendencies is that less qualified persons are obliged to perform the duties required of qualified specialists. Moreover, the difficulties in recruitment of trainees for such courses and schools have increased.¹³

National programmes and international co-operation in rehabilitation

One of the main achievements in the rehabilitation field on the national level is that rehabilitation services are recognized in many countries as a part of social welfare and social security policy. This means that in the process of rehabilitation a patient or a disabled person is not considered only as a medical case but that his social situation is also taken into account. In a number of countries laws have been enforced providing for various rehabilitation services, special education and other facilities for the disabled. This achievement, which has resulted from modern rehabilitation thinking and techniques, represents a qualitatively new approach to the treatment of the disabled in present social conditions.

During 1967-1969 some progress was also made by the United Nations and the specialized agencies concerned in organizing various rehabilitation programmes and in establishing new rehabilitation facilities (rehabilitation centres, orthopaedic workshops etc.) in the developing countries. A number of rehabilitation projects have also been initiated with the assistance of interested international non-governmental organizations as well as with bilateral assistance.

The variety of rehabilitation services poses administrative problems of co-ordination at the national level. Because a number of ministries and agencies are involved, problems of communication and overlapping frequently occur. In some countries this problem is dealt with by establishing a special co-ordinating body comprising representatives of the main rehabilitation agencies and services.

There is sometimes a tendency to put disabled persons, especially those with more severe handicaps, on social welfare rather than to provide them with an opportunity to earn a living after completing rehabilitation. Such a policy, although to be preferred to no policy at all, will not bring about a long lasting solution since both society and the disabled person, as well as his family, would stand to gain were he adequately employed.

¹³ *United Nations Interregional Seminar on Standards for the Training of Prosthetists, held at Holte, Denmark, 1968 (ST/TAO/SER.C/111).*

Finally, it is now known that with the necessary adaptation of community facilities and services (in housing, access to public building and to means of public transport, better home care etc.) it is possible to secure for the disabled living conditions similar to those of other members of the community.

There is a need for international co-operation in the rehabilitation of the disabled especially to facilitate an exchange of experiences and to assist the developing countries. To this end, co-ordinated programmes of international assistance, especially in the field of training, under the auspices of the United Nations, the ILO, UNESCO, WHO and a number of non-governmental organizations, have been implemented over the last two decades. Despite certain shortcomings—mainly financial—these programmes have helped train rehabilitation personnel and improve various rehabilitation services in eighty-eight developing countries and territories during 1968.¹⁴

The problems in the rehabilitation of the disabled, as outlined above and as viewed especially in developing countries, indicate the general direction for future efforts in this field. The ultimate aim of the whole rehabilitation process, and of various rehabilitation services engaged in it, has to be the full integration of the disabled into the life of their communities. This aim should be established from the beginning of the rehabilitation process. Moreover attempts should be made through the education of the population, especially with community support, to eliminate any discrimination based on disability. Rehabilitation of the disabled should be understood both as a medical and a social problem, and should become a part of planning for over-all national development. Such an approach will require the establishment of a comprehensive programme for the development of various rehabilitation services and the training of personnel. It will also require co-ordination among agencies responsible for various aspects of rehabilitation and the improvement of statistics and research facilities.

In view of the forthcoming Second United Nations Development Decade, the Eleventh World Congress of Rehabilitation International (formerly the International Society for Rehabilitation of the Disabled) decided to proclaim the 1970s as the Rehabilitation Decade,¹⁵ during which efforts will be made to help developing countries in the organization of various rehabilitation services, as well as to promote the aims of rehabilitation of the disabled all over the world.

CRIME AND DELINQUENCY

Trends in the incidence and pattern of crime

There has been a marked increase in some countries in recent years in the incidence of law-breaking. The United Kingdom and the United States of America, for

¹⁴ United Nations, "Summary of information on projects and activities in the field of rehabilitation of the disabled", eleventh issue (ESA/SD/MISC.1).

¹⁵ *Proceedings of the Eleventh World Congress: Community Responsibility for Rehabilitation, Dublin, Ireland, 14-19 September 1969 (Dublin, National Rehabilitation Board, 1970).*

instance, report a steep rise in the rate of serious crime. Indictable offences known to the police in England and Wales have risen from an annual average of about 500,000 in the 1950s to more than 1 million a year since 1965. The number of persons found guilty of non-indictable offences, especially traffic offences, has also risen sharply.¹⁶ In the United States, Federal Bureau of Investigation "index crimes" reported to the police remained relatively stable during the 1950s at a rate of about 1 per cent of the population, but doubled during the 1960s from 2 million to 4 million. There was a decline in arrests for minor offences other than traffic violations.¹⁷

In several other developed countries the trend is less marked. In Canada, the rate of convictions for indictable offences tended to decline slightly in the 1950s and to return to its 1950 level during the 1960s, whereas convictions for summary offences including traffic violations rose very steeply.¹⁸ In France, the number of persons found guilty of serious crimes and less serious *delits* rose after the Second World War (nearly 250,000 in 1950), then declined (about 185,000 in 1960), and has subsequently returned to the post-war level (250,000 in 1965). The number of police infractions, on the other hand, has expanded continuously and with increasing rapidity (from less than 400,000 in 1950 to nearly 600,000 in 1960 and nearly 1.6 million in 1965).¹⁹ Japan reports a steady decline in adult crime over the past fifteen years, accompanied by a sharp increase in minor violations, especially of traffic rules.

