



## 安全理事会

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2022 年 5 月 24 日第 1973(2011)号决议所设利比亚问题专家小组给安全理事会主席的信

安全理事会第 1973(2011)号决议所设利比亚问题专家小组谨依照第 2571(2021)号决议第 13 段随函转递专家小组工作的最后报告。

所附报告于 2022 年 5 月 4 日提交给安全理事会关于利比亚的第 1970(2011)号决议所设委员会，委员会于 5 月 20 日审议了报告。

请提请安全理事会成员注意本信和所附报告并将其作为安理会文件分发给荷。

第 1973(2011)号决议所设  
利比亚问题专家小组

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## 第 1973(2011)号决议所设利比亚问题专家小组的最后报告

## 摘要

利比亚政治对话论坛 2020 年 11 月通过的路线图阐明了 2021 年 12 月 24 日总统和议会选举的前景，由此产生了一种新的动力，影响到制裁制度方方面面。

事实证明，武装团体对于选举的立场与其对自身利益的风险-收益评估有着内在的联系。围绕利比亚政治对话论坛计划进程的不确定性加剧了由来已久的断层线，同时对立派系候选人则加倍努力，争取当地部队的支持。因此，利比亚大部分领土仍然处于利比亚各武装团体控制之下。在整个选举筹备期间，一系列因素汇合到了一起，导致 2021 年 12 月 22 日最高国家选举委员会发表声明指出，不可抗力原因导致其无法在 2021 年 12 月 24 日组织选举。2022 年 2 月 20 日，国民代表大会指定法特希·巴沙加组建新政府。在编写本报告时，民族统一政府领导人拒绝随后组建新政府，并继续掌权。武装团体联盟仍然不稳定，因为围绕政治前进方向的不确定性导致很容易受各种幕后交易所左右。

被指认的恐怖主义团体仍然在利比亚境内活动，而且常常很活跃，尽管它们在全国各地多次遭到反恐行动的打击。乍得、苏丹和叙利亚战斗人员以及私营军事公司继续在利比亚境内存在，仍然对该国和该区域的安全构成严重威胁，因为政治僵局导致 5+5 联合军事委员会在促成外国战斗人员撤离方面进展受阻。

尽管在本报告所述期间，活跃的军事敌对行动明显减少，但严重违反国际人道法和国际人权法的行为依然大规模存在，而且不受惩罚。专家小组尤其发现，7 个利比亚武装团体有系统地使用任意、非法的拘留，作为对被视作抗拒其权力的人的惩罚措施，并作为一种有效方法，展示其权力和不受利比亚司法和政府机构约束的自主，从而严重损害了那些机构。他们一贯无视适用的国际法和国内法，侵犯生命权、自由权和人身安全权、公平审判权，违反禁止酷刑和其他残忍、不人道和有辱人格待遇的规则。非但如此，被拘留者被直接关押，没有受到法律保护，完全凭拘留当局的任意处置，关押条件严重影响到其生命和健康。移民的人权极易受到侵犯，常常遭受奴役、强奸和酷刑。

军火禁运仍然起不到作用，一些会员国继续肆无忌惮地违反禁运。这些会员国持续控制供应链，从而严重阻碍侦测、中断或拦截行动。尽管查明的违规事件数目远少于 2019 年和 2020 年期间，而且空运飞行次数也大幅减少，但专家小组评估认为，军火库存仍然很庞大，足以维持未来任何冲突。专家小组更新了非法运到利比亚的军火类型基线数据，这将有助于查明今后的违规行为，但也表明过去几年对军火禁运的完全无视。智能电子快速移动消费品(如光学仪器和无人驾驶飞行器)技术不断发展，费用也相对低廉，而且民用全地形车易于改装成具有作战能力的车辆，使它们成为低级别冲突中军事用途的理想选择。利比亚的大多数武装团体正在利用这一点。

在海事问题上，专家小组确定，有些船只悬挂赞比亚国旗进行国际航行是非法的，因为赞比亚目前没有国际开放船舶登记册，也没有对注册国际船舶。隶属于民族统一政府的稳定支持机构已成为一个新的海上行为体，使用武装民用和海军类型的船只拦截和遣返试图离开利比亚的移民。民用船只运交后将武器安装在船上，这种做法常常被用来逃避军火禁运。哈夫塔尔附属部队的一个海上单位在自行宣布的海域内任意扣押商船。该单位要求支付非法罚款作为释放的条件，并在一起案件中盗窃了船员的个人财产。专家小组将此定性为海盗行为。

利比亚中央银行的一名外部顾问确定了统一中央银行的技术要求，但实施进展仍然缓慢。

公共石油部门已成为国家石油公司领导层与石油和天然气部之间权力斗争的中心，这表现为，该公司董事长停职失败，以及双方就该公司日常业务管理不当互相公开指责。一个令人担忧的事态发展是，该公司及其附属实体的管理层成员因被控不当行政行为而被拘留。在本报告所述期间，武装团体之间还发生冲突，使石油设施受到破坏，也导致以勒索方式不让使用石油基础设施。

本报告所述期间发生了一起事件，据称有人企图从利比亚非法出口原油。石油产品的海上走私没有回复到以前的水平，而通过陆地边界的走私则持续存在，境内流转问题更加突出。

资产冻结措施继续构成与以往强制令相同的挑战，反映各会员国没有一致执行。一些司法管辖区对第 1970(2011)号决议第 19 段关于被冻结资产的积极管理仍存在不同解读。专家小组仍然认为，根据第 19 段的规定，这种管理是不允许的。

被指认的实体需要提高其在实际和法定所有权、有效控制及其下属机构活动方面的透明度。监测工作仍然是必要的。

被指认人员在本报告所述期间根据一项长期豁免政策进行旅行。安全理事会第 2571(2021)号决议第 13 段所设委员会为实施这些豁免而发布的准则没有得到所有有关会员国的遵守。

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\* 仅以来件所用语文分发，未经正式编辑。

## 一. 背景

### A. 导言

1. 本报告根据第 2571(2021)号决议第 13 段提交安全理事会委员会，所述期间为 2021 年 3 月 8 日专家小组提交上一次报告(S/2021/229<sup>1</sup>)到 2022 年 4 月 25 日。<sup>2</sup> 其中载列该报告所详述正在进行的各项调查的最新情况。关于利比亚制裁制度演变情况的概述见本报告附件 1。<sup>3</sup>
2. 专家小组在进行调查时，遵循了安全理事会制裁的一般性问题非正式工作组建议的最佳做法和方法(见 S/2006/997)。尽管因冠状病毒病(COVID-19)大流行，前往利比亚和其他目的地的旅行依然受限，但专家小组仍保持了可达到的最高证据标准。
3. 专家小组以确凿证据为依据开展工作，并遵守了关于答辩机会的标准。<sup>4</sup> 专家小组在调查中保持了透明度、客观性、公正性和独立性。

### B. 与利益攸关方和机构的合作

4. 所访问或所咨询的会员国、组织和个人名单见附件 4。专家小组的通信记录见附件 5。专家小组还通过商业电子平台与委员会、会员国和其他对话者，包括其他专家小组保持联系。
5. 专家小组得益于与联合国利比亚支助团(联利支助团)的定期交流。欧洲联盟地中海军事行动(伊里妮行动)也向专家小组提供了支持，特别是协助专家小组调查违反军火禁运的情况和非法进出口石油产品的情况。
6. 专家小组于 2021 年 9 月中旬前往利比亚一次。2021 年 10 月至 2022 年 2 月期间，由于联利支助团后勤方面困难，专家小组提出的为其访问提供支持的请求未能得到满足。专家小组前往利比亚的签证于 2022 年 1 月底到期，其后利比亚未续签签证。因此，专家小组 2022 年 3 月访问利比亚的计划无法实现。专家小组前往利比亚，对于其执行任务仍然至关重要，会员国和联合国相关机构对此应给予优先考虑。

<sup>1</sup> 所有提及 S/2021/229 的内容也应被理解为包含 S/2021/229/Corr.1 和 S/2021/229/Corr.2。

<sup>2</sup> 所有超链接均访问于 2022 年 4 月 8 日。

<sup>3</sup> 附件仅以来件所用语文分发，未经正式编辑。由于对监测机制的报告有字数限制，专家小组在本报告附件中就若干调查工作提供了进一步细节。缩写和简称表见附件 2。

<sup>4</sup> 关于方法和答辩机会的进一步信息见附件 3。

7. 专家小组于 2021 年 9 月 21 日访问了班加西，并会晤了利比亚国民军的对话者。这是专家小组 2015 年 7 月访问图卜鲁格以来首次访问利比亚东部并与哈夫塔尔附属部队进行了首次直接接触。<sup>5、6</sup>

## 二. 威胁利比亚和平、稳定或安全或阻碍或破坏利比亚顺利完成政治过渡的行为

### A. 利比亚武装团体动态

8. [S/2021/229](#) 中所述武装团体控制利比亚安全部门的情况继续存在。<sup>7</sup> 虽然许多西部武装团体持有官方授权，能够获得政府资金(见附件 6)、而且名义上对国家机构负责，但这些团体仍然在没有实际监督的情况下活动。

9. 5+5 联合军事委员会<sup>8</sup> 于 2021 年 8 月 14 日致函总理委员会和政府总理(见附件 7)，建议对一些安全和军事机构的等级结构进行审查，其后引发的强烈反对即是上述情况的一个局部事例。稳定支持机构和利比亚武装部队参谋长<sup>9</sup> 立即作出了反应，指责该委员会越权(见附件 8)。专家小组在的黎波里会晤的一名外交代表认为，该委员会的提议是哈利法·哈夫塔尔针对利比亚西部机构的一种攻击。在另一个全然不同的方面，东部的一名军官兼联合军事委员会<sup>10</sup> 成员向专家小组解释说，这封有争议的信函意在支持那些不满武装团体过激行为的西部军方同僚。

10. 然而，在 2021 年 2 月民族统一政府组建后，利比亚大部分地区经历了一段相对平静的时期，各行为体采取“待命状态”，等待新执行团队确定政策方向。在选举之前以及在错过 12 月 24 日选举日期之后，主要武装团体保持了谨慎态度。<sup>11</sup>

#### 1. 西部局势

11. 纳瓦西旅领导人穆斯塔法·卡杜尔在被问及他对计划中的选举进程的立场说，<sup>12</sup> 他的态度将取决于临时政府履行承诺的能力。如果民族统一政府能够为曾经拿起武器推翻卡扎菲政权并击退 2019 年 4 月 4 日哈夫塔尔附属部队进攻的

<sup>5</sup> 其中包括以前被称为哈利法·哈夫塔尔的利比亚国民军的武装团体(现已改名为阿拉伯利比亚武装部队)，以及国内和外国武装团体。专家小组用“哈夫塔尔附属部队”这一称呼来涵盖所有附属哈夫塔尔的武装团体。小写字母用于泛指自称诸如“旅(Brigade)”或“营(Battalion)”的武装团体，以识别相关团体，同时不为其提供作为政府建制军事单位的合法性。同样，在提及利比亚东部当局时，如果适当，也使用小写字母。

<sup>6</sup> 见 [S/2016/209](#)，第 11 段。

<sup>7</sup> 第 8 段和附件 6。

<sup>8</sup> 5+5 联合军事委员会由民族统一政府任命的 5 名高级军官和哈利法·哈夫塔尔挑选的 5 名其他军官组成。

<sup>9</sup> 2021 年 1 月 11 日由总理委员会设立；又称安全与稳定机构或稳定支持事务处。

<sup>10</sup> 专家小组会议(2021 年 9 月 21 日)。

<sup>11</sup> 见关于稳定支持机构的第 14 段和关于阻碍或破坏利比亚政治过渡的行为的第 32 段。

<sup>12</sup> 专家小组会议(2021 年 4 月 7 日)。

黎波里平民提供其盼望已久的服务和就业机会，那么，按照卡杜尔 2021 年 4 月表达的观点，民族团结政府就能够合法地维持权力。事实上，在民族统一政府执政期间，纳瓦西旅保持了对的黎波里港口和情报总局的控制。2022 年 3 月，穆斯塔法·卡杜尔的兄弟哈菲兹·卡杜尔被任命为法特希·巴沙加组建的国家稳定政府的外交部长，<sup>13</sup> 这也反映了纳瓦西的影响力。

12. 特别威慑部队的代表表示希望民族统一政府的成立有助于在反恐问题上与东部当局加强合作。<sup>14</sup> 与大多数主要西部团体一样，该部队至少在公开场合与选前政治争议保持距离。

13. 从 2021 年 6 月开始，零星、少量的暴力事件<sup>15</sup> 在西海岸、<sup>16</sup> 的黎波里<sup>17</sup> 和班尼瓦利德周围<sup>18</sup> 演变为严重的对峙。它们经常涉及稳定支持机构。

14. 稳定支持机构负责人 Abdel Ghani Khalifa<sup>19</sup> 向专家小组<sup>20</sup> 确认了该机构的扩大政策，<sup>21</sup> 并强调了其执法授权。该机构是的黎波里、瓦尔沙法纳和扎维耶武装团体的一个联盟，近几个月，该组织的曝光度和影响力显著提高。<sup>22</sup> 候任总理法

<sup>13</sup> 主管政治与建设和平事务副秘书长在 2022 年 3 月 16 日向安全理事会通报情况时提到了利比亚局势，措辞如下：

2022 年 2 月 10 日，国民代表大会在 52 名国家最高委员会[利比亚]成员的赞同下……。指定由法特希·巴沙加先生……组建新政府……然而，2 月 24 日，国家最高委员会表示反对组建新政府。尽管如此，3 月 3 日，巴沙加先生内阁成员在国民代表大会宣誓就职……民族统一政府领导层拒绝接受投票的合法性……与此同时，巴沙加坚称，他所领导的是合法政府(见 S/PV.8996)。

秘书长注意到该国东部国民代表大会投票任命新总理(见 2022 年 2 月 11 日秘书长发言人关于利比亚问题的声明，可查阅 [www.un.org/sg/en/node/261853](http://www.un.org/sg/en/node/261853))。就本报告而言，专家小组称巴沙尔先生为候任总理，称其政府为国家稳定政府。同样，专家小组称德贝巴先生为民族统一政府现任总理，但不影响任何结果。

<sup>14</sup> 专家小组会议(2021 年 4 月 8 日)。

<sup>15</sup> 总部设在的黎波里的一个安全机构负责人向专家小组证实了 2021 年 5 月 8 日据报告在总理委员会会议地点之一的科林西亚酒店出现的紧张状态，一些武装团体领导人则在侯赛因·艾卜被任命为利比亚情报局负责人后表达了不满(参阅 <https://apnews.com/article/tripoli-europe-africa-libya-middle-east-afec7cef514a21d4f58b02c0b25ba681>，2021 年 5 月 8 日)。

<sup>16</sup> 参阅 <https://twitter.com/ObservatoryLY/status/1403842243014844418/photo/1>，2021 年 6 月 12 日。

<sup>17</sup> 参阅 <http://alwasat.ly/news/libya/331536>，2021 年 9 月 3 日。

<sup>18</sup> 参阅 <https://libyaalhadath.net/?p=41055>，2021 年 7 月 19 日。

<sup>19</sup> 也称 al-Kikli 或 Ghenewa。

<sup>20</sup> 专家小组会议(2021 年 9 月 17 日)。

<sup>21</sup> 2020 年，稳定支持机构在米苏拉塔开设了一个办事处，并在 Jabal al-Akhdar 区的贝达开设了另一个办事处。贝达办事处有 35 名成员和一个名为 Akram Aljarari 的指挥官，此人属于 Bara'sah 部落的成员，是从内政部调来的一名中尉。该机构正在考虑向南部以及在拜尼沃利德进行扩大，但据该机构负责人认为这较为“复杂”。目前正在图卜鲁格和迈尔季与各方代表谈判在当地开设办事处事宜。

<sup>22</sup> 它最近推出了一个官方网站，展示了它的活动：<https://ssa.gov.ly>，2022 年 4 月 5 日。

特希·巴沙加<sup>23</sup> 和现任总理阿卜杜勒哈密德·德贝巴<sup>24</sup> 为争取该机构的支持所作的努力凸显了该机构自 2021 年 1 月 11 日由总理委员会设立以来所具有的重要性。2021 年 12 月，据报总理委员会不得不推迟任命的黎波里军区新指挥官<sup>25</sup> 以取代阿卜杜勒·加尼·哈利法亲密盟友阿卜杜勒·巴塞特·马尔万的决定。<sup>26</sup>

15. 反对稳定支持机构的人，如 Mohammed Bahrin (别名 Al Far)<sup>27</sup> (S/2021/229) 和 444 旅指挥官马哈茂德·哈姆扎<sup>28</sup> 也向专家小组表示，他们得到其各自管理当局合法授权并且从事执法任务。这说明了各方对西部资源和影响力的持续争夺。

## 2. 东部和南部局势

16. 谋杀 Mahmud al-Warfalli 事件<sup>29</sup> 发生于 2021 年 3 月 24 日，<sup>30</sup> 谋杀 Mohammed El Shgagi (别名 Al-Kani) 事件<sup>31</sup> 发生于 2021 年 7 月 27 日，<sup>32</sup> 都是在本报告所述期间。专家小组能够确定，他们与哈夫塔尔附属部队领导层的紧张关系使这两人在被杀之前彼此走得更近。来自东部的军事总检察长 Faraj Sosaa 少将<sup>33</sup> 对专家小组表示，上述两人当时都在接受军事法庭的审判。围绕这 2 名与哈夫塔尔附属部队有关联的重要人物命案的背景情况尚待查清。

17. 2021 年 6 月 17 日，总理委员会组建了一支打击利比亚南部恐怖主义和有组织犯罪部队(见附件 10)，导致发生了另一起令人瞩目的事件。总理委员会任命当时的第 116 旅指挥官、哈夫塔尔附属部队在塞卜哈的主要军事盟友马苏德·阿卜杜拉·马苏德·阿卜杜勒贾利勒(又名马苏德·杰迪)<sup>34</sup> 为这支新“部队”的负责人。随后，哈利法·哈夫塔尔于 2021 年 9 月 11 日颁布法令，解散哈夫塔尔附属部队 116 旅(见附件 11)，但其该旅成员中的较大派别继续留在哈夫塔尔附属部

<sup>23</sup> 任命稳定支持机构副指挥官哈桑·布斯里巴的兄弟伊萨姆·布斯里巴为内政部长。

<sup>24</sup> Ghenewa 的副手之一的黎波里革命旅的 Ayub Aburas 被任命为总统卫队负责人，以及德贝巴总理 2022 年 3 月 7 日高调访问阿布萨利姆监狱，就是例证：参阅 <https://ssa.gov.ly/%d8%b2%d9%8a%d8%a7%d8%b1%d8%a9-%d8%b1%d8%a6%d9%8a%d8%b3-%d8%ad%d9%83%d9%88%d9%85%d8%a9-%d8%a7%d9%84%d9%88%d8%ad%d8%af%d8%a9-%d8%a7%d9%84%d9%88%d8%b7%d9%86%d9%8a%d8%a9-%d9%84%d9%85%d9%86%d8%b7%d9%82/>，2022 年 3 月 7 日。

<sup>25</sup> 见 S/2022/31，第 33 段。

<sup>26</sup> 参阅 [www.libyaobserver.ly/news/pc-delendes-replacement-tripoli-military-district-commander](http://www.libyaobserver.ly/news/pc-delendes-replacement-tripoli-military-district-commander)，2021 年 12 月 22 日。

<sup>27</sup> 专家小组会议(2021 年 9 月 16 日)。

<sup>28</sup> 专家小组会议(2021 年 9 月 22 日)。

<sup>29</sup> 见 S/2017/466，第 100 段。

<sup>30</sup> [www.libyaobserver.ly/news/gunmen-assassinate-icc-wanted-mahmoud-al-werfalli-libyas-benghazi](http://www.libyaobserver.ly/news/gunmen-assassinate-icc-wanted-mahmoud-al-werfalli-libyas-benghazi)，2021 年 3 月 24 日。

<sup>31</sup> 见 S/2021/229，见 36-39 段和附件 16。

<sup>32</sup> [www.middleeasteye.net/news/libya-mohammed-kani-militia-leader-reported-killed](http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/libya-mohammed-kani-militia-leader-reported-killed)，2021 年 7 月 27 日。

<sup>33</sup> 专家小组会议(2021 年 9 月 21 日)。

<sup>34</sup> 见 S/2019/914，第 31 段。

队一边,由 Ibrahim Aldib Alslimani 指挥,仍使用“116 旅”的番号。<sup>35</sup> 自那时起,哈夫塔尔附属部队和马苏德·杰迪的新团体之间发生了小规模冲突。

18. 2021 年 7 月,德贝巴总理下令组建“联合安全行动室”,以确保南部安全。<sup>36</sup> 没有迹象表明这个单位已在运作。

19. 尽管民族统一政府努力将其影响力扩展到南部,<sup>37</sup> 但哈夫塔尔附属部队在当地的的活动仍占主导地位,后者阻挡民族统一政府官员在 2021 年 8 月和 10 月走访塞卜哈、加特或库夫拉。哈夫塔尔附属部队作战能力的重大强化表明,它决心保持在东部和南部的主导地位(见附件 12)。

### 3. 在中部地区设立联合工作队

20. 截至 2021 年 8 月底,在波及大人工河<sup>38</sup> 的又一次断水事件<sup>39</sup> 发生之后,米苏拉塔 166 营和哈夫塔尔附属部队 Tareq Ibn Ziyad 旅的领导人达成了关于在拜尼沃利德至舒韦里夫地区进行联合巡逻的协议。<sup>40</sup> 这一举动得到总理德贝巴和哈利法·哈夫塔尔的认可,联利支助团也对之表示欢迎,称之为“走向军事机构和国家统一的重大步骤”。<sup>41</sup>

## B. 国际恐怖主义团体和个人

### 1. 国际恐怖主义团体和个人

21. 民族统一政府附属部队和哈夫塔尔附属部队都捣毁了恐怖分子小组,逮捕了与伊拉克和黎凡特伊斯兰国-利比亚(伊黎伊斯兰国-利比亚)(QDe.165)和伊斯兰马格里布基地组织(QDe.014)有关联的知名人士。附件 13 载有关于利比亚境内与恐怖主义和反恐相关事件的进一步资料。

### 2. 伊拉克和黎凡特伊斯兰国-利比亚(QDe.165)

22. 伊黎伊斯兰国-利比亚(QDe.165)仍然是一个中等威胁,因为它继续在利比亚南部的沙漠地区活动,以避免被发现。尽管持续开展了反恐行动,打击其活动能力,使该团体遭受了挫折,但它仍保持着发动袭击的能力。本报告所述期间,伊黎伊斯兰国-利比亚(QDe.165)声称对南部塞卜哈、济莱附近以及 Al Haruj 山区、

<sup>35</sup> 参阅 <https://twitter.com/alsaaa24/status/1471539343911235592?s=11&t=zcxZyIZm6fvHQUREbJiLYg>, 2021 年 12 月 16 日。

<sup>36</sup> 参阅 [www.libyanexpress.com/prime-minister-issues-order-to-establish-an-operations-room-to-secure-the-southern-region](http://www.libyanexpress.com/prime-minister-issues-order-to-establish-an-operations-room-to-secure-the-southern-region), 2021 年 7 月 15 日。

<sup>37</sup> 民族统一政府官员多次访问了南部:总理委员会主席穆罕默德·门菲于 2021 年 2 月访问塞卜哈;总理委员会副主席穆萨·科尼访问了奥巴里;外交部长纳吉拉·曼古什于 2021 年 5 月访问了盖特龙;总理德贝巴于 2021 年 7 月访问了塞卜哈。

<sup>38</sup> 以此支持释放被拘留的 Abdallah al-Senussi 的呼吁。

<sup>39</sup> 见 S/2021/229, 第 29 段。

<sup>40</sup> 参阅 [www.facebook.com/watch/?v=228392339162709](https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=228392339162709), 2021 年 9 月 25 日。

<sup>41</sup> 参阅 <https://unsmil.unmissions.org/unsmil-welcomes-creation-joint-force-comprising-tareq-bin-ziyad-brigade-and-166-brigade-important>, 2021 年 8 月 26 日。



盖特龙和乌姆艾拉尼卜等与该团体有关联人员活动区域发生的 5 次袭击负责。在米苏拉塔、塞卜拉泰和的黎波里也发现了与该团体有关联的个人。<sup>42</sup> 2022 年 3 月 13 日，该团体宣誓效忠被列为伊拉克基地组织(QDe.115)的伊拉克和黎凡特伊斯兰国(ISIL)新任命领导人阿布·哈桑·哈希米·古拉什。<sup>43</sup>

### 3. 伊斯兰马格里布基地组织(QDe.014)

23. 虽然这个恐怖团体没有声称对本报告所述期间在利比亚境内发生的任何恐怖袭击负责，但已查明该团体的人员在利比亚境内活动。据报告，民族统一政府和哈夫塔尔附属部队在利比亚不同地区都逮捕了伊斯兰马格里布基地组织的关联人员。这个团体的成员散布在利比亚西南部的比拉克沙提、奥巴里和加特等几个城镇。<sup>44</sup>

## C. 外国武装团体和战斗人员

24. 隶属于冲突各方的私营军事公司人员以及来自乍得、苏丹和阿拉伯叙利亚共和国的外国战斗人员仍在利比亚境内活动。几乎没有可证实的证据表明迄今为止有过任何大规模撤军。2021 年 10 月 3 日，时任外交部长纳吉拉·曼古什坚称一些外国作战人员已经离开利比亚。<sup>45</sup>

25. 当时的民族团结政府和哈夫塔尔附属部队利比亚国民军之间 2020 年 10 月 23 日签订的停火协议规定，所有雇佣军和外国作战人员应在 3 个月内离开利比亚领土。<sup>46</sup> 2021 年 11 月 11 日，5+5 联合军事委员会的哈夫塔尔附属部队代表发表声明表示，哈夫塔尔附属部队总指挥部已决定撤走首批 300 名雇佣军和外国战斗人员(见附件 14)。2022 年 1 月 1 日，哈夫塔尔附属部队一位发言人向全国媒体通报，在 2021 年 12 月最后一周，300 名苏丹战斗人员已被空运调至苏丹。<sup>47</sup> 这一说法立即遭到哈夫塔尔附属部队两名高级官员的反驳，他们否认进行过这一转调；<sup>48</sup> 不过，专家小组确认说，至少 300 名苏丹战斗人员离开了利比亚，但在 5+5 联合军事委员会倡议的框架内(见附件 15)。

<sup>42</sup> 2021 年 9 月与利比亚安全机构举行小组会议。

<sup>43</sup> 参阅 <https://ent.siteintelgroup.com/documents/insite-reports-islamic-state/1553-islamic-state-insite-march-9-15/file.html>，2022 年 3 月 18 日。

<sup>44</sup> 见 S/2022/82，第 32 段。

<sup>45</sup> [www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/libyan-foreign-minister-says-groups-foreign-fighters-left-libya-2021-10-03](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/libyan-foreign-minister-says-groups-foreign-fighters-left-libya-2021-10-03)，2021 年 10 月 3 日。

<sup>46</sup> 协议全文见 [https://unsmil.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/ceasefire\\_agreement\\_between\\_libyan\\_parties\\_english.pdf](https://unsmil.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/ceasefire_agreement_between_libyan_parties_english.pdf)，未注明日期。

<sup>47</sup> <https://ar.libyaobserver.ly/article/17310>，2022 年 1 月 1 日。

<sup>48</sup> 参阅 <https://nabd.com/s/98170976-4a92d2/> حول-ترحيل-300-مرتزق-سوداني-إلى-بلادهم-، خالد-المحجوب-يشرح-لشبكة-لام-ما-حدث

## 1. 乍得作战人员

26. 2021 年 4 月 11 日，乍得团体——乍得变革与和谐阵线——从利比亚境内向乍得提贝斯提地区的乍得军队发动进攻，持续数天。乍得总统伊德里斯·代比·伊特诺前往该地区，但于 2021 年 4 月 20 日因伤势过重去世。<sup>49</sup>

27. 2021 年 9 月 14 日，哈夫塔尔附属部队的 Tariq Ibn Ziyad 旅在 Tarbu 地区发动了一次针对其前盟友乍得变革与和谐阵线的进攻。<sup>50</sup> 2021 年 9 月 14 日，乍得变革与和谐阵线发表声明，<sup>51</sup> 称该旅得到了苏丹人员的支持(见附件 16)。该旅在其官方社交媒体平台上发布了照片和视频，记录了针对乍得变革与和谐阵线的行动。<sup>52</sup>

28. 其他乍得反对派团体仍然在利比亚境内活动，但没有明显参与利比亚的政治或武装冲突。2022 年 3 月 13 日，乍得军事过渡委员会和若干乍得反对派团体的代表，包括在利比亚境内的诸如乍得变革与和谐阵线、拯救共和国军事指挥委员会、抵抗力量联盟和争取民主与正义民族阵线等反对派团体的代表，在卡塔尔开始了“对话前”协商，寻求实现最终和平，作为利比亚政府认为的一个步骤，推动利比亚境内各派系返回并防止它们利用利比亚领土作为破坏乍得安全的基地。<sup>53、54</sup>

## 2. 苏丹作战人员

29. 《苏丹和平朱巴协议》<sup>55</sup> 的签署方以前曾根据该协议所载安全安排，将其部分部队调往苏丹，但仍然在利比亚南部保留部队。这些部队经常往返于苏丹。这些部队大多数出现在苏尔特、朱夫拉、济莱、胡恩和索克奈地区，隶属于哈夫塔尔附属部队第 128 营。哈夫塔尔附属部队对苏丹战斗人员的招募以及他们对利比亚的兴趣略有下降，但原因各有不同，包括金钱奖励不断减少和根据《协定》所给予奖励产生吸引力。《协定》的非签署方，如苏丹解放军-阿卜杜勒·瓦希德派(苏解-瓦希德派)和阿卜杜拉·班达团体，在利比亚仍有成员(见附件 15)。

## 3. 叙利亚作战人员

30. 专家小组注意到，土耳其支持的叙利亚战斗人员持续在黎波里民族统一政府附属部队军营从事活动(见附件 17)。2021 年 8 月 31 日发生了示威游行，示威者要求支付他们遭拖欠的工资(见附件十七)。与民族统一政府附属部队有关联的

<sup>49</sup> [www.nytimes.com/2021/04/20/world/africa/president-chad-killed.html](https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/20/world/africa/president-chad-killed.html)，2021 年 4 月 20 日。

<sup>50</sup> 北纬 26°1'4.02"，东经 15°16'42.44"。

<sup>51</sup> 参阅 <https://web.facebook.com/LeFACT/photos/3067447253544786>，2021 年 9 月 14 日。

<sup>52</sup> 参阅 [www.facebook.com/liwa.tariq.bin.ziad.almueazaz/photos/pcb.1029225217833802/1029224904500500](https://www.facebook.com/liwa.tariq.bin.ziad.almueazaz/photos/pcb.1029225217833802/1029224904500500)，2021 年 9 月 17 日。

<sup>53</sup> 参阅 <https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/chads-junta-rebel-groups-open-peace-talks-qatar-83419773>，2022 年 3 月 13 日。

<sup>54</sup> 参阅时任外交部长的讲话，<https://m.al-sharq.com/article/13/03/2022-وزير-الخارجية-الليبي-تشيد-بجهود-قطر-في-احلال-السلام-بجمهورية-تشاد>，2022 年 3 月 13 日。

<sup>55</sup> 这些团体是苏丹解放军/明尼·米纳维派、苏丹解放力量联盟、正义与平等运动、苏丹解放军/过渡委员会和苏丹联盟。



官员证实黎波里有叙利亚人存在，但否认他们参与了任何军事或平民活动。这些人每月得到 800 美元到 2 000 美元的酬金。<sup>56</sup> 一些叙利亚非政府组织告知专家小组，<sup>57</sup> 至少有 200 名叙利亚人已永久返回叙利亚，<sup>58</sup> 而且在本报告所述期间，民族团结政府附属部队叙利亚战斗人员来回转调，往返于利比亚，因为那些合同已结束的人被调出利比亚，由新一批人员取代。<sup>59</sup>

31. 隶属于哈夫塔尔附属部队的叙利亚战斗人员在朱夫拉和苏尔特与瓦格纳集团<sup>60</sup> 协同作战。他们的任务是提供战斗支援，如修筑战壕和临时道路或守卫敏感的瓦格纳集团阵地。<sup>61</sup> 这些叙利亚人中至少有 300 人返回了阿拉伯叙利亚共和国，没有被哈夫塔尔附属部队接替。<sup>62</sup>

#### D. 阻碍或破坏利比亚顺利完成政治过渡的行为

32. 第 2571(2021)号决议第 11 段授权专家小组查明参与或支持阻挠或破坏选举行为的个人和实体，以此配合开展更广泛任务，追查阻挠或破坏利比亚顺利完成政治过渡的行为。

33. 在整个报告所述期间，即将进行选举的前景一直是主导利比亚局势的因素。一个重大的分歧将那些赞成举行总统选举而非议会选举的人与那些赞成相反意见的人分隔开来。除了有关宪法依据或选举日程表的辩论之外，在各种受益于现状的行为体、团体和国家与希望重新掌权或巩固权力的其他各方之间也存在着分歧。

34. 2021 年 12 月 22 日，最高国家选举委员会发表声明，公开宣布它决定推迟公布总统候选人的最终名单，认为“以司法裁决干预政治利益[……]可被描述为一种不可抗力情况。委员会无法进行公布，因而也无法将 12 月 24 日定为选举日，尽管就技术角度而言，该委员会已充分准备在该日举行选举”（见附件 18）。

35. 在专家小组看来，许多因素导致利比亚政治对话论坛路线图中计划的选举受到阻碍或破坏。其中包括有争议的法律框架以及大量威胁和安全事件（见附件 19）。政治和安全紧张状况达到了严重程度，使人担忧会发生严重动乱。这些因素结合在一起，导致最高国家选举委员会于 2021 年 12 月 22 日发表了援引不可抗力情况的声明，其后也没能在 12 月 24 日举行选举。专家小组尚未确定是否有具体个人或实体符合指认标准。

<sup>56</sup> 专家小组与叙利亚非政府组织“叙利亚人争取真相和正义”互动接触。

<sup>57</sup> “叙利亚人争取真相和正义”组织和保密资料来源。

<sup>58</sup> 另参阅 [www.syriahr.com/450065/الم-مدبر-الإنسان-لحقوق-السوري](http://www.syriahr.com/450065/الم-مدبر-الإنسان-لحقوق-السوري)，2022 年 10 月 4 日。

<sup>59</sup> 另见附件 88。

<sup>60</sup> ChVK 是俄语首字母缩写，意为“私营军事公司”。在本报告全文中，Wagner 组织将被称为 ChVK Wagner。

<sup>61</sup> 另见附件 100。

<sup>62</sup> 保密资料来源；[www.enabbaladi.net/archives/558431](http://www.enabbaladi.net/archives/558431)，2022 年 3 月 22 日；<https://ar.libyaobserver.ly/article/18449>，2022 年 3 月 21 日。

## E. 违反可适用国际人权法或国际人道法的行为或构成践踏人权的行为

36. 根据第 2213(2015)号决议第 11(a)段和其后各项决议，专家小组调查了利比亚境内违反国际人道法和国际人权法的行为及践踏人权行为。

37. 这些威胁利比亚和平、稳定与安全的行为大规模持续存在而不受惩罚。法官和律师一直告诉专家小组，过去 10 年来的安全威胁和武装冲突大大削弱了司法系统，以至于当前不存在将责任人绳之以法的实际前景。54 名个人作证说，他们提出了人权遭受严重侵犯的指控但却无法获得有效补救和赔偿。他们都认为，国际社会有责任确保追究利比亚境内严重违反国际人道法和国际人权法行为的责任。<sup>63</sup>

### 1. 在剥夺自由背景下发生的违反国际人道法和国际人权法的行为

#### 在拘留设施中犯下的行为

38. 专家小组调查了 2015 年以来在 6 个武装团体控制的 8 个拘留设施发生的 23 起严重违反国际人道法和国际人权法事件。这些事件的简要情况载于附件 20，以说明问题的严重程度。

#### 特别威慑部队

39. 专家小组约谈了 8 名证人，他们目睹了特别威慑部队成员在黎波里 Mitiga 拘留所<sup>64</sup> 任意非法剥夺自由、施加酷刑、残忍虐待和凌辱个人尊严<sup>65</sup> 的行为。这些暴力行为包括：(a) 持续的野蛮殴打；(b) 可怕的物质条件，如严重过度拥挤和卫生条件极差；(c) 长时间单独囚禁，得不到食物和饮用水；(d) 强迫被拘留者从事军事任务。<sup>66</sup> 专家小组查明，特别威慑部队负责监督拘留行动的人员 Osama Najim 和 Adel Mohamed Ali (又称 Sheikh Adel) 非法将被拘留者从黎波里的非官方和官方拘留场所转到 Mitiga 设施，主要目的是让他们从事强迫劳动，作为一种形式的奴役(见附件 21)。<sup>67</sup>

#### 的黎波里革命旅

40. 专家小组查明了两起出于政治原因而针对有关个人的任意非法剥夺自由、强迫失踪和虐待案件。受害者在其工作场所被非法绑架，其后被转到该旅在艾因扎拉的 Al-Saadawi 营地。在那里，他们受到残酷暴力对待，如长时间单独拘禁、恶劣拘留条件以及就受害者参与选举进程和据称与哈夫塔尔附属部队有关联问题进行的广泛和辱骂性审讯。<sup>68</sup>

<sup>63</sup> 这些定性数据与利比亚追求正义律师协会向专家小组提供的统计数据一致(即将出版)。

<sup>64</sup> 附件 20、23 和 24 载有所有已设立拘留设施和其他拘留场所的已知地点。

<sup>65</sup> 见 1949 年 8 月 12 日日内瓦四公约共同第 3 条。

<sup>66</sup> 专家小组与前被拘留者(国际人道法保密资料来源 3、4、5、6、48、49 和 61)和一名家庭成员(保密资料来源 8)的约谈。

<sup>67</sup> 见《1949 年 8 月 12 日日内瓦四公约关于保护非国际性武装冲突受难者的附加议定书》(《第二议定书》)，第 4 条。

<sup>68</sup> 专家小组与证人的约谈，保密资料来源 9、10 和 38。

哈夫塔尔附属部队阿拉伯利比亚武装部队

41. 专家小组调查了 6 起任意非法拘留、酷刑和其他虐待以及在哈夫塔尔附属部队控制下的临时和永久拘留场所剥夺公平审判权的事件。这些拘留所包括贝达的 Gernada 拘留所、迈尔季的国内安全机构办事处、班加西的 Kuwayfiah 拘留所和班加西西迪法拉杰由哈夫塔尔附属部队 Tariq Ibn Ziyad 旅控制下的一个非官方拘留所。<sup>69</sup> 在四起案件中，被拘留者接连遭受到：(a) 有计划和野蛮的殴打；(b) 长时间单独拘禁；(c) 故意不提供医疗；(d) 心理虐待；(e) 恐吓。

42. 两名曾被关押在 Kuwayfiah 设施的前被拘留者确认卫队长 Bashir Al Jahni 上尉是针对他们实施酷刑的直接凶手，他们被迫裸体，遭木棍野蛮殴打。专家小组确定，这些行为对受害者的身体造成了永久性伤害以及严重心理创伤。<sup>70</sup>

第七旅武装团体

43. 如 S/2021/229 中所报告的那样，<sup>71</sup> 专家小组收到了关于 7 起任意非法监禁和暴力侵害生命和人身事件的进一步证据，其中包括在第七旅武装团体实际控制的拘留场所发生的 5 名被拘留者被杀事件。<sup>72</sup> 三名证人一致表示，包括 Abdurahem El Shgagi (又名 Abdurahem Al-Kani) 在内的三名第七旅指挥官应对这些行为负责。

## 2. 针对人权维护者、社会活动人士和媒体工作者的袭击

44. 专家小组确认了针对 6 名人权维护者、社会活动人士和媒体工作者的攻击行为，这些行为严重剥夺了这些人的人权，特别是生命权、自由权和表达自由(见附件 22)。<sup>73</sup> 两名知名女性人权维护者因参与公共生活和活动而受到恐吓和威胁。攻击者利用文化和性别规范，恐吓她们及其家庭成员，威胁要在其附近当地社区公开对其进行羞辱。

## 3. 对移民和寻求庇护者实施的违反国际人权法行为

45. 专家小组确认了 26 起严重侵犯移民和寻求庇护者人权的事件，这些事件是在三个相互关联的贩运人口和偷运移民情形下发生的：(a) 在人口贩运网络所控制的人口贩运路线沿线；(b) 在移民拘留中心；(c) 与海上活动有关。

在人口贩运者控制的非法拘禁场所实施的行为

46. 专家小组确定，在塔济尔和拜尼沃利德地区由人口贩运网络设立和控制的秘密拘禁设施中，四名移民的人权受到侵犯。受害者被非法拘禁在恶劣的卫生条件下，受到奴役和折磨，日夜惨遭毒打，被故意置于饥饿之中，以致于体重减轻，

<sup>69</sup> 专家小组与前被拘留者(保密资料来源 1、54、73、79 和 80)和家庭成员(保密资料信息来源 7、13 和 81)的约谈。

<sup>70</sup> 2021 年 2 月 21 日、3 月 31 日、4 月 13 日和 4 月 21 日的医疗文件。

<sup>71</sup> 见 S/2021/229，见 36-39 段。

<sup>72</sup> 日内瓦四公约共同第 3 条。

<sup>73</sup> 见《公民及政治权利国际公约》，第六、九和十九条。

营养不良，严重到危及生命的地步，而且还不让其接受医疗护理。两名前女性被拘禁者(当时是 14 岁和 15 岁的女童)还向专家小组作证说，在拜尼沃利德一个秘密拘禁设施中，多名施暴者在 18 个多月的时间里多次强奸她们，并迫使她们充当性奴以及实施其他形式的性暴力(见附件 23)。

### 在移民拘留中心实施的行为

47. 专家小组查明，有三个平行的移民和寻求庇护者拘留系统至少自 2021 年 12 月以来一直在三个不同拘留当局控制下运行：(a) 由打击非法移民局授权运行的官方拘留系统，由大约 24 个拘留中心组成，关押着 1 400 至 2 000 名移民；<sup>74</sup> (b) 至少有该局三个前拘留中心虽已正式关闭，但仍在该局前管理层的监督下运作；(c) 稳定支持机构打击定居和非法移民司授权运行的非官方拘留中心(见附件 24)。

### 打击非法移民局拘留中心

48. 专家小组约谈了 11 名受害人，涉及 2021 年 12 月之前名义上隶属由打击非法移民局授权的 5 个移民拘留中心：Ayn Zarah、Mabani、Shara Zawayah 和 Tariq al-Sikkah，均在的黎波里；扎维耶的 Al-Nasr。<sup>75</sup> 在所有案件中，利比亚海岸警卫队成员在受害者试图前往欧洲港口过程中于利比亚领海和/或国际水域予以抓获，并将他们转至拘留地点，在那里他们遭受酷刑。受害者的叙述提供了长期任意、非法拘留、强迫劳动、酷刑及残忍和有辱人格待遇的目击证据。酷刑和其他虐待的方法包括残酷殴打，造成被拘留者严重身体损害、强迫赤身裸体、蓄意剥夺足够的食物、水和医疗照料，以及强迫生活在过度拥挤和有辱人格的条件下(见附件 24)。

49. 专家小组还发现，负责保护被关押在 Shara' al-Zawayah 拘留中心的最弱势移民的个别警卫直接参与或无视针对被关押在该中心的妇女和女童的持续强奸、性剥削和强奸威胁行为。这些违法行为发生在 2021 年 1 月至 6 月期间。

### 稳定支持机构拘留中心

50. 专家小组查明了截至 2021 年 12 月在稳定支持机构控制下的 Mayah 移民拘留中心发生的 6 起严重侵犯人权案件，特别是非法拘留、酷刑、残忍及不人道和有辱人格的待遇。在 3 起案件中，受害者被虐待致死，其生命权受到侵犯。<sup>76</sup>

<sup>74</sup> 2022 年 3 月 23 日专家小组对打击非法移民局局长的约谈；保密资料来源 33 和 45。专家小组注意到，被拘留移民和寻求庇护者的确切人数以及该局拘留中心的人数和状况经常变动。截至 2022 年 3 月 23 日数据。

<sup>75</sup> 专家小组正在保护受约谈者的身份，作为一项个人安全措施。

<sup>76</sup> 专家小组与证人的约谈(保密资料来源 100)和文件证据，包括医疗报告和明显带有虐待痕迹的受害者尸体照片。

51. 三名前被拘留者指认 Mayah 拘留中心主管 Mohamed Al-Kabouti 是残忍虐待、特别是残酷殴打行为的直接实施者，在他们被长期非法监禁的整个期间，他经常对他们进行毒打。<sup>77</sup>

### 与海上活动相关的行为

52. 四个不同的指挥和控制单位在利比亚领水和国际水域开展了海上安保行动：(a) 利比亚海军；(b) 利比亚海岸警卫队，也由国防部指挥和控制；(c) 内政部下属的海岸安全总局；(d) 由稳定支持机构控制的海事单位。此种业务碎片化造成了严重的保护缺口。在确定适当利比亚海事机构方面遇到的困难使移民和寻求庇护者面临严重侵犯人权行为的实际风险，而且损害到了对所报告的侵犯人权行为追究责任的前景。目击证人对可能的肇事者所属的单位感到困惑。利比亚主管当局之间的海上行动协调不力，而且往往不符合适用的国际法。

#### 利比亚海岸警卫队

53. 专家小组收到的证据显示，2021 年 4 月 30 日和 6 月 30 日发生了两起利比亚海岸警卫队侵犯国际水域处于困境的大约 93 名移民和寻求庇护者(包括儿童)人权的事件。<sup>78</sup> 专家小组认为，利比亚海岸警卫队人员对这些受困的人实施了残忍和有辱人格的待遇并过度使用武力，使移民面临可预见的丧生危险(见附件 24)。<sup>79</sup> 关于这些侵犯人权行为的陈述与专家小组与其他 4 名受害者约谈中所获信息相一致，即在不同事件中，利比亚海岸警卫队成员在他们试图穿越地中海时对其开枪，实施殴打，在抓捕后非法没收其私有财产以及(或)加以辱骂。<sup>80</sup>

#### 海上救援和协调中心

54. 专家小组调查了 2021 年 4 月 22 日发生在利比亚搜索和救援区的一起沉船事件。根据大量证据，专家小组认为，利比亚主管当局——海上救援和协调中心——侵犯了大约 130 名移民和寻求庇护者的生命权，因为它没有采取适当措施向海上遇险人员提供援助(见附件 24)。专家小组还接到了关于 5 起类似事件的信息，在这些事件中，利比亚当局没有对利比亚搜救区内载有移民和寻求庇护者的遇险船只作出搜索和救援反应。

#### 稳定支持机构海事单位

55. 专家小组查明，在 2021 年 8 月 12 日和 2022 年 1 月 19 日发生的两起海上事件中，稳定支持机构成员对移民和寻求庇护者过度使用武力。遇险人员受到有辱

<sup>77</sup> 专家小组对前被拘留者的约谈(保密资料来源 101、102 和 103)。

<sup>78</sup> 见经鉴定为真实的 2021 年 4 月 30 日 Sea-Watch 4 视频，[https://twitter.com/seawatch\\_intl/status/1388171810315902976](https://twitter.com/seawatch_intl/status/1388171810315902976)；以及经鉴定为真实的 2021 年 6 月 30 日 Seabird – Sea-Watch 侦察机视频，[www.youtube.com/watch?v=62BDsKmjsVY](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=62BDsKmjsVY)。

<sup>79</sup> 见《公民及政治权利国际公约》，第六和七条。

<sup>80</sup> 专家小组对前被拘留者的约谈(保密资料来源 6、17、18 和 20)。



人格的待遇，一人被非法剥夺生命。<sup>81</sup> 专家小组还接到关于 2021 年 11 月 21 日和 2022 年 2 月 18 日稳定支持机构海事单位使用致命武力的信息，专家小组将继续对此进行调查。

### 三. 军火禁运执行情况

56. 根据经后续决议修订的第 1970(2011)号决议第 9 至 13 段，专家小组继续监测、调查及查明违反<sup>82</sup> 和不遵守<sup>83</sup> 军火禁运的情况。专家小组继续调整及使用海运和空运交货特征指标，以帮助确定出现违反禁运行为和情况的可能性，从而确定专家小组的调查重点(见附件 20)。船只、飞机或航空公司需要符合多项指标才能被归类为专家小组关注对象或报告其违反或不遵守禁运。

57. 如果由会员国控制每个会员国所支持的冲突方的后勤流动和供应链，军火禁运将继续完全无效。由于迄未对据报违反军火禁运且符合第 2213(2015)号决议第 11(e)段指认标准的个人和实体采取行动，制裁制度的威慑效力很低。

58. 自最初决议对向利比亚境内供应及转让军火和军用物资行为实行限制性措施以来，时间已经过去 11 年多。附件 26 汇总了在这段期间违反第 1970(2011)号决议第 9 段向利比亚境内转运的军火和军用品类型。本摘要说明了利比亚境内现有军火和军用品的不同种类和技术复杂性；它还作为一种基线，帮助识别任何未来的违反行为。

#### A. 技术性违反和两用技术

59. 在整个利比亚军火禁运期间，会员国军事、海军或航空资产进入利比亚领土，已成为一个反复出现的问题，所有这些都需要专家小组进行调查，直到查明出现此种情况的原因。这些资产中有许多经查明是根据第 2214 (2015)号决议第 3 段<sup>84</sup> 部署到利比亚的，专家小组曾多次提出过这个问题。<sup>85</sup>

<sup>81</sup> 见《公民及政治权利国际公约》，第六和七条。稳定支持机构 DCSIM 否认对 2022 年 1 月 19 日事件负责(见 <https://twitter.com/rgowans/status/1486032462564278281?s=21>, 2022 年 1 月 21 日至 25 日)，但无法令人信服。

<sup>82</sup> 专家小组认为，如果实际转让了武器和军用物资、进行了培训或提供了实物支持，即构成“违反”。专家小组还使用“技术性违反”一语来形容临时将军用品转至利比亚境内，如海军舰艇和军用货机，但没有明显意图向冲突方提供军事能力，例如，会员国使用军用飞机或船只向外交使团提供补给、运送人道主义物品或提供人道主义援助。

<sup>83</sup> “不遵守”是指一个实体没有采取决议所述适当行动，例如没有检查飞往利比亚的飞机或船只，或没有向委员会和(或)其专家小组提供所需或所要求的信息，以防止“违反行为”。“技术性不遵守”是指无法合理预期责任方在转让时知悉这将构成不遵守事件，应采取行动改进其尽职调查规程和程序。

<sup>84</sup> 在该段中，安全理事会促请会员国在必要且适当时，应请求帮助其他会员国建设能力，以应对伊拉克和黎凡特伊斯兰国(伊黎伊斯兰国)、宣誓效忠伊黎伊斯兰国的团体、伊斯兰教法辅士组织和与利比亚境内基地组织有关联的所有其他个人、团体、企业和实体构成的威胁，并与利比亚政府进行协调。

<sup>85</sup> 报告见 S/2016/209，第 126 段；S/2017/466 第 147 段；S/2018/812 和 S/2018/812/Corr.1 第 108 至 109 段；S/2019/914 第 93 段和 S/2021/229 第 59 段。在 S/2019/914 号文件中，专家小组建议委员会提供指导，说明第 2214(2015)号决议第 3 段中的“采用一切手段消除”这一用语是否优先于经后续修正的第 1970(2011)号决议第 9 段所述要求。

60. 然而，在本报告所述期间，也有会员国根据第 2095 (2013) 号决议第 9 段，使用军用航空资产运送人道主义援助物资，<sup>86</sup> 或使用海军资产运送“仅用于人道主义或保护用途的非致命性军事装备”；<sup>87</sup> 这两类货物都不需要通知委员会。然而，运载工具涉及军用飞机和(或)海军舰艇进入利比亚领土，专家小组认为这在技术上违反了第 1970 (2011) 号决议第 9 段。考虑到在这些情况中，会员国无意向利比亚境内任何武装团体提供军事能力，专家小组认为，不应将这些情况作为违反第 1970 (2011) 号决议第 9 段的行为来报告。然而，每一事件都会给会员国带来信誉风险，也需要专家小组进行调查，而如果会员国在使用军用航空或海军资产运送此类物资或援助时将此事通知委员会，就可以避免这种情况(见建议 1)。

61. 智能电子快速移动消费品(如光学仪器和无人驾驶飞行器)<sup>88</sup> 技术不断发展，费用也相对低廉，而且民用车辆易于改装成具有作战能力的车辆，<sup>89</sup> 使此类两用物品<sup>90</sup> 成为低级别冲突中军事用途的理想选择。在本报告周期，专家小组继续查明在一些案件中有人采购快速移动消费品技术并在利比亚将其用于军事目的。专家小组认为，如果此类技术主要由活跃参与武装冲突的行为体进口，而后用于军事目的，则此类转让即违反第 1970 (2011) 号决议第 9 段。

## B. 海上问题

### 1. 区域应对措施

62. 安全理事会第 2578(2021) 号决议将利比亚沿岸公海船只的检查授权延长至 2022 年 6 月 3 日。虽然在本报告所述期间，欧洲联盟地中海军事行动(欧盟海军地中海伊里妮行动)进行了调查，但没有查获武器。

63. 2021 年 7 月 29 日，赞比亚常驻代表团在答复关于对悬挂赞比亚国旗的 MV *Antalya* 号船(国际海事组织(海事组织)第 7615232 号)进行检查的通知时告诉委员会，赞比亚没有开放船舶登记，也不登记国际船舶。因此，2021 年 5 月 11 日，另一艘悬挂赞比亚国旗的 MV *Gauja* 号船只(IMO 7612474)在接受伊里妮行动海军资产检查时也是在悬挂“假旗”航行。

<sup>86</sup> 例如，埃及于 2021 年 4 月 14 日使用军用 C-130 大力神运输机向塞卜哈运送医疗用品，土耳其于 4 月 14 日使用军用 A400M “阿特拉斯” 运输机向的黎波里运送 COVID 疫苗。

<sup>87</sup> 例如，2021 年 12 月 2 日，意大利海军圣乔治船坞登陆舰(L9892)被用于向利比亚海岸警卫队和海军交付海上救援和协调中心设施(见附件 31)。

<sup>88</sup> 见 S/2021/229，附件 73、附件 77 图 77.8 以及附件 80。

<sup>89</sup> 例如，将四轮驱动轻型多用途车改装成被称作“技术战车”的武器平台。见 S/2021/229，附件 35 附录 A。

<sup>90</sup> 注：报告中使用的“两用”一词并不等同于《关于常规武器和两用物品及技术出口控制的瓦森纳安排》中使用的“两用货物和技术”定义，或欧洲联盟出口管制制度中使用的“两用货物”定义(欧洲议会和理事会 2021 年 5 月 20 日(EU)2021/821 号条例，其中建立了管制两用物品出口、中介、技术援助、过境和转让的欧盟制度)。关于专家小组使用的“两用”一词，见第 61 段。

## 2. 值得高度注意的船只和海上违规行为

64. 根据公开来源和机密资料以及海事概况指标,包括自动识别系统停用、途中变更目的港、船旗国拒绝检查以及拥有和经营这些船只的公司的结构,专家小组认为有几艘船只“值得高度注意”。专家小组已致函有关会员国和一些船只的船东和运营者,正在等待答复。

### 民族统一政府附属部队

65. 在 S/2019/914 号文件中,<sup>91</sup> 专家小组提出了会员国根据第 2095(2013)号决议第 10 段的非致命性例外规定向利比亚提供海军巡逻艇、并在交付后配备武器的问题。专家小组注意到,在本报告所述期间,稳定支持机构设立了自己的水面部队。这支部队在利比亚领水和搜救区水域开展执法和其他海上行动,与利比亚海岸警卫队、海岸安全总局和利比亚海军的行动同时进行(另见第 52 段)。<sup>92</sup>

66. 稳定支持机构水面部队至少有 5 艘船只,包括两艘改装为巡逻艇的民用船只:(a) *Alqayid Saqar* 号,船身为醒目的黄色,表明用于搜索和救援,但也装有一挺重机枪;(b) *Alqayid 1* 号,既有民用配置,也配有可拆卸的重机枪;(c) 一艘 Lambro Olympic D74 级海军快速巡逻艇(见表 1 和附件 27)。<sup>93</sup> 虽然(a)和(b)如果没有配备武器,则其转让不属于军火禁运的范围,但转让后配备武器则属于规避禁运。专家小组认为,(c)的转让不属于第 2095(2013)号决议第 9 段(人道主义或防护)和第 10 段(安保或解除武装援助)所载非致命性军事装备的例外情况。

67. 第 2095(2013)号决议第 10 段仅适用于利比亚政府,因此仅适用于其控制下的部队。为此,根据第 2278(2016)号决议第 6 段的要求,民族团结政府于 2017 年 5 月向委员会提交了关于其控制下部队的资料,这反映在第 2362(2017)号决议第 6 段中。稳定支持机构不属于被确定为“在政府控制下的安全部队结构”内的单位之一。<sup>94</sup> 专家小组了解到,自该通知发出以来,政府控制下的部队发生了重大变化,例如,自 2017 年以来设立了稳定支持机构、一个联合行动室和七个军区。提供“政府控制下的安全部队”的最新情况将使军火禁运的执行工作更加明确(见建议 2)。

### 哈夫塔尔附属部队

68. 专家小组在 S/2019/914 号文件<sup>95</sup> 中报告了 2013 年转让的船只,包括海军巡逻艇,这些船只最终由哈夫塔尔附属部队控制。专家小组现已查明,哈夫塔尔附属部队一支水面部队——苏萨海军战斗中队的人员<sup>96</sup> 在专家小组调查的至少五起事件中,使用了其中一些船只和一艘新查明的海军硬船身充气艇(RHIB)从事妨

<sup>91</sup> 第 78 至 80 段。

<sup>92</sup> 见 [https://twitter.com/SSA\\_Gov/status/1480979918456504331](https://twitter.com/SSA_Gov/status/1480979918456504331), 2022 年 1 月 11 日。

<sup>93</sup> 见 <https://twitter.com/SARwatchMED/status/1485711494633472000>, 2022 年 1 月 24 日;以及 <https://twitter.com/SARwatchMED/status/1487425542441820163>, 2022 年 1 月 29 日。

<sup>94</sup> 这些部队是利比亚海岸警卫队、爆炸物处理单位和总统卫队。

<sup>95</sup> 第 79 段和附件 33。

<sup>96</sup> 也被称为苏塞海军战斗中队或苏萨海军战斗连。



碍航行自由的行为，构成海盗行为。这些海盗行为是在公海上实施的，其形式是任意和非法扣留悬挂外国国旗的中立商船并非法扣押其船员财产(见附件 28)。<sup>97</sup> 至少自 2020 年年底以来，该中队人员的非法行为模式包括他们以利比亚海岸警卫队的名义行事和自称为利比亚海岸警卫队的人员，<sup>98</sup> 意图从被扣押船只非法获取经济收益。该中队人员扣留船只的理由是，这些船只侵犯了两个非法宣布的哈夫塔尔附属部队海区之一，即海上“禁航”区和“禁区”(这两个海区都延伸到国际水域)，为了获得释放，船只被迫支付可协商的现金罚款，最高可达 200 000 利比亚第纳尔(约 42 000 美元)(见图)。<sup>99</sup>

69. 2015 年，利比亚国民军首次宣布“禁航区”，将其作为拦截武器运输的一项执法措施，“禁航区”至今仍然有效。<sup>100</sup> 该区域包括北纬 34 度以南水域，虽然其横向延伸范围没有明确界定，但它从贝达延伸到德尔纳，还可能延伸到班加西。<sup>101</sup> 因此，这一模糊区域从利比亚海岸线向外延伸最长达 70 海里，远远超出其领水，<sup>102</sup> 距离穿越地中海的主要航道仅约 10 海里。

70. 不清楚“禁区”何时首次颁布，但当地商船代理人最近在 2022 年 1 月与一家海事服务公司共享了一份给商船和其他船只的未注明日期的划定禁区通知(见附件 29)。“禁区”构成了“禁航区”的一部分，但进一步向东延伸。只有东部超出利比亚领水的范围，最远延伸距离为 16.9 海里。苏萨海军战斗中队的一名代表向专家小组证实了“禁区”的真实性，并说，允许船只通过的条件是提供有关船只、航程和货物的信息。他表示，设立“禁区”是为了阻止武器和人员流向德尔纳的恐怖主义团体。专家小组注意到，截至 2018 年 6 月底，哈夫塔尔附属部队已宣布德尔纳“从恐怖分子手中解放”。<sup>103</sup>

<sup>97</sup> 专家小组采用《联合国海洋法公约》第 87 条和第 101 条所编纂的习惯国际法中“航行自由”和“海盗行为”的定义。另见国际法委员会，海洋法条款及其评注，《国际法委员会年鉴》，1956 年，第二卷，第 27 和 39 条。专家小组使用这些术语并不影响国际法规定的有关非国家行为的地位。

<sup>98</sup> 专家小组认为，只有在民族统一政府控制下的利比亚海岸警卫队才是国家官方的利比亚海岸警卫队。

<sup>99</sup> 机密来源和 <https://safety4sea.com/libya-releases-turkish-owned-cargo-ship-after-paying-fine>，2020 年 12 月 14 日。

<sup>100</sup> 专家小组找不到利比亚国民军宣告的主要来源，该宣告似乎是通过其现已停用的 Facebook 页面作出的。二手资料来源：<https://medium.com/libya-security-monitor/libya-situation-update-12-15-december-4aa69983ad01>，2015 年 12 月 16 日；<https://twitter.com/Oded121351/status/676999971082780672>，2015 年 12 月 16 日；2020 年 3 月 24 日。

<sup>101</sup> <https://mc.nato.int/nsc/operations/news/2020/threat-to-commercial-shipping-operating-in-the-mediterranean-2>，<https://safety4sea.com/update-situation-of-libyan-ports>，2021 年 1 月 7 日，以及 [www.gard.no/web/content/libya-port-situation](http://www.gard.no/web/content/libya-port-situation)，2022 年 2 月 24 日。


<sup>102</sup> 在不妨碍会员国对领水范围的解释的情况下，专家小组采用了《联合国海洋法公约》第 3 条规定的“领水”的 12 海里定义，这也符合利比亚的相关立法；见 1959 年 2 月 18 日关于利比亚领水划界的第 2 号法令，可查阅 [www.un.org/depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/LBY\\_1959\\_Act.pdf](http://www.un.org/depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/LBY_1959_Act.pdf)。

<sup>103</sup> [www.france24.com/ar/20180629-المشير-خليفة-حقت-يعلن-تحرير-درنة-شرق-ليبيا-من-الارهابيين](http://www.france24.com/ar/20180629-المشير-خليفة-حقت-يعلن-تحرير-درنة-شرق-ليبيا-من-الارهابيين)，2018 年 6 月 29 日。

71. 利比亚正式宣布将一片海域划定为渔业保护海域，称为利比亚渔业保护区。这只是为了渔业管理和种群保护目的(见图)。<sup>104</sup>

图

哈夫塔尔附属部队“禁航”区和“禁”区以及正式宣布的渔业保护区



<sup>104</sup> 见《宣布在地中海建立利比亚渔业保护区》，2005年2月24日(《海洋法公报》，第58期，2005年，II.A.1(b)节)，可查阅 [www.un.org/Depts/los/doalos\\_publications/LOSBulletins/bulletinpdf/bulletin58e.pdf](http://www.un.org/Depts/los/doalos_publications/LOSBulletins/bulletinpdf/bulletin58e.pdf)；以及总人民委员会自先知逝世(公元2005年)起1373年关于划定利比亚地中海渔业保护区的第105号决定(《海洋法公报》，第59号，2005年，II.A.1(b)节)，可查阅 [www.un.org/Depts/los/doalos\\_publications/LOSBulletins/bulletinpdf/bulletin59e.pdf](http://www.un.org/Depts/los/doalos_publications/LOSBulletins/bulletinpdf/bulletin59e.pdf)。

### 3. 海上违规行为

72. 专家小组确定了 1 起经证实和 1 起极有可能的海上违规事件，以及 2 起海上技术违规事件(见表 1)。<sup>105</sup>

表 1  
海上违规行为

名称/分类	海事组织/ 船体编号	船旗	违规行为		技术 违规	概况指标 编号	说明
			已证实	极有可能			
Luccello <sup>a</sup>	7800112	科摩罗	✓			9	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>100 辆军用装甲车</li> <li>在班加西卸载(哈夫塔尔附属部队)</li> <li>见附件 30</li> </ul>
Lambro Olympic D74 级快速巡逻艇	无	TBC		✓		不详	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>稳定支持机构海上部分(民族统一政府附属部队)使用的巡逻艇</li> <li>交货方式和日期不明</li> </ul>
San Giorgio 级 船坞登陆舰 <sup>b</sup>	L9892	意大利			✓	不详	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>用于运送不属于军火禁运范围的物品的军用船只(海上救援和协调中心)</li> <li>见附件 31</li> </ul>
卡普里岛、特 雷米蒂岛和/或 卡普雷拉岛沿 海运输舰 <sup>c</sup>	A5353 A5348 A5349	意大利			✓	不详	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>自 2018 年起继续驻扎阿布西塔海军基地</li> <li>见附件 31</li> </ul>

<sup>a</sup> 现以“MV Victory Roro”船名航行，悬挂赤道几内亚国旗。

<sup>b</sup> 意大利海军 San Giorgio 级船坞登陆舰。

<sup>c</sup> 意大利海军 Gorgona 级沿海运输舰。

73. 专家小组认定，表 2 所列船只的船东/运营者违反了第 1970(2011)号决议第 9 段关于向利比亚转让军用物资的规定。

表 2  
已证实违规的海上转运

船只	船旗	船东	运营者	向下列实体转让	说明
Luccello <sup>a</sup> (国际海事组织编号 7800112)	科摩罗	土耳其 Medred 船 舶管理有限公司	船东	哈夫塔尔附属部队	

<sup>a</sup> 现以“MV Victory Roro”船名航行，悬挂赤道几内亚国旗。

<sup>105</sup> 专家小组已致函有关会员国和一些船只的船东和运营者，并得到了答复。详细情况见有关证据附件。

## C. 武器转让和军事训练违规行为

### 1. 背景

74. 专家小组查明，在本报告所述期间发生了违反第 1970(2011)号决议第 9 段的 18 起武器转让<sup>106</sup> 和 4 起军事训练事件。<sup>107</sup> 专家小组还查明，在前几次报告所述期间发生了 26 起武器转让和 5 起训练违规事件，但这些事件没有得到报告；本报告中列入这些事件，为第 58 段提到的基线数据提供证据。专家小组还确定了 S/2021/229 号文件中报告的两起未查明案件的责任人。

75. 为便于参考，附件 32 按时间顺序列出了违规事件。关于武器转让违规案件的信息图表载于附件 33 至 76，关于训练违规案件的信息图表载于附件 77 至 85。

### 2. 土耳其向民族统一政府附属部队提供的军事训练

76. 利比亚陆军总参谋长官方官网显示，2021 年 11 月 16 日，利比亚陆军训练主任 Nouri Shenuk 少将参观土耳其国防部训练管理和作战局总部。<sup>108</sup> 访问的目的是讨论两国在军事训练领域正在进行的联合合作，并回顾土耳其目前向利比亚军队提供的训练的进展情况。<sup>109</sup> 随后，2021 年 11 月 30 日，土耳其国防部发言人 Pinar Kara 表示，土耳其将继续“应国际公认的合法政府邀请，根据双边协议向利比亚提供军事援助”。<sup>110</sup> 该发言人进一步透露，截至 2021 年 11 月 30 日，土耳其部队已在利比亚和土耳其训练了 6 799 名利比亚士兵，另有 974 名士兵仍在接受训练。专家小组于 2021 年 12 月 10 日致函土耳其，要求提供有关训练的详细信息。土耳其 2022 年 2 月 14 日的答复证实，Nouri Shenuk 少将曾在 2021 年 11 月 14 日至 21 日期间进行访问，但没有提供关于训练类型或范围的进一步细节。

77. 专家小组承认，土耳其提供的一些专门培训，例如爆炸物处理方面的培训，<sup>111</sup> 属于第 2095(2013)号决议第 9 段所述“人道主义……培训”豁免范围。土耳其向民

<sup>106</sup> “转让”涉及武器和军事装备的转让。

<sup>107</sup> “训练”系指由第三方提供的与军事活动有关的训练。

<sup>108</sup> 见：[www.facebook.com/LibyaAlAhrarTV/posts/5196300483741754?\\_rdc=1&\\_rdr](https://www.facebook.com/LibyaAlAhrarTV/posts/5196300483741754?_rdc=1&_rdr)，2021 年 11 月 16 日；以及 [www.facebook.com/The.presidency.of.the.General.Staff.To.Libyan.Army/posts/275452701190177?\\_rdc=1&\\_rdr](https://www.facebook.com/The.presidency.of.the.General.Staff.To.Libyan.Army/posts/275452701190177?_rdc=1&_rdr)，2021 年 11 月 20 日；该会员国 2022 年 2 月 15 日给专家小组的信也证实了这一点。

<sup>109</sup> 根据 2019 年 11 月 27 日《土耳其共和国政府和利比亚民族团结政府关于安全和军事合作的谅解备忘录》的条款(见“土耳其和利比亚新的全面安全和军事合作协议全文披露”，Nordic Monitor, 2019 年 12 月 16 日，可查阅 <https://nordicmonitor.com/2019/12/full-text-of-new-turkey-libya-sweeping-security-military-cooperation-deal-revealed>)。

<sup>110</sup> 见 [www.libyaobserver.ly/news/turkey-reiterates-our-presence-libya-legitimate](https://www.libyaobserver.ly/news/turkey-reiterates-our-presence-libya-legitimate)，2021 年 12 月 2 日；[www.libyaakhbar.com/libya-news/1729919.html](https://www.libyaakhbar.com/libya-news/1729919.html)，2021 年 11 月 30 日；以及 <https://nabd.com/s/96772656-b6f28d/الدفاع-التركية-لسنا-قوة-أجنبية-في-ليبيا>，2021 年 11 月 30 日。

<sup>111</sup> 见 <https://twitter.com/tcsavunma/status/1475029180207271942>，2021 年 12 月 26 日；以及 <https://twitter.com/Oded121351/status/1475831938514575365>，2021 年 12 月 28 日。

族统一政府附属部队提供的其余训练是军事或海军性质的，因此违反了第 1970(2011)号决议第 9 段。

### 3. 打击贩运

78. 4 348 公里长的陆地边界仍然漏洞百出，小规模武器走私(小规模“蚂蚁搬家式交易”)有增无减，其规模难以确定或控制。在边界两侧收缴武器的情况都很罕见，在本报告所述期间，仅报告了 4 次收缴：(a) 2021 年 4 月 13 日在尼日尔收缴了 80 件武器；<sup>112</sup> (b) 2021 年 9 月 13 日在苏丹收缴了 37 件武器；(c) 2022 年 1 月 8 日在苏丹收缴了武器和小武器弹药(见附件 71)；<sup>113</sup> (d) 2022 年 1 月 4 日哈夫塔尔附属部队第 106 旅在阿尔及利亚边境收缴了武器和小武器弹药。<sup>114</sup>

## D. 航空违规和未遵守规定情况

### 1. 空运线

79. 2020 年，专家小组从其概况指标(见附件 25)中确定，中央规划的空运线主要在以下地点间运作：(a) 阿拉伯联合酋长国至埃及西部/利比亚东部(哈夫塔尔附属部队)；(b) 俄罗斯联邦经阿拉伯叙利亚共和国至利比亚东部(哈夫塔尔附属部队)；(c) 土耳其至利比亚西部(民族统一政府)。专家小组在 S/2021/229 号报告中认定，组成空运线的飞机运营商没有遵守第 1970(2011)号决议第 9 段的规定。

80. 在本报告所述期间，这些空运线上的交通量普遍比上一个时期显著减少。例如，俄罗斯联邦军用货机飞往利比亚西部的航班减少了 61% (见附件 86)。专家小组还注意到，俄罗斯联邦军用货机正在利用利比亚作为飞往中非共和国和马里等地的技术中转站。土耳其军用货机飞往利比亚东部的航班减少了 62% (见附件 87)。与此相反，叙利亚的湛翼航空公司的航班增加了 79% (见附件 88)，虽然这些航班仍被用于外国战斗人员轮调，但也被用作非正规移民路线的一部分。

### 2. 与航空有关的违规和未遵守规定情况

81. 专家小组继续调查值得专家小组注意的或被认定违反军火禁运的飞机的所有者和运营者(见附件 89 和附件 90 至 96 中的摘要)。

82. 飞机继续在所有者和经营者之间定期转换，以不透明的表象遮掩其非法飞行活动。特别是，专家小组注意到，阿拉伯联合酋长国 Space Cargo 公司<sup>115</sup> 拥有的支持哈夫塔尔附属部队的飞机数目有所增加，因此违反了军火禁运。

<sup>112</sup> 见 <https://wmuayqih5acbvjrj5vul3ddnjia-adwhj77lcyoafdy-alwasat-ly.translate.google.com/news/libya/317324>，2021 年 4 月 14 日。

<sup>113</sup> 见 <https://rsf.gov.sd/news/1467>，2021 年 9 月 18 日。

<sup>114</sup> 见 <http://nabdapp.com/t/99061768>，2022 年 1 月 5 日。

<sup>115</sup> 关于 Space Cargo 公司参与私营军事行动的情况，另见第 83 段。



## E. 私营军事公司违规情况

### 1. “Opus 项目”

83. 专家小组查明了均在阿拉伯联合酋长国注册的 Space Cargo 公司和 BU Shames 自由区公司的一个项目，该项目涉及 Opus 项目组织部署并在 S/2021/229 号文件附件 76 中报告的三架 AS332L 超级美洲豹直升机的维修、保养和试飞。与 Space Cargo 公司签约的南非技术人员于 2020 年 12 月 18 日首次部署到班加西。飞机调试后可以试飞，并于 2021 年 5 月 29 日首次出现在哈夫塔尔附属部队“尊严行动”七周年阅兵式上(见附件 97)。

84. 关于(a) 注册为 YU-TSH 的 LASA T-Bird 飞机及(b) 使用伪装的公司所有权情况的最新资料载于附件 99。这项调查仍在进行中。

### 2. 瓦格纳集团

85. 专家小组继续调查瓦格纳集团的部署情况以及支持瓦格纳集团行动的武器和相关物资转让情况。关于 2020 年期间其行动和后勤的详情，见附件 100，其中还包括一起违反国际人道法事件的详情。

### 3. AR 全球集团自由区有限责任公司

86. 专家小组查明，在阿拉伯联合酋长国注册的 AR 全球集团自由区有限责任公司是哈夫塔尔附属部队的中间人或供应商。<sup>116</sup> 2020 年 9 月 27 日，该公司试图采购一套两用通信监控系统。2021 年 5 月，立陶宛拒绝为更大系统的一些两用部件发放出口许可证，采购工作中断。哈夫塔尔附属部队提供的最终用户证书见附件 101。2021 年 2 月 14 日给了 AR 全球集团自由区有限责任公司作出答复的机会。未收到任何答复。

## F. 违规和未遵守规定行为责任摘要

87. 专家小组认为，表 3 所列国家、实体或个人：

(a) 违反第 1970(2011)号决议第 9 段；

(b) 未遵守第 2213(2015)号决议第 19 段，原因是未能对前往或来自利比亚的船只和(或)飞机进行适当检查；并且(或者)

(c) 未遵守第 2571(2021)号决议第 14 和(或)第 15 段，未提供他们所掌握的关于措施执行情况的信息，也(或)未允许顺畅查询专家小组认为与执行其任务相关的文件。

<sup>116</sup> 阿拉伯联合酋长国阿治曼，A-0059-03 Flamingo Villas。首席执行官是 Hazem Abdurrahim Imam。

表 3

## 违规和(或)未遵守规定责任摘要

国家/实体/个人 <sup>a</sup>	违反 第 1970(2011)号 决议第 9 段	未遵守第 2213(2015)号决议 第 19 段	未遵守第 2571(2021) 号决议第 14 和(或) 第 15 段	原由
利比亚(民族统一政府附属 部队)	✓	✓	✓	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>采购军火和相关物资,但未事先请求委员会批准</li> <li>未能在抵达时检查用于向利比亚运送军火和相关物资的船只和飞机</li> <li>未能应要求向专家小组提供信息</li> </ul>
约旦		✓		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>未能检查用于向利比亚运送军火和相关物资的船只和飞机</li> </ul>
俄罗斯联邦	✓			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>经常从利比亚或向利比亚运送军火和相关物资,特别是军用货机</li> </ul>
阿拉伯叙利亚共和国		✓		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>未能在抵达时检查用于向利比亚运送军火和相关物资的船只和飞机</li> </ul>
土耳其	✓	✓		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>向利比亚转让军火和相关物资,供民族统一政府附属部队使用</li> <li>向民族统一政府附属部队提供与军事活动有关的训练</li> <li>未能检查用于向利比亚运送军火和相关物资的船只和飞机</li> </ul>
阿拉伯联合酋长国	✓	✓		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>向利比亚转让军火和相关物资,供哈夫塔尔附属部队使用</li> <li>未能检查用于向利比亚运送军火和相关物资的飞机</li> </ul>
哈夫塔尔附属部队	✓	✓	✓	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>采购军火和相关物资</li> <li>未能在抵达时检查用于向利比亚运送军火和相关物资的船只和飞机</li> </ul>

国家/实体/个人 <sup>a</sup>	违反 第 1970(2011)号 决议第 9 段	未遵守第 2213(2015)号决议 第 19 段	未遵守第 2571(2021) 号决议第 14 和(或) 第 15 段	原由
阿尔法航空有限责任公司 (乌克兰)	✓			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>未能应要求向专家小组提供信息</li> <li>直接和间接向利比亚提供军事装备和其他援助的飞行作业</li> </ul>
湛翼航空公司(SAW) (阿拉伯叙利亚共和国)	✓		✓	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>直接和间接向利比亚提供军事装备和其他援助的飞行作业</li> <li>未能应要求向专家小组提供信息</li> </ul>
FlySky 航空有限责任公司 (FSQ) (吉尔吉斯共和国)	✓			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>直接和间接向利比亚提供军事装备和其他援助的飞行作业</li> </ul>
FlySky 航空有限责任公司 (FSU) (乌克兰)	✓			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>直接和间接向利比亚提供军事装备和其他援助的飞行作业</li> </ul>
绿旗航空(GNF)(苏丹)	✓		✓	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>提供与军事活动有关的其他援助,特别是向哈夫塔尔附属部队在利比亚境内的军事行动提供航空后勤支持</li> <li>未能应要求向专家小组提供信息</li> </ul>
Medred 船舶管理有限公司 (土耳其)	✓	✓		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>向利比亚转让军火和相关物资</li> <li>未能检查用于向利比亚运送军火和相关物资的船只</li> </ul>
Sapsan 航空有限责任公司 (KGB) (吉尔吉斯斯坦)	✓			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>直接和间接向利比亚提供军事装备和其他援助的飞行作业</li> </ul>
Space Cargo 公司 (阿拉伯联合酋长国)	✓			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>提供与军事活动有关的其他援助,特别是向哈夫塔尔附属部队在利比亚境内的军事行动提供航空后勤支持</li> </ul>

<sup>a</sup> 按泛类字母顺序排列。



## G. 应对违反军火禁运行为

88. 会员国和区域组织针对设在其境内或在其境内注册的实体不遵守军火禁运的情况采取了一系列行动(见附件 102)。

## H. 哈夫塔尔附属部队发射战术弹道导弹

89. 2022 年 3 月 7 日, 哈夫塔尔附属部队试射了至少三枚战术弹道导弹, 这是一个意外事件, 因为排雷和库存管理组织的普遍共识是, 利比亚境内已没有可操作的战术弹道导弹。对该事件的分析见附件 103。

# 四. 国家机构的统一

90. 根据第 2509(2020)号决议第 5 段的要求审查了这一问题。

## A. 利比亚中央银行的统一进程

### 1. 概述

91. 2018 年 7 月, 利比亚前总理法耶兹·穆斯塔法·萨拉杰致函秘书长, 要求联合国协助对的黎波里的利比亚中央银行和东部贝达的平行分支机构进行财务审查, 以恢复利比亚金融机构的完整性、透明度和信任度, 并为利比亚金融机构的统一创造必要的条件。

92. 2021 年 7 月, 德勤会计师事务所在仔细研究了黎波里和贝达分支机构的财务状况后, 提交了一份基于六大主要支柱和一套十五项建议的最终报告(见附件 104)。专家小组注意到, 报告中指出的阻碍统一进程的主要问题是:

- (a) 有必要改革和改进信用证的签发程序;
- (b) 没有采用《国际财务报告准则》;<sup>117</sup>
- (c) 需要评估利比亚第纳尔贬值的影响;
- (d) 需要制定有效治理和内部控制的规定;
- (e) 国民代表大会一再否决预算提案;
- (f) 在两个分支机构领导方面的问题。<sup>118</sup>

### 2. 路线图和关于谈判现状的最新情况

93. 德勤的建议是其 2021 年 7 月 9 日发布的工作范围的基础, 目前这些工作范围指导着改革和统一进程。专家小组获悉, 2022 年 2 月 20 日, 利比亚东部中央

<sup>117</sup> 《国际财务报告准则》是上市公司财务报表的一套会计规则, 旨在使财务报表在世界各地保持一致、透明和易于比较。这些准则是由国际会计准则理事会制定的(见 [www.ifrs.com](http://www.ifrs.com))。

<sup>118</sup> 请注意, 国民代表大会曾于 2014 年 9 月和 2015 年 4 月试图替换利比亚中央银行的现任行长, 但他拒绝离职。

银行行长 Ali al-Hibri<sup>119</sup> 确认了以下做法：<sup>120</sup> 将就短期措施达成初步协议，解决流动性、东部银行余额和支票清算问题，然后利比亚中央银行董事会将与各商业银行讨论，调整利比亚海外银行董事会的成员，使其包括银行业专家，随后改组利比亚中央银行。与此同时，在东部中央银行由 Ali Jehani 领导的项目管理办公室将在工作人员一级推进银行监督和监管一体化，由贝达负责东部，的黎波里负责西部，但没有相互冲突的目标。(例如，Jumhuriya 银行将有一个大会，由利比亚中央银行和利比亚东部中央银行参加，两家银行在 Jumhuriya 银行董事会中有均衡的代表权。)

94. 利比亚中央银行董事会尚未开始这项工作。尽管如此，两个分支机构的负责人之间已经进行了初步讨论。与此同时，德勤于 2022 年 2 月中旬举办了一场研讨会，推进工作范围的落实，首先是确定具体目标。商定的时间安排如表 4 所示。

表 4

执行利比亚中央银行统一和改革工作范围的目标时间表

问题	目标启动日期	期间	说明
为统一做准备	2022 年 1 月底	三个月	—
实现统一	2022 年 4 月底	三个月	—
评价	2022 年 7 月底	一个月	—
改革目标	2022 年 7 月底	六个月	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 会计方面的强化</li> <li>• 银行监管</li> <li>• 重组</li> </ul>

95. 该进程由七个工作流支持：

- (a) 愿景和运营模式；
- (b) 公共债务；
- (c) 货币发行和流通；
- (d) 清算系统；
- (e) 硬通货分配；
- (f) 将财务审查的范围扩大到 2020 年年中至 2021 年的账目；
- (g) 政府预算和支出。

96. 在安排董事会开始上述工作方面没有任何进展，这些工作被认为是改革成功的关键。不过，拒信其余工作流正在取得进展。

<sup>119</sup> 名义上也是中央银行副行长。

<sup>120</sup> 机密来源。

### 3. 利比亚审计局关于利比亚中央银行的报告

97. 2021 年 8 月 24 日，利比亚审计局发布了 2020 年报告，<sup>121</sup> 重点指出了利比亚中央银行的一些不正常的做法。主要调查结果涉及利比亚中央银行业务部。

98. 利比亚中央银行的分裂在几个方面影响了其业务的正常运作，其中值得一提的是不同的支付系统，因为东部的银行是独立运作的。建立了双重支付系统：(a) 西部银行通过实时全额结算制度处理付款；而(b) 东部的银行则以人工方式进行交易，因为东部中央银行已与实时全额结算制度断开。这对东部分支履行义务产生了负面影响，因为利比亚中央银行不承认手工系统。

99. 报告指出，利比亚中央银行未能改用电子清算系统，因为它无法统一上述银行系统，也未能统一和监测收费。因此，银行的东部和西部分行各自单方面决定自己的费用。

100. 利比亚审计局还报告，利比亚中央银行拒绝提供与打击洗钱措施有关的必要文件和数据。

### B. 国家石油公司

101. 在本报告所述期间，石油和天然气部长 Mohamed Aoun 与国家石油公司董事会主席 Mustafa Sanalla 之间为争夺对利比亚石油部门的影响力而争斗不已。2021 年 8 月和 10 月，Aoun 试图以所谓的行政不当行为暂停 Sanalla 的职务，但没有成功。<sup>122</sup> 同样在 2021 年 10 月，包括一名董事会成员<sup>123</sup> 和 Sanalla 办公室经理在内的 4 名国家石油公司关联个人被总检察长下令逮捕。<sup>124</sup> 国家石油公司谴责任意逮捕和拘留公众人物，认为这是一种恐吓手段，可能对石油部门的业务产生影响。国家石油公司表示关切，武装团体越来越多地试图对石油和天然气部及国家石油公司施加影响。<sup>125</sup>

102. 2021 年 10 月 26 日，扎维耶炼油厂发生武装冲突，导致储罐受损，原油和精炼石油产品泄漏。<sup>126</sup> 虽然这些袭击也可能与以扎维耶为基地的武装团体之间

<sup>121</sup> 见 [www.audit.gov.ly/ar/report2020.pdf](http://www.audit.gov.ly/ar/report2020.pdf)，2021 年 8 月 24 日。

<sup>122</sup> 见 <https://www.theafricareport.com/165206/mustafa-sanalla-libyas-undisputed-oil-boss-locked-in-a-power-struggle/>，2022 年 1 月 11 日；<https://noc.ly/index.php/en/new-4/7526-the-national-oil-corporation-an-important-clarification>，2021 年 12 月 19 日。

<sup>123</sup> <https://noc.ly/index.php/en/new-4/7353-abulgasem-shengheer-unlawfully-stopped-at-mitiga-airport>，2021 年 11 月 4 日。

<sup>124</sup> 见 [www.libyaherald.com/2021/11/04/the-attorney-general-arrests-noc-board-member-oil-minister-supports-enforcement-of-law](http://www.libyaherald.com/2021/11/04/the-attorney-general-arrests-noc-board-member-oil-minister-supports-enforcement-of-law)，2021 年 11 月 4 日；以及专家小组在线会议，2021 年 12 月 2 日。

<sup>125</sup> 见 <https://noc.ly/index.php/en/new-4/7353-abulgasem-shengheer-unlawfully-stopped-at-mitiga-airport>，2021 年 10 月 30 日。<https://noc.ly/index.php/en/new-4/7403-the-national-oil-corporation-welcomes-the-statement-issued-by-the-us-ambassador-and-special-envoy-to-libya-richard-norland>，2021 年 11 月 16 日；以及 2021 年 11 月 25 日收到的 Sanalla 给专家小组的一封信(未注明日期)的信函。

<sup>126</sup> 机密来源和 <https://noc.ly/index.php/en/new-4/7339-the-national-oil-corporation-condemns-acts-78of-sabotage-that-took-place-at-the-zawiya-oil-complex>。

的历史斗争和宿怨有关，但对扎维耶炼油厂及其分销网络的控制权是一个令人垂涎的目标。

103. 产量上升到每天 120 万至 125 万桶，而且大多数情况下保持在这一水平。然而，生产受到了几个事件的影响，这表明该国的石油基础设施继续被不同方面用作胁迫工具。2021 年 12 月 20 日，国家石油公司证实，由于石油设施警卫队津坦人员封锁管道和集散站，Shararah、Fil、Wafa 和 Hamada 油田停止生产。这一行动是对 Akakus 石油公司董事会负责人被免职的回应，<sup>127</sup> 他也来自津坦。<sup>128</sup> 国家石油公司宣布不可抗力，<sup>129</sup> 2022 年 1 月初产量下降到每天 72.9 万桶，<sup>130</sup> 之后据报达成协议。<sup>131</sup> 大约在同一时间，东部部落威胁要关闭 Sidra 和 Ra's Lanuf 设施，原因是哈夫塔尔附属部队被拖欠了工资。<sup>132</sup> 2022 年 3 月 6 日，国家石油公司宣布不可抗力，原因是当地团体关闭了 Shararah 和 Fil 油田的泵阀，导致每日产量减少 33 万桶。这意味着每天的损失超过 1 600 万利比亚第纳尔，此事已提交总检察长。<sup>133</sup> 该团体在津坦组建，部落领导人参与了恢复生产的谈判。<sup>134</sup> 两天后，宣布情况已得到解决。<sup>135</sup>

104. 石油和天然气部与国家石油公司之间的内部分歧也蔓延到了业务环境。从 2022 年 2 月 23 日到至少 3 月 3 日期间，国家石油公司暂停出口，声称恶劣天气影响了全国各地的石油港口。<sup>136</sup> 石油和天然气部公开表示不同意这一决定，声称天气条件适合出口，并对潜在收入的损失表示痛惜。<sup>137</sup> 专家小组注意到，在所

<sup>127</sup> [www.akakusoil.com](http://www.akakusoil.com).

<sup>128</sup> 机密来源和 <https://noc.ly/index.php/en/new-4/7531-stopping-the-production-of-the-el-sharara,-el-feel,-al-wafa-and-hamada-fields,-and-the-loss-of-more-than-300,000-barrels-per-day-at-the-hands-of-members-of-the-petroleum-facilities-guard,-as-a-result-of-wasting-the-country%E2%80%99s-wealth>, 2021 年 12 月 20 日。

<sup>129</sup> <https://twitter.com/MedWave1/status/1472996496064798720?s=20>, 2021 年 12 月 20 日。

<sup>130</sup> 见 <http://en.alwasat.ly/news/economy/344958>, 2022 年 1 月 6 日。

<sup>131</sup> 见 <https://libyaupdate.com/libyan-oilfields-to-reopen-after-deal-between-dbeibeh-and-pfg-italian-press-reports>, 2022 年 1 月 10 日；以及 [www.libyaobserver.ly/inbrief/sharara-oilfield-production-hits-190000-bpd](http://www.libyaobserver.ly/inbrief/sharara-oilfield-production-hits-190000-bpd), 2022 年 1 月 12 日。

<sup>132</sup> 见 <https://libyareview.com/20276/libyan-tribes-threaten-to-block-oil-exports>, 2022 年 1 月 8 日。

<sup>133</sup> 见 <https://noc.ly/index.php/en/new-4/7806-the-illicit-closure-of-crude-pumping-valves-from-the-al-sharara-and-al-feel-fields-puts-offline-330,000-barrels-per-day-and-leads-to-a-daily-loss-to-the-public-of-more-than-160-million-libyan-dinars>, 2022 年 3 月 6 日。

<sup>134</sup> 机密来源和 [www.marsad.ly/en/2022/03/07/un-envoy-to-libya-says-oil-blockade-should-be-lifted](http://www.marsad.ly/en/2022/03/07/un-envoy-to-libya-says-oil-blockade-should-be-lifted), 2022 年 3 月 7 日。

<sup>135</sup> 见 <https://noc.ly/index.php/en/new-4/7813-the-opening-of-the-al-riyayna-valves-%E2%80%A6-the-resumption-of-production-in-the-al-sharara-field-and-lifting-of-force-majeure-status>, 2022 年 3 月 8 日。

<sup>136</sup> 见 <https://noc.ly/index.php/en/new-4/7749-the-national-oil-corporation-announces-that-the-weather-is-disrupting-the-country-s-oil-exports>, 2022 年 2 月 23 日；以及 <https://noc.ly/index.php/en/new-4/7796-the-continuation-of-oil-production-and-incapability-of-the-sea-locomotives-to-connect-the-vessels-due-to-bad-weather>, 2022 年 3 月 3 日。

<sup>137</sup> 见 [www.reuters.com/article/oil-libya-ports-idINL2N2V60R9](http://www.reuters.com/article/oil-libya-ports-idINL2N2V60R9), 2022 年 3 月 3 日。

涉期间，有些天的海况达到世界气象组织(气象组织) 6 级(浪高 4 至 6 米)，但平均在 5 级左右(浪高 2.5 至 4 米)。5 级海况不应明显妨碍装载作业。海运订购来源提供的数据显示，码头似乎没有在整个所涉期间一直关闭，因为受影响的码头有几天进行了装货作业。该部门领导层之间公开表示的分歧阻碍了机构的统一。

## 五. 防止非法出口或非法进口石油

### A. 非法出口原油

105. 没有根据第 2146(2014)号决议第 11 段指认任何船只。

106. 2022 年 1 月 23 日，根据第 2146(2014)号决议设立的协调人<sup>138</sup> 通知专家小组，有人企图从 Marsa al-Hariga 非法出口 40 万桶原油。<sup>139</sup> 所提供的数据使小组得以确定据称将要使用的油轮。2022 年 2 月 1 日，机密消息来源向专家小组证实，这艘数月未显示自动识别系统信号的油轮在 Marsa al-Hariga 附近的锚泊区。该船一直停留在那里，没有进入港口，直到 2022 年 2 月 4 日离开利比亚领水。在锚泊位置没有发生船对船装载。专家小组已致函有关会员国以及该船的船东和运营者；调查仍在继续。

### B. 非法出口精炼石油产品

107. 尽管在本报告所述期间，精炼石油产品价格持续上涨，但海上燃料走私没有反弹到以前的水平。有几个因素促成了走私动态的变化，其中包括意大利和马耳他的执法活动以及石油市场的势头。燃料走私的规模小得多，使用的是小型多用途船只，这些船只同时或相继用于运输其他合法或非法货物。虽然这种作案手法可能会增加单个走私活动的数量，但较小的装载量限制了走私者的地理范围，而运输其他非法物品能带来更高的利润。这并不排除在国际水域由较小船只向较大船只进行船对船装载的可能性，但在本报告所述期间，专家小组没有了解到这方面的任何具体案例。在本报告起草期结束时，媒体<sup>140</sup> 和机密消息来源报告称，涉嫌非法出口石油产品的情况突然增加。这是否表明一种发展趋势仍有待观察；专家小组继续进行调查。

108. 虽然主要在利比亚南部和西部边界进行的陆上燃料走私仍在继续，但利比亚境内的转运情况已变得更加突出。加油站、特别是南部加油站的燃料长期短缺，

<sup>138</sup> 在本报告所述期间，民族统一政府再次确认了协调人。

<sup>139</sup> 联合国贸易和运输地点代码 LYMHR。

<sup>140</sup> 见：[www.theguardian.com/world/2022/apr/17/tunisia-fuel-ship-sinking-nearby-countries-offer-help-to-prevent-disaster](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/apr/17/tunisia-fuel-ship-sinking-nearby-countries-offer-help-to-prevent-disaster)；2022 年 4 月 17 日；<https://twitter.com/TurkeyAffairs/status/1515821968943112202?s=20&t=pET1loq7FJ4EI5TxlfICQ&fbclid=IwAR2xj2K4y0ZbMgtulcZKdrNr3l3RiVk6ImHsTvD2Q43R8ukSIWlmbDdKaME>，2022 年 4 月 17 日；以及 <https://libyareview.com/23164/libya-seizes-turkish-owned-tanker-suspected-of-fuel-smuggling>，2022 年 4 月 24 日。

迫使民众转向非法市场，使通货膨胀率高于北部。<sup>141</sup> 全国各地的武装团体受益于整个燃料转运供应链的收益，这一供应链遍布各地，组织严密。

## 六. 对被指认实体实施资产冻结

### A. 概述

109. 专家小组继续与利比亚投资管理局(LYe.001)、利比亚非洲投资组合(LYe.002)和其他有关各方接触。被指认的实体一般都是合作的。财务问题十分复杂，要求专家小组与多个对话方接触，包括会员国、基金经理和指认实体代表。

110. 专家小组继续侧重于：(a) 从被冻结资产中获取利益和其他股息收益；(b) 会员国提出的资产冻结豁免请求或通知；(c) 支付管理费和基本支出；以及(d) 附属机构在不同管辖区的不同待遇。

111. 利比亚投资管理局向专家小组介绍了其根据《圣地亚哥原则》治理和管理该机构的战略的最新进展。<sup>142</sup> 即使投资管理局所报告的努力是有效的，但仍有进一步的工作要做，以充分遵守《国际财务报告准则》(见附件 105)。专家小组对管理层缺乏透明度的关切没有得到缓解，因为管理层仍然不愿意提供关于其一些附属机构活动的最新情况。在这个意义上，专家小组认为，在附属机构的掩护下开展业务可能导致违反制裁制度，仍然构成可能转移资产的风险。

### B. 将利比亚对外投资公司和利比亚阿拉伯对外投资公司误列为利比亚投资管理局的别名

112. 专家小组注意到，第 1973 (2011) 号决议最初指认利比亚投资管理局(LYe.001)时，将利比亚阿拉伯对外投资公司(LAFICO)列为别名。2012 年 3 月 7 日的第 1 号执行援助通知也将 LAFICO 列为被指认实体的别名。2014 年 6 月 27 日，在专家小组提出建议(见 S/2014/106)后，委员会将其制裁名单上的列名提法从 LAFICO 改为利比亚外国投资公司，即“Libyan Foreign Investment Company (LFIC)”。<sup>143</sup> 随后未对第 1 号执行援助通知作出反映这一变化的修正。专家小组在 S/2018/812 和 S/2018/812/Corr.1 号文件<sup>144</sup> 中指出，前几份报告(见 S/2013/99<sup>145</sup> 和 S/2017/466<sup>146</sup>)讨论了以缩写 LAFICO 名义开展业务的利比亚对外投资公司的法

<sup>141</sup> 机密来源和 <http://alwasat.ly/news/libya/353324>，2022 年 3 月 22 日。

<sup>142</sup> 《圣地亚哥原则》含 24 项得到主权财富基金国际论坛成员自愿认可的公认原则和做法。《圣地亚哥原则》促进透明度、善治、问责制和审慎投资做法，同时鼓励对主权财富基金活动进行更开放的对话和更深入的了解(见 [www.ifswf.org/sites/default/files/santiagoprinciples\\_0\\_0.pdf](http://www.ifswf.org/sites/default/files/santiagoprinciples_0_0.pdf))。

<sup>143</sup> 第 238 和 289(a)段。

<sup>144</sup> 第 232 段。

<sup>145</sup> 第 225 段。

<sup>146</sup> 第 237 和 238 段。



律地位。专家小组重申，将 LFIC (最初是 LAFICO) 作为利比亚投资管理局的别名 (LYe.001) 列入名单是不正确的，该公司 100% 为利比亚投资管理局所有 (见建议 3)。

### C. 比利时法院审理欧洲结算系统案件的最新情况

113. 专家小组在 [S/2018/212](#) 和 [S/2018/212/Corr.1](#) 号文件<sup>147</sup> 中报告，2011 年至 2017 年期间，利比亚投资管理局在欧洲结算银行持有的被冻结资产的利息和其他收益被存入该局的其他银行账户，这是不符合资产冻结规定的。截至 2017 年 10 月 25 日，比利时司法当局对这些资金和利益进行了法律扣押，作为正在进行的对涉嫌洗钱行为和与管理利比亚投资管理局在该国的冻结资产有关的其他不当行为的刑事调查的初步措施。

114. 在这些刑事诉讼中，利比亚投资管理局主席 Ali Mahmoud Hassan Mohammed 被传唤于 2021 年秋季在比利时出庭。他没有服从这一传唤，声称利比亚国内法禁止他作证。<sup>148</sup> 因此，2022 年 1 月 9 日，比利时调查法官对他发出了国际逮捕令。<sup>149</sup> 利比亚总检察长与比利时总检察长在布鲁塞尔会晤，试图解决这一问题。<sup>150</sup>

115. 专家小组继续监测此案，并回顾，如 [S/2018/812](#) 和 [S/2018/812/Corr.1](#) 所述，冻结资产产生的任何利息和收益也应保持冻结。<sup>151</sup>

### D. 资产冻结豁免

116. 专家小组注意到，规定资产冻结措施条款的第 [1970\(2011\)](#) 号决议第 17 段的执行情况不够连贯。

117. 资产冻结的通常定义是：“防止以任何方式转移、转让、改变或使用、获取或处理资金，从而导致资金的数量、数额、地点、所有权、持有、性质、目的地发生变化或者其他导致资金得以使用的变化，包括证券组合管理。”<sup>152</sup>

118. 专家小组注意到，大不列颠及北爱尔兰联合王国继续将第 [1970\(2011\)](#) 号决议第 19(a) 段的内容解释为该段允许发放对冻结资金进行积极资产管理的许可证。其理由是，积极的资产管理对于保持资金的价值是必要的，这些资金最终将提供给、并造福于利比亚人民。该会员国指出，发放此类许可证并非授权被指认实体动用被冻结资金，因此资产冻结的意图得以维持。

<sup>147</sup> 第 197 至 207 段。

<sup>148</sup> 2022 年 2 月 2 日与 Ali Mahmoud 和利比亚投资管理局管理层举行的专家小组会议。

<sup>149</sup> 同上。

<sup>150</sup> 见 [www.libyaherald.com/2022/01/attorney-general-in-bid-to-end-belgian-legal-moves-to-seize-lia-assets](http://www.libyaherald.com/2022/01/attorney-general-in-bid-to-end-belgian-legal-moves-to-seize-lia-assets)，2022 年 1 月 24 日；以及 <https://libyaupdate.com/libya-attorney-general-in-belgium-for-talks-on-frozen-assets>，2022 年 2 月 2 日。

<sup>151</sup> 第 200 至 207 段。

<sup>152</sup> 见 [S/2021/229](#) 号文件第 165 段中的定义，这是许多会员国的财务立法和行政指示中通常作出的定义。

119. 专家小组持相反意见，认为涉及在管理中相机抉择或租金收入的资产管理活动，即使这种收入仍被冻结，目前也不属于第 1970(2011)号决议第 19(a)段所述冻结资金的“基本开支”或“惯常置存或保管”范围。第 1970(2011)号决议第 19 至 21 段规定的豁免继续有效。任何豁免通知如果不属于任何现有规定的范围，则不得予以考虑，无论被指认实体是否能够动用被冻结资金。

120. 鉴于对第 1970(2011)号决议第 19 段的不同解释，专家小组继续协助委员会，就这一问题提供进一步的适当指导。这突出表明，需要监测第 1970(2011)号决议第 19 段关于积极管理规定的适用情况。<sup>153</sup>

## E. 其他问题

121. 利比亚投资管理局继续强调对其本身、利比亚阿拉伯对外投资公司和利比亚非洲投资组合及其各附属机构的制裁制度的关切问题。这些问题是：(a) 根据第 6 号执行援助通知，利息不可动用；(b) 负利率；(c) 无法再投资和维持现有投资；(d) 涉及会员国的程序问题。

122. 投资管理局称资产冻结是资金损失的主要原因，据一名国际顾问的审计报告估计，资金损失约为 40 亿美元。<sup>154</sup> 投资管理局认为，如果不能管理被冻结的资金，就无法对该机构进行妥善管理，投资管理局被迫耗尽其日益减少的未冻结资源，以支付其日常业务开支。它认为，对于一个需要灵活执行商业或战略决策的主权财富基金来说，许可证制度在功能上是不可行的。<sup>155</sup>

### 资产冻结环境下的负利率政策评估

123. 委员会已收到若干请求，要求根据会员国的国家立法，释放利比亚投资管理局的某些资金，以支付费用或佣金。第 1970(2011)号决议第 19(a)段经常被援引。其中一些请求涉及根据国家立法收取负利率。

124. 专家小组认为，在资金受到资产冻结措施限制的特殊情况下，商业银行采用的负利率政策是有问题的。这一政策导致冻结资金的流失，从而违背了制裁制度的目标，即为了利比亚人民的利益而保护这些资金。对长期现金余额实行负利率的银行政策，以阻止客户长期保留现金资金，这对投资管理局不利，因为投资管理局无法转移冻结资金以避免负利率。

125. 专家小组理解，这是会员国的国家问题，但建议在国家一级审查这一政策，看它是否适用于根据联合国制裁冻结的资产(见建议 6)。

<sup>153</sup> 见 S/2021/229，第 168 段，其中涉及积极管理的一些利比亚投资管理局和利比亚非洲投资组合的资产以及专家小组对此的看法。

<sup>154</sup> 同上，第 152 至 163 段。

<sup>155</sup> 专家小组会议(2021 年 9 月 20 日)。



## 七. 对被指认人员实施资产冻结和旅行禁令

### A. 萨阿迪·卡扎菲

126. 2021 年 9 月 6 日，民族统一政府宣布释放关押在的黎波里的萨阿迪·卡扎菲(LYi.015)(见附件 106)。利比亚官方消息人士向专家小组证实，他于 2021 年 9 月 5 日晚乘坐一架属于利比亚政府的飞机(达索猎鹰 900EX 型飞机，注册号 5A-DCN)离开利比亚，于 2021 年 9 月 6 日凌晨 1 时 37 分降落在土耳其伊斯坦布尔。专家小组于 2021 年 9 月 8 日致函土耳其和利比亚，并于 2021 年 11 月 17 日再次致函土耳其，提供了进一步的身份识别信息。未收到任何答复。专家小组继续进行调查。

### B. 阿布·扎伊德·奥马尔·杜尔达

127. 2022 年 2 月 27 日，媒体报道称阿布·扎伊德·奥马尔·杜尔达(LYi.006)去世。<sup>156</sup> 专家小组致函利比亚和埃及，这两个国家是他的名单条目中所列的国籍国和常住国。埃及答复说，杜尔达于 2022 年 2 月 28 日自然死亡，并提供了死亡证明复印件(见附件 107)。死亡证明包括一个额外的中间名——Hmeid(赫迈德)，给出的名字是 Abu Zayd Umar Hmeid Dorda(阿布·扎伊德·奥马尔·赫迈德·杜尔达)。没有收到利比亚的答复(见建议 5)。

### C. 长期旅行禁令豁免

128. 2020 年 12 月 1 日，委员会决定给予 3 名被列名个人 6 个月的“无限制”人道主义旅行豁免。<sup>157</sup> 这意味着，只要事先向委员会通报每次旅行的有关资料，获豁免的个人就可以在这段期间旅行，而不必为每次旅行单独申请豁免。这使委员会能够随时了解这些人的下落和旅行目的。

129. 此后，这一豁免不断延长，最近一次延期将于 2022 年 5 月 31 日到期。委员会在相关新闻稿和普通照会中告知所有会员国，<sup>158</sup> 根据委员会的工作准则和第 4 号执行援助通知，每次旅行的资料仍需在旅行前和旅行后一个月内提交。<sup>159</sup> 委员会还指出，“任何允许上述三人中任何一人入境或过境的國家，应在有关个人抵达或通过其境内后 48 小时内通知委员会。通知应以书面形式提交，注明入境日期和预期逗留时间”。

<sup>156</sup> 见 <https://al-ain.com/article/abuzeid-dorda-libya-intelligence>，2022 年 2 月 28 日；以及 [www.libyaobserver.ly/inbrief/former-regime-official-died-cairo](http://www.libyaobserver.ly/inbrief/former-regime-official-died-cairo)，2022 年 2 月 28 日。

<sup>157</sup> 见 [www.un.org/press/en/2020/sc14369.doc.htm](http://www.un.org/press/en/2020/sc14369.doc.htm)，2020 年 12 月 1 日。这些个人是萨菲亚·法尔卡什·巴拉西(LYi.019)；艾莎·穆阿迈尔·穆罕默德·阿布·明亚尔·卡扎菲(LYi.009)；穆罕默德·穆阿迈尔·卡扎菲(LYi.012)。

<sup>158</sup> 见 [www.un.org/press/en/2021/sc14543.doc.htm](http://www.un.org/press/en/2021/sc14543.doc.htm)，2021 年 6 月 7 日；以及 [www.un.org/press/en/2021/sc14718.doc.htm](http://www.un.org/press/en/2021/sc14718.doc.htm)，2021 年 12 月 3 日。

<sup>159</sup> 见 [www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1970/guidelines](http://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1970/guidelines)；以及 [www.un.org/securitycouncil/sites/www.un.org.securitycouncil/files/1970\\_ian4\\_0.pdf](http://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sites/www.un.org.securitycouncil/files/1970_ian4_0.pdf)。

130. 在本报告所述期间，有两名获豁免的个人前往或过境埃及、土耳其和(或)阿拉伯联合酋长国。这些会员国中没有一个根据委员会发布的上述指南通知委员会。阿曼和瑞士都根据该指南向委员会通报了获豁免个人的旅行情况。

131. 为了充分执行委员会的工作准则和第 4 号执行援助通知，可能需要向有关会员国及时提供更有针对性的信息(见建议 4)。

## 八. 建议

132. 专家小组建议：

### 给安全理事会的建议：

- 建议 1. 考虑要求会员国在使用海军舰艇或军用飞机向利比亚运送外交用品或人道主义或保护物品时通知委员会。[见第 60 段]
- 建议 2. 请利比亚政府根据第 2278(2016)号决议第 6 段，更新关于其协调人的信息，并提供与委员会关于政府控制下的安全部队结构的工作有关的信息。[见第 67 段]

### 给委员会的建议：

- 建议 3. 从制裁名单上的利比亚投资管理局条目(LYe.001)中删除别名“Libyan Foreign Investment Company (LFIC)”的信息，并考虑将利比亚对外投资公司(别名利比亚阿拉伯对外投资公司)作为单独的被指认实体列入制裁名单。[见第 112 段]
- 建议 4. 在委员会收到关于即将根据无限制旅行禁令豁免进行的旅行的信息时，提醒相关会员国注意其通知要求。[见第 131 段]
- 建议 5. 更新制裁名单上阿布·扎伊德·奥马尔·杜尔达(LYi.006)的条目，以反映他的死亡和增加的中间名。[见第 127 段]

### 给会员国的建议：

- 建议 6. 在国家负利率政策中考虑到根据联合国制裁制度应受资产冻结措施制约的资金的特殊情况。[见第 125 段]

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## Annex 1      Overview of the evolution of the Libya sanctions regime

1. By resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#), the Council expressed grave concern at the situation in Libya, condemned the violence and use of force against civilians and deplored the gross and systematic violation of human rights. Within that context, the Council imposed specific measures on Libya, under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, including the arms embargo, which relates to arms and related materiel of all types, including weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary equipment, and spare parts for the aforementioned, in addition to the provision of armed mercenary personnel. The arms embargo covers both arms entering and leaving Libya. The Council also imposed travel ban and asset freeze measures, and listed individuals as subject to one or both measures, in the resolution. Furthermore, the Council decided that the travel ban and the asset freeze were to apply to the individuals and entities designated by the Committee established pursuant to resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#) concerning Libya involved in or complicit in ordering, controlling or otherwise directing the commission of serious human rights abuses against persons in Libya.
2. By resolution [1973 \(2011\)](#), the Council strengthened the enforcement of the arms embargo and expanded the scope of the asset freeze to include the exercise of vigilance when doing business with Libyan entities, if States had information that provided reasonable grounds to believe that such business could contribute to violence and use of force against civilians. Additional individuals subject to the travel ban and asset freeze were listed in the resolution, in addition to five entities subject to the freeze. The Council decided that both measures were to apply also to individuals and entities determined to have violated the provisions of the previous resolution, in particular the provisions concerning the arms embargo. The resolution also included the authorization to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in Libya. In addition, it included a no-fly zone in the airspace of Libya and a ban on flights of Libyan aircraft.
3. On 24 June 2011, the Committee designated two additional individuals and one additional entity subject to the targeted measures. By resolution [2009 \(2011\)](#), the Council introduced additional exceptions to the arms embargo and removed two listed entities subject to the asset freeze, while allowing the four remaining listed entities to be subjected to a partial asset freeze. It also lifted the ban on flights of Libyan aircraft.
4. By resolution [2016 \(2011\)](#), the Council terminated the authorization related to the protection of civilians and the no-fly zone. On 16 December 2011, the Committee removed the names of two entities previously subject to the asset freeze.
5. In resolution [2040 \(2012\)](#), the Council directed the Committee, in consultation with the Libyan authorities, to review continuously the remaining measures with regard to the two listed entities – the Libyan Investment Authority and the Libyan Africa Investment Portfolio – and decided that the Committee was, in consultation with the Libyan authorities, to lift the designation of those entities as soon as practical.
6. In resolution [2095 \(2013\)](#), the Council further eased the arms embargo in relation to Libya concerning non-lethal military equipment.
7. By resolution [2144 \(2014\)](#), the Council stressed that Member States notifying to the Committee the supply, sale or transfer to Libya of arms and related materiel, including related ammunition and spare parts, should ensure such notifications contain all relevant information, and should not be resold to, transferred to, or made available for use by parties other than the designated end user.
8. By resolution [2146 \(2014\)](#), the Council decided to impose measures, on vessels to be designated by the Committee, in relation to attempts to illicitly export crude oil from Libya and authorized Member States to undertake inspections of such designated vessels.
9. By resolution [2174 \(2014\)](#), the Council introduced additional designation criteria and requested the Panel to provide information on individuals or entities engaging or providing support for acts that threaten the peace, stability of security of Libya or obstructing the completion of the political transition. The resolution strengthened the arms embargo, by requiring prior approval of the Committee for the supply, sale or transfer of arms and related materiel, including related ammunition and spare parts, to Libya intended for security or disarmament assistance to the Libyan government, with the exception of



non-lethal military equipment intended solely for the Libyan government. The Council also renewed its call upon Member States to undertake inspections related to the arms embargo, and required them to report on such inspections.

10. By resolution [2213 \(2015\)](#), the Council extended the authorizations and measures in relation to attempts to illicitly export crude oil from Libya until 31 March 2016. The resolution further elaborated the designation criteria listed in resolution [2174 \(2014\)](#).

11. By resolution [2214 \(2015\)](#), the Council called on the 1970 Committee on Libya to consider expeditiously arms embargo exemption requests by the Libyan government for the use by its official armed forces to combat specific terrorist groups named in that resolution.

12. By resolution [2259 \(2015\)](#), the Council confirmed that individuals and entities providing support for acts that threaten the peace, stability or security of Libya or that obstruct or undermine the successful completion of the political transition must be held accountable, and recalled the travel ban and asset freeze in this regard.

13. By resolution [2278 \(2016\)](#) the Council extended the authorizations and measures in relation to attempts to illicitly export crude oil, while calling on the Libyan Government of National Accord (GNA) to improve oversight and control over its oil sector, financial institutions and security forces.

14. By resolution [2292 \(2016\)](#), the Council authorized, for a period of twelve months, inspections on the high seas off the coast of Libya, of vessels that are believed to be carrying arms or related materiel to or from Libya, in violation of the arms embargo.

15. By resolution [2357 \(2017\)](#), the Council extended the authorizations set out in resolution [2292 \(2016\)](#) for a further 12 months.

16. By resolution [2362 \(2017\)](#), the Council extended until 15 November 2018 the authorizations provided by and the measures imposed by resolution [2146 \(2014\)](#), in relation to attempts to illicitly export crude oil from Libya. These measures were also applied with respect to vessels loading, transporting, or discharging petroleum, including crude oil and refined petroleum products, illicitly exported or attempted to be exported from Libya.

17. By resolution [2420 \(2018\)](#), the Council further extended the authorizations, as set out in resolution [2292 \(2016\)](#) and extended by resolution [2357 \(2017\)](#), for a further 12 months from the date of adoption of the resolution.

18. By resolution [2441 \(2018\)](#), the Council extended until 15 February 2020 the authorizations provided by and the measures imposed by resolution [2362 \(2017\)](#), in relation to attempts to illicitly export crude oil from Libya.

19. By resolution [2473 \(2019\)](#), the Council further extended the authorizations, as set out in resolution [2292 \(2016\)](#) and extended by resolutions [2357 \(2017\)](#) and [2420 \(2018\)](#), for a further 12 months from the date of adoption of the resolution.

20. By resolution [2509 \(2020\)](#), the Council extended until 30 April 2021 the authorizations and the measures in resolution 2146 (2014), as amended by paragraph 2 of resolutions [2362 \(2017\)](#) and [2441 \(2018\)](#), and modified the designation period in paragraph 11 of resolution 2146 (2014) to be one year, and requested the Panel to report any information relating to the illicit export from or illicit import to Libya of petroleum, including crude oil and refined petroleum products.

21. By resolution [2526 \(2020\)](#), the Council further extended the authorizations, as set out in resolution [2292 \(2016\)](#) and extended by resolutions [2357 \(2017\)](#), [2420 \(2018\)](#), and [2473 \(2019\)](#), for a further 12 months from the date of adoption of the resolution.

22. By resolution [2571 \(2021\)](#), the Council extended until 30 July 2022 the authorizations and the measures in resolution 2146 (2014), as amended by paragraph 2 of resolutions [2362 \(2017\)](#), [2441 \(2018\)](#) and [2509 \(2020\)](#), in relation to attempts to illicitly export petroleum, including crude oil and refined petroleum products, from Libya.

23. By resolution [2578 \(2021\)](#), the Council further extended the authorizations, as set out in resolution [2292 \(2016\)](#) and extended by resolutions [2357 \(2017\)](#), [2420 \(2018\)](#), [2473 \(2019\)](#), and [2526 \(2020\)](#) for a further 12 months from the date of adoption of the resolution.

24. To date the Committee has published six implementation assistance notices which are available on the Committee's website.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> <http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1970/notices.shtml>.

## Annex 2      Abbreviations and acronyms

AQIM	Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb
BPD	Barrels Per Day
CBL	Central Bank of Libya
CCMSR	Conseil de Commandement Militaire pour le Salut de la République
CEO	Chief Executive Officer
ChVK	Russian language abbreviation for private military enterprise
Committee	Committee established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1970 (2011) concerning Libya
DCIM	Directorate for Combating Illegal Migration
DCSIM	Department for Combating Settlement and Illegal Migration
DOB	Date of Birth
ECBL	Eastern Central Bank of Libya
EOD	Explosive Ordnance Disposal
EUNAVFOR	EU Naval Force Mediterranean
EUR	Euro
FACT	Front pour l'Alternance et la Concorde au Tchad
FMCG	Fast Moving Consumer Goods
FNDJT	Front de la Nation pour la Démocratie et la Justice
FZE	Free Zone Enterprise (UAE)
GACS	General Administration for Coastal Security
GMMR	Great Man Made River
GNA	Government of National Accord
GNA-AF	Government of National Accord Affiliated Forces
GNU	Government of National Unity
HAF	Haftar Affiliated Forces
HNEC	High National Election Commission
HoR	House of Representatives
IAN	Implementation Assistance Notice
IFSWF	International Forum of Sovereign Wealth Funds
IHL	International Humanitarian Law
IHRL	International Human Rights Law
IMO	International Maritime Organization
ISIL	Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant
JMC	Joint Military Commission
JPA	Juba Peace Agreement
km	Kilometre(s)
LAAF	Libyan Arab Armed Forces (HAF)
LAFICO	Libyan Arab Foreign Investment Company
LAIP	Libyan Africa Investment Portfolio
LCG	Libyan Coast Guard
LFB	Libyan Foreign Bank
LFIC	Libyan Foreign Investment Company
LIA	Libyan Investment Authority
LIA	Libyan Investment Authority
LIDCO	Libyan Investment and Development Company
LN	Libyan Navy
LNA	Libyan National Army (now LAAF)

LPDF	Libyan Political Dialogue Forum
LYD	Libyan Dinar(s)
m	Metre(s)
MAV	Military Armoured Vehicle
MRCC	Maritime Rescue and Coordination Centre
MV	Motor Vessel
NGO	Non-governmental organization
nm	Nautical Miles
NOC	National Oil Corporation
Panel	Panel of Experts
PC	Presidency Council
PFG	Petroleum Facility Guard
PMC	Private Military Company
PMO	Project Management Office
RHIB	Rigid Hulled Inflatable Boats
RTGS	Real-Time Gross Settlement System
SAR	Search and Rescue
SCMS	Susah Combat Marine Squadron
SDF	Special Deterrence Force
SLA/AW	Sudan Liberation Army/Abdul Wahid
SSA	Stability Support Apparatus
SWF	Sovereign Wealth Funds
TBM	Tactical Ballistic Missile(s)
TBZ	Tariq Ibn Ziyad (brigade)
ToR	Terms of Reference
TRB	Tripoli Revolutionary Brigade
UAE	United Arab Emirates
UFR	Union des Forces de la Resistance
UN	United Nations
UNCLOS	United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
UNSMIL	UN Support Mission in Libya
USD	United States Dollars
WMO	World Meteorological Organization

## Annex 3      Methodology

1. The Panel ensured compliance with the methodological standards recommended by the Informal Working Group of the Security Council on General Issues of Sanctions (S/2006/997). Those standards call for reliance on verified, genuine documents and concrete evidence and on-site observations by the experts, including taking photographs, wherever possible. When physical inspection is not possible, the Panel will seek to corroborate information using multiple, independent sources to appropriately meet the highest achievable standard, placing a higher value on statements by principal actors and first-hand witnesses to events.
2. The Panel used satellite imagery of Libya procured by the United Nations from private providers to support investigations, as well as open-source imagery. Commercial databases recording maritime and aviation data were referenced. Public statements by officials through their official media channels were accepted as factual unless contrary facts were established. Any mobile phone records from service providers were also accepted as factual. While the Panel wishes to be as transparent as possible, in situations in which identifying sources would have exposed them or others to unacceptable safety risks, the Panel decided not to include identifying information in this document and instead placed the relevant evidence in United Nations secure archives.
3. The Panel reviewed social media, but no information gathered was used as evidence unless it could be corroborated using multiple independent or technical sources, including eyewitnesses, to appropriately meet the highest achievable standard of proof.
4. The spelling of toponyms within Libya often depends on the ethnicity of the source or the quality of transliteration. The Panel has adopted a consistent approach in the present update. All major locations in Libya are spelled or referenced as per the UN Geographical Information System (GIS) map at appendix A.
5. The Panel has placed importance on the rule of consensus among the Panel members and agreed that, if differences and/or reservations arise during the development of reports, it would only adopt the text, conclusions and recommendations by a majority of five out of the six members including the Coordinator. In the event of a recommendation for designation of an individual or a group, such recommendation would be done based on unanimity.
6. The Panel is committed to impartiality in investigating incidents of non-compliance by any party.
7. The Panel is equally committed to the highest degree of fairness and has offered the opportunity to reply to Member States, entities and individuals involved in the majority of incidents that are covered in this update. Their response has been taken into consideration in the Panel's findings. The methodology for this is provided in appendix B.
8. The Panel's methodology, in relation to its investigations concerning IHL, IHRL and human rights abuses, is provided in appendix C.

## Appendix A to Annex 3: UN GIS place name identification

Figure 3.1

UN GIS place names Libya





## Appendix B to Annex 3: ‘The opportunity to reply’ methodology used by the Panel

1. Although sanctions are meant to be preventative not punitive, it should be recognized that the mere naming of an individual or entity<sup>2</sup> in a Panel’s report could have adverse effects on the individual. As such, where possible, individuals concerned should be provided with an opportunity to provide their account of events and to provide concrete and specific information/material in support. Through this interaction, the individual is given the opportunity to demonstrate that their alleged conduct does not fall within the relevant listing criteria. This is called the ‘opportunity to reply’.
2. The Panel’s methodology on the opportunity to reply is as follows:
  - (a) Providing an individual with an ‘opportunity to reply’ should be the norm;
  - (b) The Panel may decide not to offer an opportunity of reply if there is credible evidence that it would unduly prejudice its investigations, including if it would:
  - (c) Result in the individual moving assets if they get warning of a possible recommendation for designation;
  - (d) Restrict further access of the Panel to vital sources;
  - (e) Endanger Panel sources or Panel members;
  - (f) Adversely and gravely impact humanitarian access for humanitarian actors in the field; or
  - (g) For any other reason that can be clearly demonstrated as reasonable and justifiable in the prevailing circumstances.
3. If the circumstances set forth in 2 (b) do not apply, then the Panel should be able to provide an individual an opportunity to reply.
4. The individual should be able to communicate directly with the Panel to convey their personal determination as to the level and nature of their interaction with the Panel.
5. Interactions between the Panel and the individual should be direct, unless in exceptional circumstances.
6. In no circumstances can third parties, without the knowledge of the individual, determine for the individual its level of interaction with the Panel.
7. The individual, on the other hand, in making their determination of the level and nature of interaction with the Panel, may consult third parties or allow third parties (for example, legal representative or his/her government) to communicate on his/her behalf on subsequent interactions with the Panel.

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<sup>2</sup> Hereinafter just the term individual will be used to reflect both.

### **Appendix C to Annex 3: Violations relating to IHL, IHRL, and acts that constitute human rights abuses investigative methodology**

1. The Panel's methodology, in relation to its investigations concerning IHL, IHRL and human rights abuses, is set out as below:

- (a) All Panel investigations are initiated based on verifiable information being made available to the Panel, either directly from sources or from media reports.
- (b) In carrying out any investigations on the use of explosive ordnance against the civilian population, the Panel will rely on at least three or more of the following sources of information:
  - (i) At least two eye-witnesses or victims;
  - (ii) At least one individual or organization (either local or international) that has also independently investigated the incident;
  - (iii) If there are casualties associated with the incident, and if the casualties are less than ten in number, the Panel obtains copies of death certificates and medical certificates. In incidents relating to mass casualties, the Panel relies on published information from the United Nations and other organizations;
  - (iv) Technical evidence, which includes imagery of explosive events such as the impact damage, blast effects, and recovered fragmentation. In all cases, the Panel collects imagery from at least two different and unrelated sources. In the rare cases where the Panel has had to rely on open-source imagery, the Panel verifies that imagery by referring it to eye or by checking for pixilation distortion;
    - a. In relation to air strikes, the Panel often identifies the responsible party through crater analysis or by the identification of components from imagery of fragmentation; and
    - b. The Panel also analyses imagery of the ground splatter pattern at the point of impact from mortar, artillery, or free flight rocket fire to identify the direction from which the incoming ordnance originated. This is one indicator to assist in the identification of the perpetrator for ground fire when combined with other source information.
  - (v) The utilisation of open source or purchased satellite imagery wherever possible, to identify the exact location of an incident, and to support analysis of the type and extent of destruction. Such imagery may also assist in the confirmation of timelines of the incident;
  - (vii) Access to investigation reports and other documentation of local and international organizations that have independently investigated the incident;
  - (vii) Other documentation that supports the narrative of sources, for example, factory manuals that may prove that the said factory is technically incapable of producing weapons of the type it is alleged to have produced;
  - (viii) In rare instances where the Panel has doubt as to the veracity of available facts from other sources, local sources are relied on to collect specific and verifiable information from the ground. (For example, if the Panel wished to confirm the presence of an armed group in a particular area);
  - (ix) Statements issued by or on behalf of a party to the conflict responsible for the incident; and/or
  - (x) Open-source information to identify other corroborative or contradictory information regarding the Panel's findings.
- (c) In carrying out its investigations on deprivation of liberty and associated violations the Panel relies on the following sources of information:

- (i) The victims, where they are able and willing to speak to the Panel, and where medical and security conditions are conducive to such an interview;
  - (ii) The relatives of victims and others who had access to the victims while in custody. This is particularly relevant in instances where the victim dies in custody;
  - (iii) Interviews with at least one individual or organization (either local or international) that has also independently investigated the incident;
  - (iv) Medical documentation and, where applicable, death certificates;
  - (v) Documentation issued by prison authorities;
  - (vi) Interviews with medical personnel who treated the victim, wherever possible;
  - (vii) Investigation and other documentation from local and international organizations that have independently investigated the incident. The Panel may also seek access to court documents if the detainee is on trial or other documentation that proves or disproves the narrative of the victim;
  - (viii) Where relevant, the Panel uses local sources to collect specific and verifiable information from the ground, for example, medical certificates;
  - (ix) Statements issued by the party to the conflict responsible for the incident; and/or
  - (x) Open-source information to identify other corroborative or contradictory information regarding the Panel's findings.
- (d) In carrying out its investigations on other violations, which can include forced displacement and threats against medical workers, the Panel relies on information that includes:
- (i) Interviews with victims, eyewitnesses, and direct reports where they are able and willing to speak to the Panel, and where conditions are conducive to such an interview;
  - (ii) Interviews with at least one individual or organization (either local or international) that has also independently investigated the incident;
  - (iii) Documentation relevant to verify information obtained;
  - (iv) Statements issued by the party to the conflict responsible for the incident; and/or
  - (v) Open-source information to identify other corroborative or contradictory information regarding the Panel's findings.
- (e) Upon completion of its investigation, wherever possible, the Panel provides those responsible with an opportunity to respond to the Panel's findings in so far as it relates to the attribution of responsibility. Detailed information on incidents will not be provided when there is a credible threat that would threaten Panel sources.
- (f) If a party does not provide the Panel with the information requested, as called upon by paragraph 14 of resolution [2571 \(2021\)](#), the Panel may consider this for reporting to the Committee.

2. The Panel will not include information in its reports that may identify or endanger its sources. Where it is necessary to bring such information to the attention of the Council or the Committee, the Panel may include more source information in confidential annexes.

3. The Panel will not divulge any information that may lead to the identification of victims, witnesses, and other particularly vulnerable Panel sources, except: 1) with the specific permission of the sources; and 2) where the Panel is, based on its own assessment, certain that these individuals would not suffer any danger as a result. The Panel stands ready to

provide the Council or the Committee, on request, with any additional imagery and documentation to supports the Panel's findings beyond that included in its reports. Appropriate precautions will be taken though to protect the anonymity of its sources.

## Annex 4 Member States, organizations and institutions consulted

This list excludes individuals and certain organisations or entities with whom the Panel met, in order to maintain the confidentiality of the source(s) and so as not to impede the ongoing investigations of the Panel.

Table 4.1

Member States, organizations and institutions consulted <sup>a b c</sup>

<i>Country/ Location</i>	<i>Government</i>	<i>Representative or International Organization</i>	<i>Institution / NGO</i>
Algeria		Permanent Mission to the UN	
Australia			Federal Police <sup>c</sup>
Austria	Ministry of Foreign Affairs <sup>c</sup>	Permanent Mission to the UN <sup>c</sup> UNODC <sup>c</sup> Office of the Public Prosecutor <sup>c</sup>	
Belgium		EU EEAS	
Chad		Permanent Mission to the UN <sup>c</sup>	
China <sup>a</sup>		Permanent Mission to the UN	
Cyprus	Ministry of Foreign Affairs <sup>c</sup>		
Egypt		Permanent Mission to the UN <sup>c</sup>	
France <sup>a</sup>	Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Permanent Mission to the UN Embassy to Libya (in Tunis) UNESCO <sup>c</sup>	NGOs
Germany		Embassy to Libya (in Tunis)	NGOs <sup>c</sup>
India <sup>b</sup>		Permanent Mission to the UN <sup>c</sup>	
Ireland <sup>b</sup>	Ministry of Foreign Affairs <sup>c</sup>	Permanent Mission to the UN	
Italy	Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other ministries and departments	Permanent Mission to the UN <sup>c</sup> HQ EU NAVFOR Guardia di Finanza Office of the Public Prosecutor	NGOs
Jordan		Permanent Mission to the UN <sup>c</sup>	
Kazakhstan			Civil Aviation Authority <sup>c</sup>
Libya	Ministry of Foreign Affairs, security agencies	Permanent Mission to the UN IOM <sup>c</sup> UNHCR UNICEF <sup>c</sup> UNSMIL UNODC <sup>c</sup>	Designated entities, Office of the Attorney General, CBL NOC NGOs

<i>Country/ Location</i>	<i>Government</i>	<i>Representative or International Organization</i>	<i>Institution / NGO</i>
Liechtenstein		Permanent Mission to the UN <sup>c</sup>	
Malta	Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Permanent Mission to the UN	NGOs
Mexico <sup>b</sup>		Permanent Mission to the UN	
Netherlands		Embassy to Libya	
Nigeria		Permanent Mission to the UN <sup>c</sup>	
Norway		Permanent Mission to the UN	
Poland		FRONTEX <sup>c</sup>	
Russian Federation		Permanent Mission to the UN <sup>c</sup>	
Serbia	Ministry of Foreign Affairs		
Sweden	Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Inspectorate for Strategic Products) <sup>c</sup>		
Switzerland		UN OHCHR	NGOs
Tunisia	Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other ministries and departments	EU Delegation to Libya EUBAM <sup>c</sup> UNODC <sup>c</sup>	NGOs
Turkey		Permanent Mission to the UN Embassy to Libya	
United Kingdom <sup>a</sup>	Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, and Treasury <sup>c</sup>	Permanent Mission to the UN	NGOs
UAE		Permanent Mission to the UN	
USA <sup>a</sup>	State Department and other departments	Mission to the UN SRSG SVC <sup>c d</sup> SRSG CAAC <sup>c e</sup>	C4ADS <sup>c</sup>

<sup>a</sup> Countries indicated ‘a’ are permanent members of the Security Council.

<sup>b</sup> Countries indicated ‘b’ are non-permanent members of the Security Council (2022).

<sup>c</sup> Via VTC or other electronic platform only.

<sup>d</sup> Sexual Violence in Conflict.

<sup>e</sup> Children and Armed Conflict.



## Annex 5 Summary of Panel correspondence

Table 5.1

**Correspondence with Member States (2571 (2021) Mandate)<sup>3</sup>**  
**(15 May 2021 to 25 April 2022)<sup>a</sup>**

<i>Member State / country</i>	<i># letters sent by the Panel<sup>b</sup></i>	<i># replies from Member State</i>	<i># awaiting reply from Member State</i>
Armenia	1	1	0
Azerbaijan	1	1	0
Belarus	4	4	0
Bulgaria	1	1	0
Chad	4	2	2
Cyprus	3	3	0
Egypt	4	3	1
France	2	2	0
India	1	1	0
Greece	2	0	2
Iran (Islamic Republic of)	1	1	0
Italy	4	2	2
Jordan	4	1	3
Kazakhstan	1	1	0
Kyrgyz Republic	9	7	2
Lebanon	1	0	1
Libya	24	3	21
Moldova	2	1	1
Qatar	2	1	1
Russian Federation	4	3	1
Saudi Arabia	1	0	1
South Africa	3	0	3
Sudan	4	1	3
Tunisia	1	1	0
Turkey	15	7	8
Turkmenistan	1	1	0
Uganda	1	0	1

<sup>3</sup> Excluding updates to the Committee, letters to the Chair or visa requests to Member States.

<i>Member State / country</i>	<i># letters sent by the Panel <sup>b</sup></i>	<i># replies from Member State</i>	<i># awaiting reply from Member State</i>
Ukraine	3	2	1
United Arab Emirates	7	4	3
United Kingdom	2	2	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>113</b>	<b>56</b>	<b>57</b>

<sup>a</sup> 15 May 2021 being the date the Panel was appointed pursuant to resolution [2571 \(2021\)](#), and 25 April 2022 being the last date for which responses had been requested by the Panel. Letters requesting responses after 25 April 2022 are not included in the table.

Table 5.2

**Correspondence with regional organizations and other entities (2571 (2021) Mandate)  
(15 May 2021 to 25 April 2022) <sup>a</sup>**

<i>Organization or entity</i>	<i># letters sent by the Panel</i>	<i># replies <sup>b</sup></i>	<i># awaiting reply</i>
Attorney General's Office Libya	2	0	2
European Union (FRONTEX)	2	1	1
<i>Front pour l'Alternance et la Concorde au Tchad</i>	1	1	0
HAF LAAF	1	0	1
Libyan Investment Authority	1	1	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>

<sup>a</sup> 15 May 2021 being the date the Panel was appointed pursuant to resolution [2571 \(2021\)](#), and 25 April 2022 being the last date for which responses had been requested by the Panel.

Table 5.3

**Correspondence with commercial companies (2571 (2021) Mandate)  
(15 May 2021 to 25 April 2022) <sup>a</sup>**

<i>Organization or entity</i>	<i># letters sent by the Panel</i>	<i># replies <sup>b</sup></i>	<i># awaiting reply</i>
Aerobusiness FZE, UAE	1	0	1
Africo 1, Lebanon	1	0	1
Airbus, France	1	1	0
Akar Group, Turkey	1	0	1
Alpha Express, Ukraine	1	0	1
Antonov Airlines, Ukraine	1	0	1

<i>Organization or entity</i>	<i># letters sent by the Panel</i>	<i># replies <sup>b</sup></i>	<i># awaiting reply</i>
AR Global FZE, UAE	1	0	1
Arkas Denizcilik Ve Nakliyat, Turkey	1	0	1
CAE Aviation LLP, Luxembourg	1	1	0
Ceha Hempel LLP, Austria	1	0	1
CMA CGM, France	1	1	0
EOTech Ltd, USA	1	1	0
Grimaldi Group SpA, Italy	1	1	0
Hilton Group, USA	1	1	0
Holman Fenwick Willan MEA LLP, UAE	4	3	1
Iveco D.V, Italy	1	1	0
Jabal Alkowf, Libya	1	0	1
Jamaluddin Trading, UAE	1	0	1
Jeep LLC, USA	1	1	0
Kapeks Kimya Sanayi A.S, Turkey	1	1	0
L3 Harris LLC, USA	1	0	1
Mehdi Bros, India	1	1	0
Meridien Airlines FZE, UAE	2	1	1
MNG Airlines, Turkey	1	1	0
MSPV LLC, UAE	1	1	0
Novi Automax LLC, UAE	1	0	1
RAK Leisure FZE, UAE	1	0	1
Roland Aviation FZE, UAE	2	0	2
Sberbank Magyarorszag Zrt, Hungary	1	1	0
South Florida Jeeps Ltd, USA	1	0	1
Space Cargo FZE, UAE	6	6	0
Steyr Arms, Austria	1	1	0
Sur Arms, Turkey	1	1	0
Syrian Arab Airlines, Syria	2	0	2
Toba Ship Management, Marshall Islands	1	1	0
Toyota Motor Company, Japan	1	0	1
ZMT LLC, Poland	1	0	1
<b>Total</b>	<b>48</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>22</b>

<sup>a</sup> 15 May 2021 being the date the Panel was appointed pursuant to resolution [2571 \(2021\)](#), and 25 April 2022 being the last date for which responses had been requested by the Panel.

## Annex 6 Urgent expenditures committed by the GNU

### Panel's observations:

- Line 16 allocates LYD 16.8 million to the Stability Support Agency
- Line 24 allocates LYD 15 million to the Internal Security Service
- Line 65 allocates LYD 25 million to the Joint Task Force
- Line 87 allocates LYD 15 million to the Special Deterrence Force

Figure 6.1

Urgent expenditures committed by the GNU (source: Confidential Source)

إدارة الميزانية قسم التمويل موقف بما تم تمويله على الباب الخامس (نفقات الطوارئ) للعام 2021م						
2021 / 08 / 19						
ملاحظات	5,000,000,000	القيمة	رقم آذن التمويل	رقم الكتاب أو القرار	الجهة	ت
	4,900,000,000	100,000,000	3204	قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (16) لسنة 2021م	وزارة الصحة	1
	4,882,000,000	18,000,000	3221	كتاب رئيس مجلس الوزراء رقم (660) بتاريخ 2021/4/5	ديوان وزارة المواصلات	2
	4,876,182,236	5,817,764	3228	كتابي وزير الدولة (1524) - (1569) بتاريخ 2021/4/21-20	وزارة الصحة	3
	4,849,182,236	27,000,000	3233	قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (54) لسنة 2021م	وزارة الداخلية	4
	4,845,082,236	4,100,000	3234	قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (49) لسنة 2021م	وزارة الثروة البحرية	5
	4,775,082,236	70,000,000	3235	قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (50) لسنة 2021م	الجهات التنفيذية للطيران الخاص	6
	4,690,082,236	85,000,000	3236	قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (44) لسنة 2021م	جهاز تنمية وتطوير المراكز الإدارية	7
	4,540,082,236	150,000,000	3237	قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (53) لسنة 2021م	وزارة الدفاع	8
	4,534,082,236	6,000,000	3238	قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (62) لسنة 2021م	ديوان مجلس الوزراء	9
	4,524,082,236	10,000,000	4239	قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (69) لسنة 2021م	وزارة الحكم المحلي - شركة الخدمات العامة طرابلس	10
	4,523,818,236	264,000	4241	قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (67) لسنة 2021	وزارة الإسكان والتعمير	11
	4,433,470,616	90,347,620	4843	قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (85) لسنة 2021	وزارة المواصلات لصيانة الطائرات	12
	4,383,470,616	50,000,000	5609	قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (144) لسنة 2021 مكتب وزير الدولة رقم (4668) بتاريخ 13/6/2021م	مكتب النائب العام	13
	4,371,167,335	12,303,281	5610	قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (111) لسنة 2021م	وزارة الحكم المحلي - شركة الخدمات العامة طرابلس	14
	4,356,167,335	15,000,000	5611	قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (114) لسنة 2021م	ديوان وزارة الخارطة	15
	4,339,367,335	16,800,000	5766	قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (127) لسنة 2021م	جهاز دعم الاستقرار	16
	4,329,367,335	10,000,000	5767	قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (124) لسنة 2021م	المجلس الرئاسي	17
	4,279,367,335	50,000,000	5768	قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (131) لسنة 2021م	جهاز المخابرات الليبية	18
	4,271,712,335	7,655,000	5769	قرار رئيس مجلس الوزراء رقم (144) لسنة 2021م	قوة مكافحة الارهاب	19
	4,269,312,335	2,400,000	5770	قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (123) لسنة 2021م	ديوان وزارة الاقتصاد والتجارة	20
	4,252,640,770	16,671,565	5771	قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (105) لسنة 2021م	المركز الوطني للأمن وإدارة الأزمات	21
	4,242,640,770	10,000,000	5772	قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (128) لسنة 2021م	وزارة الرياضة	22
	4,240,648,583	1,992,187	5773	قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (130) لسنة 2021م	وزارة الحكم المحلي - بلدية العزيزية	23

إدارة الميزانية  
قسم التمويل  
موقف بما تم تمويله على الباب الخامس (نفقات الطوارئ) للعام 2021م

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ت	الجهة	رقم الكتاب أو القرار	رقم أذن التمويل	القيمة	5,000,000,000	ملاحظات
24	جهاز الأمن الداخلي	قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (129) لسنة 2021م	5774	15,000,000	4,225,648,583	
25	وزارة الدفاع	قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (106) لسنة 2021م	5878	8,000,000	4,217,648,583	
26	جهاز الردع لمكافحة الجريمة المنظمة والإرهاب	قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (138) لسنة 2021م	5991	15,000,000	4,202,648,583	
27	ديوان وزارة الاقتصاد والصناعة	قرار مجلس الوزراء حكومة الوحدة الوطنية رقم (58) لسنة 2021م	6868	4,707,820	4,197,940,763	
28	ديوان وزارة المواصلات		6869	22,993,349	4,174,947,414	
29	وزارة الصحة		6870	1,080,702	4,173,866,712	
30	وزارة الإسكان والمرافق		6871	5,207,130	4,168,659,582	
31	الهيئة العامة للموارد المائية		6872	8,190,678	4,160,468,904	
32	ديوان الهيئة العامة للثقافة والمجتمع المدني		6873	3,134,180	4,157,334,724	
33	هيئة المشروعات العامة		6874	1,714,806	4,155,619,918	
34	الهيئة العامة لتشجيع الاستثمار وشؤون الخصخصة		6875	11,955,823	4,143,664,095	
35	دار الإفتاء الليبية	قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (134) لسنة 2021م	6876	3,000,000	4,140,664,095	
36	المحكمة العليا	قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (142) لسنة 2021م	6877	10,000,000	4,130,664,095	
37	وزارة التربية والتعليم	قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (137) لسنة 2021م	6878	10,000,000	4,120,664,095	
38	وزارة السياحة والصناعات التقليدية	قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (146) لسنة 2021م	6879	3,000,000	4,117,664,095	
39	وزارة الصناعة والمعادن	قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (145) لسنة 2021م	6880	2,000,000	4,115,664,095	
40	وزارة المواصلات (مصلحة المطارات)	قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (147) لسنة 2021م	6881	2,000,000	4,113,664,095	
41	وزارة الداخلية (جهاز المباحث الجنائية)	قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (148) لسنة 2021م	6882	10,000,000	4,103,664,095	
42	ديوان وزارة الاقتصاد والصناعة	قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (58) لسنة 2021م	6883	10,800	4,103,653,295	
43	جهاز تنمية وتطوير المراكز الإدارية		6884	13,648,849	4,090,004,446	
44	وزارة الإسكان والمرافق		6885	907,604	4,089,096,842	
45	الهيئة العامة لتشجيع الاستثمار وشؤون الخصخصة		6886	2,280,960	4,086,815,882	
46	جهاز استثمار مياه النهر الصناعي - الحصانة		6889	179,040	4,086,636,842	
47	الهيئة العامة لتشجيع الاستثمار وشؤون الخصخصة		6890	140,904	4,086,495,938	
48	وزارة الإسكان والمرافق		6891	44,748	4,086,451,190	

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2021 / 08 / 19

ت	الجهة	رقم الكتاب أو القرار	رقم آذن التمويل	القيمة	5,000,000,000	ملاحظات
49	ديوان مجلس الوزراء	قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (156) لسنة 2021م	6895	10,000,000	4,076,451,190	
50	وزارة الدفاع	قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (244) لسنة 2021م	6896	200,000,000	3,876,451,190	
51	شركة الخدمات العامة طرابلس	قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (162) لسنة 2021م	6897	17,015,180	3,859,436,010	
52	وزارة الحكم المحلي	قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (243) لسنة 2021م	6898	45,000,000	3,814,436,010	
53	ديوان مجلس الوزراء	قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (240) لسنة 2021م	6899	10,000,000	3,804,436,010	
54	الرقابة على الأغذية والأدوية	قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (181) لسنة 2021م	6900	23,300,000	3,781,136,010	
55	وزارة الحكم المحلي	قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (168) لسنة 2021م	6901	13,131,878	3,768,004,133	
56	وزارة التعليم العالي	قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (238) لسنة 2021م	6902	19,700,000	3,748,304,133	
57	وزارة الحكم المحلي - بلدية مصراته	قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (254) لسنة 2021م	6904	8,000,000	3,740,304,133	
58	وزارة الصحة	قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (227) لسنة 2021م	6905	500,000,000	3,240,304,133	
59	وزارة الصحة	قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (248) لسنة 2021م	6906	600,000,000	2,640,304,133	
60	صندوق الضمان الاجتماعي	قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (247) لسنة 2021م	6907	500,000,000	2,140,304,133	
61	المجلس الأعلى للدولة	قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (157) لسنة 2021م	6908	50,000,000	2,090,304,133	
62	وزارة الحكم المحلي - بلدية طبرق	قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (150) لسنة 2021م	6909	4,910,365	2,085,393,768	
63	ديوان مجلس الوزراء	قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (152) لسنة 2021م	6910	15,000,000	2,070,393,768	
64	شركة الخدمات العامة طرابلس	قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (161) لسنة 2021م	6911	10,552,500	2,059,835,268	
65	قوة العمليات المشتركة	قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (158) لسنة 2021م	6912	25,000,000	2,034,835,268	
66	مركز زليتن الطبي	قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (255) لسنة 2021م	6913	6,000,000	2,028,835,268	
67	المفوضية الوطنية للانتخابات	قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (143) لسنة 2021م	6915	50,000,000	1,978,835,268	
68	مركز بحوث التقنيات الحيوية	قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (265) لسنة 2021م	6916	5,000,000	1,973,835,268	
69	وزارة الدفاع	قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (239) لسنة 2021م	6917	300,000,000	1,673,835,268	
70	وزارة الداخلية	قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (246) لسنة 2021م	6918	500,000,000	1,173,835,268	
71	التعليم التقني والفني	قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (164) لسنة 2021م	6919	2,000,000	1,171,835,268	



إدارة الميزانية  
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ت	الجهة	رقم الكتاب أو القرار	رقم إذن التمويل	القيمة	ملاحظات
72	الهيئة العامة للبحوث والتعرف على الملقطين	قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (144) لسنة 2021م	6920	3,000,000	1,168,835,268
73	ديوان مجلس الوزراء	قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (272) لسنة 2021م	6921	50,000,000	1,118,835,268
74	وزارة الحكم المحلي	قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (78) لسنة 2021م	7473	6,000,000	1,112,835,268
75	وزارة العمل	قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (287) لسنة 2021م	7309	10,000,000	1,102,835,268
76	المحكمة العليا	قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (289) لسنة 2021م	7310	3,011,000	1,099,824,268
77	المركز الليبي للبحوث والدراسات الاستراتيجية والأمن القومي	قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (155) لسنة 2021م	8082	25,000,000	1,074,824,268
78	وزارة الموارد المائية	قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (286) لسنة 2021م	8090	5,000,000	1,069,824,268
79	وزارة الشباب	قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (293) لسنة 2021م	8091	12,000,000	1,057,824,268
80	وزارة المواصلات	قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (296) لسنة 2021م	8092	3,000,000	1,054,824,268
81	وزارة المواصلات (تتبع المشروعات الخارجية بشؤون البحرية (زوارع طرابلس مطروح)	قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (295) لسنة 2021م	8093	10,000,000	1,044,824,268
82	مصنع الطيران المدني	قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (297) لسنة 2021م	8095	5,000,000	1,039,824,268
83	مصنع الطائرات	قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (297) لسنة 2021م	8095	15,000,000	1,024,824,268
84	وزارة الثقافة والتراثية المتحفية	قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (276) لسنة 2021م	8096	4,000,000	1,020,824,268
85	وزارة الخدمة المدنية	قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (277) لسنة 2021م	8097	4,000,000	1,016,824,268
86	الجامعة الليبية	قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (318) لسنة 2021م	8101	120,000	1,016,704,268
87	جهاز الردع لمكافحة الجريمة المنظمة والإرهاب	قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (327) لسنة 2021م	8102	15,000,000	1,001,704,268
88	صندوق تسوية ممرات التعاملات بالاشتراك	قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (58) لسنة 2021م	8103	7,670,700	994,033,568
89	وزارة الدفاع	قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (140) لسنة 2021م	6746	34,653,450	تمت الاجراء
90	الثروة البحرية	قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (140) لسنة 2021م	8104	7,996,950	تمت الاجراء
	الإجمالي			4,048,616,832	

رئيس قسم التمويل

الرصد المتبقي في حساب الطوارئ حتي 25 أغسطس  
951.383.168

اعداد  
كريمة الشهوبى  
محمد بحر احمد

2	بالقر مخصص قرار تبني ميثاق الشركات المتعددة	قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم ( 58 ) لسنة 2021م	16.131.907	تحت الأجراء
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إدارة الميزانية  
قسم التمويل  
موقف بما تم تمويله على الباب الخامس (نفقات الطوارئ) للعام 2021م

2021 / 08 / 19

ت	الجهة	رقم القتب أو القرار	رقم ائن التمويل	القيمة	ملاحظات
				5,000,000,000	

		الباقى للشركات			
2	باقى مخصص قرار تسوية مرئيات الشركات المستعرة	قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم ( 58 ) لسنة 2021م		16,131,907	تم تخصيص مائة مليون للشركات المستعرة
	الإجمالي			4,064,748,739	

## Annex 7 Letter addressed by the 5+5 Joint Military Commission (JMC) to the Presidential Council and to the Prime Minister

Figure 7.1

Letter addressed by the 5+5 Joint Military Commission (JMC) to the Presidential Council and to the Prime Minister (14 August 2021)



**Official UN Translation**

2113678E

Translated from Arabic

**I. Letter to PC-GNU on AGs (14 August 2021)**

5+5 Joint Military Commission

Re: Review of agencies

Date:.....

Corresponding to: 19 August 2021

Joint Military Commission 32/167

**To: The President of the Presidency Council  
President of the Government of National Unity**

At its meeting held in Sirte on 14 August 2021, the 5+5 Joint Military Commission, considered the security situation in the State of Libya as it impinges directly the Commission's action plans for banishing the spectre of war and restoring security and stability. It noted that there is a multiplicity of security and military agencies and bodies that have been charged with overlapping tasks or granted overlapping military and security authorities. These agencies are subsidiary to a variety of different entities (the Presidency Council, the Commander-in-Chief, the Minister of Defence) and have not had their tasks and duties clearly defined. This has created instability and severely undermined the performance of military and security institutions.

The agencies in question are as follows:

- |  |                                    |
|--|------------------------------------|
| 1. The Stability Support Apparatus   | 2. The General Security Service    |
| 3. The Counter-Terrorism Force   | 4. The Emergency Operations Centre |
| 5. The Special Deterrent Force   | 6. The Misratah Joint Force        |
| 7. The Military zones (Central - West - Tripoli)   |                                    |
| 8. The operations rooms in general   |                                    |
| 9. Any other agencies directly subsidiary to the Commander-in Chief that we may have failed to mention |                                    |

The Commission recommends that the hierarchical structure of these agencies be reviewed and rearranged to bring them under the Joint Chiefs of Staff or the Ministry of Interior depending on the tasks assigned to them, so they can be re-evaluated and restructured, have their tasks defined by a scientific and professional study, and have their budgets placed under the Joint Chiefs of Staff or the Ministry of Interior rather than being independent.

May peace and God's mercy and blessings be upon you.

(Signed) Major General Ahmed Ali Abu Shahma  
Chair of the 5+5 Commission

(Signed) Lieutenant General Emraja'a Emhammed  
Mohammed Al-Ammami  
Chair of the 5+5 Committee

Libyan Parliament/ Please be advised . . .

## Annex 8 Statements by the Chief of Staff of the Libyan Armed Forces and the Stability Support Apparatus (SSA)

Figure 8.1  
Statement of Al Haddad (17 August 2021)



**وَزَارَةُ الدِّفَاعِ**  
**وَكَايَةُ الْأَرْكَانِ الْعَامَةِ لِلجَيْشِ اللَّيْبِيِّ**  
**مَقَرُّ وَكَايَةِ الْأَرْكَانِ**

الموضوع: بيان لجنة 5+5  
الرقم الإشاري: / /  
الموافق: 2021 / 08 / 17 م

**218 بيان رئاسة الأركان العامة للجيش الليبي**

**نُصِيْد ...** ونؤمن ما حققته لجنة 5+5 العسكرية من إنجازات ساهمت في خفض مستوى التوتر وخطاب الكراهية بين أبناء الوطن الواحد وخلق مناخ مناسب لنقاش سياسي بين الفرقاء، حيث أشرفت على عودة أعداد من المحتجزين من الطرفين إلى أهلهم وذوهم، وساهمت في فتح الطريق الساحلي لتسهيل حركة تنقل المواطنين بين شرق البلاد وغربها.

**وَأَذ ...** نقترّب من موعد الاستحقاق الانتخابي في 24 ديسمبر تنفاجاً بانحراف لجنة 5+5 عن مسارها المهني واللفني المرسوم وتدخلها في الشؤون السياسية المناطة حصراً بالسلطة التنفيذية القائمة، هذه التدخلات المرفوضة وغير المهنية لها انعكاسات سلبية على مهام المجلس الرئاسي باعتباره القائد الأعلى للوحدة وعلى مهام حكومة الوحدة الوطنية المناطة بها إدارة الشأن العام وحدها دون غيرها.

**نُحَن ...** نستغرب خطوات هذه اللجنة وخطاباتها الأخيرة التي قد يفسرها الكثير من المهتمين بالشأن الوطني والسياسي بأن دورها أصبح كسلطة جديدة فوق السلطات الوطنية القائمة، نذكر من أهمها والتي طالت وخلقت جدل كبير بين فئات عريضة من أبناء الشعب الليبي ومؤسساته، طلبها تعيين وزير دفاع على الفور رغم أننا نعلم قصر المدة المتبقية وصعوبة الاتفاق على شخصية في هذا الزمن القصير، كما تناولت خطاباتهم الأجهزة الأمنية والعسكرية القائمة وفقاً للتشريعات التي كان معمولاً بها في زمنها وأغفلت الجهود الكبيرة التي قامت بها بعضها في مكافحة الإرهاب والجريمة وساهمت في الاستقرار الأمني.

**وَنُأَسِّمُ ...** على ذلك وحتى نبيد المخاوف الناشئة عن هذه الخطابات فأنا نطلب من القائد الأعلى ورئيس حكومة الوحدة الوطنية ووزير الدفاع التدخل بوقف هذه التجاوزات التي لا تخدم حالة السلم السياسي والمجتمعي، وبأن يكون عملها مهنياً طبقاً لسياسات هذه السلطات القائمة.

**حفظ الله ليبيا وشعبها**



**الفريق أول ركن**  
**محمد علي أحمد الحداد**  
**رئيس الأركان العامة للجيش الليبي**

☎ 00218 21 462 4103

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الطرابلس - ليبيا

**Official UN Translation**

2113678E

Translated from Arabic

Ministry of Defence  
 Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Libyan Armed Forces  
 Headquarters of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Re: Statement by the 5+5 Commission  
 Ref. No.:  
 Corresponding to: 17 August 2021

218

**Statement of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Libyan Armed Forces**

We appreciate and commend the achievements of the 5+5 Military Commission, which has contributed to reducing the level of tension and hate speech among the people of our one country and creating an atmosphere conducive to political debate among various factions. It has overseen the return of numerous detainees from both sides to their families and helped to open the coastal road, thereby facilitating the movement of citizens between the country's east and west.

However, as we approach the 24 December election deadline, we are surprised that the 5+5 Commission has deviated from its customary professional and technical approach and chosen to interfere in political affairs that should be the exclusive purview of the current executive branch. These unacceptable and unprofessional interventions are having negative repercussions for the functions of the Presidency Council as the Commander-in-Chief and functions of the Government of National Unity as the sole entity entrusted with managing public affairs.

We are particularly dismayed by recent steps and statements of the Commission that could be interpreted by those who take an interest in national political affairs as arrogating to itself the role of a new authority above existing national authorities. One of the steps it has taken that has created considerable friction among broad segments of the Libyan public and its institutions has been its request for the immediate appointment of a new Minister of Defence, even though we all know that that it would be difficult to reach agreement on any particular person for the short time available. Its statements regarding security and military agencies formed in accordance with previously existing legislation ignore the significant efforts made by some of those agencies in the fight against terrorism and crime and their contributions to national stability.

Given the preceding, and with a view to dispelling the concerns raised by these statements, we call on the Commander-in-Chief and President of the Government of National Unity, as well as the Minister of Defence, to intervene to put a stop to these infringements, which do not serve the cause of political and social peace, and to ensure that the Commission behaves professionally and in accordance with the policies of these existing authorities.

May God save Libya and its people.