There is some evidence that the rise in the rate of property crimes is more general than that of crimes against the person. During the ten years 1955-1965, property crimes are reported to have doubled in France, Italy, Norway, the United Kingdom and the United States and to have trebled in the Federal Republic of Germany, Finland, the Netherlands and Sweden, although remaining stable in Belgium, Denmark and Switzerland. On the other hand, violence against the person is reported to show less of a general trend, with an increase in the United Kingdom and the United States and a decline in Belgium, Denmark, Norway and Switzerland.²⁰ A recent United States report pointed out that the homicide rate, although only one sixth that of some other countries, is more than twice that of Finland, and from four to twelve times higher than the rates in a dozen other developed countries including Canada, England, Japan and Norway; the rape rate is twelve times that of England and Wales and three times that of Canada; the robbery rate is nine times that of England and Wales and double that of Canada, and the aggravated assault rate is double that of England and Wales and eighteen times that of

Canada.²¹ The ratio of prisoners to the economically active population was five times as high as in Denmark, Japan or the Netherlands.²²

Some developing countries report a slight increase in serious crimes in the 1960s. It is not clear, however, whether this increase represents a long-range trend. Thus India reports that cases of "cognizable offences" rose from nearly 675,000 in 1962 to more than 880,000 in 1967, although the rate remained low despite a rise from 1.5 to 1.7 per 1,000 population.²³ And in Nigeria, the number of persons committed to prison in a year rose from 55,000 in 1960/1961 to more than 75,000 in 1964/1965.

Juvenile delinquency and youthful crime

In some countries, serious crimes are being committed increasingly by young people. Moreover this high rate of increase applies to both the developed and developing countries. In the United Kingdom (England and Wales), two thirds of the convictions for indictable offences are of persons under 25.²⁴ In the United States, half of police arrests for index offences (and more than half for index offences against property) are of persons under 18, although these account for only one quarter of all arrests. Three quarters of all arrests for index offences are of persons under 25, although these account for about one half of all arrests. In the United States, crime committed by youth is also increasing: of all arrests for index crimes, the proportion of criminals under 18 years of age rose from one fifth in 1950 to one half in the 1960s, and the proportion under 25 rose from one half to three quarters in the same period.²⁵ In the United Kingdom (England and Wales), persons found guilty of indictable offences rose from 18 (1950) to 24 (1960) to 35 (1968) per 1,000 males aged 14-16, and from 10 (1950) to 22 (1960) to 35 (1968) per 1,000 males aged 17-20.²⁶ In the United States, a 22 per-cent increase in the population in the age group 10-17 has been accompanied by a 59 per-cent increase in arrests for FBI index crimes and a rise of 69 per cent for all offences (1960-1967), reaching perhaps 50 per 1,000 in the population group.²⁷

In France, the number of juveniles brought to the attention of the Prosecutor has risen rapidly (nearly 22,000 in 1950; nearly 33,000 in 1960; 53,000 in 1963) as has the number of juveniles brought before the courts (18,000; 27,000; 44,000, respectively). The number disposed by pronouncement of a penalty, including supervised probation, has increased even more rapidly (2,000;

²¹ *To Establish Justice, To Insure Domestic Tranquillity: Final Report: the causes and prevention of violence* (Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office, 1969), p. 27.

²² *International Review of Criminal Policy*, No. 26 (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 70.IV.1), table 2, p. 76.

²³ India, Ministry of Home Affairs, Central Bureau of Investigation, *Crime in India 1967* (1969).

²⁴ United Kingdom, *Home Office Criminal Statistics, England and Wales*, op. cit.

²⁵ United States Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, *Uniform Crime Reports*, op. cit.

²⁶ United Kingdom, *Home Office Criminal Statistics, England and Wales*, op. cit.

²⁷ United States Department of Justice Federal Bureau of Investigation, *Uniform Crime Reports*, op. cit.

¹⁶ United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, *Home Office Criminal Statistics, England and Wales*, Cmnd. 4098 (London, HMSO, 1969).

¹⁷ United States Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, *Uniform Crime Reports*. (Washington, D.C., 1967) annual.

¹⁸ Comité canadien de la réforme pénale et correctionnelle, *Rapport* (Ottawa, 1969).

¹⁹ France, Ministère de la Justice, *Compte général* (Paris), annual.

²⁰ United States President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice Task Force, *Report: Crime and its Impact—an Assessment* (Washington, D.C., 1967), p. 39.

5,500; 11,523).²⁸ In Belgium, the proportion of juveniles aged 8-18 brought to the attention of the public procurator rose from 15 per 1,000 in 1952 to 28 in 1962, owing partly to changes in law and procedure; but the proportion brought before a court remained around 2 per 1,000 (SOA/SD/CS.4). In Japan, the number of persons under 20 dealt with by the police rose from 1 million in 1955 to 2.4 million in 1965 (70 per 1,000 under 20) of whom more than half were "pre-delinquents" and traffic offenders.²⁹

Similarly, in some developing countries there has been a marked increase in law-breaking among the young. In Hong Kong, about half the persons convicted of serious and of violent crimes are under 25.³⁰ In Zambia, the number of persons aged 12-16 convicted rose from 300 around 1952 to 1,100 in 1962 (SOA/SD/CS.3). In Malaysia, juvenile delinquency, previously unknown, has increased since the war to reach about 2,000 convictions a year (about 2.5 per 1,000 boys aged 7-16);³¹ and in China (Taiwan) arrests rose to 5 per 1,000 of those under 21.³² In the Republic of Korea, the number of offenders under 20 years of age arrested by the police rose from 25,000 in 1959 to 125,000 in 1964.³³