(Signed) Staff Major General  
 Muhammad Ali Ahmad al-Haddad  
 Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Libyan Armed Forces



Figure 8.2  
Statement of SSA (18 August 2021)

<b>State of Libya</b> LIBYAN PRESIDENTIAL COUNCIL Stability Support		<b>دولة ليبيا</b> <b>المجلس الرئاسي</b> <b>جهاز دعم الاستقرار</b>
Index :..... Date : / /	رقم الإشراف :..... الترتيب : / /	
<h1>بيان</h1>		
<p>في الوقت الذي نؤكد فيه على الجهود المبذولة من قبل اللجنة العسكرية 5+5 والتي توجت بحل العديد من المشاكل العالقة من بينها فتح الطريق الساحلي الرابط ما بين الشرق والغرب . نؤكد ونؤيد أيضا على ما جاء في بيان غرفة العمليات المشتركة بالمنطقة الغربية التابعة لرئاسة الأركان العامة بالجيش الليبي والذي يؤكد على ضرورة ان لا تتجاوز اللجنة العسكرية 5+5 اختصاصاتها الموكلة ليها . حيث تدخلت هذه اللجنة في إعادة هيكلة الأجهزة الأمنية والعسكرية التي شكلتها حكومة الوفاق السابقة وهذا ليس من اختصاص اللجنة العسكرية 5+5 حيث ان هذا العمل هو من اختصاص الحكومة . إضافة الى عدم ذكرها إعادة تنظيم القيادة العامة في الشرق لتكون من ضمن أجهزة الدولة العسكرية وتناست وتغافلت تعافا عن ذلك . وكذلك تدخلها في تعيين وزير دفاع وهو اختصاص اصيل للحكومة بالتشاور مع المجلس الرئاسي واعتماد مجلس النواب .</p>		
<p>جهاز دعم الاستقرار يطالب لجنة 5+5 بالالتزام بالمهام المكلفة بها من المجلس الرئاسي وعدم الانحياز إلى طرف دون آخر . وذلك ضماناً للحفاظ على وحدة الوطن وامن واستقراره .</p>		
<p><b>حفظ الله ليبيا آمنه ومستقرة</b> <b>جهاز دعم الإستقرار</b> <b>صدر بتاريخ : 18 اغسطس 2021م</b></p>		
		
<a href="http://ssa.ly">ssa.ly</a>		
المقر الرئيسي طرابلس بالقرب من برج ابوليلة		

**Official UN Translation**

2113678E

*Translated from Arabic*

State of Libya  
Presidency Council  
Stability Support Apparatus

State of Libya  
Libyan Presidency Council  
Stability Support

Ref. No.:

Date: / /

Index.....

Date: / /

**Statement**

While we commend the efforts of the 5+5 Military Commission, which have culminated in the resolution of many outstanding problems, including the opening of the east-west coastal road, we must express our support for the statement of the Western Region joint operations room (subsidiary to the Joint Chiefs of Staff), which emphasizes the need for the 5+5 Joint Commission not to exceed the authorities assigned to it. That Committee has intervened in the restructuring of the security and military agencies formed by the previous government of reconciliation. That is not a prerogative of the 5+5 Military Commission; it is a competence of the Government. It also failed to mention the reorganization of the General Command in the east to become part of the State's military apparatus. It completely ignored that. It also interfered in the appointment of a Minister of Defence, which is the prerogative of the Government in consultation with the Presidency Council and subject to approval by the House of Representatives.

The Stability Support Authority calls on the 5+5 Commission to stick to the tasks assigned to it by the Presidency Council and not to align itself with one side at another's expense. That would ensure the preservation of the unity, security and stability of the nation.

May God keep Libya safe and stable.

Stability Support Apparatus  
Issued: 18 August 2021

Main headquarters, Tripoli, near the Abu Layla tower

ssa.ly



## Annex 9 Mahmoud Al Warfalli's death and burial certificates

Figure 9.1  
Al Warfalli's death certificate

الجمهورية العربية الليبية الشعبية الاشتراكية العظمى  
الجنة الشعبية العامة للأمن العام  
مصلحة الأحوال المدنية  
مكتب السجل المدني بـ

نموذج رقم 10 مكرر

رقم ورقن العائلة 65258  
رقم قيد العائلة 2045604

رقم القيد بالسجل 1651  
رقم الصفحة

الشعبية  
المحللة  
المؤتمر الشعبي الأساسي

رقم مكتب العائلة  
مكان صدور

شهادة وفاة  
مستخرج رسمي لاثبات واقعة وفاة

اسم المبلغ  
عنوانه  
مستند اثبات الشخصية ورقمه

الجنس  
السن  
تاريخ الولادة  
أسباب الوفاة (تذكر مفصلة)  
العنوان ومحل الإقامة  
تاريخ الوفاة / الساعة  
الوافق اليوم  
مكان الوفاة

اسم المتوفي ثلاثي  
السن  
تاريخ الولادة  
أسباب الوفاة (تذكر مفصلة)  
العنوان ومحل الإقامة  
تاريخ الوفاة / الساعة  
الوافق اليوم  
مكان الوفاة

اسم والد المتوفي  
اسم والدته  
لقب الوفاة

تاريخ القيد  
تاريخ التبليغ اليوم  
الوافق اليوم

(ملاحظات)

Source: Confidential

## Official UN Translation

2204597E

Translated from Arabic

Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya  
General People's Committee on Public Safety  
Civil Registry Authority  
Form No. 10 bis

## Civil Registry Office: Benghazi

Family sheet No.: 65258  
Family registration number:  
2045604

Entry No. in the register:  
Page No.: 1651

District  
Locality: Birkah  
Basic People's Congress  
-  
Family booklet No.  
Issued at:

Death certificate  
Official extract establishing death

Informant's name: [Redacted]  
Address: Benghazi  
Identification document and No.:  
281228 ba'

Three-part name of the deceased: Mahmud Mustafa Busif Surname: Al-Warfalli  
Sex: Male

Age: 43 Profession: Soldier Religion: Muslim  
Nationality: Libyan

Date of birth: 1978, Benghazi  
Causes of death (detailed): gunshots  
Address and place of residence: Benghazi

Date/time of death:	Day:	Month:	Sunnah:
Corresponding to/day: 24		Month: March	Year: 2021
Place of death: Benghazi			

Reporting party (provide name and address):

Name of deceased's father: [Redacted] Surname: Al-Warfalli  
Mother's name: [Redacted] Surname:  
The data above have been verified and recorded in the register of deaths under the  
number given above

Registering official: Misbah Amir Title: Employee

Signature/seal:

Date of registration: Corresponding to:

Reported on/Day: Month: Sunnah:  
Corresponding to/day: 25 Month: April Year: 2021  
(Comments):

Figure 9.1  
Al Warfalli's burial certificate

نموذج رقم (40)

دولة ليبيا

مكتب السجل المدني / بنغازي

تصريح بالدفن

التاريخ: 2021 - 3 - 24

اسم المتوفي: محمد بن علي بن علي الورفالي

وجنسه: (ذكر أو أنثى): ذكر

وجنسيته: ليبية

وبطاقته الشخصية إن وجدت أو جواز سفره: 9

تاريخ وجهة صدورهما: 9

تاريخ ميلاده: 1978

عمره: 43

محل إقامته: بنغازي

محل وفاته: بنغازي

اسم والد المتوفي إن كان معروفا للمبلغ: #

لقبه: #

اسم والدته المتوفي إن كانت معروفة للمبلغ: #

لقبها: #

سبب الوفاة:

صرحنا بدفن الجثة بعد أن تحققنا من شخصية المتوفي وسبب الوفاة.

توقيع أمين السجل المدني

Source: Confidential

**Official UN Translation**

2204597E

*Translated from Arabic*

**State of Libya**

**Civil Registry Authority**

Form No. 40

Civil Registry Office: Benghazi

**Burial permit**

Date: . 24 March 2021

Name of the deceased: Mahmud Mustafa Busif Surname: Al-Warfalli Sex (Male/female): Male Nationality: Libyan

Identity card or passport, if any: - Date and place of issuance: -

Date of birth: 1978 Age: 43

Name of deceased's father, if known to informant: [Redacted] Surname: -

Name of deceased's mother, if known to informant: [Redacted] Surname: Cause of death: -

Having verified the identity of the deceased and the cause of death, we hereby authorize burial

Signed by the registrar: *(Signed)*



*Official UN Translation  
2205125E  
Translated from Arabic*

State of Libya      Decisions  
Libyan Presidency Council  
Office of the Commander-in-Chief

**Decision of the Commander-in-Chief of the Libyan Army No. 7 (2021) concerning the establishment of a counter-terrorism and organized crime force in the Libyan south**

The Commander-in-Chief of the Libyan Army,

*Having considered the following:*

The Constitutional Declaration of 3 August 2011 and amendments thereto; The Libyan Political Agreement signed on 17 December 2015;

The outcomes of the Libyan Dialogue Forum adopted on 9 November 2020; Act No. 40 (1974) concerning military service and amendments thereto; Act No. 43 (1974) concerning military retirement and amendments thereto; Act No. 35 (1977) concerning reorganization of the Libyan army (formerly the armed forces); Act No. 5 (1978) amending certain provisions of military laws;

Act No. 11 (2012) approving certain provisions concerning the authorities of the leadership ranks of the Libyan army;

And the minutes of the meeting of the Presidency Council in its capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the Libyan army (No. 6 on 17 June 2021).

*Hereby decides as follows:*

*Article 1*

A military force to be called the Counter-Terrorism and Organized Crime Force is hereby established in the Libyan south. It shall be made up of the first company of the 116th infantry brigade and shall be subordinate to the Commander-in-Chief of the Libyan Army.

*Article 2*

An officer of the rank of no less than major shall be appointed as commander of the Counter-Terrorism and Organized Crime Force in the Libyan south by decision of the Commander-in-Chief of the Libyan Army.

*Article 3*

The force shall assume the following functions:

- It shall apprehend armed gangs that threaten the security of the South.
- It shall confront terrorism through arrests and investigations, with assistance and coordination from the relevant authorities



Figure 10.2

Decree no. 9 appointing Masud Jeddi as Commander of the force (17 June 2021)

Source: [https://twitter.com/W\\_Lacher/status/1406505082066149379/photo/3](https://twitter.com/W_Lacher/status/1406505082066149379/photo/3)



*Official UN Translation*  
 2205125E  
 Translated from Arabic

State of Libya Decisions  
 Libyan Presidency Council  
 Office of the Commander-in-Chief

**Decision of the Commander-in-Chief of the Libyan Army No. 9 (2021) concerning the appointment of a commander of the counter-terrorism and organized crime force in the Libyan south**

The Commander-in-Chief of the Libyan Army,

*Having considered the following:*

The Constitutional Declaration of 3 August 2011 and amendments thereto; The Libyan Political Agreement signed on 17 December 2015;

The outcomes of the Libyan Dialogue Forum adopted on 9 November 2020; Act No. 40 (1974) concerning military service and amendments thereto; Act No. 43 (1974) concerning military retirement and amendments thereto;

Act No. 35 (1977) concerning reorganization of the Libyan army (formerly the armed forces); Act No. 5 (1978) amending certain provisions of military laws;

Act No. 11 (2012) approving certain provisions concerning the authorities of the leadership ranks of the Libyan army;

The minutes of the meeting of the Presidency Council in its capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the Libyan army (No. 6 on 17 June 2021);

And the Decision of the Commander-in-Chief of the Libyan Army No. 7 (2021) concerning the establishment of a counter-terrorism and organized crime force in the Libyan south.

*Hereby decides as follows:*

*Article 1*

Major Mas'ud Abdullah Mas'ud Abduljalil is hereby appointed commander of the Counter-Terrorism and Organized Crime Force in the Libyan south.

*Article 2*

This decision shall enter into force as of its date of issue and the relevant parties are required to implement it.

The Commander-in-Chief of the Libyan Army

Done on 7 Dhu al-Qa'dah A.H. 1442  
 17 April 2021

## Annex 11 Decree by Haftar disbanding 116 brigade (11 September 2021)



Source: <https://www.facebook.com/sebha.press/posts/2923631484553823>.

**Official UN translation**  
*Translated from Arabic*

General Command of the Libyan Armed Forces

Decisions

**General Commander Decision No. 311 (2021) concerning the disbanding of the 116th and 117th infantry brigades**

The General Commander,

Having considered the following:

- Act No. 40 (1974) concerning service in the armed forces and amendments thereto;
- Act No. 1 (2015) amending Act No. 11 (2012) concerning the powers and leadership ranks of the Libyan army;
- House of Representatives Decision No. 20 (2014) concerning delegation of the Office of the Speaker of the House of Representatives of the competences of the Commander-in-Chief of the Libyan Army;
- And Commander-in-Chief Decision No. 20 (2015) appointing a General Commander of the Libyan Arab Armed Forces,

*Hereby decides as follows:*

*Article 1*

The 116th and 117th infantry brigades are hereby disbanded. All their personnel, functions, vehicles, weapons and ammunition in their entirety are hereby assigned to the Sabha military district.

*Article 2*

The present decision shall enter into force on the date of its issuance, all provisions contradicting it are hereby rescinded, and the relevant parties shall be required to implement it.

(Signed) Khalifah Abu al-Qasim **Haftar**  
Field Marshal  
General Commander of the Libyan Arab Armed Forces

Done at General Command headquarters - Rajmah  
11 September 2021

## Annex 12 Improvement of HAF operational capability

1. On 19 October 2021 HAF 106 brigade released a video on their official social media<sup>4</sup> of their latest combined arms firepower demonstration and exercise. The Panel believes that this demonstrates a significant increase in the professionalism of this unit from the 2019 conflict. Indicators of this include:

- (a) The activities shown on the imagery demonstrates a reasonable understanding and execution of combined arms manoeuvre [0:25] and armoured infantry tactics deploying from armoured fighting vehicles (AFV) [27"00'];
- (b) The low-level infantry tactics are reasonable, with proper fire and manoeuvre and aimed shots the norm [4"30'];
- (c) The main battle tank (MBT) gunnery tactics are good. The MBT are firing from hull-down, protective positions with the appropriate use of camouflage and concealment [8"30' and 9"20'];
- (d) The all arms capability very likely includes engineer manoeuvre support with gap crossing capabilities [30"10'];
- (e) The capability to deliver an integrated indirect fire plan was demonstrated using a combination of: (i) fighter ground attack aircraft [22"00']; (ii) BM-21 free flight rocket units [23"35']; 3) field artillery [25"12']; and 4) heavy mortars [24"58' and 27"28']; and
- (f) The use of ZSU-23/4 for integrated formation air defence along the line of advance [25"36' and 30"08'].

This brings the 106 Brigade, under the command of Khaled Khalifa Haftar<sup>5</sup> much closer to the qualities of an army unit. Indeed, many of the officers have a "Libyan Army" patch on their uniforms and vehicles display the national flag of Libya.

<sup>4</sup> <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sdYN0wA6AiU>, 19 October 2021.

<sup>5</sup> <https://libyaupdate.com/photos-lna-106-brigade-commander-checks-on-final-arrangements-for-big-tactical-training/>, 20 March 2022.

## Annex 13 Counterterrorism and terrorism related events in Libya (2021)

1. The Panel has not been able to independently verify some of the events listed in tables 12.1 and 12.2. For those verified the date is in bold type.

Table 12.1

### Reported terrorism related events in Libya

<i>Date</i>	<i>Event</i>
<b>6 Jun 2021</b>	ISIL-Libya claimed responsibility in the official ISIL (QDe.115) weekly publication “Annaba’a”, of a suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (SVBIED) attack targeting a HAF checkpoint at the ‘Mafreq Abnae Maziq’ Gate, near Sebha. The explosion killed at least two people including the head of the Sebha Criminal Investigation Department, Captain Ibrahim Abdunabi Mannae, and injured several others. <sup>a</sup>
<b>14 Jun 2021</b>	ISIL-Libya claimed Improvised Explosive Device (IED) attack against a HAF patrol in the Mount of Al Haruj, killing the commander of the “Martyrs of Al-Waw” company, Ali Mohammed Othman Al Tibaoui. <sup>b</sup>
<b>19 Jul 2021</b>	ISIL-Libya released a photo set entitled ‘Diaries of Caliphate Soldiers in Libya during Eid Al Adha’ showing a small group of fighters celebrating the Islamic holiday of Eid al-Adha, presumably in southern Libya. <sup>c</sup>
<b>22 Aug 2021</b>	HAF 128 brigade was attacked at the Zillah gate checkpoint near Jufra by a suicide bomber, whose associate survived the blast, identified as a Sudanese national. He was shot as he tried to escape. On 23 August 2021, ISIS claimed responsibility for this attack that wounded some HAF personnel, through ISIL’s official media branch “Aamaq”. <sup>d</sup>
<b>27 Sep 2021</b>	ISIL-Libya claimed an attack on a HAF checkpoint south of Sebha. According to initial reports there were no injuries, but the specific details of the incident remain unclear. <sup>e</sup>
<b>18 Jan 2022</b>	ISIL-Libya claimed an IED attack on a HAF camp in Umm al-Aranib, on 17 January 2022, which killed one person and injured two others. <sup>f</sup>
<b>24 Jan 2022</b>	ISIL-Libya claimed an attack against two HAF vehicles, on the road between the towns of Um al-Aranib and al-Qatrun, disabling one vehicle and killing two of its occupiers. <sup>g</sup>
<b>13 Mar 2022</b>	ISIL-Libya published photos of its members swearing allegiance to the new leader of the ISIL mother group, Abu al-Hasan al-Hashimi al-Qurashi appointed on 10 March 2022. <sup>h</sup>
<b>31 Mar 2022</b>	ISIL-Libya published a video of one of its members called “Abu Tabet Al Muhajer” giving a speech where the latter pledged allegiance to the new leader of core ISIL and urging muslims to join the terrorist groups and fight on behalf of the terrorist group. <sup>i</sup>

<sup>a</sup> Official ISIL weekly publication “Annaba’a” n°291. <https://letsupload.io/2dtmw>, 21 June 2021.

<sup>b</sup> Ibid.

<sup>c</sup> [https://archive.org/details/haded\\_80-61](https://archive.org/details/haded_80-61), 30 July 2021.

<sup>d</sup> <https://www.afriqatnews.net/article/هجوم-زلة-الانتحاري-جنوب-ليبيا>, 25 August 2021.

<sup>e</sup> <https://ent.siteintelgroup.com/Statements/is-division-in-libya-claims-bombing-lna-checkpoint-in-sabha.html>, 27 September 2021.

<sup>f</sup> <https://ent.siteintelgroup.com/Jihadist-Threat-Statements/is-libya-province-claims-blast-on-lna-position-in-sabha.html>,

18 January 2022.

<sup>g</sup> <https://ent.siteintelgroup.com/Jihadist-Threat-Statements/exactly-1-week-after-blast-in-sabha-is-libya-province-claims-armed-attack-on-lna-vehicles-in-same-city.html>, 24 January 2022.

<sup>h</sup> <https://ent.siteintelgroup.com/documents/insite-reports-islamic-state/1553-islamic-state-insite-march-9-15/file.html>, 18 March 2022.

<sup>i</sup> <https://libyasecuritymonitor.com/isis-wiliyat-libya-issues-pledge-of-allegiance-to-new-caliph/>; 31 March 2022

Table 12.2

**Reported counterterrorism related events in Libya**

<i>Date</i>	<i>Event</i>
4 Mar 2021	The AGO announced the Misratan Special Task Force arrested six ISIL-Libya members in Zliten, Garabulli, Tripoli and Zawiya. <sup>a</sup>
<b>14 Mar 2021</b>	HAF spokesperson Al Mismari announced the arrest of an ISIL-Libya leader named Mohammed Miloud Mohammed (a.k.a. Abu Omar), in Al Shareb neighbourhood in the city of Awbari. <sup>b</sup>
18 Mar 2021	The Tripoli AGO stated that 10 women and 14 children of Tunisian origin, detained during the recapture of Sirte from ISIL-Libya, have been transferred to Tunis. The women implicated in terrorist cases are still under investigation in Libya. <sup>c</sup>
2 Jun 2021	Open-source media reported that the HAF Tareq Bin Ziyad brigade arrested three Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) affiliated individuals in the village of Tarout, 30km from Brak al-Shati in the south of Libya. <sup>d</sup>
19 Jun 2021	Libyan open source media reported that HAF have undertaken airstrikes within the area of the Harouj Mountains against ISIL-Libya positions around the same area. <sup>e</sup>
19 Jul 2021	The AGO filed criminal lawsuits against 54 suspected ISIL-Libya members who were arrested during security operations after the liberation of Sirte. They are accused of different crimes against the State. <sup>f</sup>
11 Aug 2021	HAF's spokesperson Ahmed al-Mismari announced the arrest of a suspected ISIL-Libya operative of Sudanese origin, named Adam Ibrahim Ahmed, during a security operation near Qatrun. His associates have reportedly fled to the Chadian border. <sup>g</sup>
11 Aug 2021	The Libyan Minister of Justice announced the future closing of a few prisons and deportation of 100 ISIL members of Arab and African origins to their home countries. <sup>h</sup>
1 Sep 2021	The Misratan Special Task Force (MSTF) had an armed clash with 'extremist and terrorist' elements (wanted by the AGO) in the '11 July area' of Misrata, which resulted in the killing of an element of the Force. <sup>j</sup>
<b>3 Sep 2021</b>	The HAF Tareq Bin Ziyad brigade (TBZ) arrested a suspected AQIM member named Al-Ajili Ali al-Hasnawi, near Brak al-Shati. Ajili was reportedly responsible for arms and ammunition transfers to terrorist organisations in neighbouring countries. <sup>k</sup>
<b>7 Sep 2021</b>	GNU Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibah announced that the Misratan Joint Operations Force had arrested an ISIL-Libyan leader named M'barek Al Khazmi. <sup>l</sup>
22 Sep 2021	Open-source media reported that HAF military intelligence arrested an Al Qaida affiliated Egyptian national in Tobruk named Saad Desouqi Sayyed Mohamed Issa. He is believed to have entered Libya on 12 September 2021 in an attempt to reach the south of Libya. <sup>m</sup>
23 Oct 2021	Libyan open-source media reported that the GNU-affiliated Counter Terrorism Force (CTF) arrested at least two members of ISIL-Libya in the town of Misrata, one of whom fought previously in Syria. This operation was reportedly conducted in coordination with the OGA. <sup>n</sup>
28 Nov 2021	HAF 106 Brigade announced, through their official Facebook page, the arrest of an alleged terrorist named Ali Al Bakir in his residence neighbourhood of Hejara, in the city of Sebha. <sup>o</sup>
20 Jan 2022	HAF's Commander of the Moral Affairs, Khaled Mahjoub, reported that the 106 Brigade's 'Sahrawi' unit had arrested members of a criminal gang that trades arms and deals with extremist groups in Algeria and Mali. <sup>p</sup>

<sup>t</sup> <https://fb.watch/bP3lQsQhY8/>, 11 March 2022.



## Annex 14 Statement of the HAF representatives of the 5+5 JMC

الموضوع : بيان  
التاريخ :  
الموافق : 2021/11/11

اللجنة العسكرية المشتركة  
5+5

اللجنة العسكرية المشتركة  
5+5

**بيان اللجنة العسكرية المشتركة (5+5)  
ممثلي القيادة العامة للقوات المسلحة العربية الليبية**

انطلاقاً من حرص اللجنة العسكرية المشتركة (5+5) على تنفيذ بنود اتفاق وقف إطلاق النار في 23/10/2020 م بجينيف .  
ودعماً من القيادة العامة للقوات المسلحة العربية الليبية وتحفيزها لأعضاء اللجنة العسكرية المشتركة (5+5) على المضي قدماً وبخطوات شجاعة تحفظ كرامة الوطن والمواطن وحتى تتحرر كافة الأراضي الليبية بعزيمة أبناء الوطن وحرصاً من القيادة العامة على السيادة الوطنية والأمنية للارض الليبية ولطلب القيادة الفرنسية للقيادة العامة بشأن إطلاق مبادرة عملية لإخراج دفعة أولى من المرتزقة والمقاتلين الأجانب والمتواجدين في مناطق سيطرة القوات المسلحة العربية الليبية وذلك كاستثناء من شرط الخروج المتزامن والمتوازن الذي تم الاتفاق عليه بين أعضاء اللجنة العسكرية المشتركة (5+5) في خطتها لإخراج المرتزقة والمقاتلين الأجانب والقوات الأجنبية برعاية بعثة الأمم المتحدة للدعم في ليبيا .

قررت القيادة العامة للقوات المسلحة العربية الليبية إخراج عدد (300) فرد من المرتزقة والمقاتلين الأجانب كدفعة أولى وسيتم التنسيق المباشر مع بعثة الأمم المتحدة أثناء عملية نقل المقاتلين إلي دولهم وبمراعاة كافة المحاذير والأوضاع الأمنية وذلك بالتنسيق مع هذه الدول لتحقيق السلام والاستقرار في ليبيا ودول الجوار

حفظ الله ليبيا

اللجنة العسكرية المشتركة 5+5  
ممثلي القيادة العامة للقوات المسلحة العربية الليبية

Source: <https://www.alghad.tv/> لجنة-55-البدء-في-سحب-300-مرتزق-من-ليبيا/ 11 November 2021

**Official UN translation***Translated from Arabic*

5+5 Joint Military Commission

Subject: Statement

Date:

Corresponding to: 11 November 2021

**Statement of the 5+5 Joint Military Commission****Representatives of the General Command of the Libyan Arab Armed Forces**

In keeping with the commitment of the 5+5 Joint Military Commission to implementing the terms of the ceasefire agreement signed in Geneva on 23 October 2020,

With the support of the General Command of the Libyan Arab Armed Forces; with a view to encouraging the members of the 5+5 Joint Military Commission to move forward with bold steps to preserve the dignity of the Libyan homeland and its citizens; with a view to seeing all of Libyan territory liberated in accordance with the determination of our homeland's citizenry; in keeping with the commitment of the General Command to the sovereignty and security of Libyan territory; and in response to the request made by the French leadership to the General Command to take the initiative on the ground to evacuate an initial group of mercenaries and foreign fighters from areas controlled by the Libyan Arab Armed Forces – as an exception to the condition of synchronized and balanced withdrawal agreed to between members of the 5+5 Joint Military Commission in its plan to remove mercenaries, foreign fighters and foreign forces under the auspices of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL),

The General Command of the Libyan Arab Armed Forces has decided to evacuate an initial group of 300 mercenaries and foreign fighters. There will be direct coordination with the United Nations Mission during the process of transferring fighters to their countries, accompanied by security precautions and coordination with the countries involved, with a view to bringing about peace and stability in Libya and neighbouring countries.

May God preserve Libya.

The 5+5 Joint Military Commission  
Representatives of the General Command of the Libyan Arab Armed Forces

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## Annex 15 Sudanese groups in Libya

1. Since the entry into force of the Juba Peace Agreement, most of the signatories who had an important presence in Libya, namely Sudan Liberation Army / Minni Minawi (SLA/MM), Sudan Liberation Army / Transitional Council (SLA/TC), Gathering of the Sudan Liberation Forces (GSLF) and Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), have brought their elements back to Sudan (paragraph 19 to [S/2021/229](#)). However, it is estimated that their forces still in Libya are scattered in the areas of Hun, Suknah, Jufra, Zilla, Brak al-Shatii and Ghat. Since October 2020, other subgroups of non-signatories, such as Sudan Liberation Army/Abdul Wahid (SLA/AW) and the Sudanese Revolutionary Awakening Council (SRAC), have not had an effective military capability in Libya due to internal divisions.
2. SLA/MM is still receiving salaries and equipment from HAF however they have been reduced over the last months. This group is recruiting fighters in Sudan and training new members in Darfur, some of whom are sent to Libya. On 29 April 2021, the Sudanese Prime Minister Abdallah Hamdok issued a decree appointing Minni Minawi, leader of SLA/MM, as governor of the Darfur region<sup>6</sup>. The members of this group move back and forth between Darfur and Libya.
3. Abdallah Banda's group is still active in Libya in the area of Jufra, providing support personnel to HAF there. It has been reported that some of his members have allied to the SLA/MM group remaining in Libya, from whom they receive salaries.
4. By December 2021, half of Taher Hajar's GSLF group remained in Libya and are positioned around Surt and Jufra.
5. On 30 June 2021, the social media website of the military operation "Volcano of Rage" reported that a group of armed Sudanese nationals attacked a police station in Hun, in an attempt to free one of their members, who had been arrested by the local authorities for the killing of a Libyan national.<sup>7</sup> This incident was later confirmed and described<sup>8</sup> by Mahmud Ghmed, President of the "Jufra Society".<sup>9</sup>
6. In mid October 2021, at least 150 vehicles belonging to Sudanese armed groups, escorted by vehicles marked as belonging to HAF 116 and 117 brigades<sup>10</sup> relocated from the area of Al Fawwar<sup>11</sup> (south-east of Waw al-Kabir) to the region of Kilinja<sup>12</sup> (west of Kufra).
7. In early December 2021, at least 300 members of SLA/TC led by Saleh Jabal Si have moved from Libya to Korma in Sudan where a field visit was undertaken by UNITAMS, a team of experts from United Nations headquarters and members of the Darfur Permanent Ceasefire Committee ([S/2022/172](#)).
8. On 1 March 2022, during a patrol, the HAF Subul Al Salam battalion clashed with a Sudanese armed group that used to serve under HAF 128 in the Al-Rubyana, 90 km from Tazerbu area. Sources of the Panel indicated that after their defection from the latter, this group of armed Sudanese engaged in criminal activities and set up checkpoints to rob the population in the area. The group was composed of at least 18 individuals and 3 armed vehicles with HAF 128 brigade insignia.

<sup>6</sup> <https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/rebel-leader-minawi-appointed-governor-of-darfur>, 21 May 2021

<sup>7</sup> <https://www.facebook.com/Burkanly/posts/2916186455324164>, 20 September 2021.

<sup>8</sup> <https://web.facebook.com/watch/?v=302701233762470>, 20 September 2021.

<sup>9</sup> "Al Jufra Society" is a social group created in February 2021, based in Hun. It is a civil society organization that cares of all social issues related to the Jufra region including human rights.

<sup>10</sup> See annex 10 HAF disbanding 116 brigade. The Panel has yet to reconcile the status of this military grouping.

<sup>11</sup> 24°03'08.5"N 17°35'37.9"E

<sup>12</sup> 23°16'35.80"N, 20° 1'37.02"E

## Annex 16      **Front pour l'Alternance et la Concorde (FACT) and other Chadian opposition groups in Libya**

### **Background on FACT**

1. By early 2021, this group held several bases in the areas of Tamenhint, Brak Shati and Jabal Al Aswad. Comprised of at least 1,500 fighters, it was affiliated to HAF for which it operated surveillance and patrol missions in the south of Libya in cooperation with the 128 brigade and the 116brigade (prior to its disbandment). The leader of FACT, Mahamat Mahdi Ali, claimed that during their stay in Jufra in 2020, they collaborated with ChVK Wagner operatives in security missions in Brak Shati, adding that this PMC distrusted him because of his close relationship with France (where he was a political refugee for 25 years). Mahamat Mahdi denied to the Panel receiving any kind of training from ChVK Wagner, and further added that all contact with HAF stopped in April 2021.

### **FACT military activities in Libya**

2. On 11 April 2021, FACT launched its offensive against the Chadian forces from its bases in south Libya to Tibesti in Chad, which coincided with the presidential election day in Chad. The Chadian army claimed more than 300 FACT fighter fatalities and imprisonment of 150 others, whilst losing five of its soldiers in the clashes.<sup>13</sup> FACT counter-claimed that they took control of two Chadian bases in Wour and Zouarké.<sup>14</sup> The FACT leader claimed that drones of unknown origin constantly monitored his forces' movement.

3. On 18 April 2021, the Chadian President was reported to be dead, from wounds suffered on the combat front against FACT.<sup>15</sup> However, the FACT leader claimed that his group had no knowledge of the presence of Deby on the battlefield<sup>16</sup> and was unsure whether his forces were directly responsible for the Deby's death.

4. On 14 September 2021, the HAF Tariq Bin Ziyad (TBZ) special forces battalion led an offensive against a FACT base in the area of Terbu that lasted at least 4 days. FACT later issued two communiqués<sup>17</sup> on the incident describing the armed clashes against their group. <sup>18</sup> The HAF official media branch reported on its official social media page<sup>19</sup> that the offensive was led by the TBZ battalion supported by the 116 brigade, with air support from its air force.

5. FACT members are still present in Libya, reportedly south of Qatrun.<sup>20</sup>

<sup>13</sup> <https://fr.africanews.com/2021/04/19/tchad-plus-de-300-rebelles-et-cinq-militaires-tues-samedi-dans-le-nord-selon-l-armee/>, 4 May 2021.

<sup>14</sup> FACT communiqué of 11 April 2021. <https://bit.ly/2YsD5Wn>.

<sup>15</sup> [https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2021/04/20/mort-d-idriss-deby-le-sud-libyen-troublante-base-arriere-des-rebelles-tchadiens\\_6077460\\_3212.html](https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2021/04/20/mort-d-idriss-deby-le-sud-libyen-troublante-base-arriere-des-rebelles-tchadiens_6077460_3212.html), 20 April 2021.

<sup>16</sup> Panel interview with Mahamat Mahdi Ali, Leader of FACT, July 2021.

<sup>17</sup> FACT communiqué of 14 September 2021. <https://web.facebook.com/LeFACT/photos/3067447253544786>.

<sup>18</sup> FACT communiqué of 15 September 2021. <https://web.facebook.com/LeFACT/photos/3068023780153800>.

<sup>19</sup> [https://web.facebook.com/mediawarinformationdivision/?\\_rdc=1&\\_rdr](https://web.facebook.com/mediawarinformationdivision/?_rdc=1&_rdr), 20 September 2021.

<sup>20</sup> "Soldiers of fortune: The future of Chadian fighters after the Libyan ceasefire" <https://globalinitiative.net/analysis/chadian-fighters-libyan-ceasefire/>, 3 December 2021

## FNDJT and CCMSR:

6. On 26 January 2022 FNDJT claimed responsibility for an armed attack launched from its rear bases in south of Libya on a Chadian military post (Post 35) in Kouri Bougoudi, in the Tibesti region, north of Chad.<sup>21</sup> FNDJT and CCMSR<sup>22</sup> are both members of a military-political coalition created on 28 March 2021 along with two other Chadian opposition groups namely *L'union des mouvements pour la démocratie et le développement* (UMDD), *l'Union Nationale pour le Changement* (UNC)(Fig.1).

Figure 16.1

### Constitution of the alliance



Source: <https://www.facebook.com/www.CCMSR>, 28 March 2021.


<sup>21</sup> <https://www.facebook.com/tchadienne.larevolutionpopulaire>, 26 January 2021.

<sup>22</sup> The Panel has reported on the activities of CCMSR in Libya in to [S/2021/229](https://www.un.org/press/docs/2021/2021229.html), annex 9.

## Annex 17 Syrian fighters in Libya

Figure 17.1

Alaa Al-Junaid at Tikbali Camp, Tripoli



1. On 18 July 2021, in a video interview,<sup>23</sup> Colonel Fadl Allah Hajji<sup>24</sup> of the 'Syrian National Army' admitted sending Turkish backed Syrian combatants to Libya "as part of a strategic plan of the cooperation between the (Syrian) National Army and the Turkish Army...and they are not considered as mercenaries by the Turks nor by the Libyans...we didn't send fighters to kill the Libyans, but to maintain peace and security, to protect airports and the Libyan oil interests...".

<sup>23</sup> [https://mobile.facebook.com/watch/?v=294256929137721&\\_rdr](https://mobile.facebook.com/watch/?v=294256929137721&_rdr), 18 July 2021.

<sup>24</sup> Identified from figures 13.2 and 13.3.



Figure 17.2  
Colonel Fadl Allah Hajji



Figure 17.3  
Video still of Hajji



Source: <https://jisrtv.com/الأخبار-الجسر-الأخبار-السورية-استقالة-القائد-العام-للجبهة-الوطنية-للتحرير>, 1 August 2021.

2. On 31 August 2021 a group of GNU-AF Syrians demonstrated outside their base camp of Al Yarmouk against the delay in their salaries for over four months (figure 13.4). They put road blockades on a main road and set small fires in the immediate surroundings in front of the entrance gate of the camp. A GNU-AF commander stated to the Panel that the Syrians present in those camps were not engaged in any military activity and some escaped to attempt to migrate illegally to Europe.

Figure 17.4  
Demonstration at Al Yarmouk Camp, Tripoli

**Al Yarmouk Camp, Tripoli**  
(32°47'52.9"N 13°13'26.9"E)  
(31 August 2021)

On 31 August 2021, a video widely published on social media shows a group of individuals, later identified as Syrians based in the Al Yarmouk Camp, putting blockades on a road, setting fire and demonstrating in front of the main gate of the same camp.

**Primary sources**

1. <https://web.facebook.com/AACNEWSLY/videos/1045475682876324>, 3 September 2021.
2. Google Earth Pro.

Developed by UN Panel of Experts.





## Annex 18 22 December 2021 HNEC statement



## بيان مجلس المفوضية: بشأن تحديد يوم الاقتراع (للجولة الأولى) من الانتخابات الرئاسية

2021-12-22 12:09 م

لقد أخذت المفوضية على عاتقها تحقيق (إرادة الشعب) في انتخابات حرة ونزيهة تقود إلى تغيير سلمي للسلطة تُنتج حالة من الاستقرار كخطوة نحو بناء دولة المؤسسات والقانون التي يشهدها الليبيون. وعلى الرغم من الصعوبات والتحديات الفنية والقانونية التي واجهتها منذ استلامها للقوانين الانتخابية إلا أنها أنجزت الكثير وباتت على مشارف انجاز تاريخي يسطع نوره على كافة أرجاء الوطن.

غير أن تلك الصعوبات لا تنفك حتى تأتي بأخرى، فقد شكلت مرحلة (الطعون) المنعطف الخطير على مسار العملية الانتخابية. وكانت بمثابة المحطة التي توقفت عندها مساعي الجميع لإنجاز هذا الاستحقاق التاريخي المسؤول لاعتبارات لم تكن في متناول القائمين عليها كان أبرزها: قصور التشريعات الانتخابية فيما يتعلق بدور القضاء في الطعون والنزاعات الانتخابية، الأمر الذي انعكس سلباً على حق المفوضية في الدفاع عن قراراتها. وأوجدت حالة من عدم اليقين من أن قرارات المفوضية جانبها الصواب فيما يتعلق باستبعادها لعدد من المترشحين الذين لا تنطبق عليهم الشروط. كما أن التداخل القائم بين المعطيات السياسية والاحكام القضائية الصادرة دفع بقرار الإعلان عن (القائمة النهائية) للمترشحين إلى ما يعرف بحالة (القوة القاهرة) التي أفضت إلى عدم تمكن المفوضية من الإعلان عنها ومن ثم عدم قدرتها على تحديد يوم 24 ديسمبر يوماً للاقتراع على الرغم من جاهزيتها الفنية الكاملة لإنجاز العملية في التاريخ المذكور.

ووفقاً لما ورد بالمادة (43) من القانون رقم (1) لسنة 2021 بشأن انتخاب رئيس الدولة وتحديد صلاحياته، وتعديلاته، والتي تنص على أن تُعلن المفوضية عن تأجيل عملية الاقتراع، ويحدد مجلس النواب موعداً آخر لإجراء عملية الاقتراع خلال (30) يوماً، فإن المفوضية تقترح بعد التنسيق مع مجلس النواب أن يؤجل يوم الاقتراع (للجولة الأولى) إلى 24 يناير 2022 عملاً بنص المادة أعلاه، على أن يتولى (مجلس النواب) العمل على اتخاذ الإجراءات الكفيلة بإزالة حالة (القوة القاهرة) التي تواجه استكمال العملية الانتخابية.

وعلى مستوى عملية انتخاب مجلس النواب المقررة بموجب القانون رقم (2) لسنة 2021، فإن عملية التدقيق في طلبات المترشحين البالغ عددها (5385) قد قاربت على الانتهاء وهي في طور المراجعة النهائية، وحال استلامنا لردود شركائنا في عملية التدقيق ومدى انطباق شروط الترشح الواردة بالقانون، سوف تصدر المفوضية قرارها المتعلق بالإعلان عن القوائم الأولية لمترشحي مجلس النواب، ومن ثم البدء في مرحلة الطعون.

وبالمناسبة نود أن نؤكد على أننا لم نتخل عن تحمل مسؤولياتنا، وانجزنا ما يتوجب علينا القيام به بما لا يدع مجالاً للشك في حياديتنا واستقلاليتنا، وأن الاتهامات الموجهة إلينا بالتقصير والتسييس ما هي إلا مجرد حملات للتشويش والتظليل هدفها النيل من سمعة المفوضية وعرقلة هذا الاستحقاق بما يخدم اجنداتهم العنيفة. وفي الوقت نفسه نضع السلطات التشريعية والقضائية أمام مسؤولياتهم والتزاماتهم في الأخذ بإجراءات تُفضي إلى نجاح هذا الاستحقاق بما يحقق آمال شعبنا وتطلعاته نحو غدٍ أفضل يزخر بالسلام والتنمية والرخاء.

وُفقنا جميعاً إلى ما فيه صالح البلاد والعباد والله ولي التوفيق

مجلس المفوضية الوطنية العليا للانتخابات

في 22 ديسمبر 2021



### بيان مجلس المفوضية بشأن تحديد يوم الاقتراع (للمرحلة الأولى) من الانتخابات الرئاسية

لقد أخذت المفوضية على عاتقها تحقيق (إرادة الشعب) في الانتخابات حرة ونزيهة تقود إلى تغيير سلمي للسلطة تُنتج حالة من الاستقرار كخطوة نحو بناء دولة المؤسسات والقانون التي يشهدها الليبيون، وعلى الرغم من الصعوبات والتحديات الفنية والقانونية التي واجهتها منذ استلامها للقوانين الانتخابية إلا أنها انجزت الكثير وياتت على مشارف انجاز تاريخي يسطع لوره على كافة أرجاء الوطن.

غير أن تلك الصعوبات لا تتفكك حتى تأتي بأخرى، فقد شكلت مرحلة (الطمعون) المتعطف الخطير على مسار العملية الانتخابية، وكانت بمثابة المحطة التي توقفت عندها مساعي الجميع لإنجاز هذا الاستحقاق التاريخي المسؤول لا اعتبارات لم تكن في متناول القائلين عليها سكان أبرجها، قصور التشريعات الانتخابية فيما يتعلق بنزول القضاء في الطعون والنزاعات الانتخابية، الأمر الذي انعكس سلباً على حق المفوضية في الدفاع عن قراراتها، وأوجدت حالة من عدم اليقين من أن قرارات المفوضية جانبها الصواب فيما يتعلق باستبعادها لعدد من المترشحين الذين لا تنطبق عليهم الشروط، كما أن التداخل القائم بين العمليات السياسية والأحكام القضائية الصادرة دفع بقرار الإعلان عن (القائمة النهائية) للمترشحين إلى ما يعرف بحالة (القوة القاهرة) التي أفضت إلى عدم تمكن المفوضية من الإعلان عنها ومن ثم عدم قدرتها على تحديد يوم 24 ديسمبر يوماً للاقتراع على الرغم من جاهزيتها الفنية الكاملة لإنجاز العملية في التاريخ المذكور.

وفقاً لما ورد بالمادة (43) من القانون رقم (1) لسنة 2021 بشأن الانتخاب رئيس المولة وتحديد صلاحياته، وتعديلاته، والتي تنص على أن تُعلن المفوضية عن تأجيل عملية الاقتراع، ويحدد مجلس النواب موعداً آخر لإجراء عملية الاقتراع خلال (30) يوماً، فإن المفوضية تقترح بعد التنسيق مع مجلس النواب أن يؤجل يوم الاقتراع (للمرحلة الأولى) إلى 24 يناير 2022 عملاً بنص المادة أعلاه، على أن يتولى (مجلس النواب) العمل على اتخاذ الإجراءات الكفيلة بإزالة حالة (القوة القاهرة) التي تواجه استكمال العملية الانتخابية.



وعلى مستوى عملية انتخاب مجلس النواب المقررة بموجب القانون رقم (2) لسنة 2021، فإن عملية التدقيق في طلبات المترشحين البالغ عددها (5385) قد قاربت على الانتهاء وهي في طور المراجعة النهائية، وحال استلامنا لبريد شركائنا في عملية التدقيق ومدى انطباق شروط الترشح الواردة بالقانون، سوف تصدر المفوضية قرارها المتعلق بالإعلان عن القوائم الأولية لمترشي مجلس النواب، ومن ثم البدء في مرحلة الطعون.

وبالنسبة لود أن نؤكد على أننا لم نتخل عن تحمل مسؤولياتنا، وانجزنا ما يتوجب علينا القيام به بما لا يدع مجالاً للشك في حياديتنا واستقلاليته، وأن الاتهامات الموجهة إلينا بالتقصير والتسييس ما هي إلا مجرد حملات للتشويش والتضليل هدفها النيل من سمعة المفوضية وعرقلة هذا الاستحقاق بما يخدم أجنداتهم الميثية، وفي الوقت نفسه نضع السلطتين التشريعية والقضائية أمام مسؤولياتهم والتزاماتهم في الأخذ بإجراءات تُفضي إلى نجاح هذا الاستحقاق بما يحقق آمال شعبنا ولطمعته نحو هذا أفضل يزخر بالسلام والتنمية والرخاء.

**وُفقنا جميعاً إلى ما فيه صالح البلاد والعباد  
والله ولي التوفيق**

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عضو مجلس المفوضية يستقبل المستشار الدولي  
"جاستن ماروزي" page-00... بيان-مجلس-المفوضية-بشأن-تحديد-ي-

إعلان عن تمديد فترة تسجيل المرشحين  
2014-05-07

مجلس المفوضية يعقد اجتماعاً استثنائياً مع أعضاء  
اللجان الانتخابية بنغازي

Source: <https://hnec.ly/2021/12/22/بيان-مجلس-المفوضية-بشأن-تحديد-يوم-الاقتراع-للمرحلة-الاولى/>

*Translated from Arabic*  
*Official UN translation*

**High National Elections Commission**

**Statement of the Commission board on setting a polling date for the first round of presidential elections**

22 December 2021, 12:09 hours

The Commission is carrying out its responsibility to see the will of the people realized in free and fair elections leading to a peaceful transfer of power that brings about stability as a step towards building the State of institutions and law to which Libyans aspire. Despite the technical and legal difficulties and challenges it has faced since it received the elections laws, it has accomplished a lot and is on the verge of a historic achievement that will shine its light throughout the whole country.

Unfortunately, no sooner is one set of difficulties resolved than another emerges. The challenge stage marked a dangerous turning point in the electoral process. It in effect became the station stop at which efforts to carry forward this historical election came to a halt, owing to considerations that were beyond election officials' control. Most notably, electoral laws were deficient with respect to the role of the judiciary in electoral challenges and disputes. That had a negative impact on the right of the Commission to defend its decisions. It created uncertainty about the correctness of decisions by the Commission to disqualify a number of candidates who did not meet conditions. The interference of political interests with the judicial rulings issued pushed the decision to announce the final list of candidates into what may be described as a force majeure situation. The Commission was unable to make its announcement, and therefore unable to set 24 December as election day even though, from a technical standpoint, it was fully prepared to conduct the process on that date.

Article 43 of Act No. 1 (2021) on the election and definition of powers of the Head of State and amendments thereto provides that the Commission shall announce the postponement of the voting process and the House of Representatives shall set another date for conduct of the voting process within 30 days. After coordinating with the House of Representatives, the Commission proposes to postpone the polling date for the first round to 24 January 2022 in accordance with the above-mentioned article. Meanwhile, the House of Representatives must act to take measures to remove the force majeure situation standing in the way of the electoral process.

As far as election for the House of Representatives – as provided for by Act No. 2 (2021) – is concerned, the vetting process for the 5,385 candidate applications is nearing completion and is at the final review stage. Once we have received the responses of our partners in the vetting process on whether the conditions for candidacy provided for by the law have been met, the Commission will issue a decision announcing preliminary candidate lists for the House of Representatives. Then the challenge phase will begin.

We would like to take this opportunity to stress that we have not abdicated our responsibilities. We have carried out our duties in a way that leaves no doubt as to our neutrality and independence. The accusations of negligence and politicization being made against us are just efforts to cast a shadow over the Commission's reputation and obstruct this election in the interests of unconstructive agendas. In the meantime, we encourage the legislative and judicial branches to carry out their responsibilities and take the actions needed for the success of this election in order to achieve the hopes and aspirations of our people for a better tomorrow full of peace, development and prosperity.

May we all succeed achieving the interests of the country and the people, with God's help.

The High National Elections Commission

22 December 2021

## Annex 19 Various factors impacting the electoral process

### 1. A disputed legal framework

The electoral laws adopted by the House of Representatives (HOR)<sup>25</sup> failed to offer a largely agreed constitutional basis.<sup>26</sup> Several sources believe that these texts were deliberately devised to create dissension and prevent the elections from happening; they would have been adopted only to demonstrate goodwill and avoid sanctions.<sup>27</sup> Similarly, the UN and various Member States received their share of criticism<sup>28</sup> for failing to achieve consensus among the Libyans in a timely manner after the adoption of the roadmap<sup>29</sup> and for supporting the electoral process despite the flaws affecting the laws finally adopted.

### 2. Controversial candidacies

The successive candidacies for presidential election of prominent figures across Libya of Saif al-Islam Qadhafi (LYi.015),<sup>30</sup> Khalifa Haftar,<sup>31</sup> the HoR Speaker, Aguila Saleh,<sup>32</sup> and incumbent Prime Minister Dbeibah<sup>33</sup> stirred controversies over their legality and/or legitimacy.<sup>34</sup> The confirmation of Saif al-Islam Qadhafi's (LYi.015) candidacy by the Sebha court on 5 December 2021 antagonized both Haftar and Libyan figures and armed groups from the west. This has exacerbated the challenge of publishing the final list of candidates by HNEC.

### 3. Threats and security incidents

The Panel identified several problematic incidents that preceded the planned elections, such as forced closure of electoral offices, public calls to boycott the elections, and threats addressed to the HNEC (table 19.1).

<sup>25</sup> On 8 September 2021, HoR issued Law No. 1 (2021) on the elections of the president; on 1 November 2021, HoR issued Law No. 9 (2021) amending Law No. 1: [https://liasinstitute.com/PDFs/HoR\\_Law\\_No\\_1\\_2021.pdf](https://liasinstitute.com/PDFs/HoR_Law_No_1_2021.pdf), 8 September 2021.

<sup>26</sup> See SG Report 2022/31, paragraph 5 regarding the amendment of the electoral framework, SG Report 2022/31.

<sup>27</sup> Confidential sources and Jalel Harchaoui and Wolfram Lacher in <https://www.franceculture.fr/emissions/cultures-monde/de-tripoli-a-bagdad-voter-suffit-il-a-faire-etat>, 10 January 2022.

<sup>28</sup> Confidential sources and Jalel Harchaoui and Wolfram Lacher in <https://www.franceculture.fr/emissions/cultures-monde/de-tripoli-a-bagdad-voter-suffit-il-a-faire-etat>, 10 January 2022.

<sup>29</sup> According to the roadmap, the 75 participants to the LPDF should have agreed on the constitutional basis for the elections by July 2021.

<sup>30</sup> On 14 November 2021

<sup>31</sup> On 16 November 2021

<sup>32</sup> On 17 November 2021

<sup>33</sup> On 21 November 2021

<sup>34</sup> <https://www.skynewsarabia.com/video/1480989-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A8%D8%A9-%D9%8A%D9%82%D8%AF%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%94%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82-%D8%AA%D8%B1%D8%B4%D8%AD%D9%87-%D9%84%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%94%D8%A7%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A7>, 22 November 2021.

Table 19.1  
Threats and security incidents

<i>Date</i>	<i>Event</i>	<i>Remarks</i>
4 Nov 2021	During a televised interview, <sup>35</sup> Khaled al-Mishri, Head of the PC, staunchly expressed his opposition to elections “devised for Haftar”, rejected the electoral laws adopted by the HOR, challenged the legitimacy of Imad al-Sayeh as HNEC chair, declared that the outcome of the 24 December 2021 elections will not be accepted and concluded that if Haftar were elected, the western region would take up arms.	
11 Nov 2021	The cleric Sadiq al-Gharyani called upon the Libyan representatives from various regions to gather and issue a statement supported by “the sound of arms” inciting Libyans to boycott the elections. He also voiced his concern about forged voter cards. <sup>36</sup>	
14 Nov 2021	Saif al-Islam Qadhafi (LYi.015) submitted his application for the presidential election that was formally registered by the HNEC.	This has drawn angry reactions <sup>37</sup> in Western Libya that forced the HNEC to temporarily close electoral centres in some places (e.g. in Zliten, Zawiya and Misrata). Public calls in the west to boycott the elections also followed the submission of Saif al-Islam Qadhafi’s (LYi.015) candidacy. <sup>38</sup>
24 Nov 2021	HNEC rejected 25 submissions including that of Saif al-Islam Qadhafi (LYi.015). <sup>39</sup>	The next day, the candidate challenged the decision before the Sebha court that was subsequently

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<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PQC1Z1fBIF0;>

<https://mubasher.aljazeera.net/news/politics/2021/11/5/%D8%AE%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B4%D8%B1%D9%8A-%D9%84%D9%84%D8%AC%D8%B2%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D9%85%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B4%D8%B1-%D8%A5%D8%AC%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A1>, 4 November 2021.

36

[https://m.facebook.com/story.php?story\\_fbid=1553940311640789&id=625474811154015&m\\_entstream\\_source=video\\_home&player\\_suborigin=entry\\_point&player\\_format=permalink&\\_ft\\_=qid.-7380469463049397347%3A%2Fstory\\_key.9179170747893826860%3A%2Ftop\\_level\\_post\\_id.425419515814851%3A%2Fcontent\\_owner\\_id\\_new.625474811154015%3A%2Fpage\\_id.625474811154015%3A%2Ftracking\\_source.video\\_home%3A%2Fstory\\_location.31%3A%2Fstory\\_attachment\\_style.video\\_inline%3A%2Fatt.AX90DCVHFNV0\\_Zsl%3A%2Ftds\\_flg.3](https://m.facebook.com/story.php?story_fbid=1553940311640789&id=625474811154015&m_entstream_source=video_home&player_suborigin=entry_point&player_format=permalink&_ft_=qid.-7380469463049397347%3A%2Fstory_key.9179170747893826860%3A%2Ftop_level_post_id.425419515814851%3A%2Fcontent_owner_id_new.625474811154015%3A%2Fpage_id.625474811154015%3A%2Ftracking_source.video_home%3A%2Fstory_location.31%3A%2Fstory_attachment_style.video_inline%3A%2Fatt.AX90DCVHFNV0_Zsl%3A%2Ftds_flg.3), 11 November 2021.

37

<https://www.alarabiya.net/north-africa/2021/11/15/%D9%85%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%B4%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A8%D8%BA%D8%B1%D8%A8-%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%81%D8%B6-%D8%AA%D8%B1%D8%B4%D8%AD-%D8%B3%D9%8A%D9%81-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B0%D8%A7%D9%81%D9%8A-%D9%88%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%AF%D8%AF-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B1%D8%A8->, 15 November 2021.

38

<https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20211115-libye-l-%C3%A9pineuse-candidature-de-sa%C3%AFf-al-islam-kadhafi>. 15 November 2021.

<sup>39</sup> <https://h nec.ly/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/scan0001-1.pdf>. Accessed 13 April 2022

<i>Date</i>	<i>Event</i>	<i>Remarks</i>
		surrounded by TBZ brigade and forced to close for several days. <sup>40</sup> Despite this intimidation, the procedure ended on 5 December 2021 with a decision favourable to Saif al-Islam Qadhafi's (LYi.015) inclusion in the list of presidential candidates.
16 Dec 2021	Salah Badi (LYi.028) threatened to shut down State institutions in Tripoli <sup>41</sup> and asserted that elections would not happen. <sup>42</sup>	

<sup>40</sup> <https://unsmil.unmissions.org/unsmil-warns-against-acts-could-serve-deprive-libyans-exercising-their-democratic-right>, 29 November 2021.

<sup>41</sup> <http://en.alwasat.ly/news/libya/342713>, 16 December 2021.

<sup>42</sup> [https://www.facebook.com/watch/?ref=search&v=291163996357697&external\\_log\\_id=9f7ac813-f3ff-40d3-9aa1-abfc9a2bf367&q=%D8%B5%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AD%20%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AF%D9%8A%20%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A7%20%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AA](https://www.facebook.com/watch/?ref=search&v=291163996357697&external_log_id=9f7ac813-f3ff-40d3-9aa1-abfc9a2bf367&q=%D8%B5%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AD%20%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AF%D9%8A%20%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A7%20%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AA), 16 December 2021.

## **Annex 20      Incidents of violations of international humanitarian law and international human rights law committed in detention facilities under the control of armed groups in Libya**

1. The Panel has interviewed twenty-three victims and their family members<sup>43</sup> in regard to alleged violations of international humanitarian law and human rights law that took place during the period from 2015 to 2021. The incidents were perpetrated in official and unofficial places of detention including: (a) the Mitiga detention facility in Tripoli, under the exclusive responsibility and control of the Special Deterrence Forces (SDF); (b) the Saadawi Camp in Ain Zara under the control of Tripoli Revolutionaries Brigade (TRB); (c) the Gernada detention facility in Al Bayda under the control of the HAF Libyan Arab Armed Forces (LAAF); (d) Al Kweifiya detention facility in Benghazi under the control of the HAF LAAF; (e) unofficial place of detention (“military prison”) in Sidi Freij in Benghazi under the control of HAF Tariq Ibn Ziyad brigade; (f) HAF LAAF military intelligence facilities in Benghazi; (g) unofficial place of detention under the internal security agency (ISA) facility in Al Marj; and (h) the detention facility in Tarhuna under the control of Al Kaniyat until June 2020. Summary information is at table 20.1.

2. The Panel identified that officials of SDF, TRB and the four LAAF armed groups had complete control over the victims during the period of their arrest, detention, and transfers to other locations. In all twenty-three cases the Panel found that the detaining authorities: (a) violated victims’ right to liberty and security of person by arresting them on arbitrary grounds; and (b) intentionally depriving them of core procedural and judicial guarantees. This equates to arbitrary and unlawful detention.<sup>44</sup>

3. Fifteen individuals consistently reported that different methods of torture and other mistreatment were administered on detainees, including severe beatings with pipes and cables, suspension, sleep deprivation, denial of food and potable water, and deliberate denial of medical care. Some of these methods were used in combination and repeatedly on a regular basis for the purpose of obtaining information, punishing, or otherwise coercing the detainees.<sup>45</sup> Four family members of individuals detained in the Gernada, Saadawi and Mitiga detention facilities reported inhuman treatment caused by prolonged incommunicado detention and harsh material conditions.<sup>46</sup>

4. Five of seven detainees were executed in detention facilities under the control of Al-Kaniyat.<sup>47</sup> The five victims were identified among excavated bodies from mass graves in the Tarhuna area. All victims and witnesses attributed the seven incidents to individuals of the Al-Kaniyat armed group. Three witnesses consistently stated that the three Al-Kani brothers who were Al-Kaniyat’s top commanders, Abdurahem El Shgagi (a.k.a. Abdurahem Al-Kani), Mohammed El Shgagi (a.k.a. Mohammed Al-Kani),<sup>48</sup> and Mohsen<sup>49</sup> El Shgagi (a.k.a. Mohsen Al-Kani), ordered and in five cases executed acts of torture and murder of detainees.

5. Six members of the legal profession told the Panel that armed groups operating in the above locations have seriously undermined the role of judges and lawyers in: (a) ensuring respect for detainees’ procedural rights; and (b) in preventing torture and other ill-treatment in detention. These armed groups act with complete impunity from the judicial system. The Panel identified that in two documented cases, the SDF refused to implement decisions of Libyan judicial and government institutions in violation of procedural and judicial safeguards of detainees held in the SDF Mitiga detention facility.

<sup>43</sup> Where a victim was unable to give testimony due to an ongoing detention the Panel interviewed an immediate family member.

<sup>44</sup> Article 9 of the ICCPR; UN Human Rights Committee, *General Comment No. 35*, CCPR/C/GC/35, 16 December 2014.

<sup>45</sup> See Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions; article 7 of the ICCPR.

<sup>46</sup> Panel interview with family members (CS 07, 08, 09 and 13).

<sup>47</sup> Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions.

<sup>48</sup> Deceased, reportedly on 27 July 2021, <https://apnews.com/article/middle-east-africa-shootings-libya-13a98c8ccac6def7c4ebd381e7e32fbc>.


<sup>49</sup> Deceased, reportedly on 13 September 2019, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-libya-security-idUSKCNIVY2L2>.



## Appendix A to Annex 20: Locations of detention facilities under the control of armed groups

Figure 20.1

Map of detention facilities



**CONFIDENTIAL** Appendix B to Annex 20: Summary of investigated incidents

## Annex 21      Slavery of migrant detainees in the Mitiga detention facility


1. Four migrant detainees testified to the Panel that individuals of the SDF formed and supervised groups of able-bodied migrants in the Mitiga detention facility (“Mitiga”) for the primary purpose of forced labour. Former detainees identified Osama Najim and Adel Mohamed Ali (a.k.a. “Sheikh Adel”) as individuals directly responsible for their unlawful transfer and unlawful labour that violated the prohibition of slavery, cruel treatment and outrages upon personal dignity under international humanitarian law.<sup>50</sup>
2. Migrant detainees were unlawfully transferred to Mitiga from official and unofficial detention places in Tripoli by a well-organised scheme operated by SDF individuals since at least April 2019.<sup>51</sup> The migrants were captured by the Libyan Coast Guard while attempting to cross the Mediterranean Sea and taken to temporary detention places in the Tripoli area (see figure 21.1).
3. SDF members responsible for the supervision of detainees deliberately exercised power of ownership over migrant detainees under their exclusive control. They forcibly deployed detainees in various locations inside and in close vicinity of Mitiga, primarily as a labour force in support of SDF military operations. In addition to being unlawfully recruited to participate in military operations, detainees had to perform labour under dangerous conditions and inside legitimate military objectives. Military-related tasks included: (a) cleaning and loading weapons; (b) unloading arms shipments in Tripoli port; and (c) unloading arms and other military equipment into underground ammunition storage sites around Mitiga (see appendix C), where they were occasionally exposed to shelling. Other tasks involved collecting and managing dead bodies of fighters and migrant detainees who were killed on the front lines;<sup>52</sup> and reparation and reconstruction work on facilities belonging to the SDF that were damaged or destroyed during the active military hostilities.<sup>53</sup>
4. Under armed supervision, migrant detainees worked for twelve to fourteen hours a day to the point of physical exhaustion, without any form of compensation. When they refused to engage in unlawful labour or were unable to perform enforced tasks due to fatigue, they were punished by severe beatings and prolonged solitary confinement in an inadequate isolation cell under poor sanitary conditions and without access to food and potable water (for the Panel’s findings on mistreatment in Mitiga, see annex 20). They performed assigned tasks feeling degraded and humiliated, and under the constant fear of violence.

<sup>50</sup> Common article 3 of the Geneva Conventions; Article 4 of Additional Protocol II.

<sup>51</sup> Victims testified that the scheme of unlawful transfers of migrants for forced labour existed at least since the military offensive on Tripoli by HAF LAAF started in April 2019.

<sup>52</sup> Victims testified that groups of migrant detainees were forcibly sent to the front lines to directly participate in the hostilities.


<sup>53</sup> Common article 3 of the Geneva Conventions.

**Appendix A to Annex 21: Scheme of unlawful transfers of migrants to the Mitiga detention facility**

## Appendix B to Annex 21: Locations of forced labour in the Mitiga detention facility

Figure 21.B.1

Former detainee's sketch of Mitiga



Source: Confidential

Figure 21.B.2

**Satellite imagery of Mitiga for comparison<sup>54</sup>****Source:** Google Earth

<sup>54</sup> The veracity of the detainee's evidence was supported by the accuracy of his hand-drawn map which matches the actual geographic features shown on the satellite imagery.

## Appendix C to Annex 21: Satellite imagery and locations of GNU-AF underground ammunition storage sites where migrant detainees were forced to perform military tasks

Figure 21.C.1

Underground ammunition storage site 1



Source: Google Earth



Figure 21.C.2  
Underground ammunition storage site 2



Source: Google Earth

Figure 21.C.3  
Underground ammunition storage site 3



Source: Google Earth

## Annex 22      Attacks on human rights defenders, social activists and media workers

1. The Panel identified six incidents of attacks committed against individuals who participated in public life as human rights defenders, social activists, or media workers. Attacks were perpetrated in the form of unlawful deprivation of life, unlawful deprivation of liberty, enforced disappearance, intimidation, and threats to life.
2. Two female human rights defenders were further intimidated into withdrawing from public life by being subjected to gender-based violence, which included repeated online harassment for reasons related to their gender, receiving humiliating and degrading messages of misogynistic nature on their social media accounts, and online threats of exposing intimate photographs in public.<sup>55</sup>
3. Two prominent human rights defenders were unlawfully abducted from their workplaces by masked armed men and taken in Toyota vehicles to unknown locations shortly after they actively promoted free and democratic elections in Libya. The victims have been kept outside the protection of the law and their whereabouts were deliberately concealed for an extended period of time. The Panel continues to investigate to identify the perpetrators.
4. The Panel found that all these violent acts violated the victims' human rights and in particular the right to life, liberty, and freedom of expression.<sup>56</sup> A summary is at table 22.1 in confidential appendix A.

<sup>55</sup> Article 1 of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women.

<sup>56</sup> See articles 6, 9 and 19 of the ICCPR. See also UN CAT, *Francisco Dionel Guerrero Larez v. Venezuela*, Communication No. 456/2011, 15 May 2015, para. 6.6; UN Human Rights Committee, *General Comment No. 35*, para. 58 (incommunicado detention or enforced disappearance as a form of ill-treatment).

**CONFIDENTIAL** Appendix A to Annex 22

**Annex 23      Human rights abuses in unlawful detention places under the control of networks of human traffickers in Bani Walid and Tazirbu**

1. This annex contains evidence of human rights abuses committed against four migrants in unlawful detention facilities under the control of networks of human traffickers: (a) Bani Walid (appendix A); and (b) Tazirbu (confidential appendix B).

## Appendix A to Annex 23: Locations of unlawful detention places under the control of human traffickers in Bani Walid

Figure 23.A.1


Excerpts from a video footage of detention places in Bani Walid



Source: <https://twitter.com/rgowans/status/1368703470702845959?s=20&t=vkxBPes4Bs7gYPy9ZQmUJg>.

Figure 23.A.2

Network of identified human traffickers in control of detention places in Bani Walid and responsible for serious human rights violations against migrants and asylum seekers



Sources: CS 85 and 86.

1. Witnesses identified four individuals responsible for running a well-organised network of human trafficking of persons from, among others, Eritrea, Somalia and Sudan. Abdel Al Munam owns private detention facilities in Bani Walid where trafficked persons were imprisoned and subjected to serious human rights violations. Hassan Qidi manages the detention facilities and Abdel Al Munam's brothers, Waleed and Ashraf, assist him in running the trafficking chain.
2. Two female victims, who were children at the time of captivity, identified Hassan Qidi and Abdel Al Munam as individuals who repeatedly raped them, subjected them to sexual enslavement and other forms of sexual violence in the period from 2018 until 2020.
3. Hassan Qidi was arrested on 5 March 2021 during a law enforcement operation by members of the Libyan Ministry of Defence.<sup>57</sup>

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<sup>57</sup> <https://twitter.com/rgowans/status/1368703470702845959?s=20&t=vkxBPes4Bs7gYPy9ZQmUJg>.



**CONFIDENTIAL** Appendix B to Annex 23: Locations of unlawful detention places under the control of human traffickers in Tazirbu

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## **Annex 24      Violations of international human rights law against migrants and asylum seekers**

1. This annex contains evidence of serious violations of international human rights law against migrants and asylum seekers: (a) in detention centres for migrants under the authority of the DCIM prior to December 2021, and (b) under the authority of the SSA (appendices A and B); and 2) associated with maritime operations (appendix C).<sup>58</sup>
2. The Panel sent five letters to Libya requesting information regarding the human rights situation in DCIM detention facilities and associated with maritime operations, and responses are awaited.
3. On 23 March 2022, the Panel had a telephone call with the new Head of DCIM, Mr. Mohamed Salem al-Khodja,<sup>59</sup> to discuss the human rights situation of migrants and asylum seekers under the control and authority of the DCIM and in particular the identified human rights violations in DCIM detention centres for migrants.

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<sup>58</sup> See articles 6, 7 and 9 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

<sup>59</sup> Mohamed Salem al-Khodja was appointed as Head of DCIM by GNU Decree 742 (2021) on 23 December 2021.

## Appendix A to Annex 24: Violations of international human rights law committed against migrants in detention centres

Table 24.A.1

Location of DCIM detention facilities for migrants prior to December 2021

<i>Facility</i>	<i>Operator</i>	<i>Latitude (<sup>0</sup>N)</i>	<i>Longitude (<sup>0</sup>E)</i>	<i>Remarks</i>
Abu Salim	DCIM	32.830867	13.158163	Operational
Ain Zara	DCIM	32.783611	13.28545	Operational
Ajdabiya	DCIM	30.75967	20.223749	Empty
Al Bayda	DCIM	32.768295	21.741761	Operational
Al Falah	DCIM	32.849505	13.14872	Operational
Al Gatroun	DCIM	24.933333	14.633333	Empty
Al Kufra	DCIM	24.184672	23.275175	Empty
Al Mabani	DCIM	32.849937	13.111648	Operational
Al Marj	DCIM	32.29559	20.49483	Empty
Al Qubba	DCIM	32.758201	22.241164	Operational
az-Zawiyah Abu Isa	DCIM	32.753059	12.631052	Operational
az-Zawiyah Al-Nasr	DCIM	32.771767	12.696328	Operational
Baten al Jabal	DCIM	32.071312	11.43797	Operational
Bir al Ghanam	DCIM	32.2904663	12.4932337	Operational
Dirj	DCIM	30.172877	10.455851	Operational
Ganfouda Benghazi	DCIM	32.042797	20.028183	Operational
Gharyan Abu Rashid	DCIM	32.205972	12.980663	Operational
Gharyan al Hamra	DCIM	32.30664	12.989343	Empty
Sabrata	DCIM	32.79193	12.484716	Empty
Shahhat	DCIM	32.808215	21.869684	Operational
Shara az-Zawiyah	DCIM	32.874982	13.191959	Operational
Shati	DCIM	27.53884	13.987545	Empty
Suq al Khamis	DCIM	32.604361	14.342944	Empty
Talmetha (as-Sahel)	DCIM	32.31056	20.342	Empty
Tarik al-Sikka	DCIM	32.877049	13.196427	Empty
Tobruk	DCIM	32.083611	23.976389	Operational
Twesha	DCIM	32.694866	13.1588745	Empty
Wadi Al Hai	DCIM	32.191	12.4454	Empty
Zintan	DCIM	31.991556	12.515028	Empty

<i>Facility</i>	<i>Operator</i>	<i>Latitude (<sup>0</sup>N)</i>	<i>Longitude (<sup>0</sup>E)</i>	<i>Remarks</i>
Zliten	DCIM	32.472881	14.57121	Empty
Zwara	DCIM	32.938242	12.063675	Empty

**Sources:** CS 24, 36, 45, and Panel analysis.

Table 24.A.2

**Location of DCIM detention facilities for migrants as of March 2022**

<i>Facility</i>	<i>Operator</i>	<i>Latitude (<sup>0</sup>N)</i>	<i>Longitude (<sup>0</sup>E)</i>	<i>Remarks</i>
Abu Salim	DCIM	32.830867	13.158163	Operational
Ain Zara	DCIM	32.783611	13.28545	Operational
Ajdabiya	DCIM	30.75967	20.223749	Empty
Al Bayda	DCIM	32.768295	21.741761	Operational
Al Gatroun	DCIM	24.933333	14.633333	Empty
Al Kufra	DCIM	24.184672	23.275175	Empty
Al Marj	DCIM	32.29559	20.49483	Empty
Al Qubba	DCIM	32.758201	22.241164	Operational
az-Zawiyah Abu Isa	DCIM	32.753059	12.631052	Operational
Daraj	DCIM	30.172877	10.455851	Operational
Ganfouda Benghazi	DCIM	32.042797	20.028183	Operational
Gharyan Abu Rashid	DCIM	32.205972	12.980663	Operational
Gharyan al Hamra	DCIM	32.30664	12.989343	Empty
Sabrata	DCIM	32.79193	12.484716	Empty
Shahhat	DCIM	32.808215	21.869684	Operational
Shara az-Zawiyah	DCIM	32.874982	13.191959	Operational
Shati	DCIM	27.53884	13.987545	Empty
Suq al Khamis	DCIM	32.604361	14.342944	Empty
Talmetha (as-Sahel)	DCIM	32.31056	20.342	Empty
Tarik al-Sikka	DCIM	32.877049	13.196427	Empty
Tobruk	DCIM	32.083611	23.976389	Operational
Twesha	DCIM	32.694866	13.1588745	Empty
Zintan	DCIM	31.991556	12.515028	Empty
Zwara	DCIM	32.938242	12.063675	Empty

Table 24.A.3

**Location of detention facilities for migrants under the former DCIM administration as of December 2021**

<i>Facility</i>	<i>Operator</i>	<i>Latitude (<sup>0</sup>N)</i>	<i>Longitude (<sup>0</sup>E)</i>	<i>Remarks</i>
Al Mabani	Former DCIM administration	32.849937	13.111648	Operational
Baten al Jabal	Former DCIM administration	32.071312	11.43797	Operational
Wadi Al Hai	Former DCIM administration	32.191	12.4454	Operational

Table 24.A.4

**Location of SSA DCSIM detention facilities for migrants as of December 2021**

<i>Facility</i>	<i>Operator</i>	<i>Latitude (<sup>0</sup>N)</i>	<i>Longitude (<sup>0</sup>E)</i>	<i>Remarks</i>
Al-Maya	SSA DCSIM	32.808367	12.900751	Operational
Al-Zahra	SSA DCSIM	32.41347	12.52082	Operational
az-Zawiyah Al-Nasr	SSA DCSIM	32.771767	12.696328	Operational

**Sources:** CS 24, 28, and Panel analysis.

Figure 24.A.5

**DCIM Ain Zara [L] and DCIM Al Mabani [R]**

**Source:** Google Earth

Figure 24.A.6

DCIM An Naser [L] and DCIM Tarik al-Sikka [R]



Source: Google Earth

Figure 24.A.7

DCIM Shara Zawiya [L] and SSA Al-Maya [R]



Source: Google Earth

**CONFIDENTIAL** Appendix B to Annex 24: Summary of investigated incidents



## Appendix C to Annex 24: Violations of international human rights law committed against migrants and asylum seekers associated with maritime operations

### A. Maritime incidents of 30 April 2021 and 30 June 2021

Figures 24.C.1<sup>a</sup> and 24.C.2<sup>b</sup>

Excerpts from video imagery showing the acts of ill-treatment and excessive use of force committed against persons in distress by the Libyan Coast Guard at sea



LCG member beating migrants in distress with a bullwhip.



LCG members shooting at and making hazardous manoeuvres against migrants.

<sup>a</sup> Sea-Watch 4 crew video of 30 April 2021.

[https://twitter.com/seawatch\\_intl/status/1388171810315902976](https://twitter.com/seawatch_intl/status/1388171810315902976), 30 April 2021. The Panel authenticated the video with the primary source.

<sup>b</sup> Seabird – Sea-Watch reconnaissance aircraft video of 30 June 2021.

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=62BDsKmjsVY>, 5 July 2021. The Panel authenticated the video with the primary source.

### B. Maritime incidents of 12 August 2021 and 19 January 2022

1. The Panel identified that on the night of 12 August 2021, in a supposedly law enforcement operation, armed individuals of SSA maritime units used deadly force against migrants, located in a boat in the waters that survivors claimed to be an hour away from the coast of Zawiya, in violation of their right to life.<sup>60</sup> In particular, SSA individuals performed hazardous movements, including by hitting the migrant boat, and fired gunshots at the passengers that caused the death of one person on board.<sup>61</sup> The surviving eyewitnesses, whom SSA embarked on their boat and returned to Libya, recognised the SSA boat as responsible for the incident (see figure 24.C.3)

<sup>60</sup> Article 6 of the ICCPR.

<sup>61</sup> CS 38 and 60; Forensic death report dated 23 August 2021.

2. The Panel identified the same pattern of violence in an incident of 19 January 2022, when the armed individuals of SSA maritime units used excessive force against around fifty migrants at sea and subjected them to degrading treatment (see Figures 24.C.4 to 24.C.6).<sup>62</sup>

Figures 24.C.3 to 24.C.6

**Imagery of SSA maritime units involved in excessive use of forces and degrading treatment against migrants at sea<sup>63</sup>**



SSA boat *Alqayid-2* identified by eyewitnesses of 12 August 2021 incident.<sup>a</sup> Source CS 38 and 60.



SSA Lambro Olympic D74 boat identified by eyewitnesses of 19 January 2022 incident.<sup>b</sup> Source CS82.



Individual of SSA kicking a person in distress during the 19 January 2022 incident.<sup>c</sup>



Two individuals of SSA armed with AK-type assault rifles engaged in the 19 January 2021 incident.<sup>d</sup>

<sup>a</sup> SSA DCSIM official Facebook page: <https://www.facebook.com/107789065107358/posts/113202834565981/?d=n>, 03 January 2022.

<sup>b</sup> MV Louise Michel: <https://twitter.com/mvlouisemichel/status/1483861110470107140?s=21>, 19 January 2022.

<sup>c</sup> SSA DCSIM official video of the 19 January 2022 incident: [https://twitter.com/rgowans/status/1486032488149438464?s=20&t=bxYgk7i5hyWSXXz\\_sCz0MA](https://twitter.com/rgowans/status/1486032488149438464?s=20&t=bxYgk7i5hyWSXXz_sCz0MA), 25 January 2022.

<sup>62</sup> Articles 6, 7 and 9 of the ICCPR.

<sup>63</sup> For a detailed overview of SSA naval assets, see annex 27.

<sup>d</sup>SSA DCSIM official video of the 19 January 2022 incident:

[https://twitter.com/rgowans/status/1486032462564278281?s=20&t=bxyGk7i5hyWSXXz\\_sCz0MA](https://twitter.com/rgowans/status/1486032462564278281?s=20&t=bxyGk7i5hyWSXXz_sCz0MA), 25 January 2022.

### C. Maritime incident of 22 April 2021

1. The Panel investigated a shipwreck incident that had resulted in approximately 130 fatalities to individuals in distress<sup>64</sup> in the Libyan Search and Rescue region (SRR) on 22 April 2021. During the investigation, the Panel interviewed ten witnesses and collected forty-seven elements of documentary evidence, including imagery of the shipwrecked boat.<sup>65</sup>

2. The boat (designated by Panel as BD01) with approximately 130 passengers on board left Al Khoms at approximately 22:00 hours CEST<sup>66</sup> on 20 April 2021<sup>67</sup> and set course for Italian ports. BD01 was accompanied by a second boat (designated by Panel as BD02), which had approximately 100 passengers on board. The vessels became “in distress” on the morning of 21 April 2021 due to deteriorating weather conditions. This was a complex incident which is best explained by summarising the facts (see table 24.C.7).<sup>68</sup>

Table 24.C.7

#### Maritime incident with boat BD01 (20 – 22 April 2021)

<i>Date</i>	<i>Time <sup>a</sup></i>	<i>Event</i>	<i>Remarks</i>
20 Apr 2021	22:00	BD01 and BD02 depart Al Khoms, Libya	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>230+ migrants and asylum seekers on board.</li> </ul>
21 Apr 2021	09:52	NGO Alarm Phone alert Libya, Italy and Malta MRCCs via email to possible Search and Rescue (SAR) incident.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No acknowledgement or response from any MRCC.</li> </ul>
21 Apr 2021	10:03	NGO Alarm Phone establish contact with BD01.	
21 Apr 2021	11:00	NGO Alarm Phone receive coordinates and details of dangerous conditions on board.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>NGO Alarm Phone maintain contact with BD01 throughout day until evening.</li> </ul>
21 Apr 2021	11:28	NGO Alarm Phone send full details of incident to Libya, Italy and Malta MRCCs by email, including conditions and coordinates.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Figures 24.C.9 and 24.C.10.</li> <li>Seven updates sent during day (see figures 24.C.11 to 24.C.14, 24.C.16, 24.C.17 and 24.C.20).</li> <li>No acknowledgement or response from any MRCC.</li> </ul>

<sup>64</sup> International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue (SAR Convention) defines “distress phase” as “a situation wherein there is a reasonable certainty that a person, a vessel or other craft is threatened by grave and imminent danger and requires immediate assistance”, Annex, Chapter 1, para. 1.3.13, SAR Convention.