On the other hand, there are other countries in which young offenders are responsible for only a small fraction of all law-breaking offences. For example, in Malaysia only 17 out of every 1000 persons convicted are below 18.³⁴ In India, one cognizable case in forty is of a juvenile. In the Philippines, only 40-70 per 1000 arrested are below 16.³⁵ In Yugoslavia, only 23-32 per 1000 convicted have been minors (SOA/SD/CS.5). In Tunisia, for serious crime, one urban prosecution in thirty and one rural prosecution in four have involved minors (1962).³⁶

Capital punishment

There is a marked trend in most countries towards the abolition of capital punishment, or at least towards fewer executions. Available data indicate that a growing number of offenders who are sentenced to death are spared through judicial processes or by executive clemency.³⁷ There is also a steady movement towards legal abolition of the death penalty. In countries which still carry the death penalty in their statutes, capital punishment is increasingly becoming a discretionary rather than a mandatory sanction.³⁸ In recent years, capital punishment has been abolished in several countries as the pen-

²⁸ France, Ministère de la Justice, op. cit.

²⁹ A. A. G. Peters, *Comparative Survey of Juvenile Delinquency in Asia and the Far East* (Tokyo, United Nations Asia and Far East Institute for the Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders (UNAFEI), 1968).

³⁰ *Ibid.*

³¹ A. A. G. Peters, *Comparative Survey of Juvenile Delinquency in Asia and the Far East*, op. cit.

³² *Ibid.*

³³ *Ibid.*

³⁴ *Ibid.*

³⁵ *Ibid.*

³⁶ Abdelwahab Bouhdiba, *Criminalité et changements sociaux en Tunisie*.

³⁷ Statistical data on factual information is contained in the report, *Capital Punishment* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 69.IV.15).

³⁸ *Ibid.*

alty for various crimes. Several countries, however, have adopted the death penalty for offences not previously punishable by death. An interesting trend is that the death penalty has been removed from some offences like homicide, to which it was traditionally applied. In some instances the death penalty has been adopted for economic and political crimes that involve a threat to social order or governmental stability.

A growing number of countries also have provisions for the exclusion of certain offenders from capital punishment because of their mental and physical condition, their age or other extenuating circumstances. The scope of the categories of offenders exempted is also broadening significantly, although the inclusion of the feeble-minded and the concept of diminished responsibility may raise practical problems in view of the difficulties involved in ascertaining the extent of the offender's mental disturbance and in relating it to the criminal act. There is generally no restriction on the use of the death penalty on account of the offender's sex, apart from the postponement of execution in the case of a pregnant woman. However, in most countries the number of women sentenced to death constitutes but a very small proportion of the total number of death sentences.³⁹ There seems to be general agreement that juvenile offenders should be excluded by statute from the death penalty. The laws of many countries recognize an age-period in which a young person, though criminally responsible, may not be subjected to a sentence of death, although he may be eligible for imprisonment.

The disparity between the legal provisions for capital punishment and their actual application has been increasing in those countries which still have capital punishment in their laws. The trend towards exclusion of broader categories of offenders and offences from capital punishment raises the problem of inequality in the administration of justice. Emphasis on certain legal and judicial safeguards has sought to reduce this danger and to safeguard basic human rights. This includes the right of appeal to a superior and independent judicial tribunal in respect of the sentence as well as the conviction, the right to petition for pardon or reprieve, the right to qualified counsel at all stages of the proceedings, and a minimum (and possibly maximum) time lapse between the sentence and its execution. Capital punishment is thus increasingly becoming an "exceptional" rather than a routine sanction, which should be justified legislatively, judicially and by the executive and used as sparingly as social circumstances permit, so that the provisions of article 3 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights may be implemented.

There is also an increasing tendency, with regard to offenders who have been sentenced to capital punishment but who have been accorded another penalty, to confine them in conditions similar to those of other prisoners and to provide mechanisms for their eventual release. There is, further, an increasing recognition of the need to view the preventive application of criminal penalties in the light of new contributions of the criminal sciences

³⁹ The report entitled *Capital Punishment* notes that of the 2,052 offenders sentenced to death in the reporting countries during the period under review, only twenty-seven were women; of the 552 executions reported, there were only seven women. *Ibid.*

in this area. These relate to three main aspects: the diagnosis of the accused and convicted person, the deterrent effect of capital punishment, and the selection of those offenders who present a continuing danger.

PLANNING FOR SOCIAL DEFENCE

While increasing attention is being given to the development of human resources (through investments in health, education, higher standards of living, social services), in most of the developing countries resources do not seem to be available for any very large special and independent operation to deal with particular social problems such as that of criminality. The experience of the developed countries and of an increasing number of the developing ones has shown that unplanned and unbalanced development may have certain negative side-effects which can nullify many of its gains. These may result from imbalances resulting from the differential rates of development of various sectors and the possible implications of certain legislative and planning measures in these sectors. For instance, universal primary school education without corresponding secondary school or vocational opportunities, child labour laws etc. may have criminogenic effects which often are either not taken into account in the planning process or are recognized only after difficulties arise. Preventive measures taken in good time must anticipate such possible consequences and seek to avoid them. This requires a comprehensive, integrated approach and a unified socio-economic policy with built-in social defence elements. All sectors of activity in the social and other fields must be viewed as integral parts of such an approach, with the goal the promotion of national development. This implies that social defence considerations must be taken into account in planning economic and social programmes so as to enhance the latter's contribution to development by neutralizing or mitigating whatever ill side-effects they may have. This means also that planning for social defence must be both cross-sectoral and sectoral in nature.

Social defence considerations should be incorporated in any project, scheme, proposal or service in the different sectors that might have implications for delinquency and crime. The evaluation of the desirability and results of development projects should, as a matter of routine, include data and an assessment of the actual and potential impact of the plan on criminality. In this connexion, consideration will need to be given to particularly vulnerable areas and groups. Special attention must be accorded to the adverse effects of certain forms of rapid urbanization and industrialization, and assistance should be given to planning groups in identifying the potentially criminogenic aspects, especially those affecting children and youth. While separate sectors in plans dealing with such groups need not be provided, development plans should ensure a concerted cross-sectoral approach, bringing together planned investments and policies especially affecting children and youth, so that adequate preventive measures can be included as part of a country's socio-economic policy.

If they are to be functional, social defence policies and programmes—whether defined in law, administrative regulation or other formal provision—must reflect shifts in

social values and norms, with particular attention to aspects of social injustice that may currently be outside the immediate purview of social defence but in the long run may have considerable influence on criminality. Appropriate use should also be made of traditional forms of social control, as well as newer economic and social institutions, local community, cultural or political organizations, and non-punitive forms of law that can often be more effective than simple statutory criminal prohibition, which can be too forceful a weapon of social control for indiscriminate use.

At every phase of crime control, there is also a wide range of detailed programming options. For example, the ration of non-sentenced prisoners to total prisoners may vary from one in twelve (United Kingdom) to one in two or slightly higher (in some countries of the Middle East and Latin America), indicating that the rationalization of adjudicatory procedures or an increased outlay on adjudicatory personnel may obviate increased investment in prisons.⁴⁰ Or the ratio of offenders on probation undergoing non-institutional curtailment of freedom to prisoners condemned to institutional deprivation of freedom may vary from 4 to 1 (United Kingdom, Netherlands) to 1 to 2 (France), indicating that an increased outlay for non-institutional supervision may provide an alternative to investment in institutional treatment.⁴¹ Or, again, one out of three prisoners may be found suitable for open institutions.⁴² Moreover, advantage can be taken of other aspects of social development, by projecting educational, health, employment and welfare services into the treatment of offenders, thus mitigating the traditional correctional or penal approach.

Research

During the 1960s, the study of crime and delinquency was pursued along a number of new lines, some of which may be regarded as basic to scientific understanding of the causes and cure of law-breaking, while others are more immediately action-oriented. The approach has been to relate criminal behaviour to complex human environmental patterns rather than to simple isolatable causes. This includes an extension of behavioural studies from adolescent gangs to police forces, prison communities and other related groups in several countries. It has been an attempt to probe behind legal institutions and to study phenomena related to various offences in different cultural settings. Efforts have also been made to measure the actual prevalence of criminality from the points of view of both the perpetrator and the public authorities. This in turn has facilitated economic estimates of the role of crime in the national accounts.

While the study of law-breaking has related this kind of behaviour to the social environment, the study of the law-breaker himself has continued through both genetic and biochemical research and through psychiatric insights, including studies of the dangerous psychopath. Meanwhile, operational research applied to the strategy of social defence has also developed some additional instru-

⁴⁰ *International Review of Criminal Policy*, No. 26 (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 70.IV.1), table 2, p. 76.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*

⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 88.

ments. In an increasing number of countries, administrative data affording a measurement of police, magisterial and correctional activity are being communicated to a central statistical office—and through it to the United Nations. However, this kind of data is still unavailable or inadequate in many countries, developed as well as developing. Research has opened up new ways of converting this growing store of data into usable information. One example of this is the estimates already mentioned, which have been made of the cost of crime for the use of policy-makers. Another is the analysis of criminal policy as a system, with component subsystems such as policing, prosecution, adjudication, disposition and correction and with relation with other systems such as health or education; with inputs, outputs and feedbacks; with entries and exits; and with information flowing into, through and out of the system. Some attention has also been given to a quantitative evaluation of the extent to which specific prevention or treatment procedures produce the results for which they are intended. Programme budgeting and cost/benefit analysis of budgetary alternatives have called for yet other forms of operational research. Research has thus become an indispensable planning and management tool in the shaping and application of criminal policy. The last few years have seen some major national government studies both of social defence systems as a whole and of particular elements within those systems.

Much of this innovation in methods of studying crime and delinquency is associated with the growing participation of social science disciplines—particularly sociology, cultural anthropology, political and administrative sciences and economics—in a field originally opened up by the legal and medical professions. These innovative lines of research have therefore emerged most frequently in those countries and regions in which academic social sciences have had the most opportunity to develop, while in some other settings legal and medical approaches tend to predominate.

This broadening of approaches has been accompanied by intergovernmental sponsorship of some important newcomers in the field of the international comparative study of crime. Particular mention should be made of work published under the auspices of the Council of Europe's regional Conference of Directors of Criminological Research Institutes, the Nordic Council's subregional Scandinavian Research Council for Criminology and the United Nations Asia and Far East Institute for the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders (UNAFEI).

SOCIAL WELFARE SERVICES

The International Conference of Ministers Responsible for Social Welfare, held at United Nations Headquarters in 1968,⁴³ provided an excellent medium for assessing many of the recent trends in social welfare programmes around the world. The Conference proceedings and documents submitted by Governments (E/CONF.55/7 and Add.1 to 25), and statements by the specialized agencies (E/CONF.55/8), regional economic commissions

⁴³ *Proceedings of the International Conference of Ministers Responsible for Social Welfare* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 69.IV.4).

(E/CONF.55/9) and non-governmental organizations (E/CONF.55/10), are primary sources of information for evaluating the social welfare situation during the period under review.