<sup>65</sup> The Panel considers a boat in this context as a small watercraft designed for use on inland waterways or protected coastal areas. This is to distinguish it from a vessel, which has a sea going capability.

<sup>66</sup> All times are in Central European Summer Time (CEST).

<sup>67</sup> Panel interviews with CS 69 and 88; and <https://alarmphone.org/en/2021/04/22/coordinating-a-maritime-disaster-up-to-130-people-drown-off-libya/>.

<sup>68</sup> For another detailed timeline of the incident, see <https://alarmphone.org/en/2021/04/22/coordinating-a-maritime-disaster-up-to-130-people-drown-off-libya/>; [https://alarmphone.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/20210716\\_AP182\\_BF-COE.pdf](https://alarmphone.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/20210716_AP182_BF-COE.pdf); and [https://www.lemonde.fr/international/video/2021/10/31/migrants-enquete-sur-le-role-de-l-europe-dans-le-piege-libyen\\_6100475\\_3210.html](https://www.lemonde.fr/international/video/2021/10/31/migrants-enquete-sur-le-role-de-l-europe-dans-le-piege-libyen_6100475_3210.html).

<i>Date</i>	<i>Time <sup>a</sup></i>	<i>Event</i>	<i>Remarks</i>
21 Apr 2021	12:05	NGO Alarm Phone make first attempt to contact Libya MRCC by phone.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Only one of the seven phone lines was responsive. Libya MRCC operator informed about alert messages sent via email.</li> </ul>
21 Apr 2022	18:39	Frontex patrol plane streams live video from the scene.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No acknowledgement or response from any MRCC.</li> </ul>
21 Apr 2021	18:51	Frontex send email to Libya, Italy and Malta MRCCs containing extensive information on the incident.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Details obtained from a Frontex flight.</li> <li>No acknowledgement or response from any MRCC.<sup>69</sup></li> </ul>
21 Apr 2021	18:58	Contact lost with BD01.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Assuming satellite phone batteries exhausted.</li> </ul>
21 Apr 2022	19:14	Frontex asset broadcasts an initial “Mayday” call to all ships in vicinity of BD01 regarding the incident.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><i>MV Ocean Viking</i> (IMO 8506854) and <i>MV Alk</i> [IMO 9298612] receive the MAYDAY call (see figures 24.C.18 and 24.C.19).</li> </ul>
22 Apr 2021	12:42	Shipwreck of BD01 found by Frontex patrol plane. <sup>70</sup>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No survivors found.</li> </ul>
22 Apr 2021	12:43	Frontex asset broadcasts a second “Mayday” call to all ships in vicinity of BD01 call regarding the incident.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No acknowledgement or response.</li> </ul>
22 Apr 2021	13:08	Frontex send email to Libya, Italy and Malta MRCCs containing extensive updated information on the incident.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Details obtained from a Frontex flight.</li> <li>No acknowledgement or response from any MRCC.<sup>71</sup></li> </ul>
22 Apr 2021	13:23	Last attempt [by <i>MV Ocean Viking</i> ], of 38 attempts, made to contact Libya MRCC by phone and VHF radio.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>NGO Alarm Phone, <i>MV Ocean Viking</i> and Frontex attempt to reach the Libyan MRCC by phone and VHF radio <b>38 times</b> in total.</li> <li>Libya MRCC respond to only seven phone calls of NGO Alarm Phone. See paragraph 4 for Libya MRCC response.</li> </ul>

<sup>a</sup> All timings are CEST (GMT+1).

<sup>69</sup> Frontex letter of 8 November 2021 (IEC/ICU/IAGA/10803/2021).

<sup>70</sup> Two vessels that arrived in the location of the capsized BD01 on 22 April 2022 observed several dead bodies floating in the water (see figures 24.C.27 and 24.C.28), <https://twitter.com/sosmedintl/status/1385297161550798851>. The Panel received the information on the identity of 18 people who were boarded on BD01 and have been disappeared since the shipwreck. In its letter of 10 March 2022 to Libya, the Panel requested information on the actions that Libyan authorities took to recover and manage the dead bodies after the shipwreck, in particular the identification of the bodies and the delivery of the bodies to family members. A response is awaited.

<sup>71</sup> Frontex letter of 8 November 2021 (IEC/ICU/IAGA/10803/2021).

3. Responsible officials of all three notified States, Libya, Italy and Malta, were obliged to protect and respect the lives of individuals who found themselves in a situation of distress at sea on 21 and 22 April 2021 in accordance with their international obligations on rescue at sea,<sup>72</sup> provided that they exercised power or effective control over the enjoyment of the right to life of the distressed individuals.<sup>73</sup> The Panel notes that legal obligations of the three MRCCs regarding this incident, other than under international human rights law, are outside of the Panel's mandate.<sup>74</sup>

4. Since the incident took place in the Libyan Search and Rescue Region (SRR) (see figure 24.C.8), the Libyan national authority, Libyan MRCC, had the primary obligation under international law to actively proceed with all possible speed to the rescue of persons in distress, if informed of their need of assistance.<sup>75</sup> The Panel considers that Libya MRCC was well informed about the emergency situation that threatened the lives of all estimated 130 passengers, as established above, but failed to take appropriate measures to provide the needed assistance to BD01.<sup>76</sup> NGO Alarm Phone informed the Panel that Libya MRCC had provided three conflicting scenarios to them as a justification for this failure: (a) that the Libyan patrol boat was on the way to search and rescue BD01 on 21 April 2021; (b) that the Libya MRCC was unaware of BD01 distress case; and (c) that Libyan maritime units were unable to execute SAR operation on 21 April 2021 due to bad weather.

5. The Panel finds these justifications problematic. Firstly, none of the actors that had visuals on BD01, including Frontex and private vessels, received any information that Libyan patrol boats were engaging in a SAR operation that involved BD01 (for example, see figures 24.C.27 and 24.C.28). To the contrary, NGO Alarm Phone, Frontex and *MV Ocean Viking* all reported that Libya MRCC officers were consistently unresponsive to distress calls and alert messages that these three entities conveyed to them multiple times. Secondly, the overwhelming evidence of the direct knowledge of the Libya MRCC officers contradicts the claim that they were unaware of the incident (for example, see figures 24.C.9 to 24.C.28). Finally, whilst the Panel appreciates that the assessment of operational conditions that might have endangered the boat or the crew members due to bad weather was at the relevant authorities' discretion,<sup>77</sup> Libya MRCC was responsible at the minimum to engage in activities aimed at rendering assistance to BD01 such as: (a) providing shelter to BD01; and (b) actively coordinating SAR operation with neighbouring MRCCs and merchant vessels that were attempting to search and rescue BD01.<sup>78</sup> Additionally, the ability of Libyan officers to search and rescue BD01 on time was indicated in the morning hours of 21 April, 2021 when the Libyan Coast Guard found BD02 and returned the surviving passengers to Libya.<sup>79</sup> The Panel wrote to Libya on 10 March 2022 and has yet to receive a response.

<sup>72</sup> Article 98 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS); Chapter 5, Regulation 33 of the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS); Annex, paras. 4.2.1 and 4.3 of the International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue (SAR Convention).

<sup>73</sup> Articles 2(1) and 6 of the ICCPR; Human Rights Committee, General comment No. 36 (2018) on article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, on the right to life, para. 63. This obligation applies to all individuals within the power or effective control of the said authorities, regardless of their nationality, statelessness or other status.

<sup>74</sup> Paragraph 11(a) of resolution 2213 (2015). International humanitarian law is inapplicable in this incident due to the absence of the required link (or "nexus") of alleged acts to the armed conflict in Libya.

<sup>75</sup> Although Libya is not State Party to the UNCLOS, it is bound by the duty to render assistance to persons in distress at sea as a norm of customary international law codified in article 98(1) of the UNCLOS: "Every State shall require the master of a ship flying its flag, in so far as he can do so without danger to the ship, the crew or the passengers: (a) to render assistance to any person found at sea in danger of being lost; (b) to proceed with all possible speed to the rescue of persons in distress, in so far as such action may reasonably be expected of him." See also Chapter 5, Regulation 33 of the SOLAS; Annex, paras. 4.2.1 and 4.3 of the SAR Convention; International Law Commission, Commentary to draft article 36 of the Articles concerning the Law of the Sea, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, Volume II (1956).

<sup>76</sup> Article 6 of the ICCPR.

<sup>77</sup> Article 98(1) of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.

<sup>78</sup> Chapter 4, Regulation 33 of SOLAS Convention; Chapter 2, para. 2.1.9 of the SAR Convention.

<sup>79</sup> [https://twitter.com/alarm\\_phone/status/1384973210702200835?s=21](https://twitter.com/alarm_phone/status/1384973210702200835?s=21).

6. While the primary responsibility for the search and rescue operation of BD01 fell to Libya MRCC, the Italian and Maltese MRCC also had a duty to cooperate with and provide assistance to Libya MRCC to rescue people in distress at sea and to take all feasible measures to prevent loss of life at sea.<sup>80</sup>

(a) Malta MRCC did not engage in such cooperation, despite their knowledge of BD01, their position being that “*Malta was not the responsible nor the coordinating authority on this particular case*” given that the incident took place outside the Maltese SRR.<sup>81</sup>

(b) Italy MRCC was also uncooperative in providing assistance to BD01. In addition to multiple email messages, Italy MRCC received at least five telephone calls from NGO Alarm Phone and *MV Ocean Viking* asking the Italian authorities to provide assistance to search and rescue of BD01. The Italian officers referred them to the Libyan MRCC as a competent authority. Furthermore, according to the NGO Alarm Phone report, Libya MRCC claimed that Italy MRCC engaged with them to request authorisation for an Italian flagged merchant vessel engage in SAR operations for BD01. The Panel was unable to verify this claim.

7. While the passive attitude of the Italian and Maltese MRCCs to alert messages might be qualified as a serious failure in the response to assist in the search and rescue operation under the international law of the sea, having assessed all the evidence available, the Panel was unable to establish a jurisdiction link between these authorities and BD01, necessary to make the findings on the responsibility of Italy and Malta MRCCs officials under international human rights law.

8. Shipmasters of private vessels that were in sufficient proximity to the boat in distress also had the duty under international law to proceed with all possible speed to render assistance to persons in distress. Four private vessels – *MV Alk* (IMO: 9298612), *VS Lisbeth* (IMO: 9309978), *MY Rose* (IMO: 8207381), and *MV Ocean Viking* (IMO: 8506854) were the only vessels that actively searched for BD01 for over ten hours.<sup>82</sup> They, however, reached the site of BD01 on 22 April only to find a number of dead bodies in the sea and a capsized boat without survivors.

<sup>80</sup> SAR Convention, Annex, paras. 4.2.1.1. and 4.3.


<sup>81</sup> Written response to the Panel’s request for information by Malta, dated 12 July 2021. Malta reiterated its position at the meeting with representatives of the Government of Malta on 15 February 2022 in Valletta.

<sup>82</sup> Merchant vessels ALK and BRUNA [IMO 7601073] were in close proximity of BD01 at around noon of 21 April but Bruna declined to engage in the search and rescue and instead changed its course for unestablished reasons (see figures 24.C.11 and 24.C.13).



Figure 24.C.8

Map of Central Mediterranean Search and Rescue Regions (SRR) and locations of boat in distress on 21 and 22 April 2021





Figures 24.C.9 to 24.C.28

**Copies of email correspondences between involved actors of the 22 April 2021 incident**

Figure 24.C.9




Figure 24.C.10




Figure 24.C.11




Figure 24.C.12




Figure 24.C.13




Figure 24.C.14




Figure 24.C.15






Figure 24.C.16




Figure 24.C.17




Figure 24.C.18




Figure 24.C.19




Figure 24.C.20




Figure 24.C.21




Figure 24.C.22






Figure 24.C.23




Figure 24.C.24




Figure 24.C.25



Figure 24.C.26




Figure 24.C.27



Figure 24.C.28



## Annex 25 Maritime and air delivery non-compliance profile indicators

1. The Panel has continued to use a set of profile indicators<sup>83</sup> of suspicious activities and documentation that, when considered collectively, indicate that a vessel or aircraft is likely to be carrying illicit cargo (see tables 25.1 and 25.2). Multiple indicators are required before a vessel, aircraft or airline is classified as of interest to the Panel or reported as being a violation of or non-compliance with the arms embargo. This annex summarises these indicators.

Table 25.1

### Maritime non-compliance profile indicators

#	Type	Indicator	Remarks
1	Visibility	Automatic Identification System(AIS) <sup>a</sup>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ “Dark activity” periods.</li> </ul>
2	Route(s)	Destination Ports	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ The ports of Gabes and Algiers are often inaccurately declared.</li> <li>▪ Unusual routing from past voyages.</li> </ul>
3	Ownership	Frequent change of vessel’s owners	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Lack of corporate on-line presence.</li> </ul>
4	Operators	Frequent change of vessel’s operators	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Lack of corporate on-line presence.</li> </ul>
5	Vessel Name	Frequent change of vessel’s name	
6	Vessel Tonnage	Tonnage Range	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Comparison to historical tonnage of vessels known to be non-compliant.</li> </ul>
7	Vessel Draught	Change of Draught	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Comparison of draught at loading and discharge.</li> </ul>
8	Commercial Relationships	Linkages	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Links between owners / operators /agents.</li> </ul>
8	Commercial Activity	Uneconomic behaviour	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Low utilization profile</li> </ul>
9	Flag of Registry	Flags of convenience and multiple flag changes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Includes Flag refusal to allow inspections when requested.</li> </ul>
10	Documentation	Accuracy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Transparency in information supplied to Panel.</li> <li>▪ Accuracy of completion.</li> </ul>
11	Cargo Shielding	Container layout on weather deck Container layout on port dock	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Containers are used to line the edge of the weather deck to shield the remainder of the deck from external view.</li> <li>▪ Containers are used to shield offloading sites at ports from external view.</li> </ul>

<sup>83</sup> First developed for use in [S/2021/229](#).



#	Type	Indicator	Remarks
12	Cargo Analysis	Volumetric and mass analysis	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Do reported weight and packaging match declaration on documentation?</li> </ul>
13	Sanctions Listings	Sanctions designated or reported vessel	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Previous reports by other UN Panels and Monitoring Groups.</li> <li>Sanctions notices by subscription-based resources.</li> </ul>

<sup>a</sup> Or Long-Range Identification and Tracking system (LRIT).

Table 25.2

**Profile indicators of airbridge and air delivery**

#	Activity	Details	Remarks
1	Flight volume	The number of unscheduled flights on a previously little used route	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>For example, a significant number of flights over a short period indicates a centrally organized supply chain.</li> </ul>
2	Flight timings	Most flights are planned so that the cargo aircraft are unloaded during darkness	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Disguises the nature of cargo being offloaded from onlookers in areas where access is difficult to control.</li> </ul>
3	Flight routing	The flights often take off from a civilian airport, then land at a military airbase before departing on a flight track directly towards Libya	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Civilian cargo aircraft require time in civilian airports where the appropriate servicing and maintenance capabilities exist.</li> <li>Indicative of the loading of military related equipment.</li> </ul>
4	Flight safety	Signals from the aircraft ADS-B <sup>a</sup> transponders are not visible on open-source ADS-B monitoring shortly after entering Egyptian airspace	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Airline captains sometimes “go dark” when approaching Libyan airspace as a countermeasure against being targeted by air defence systems, but usually not for the majority of the flight.</li> <li>Deliberately switched off due to the covert nature of these flights.</li> <li>Other legitimate flights (for example the scheduled Afriqiyah Airlines A320 from Benghazi to Alexandria always displays ADS-B data).</li> </ul>
5	Flight safety	Signals from the aircraft ADS-B transponders are switched to MLAT (multilateration) mode <sup>84</sup> for the whole flight	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>MLAT mode only transmits aircraft code, heading, altitude and speed but NOT current location.</li> </ul>

<sup>84</sup> Aircraft without, or that are not broadcasting on, ADS-B transponders do not broadcast their latitude/longitude, so flight monitoring software uses multilateration of 1090 MHz Mode S transponder signals to determine the aircraft's location by using the time difference of arrival (TDOA) when an aircraft is detected across four or more receivers/ground stations.

#	Activity	Details	Remarks
6	Flight transparency	Signals from aircraft ADS-B transponders are not available for all flights	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Airlines have utilised a “blocking” service provided by some of the open-source ADS-B monitoring providers.</li> <li>A deliberate attempt by the airline to avoid scrutiny and disguise covert or illicit flights.</li> </ul>
7	Flight availability	Scheduled or non-scheduled route	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Ticket unavailability from the air operator for passenger aircraft flights suggests movement of military personnel. For example: Cham Wings flights from Syria to Benghazi.</li> </ul>
8	Aircraft documentation	The use of fake Air Operating Certificates (AOC)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The Panel has identified the use of at least one fake AOC used to justify an ADS-B signal blocking service.</li> </ul>
9	Flight documentation	<p>The submission of incomplete or inaccurate Cargo Manifests and Air Waybills</p> <p>The lack of detailed flight documentation submitted</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Fake consignees listed.</li> <li>Fake consignors listed.</li> <li>Used to disguise the true nature of the actual cargo.</li> <li>Customs value listed as zero.</li> <li>Failure to supply, for example: 1) Flight Plan; 2) Aircraft Technical Logbook; 3) Journey Flight Log; 4) Weight and Balance Report; 5) Take-off and Landing Balance; and 6) General Declaration.</li> </ul>
10	Air operator transparency	Limited, inaccurate or no information provided to requests for information	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Indicative of covert or illicit activity.</li> </ul>
11	Air operator web presence	Lack of corporate website or very limited contact information on website	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>A reputable cargo aircraft company would have an easily sourced online presence as part of the company marketing strategy.</li> </ul>
12	Cargo agency web presence	Lack of corporate website	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>A reputable cargo agent would have an easily sourced online presence as part of the company marketing strategy.</li> </ul>
13	Air operator’s relationships	Corporate links	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Change of ownership or operating conditions for aircraft between linked companies.</li> </ul>
14	Sanctions Listings	Current or previous listings of owner, operator, or aircraft	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Previous reports by other UN Panels and Monitoring Groups.</li> <li>Sanctions notices by subscription databases.</li> </ul>

## Annex 26 Summary of arms embargo equipment violations (26 Feb 2011 - 25 Apr 2022)

1. Tables 26.1 and 26.2 summarises confirmed arms and military materiel transferred into Libya in violation of paragraph 9 of resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#), as modified by subsequent resolutions.<sup>85</sup> It does not include arms and military materiel transferred to Libya for which exemptions were provided for by the Committee.

Table 26.1

**Confirmed arms and military materiel transferred from Libya (26 Feb 2011 - 25 Apr 2022) (weapon systems and equipment)**<sup>86</sup>

<i>Generic type</i>	<i>Nomenclature / Calibre</i>	<i>Panel Report</i>	<i>Responsible</i>	<i>Remarks</i>
Aircraft (FGA) <sup>87</sup>	IOMAX AT-802i	<a href="#">S/2017/466</a>	UAE	▪
	Dassault <i>Mirage 2000/9</i>	<a href="#">S/2021/229</a>	UAE	▪ Operated from Sidi Barani airbase in Egypt.
	General Dynamics F-16	<a href="#">S/2021/229</a>	Turkey	▪ Overflight.
	** MiG-21MF	<a href="#">S/2015/128</a> <a href="#">S/2016/209</a>	Egypt	▪
	MiG-23ML(D)	New <sup>88</sup>	UID <sup>89</sup>	▪ Identification from 2017 imagery and unreported by Panel. ▪ Other aircraft restored to flight status by cannibalization. <sup>90</sup>
	MiG-29	<a href="#">S/2021/229</a>	Russian Federation	▪
	Su-24	<a href="#">S/2021/229</a>	Russian Federation	▪
Aircraft (ISR) <sup>91</sup>	<i>Pilatus PC-6</i>	<a href="#">S/2021/229</a>	Lancaster6	▪ Project Opus.
Aircraft (Rotary Wing)	** AS332L <i>Super Puma</i> Medium Utility	<a href="#">S/2021/229</a>	Lancaster6	▪ Project Opus.
	Mi-8	<a href="#">S/2015/128</a> <a href="#">S/2016/209</a>	Egypt	▪
	Mi-24	<a href="#">S/2016/209</a>	Sudan	▪
	Mi-24V	<a href="#">S/2016/209</a>	UID	▪
	Mi-24P	<a href="#">S/2017/466</a>	UAE	▪
	SA341 <i>Gazelle</i> Light Utility	<a href="#">S/2021/229</a>	Lancaster6	▪ Project Opus.
	UH-60M <i>Blackhawk</i>	<a href="#">S/2017/466</a>	UAE	▪
Aircraft (Transport)	Airbus A400B <i>Atlas</i>	<a href="#">S/2021/229</a>	Turkey	▪ For transfer of military materiel into Libya.

<sup>85</sup> This annex updates and clarifies information within the previous original work at <https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2020/06/types-of-arms-and-equipment-supplied-to.html>, 23 March 2021.

<sup>86</sup> Items marked \*\* appeared in the 29 May 2021 7th Anniversary of Operation Dignity parade in Benghazi. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mbIDXxITPa0>.

<sup>87</sup> Fighter Ground Attack.

<sup>88</sup> <https://medium.com/war-is-boring/it-looks-like-russia-gave-a-fighter-jet-to-libyas-warlord-1a564098b223>, 1 March 2017. Although the imagery shows the MiG-23 in Libya the Panel does not endorse the supply chain in the article.

<sup>89</sup> UID, in all uses, means unidentified, or low evidential levels, and responsibility has yet to be attributed by the Panel.

<sup>90</sup> <https://www.africanmilitaryblog.com/2019/08/libya-frankenstein-mig-23-flogger-fighter-jet-take-flight>, 3 August 2019.

<sup>91</sup> Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance.

<i>Generic type</i>	<i>Nomenclature / Calibre</i>	<i>Panel Report</i>	<i>Responsible</i>	<i>Remarks</i>
	Antonov AN-12A [#2340806] <sup>92</sup>	New <sup>93</sup>	Space Cargo Inc	▪ Operating in Libya in direct support of HAF.
	Antonov AN-12BP [#5342908]	New	Space Cargo Inc	▪ Operating in Libya in direct support of HAF.
	Antonov AN-12BP [#5343005]	<a href="#">S/2021/229</a>	Space Cargo Inc	▪ Operating in Libya in direct support of HAF.
	Antonov AN-26 [#503]	<a href="#">S/2017/466</a> <a href="#">S/2019/914</a>	Space Cargo Inc	▪ Operating in Libya in direct support of HAF.
	Antonov AN-32B [#2009]	<a href="#">S/2021/229</a>	Space Cargo Inc	▪ Operating in Libya in direct support of HAF.
	C-17A <i>Globemaster</i>	<a href="#">S/2021/229</a>	Turkey	▪ For transfer of military materiel into Libya.
	C-130E <i>Hercules</i>	<a href="#">S/2015/128</a> <a href="#">S/2016/209</a>	Sudan	▪ For transfer of military materiel into Libya.
	C-130E <i>Hercules</i>	<a href="#">S/2021/229</a>	Turkey	▪ For transfer of military materiel into Libya.
	Ilyushin IL-18D [#172001401]	<a href="#">S/2021/229</a>	Space Cargo Inc	▪ Operating in Libya in direct support of HAF
	Ilyushin IL-18D [#187009903]	<a href="#">S/2017/466</a>	Space Cargo Inc	▪ Operating in Libya in direct support of HAF
	Ilyushin IL-76TD [#73479367]	<a href="#">S/2021/229</a>	Space Cargo Inc	▪ Operating in Libya in direct support of HAF
	Ilyushin IL-76TD [#1013405167]	<a href="#">S/2021/229</a>	Space Cargo Inc	▪ Operating in Libya in direct support of HAF
	Ilyushin IL-76TD [#1013409282]	<a href="#">S/2021/229</a>	Green Flag Aviation	▪ Operating in Libya in direct support of HAF
	Ilyushin IL-76TD [#1023411378]	<a href="#">S/2021/229</a>	Space Cargo Inc	▪ Operating in Libya in direct support of HAF
	** Ilyushin IL-76TD [5A-ILA]	New	UID	▪
	Ilyushin IL-76TD Various	<a href="#">S/2021/229</a>	Russian Federation	▪ For transfer of military materiel into Libya.
Air Defence (Guns)	** 23mm ZSU-23-2CP	New	UID	▪
	35mm <i>Korkut</i> Cannon	<a href="#">S/2021/229</a>	Turkey	▪
Air Defence (Missiles)	MIM-23 <i>Hawk</i>	<a href="#">S/2021/229</a>	Turkey	▪
	MIM-104 <i>Patriot</i>	New <sup>94</sup>	UAE	▪
	<i>Pantsir</i> S1	<a href="#">S/2021/229</a>	Russian Federation	▪ On KaMAZ platform.
	<i>Pantsir</i> S1	<a href="#">S/2021/229</a>	UAE	▪ On MAN platform.
Anti-Tank (ATGW) <sup>95</sup>	9K115-2 <i>Metis-M</i>	<a href="#">S/2019/914</a>	UID	▪ With GNU-AF.
	9M133 <i>Kornet</i>	<a href="#">S/2019/914</a>	UID	▪ With GNU-AF.
	<i>Dehleyvah</i>	<a href="#">S/2021/229</a>	UID	▪ With GNU-AF.
Armoured Vehicles (APC) <sup>96</sup>	AMN 233114 <i>Tigr-M</i>	New	Likely Russian PMC	▪

<sup>92</sup> These are the manufacturer's serial numbers (MSN).

<sup>93</sup> Where indicated as new, the evidence appears elsewhere in the annexes to the report as an infographic, unless otherwise indicated by a footnote reference.

<sup>94</sup> In a single open-source report in <https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2020/06/types-of-arms-and-equipment-supplied-to.html>, 23 March 2021. A confidential source informed the Panel that the system was only very briefly deployed to Libya and soon withdrawn.

<sup>95</sup> Anti-Tank Guided Weapon.

<sup>96</sup> Armoured Personnel Carriers. Sometimes also referred to as Protected Patrol Vehicles (PPV).

<i>Generic type</i>	<i>Nomenclature / Calibre</i>	<i>Panel Report</i>	<i>Responsible</i>	<i>Remarks</i>
	<i>Irigiri 4x4</i>	<a href="#">S/2019/914</a>	UID	▪ First seen 2015.
	<i>Inkas Titan-DS 4x4</i>	<a href="#">S/2021/229</a>	UAE	▪
	<i>Inkas Titan-S 6x6</i>	New	UID	▪
	** KADDB <i>Al Wahsh 4x4</i>	<a href="#">S/2016/209</a>	Jordan	▪
	KADDB <i>Al Wahsh 4x4</i>	<a href="#">S/2018/812</a>	Jordan	▪ "Snake Head" Turret fitted.
	<i>Katmerciler Kirac</i>	New	Turkey	▪
	<i>Lenco Bearcat G3 4x4</i>	<a href="#">S/2021/229</a>	UID	▪ With GNU-AF.
	<i>Mezcal Tygra 4x4</i>	<a href="#">S/2017/466</a>	UAE	▪
	<i>MIC VPK Tigr-M</i>	<a href="#">S/2021/229</a>	Russian PMC	▪
	** MSPV <i>Panthera T6 4x4</i>	<a href="#">S/2016/209</a> <a href="#">S/2017/466</a> <a href="#">S/2018/812</a> <a href="#">S/2021/229</a>	UAE	▪ From different shipments.
	MSPV <i>Panthera F9 4x4</i>	<a href="#">S/2018/812</a>	UAE	▪
	** Streit <i>Cobra 4x4</i>	<a href="#">S/2016/209</a>	UAE	▪ Transferred in 2012.
	Streit <i>Cougar 4x4</i>	<a href="#">S/2016/209</a>	UAE	▪ Transferred in 2012.
	** Streit <i>Cougar 4x4</i>	<a href="#">S/2019/914</a>	Jordan	▪ "Snake Head" Turret fitted.
	Streit <i>Spartan 4x4</i>	<a href="#">S/2016/209</a> <a href="#">S/2018/812</a> <a href="#">S/2021/229</a>	UAE	▪ From different shipments.
	TAG BATT APC	New	UID	▪
	** TAG <i>Terrier LT-79 4x4</i>	<a href="#">S/2021/229</a>	UAE	▪ New attribution. <sup>97</sup>
	<i>Tundra Variant</i>	<a href="#">S/2021/229</a>	UID	▪
Armoured Vehicles (IAFV) <sup>98</sup>	FNSS <i>ACV-15</i>	<a href="#">S/2021/229</a>	Turkey	▪
	KADDB <i>Mared 8x8</i>	<a href="#">S/2019/914</a>	Jordan	▪
	** KADDB <i>Mared 8x8</i>	<a href="#">S/2021/229</a>	Jordan	▪ "Snake Head" Turret fitted.
	Paramount <i>Mbombe 6x6</i>	<a href="#">S/2019/914</a>	UID	▪ With HAF.
	<i>Ratel-60</i>	<a href="#">S/2019/914</a>	UID	▪ With HAF.
Armoured Vehicles (MRAP) <sup>99</sup>	BAe <i>Cayman</i>	<a href="#">S/2016/209</a>	UID	▪ First seen 2012.
	BMC <i>Kirpi 4x4</i>	<a href="#">S/2019/914</a>	Turkey	▪
	BMC <i>Vuran 4x4</i>	<a href="#">S/2019/914</a>	Turkey	▪
	Evro-Polis <i>Valkyrie 4x4</i>	<a href="#">S/2021/229</a>	ChvK Wagner	▪ Based on a Ural-432007 platform. ▪ New attribution.
	NIMR <i>Jais 4x4</i>	<a href="#">S/2016/209</a>	UAE	▪ First seen 2013.
	Streit <i>Typhoon 4x4</i>	New	UID	▪

<sup>97</sup> [https://www-africaintelligence-com.eu1.proxy.openathens.net/north-africa\\_business/2019/12/19/un-supplier-tag-supplies-armoured-cars-to-haftar,108386984-art](https://www-africaintelligence-com.eu1.proxy.openathens.net/north-africa_business/2019/12/19/un-supplier-tag-supplies-armoured-cars-to-haftar,108386984-art), 19 December 2019.

<sup>98</sup> Infantry Armoured Fighting Vehicles.

<sup>99</sup> Mine Resistant Armoured Protected.

<i>Generic type</i>	<i>Nomenclature / Calibre</i>	<i>Panel Report</i>	<i>Responsible</i>	<i>Remarks</i>
Artillery (Towed)	** 122mm M1938 M-30 Howitzer	New	UID	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ This weapon system was NOT reported in the inventory of the Libyan Armed Forces prior to the 2011 arms embargo.<sup>100</sup></li> <li>▪ Identified with HAF 106 brigade.</li> </ul>
	** 155mm G5 Howitzer	<a href="#">S/2021/229</a>	UID	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ With HAF.<sup>101</sup></li> </ul>
Artillery (Self-Propelled)	155mm <i>Firtina</i> T-155	<a href="#">S/2021/229</a>	Turkey	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪</li> </ul>
Artillery (MLRS)	Rocketsan 122mm <i>Sakarya</i> T-122	<a href="#">S/2021/229</a>	Turkey	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪</li> </ul>
	** 128mm LSRVM <i>Morava</i>	<a href="#">S/2021/229</a>	UID	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ The 107mm variant may also have been supplied.<sup>102</sup></li> </ul>
	122mm Hybrid Version	New	UAE	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪</li> </ul>
Logistic Vehicles	** CFORCE All-Terrain Vehicle	New	UID	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪</li> </ul>
	** Jeep Gladiator	New	UID	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Militarised.</li> </ul>
	KamAZ 6x6 Truck	New	UID	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Identification from 2018 and unreported by Panel.</li> <li>▪ Also delivered to Libya on <i>MV Fehn Calypso</i> in 2020.<sup>103</sup></li> </ul>
	KamAZ 8x8 Truck	<a href="#">S/2021/229</a>	Russian PMC	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Identified as the mobility platform for the ChVK Wagner operated Pantsir-1.</li> </ul>
	Militarised Toyota Land Cruiser 79 4x4	New	UID	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪</li> </ul>
	** Toyota 6x6 Light Utility Vehicle	New	UID	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪</li> </ul>
	UAZ-469 Light Communications Vehicle	New	UID	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪</li> </ul>
	Ural-4320 Truck	New	UID	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Some identified on deck of <i>MV Fehn Calypso</i> on 25 April 2020 during transit of Bosphorus, but these offloaded in Alexandria according to shipping company.</li> </ul>
	Ural-4320 Truck (Armoured)	New	UID	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪</li> </ul>
Mortars (Field)	120mm 120-PM-43 M1943	New	UID	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪</li> </ul>
	120mm M-74	New	UID	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ With HAF Tariq bin Ziyad brigade.</li> </ul>

<sup>100</sup> Pre-2011 Libyan inventory based on that equipment reported in Jane's publications and the IISS Military Balance (<https://www.iiss.org/publications/the-military-balance-plus>).

<sup>101</sup> Also <https://twitter.com/Oded121351/status/1328016339072638978>, 15 November 2020.

<sup>102</sup> Single source report in <https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2020/06/types-of-arms-and-equipment-supplied-to.html>, 23 March 2021. Extract imagery from a video dated 29 May 2021 (<https://youtu.be/mbIDXxITPa0>) (2:37:26) may also show the 107mm variant, but resolution was insufficient to allow confirmatory analysis by photogrammetry.

<sup>103</sup> Information from shipping company.

<i>Generic type</i>	<i>Nomenclature / Calibre</i>	<i>Panel Report</i>	<i>Responsible</i>	<i>Remarks</i>
Naval Vessels	<i>Corrubia</i> Class patrol boats	<a href="#">S/2019/914</a>	Member State	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Converted to naval vessels post-delivery.</li> </ul>
	<i>Damen Stan Patrol 1605</i> Class patrol boats	<a href="#">S/2018/812</a>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li></li> </ul>
	<i>Gabya</i> Class Frigates	<a href="#">S/2021/229</a>	Turkey	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li></li> </ul>
	Lambro Olympic D74 Fast Patrol Boat	New	Libya SSA	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>In use with SSA</li> <li>a.k.a. <i>Javelin</i> Class.</li> </ul>
	MRC-1250 Rigid Hulled Inflatable Boats	<a href="#">S/2021/229</a>	Lancaster6	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Project Opus.</li> </ul>
	Offshore Patrol Vessel <i>Alkarama</i>	<a href="#">S/2018/812</a> <a href="#">S/2019/914</a>	Universal Satcom Services, UAE	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li></li> </ul>
	Patrol Boat <i>Alqayid Saqar</i>	New	Libya SSA	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Type UID.</li> <li>Classed as military as dual use and subsequently armed.</li> </ul>
Radars and EW	<i>Raidco</i> RPB 20 class patrol boats	<a href="#">S/2019/914</a>	Member State	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Converted to naval vessels post-delivery.</li> </ul>
	Aselsan <i>Koral</i> Electronic Warfare System	<a href="#">S/2021/229</a>	Turkey	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li></li> </ul>
	** IRL131 P-18 Early Warning Radar	New	UID	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li></li> </ul>
	LEMZ 96L6/E Target Acquisition Radar	<a href="#">S/2021/229</a>	UID	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li></li> </ul>
	Samel-90 Mobile IED Jammer	<a href="#">S/2019/914</a>	UID	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li></li> </ul>
Small Arms and Light Weapons	5.56mm AK-103 Assault Rifles	New	Likely Russian PMC	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li></li> </ul>
	5.56mm JAWS-556 Assault Rifles	New	Jordan	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li></li> </ul>
	5.56mm MFR Multi-Functional Rifles	New	Turkey	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li></li> </ul>
	5.56mm MPT 55K Assault Rifles	New	Turkey	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li></li> </ul>
	7.62 x 39mm AK-103-1 Assault Rifles	New	UID	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li></li> </ul>
	7.62 x 39mm AR-M9F Assault Rifles	<a href="#">S/2016/209</a>	UAE	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li></li> </ul>
	7.62 x 39mm Type 63-1 Assault Rifle	New	UID	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li></li> </ul>
	7.62 x 51mm FN FAL Assault Rifle	<a href="#">S/2013/99</a>	UAE	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li></li> </ul>
	7.62 x 51mm JNG-90 <i>Bora -12</i> Sniper Rifle	New	Turkey	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li></li> </ul>
	7.62 x 51mm MPT 76 Assault Rifles	New	UID	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li></li> </ul>
	7.62 x 54mmR Type-80 General Purpose Machine Gun <sup>104</sup>	New	UID	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li></li> </ul>
	0.308 Sako TRG Sniper Rifle	New	UID	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li></li> </ul>
	0.338 <i>Orsis</i> T-5000 Sniper Rifle	New	UID	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Chambered for <i>Lapua</i> rounds.</li> </ul>
	0.338 <i>Steyr</i> SSG-08 Sniper Rifle (Variant or Copy)	New	Russian PMC	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Chambered for <i>Lapua</i> rounds.</li> </ul>
	0.50 Barrett M82 variant Anti-Materiel Rifle	New	UID	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li></li> </ul>
	9mm Caracal F Pistols	<a href="#">S/2015/128</a>	UAE	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li></li> </ul>
	9mm <i>EKOL</i> P29 Blank Firing Pistols	<a href="#">S/2019/914</a>	UID	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li></li> </ul>
	9mm <i>SUR</i> BRT M9 Blank Firing Pistols	New	UID	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li></li> </ul>
	12.7 x 108mm W-85 Heavy Machine Gun	New	UID	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li></li> </ul>

<sup>104</sup> [https://twitter.com/r\\_u\\_vid/status/1221227142911905793](https://twitter.com/r_u_vid/status/1221227142911905793), 26 January 2020.



<i>Generic type</i>	<i>Nomenclature / Calibre</i>	<i>Panel Report</i>	<i>Responsible</i>	<i>Remarks</i>
	AGS 30mm Grenade Launcher	<a href="#">S/2021/229</a>	Russian PMC	▪ Either AGS-17 or AGS-30 based on ammunition recovered.
	VOG-25 40mm Grenade Launcher	<a href="#">S/2021/229</a>	Russian PMC	▪ Based on ammunition recovered.
	40 x 46mm <i>Akdas</i> AK-40-GL Grenade Launchers	New	Turkey	▪
	RPG-32 <i>Nashbab</i> Rocket Launcher	<a href="#">S/2019/914</a>	Jordan	▪
	** SPG-9 73mm Recoilless Rifle	New	UID	▪
	Type-69 85mm Rocket Launcher	New	UID	▪
Tanks (MBT)	M-60 <i>Patton</i> <sup>105</sup>	New	Turkey	▪
	T-62MV	<a href="#">S/2021/229</a>	Russian PMC	▪ Also see annex 56.
Uncrewed Aerial Vehicles (UAV)	Adcom <i>Yabhon-HMD</i>	<a href="#">S/2019/914</a>	UAE	▪
	Aeryon <i>Scout Micro</i>	<a href="#">S/2013/99</a>	Zariba Security Corporation	▪
	Chilong CL-11 VTOL	<a href="#">S/2019/914</a>	UID	▪ Dual use system.
	** DJI Inspire	New	UID	▪
	Mohajer-2	<a href="#">S/2019/914</a>	UID	▪
	Orbiter-3	<a href="#">S/2019/914</a>	GNA-AF	▪ Dual use system.
	Orlan-10	<a href="#">S/2019/914</a>	HAF	▪ Possibly from ChVK Wagner.
	Schiebel Camcopter S-100	<a href="#">S/2017/466</a>	UID	▪ With a UID Militia.
	Xiamen <i>Mugin 4450</i>	<a href="#">S/2021/229</a>	UID	▪ Dual use system.
	Zala 421-16E	New	UID	▪ With HAF.
UAV (Loitering Munition)	IAI <i>Harpy</i>	<a href="#">S/2021/229</a>	UID	▪ With GNU-AF.
	STM <i>Kargu-2</i>	<a href="#">S/2021/229</a>	Turkey	▪
	WB <i>Warmate</i>	<a href="#">S/2021/229</a>	UID	▪
Uncrewed Aerial Combat Vehicles (UACV)	Bayraktar TB2	<a href="#">S/2019/914</a>	Turkey	▪
	TAI <i>Anka</i>	<a href="#">S/2021/229</a>	Turkey	▪
	Wing Loong I	<a href="#">S/2017/466</a>	UAE	▪
	Wing Loong II	<a href="#">S/2019/914</a>	UAE	▪
Miscellaneous	AN/PEQ-15 Advanced Target Pointer Illuminator Aiming Laser (ATPIAL)	New	UID	▪
	AN/PVS-7 Night Vision Goggles	New	UID	▪
	Aselsan A100 Night Vision Monocular	New	Turkey	▪
	Dahua DHI-UAV-D-1000JHV2 Anti Drone Gun	<a href="#">S/2021/229</a>	UID	▪
	Holographic Weapon Sights (HWS)	New	Turkey	▪

<sup>105</sup> Also <https://twitter.com/MiddleEastWatch/status/1281616199957323776>, 10 July 2020.

<i>Generic type</i>	<i>Nomenclature / Calibre</i>	<i>Panel Report</i>	<i>Responsible</i>	<i>Remarks</i>
	Sordin Supreme Pro-X Hearing Protectors	New	UID	▪

Table 26.2

**Confirmed arms and military materiel transferred to Libya (26 Feb 2011 - 25 Apr 2022) (ammunition and explosive ordnance)**

<i>Generic type</i>	<i>Nomenclature / Calibre</i>	<i>Panel Report</i>	<i>Responsible</i>	<i>Remarks</i>
Air to Ground Missiles (AGM)	BA-7 Blue Arrow	<a href="#">S/2019/914</a>	UAE	▪
Anti-Tank (ATGM)	FGM-148 <i>Javelin</i>	<a href="#">S/2019/914</a>	Member State	▪ Present under resolution 2214 (2015). <sup>106</sup>
	<i>Rocketsan</i> UMTAS	<a href="#">S/2021/229</a>	Turkey	▪
Anti-Tank (Rockets)	M-79 Osa	New	UID	▪
Engineer Stores	ML-8 anti-lift initiators	<a href="#">S/2021/229</a>	Russian PMC	▪
Free Flight Rockets (FFR)	122mm <i>Rocketsan</i> FFR	New	Turkey UAE	▪
Grenades	F1 Fragmentation	New	ChVK Wagner	▪
	30mm VOG-17M Grenades	<a href="#">S/2021/229</a>	ChVK Wagner	▪
	40mm VOG-25 Grenades	<a href="#">S/2021/229</a>	ChVK Wagner	▪
Laser Guided Bombs (LGB)	GBU-12 <i>Paveway</i> II	<a href="#">S/2017/466</a>	UAE	▪
Laser Guided Projectiles (LGP)	155mm GP-1A	<a href="#">S/2017/466</a> <a href="#">S/2018/812</a>	UAE	▪
	155mm GP-6	<a href="#">S/2019/914</a>	UAE	▪
Mines (Anti-personnel)	MON-50	New	ChVK Wagner	▪
	MON-90	New	ChVK Wagner	▪
	MON-200	New	ChVK Wagner	▪
	OZM-72	New	ChVK Wagner	▪
	PMN-2	<a href="#">S/2021/229</a>	ChVK Wagner	▪
	POM-2R	<a href="#">S/2021/229</a>	ChVK Wagner	▪
Mines (Anti-Tank)	TM-62M	New	Russian PMC	▪
Mortar Bombs	120mm high explosive	<a href="#">S/2021/229</a>	UID	▪
	120mm M62P8 high explosive	<a href="#">S/2021/229</a>	UAE	▪
	120mm M62P10 high explosive	New	UAE	▪
Small Arms and Cannon Ammunition	7.62 x 39mm	<a href="#">S/2015/128</a> <a href="#">S/2016/209</a>	Belarus UID	▪ For Ministry of Interior.
	7.62 x 39mm	<a href="#">S/2016/209</a>	Sudan	▪
	7.62 x 39mm TulAmmo	<a href="#">S/2021/229</a>	Russian PMC	▪ Lot A421/2019.
	7.62 x 51mm M80	<a href="#">S/2016/209</a>	Qatar	▪
	7.62 x 54Rmm	<a href="#">S/2016/209</a>	UID	▪ Manufactured in 2012.

<sup>106</sup> In [S/2019/914](#), the Panel recommended that the Committee provide guidance as to whether the term “combat by all means” in paragraph 3 of resolution 2214 (2015) overrides the requirements of paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011) and as subsequently amended.

<i>Generic type</i>	<i>Nomenclature / Calibre</i>	<i>Panel Report</i>	<i>Responsible</i>	<i>Remarks</i>
	12.7 x 108mm	<a href="#">S/2013/99</a> <a href="#">S/2015/128</a>	UAE	▪
	14.5 x 114mm	<a href="#">S/2015/128</a>	Belarus	▪ For Ministry of Interior.
	23 x 115mm	<a href="#">S/2015/128</a>	Belarus	▪ For Ministry of Interior.
Thermobaric Munitions	KBP RPO-A <i>Shmel</i>	<a href="#">S/2021/229</a>	ChVK Wagner	▪

2. Tables 26.3 and 26.4 summarises arms and military materiel that have been reported in open-sources as new transfers. The Panel is still investigating these alleged transfers as: (a) in some cases the arms and military materiel were in the inventory of the Libyan Armed Forces prior to the 2011 arms embargo; and/or (b) the imagery was not of high enough resolution to identify serial numbers or lot/batch numbers to confirm post-2011 manufacture, and thus enable the initiation of tracing requests to identify supply chains. The Panel continues to investigate to find confirmatory information to the appropriate evidential standards.

Table 26.3

**Reported but not yet confirmed arms and military materiel transferred to Libya (26 Feb 2011 - 25 Apr 2022) (weapon systems and equipment)** <sup>107</sup>

<i>Generic type</i>	<i>Nomenclature / Calibre</i>	<i>Remarks</i>
Air Defence (Missiles)	S-125 (SA-3)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ This system was in the inventory of the Libyan Armed Forces prior to the 2011 arms embargo.</li> <li>▪ Reports in June 2020 of supply from Ukraine to Turkey,<sup>108</sup> and then deployed to Al Watiya.<sup>109</sup> No S-125 appear on satellite imagery of Al Watiya at that time, only <i>HAWK MIM</i>.</li> </ul>
Anti-Tank (ATGW)	9M113 <i>Konkurs</i> <sup>110</sup>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ This system was in the inventory of the Libyan Armed Forces prior to the 2011 arms embargo.</li> <li>▪ Also seen with HAF 106 brigade in November 2020 exercise, but resolution of imagery insufficient to identify if post-2011 production.</li> <li>▪ More confirmatory evidence required before post-2011 transfer to Libya can be proven.</li> </ul>
Armoured Vehicles (APC)	<i>NIMR II</i> <sup>111</sup>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ This vehicle was in the inventory of the Libyan Armed Forces prior to the 2011 arms embargo. The unit badge on the vehicle dates back to 1970.</li> <li>▪ Supplied under a contract signed in 2009 between Libya and the Bin Jamr Group, UAE.<sup>112</sup></li> <li>▪ The imagery was not sufficient to allow for confirmation of a new transfer to Libya without other confirmatory evidence.</li> </ul>

<sup>107</sup> Listed primarily in <https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2020/06/types-of-arms-and-equipment-supplied-to.html>, 23 March 2021.

<sup>108</sup> <https://avia-pro.net/news/na-vooruzhenii-livii-poyavilis-ukrainskie-s-125-protiv-rossiyskih-mig-29-i-su-24>, 8 July 2020.

<sup>109</sup> [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=\\_mPg5CTUJHQ](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_mPg5CTUJHQ), 12 July 2020.

<sup>110</sup> Reported capture. <https://twitter.com/AnalystMick/status/1249681644933599233>, 13 April 2020.

<sup>111</sup> <https://twitter.com/oded121351/status/966794267585925120>, 22 February 2018.

<sup>112</sup> <http://www.army-guide.com/eng/product.php?prodID=3936&printmode=1>. Accessed 21 January 2022.

<i>Generic type</i>	<i>Nomenclature / Calibre</i>	<i>Remarks</i>
Armoured Vehicles (IAFV)	BRDM-2	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>This weapon system was in the inventory of the Libyan Armed Forces prior to the 2011 arms embargo.</li> <li><a href="#">S/2016/209</a> reported the transfer of these APC types from Libya to Mali.</li> <li>Ukraine sold 108 BRDM to a UAE customer in 2017.<sup>113</sup></li> <li>More confirmatory evidence required before post-2011 transfer to Libya can be proven.</li> </ul>
Artillery (Towed)	** 122mm D-30 Howitzer <sup>114</sup>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>This weapon system was in the inventory of the Libyan Armed Forces prior to the 2011 arms embargo.</li> <li>More confirmatory evidence required before post-2011 transfer to Libya can be proven.</li> </ul>
	152mm 2A65 Msta-B Howitzer	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>This weapon system was NOT in the inventory of the Libyan Armed Forces prior to the 2011 arms embargo.</li> <li>The open-source imagery that initially referred to this weapon was later updated to attribute the gun as a G5 Howitzer.<sup>115</sup></li> <li>The Panel has yet to find any imagery of the weapon system deployed in Libya.</li> </ul>
	155mm Norinco AH4 Gun-Howitzer	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>This weapon system was NOT in the inventory of the Libyan Armed Forces prior to the 2011 arms embargo.</li> <li>Procured by UAE in 2019.<sup>116</sup></li> <li>Ammunition for the weapon system reported in <a href="#">S/2017/466</a>, <a href="#">S/2018/812</a> and <a href="#">S/2019/914</a>, but this may be compatible with the 155mm G5 Howitzer known to have been transferred.</li> <li>The Panel has yet to find any imagery of the weapon system proving deployment in Libya.</li> </ul>
Artillery (MLRS)	107mm LSRVM <i>Morava</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The 128mm version was reported in <a href="#">S/2021/229</a>.</li> <li>Also see table 26.1.</li> </ul>
	107mm <i>Taka</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Copy of Chinese Type-63 manufactured in Sudan.</li> <li>The single source imagery cannot confirm the weapon type, nor deployment in Libya.<sup>117</sup></li> </ul>
Logistic Vehicles	Safir Light Utility Vehicle	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>This vehicle was in the inventory of the Libyan Armed Forces prior to the 2011 arms embargo.</li> <li>More confirmatory evidence required before post-2011 transfer to Libya can be proven.</li> </ul>
Mortars (Field)	60mm Type-32	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Image resolution insufficient for 100% identification.<sup>118</sup></li> </ul>
	82mm 82-BM-37 <sup>119</sup>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>This weapon system was in the inventory of the Libyan Armed Forces prior to the 2011 arms embargo.</li> <li>More confirmatory evidence required before post-2011 transfer to Libya can be proven.</li> </ul>
Mortars (Self-propelled)	120mm <i>Boragh</i> Armoured Mortar Vehicle	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The single source imagery identified is insufficient to allow for confirmation of a new transfer to Libya.<sup>120</sup></li> </ul>
Radars and EW	Grozna-S Counter UAV	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The single source imagery identified is insufficient to allow for confirmation of a new transfer to Libya.<sup>121</sup></li> </ul>

<sup>113</sup> <https://defence-blog.com/ukraine-sold-108-brdm-2-armoured-reconnaissance-vehicles-to-uae/>, 1 August 2017.

<sup>114</sup> <https://twitter.com/Oded121351/status/1328016339072638978>, 15 November 2020.

<sup>115</sup> <https://twitter.com/Oded121351/status/1328016339072638978/photo/1>, 15 November 2020; and <https://twitter.com/darksecretplace/status/1328024363887595520>, 15 November 2020.

<sup>116</sup>

[https://www.armyrecognition.com/march\\_2019\\_global\\_defense\\_security\\_army\\_news\\_industry/norinco\\_ah4\\_155\\_mm\\_howitzers\\_for\\_united\\_arab\\_emirates\\_army.html](https://www.armyrecognition.com/march_2019_global_defense_security_army_news_industry/norinco_ah4_155_mm_howitzers_for_united_arab_emirates_army.html), 1 March 2019.

<sup>117</sup> <https://postimg.cc/fkz4Rqhp>, undated. Accessed 23 January 2022.

<sup>118</sup> <https://twitter.com/libyatogether20/status/1378031351132254209>, 2 April 2021.

<sup>119</sup> <https://twitter.com/Oded121351/status/1328012799948312576>, 15 November 2020.

<sup>120</sup> <https://twitter.com/tariqgibrel/status/601900388267208704>, 23 May 2015; and <https://postimg.cc/4K7MjjVH>, undated. Accessed 23 January 2022.

<sup>121</sup> <https://twitter.com/towersight/status/1292885386902069249>, 10 August 2020.

<i>Generic type</i>	<i>Nomenclature / Calibre</i>	<i>Remarks</i>
	Grozna-6	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The single source image is of a Grozna-6 deployed in the UAE,<sup>122</sup> but the Panel has yet to see imagery of the system deployed in Libya.<sup>123</sup></li> </ul>
	Krasuha	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Single source on 18 May 2020 with no supporting high-resolution imagery to allow for confirmation of type or location in Libya.<sup>124</sup></li> </ul>
Small Arms and Light Weapons	7.62 x 54mmR PKM General Purpose Machine Gun	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>This system was in the inventory of the Libyan Armed Forces prior to the 2011 arms embargo.</li> <li>More confirmatory evidence required before post-2011 transfer to Libya can be proven.</li> </ul>
Tanks (MBT)	T-55E	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The T-55 was in the inventory of the Libyan Armed Forces prior to the 2011 arms embargo.</li> <li>HAF official social media showed a T-55 variant with the Tariq bin Ziyad brigade in 2020.<sup>125</sup></li> <li>ChvK Wagner personnel also repaired 16 and overhauled 31 T-55 variants in 2019, so possible these are from that work.<sup>126</sup></li> <li>More confirmatory evidence required before post-2011 transfer to Libya can be proven.</li> </ul>
	T-62M	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>T-62 variants were in the inventory of the Libyan Armed Forces prior to the 2011 arms embargo.</li> <li>ChvK Wagner personnel also repaired 4 and overhauled 9 T-62 variants in 2019.<sup>127</sup></li> <li>The imagery was not sufficient to allow for confirmation of a new transfer to Libya.</li> </ul>
UAV	Ababil-2	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Reported as operated by HAF.</li> <li>Image resolution insufficient for 100% identification of type or location.<sup>128</sup></li> </ul>
	Zagil	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The Panel has identified a single-source report alleging Sudan supplied this UAV type in 2014.<sup>129</sup> The imagery shows Libyan officers but is insufficient to prove the presence of this UAV type in Libya.</li> <li>No open-source imagery of a "Zagil" UAV could be found to allow for confirmation of UAV type.</li> </ul>

<sup>122</sup> <https://www.menadefense.net/mideast/les-emirats-arabes-unis-se-dotent-de-brouilleurs-bielorusses-groza-6/>, 25 June 2020.

<sup>123</sup> <https://army-tech.net/forum/index.php?threads/الالكترونية-الحرب-الانظمة-الغروزا-18194.العاصفة.أو-،> 25 April 2020.

<sup>124</sup> <https://libya.liveuamap.com/en/2020/18-may-gna-turkish-uav-airstrike-on--electronic-warfare-system>, 20 May 2020.

<sup>125</sup> <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LXt5d1iacEk>, 14 November 2020. [14min 29sec].

<sup>126</sup> Table 77.2 to S/2021/229.

<sup>127</sup> Table 77.2 to S/2021/229.

<sup>128</sup> <https://postlmg.cc/3dNhp1>. Accessed 23 January 2022.

<sup>129</sup> <https://m.facebook.com/1445146409065850/photos/a.1445154462398378/1484269561820201/?type=3&source=54>, 9 August 2014.

Table 26.4

**Reported but not confirmed arms and military materiel transferred to Libya (26 Feb 2011 - 25 Apr 2022) (ammunition and explosive ordnance)**

<i>Generic type</i>	<i>Nomenclature / Calibre</i>	<i>Remarks</i>
Artillery	155mm 2K25 Krasnopol laser guided projectile.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Reported as being for the 152mm 2A65 Msta-B Howitzer (see table 26.3), so possible calibre error in report.</li> <li>Imagery insufficient to confirm calibre or transfer to Libya.<sup>130</sup></li> <li>The imagery could equally be of a GP1, which is a direct copy.<sup>131</sup> GP1 reported in in <a href="#">S/2017/466</a> and <a href="#">S/2018/812</a>.</li> </ul>
Engineer Stores	Fateh-4 mine clearance line charge	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The single source imagery identified is insufficient to allow for confirmation of a transfer to Libya.<sup>132</sup></li> </ul>
Mines (Anti-personnel)	MON-100	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The Libyan Mine Action Centre (LibMAC) have confirmed that no mines of this type have been reported, identified or rendered safe in Libya to date.<sup>133</sup></li> <li>The single source imagery identified is insufficient to allow for confirmation of a transfer to Libya.<sup>134</sup></li> </ul>
Mines (Anti-Tank)	TM-83	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>LibMAC have confirmed that no mines of this type have been reported, identified or rendered safe in Libya to date.<sup>135</sup></li> <li>The single source imagery is insufficient to confirm type or transfer to Libya.<sup>136</sup></li> </ul>

<sup>130</sup> <https://twitter.com/lostweapons/status/1243787785724542976?lang=he>, 28 March 2020.

<sup>131</sup> Confidential source analysis.

<sup>132</sup> [https://vk.com/wall-98555648\\_224885?lang=en](https://vk.com/wall-98555648_224885?lang=en), 10 August 2021.

<sup>133</sup> Email to Panel of 25 January 2022.

<sup>134</sup> [https://www.libyaobserver.ly/news/libyas-interior-ministry-urges-south-tripoli-residents-not-return-home-just-yet?qt-libya\\_weather=1&qt-sidebar\\_tabs=1](https://www.libyaobserver.ly/news/libyas-interior-ministry-urges-south-tripoli-residents-not-return-home-just-yet?qt-libya_weather=1&qt-sidebar_tabs=1), 8 June 2020.

<sup>135</sup> Ibid.

<sup>136</sup> <https://twitter.com/analystmick/status/1125785280626200576>, 7 May 2019.

## Annex 27 Naval assets used by the Stability Support Apparatus

### A. Overview of SSA naval assets

1. The newly formed maritime unit of the SSA operates at least six vessels, including the *Alqayid-1*, the *Alqayid-2*, *Alqayid Saqar* and a fast patrol boat (FPB) whose name is unknown to the Panel (figures 27.1 through 27.5). Further context on the use by the SSA on its naval assets can be found in Annex 24.

### B. Civilian-type vessels

#### 1. Alqayid 1 and 2

2. The Panel has identified the *Alqayid 1*, and the *Alqayid 2* as being operated by the SSA.<sup>137</sup> *Alqayid 1* has been observed both with and without a heavy machine gun mounted on its bow (figure 27.1). No imagery has emerged of the *Alqayid 2* being armed (figure 27.2). They are not specifically designed for intercepting migrant boats for return, mainly owing to their limited passenger and life-saving equipment capacity. The SSA addresses this shortcoming by operating these boats in tandem with a large wooden boat with higher passenger capacity (also pictured in figure 27.1).<sup>138</sup>

Figure 27.1

Vessel *Alqayid 1* in unarmed (left) <sup>a</sup> and armed configuration (right)<sup>b</sup>



Sources: <sup>a</sup> <https://twitter.com/SARwatchMED/status/1485711494633472000>, 24 January 2022;

<sup>b</sup> <https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=305766508128448>, 28 December 2021

<sup>137</sup> At least two further, unidentified civilian vessels are presented on the SSA's official social media: [https://twitter.com/SSA\\_Gov/status/1480979918456504331](https://twitter.com/SSA_Gov/status/1480979918456504331), 11 January 2022.

<sup>138</sup> <https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=305766508128448>, 28 December 2021.



Figure 27.2

**Vessel *Alqayid 2***


Source: <https://twitter.com/SARwatchMED/status/1485711494633472000>, 24 January 2022

**2. Alqayid Saqar**

3. The *Alqayid Saqar* has a yellow paint scheme that would suggest SAR use (see figure 27.3). While appearing to be a tender or a pilot boat, it also has features that support use as a SAR vessel. These being a deck to accommodate a limited number of survivors and a low stern platform for ease of recovery and man-overboard assistance. However, the vessel also has a 12.7mm DShK variant heavy machine gun (HMG) mounted to its bow, which gives the vessel a role as a fast patrol boat (FPB), even if other features of a naval-type vessel<sup>139</sup> are missing.

<sup>139</sup> Annex 32 of S/2019/914 explains the rationale for the classification of specifically naval designed vessels as military materiel, regardless of whether armed or not.

Figure 27.3

FPB *Alqayid Saqar* with mounted 12.7mm DShK variant HMG

### 3. Military conversion of dual-use items

4. All of these vessels are civilian in design and thus are not classified as naval-type vessels by virtue of design, hence they are not classified as military materiel *per se*.<sup>140</sup> While an initial transfer of a vessel in a civilian configuration, be it as

<sup>140</sup> Annex 32 of S/2019/914 explains the rationale for the classification of specifically naval designed vessels as military materiel, regardless of whether armed or not.

tender, pilot boat or as SAR vessel, would not be a violation of the arms embargo, a post-transfer mounting of weaponry is problematic. This clearly shows how modification, even if post-transfer, converts dual-use into military materiel (see paragraph 61 of main body of report). The Panel is still investigating the exact type, capabilities, and supply chain of this vessel.

### C. Naval-type vessel

#### 1. Lambro Olympic D74 (Javelin 74) Fast Patrol Boat

5. The SSA also operates a FPB that has design features consistent with the Lambro Olympic D74 (Javelin 74) FPB previously used by the Hellenic Coast Guard. The vessel was first observed unarmed (figure 27.4) and later with a twin mounted machine guns on its bow (figure 27.5). Regardless of being armed or unarmed and regardless of its eventual capabilities for SAR use, it is by design a naval-type fast patrol boat, and hence classified as military materiel. The Panel has written to Greece to establish the supply chain and is awaiting a response. The transfer of this vessel is a violation of paragraph 9 of resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#).

Figure 27.4

**Lambro Olympic D74 used by the SSA, unarmed (in red, left) and used by the Greek Coast Guard (right)**




Figure 27.5

**Lambro Olympic D74 used by the SSA, in armed configuration**



Source: <https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=6977063982334836>, 15 February 2022.

## Annex 28 Activities by HAF naval units

### 1. Overview

1. The Panel is investigating 24 incidents of unlawful hailing, boarding and detention of foreign-flagged vessels by members of the HAF Susah Combat Marine Squadron (SCMS) that have taken place since late 2020. The SCMS individuals execute these unlawful acts under the justification that the targeted vessels violated a restricted zone unilaterally declared by the LNA in 2015 (see paragraphs 68-71 in main body of report). The majority of the hailing incidents occurred between January and November 2021. While the Panel is still investigating each individual case, it has established the *modus operandi* and highlights one incident as a case study.

### 2. Modus operandi

2. While its selection criteria are so far unclear to the Panel, the SCMS intercepts on average one to two vessels per month, although on an irregular basis. In 2021, only March, April, July and December saw no interceptions. Once members of the SCMS identify a vessel, they hail the vessel over the radio (VHF channel 16) and ask it to reduce speed and prepare for inspection. Vessels are regularly intercepted around 20 nautical miles (nm) from the Libyan shore, in international waters, that fall within the unlawfully demarcated HAF “no-sail zone” but mostly outside the “prohibited zone” (see paragraphs 68-71 in main body of the report). Vessels are then approached by naval-type vessels flying the Libyan flag, that most often are high-speed rigid-hulled inflatable boats (RHIB) of the same type widely used by Coast Guards, military or law enforcement agencies of other Member States.<sup>141</sup> SCMS also operates a Damen Stan 1605 patrol boat.<sup>142</sup> The use of these boats gives merchant vessels the first impression that they are being hailed by an authorised enforcement unit of a Member State.<sup>143</sup>

3. Once merchant vessels have stopped, armed members of SCMS in camouflage uniforms with distinct insignia board. They present themselves as the Libyan Coast Guard and inform the master of the merchant vessel that the vessel is being stopped for having violated a “no-sail zone” (see paragraphs 68-71 in main body of the report). Ship and crew documents are confiscated, and vessels are detained and forced to follow the SCMS to the anchorage area 2 nm off Ras El Hilal, within Libyan territorial waters.

4. Once at anchorage off Ras El Hilal, crews remain detained on the merchant vessel, while the vessel’s insurance company, through local intermediaries, arranges for the payment of an unlawful fine for the violation of the “no-sail zone”. The fine of LYD 200,000 (approximately USD 42,000) is negotiable and has to be paid in cash. Once paid, the master of the merchant vessel has to sign a document declaring that an agreement to pay the fine for having violated the “no-sail zone”. Documents are then returned and the vessel is released.

### 3. Case study: MV *Corona J*

5. On 24 May 2021, the MV *Corona J* (IMO: 9238686) on track from Port Said, Egypt to Misrata, Libya, was hailed via radio by members of the SMCS identifying themselves as Libyan Coast Guard, instructed to reduce speed, and then boarded by members of SMCS around 20 nm off the coast of Libya, north of Ras El Hilal (interception point: 33°14'30.00"N, 22°17'18.00"E). SMCS used two naval-type RHIBs with Libyan flags, one approaching and one trailing several miles behind. Once on board, members of SMCS, wearing uniforms and being armed with assault rifles and sidearms, informed the vessel’s master that the *Corona J* had been stopped for violating the “no-sail zone” then, and also a few years earlier; thus a fine needed to be paid. SMCS collected the ship’s and crew’s documents but refused to inspect the documents on

<sup>141</sup> The Panel has recently identified the type of RHIB used by SMCS but has yet to give the relevant Member State appropriate time to respond. That Member State is therefore not named here.

<sup>142</sup> Confidential sources.

<sup>143</sup> Panel interviews with primary sources.

board the *Corona J*; instead, they returned to their RHIB and instructed the *Corona J* to follow them to anchorage off Ras El Hilal.

6. En route to the anchorage position SMCS did not respond to radio calls. During that time, the *Corona J* was in contact with the vessel's owner, who informed the insurance company and the flag State (Antigua and Barbuda). Once at anchor off Ras El Hilal (32°53'60.00"N, 22°11'0.00"E), a six-member SCMS team arrived, again all armed, wearing uniform and identifying themselves as Libyan Coast Guard. They told the master of the *Corona J* to assemble the crew on the bridge, from where they were prohibited to leave by two armed SMCS members. They ordered the seal on one container to be removed, opened the container, superficially checked the cargo, and then closed the container again. No certificate of inspection was issued. Thereafter, they started to search the crew's quarters, while the crew was not allowed inside, despite request. When they were finished, crew checked and noted that currency and personal valuables of crew members had been taken (value totaling around USD 11,000). The ship's safe in the master's quarters had signs of (failed) attempted forceful entry. The crew protested the theft but were threatened with the use of force. The SCMS members left the *Corona J*.

7. On 25 May 2021, the *Corona J* protection and indemnity insurance mutual (P&I Club) negotiated the settlement of the fine for having violated the "no-sail zone", through a local agent. In the end, LYD 180,000 (USD 41,000) was paid in cash. In addition, to secure the release of the vessel, the master of the *Corona J* was forced to sign a document stating that he was guilty of "entering territorial waters without authorization" by "entering the restricted area in Ras El Hilal" and accepted the fine. He also needed to provide a letter from the vessel's owner, to also be counter-signed by him, in which he apologized for having brought forward unwarranted allegations of theft against the Libyan Coast Guard.<sup>144</sup> The stolen currency and valuables were not returned. The ship was allowed to sail after having spent about one day in detention.

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<sup>144</sup> The Panel has reviewed the relevant documentation and established its veracity to reach these findings.

## Annex 29 “Prohibited zone” declared by HAF

SUBJECT:- LIBYAN COAST GUARD PROHIBITED ZONE

TO ALL SHIP MASTERS, SHIP OWNERS, CHARTERS, AND SHIP AGENTS

THIS IS TO INFORM YOU ALL THAT SAILING THROUGH AND/OR CROSSING THE FOLLOWING COORDINATES IS PROHIBITED.

32 54 42N, 022 04 22 E

33 04 11 N, 022 01 55 E

32 59 22 N, 022 40 59 E

32 65 12 N, 023 14 40 E

32 36 21 N, 023 07 57 E

MUST SAIL 5 NM NORTH TO ABOVE COORDINATES

ANY VESSEL DOES NOT CONFORM AND COMPLY TO THE LIBYAN COAST WARNING, WILL BE SUBJECTED TO DETAINING AND FINANCIAL PENALTIES.

IN CASE OF EMERGENCY TO ENTER PROHIBITED ZONE PERMISSION MUST BE OBTAINED FROM THE RESPONSIBLE PERSONS;

**CAPT. HUSSEIN ALSHARAA-ISPS OFFICER**, MOB. +218 92 580 7934 /+218 91 052 0474

EMAIL: beng.safetyport@gmail.com


**MR. MUFTAH AL GHOUL** : MOB.+218 92 756 9391

**NAVY COAST GUARD OFFICER,;MOHAMED AL MAJDOUB**: MOB. +218 92 579 84 65

**NAVY OFFICER : MR KHALED ABOKHAID**: MOB. +218 91 382 7051


EMAIL: khaledboket@gmail.com


OR CALL YOUR LOCAL SHIPPING AGENCY FOR GUIDE LINES.

RECEIVED BY : 

NAME:-

DATE:





Source: Confidential



## Annex 30 Military Armoured Vehicles on board MV Luccello (4 March 2022)

### Introduction

1. Open and confidential sources have informed the Panel that on 4 March 2022 the MV *Luccello* (IMO: 78100112) offloaded 100 military armoured vehicles (MAV) in Benghazi Port (LYBNG, 32°06'04"N, 20°02'52"E). This was confirmed by satellite imagery of 6 March 2022, which showed 100 MAV parked in the port area behind shielding (figure 30.1).

Figure 30.1

**Satellite imagery of armoured vehicles at Benghazi Port on 6 March 2022**



**Source:** Confidential

### Voyage

2. The vessel arrived at Aqaba, Jordan (JOAQJ) on 18 February and left on 21 February 2022. The draft of the vessel had changed from 4.7 to 5.8 m (+1.1 m), confirming that a cargo was embarked at Aqaba. On 22 February 2022, whilst still in the Gulf of Aqaba, the vessel declared Suez Canal, Egypt (EGSUZ) as the next destination.

3. On 24 February 2022, after transit of the Suez Canal, the vessel continued north towards Antalya, Turkey with intermittent AIS transmissions. On 26 February 2022, on approaching Turkish territorial waters the vessel declared Tripoli, Libya (LYTIP) as the next destination. The vessel's track was then erratic, first heading west into Greek territorial waters, then west and finally north to an anchorage off Kemen Marina, 15 nautical miles (NM) south of Antalya, Turkey (TRAYT).

4. On 27 February 2022 the vessel continued its voyage on a south-west track, passing south of Crete, until on the evening of 1 March 2022 the vessel turned onto a southerly track when 55nm north of Al Bayda, well within the HAF "no-sail zone", but outside of the HAF "prohibited zone" (see paragraphs 68-71 of main part of the report). The AIS transmission was lost soon thereafter north of Ras Al Hilal (LYREH) until 2 March 2022 when the vessel was near Derna (LYDRX). AIS was lost again until 3 March 2022 close to Ras Al Hilal, when the vessel track was then west in close proximity to the coast. The vessel stayed within Libyan territorial waters until approaching Benghazi port on 4 March 2022. The vessel then changed its declared destination to Benghazi before entering the port and making a port call. Elements of the unusual routing and track changes of the vessel from Aqaba to Benghazi is shown at figures 30.2 to 30.4.

Figure 30.2  
Track from Aqaba




Figure 30.3  
Track near Turkish anchorage




Figure 30.4  
Track along Libyan coast



Source: IHS Maritime and Trade (Subscription).

5. A draft change for the vessel from 5.8m to 5.5m (-0.3m) indicates that the vessel discharged cargo in Benghazi between 4 and 6 March 2022. Change of draft cannot be used as a sole indicator of cargo discharge as the vessel could be ballasting. In this case cargo discharge is supported by the presence of MAV in the port area immediately after the vessel's arrival (see below). The vessel departed Benghazi on 6 March 2022 on a north-east track.

#### Analysis of voyage, seizure claims and cargo

6. The initial detour of the vessel via Antalya, Turkey can plausibly be explained by the inclement weather conditions known to be prevailing during the transit days in the south-eastern Mediterranean. One subscription-only source reports that the vessel declared a technical issue on 26 February 2022 and might have anchored off Antalya for repairs.

7. On 15 March 2022, a claim surfaced on social media<sup>145</sup> that HAF had intercepted a vessel 70nm off Libya's coast that was carrying 100 armoured vehicles, worth 100 million LYD, destined for Abdel Raouf Kara's Special Deterrent Force (SDF). The report stated the vehicles were coming from Aqaba, Kingdom of Jordan, and that the vessel was intercepted "70 miles" off Libya's eastern coast, boarded and redirected under the threat of force to the port of Derna.<sup>146</sup> The vessel was later released after the vehicles had been seized. A confidential source confirmed to the Panel that the background of the image that accompanied the report indeed shows the MV *Luccello* and its cargo in question (see figure 30.5 below).

8. At this stage it is unclear whether the above-described seizure indeed took place. The AIS signal loss north of Ras Al Hilal (LYREH), followed by a dark period of almost two days, the subsequent sailing in Libyan territorial waters within the NSZ, and the declaration of Benghazi as of destination only upon arrival at that port supports are indicators that would support that a seizure took place. However, were this to be the case, and the true destination was Tripoli and the SDF, this would be remarkable as it would indicate shifting alliances. Such a large military cargo could not have been loaded in Aqaba, Jordan without permission of, at least, local port officials. The interception point, regardless if 70 nm as per the open-source report or if 55 nm as per the vessel's sudden change of direction, would be at a far greater distance to the Libyan coast than the area that members of the SCMS have so far undertaken interceptions in (see annex 27).

<sup>145</sup> <https://www.facebook.com/113742230465858/posts/491945085978902/?sfnsn=mo>, 15 March 2022; and <https://twitter.com/libyapress2010/status/1503683044615593984>, 15 March 2022.

<sup>146</sup> The social media sources give different dates for this event, ranging from 1 March to the evening of 2 March 2022.

9. A confidential source has stated that the MAV offloaded in Benghazi are *Spartan-2*<sup>147</sup> manufactured by Streit Group (figure 30.5). In 2011 Streit Group opened a manufacturing facility in Aqaba, Jordan,<sup>148</sup> and the port of departure of the voyage of the MV *Luccello*. HAF have previously received deliveries of Streit Group MAV, and such vehicles form a major component of its military capability.

Figure 30.5

*Spartan-2* MAV on board the MV *Luccello* (left) <sup>a</sup> and manufacturer's image (right) <sup>b</sup>



**Sources:** <sup>a</sup> <https://twitter.com/libyapress2010/status/1503683044615593984>; <sup>b</sup> <https://www.armored-cars.com/products-services/military-vehicles/spartan-mav/>

10. After delivery, the MAV were temporarily stored in an area with a perimeter wall (see figure 30.1). A confidential source informed the Panel that the approximately 6 metres high perimeter wall had only been erected between November 2021 and January 2022. This indicates that deliveries of sensitive cargo were expected, as this is a common concealment tactic used in Libya.

#### Other indicators

11. The vessel changed its name and flag a few days after the voyage, to MV *Victory Roro* under Equatorial Guinea flag. This is the third name and second flag change in five years for this vessel. Frequent name and flag changes for vessels are both indicators of illicit activity.

#### Violation

12. The Panel continues its investigation into the full supply chain and the perpetrators of this transfer of MAV from Jordan to Libya. The transfer is a violation of paragraph 9 of resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#) and a non-compliance by Jordan for failure to inspect the vessel.

<sup>147</sup> <https://www.armored-cars.com/products-services/military-vehicles/spartan-mav/>.

<sup>148</sup> <https://www.armored-cars.com/company/manufacturing-facilities/>.

## Annex 31 Italian naval vessel presence in Libya

### 1. Delivery of equipment intended solely for humanitarian or protective use

1. On 7 December 2021, a media article reported the delivery of a Maritime Rescue and Coordination Centre (MRCC) to Libya, on board the MM *San Giorgio* Landing Platform Dock (L9892).<sup>149</sup> Italy informed the Panel that on 2 December 2021, the Italian MM *San Giorgio* Landing Platform Dock (L9892) docked at Tripoli's commercial harbour and delivered an MRCC facility to the Libyan Coast Guard and Navy. The delivery was undertaken within the framework of the EU program "Support to Integrated Border and Migration Management in Libya" (SIBMMIL). The MRCC consisted of ten containers that serve for lodgings, office space, mobile kitchen, storage, electricity generation and MRCC functions and activities. The *San Giorgio* departed Libya the next day.

2. The MM *San Giorgio* is operated by the Italian Navy and is equipped with an Oto Melara 76mm / 62 calibre gun and two Oerlikon 20mm cannons, and clearly falls under the category of arms and related materiel in the sense of paragraph 9 of resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#) (see figure 31.1).

3. While the items delivered by the MM *San Giorgio* fall under the exception of "*supplies of non-lethal military equipment intended solely for humanitarian or protective use, ...*" under the auspices of paragraph 9 of resolution [2095 \(2013\)](#), in the Panel's view, the entering and exiting of Libyan territory by the vessel is by itself a technical violation of paragraph 9 to resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#), even if there is no intent to transfer arms and related materiel to Libya.

Figure 31.1

MM *San Giorgio* Landing Platform Dock (L9892)



**Source:** Panel of Experts, Brindisi, 8 April 2022.

<sup>149</sup> [https://www.repubblica.it/esteri/2021/12/07/news/nave\\_italiana\\_libia-329232874/?fbclid=IwAR1V3mGgd\\_WZWfdWjSfBk2TV1Y1sIvtDDXJUmfUeA2VQJeUzUf70BR8F8f0](https://www.repubblica.it/esteri/2021/12/07/news/nave_italiana_libia-329232874/?fbclid=IwAR1V3mGgd_WZWfdWjSfBk2TV1Y1sIvtDDXJUmfUeA2VQJeUzUf70BR8F8f0), 7 December 2021.




## 2. Presence in Abu Sitta naval base

4. In [S/2019/914](#),<sup>150</sup> the Panel noted the activities of Italian Navy *Gorgona* class coastal transport ships (CTS) MTC<sup>151</sup> *Capri* (A5353) and MTC *Tremiti* (A5348). The Panel has identified that a *Gorgona*-class vessel has continued to be regularly moored at Abu Sitta navy base, Tripoli (32°54'24.68"N, 13°13'12.48"E). Open-source satellite imagery shows that the vessel has been present there consistently since 2018 (for the latest image, see figure 31.2). There has been also a rotation that included the MTC *Caprera* (A5349).<sup>152</sup> The Panel has written to Italy to inquire about the vessels' activities and is awaiting a response.

5. The *Gorgona*-class vessels are operated by the Italian Navy and are equipped with an Oerlikon 20mm cannon and two 7.62mm machine guns, and clearly falls under the category of arms and related materiel in the sense of paragraph 9 of resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#).

6. In the Panel's view, the entering and exiting of Libyan territory by the vessel is by itself a technical violation of paragraph 9 to resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#), even if there is no intent to transfer arms and related materiel to Libya.

Figure 31.2



<sup>150</sup> Table 27.3, page 189.

<sup>151</sup> Moto Trasporto Costiero (MTC).