Until recently, the pattern of social welfare services in developing countries was basically influenced by the practice of some industrialized countries that emphasized the rehabilitation of vulnerable individuals and groups. Social welfare measures were also meant to alleviate the sufferings of those who were left behind in the process of development. The International Conference of Ministers, however, reflecting current trends in welfare, favoured the more dynamic approach of linking welfare practices to the development process. It noted that social welfare is inseparable from society's total effort to attain the objectives of higher levels of living, social justice, freedom and a better quality of life. This trend has also been observed at some recent social welfare seminars such as that on the relationship of social work education to developmental needs and problems in the ECAFE region and at the interregional meeting of experts on the training of social welfare personnel for participation in development.⁴⁴ While recognizing that remedial measures still remained essential, it was stressed that high priority should be accorded to the developmental and preventive functions of social welfare. A strategy of over-all development should be related to a clearly enunciated policy of social development and include as an essential component those social welfare activities which help insure that national plans and policies are fully responsive to the needs and aspirations of the people. The preventive and developmental functions, the Conference emphasized, should give priority to those programmes designed to raise the level of living of large sectors of the population or stimulate self-help projects and those of a comprehensive character that encourage new patterns of participation in civic affairs. These new directions in many countries represent a major shift in social welfare policy and require a marked reorientation of existing resources, programmes and personnel.

Among the operational programmes reflecting these new trends are: those designed to increase opportunities for women to contribute more effectively towards family life and economic and social development; programmes for the growth and development of the young child and services to integrate the activities of youth into national development; family planning welfare services; self-help programmes for migrants to urban areas and the training of human resources for social welfare purposes. A common element among these various examples is the crucial role played by social welfare personnel in dealing with the human aspects of development and in facilitating attitudinal changes and community participation.

Womens's programmes

Many developing countries are focusing their attention on the education and training of women for family and

⁴⁴ Report of the Seminar on the Relationship of Social Work Education to Developmental Needs and Problems in the ECAFE Region, Bangkok, 29 January - 9 February 1968 (E/CN.11/SD/DNP/L.2), also *Report of the Meeting of Experts on the Training of Social Work Personnel for Participation in Development*, Geneva, 11-22 August 1969 (ST/SOA/97).

community life. These programmes are meant not only to improve the status of women as such but also to improve the well-being of their children. Moreover, it is realized that women with initiative and leadership qualities can exert considerable influence in opening up the community to new ideas and co-operating in community improvement projects.

Women's programmes have undergone three major stages of development. The emphasis on training and education of women in the earlier stages was placed on preparing women for the home and family. Services were focused on family counselling, child care, home improvement, parent education, nutrition and other home and family related services. The second phase was directed to women's education and training for civic and community responsibilities both in rural and urban settings. A third phase of women's programmes concerns their contribution to economic development. Traditionally, rural women worked in agriculture and carried out their responsibility for producing indigenous handicrafts by weaving and working in cottage industries. However, Governments—for example, those of Cameroon, Uganda and the United Republic of Tanzania—are increasingly strengthening women's education directed towards production purposes. Training in cottage industries, animal husbandry, trade and marketing, in co-operatives and for urban employment constitute the areas which are receiving more consideration nationally and internationally.

In a number of developing countries, ministries or departments responsible for social welfare are helping in the planning of a national programme giving particular attention to social policy and the establishment of co-ordinated machinery for the organization and administration of women's programmes. The International Conference of Ministers Responsible for Social Welfare noted that social welfare activities in these countries designed for the benefit of women range from individual self-help projects to broad social action and leadership programmes to modify those of the society's attitudes, traditions and concepts which adversely affect the status and role of women. In countries such as Ghana, Kenya and India, women social workers at the village level have helped the women of the village discuss more openly, in group meetings, family planning methods and practices. These countries, through their national rural women's programmes, train volunteers to conduct home visits and counselling in their respective communities. Citizens' committees, women's movements, parents' groups and youth groups are all indigenous potential resources whose members, if trained, could have positive direct impact on family planning programmes. In the North African countries of Tunisia, Morocco and Algeria, the *assistantes sociales*, intermediate-level social workers, are closely aligned to national women's organizations and organize programmes related to family-life education, the preparation of women for family responsibilities, spacing of children and child development.

Services for children

In many developing countries, programmes are being developed to benefit young children from 1 to 5 years, the age-group that is considered the most vulnerable and at the same time the most crucial in the context of long-

term social development. Day-care programmes with an educational content (called *balwadis*) are popular in India as part of an integrated approach to child and family welfare at the village level. Similar programmes for pre-school children are also widespread, especially in French-speaking Africa where they are conducted in close co-operation with the maternal and child health clinics or community centres (*foyers sociaux*). These programmes sometimes take the form of day-care centres to which women's education, nutrition programmes and health services are usually related. Many of these programmes benefit from UNICEF assistance or from technical assistance and advisory services provided by the United Nations in co-operation with other agencies.

Youth programmes

The problems and needs of young people are receiving increasing attention throughout the world. More than half the population of developing countries is under twenty-five years of age. The high rate of illiteracy and early school-leaving among young people, the high rates of unemployment among out-of-school youth in all developing areas and among educated youth in some countries and the streams of youth leaving rural areas for an uncertain future in the cities, are problems for which solutions are likely to be found only within the context of national plans for social and economic development. As discussed elsewhere in the report,⁴⁵ youth programmes of various kinds are attracting increasing attention, especially in developing countries. Some of these national youth service programmes not only provide pre-vocational or vocational training but also offer opportunities to contribute to development through public works, for example in Kenya. Other types of programmes are being carried out in rural areas in some countries. In some countries, the Minister of Social Welfare is responsible for initiating youth programmes and for establishing multipurpose counselling centres for youth. They also co-operate with voluntary youth organizations, which are focusing increasing attention on the basic needs of underprivileged youth, shifting where necessary from their previous emphasis on leisure-time activities.

Increasingly, students are becoming involved in social and economic development. Service groups have been formed at colleges and universities, for example in Thailand, and national volunteer schemes have been organized in Canada, Indonesia, Iran, Jamaica and the United States to spearhead campaigns in literacy, health education, community development and pollution control, child welfare, education on drug addiction and work with the aged, handicapped and mentally ill. In many countries, both local and national student programmes are eligible for government subsidies in such areas as agricultural production and land settlement schemes.

The International Conference of Ministers of Social Welfare pointed out that social welfare services might significantly assist in meeting the needs of youth for counselling and vocational guidance. They might also provide opportunities for constructive leisure-time activi-

⁴⁵ *Proceedings of the International Conference of Ministers Responsible for Social Welfare* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 69.IV.4).

ties, pre-vocational training, low-cost accommodations for young workers and, in general, for assistance in making the transition from youthful patterns of behaviour to adult roles.

The success of both governmental and non-governmental programmes depends to a large extent on the availability of qualified youth leaders, both professional and voluntary. To this end, in addition to training at universities and schools of social work, more national training centres are being organized, more itinerant training teams are being established, and more short-term courses are being offered towards training for action in social and economic development.

Family planning and social welfare

Rapid population growth is being viewed as a serious threat to achieving development objectives in a number of developing countries. The success of such development programmes will depend on the decision of millions of parents to limit effectively the size of their families, which often requires changes in traditional attitudes. Parents living in rural areas do not feel the same pressure to reduce the size of the family. It is often generally believed in traditional societies that large numbers of children are an asset to a family and will ensure security for ageing parents. Consequently, it is not readily evident to the masses of rural parents that their lot is likely to be significantly improved by restricting the number of their children.

Recent trends in family planning programmes have been to rely on intensive motivational work. This is achieved partially through mass media designed to give wide interpretation to the programme and to break down traditional cultural and psychological barriers. Motivational work also has to be carried out at the village or neighbourhood levels through individual and group contacts with the parents concerned. It is at this level that social welfare services are often considered an integral service of any family planning programme. Family and child welfare services have been extended through various clubs and centres in a growing number of developing countries, including Colombia, Jamaica, India, Pakistan, Tunisia and the United Arab Republic.

In countries that have adopted family planning policies, social welfare personnel are involved in the educational process for family planning, either as part of a comprehensive family planning programme or as staff for family welfare programmes. Family planning programmes, organized as interdisciplinary services, are also providing services allowing social welfare personnel to work closely with those from the field of health, home economics, adult education etc. In a few countries, social welfare policy-makers have been involved in the areas of research, experimentation and evaluation in family planning programmes. In the United Arab Republic, for example, the Ministry of Social Affairs employs in its social welfare centres a large number of social workers trained in the educational and motivational aspects of the family planning programme. A recent evaluation of the family planning programme in Pakistan noted that the provision of extension services offering a multiple approach to family planning by relating it to such services as health,

maternal and child welfare and vocational guidance has proved to be an effective channel of adult education and a means of promoting social change (ST/SOA/SER.R/9).

Social welfare in urban areas

Social welfare personnel, together with community development workers, play a major role in urban programmes, especially in Latin America and parts of Asia, notably India, Pakistan and Singapore. Their activities demonstrate that within a sound comprehensive policy, the social welfare approach can be useful for involving citizens in programmes designed to improve local conditions. These programmes are usually related to self-help housing and community welfare projects for improving the physical and social environment. They can be applied either to the gradual improvement of slums and shantytowns, or to new urban developments for the benefit of low-income families. People learn to work together, with some technical guidance, to build their own houses in their spare time and to co-operate in community projects for building schools, health clinics and community centres, thereby earning a measure of self-reliance, acquiring new skills and becoming active participants in community uplift. In the process, they are exposed to basic knowledge regarding home management, hygiene, nutrition, child education, etc. As a result, they are better able independently to organize informal labour exchanges, day-care arrangements, savings and credit unions and consumers' co-operatives. Neighbourhood-centred programmes, moreover, are useful in helping rural migrants adjust to conditions of urban life, reduce the incidence of antisocial behaviour such as delinquency, alcoholism and drug addiction, and provide assistance to such vulnerable groups as youth, the handicapped and the aged. Social welfare personnel involved in these services are carrying out developmental social welfare services which are closely allied to community development services.

Trends in the training of social welfare personnel

In keeping with the changing approach to social welfare described earlier, there has been a marked change in the training of social welfare personnel for the tasks of national development.⁴⁶ Such an approach has naturally affected the scope and content of the training of social welfare personnel. There has been a shift of emphasis from the methods of traditional social work. The trend is now toward an understanding of changes taking place in the social system and its institutions at all levels; the development of appropriate strategies of intervention involving social policy measures and the evaluation and implementation of policies that will promote the development of the widest possible population groups, while at the same time not ignoring the needs of individuals and families. Attention is also being given to the development of new content areas to deal with the problems of family planning, the welfare of women, youth and minority groups. These, as has been noted, have been identified

⁴⁶ See *Training for Social Welfare: Fifth International Survey: New Approaches in Meeting Manpower Needs* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 71.IV.5).

crucial areas which contribute in a fundamental way to national development.

Another important trend in training programmes for social welfare workers is the stress being given to the use of indigenous teaching resources and indigenous workers to meet local problems. The development of rural training institutions in India is an example of this trend. Where most people live in rural areas the tendency now is to promote training institutions in appropriate rural settings rather than in urban centres. As noted by the International Conference of Ministers, there is a need for regional training and research centres in Asia, Africa and Latin America. These training centres are to encourage the practice of finding indigenous solutions to local problems through the use of available resources and personnel. However, the regional centres may also be in a position to identify what is relevant in the experience of other regions and cultures for adaptation to local needs.