<sup>152</sup>

See

also

[https://www.difesa.it/OperazioniMilitari/op\\_intern\\_corso/Libia\\_Missione\\_bilaterale\\_di\\_supporto\\_e\\_assistenza/notizie\\_teatro/Pagine/Nave\\_Caprera\\_sostituisce\\_la\\_Capri\\_nella\\_missione\\_bilaterale\\_di\\_assistenza\\_e\\_supporto\\_in\\_Libia.aspx](https://www.difesa.it/OperazioniMilitari/op_intern_corso/Libia_Missione_bilaterale_di_supporto_e_assistenza/notizie_teatro/Pagine/Nave_Caprera_sostituisce_la_Capri_nella_missione_bilaterale_di_assistenza_e_supporto_in_Libia.aspx)

## Annex 32 Summary of newly identified arms embargo equipment transfer and training violations and non-compliances

1. Sources for tables 32.1 and [32.2](#), which are shown in the appropriate annexes, are primarily from a combination of: (a) Member States responses to Panel enquiries; (b) entity responses to Panel enquiries; (c) official social media of national armed forces; (d) official social media of armed groups; (e) other social media; (f) authoritative specialist military media; (g) imagery supported by geo-location; and/or (h) imagery supported by technical analysis.
2. Transfer violations that took place and went unreported during previous mandates are included in table 32.1 to provide the evidence for the baseline data necessary to assist in the identification of any future violations.

Table 32.1

### Summary of equipment transfer violations

<i>Annex</i>	<i>Date identified in Libya or by Panel</i>	<i>End User</i>	<i>Equipment nomenclature</i>	<i>Responsible</i>	<i>Cross-references</i>
<b>Previously unreported</b>					
33	31 Dec 2014	GNA	Streit <i>Typhoon</i> 4x4	UID <sup>a</sup>	▪
34	1 Jun 2018	HAF	KaMaz 6x6 Military Truck	UID	▪
35	5 Mar 2019	HAF	SPG-9 73mm Rocket Launcher	UID	▪
36	7 May 2019	HAF	Orsis T-5000 Sniper Rifle	UID	▪
<b>During resolution <a href="#">2509 (2020)</a> reporting period and unreported or unattributed</b>					
37	26 Jan 2020	HAF	7.62 x 39mm Type 63-1 Assault Rifle 7.62 x 54mmR Type-80 General Purpose Machine Gun Type 69 85mm Grenade Launcher	UID	▪
38	15 Mar 2020	HAF	Inkas <i>Titan-S</i> 6x6 APC	UID	▪
39	21 Mar 2020	HAF	12.7mm W-85 Heavy Machine Gun	UID	▪
40	17 Apr 2020	HAF	Zala 421-16E UAV	UID	▪
41	14 June 2020	HAF	ZSU 23-2-CP 23mm Twin Cannon	UID	▪
42	3 Jun 2020	HAF	120mm HE Mortar Bomb M62P10	UAE	▪
43	18 Jun 2020	HAF	1RL131 P-18 Early Warning Radar	UID	▪
44	12 Jul 2020	Russian PMC	Ural 4320 6x6 Military Truck	Russian PMC	▪
45	1 Aug 2020	Russian PMC	TM-62M Anti-Tank Mine	UID	▪
46	9 Oct 2020	GNU	120mm HE Mortar Bomb	Turkey	▪ Update to table 4, and annex 41 to <a href="#">S/2021/229</a> .

<i>Annex</i>	<i>Date identified in Libya or by Panel</i>	<i>End User</i>	<i>Equipment nomenclature</i>	<i>Responsible</i>	<i>Cross-references</i>
47	15 Nov 2020	HAF	120mm 120-PM-43 M1943 Mortar	UID	▪
48	21 Nov 2020	GNU	Holographic Weapon Sights (HWS) virtually identical to EOTECH design	Turkey	▪
49	21 Nov 2020	GNU	MKEK 5.56mm MPT 55K Assault Rifles	Turkey	▪
50	4 Jan 2021	HAF	120mm M-74 Mortar	UID	▪
51	28 Jan 2021	GNU	Akdas AK40-GL 40x46mm Grenade Launchers	Turkey	▪ Also a training violation.
52	30 Jan 2021	HAF	5.56mm AK-103 Assault Rifles	UID	▪
53	2 Feb 2021	GNU	System Defence MFR 5.56mm Multi-Functional Rifle	Balance of Probability Turkey <sup>b</sup>	▪
54	4 Feb 2021	HAF	JAWS-556 5.56mm Assault Rifle (14.5" barrel)	Jordan	▪
55	23 Mar 2021	HAF	122m M-30 M1938 Howitzer	UID	▪
56	23 Mar 2021	HAF	T-62MV variant Main Battle Tanks	UID	▪ Update to annex 64 to <a href="#">S/2021/229/Corr.1</a> .
57	27 Mar 2021	GNU	Patton M60 Main Battle Tanks.	UID	▪ Also a training violation.
58	30 Mar 2021	PMC / HAF	AMN 233114 <i>Tiger-M</i> Multi-Purpose Vehicle	UID	▪
<b>During resolution <a href="#">2571 (2021)</a> reporting period (all new identifications)</b>					
59	5 May 2021	HAF	Sordin Supreme Pro-X Max Black hearing protectors	UID	▪
60	18 May 2021	UID	SUR BRT M9 blank firing pistols	UID	▪
61	24 May 2021	HAF	UAZ-469 light communications vehicle	UID	▪
62	24 May 2021	HAF	Militarized Jeep Gladiator light 4 x 4 vehicle	UID	▪
63	27 May 2021	HAF	Militarized Toyota light 6 x 6 vehicle	UID	▪
64	29 May 2021	HAF	TAG <i>BATT</i> 4x4 APC	UID	▪
65	3 Jun 2021	Russian PMC	Steyr SSG 08 variant or copy Sniper Rifle	UID	▪



<i>Annex</i>	<i>Date identified in Libya or by Panel</i>	<i>End User</i>	<i>Equipment nomenclature</i>	<i>Responsible</i>	<i>Cross-references</i>
66	3 Jun 2021	Russian PMC	Militarized Toyota Land Cruiser 79 4 x 4 vehicle	UID	▪
67	5 Jul 2021	GNU	GFORCE all-terrain vehicle ('ATVG')	UID	▪
68	11 Jul 2021	GNU	MKEK JNG-90 Bora-12 Sniper Rifle	Balance of Probability Turkey	▪ Also a training violation.
69	9 Aug 2021	HAF	AN/PVS-7 Night-Vision Goggles	UID	▪
70	17 Aug 2021	GNU HAF	Rocketsan 122mm Free Flight Rocket pods	Turkey UAE	▪ Battlefield capture of hybrid system.
71	18 Sep 2021 9 Jan 2022	UID	Small arms and ammunition	UID	▪ Transfer from Libya to Sudan.
72	24 Dec 2021	GNU	Katmerciler <i>KIRAC</i> Armoured Personnel Carriers	Turkey	▪
73	31 Dec 2021	GNU	AN/PEQ-15 Advanced Target Pointer Illuminator Aiming Laser (ATPIAL)	UID	▪
74	8 Feb 2022	GNU	Aselsan A100 Night Vision Monocular	Turkey	▪
75	8 Feb 2022	GNU	MKEK 5.56mm MPT 55K Assault Rifles	UID	▪
76	24 Mar 2022	UID	M79 OSA Anti-tank Rockets	UID	▪

<sup>a</sup> Unidentified as yet.

<sup>b</sup> International arms sales are virtually always widely reported by the manufacturer in authoritative defence media as it is their major means, other than conflict, of attracting publicity for future sales. Authoritative media includes: Janes Defence Weekly (<https://www.janes.com/defence-news/>); Janes Intara (<https://www.janes.com/intara-interconnected-intelligence/defence-industry>); Defence Procurement International (<https://www.defenceprocurementinternational.com/magazine>); Military Systems and Technology (<https://www.militarysystems-tech.com/>); and Army Technology (<https://www.army-technology.com/>). Covert arms transfers go unreported until identified by investigation.

1. The Panel has determined that none of the training listed in table 32.2 falls under the exception contained in paragraph 10 of resolution [2095 \(2013\)](#), which is for disarmament and security purposes only.

Table 32.2

**Summary of training violations**

<i>Annex</i>	<i>Date identified in Libya or by Panel</i>	<i>End User</i>	<i>Type of training support</i>	<i>Responsible</i>	<i>Cross-references</i>
<b>During resolution <a href="#">2509 (2020)</a> reporting period and unreported or unattributed</b>					
77	1 Feb 2021	GNU	Air defence systems, <i>iHASAVAR</i> and <i>iHATAR</i> anti-drone systems training in Konya, Turkey	Turkey	▪
78	6 Feb 2021	GNU	Military diving training	Turkey	▪
79	7 Feb 2021	GNU	Officer Cadet training	Turkey	▪
80	25 Mar 2021	GNU	Training to Unit 444 in UAV use. <i>Foxtech</i> Baby Shark 260 VTOL UAV.	UID <sup>a</sup>	▪
81	30 Mar 2021	GNU	Operation of <i>Firtina</i> T-155 artillery	Turkey	▪ Transfer reported in table 4, and annexes 28 and 34 to <a href="#">S/2021/229</a> .
<b>During resolution <a href="#">2571 (2021)</a> reporting period (all new identifications)</b>					
82	7 Aug 2021	GNU	Special Forces unit from Misrata training in Turkey	Turkey	▪
83	8 Sep 2021	HAF	Official HAF social media report that elements of HAF 106 brigade were training in Egypt	UID	▪ Egypt denies such training.
84	3 Oct 2021	GNU	Sniper training of GNU-AF	Turkey	▪
85	9 Oct 2021	GNU	Mountain Corps Academy training of GNU-AF in Turkey.	Turkey	▪

<sup>a</sup> Unidentified as yet.

### Synergy with other arms embargo violation attempts

2. The Panel also identified a synergy between an attempted arms embargo violation reported in the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1874 (2009) report [S/2016/157](#)<sup>153</sup> and Panel report [S/2021/229](#).<sup>154</sup> [S/2016/157](#) reported on an attempt by a UAE resident, Abdulrahman Bager, to procure arms for an entity named Al Mutlaq Technology through the auspices of the Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation (KOMID) of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

3. The complete list of arms requested by the UAE from KOMID is at figure 32.1. In [S/2021/229](#) the Panel reported on a Serbian manufactured P62M8 120mm Mortar Bomb and provided a copy of the End User certificate (DP3/2/50/1/2015/64/185) dated 21 October 2015 from the UAE, which was supplied to Serbia for the purchase of the ammunition (see figure 32.2). A comparison of the two lists shows them to be over 75% identical (see table 32.3). The Panel considers that the purchase from Serbia was made after the failure of the deal through KOMID. Table 32.3 also identifies the arms subsequently identified as being transferred to Libya.

Figure 32.1

UAE Products List for procurement from KOMOD, DPRK (2 May 2015)

#	Item	Qty.
1	M92 Cal 7.62x39	5,000
2	7.62X39Ammunition	5,000,000
3	Sniper Rifle 7.62x54 (Draganov)	150
4	7.62x54 R ammunition	15,000
5	7.62PKM Machine Gun	1,000
6	7.62x54 ammunition	10,000,000
7	Sniper Rifle 12.7x108	50
8	Ammunition 12.7x108	10,000
9	Heavy Machine Gun M02 Coyote Cal 12.7x108	200
10	12.7mmx108 Ammunition	10,000,000
11	Mortar 60mm M57	100
12	Mortar Shell 60mm	50,000
13	Mortar 82mm M69	100
14	82mm Mortar Shells	50,000
15	120mm PM-38 Mortar	40
16	120mm Mortar Shell	30,000.00
17	14 Sx114mm 8-32, 82T Cartridges	2,000,000.00
18	23mm HEI with Link	1,500,000.00
19	107 MULTIROCKET Launcher	30.00
20	107mm Rocket	40,000.00
21	122MM rocket Projectile M210	40,000.00
22	Hand Grenade	3,000.00
23	Armor Vest	5,000.00
24	Anti-Tank 106mm HEAT Ammunition	5,000.00

<sup>153</sup> Annexes 104 and 105.

<sup>154</sup> Annex 52.

Figure 32.2

## UAE End User Certificate from UAE to Serbia (5 October 2015)

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES G. H. Q ARMED FORCES LOGISTICS STAFF DEPARTMENT OF GENERAL PURCHASING Our Ref.: DP3/2/50/1/2015/64/185		دولة الامارات العربية المتحدة القيادة العامة للقوات المسلحة هيئة الامداد مديرية المشتريات العامة Date: 21/10/2015
---	---	---

**DECLARATION BY END-USER  
TO THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIA**

WE, THE GOVERNMENT OF UNITED ARAB EMIRATES HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THE GOODS LISTED BELOW AND ORDERED BY USE FROM

Jugoimport - SDPR" J.P., Beograd, Bulevar Umetnosti 2, 11150 Novi Beograd, Republic of Serbia


IS FOR THE EXCLUSIVE USE OF: GHQ UAE ARMED FORCES, UAE  
 AND WILL NOT BE EXPORTED OR RE-EXPORTED WITHOUT A PRIOR WRITTEN CONSENT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC SERBIA.

We confirm that the goods will not be used in any activities related to the development nor production of chemical or biological weapons.


PURCHASER.: GHQ UAE ARMED FORCES, UAE  
 CONTRACT NUMBER: DP3/2/50/1/2015/64 dated: 05/10/2015

No	Description	Quantity-pcs.
1	7.62x39mm small arms FMJ ammunition	5,000,000
2	Sniper Rifle M91 7.62x54R with optical sight and accessorises	150
3	7.62x54mm Sniper ammunition	15,000
4	7.62x54mm general purpose machine gun M84 (PKM Machine gun substitute)	1,000
5	7.62x54mm R M30 FMJ ammunition	10,000,000
6	12.7x108mm Black Arrow Sniper Rifle	50
7	12.7x108mm M09 Sniper Ammo	10,000
8	Machine gun 12.7x108mm with tripod	200
9	Mortar 60mm M57	100
10	60mm mortar shells HE	50,000
11	82mm mortar	100
12	82mm mortar HE 82 bomb	50,000
13	120mm mortar	40
14	120mm mortar rounds	30,000
15	23mm Ammo HE	1,000,000
16	23mm Ammo APIT	500,000
17	Hand grenades	3,000
18	107mm HE Rocket M15/ type 63	40,000
19	128 mm M63 multiple rocket launcher towed	26
20	Armor vest Level 3A	5,000
21	Ballistic plates L4	10,000

Upon request by the competent authorities of Serbia we undertake to confirm the receipt of the goods listed above.



STAFF BRIGADIER ENGINEER  
 DIRECTOR GENERAL PURCHASING  
 WAHEED HASSAN IBRAHIM AL-ZAAKI



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Source: Member State.

Table 32.3  
Comparison of arms requirements

# <sup>a</sup>	Description <sup>b</sup>	Quantity in Products List to KOMID DPRK (5 May 2015)	Quantity UAE EUC to Serbia (5 Oct 2015)	# <sup>c</sup>	Remarks
1	M92 Rifle 7.62x39mm	5,000			KOMID request only.
2	<b>7.62x39mm ammunition</b>	5,000,000	5,000,000	1	
3	Sniper Rifle 7.62x54Rmm Draganov	150	150	2	
4	<b>7.62x54mm R ammunition</b>	15,000	15,000	3	
5	7.62mm PKM Machine Gun	1,000	1,000	4	Type M84 requested as substitute
6	<b>7.62x54mm ammunition</b>	10,000,000	10,000,000	5	
7	<b>Sniper Rifle 12.7x108mm</b>	50	50	6	Black Arrow requested as substitute
8	<b>12.7x108mm ammunition</b>	10,000	10,000	7	
9	Heavy Machine Gun M02 Coyote 12.7x108mm	200	200	8	
10	<b>12.7x108mm ammunition</b>	20,000,000	0		KOMID request only.
11	60mm Mortar M57	100	100	9	
12	60mm Mortar Bombs	50,000	50,000	10	
13	82mm Mortar M69	100	100	11	
14	82mm Mortar Bombs	50,000	50,000	12	
15	120mm Mortar PM-38	40	40	13	
16	<b>120mm Mortar Bombs</b>	30,000	30,000	14	
17	<i>14.5x114mm B-32 BZT ammunition</i>	2,000,000	0		KOMID request only.
18	23mm HEI Linked ammunition	1,500,000	1,500,000	15 and 16	
19	<b>107mm Multi-Barrel Rocket Launcher (MBRL)</b>	30	0		KOMID request only.
20	<b>107mm Rockets</b>	40,000	40,000	18	
21	<i>122mm Rocket Projectile M210</i>	40,000	0		KOMID request only.
22	Hand Grenade	3,000	3,000	17	
23	Armour Vest	5,000	5,000	20	
24	<i>106mm Anti-Tank HEAT ammunition</i>	5,000			
N/A	<i>128mm M63 MBRL (Towed)</i>			26	19
N/A	<i>Ballistic Plates</i>		10,000	21	

<sup>a</sup> Serial is from the Products List requirement submitted to KOMID, DPRK by the UAE.

<sup>b</sup> Items in bold text have been identified as transferred to Libya in violation of the arms embargo.

<sup>c</sup> Serial is from the EUC supplied to Serbia by the UAE.

## A line of military vehicles, including an armored car with a mounted machine gun, moving along a road. A person in civilian clothing is walking in the foreground.



## Developed by UN Panel of Experts

## Annex 34      KaMaz 6x6 Military Trucks (1 June 2018)

### Kamaz 43118 6x6 Military Truck (Dirne) (1 June 2018)

The Panel has identified from open-source media the presence of a KaMaz 6x6 Military Truck in the possession of HAF on 1 April 2018.

This military vehicle type was NOT reported in the inventory of the Libyan Armed Forces prior to the 2011 arms embargo.

The Panel has also identified that Kamaz 43118 6x6 Trucks were shipped to Benghazi on the MV *Fehn Calypso* on 24 April 2020. These were declared as civilian vehicles, but have obvious dual-military use.

The transfer to Libya of this military vehicle type is a violation of paragraph 9 to resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#).

#### Primary sources

1. <https://twitter.com/Oded121351/status/1002608845762555905>, 1 June 2018;
2. Confidential source, 15 June 2020; and
3. <https://kamazexport.com/truck/kamaz-43118/>. Accessed 22 January 2022.

Developed by UN Panel of Experts



3. Cargo

- a. We herewith also attach the respective B/L for shipment in question.
- b. We herewith provide a list of Specification of cargo stuffed into boxes, which have been loaded per trucks of trucks KAMAZ destination Benghazi.
- c. Further and as absolutely usual, we are (at least yet) not in possession of any further cargo related documentation as this solely rests with cargo interest and Charterers. At the moment, we thus cannot provide a detailed specification of the cargo other than those evidenced by the letter from [REDACTED] (the B/L, the additional list (see item 3.b.)).
- d. However, we kindly refer to Kamaz website (<https://kamazexport.com/truck/kamaz-43118/>) showing the details of the trucks shipped (model no. 43118, 6x6) and also pointing to the trucks being solely designed for civil use only.



**Annex 35      SPG-9 73mm Grenade Launcher (5 March 2019)****SPG-9 73mm Recoilless Rifle  
(Al Gharefa)  
(05 March 2019)**

The Panel has now identified the presence of an SPG-9 73mm Recoilless Rifle in the possession of HAF near Al Gharefa, which went unreported in [S/2021/229](#).

These weapon types were not reported to be in the inventory of the Libyan Armed Forces prior to the 2011 arms embargo.

The transfer to Libya of these weapon types is a violation of paragraph 9 to resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#).

**Primary sources**

1. Extract from video imagery at <https://twitter.com/Mansourtalk/status/1102893338057981952>, 5 March 2019; and
2. Jane's Defence.

Developed by UN Panel of Experts

## Annex 36      *Orsis T-5000 Sniper Rifle* (7 May 2019)

### 0.338in Orsis T-5000 Sniper Rifle (HAF) (7 May 2019)

The Panel has identified from open-source imagery the presence of an early version of an *Orsis T-5000* Sniper Rifle in the possession of HAF. The magazine profile suggests that this weapon is chambered for 0.338in *Lapua* Magnum ammunition.

These is the first sighting of this weapons system in Libya. This weapon type has been manufactured since 2011 and is in service with at least seven Member States. Without the serial number a tracing request would be ineffective.

The transfer of this weapon type to Libya is a violation of paragraph 9 of resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#).

#### Primary sources

1. <https://twitter.com/analystmick/status/1125785280626200576>, 7 May 2019;
2. <http://orsis.com/en/production/product/202/> . Accessed 22 January 2022;
3. Confidential source for identification; and
4. [customer.janes.com](http://customer.janes.com), 20 October 2020. (Subscription).

Developed by UN Panel of Experts



## Annex 37      Type 56-1 Assault Rifle, Type-80 GPMG and Type-69 Grenade Launcher (26 January 2020)

### 7.62 x 39mm Type 56-1 Assault Rifle, 7.62 x 54mmR Type-80 General Purpose Machine Gun and Type 69 40mm calibre Grenade Launcher (Eastern Libya) (26 January 2020)

The Panel has now identified the presence of 7.62 x 39mm Type 56-1 Assault Rifles, 7.62 x 54mmR Type-80 General Purpose Machine Guns and Type 69 40mm calibre Grenade Launchers in the possession of the Municipal Guard Fighting Unit in Benghazi, which went unreported in [S/2021/229](#).


These weapon types were not reported to be in the inventory of the Libyan Armed Forces prior to the 2011 arms embargo.

The transfer to Libya of these weapon types is a violation of paragraph 9 to resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#).

#### Primary sources

- [https://twitter.com/r\\_u\\_vid/status/1221227142911905793](https://twitter.com/r_u_vid/status/1221227142911905793), 26 January 2020; and
- Jane's Defence.

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7.62 x 39mm Type 56-1  
Assault Rifles

Type 69 40mm calibre  
Grenade Launchers

7.62 x 54mmR Type-80  
GPMG

## Annex 38      Inkas *Titan-S* 6x6 APC (15 March 2020)

### Inkas *Titan-S* 6x6 APC (HAF Tariq bin Ziyad brigade) (15 March 2020)

The Panel has identified from official HAF social media the presence of Inkas *Titan-S* 6x6 APCs in the possession of the HAF Tariq bin Ziyad brigade on 15 March 2020.

This military vehicle type was manufactured in the United Arab Emirates by Inkas Armoured Vehicle Manufacturing. It is no longer advertised as being in production on the manufacturers website.

The transfer to Libya of this military vehicle type is a violation of paragraph 9 to resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#).

#### Primary sources

1. [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JGN\\_nFJ9m18](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JGN_nFJ9m18), 15 March 2020. [Extract at 5"21"]; and
2. <https://inkasvehiclesuae.com/armored/inkas-titan-s-apc/>. Accessed 22 January 2022. (For identification).

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


## Annex 39 12.7mm W-85 Heavy Machine Gun (21 March 2020)

### 12.7mm W-85 Heavy Machine Gun (Benghazi) (21 March 2020)

The Panel has now identified from open-source imagery the presence of a 12.7mm W-85 Heavy Machine Gun in the possession of HAF in Benghazi on 21 March 2020 and with the HAF Tariq Ibn Ziyad brigade on 4 January 2021, which went unreported in [S/2021/229](#).

The transfer to Libya of this weapon type is a violation of paragraph 9 to resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#).



#### Primary sources

1. <https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/04/07/coronavirus-libya-civil-war-pandemic/>, 07 April 2020;
2. Abdullah Doma, AFP via Getty Images;
3. <https://twitter.com/Oded121351/status/1346162906967191553>, 4 January 2021; and
4. Jane's Defence.

Developed by UN Panel of Experts




## Annex 40 ZALA 421-16E UAV (20 April 2020)

### ZALA 421-16E UAV (Near Ain Zara) (17 April 2020)

The Panel has now identified from open-source imagery the presence of a Zala 421-16E UAV that was downed near Ain Zara, south of Tripoli during the conflict in that area. This event was unreported in [S/2021/229](#).

The Panel considers that as this dual-use technology is primarily being imported by actors actively participating in armed conflict, and then used for military purposes, such transfers are a violation of paragraph 9 to resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#).



#### Primary sources

1. <https://twitter.com/oded121351/status/1251052368906596352>, 17 and 18 April 2020;
2. <https://southfront.org/gna-forces-shot-down-russian-made-drone-near-libyas-ain-zara-photos/>, 18 April 2020;
3. <https://zala-aero.com/en/production/bvs/zala-421-16e/>. Accessed 18 January 2022.

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بالتعاون مع القوات المسلحة  
القوات المسلحة المصرية  
القيادة العامة للقوات المسلحة  
٤٧٦٦-٢-٤٥٨٧٣٢٩  
القاهرة - مصر ١١٥٠١



by: drt-aps-prox.mil.eg Date: 14/03/2018

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES  
G. H. Q. ARMED FORCES  
LOGISTICS STAFF  
Directorate General Purchasing  
Tel : +971-2-4078939  
Fax : +971-2-4414043  
P.O. Box : 1201 Abu Dhabi

Date: 14/03/2018

Our Ref: DP3/235/101/201801018

**END USER CERTIFICATE**  
**TO THE AUTHORITIES OF THE GOVERNMENT OF**  
**THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIA**

1. Name and address of the End User:  
**GIZU UAE Armed Forces**  
**Directorate General Purchasing**  
**P.O.Box No 3201, Abu Dhabi, Fax: +91 2 441 41 46**

2. Name and address of the Importer:  
**INTERNATIONAL GOLDEN GLOBE PJSC**  
**Nation Tower, Complete Road, P.O.Box 43999, Abu Dhabi,**  
**UAE Tel: +97130566661, Email: info@iglobe.ae**

3. Name and address of the Seller:  
**HOLDING CORPORATION "KRUSIK" A.D.**  
**Vladik Nikolaia 59, 14000 Valjevo**  
**Republic of Serbia**

4. Name and address of the Exporter:  
**HOLDING CORPORATION "KRUSIK" A.D.**  
**Vladik Nikolaia 59, 14000 Valjevo**  
**Republic of Serbia**

5. Denomination and full description of the goods:


No	DESCRIPTION OF ITEM	Quantity
1	SHORTAR SHILL 60mm M7 HE	15,000
2	SHORTAR SHILL 60mm M7C HE	10,000
3	SHORTAR SHILL 60mm M7A HE	15,000
4	SHORTAR SHILL 120mm MS2P75 HE	17,000

6. Place of the use of the goods:  
**United Arab Emirates**  
Use for own needs of Armed Forces of United Arab Emirates

7. Purpose of use of the goods:  
The End User: Armed Forces of United Arab Emirates confirms with the present document, that the prop indicated by the point 5 will not be used in a different way from the way indicated in point no 7 and will not be exported, sold or transferred to the third countries without the corresponding written permission of the State Secretariat of Export Control of Republic of Serbia and United Arab Emirates.

8. It is undertaken to the "Delivery Verification Certificate" after received of goods by the End-User if required.

STAFF BRIG. GENERAL (RNG.)  
DIRECTOR GENERAL PURCHASING  
WAHEED IBRAHIM ISRAHIL AL ZAARI

  
٢٠١٨ / ٣ / ١٤  
مديرية المشتريات  
القوات المسلحة  
الإمارات العربية المتحدة

1. The Panel noted that the broker for this procurement was the United Arab Emirates based International Golden Group PJSC<sup>155</sup> ([www.igggroup.ae](http://www.igggroup.ae)). The Panel has reported before on the involvement of this company in the illicit transfer of arms and military materiel to Libya in Panel reports [S/2013/99](#)<sup>156</sup> and [S/2016/209](#).<sup>157</sup>
2. Open-source media has reported that International Golden Group PJSC is an essential link in Haftar's equipment supply chain.<sup>158</sup> It was reported that the company plays a key role in the procurement of weapons from Serbia and other Eastern European countries in support of Haftar.<sup>159</sup>

3. In [S/2013/99](#) the Panel identified that the International Golden Group PJSC procured 800,000 rounds of 12.7 x 108mm small arms ammunition from the Military Export Import Company (MEICO)<sup>160</sup> of Albania through a Ukrainian broker (Ukrinmash) and an Armenian facilitator (DG Arms Corporation). Although the end user was falsely declared as the United Arab Emirates the ammunition was shipped by air directly to Benghazi, Libya on the Avk Avia<sup>161</sup> owned Ilyushin IL-76

<sup>161</sup> Ayk Avia was reported in the Somalia Panel report [S/2011/433](#), annex 6.3 for breaching the Somalia arms embargo.

(#EK-76659). This was a post-departure diversion, as the flight plan filed with the Albanian authorities showed the United Arab Emirates as the destination. A Delivery Verification Certification dated 24 February 2012 was provided to Albania by the International Golden Group PJSC stating that the ammunition had been delivered to the declared end user, the United Arab Emirates Armed Forces. Note that a commercial company, albeit an official supplier to the United Arab Emirates Armed Forces, is authorised to sign DVC on their behalf. The United Arab Emirates did not respond to a tracing request from the Panel.<sup>162</sup>

4. In [S/2016/209](#)<sup>163</sup> the Panel identified a Bulgarian manufactured AR-M9F assault rifle<sup>164</sup> (#AB 46 7722) being offered for sale on open-source social media. Bulgaria informed the Panel that the weapon had been procured by the International Golden Group PJSC using a United Arab Emirates end user certificate. The United Arab Emirates did not respond to a tracing request from the Panel.<sup>165</sup>

5. On 21 February 2019 the UAE announced at IDEX 2019 that it had procured Norinco 155mm AH4 gun howitzers, and that International Golden Group PJSC was awarded a US\$2.8 million contract to supply the ammunition.<sup>166</sup> This weapon system fires the GP6 155mm Laser Guided Projectile (LGP). In [S/2019/914](#)<sup>167</sup> the Panel reported on the presence of GP6 155mm LGP from a consignment supplied to the United Arab Emirates prior to 2019. In its response, 14 months after the Panel tracing request,<sup>168</sup> the United Arab Emirates "rejected the allegation" but provided no information or clarification as to how ammunition delivered to their armed forces was present in Libya.<sup>169</sup>

### Previous violations of arms embargoes (other)

6. In [S/2016/157](#)<sup>170</sup> the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1874 (2009) investigated International Golden Group PJSC in relation to the attempted procurement of conventional arms for a contract worth US\$100 million by the Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation (KOMID).

### Signatory

7. The Panel notes that the end user certificate signatory for the 12.7 x 108mm small arms ammunition shipment reported in [S/2013/99](#) is the same individual that signed the end user certificate in 2018 for the 120mm High Explosive M62P10 Mortar Bombs referred to in this annex; Staff Brigadier General (Engineering) Waheed Hasan Ibrahim Al Zaaki, Director of General Purchasing, GHQ Armed Forces Logistics Staff.

8. The General Headquarters of the United Arab Emirates Armed Forces appears to be selective as to when and when not to use the auspices of the International Golden Group PJSC for the procurement of ammunition. In annex 52 to [S/2021/229](#)<sup>171</sup> the Panel reported on the sale of 120mm High Explosive M62P8 Mortar Bombs, identified in Libya, to the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the United Arab Emirates in September 2016. Whereas in 2018 the importer for 120mm High Explosive M62P10 Mortar Bombs referred to in this annex was International Golden Group PJSC.

<sup>162</sup> Panel letter of 21 December 2012.

<sup>163</sup> Annex 27.

<sup>164</sup> <https://www.arsenal-bg.com/c/556x45-762x39-mm-assault-rifles-barrel-length-415-mm-44/556x45-and-762x39-mm-ar-m9f-44>. Accessed 5 December 2021.

<sup>165</sup> Panel letter of 22 December 2015.

<sup>166</sup> Christopher F Foss, "UAE confirms Chinese 155mm AH4 gun-howitzer acquisition", in *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 28 February 2019.

<sup>167</sup> Para. 95 and annex 39.

<sup>168</sup> 12 July 2019.

<sup>169</sup> Member State letter of 3 September 2020.

<sup>170</sup> Annex 104.

<sup>171</sup> Annex 52 (p.281).

## Annex 43 1RL131 P-18 early warning radar (18 June 2020)

### 1RL131 P-18 early warning radar (29°12'41.25"N, 15°59'28.63"E - Al Jufra) (18 June 2020)

The Panel has now identified the presence of 1RL131 P-18 early warning radars at Al Jufra military air base on 18 June 2020, which were unreported in [S/2021/229](#).

The same equipment type also featured on the official HAF social media covering the HAF 7th Anniversary Operation Dignity parade in Benghazi on 29 May 2021.

The transfer of this military material to Libya is a violation of paragraph 9 of resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#).



18 June 2020 - Al Jufra



18 June 2020 - Al Jufra



29 May 2021 - Benina, Benghazi



Manufacturer's reference image.  
(Jane's Defence)

#### Primary sources

1. <https://www.africom.mil/pressrelease/32941/new-evidence-of-russian-aircraft-active-in-li>, 20 June 2020;
2. <https://twitter.com/Oded121351/status/1287019300281352192>, 25 July 2020;
3. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mbIDXxITPa0>, 31 May 2021; and
4. [customer.janes.com](https://www.janes.com), 13 December 2021. (Subscription).

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## Annex 44 Ural 6x6 Military Trucks (12 July 2020)

### Ural 4320 6x6 Military Truck (Russian PMC Convoy) (12 July 2020 and 10 May 2021)

The Panel has identified from open-source media the presence of Ural 4320 6x6 Military Trucks in a Russian PMC convoy on 12 July 2020. An armoured version was identified in Houn on 10 May 2021.

This military vehicle type was NOT reported in the inventory of the Libyan Armed Forces prior to the 2011 arms embargo.

The transfer to Libya of this military vehicle type is a violation of paragraph 9 to resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#).

#### Primary sources

1. Extract from <https://www.facebook.com/FebruaryBN/videos/2384205178548707/>, 12 July 2020. [18 sec];
2. <https://twitter.com/Oded121351/status/139169145343323523/photo/2>, 10 May 2021;
3. <https://1cars.org/426-ural-4320-specifications-modifications-photos-videos-reviews.html>. Accessed 21 January 2022; and
4. Janes Defence. 31 March 2004. (Subscription).

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## Annex 45      TM-62M Anti-Tank Mine (1 August 2020)

### TM-62M Anti-Tank Mine (Russian PMC) (Summer 2020)

The Panel has identified from open-source media and confidential sources the presence of TM-62M anti-tank mines in Southern Tripoli. The mines were made safe and recovered from areas previously occupied by Russian PMC. Many had anti-lift devices underneath.

The mines identified had 1981 lot numbers, so tracing is no longer possible due to their age and the wide spread export of such mines.

This explosive ordnance was NOT in the inventory of the Libyan Armed Forces prior to the 2011 arms embargo.

The transfer to Libya of this explosive ordnance type is a violation of paragraph 9 to resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#).

#### Primary sources

1. <https://postimg.cc/G9rPsG6F>. Accessed 23 January 2022;
2. Confidential source; and
3. <https://cat-uxo.com/explosive-hazards/landmines/tm-62m-landmine>. Accessed 23 January 2022.

Developed by UN Panel of Experts



Stock Image



## Annex 46 120mm High Explosive (HE) Mortar Bomb (9 October 2020)

### 120mm High Explosive (HE) Mortar Bombs (GNA-AF in Western Libya) (9 October 2020)

Imagery from the website of the "Sons of Lions" Mortar Unit of the GNA Western Command showed the presence of a batch of 120mm high explosive (HE) Mortar Bombs not previously seen in Libya before. This is an update to that reported in table 4 and annex 41 of Panel report S/2021/229.

The markings on the ammunition identify that it was produced in January 2018, whereas markings on primary packaging shows ammunition manufactured in April 2017. The markings also indicate that the ammunition was manufactured by the Arsenal 2000 JSCo Dunarit company of Bulgaria. The Panel has confirmed that the bombs are from a consignment under Export Licences 017610 (18 February 2020) and 017677 (18 March 2020) for the Turkish Land Forces Command as the end user.

The Panel offered an opportunity to respond to Turkey on 8 March 2021. No response was received.

The transfer of this ammunition to Libya by Turkey is a violation of paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011).

#### Primary sources

- <https://twitter.com/i/status/1314628386258653185>, 9 October 2020;
- [https://www.facebook.com/pages/category/Interest/115506966518255/?\\_rdc=2&\\_rdr](https://www.facebook.com/pages/category/Interest/115506966518255/?_rdc=2&_rdr), Accessed 17 October 2020;
- [customer.janes.com](https://customer.janes.com), 14 October 2019, (Subscription); and
- Member State, 18 February 2021 and 28 August 2021.

Developed by UN Panel of Experts.

END USER CERTIFICATE		
TO: INTERMINISTERIAL COMMISSION FOR EXPORT CONTROL AND NON-PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION		
1. Name of the Exporter:		
2. Name of the Buyer/Importer: <b>Neftürk Savunma ve Havacılık Sanayi AŞ</b> İçerenköy Mah. Prof.Dr.Hecmettin Erbakan Cad. Örce Yılmaz İş Merkezi No: 97 İş Kapı No: 14 Alagehir-İstanbul / TURKEY Tax ID: Kozysatılı VD 6300974451 204003-5		
3. Name of the End User: <b>Turkish Land Forces Command</b>		
4. Full description of the goods and quantity:		
NO	DESCRIPTION OF THE GOOD	QUANTITY / PIECES
1	120MM MORTAR BOMB HE 120	3.000
5. Place of the use of the goods: <b>Republic of Turkey</b>		
6. Purpose of use of the goods: <b>For the requirement of Land Forces Command</b>		
7. The End-User of the goods hereby guarantees that the goods defined in the clause N° 4 of the present certificate will not be used other than for the purpose defined in the clause N° 6 and will not be transferred to any other person of the business activity in the territory of the Republic of Turkey or re-exported, lent or rented without written permission of the Bulgarian Export authorities.		
8. We also certify that the items defined in the clause N° 4 will not be used for the purpose of violating the human rights.		
9. We confirm that the items defined in the clause N° 4 will not be used for the purposes associated with chemical, biological or nuclear weapons or missiles capable to deliver such weapons, nor will they be resold if we know or suspect that it is likely intended to be used for such purpose.		
(Signature and stamp from the End User)		
Government Certification		



## Annex 47 120mm 120-PM-43 M1948 Mortar (15 November 2020)

### 120mm 120-PM-43 M1943 Mortar (HAF) (15 November 2020)

The Panel has identified from open-source social media the presence of 120mm 120-PM-43 M1943 Mortars in the possession of HAF on 15 November 2020.

This weapon system was NOT reported in the inventory of the Libyan Armed Forces prior to the 2011 arms embargo.


The transfer to Libya of this weapon type is a violation of paragraph 9 to resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#).



#### Primary sources

1. <https://twitter.com/Oded121351/status/1328012799948312576>, 15 November 2020;
2. [https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:120\\_mm\\_regimental\\_mortar\\_M1943.jpg](https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:120_mm_regimental_mortar_M1943.jpg). Accessed 22 January 2022;
3. Confidential source for identification; and
4. Jane's Defence.

Developed by UN Panel of Experts



Reference Image



## Annex 48 XP Type Holographic Weapon Sights (HWS) (21 November 2020)

### EOTECH "Type" Holographic Weapon Sights (HWS) (HAF Omar Al-Mukhtar Training Centre, Tajoura) (21 November 2020)

From imagery of a GNA-AF training demonstration at the Omar Al-Mukhtar Training Centre near Tajoura on, 21 November 2021 the Panel has identified weapon sights, virtually identical to the XP type holographic weapon sights (HWS) manufactured by EOTECH LLC, USA. The HWS were fitted to 5.56mm MKEK MBT 55K assault rifles in the possession of the armed forces of the then Government of National Accord (GNA-AF). Weapons sights fall under the auspices of "arms and related materiel of all types" under the arms embargo.

The present owners of the US company claim that they cannot be sure that HWS were not supplied to Libya prior to 31 July 2020, the date they purchased the company. The company also informed the Panel that the XP HWS was widely counterfeited by "Far East based" companies.

Although the Panel cannot positively identify the supplier of the HWS to Libya, the transfer of this military material to Libya is a violation of paragraph 9 of resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#).

#### Primary sources

1. <https://twitter.com/Oded121351/status/1330225538875658242>, 21 November 2020;
2. Location confirmed from <https://twitter.com/TRTArabi/status/1330177488580960263>, 21 November 2021;
3. <https://www.facebook.com/Erdoganarabie/posts/412139096861489>, 21 November 2021; and
4. Manufacturers image for comparison and identification.

Developed by UN Panel of Experts



## Annex 49 MKEK MBT 55K Assault Rifles (21 November 2020)

### 5.56mm MKEK MBT 55K Assault Rifles (HAF Omar Al-Mukhtar Training Centre, Tajoura) (21 November 2020)

The Panel identified from imagery of a GNA-AF training demonstration at the Omar Al-Mukhtar Training Centre near Tajoura on 21 November 2020, 5.56mm MKEK MBT 55K assault rifles in the possession of the armed forces of the then Government of National Accord (GNA-AF).

These weapons are designed and manufactured by Mechanical and Chemical Industry Company (MKEK) (Makina ve Kimya Endüstrisi Kurumu) of Turkey. This weapon type entered service with the Turkish Armed Forces in 2018, and no exports were made until 2021, after they were first identified in Libya. These exports being 30 weapons to two Balkan countries for evaluation. Over 60 weapons were identified at the training demonstration in Khoms.

The Panel offered an opportunity to respond to Turkey in letters of 8 March 2021 and 5 October 2021. No response was received.

The transfer of these weapons to Libya by Turkey is a violation of paragraph 9 of resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#).

#### Primary sources

1. <https://twitter.com/Oded121351/status/1330225538875658242>, 21 November 2020;
2. Location confirmed from <https://twitter.com/TRTArabi/status/1330177488580960263>, 21 November 2021;
3. <https://www.facebook.com/Erdoganarabi/posts/412139096861489>, 21 November 2021;
4. <https://www.mkek.gov.tr/en/product.aspx?id=52&source=Products&pid=1383>, Accessed 23 March 2021; and
5. [customer.janes.com](#), 12 July 2021.(Subscriber).

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**Annex 50     120mm M-74 Mortar (4 January 2021)****120mm M-74 Mortar  
(HAF Tariq Ibn Ziyad brigade)  
(4 January 2021)**

The Panel has identified from official HAF social media the presence of 120mm M-74 Mortars in the possession of the "10th Unit" of the HAF Tariq Ibn Ziyad brigade on 4 January 2021.

This weapon system was NOT reported in the inventory of the Libyan Armed Forces prior to the 2011 arms embargo.

The transfer to Libya of this weapon type is a violation of paragraph 9 to resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#).

**Primary sources**

1. Extract from <https://www.facebook.com/sreya10.army.ly/videos/229234458726136/>, 4 January 2021. (7min 24sec);
2. <https://www.yugoimport.com/en/proizvodi/120mm-mortar-m74>. Accessed 22 January 2022; and
3. Jane's Defence.

Developed by UN Panel of Experts

## Annex 51 Akdas AK40-GL type 40x46mm Grenade Launchers (28 January 2021)

### Akdas AK-40 GL variant 40x46mm SR Grenade Launchers (GNA-AF Khoms Joint Naval Training Centre) (28 January 2021)

On 28 January 2021 imagery was published on official social media of the Turkish Armed Forces of the then GNA-AF receiving training in the use of the Akdas AK-40 GL variant 40x46mm SR grenade launchers from Turkish military instructors.

This is the first time that Akdas AK-40 GL variant 40x46mm SR grenade launchers have been identified in Libya. These weapons are designed and manufactured by the Akdas Arms Company of Turkey ([www.akdassilah.com](http://www.akdassilah.com)). This weapon type entered service with the Turkish Armed Forces in October 2019, and deliveries of the 8,000 units ordered continued through 2020. No exports have been reported in the authoritative defence trade media. They are also designed for use as under barrel grenade launchers fitted to the Turkish MKEK 5.56mm MBT 55K assault rifles, also supplied to Libya by Turkey.

The Panel offered Turkey an opportunity to respond in letters dated 9 February and 5 October 2021. No response was received.

This military training undertaken within the scope of the Military Training, Cooperation and Consultancy Agreement between Turkey and the GNA is a violation of paragraph 9 of resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#).

#### Primary sources

1. <https://twitter.com/tcsavunma/status/1354772279897563136>, 28 January 2021;
2. <https://silahreport.com/2020/02/11/akdas-ak-40gl-turkeys-new-underbarrel-grenade-launcher/>, 11 February 2020;
3. <https://akdassilah.com/en/ak-40gl.html>. Accessed 11 November 2021; and
4. [customer.janes.com](http://customer.janes.com).

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The transfer of these weapons to Libya by Turkey, is also a violation of paragraph 9 of resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#).



## Annex 52 AK-103 Assault Rifles with HAF 106 brigade (30 January 2021)

### 7.62mm AK-103 variant Assault Rifle (HAF 106 brigade, Eastern Libya) (30 January 2021)

The Panel has identified from official and open-source imagery of a training exercise on 30 January 2021 the presence of AK-103 variant assault rifles in the possession of HAF 106 brigade.

The Panel is confident these are a new import into Libya due to the two digit year code [20] that forms part of the serial number [201109571].

On 12 May 2021 the Panel wrote to the Member State that designed and manufactures the weapon, and also the two Member States that manufacture them under licence. No responses have yet been received by the Panel, so supply chain tracing is stalled.

The transfer of these weapons to Libya is a violation of paragraph 9 of resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#).

#### Primary sources

1. <https://www.facebook.com/mediawarinformationdivision/videos/406443407317097>, 28 January 2021;
2. <https://twitter.com/Oded121351/status/1355414260034260993>, 30 January 2021;
3. <https://twitter.com/CalibreObscura/status/1355434875214585857>, 30 January 2021; and
4. [customer.janes.com](https://customer.janes.com). Subscriber only.

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## Annex 53      *System Defence 5.56mm Multi-Functional Rifle (MFR) (2 February 2021)*

### **System Defence 5.56mm Multi-Functional Rifle (MFR) (GNU Ministry of Interior security agencies) (2 February 2021)**

The Panel has identified from official GNU Ministry of Interior and open-source imagery the presence of System Defence 5.56mm multi-functional rifles (MFR) in the possession of Ministry of Interior personnel on 2 February 2021. Subsequent official social media posted on 2 July 2021 confirmed the presence of this weapon type with the Ministry of Interior security agencies.

These are the first sightings of this weapon type in Libya. This weapon type has only been manufactured since 2018 and there have been no reported foreign sales in the authoritative trade media.

The Panel offered Turkey an opportunity to respond in a letter of 12 July 2021. On 12 September 2021 Turkey stated that, based on inventory analysis, it had not sold, transferred or exported such weapons to Libya.

The transfer of this weapon type to Libya, in the absence of an approved exemption request, is a violation of paragraph 9 to resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#).

#### **Primary sources**

1. [https://www.facebook.com/enfad.alkanon/photos/2810902145798509?\\_rdc=1&\\_rdr](https://www.facebook.com/enfad.alkanon/photos/2810902145798509?_rdc=1&_rdr), 2 February 2021;
2. <https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=333678458468381>, 2 July 2021; and
3. <http://www.nowyousafe.com/rifles/>. Accessed 10 August 2021.

Developed by UN Panel of Experts



## Annex 54 5.56mm JAWS 556 Assault Rifles in Libya (4 February 2021)

### 5.56mm JAWS-556 Assault Rifle (Sirte, Libya) (4 February 2021)

The Panel has identified from open-source media a weapon in the possession of an armed group affiliated to Khalifa Haftar present in Sirte on, or about, 4 February 2021. The weapon is virtually identical to the JAWS-556 (14.5" barrel) assault rifle produced by the Jordanian Armament and Weapon Systems (JAWS) facility ([www.jaws-jordan.com](http://www.jaws-jordan.com)), which is part of the King Abdullah II Design and Development Bureau (KADDB) consortium. This is the first sighting of this weapons system in Libya. The weapon has only been manufactured since 2017/2018, and there are no reports of any exports in the authoritative defence trade media. Jordan confirmed to the Panel that no overseas sales had taken place.

The Panel wrote to Jordan on 22 February, 25 March and 7 September 2021. Jordan denied supply to Libya. Their response stated that the weapons "*can be assembled (including in Jordan) by a third party and then sold by this third party*", but provided no evidence to support the statement. The Panel considers it highly unlikely that such an activity could take place in Jordan, and a subsequent transfer to Libya take place, without State knowledge.

The transfer of these weapons to Libya is a violation of paragraph 9 of resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#) by Jordan as they failed to prevent the transfer.

#### Primary sources

1. <https://twitter.com/Oded121351/status/1357394846013612032>, 4 February 2021;
2. <https://army-tech.net/forum/index.php?threads/الاصارم-نادرال-تاوالة-صا-2018.14611/page-3>, SOFEX 2018; and
3. [customer.janes.com](http://customer.janes.com). Subscriber.

Developed by UN Panel of Experts





## Annex 55      122mm M-30 M1938 Howitzer in Libya (23 March 2021)

### 122mm M-30 M1938 Howitzer (HAF 106 brigade) (23 March 2021)

The Panel has identified from open-source media the presence of 122mm M-30 M1938 Howitzers in the possession of HAF 106 brigade on 23 March 2021.

This weapon system was NOT reported in the inventory of the Libyan Armed Forces prior to the 2011 arms embargo.

The transfer to Libya of this weapon type is a violation of paragraph 9 to resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#).



#### Primary sources

1. [https://twitter.com/Libya\\_OSINT/status/1374424342608547843](https://twitter.com/Libya_OSINT/status/1374424342608547843), 23 March 2021;
2. <https://www.istockphoto.com/photo/soviet-122-mm-howitzer-m1938-back-view-gm495566889-41002254>, Accessed 22 January 2022; and
3. Jane's Defence.

Developed by UN Panel of Experts

## Annex 56 T-62 variant Main Battle Tank (MBT) in Libya (23 March 2021)

### HAF T- 62 MV variant Main Battle Tank (MBT) (Update) (near Benghazi) (23 March 2021)

The Panel corrected its initial report (annex 64 to [S/2021/229](#)) on the presence of T-62 main battle tanks (MBT) in Libya in annex 64 to [S/2021/229/Corr.1](#). Subsequent to the drafting of that corrigendum the Panel has identified further information on social media from third-party investigators on the presence of the T-62 MV variant in Libya, who identified the variant from imagery in official media of HAF 106 brigade.

The Panel initially considered that the presence of the T-62 MV variant may have been due to upgrades made to T-62 MBT by ChVK Wagner personnel to T-62 already in possession of the Libyan Armed Forces prior to the arms embargo. Further investigations, including consideration of the findings of independent OSINT analysts, now consider that option as highly unlikely due to the design differences between the two variants, and the extensive engineering work necessary to make such modification.

The transfer of this military materiel into Libya is a violation of paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011).

#### Primary sources

1. Twitter, @HasairiOuais. 5 June 2020;
2. <https://twitter.com/oryxspioenkop/status/1371893466641354757>, 16 March 2021;
3. <https://www.facebook.com/aljishlibya/photos/pcb.1779681972210482/1779680602210619>, 23 March 2021;
4. <https://www.facebook.com/Brigade106/photos/pcb.2872755536273323/2872753766273500>, 29 March 2021;
5. <https://twitter.com/oryxspioenkop/status/1376829002015514629>, 30 March 2021; and
6. [customer.janes.com](https://www.janes.com). (Subscription).

Developed by UN Panel of Experts



## Annex 57 GNU-AF training on M60 *Patton* Main Battle Tank in Libya (27 March 2021)

### GNU-AF M60 *Patton* Main Battle Tank Transfer and Training (Joint Land Training Centre, Tajoura) (27 March 2021)

The Panel identified from open source information, including a subsequently deleted 'tweet' from the official Turkish Ministry of Defence social media account, Turkish military personnel training GNU-AF personnel on M60 *Patton* main battle tanks (MBT). This is the first sighting of an M60 *Patton* MBT in Libya as this equipment was not in the past inventory of the Libyan Armed Forces.

In response to an enquiry by the Panel, Turkey denied transferring M60 *Patton* MBT to Libya, denied providing training and denied having a surplus of such MBT in the Turkish Armed Forces.

The Panel has evidence that contradicts the Turkish response to the Panel:

- 1) Copy of the imagery [R] from the official Turkish Ministry of Defence social media account;
- 2) Credible evidence that the Turkish Armed Forces have a surplus of M60 *Patton* MBT, which were originally procured from the USA during 1992/1993; and
- 3) Confidential information that the M60 *Patton* MBT were delivered to Misrata, Libya on 28 May 2020 onboard the MV Cirkin. [See appendix D to annex 34 to S/2021/229].

#### Primary sources

1. <https://twitter.com/tcsavunma/status/1375719303471898630>, subsequently deleted;
2. <https://www.savunmatr.com/savunma-sanayii/msb-den-libyali-askerlere-sinif-okulu-intibak-egitimi-h10067.html>;
3. <https://twitter.com/BurkanLy/status/1376617705009188869>, 29 March 2021;
4. <https://www.janes.com/defence-news/news-detail/m60-tanks-transferred-to-libya>, 31 March 2021;
5. [https://customer.janes.com/Janes/Display/JAA\\_0085-JAFV](https://customer.janes.com/Janes/Display/JAA_0085-JAFV), Accessed 15 April 2021. (Subscription);
6. Member State (20 May 2021); and
7. Confidential source.

Developed by UN Panel of Experts



This training in the operation of M60 *Patton* MBT undertaken within the scope of the Military Training, Cooperation and Consultancy Agreement between Turkey and the GNU is a violation of paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011).

This transfer of M60 *Patton* MBT into Libya by Turkey is a violation of paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011).

## Annex 58 AMN 233114 Tiger-M MPV deployed with HAF (30 March 2021)

### AMN 233114 Tiger-M Multi-Purpose Armoured Vehicle (MPV) (HAF Live Firing Exercise and Benina, Benghazi) (30 March 2021)

The Panel reported on the presence of a Tigr-M variant with ChVK Wagner operatives in annex 63 to [S/2021/229](#). The vehicles covered in that report were painted grey or black.

Since then the Panel has identified some AMN 233114 Tiger-M MPV present at the HAF 106 brigade live firing exercise in late March 2021. These vehicles were painted in a sand colour. Four vehicles were also seen with the Tariq Ibn Ziyad brigade on the HAF 7th Anniversary of Operation Volcano parade at Benina, Benghazi on 29 May 2021. A further vehicle was identified with HAF 106 brigade on 8 July 2021.


The Panel has not yet identified whether these vehicles are in operational use by HAF, or whether they are used by ChVK Wagner personnel embedded within HAF units as advisors.

The transfer of this military materiel to Libya is a violation of paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011).

#### Primary sources

1. <https://twitter.com/Oded121351/status/1376806109416144897>, 30 March 2021;
2. <https://twitter.com/Oded121351/status/1376812499954241542>, 30 March 2021;
3. <https://twitter.com/RS0TM/status/1400586112574406657>, 3 June 2021;
4. <https://milindcom.ru/EN/catalog/voennaya-produktsiya/avtomobil-mnogotselevogo-naznacheniya-amn-233114-tigr-m/>. Accessed 10 June 2021; and
5. [https://twitter.com/Libya\\_OSINT/status/1413082728422117378](https://twitter.com/Libya_OSINT/status/1413082728422117378), 8 July 2021.

Developed by UN Panel of Experts



## Annex 59 HAF Sordin Supreme Pro-X Max Black hearing protectors (5 May 2021)

### Sordin Supreme Pro-X Max Black hearing protectors (HAF 106 brigade) (5 May 2021)


The Panel has identified from official social media of HAF and other open-source imagery the presence of Swedish-manufactured Sordin Supreme Pro-X Max Black hearing protectors being used by fighters of HAF 106 brigade. The Member State confirmed that these items are not subject to export controls, nor specifically classified as military material or dual-use. Yet they they have obvious military utility.

The Panel considers that as this dual-use technology is primarily being imported by actors actively participating in armed conflict, and then used for military purposes, such transfers are a violation of paragraph 9 to resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#).

#### Primary sources

1. [https://twitter.com/Libya\\_OSINT/status/1390066440254992386](https://twitter.com/Libya_OSINT/status/1390066440254992386), 5 May 2021;
2. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aBiya-0pBfI>, 28 May 2021;
3. Member State (11 May 2021); and
4. <https://www.sordin.com/products/supreme-pro-x-neckband>.

Developed by UN Panel of Experts





## Annex 60 Seizure of SUR BRT M9 blank firing pistols in Misrata (18 May 2021)

### SUR MRT M9 blank firing pistols (Misrata) (18 May 2021)

The Panel has identified from social media the seizure of 2,000 Surarms SUR BRT M9 blank firing pistols by customs authorities in Misrata port on 18 May 2021. The pistols were concealed within a shipping container [#280132.3] full of clothes, which was offloaded from the MV *Medkon Azmir* (IMO 9103374). This information was confirmed to the Panel on 22 October 2021 and 24 February 2022 by the Libyan authorities who are investigating the case.

These pistols can be readily converted into live firing weapons and the Panel assesses that they were destined to be such converted and then sold on the black market by an organized criminal group.

The transfer of these weapons to Libya is a violation of paragraph 9 of resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#).



#### Primary sources

1. [https://twitter.com/Libya\\_OSINT/status/1394787951058505731](https://twitter.com/Libya_OSINT/status/1394787951058505731), 18 May 2021;
2. Member State (22 October 2021 and 24 February 2022); and
3. <http://en.surarms.com/bri-m9/>, Accessed 18 November 2021.

Developed by UN Panel of Experts

**Annex 61      UAZ-469 communication vehicles with HAF 166 brigade (24 May 2021)****UAZ-469 communication vehicles  
(Eastern Libya)  
(24 May 2021)**

The Panel has identified from open-source media the presence of UAZ-469 variant communication vehicles in the possession of HAF 166 brigade. The vehicle type had not been seen in Libya before.

This particular vehicle has been exported to over 80 countries, so a tracing request would be highly unlikely to provide any useful information as to the supply chain to Libya.

The transfer of this military materiel to Libya is a violation of paragraph 9 of resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#).

**Primary sources**

1. [https://twitter.com/Libya\\_OSINT/status/1396868224696963077](https://twitter.com/Libya_OSINT/status/1396868224696963077), 25 May 2021; and
2. [customer.janes.com](https://customer.janes.com), 23 March 2020. (Subscription).

Developed by UN Panel of Experts





**Annex 62      Militarized Jeep Gladiator with HAF (27 May 2021)****Militarized Jeep Gladiator light utility vehicle  
(Benghazi)  
(27 May 2021)**

The Panel has identified from open-source media the presence of two militarized Jeep Gladiator light utility vehicles preparing to take part in the HAF 7th anniversary "Operation Dignity" parade near Benghazi, which was held on 29 May 2021.

The manufacturer has stated that the paint colour of the vehicles is Gobi (Code: PUA), for which 6,965 vehicles were manufactured in 2020. Of these 55 were exported to distributors or individuals in 6 middle eastern countries. None were exported direct to Libya. A tracing request is thus unlikely to yield results.

The transfer of this military materiel to Libya is a violation of paragraph 9 of resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#).

**Primary sources**

1. Extract from video at [https://twitter.com/Libya\\_OSINT/status/1397790180476608517](https://twitter.com/Libya_OSINT/status/1397790180476608517), 27 May 2021; and
2. Letter from manufacturer (2 July 2021).

Developed by UN Panel of Experts



## Annex 63      Militarized Toyota Land Cruiser 6x6 variant with HAF (29 May 2021)

### Militarized Toyota 6x6 light utility vehicle (Eastern Libya) (29 May 2021)

The Panel has identified from open-source media the presence of a militarized Toyota Land Cruiser 6x6 type light utility vehicle in Libya for the first time. It was participating in the HAF 7th anniversary "Operation Dignity" parade held on 29 May 2021 at Benina, Benghazi .

The Panel wrote to the manufacturer on 11 June 2021 requesting further information. No response was received.

The transfer of this military materiel to Libya is a violation of paragraph 9 of resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#).



#### Primary source

1. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mbIDXxITPa0>, 31 May 2021.

Developed by UN Panel of Experts

## Annex 64 TAG BATT 4x4 APC (29 May 2021)

### TAG BATT 4x4 APC (Benghazi) (29 May 2021)

The Panel has identified from open-source social media the presence of a TAG BATT 4x4 APC taking part in the 29 May 2021 HAF 7th anniversary "Operation Dignity" parade near Benghazi. The antenna array on the vehicle indicates it is equipped for communications, electronic warfare or electronic countermeasures.

This military vehicle type was first manufactured by The Armored Group (TAG) in 2011, which complicates tracing requests due to the requirement to only keep records for 10 years under the auspices of the Arms Trade Treaty. It is no longer in production.

The transfer to Libya of this military vehicle type is a violation of paragraph 9 to resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#).

#### Primary sources

1. <https://postimg.cc/LhXkM4ny>, Accessed 23 January 2022; and
2. <https://www.armoredcars.com/batt-ap-swat-truck-canada/batt-ap/>, 6 April 2011.

Developed by UN Panel of Experts



## Annex 65      *Steyr SSG 08 variant or copy Sniper Rifle (3 June 2021)*

### **Steyr SSG 08 variant or copy Sniper Rifle (Russian PMC in Eastern Libya) (3 June 2021)**

The Panel has identified from open-source imagery the presence of a weapon virtually identical to a *Steyr SSG 08* variant sniper rifle in the possession of a Russian PMC operative in Eastern Libya.

The Panel was informed by the manufacturer that they had not exported any weapons to Libya, and that the finish on the weapon was not a standard production finish. They also stated that this weapon type has had worldwide sales, and that copies are now being made. This precludes further tracing by the Panel unless a serial number can be obtained.

The transfer of this weapon type to Libya is a violation of paragraph 9 of resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#).

#### **Primary sources**

1. <https://twitter.com/RS0TM/status/1400585777394900995>, 3 June 2021;
2. <https://twitter.com/Oded121351/status/1401482925212905474>, 6 June 2021;
3. <https://www.steyr-arms.com/en/sporting-rifles/ssg-08/>. Accessed 6 June 2021; and
4. Letter from manufacturer, 24 June 2021.

Developed by UN Panel of Experts



## Annex 66 Armoured Toyota Land Cruiser 79 variant with Russian PMC (3 June 2021)

### Armoured Toyota Land Cruiser 79 light utility vehicle (29°13'21.03"N, 16°11'22.29"E) (3 June 2021)

The Panel has identified from open-source media the presence of armoured Toyota 79 Land Cruiser light utility vehicles in Libya for the first time. The vehicles were heading North East in a Russian PMC convoy from Al Jufra to Sirte.

Panel research has identified that numerous companies provide this up-armouring option to the standard Toyota Land Cruiser 79. Successful tracing of the supply chain is not possible without more detailed information,

The Panel also notes that the GNU-AF (Misrata militias) may also have possession of similar vehicles, but the imagery resolution available does not allow for a 100% identification (see primary source 4).

The transfer of this military materiel to Libya is a violation of paragraph 9 of resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#).



#### Primary sources

1. <https://twitter.com/RS0TM/status/1400582605431619587>, 3 June 2021;
2. Geo-referenced at <https://twitter.com/CourtenaySargon/status/1401503780596768768>, 7 June 2021; and
3. Extract from <https://twitter.com/salaaah62/status/1401893333044244484>, (0.46min), 7 June 2021.

Developed by UN Panel of Experts



## Annex 67 GNU-AF CForce All-Terrain Vehicles (ATV) (4 July 2021)

### CForce All Terrain Vehicles (ATV) (GNU-AF in South Tripoli) (4 July 2021)

The Panel has identified from official social media of the GNU Ministry of Interior and other open-source imagery the presence of CFMoto CForce All Terrain Vehicles (ATV) being used by the GNU Ministry of Interior's General Department of Security Operations in southern Tripoli. Although these items are not subject to export controls, nor specifically classified as military material or dual-use, they have obvious military utility.

This has been included in the report as a further example of the ease with which arms embargos can be negated by the innovative use of commercial or dual use products. In this case all the vehicles were seen in black or green "military" colours.

CFMoto is a global brand with high production levels and global distribution, which means that without vehicle identification numbers (VIN) supply chain tracing is not possible.

The Panel considers that as this dual-use technology is primarily being imported by actors actively participating in armed conflict, and then used for military purposes, such transfers are a violation of paragraph 9 to resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#).

#### Primary sources

1. <https://www.facebook.com/moi.gov.ly/photos/pcb.4108454315917896/4108453999251261>, 4 July 2021.
2. [https://twitter.com/Libya\\_OSINT/status/1412183012960260098](https://twitter.com/Libya_OSINT/status/1412183012960260098), 5 July 2021; and
3. <https://www.cfmoto.co.uk/atv/>. Accessed 21 November 2021.

Developed by UN Panel of Experts





## Annex 68 MKEK JNG-90 Bora Sniper Rifles in Libya (11 July 2021)

### **MKEK 7.62mm JNG-90 Bora Sniper Rifle (GNU Ministry of Interior security agencies) (11 July 2021 and 9 March 2022)**

The Panel has identified from official GNU Ministry of Interior and open-source imagery the presence of *MKEK 7.62mm JNG-90 Bora* Sniper Rifles in the possession of Ministry of Interior security agencies on 11 July 2021 and 9 March 2022. The weapons were being used as part of sniper training provided by Turkey.

These are the first sightings of this weapons system in Libya. This weapon type has been manufactured since 2008. The two Member States also licensed to produce the weapon have confirmed to the Panel that they have yet to manufacture any weapons.

The Panel offered Turkey an opportunity to respond in a letter of 22 July 2021. On 12 September 2021 Turkey stated that, based on inventory analysis, it had not sold, transferred or exported such weapons to Libya.

This military sniper training undertaken within the scope of the Military Training, Cooperation and Consultancy Agreement between Turkey and the GNA, and the transfer of this weapon type to Libya, are both violations of paragraph 9 of resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#).

#### **Primary sources**

1. <https://www.facebook.com/Ministry.of.Interior.libya/posts/4127878207308840>, 11 July 2021;
2. <https://twitter.com/Oded121351/status/1414847896751648771>, 13 July 2021;
3. <https://web.archive.org/web/20101126225913/http://mkek.gov.tr/english/foUrunDetaylari.aspx?iKodUrun=335&iKodUrunKategorisi=131>, Accessed 22 July 2021;
4. <https://www.facebook.com/photo?fbid=511947766965593&set=pcb.511948683632168>, 9 March 2022; and
5. [customer.janes.com](https://customer.janes.com), 20 October 2020. (Subscription).

Developed by UN Panel of Experts



## Annex 69 AN/PVS-7 Night Vision Goggles (9 August 2021)

### AN/PVS-7 Night Vision Goggles (PNG) (Benina, Benghazi) (9 August 2021)

The Panel has identified from official HAF social media imagery of the 81st Anniversary parade of the formation of the Libyan Army, held at Benina on 9 August 2021, HAF personnel equipped with Army/Navy Portable Visual Search 7 (AN/PVS-7) type Night Vision Goggles (NVG). This is the first reporting of this military materiel by the Panel, although independent research has identified a single image of the same equipment with a HAF fighter on 3 August 2017, which went unreported by the Panel at the time.

Designed in the United States in 1982, in-service since 1985, with many manufacturers, means that a tracing request is unlikely to identify the supply chain unless serial numbers can be identified.

Weapons sights fall under the auspices of *arms and related materiel of all types* under the arms embargo.

Although the Panel cannot positively identify the supplier of the AN/PVS-7 NVG to Libya, the transfer of this military material to Libya is a violation of paragraph 9 of resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#).

#### Primary sources

1. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Vscz8zHfL70>, 9 August 2021;
2. <https://twitter.com/Oded121351/status/1425789777975074821>, 12 August 2021;
3. <https://twitter.com/Oded121351/status/892972404833734656>, 3 August 2017; and
4. Manufacturers image for comparison and identification.

Developed by UN Panel of Experts



## Annex 70 122mm *Rocketsan* FFR Pods and Hybrid Launcher (17 August 2021)

### 122mm *Rocketsan* Free Flight Rockets (FFR) and Hybrid Launcher (Sidi Bilal, 32°48'56.73"N, 12°57'19.76") (17 August 2021)

A Hybrid Multi-Barrel Rocket Launcher (MBRL) was identified in the possession of the GNU-AF entering Camp Sidi Bilal, near Jazour, on 17 August 2021. The location was confirmed by an independent OSINT analyst using geo-location, and the Panel concurs with the coordinates identified.

This MBRL is of interest as further research identified that a very similar hybrid MBRL was seen in the possession of HAF in Tarhuna on 5 June 2020. In 1989/1990 the DPRK supplied the UAE with some 240mm M-1985 MBRL, and the erector launcher seen on the hybrid MBRL is of the same type. The manufacturer has confirmed to the Panel that Iveco 230.35 WM chassis were supplied to the UAE during 1991/1992.

The Hybrid MBRL seen at GNU-AF Camp Sidi Bilal has the Turkish manufactured *Rocketsan* 122mm free flight rocket (FFR) pods mounted on an M-1985 MBRL erector launcher on an uparmoured Iveco 230.35WM chassis.

This makes it almost certain that the Hybrid MBRL identified with the GNU-AF at Camp Sidi Bilal is the result of a battlefield capture from HAF.

The transfer of this Hybrid MBRL to Libya is a violation of paragraph 9 of resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#) by the UAE. The supply of the *Rocketsan* 122mm FFR is a violation of paragraph 9 of resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#) by Turkey.

#### Primary sources

1. [www.politico.eu/article/libya-khalifa-haftar-in-retreat-france-hedges-its-bets/](http://www.politico.eu/article/libya-khalifa-haftar-in-retreat-france-hedges-its-bets/), 5 June 2020;
2. [www.oryxspioenkop.com/2020/11/inconvenient-arms-north-korean-weapons.html](http://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2020/11/inconvenient-arms-north-korean-weapons.html), 2 November 2020;
3. [twitter.com/Oded121351/status/1427514232749404180](https://twitter.com/Oded121351/status/1427514232749404180), 17 August 2021;
4. [twitter.com/oryxspioenkop/status/1427536079981322241](https://twitter.com/oryxspioenkop/status/1427536079981322241), 17 August 2021;
5. [twitter.com/azyakancokkacan/status/1427552230912241671](https://twitter.com/azyakancokkacan/status/1427552230912241671), 17 August 2021;
6. Geo-located at [twitter.com/il\\_kanguru/status/1427520357867696139](https://twitter.com/il_kanguru/status/1427520357867696139), 17 August 2021;
7. [www.oryxspioenkop.com/2021/12/the-mystery-mrfs-that-fuelled-both.html](http://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2021/12/the-mystery-mrfs-that-fuelled-both.html), 14 December 2021; and
8. [customer.janes.com](http://customer.janes.com). (Subscription).

Developed by UN Panel of Experts



Iveco 230/35 WM Chassis  
HAF Hybrid 122mm MBRL in Tarhuna  
(5 June 2020)



GNU-AF Hybrid 122mm MBRL in Jazour  
(17 August 2021)



Rocketsan 122m FFR Pod >>



<< DPRK M-1985 erector launcher

## Annex 71 SALW seizures in Sudan (18 September 2021 and 8 January 2022)

### Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) Transfers to Sudan (18 September 2021 and 8 January 2022)

On 18 September 2021 imagery was published on official social media of the Sudanese Rapid Support Forces (RSF) of an SALW seizure in the area of Sidi al-Barli, Sudan. It was reported that four smugglers, two Libyans and two foreign nationals, were arrested, but the Panel has yet to verify this information. The seizure included 36 x AK variant assault rifles, two DshK heavy machine guns, two RPG-7 rocket launchers and associated ammunition.

On 8 January 2022 official RSF open source media reported a further seizure of 3,995 rounds of small arms ammunition.

The Panel requested further information from Sudan in letters dated 26 September 2021 and 4 February 2022. No response was received.

This transfer of small arms and light weapons from Libya is a violation of paragraph 9 of resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#).

#### Primary sources

1. <https://rsf.gov.sd/news/1467>, 18 September 2021;
2. <https://twitter.com/RSFSudan/status/1439183450691575808?s=20>, 18 September 2021; and
3. <https://english.alaraby.co.uk/news/sudanese-forces-seize-libya-arms-shipment>, 19 September 2021;
4. <https://www.rsf.gov.sd/news/1666>, 8 January 2022;
5. <https://rsf.gov.sd/en/news/1667/RSF-Thwarts-Attempt-of-Smuggling-a-Shipment-of-Ammunition-on-the-Sudanese-Libyan-Borders>, 9 January 2022; and
6. <https://www.libyaobserver.ly/inbrief/sudan-thwarts-ammunition-smuggling-operation-near-libyan-border>, 9 January 2022.

Developed by UN Panel of Experts





## Annex 72 Katmerciler *KIRAC* Armoured Personnel Carrier (24 December 2021)

### Katmerciler *KIRAC* Armoured Personnel Carriers (APC) (GNU Ministry of Interior in Tripoli) (25 December 2021)

The Panel has identified from Turkish specialist defence media the presence of Katmerciler *KIRAC* armoured personnel carriers (APC) being used by the GNU in Tripoli. These vehicles are designed and manufactured by the Katmerciler Arac Ustu Ekipman Sanayi ve Ticarit A.S. Merkez (Fabrika) company in Turkey.

The manufacturer's coverage on their website states that this New Generation Criminal Investigation Vehicle has a unique design which can be configured as armoured personnel carrier, command control vehicle and internal security vehicle. If designed for use in the "Command Control" or "Internal Security" roles, the vehicles, depending on the end-user, could fall under the exception for non-lethal humanitarian or protective use provided for in paragraph 9 (a) of resolution 1970 (2011), as amended by paragraphs 9 and 10 of resolution 2095 (2013).

However, these particular vehicles are armoured and are being used in the APC role, hence an exemption request and prior approval by the Committee would have been required under paragraph 8 of resolution 2174 (2014). No such request was made by Libya or Turkey.

The Panel offered Libya and Turkey an opportunity to respond in letters dated 1 February and 31 January 2022 respectively. No response was received.

This transfer of military equipment to Libya undertaken within the scope of the Military Training, Cooperation and Consultancy Agreement between Turkey and the then GNA is a violation of paragraph 9 of resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#) by Turkey.



KIRAC APC in Tripoli. Note the official Libyan Ministry of Interior number plate.



Two KIRAC APC in official convoy in Tripoli. Note the Libyan police car.

#### Primary sources

- <https://www.defenceturk.net/turk-katmerciler-firmasinin-zirhli-araclari-libyada>, 24 December 2021; and
- <http://www.katmerciler.com.tr/L/EN/mid/343/g/343/c/31/id/79/KIRAC-New-Generation-Criminal-Investigation-Vehicle.htm>. Accessed 11 January 2022.

Developed by UN Panel of Experts

## Annex 73 AN/PEQ-15 Advanced Target Pointer Illuminator Aiming Laser (ATPIAL) (31 December 2021)

### AN/PEQ-15 Advanced Target Pointer Illuminator Aiming Laser (ATPIAL) (Misrata) (31 December 2021)

The Panel has identified from GNU official social media the presence of a target pointer illuminator (TPI), virtually identical to the AN/PEQ-15 Advanced Target Pointer Illuminator Aiming Laser (ATPIAL), fitted to an assault rifle in the possession of the Joint Operations Force of the Government of National Unity (GNU-AF) in Misrata on 31 December 2021.

Target Pointer Illuminators (TPI) fall under the auspices of *arms and related materiel of all types* under the arms embargo.

The ATPIAL has high production levels and is globally distributed, which means that without a serial number supply chain tracing is not possible.

The transfer of this military material to Libya is a violation of paragraph 9 of resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#).

#### Primary sources

1. <https://www.facebook.com/GOVLYT/photos/1825880584261887>, 2 January 2022; and
2. <https://www.l3harris.com/all-capabilities/advanced-target-pointer-illuminator-aiming-laser-atpial-an-peq-15>. Accessed 22 January 2022.

Developed by UN Panel of Experts






## Annex 74 Aselsan A100 Night Vision Monocular (NVM) (9 February 2022)

### Aselsan A100 Night Vision Monocular (HAF Omar Al-Mukhtar Training Centre, Tajoura) (8 February 2022)

Imagery on GNA 166 Battalion official social media of a GNA-AF training demonstration at the Omar Al-Mukhtar Training Centre near Tajoura on 8 February 2022 shows the use of the Aselsan A100 Night Vision Monocular. Night vision optics fall under the auspices of “arms and related materiel of all types” under the arms embargo.

The optics are manufactured by Aselsan A.S of Turkey and there have been no reported exports or transfers in the authoritative defence media. The optics were only in service with the Turkish Armed Forces. The Panel requested information on the supply chain from Turkey on 24 February 2022. The response from Aselsan A.S. on 22 March 2022 denied any direct sale or export by the company to Libya. Their response did not preclude a third party transfer.

The transfer of this military material to Libya is a violation of paragraph 9 of resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#).



Manufacturer's Image

#### Primary sources

1. <https://www.facebook.com/البيدك-لل-عالم-ال-بديك-لل-166-قوة-ال-او-قوة-ال-او-2465151337105462/photos/3292495174371070>, 8 February 2022;
2. [customer.janes.com](https://customer.janes.com). Accessed 11 February 2022; and
3. <https://www.aselsan.com.tr/en/capabilities/electro-optic-systems/handheld-applications/a100-night-vision-monocular>. Accessed 11 February 2022.

Developed by UN Panel of Experts



## Annex 76 M79 Osa 90mm Anti-tank Rockets (23 March 2022)

### M79 Osa 90mm Anti-tank Rockets (Ajdabia) (23 March 2022)

The Panel has identified from GNU official social media the seizure of five M79 Osa 90mm anti-tank rockets by the Security Directorate in Ajdabia on 23 March 2022. This ammunition type has not been seen in Libya before.

The resolution of the imagery was not high enough to confirm the Lot/Batch number, which appeared to be 18-1984. The age and wide distribution of this ammunition type means that a tracing request would be nugatory.

The transfer of this military material to Libya is a violation of paragraph 9 of resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#).



#### Primary sources

1. [https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story\\_fbid=3112507732370942&id=1706796266275436](https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=3112507732370942&id=1706796266275436), 23 March 2022; and
2. [customer.janes.com](#). Subscription. Accessed 23 March 2022.

Developed by UN Panel of Experts

## Annex 77 GNA-AF Air Defence training in Turkey (1 February 2021)

### GNA -AF Air Defence systems training (1 February 2021)

On 01 February 2021 imagery was published on social media of the Turkish Armed Forces providing training in Konya, Turkey to the then GNA-AF across a range of air defence systems. It was confirmed by video imagery on the official Turkish Armed Forces website.

The systems included: 1) *Korkut* Twin 35mm Cannon (SSA and KKA); 2) *Kalkan* II Air Defence Radar; 3) iHASAVAR Anti-Drone System; 4) iHATAR Anti-Drone System; and 5) Twin *Oerlikon* 35mm Cannon.

The Panel offered Turkey an opportunity to respond in letters dated 9 February and 5 October 2021. No response was received.

This military training undertaken within the scope of the Military Training, Cooperation and Consultancy Agreement between Turkey and the then GNA is a violation of paragraph 9 of resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#).



#### Primary sources

- [https://twitter.com/COIN\\_V2/status/1356172136629624832](https://twitter.com/COIN_V2/status/1356172136629624832), 1 February 2021;
- <https://twitter.com/Oded121351/status/1356161444769898496>, 1 February 2021;
- <https://www.aselsan.com.tr/en/capabilities/air-and-missile-defense-systems/self-propelled-and-air-burst-munition/korkut-self-propelled-air-defense-gun-system>;
- <https://www.aselsan.com.tr/en/capabilities/radar-systems/air-defense-radars/kalkan-air-defence-radar>; and
- <https://www.ssb.gov.tr/urun katalog/en/412/>.

Developed by UN Panel of Experts

## Annex 78 GNA-AF Military Diving training in Khoms, Libya (6 February 2021)

### GNA -AF Military Diving Training by Turkey (Khoms Naval Base) (6 February 2021)

On 6 February 2021 imagery was published on official social media of the Turkish Armed Forces of military diving training in the Khoms Joint Naval Training Command centre being provided to the then GNA-AF. The Panel has confirmed the imagery by geo-locating the training location to 32°41'30.7"N 14°14'31.8"E.

The Panel offered Turkey an opportunity to respond in letters dated 12 July and 5 October 2021. Their response of 17 March 2022 stated that only training was provided and no diving equipment was supplied.

This military diving training undertaken within the scope of the Military Training, Cooperation and Consultancy Agreement between Turkey and the then GNA is a violation of paragraph 9 of resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#).

#### Primary sources

1. <https://twitter.com/tcsavunma/status/1358031134941212672>, 6 February 2021; and
2. Google Earth Pro.

Developed by UN Panel of Experts





## Annex 79 GNA-AF Officer Cadet training in Tripoli, Libya (7 February 2021)

### GNA-AF Officer Cadet training by Turkey (Tripoli) (7 February 2021)

On 7 February 2021 imagery was published on official social media of the Turkish Armed Forces of Officer Cadet training being provided to the then GNA-AF. The Panel has confirmed the imagery by geo-locating the training location to a military base in Tripoli at 32°50'23.2"N, 13°12'07.3"E.


The Panel offered Turkey an opportunity to respond in letters dated 12 July and 5 October 2021. No response was received.

This military training undertaken within the scope of the Military Training, Cooperation and Consultancy Agreement between Turkey and the then GNA is a violation of paragraph 9 of resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#).

#### Primary sources

1. <https://twitter.com/tcsavunma/status/1358392940591259648>, 4 February 2021;
2. <https://twitter.com/tcsavunma/status/1358392818083848201>, 7 February 2021; and
3. Google Earth Pro.

Developed by UN Panel of Experts





## Annex 80 GNU-AF Unit 444 UAV training in Libya (25 March 2021)

### GNU-AF Unit 444 UAV training (Takbali Training Camp, Tripoli) (25 March 2021)

The official social media account of the GNU-AF Tripoli Military District 444 Unit, showed imagery of training in the use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) at the Takbali Training Camp on 25 March 2021. The Panel has confirmed the imagery by geo-referencing the location to approximately 32°48'53.9"N,13°13'26.7"E.

The Panel has identified the UAV as a Foxtech Baby Shark 260 VTOL, which has dual use military utility as an Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) platform. The imagery shows a vehicle painted in a military sand colour, with air conditioning and a dual antenna array. The Panel considers it almost certain that this vehicle is a command, control and communications (C3) vehicle for the operation of the UAV.

The wide commercial distribution of the Foxtech Baby Shark 260 VTOL, means that a tracing request is unlikely to identify the supply chain unless serial numbers can be identified.

This transfer of the Foxtech Baby Shark 260 VTOL into Libya is a violation of paragraph 9 of resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#).

#### Primary sources

1. <https://www.facebook.com/الوحد-444-ج-115065407070788/photos/pcb.231514245425903/231513142092680>, 25 March 2021;
2. <https://www.foxtechfpv.com/foxtech-baby-shark-vtol.html>. Accessed 18 June 2021; and
3. Google Earth Pro.

Developed by UN Panel of Experts



## Annex 81 GNU-AF training on *Firtina* T-155 SP howitzer in Libya (30 March 2021)

### GNU-AF *Firtina* T155 Training (Joint Land Training Centre, Tajoura) (30 March 2021)

The Panel reported on the transfer of *Firtina* T-155 self propelled howitzers from Turkey to Libya in annexes 28 and 34 to [S/2021/229](#).

The Panel identified from an official social media account of the GNU-AF “Media Centre for Operation Volcano of Anger” a report of the Turkish Armed Forces providing artillery training on the use of the T-155 *Firtina* self-propelled howitzers to the GNU-AF.

The Panel offered Turkey an opportunity to respond in letters dated 15 July and 5 October 2021. No response was received.

This training in the operation of *Firtina* T155 self propelled howitzers undertaken within the scope of the Military Training, Cooperation and Consultancy Agreement between Turkey and the then GNU is a violation of paragraph 9 of resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#).

#### Primary sources

1. <https://twitter.com/BurkanLy/status/1376896912553562117>, 30 March 2021; and
2. [https://customer.janes.com/Janes/Display/JAA\\_1327-JAAD](https://customer.janes.com/Janes/Display/JAA_1327-JAAD), 2 February 2021. (Subscription).

Developed by UN Panel of Experts



## Annex 82 GNU-AF Special Forces Training in Turkey (7 August 2021)

### GNU-AF Special Forces Training (Egirdir, Turkey) (7 August 2021)

On 7 August 2021 imagery was published on official social media of the GNU-AF, and on 15 August 2021 on open-source media, of GNU-AF personnel receiving special forces training at the Turkish Ministry of Defence Counter-Terrorism Training and Exercise Centre near Egirdir, Turkey.

The training location was geo-referenced to 37°52'18.56"N, 30°49'52.14"E by an independent OSINT analyst. The Panel concurs with the location identified (see R).

The Panel offered Turkey an opportunity to respond in a letter dated 7 October 2021. No response was received.

This military special forces training undertaken within the scope of the Military Training, Cooperation and Consultancy Agreement between Turkey and the then GNA is a violation of paragraph 9 of resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#).

#### Primary sources

1. <https://www.facebook.com/Libyabook/posts/1175363809541529>, 7 August 2021;
2. <https://twitter.com/Oded121351/status/1424632216617893891>, 9 August 2021;
3. [https://twitter.com/il\\_kanguru/status/1424637919080419329](https://twitter.com/il_kanguru/status/1424637919080419329), 9 August 2021;
4. <https://twitter.com/Oded121351/status/1426881959876235265>, 15 August 2021; and
5. Google Earth Pro.

Developed by UN Panel of Experts



## Annex 83 HAF 106 brigade return from training in Egypt (8 September 2021)

### HAF 106 brigade training (Egypt) (8 September 2021)

On 8 September 2021 imagery was published on the official social media of the HAF 106 brigade reporting the conclusion of a training event in Egypt.

The Panel has confirmed that the aircraft in the imagery showing the return of HAF 106 brigade personnel was in Libya when the image was taken, and that it is the IL-76 [MSN#33446205] [now 5A-7656] flying in support of HAF.

The Panel offered Egypt an opportunity to respond in a letter dated 29 September 2021. On 21 October 2021 Egypt responded that the official HAF report was false.

This training is a violation of paragraph 9 of resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#) by HAF and the, as yet to be identified, training provider.



#### Primary sources

1. <https://twitter.com/JDTkLYZayYGdbew/status/1435663797679792132/photo/1>, 8 September 2021; and
2. [https://twitter.com/Gerjon\\_/status/1436052461031133190?s=20](https://twitter.com/Gerjon_/status/1436052461031133190?s=20), 9 September 2021.

Developed by UN Panel of Experts



## Annex 84 GNU-AF Sniper Training from Turkish Armed Forces (3 October 2021)

### GNU -AF Sniper Training by Turkey (Western Region, Tripoli) (3 October 2021)

On 3 October 2021 imagery was published on official social media of the Turkish Armed Forces of military sniper training being provided to military personnel of the GNU-AF Western Region.

The Panel offered Turkey an opportunity to respond in a letter dated 7 October 2021. No response was received.

This military sniper training undertaken within the scope of the Military Training, Cooperation and Consultancy Agreement between Turkey and the then GNA is a violation of paragraph 9 of resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#).

#### Primary sources

1. <https://twitter.com/tcsavunma/status/1444632404128378880>, 3 October 2021; and
2. [https://twitter.com/wady\\_dynar/status/1444662262640398341?s=20](https://twitter.com/wady_dynar/status/1444662262640398341?s=20), 3 October 2021.

Developed by UN Panel of Experts



## Annex 85 GNU-AF Mountain Corps Academy Training in Turkey (9 October 2021)

### GNU-AF Mountain Corps Academy Training (Turkey) (9 October 2021)

On 9 October 2021 imagery was published on the official website of the Presidency of the General Staff to the Libyan Army of GNU-AF personnel receiving training at the Mountain Corps Academy in Turkey. Note the Blue Beret worn by a Turkish instructor. The Blue Beret is worn by elite units of the Turkish Armed Forces such as: 1) Land Forces Mountain Commandos; and 2) Gendarmerie Commandos.

The Panel offered Turkey an opportunity to respond in a letter dated 13 December 2021. On 15 February 2022 the Turkish authorities confirmed to the Panel that 34 Libyan students were trained between 2 August to 8 October 2021.

This specialist military training undertaken within the scope of the Military Training, Cooperation and Consultancy Agreement between Turkey and the then GNA is a violation of paragraph 9 of resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#).



#### Primary sources

1. <https://www.facebook.com/The.presidency.of.the.General.Staff.To.Libyan.Army/photos/pcb.250136173721830/250136023721845>; 9 October 2021;
2. <https://twitter.com/Oded121351/status/1447198469953925120>, 10 October 2021;
3. <https://iacmc.forumotion.com/t10559-berets-of-the-turkish-armed-forces-law-enforcement-units>. Accessed 23 November 2021; and
4. Letter from Member State dated 15 February 2022.



## Annex 86 Russian Federation military cargo flights in eastern Libya

1. The Panel has continued to monitor and analyse the quantity of military cargo flights by the Russian Federation on the air line of communication (ALoC) from the Hmeymim military air base<sup>172</sup> in Syria to eastern Libya. These flights meet the profile indicators for flights deemed to be suspicious. The Panel wrote to the Member State (see paragraph 5).

2. The Panel has identified at least 175 flights by specific aircraft registration number,<sup>173</sup> equating to a maximum cargo delivery capacity of 7,922 tonnes from 1 May 2021 to 31 March 2022 (assuming a 48-tonne cargo payload for an IL-76TD). Flights are summarised at tables 86.1 and 86.2 and figures 86.1 and 86.2.<sup>174</sup> The data is not exhaustive as pre-departure flight plans are not usually filed directly with Eurocontrol<sup>175</sup> for entry into European airspace. Entry is usually activated by Cyprus air traffic control (ATC) using a ZZZZ code for departure airfield, or by the destination airfield itself.

Table 86.1

**Summary of RF military cargo flights to Libya (1 January – 31 December 2021)**


<i>Data set</i>	<i>Jan</i>	<i>Feb</i>	<i>Mar</i>	<i>Apr</i>	<i>May</i>	<i>Jun</i>	<i>Jul</i>	<i>Aug</i>	<i>Sep</i>	<i>Oct</i>	<i>Nov</i>	<i>Dec</i>	<i>Totals</i>
# Flights <sup>a</sup>	25	23	20	19	15	22	16	12	23	12	15	15	217
Max load (t) <sup>b</sup>	1,168	1,072	920	912	682	1,016	728	544	1,064	576	624	656	9,962

<sup>a</sup> Identified by Panel.

<sup>b</sup> Assuming cargo payload of 48 tonnes for IL-76 aircraft. Data is rounded and includes other aircraft types.

Figure 86.1

**Number of RFF military cargo flights to Libya (1 January - 31 December 2021)**



<sup>172</sup> Centred on 35°24'27.07"N, 35°57'8.00"E.

<sup>173</sup> Flight data for flights is based on data received from a combination of: (a) Confidential sources; (b) [www.flightradar24.com](http://www.flightradar24.com); (c) [www.radarbox.com](http://www.radarbox.com); (d) [www.italmilitaradar.com](http://www.italmilitaradar.com); (e) C4ADS analysis; (f) Twitter [@ALandewers](https://twitter.com/ALandewers); [@Gerjon](https://twitter.com/Gerjon) (primarily) and (g) Twitter [@YorukIsik](https://twitter.com/YorukIsik).

<sup>174</sup> The Panel has maintained a database of flight details.

<sup>175</sup> <https://www.eurocontrol.int/>.


Table 86.2  
Summary of RF military cargo flights to Libya (1 January – 31 March 2022)

<i>Data set</i>	<i>Jan</i>	<i>Feb</i>	<i>Mar</i>	<i>Totals</i>
# Flights <sup>a</sup>	17	11	17	45
Max load (t) <sup>b</sup>	752	464	816	2,032

<sup>a</sup> Identified by Panel.

<sup>b</sup> Assuming cargo payload of 48 tonnes for IL-76 aircraft. Data is rounded and includes other aircraft types.

Figure 86.2  
Number of RF military cargo flights to Libya (1 January - 31 March 2022)



3. The Panel requested further information from the Member State<sup>176</sup> and in their reply<sup>177</sup> they stated that the cargo comprised of “humanitarian assistance to Libya, including the supply of vaccines against COVID-19”. No further details were provided.

4. UN agencies have neither observed, nor heard of, any large quantity of humanitarian aid from the Russian Federation being supplied to, or distributed in, eastern Libya.<sup>178</sup> No humanitarian aid has been identified from satellite imagery or ground reports in the aircraft unloading areas at Benina (HLLB) and Al Khadim (HL59), and Al Khadim is not known to be a humanitarian hub for any aid agency.<sup>179</sup> A mass and volumetric cargo analysis by the Panel (see table 86.2) shows the cargo capacity of these flights for selected items.

<sup>176</sup> Panel letter of 5 October 2021.

<sup>177</sup> Email to Panel of 26 October 2021.

<sup>178</sup> Senior UN official in the UN Country Team.

<sup>179</sup> Ibid.

Table 86.2

**Volumetric cargo analysis of typical humanitarian aid**

<i>Item</i>	<i>Mass (tonnes)</i>	<i>Volume (m<sup>3</sup>)</i>	<i>Density (tonnes/m<sup>3</sup>)</i>	<i>Flights</i>	<i>Maximum Payload</i>	<i>Remarks</i>
IL-76 TD Cargo Capacity	48	234				
COVID-19 (5,000 vials) <sup>a</sup>	1	6	1.67	175	42,000,000 vials	92% of cargo hold volume
Wheat	1	0.79	0.79	175	8,400 tonnes	26% of cargo hold volume
Water	1	1	1.00	175	8,400,000 litres	21% of cargo hold volume

<sup>a</sup> Assuming packed in Single Use Thermal Type packaging.

5. The Panel also noted that Russian Federation military cargo aircraft are using eastern Libyan airfields for technical stop overs on flights to other destinations in Africa, including the Central African Republic. For example, on 2 October 2021 aircraft tracking websites identified a Russian Federation Air Force Tupolev TU-154M (registered #RA-85042)<sup>180</sup> on the normal route from Latakia (OSLK), Syria to Al Khadim (HL59), Libya. The aircraft tracking websites then showed “no data” for the period from 01:48 hours UTC on 2 October to 15:16 hours UTC on 3 October 2021. A “dark period” of 1 Day, 13 Hours and 26 Minutes. Sentinel-1 satellite imagery for that period did not show a TU-154M aircraft parked at Al Khadim (HL59) in eastern Libya. Figure 86.2 shows the same aircraft at Bangui M’Poko airport (FEFF), Central African Republic on 2 October 2021 between 08:15 to 10:36 hours UTC, based on the ground time for the Air France Boeing 777-228 (F-GSPO) parked in the vicinity and shown on aircraft tracking websites. The Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic established pursuant to resolution [2127 \(2013\)](#) was informed of this flight activity.<sup>181</sup>

Figure 86.2

**TU-154M (RA-85042) at Bangui, CAR (2 October 2021)**



Source: [https://twitter.com/tom\\_bullock\\_/status/1445386123161788421](https://twitter.com/tom_bullock_/status/1445386123161788421), 2 October 2021.

<sup>180</sup> This aircraft was also reported in annexes 55 and 77 to [S/2021/229](#) as operating in support of ChVK Wagner.

<sup>181</sup> Reported in the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic report [S/2021/259](#) (annex 3.4).

6. The Panel has identified that flights from Benghazi, Libya (HLLB) to Modibo Keita International Airport, Mali (GABS) took place on 1, 21 and 26 February 2022. The Panel of Experts on Mali established pursuant to resolution [2374 \(2017\)](#) has been informed of this flight activity.
7. The Panel finds that this flight activity by military cargo aircraft is a violation of paragraph 9 of resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#) for the *direct, and indirect, supply of (...) military (...) equipment* and (...) *other assistance* (...) to Libya. As they are military aircraft their routine landing at Libyan airports violates paragraph 9 of resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#) regardless of whether the aircraft are transferring arms or military equipment to Libya.

## Annex 87 Turkish military cargo flights in support of GNU-AF

1. The Panel has continued to monitor and analyse the quantity of military cargo flights by the Turkish Air Force (TuAF) on the air line of communication (ALoC) from Turkey to western Libya by Airbus A400M operated by the 221 *Breeze* Squadron based at Kayseri/Erkilet.<sup>182</sup>

2. The Panel has identified at least 33 flights by specific aircraft registration number,<sup>183</sup> equating to a maximum cargo delivery capacity of 1,221 tonnes from 1 May 2021 to 31 March 2022 (assuming a 37-tonne cargo payload for an Airbus A400M). Flights are summarised at tables 87.1 and 87.2 and figures 87.1 and 87.2.<sup>184</sup> The list may not be exhaustive as the TuAF use an indirect route to avoid certain Flight Information Regions (FIR). This route follows the Istanbul / Nicosia FIR boundary and then the Athens / Cairo FIR boundary until reaching the Tripoli FIR. These flights meet the profile indicators for flights deemed to be suspicious and almost certainly violating the arms embargo.

Table 87.1

**Summary of TuAF cargo flights to Libya (1 January - 31 December 2021)**


Data set	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Totals
# Flights <sup>a</sup>	3	4	2	4	2	2	3	2	13	3	2	1	41
Max load (t) <sup>b</sup>	111	130	74	148	74	74	111	74	222	37	0	37	1,517

<sup>a</sup> Identified by Panel.

<sup>b</sup> Assuming cargo payload of 37 tonnes for Airbus A400M aircraft.

Figure 87.1

**Number of TuAF cargo flights to western Libya (1 January – 31 December 2021)**



<sup>182</sup> LTAU. Joint Airbase. 38°46'13"N, 35°29'43"E.

<sup>183</sup> Flight data for flights is based on data received from a combination of: (a) Confidential sources; (b) [www.flightradar24.com](http://www.flightradar24.com); (c) [www.radarbox.com](http://www.radarbox.com); (d) [www.italmilradar.com](http://www.italmilradar.com); (e) C4ADS analysis; (f) Twitter [@ALandewers](https://twitter.com/ALandewers); [@Gerjon](https://twitter.com/Gerjon) (primarily); and (g) Twitter [@YorukIsik](https://twitter.com/YorukIsik).

<sup>184</sup> The Panel has maintained a database of flight details.


Table 87.2

**Summary of TuAF military cargo flights to Libya (1 January – 31 March 2022)**

<i>Data set</i>	<i>Jan</i>	<i>Feb</i>	<i>Mar</i>	<i>Totals</i>
# Flights <sup>a</sup>	1	2	2	5
Max load (t) <sup>b</sup>	37	78	78	193

<sup>a</sup> Identified by Panel.<sup>b</sup> Assuming cargo payload of 48 tonnes for IL-76 aircraft.

Figure 87.2

**Number of TuAF military cargo flights to Libya (1 January - 31 March 2022)**

3. On 14 April 2021 one TuAF A400 delivered humanitarian supplies (vaccines) to Tripoli (figure 87.2), but two other aircraft flew to their military operating base at Al Wattiyah.



Figure 87.2  
TuAF A400M offloads vaccines at Tripoli (Mitiga) (14 April 2021)




Source: <https://twitter.com/libyaalahrartv/status/1382366609612890112>, 14 April 2021.

4. The Panel finds that this flight activity by military cargo aircraft is a violation of paragraph 9 of resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#) for the *direct, and indirect, supply of (...) military (...) equipment* and (...) *other assistance* (...) to Libya. As they are military aircraft their routine landing at Libyan airports violates paragraph 9 of resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#) regardless of whether the aircraft are transferring arms or military equipment to Libya.

## Annex 88 Cham Wings Airlines flights in support of HAF

1. The flight activity of Cham Wings Airlines<sup>185</sup> (SAW) aircraft continued to be of interest to the Panel during this mandate.<sup>186</sup>
2. On 2 December 2021 the European Union placed restrictive measures<sup>187</sup> on Cham Wings Airlines for an issue unrelated to the UN sanctions measures relating to Libya. This action has impacted on the company's flight operations in regard to Libya as the EU sanctions measures consider access to European controlled airspace as an "economic resource". It is the responsibility of the Member State to refuse access to its own national air space.
3. By international law, a State "has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its territory", which corresponds with the maritime definition of territorial waters as being 12 nautical miles (22.2 km) out from a nation's coastline.<sup>188</sup> Airspace not within any country's territorial limit is considered international, analogous to the "high seas" in maritime law. Operational control of air space over the Mediterranean is split up, under an agreement with the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) into Flight Information Regions (FIR). For the coastal States of the Mediterranean, the FIR consists of the airspace above its land and sea territory plus any international airspace in respect of which ICAO has assigned responsibility to that State.
4. The Panel has identified that shortly after the imposition of EU sanctions on Cham Wings Airlines their flight routes changed to avoid the national air space of Cyprus and Greece. Their aircraft still transit the FIR controlled by these two nations, as well as Malta FIR, but try and fly on the inter-FIR boundaries in order to introduce a level of confusion of responsibility as to which Member State should take action (see figures 88.1 and 88.2). The Panel mentions this as an example of sanctions evasion tactics used by airlines.

Figure 88.1  
Cham Wings Airlines flight profile 2021 (pre-EU sanctions)




<sup>185</sup> [www.chamwings.com](http://www.chamwings.com). Fardos Street, Damascus, Syria. +963 11 9211. ([cs@chamwings.com](mailto:cs@chamwings.com)).

<sup>186</sup> In particular Airbus A320-211 (Registered in Syria as YK-BAB).

<sup>187</sup> (a) Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/2124 of 2 December 2021; and (b) Council Implementing Decision (CFSP) 2021/2125 of 2 December 2021. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L:2021:430I:FULL&from=EN>.

<sup>188</sup> Convention on International Civil Aviation. [https://www.icao.int/publications/Documents/7300\\_cons.pdf](https://www.icao.int/publications/Documents/7300_cons.pdf).



(a) UNSMIL source reporting;

(c) The flights meet at least six of the air delivery profile indicators (see annex 25) that when considered collectively indicate that an aircraft is almost certainly carrying illicit cargo: (a) lack of an obvious schedule, with flights usually in dark hours for concealment of offloads; (b) the random nature of the flights; (c) some flights depart from the military airbase at Damascus airport (OSDI); (d) AIS is sometimes switched off; (e) tickets were unavailable for public purchase (the Cham Wings Airlines website does not list an office or agent for Libya) and flights to Libya did not appear on their schedule. Flights to Libya could not be booked through their on-line booking service; and (f) air operator transparency is opaque;

(e) It was reported on 13 December 2020 that Cham Wings Airlines would commence scheduled twice-weekly flights to Benghazi,<sup>192</sup> and a Panel test booking found seat availability on the website on 7 January 2021, but it was not possible to book a seat remotely. More recent Panel checks on 14 April 2021 and 26 October 2021 found no flight availability on the airline booking system and flights could not be booked from Cham Wings Airlines via phone; and

<sup>190</sup> <https://www.eurocontrol.int/>.

<sup>192</sup> <https://libvareview.com/8705/syrias-cham-wings-airlines-operates-direct-flights-to-benghazi/>. 13 December 2020.

(f) No response to Panel enquiries was received from the Member State nor the airline.

Table 88.1

**Summary of Cham Wings Airlines flights to eastern Libya (1 January – 31 December 2021)**

<i>Data set</i>	<i>Jan</i>	<i>Feb</i>	<i>Mar</i>	<i>Apr</i>	<i>May</i>	<i>Jun</i>	<i>Jul</i>	<i>Aug</i>	<i>Sep</i>	<i>Oct</i>	<i>Nov</i>	<i>Dec</i>	<i>Totals</i>
# Flights	13	13	18	13	8	20	17	16	9	5	14	12	158
Max passengers	2,262	2,262	3,132	2,262	1,392	3,480	2,958	2,784	1,566	870	2,436	2,088	27,492
Max load (t)	103	103	142	103	63	158	134	126	71	40	111	95	1,249

Figure 88.3



**Number of Cham Wings Airlines flights to Libya (1 January - 31 December 2021)**

Table 88.2

**Summary of Cham Wings Airlines flights to eastern Libya (1 January – 31 March 2022)**

<i>Data set</i>	<i>Jan</i>	<i>Feb</i>	<i>Mar</i>	<i>Totals</i>
# Flights	10	8	11	29
Max passengers	1,740	1,392	1,914	5,046
Max load (t)	79	63	87	229

Figure 88.4  
Number of Cham Wings Airlines flights to Libya (1 January - 31 March 2022)



7. The Panel has further identified that these flights are not always uniquely military in nature, as flights for migrants have also taken place.<sup>193</sup> Since 26 June 2021, a Facebook profile<sup>194</sup> of a representative of the airline has occasionally reported on availability of migrant flights to Libya,<sup>195</sup> stating tickets and security clearances must be obtained through ‘their’ offices.

8. The Panel finds that Cham Wings Airlines have continued to conduct flight operations in violation of paragraph 9 of resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#) for the *direct, and indirect, supply of (...) military (...) equipment and (...) other assistance (...)* to Libya.

<sup>193</sup> Confidential report by IHL CS24. 10 September 2021.

<sup>194</sup> <https://www.facebook.com/MMD.76/>. 26 June 2021.

<sup>195</sup> Flights offered for 29 June, 10 July, 14 July, 30 July, 8 August, 17 August, 3 September 2021. A total of seven flights out of the 34 identified during this period. Panel interviews with Syrian migrants (CS66 to CS68) (13 and 14 January 2022) confirmed that this was now a regular route for the onward transfer of migrants.

## Annex 89 Summary of aviation related violations, non-compliances and 'of interest' air operators

1. The Panel has multiple sources for the entries in tables 89.1 to 89.5, which are shown in the appropriate annexes, and are primarily from a combination of: (a) Member States responses to Panel enquiries; (b) entity responses to Panel enquiries; (c) official social media of national armed forces; (d) social media of armed groups; (e) other social media; (f) specialist aviation databases<sup>196</sup> and web platforms;<sup>197</sup> (g) imagery supported by geo-location; and/or (h) imagery supported by technical analysis.

2. Commercial aviation related violations and non-compliances, or data on airlines of current interest to the Panel, are presented in the annexes listed in tables 89.1 to 89.4 below:

Table 89.1

### Commercial airlines or operators identified as violating the arms embargo in support of GNU-AF

<i>Airline</i>	<i>ICAO Code</i>	<i>Air Operator Certificated (AOC)<sup>a</sup></i>	<i>Operational Base<sup>b</sup></i>	<i>Owned aircraft in direct support of GNU-AF or MoI<sup>c</sup></i>	<i>Annex</i>
Libya Police Aviation	<sup>d</sup>	<sup>e</sup>	Libya	IL-76TD [MSN#53465956] <sup>f</sup>	90

<sup>a</sup> Member State where the company is registered.

<sup>b</sup> Member State from which airline primarily operates.

<sup>c</sup> Ministry of Interior.

<sup>d</sup> Not registered with the ICAO.

<sup>e</sup> Information not received from the Libyan Civil Aviation Authority after numerous Panel requests.

<sup>f</sup> Previously flew for Sigma Airlines as UP-I7645 and reported in: annex 52 to [S/2019/914](#); and appendix C to annex 55 of Panel report [S/2021/229](#).

Table 89.2

### Commercial airlines or operators identified as violating the arms embargo in support of HAF

<i>Airline</i>	<i>ICAO Code</i>	<i>Air Operator Certificated (AOC)<sup>a</sup></i>	<i>Operational Base<sup>b</sup></i>	<i>Owned aircraft in direct support of HAF</i>	<i>Annex</i>
Alpha Air LLC				IL-76TD [MSN#0033446325] <sup>c</sup>	91
Cham Wings Airlines	SAW	Syria	Syria		88
FlySky Airlines LLC	FSQ	Kyrgyz Republic	UAE		92
FlySky Airlines LLC	FSU	Ukraine	UAE		93

<sup>196</sup> 1) Aerotransport Database ([www.atdb.org](http://www.atdb.org)). (Subscription); 2) [www.ch-aviation.com](http://www.ch-aviation.com). (Subscription); and 3) <http://www.csgnetwork.com/aviationdatabases.html>.

<sup>197</sup> Flight data for flights is based on data received from a combination of: (a) Confidential sources; (b) [www.flightradar24.com](http://www.flightradar24.com); (c) [www.radarbox.com](http://www.radarbox.com); (d) [www.italmradar.com](http://www.italmradar.com); (e) C4ADS analysis; (f) Twitter [@ALandewers](#); [@Gerjon](#) (primarily); and (f) Twitter [@YorukIsik](#).



<i>Airline</i>	<i>ICAO Code</i>	<i>Air Operator Certificated (AOC) <sup>a</sup></i>	<i>Operational Base <sup>b</sup></i>	<i>Owned aircraft in direct support of HAF</i>	<i>Annex</i>
Green Flag Aviation	GNF	Sudan	Libya	IL-76TD [MSN#1013409282] <sup>d</sup>	94
NPP Mir Aviakompania	NPP	Russian Federation	Russian Federation		95
Sapsan Airlines LLC	KGB	Kyrgyz Republic	UAE		96
Space Cargo Inc FZE	<sup>e</sup>	UAE	Libya	AN-12A [MSN#2340806] AN-12BP [MSN#5342908] AN-12BP [MSN#5343005] <sup>f</sup> AN-32B [MSN#2009] <sup>g</sup> IL-18D [MSN#172001401] <sup>h</sup> IL-18D [MSN#187009903] <sup>j</sup> IL-76TD [MSN#73479367] <sup>k</sup> IL-76TD [MSN#1013405167] <sup>l</sup> IL-76TD [MSN#1023411378] <sup>m</sup>	97

<sup>a</sup> Member State where the company is registered.

<sup>b</sup> Member State from which airline primarily operates.

<sup>c</sup> Also see table 55.3 and appendix E to annex 55 of [S/2021/229](#).

<sup>d</sup> Also see appendix K to annex 55 of [S/2021/229](#).

<sup>e</sup> Although Space Cargo Inc FZE owns and operates aircraft the company is not registered with ICAO.

<sup>f</sup> Also see appendix K to annex 55 to [S/2021/229](#).

<sup>g</sup> Also see appendix J to annex 55 to [S/2021/229](#).

<sup>h</sup> Also see appendix F to annex 55 to [S/2021/229](#).

<sup>j</sup> Also see annex 35 to [S/2017/466](#).

<sup>k</sup> Also see appendix F to annex 55 to [S/2021/229](#).

<sup>l</sup> Ibid.

<sup>m</sup> Flying with Sapsan Airline, Kyrgyz Republic since 18 May 2021, with owner changed to BU Shames FZE. Also see appendix F to annex 55 to [S/2021/229](#).

Table 89.3

**Commercial airlines or operators of interest to the Panel regarding potential arms embargo in support of HAF**

<i>Airline</i>	<i>ICAO Code</i>	<i>Air Operator Certificated (AOC) <sup>a</sup></i>	<i>Operational Base <sup>b</sup></i>	<i>Owned aircraft in direct support of HAF</i>	<i>Annex</i>
Syrian Arab Airlines <sup>c</sup>	SYR	Syria	Syria		98

<sup>a</sup> Member State where the company is registered.

<sup>b</sup> Member State from which airline primarily operates.

<sup>c</sup> This is the legal name. Flies as Syria Air.

Table 89.4

**Summary of other aviation related violations and non-compliances**

<i>Date identified</i>	<i>End User</i>	<i>Type</i>	<i>Details of violation or non-compliance</i>	<i>Responsible</i>	<i>Remarks</i>
<b>During resolution <a href="#">2509 (2020)</a> reporting period</b>					
18 Apr 2020 11 Jun 2020	GNU	Military aircraft overflights	Squadron of ten F16 multi-role fighter aircraft violated Libyan air space off the coast of Tripoli and Misrata. <sup>a</sup>	Turkey	
<b>During resolution <a href="#">2571 (2021)</a> reporting period</b>					
29 May 2021	HAF	Cargo aircraft	IL-76 now marked as 5A-??? identified operating in support of HAF, but not 5A-ILA as paint scheme different. <sup>198</sup>  Based on colour scheme, highly probably ex UP-I7651 <sup>b</sup> or ex UP-I7652, <sup>c</sup> both operated by Azee Air LLC and owned by Space Cargo Inc.	HAF	
21 Aug 2021	HAF	Cargo aircraft	IL-76 marked as 5A-ILA first identified operating in support of HAF.  Libyan registration and manufacturers serial number to be confirmed.	HAF	

<sup>a</sup> Source: Member State.<sup>b</sup> [MSN#0073479367]. IAC airworthiness expired on 25 September 2020.<sup>c</sup> [MSN#1013405167]. IAC airworthiness expired on 19 July 2020.

3. Routine commercial air activity is now expanding for Libya, as time moves on from the more recent conflicts. Table 89.5 lists those air operators now routinely operating commercial cargo and passenger flights into Libya on a regular basis. Panel monitoring has identified no suspicious activity during this reporting mandate.

Table 89.5

**Routine commercial cargo and passenger operators for Libya**

<i>Air Operator</i>	<i>Primary type</i>	<i>ICAO Code</i>	<i>Air Operator Certified (AOC)<sup>a</sup></i>	<i>Operational Base<sup>b</sup></i>	<i>Remarks</i>
Afriqiyah Airways <sup>c</sup>	Passenger	AAW	Libya	Tripoli	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Government owned.</li> <li>Flights mainly to Algeria and Turkey.</li> </ul>
Buraq Air Transport <sup>d</sup>	Mixed	BRQ	Libya	Tripoli	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Flights currently only to Turkey.</li> </ul>
Express Air Cargo <sup>e</sup>	Cargo	XRC	Tunisia	Tunis	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li></li> </ul>
Libyan Airlines <sup>f</sup>	Mixed	LAA	Libya	Tripoli	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Government owned.</li> <li>Flights currently only to Turkey.</li> </ul>

<sup>198</sup> ??? means unknown letters. XXX not used as this could be a real number.

<i>Air Operator</i>	<i>Primary type</i>	<i>ICAO Code</i>	<i>Air Operator Certificated (AOC) <sup>a</sup></i>	<i>Operational Base <sup>b</sup></i>	<i>Remarks</i>
Libyan Wings Airlines <sup>g</sup>	Mixed	LWA	Libya	Tripoli	▪
MNG Airlines <sup>h</sup>	Cargo	MNB	Turkey	Istanbul	▪
Rada Airlines <sup>i</sup>	Cargo	RDA	Belarus	Minsk	▪ Contracted by WFP.
Tunis Air <sup>j</sup>	Mixed	TAR	Tunisia	Tunis	▪
ULS Airlines Cargo <sup>k</sup>	Cargo	ULS	Turkey	Istanbul	▪

<sup>a</sup> Member State where the company is registered.

<sup>b</sup> Member State from which airline primarily operates.

<sup>c</sup> <https://flyafriqiyahairways.com>.

<sup>d</sup> [www.buraq.aero](http://www.buraq.aero).

<sup>e</sup> <http://express-aircargo.com>.

<sup>f</sup> <https://libyanairlines.aero>.

<sup>g</sup> <https://libyanwings.ly>.

<sup>h</sup> [www.mngairlines.com](http://www.mngairlines.com).

<sup>i</sup> <http://www.rada.aero/>.

<sup>j</sup> [www.tunisair.com](http://www.tunisair.com).

<sup>k</sup> <https://ulsairlines.com>.

## Annex 90      Libya Police Aviation IL-76TD cargo aircraft (5A-POL)

1. The Panel has identified that the IL-76TD cargo aircraft displaying Libyan registration 5A-POL<sup>199</sup> is the IL-76TD (MSN<sup>200</sup> 186009403). The aircraft previously flew for Sigma Airlines under Kazakhstan registration UP-I7645<sup>201</sup> and was reported for violating the arms embargo in: (a) annex 52 to [S/2019/914](#); and (b) appendix C to annex 55 of Panel report [S/2021/229](#). At that time, it was being chartered by Space Cargo Inc.
2. This aircraft is listed on [www.aerotrtransport.org](http://www.aerotrtransport.org) (ATDB), a definitive aviation database, as being operated by 'Libyan Police Aviation' since December 2019, and is the only aircraft listed as operating for them. No ownership is listed on ATDB.
3. The last known owner<sup>202</sup> of the aircraft was Technoline FZC of Sharjah, UAE.<sup>203</sup> The owner has no open-source web presence, but the Panel notes that the email address is hosted by North South Cargo, whose website states that they specialise in cargo flights from UAE to the Russian Federation.<sup>204</sup>
4. The aircraft made 53 return flights from Misrata (HLMS) to Istanbul (LTFM) in 2020 and only one in 2021. The Panel notes that the manufacturer's Certificate of Airworthiness for this aircraft expired on 21 June 2021.<sup>205</sup> Without such a certificate, flights cannot be legally made through EU controlled air space, thus restricting the aircraft to operations within Libya.

Figure 90.1

**IL-76TD (POL) at Minsk (26 September 2020)**



Figure 90.2

**IL-76TD (POL) at Istanbul (6 October 2020)**



Sources: (a) <https://www.airplane-pictures.net/photo/1346627/5a-pol-libya-government-ilyushin-il-76-all-models/>, 26 September 2020; and (b) <https://www.jetphotos.com/photo/9882694>, 6 October 2020

5. The activities and profile of this aircraft meet at least seven of the Panel's air delivery profile indicators that when considered collectively indicate that a vessel or aircraft is almost certainly carrying illicit cargo: (a) lack of an obvious schedule, with flights usually in dark hours for concealment of offloads; (b) the random nature of the flights; (c) AIS is sometimes switched off; (d) tickets are unavailable for public purchase; (e) there is no open-source trace for the air operator; (f) air operator transparency is opaque; and (g) the previous record of this aircraft for sanctions violations.

<sup>199</sup> Initially reported in Reported in table 39.1 of annex 39 to Panel report [S/2021/229](#).

<sup>200</sup> Manufacturer's serial number.

<sup>201</sup> Kazakhstan removed the aircraft from its civil aviation register on 10 September 2019. Certificate #291.

<sup>202</sup> Member State information of 25 December 2019.

<sup>203</sup> Sharjah Airport Free Zone, Sharjah, UAE. +971 6 557 3127, +971 6 557 3128. [technoline@nsc.ae](mailto:technoline@nsc.ae)

<sup>204</sup> Warehouse 2, Street #24, Sharjah, UAE. +971 6 532 5538. [nsc@nsc.ae](mailto:nsc@nsc.ae).

<sup>205</sup> <https://ilyushin.org/en/airworthiness/>.

6. The Panel requested further information from Libya in letters dated 31 March 2020 and 7 January 2022. No response was received.

7. The Panel finds that the IL-76TD (MSN 186009403) cargo aircraft undertook internal and external flight operations to Libya in violation of paragraph 9 of resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#) for the *direct, and indirect, supply of (...) military (...) equipment* and (...) *other assistance* (...) to Libya.

## Annex 91      Alpha Air LLC owned IL-76TD cargo aircraft (5A-7656)

1. The Panel has identified that the IL-76TD cargo aircraft displaying Libyan registration 5A-7656 is the IL-76TD (MSN<sup>206</sup> 33446325). The aircraft previously flew for Jenis Air LLC under Kazakhstan registration UP-I7656<sup>207</sup> and was reported for violating the arms embargo in appendix E to annex 55 of Panel report [S/2021/229](#). At that time, it was being chartered by Space Cargo Inc.

Figure 91.1

**IL-76TD displaying registration 5A-7656 flying in support of Haftar**

### **Ilyushin IL-76TD cargo aircraft (5A-7656) at Benghazi (29 May 2021)**

The Panel has identified an Ilyushin IL-76 cargo aircraft flying as part of the Libyan National Army 7th Operation Dignity anniversary military parade in Benghazi on 29 May 2021. Flight operations in support of armed groups affiliated to Khalifa Haftar are a violation of paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011) as such operations constitute “*other assistance*”.

The aircraft was displaying the registration number 5A-7656, which is unusual as the correct ICAO format for all Libyan registered aircraft is 5A-XXX (Libyan Civil Aviation Regulations, Aircraft Registration and Markings (LYCAR.47) clause 47.045 (b) refers).



#### **Primary sources**

1. [https://twitter.com/Gerjon\\_/status/1398695363138273288](https://twitter.com/Gerjon_/status/1398695363138273288), 29 May 2021; and
2. Confidential source.

Developed by UN Panel of Experts

2. The documentation submitted to the Kazakhstan civil aviation authorities states that the aircraft is owned by Alpha Air LLC of Ukraine.<sup>208</sup> The aircraft is still registered in Kazakhstan as UP-I7656 and is thus flying under a “fake registration”.

3. The Panel notes that the manufacturer's Certificate of Airworthiness for this aircraft expired on 21 May 2020.<sup>209</sup> Without such a certificate, flights cannot be legally made through EU controlled air space, thus restricting the aircraft to operations within Libya.

<sup>206</sup> Manufacturer's serial number.

<sup>207</sup> Registration Certificate #1180 dated 21 May 2019.

<sup>208</sup> Office 58, House 1A, Dnepropetrovskaya Street, Kiev, Ukraine. +380 67 6123237. [yss67uae@gmail.com](mailto:yss67uae@gmail.com).

<sup>209</sup> <https://ilyushin.org/en/airworthiness/>.



4. The Panel requested further information from Libya in letter dated 8 July 2021. No response was received. The Panel also requested further information from Ukraine on 21 October 2021. No response was received.
5. The Panel finds Alpha Air LLC in violation of paragraph 9 of resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#) for the *direct, and indirect, supply of (...) military (...) equipment* and (...) *other assistance* (...) to Libya.

## Annex 92 FlySky Airlines LLC (FSQ), Kyrgyz Republic flights in support of HAF

1. The flight activity of FlySky Airlines LLC (FSQ)<sup>210</sup> aircraft continued to be of interest to the Panel during this mandate. FlySky Airlines LLC (FSQ) received their Air Operating Certificate (AOC) #53 from the Kyrgyz Republic Civil Aviation Agency on the 28 August 2020 and then operated the aircraft shown in table 92.1 on the Libyan airbridge to HAF.<sup>211</sup>

Table 92.1

### FlySky Airlines LLC (FSQ) aircraft

Type	MSN#	Current Registration #	Previous Registration #	Current Owner	Previous Owner
Ilyushin IL-76TD	1033418596	EX-76003	UP-I7650	Aero Business Charter FZE <sup>a</sup>	Azee Air LLC

<sup>a</sup> Office C3/17, PO Box 8399, SAIF Zone, Sharjah, UAE. +971 6 557 1440. [Sales@charteraflight.com](mailto:Sales@charteraflight.com). [www.charteraflight.com](http://www.charteraflight.com) is non-operational. The Panel notes that a second address in Fujairah International Airport, UAE was used on documentation from the company.

2. Table 92.2 summarises the recent history of this aircraft as it relates to sanctions violations. Note that it was previously owned and operated by Azee Air LLC (AZL) of Kazakhstan who were reported for violating paragraph 9 of resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#) in Panel report [S/2021/229](#).<sup>212</sup> Azee Air LLC (AZL) had their AOC suspended on 21 April 2020, and the aircraft was transferred to a Kyrgyz Republic registration (EX-76003) on 9 June 2020, before the Azee Air LLC (AZL) AOC was revoked by Kazakhstan on 1 February 2021. The aircraft was sold to Aero Business Charter FZE on 31 July 2020. The Panel considers that this action was taken to protect the aircraft against any legal action from the Kazakhstan authorities.

Table 92.2

### IL-76TD (MSN# 1033418596) sanctions violations related history

Date	Activity	Panel Evidence / Remarks <sup>a</sup>
9 Jul 2018	Registered by Kazakhstan as UP-I7650.	▪ Certificate of Registration No.1145.
14 Jan 2020	First identified by the Panel flying on UAE - Libya airbridge operating in support of HAF.	▪
17 Jan 2020	Flight data blocked from public view on <a href="http://www.flightradar24.com">www.flightradar24.com</a> platform at Azee Air LLC (AZL) request.	▪ FR24 documentation. <sup>b</sup> ▪ Intended to disguise clandestine flights into Libya.
21 Apr 2020	Azee Air LLC (AZL) Air Operating Certificate suspended for six months.	▪ Until 20 October 2020.
4 May 2020	Dry leased by Azee Air LLC (AZL) to FlySky Airlines (FSQ), Kyrgyz Republic.	▪ Dry Lease No 04/05/20. ▪ Prior to issuance of FlySky Airlines (FSQ) air operating certificate.
9 Jun 2020	Registered by Kyrgyz Republic as EX-76003.	▪

<sup>210</sup> Office No 6, Ch Aitmatova Avenue 82A, Bishkek 720044, Kyrgyz Republic. +996 312 979300. [office@flysky.kg](mailto:office@flysky.kg).

<sup>211</sup> Identified in para. 83 and annex 55 to [S/2021/229](#).

<sup>212</sup> Annex 55.

<i>Date</i>	<i>Activity</i>	<i>Panel Evidence / Remarks <sup>a</sup></i>
15 Jun 2020	Cancellation of aircraft registration by Kazakhstan.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Certificate of Cancellation No. 301.</li> </ul>
31 Jul 2020	Sold by Azee Air LLC (AZL) to Aero Business Charter FZE, UAE.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Sale Agreement #9009-07-2020.</li> <li>▪ The Panel notes that the Acceptance Certificate was signed on 7 May 2020, 11 weeks prior to the Sales Agreement.</li> </ul>
28 Aug 2020	FlySky Airlines LC (FSQ) receive Air Operating Certificate from Kyrgyz Republic CAA.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ AOC Certificate #53.</li> </ul>
7 Sep 2020	First flight (FSQ1110) identified as made by IL-76 (EX-76003) on the airbridge leg from UAE to Sidi Barani, Egypt.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ In Panel report <a href="#">S/2021/229</a><sup>c</sup> the Panel found that flights along this airbridge formed part of the wider supply chain to HAF, and were therefore a violation of paragraph 9 of resolution <a href="#">1970 (2011)</a>.</li> <li>▪ Flight documentation showed cargo for the return flight only.<sup>d</sup></li> <li>▪ Suspicious flights made during 2021 are at appendix A.</li> </ul>
24 Sep 2020	IL-76 (EX-76003) made flight (FSQ1110) on the airbridge from UAE to Sidi Barani, Egypt.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ The flight documentation listed the shipper as the Khalifa Foundation of Abu Dhabi.</li> <li>▪ The Khalifa Foundation was previously used in flight documentation by Azee Air LLC (AZL) for flight AZL1538 on 20 January 2020. In Panel report <a href="#">S/2021/229</a> the Panel found very similar documentation to be false.<sup>e</sup></li> <li>▪ After documentary analysis the Panel finds the flight documentation for this flight to be false (see appendix B).</li> </ul>
1 Oct 2020	Dry leased by Aero Business Charter FZE to FlySky Airlines (FSQ), Kyrgyz Republic.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Unreferenced lease document.</li> </ul>
1 Feb 2021	Azee Air LLC Air Operating Certificate revoked by Kazakhstan	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Revocation Order #00.47.</li> </ul>
6 Feb 2021	IL-76 (EX-76003) made flight on the airbridge from UAE to Sidi Barani, Egypt.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ FlySky Airlines LLC (FSQ) only supplied flight documentation for the return flight despite two requests from the Panel.</li> </ul>
4 Apr 2021	IL-76 (EX-76003) made flight from UAE to Mitiga, Tripoli.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ The Panel has analysed the flight documentation for this flight and elements of it are suspicious (see appendix C).</li> <li>▪ Imagery shows the aircraft on the ground in Mitiga, Libya, with a brand named vaccine packaging box in the cargo hold.<sup>f</sup></li> <li>▪ The Panel continues to investigate this flight.</li> </ul>

<i>Date</i>	<i>Activity</i>	<i>Panel Evidence / Remarks <sup>a</sup></i>
1 Aug 2021	IL-76 (EX-76003) made flight on the airbridge from UAE to Mitiga, Tripoli.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ The Panel has analysed the flight documentation for this flight and elements of it are suspicious (see appendix D).</li> <li>▪ The Panel continues to investigate this flight.</li> </ul>
2 Aug 2021	IL-76 (EX-76003) made flight on the airbridge from UAE to Mitiga, Tripoli.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ The Panel has analysed the flight documentation for this flight and elements suspicious (see appendix D).</li> <li>▪ The Panel continues to investigate this flight.</li> </ul>

<sup>a</sup> The Panel has evidentiary copies of the documentation listed in this table on file.

<sup>b</sup> Email to Panel of 23 June 2020.

<sup>c</sup> Annex 55.

<sup>d</sup> FlySky Airlines, Ukraine (FSU) also supplied flight documentation for return flights, claiming outbound flights were empty.

<sup>e</sup> Para.13 to annex 55.

<sup>f</sup> [https://twitter.com/Gerjon\\_/status/1378623180458328066](https://twitter.com/Gerjon_/status/1378623180458328066), 4 April 2021.

3. The Panel identified that FlySky Airlines LLC (FSQ) flights in 2020 meet at least eight of the air delivery profile indicators (see annex 25) that when considered collectively indicate that an aircraft is almost certainly carrying illicit cargo. (a) lack of an obvious schedule; (b) flights usually in dark hours for concealment of offloads; (c) the random nature of the flights; (d) ADBS signal on AIS is often switched off; (e) false flight documentation; (f) air operator transparency is opaque; (g) inconsistent use of flight numbers; and (h) the links to Azee Air LLC (AZL).

4. The Panel has examined the documentation for the flights on 4 April, 1 August and 2 August 2021, which reports that the cargo was vaccines and medical supplies. Although the flight documentation is inaccurate and suspicious, the Panel considers it possible that this is because the same shipping agents were used as for the military cargo flights, and thus it was routine for the shipping agents to be inaccurate in completion of such documents. Additionally, the WFP (the logistic coordination agency for the UN presence in Libya) have confirmed that vaccines were delivered during that period, although they have no knowledge of the delivery mechanism. The Panel does not have evidence to the necessary evidential standards that these three flights carried military materiel.

5. The Panel offered FlySky Airlines LLC (FSQ) an opportunity to respond on 26 November 2021. Their response was sent by the Member State on 17 December 2021. This stated that they were aware of the flights by their aircraft into Libya and that “*the airline is also aware of the nature of the cargo being transported, which conforms to the stated requirements, is not prohibited for transport by air and does not constitute military cargo subject to United Nations Security Council sanctions*”. The Panel does not consider that this response addresses any of the indicators (paragraph 3) and documentary evidence (appendices) identified by the Panel.

6. The Panel offered the owner of the aircraft, Aero Business Charter FZE, an opportunity to respond on 25 January 2022. No response has yet being received by the Panel.

7. The Panel finds that FlySky Airlines LLC (FSQ) conducted flight operations on the air bridge from UAE to Egypt during 2020 in violation of paragraph 9 of resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#) for the *direct, and indirect, supply of (...) military (...) equipment* and (...) *other assistance* (...) to Libya.

7. The Panel also notes that FlySky Airlines, Kyrgyz Republic (FSQ) and FlySky Airlines, Ukraine (FSU) share the same logo, and conducted flights on the Libya airbridge alongside each other in early 2021. The Panel has yet to determine the exact relationship between the two companies.

## Appendix A to Annex 92: FlySky Airlines LLC (FSQ) suspicious flights on Libya airbridge 2020 and 2021

1. Table 92.A.1 shows a consolidated list of flights made by FlySky Airlines LLC, Kyrgyz Republic (FSQ).

Table 92.A.1

### FlySky LLC Airlines (FSQ) suspicious flights on Libya airbridge 2021

<i>Date</i>	<i>From</i>		<i>To</i>		<i>A/C</i> <sup>a</sup>	<i>Flight#</i>	<i>Remarks</i>
7 Sep 2020	OEJN	Jeddah	HE40	Sidi Barani	EX-76003	FSQ1110	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Only return flight documentation to OMDW Al Maktoum supplied to Panel after two requests.</li> </ul>
9 Sep 2020	OMAH	Al Dafra <sup>a</sup>	HE40	Sidi Barani	EX-76003	FSQ1110	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Only return flight documentation to Al Dhafra supplied to Panel after two requests.</li> </ul>
24 Sep 2020	OMAA	Abu Dhabi	HE40	Sidi Barani	EX-76003	FSQ1110	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Suspicious air waybill. See appendix B.</li> </ul>
14 Nov 2020	OJAQ	Aqaba			EX-76003	FSQ1110	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>On direct flight track to HE40.</li> <li>AIS disabled.</li> </ul>
30 Nov 2020	OJAQ	Aqaba			EX-76003	FSQ4921	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>On flight track towards HE40 or Libya.</li> <li>AIS disabled.</li> </ul>
17 Jan 2021	OJAQ	Aqaba	HE40	Sidi Barani	EX-76003	FSQ1120	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>On flight track towards HE40 or Libya.</li> <li>AIS disabled.</li> </ul>
18 Jan 2021		UAE	HE40	Sidi Barani	EX-76003	FSQ1119	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>AIS disabled.</li> </ul>
21 Jan 2021		UAE			EX-76003	FSQ1119	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>On direct flight track to HE40.</li> <li>AIS disabled.</li> </ul>
22 Jan 2021		UAE			EX-76003	FSQ1120	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>On flight track towards HE40 or Libya.</li> <li>AIS disabled.</li> </ul>

<i>Date</i>	<i>From</i>		<i>To</i>		<i>A/C</i> <sup>a</sup>	<i>Flight#</i>	<i>Remarks</i>
7 Feb 2021	OEJN	Jeddah			EX-76003	FSQ1119	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>On direct flight track to HE40.</li> <li>AIS disabled.</li> </ul>
3 Apr 2021	OMAA	Abu Dhabi	HLLM	Mitiga	EX-76003	FSQ1110	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Declared cargo of vaccines, but flight documentation highly suspicious.</li> <li>Same flight number as used for flights to HE40.</li> </ul>
9 Apr 2021	OMAA	Abu Dhabi	HLLM	Mitiga	EX-76003	FSQ1110	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Declared cargo of vaccines.</li> <li>Same flight number as used for flights to HE40.</li> </ul>
2 May 2021	OMAA	Abu Dhabi	HLLB	Benina	EX-76003	FSQ1112	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Declared cargo of vaccines.</li> </ul>
1 Aug 2021	OMAA	Abu Dhabi	HLMS	Misrata	EX-76003	FSQ1111	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Declared cargo of vaccines.</li> </ul>
2 Aug 2021	OMAA	Abu Dhabi	HLLM	Mitiga	EX-76003	FSQ1113	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Declared cargo of vaccines.</li> </ul>
3 Aug 2021	OMAA	Abu Dhabi	HLLM	Mitiga	EX-76003	FSQ1115	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li></li> </ul>
17 Oct 2021	OEJN	Jeddah	HLLM	Mitiga	EX-76003	FSQ1110	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li></li> <li></li> <li></li> <li></li> </ul>

<sup>a</sup> Aircraft registration #.<sup>b</sup> Al Dafra is a UAE military airbase. 24°14'24"N, 054°32'54"E. This was listed on return flight documentation supplied by airline.





### Appendix C to Annex 92: Panel analysis of Air Waybill for Flight FSQ1110 (4 April 2021)

[illegible]

Consignor Contact Number +971 5010 10304

Claims to be contact number for a "Mr Thanos" at the Office of Presidential Affairs.

The Panel notes that "Thanos" is not a typical arabic name.

**Consignee Contact Number Contact Number +971 5066 22961**

Same contact number for air waybills for Maximus Air flights on 12, 14, 18 and 19 January 2020. See appendix G to annex 55 to [S/2021/229](#) for the reported violations of the arms embargo for these flights.

The number linked to Mubarak Al Ameri the contact for the GHQ of United Arab Emirates Armed Forces, a.k.a Mubarak Al Amri or Mubarak Al Ansari. The number is also linked to a security incident of 20 October 2021, which was reported separately to the Committee.

It is NOT the number for the Libyan Ministry of Health as declared on the air waybill.

### Volumetric Cargo Analysis

The declared 3,600kg for the cargo would equate to only 18,000 vials if packed similarly to the standard WFP Single Use Thermal packaging. This equates to 8% of the maximum cargo load mass for the aircraft, and 7% of the maximum cargo area volume for the aircraft.

The second AWB for this flight only declares a cargo of 565kg.

## Appendix D to Annex 92: Panel analysis of Air Waybill for Flight FSQ1110 (1 August 2021)

**'Suspicious' Air Waybill**  
**Fly Sky Airlines (FSQ), Kyrgyz Republic, Flight# FSQ1111, Declared UAE to Misrata**  
**(1 August 2021)**

**Consignor Contact Number +971 5066 22961**  
 Same contact number for air waybills for Maximus Air flights on 12, 14, 18 and 19 January 2020. See appendix G to annex 55 to [S/2021/229](#) for the reported violations of the arms embargo for these flights.

The number linked to Mubarak Al Ameri the contact for the GHQ of United Arab Emirates Armed Forces. a.k.a Mubarak Al Amri or Mubarak Al Ansari. The number is also linked to a security incident of 20 October 2021, which was reported separately to the Committee.

On 11 Oct 2021 the listed UAE contact number claimed to be "Fast Food" shop in Gaza, then "Fast Food" shop in Abu Dhabi. Same claim to a 12 Oct 2021 OTR.

**Consignee Contact Number NONE**  
 No proper address for the Ministry of Health for Libya in Mitiga.

**Volumetric Cargo Analysis**  
 The declared 12,646kg for the cargo would equate to 89,500 vaccines if packed similarly to the standard WFP Single Use Thermal packaging. This equates to 26% of the maximum cargo load mass for the aircraft, and 27% of the maximum cargo area volume for the aircraft.

Flight FSQ1115 on 2 August 2021, made by the same aircraft had a declared cargo of 17.886kg of "relief goods". This equates to 37% of the maximum cargo load mass for the aircraft. The use of two flights is inefficient, expensive and unlikely if the cargo was as declared.

## Appendix E to Annex 92: Panel analysis of Air Waybill for Flight FSQ1110 (2 August 2021)

### 'Suspicious' Air Waybill

Fly Sky Airlines (FSQ), Kyrgyz Republic, Flight# FSQ1115, Declared UAE to Mitiga (2 August 2021)

#### Consignor Contact Number +971 5066 22961

Same contact number for air waybills for Maximus Air flights on 12, 14, 18 and 19 January 2020. See appendix G to annex 55 to [S/2021/229](#) for the reported violations of the arms embargo for these flights.

The number linked to Mubarak Al Ameri the contact for the GHQ of United Arab Emirates Armed Forces. a.k.a Mubarak Al Amri or Mubarak Al Ansari. The number is also linked to a security incident of 20 October 2021, which was reported separately to the Committee.

On 11 Oct 2021 the listed UAE contact number claimed to be "Fast Food" shop in Gaza, then "Fast Food" shop in Abu Dhabi. Same claim to a 12 Oct 2021 OTR.

#### Consignee Contact Number +218 8285 32639

Contact number does not belong to the Ministry of Health for Libya in Mitiga.

#### Volumetric Cargo Analysis

The declared 17,886kg for the cargo would equate to 89,500 vaccines if packed similarly to the standard WFP Single Use Thermal packaging. This equates to 37% of the maximum cargo load mass for the aircraft, and 33% of the maximum cargo area volume for the aircraft.

Flight FSQ1111 on 1 August 2021, made by the same aircraft had a declared cargo of 12,646kg of "relief goods". This equates to 26% of the maximum cargo load mass for the aircraft. The use of two flights is inefficient, expensive and unlikely if all the cargo was as declared.

## Annex 93 FlySky Airlines LLC (FSU) Ukraine flights in support of HAF

1. FlySky Airlines LLC (FSU)<sup>214</sup> received their Air Operating Certificate (AOC) #UK058 from the Ukraine State Aviation Administration on the 28 October 2020 and operated the aircraft shown in table 93.1 on the Libyan airbridge to HAF route.<sup>215</sup> The company's AOC was suspended by the Ukraine State Aviation Administration on 11 June 2021<sup>216</sup> for non-compliance with aviation standards. The AOC was reinstated on 19 July 2021.<sup>217</sup>

Table 93.1

### FlySky Airlines LLC (FSQ) aircraft of interest

Type	MSN#	Registration # on violation	Previous Registration #	Current Owner	Previous Operator
Ilyushin IL-76TD	93498974	UR-FSA	UR-COE	Aganya Holdings Limited, UAE <sup>a b</sup>	Europe Air LLC, Ukraine
Ilyushin IL-76TD	1023412399	UR-FSC	UR-CRN	Aganya Holdings Limited, UAE	Europe Air LLC, Ukraine
Ilyushin IL-76TD	1003403075	UR-FSE	UR-EAB	Aganya Holdings Limited, UAE	Europe Air LLC, Ukraine

<sup>a</sup> Operated from RAK Offshore, PO Box 48904, Al Khaimah UAE. Documentation from the company claims that it is incorporated in the British Virgin Islands, (BVI) but the BVI authorities confirmed to the Panel on 28 April 2020 that the company was not registered in the BVI.

<sup>b</sup> Second address used for aircraft registration: PO Box 128666, 24 Al Sila Tower, Abu Dhabi Global Market Square, Al Maryah Island, Abu Dhabi, UAE.

2. The previous owner of the FlySky LLC (FSU) aircraft above was Europe Air LLC of Ukraine, who were reported for violating paragraph 9 of resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#) in Panel report [S/2019/914](#).<sup>218</sup> The Europe Air LLC AOC suspended by the State Aviation Administration of Ukraine on 27 July 2019 and the company ceased trading on 9 August 2019. At that time their aircraft were leased from Infinite Seal Inc of the BVI, whose listed beneficial owner works for the Department of Civil Aviation of Fujairah, UAE, but were subsequently transferred to Aganya Limited, UAE. The Panel has not been able to refine the date of transfer of the aircraft from Infinite Seal Inc ownership to Aganya Limited beyond mid-2020.<sup>219</sup> The Panel considers that this ownership transfer was taken to protect the aircraft against any legal action from the appropriate authorities.

3. Tables 93.2 to 93.4 summarise the recent history of the aircraft at table 93.1 as relating to sanctions violations regarding Libya.

<sup>214</sup> Office 16, 1 Pidlisna Street, Kiev 03164, Ukraine .+380 44 353 1083. [office@flysky.co](mailto:office@flysky.co).

<sup>215</sup> Identified in para. 83 and annex 55 to [S/2021/229](#).

<sup>216</sup> Order of the State Aviation Administration of Ukraine # 902 dated 10 June 2021.

<sup>217</sup> Order of the State Aviation Administration of Ukraine # 1134 dated 19 July 2021.

<sup>218</sup> Annex 52.

<sup>219</sup> In 2020 Aganya Limited also sold other aircraft to Space Cargo Inc (Appendix E to annex 55 to [S/2021/229](#)). It appears to the Panel as if aircraft ownership are transferred between the three companies to disguise beneficial ownership and to protect the aircraft against legal action by appropriate authorities.



Table 93.2

**FlySky Airlines LLC (FSU) aircraft sanctions violations related history**

<i>Date</i>	<i>Activity</i>	<i>Panel Evidence / Remarks <sup>a</sup></i>
21 Apr 2020	Air Operating Certificate of Azee Air LLC (AZL) suspended by Civil Aviation Authority of Kazakhstan for six months.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>See later for link to Deek Aviation FZE, UAE contract and previous arms embargo violations.</li> </ul>
28 Oct 2020	Air Operating Certificate issued to FlySky (FSU) by State Aviation Administration of Ukraine	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Certificate #UK 058.</li> </ul>
3 Nov 2020	IL-76TD (MSN#93498974) registered by Ukraine as UR-FSA.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Certificate of Registration #4283/2</li> </ul>
3 Nov 2020	IL-76TD (MSN#1023412399) registered by Ukraine as UR-FSC.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Certificate of Registration #4569/2</li> </ul>
10 Nov 2020	General Contract for Freight Transportation signed between FlySky (FSU) and Deek Aviation, UAE.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Contract #10112020.</li> <li>See paragraph 4.</li> </ul>
1 Jan 2021	IL-76TD (MSN#1003403075) registered by Ukraine as UR-FSE.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Certificate of Registration #4434/1</li> </ul>
19 Jan 2021	First flight (FSU4812) identified as made by IL-76 (UR-FSA) on the airbridge from UAE to Sidi Barani, Egypt.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>In Panel report <a href="#">S/2021/229</a><sup>c</sup> the Panel found that cargo flights on this air bridge formed part of the wider supply chain to HAF, and were therefore a violation of paragraph 9 of resolution <a href="#">1970 (2011)</a>.</li> <li>Suspicious flights made during 2021 are at appendix A.</li> </ul>
1 Feb 2021	Air Operating Certificate of Azee LLC (AZL) formally revoked by Civil Aviation Administration of Kazakhstan.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Order #00.47.</li> </ul>
8 Feb 2021	Last flight (FSU4814) identified as made by IL-76 (UR-FSA) on the airbridge from UAE to Sidi Barani, Egypt.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li></li> </ul>
11 Jun 2021	Air Operating Certificate of FlySky Airlines LLC (FSU) suspended by State Aviation Administration of Ukraine.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Order 902 of State Aviation Administration of Ukraine.</li> </ul>
19 Jul 2021	Air Operating Certificate of FlySky Airlines LLC (FSU) reinstated by State Aviation Administration of Ukraine.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Order 1134 of State Aviation Administration of Ukraine.</li> </ul>

<sup>a</sup> The Panel has evidentiary copies of the documentation listed in the tables in this appendix. The documentation is not included in the report as the final report would become even more voluminous.



3. The Panel identified the FlySky Airlines LLC (FSU) flights meet at least seven of the air delivery profile indicators (see annex 25) that when considered collectively indicate that an aircraft is almost certainly carrying illicit cargo. (a) lack of an obvious schedule; (b) flights usually in dark hours for concealment of offloads; (c) the random nature of the flights; (d) ADBS signal on AIS is often switched off; (e) false flight documentation; (f) air operator transparency is opaque; and (g) the links to other Libyan arms embargo violators such as Deek Aviation FZE.

4. The Panel notes that the airline is contracted under a General Sales Agreement to fly cargo on the Libya airbridge by Deek Aviation FZE,<sup>220</sup> a company with a history of arms embargo violations:

(a) Deek Aviation FZE was reported in Panel report [S/2019/914](#)<sup>221</sup> for violating paragraph 9 of resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#) for contracting Europe Air LLC to fly military materiel into Libya.

(b) Deek Aviation was further reported in Panel report [S/2021/229](#)<sup>222</sup> in connection to a violation of paragraph 9 of resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#) by Azee Air LLC, with whom they had a General Sales Agreement.

5. Due diligence by FlySky Airlines LLC (FSU) should have identified the involvement of Deek Aviation FZE in sanctions violations activities in Libya. The Panel considers that FlySky Airlines LLC (FSU) have in effect partly taken on the logistic support role to HAF previously undertaken by Azee Air LLC until their AOC was suspended. The remainder of that role being taken on by FlySky Airlines LLC (FSQ) (see annex 92).

6. The Panel finds that FlySky Airlines LLC (FSU) have conducted flight operations on the air bridge from UAE to Egypt in violation of paragraph 9 of resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#) for the *direct, and indirect, supply of (...) military (...) equipment and (...) other assistance (...)* to Libya.

7. The Panel notes that FlySky Airlines, Ukraine (FSU) and FlySky Airlines, Kyrgyz Republic (FSQ) share the same logo, and conducted flights on the Libya airbridge alongside each other in early 2021.

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<sup>220</sup> [www.deek.aero](http://www.deek.aero).

<sup>221</sup> Annexes 28 and 52. The two aircraft destroyed at Al Jufra on 26 July 2019 (UR-CMP and UR-CRC) were both operated by Europe Air LLC, the previous operator of the aircraft now operated by FlySky LLC (FSU).

<sup>222</sup> Para. 8 of annex 55.

## Appendix A to Annex 93: FlySky Airlines LLC (FSU) suspicious flights on Libya airbridge in 2021

1. Table 93.A.1 shows a consolidated list of flights made by FlySky Airlines LLC, Ukraine (FSU).

Table 93.A.1

### FlySky LLC Airlines (FSU) suspicious flights on Libya airbridge 2021

<i>Date</i>	<i>From</i>	<i>To</i>	<i>A/C<sup>a</sup></i>	<i>Flight#</i>	<i>Remarks</i>
19 Jan 2021	OMDW Dubai		UR-FSA	FSU4812	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>On direct flight track to HE40.</li> <li>AIS disabled.</li> </ul>
19 Jan 2021	OMFJ Fujairah		UR-FSC	FSU4814	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>On direct flight track to HE40.</li> <li>AIS disabled.</li> </ul>
21 Jan 2021	OMDW Dubai			FSU4814	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>On direct flight track to HE40.</li> <li>AIS disabled.</li> </ul>
22 Jan 2021	OMDW Dubai			FSU4812	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>On direct flight track to HE40.</li> <li>AIS disabled.</li> </ul>
24 Jan 2021		UAE		FSU4814	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>On direct flight track to HE40.</li> <li>AIS disabled.</li> </ul>
6 Feb 2021	OJAQ Aqaba	HE40 Sidi Barani	UR-FSA	FSU4814	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>AIS disabled.</li> <li>Flight documentation shows zero payload for the flight from OJAQ to HE40.</li> <li>The Panel has analysed the flight documentation for the return flight and finds it suspicious (see appendix B).</li> </ul>
7 Feb 2021	OEJN Jeddah	HE40 Sidi Barani	UR-FSC	FSU4817	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>AIS disabled.</li> <li>Flight documentation shows zero payload for the flight from OMSJ (Sharjah) to OEJN (Jeddah) and then zero payload from OEJN to HE40.</li> </ul>

<i>Date</i>	<i>From</i>		<i>To</i>	<i>A/C</i> <sup>a</sup>		<i>Flight#</i>	<i>Remarks</i>
7 Feb 2020	OEJN	Jeddah	HE40	Sidi Barani	UR-FSE	FSU4812	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ AIS disabled.</li> <li>▪ Flight documentation shows zero payload for the flight from OMDW (Al Maktoum) to OEJN and then zero payload from OEJN to HE40. Supplied copies of Cargo Manifest showing "EMPTY", which is highly unusual.</li> </ul>
8 Feb 2021	OEJN	Jeddah	HE40	Sidi Barani	UR-FSA	FSU4814	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ AIS disabled.</li> <li>▪ Flight documentation shows zero payload for the flight from OMDW (Al Maktoum) to OEJN and then zero payload from OEJN to HE40.</li> <li>▪ Subsequent flights made by FlySky Airlines LLC (FSQ).</li> <li>▪</li> </ul>

<sup>a</sup> Aircraft registration #.

## Appendix B to Annex 93:

Panel analysis of Air Waybill for Flight FSU4814 (Return from HE40) <sup>223</sup>

## SHIPPER / CONSIGNEE

There is no listing for a company called "Powerex Eastpac LLC" in any UAE business directory, nor a presence on social media.

A company called "Eastpac International" was identified, but their representative informed the Panel that the company had never conducted business in Egypt.

## DECLARED VALUE

No Customs value is unusual.

<b>FSU- 0001 0205</b>		<b>FSU- 0001 0205</b>	
Shipper's Name & Address <b>REP OF POWEREX EAST PAC LLC, SIDI BARRANI, EGYPT.</b>		Shipper's Account Number Not Negotiable	
Consignee's name & address <b>POWEREX EASTPAC LLC, ABU DHABI UNITED ARAB EMIRATES.</b>		Consignee's account Number	
Issuing Carrier's Agent Name and City <b>FLYSKY AIRLINES LLC</b>		Accounting Information <b>FREIGHT PREPAID</b>	
Agent's IATA Code <b>SQK</b>		Account No.	
Airport of departure (Addr. Of First Carrier) and Requested Routing <b>SQK SIDI BARRANI AIRPORT to DWC By First Carrier Routing &amp; Destination SQK-DWC</b>		Currency <b>USD</b>	
Amount of Insurance <b>XXX</b>		Declared Value for Carriage <b>NCV</b>	
Handling Information <b>DWC AL MIAKTOUN INTL AIRPORT FSU-4814 / 09/02/2021</b>		Declared Value for Customs <b>NCV</b>	
No. of PCD <b>1</b>	Gross Weight <b>8500</b>	Rg <b>1</b>	Rate Class <b>3000</b>
			Chargeable Weight <b>2500</b>
			Rate 1 <b>3000</b>
			Charge <b>2702</b>
Total		Nature and Quantity of Goods (Ind. Dimensions or Volume)	
<b>AS AGREED</b>		<b>GENERATOR</b>	
<b>AS AGREED</b>		<b>GENERATOR</b>	
<b>AS AGREED</b>		<b>GENERATOR</b>	
<b>AS AGREED</b>		<b>AIR COMPRESSOR</b>	
<b>AS AGREED</b>		<b>AIR COMPRESSOR</b>	
Prepaid		Other Charges	
Valuation Charge			
Tax			
Total other charges due amount		Shipper certifies that the particulars on the face hereof are correct and that (having) any part of the consignment consists dangerous goods, such part is properly described by name (herein) in proper condition for carriage by air according to the applicable dangerous goods Regulations.	
Total other charges due carrier		Signature of Shipper or its Agent	
<b>AS AGREED</b>		Total Collect	
Currency conversion rates		Date	
For carrier's use only at destination		Charges at destination	
		Total Collect charges	

<sup>223</sup> The Panel has higher quality imagery available on request. The imagery resolution is poor in some of the remaining appendices due to the infographics being compressed to make the overall document a more manageable size.

## Annex 94      Green Flag Aviation, Sudan aircraft in support of HAF

1. The Panel has identified that the Ilyushin IL-76TD cargo aircraft displaying Libyan registration 5A-EWX<sup>224</sup> is the Ilyushin IL-76TD (MSN<sup>225</sup> 1013409282). Closer inspection of the number by the Panel has identified that the number has been adapted from a Sudan Civil Aviation Authority registration ST-EWX, in that the “5” uses the bottom half of the original “S” and the “A” uses the top of the “T” from the previous registration number.

Figure 94.1

Change of registration from ST-EWX to 5A-EWX



<sup>224</sup> New registration first identified when the aircraft was participating in the Libyan National Army 7<sup>th</sup> Operation Dignity anniversary military parade in Benghazi on 29 May 2021.

<sup>225</sup> Manufacturer's serial number.

2. The aircraft previously flew for Green Flag Aviation (GNF)<sup>226</sup> under Sudanese registration ST-EWX<sup>227</sup> and was reported for violating the arms embargo in appendix K to annex 55 of Panel report [S/2021/229](#).<sup>228</sup> This aircraft is listed on [www.aerotrtransport.org](http://www.aerotrtransport.org) (ATDB), a definitive aviation database, as being owned by Green Flag Aviation (GNF) since July 2011. No ownership transfer to HAF is listed on ATDB.
3. The Panel notes that the manufacturer's Certificate of Airworthiness for this aircraft expired on 24 February 2017.<sup>229</sup> Without such a certificate, flights cannot be legally made through EU controlled air space, thus restricting the aircraft to operations within Libya.
4. The Panel requested further information from Libya in letter dated 8 July 2021. No response was received.
5. The Panel finds that Green Flag Aviation have supported flight operations within Libya in violation of paragraph 9 of resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#) for the *direct, and indirect, supply of (...) military (...) equipment and (...) other assistance (...)* to Libya.

<sup>226</sup> <http://www.greenflag-sdn.com>. Website inactive.

<sup>227</sup> The Member State confirmed to the Panel on 21 September 2021 that the aircraft was no longer registered in Sudan.

<sup>228</sup> Sources: (a) <https://twitter.com/Gerjon/status/1268467153340174336>; and (b) <https://twitter.com/HasairiOuais/status/1268466092265127937>, 4 June 2020.

<sup>229</sup> <https://ilyushin.org/en/airworthiness/>.



## Annex 95 NPP Mir Aviakompania (NPP), Russian Federation in support of HAF

### Converted *Ilyushin* IL-18D cargo aircraft at Al Khadim (HL59) (31°59'48.04"N, 21°12'7.03"E) (3 October to 2 November 2021)

The Panel has identified from satellite imagery the presence of an *Ilyushin* IL-18D cargo aircraft at Al Khadim airbase (HL59) on 3, 17, 26 and 28 October 2021, and 1 and 2 November 2021. The aircraft has been converted from an IL-38 maritime patrol aircraft at some time, as evidenced by the presence of a sensor tail boom.

The aircraft is almost certainly IL-18TD (MSN 186009403). This aircraft is listed on [www.aerotransport.org](http://www.aerotransport.org) (ATDB), a definitive database, as being operated by NPP MIR Aviakompania of Saint Petersburg, Russian Federation at that time.

The Panel requested further information from the Russian Federation in a letter dated 22 December 2021. On 28 January 2022 they responded that the aircraft was deregistered from #RA-75713 on 24 February 2004. The Russian Federation did not provide the requested information regarding the air operator. ATDB now show the aircraft as registered by the Central African Republic as TL-ARN in October 2021 and operated by an unknown user.

The use of this aircraft in support of HAF is a violation of paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011).

#### Primary sources

1. Satellite imagery and Google Earth Pro;
2. Confidential source; and
3. [www.jetphotos.com/photo/8722017](http://www.jetphotos.com/photo/8722017), 9 October 2017.

Developed by UN Panel of Experts



## Annex 96 Sapsan Airline LLC (KGB), Kyrgyz Republic flights in support of HAF

1. The flight activity of Sapsan Airline LLC (KGB)<sup>230</sup> aircraft became of interest to the Panel during this mandate. Sapsan Airline LLC (KGB) received their Air Operating Certificate (AOC) #54 from the Kyrgyz Republic Civil Aviation Agency on the 27 January 2021 and then operated at least one of the aircraft shown in table 96.1 on the Libyan airbridge to HAF.<sup>231</sup>

Table 96.1

### FlySky Airlines LLC (FSQ) aircraft

Type	MSN#	Current Registration #	Previous Registration #	Current Owner	Previous Owner
Antonov AN-74D	36547098943	EX-74001	RA-74048	Sapsan Airline	▪ Uktus Air Company
Ilyushin IL-76TD	63471147	EX-76005	UR-CIV	Technoline FZC, UAE <sup>a</sup>	▪ Technoline FZC, UAE
Ilyushin IL-76TD	1033416515	EX-76008	UR-CIG	BU Shames FZE <sup>b</sup>	▪ Technoline FZC, UAE

<sup>a</sup> No corporate web presence. Suite Y-2-215, PO Box 8953, Sharjah Airport Free Zone, Sharjah, UAE. +971 65 578170. +971 65 573127. ([technoline@nsc.ae](mailto:technoline@nsc.ae)).

<sup>b</sup> No corporate web presence. A4-08, PO Box 7812, SAIF, Sharjah, UAE.

2. Table 96.2 summarises the recent history of Ilyushin IL-76TD (EX-76008) as it relates to sanctions violations. This aircraft was previously registered by the Aviation Administration of Ukraine as UR-CIG where it was operated by ZetAvia LLC (ICAO Code: ZAV). In appendix J to annex 55 of Panel report [S/2021/229](#) the Panel found that flight activity by ZetAvia using this aircraft was a violation of paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011) for the *direct supply of (...) military (...) equipment and (...) other assistance (...)* to Libya. ZetAvia LLC also delivered the aircraft in support of Operation OPUS in 2019 (annex 76 of Panel report [S/2021/229](#) refers).

Table 96.2

### IL-76TD (MSN# 1033416515) sanctions violations related history

Date	Activity	Panel Evidence / Remarks <sup>a</sup>
1 Jul 2018	ZetAvia LLC receive Air Operating Certificate from the State Aviation Administration of Ukraine.	▪ AOC Certificate #UK009
30 Jul 2019	State Aviation Administration of Ukraine prohibited flights of Ukrainian registered aircraft to Libya.	▪
7 Mar 2020	Aircraft first identified leaving Sweihan military base <sup>b</sup> on the UAE to Libya airbridge route.	▪

<sup>230</sup> 132 A/1 Bakaeva Street, Bishkek 720032, Kyrgyz Republic. +996 552 962888. [sapsan.aircargo@mail.ru](mailto:sapsan.aircargo@mail.ru).

<sup>231</sup> Identified in para. 83 and annex 55 to [S/2021/229](#).

<i>Date</i>	<i>Activity</i>	<i>Panel Evidence / Remarks <sup>a</sup></i>
30 Apr 2020	Last flight identified of the aircraft on the UAE to Libya airbridge route.	▪
11 Jan 2021	ATDB reports sale of aircraft from Technoline FZE, UAE to BU Shames FZE.	▪
21 May 2021	Aircraft transferred from ZetAvia LLC to Sapsan Airline LLC as air operator.	▪
4 Jan 2022	Aircraft first identified as operating on the UAE to Libya airbridge route using new callsign KGB4961.	▪
10 Jan 2022	Aircraft operated on the UAE to Libya airbridge route using callsign KGB4961.	▪ Returned to Sweihan military base in UAE.
11 Jan 2022	Aircraft operated on the UAE to Libya airbridge route using callsign KGB4961.	▪ Returned to Sweihan military base in UAE.
		▪

<sup>a</sup> The Panel has evidentiary copies of the documentation listed in this table on file.