The trend towards emphasizing the developmental aspect of social welfare has necessitated the projection of manpower requirements for social welfare as part of national development plans. In the countries of Latin America and Asia, in particular, there has been a growing recognition of the need for formulating manpower policies for social welfare even though these countries have not been able to implement such policies due to lack of resources.

REGIONAL AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT

In developing countries in Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Middle East, community development has become an important strategy for development in the rural areas, and increasingly in the cities. Within the past several years, there has been a basic review of community development to strengthen its effectiveness as an instrument for both local and national development. Reflecting the conclusions derived from this review, and borrowing from experience in development planning in general, efforts have been made to modify certain aspects of community development theory and practice. Among these changes, the most important bear on the concept of "felt needs" and local planning, a reordering of the relationship between social and economic development, training and the definition of a new spatial dimension in which to centre community development programmes. In a number of areas, changes were already under way and the new findings serve to confirm the validity of the new trends.

A lack of progress in local development has caused community development to place greater emphasis on planning.⁴⁷ Attention is being given to identifying the "real" as against "felt needs" of the community. In planning for community needs, community development has to be mindful of matching resources to projects. It should also assist in co-ordinating sectoral programmes to promote the delivery of services on an integrated basis. Consistent with the need to harness community development to the national effort, local planning has to be undertaken within the national framework.⁴⁸ It is important,

therefore, that local crop production be considered not only in terms of local preferences but also in terms of its potential impact on increasing food exports or reducing imports.

The effort to gear community needs and preferences to over-all national development has had other implications for community development practice. Heretofore, considerable stress has been given to emphasizing social improvement. As a result, there was often an imbalance between social and economic development that worked to the detriment of both. Social development, although an indispensable ingredient of economic development, cannot progress unless founded on an economic basis strong enough to sustain it. In recognition of this, community development is today attempting to balance social with economic needs at the local level, a complex task that requires careful planning.

The community and regional approach to development

Under traditional community development practice, the village was viewed as the focal point of development. In line with this premise, the village was conceived as a harmonious unit distinguished by the absence of class, caste or ethnic differences. Available community development experience indicates that the village lacks the size, resources and human skills to serve as a focal point for rural development. The view that the village tended toward consensus also has not been supported by sociological findings about village life, which reveal widespread and persistent factionalism along class, caste and ethnic lines.

The strategy implications growing out of this revised interpretation of the nature of village society are significant. Since dissensus rather than consensus characterizes much of village life, it would no longer be considered inappropriate for community development practitioners to work with socially or economically disadvantaged groups by supporting their claims through a strategy of political action. Such an approach could, for example, yield results in the sphere of land reform, a legitimate area of concern for community development. In many developing countries, land reform legislation has been enacted, but its full implementation has been blocked by powerful vested interests. Community development could help overcome this opposition by encouraging the formation of peasant leagues—as has been done in a number of Latin American countries—which would bring pressure to bear on local and provincial authorities to implement existing laws.

The unsuitability of the village to serve as the fulcrum of rural development has prompted a search for a new approach to rural development. The current effort to place more economic content in community development, an implicit recognition of the inadequate economic results achieved to date, is part of an effort to strengthen community development's role in the development process. With the village unable to serve as a basis for rural development, community development strategists are turning to a regional or zonal approach. A regional approach, it is increasingly realized, provides a more viable geographical configuration in which to mount programmes for rural development. Policy-makers need

⁴⁷ *Community Development and National Development* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 64.IV.2).

⁴⁸ *Local Participation in Development Planning* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 68.IV.2).

not be bound by fixed administrative or political boundaries but could organize programmes in discrete areas that lend themselves to regional development schemes. The region has been demonstrated to be a suitable setting in which to introduce a balance between agriculture, the traditional basis of rural life, and industry, the mainstay of urban development. It encompasses within its scope urban as well as rural areas.

The concept of a region takes on different forms and includes river valleys, areas endowed with natural resources, areas that are in close proximity to established growth centres and economically backward regions which the Government, for political, social or other reasons, wishes to uplift. The regional or, in some cases, zonal approach to development is being followed in a growing number of nations including: Burundi, Ceylon, Chile, Colombia, Ethiopia, Ghana, Israel, Jamaica, Japan, Mexico, Peru, Syria and the United Arab Republic. Not uncommonly, national planning in these countries is an integral part of national planning. The Yallahs Valley Land Authority and the Christiana Area Land Authority in Jamaica served as a useful experiment in regional development, and the experiences gained from them have led the Government to establish eleven additional regional land authority schemes.⁴⁹ In Israel, the Lakhish area has become the focal point of regional development with the building of the new town of Kiryat Gat as a centre for industrial growth, along with the establishment of a hierarchical pattern of rural centres for social services and light industry.⁵⁰ The Chubu Project in Japan has adopted a systematic approach to the development of the central region of the country, which covers about 16 per cent of the total area of Japan, contains nearly 17 per cent of its population and accounts for a little over one fifth of the nation's total industrial production. In Syria, the Ghab Project is designed to include numerous diversified programmes including irrigation, land reclamation and land reform, resettlement and the development of social and economic institutions to serve the population (ST/SOA/101).

The zonal approach to rural and community development is evident in Peru and Mexico. In the former country, the Cooperación Popular programme has succeeded in promoting a concerted programme of development in selected zones in the Andes. This has been possible through a new structure at the central level through which funds are allocated for rural development projects based on annual plans for each of the zones. Zonal committees are responsible for the planning and programming of the projects, while implementation is carried out through local committees organized on an *ad hoc* basis for specific projects. These projects include road construction, school extensions, improved storage for communities, irrigation facilities and similar infrastructure improvements. The zonal approach to community development also has been carried out in the Plan Lerma region of Mexico.

The rapid growth of cities in developing countries has led to the extension of community development techniques and programmes in urban areas. Among the cities with such programmes are Addis Ababa, Cali, Dacca, Delhi, Guayaquil, Lusaka, Manila, Montevideo and Ryadh.⁵¹ In North America, where there is a long tradition of urban community organization, many cities, including New York, Philadelphia, Boston, Chicago, Seattle and Montreal and Quebec have programmes using traditional community development techniques of self-help and community action. In North America and in western Europe, community development has been employed mainly in depressed neighbourhoods and slum areas. In the United States, the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 and a model cities programme have given new impetus to popular involvement in the planning and implementation of urban and neighbourhood programmes, a number of which employ community development techniques.

Despite the extension of community development to general development, its application in terms of numbers of cities covered and the total allocation of resources has been limited. By and large, community development has remained a rural-bound movement. Within the rural agricultural matrix, community development programmes and techniques—allowing for regional and national variants—have evolved to their present stage.

Given these factors, it has proven necessary to adapt traditional community development methods to urban conditions. There is, therefore, a compelling need to examine community development methods and programmes for the purpose of determining their suitability within an urban environment. The impersonal nature of urban life, the bureaucratization of public services and the absence of an economic base around which community development could provide employment and training programmes—similar to the role played by agriculture in the rural areas—open to question some of the premises upon which traditional community development techniques and programmes are based. Moreover, the organized distribution of social services through established channels and the complex nature of urban life limit the scope of self-help and mutual aid programmes, the significant characteristics of rural community development.

Generally, community development strategists have tended to stress an ameliorative approach to urban problems, an emphasis on social objectives and the improvement of environmental conditions. In a number of cities, such as Ryadh, Singapore and Guayaquil, community centres have been built to serve as the focal point of community activities. There is some evidence that the centre has not always attracted the numbers and types of persons that proponents of this facility had hoped for.

A potentially important area for community development is in self-help or modified self-help housing. Here community development could help ease the critical urban housing shortage. Self-help housing is a logical extension of the concept of community improvement, by

⁴⁹ Government of Jamaica, *Economic Survey, Jamaica, 1969* (Kingston, Central Planning Unit), pp. 52 and 53.

⁵⁰ *Regional Co-operation in Israel*, Settlement Study Centre, No. 1 (Rehovoth, National and University Institute of Agriculture).

⁵¹ *Community Development in Urban Areas* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 61.IV.6).

which residents of a neighbourhood assist in maintaining a clean and attractive environment. Self-help housing projects have been successfully undertaken in Chile, Ghana, Guatemala and Trinidad and Tobago. In Ghana the core-housing approach has been used. Under this approach, a family moves into the core, usually one room, and expands it as time and funds allow. Self-help housing can be successful when community groups are committed to the purpose of the programme and when enough of their members possess the requisite skills and capacity for leadership. Municipal government, moreover, has to work in close co-operation with community development workers. Government can designate suitable sites for construction, resolve tenure problems, conclude agreements with the community on a division of responsibility for the installation and maintenance of public services and utilities, and provide credit and technical assistance. The commitment of the Government to act in urban community development was explicitly recognized in Pakistan's first five-year plan.

The need for government support to provide a solid basis for citizen initiatives invites consideration of a somewhat different strategy for urban community development. Attention should be given to mobilizing community groups to seek greater aid from government. Where municipal government has not been sufficiently responsive to community and neighbourhood needs, community action programmes could be undertaken to bring pressure to bear on government agencies and elected officials to allocate greater resources for community improvements. Where for example, unfavourable tenurial conditions discourage self-help housing projects, a community action strategy might seek to eliminate this condition by petitioning government officials or by other measures consistent with local processes.

Training

A major focus of community development activity is the training and utilization of human resources for development. Training for community development is gener-

ally carried out in different types of centres, usually established under the relevant government ministry at the national, district or local level. In India there is a vast network of training institutions throughout the country designed to service community development and the *panchayats*. They operate under the umbrella of the National Institute of Community Development located at Hyderabad. Some provide training for government officials and others are devoted to training village leaders in community development methods. The Rural Institute in Rapte, Nepal, under the Ministry of Panchayat and Home Affairs, offers in-service training courses to government officials, while the Institute for Political Cadres Training in Thapa, provides leadership training to village leaders. Training courses are often geared to special groups, such as the Women's Training Institute in Kathmandu, or the Social Development Women Training Centre, Iperu, Nigeria.

In line with the objective of giving community development greater professional status, an effort is being made to upgrade the content of community development training. Training in many countries is often scheduled at irregular intervals, is weak in academic content, and is generally inadequate for the requirements of development. In Latin America, only Chile and Venezuela have taken steps to create training institutions which include action research and regularly scheduled intensive training programmes at a high level. Not uncommonly, there is no recognized training centre for community development, and government training courses are dispersed among different ministries, each competing for limited funds.

Community development itself is largely responsible for this state of affairs, as it originally focused its attention on turning out a multipurpose village-level worker. In organizing a training programme to suit the needs of the generalist, the curriculum was eclectic and tended to become diffuse. By and large, there is a trend away from the all-purpose village-level worker. In Latin America, government agencies tend to use interdisciplinary teams of professionals or technicians in applying community development techniques for rural development.

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