<sup>b</sup> OMAW. Military Airbase. 24°31'38"N, 54°58'27"E.

3. The activities and profile of this aircraft meet at least six of the Panel's air delivery profile indicators that when considered collectively indicate that a vessel or aircraft is almost certainly carrying illicit cargo: (a) lack of an obvious schedule; (b) flights usually in dark hours for concealment of offloads; (c) use of military airbases; (d) AIS dark activity; (e) air operator transparency is opaque (no online presence); and (f) corporate links to previous sanctions violators.

4. The Panel requested further information from the Kyrgyz Republic in a letter dated 25 January 2022. In their response of 9 February 2022, they provided flight documentation showing that Ilyushin IL-76TD (EX-76008) had flown to Chanda, Pakistan on 4 January 2022. This is contrary to the ADBS<sup>232</sup> data shown on open-source flight tracking platforms. The Panel accepts the veracity of the flight data provided by the Member State regarding the air operations of Ilyushin IL-76TD (EX-76008) on that day. Nevertheless, an aircraft transmitting the hex code of that aircraft certainly made a flight on the UAE to Libya airbridge route that day. Independent aviation OSINT analysts have identified that Sapsan Airline operated aircraft have exchanged ADBS Hex "squawk" codes for other flights.<sup>233</sup> This exchange of ADBS Hex "squawk" codes is not accidental and is designed to disguise the activities of specific aircraft. It is also contrary to ICAO regulations.

5. The Panel finds that the Sapsan Airline LLC cargo aircraft flight operations to Libya were in violation of paragraph 9 of resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#) for the *direct, and indirect, supply of (...) military (...) equipment* and (...) *other assistance* (...) to Libya.

<sup>232</sup> Automatic Dependent Surveillance–Broadcast.

<sup>233</sup> <https://twitter.com/Gerjon/status/1487392355028283400?s=20>,  
<https://twitter.com/Gerjon/status/1487392355028283400?s=20>,  
<https://twitter.com/Gerjon/status/1487393905809281035>, 29 January 2022.

29 January 2022;  
 29 January 2022; and

## Annex 97      Space Cargo Inc (UAE) activities in 2021

1. The Panel has previously reported on Space Cargo Inc (United Arab Emirates)<sup>234</sup> owned or operated aircraft in [S/2019/914](#)<sup>235</sup> and [S/2021/229](#).<sup>236</sup> Space Cargo Inc remains a common denominator in many of the illicit aviation activities relating to eastern Libya and airports under the control of HAF. The Panel found that the company has a major coordination and operational role for the United Arab Emirates airbridge to eastern Libya, and the delivery of military materiel to HAF. The company has also operated as a PMC in Libya during this period.

2. During the investigations covered in Panel report [S/2021/229](#) the Panel identified that Space Cargo Inc supplied false and misleading information in response to Panel enquiries. The company continued to do so during this mandate (see paras. 10, 20 and 24).

### A. Aviation logistic support to HAF

3. The Panel has documentation or evidence showing that Space Cargo owns or operates other aircraft previously reported as operating in Libya in support of United Arab Emirates and has developed the consolidated list at table 97.1 for reference. The Panel notes that many aircraft are not flying in accordance with ICAO regulations<sup>237</sup> as the aircraft do not have a valid airworthiness certificate. Only details of newly identified aircraft (shown below in *italic*) are included later in this annex.

Table 97.1

#### Summary of Space Cargo Inc related aircraft supporting HAF operations in Libya

<i>Date</i> <sup>a</sup>	<i>Aircraft type</i>	<i>MSN#</i> <sup>b</sup>	<i>Registration #</i> <sup>c</sup>	<i>Status</i>	<i>Remarks</i>
22 Jun 2015	AN-26	503	UP-AN601	Owned	▪
4 Mar 2019	IL-76TD	1013409295	UP-I7601 <sup>d</sup>	Chartered	▪ Previously operated by Sigma Airlines. ▪ Went to ZetAvia (UR-CTO) on 15 June 2020 and not seen in Libya since.
24 Nov 2019	IL-76TD	1003405167	UP-I7652 <sup>e</sup>	Owned	▪ Previously operated by Jenis Air. <sup>f</sup> ▪ Now HAF.
20 Dec 2019	IL-18D	172011401	UP-I1805	Owned	▪ Previously operated by Jenis Air. <sup>g</sup> ▪ Now HAF.

<sup>234</sup> A4-73, Block A4 Street, G Floor, Sharjah International Airport, Al Ruqa Al Hamra, 61487 Sharjah, UAE or SaifZone 125 M2, Warehouse A4-73, P.O. Box 7812, Sharjah, UAE. [www.spacecargoinc.com](http://www.spacecargoinc.com). The website was live and was then removed after Panel enquiries to the Company in September 2020.

<sup>235</sup> Table 8 and annexes 28 and 52.

<sup>236</sup> Annex 55 and appendix F to annex 55.

<sup>237</sup> See annex 8 at <https://aviation-is.better-than.tv/icaodocs/Annex%208%20-%20Airworthiness%20of%20Aircraft/Annex%2008,%2010%20edition.pdf>.

<i>Date</i> <sup>a</sup>	<i>Aircraft type</i>	<i>MSN#</i> <sup>b</sup>	<i>Registration #</i> <sup>c</sup>	<i>Status</i>	<i>Remarks</i>
1 Feb 2020	IL-76TD	1023411378	UP-I7646 <sup>h</sup> 5A-7656 EX-76007	Owned	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Previously operated by Azee Air<sup>i</sup> and then Jenis Air.</li> <li>Then HAF.</li> <li>Went to Sapsan Airlines LLC (EX-76007) on 18 May 2021 and not seen in Libya since.</li> </ul>
19 Mar 2020	IL-76TD	73479367	UP-I7651 <sup>j</sup>	Owned	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Previously operated by Azee Air.<sup>k</sup></li> <li>Now HAF.</li> </ul>
12 Apr 2020	AN-32B	2009	EY-332	Owned	
30 Jan 2021	AN-12A	2340806	UP-AN220 9U-BBD	Owned	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Flying under fake Burundi markings.</li> </ul>
30 May 2021	AN-12BP	5342908	UP-AN218	Owned	▪
2 Oct 2021	IL-18D	187009903	ER-ICS <sup>l</sup>	Owned	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Now flying as 5A-AND.</li> </ul>
12 Oct 2021	AN-12BP	5343005	EY-407 <sup>m</sup>	Owned	

<sup>a</sup> Date purchased, first identified operating in Libya or identified by the Panel as owned by Space Cargo Inc.

<sup>b</sup> Manufacturers serial number.

<sup>c</sup> Includes all registrations legitimately used or illicitly displayed by the aircraft during Libya operations.

<sup>d</sup> No Ilyushin Aviation Complex airworthiness listed.

<sup>e</sup> Ilyushin Aviation Complex airworthiness expired 19 July 2020. May now be flying displaying a Libyan 5A series registration.

<sup>f</sup> Reported in annex 55 and appendix E to annex 55 of [S/2021/229](#). Jenis Air LLC had its air operating certificate suspended by the Kazakhstan civil aviation authorities on 3 July 2020. It was not renewed by the company.

<sup>g</sup> Reported in appendix F to annex 55 to [S/2021/219](#).

<sup>h</sup> Ilyushin Aviation Complex airworthiness expires on 24 June 2022.

<sup>i</sup> Also see appendix F to annex 55 to [S/2021/219](#).

Operating outside Libya since at least 17 July 2021 with Sapsan Airlines (KGB) of Kyrgyz Republic.

<sup>j</sup> Ilyushin Aviation Complex airworthiness expired on 25 September 2020. May now be flying displaying a Libyan 5A series registration.

<sup>k</sup> Reported in annex 55 and appendix D to annex 55 of [S/2021/229](#). Azee Air LLC had its air operating certificate revoked by the Kazakhstan civil aviation authorities on 20 September 2020.

<sup>l</sup> First reported in annex 35 of [S/2017/406](#).

<sup>m</sup> First reported as operating in support of HAF in appendix K to annex 55 to [S/2021/219](#). A 31 October 2021 response to the Panel by Space Cargo contained inconsistencies and used a previously discredited purchase type explanation, used in previous cases where the Panel found Space Cargo's claims as not credible.

# 1. Antonov AN-12A cargo aircraft (MSN#2340806) (ex UP-AN220)

4. At 13:00 hours on 28 January 2021 the Antonov AN-12A cargo aircraft (MSN#2340806) departed Amman (Marka) airport, Jordan (ICAO: OJAM) bound for Benghazi (Benina) airport, Libya (ICAO: HLLB). On board were three technicians recruited under a Space Cargo Inc contract to repair the three AS332L Super Puma helicopters reported in annex 76 to [S/2021/229](#) (see later for details of this PMC activity). The aircraft encountered technical issues with its transponders forcing a return to OJAM.<sup>238</sup>

<sup>238</sup> Confidential source.

5. The aircraft was clearly marked with a Kazakhstan registration UP-AN220 at this time (see appendix A). This is contrary to a statement made by the then operator, Jupiter Jet LLC<sup>239</sup> to the Aviation Authority of Kazakhstan that the Kazakhstan markings had been overpainted on 25 January 2021 (see imagery at appendix A).<sup>240</sup> The General Manager of Jupiter Jet LLC, Erikzhan Satenovich Kozbagarov, informed the Aviation Authority of Kazakhstan that the aircraft owner, Space Cargo Inc, had terminated their lease of the aircraft on 25 January 2021 and that the owner had requested that the aircraft be delivered to Amman, Jordan on termination of the lease. The Panel notes that the aircraft had landed at Amman, Jordan on 23 January 2021, two days prior to the declared termination of the lease.

6. After resolving the transponder technical issue, the aircraft departed Amman (OJAM) at 14:45 hours on 31 January 2021 with the same crew, and successfully delivered the three Space Cargo Inc technicians to Benghazi (HLLB). The Panel obtained imagery of the aircraft at HLLB on 5 February 2021, which was then displaying a Burundi registration (see appendix A). The Panel has confirmed with the Burundi authorities that this is a fake registration, and that no AN-12 type aircraft are registered with Burundi.<sup>241</sup>

7. This aircraft was registered with the Aviation Administration of Kazakhstan as UP-AN220 until the registration was officially cancelled on 12 February 2021. It is now unregistered.

8. The timeline of events regarding this aircraft is summarised at table 97.2.

Table 97.2

**Timeline of main events for AN-12A cargo aircraft (#2340806) (ex UP-AN220)**

<i>Date</i>	<i>Event</i>	<i>Remarks</i>
20 Mar 2020	Ukraine registration (UR-CSI) for aircraft cancelled.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Cancellation No. PB1319.</li> <li>▪ Then owned by Aeronet FZE.<sup>242</sup></li> <li>▪ Aircraft operating unregistered for nine months.</li> </ul>
2 Sep 2020	Aircraft leased by Space Cargo Inc to Jupiter Jet LLC	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Contract No.02/09/2020.</li> </ul>
22 Dec 2020	Aircraft registered by Aviation Authority of Kazakhstan as UP-AN220.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Certificate No.1230.</li> </ul>
23 Jan 2021	Aircraft arrives at Amman (Marka) (OJAM) from Sudan (HSSS).	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ At Space Cargo Inc request.</li> <li>▪ Departed Sudan (HSSS) on 22 Jan 2021. Ferry flight documentation with Panel.</li> <li>▪ Pilot was Nikolay DENISOV (Kazakhstan).</li> </ul>
25 Jan 2021	Lease agreement <sup>243</sup> with Jupiter Jet LLC, Kazakhstan for aircraft cancelled by owner, Space Cargo Inc, UAE.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Space Cargo Inc had requested aircraft be taken to Aqaba, Jordan, but it was already in Amman, Jordan.</li> </ul>

<sup>239</sup> [www.jupiterjet.aero](http://www.jupiterjet.aero). Last accessed 6 August 2021.

<sup>240</sup> Letter from Member State of 2 June 2021.

<sup>241</sup> Letter from Member State of 30 June 2021.

<sup>242</sup> PO Box 7902, Sharjah, UAE.

<sup>243</sup> Contract No 02/09/220 dated 02 September 2020 between Space Cargo Inc, UAE and Jupiter Jet LLC, Kazakhstan.



<i>Date</i>	<i>Event</i>	<i>Remarks</i>
25 Jan 2021	Kazakhstan registration on aircraft declared by Jupiter Jet LLC to the Kazakhstan aviation authorities as having been overpainted blue.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Fake report as identified with Kazakhstan registration was still displayed on the aircraft on 28 Jan 2021.</li> </ul>
28 Jan 2021	13:00 hours. Aircraft (marked as UP-AN220) departs from Amman (OJAM) for Benghazi (HLLB) but returns after 90 minutes due to a transponder fault.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Three Space Cargo Inc technicians as passengers. ('Team A' – see Part B).</li> </ul>
31 Jan 2021	14:45 hours. Aircraft departs Amman (OJAM) for Benghazi (HLLB).	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Three Space Cargo Inc technicians as passengers. ('Team A' – see Part B).</li> </ul>
5 Feb 2021	Aircraft identified in Benghazi airport (HLLB) now displaying Burundi registration 9U-BBD or 9U-BBO.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Burundi has confirmed that this is a fake registration number.<sup>244</sup></li> </ul>
12 Feb 2021	UP-AN220 registration cancelled by Aviation Authority of Kazakhstan. <sup>245</sup>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Cancellation No.332.</li> <li>▪ At the request of the operator.</li> </ul>
10 Apr 2021	Aircraft identified in Benghazi airport (HLLB) by satellite imagery.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Identified by unique blue and red colour scheme.</li> <li>▪ Aircraft parking position and orientation different to that of 5 February 2021 indicating flight operations have taken place.</li> </ul>

9. The Panel notes: (a) that the aircraft was moved to Jordan (OJAM) prior to the cancellation of the contract; (b) the contract was extant for only four months: aircraft leases are usually much longer; and (c) the operator provided the Kazakhstan aviation authorities with false information regarding the markings on the aircraft. The Panel considers that these activities were deliberately designed to protect Jupiter Jet LLC from any allegations of arms embargo violations. The aircraft was still technically operated by Jupiter Jet LLC for its flight to Libya, as the aircraft registration was not cancelled until two weeks after the flight.

10. The Panel offered Space Cargo an opportunity to reply on 15 July 2021. Their response on 10 August 2021 claimed that they had sold the aircraft to a South Sudanese company<sup>246</sup> on 20 January 2020. This is the same response they made in their proven false claim when questioned about their ownership of the Ilyushin IL-76TD cargo aircraft (MSN#0073479367) on 15 November 2020. On 10 August 2021 the South Sudanese company again refuted all claims made by Space Cargo Inc and denied any business relationship with them.<sup>247</sup> The Panel considers the documentation provided by Space Cargo Inc to the Panel on 10 August 2021 (see appendix A) as nothing more than a virtual "cut and paste" of the fake documentation supplied to the Panel on 15 November 2020 for the Ilyushin IL-76TD cargo aircraft (MSN#0073479367). The extensive and detailed evidence in this annex serves to refute all claims made by Space Cargo in their letters of 10 August and 9

<sup>244</sup> Letter to Panel of 30 June 2021.

<sup>245</sup> Letter to Panel of 2 June 2021. Cancellation No 322.

<sup>246</sup> The Panel is aware of the identity of the company but considers it is not necessary to report the identity of the company at this stage and expose the company to any reputational risk resulting from its cooperation with the Panel and being named in a UN report on sanctions violations. The Panel has copies of all correspondence from the South Sudanese company that refutes the Space Cargo Inc claim.

<sup>247</sup> Email to Panel of 10 August 2021. The address used by Space Cargo Inc in their documentation was last occupied by the South Sudanese company in 2015.

September 2021. Mr Maher Nayef Alismail, General Manager of Space Cargo Inc., has again provided the Panel with false documentation and a narrative of falsehoods, and continues to violate the UN arms embargo with complete impunity.

11. The provision of this aircraft for “*other assistance .... relating to military activities*” is a further violation of paragraph 9 of resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#) by Space Cargo Inc, and Mr. Maher Nayef Alismail. Jupiter Jet LLC remains under investigation for its involvement in this violation.

## 2. Antonov AN-12BP cargo aircraft (MSN#5342908) (ex UP-AN218)

12. The Panel has now confirmed that this aircraft is owned by Space Cargo Inc and is operating in Libya in support of HAF.

13. The timeline of events regarding this aircraft is summarised at table 97.3.

Table 97.3

### Timeline of main events for AN-12BP cargo aircraft (MSN#5342908)<sup>248</sup>

Date	Event	Remarks
12 May 2019	Leased by Roland Aviation FZE, UAE to Jupiter Jet LLC (JPJ), Kazakhstan.	▪ Lease unreferenced.
24 Sep 2019	Registered in Kazakhstan as UP-AN218.	▪ Registration certificate #1191. ▪ Previously registered as EY-414 by Lithuania.
17 Jul 2020	Termination of lease between Roland Aviation FZE, UAE and Jupiter Jet LLC (JPJ), Kazakhstan.	▪
26 Aug 2020	Deregistered by Kazakhstan.	▪ Cancellation certificate #314.
9 Sep 2020	Panel identified from a confidential source <sup>249</sup> that Roland Aviation FZE had sold the aircraft to Space Cargo Inc FZE.	▪
29 May 2021	Identified as flying on HAF parade in Benina, Benghazi. <sup>a</sup>	▪ The aircraft has a distinctive blue and white colour scheme (figure 97.1) ▪

<sup>a</sup> <https://twitter.com/gerjon/status/1401616972589248516>, 31 May 2021.

Figure 97.1

### Comparative imagery of AN-12BP cargo aircraft (MSN#5342908)



11 August 2020: Image supplied by Jupiter Jet LLC to Kazakhstan CAA



29 May 2021: HAF Benghazi Parade.



29 May 2021: Enhancement of HAF Benghazi Parade imagery.

<sup>248</sup> The Panel has copies of all the documentation referred to in this table.

<sup>249</sup> A senior commercial airline official in Kazakhstan in taped interview with Kazakhstan CAA.

14. The Panel offered Space Cargo an opportunity to reply on 23 December 2021. Their response on 20 January 2022 (extract in appendix A) claimed that they were going to act as a broker for the sale of this aircraft, but that the then owner, Roland Aviation FZE, sold the aircraft directly to the same above-mentioned South Sudanese company<sup>250</sup> on, or about, 28 December 2020. On 23 January 2022 the South Sudanese company again refuted all claims made by Space Cargo Inc, denied any business relationship with Space Cargo Inc.<sup>251</sup> The company also denied that it had purchased any aircraft from Roland Aviation FZE. The Panel requested information as to the ownership trail for this aircraft from Roland Aviation FZE on 15 July 2021 and 14 February 2022. No response was received.

15. The detailed evidence in possession of the Panel serves to refute all claims made by Space Cargo in their letter of 20 January 2022. Mr Maher Nayef Alismail has again provided the Panel with a narrative of falsehoods and continues to violate the UN arms embargo with complete impunity.

16. The provision of this aircraft for “*other assistance .... relating to military activities*” is a further violation of paragraph 9 of resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#) by Space Cargo Inc and Mr. Maher Nayef Alismail.

### 3. Ilyushin IL-18D cargo aircraft (MSN# 187009903) (ex ER-ICS)

17. This aircraft has been reported on in [S/2017/466](#),<sup>252</sup> [S/2019/914](#)<sup>253</sup> and [S/2021/229](#),<sup>254</sup> where it identified as being the aircraft previously registered as ER-ICS. A Member State has confirmed that this aircraft was sold to Space Cargo Inc sometime after 8 July 2015.<sup>255</sup>

18. The timeline of events regarding this aircraft is summarised at table 97.4.

Table 97.4

#### Timeline of main events for IL-12D cargo aircraft (MSN#187009903)<sup>256</sup>

<i>Date</i>	<i>Event</i>	<i>Remarks</i>
14 Dec 2013	Registered in Moldova to Sky Prim Air S.R.L as ER-ICS.	▪ Certificate 0418.
29 May 2015	Export Certificate of Airworthiness listed Chad as country of export.	▪ Chad confirmed to Panel that this aircraft had never being listed under their aviation registry. <sup>a</sup>
8 Jul 2015	Cancellation of Moldovan registration ER-ICS.	▪ De-registration Certificate 0418. ▪ Member State confirm sold to Space Cargo Inc.

<sup>250</sup> The Panel is aware of the identity of the company but considers it is not necessary to report the identity of the company at this stage and expose the company to any reputational risk resulting from its cooperation with the Panel and being named in a UN report on sanctions violations. The Panel has copies of all correspondence from the South Sudanese company that refutes the Space Cargo Inc claim.

<sup>251</sup> Email to Panel of 23 January 2022. The address used by Space Cargo Inc in their documentation was last occupied by the South Sudanese company in 2015.

<sup>252</sup> Annex 35.

<sup>253</sup> Annex 52.

<sup>254</sup> Annex 55 and appendix F to annex 55.

<sup>255</sup> Letter to Panel dated 15 September 2021.

<sup>256</sup> The Panel has copies of all the documentation referred to in this table.

<i>Date</i>	<i>Event</i>	<i>Remarks</i>
15 Sep 2016	IL-18D (ER-ICS) identified in Zintan.	▪ Paint scheme identical to that seen later on for positive identification.
25 Nov 2016	IL-18D (ER-ICS) identified in Benina.	▪ Paint scheme identical to that seen later on for positive identification.
27 Jul 2020	IL-18D re-confirmed as ex ER-ICS	▪ Identified by independent OSINT analyst. <sup>c</sup> See appendix B.
2 Oct 2021	Aircraft identified as now flying under Libyan registration number 5A-AND. <sup>d</sup>	▪ Legitimacy of Libyan registration unconfirmed.

<sup>a</sup> Letter to Panel dated 8 November 2021.

<sup>b</sup> Letter from Member State dated 1 April 2022.

<sup>c</sup> <https://twitter.com/Gerjon/status/1288061918364794889>, 27 July 2020.

<sup>d</sup> <https://twitter.com/Gerjon/status/1444324396349411332?s=20>, 2 October 2021

19. The Panel wrote to Libya on 7 October 2021 requesting confirmation, or otherwise, of the legitimacy of the displayed Libyan registration. No response has been received.

20. The Panel offered Space Cargo Inc an opportunity to reply on 7 October 2019 regarding their ownership of this aircraft. Their response of 21 February 2021 denied that their company had purchased the aircraft, which is contrary to the information provided, and subsequently confirmed, by a Member State.

21. The provision of this aircraft for “*other assistance .... relating to military activities*” is a further violation of paragraph 9 of resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#) by Space Cargo Inc and Mr. Maher Nayef Alismail.

#### **4. Antonov AN-12BP cargo aircraft (MSN#5343005) (ex-EY-409)**

22. This aircraft was reported on in [S/2021/229](#),<sup>257</sup> where it identified as being the aircraft previously registered as EY-409. The Panel has now confirmed that this aircraft is owned by Space Cargo Inc.

23. The timeline of events regarding this aircraft is summarised at table 97.5.

Table 97.5

**Timeline of main events for AN-12BP cargo aircraft (MSN#5343005)<sup>258</sup>**

<i>Date</i>	<i>Event</i>	<i>Remarks</i>
9 Jul 2014	Acquired by ALA International FZE, UAE	▪ <a href="http://www.aerotransport.org">www.aerotransport.org</a> .
1 Apr 2015	Leased by Allied Services Limited, South Sudan ( <a href="http://www.alliedservicesltd.com">www.alliedservicesltd.com</a> ).	▪ Lease Agreement No 15/03 dated 1 April 2015. <sup>a</sup>
4 Nov 2015	Aircraft returned to owners by Allied Services Limited, South Sudan, but stayed in storage in Juba.	▪ No longer required as South Sudan CAA had banned use of AN-12 cargo aircraft in South Sudan. <sup>b</sup>
9 Nov 2015	ALA International renamed as Meridien FZE.	▪ Addendum to Memorandum and Articles of Understanding. <sup>c</sup>

<sup>257</sup> Annex 55 and appendix K to annex 55.

<sup>258</sup> The Panel has copies of all the documentation referred to in this table.

<i>Date</i>	<i>Event</i>	<i>Remarks</i>
11 Dec 2015	Deregistered by Tajikistan	▪ De-registration Certificate dated 11 December 2015.
1 Apr 2016	Formal expiration of lease between Allied Services Limited, South Sudan and Meridien FZE.	▪
20 Aug 2019	Sold to Space Cargo Inc by Meridien FZE.	▪ Aircraft Purchase and Sale Agreement dated 20 August 2019. <sup>d</sup>
26 Oct 2019	Aircraft departed Juba, South Sudan flown by AsiaAirways LLC of Tajikistan.	▪ South Sudan CAA Pre-Flight Inspection Report.
4 Nov 2019	AN-12BP identified delivering HAF commanders to Al-Muzaq.	▪ Subsequently confirmed as AN-12 BP (MSN#5343005). <sup>e</sup>
22 Aug 2020	Identified as AN-12 BP (MSN#5343005) in Al Jufra, Libya flying in support of HAF.	▪ Identified by independent OSINT analyst. <sup>f</sup>

<sup>a</sup> Email to Panel from Meridien FZE of 12 October 2021.

<sup>b</sup> Letter/Email to Panel from Allied Services Limited of 29 October 2021.

<sup>c</sup> Supplied by Meridien FZE on 12 October 2021.

<sup>d</sup> Supplied by Meridien FZE on 12 October 2021.

<sup>e</sup> <https://twitter.com/Oded121351/status/1191436452716056577>, 4 November 2019.

<sup>f</sup> [https://twitter.com/Gerjon\\_/status/1297157977816915969?s=20](https://twitter.com/Gerjon_/status/1297157977816915969?s=20), 22 August 2020.

24. The Panel offered Space Cargo Inc an opportunity to reply on 19 October 2019 regarding their ownership of this aircraft. Their response to the Panel on 31 October 2021 contained inconsistencies and used a previously discredited purchase type explanation, used in previous cases, where the Panel found Space Cargo's claims as not credible. In this case Space Cargo Inc claimed to have used an offset credit agreement to sell the aircraft to a company called Mars Avia Tech LLC in Belarus. The Panel found this claim as not credible as:

- (a) The alleged sale took place two days after they purchased the aircraft from Meridien. This would not allow time for the normal due diligence for aircraft purchases to take place.
- (b) Mars Tech Avia LLC is not registered as a company in Belarus,<sup>259</sup> and there is no trace of the company in open source information in either English or Russian.
- (c) The contract with Meridien FZE stated that the Buyer, Space Cargo LLC, should provide the crew at Juba, South Sudan. The aircraft was flown out of South Sudan by a crew from Asia Airways LLC, who were listed on the flight operations manual provided by Meridien to the original lessee.
- (d) Allied Services Limited, South Sudan handed the aircraft back to Meridien FZE and not the alleged new owners, Mars Avia Tech LLC as stated in the alleged contract between Space Cargo LLC and Mars Avia Tech LLC.
- (e) The contract with Space Cargo LLC stated that the alleged Buyer, Mars Avia Tech LLC, should settle the contract based on 100% pre-payment of US\$ 553,446. No mention of an offset credit agreement, which was submitted unreferenced to the Panel, and in a very different format to the fake one supplied for the sale of the Antonov AN-12A cargo aircraft (MSN#2340806) (see paragraph 10).

<sup>259</sup> Confirmed by Member State in letter to Panel of 13 December 2021.

25. The extensive and detailed evidence in this annex serves to refute all claims made by Space Cargo in their letters of 10 August and 9 September 2021. Mr Maher Nayef Alismail has again provided the Panel with a narrative of falsehoods and forged documentation. He continues to violate the UN arms embargo with complete impunity.

26. The provision of this aircraft for “*other assistance .... relating to military activities*” is a further violation of paragraph 9 of resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#) by Space Cargo Inc and Mr. Maher Nayef Alismail.

## **B. PMC maintenance support for three AS332L Super Puma helicopters**

27. The Panel has established that Space Cargo Inc contracted the provision of helicopter engineers and aircrew from a South African company to make the three AS332L Super Puma helicopters transferred into Libya during July 2019 by Project Opus<sup>260</sup> airworthy. In doing so it became a private military company for under the auspices of “*other assistance .... relating to military activities*”. Supporting imagery and evidence is at appendix C.

28. On 10 December 2020 a South African helicopter maintenance company<sup>261</sup> was contracted by Space Cargo Inc to provide qualified individuals capable of making the above-mentioned helicopters airworthy. The individual in Space Cargo Inc responsible for coordinating this programme with the South African company was Aleksandra Isamova, the “Auditor” of Space Cargo Inc, (see figure 97.2, the remaining Email evidence is at appendix C). The Panel offered Aleksandra Isamova an opportunity to respond on behalf of the company on 7 August 2021, which she declined.<sup>262</sup>

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
<sup>260</sup> See annex 76 to Panel report [S/2021/229](#).

<sup>261</sup> The Panel is aware of the identity of the company but considers that: (a) as the company was unaware that the work would be a technical non-compliance with the arms embargo; and (b) has fully cooperated with the Panel, it is not necessary to report the identity of the company at this stage and expose the company to any reputational risk resulting from its participation. Similarly, the Panel is aware of the identities of all the individuals employed by the company that deployed to Libya.

<sup>262</sup> WhatsApp message. 7 August 2021, which the company has confirmed receiving (Email of 20 January 2022). Three separate numbers were also used to call and there was no reply, but the Panel acknowledges that unless the subscriber is using a virtual private network (VPN) calls are blocked on WhatsApp in the UAE.



Figure 97.2

**E Mail to company from Space Cargo Inc**

29. The Panel has established that the first technician deployed to Jordan on 19 December 2020 on flight EK903 from Dubai, where he was met by a representative from SkyWings Aviation<sup>263</sup> and accommodated in the Hotel Corp, Amman, Jordan.<sup>264</sup> He then soon flew into Libya on a Space Cargo Inc charter flight.

30. A team of three further technicians ('Team A') then deployed to Jordan on 1 January 2021 on Egypt Air flights MS840 and MS871. They were also met by a representative from SkyWings Aviation and accommodated in the Hotel Corp, Amman, Jordan.

31. 'Team A' was delayed in Jordan until the first attempt was made on 28 January 2021 to fly them to Libya on the Space Cargo Inc owned Antonov AN-12 (#2340806) (see Part A above). This flight had to return to Jordan due to transponder issues, and 'Team A' eventually deployed to Libya on 31 January 2021 on the Antonov AN-12 (#2340806). 'Team A' remained in Libya working on the helicopters until returning to Johannesburg on 17 February 2021.

32. The Panel has copies of the return flight tickets for Team 'A', which were paid for by a credit card in the name of Maher ALISMAIL, the same name as the Managing Director of Space Cargo Inc (see figure 97.3).

<sup>263</sup> <http://www.skywingsjordan.com>. Accessed 18 June 2021. Contact person details +96277900077. Elie NJEIM. [ops@skywingsjordan.com](mailto:ops@skywingsjordan.com).

<sup>264</sup> <https://www.hmhhotelgroup.com/en/jor/amman/corp-amman>. Accessed 18 June 2021.

Figure 97.3

**Payment information for Team A return flights to South Africa (17 February 2021)**

Payment reference 50160547	Administration fee EGP 189.72
Booked on 17 February 2021	Booking total EGP 6,513.72
Card number: *****7800	AED 1,557.64
Maher Alismail 17 February 2021	Equivalent to EGP 6,513.72
Please note, that the credit/debit card used to make the payment will be checked at the airport.	

**Source:** Confidential.

33. The agreed contract price for the provision of ‘Team A’ was \$195,000, which was invoiced to Space Cargo Inc.<sup>265</sup>

34. On 27 April 2021 a second team (‘Team B’) consisting of one pilot and four technicians deployed to Benghazi, Libya directly from Johannesburg (Lanseria) airport (FALA) on board a Dassault Falcon 900DX business jet (see at appendix C).<sup>266</sup> The Panel also independently obtained a copy of the aircraft flight plan from another source, which confirms this flight. The aircraft charter flight was booked by Shamil Travel Services Company of Benghazi, whom the Panel could not contact for their comment. The charter cost was LYD 135,000 (US\$ 29,800), which was paid in cash.

35. After ‘Team B’ maintenance work, two of the AS332L Super Puma helicopters were seen flying as part of the HAF Libyan National Army 7<sup>th</sup> Operation Dignity anniversary military parade in Benghazi on 29 May 2021 (see figure 97.4).

<sup>265</sup> Confidential source.

<sup>266</sup> The Panel is aware of the owner and operator of the private jet but considers that as the company was unaware that the flight would be a technical non-compliance with the arms embargo, and cooperated fully with the Panel, it is not necessary to expose them to the reputational risk resulting from the company being identified.

Figure 97.4  
AS332L Super Pumas flying in Haftar parade (29 May 2021)



Source: [https://twitter.com/Libya\\_OSINT/status/1398654492980166658](https://twitter.com/Libya_OSINT/status/1398654492980166658), 29 May 2021

36. The agreed contract price for the provision of 'Team B' was \$375,000, which Space Cargo Inc requested to be invoiced to BU Shames FZE.<sup>267</sup> The Panel has identified that a Mr. Abdullah Mohamed Alismail<sup>268</sup> is listed as the owner of BU Shames FZE.<sup>269</sup> In figure 97.2 there is a copy email address for [abdullah.ismail@spacecargoinc.com](mailto:abdullah.ismail@spacecargoinc.com), and the Panel has confirmed that Abdullah Mohamed Alismail also uses [abdullahgm@bushamesfze.com](mailto:abdullahgm@bushamesfze.com). The Panel has identified that Aleksandra Isamova,<sup>270</sup> Auditor of Space Cargo Inc, is also listed as working in the finance department of BU Shames FZE. Although the Panel has yet to confirm the exact family relationship between Maher Nayef Alismail, the General Manager of Space Cargo Inc, and Abdullah Mohamed Alismail, the owner of BU Shames FZE, the Panel considers that the two companies are in effect operated as a single business entity.

37. During the maintenance periods for both Space Cargo Inc 'Team A' and 'Team B', their local HAF air force counterparts requested information as to the types of weapons that could be mounted to the aircraft, and what sort of weapons mounts were required.<sup>271</sup> The Panel also identified from confidential imagery that the three Gazelle helicopters delivered in July 2019 as part of Project Opus had been repainted in military sand colour with Libyan armed forces markings (see figure 97.5).

<sup>267</sup> Registered as company #11617945 on 3 March 2020. 600 M2 Warehouse A4-08, Sharjah, UAE. The invoice was paid from account number IBAN AE080260001015771385401, Emirates NBD Bank, Deira Branch, Dubai, UAE.

<sup>268</sup> a.k.a. Abdullah Mohamed ALISMAEL, Abdullah Mohamed AL ISMAIL, Abdullah Mohamed AL ISMAEL.

<sup>269</sup> <https://are.databasesets.com/en/company-all/company/27180>. Accessed 6 August 2021.

<sup>270</sup> Uses [sasha@bushamesfze.com](mailto:sasha@bushamesfze.com) and [auditor@spacecargoinc.com](mailto:auditor@spacecargoinc.com). Same telephone number as Space Cargo Inc +971 58 206 4133.

<sup>271</sup> Confidential source.

Figure 97.5  
**Project Opus Gazelle helicopters in military livery (2021)**



**Source:** Confidential

38. The Panel has identified that one or more of the Super Puma aircraft has rotor gearbox faults necessitating the delivery of spare parts. These are only legitimately available from Airbus Helicopters<sup>272</sup> or companies that have passed the Airbus Helicopters' due diligence and compliance processes. Airbus Helicopters informed the Panel<sup>273</sup> that the three helicopters were removed from the Airbus Helicopters database on 10 March 2020 after a self-declaration from the previous legitimate owner Starlite Aviation<sup>274</sup> on 28 August 2019. This was over nine months after Starlite sold the helicopters to L6-FZE of Project Opus. It is thus highly unlikely that Space Cargo Inc or HAF will ever be able to legitimately access the spare parts necessary to maintain any airworthiness for these aircraft. Sources have informed the Panel that illegitimate sources for such parts are rare.

39. The timeline of events regarding this support by Space Cargo Inc is summarised at table 97.6.

<sup>272</sup> <https://www.airbus.com/helicopters.html>. Accessed 6 August 2021.

<sup>273</sup> Letter of 2 August 2021 and Email of 1 September 2021.

<sup>274</sup> <https://www.starliteaviation.com>. Accessed 6 August 2021.

Table 97.6

**Timeline of main events for Space Cargo Inc support to HAF (2021)**

<i>Date</i>	<i>Event</i>	<i>Remarks</i>
10 Dec 2020	South African maintenance company contacted by Space Cargo Inc (UAE) <sup>275</sup> for recruitment of Super Puma engineers for a contract in Libya.	▪
19 Dec 2020	Team Leader for the Space Cargo Inc contract deploys to Jordan from South Africa.	▪ Arrives Amman on flight EK903 from Dubai. ▪ Met by Skywings Aviation and accommodated at Corp Amman Hotel, Amman.
1 Jan 2021	Repair Team A (3 persons) deploy from Johannesburg, RSA via Cairo to Amman, Jordan.	▪ Egypt Air flights MS840 and MS871. ▪ Flights booked by <a href="mailto:info@spacecargoinc.com">info@spacecargoinc.com</a> . ▪ Payment card ending in 7800 (Maher Alismail). ▪ Met by Skywings Aviation and accommodated at Corp Amman Hotel, Amman.
23 Jan 2021	Aircraft AN-12A (#2340806) arrives at Amman (Marka) airport (OJAM) from Sudan (HSSS) .	▪ At Space Cargo request. ▪ Departed Sudan (HSSS) on 22 Jan 2021. ▪ Pilot was Nikolay DENISOV (Kazakhstan).
24 Jan 2021	Repair Team A members identified by Panel.	▪
28 Jan 2021	13:00 hours. Repair Team A departs from Amman (OJAM) for Benghazi (HLLB) on aircraft AN-12A (#2340806) (marked UP-AN220).	▪
28 Jan 2021	14:30 hours. Aircraft AN-12A (#2340806) (marked UP-AN220) returns to Amman (OJAM), Jordan due to technical fault.	▪
31 Jan 2021	14:45 hours. aircraft AN-12A (#2340806) departs Amman (OJAM) for Benghazi (HLLB)	▪ Repair 'Team A' now deployed.
7 Feb 2021	Repair 'Team A' identified working on third Super Puma.	▪ 32° 5'36.44"N, 20°15'38.67"E.
8 Feb 2021	Panel identify Repair 'Team A' accommodation location.	▪ 32° 5'18.16"N, 20°15'37.66".

<sup>275</sup> [auditor@spacecargoinc.com](mailto:auditor@spacecargoinc.com). Aleksandra. +971 6 55 70 388. Fax: +971 6 57 24 019. Mobile: +971 58 206 4133. SAIF Zone | A4-073 | P.O.Box 7812 | Sharjah | UAE.

<i>Date</i>	<i>Event</i>	<i>Remarks</i>
10 Feb 2021	General Haftar's representative visited Benina Hanger and observed ground tests on all three Super Puma.  Looking to recruit pilots from RSA as no Libyan pilots qualified. RSA company to recruit and pilots for Space Cargo Inc.	▪ Confidential source.
17 Feb 2021	Repair 'Team A' departs Benghazi for Johannesburg	▪ Route HLLB > Alexandria (HEBA) > Dubai (OMDB) > Addis Adaba (HAAB) > Johannesburg (FAOR)
26 Apr 2021	Private jet flight from Benghazi (HLLB) via Entebbe (HUEN) to Johannesburg (FAOR) to collect Repair 'Team B'.	▪ Dassault Aviation Falcon 900EX registered 9A-XXX.
27 Apr 2021	Repair 'Team B' fly on private jet flight from Johannesburg (FAOR) via Entebbe (HUEN) to Benghazi (HLLB)	▪ 'Team B' accommodation located 14.5km from airport at 31°59'36.75"N, 20°9'45.23"E.
29 May 2021	Two Super Puma helicopters fly in the HAF 7th Anniversary of Operation DIGNITY parade. <sup>276</sup>	▪
20 Jul 2021	Repair "Team B" returns to South Africa.	▪

40. The Panel offered Space Cargo an opportunity to reply on 23 December 2021. Space Cargo Inc responded on 22 January 2022 and requested a three-week delay for them to respond so that they could consolidate the necessary documentation. The Panel agreed, but no response was received by the agreed 12 February 2022 deadline.

41. On 7 January 2022 the Panel wrote to Holman Fenwick Willan MEA LLP (HFW), the legal representative of the last known owners of the aircraft to request an update on the aircraft ownership, or any sales or transfers that may have taken place. HFW have yet to respond to the Panel's request.

42. The provision of maintenance technicians for these particular aircraft that were supplied for military use and are operated now by HAF falls under the auspices of "*other assistance .... relating to military activities*". This is a further violation of paragraph 9 of resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#) by Space Cargo Inc and Maher Nayef ALISMAIL.

### C. Space Cargo Inc violations of other arms embargoes

43. The Panel notes that in paragraph 75 of [S/2021/569](#) the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic also named Space Cargo Inc as the owner of two IL-76TD cargo aircraft (MSN# 33446325 and 1013405167) operated by Jenis Air LLC, Kazakhstan, who used the aircraft on 19 December 2020 for the transfer of military materiel into the Central African Republic.

<sup>276</sup> <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mbIDXxITPa0>, 31 May 2021. (@35 min 05 sec).



**D. Space Cargo Inc business licences**

44. The United Arab Emirates informed the Panel on 24 March 2022 that the company's business licence (#20155) was not renewed after expiry on 26 October 2021. The United Arab Emirates provided no information on the company's other business licences (#00607) and (#14987).

## Appendix A to Annex 97: Supporting imagery and documentation relating to Space Cargo Inc aviation support

Figure 97.A.1

AN-12A cargo aircraft (#2340806) at Jordan Marka airport (OJAM) (28 January 2021)



Sources: Confidential source and Panel analysis

Figure 97.A.2

Faked imagery of AN-12A cargo aircraft (#2340806) claiming markings overpaint on 25 January 2021



<sup>a</sup> Geo-referenced to 31°58'22"N, 35°59'54"E (OJAM).

<sup>b</sup> Note UP-AN220 still on aircraft on image in figure 97.A.1, taken 3 days after the claimed date the above images were taken.

Sources: Member State and Panel analysis.

Figure 97.A.3

AN-12A cargo aircraft (#2340806) in Benghazi with faked Burundi registration (5 February 2021)

**AN-12A Cargo Aircraft (#2340806) in Benghazi  
(5 February to 10 April 2021)**



Image extracted from confidential source video imagery of 5 February 2021. Note the changed registration number to a Burundi registration 9U-BBD or 9U-BBO. The paint work is of poor quality.



**5 February 2021.  
Benghazi Airport  
32°05'34.47"N,  
20°15'39.92"E**



**10 April 2021.  
Benghazi Airport  
32°05'33.16"N,  
20°15'40.58"E**

**Sources:** Confidential source and Panel analysis

Figure 97.A.4

Space Cargo Inc OTR false response (10 August 2021)

6	Sale Purchase Contract of aircraft (ANTONOV AN-12) Serial No (2340806) holding registration mark (UP-AN220) with [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] along with the full material and financial possession. The capacity of our company in the capacity of the owner/medium/broker without any control or actual possession to the airport. Our documentary possession of the aircraft by one day is 10/3/2020 (only one day)	2020/03/10	.2
---	--	------------	----

Figure 97.A.5

Extract from Space Cargo Inc fake sales agreement (20 January 2021) supplied to Panel (10 August 2021)

**SALE AND PURCHASE AGREEMENT**  
No: 2001/2021  
DATE: 20<sup>th</sup> January 2021  
Correspondence by Email:

Space Cargo Inc., hereinafter referred to as "SELLER" represented by Mr. Abdulrazzak Al Hamid, Director, acting in accordance with the power of attorney dated by 01<sup>st</sup> January 2021 of the Company and the [REDACTED] [REDACTED] to as a "Buyer", represented by its [REDACTED] [REDACTED] have concluded this Agreement as follows:

SELLER hereby agrees to sell to Buyer 1 (one) Civil Aircraft Antonov (AN) 12A (2340806), and BUYER agrees to purchase this aircraft from SELLER in accordance with the terms and conditions set out in this Agreement.

**Clause 1.**  
**Definitions and Interpretations**

For the purpose of this Agreement the following expressions shall have the meaning assigned to them below unless the context otherwise requires:

Aircraft: AN-12A (S/N: 2340806) type of civil aircraft.  
Tools: Tools for aircraft, engines and system maintenance;  
Flight Crew: AN-12A of civil aircraft crew;  
Technical Acceptance: Acceptance of the aircraft envisaged by Clause 4 of this agreement, implemented by Buyer's team through operational inspection of the aircraft's systems and its equipment thereof on ground in the volume of pre-flight procedures stipulated by Maintenance Schedule and perform a test flight (after ground inspection the aircraft familiarization flight can be combined with the ferry flight, if agreed by the parties). Technical acceptance shall be carried out by Buyer's representatives in the presence of representatives of Seller.  
Aircraft Delivery: Ferry flight of aircraft as it is envisaged in Clause 3 of this Agreement.  
"The Buyer's base": Khartoum International Airport  
"The Seller's base": Khartoum International Airport  
"Bill of Sale": Certificate of sale and transfer of property rights

Life Expenditure: Aircraft operating hours on ground and in flight recorded in the aircraft's Log Books.  
Defect: Each separate product discrepancy between prescribed requirements.  
Technical Service Life: Aircraft's operating hours from the beginning of operation till discarding.  
Warranty: Obligations stipulated by Clause 5 of this Agreement.  
Delivery Date: The date of fulfilling obligations envisaged by Clause 4.4 of this Agreement.  
Reclamation Report: claims to quality of the AN-12A type aircraft and equipment supplied according to this Contract coming within the scope of the definition of Clause 5.

**Clause 2.**  
**Subject of Contract and Contract Price**

2.1. SELLER shall sell and BUYER shall buy 1 (one) AN-12A civil aircraft serial number №: 2340806 together with components, devices, systems and technical publications.  
Service lives of vendor items are indicated in their Log Books and Certificates.  
2.2. The price of Aircraft under this Agreement is set forth in Annex No.3 to this Agreement.

**Clause 3.**  
**Terms of Delivery**

3.1. Hand-over of the aircraft to BUYER shall be done after the requirements to Buyer to this Agreement have been met.  
SELLER provides BUYER with all necessary data and documents of delivered aircraft to receive licenses/documents which are needed.



Figure 97.A.6

Space Cargo Inc fake credit note to South Sudanese company (20 January 2021) supplied to Panel (10 August 2021)

<b>CREDIT NOTE</b>						
<b>No: SCI/CN/3</b>				<b>Date: 20-01-2021/8888</b>		
<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px;"> <p>Credit to: SPACE CARGO INC</p> <p>Reference:</p> </div>						
Outstanding Balance for Services Provided in Sudan and Ethiopia /Fueling, Handling and Landing Permits for Aug 2020 to Dec 2020						
S.N.		GL Acct.	Description	Cur.	Amount	Amount AED
1	Dr	11000	Accounts receivable: Outstanding Balance for Services Provided in Sudan and Ethiopia /Fueling for Aug 2020 to Dec 2020	USD	393,652.00	1,446,671.10
	Cr	20000	Accounts payable	USD	393,652.00	1,446,671.10
2	Dr	11000	Accounts receivable: Outstanding Balance for Services Provided in Sudan and Ethiopia / Handling and Landing Permits for Aug 2020 to Dec 2020	USD	174,371.00	640,813.43
	Cr	20000	Accounts payable	USD	174,371.00	640,813.43
<b>TOTAL:</b>				<b>USD</b>	<b>568,023.00</b>	<b>0.00</b>
Amount in words: <u>Five Hundred Sixty Eight Thousand Twenty Three Dollars Only</u>						
Prepared by _____ Accounts Manager _____ General Manager _____						
Received by _____						

Figures 97.A.7 and 97.A.8

**One of the South Sudanese company's responses to Panel enquiry (10 August 2021)**

The Panel holds copies of all the other rebuttals from this company, and this one is included for an illustration of that company's responses.






Figure 97.A.9


Extract from Space Cargo Inc OTR inaccurate response (20 January 2022)

<p>1. Regarding the aircraft (Antonov AN-12A) with the serial number (5342908), and <u>since among the activities of our company is the activity of importing and exporting aircraft and their spare parts under License No. (0067) issued in 1999 by the Sharjah Airport International Free Zone Authority:</u></p> <p>a. On (December 28, 2020), our company requested (reservation in return for purchase) as an intermediary/ broker in dealing with the purchase of the aircraft described in our response above from the seller (Roland Aviation FZE) with the intention of reselling it to others.</p> <p>b. The selling company (Roland Aviation FZE) issued an invoice in the name of our company, and the amount (the down payment) was settled with the intention of completing the mediation and completing the sale.</p> <p>c. Immediately and on the same date on (28/12/2020) and before making any change in the registration or any flight or operation of the aircraft, the selling company executed the sales contract directly with the buyer (other than our company).</p>	<p>3. Our company is not concerned with the name of the air operator / company that currently operates the aircraft described in our response and is not concerned with its technical condition or the scope of its operations and operation, nor is it aware of any of the foregoing.</p>
<p>2. Our company has not entered with the selling company (Roland Aviation FZE) into any sale and purchase contract and has not concluded any lease contract, because the oral agreement is that the amount paid by our company as a deposit is a refundable / redeemable advance to prove the seriousness of the deal and to book the aircraft, provided that the transaction is direct sale and purchase contract between Seller and Buyer.</p>	<p>4. Our company is not concerned with the civil registration number of the aircraft described in our answer, nor its registration certificate, nor is it aware of any of the foregoing.</p>
	<p>5. Our company is not concerned with the airworthiness certificate of the aircraft described in our answer, nor is it aware of any of the foregoing</p>
	<p>6. Our company is not concerned with operating the aircraft described in our answer, nor is it aware of any of the foregoing</p>
	<p>7. Our company is not concerned with any means of payment regarding the implementation of the operation of the aircraft described in our answer and is not aware of any of the foregoing.</p>
	<p>8. To the best of our knowledge, the selling company has executed the sale contract for the aircraft described in our answer directly with the buyer ((Eagle Enterprise Company Limited), Address: Eastern Pearl, Juba, South Sudan, Tel: 00211955921703 and our company has not obtained any copy of any contract between the two parties (the seller and the buyer) in the same matter</p>

## Appendix B to Annex 97: Supporting imagery and documentation relating to IL-18D (MSN#187009903)

Figures 97.B.1

Independent OSINT analyst identification of the IL-18D.<sup>a</sup>





<sup>a</sup> Source: [https://twitter.com/Gerjon\\_/status/1287815982350766085](https://twitter.com/Gerjon_/status/1287815982350766085), 27 July 2020.

## Appendix C to Annex 97: Supporting imagery and documentation relating to Space Cargo Inc PMC support

Figures 97.C.1

Space Cargo Inc emails regarding initial deployment<sup>277</sup>



<sup>277</sup> The resolution of some of this evidence has been reduced as a result of the means of transfer to the Panel via secure social messaging platform, then data erasure to protect sources and finally file compression when adding to this document. Higher resolution imagery is available on request.

**From:** Accounts Department <auditor@spacecargoinc.com>  
**Sent:** Saturday, December 12, 2020 2:08 PM  
**To:** [REDACTED]  
**Cc:** abdullah.ismail@spacecargoinc.com; ermolchev.s.  
**Subject:** HA: ASSEMBLY AND MAINTENANCE OF HELI

Dear [REDACTED]  
Please let M [REDACTED] go for COVID test immediately.  
Once test will be ready, please let me know we will purchase for him regular flight from Cape Town to Amman (Jordan), and from Jordan we will arrange flight to point of work.

Regards, Sasha

Thank you & best regards,

Aleksandra  
Finance Department  
"SPACE CARGO INC."

T/F: +971 6 55 70 388/+971 6 57 24 019 | Mobile: +971 58 206 4133 |  
Email: [auditor@spacecargoinc.com](mailto:auditor@spacecargoinc.com) ; [accounts@spacecargoinc.com](mailto:accounts@spacecargoinc.com)  
SAIF Zone | A4-073 | P.O.Box 7812 | Sharjah | United Arab Emirates

**From:** Accounts Department <auditor@spacecargoinc.com>  
**Sent:** 16 December 2020 09:04  
**To:** [REDACTED]  
**Cc:** s.ermolchev@spacecargoinc.com; maher\_nafaa@yahoo.com; 'Abdullah Ismail' <abdullah.ismail@spacecargoinc.com>; jyotsna@spacecargoinc.com  
**Subject:** regulations for M [REDACTED] for his trip to Amman, Jordan

Dear [REDACTED]  
Please note below and handover to M [REDACTED] information as follows:

1. <https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=jo.gov.moh.aman> – this application he has to download on his mobile device;
2. Above application is for QR code tracking – QR code required at Cape Town and Dubai airports;
3. He has to pay around – USD 60-70 for visa stamping on arrival;
4. CORP HOTEL in Amman & Meeting Company is Skywings Aviation - +962779200077 contact number of Skywings Aviation representative – this information required by Immigration in Amman, Jordan;

Confirm the receipt of email

Thank you & best regards,

Aleksandra  
Finance Department  
"SPACE CARGO INC."

T/F: +971 6 55 70 388/+971 6 57 24 019 | Mobile: +971 58 206 4133 |  
Email: [auditor@spacecargoinc.com](mailto:auditor@spacecargoinc.com) ; [accounts@spacecargoinc.com](mailto:accounts@spacecargoinc.com)  
SAIF Zone | A4-073 | P.O.Box 7812 | Sharjah | United Arab Emirates

On 18 Dec 2020, at 3:10 PM, [s.ermolchev@spacecargoinc.com](mailto:s.ermolchev@spacecargoinc.com) wrote:

Dear colleagues,

Good afternoon!

Kindly arrange transportation and HOTAC (1 single room) for [REDACTED] arriving in Queen Alia International Airport on 19<sup>th</sup> of December 2020 at 15.55 local Jordanian time by flight #EK903 (EMIRATES AIRLINES) from Dubai.

Thank you in advance!

Best Regards,

Sergey Ermolchev  
Operations Manager

T/F: +971 6 544 4159 | [Mobile: +971 52 7888 309](tel:+971527888309) | E-mail: [s.ermolchev@spacecargoinc.com](mailto:s.ermolchev@spacecargoinc.com)  
SAIF Zone | A4-073 | P.O.Box 7812 | Sharjah | United Arab Emirates

On 18 Dec 2020, at 3:10 PM, [s.ermolchev@spacecargoinc.com](mailto:s.ermolchev@spacecargoinc.com) wrote:

Dear colleagues,

Good afternoon!

Kindly arrange transportation and HOTAC (1 single room) for [REDACTED] arriving in Queen Alia International Airport on 19<sup>th</sup> of December 2020 at 15.55 local Jordanian time by flight #EK903 (EMIRATES AIRLINES) from Dubai.

Thank you in advance!

Best Regards,

Sergey Ermolchev  
Operations Manager

T/F: +971 6 544 4159 | [Mobile: +971 52 7888 309](tel:+971527888309) | E-mail: [s.ermolchev@spacecargoinc.com](mailto:s.ermolchev@spacecargoinc.com)  
SAIF Zone | A4-073 | P.O.Box 7812 | Sharjah | United Arab Emirates



**From:** [auditor@spacecargoinc.com](mailto:auditor@spacecargoinc.com) <[auditor@spacecargoinc.com](mailto:auditor@spacecargoinc.com)>  
**Sent:** Friday, December 18, 2020 6:53 PM  
**To:** [REDACTED]  
**Cc:** Abdullah Ismail; S Ermolchev  
**Subject:** Fwd: FW: HOTAC & TRANSPORTATION REQUEST/19 DEC 2020

Dear [REDACTED]  
Hope all is well at your side .  
Kindly accept below confirmation for transportation and Hotel Accommodation for [REDACTED] contact details are below.  
Regards, Sasha

--  
Отправлено из Outlook Email App для Android

----- Пересланное письмо -----  
**От:** [s.ermolchev@spacecargoinc.com](mailto:s.ermolchev@spacecargoinc.com)  
**Кому:** Auditor SCI [auditor@spacecargoinc.com](mailto:auditor@spacecargoinc.com)  
**Дата:** пятница, 18 декабря 2020г., 18:44 +04:00  
**Тема:** FW: HOTAC & TRANSPORTATION REQUEST/19 DEC 2020

---

**From:** Ops <[ops@skywingsjordan.com](mailto:ops@skywingsjordan.com)>  
**Sent:** Friday, December 18, 2020 6:11 PM  
**To:** [s.ermolchev@spacecargoinc.com](mailto:s.ermolchev@spacecargoinc.com)  
**Cc:** Mike <[ops@skywingsjordan.com](mailto:ops@skywingsjordan.com)>; suha <[suha@skywingsjordan.com](mailto:suha@skywingsjordan.com)>  
**Subject:** Re: HOTAC & TRANSPORTATION REQUEST/19 DEC 2020

Dear Sergey  
Good evening  
Ref below well action and confirm  
Kind regards  
Elie Njeim  
OCC/SWA  
Mob:+962779200077  
24/7:+962777818444  
[www.skywingsjordan.com](http://www.skywingsjordan.com)  
Amman-Jordan

**Source:** Confidential



Figure 97.C.2

Imagery of AS332L Super Puma helicopter repairs in Libya (February to May 2021)<sup>278</sup>



Source: Confidential


<sup>278</sup> The resolution of some of this evidence has been reduced as a result of the means of transfer to the Panel via secure social messaging platform, then data erasure to protect sources and finally file compression when adding to this document. Higher resolution imagery is available on request.

Figures 97.C.3 and 97.C.4

**Infographic for 'Team B' private jet transfer from South Africa to Libya (27 April 2021)****PMC 'Team B' deployment on P4-XXX  
(27 April 2021) Departure from Johannesburg  
(25°56'7.13"S 27°55'38.19"E)**


A confidential source provided an image taken of the Dassault Falcon 900DX business jet (registered P4-XXX) prior to departure from Johannesburg (Lanseria) airport. The aircraft was used to deploy Space Cargo Inc 'Team B' to support HAF air operations.

The PMC was contracted to provide the necessary maintenance personnel to get the 3 x Super Puma delivered in July 2019 ready for operational flight.

**Primary sources**

1. Confidential source.
2. Google Earth Pro
3. Geo-reference by Panel.

Developed by UN Panel of Experts.



**PMC 'Team B' deployment on P4-XXX  
(27 April 2021) Arrival at Benghazi  
(32°05'38.30"N, 20°15'45.84"E)**

A confidential source provided an image taken from the cockpit of the Dassault Falcon 900DX business jet (registered P4-XXX) during taxiing in Benghazi (Benina) airport. The aircraft was used to deploy the Space Cargo Inc 'Team B' to support HAF air operations.

Space Cargo Inc was contracted to provide the necessary maintenance to get the 3 x Super Puma delivered in July 2019 ready for operational flight.



**Primary sources**

1. Confidential source.
2. Google Earth Pro
3. Geo-reference support from "Il-Kangurur".

Developed by UN Panel of Experts.

Figure 97.C.5

## Private jet transfer booking request (10 April 2021)



التاريخ 10 أبريل 2021

نتقدم شركة الشامل للخدمات السياحية بطلبها هذا بسؤالكم عن إمكانية ترتيب رحلة بطائرة خاصة من جوهانسبرغ (جنوب أفريقيا) إلى بنغازي (ليبيا) لعدد 5 أشخاص وذلك حسب خط السير أدناه

عدد الركاب	خط السير	تاريخ الرحلة
5	Johannesburg (JNB) Benghazi (BEN)	27/04/2021

على أن يكون الإقلاع من مدينة جوهانسبرغ على تمام الساعة 10:00 صباحا بتوقيت جنوب أفريقيا

نرجو من حضراتكم التكرم بالرد بالإمكانية لتوفير هذه الرحلة وإعلامنا بتكلفة الرحلة بالدينار الليبي وطرق الدفع وشكرا

تجدون طيئته قائمة بأسماء الركاب ونسخة من صور الجوازات

تقبلوه بقاتق الاحترام  
مدير قسم الحجوزات  
شركة الشامل للخدمات السياحية



---

هاتف : 0619091531-0619091530      العنوان : السلماني الشرقي مقابل البريد الرئيسي

Source: Confidential

OFFICIAL UN TRANSLATION 2107704E

*Translated from Arabic*

Date: 10 April 2021

Falcon Jet

Sirs,

Greetings

The Shamil Travel Services Company would like to inquire as to the possibility of arranging a private aeroplane flight from Johannesburg, South Africa, to Benghazi, Libya, for five people, with the following itinerary:

<i>Date of flight</i>	<i>Route</i>	<i>Number of passengers</i>
	Johannesburg (JNB)	
27 April 2021	Benghazi (BEN)	5

Take-off time from Johannesburg should be 1000 hours South African time

We ask you to kindly respond about the possibility of providing such a flight and let us know the cost in Libyan dinars and the preferred method of payment. Thank you.

Please find attached a list of the passengers' names and a copy of the passport photos.

Accept, Sir, the assurances of my highest consideration.

(*Signature*) Director of the Reservations Division  
Shamil Travel Services Company

---

Address: Eastern Salmani opposite the Main Post Office    Tel: 0619091531-0619091530



Figure 97.C.6 and 97.C.7

## BU Shames FZE Business Licenses

SAIF ZONE المنطقة الحرة - الشارقة Sharjah Free Zone		حكومة الشارقة Government of Sharjah	
<b>شهادة ترخيص License Certificate</b>			
LICENSE NO.	21315	رقم الرخصة	٢١٣١٥
NAME	BU SHAMES (FZE)	الاسم	بو شامس (م.م.ح)
LEGAL STATUS	Free Zone Est. with Limited Liability	الشكل القانوني	مؤسسة منطقة حرة ذات مسؤولية محدودة
TYPE OF LICENSE	Commercial	نوع الرخصة	تجارية
ACTIVITY(S)	Trading in Civil Aircrafts & Spare Parts	النشاط	تجارة الطائرات المدنية وقطع غيارها (بشرط الحصول على موافقة الجهات المختصة في دولة الإمارات العربية المتحدة)
OWNER(S)	ABDULLAH MOHAMED ALISMAEL	المالك	عبدالله محمد الاسماعيل
MANAGER	ABDULLAH MOHAMED ALISMAEL	المدير المسؤول	عبدالله محمد الاسماعيل
SAIF-ZONE ADDRESS	600 M2 Warehouse A4-08 Sharjah - U.A.E	العنوان في المنطقة الحرة	مستودع ٢٠٠م ٨-٠٤ الشارقة - أ.ع.م
INCORPORATION DATE	08 March 2020	تاريخ عقد التأسيس	٠٨ مارس ٢٠٢٠
ISSUE DATE	08 March 2021	تاريخ الاصدار	٠٨ مارس ٢٠٢١
EXPIRY DATE	07 March 2022	تاريخ الانتهاء	٠٧ مارس ٢٠٢٢
REMARKS	THIS LICENSE IS ISSUED AND BASED UPON EMIRI DECREE NO. 2 OF 1995 ISSUED IN SHARJAH ON MAY 8, 1995.  THIS LICENSE IS GRANTED TO THE LICENSEE ONLY AND SHALL NOT BE LEASED OR TRANSFERRED WITHOUT PRIOR APPROVAL OF THE SAIF ZONE.  SALES IN U.A.E SHALL BE CARRIED OUT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE VALID LAWS AND REGULATIONS THEREOF.	ملاحظات	هذه الرخصة صادرة استنادا الى المرسوم الاميري رقم ٢ لسنة ١٩٩٥ الصادر في الشارقة بتاريخ ٨ مايو ١٩٩٥.  هذه الرخصة ممنوحة للمرخص له فقط ولا يجوز تأجيرها او تحويلها الا بموافقة هيئة المنطقة الحرة لمنطقة الشارقة لتتولى.  تم اعتبار البيع داخل الدولة وفقا للنظم والقوانين المعمورة فيها.
To check the validity of the license:		للتحقق من صلاحية الرخصة:	
1- Send an SMS to 2514 with License number.		1- رسالة نصية قصيرة (SMS) إلى الرقم 2514 مع رقم الرخصة.	
2- Scan the QR code.		2- مسح رمز الاستجابة السريع (QR Code).	
3- Visit the website: <a href="https://portal.saif-zone.com/LicenseDetail.aspx">https://portal.saif-zone.com/LicenseDetail.aspx</a>		3- زيارة الموقع الإلكتروني: <a href="https://portal.saif-zone.com/LicenseDetail.aspx">https://portal.saif-zone.com/LicenseDetail.aspx</a>	
			
<p>هذه الوثيقة رسمية ولا تحتاج لخطم او توقيع وللتأكد من صحة البيانات يرجى زيارة الموقع <a href="http://www.saif-zone.com">www.saif-zone.com</a></p> <p>This document is official and it does not need to be stamped or signed. To view license detail visit <a href="http://www.saif-zone.com">www.saif-zone.com</a></p>			





حكومة الشارقة  
Government of Sharjah

## شهادة ترخيص

### License Certificate

LICENSE NO.	22237	٢٢٢٣٧	رقم الرخصة
NAME	BU SHAMES (FZE)	بو شامس (م.م.ح)	الاسم
LEGAL STATUS	Free Zone Est. with Limited Liability	مؤسسة منطقة حرة ذات مسؤولية محدودة	الشكل القانوني
TYPE OF LICENSE	Services	خدمية	نوع الرخصة
ACTIVITY(S)	Chartering & Leasing of Civil Aircraft	تأجير واستئجار الطائرات المدنية (بشرط الحصول على موافقة الجهات المختصة في دولة الإمارات العربية المتحدة)	النشاط
OWNER(S)	ABDULLAH MOHAMED ALISMAEL	عبدالله محمد الاسماعيل	المالك
MANAGER	ABDULLAH MOHAMED ALISMAEL	عبدالله محمد الاسماعيل	المدير المسؤول
SAIF-ZONE ADDRESS	600 M2 Warehouse A4-08 Sharjah - U.A.E	مستودع ٢٠٠م ٨-٤ الشارقة - ا.ع.م	العنوان في المنطقة الحرة
INCORPORATION DATE	08 March 2020	٠٨ مارس ٢٠٢٠	تاريخ عقد التأسيس
ISSUE DATE	17 March 2021	١٧ مارس ٢٠٢١	تاريخ الاصدار
EXPIRY DATE	07 March 2022	٠٧ مارس ٢٠٢٢	تاريخ الإنتهاء
REMARKS	THIS LICENSE IS ISSUED AND BASED UPON EMIRI DECREE NO. 2 OF 1995 ISSUED IN SHARJAH ON MAY 8, 1995  THIS LICENSE IS GRANTED TO THE LICENSEE ONLY AND SHALL NOT BE LEASED OR TRANSFERRED WITHOUT PRIOR APPROVAL OF THE SAIF ZONE  SALES IN U.A.E SHALL BE CARRIED OUT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE VALID LAWS AND REGULATIONS THEREOF	هذه الرخصة صادرة استنادا الى المرسوم الأميري رقم ٢ لسنة ١٩٩٥ الصادر في الشارقة بتاريخ ٨ مايو ١٩٩٥  هذه الرخصة ممنوحة للمرخص له فقط ولا يجوز تأجيرها أو تحويلها إلا بموافقة هيئة المنطقة الحرة لمطار الشارقة الدولي  تتم أعمال البيع داخل الدولة وفقا للنظم والقوانين السارية فيها	ملاحظات

To check the validity of the license:

- 1- Send an SMS to 2514 with License number.
- 2- Scan the QR code.
- 3- Visit the website:  
<https://portal.saif-zone.com/LicenseDetail.aspx>



للتحقق من صلاحية الرخصة:

- 1- رسالة نصية قصيرة (SMS) إلى الرقم 2514 مع رقم الرخصة.
- 2- مسح رمز الاستجابة السريع (QR Code)
- 3- زيارة الموقع الإلكتروني:  
<https://portal.saif-zone.com/LicenseDetail.aspx>

هذه الوثيقة رسمية ولا تحتاج لختم أو توقيع

This document is official and it does not need to be stamped or signed

Date : 17/03/2021

\*RM\*

التاريخ: ٢٠٢١/٠٣/١٧

Figure 97.C.8

**Repair Team 'A' accommodation in Benghazi airport****PMC 'Team A' Accommodation  
(02 February 2021)  
(32° 5'18"N, 20°15'38"E)**

A confidential source provided imagery of the accommodation for the Space Cargo Inc 'Team A' that deployed to Libya on 31 January 2021.

The location was identified from geo-referencing.

**Primary sources**

1. Confidential sources.
2. Google Earth Pro
3. Geo-reference support from "Il-Kanguru".

Developed by UN Panel of Experts.



Figure 97.C.9

**Repair Team 'B' accommodation in Benghazi****PMC 'Team B' Accommodation  
(April/May 2021)  
(31°59'36.75"N, 20° 9'45.23"E)**

A confidential source provided imagery of the accommodation for the Space Cargo Inc 'Team B' that deployed to Libya on 27 April 2021.

The location was identified from geo-referencing.

**Primary sources**

1. Confidential sources.
2. Google Earth Pro
3. Geo-reference support from "Il-Kanguru".

Developed by UN Panel of Experts.



## **Annex 98      Syrian Arab Airlines (SYR) operating in Libya**

1. The Panel has identified that the Syrian Arab Airlines<sup>279</sup> operated IL-76T cargo aircraft displaying Syrian registration YK-ATA (MSN<sup>280</sup> 93421613) made an initial flight from Damascus to Benghazi or Tobruk on 20 August 2021. The aircraft was identified as making five flights from Benghazi to Tobruk in December 2022 and six flights in February 2022.
2. The activities and profile of this aircraft meet five of the Panel's air delivery profile indicators that when considered collectively indicate that an aircraft is carrying illicit cargo: (a) lack of an obvious schedule; (b) the random nature of the flights; (c) the indirect route; (d) AIS is often switched off; (d) air operator transparency is opaque; and (e) the aircraft flew a similar track to that used for the “Libya Airbridge” reported in UN document [S/2021/229](#) (paragraphs 81 to 83 and annexes 39 and 55).
3. The Panel requested further information from the airline in letters dated 24 September 2021 and 14 March 2022. No response has yet been received.
4. The Panel will continue to monitor the activities of Syrian Arab Airlines (SYR).

---

<sup>279</sup> Office 3N, 35 Starinovskaya Street, 220056 Minsk, Belarus. +375 (17) 3507253. [www.rada.aero](http://www.rada.aero).

<sup>280</sup> Manufacturer's serial number.



## Annex 99 Update on Project Opus

### Aircraft

1. The Panel has identified further information on the design, deployment routing and current whereabouts of the LASA T-Bird (YU-TSH) light attack aircraft reported in [S/2021/229](#).<sup>281</sup>
2. The aircraft<sup>282</sup> deployed from GAS Aviation in Rudine, Serbia on 18 June 2019 and flew to Wiener Neustadt airport, Austria (LOAN). Wiener Neustadt airport is the base of Airborne Technologies,<sup>283</sup> the company that designed and modified the aircraft.<sup>284</sup> It remained there for six days before deploying to Amman, Jordan (OJAM) on 24 June 2019 making technical stops at Sofia, Bulgaria (LBSF) and Heraklion, Greece (LGIR). The pilot was Shawn Matthews, the Head of Airborne Technologies Flight Test department.<sup>285</sup>
3. The Panel can now confirm that the aircraft left Amman, Jordan on 18 July 2019 for Larnaca, Cyprus (LCLK) and not on 22 July 2019 as initially reported. On 30 July 2019 the aircraft was moved to Paphos, Cyprus (LCPH) where it is now in storage with EDT Hangar Services Limited (see figures 99.1 and 99.2).<sup>286</sup> The pilot was Matthew Coughlin, one of the PMC operatives that evacuated from Libya to Malta on the rigid hulled inflatable boat (RHIB) 'Manta-1' on 29 June 2019.<sup>287</sup> An updated infographic for the aircraft is at appendix A.<sup>288</sup>

Figure 99.1

LASA T-Bird condition in Serbia on 16 June 2019



Figure 99.2

LASA T-Bird at Larnaca (19 July 2019)



Sources: See figure 99.3

<sup>281</sup> See paras. 39 to 41 and annex 76 of [S/2021/229](#).

<sup>282</sup> Using Mode-S Hex Code 4C4E47.

<sup>283</sup> <https://www.airbornetechnologies.at>.

<sup>284</sup> At that time (2013 to 2017) Erik PRINCE was an indirect partner in the Company, controlling 25%. <https://www.profil.at/wirtschaft/neue-ermittlungen-gegen-firma-airborne-technologies-aus-noe/401724246>, 4 September 2021; and <https://theintercept.com/2016/04/11/blackwater-founder-erik-prince-drive-to-build-private-air-force/>, 11 April 2016. See later for example of disguised ownership.

<sup>285</sup> Confidential source.

<sup>286</sup> <http://www.edthangarservices.com/>.


<sup>287</sup> See appendix R to annex 76 of [S/2021/229](#).

<sup>288</sup> This no longer includes the transfer to Aircraft and More GmbH, as the company was purely used as a sales agent. Information from Cerha Hempel Rechtsanwälte GmbH dated 16 November 2021.

4. The Panel noted that at some time between leaving Serbia on 18 June 2019 and arriving at Larnaca on 19 July 2019 the overall body colour of the aircraft had changed from white to a 'military grey'. The position and font of the registration markings had also changed (see figure 99.3). The Panel notes that 'Global Geo Survey' markings were applied to the aircraft in Paphos. The company does not exist, and the company name was last seen on the sister aircraft H80-156DC on 12 November 2014 in Malta. This sister aircraft was last seen in Nakasongola air force base in Uganda in May 2019.

Figure 99.3

#### Comparison of overall body colour and registration markings



5. The aircraft no longer holds a valid certificate of airworthiness, which expired on 4 June 2020,<sup>289</sup> and the Serbian authorities revoked the aircraft registration certificate on 8 October 2021. At this time, the aircraft can no longer legally fly until re-registered with a Member State and a certificate of airworthiness issued.

6. The aircraft were inspected by the Cypriot authorities, in the presence of a Member State law enforcement agency on 11 October 2021. The Panel is awaiting the official release of this report to the Panel.

#### Disguised company ownership

7. In [S/2021/229](#) the Panel made a statement regarding the assistance provided by Erik Prince for the rapid transfer of aviation assets from companies that he controlled. What the Panel did not report at that time, due to it being single source, was an interview with Gregg Smith who, as the Chief Executive Officer of Frontier Services Group (FSG) from 2014 to 1

<sup>289</sup> Data from Serbian CAA civil aircraft registry. <http://cad.gov.rs/en/strana/20841/aircraft-registry#app>.



May 2016,<sup>290</sup> worked closely with Erik Prince, then the Chairman of FSG. Gregg Smith stated to the Panel<sup>291</sup> that the cover story for Operation Opus would be “oil and gas security” or “oil and gas survey” as that was what Erik Prince had always used. Gregg Smith repeated this publicly in an interview with [www.narativ.org](http://www.narativ.org) on 17 September 2020.<sup>292</sup>

8. Gregg Smith also claimed that it was implausible that Erik Prince did not control Lancaster6, the company that launched the operation. Gregg Smith went on to explain that, in his experience, Erik Prince protected himself from litigation by not owning companies, and by controlling them through debt ownership or security pledges he would receive material or financial benefits in other ways. The Panel now has evidence<sup>293</sup> of this technique being used by Erik Prince regarding PBM Limited (Malta #C74485), which was 50% owned by Unified Global Services Group Limited (Malta C66387) a company controlled by James Fenech, coincidentally the supplier of the RHIBs to Operation Opus. On 1 June 2017 Unified Global Services Group Limited pledged 100% of their shareholding in PBM Limited (Malta) to a US registered company Phalanx Holding Company LLC (Delaware# 4901076), which was controlled by Erik Prince, hence making Erik Prince in effect the beneficial owner of PBM Limited (Malta). After the investigation and arrest of James Fenech in late April 2020, and the freezing of Fenech’s assets on 24 April 2020 by the Maltese court, Erik Prince made efforts to divest himself of his interest in PBM Limited (Malta) and sever business links with James Fenech. The Panel believes this to be part of a wider cover up operation. At this point Erik Prince revealed his interest in Phalanx Holding Company LLC by personally signing the termination of pledge documentation, in effect returning control and ownership of the company back to Nicola Bandini and Unified Global Services Group Limited (Malta) on 21 July 2020. This was an uncharacteristic error of Erik Prince whose signature has not previously been identified by the Panel on open-source corporate documentation. Documentary evidence is at appendix B to this annex.


<sup>290</sup> <https://www.marketscreener.com/quote/stock/Frontier-Services-Group-L-6165919/news/Frontier-Services-1-RESIGNATION-OF-AN-EXECUTIVE-DIRECTOR-2-GRANT-OF-SHARE-OPTIONS-3-RESIGNAT-22268951/>, 29 April 2016.

<sup>291</sup> Panel interview of 30 March 2020.

<sup>292</sup> Smith, Gregg interviewed by Shalev, Zev, “Prince of Proxy: Libya”, *Narativ live with Zev Shalev*, Narativ.org, 12:30 to 13:35. 17 September 2020. <https://www.podbean.com/ew/pb-zzcef-ebc21a>.

<sup>293</sup> Initially identified by @bugdavem (Twitter), 18 April 2019.

## Appendix A to Annex 99: LASA T-Bird (YU-TSH) infographic



## Appendix B to Annex 99: Documentation illustrating disguised ownership technique used by Erik PRINCE

1. Documentation for figures 99.B.1 to 99.B.3 within this annex is from the Malta Business Registry.<sup>294</sup>
2. PBM Limited was registered on 2 December 2016 with 1,200 authorized shares. Nicola Bandini held 600 shares and Unified Global Services Group Limited (Malta C66387) the remaining 600 shares. Unified Global Services Group Limited (Malta C66387) is owned by James Fenech, the individual who supplied the RHIBs to Opus through a separate subsidiary of Unified Global Services Group Limited called Sovereign Charterers (Malta) Limited.

Figure 99.B.1

### Authorised Share Capital of 1000 shares

MBR

MALTA  
BUSINESS  
REGISTRY

Company Share Capital

Company Details

Authorised Shares

Involved Parties

Beneficial Owners

Documents

Company Registration Number C 78445 - PBM LIMITED

Company Registration Number

C 78445

Total No. of Authorised Shares

1,200 (EUR 1200.00)

Total No. of Issued Shares

1,200 (EUR 1200.00)

Authorised Share Capital	Type	Nominal Value Per Share in EUR	Issued Shares
1,200	Ordinary	1.000000	1,200

<sup>294</sup> <https://registry.mbr.mt>.

Figure 99.B.2

Pledge of shares to Phalanx Holding Company LLC (USA)<sup>295</sup> (1 June 2017)

Form T (2)

No. of Company C78445

**REGISTRY**

**RECEIVED**

- 6 JUN 2017

**OF COMPANIES**

Name of Company

**COMPANIES ACT, 1995**

**Notice of a pledge of securities**

**Pursuant to Section 122 (2)**

**PBM LIMITED**

**BG**

**09 JUN 2017**

Given by **MamoTCV Advocates – Dr. Nicholas Valenzia**

To the *Registrar of Companies*:

I hereby give notice in accordance with Section 122 (2) of the Companies Act, 1995 that with effect from 28<sup>th</sup> May, 2017 the undermentioned securities have been pledged.

Pledgor (Name and Address)	Pledgee (Name and Address)	Securities		
		Number	Kind	Value
<b>UNIFIED GLOBAL SERVICES GROUP LIMITED</b> Co. Reg. № 66837 /22, Parish Square, Melbourne, Australia.	<b>PHALANX HOLDING COMPANY, LLC</b> Co. Reg. № 4901076 1209, Orange Street, Wilmington, New Castle County, Delaware 19801, USA.	600	Ordinary	€1.00
<b>NICOLA BANDINI</b> Italian Passport № A1301870 P.O. BOX 77798, Khalifa Park, Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates.	<b>PHALANX HOLDING COMPANY, LLC</b> Co. Reg. № 4901076 1209, Orange Street, Wilmington, New Castle County, Delaware 19801, USA.	600	Ordinary	€1.0

Signature.....  
**Nicholas Valenzia**  
As duly authorized  
for and on behalf of the Pledgee

Dated this.....1<sup>ST</sup>.....day of June.....of the year 2017.

<sup>295</sup> Owned by Erik Prince. See figures 99.B.3 and .B.4.

Figure 99.B.3


Termination of pledge of shares to Phalanx Holding Company LLC (USA) signed by Erik Prince (21 July 2020)

Delivered by **Nicola Bandini**

To the Registrar of Companies:

I hereby give notice in accordance with Section 122 (15) of the Companies Act, 1995 that with effect from 21/07/2020 2020 the pledge of the undermentioned securities has been terminated.

Pledgor (Name & Address)	Pledgee (Name & Address)	Securities		
		Number	Type	Nominal Value
Unified Global Securities Group Ltd. 22, Parish St. John's, Malta Company Reg. No. 66837	Phalanx Holding Company, LLC Co. Reg. No. 001076 Wilmington, New Castle County, Delaware 19801, USA	600	Ordinary shares	€1
Nicola Bandini Via Casalone Di Val 53034 Italy Italian Passport Number YA1301870	Phalanx Holding Company, LLC Co. Reg. No. 001076 Wilmington, New Castle County, Delaware 19801, USA	600	Ordinary Shares	€1

Signature .....  .....  
Erik Prince  
For and on behalf of  
Phalanx Holding Company,  
LLC

Dated this 21 day of July of the year 2020

*This form must be completed in typed form.*

4. Further research establishes that Phalanx Holding Company LLR is registered to Erik Prince's home address in Virginia.

Figure 99.B.4

Identification of the use of Erik Prince's home address for registration of Phalanx Holding Company LLC (Virginia, USA)

**opencorporates**  
The Open Database Of The Corporate World

Company name or number  **SEARCH**

[Companies](#) [Officers](#) [Log in/Sign up](#)

## PHALANX HOLDING COMPANY LLC

**BRANCH**

**Company Number** T0464935  
**Status** Active  
**Incorporation Date** 9 May 2011 (almost 10 years ago)  
**Company Type** Foreign Limited Liability Company  
**Jurisdiction** [Virginia \(US\)](#)  
**Branch** Branch of PHALANX HOLDING COMPANY, LLC (Delaware (US))

**Registered Address** 23118 FOXCROFT  
 MIDDLEBURG  
 20118-0000  
 Virginia  
 United States

**Business Classification Text** GENERAL  
**Agent Name** C T CORPORATION SYSTEM  
**Agent Address** 4701 Cox Rd Ste 285, Glen Allen, Virginia, 23060-6808  
**Directors / Officers** [C T CORPORATION SYSTEM, agent](#)

**Company network**  
 Not yet available for this company. [Click to find out more](#)

**Latest Events**

- 2011-05-09 Incorporated
- 2011-05-09 - 2019-11-12 Addition of officer C T CORPORATION SYSTEM, agent
- 2019-12-03 - 2020-12-05 Change of name from 'PHALANX HOLDING COMPANY, LLC' to 'PHALANX HOLDING COMPANY LLC'

[See all events](#)

**Corporate Grouping** [USER CONTRIBUTED](#)  
 None known. [Add one now?](#)  
[See all corporate groupings](#)

**Similarly named companies**

[PHALANX HOLDING COMPANY, LLC](#) (Delaware (US), 19 Nov 2010- )

Source Commonwealth of Virginia State Corporation Commission, <https://cis.scc.virginia.gov/>, 28 Feb 2021



## Annex 100 Update on ChVK Wagner and Russian PMC operations and logistics<sup>296</sup>

### General

1. The Panel has obtained further information and records relating to ChVK Wagner operations and logistics additional to that reported in Panel report [S/2021/229](#).<sup>297</sup>

2. In early 2021 the BBC gained exclusive access to a Samsung electronic tablet left behind on a Libyan battlefield by a ChVK Wagner mercenary.<sup>298</sup> Their investigation was published on 10 and 11 August 2021.<sup>299</sup> The Panel has spoken to the BBC investigative team regarding the circumstances of the find and is assured of the chain of custody and continuity of evidence for the electronic tablet. Furthermore, although a single technical source, the electronic device contains tangible documentary and imagery evidence that makes it highly likely that the contents are authentic. Some of the information contained in the tablet has been corroborated by other sources (see below). Two confidential Panel sources with extensive knowledge of the ChVK Wagner organization, independent from the BBC, also considered the find of the electronic tablet and its contents as authentic.

3. The Samsung electronic tablet contained:

- (a) Over 42 military diagrammatic images for Russian designed fuzes, mines and booby-traps (see examples at appendix A);
- (b) Over twenty pages of Russian military low level tactical information on, for example, range finding through weapons sights, published by the Senior Service College of the Far East Department of Weapons and Marksmanship (author S.P. Proshchenkov) (see examples appendix B);<sup>300</sup> and
- (c) A mapping application software “All in One Offline Maps Plus”,<sup>301</sup> which had at least 35 locations of mines and booby traps displayed, as well as code names of fighters and fighting positions in the Ain Zara area of South Tripoli.



<sup>296</sup> There were a number of Russian PMC operating in Libya between 2019 and 2020. The Panel will only attribute an incident or activity to a named Russian PMC where evidential standards for attribution have been met. Otherwise, the term “Russian PMC” will be used.

<sup>297</sup> Primarily in p.32 and annex 77.

<sup>298</sup> The term “private military operative” was previously used in Panel reporting as evidential standards of ‘*direct participation in hostilities*’ by specifically ChVK Wagner personnel had not been met to allow the Panel to use the term ‘mercenary’ when referring to ChVK Wagner personnel. The term ‘mercenary’ when used in this document refers to ‘armed mercenary personnel’ as referenced in paragraph 9 of resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#). The information contained in this update provides evidence of ‘*direct participation in hostilities*’ by ChVK Wagner individuals thus allowing the Panel to make a definitive finding as to the “armed mercenary personnel” status of the individuals identified in Libya as operating for ChVK Wagner.

<sup>299</sup> <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-58009514>; and <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/extra/8iaz6xit26/the-lost-tablet-and-the-secret-documents>.

<sup>300</sup> Official UN translation 2108754E.

<sup>301</sup> [https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=net.psyberia.offlinemaps&hl=en\\_GB&gl=US](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=net.psyberia.offlinemaps&hl=en_GB&gl=US).

### Imagery of anti-personnel mines

4. The imagery included schematic diagrams of the Russian designed MON-50, POM-2 and PMN-2 anti-personnel mines (APM). The POM-2 and PMN-2 APM were reported as being first seen in Libya in Panel report [S/2021/229](#),<sup>302</sup> and were found to be violations of paragraph 9 of resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#) by a Russian PMC. Also see paragraphs 7 to 9 below for other equipment, weapons and ammunition requested in the logistic resupply documentation found on the electronic tablet, that were first seen in Libya during 2020.

### Mapping application - location of anti-personnel mines

5. The locations of thirty-five APM were indicated within the mapping application as shown in table 100.1 and in figure 100.1. The Panel has geo-referenced the locations shown to confirm the accuracy of the mapping application software. The Panel also confirmed that the area within which the mined locations are indicated on the mapping software was under the control of HAF, including his ChVK Wagner support, from the end of February 2020 until the HAF withdrawal in late May 2020. It was their frontline at that time, which explains the deployment of defensive command initiated anti-personnel mines such as the MON-50, 90 and 200 series. The Panel has further confirmed<sup>303</sup> that explosive hazards were removed from these specific locations by a combination of Libyan Ministry of Interior, military and NGO explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) teams as part of ongoing battlefield area clearance (BAC) operations in mid 2020. Examples of screenshots from the electronic tablet are at appendix C.

Table 100.1

#### Indicated locations of APM

#	ChVK #	Type	Location (Longitude and Latitude)		Remarks
1			32°46'36.33"N	13°17'02.69"N	
2			32°46'40.36"N	13°16'56.46"N	
3			32°46'21.96"N	13°16'51.43"N	
4			32°45'54.59"N	13°16'50.97"N	
5		Booby Trap	32°46'24.01"N	13°16'21.85"N	▪ Booby trapped F1 Grenade.
6		Command	32°46'23.52"N	13°16'21.33"N	▪ Possible remote controlled OZM APM.
7		Booby Trap	32°46'24.28"N	13°16'20.24"N	▪ Booby trapped F1 Grenade.
8			32°46'08.80"N	13°16'20.64"N	
9	A1		32°45'38.24"N	13°16'41.90"N	
10	A1		32°46'33.28"N	13°16'23.97"N	▪ Second A1 code location referenced.
11	A2		32°45'41.13"N	13°16'48.19"N	
12	A2		32°46'32.27"N	13°16'31.89"N	▪ Second A2 code location referenced.
13	A3		32°45'42.48"N	13°16'54.73"N	
14	A3		32°46'31.72"N	13°16'26.77"N	▪ Second A3 code location referenced.
15	A4		32°45'42.65"N	13°16'55.88"N	
16	A5		32°45'44.47"N	13°16'55.43"N	

<sup>302</sup> PMN-2 in table 6 and annex 67. POM-2R in table 6 and annex 70.


<sup>303</sup> Source: An operational demining organization in Libya.

#	ChVK #	Type	Location (Longitude and Latitude)		Remarks
17	A5		32°46'29.50"N	13°16'23.78"N	▪ Second A3 code location referenced.
18	A6		32°45'45.14"N	13°17'10.12"N	
19	A6		32°46'27.40"N	13°16'23.81"N	▪ Second A6 code location referenced.
20	A7		32°45'50.90"N	13°17'09.53"N	
21	A7		32°46'37.36"N	13°16'18.79"N	▪ Second A7 code location referenced. ▪ Two F3 EOD operators killed at 32° 46' 37.46N", 13°16'19.10"E by an OZM-72 on 5 July 2020. (8.5m between reported locations). <sup>a</sup>
22	A8		32°45'46.25"N	13°16'48.46"N	
23	A9		32°45'30.35"N	13°16'35.27"N	
24	A10		32°45'41.26"N	13°16'42.17"N	
25	A11		32°45'39.13"N	13°16'43.20"N	
26	T2		32°46'12.35"N	13°16'44.75"N	
27		MON-50	32°46'21.88"N	13°16'41.41"N	
28		MON-50	32°46'18.27"N	13°16'30.64"N	▪ Possibly remote initiated.
29		MON-50	32°46'19.33"N	13°16'28.80"N	
30		MON-50	32°46'21.46"N	13°16'21.21"N	
31		MON-50	32°46'21.20"N	13°16'27.13"N	
32		MON-50	32°46'23.08"N	13°16'25.52"N	
33		MON-90	32°46'24.75"N	13°16'31.35"N	
34		MON-90	32°46'24.45"N	13°16'31.98"N	
35		MON-200	32°46'22.64"N	13°16'32.18"N	

<sup>a</sup> **Source:** Accident report by an operational demining organization in Libya.

6. The locations at table 100.1 also includes some information as to the type of mine deployed. These include MON-50, MON-90, MON-200 and OZM-72, none of which have been reported as being in Libya before. The transfer of these mines to Libya is therefore a violation of paragraph 9 of resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#). Imagery of three of these mine types recovered by GNU-AF and Libyan NGO EOD teams in the Tripoli area is at appendix D.

Figure 100.1  
Indicated locations of APM from mapping software



5. The Panel also received information<sup>304</sup> regarding the recovery during Summer 2020 of booby-trapped TM-62M anti-tank mines from positions previously occupied by, primarily, ChVK Wagner operatives in Southern Tripoli (see figure 100.2).<sup>305</sup>

Figure 100.2

**TM-62M mine with booby trap**



**IHL and indiscriminate use of explosive ordnance**

6. When employing explosive weapons in their military operations, Russian PMC operatives were obliged under IHL to respect the prohibition of indiscriminate attacks and to take all feasible precautionary measures to protect civilians from the indiscriminate effects of those weapons.<sup>306</sup> These measures should include: (a) the visible marking of mines and other explosive devices; (b) issuing effective warnings on the emplacement of these devices to the local civilian population; and (c) removing or facilitating their removal upon the end of active hostilities.

7. The Panel found that ChVK Wagner operatives did not take the required precautions when they laid the thirty-five APMs (table 100.1 above) in urban locations of the Ain Zara municipality that were likely to be used by civilians after their withdrawal. This failure to avoid, or at least to minimize, incidental effects of the deployed ordnance on the civilian population and civilian objects rendered their method of warfare unlawful under IHL.<sup>307</sup>

8. In at least one case on 5 July 2020, shortly after the withdrawal of the ChVK Wagner operatives from their positions in Ain Zara, a booby-trapped mine (serial 21 in table 100.1 above) unexpectedly detonated during an EOD clearance operation. This resulted in the indiscriminate death of two civilian EOD operators.<sup>308</sup> The device was unmarked and attached to a harmless object inside a civilian house (see appendix F). The two victims, who did not take a direct part in the hostilities, were staff members of a mine action non-governmental organisation deployed to remove mines, booby-traps and other explosive devices from the populated area of Ain Zara.

<sup>304</sup> Confidential source in the mine action community (19 January 2022).

<sup>305</sup> The use of ML-8 anti lift initiators was reported in S/2019/229.

<sup>306</sup> Customary International Humanitarian Law [CIHL] rules 1, 11-12, and 15.

<sup>307</sup> CIHL rules 80-83. *See also* CIHL rule 15.

<sup>308</sup> Confidential sources within mine action organizations operational in Libya. The Panel has copies of the death certificates.

9. The Panel further found that Russian PMC operatives did not take the required precautions when they laid the TM-62M booby trapped anti-tank mines (figure 100.2 above) in an urban location along the civilian road in Southern Tripoli, which was expected to be used by civilians after the withdrawal of the PMC operatives.<sup>309</sup> This failure to avoid, or at least to minimize, incidental effects of the deployed ordnance on the civilian population and civilian objects rendered their method of warfare unlawful under IHL.<sup>310</sup>

10. The method in which ChVK Wagner operatives emplaced the thirty-five APMs and the Russian PMC operatives the TM-62M booby trapped anti-tank mines, without any feasible precautionary measures, also heavily undermined the safe return of the displaced civilians to their homes as well as the protection of those civilian organizations mandated to carry out mine clearance as a specific measure to facilitate the right of the displaced civilians to voluntary return in safety to their homes or places of habitual residence as soon as the reasons for their displacement ceased to exist.<sup>311</sup>

### Mapping application - tactical information

11. The mapping application software data also contained tactical information such as names and unit identifiers. These are at table 100.2 for reference.

Table 100.2

#### Tactical information

#	Data	Panel analysis	Remarks
1	Red Dot	ChVK Wagner location	
2	Blue Dot	Enemy / GNU-AF	
3	Yellow Dot	LNA / HAF	
4	Purple Dot	Not confirmed	▪ Possibly 'Protective Fire' (PF) <sup>a</sup> or 'Final Protective Fire' (FPF) <sup>b</sup> locations.
5	Black Dot	Mines, booby traps or IEDs.	
6	Light Blue Dot	Not confirmed	
7	"Diver"	Unknown	▪ Possible code name of fighter.
8	"German"	Code name of fighter	▪ Three Wagner operatives are known to use this nickname. <sup>c</sup>
9	"Himmler"	Code name of fighter	
10	"Metla"	Fedor Andreevich METELKIN	▪ Wagner # M-1913. <sup>d</sup>
11	"Spirits"	Enemy	▪ "Spirits" is ChVK Wagner nickname for ISIS in Syria, so could mean similar here.

<sup>309</sup> Civilian casualties due to UXO were reported in this area during the summer of 2020. Confidential source in the mine action community (19 January 2022).

<sup>310</sup> CIHL rules 80-83.

<sup>311</sup> CIHL rule 132.



<sup>a</sup> ‘Protective fire’ refers to a tactical fire plan for a military unit, pre-set up to protect itself against overwhelming attack. It involves the pre-laying and concentration of all support weapons fire (heavy machine gun, artillery, mortar and air support) directly in front of the unit to impede enemy movement.

<sup>b</sup> As the “final” in the name implies, this is the last resort in defensive plans, involving weapons fire directed dangerously close to friendly defensive positions that are at risk of being overrun by the enemy. An FPF request has absolute priority over any other kind of fire support request.

<sup>c</sup> 1) Makarov (DOB 6 Jan 1994); 2) Ivanovich Apes (Wagner # M2206); and 3) Alexander Alexanderovich (Wagner # M-0176).

<sup>d</sup> <https://myrotvorets.center/criminal/metelkin-fedor-andreevich/>.

## Logistic resupply documentation

12. The electronic tablet also stored a ten-page document dated 19 January 2020, which included a list of the weapons and equipment required for various sub-units within ChVK Wagner in Libya. The document is at appendix E together with an official UN translation.<sup>312</sup> Within this document are code names or nick names of senior ChVK Wagner staff who are mentioned within, or contributed to, the document. These are at table 100.3. A summary of the equipment requested is at appendix G.

Table 100.3

**Identification of report name mentions and contributors**

Page #	Codename	Panel identification	Remarks
1	Director General	Highly probably Yevgeny PRIGOZHIN	
1	Lipetsk	Libya	
1	Zurab		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Senior Signals Officer.</li> <li>New in position as Head of Communications.</li> </ul>
1	The Nineth	Dimitry UTKIN	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Utkin is known as “the nineth”. This is based on his Wagner number M-0209. The Panel assesses that the hand written word “DA” in Cyrillic appears in the document next to the typed “nineth”, meaning “Yes” has been written as a personal approval for the transfer.<sup>313</sup></li> </ul>
2	Bonya		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Senior Intelligence Officer.</li> <li>Probably a former district police officer from the Asiatic regions.</li> <li>Been with Wagner since 2014 but still unidentified.</li> </ul>
5	Chukcha	Kirill Vladimirovich TIKHONOVIC	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>M-0379</li> <li>Commander, Assault Team 6.</li> <li>DoB 16 March 1984</li> </ul>

<sup>312</sup> 2107434E.

<sup>313</sup> This assessment is agreed by two confidential sources with extensive knowledge of the ChVK Wagner Organization. The Panel has seen other documents authenticated as genuine ChVK Wagner documents where both the Cyrillic initials “DU” and “DA” appear in the same handwriting as approval signatures.

Page #	Codename	Panel identification	Remarks
7	'1374'		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Commander, Assault Team 1.</li> <li>M-1374 personal number is assigned to Leonardovich Vasiliiy PIVNEV.</li> </ul>
9	Lotus	Possibly Alexander Antolievich TISHCHENKO	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Commander, Assault Team 7.</li> </ul>
12	Cap <sup>314</sup>	Probably Alexey Vasilievich KLOKOV	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Commander, Assault Team 2.</li> <li>DoB 14 October 1973</li> </ul>

13. The Panel notes that the equipment list contains equipment, weapons and ammunition not previously seen in Libya before 2020, and reported for the first time in Panel report [S/2021/229](#): (a) MIC VPL *Tigr*-M armoured vehicles;<sup>315</sup> (b) KBP RPO-A *Schmel* Thermobaric Munitions;<sup>316</sup> (c) VOG-17M 30mm Grenades; and (d) VOG-25 40mm Grenades.<sup>317</sup> These were all found by the Panel to be violations of paragraph 9 of resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#) by a Russian PMC.

14. Other weapons on the equipment list have been identified by the Panel as being newly present in Libya during 2021, and are reported on elsewhere in the report: (a) AK-103 Assault Rifles manufactured in 2020 (annex 52); and (b) *Steyr* SSG 08 anti-materiel rifle (annex 65).

15. The Panel noted that some military materiel requested in the equipment list are technologically advanced systems that have only very recently been made available for operational use. The systems include: (a) the *Ironiya* electro-optical system (serial 17 to table 100.E.1), which was first seen publicly in April 2019;<sup>318</sup> (b) the 1L277 *Sobolyatnik* battlefield surveillance radar (see serial 11 to table 100.E.1), which have only been seen operationally deployed since 2018.<sup>319</sup>

16. The Panel is currently investigating how much of the requested equipment was physically supplied, if any, to ChVK Wagner in Libya.

#### Media response to BBC coverage in Russia

17. Media outlets closely linked to, or controlled by, Yevgeny Prigozhin<sup>320</sup> have heavily criticised the initial BBC report.<sup>321</sup> RIAFAN (a.k.a the Federal News Agency)<sup>322</sup> stated the BBC report was “...an assortment of inventions, rumours, falsified materials and fakes which have been disproved many times”.

<sup>314</sup> Another Wagner mercenary with this nickname, Alexander Viktorovich UMANSKY (M-1181), was previously killed in operations elsewhere.

<sup>315</sup> Annex 63.

<sup>316</sup> Annex 60.

<sup>317</sup> Annex 77. VOG-17 and VOG-25.

<sup>318</sup> <https://avia-pro.net/news/rossiyskiy-optiko-elektronnyy-kompleks-ironiya-vpervye-pokazali-publike>.

<sup>319</sup>

[https://www.armyrecognition.com/june\\_2020\\_news\\_defense\\_global\\_security\\_army\\_industry/russian\\_airborne\\_forces\\_receive\\_sobolyatnik\\_portable\\_radar.html](https://www.armyrecognition.com/june_2020_news_defense_global_security_army_industry/russian_airborne_forces_receive_sobolyatnik_portable_radar.html), 23 June 2020.

<sup>320</sup> Mentioned as connected with ChVK Wagner in Panel report [S/2021/229](#) (annex 77 and appendix A to annex 77).

<sup>321</sup> <https://monitoring.bbc.co.uk/country/LBY?preview=true>. Subscription.

<sup>322</sup> <https://riafan.ru/1502678-professionalizm-lzhi-vasserman-obyasnil-cel-filma-vvs-o-rossiyanakh-v-livii>. This is also commonly referred to as the “Troll Factory”.

18. The RIAFAN response was reprised in other media outlets<sup>323</sup> within the Prigozhin controlled Patriot Media group.<sup>324</sup> RIAFAN questioned the chain of custody of the electronic tablet and the continuity of the evidence contained within it.

19. Key to the RIAFAN response was that some of the locations within the mapping application were under the control of the GNU-AF and “Tripoli gangs” in 2019. This is true, but irrelevant as they later came under control of HAF and ChVK Wagner (see paragraph 4).

20. RIAFAN also reported that they had interviewed an individual mentioned in the report, Fedor METELKIN (“Metla”), who denied being in Libya and that he worked on a construction site.

#### Communications liaison between ChVK Wagner and HAF

21. The Panel obtained a copy of a separate handwritten document<sup>325</sup> that contained receipts from HAF officers for the delivery of BauFeng UV-5R series hand-held radios.<sup>326</sup> Two independent confidential Panel sources with extensive knowledge of the ChVK Wagner organization considered the document as credible and authentic. The Panel has also confirmed that the names of the HAF officials accurately reflect the command appointments reflected in the document. A copy of the original documentation and official UN translation is at appendix H, and summarised in table 100.4 below:

Table 100.4

Summary of communication receipts

<i>Receipt #</i>	<i>ChVK Wagner name</i>	<i>HAF Official in receipt</i>	<i>Communication device</i>	<i>Quantity</i>
2	Zurab <sup>a</sup>	lieutenant colonel Omar Mraji'i Hasan commander, Tareq Bin Ziyad battalion	BauFeng UV-5R	20
3	Zurab	major general Salih Abbudah battlefield commander	BauFeng UV-5R	10
4	Zurab	major general Ahmad Salim commander, second division	BauFeng 5R	10
5	Zurab	major general Ahmad Salim commander, second division	BauFeng UV-5R	15

<sup>323</sup> Economics Today (<https://rueconomics.ru/537270-tehnologiya-voiny-obmana-fedorov-ocenil-psevdorassledovanie-vbs-rossiyanah-v-livii>), <https://rueconomics.ru/537265-fan-ukazal-na-somnitelnye-istochniki-v-rassledovanii-bbc-o-livii>, <https://rueconomics.ru/537186-fan-anonsiroval-razoblachenie-rassledovaniya-bbc-o-livii>; <https://rueconomics.ru/537256-zvenya-zapadnoi-propagandy-manukyan-obyasnil-chto-stoit-za-rassledovaniem-bbc-o-livii>; Info Reactor (<https://infoactor.ru/385841-v-afrike-nikogda-ne-byl-figurant-rassledovaniya-o-rossiyanah-otvetil-na-publikaciyu-bbc>; <https://infoactor.ru/385834-peredacha-plansheta-v-ruki-zhurnalistov-sdelala-bespoleznoi-glavnuyu-uliku-rassledovaniya-vvs>); PolitRos (<https://politros.com/217387-bbc-pytalos-vydat-fail-iz-word-office-za-dokazatelstvo-prisutstviya-rossiyan-v-livii>); and PolitExpert (<https://politexpert.net/256930-fan-zametil-fakticheskie-oshibki-v-rassledovanii-bbc-o-livii-skom-konflikte>).

<sup>324</sup> <https://mediapatriot.ru/o-mediagruppe/>.

<sup>325</sup> Confidential source.

<sup>326</sup> <https://baofengtech.com/product/uv-5r/>.

<i>Receipt #</i>	<i>ChVK Wagner name</i>	<i>HAF Official in receipt</i>	<i>Communication device</i>	<i>Quantity</i>
6	Zurab	major general Ahmad Salim commander, second division	BauFeng UV-5R	50
7	Zurab	lieutenant colonel Omar Mraji'i commander, Tareq Bin Ziyad battalion	BauFeng 5R	5
8	Zurab	major general Ahmad Salim commander, second division	BauFeng 5R	5
9	Zurab	major general Ahmad Salim commander, second division	BauFeng UV-5R	10
11	Zurab	Ali al-Ghazwi <sup>b</sup> western region operations room	BauFeng UV-5R	2
12	Zurab	Ali al-Ghazwi western region operations room	BauFeng UV-5R	10
?	Zurab	major general Salih Abbudah battlefield commander forward operations room western region operations room	BauFeng UV-5R	50

<sup>a</sup> See table 27.3.

<sup>b</sup> a.k.a Mabrouk Al Ghazwi.

22. The Panel assesses that the radios were supplied to ensure deconfliction between the armed groups during low-level tactical operations within a 5km area. The radios are readily available consumer items, insecure and obsolescent. Nevertheless, they are cheap, simple to operate, can be pre-programmed to operate on specific frequencies and are expendable.

#### Verified open-source information

23. A social media page for the mercenary community,<sup>327</sup> known as Reverse Side of the Medal (RSOTM), has recently begun to display imagery of ChVK Wagner in Libya that was verified by geo-location or from other sources.<sup>328</sup>

<sup>327</sup> <https://twitter.com/RSOTM>.

<sup>328</sup> For example:

<https://twitter.com/RSOTM/status/1403061848665112588>, 10 June 2021 (@0.31 minutes) (geo-located ;  
<https://twitter.com/RSOTM/status/1420379513712746499>, 28 July 2021;  
<https://twitter.com/RSOTM/status/1431663037866446851>, 28 August 2021 (by geo-location); and  
<https://twitter.com/RSOTM/status/1431657243603259401>, 28 August 2021 (by geo-location).

24. Other social media video imagery<sup>329</sup> contains evidence of ChVK Wagner in Libya. This video, geo-located by the Panel, shows a mixed ChVK Wagner and HAF 106 brigade convoy entering Bani Walid in late May 2020. The image at figure 100.2 provides evidence of ChVK Wagner / HAF interoperability as the vehicle is painted in the distinctive “Africa” camouflage used exclusively by HAF 106 brigade.



Figure 100.2

**HAF 106 brigade ‘Africa’ camouflage**



<sup>329</sup> <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tt2ne2So5sQ>, 26 May 2020.

Appendix A to Annex 100: Low level tactical publications (example)





## Appendix B to Annex 100: Diagrams of fuzes, mines and booby traps (example)



## ВЗРЫВНЫЕ УСТРОЙСТВА

### ВЗРЫВЧАТЫЕ ВЕЩЕСТВА

Взрывчатые вещества (ВВ) называются соединениями, способными к самопроизвольному или инициированному взрыву. В зависимости от назначения ВВ делятся на взрывчатые вещества для подрыва и взрывчатые вещества для инициирования взрыва.

ВВ	Плотность, г/см³	Взрывчатость, %	Скорость взрыва, м/с
Триггер	1,38	4000	4000
Триггер	1,79	4000	4000
Триггер	1,77	3000	3000
Триггер	1,80	3000	3000
Триггер	1,42	4000	4000
Триггер	1,5-1,8	3000-5000	3000-5000
Триггер	1,3-1,7	3000-5000	3000-5000
Триггер	4,4	1740	1740
Триггер	4,3	1350	1350
Триггер	5,38	845	845

### ВЗРЫВООПАСНЫЕ ВЕЩЕСТВА

Взрывоопасные вещества (ВОВ) называются соединениями, способными к самопроизвольному или инициированному взрыву. В зависимости от назначения ВОВ делятся на взрывоопасные вещества для подрыва и взрывоопасные вещества для инициирования взрыва.

### ВЗРЫВООПАСНЫЕ ВЕЩЕСТВА

Взрывоопасные вещества (ВОВ) называются соединениями, способными к самопроизвольному или инициированному взрыву. В зависимости от назначения ВОВ делятся на взрывоопасные вещества для подрыва и взрывоопасные вещества для инициирования взрыва.

### СХЕМЫ ВЗРЫВНЫХ УСТРОЙСТВ

Взрывные устройства (ВУ) представляют собой технические средства, предназначенные для взрыва. В зависимости от назначения ВУ делятся на взрывные устройства для подрыва и взрывные устройства для инициирования взрыва.

### ВЗРЫВНЫЕ УСТРОЙСТВА ЗАВОДСКОГО ИЗГОТОВЛЕНИЯ

ВЗУ представляют собой технические средства, предназначенные для взрыва. В зависимости от назначения ВЗУ делятся на ВЗУ для подрыва и ВЗУ для инициирования взрыва.

### САМОДЕЛЬНЫЕ ВЗРЫВНЫЕ УСТРОЙСТВА

СВЗУ представляют собой технические средства, предназначенные для взрыва. В зависимости от назначения СВЗУ делятся на СВЗУ для подрыва и СВЗУ для инициирования взрыва.

### ВЗРЫВАТЕЛИ

Взрыватели (ВЗ) представляют собой технические средства, предназначенные для взрыва. В зависимости от назначения ВЗ делятся на ВЗ для подрыва и ВЗ для инициирования взрыва.

### ТЕХНИЧЕСКИЕ СРЕДСТВА ПОИСКА ВЗ

ТСПВ представляют собой технические средства, предназначенные для поиска ВЗ. В зависимости от назначения ТСПВ делятся на ТСПВ для подрыва и ТСПВ для инициирования взрыва.

### МЕРЫ БЕЗОПАСНОСТИ ПРИ ОБНАРУЖЕНИИ ВЗ

МБПВ представляют собой меры безопасности, предназначенные для обнаружения ВЗ. В зависимости от назначения МБПВ делятся на МБПВ для подрыва и МБПВ для инициирования взрыва.

## РУЧНЫЕ ОСКОЛОЧНЫЕ ГРАНАТЫ

### РГД-5

РГД-5 представляет собой ручную осколочную гранату. В зависимости от назначения РГД-5 делятся на РГД-5 для подрыва и РГД-5 для инициирования взрыва.

### Ф-1

Ф-1 представляет собой ручную осколочную гранату. В зависимости от назначения Ф-1 делятся на Ф-1 для подрыва и Ф-1 для инициирования взрыва.

### ОСНОВНЫЕ ЧАСТИ

ОСЧ представляют собой основные части гранаты. В зависимости от назначения ОСЧ делятся на ОСЧ для подрыва и ОСЧ для инициирования взрыва.

### ОСНОВНЫЕ ВОЕНЫЕ СВОЙСТВА РУЧНЫХ ОСКОЛОЧНЫХ ГРАНАТ

Вид гранаты	РГД-5	Ф-1	РГН	РГО
Масса, кг	4,0	4,0	4,0	4,0
Длина, мм	170	170	170	170
Диаметр, мм	40	40	40	40
Скорость полета, м/с	30	30	30	30
Дальность полета, м	100	100	100	100
Время задержки, с	3-5	3-5	3-5	3-5

### ОБЩЕЕ УСТРОЙСТВО

ОУ представляет собой общее устройство гранаты. В зависимости от назначения ОУ делятся на ОУ для подрыва и ОУ для инициирования взрыва.

### УДАРНО-ДИСТАНЦИОННЫЙ ЗАПАЛ УДЗ


УДЗ представляет собой ударно-дистанционный запал. В зависимости от назначения УДЗ делятся на УДЗ для подрыва и УДЗ для инициирования взрыва.

### УДАРНО-ДИСТАНЦИОННЫЙ ЗАПАЛ УДЗ

УДЗ представляет собой ударно-дистанционный запал. В зависимости от назначения УДЗ делятся на УДЗ для подрыва и УДЗ для инициирования взрыва.



# Appendix C to Annex 100: Mapping software mine and booby trap locations (examples)



## Appendix D to Annex 100: Imagery of explosive ordnance recovered from old ChVK Wagner locations

MON-50 APM



MON-90 APM



OZM-72 APM



### Primary sources

1. @lpc.ly Twitter, 3 September 2021.
2. www.napd.com, 3 September 2021.
3. <https://twitter.com/Oded121351/status/1434439691340759043>, 5 September 2021.
4. customer.janes.com. (Subscription). 7 September 2021.
5. CAR-UXO. 7 September 2021.

Developed by UN Panel of Experts.




# Appendix E to Annex 100: ChVK logistic resupply documentation (original: left; translation: right)<sup>330</sup>


Генеральному директору

Заявка

В целях обеспечения выполнения боевой задачи на направлении «Липецк» прошу Вас о закупке средств связи:

1. Радиостанции для установки на автомобили и бронеемкости Motorola DM 4600 – 70 шт.
2. Антенна AW-6 UHF – 70 шт.
3. Кабельная сборка – 70 комплектов (кабель питания для подключения радиостанции к АКБ, кабельная сборка для подключения радиостанции к антенне с креплением, переходник антенный BU-312).
4. Радиостанция носимая Motorola DP 4400 (комплект 2АКБ, зарядное устройство) – 190 комплектов. (замена радиостанций старого парка Motorola DP-1400, Вертекс)
5. Рюкзак носимый с радиостанцией Motorola DM 4600 с АКБ Li-Po 2 шт., с карманом под радиостанцию и с карманом под АКБ, зарядным устройством, антенная сборка для подключения радиостанции к антенне-8 метров с креплением, кабельная сборка антенной AW-6 UHF – 20 комплектов.
6. Квадрокоптер DJI Mavic 2 Pro с ночной камерой 20 комплектов.
7. Смартфон с SD картой 64 Gb для установки программы All-In-One Offline Maps-30 штук.
8. Ларингофонная гарнитура для радиостанции Motorola DP 4400-4600-500 штук.

Начальник связи  «Зураб»  
«19» января 2020г.

Согласовано:  
Командир БрГ  «Девятый»

UN Translation 2107434E  
Translated from Russian

Attn: Director General

## Requisition note

I hereby request the purchase of the following communication equipment to ensure the success of the Lipetsk [LIBYA] combat mission:

1. Motorola DM4600 radio to be installed in vehicles and armoured vehicles, 70 units.
2. AW-6 UHF antenna, 70 units.
3. Set of cables, 70 sets (a power cable to connect the radio to the battery, a set of cables and mount for connecting the radio to the antenna and a BU-312 antenna adapter).
4. Motorola DP4400 wearable radio (in a set with two batteries and charging device), 190 sets (replacements for the old Motorola DP1400, Vertex, radios).
5. A backpack for carrying a Motorola DM4600 radio with two lithium polymer batteries, with a pocket for the radio and another for the battery, charging device, antenna assembly with mount for connecting the radio to an eight-meter antenna, and a cable assembly for the AW-6 UHF antenna, 20 sets.
6. DJI Mavic 2 Pro quadcopter with night vision camera, 20 sets.
7. Smartphone with a 64 GB SD card for installing the All-in-One Offline Maps application, 30 units.
8. Throat microphone for Motorola DP4400 and DP4600 radios, 500 units.

[Signed] “Zurab”

Senior signals officer

19 January 2020

Approved by: [Signed] “The Ninth”, Brigade commander

<sup>330</sup> Only two pages of the ten have been included due to document size limitations.

Командиру бригады

Заявка

Для выполнения боевых задач на направлении «Липецк», СШГ «Трак» требуется следующая техника, вооружение, оптические приборы и средства связи:

**I. Бронетехника**

1. БТР-82 – 2 ед.
2. БМП-2 – 1 ед.
3. Т-72Б – 1 ед.
4. Пикап LandCruzer 70 с ЗУ-23 – 4 ед.
5. Пикап LandCruzer 70 (бронированный) – 5 ед.

**II. Вооружение**

1. Комплекс ПЗРК «Верба» 9К333 с РЛС-1Л122 модификация 2Е – 2 ед.
2. 120мм миномет 2Б11 (1ШО и ШГ «Легион») – 6 ед.
3. ПТУР «КОРНЕТ» – 3 ед.
4. 7,62мм ПКН – 8 ед.
5. АС «БП30» ВАЛ – 3 ед.
6. 9мм АПС – 40 ед.
7. 9мм ПБ «БП9» – 6 ед.
8. 7,62 мм ПБС – 20 шт.
9. Полуавтоматическое ружьё 12кал. – 16 шт.

**III. Боеприпасы**

1. ПГ-7 (осколочный) – 50 шт.
2. 7,62x39 УС – 28000 шт.
3. 9x56мм ПАБ-9 – 5000 шт.
4. МРО-А – 100 шт.
5. РПО – 50 шт.
6. Патрон 12 кал.(картечь) – 2000 шт.
7. Патрон 12 кал. (пуля) – 2000 шт.
8. Ракеты для ПТУР «Корнет» – 60 шт.

**IV. Оптические приборы**

1. ППН93-3 (ПКН) – 10 шт.
2. ППН93-1АС – 6 шт.
3. ЛЦУ с возможностью крепления на планку «Тикатинни» на АК – 10 шт.

**V. Средства связи**

1. Гарнитура для радиостанции Motorola DP – 60 шт.
2. Квадрокоптер с возможностью ночной съемки и зумом – 4 шт.
3. Активные наушники – 60 шт.

19.01.2020г. Командир 1ШО \_\_\_\_\_ «1374»

*Липецк, 19.01.2020г.  
Полковник  
ДМ-4600-13-2020  
ДР-4600-13-2020*

Attn: Brigade commander

**Requisition note**

The following equipment, munitions, optical devices and communications equipment are required to carry out the Lipetsk and [unknown abbreviation:] SShG Trak combat missions:

**I. Armoured vehicles**

1. BTR-82 armoured personnel carrier, two units.
2. BMP-2 armoured personnel carrier, one unit.
3. T-72B tank, one unit.
4. Land Cruiser Pickup 70 with ZU-23 gun, four units.
5. Land Cruise Pickup 70 (armoured), five units.

**II. Munitions**

1. 9k333 Verba shoulder-fired air-defence missile system with 1L122-2E radar, two units.
2. 120-mm 2B11 mortar (for Assault Team 1 and the Legion assault group), six units.
3. Kornet anti-tank guided missile system, three units.
4. 7.62-mm PKN night-vision Kalashnikov machine gun, eight units.
5. AS Val assault rifle (GRAU designation 6P30), three units.
6. 9-mm Stechkin automatic pistol, 40 units.
7. 9-mm PB silent pistol (Russian armed forces (GRAU) index 6P9), six units.
8. 7.62-mm PBS silencer, 20 units.
9. 12-gauge semi-automatic shotgun, 16 units.

**III. Ammunition**

1. PG-7 (fragmentation) rocket, 50 units.
2. Subsonic 7.62 x 39 ammunition, 28,000 rounds.
3. 9 x 56 mm PAB-9 ammunition, 5,000 rounds.
4. MRO-A sighting device, 100 units.
5. RPO rocket, 50 units.
6. 12-gauge cartridge (buckshot), 2,000 rounds.
7. 12-gauge cartridge (bullet), 2,000 rounds.
8. Rockets for the Kornet anti-tank guided missile system, 60 units.



IV. Optical devices	
1. 1PN93-3 night sight (for night-vision Kalashnikov machine gun), 10 units.	
2. 1PN93-1 night sight for assault rifle, six units.	
3. Laser designator with Picatinny rail mount for Kalashnikov assault rifle, 10 units.	
V. Communications equipment	
1. Motorola DP radio headset, 60 units.	
2. Quadcopter with night vision and zoom, four units.	
3. Noise-cancelling headphones, 60 units.	
	[Handwritten note:]
	Throat microphone, 100 units
	DM4600 [illegible]
	DP4400 [illegible]
19 January 2020	
	"1374"
	Commander, Assault Team 1

Engineer operations	
UR-83 mine clearing system, three units	
ZTP-50, 150 and 300 fuses	
Portable manual mine clearance kits, 20 units	
PM-4 blasting machine, 10 units	
Green camouflage netting (3.5 x 6), 30 units	
Metal detectors, five units	
Understaffing of 60 persons (maximum age: 40; maximum weight: 100 kg)	
19 January 2020	
	"Cap"
	Commander, Assault Team 2

## Appendix F to Annex 100: Imagery from the 5 July 2020 explosion site

Figure 100.F.1

Overview of incident site (5 July 2020)



Figure 100.F.2

Location of victims (5 July 2020)



Source: Confidential source.

## Appendix G to Annex 100: Summary of major equipment requested by ChVK Wagner in Libya

Table 100.G.1

### Major equipment requested by ChVK Wagner in Libya

#	Generic Type	Equipment <sup>a</sup>	Signals	Intelligence	Assault Team 1	Assault Team 2	Assault Team 6	Assault Team 7	Totals	Remarks
1	Communications	Antenna AW-6 UHF	70						70	
2		Antenna AW-6 UHF Cable Assembly	20						20	
3		Motorola DM 4400 Radio	190		UID	21	46	UID	257+	
4		Motorola DM 4600 Radio	70		UID <sup>331</sup>	25	63	UID	155+	
5		Throat Microphones	500						500	
6		64GB SD Card Smartphone	30						30	
7	UAV <sup>332</sup>	DJI Mavic Pro 2 (Night Vision Version) or similar	20		4	10	5	4	43	For guiding 152mm Laser Guided Projectiles.
8		Orlan 30 UAV		UID					UID	
9		<b>Orlan 10 UAV</b>		4					4	
10	Electro Optics	1L-122-2E Radar			1				1	Entered operational service in 2018.
11		1L227 Sobolyatnik Radar		15					15	
12		1PN93-1 NVS <sup>333</sup>			6		270		276	
13		1PN93-3 NVS			10		12	11	33	
14		DEDAL 370 NVS						12	12	
15		DEDAL DVS-8 NVS				15		18	33	
16		Fortuna 40L6 Thermal Sight					24	9	33	

<sup>331</sup> Requested but quantity unidentified.

<sup>332</sup> Unmanned Aerial Vehicles.

<sup>333</sup> Night Vision Sight.

#	Generic Type	Equipment <sup>a</sup>	Signals	Intelligence	Assault Team 1	Assault Team 2	Assault Team 6	Assault Team 7	Totals	Remarks
17		Ironiya Electro-Optical		9		UID		1	10+	First seen operationally in 2019
18		LPR-1 Laser Range Finder						2	2	
19		LPR-3 Laser Range Finder						4	4	
20		Quaker Night Vision Goggles					72		72	
21	Electronic Warfare	Silok EWS <sup>334</sup>		6					6	
22	AFV / AIFV <sup>335</sup>	T-72 Main Battle Tank			2		4		6	
23		BMP-2			2	3	6	1	12	
24		BTR-82 APC			2	3			5	
25		Gorets APC <sup>336</sup>					4		4	
26		Tigyr					6	8	14	
27	Vehicles	Toyota Land Cruiser			9	18	44		71	
28	Weapons	Anti-Materiel Rifle					4		4	
29		AK-103 Assault Rifle					270		270	
30		AS VAL Assault Rifle			3	9	8		20	
31		AS VSS Sniper Rifle				3			3	
32		ASVK Kord Sniper Rifle				6			6	
33		GP-25 Grenade Launcher					28		28	
34		GP-30 Grenade Launcher				22			22	
35		<b>Kornet ATGW</b> <sup>337</sup>			3	3	4		10	
36		Makarov 9mm Pistol				20		15	35	
37		NSVS Utes 12.7mm Heavy Machine Gun				4			4	
38		PB 6P9 9mm Silent Pistol			6				6	
39		PKM Light Machine Gun				12	16	11	39	

<sup>334</sup> Electronic Warfare System.

<sup>335</sup> Armoured Fighting Vehicles / Armoured Infantry Fighting Vehicles.

<sup>336</sup> Armoured Personnel Carrier.

<sup>337</sup> Anti-Tank Guided Weapon.

#	Generic Type	Equipment <sup>a</sup>	Signals	Intelligence	Assault Team 1	Assault Team 2	Assault Team 6	Assault Team 7	Totals	Remarks
40		RG6 40mm Grenade Launcher				10			10	
41		Shotgun 12 Gauge			16			12	28	
42		Stechkin 9mm Pistol			40	20	24	28	112	
43		SVD 7.62mm Sniper Rifle						7	7	
44		Verba 9K333 MANPADS <sup>338</sup>			2	UID			2+	
45		<b>ZSU-23-2 Cannon</b>			2	10	6		18	
46		ZPU 57mm Cannon				7			7	
47		2B11 120mm Mortar			6			3	9	
48	Ammunition	MRO-A Rockets					UID		UID	
49		OG-7 Rockets				UID			UID	
50		PG-7 Rockets			50				50	
51		RDG-5 Hand Grenades				UID			UID	
52		RPG-26				UID	UID		UID	
53		RPO-A			50		UID		50+	
54		Stun Grenades				UID			UID	
55		TBG-7B Thermobaric Rockets				UID			UID	
56		UR-83 Mine Clearance System				3			3	
57		<b>VOG-17 Grenades</b>					UID	450	450+	
58		<b>VOG-25 Grenades</b>					UID		UID	
59		ZTP-50 Fuze Firing Device				UID			UID	
60		ZTP-150 Fuze Firing Device				UID			UID	
61		ZTP-300 Fuze Firing Device				UID			UID	
62		<b>9M133 Kornet ATGM</b>			60				60	
63		<b>7.62 x 39mm Rounds Ball</b>			28,000				28,000	
64		<b>7.62 x 39mm Rounds Link</b>						10,000	10,000	
65		9 x 56mm PAB-9 Rounds			5,000				5,000	

<sup>338</sup> Man Portable Air Defence System.

#	Generic Type	Equipment <sup>a</sup>	Signals	Intelligence	Assault Team 1	Assault Team 2	Assault Team 6	Assault Team 7	Totals	Remarks
66		<b>12.7mm Rounds Link</b>						5,000	5,000	
67		12 Gauge Pellet			2,000			1,200	3,200	
68		12 Gauge Solid Shot			2,000				2,000	
69		23mm Rounds						UID	UID	

<sup>a</sup> The equipment in **bold** has been identified as being in Libya in violation of the arms embargo.



# Appendix H to Annex 100: HAF receipts for communications equipment from ChVK Wagner<sup>339</sup>

Акт № 7

Приема-передача радиостанции  
"Турбо-сиг" (Baofeng-UV-5R) в количестве  
5 (пяти) комплектов от представителя  
организации "Эраб", батальон Тарик  
Бен Зиян.

محمد زكريا

تسليم واستلام الأجهزة اللاسلكية  
مقدم التلقيم: القوات المسلحة العربية الليبية  
اللاسلكية Turbo-Sky (Baofeng-UV-5R) لا مصنع الصين (Baofeng-SR)  
و ذلك بعدد 5 (خمسة) جهاز لاسلكي اسود اللون

المستلم: صفول الشرك  
نوراس

المستلم: صفول القوات المسلحة العربية  
الليبية  
مقدم / عمر ابراهيم  
أمر كتيبة طارم بن زياد

Акт № 7

Приема-передача радиостанции  
"Турбо-сиг" (Baofeng-UV-5R) в количестве  
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نوراس

المستلم: صفول القوات المسلحة العربية  
الليبية  
مقدم / عمر ابراهيم  
أمر كتيبة طارم بن زياد

<sup>339</sup> Only one of the six documents has been included due to document size limitations.

**Official UN Translation****2111841E***Translated from Arabic*

## Document No. 2

Delivery and receipt of wireless devices

Twenty black Chinese-made Turbo Sky wireless devices (Baufeng UV-5R) were delivered to the Libyan Arab Armed Forces.

Deliverer: On behalf of the company Zurab	Recipient: On behalf of the Libyan Arab Armed Forces Lieutenant Colonel Omar Mraji'I Hasan Commander, Tareq Bin Ziyad Battalion
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## Document No. 3

Delivery and receipt of wireless devices

Ten black Chinese-made Turbo Sky wireless devices (Baufeng UV-5R) were delivered to the Libyan Arab Armed Forces.

Deliverer: On behalf of the company Zurab	Recipient: On behalf of the Libyan Arab Armed Forces Major General Salih Abbudah Battlefield Commander
---	--

## Document No. 4

Delivery and receipt of wireless devices

Ten black Chinese-made Turbo Sky wireless devices (Baufeng UV-5R) were delivered to the Libyan Arab Armed Forces.

Deliverer: On behalf of the company Zurab	Recipient: On behalf of the Libyan Arab Armed Forces Major General Ahmad Salim Commander, Second Division
---	---

## Document No. 5

Delivery and receipt of wireless devices

Fifteen black Chinese-made Turbo Sky wireless devices (Baufeng UV-5R) were delivered to the Libyan Arab Armed Forces.

Deliverer: On behalf of the company Zurab	Recipient: On behalf of the Libyan Arab Armed Forces Major General Ahmad Salim Commander, Second Division
---	---

## Document No. 6

## Delivery and receipt of wireless devices

Fifty black Chinese-made Turbo Sky wireless devices (Baufeng UV-5R) were delivered to the Libyan Arab Armed Forces.

<b>Deliverer:</b> On behalf of the company Zurab	<b>Recipient:</b> On behalf of the Libyan Arab Armed Forces Major General Ahmad Salim Commander, Second Division
--	--

## Document No. 7

## Delivery and receipt of wireless devices

Five black Chinese-made Turbo Sky wireless devices (Baufeng 5R) were delivered to the Libyan Arab Armed Forces.

<b>Deliverer:</b> On behalf of the company Zurab	<b>Recipient:</b> On behalf of the Libyan Arab Armed Forces Lieutenant Colonel Omar Mraji'i Commander, Tareq Bin Ziyad Battalion
--	--

## Document No. 8

## Delivery and receipt of wireless devices

Seven black Chinese-made Turbo Sky wireless devices (Baufeng UV-5R) were delivered to the Libyan Arab Armed Forces.

<b>Deliverer:</b> On behalf of the company Zurab	<b>Recipient:</b> On behalf of the Libyan Arab Armed Forces Major General Ahmad Salim Commander, Second Division
--	--

## Document No. 9

## Delivery and receipt of wireless devices

Ten black Chinese-made Turbo Sky wireless devices (Baufeng UV-5R) were delivered to the Libyan Arab Armed Forces.

<b>Deliverer:</b> On behalf of the company Zurab	<b>Recipient:</b> On behalf of the Libyan Arab Armed Forces Major General Ahmad Salim Commander, Second Division
--	--

Document No. 11

Delivery and receipt of wireless devices

Two black Chinese-made Turbo Sky wireless devices (Baufeng 5R) were delivered to the Libyan Arab Armed Forces.

Deliverer: On behalf of the company Zurab	Recipient: On behalf of the Libyan Arab Armed Forces Operations Room Ali al-Ghazwi
---	---

Document No. 12

Delivery and receipt of wireless devices

Ten black Chinese-made Turbo Sky wireless devices (Baufeng UV5R) were delivered to the Libyan Arab Armed Forces.

Deliverer: On behalf of the company Zurab	Recipient: On behalf of the Western Region Operations Room  Ali al-Ghazwi
---	---

Document ?

Delivery and receipt of wireless devices

Fifty black Chinese-made Turbo Sky wireless devices (Baufeng UV-5R) were delivered to the Libyan Arab Armed Forces.




Deliverer: On behalf of the company Zurab	Recipient: On behalf of the Libyan Arab Armed Forces Major General Salih Abbudah Battlefield Commander Forward Operations Room Western Region Operations Room
---	---

## Annex 101 End user certificates for communication surveillance systems

1. Figures 101.1 to 101.3 are the EUC submitted by AR Global FZE to the supplier. The signatory, Ahmed Al Alwerfly, is not one of the only two individuals authorised to sign on behalf of Libya, as notified to the Committee in accordance with Implementation Notice (IAN) Number 2.<sup>340</sup>

Figure 101.1

EUC for Sigma Thuraya (3 December 2020)

<b>LIBYAN GOVERNMENT</b> GENERAL AUTHORITY FOR COMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATICS		<b>الحكومة الليبية</b> الهيئة العامة للاتصالات والمعلوماتية
التاريخ: 03 / 12 / 2020 الرقم الإداري:		
<b>END-USER CERTIFICATE</b> No. 51970/4 dated 09/12/2020		
Reference: Contract No. 51970 dated 27 <sup>th</sup> September 2020		
1. User's full name and address: Libyan Ministry of Communication and Information Technology		
2. Agent's full name and address: <div style="background-color: black; height: 20px; width: 100%;"></div>		
3. Importer's full name and address: Libyan Ministry of Communication and Information Technology		
4. Exporter's full name and address: <div style="background-color: black; height: 20px; width: 100%;"></div>		
5. Description and quantity of the goods: 1 Unit, Thuraya monitoring solution.		
6. Place of installation (use) of the goods: East Libya, Benghazi		
7. The purpose of end-use of the goods: These goods will be plugged in the End-User's equipment with the purpose of Monitoring and collecting statistics of subscribers, which use Thuraya services.		
8. The user of the goods warrants by this, that the goods stated in item 5, will not be used other, than for needs of Libyan Ministry of Communication and Information Technology and will not be transferred to any one or re-exported without a permission of the State Service on Export Control of Lithuania.		
9. The user of the goods shall provide written verification of receipt of stores certifying that consignee against present End-User Certificate has received the stores under the referenced Contract.		
Signature:  Name: Ahmed M. Alwerfly Position: Manager of East Libya Seal: 		
ميثاق بريد السلمان / بنغازي - ليبيا    +218 61 479 9494    info@gacily.com    www.gacily.com		

<sup>340</sup> As provided in letter from the Permanent Representative of the State of Libya to the United Nations on 12 December 2018.

Figure 101.2  
EUC for Alpha Max surveillance system (3 December 2020)

<b>LIBYAN GOVERNMENT</b> <b>GENERAL AUTHORITY FOR</b> <b>COMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATICS</b>			<b>الحكومة الليبية</b> <b>الهيئة العامة للاتصالات والمعلوماتية</b>
التاريخ: 03 / 12 / 2020 الرقم الإشاري: /			
<b>END-USER CERTIFICATE</b>			
<b>A. Parties</b>			
1. <i>Exporter</i> 		4: <i>Country of final destination.</i> Libya	
2. <i>Consignee</i> Libyan Ministry of Communication and Information Technology East Libya, Benghazi			
3. <i>End-user</i> Libyan Ministry of Communication and Information Technology East Libya, Benghazi			
5. <i>Contract N°:</i> 51970		6. <i>Date of signature of contract:</i> 22/11/2020	
<b>B. Goods</b>			
1. <i>Items</i> Alpha-MAX tactical cellular interception system.			
2. <i>Quantity (Units) / weight:</i> 1 qty			
3. <i>End-use</i> This is a software and hardware solution for intelligence purposes and tactical interception of cellular communications. This product is sold only to qualified government intelligence agencies.			
4. <i>Specification of end-use location of the items</i> Anti-terrorism and organized crime Libyan Ministry of Communication and Information Technology East Libya, Benghazi			
 ميني بريد السلمياني / بنغازي - ليبيا  +218 61 479 9494  info@gacily.com  www.gacily.com			



**LIBYAN GOVERNMENT**  
GENERAL AUTHORITY FOR  
COMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATICS



الحكومة الليبية  
الهيئة العامة للاتصالات والمعلوماتية

التاريخ: ٠٣ / ١٢ / ٢٠٢٠  
الرقم الإشاري: /

**C. Commitment**

We certify that the items described in section B1 :

1. will only be used for the purposes described in section B.3 and that the items are intended for final use in the country named in section A.4.
2. that the items will not be used in any nuclear explosive activity or unsafeguarded nuclear fuel cycle activity.
3. that the items will not be used for any purpose connected with any chemical or biological or nuclear weapons, or missiles capable of delivering such weapons.
4. that the items will only be used for civil end uses. (Tick if applicable)
5. as far as technology is concerned, we certify that we treat the technology strictly confidential and neither pass the technology on to other companies nor shall we make knowledge available to third parties. In case of goods produced by the help of transferred technology, these goods will only be delivered to a third person/company in condition that this person/company accepts the commitments of the above declaration as binding for itself and on condition that this third person/company is known to be trustworthy and reliable in the observance or such commitments.
6. we further certify that we will not re-export the items to a third country without the consent of the UAE authorities.

I undersigned

NAME - RANK/ROLE

AHMED M. ALWERFLY

certify that the information given in this document is true and accurate.






(Signature)

03/12/2020-Libya  
(Place, Date)



Figure 101.3

EUC Alpha interception system (3 December 2020)

LIBYAN GOVERNMENT GENERAL AUTHORITY FOR COMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATICS		 الحكومة الليبية الهيئة العامة للاتصالات والمعلوماتية	
التاريخ: ١٢/١٢/٢٠٢٠ الرقم الإشاري:			
<b>END-USER CERTIFICATE</b>			
<b>A. Parties</b>			
1. <i>Exporter</i>		4: <i>Country of final destination.</i>	
[Redacted]		Libya	
2. <i>Consignee</i>			
Libyan Ministry of Communication and Information Technology East Libya, Benghazi			
3. <i>End-user</i>			
Libyan Ministry of Communication and Information Technology East Libya, Benghazi			
5. <i>Contract N°:</i> CONTRACT NO		6. <i>Date of signature of contract:</i> DATE	
<b>B. Goods</b>			
1. <i>Items</i>			
Alpha-AC-V tactical cellular interception system. Alpha-DET tactical cellular interception detection system.			
2. <i>Quantity (Units) / weight:</i>			
1 qty			
3. <i>End-use</i>			
This is a software and hardware solution for intelligence purposes and tactical interception of cellular communications. This product is sold only to qualified government intelligence agencies.			
4. <i>Specification of end-use location of the items</i>			
Anti-terrorism and organized crime  Libyan Ministry of Communication and Information Technology East Libya, Benghazi			
 مبنى بريد السلماني / بنغازي - ليبيا  +218 61 479 9494  info@gacily.com  www.gacily.com			

**LIBYAN GOVERNMENT**  
GENERAL AUTHORITY FOR  
COMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATICS



الحكومة الليبية  
الهيئة العامة للاتصالات والمعلوماتية

التاريخ: ...../...../.....

الرقم الإشاري: .....

**C. Commitment**

We certify that the items described in section B1 :

1. will only be used for the purposes described in section B.3 and that the items are intended for final use in the country named in section A.4.
2. that the items will not be used in any nuclear explosive activity or unsafeguarded nuclear fuel cycle activity.
3. that the items will not be used for any purpose connected with any chemical or biological or nuclear weapons, or missiles capable of delivering such weapons.
4. that the items will only be used for civil end uses. (Tick if applicable)
5. as far as technology is concerned, we certify that we treat the technology strictly confidential and neither pass the technology on to other companies nor shall we make knowledge available to third parties. In case of goods produced by the help of transferred technology, these goods will only be delivered to a third person/company in condition that this person/company accepts the commitments of the above declaration as binding for itself and on condition that this third person/company is known to be trustworthy and reliable in the observance of such commitments.
6. we further certify that we will not re-export the items to a third country without the consent of the UAE authorities.

I undersigned

NAME – RANK/ROLE

AHMED.M.ALWRFLY

certify that the information given in this document is true and accurate.

(Signature)

03/12/2020 - Libya

(Place, Date)

(Company Stamp / Official seal)



مبنى بريد السلماني / بنغازي - ليبيا



+218 61 479 9494



info@gacily.com



www.gacily.com

## Annex 102 Member States and regional organizations responses to arms embargo violations

1. In [S/2021/229](#)<sup>341</sup> the Panel provided information on unilateral action taken by Member States and regional organizations during 2020 to violations of the arms embargo. Table 102.1<sup>342</sup> summarises unilateral responses taken from 1 January 2021 to 31 March 2022, and for those unreported in [S/2021/229](#).

Table 102.1  
Member State responses

<i>Date</i>	<i>Perpetrator</i>	<i>Equipment / Entity</i>	<i>Member State location</i>	<i>Response</i>
7 Jul 2020	Kapor Trade LP <sup>a</sup>	Engines and spare parts for vehicle type used by Russian PMC	Malta	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Consignment seized pending disposal decision. <sup>b</sup></li> </ul>
1 Feb 2021	Azee Air LLC (AZL) <sup>c</sup>	Airline	Kazakhstan	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Revocation of air operating certificate. <sup>d</sup></li> </ul>
1 Feb 2021	Jenis Air LLC (JEN) <sup>e</sup>	Airline	Kazakhstan	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Revocation of air operating certificate. <sup>f</sup></li> </ul>
18 May 2021	Company <sup>g</sup>	Communications surveillance equipment.	Lithuania	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Denial of export licence.</li> <li>▪ Reference (24.38-72E)-3.</li> </ul>
11 Jun 2021	FlySky Airlines (FSU) <sup>h</sup>	Airline	Ukraine	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Revocation of air operating certificate. <sup>i</sup></li> </ul>
8 Oct 2021	L6-FZE <sup>j</sup>	LASA T-Bird (#YU-TSH)	Serbia	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Revocation of civil aircraft registration. <sup>k</sup></li> </ul>
13 Dec 2021	Individual <sup>l</sup>	Member of ChVK Wagner	EU	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Placed under restrictive measures. <sup>m</sup></li> </ul>
13 Jan 2022	Add Helium <sup>n</sup>	Rebreathing diving equipment	USA	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Supply prohibited.</li> <li>▪ Owner and manager from the company convicted. <sup>o</sup></li> </ul>
				<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪</li> </ul>

<sup>a</sup> Kapor Trade LP, Office 29, Clifton House. Fitzwilliam Street Lower, Dublin, D02 XT91.

<sup>b</sup> Member State.

<sup>c</sup> Appendix D to Annex 55 to [S/2021/229](#).

<sup>d</sup> Revocation Order: 00.47.

<sup>e</sup> Appendix E to Annex 55 to [S/2021/229](#).

<sup>f</sup> Revocation Order: 00.46.

<sup>341</sup> Annex 78.

<sup>342</sup> This table does not include national or regional organization designation listings made in response to a UN designation.

<sup>g</sup> The company cooperated fully with the Panel and the contract was immediately cancelled by the company once they were aware that the system would be a breach of a UN arms embargo. This occurred before the Panel made contact with the company. The Panel considers that it is not necessary to expose them to the reputational risk resulting from the company being identified in a Panel report.

<sup>h</sup> Annex 75 to [S/2021/229](#).

<sup>i</sup> Revocation No: UK 058.

<sup>j</sup> Annex 76 to [S/2021/229](#).

<sup>k</sup> De-registration Certificate No-01-0022/2021-0008.

<sup>l</sup> Annex 77 to [S/2021/229](#).

<sup>m</sup> (a) Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/2192 of 13 December 2021; and (b) Council Implementing Decision (CFSP) 2021/2198 of 13 December 2021.

<sup>n</sup> <https://addhelium.com>. Accessed 14 January 2022.

<sup>o</sup> <https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/south-florida-residents-sentenced-illegally-exporting-controlled-items-libya>, 13 January 2022.



## Annex 103 HAF tactical ballistic missile test launches

### 1. Background

1. On 7 March 2022 the 1st missile battalion of the LAAF launched at least three tactical ballistic missiles (TBM) in eastern Libya.<sup>343</sup> HAF claimed that two single missiles and a double missile launch took place, but available open-source imagery can only confirm a single and a double launch.<sup>344</sup> This was an unexpected event that surprised much of the international community. Unannounced launches of any form of ballistic missile type may act as deterrence but they are also equally likely to be regarded as threatening, particularly when launched by a non-state actor with the recent history HAF has for initiating armed conflict.<sup>345</sup>

2. HAF displayed ballistic missiles with a profile virtually identical to the R-17/SCUD-B TBM<sup>346</sup> at the 29 May 2021 "7th Anniversary of Operation Dignity" parade in Benina.<sup>347</sup> Four transport erector launchers (TEL)<sup>348</sup> (figure 103.1) and four missile transport vehicles (figure 103.2) were paraded.<sup>349</sup>

Figure 103.1

TBM on 9P117 *Uragan* TEL vehicles



Figure 103.2

TBM on transport vehicles



### 2. Identification of missile type

3. The imagery resolution and positioning of the missiles on the vehicles was not sufficient to be able to confirm the exact type of missile or whether they were practicable TBM or not. The number and positioning of fuel and oxidiser filling and drainage valves is a key visual indicator as to type and figure 103.3, as an example, shows the key components for a SCUD-B.

<sup>343</sup> Official HAF social media <https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=496270341902499>, 7 March 2022; and [https://twitter.com/aleasima\\_17/status/1500962189754122244?s=20&t=60EpJCaRRCelikjg6V3Nyg](https://twitter.com/aleasima_17/status/1500962189754122244?s=20&t=60EpJCaRRCelikjg6V3Nyg), 7 March 2022.

<sup>344</sup> [https://twitter.com/soldier\\_libyan3/status/1501559395146252292](https://twitter.com/soldier_libyan3/status/1501559395146252292), 9 March 2022.

<sup>345</sup> 4 April 2019 "Operation Flood of Dignity" offensive against Tripoli.

<sup>346</sup> SCUD-B can also be classified as a Short-Range Ballistic Missile (SRBM), which has a range classification of up to 1,000km. The Panel will use the term TBM to desensitise the issue. Some Member States also classify it as an Operational-Tactical missile.


<sup>347</sup> HAF 7th Anniversary Operation Dignity parade in Benina, 29 May 2021. <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mbIDXxITPa0>, 31 May 2021.

<sup>348</sup> 9P117 *Uragan* 8x8 MAZ-453 wheeled vehicles.

<sup>349</sup> One missile was displayed on the LNA "Alkarama parade" on 7 May 2018. <https://mobile.twitter.com/mahmouedgamal44/status/993809662163243008>, 8 May 2018.



Figure 103.3  
Schematic of SCUD-B design<sup>350</sup>



4. Although virtually identical to the R17/SCUD TBM it is also possible that the missiles are Hwasong-6 TBM. Libya reportedly acquired a few from the Democratic People's Republic of North Korea in 1993.<sup>351</sup> The Hwasong-6 is a variant of the SCUD-C design. The only major external difference from the SCUD-B being the missile length (see table 103.1). Imagery resolution was insufficient to enable the use of photogrammetry as the differential in length of 0.31m is only 2.8% of the total length, which is within the error margin for photogrammetry at this resolution.

Table 103.1  
Comparison of SCUD-B and Hwasong-6<sup>352</sup>

Missile	Diameter	Length	Warhead Mass	Range	Accuracy (CEP) <sup>353</sup>
SCUD-B	0.88m	11.25m	545kg <sup>354</sup>	300km	450m
Hwasong-6	0.88m	10.94m	770kg	500km	1,000

## 2. Launch operations

5. Confidential satellite imagery identified the launch area as being at 31°51'08"N, 20°24'02"E (figure 103.4). Four TEL vehicles, five military trucks and two unidentified light utility vehicles were observed on the access road to the training area where the launch positions were located. HAF misinformation placed the launch area as south of Suluq (see figure 103.5).

6. Open-source media reported that the missiles were launched "towards hypothetical targets 300km south of Tobruk",<sup>355</sup> (see figure 103.5) but the HAF released imagery of the target area only showed explosions and could not be geo-

<sup>350</sup> From UN Panel of Experts on Yemen report [S/2018/594](#). Not scaled but proportional. Valves are shown larger proportionally than on real missile to assist in identification. FFV is Fuel Filling Valve, FDV is Fuel Drainage Valve, OFV is Oxidiser Filling Valve and ODV is Oxidiser Drainage Valve.

<sup>351</sup> <https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/hwasong-6/>.

<sup>352</sup> Data varies dependent on source, so worse case options used in this table, which was compiled primarily from [customer.janes.com](#).

<sup>353</sup> Circular Error Probability. The CEP is a measure of a weapon system's precision. It is defined as the radius of a circle, centred on the mean, whose boundary is expected to include the landing points of 50% of the missiles fired.


<sup>354</sup> From confidential "SCUD data pack".

<sup>355</sup> <https://twitter.com/ObservatoryLY/status/1500962768064757765?s=20&t=60EpJCaRRCelikjg6V3Nyg>, & March 2022.

referenced, so the range of the missile, and effectiveness of the warhead cannot yet be independently verified. Official HAF imagery of the firings was released (see figures 103.6 to 103.8).<sup>356</sup>

Figure 103.4

**Location of missile launch area**



**Source:** Google Earth

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<sup>356</sup> [https://twitter.com/soldier\\_libyan3/status/1501559395146252292](https://twitter.com/soldier_libyan3/status/1501559395146252292), 9 March 2022.

Figure 103.5

## Map of missile launch location and possible target area




Figure 103.6

**TBM on TEL in launch position**

7. Note the red flag at the front left-hand side of the TEL vehicle. This almost certainly indicates that the missiles are being fired from pre-surveyed positions. Pre-surveyed positions are used to assist in the accuracy of the missile system. They are an indicator that this was the launch of a fully capable missile.

8. Also note that in the HAF video that the crew are wearing full personal protective equipment, indicating that live fuelling operations took place on site. The missile can only be safely filled with the liquid bipropellant when it is in the erected launch position. The missile should not be pre-fuelled when in the transport position as the missile propellant tanks and joints are not strong enough to support the weight of the fuel and oxidiser when being moved the 90° from the transport to launch position. There is also the risk of internal valve leakage due to movement-induced internal pressure on seals. Either event could result in immediate spontaneous combustion of the bipropellant if the fuel and oxidiser met the ignition fuel (usually “Samin”).

Figure 103.7

**TBM on TEL in launch position**

9. The Libyan flag and the Arabic text “Al Karama” are indicators that this is real imagery of the launch area.



Figure 103.8

**Simultaneous launch of two TBM**

10. The orange-brown smoke on launch is typical for the combustion of the fuel (kerosene or unsymmetrical dimethyl hydrazine (UDMH)) and the oxidiser (inhibited red fuming nitric acid (IRFNA)). These chemicals also have commercial applications and are available in Libya. Stocks of the bipropellant have been reported as been stored near Tobruk.<sup>357</sup>


11. Analysis of imagery from the launch (figure 103.9) shows indicators that live warheads were fitted to the missiles, but no evidence as to if the full explosive yield of 545kg was present.<sup>358</sup>

<sup>357</sup> Confidential source.

<sup>358</sup> Two of the three ballistic missiles show a constant diameter from the base until the guidance and control section, but one appears to have a guidance and control section with a smaller diameter and a small conic section below the guidance and control section, and also between the oxidiser tank and the tail unit (see the missile at the top in figure 103.9 versus the one at the bottom). This is probably an optical illusion, because the cable ducts make the diameter look a bit larger; investigations of this continue.



Figure 103.9  
Missile analysis of launch missiles



12. Comparison against one of the few known images of a Libyan SCUD-B (figure 103.10) clearly shows that the black line markings for safe lift points and internal separation points are in the identical positions of those launched (figure 103.9).

Figure 103.10  
**Libyan confirmed SCUD-B TRM**



Source: <http://www.b14643.de/Spacerockets/Specials/Scud/>.

### 3. Availability

13. The availability of SCUD-B TBM in Libya is, yet, undetermined. In February 2005 Muammar Qadhafi attempted to sell the entire Libyan stockpile of 417 SCUD missiles to the United States of America for USD 834 million, but the United States only acquired ten for testing. More recent estimates state that only 80 SCUD-B missiles remained at the time of the 2011 uprising.<sup>359</sup>

14. During the 2011 uprising Qadhafi launched a SCUD-B TBM against rebel forces, which had no military effect.<sup>360</sup> At that time experts doubted the utility of Libya's SCUD-B TBM arsenal due to poor maintenance and operability, and a history of suboptimal test flight and combat performance.<sup>361</sup>

15. Technical sources who have operated within Libya over the past ten years have yet to report seeing any examples of the SCUD-B TBM, which have remained "hidden" from the international community. Reports have stated that although missile main assemblies may have existed, the specialist missile fuelling and air pressure systems had been lost or were inoperable. The launch on 7 March 2022 clearly indicates that HAF have resolved this issue.

<sup>359</sup> [https://www.nti.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/libya\\_missile.pdf](https://www.nti.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/libya_missile.pdf).

<sup>360</sup> <https://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/libya-missile/>.

<sup>361</sup> James Hackett, "Whatever happened to Libya's Scud-Bs?" *IISS Voices*, 23 March 2011, [www.iiss.org](http://www.iiss.org); and General Carter Ham, "DOD News Briefing with Gen. Ham via Teleconference from Germany," 21 March 2011.

#### 4. Threat analysis

16. The low number of SCUD-B available to HAF are of minimal military utility. They can only deliver an explosive warhead, no bigger than an average terrorist vehicle-borne IED (VBIED), to an accuracy of within 450m of the target under ideal conditions.

17. Nevertheless, the launch demonstrates that HAF has access to capable missile engineers and technicians, highly probably with cross-transferable skills allowing them to maintain the remainder of his arsenal. This being another indicator of their movement from undisciplined light infantry towards a capable all arms combat force. Khalifa Haftar personally attended the launch and regarded it as a success, and then immediately promoted all the personnel of 1<sup>st</sup> missile battalion.

18. The possession of a capability to launch ballistic missiles, even at the tactical level, is highly symbolic and goes well beyond the actual combat effectiveness of the system. They are regarded as "prestige" weapon systems despite their limited military utility. Only two non-state actors are confirmed as possessing a launch capability for TBM: (a) the Houthi in Yemen;<sup>362</sup> and now (b) HAF.

19. The possession of TBM by non-states actors provides them with a long-range strike capability to attack symbolic area targets such as international airports or critical national infrastructure. Although damage will be limited there is a strategic impact as: (a) it demonstrates a defensive weakness if the target party does not have an effective air defence system;<sup>363</sup> (b) it compels the target party to deploy a disproportionate air defence capability to reassure the civilian population; (c) it demonstrates the vulnerability of the civilian population to surprise attacks by TBM; and (d) results in an immediate increase in military tension.

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<sup>362</sup> Annexes 35 and 36 to [S/2018/594](#).

<sup>363</sup> MIM-104 Patriot air defence systems did not stop Houthi SRBM attacks against Riyadh. See footnote 98 to para.82 of [S/2018/594](#).

## **Annex 104 Central Bank of Libya (CBL) reunification process from report of external consultant to the CBL**

### **1. Pillars and challenges resulting from the institutional split**

- (a) Currency stability;
- (b) Reserves management;
- (c) Monetary policy;
- (d) Foreign exchange regulation;
- (e) Financial system stability; and
- (f) Banking regulation.


### **2. Recommendations**

- (a) Strengthen financial accountability and transparency;
- (b) Reconcile the two branches' Balance Sheets;
- (c) Unifying the ledger system of the two branches;
- (d) Assessment of letters of Credit system/process;
- (e) Review foreign currency sales distribution to ensure fair distribution;
- (f) Review the composition of asset backing for Currency in Circulation issued by the two branches;
- (g) Adoption of widely accepted IFRS standards for financial reporting;
- (h) Periodic physical count of gold, currencies and verification of value of other tangible assets;
- (i) Establish third party confirmation process;
- (j) Resolve potential conflicts of interest on account of holding investments;
- (k) Assessment of impact of devaluation of LYD;
- (l) Unified organization structure, operations, resource needs and plans;
- (m) Establishment of effective governance and internal controls;
- (n) Comprehensive governance framework for transactions with the Public Treasury; and
- (o) Ensure data proposed to be published reconciles with the trial balances.

## Annex 105 Ernst and Young Global Limited progress status of LIA as of 18 February 2022

Figure 105.1

### Assessment of progress status of LIA by Ernst and Young Global Limited



**Source:** Ernst and Young Global Limited.



وإذ تؤكد حكومة الوحدة الوطنية التزامها بما تعهدت به بالعمل على الإفراج على جميع المساجين ممن تقضي أوضاعه القانونية ذلك دون استثناء، فإنها تأمل بأن تكون مثل هذه الجهود تصب في مسار المصالحة الوطنية الشاملة، والتي أساسها انفاذ القانون واحترامه.

حكومة الوحدة الوطنية  
2021 / 09 / 06م



***Official UN Translation****2115622E**Translated from Arabic***Government of National Unity****Press release**

In accordance with binding court rulings, the detainee Saadi Muammar Qadhafi was released today, two years after the decision to release him was issued. The release was executed in cooperation with the Office of the Public Prosecutor and the Deterrent Agency for Combating Organized Crime and Terrorism. He was received by his family in accordance with the relevant legal procedures.

The Government of National Unity reaffirms that it is committed to its undertaking to release all prisoners, without exception, whose legal situation warrants doing so, and it hopes that such efforts will promote comprehensive national reconciliation, the basis of which is enforcement of and respect for the law.

**Government of National Unity**

6 September 2021

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## Annex 107 Certificate of death for Abu Zayd Umar Dorda (LYi.006)

جمهورية ليبيا  
وزارة الداخلية  
قطاع الأحوال المدنية

صورة قيد الوفاة

الرقم القومي

بيانات (الشخص)

الاسم: أبو زيد عمر أحمد دورده  
النوع: ذكر  
الجنسية: ليبية  
الاسم اللام: أبو زيد عمر أحمد دورده  
الحالة الاجتماعية: متزوج

تاريخ الوفاة: ثمانية وعشرون من شهر فبراير  
سنة ١٤٤٢ هـ الموافق ٢٠٢٠ م

مكان الوفاة: القاهرة

العمر عند الوفاة: ٧٨ سنة ١ شهر ٢٧ يوم

مكان الميلاد: مصر

م: صحة: زينهم  
س: مدني: السيد زينهم  
س: اصدار: م. نموذجي القطر P ت. الاصدار: ٢٠٢٢/٢/٢٤

رقم مسلسل ١٤٩٥٥٥٨٢٠

تأكد من وجود العلامة المائية ونشر شعار الجمهورية - وثيقة أحوال مدنية

وزارة الداخلية  
قطاع الأحوال المدنية

اسم طالب الخدمة:

طلب استخراج صورة قيد وفاة  
خدمة خاصة مميزة

التاريخ: (نموذج ٤٠/٣)

Source: Member State.

*Official UN translation  
Translated from Arabic*

Arab Republic of Egypt  
Ministry of the Interior  
Civil Status Division

**Copy of death registration**

National ID:

*Particulars of the deceased*

Name: Abu Zayd Umar Ahmid Durdah

Gender: Male

Religion: Muslim

Nationality: Libya

Mother's name:

Social status: Married

Date of death: 28 February 2022

Place of death: Cairo

Age at death: 78 years, 1 month, 27 days

Place of birth:

Health office: Zaynhum

Record No.: 1155

Civil registration office: Sayyidah Zaynab Date of record: 28 February 2022

Issuing registry: Division forms office

Date of issue: 24 March 2022

Serial number: 149555820

*Check for watermark and eagle emblem of the Republic - Civil status document*

Ministry of the Interior	Request to obtain copy of death registration	(Form 40/3)
Civil Status Division	Special service	
Name of person requesting service:		Date: