



安全理事会

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2019 年 11 月 1 日安全理事会关于索马里的第 751(1992)号决议所设
委员会主席给安全理事会主席的信

谨代表安全理事会关于索马里的第 751(1992)号决议所设委员会，并根据安全理事会第 2444(2018)号决议第 54 段的规定，随函转递索马里问题专家小组的最后报告。

在这方面，委员会谨请提请安全理事会成员注意本信和报告，并将其作为安理会文件分发。

安全理事会关于索马里的
第 751(1992)号决议
所设委员会

主席

马克·贝克斯廷·德布伊茨沃夫(签名)

* 由于技术原因于 2019 年 11 月 14 日重发。



2019 年 9 月 27 日索马里问题专家小组给安全理事会关于索马里的
第 751(1992)号决议所设委员会主席的信

谨根据安全理事会第 2444(2018)号决议第 54 段，随函转递索马里问题专家小组的最后报告。

索马里问题专家小组

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摘要

在索马里问题专家小组首次报告期间，青年党使用简易爆炸装置同比增加约三分之一，创下索马里历史新记录。专家小组得到的爆炸后化学分析首次确凿证明，至少在 2017 年 7 月，很可能在此之前，青年党就开始自制爆炸物。过去，青年党主要依靠从非洲联盟驻索马里特派团(非索特派团)缴获的战争遗留爆炸物和弹药中得到的军用爆炸物来制造简易爆炸装置，而自制爆炸物意味着青年党现在可以利用更容易获得的材料来制造简易爆炸装置。

对于青年党的活动，资金也不能起到限制作用。索马里和厄立特里亚问题监测组在 2018 年的一份报告(S/2018/1002)中强调，青年党在索马里南部和中部实施黑手党式的“税收”制度，手段残酷，高效稳收，覆盖面广。在本报告期间，专家小组发现了青年党对摩加迪沙港进口货物征税这一扩大创收新趋势。青年党能够在非实际控制区持续创收，在一定程度上说明青年党在索马里联邦政府安全行动和美利坚合众国空袭之后可以迅速恢复创收。青年党提供司法等基本服务，可能是其在尚未建立国家机构地区具有一定号召力的原因之一。

2019 年，青年党已经渗透到联邦政府机构中的贝纳迪尔州政府。7 月 24 日，一名青年党女自杀炸弹手在摩加迪沙贝纳迪尔州政府总部引爆自杀，造成摩加迪沙市长阿卜迪拉赫曼·奥马尔·奥斯曼·“亚里索”及至少其他 9 人死亡。后来发现，自杀炸弹手和共犯都使用假身份在贝纳迪尔州政府工作。

青年党继续对区域和平与安全构成有力威胁。2019 年 1 月 15 日，青年党在肯尼亚首都内罗毕袭击 DusitD2 酒店大院，造成 21 人死亡，这是 2013 年以来的第一次重大袭击。DusitD2 行动的显著特点是，肯尼亚小组头目在选择目标等方面具有广泛的酌处权和自主权。专家小组对袭击事件的调查还显示，青年党在该区域建立了资源充足的庞大网络，专门从事针对外国国民的绑架活动。

2018 年底至 2019 年初，青年党及伊拉克和黎凡特伊斯兰国(伊黎伊斯兰国)索马里小组在邦特兰伊黎伊斯兰国腹地和摩加迪沙进行武装斗争。在邦特兰，2018 年底伊黎伊斯兰国以暴力方式更换领导班子后，采用类似青年党的手段，协同开展针对邦特兰企业的“征税”行动。索马里的伊黎伊斯兰国小组 2015 年成立以来首次参与外国的恐怖袭击计划，情况严重。2018 年 12 月，意大利当局在意大利巴里逮捕了索马里国民奥马尔·莫欣·易卜拉欣，他涉嫌参与伊黎伊斯兰国在 12 月 25 日圣诞节当天炸毁罗马圣彼得大教堂的阴谋。专家小组在意大利政府协助下进行了调查，发现易卜拉欣与索马里、肯尼亚、利比亚的伊黎伊斯兰国分子都有联系。

在本报告所述期间，联邦政府和联邦成员国关系恶化，对该国稳定构成进一步威胁。2018 年 12 月，联邦政府试图引导朱巴兰、邦特兰、特别是西南索马里等州的选举进程，使中部和各州之间紧张加剧。2018 年 12 月，联邦政府决定在选举进程前逮捕西南州总统候选人穆赫塔尔·罗博，导致拜多阿发生大规模抗议，15 名平民被州安全部队打死。选举进程中出现丑闻，有人指控西南成员州议员为选举指

定候选人受贿 2 万至 3 万美元。专家小组还得到证据表明，在西南成员州选举之前，一名联邦政府财务干事将数十万美元转给了西南成员州的一名内阁官员。

联邦政府和联邦成员州重大安全问题对话破裂，也影响了索马里《国家安全架构》和《过渡计划》的执行，《过渡计划》的目标是到 2021 年将非索特派团的安全职责移交给索马里安全部队。但是，《过渡计划》的一些初步目标已经实现，索马里国防军在非索特派团和美国军队的协助下，2019 年 4 月至 8 月从青年党手中夺取了下谢贝利州的萨比德、安诺勒、巴里雷和奥赫格勒四镇。

2019 年 3 月联邦政府宣布的索马里国民军生物特征登记第一阶段结束，这是联邦政府安全部队进行准备，接管非索特派团职责的新进展。但是，专家小组对拜多阿和摩加迪沙登记的数百名国民军士兵进行了三个案例研究，发现在索马里和厄立特里亚问题监测组 2017 年和 2018 年得到的索马里国民军登记文件中，不到一半是在 2019 年进行生物特征登记的。另外，在 2017 年底得到的联邦政府标记武器的 60 区士兵中，2019 年国民军进行生物特征登记的不到五分之一，使专家小组对索马里联邦政府武装人员在一年之后不再被视为安全部队成员产生疑问。专家小组无法确定这些前士兵的下落和他们持有的武器。

联邦政府在公共财政管理领域取得重大进展，完成了国际货币基金组织的三个工作人员监测方案，这是一系列旨在增加国内收入、最终实现债务减免和进入国际借贷市场的技术基准。工作人员监测方案作为重点的潜在收入来源包括直接收取的航空税费，这是 2019 年 6 月联邦政府从国际民用航空组织(民航组织)接管的责任。专家小组调查发现，索马里联邦政府索马里民航和气象局在收取现有航运欠款方面存在财务违规行为，民航和气象局注销了朱巴航空公司所欠的 580 万美元债务，但没有从该公司收回资金。

专家小组注意到，在本报告所述期间，联邦政府在遵守部分解除武器禁运条件的某些方面有所改善。联邦政府根据安全理事会第 751(1992)号决议向委员会提交了七份通知，有五份符合安全理事会的要求。但根据第 2182(2014)号决议第 9 段提交委员会的安全部队结构组成报告却存在不一致、不完整的情况。专家小组继续记录联邦政府非法领域的武器和弹药，包括在摩加迪沙和拜多阿黑市交易商及青年党手中发现的 38 件武器。

向联邦政府供应军用物资必须遵守严格的通知要求，但索马里各州政府经常收到规避武器禁运的武器弹药。在本报告所述期间，专家小组查阅了数百份文件，这些文件详细记载了埃塞俄比亚国有金属工程公司十年来向索马里各州政府系统供应武器弹药的情况。安全理事会在第 2111(2013)号决议第 11 (a)段中，允许会员国经委员会批准向索马里联邦政府以外的“索马里安全机构”供应物资，但是埃塞俄比亚政府从未利用过这一机制。

鉴于简易爆炸装置在青年党武器中的突出地位，武器禁运应当简化和更新，反映现代反叛乱战争的模式，如应限制青年党获取化学前体和其他部件制造简易爆炸装置。2019 年 5 月，邦特兰州博萨索进口了用于建造加尔阿卡德港的 180 吨硝酸铵/燃料油和其他爆炸物，显示爆炸物无管制进口是索马里和平、安全、稳定的潜在威胁。鉴于此类材料在索马里境内有较大的转移风险，委员会 2019 年 4 月要求专家小组紧急出台技术准则，确保今后对此类物品进行安全储存和衡算。

违反国际人道主义法袭击平民事件，集中发生在摩加迪沙及索马里南部中部的其他地区，而青年党发动的袭击最多。这个好战组织使用简易爆炸装置在国内流离失所者营地、餐馆、市场、购物中心、政府办公室、酒店杀害和伤残平民。青年党继续开展针对政府官员和议员以及参与 2016 年联邦选举进程的代表的运动。拜州的情况尤其严重，青年党强行招募、绑架数百名儿童，最小的只有 8 岁，在该组织的宗教学校系统注册上学。专家小组还注意到这一令人担忧的新趋势，即青年党在盖州袭击人道主义人员，并绑架当地援助人员勒索赎金。

联邦政府和联邦成员州的警察和军人也对平民进行侵犯。2018 年 12 月 31 日，索马里国民军在盖多州巴尔德拉镇即决处决了六名涉嫌与青年党有关联的男子。在邦特兰，专家小组调查了邦特兰安全部队酷刑及不人道和有辱人格行为，这支部队是美国训练和支持的反恐部队，总部设在博萨索。此外，在通过邦特兰军事法院起诉恐怖主义案件，包括儿童实施恐怖主义案件中，专家小组确定了酷刑逼供、长时间审前拘留、不作解释的裁决、任意判决、上诉受限等几个关切方面。

在本报告所述期间，性暴力和性别暴力问题继续存在。索马里冲突旷日持久，政府机构几乎完全丧失了记录和调查性暴力并起诉肇事者的能力。许多案件通过部落长老的干预进行处理，在干预过程中，占幸存者大多数的妇女既不参加谈判，一般也得不到赔偿金。

2018 年 8 月以来，索马里和厄立特里亚问题监测组及后续的专家小组，没有记录任何违反安全理事会禁令从索马里出口木炭的情况，而在上个报告期间共计出口木炭约 300 万袋(75 000 吨)。阿拉伯联合酋长国、伊朗伊斯兰共和国、阿曼、科威特等会员国，对木炭进口采取限制措施，迫使木炭贩运中断，贩运商需要制作新的伪造文件，并为木炭运输安排替代港口。但是，国内的木炭生产仍在进行，截至编写本报告时，基斯马尤和布尔加博的库存为 60 万至 90 万袋，批发价值约为 3 000 万至 4 500 万美元。

2018 年 8 月，一艘货船从基斯马尤向伊拉克霍尔祖贝尔港运送了 190 000 袋(4 750 吨)木炭，这是索马里最近一次有记录的木炭出口。2019 年，这批索马里木炭被重新装袋从伊拉克转运到邻近会员国。索马里的木炭出口已暂时停止，但参与木炭贸易的国际犯罪网络仍然活跃。专家小组了解到，伊拉克的霍尔祖贝尔港将来可能成为大量木炭的转运中心，运输船只将是商业货船而不是典型的印度洋独桅帆船。

安全理事会第 2036(2012)号决议发布木炭禁令，主要原因是减少青年党的收入。在本报告所述期间，青年党增加了对内陆生产地点向索马里出口点运输木炭的贸易商的袭击，在历史上青年党一直对这种货物进行“征税”。青年党继续从木炭贸易中得到有限的收入，但从索马里南部几乎所有贸易的“税收”基础始终保持高度多样化。即使索马里木炭出口完全停止，青年党发动叛乱的能力也不会受到重大影响。因此，专家小组建议安理会对木炭禁令进行审查，对继续采取禁令的适宜性作出评估。

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* 呈件以原文印发，未经编辑。

一. 引言

A. 任务

1. 索马里问题专家小组是索马里和厄立特里亚监察组的后续机制，安全理事会在第 2444(2018)号决议第 10 段中规定，监察组的任务于 2018 年 12 月 16 日结束。安全理事会在同项决议第 11 段中，决定设立专家小组，其任务包括第 2060(2012)号决议第 13 段规定并经第 2093(2013)号决议第 41 段、第 2182(2014)号决议第 15 段、第 2036(2012)号决议第 23 段和第 2444(2018)号决议第 29 段更新的与索马里有关的工作。
2. 根据第 2444(2018)号决议第 54 段，专家小组 2019 年 5 月 10 日向安全理事会关于索马里的第 751(1992)号决议所设委员会提交了中期情况介绍。专家小组在整个任务期间向委员会提交了月度进展报告。
3. 在调查过程中，专家小组成员访问了加拿大、埃塞俄比亚、法国、意大利、伊朗伊斯兰共和国、毛里求斯、荷兰、卡塔尔、塞舌尔、索马里、土耳其、阿拉伯联合酋长国、大不列颠及北爱尔兰联合王国、坦桑尼亚联合共和国和美利坚合众国。从 2019 年 3 月起，专家小组在索马里境内的旅行受到索马里联邦政府的限制，2019 年 2 月小组成员的目的地仅限于伯贝拉、博萨索、加罗韦和哈尔格萨。
4. 专家小组设在内罗毕，由下列专家组成：杰伊·巴哈杜尔(协调员)、穆罕默德·巴比克尔(人道主义)、纳扎宁·莫希里(武装团体)、布赖恩·奥沙利文(武装团体/自然资源)、马修·罗斯博特(金融)和理查德·扎博特(武器)。

B. 方法

5. 索马里和厄立特里亚问题监察组报告中概述的证据标准和核查程序，适用于专家小组在本报告所述期间开展的工作，具体如下：
 - (a) 尽可能从多个来源收集关于事件和议题的信息；
 - (b) 尽可能从有关事件的第一手资料来源收集信息；
 - (c) 确定信息模式是否一致，将新信息、新趋势同已知信息进行对比；
 - (d) 在信息可信度和来源可靠性方面，继续借鉴监测组有关专家的专业知识和判断以及小组的集体评估意见；
 - (e) 采集实物、照片、视频和(或)书面证据，用以佐证收集到的信息；
 - (f) 酌情分析卫星图像。
6. 专家小组采取谨慎、系统的措施，通过直接了解或认识直接了解违反制裁措施细节的人，接触制裁措施违反的参与者。
7. 专家小组利用相关信息约谈了政府官员、外交使团、民间社会组织、援助机构代表等广泛的消息来源。专家小组还会见了各州政府官员、政治及武装团体代表、商界和索马里民间社会的成员，与他们进行了沟通。

8. 根据秘书长关于信息敏感性、分类和处理的公报(ST/SGB/2007/6), 专家小组连同本报告向委员会提交了几份绝密附件, 附件信息如被披露, 可能有损于联合国的正常运作或其工作人员或第三方的福祉与安全, 或违反本组织的法律义务。这些附件将不作为安全理事会的文件印发。

二. 威胁索马里和平、安全与稳定的行动

A. 青年党

9. 极端主义团体青年圣战者组织(青年党)继续对索马里和平与安全构成最直接威胁。在本报告所述期间, 美国明显加大了对青年党好战分子及头目的空袭, 这有助于打乱青年党的部署, 防止大量战斗人员集结, 但对该团体在索马里经常发动不对称袭击的能力影响甚微。青年党仍然能够对索马里联邦政府和非洲联盟索马里特派团(非索特派团)部队发动零星的常规袭击, 2019 年 7 月 29 日在巴拉德伏击了非索特派团的布隆迪部队。

10. 在本报告所述期间, 青年党实施了空前数量的简易爆炸装置袭击。有确凿证据表明, 青年党正在自制爆炸物(见下文“青年党使用简易爆炸装置”), 显示该团体现在拥有现成的简易爆炸装置材料。青年党保持其行动方式, 用车载简易爆炸装置突破目标外围, 最多六名枪手随后进行袭击。青年党宣称, 袭击以联邦政府官员光顾的酒店餐馆为目标, 但大多数受害者是其他平民。

11. 正如索马里和厄立特里亚问题监测组多份报告指出, 青年党对联邦政府机构进行渗透。¹ 2019 年 7 月 24 日协调世界时第 3 时区 16 时 55 分, 一名青年党女性自杀炸弹手在摩加迪沙贝纳迪尔州政府总部引爆自杀, 并至少造成摩加迪沙市长阿卜迪拉赫曼·奥马尔·奥斯曼·“亚里索”、三名地区专员等 10 人死亡。后来发现, 自杀炸弹手从 2018 年 5 月开始使用伪造身份受雇于贝纳迪尔州政府。² 截至编写本报告时, 同样使用伪造身份在州政府工作的共犯仍然在逃。

12. 青年党通过对索马里经济各领域“征税”创造国内收入的能力没有削弱, 在本报告所述期间甚至可能扩大, 初步证据表明, 该团体已开始对摩加迪沙港的进口货物征税(见下文“青年党的筹资”)。该团体继续利用几乎不受监管的移动支付和国内银行服务, 在全国范围内收取并转移收入。联邦政府财务报告中心 2018 年 11 月投入运作, 是打击索马里境内恐怖主义融资的一个积极步骤, 但必须进一步加强国内金融机构的合规(见下文第八节)。

13. 2019 年 1 月 15 日, 青年党袭击内罗毕 DusitD2 酒店所在商业综合体, 显示该团体继续对区域和平与安全构成威胁。2019 年 6 月和 7 月, 青年党可能利用肯尼亚和索马里的紧张关系, 在两国边境实施了空前数量的简易爆炸装置袭击和其他袭击。

¹ 见最近的 S/2018/1002, 附件 2.2 和附件 4.2(绝密)。

² 哈伦·马鲁夫, “摩加迪沙市长遭女炸弹手袭击”, 美国之音, 2019 年 8 月 9 日。可查阅: www.voanews.com/africa/mogadishu-mayor-targeted-female-bomber。

青年党在索马里的控制范围

14. 自 2015 年 7 月非索特派团停止重大进攻行动以来，青年党在索马里控制的领土范围基本保持不变。非索特派团和国民军占据大部分城市中心，但青年党继续对大片腹地保持直接控制或影响，并能够切断主要供应路线，有效隔离非索特派团和政府控制的地区。

15. 青年党的势力范围大致可以分为三类：青年党作为实际政府直接管理的地区；保持重要军事存在的地区；无法控制但能“征税”的地区。

青年党管理的地区

16. 青年党继续对朱巴谷地的大部分地区实行行政控制，包括布阿勒、萨科和青年党“首都”吉利布等主要城市中心。下朱巴的库尼奥·巴罗是青年党的财务总部，很可能藏有该团体很大一部分现金储备。青年党还管理以萨布拉勒镇为中心的下谢贝利州，并将大部分训练营设在拜州布洛富莱周围的林区，并在那里定期举行新兵毕业典礼。

青年党保持重要军事存在的地区

17. 青年党在穆杜格州哈拉尔代雷和中谢贝利州阿丹·亚巴尔周围保持大量军事存在，但并不管理大片领土。此外，在博萨索西南 30 公里的邦特兰州戈利斯山以及盖多州埃尔阿德镇周围部分地区，该团体正在发动积极叛乱。

青年党征税的地区

18. 青年党甚至在没有实际控制的地区充当影子政府，进行“征税”并提供一些基本服务。正如索马里和厄立特里亚问题监测组 2018 年报告(S/2018/1002，附件 2.4)详述，青年党常常通过索马里中部南部的一系列检查站对贸易、牲畜和农业生产进行征税，并以暴力威胁强制征税。

19. 本文件附件 1.1 载有青年党在索马里的各种控制地区图。

青年党使用简易爆炸装置

20. 专家小组首次得到确凿证据，青年党至少从 2017 年 7 月 20 日以来一直在自制爆炸物。³ 向专家小组提供的联邦调查局恐怖爆炸装置分析中心进行的爆炸后实验室分析确定，青年党利用自制炸药在索马里进行了至少 11 次简易爆炸装置袭击。分析发现了硝化甘油(高度敏感炸药)、硝酸钾(用作氧化剂)和木炭(燃料元素)混合物的证据。⁴ 青年党明确承认使用自制炸药，表明青年党制作简易爆炸装

³ 对 2017 年 7 月 20 日在埃拉沙比亚哈缉获的一枚车载简易爆炸装置的实验室分析证实，存在硝化甘油、硝酸钾和一种与木炭一致的成分。

⁴ 氧化剂当与适当比例的燃料结合，为简易爆炸装置提供化学氧源。见 S/2018/1002，第 66-69 段。

置方法开始多样化,传统上青年党使用主要从战争遗留爆炸物中得到的军用爆炸物、缴获的非索特派团弹药以及从也门非法转让的材料。⁵

21. 专家小组从一系列爆炸物处理专家收到的信息表明,青年党在自制炸药的发展与近年简易爆炸装置袭击索马里的频率增加之间可能存在联系。⁶ 2018 年 7 月至 2019 年 7 月,青年党在索马里进行了 548 次简易爆炸装置袭击,比上年同期 413 次增加 32%。⁷ 同期,摩加迪沙所在的贝纳迪尔州简易爆炸装置事件也增加了 36%(见附件 1.2)。⁸

22. 在索马里不同地区,青年党使用自制炸药的方法似乎各不相同。爆炸物处理专家注意到,在朱巴兰自制炸药装置较小,2019 年 1 月 19 日在巴桑古尼(基斯马尤以北 40 公里)对国民军、ENDF 和美国部队发动了两次车载简易爆炸装置袭击。2019 年 7 月 12 日,基斯马尤梅迪纳酒店高难度袭击初步报告也显示,青年党使用了自制炸药。⁹

23. 青年党使用自制炸药是一个重大发展,但该团体在许多简易爆炸装置袭击中仍继续使用军用炸药。¹⁰ 例如,2018 年 11 月 9 日,青年党使用军用炸药袭击摩加迪沙的萨哈菲酒店(见下文“萨哈菲酒店袭击”),造成至少 50 人死亡。

对索马里的简易爆炸装置材料供应

24. 安全理事会在第 2444(2018)号决议第 29 段中,决定专家小组继续开展索马里和厄立特里亚问题监测组开始的关于向索马里出口用于制造简易爆炸装置的化学品的调查。经与爆炸物处理专家和化学家协商,专家小组编制了青年党用于制造简易爆炸装置的化学品和其他常见成分清单,这些成分可能产生上述实验室分析结果。¹¹ 专家小组与定期在索马里主要港口进行中转的航运公司以及相关会员国取得联系,要求提供含有潜在简易爆炸装置材料物的信息。截至目前,专家小组在调查中没有得到任何实际信息。

25. 2019 年 4 月 5 日,联邦政府安全部队在摩加迪沙郊区埃拉沙·比亚哈附近的青年党地下藏身处,发现了空硝酸瓶(见附件 1.2)。硝酸可以与硫酸和甘油混合

⁵ 索马里简易爆炸装置袭击中最常见的军用炸药是 2-、4-、6-三硝基甲苯和环三亚甲基三硝基甲苯。

⁶ 2018 年,索马里共发生 491 起简易爆炸装置事件,2017 年 402 起,2016 年 295 起。截至本报告编写时,预计到 2019 年底将发生 544 起简易爆炸装置事件。

⁷ 地雷行动处索马里统计数字,2016-2019 年。

⁸ 2018 年 7 月至 2019 年 7 月,青年党在贝纳迪尔实施了 137 起简易爆炸装置袭击,上年同期发生 101 起。

⁹ 地雷行动处《索马里重大活动报告》,2019 年 7 月 22 日。

¹⁰ 对爆炸物处理专家的约谈,2018 年 12 月至 2019 年 8 月,内罗毕和摩加迪沙。

¹¹ 调查重点是铵和硝酸钾肥料、氯酸钾、氯酸钠、硝化甘油、甘油、丙酮、镁、硝酸、铝膏或粉末、雷管、导爆索和硝酸铵/燃料油的运输。

生成硝化甘油，在对青年党自制炸药的多项实验室分析中已经检测到硝化甘油。专家小组咨询的爆炸弹药专家表示，索马里对浓硝酸没有合理的工业需求。¹²

26. 专家小组还记录了 2019 年 7 月至 8 月基斯马尤和摩加迪沙两种含钾肥料的供应情况(见附件 1.2)。但是，所记录的化肥的钾含量(5%和 10%)低于 40%简易爆炸装置建造门槛。¹³

澳大利亚海军的扣押行动

27. 2019 年 6 月 25 日，澳大利亚海军“Ballarat”舰在阿拉伯海上一艘无国籍独桅帆船上，扣押了 697 袋硝酸铵化肥和大约 475 000 发小武器弹药。¹⁴ 专家小组从欧洲联盟海军部队收到的其他信息表明，扣押行动发生在阿曼海岸附近，显示索马里北部可能是独桅帆船的目的地。¹⁵

萨哈菲酒店袭击

28. 2018 年 11 月 9 日，青年党在摩加迪沙萨哈菲酒店外引爆了三枚车载简易爆炸装置。¹⁶ 五名持枪者随后袭击了酒店大院，他们似乎身穿新发的索马里安全部队制服，头戴配套的贝雷帽。¹⁷ 袭击至少造成 50 人死亡，100 人受伤，是 2017 年 10 月 14 日袭击(致 600 人死亡)以来死亡人数最多的一次(见 S/2018/1002，附件 2.2)。

29. 此外，从其中一名持枪者手中缴获的一支 AK 型突击步枪上的标记，与索马里联邦政府 2017 年 7 月进口的枪支相一致。¹⁸ 从持枪者缴获的至少两枚未爆炸手榴弹上的标记，与乌干达人民国防军 2018 年 3 月在布洛马雷尔从青年党缴获的几枚手榴弹上的标记几乎相同(见附件 1.3 和 2.6)。¹⁹

¹² 对一名联邦调查局分析员的约谈：2019 年 8 月 15 日；对一名商业情报研究员的约谈，2019 年 8 月 20 日。

¹³ 对爆炸物处理专家的约谈，2019 年 8 月 12 日。

¹⁴ 澳大利亚皇家海军(@ Australian Navy)，“HMASBallarat 号护卫舰在阿拉伯海登上一艘独桅帆船”，2019 年 6 月 28 日，可查阅：https://twitter.com/Australian_Navy/status/114449225009888705。

¹⁵ 专家小组 2019 年 7 月 2 日致函澳大利亚常驻联合国代表团，请求提供进一步信息并提供检查扣押情况的机会，但尚未收到答复。

¹⁶ 青年党曾于 2015 年 11 月 1 日袭击该酒店，造成至少 24 名平民死亡，30 人受伤。

¹⁷ 青年党过去在索马里袭击中使用索马里安全部队制服的情况，见 S/2018/1002，第 29-33 段。

¹⁸ 来自中国的货物于 2017 年 7 月交付(2018 年 2 月 2 日通知)。

¹⁹ 见 S/2018/1002，第 47-49 段。两枚手榴弹都有工厂标记 349，与圣彼得堡工厂相一致。乌干达部队缴获的手榴弹 1980 年制造，而在萨哈菲酒店袭击中缴获的手榴弹是 1979 年制造。

青年党筹资

30. 索马里和厄立特里亚问题监测组 2018 年的一份报告显示，青年党的收入来自各种国内来源，主要是对过境车辆和货物征税、征农业税、对企业勒索和强征“札卡特”(济贫税)(见 S/2018/1002，附件 2.4)。在整个报告所述期间，专家小组发现，尽管国际部队将青年党检查站作为具体目标，青年党继续在索马里南部和中部使用一套勒索系统。²⁰

31. 2019 年，专家小组的调查确认，青年党通过对进口到摩加迪沙港口的货物进行系统征税，进一步扩大了其收入基础。专家小组对摩加迪沙商业界人士的约谈显示，青年党已经渗透到摩加迪沙的港口机构以及在该市经营的商业航运代理商。²¹ 因此，青年党获得了货物清单，其中详细记录了进口货物的性质、价值和所有权。²² 2019 年 4 月 1 日至 7 日，青年党联系了摩加迪沙的企业主，告知他们所有进口到摩加迪沙港口的货物从此都要向青年党缴纳税款。²³ 青年党还要求摩加迪沙的企业在进口之前向该团体财务部门申报所有进口货物，并警告说，所有申报将通过对照货物清单加以证实。²⁴

32. 例如，2019 年 7 月下旬，总部在某海湾合作委员会国家的一个营业实体从摩加迪沙港口进口了几千吨建材。2019 年 8 月初，青年党通过电话联系了该公司在摩加迪沙的代表，命令他立即前往设在下谢贝利州穆巴拉克的青年党法院。²⁵ 该代表抵达法院后，青年党向他出示了来自摩加迪沙港口的货物清单，其中重点标出了该公司在该日历年期间的交货。青年党要求该代理人向青年党支付超过 70 000 美元的税款。他们还警告该代理人，未来装运的货物应提前缴税。在向公司管理层请示后，代理人利用一家索马里银行机构的账户间转账付了款。²⁶ 青年党向该公司提供了交易收据，附件 1.4 包含收据副本(绝密)。

青年党的司法系统

33. 除了有能力征税外，青年党还提供一些通常与政府有关的基本服务，即使在其不实际控制的地区也是如此。在国家机构有限或在某些情况下完全不存在的环

²⁰ 2019 年 6 月 25 日，美国非洲司令部宣布，他们在 Qunyo Barrow 实施了定向空袭，索马里和厄立特里亚问题监测组此前将该地区确定为青年党财务部门的中心(S/2018/1002，附件 2.4)。见美国非洲司令部，“美国为支持索马里联邦政府而开展针对青年党的空袭”，新闻稿，2019 年 6 月 27 日。可查阅：www.africom.mil/media-room/pressrelease/31992/u-s-airstrike-targets-al-shabaab-in-support-of-the-federal-government-of-somalia。

²¹ 2019 年 7 月和 8 月对摩加迪沙五家企业的约谈。

²² 2019 年 6 月 26 日在阿拉伯联合酋长国迪拜对一家国际贸易公司的约谈，该公司从海湾合作委员会地区向摩加迪沙出口干粮。

²³ 2019 年 7 月和 8 月对摩加迪沙五家企业的约谈。另见 S/2019/570，第 39 段。

²⁴ 2019 年 7 月和 8 月对摩加迪沙五家企业的约谈。

²⁵ 2019 年 6 月 26 日在迪拜对一家国际贸易公司的约谈，该公司从海湾合作委员会地区向摩加迪沙出口干粮。

²⁶ 同上。

境下，青年党提供了初级法院和诉诸司法的机会，并且有能力通过暴力威胁执行其判决，这可能是青年党在某些人群中具有吸引力的原因。

34. 人们经常在发生土地所有权争端时向青年党寻求正义，尤其是在摩加迪沙。由于国家司法往往代价高昂、旷日持久、不可预测，因此当事方经常与青年党展开对话，请求该团体调解与土地所有权冲突有关的问题。²⁷ 青年党司法官员约谈邻居和其他证人，并传唤原告和被告到该团体在阿夫戈耶附近 Tortorow 的法院，以便作出判决。专家小组获得了一份青年党给土地争端案被告的传票副本(见附件 1.5)。

35. 青年党的司法机制可能对弱势群体具有吸引力，因为他们无法利用国家司法机构或利用途径有限。例如，在农村地区没有正常运作的家事法院的情况下，青年党为一些妇女提供了从前夫和男性亲属那里获得经济补偿的唯一机会。²⁸ 2018 年在拜州收缴的青年党已故官员的笔记本记录了青年党对各种议题的司法裁决例子，包括离婚和子女抚养费、偷窃、拥有武器和出售牲畜。附件 1.5 包含与青年党司法机制有关的文件。

区域行动

内罗毕杜斯特 D2 酒店袭击

36. 2019 年 1 月 15 日，青年党好战分子袭击了内罗毕一个商业综合体，其中包括杜斯特 D2 酒店。袭击大约于 15:25(比协调世界时提前 3 个小时)开始，起初一名自杀炸弹手引爆了炸弹。四名持枪歹徒随后使用 AK 型步枪和手榴弹袭击了大院，目标是杜斯特 D2 酒店和周围商店内的人员。

37. 袭击造成 21 人遇害，4 名持枪歹徒被击毙。袭击的日期颇具含义，选在了青年党对非索特派团部队死亡人数最多的袭击三周年纪念日。2016 年 1 月 15 日，好战分子占领了位于索马里 El Adde 的肯尼亚国防军非索特派团基地，造成约 150 名肯尼亚国防军士兵死亡(S/2016/919，第 15-20 段)。

38. 青年党在袭击后第二天发布了一份详细声明，其中宣布该行动的代号为“耶路撒冷永远不会犹太化”，目标是“世界各地的西方和犹太复国主义利益，支持我们在巴勒斯坦的穆斯林家庭”。这种言论对青年党而言不常见，青年党过去一直以外国行为体(如非索特派团部队派遣国)驻扎在索马里领土上作为对其发动袭击的理由。青年党将重点转向了西方目标和“解放”耶路撒冷，其背景是该好战团体在索马里境内与伊黎伊斯兰国持续存在竞争，伊黎伊斯兰国的意识形态一直以来比青年党更具全球视角。

39. 在杜斯特 D2 酒店袭击发生近一年前，青年党很可能计划在 El Adde 事件两周年纪念日在肯尼亚伊西奥洛县 Merti 实施车载简易爆炸装置行动，结果被肯尼

²⁷ 从 2019 年 1 月至 4 月，专家小组对摩加迪沙的个人进行了四次电话约谈，这些人与青年党接触以寻求解决土地所有权问题。

²⁸ 国际危机组织，“妇女与青年党的叛乱”，危机组织非洲简报第 145 号，2019 年 6 月 27 日。可查阅：www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/somalia/b145-women-and-al-shabaabs-insurgency。

亚安全部队阻止(S/2018/1002, 第 75-81 段)。专家小组审查的证据表明, 参与策划 Merti 袭击和杜斯特 D2 酒店袭击的网络可能存在重叠, 包括在肯尼亚 Manderla 的一名筹资中间人(见下文“袭击筹资”), 以及杜斯特 D2 酒店袭击中一名持枪歹徒使用的 56-2 型步枪。

袭击小队

40. 青年党袭击小队由四名持枪歹徒和一名自杀炸弹手马希尔·哈立德·里齐基组成。里齐基是唯一的青年党长期成员, 由于参与了肯尼亚沿海的袭击而被肯尼亚警方知晓。²⁹

41. 内罗毕郊区该小组安全屋的领导兼行动人阿里·萨利姆·吉通加于 1995 年出生于肯尼亚的伊西奥洛。对于青年党内部的肯尼亚特工人员而言, 吉通加的不同寻常之处在于在策划的细节方面有很大的自由裁量权和自主权, 包括在挑选目标方面, 而不受索马里境内的直接督导。另外三名持枪歹徒是肯尼亚国民奥斯曼·易卜拉欣·盖迪、来自肯尼亚 Dadaab 难民营的难民西亚特·奥马尔·阿卜迪和从 Dadaab 难民营前往的一名不明身份索马里国民。发现每个袭击者都持有多份身份证件, 其中一些是真的, 另一些是通过贿赂获得或完全假造的。

42. 为了误导执法人员, 袭击小组成员单独前往内罗毕, 仅在袭击发生两天前聚在一起。袭击前一天, 目标尚未最终选定, 该小组成员曾在内罗毕北部的另一处地点进行侦察。

袭击筹资

43. 索马里青年党与肯尼亚袭击小组之间在肯尼亚的关键筹资联系人是在 Manderla 的肯尼亚国民阿卜迪·阿里·穆罕默德。穆罕默德随后使用三个电话号码, 使用肯尼亚主要移动电话货币服务 M-PESA 把将近 700 000 肯尼亚先令(7 000 美元)发给小组领导人阿里·萨利姆·吉通加, 通常一次转账 70 000 肯尼亚先令(700 美元)。2018 年初, 穆罕默德的一个电话号码也被用来转移资金给青年党特工人员阿卜迪马吉特·阿丹, 此人因参与策划在内罗毕实施车载简易爆炸装置袭击于 2018 年 2 月被肯尼亚安全部队逮捕(见 S/2018/1002, 附件 2.3), 这表明两次行动的策划存在重叠。杜斯特 D2 酒店袭击行动总费用的保守估计在 45 000 美元至 50 000 美元之间(见附件 1.6.1(绝密))。

56-2 型步枪

44. 一名杜斯特 D2 酒店持枪歹徒所使用武器上的序列号和其他标记表明, 该步枪极有可能来自部分解除武器禁运后, 2013 年索马里联邦政府从埃塞俄比亚政府购买的一批 3 500 支 56-2 型步枪。³⁰ 发现肯尼亚警方 2018 年 2 月逮捕的青年党

²⁹ 2014 年, 里齐基是青年党负责在沿海地区杀害安全人员的暗杀小组成员, 2014 年 10 月, 他参与了在蒙巴萨皇家酒店杀害一名警官。2019 年 3 月, 专家小组看到的机密警察报告。

³⁰ 该批交货已于 2013 年 7 月 29 日通知委员会。

特工人员拥有 4 支 56-2 型步枪,这些步枪也来自 2013 年的交货(见 S/2018/1002, 附件 2.3)。

45. 附件 1.6 包含杜斯特 D2 酒店袭击的详细案例研究。

东非的其他青年党网络

46. 杜斯特 D2 酒店袭击调查所收集的证据显示,该地区还有更多青年党小组,这些小组通过位于青年党吉利卜据点的至少两名小组协调员联系。³¹ 大部分用流利英语进行的电子通信表明,有证据证明策划 2019 年 2 月在肯尼亚奈瓦沙和纳库鲁附近地区采取行动,绑架外国国民;这些阴谋被肯尼亚反恐警察部队成功挫败。³² 当地小组领导(“埃米尔”)被要求每月向吉利卜提交该小组活动的报告。

47. 设在吉利卜的小组协调员应请求向肯尼亚和坦桑尼亚联合共和国的特工人员提供资金,每个小组的埃米尔需要提交一份支出估计数清单,包括向每个特工人员每月发 700 美元的薪金。在收到请求后,协调员将指示青年党财务部门使用 M-PESA 手机货币将资金转移到特工人员提供的一个电话号码。资金要求很快得到满足,极少受到质疑;在一个案例中,一名小组协调员向坦桑尼亚联合共和国的一名潜伏分子提供了 6 000 美元,其中 1 000 美元用来支付婚礼费用,以便在达累斯萨拉姆开一家面包店,并获得坦桑尼亚的身份证件。小组协调员有时会因为行动方面的关切拒绝特工人员的要求,而不会因为所要求的数额而拒绝。例如,一名小组协调员拒绝了一名特工人员购买丰田 Surf 四轮驱动车的要求,因为这样的车辆不符合他作为大学生的掩护身份。

48. 根据对这些通信的分析,专家小组估计,2018 年 3 月至 2019 年 2 月期间,索马里的青年党特工人员向东非的四个小组转了约 100 000 美元。

49. 青年党在东非行动的详细情况见附件 1.7(绝密)。

肯尼亚境内的招募

50. 吉利卜的小组协调员与外地特工人员之间的电子通信也前所未有地暴露了青年党在肯尼亚境内的招募技巧。肯尼亚的特工人员多次推荐可招募人员,这些人通常是他们通过犯罪方面的联系结识的。在一个例子中,一名特工人员建议招募“AH”,一名非索马里族裔的肯尼亚国民,曾与该特工人员一起实施抢劫。设在吉利卜的小组协调员为“AH”于 2018 年 12 月经埃勒瓦克前往索马里提供便利,“AH”在索马里仅在盖多州接受了 24 天的培训,然后于 2019 年 1 月返回肯尼亚。

51. “AH”的案例使用了肯尼亚新招募人员前往索马里常用的路线,即经青年党首选的埃勒瓦克过境点,并在盖多州接受培训。然而,在其他方面,该案例代

³¹ 被国际安全机构通过其因特网协议地址识别。

³² 2019 年 6 月对国际安全消息人士的约谈。

表了青年党招募战略新被观察到的一面，即拥有犯罪技能，包括逃避执法人员知识，对这方面的重视优先于意识形态或与某些清真寺或宗教网络的联系。

跨界袭击肯尼亚

52. 在本报告所述期间，青年党加强了索马里-肯尼亚边界沿线的肇事逃逸和简易爆炸装置袭击，特别是在 2019 年 6 月和 7 月期间，两个月总共发生了 30 起事件。这些袭击的地理范围从与索马里接壤的最北部边境点肯尼亚 Mandera 到拉穆县的南部边界，跨度近 700 公里。

53. 最严重的跨界事件 2019 年 6 月 15 日发生在肯尼亚瓦吉尔县的 Konton，8 名肯尼亚警察被一枚简易爆炸装置炸死，另有多人受伤。袭击发生前一天，也在 Konton 地区，三名肯尼亚后备警察被绑架。

54. 青年党袭击肯尼亚的频率增加可能是由于两国之间外交紧张局势加剧(见下文“与肯尼亚的海上边界争端”)，该好战团体可能试图利用这一点。

55. 附件 1.8 包含关于青年党跨界袭击肯尼亚的补充资料。

B. 伊拉克和黎凡特伊斯兰国派别

56. 索马里和厄立特里亚问题监测组 2018 年报告称，以阿卜杜勒卡迪尔·穆明为首、设在邦特兰巴里州的伊黎伊斯兰国派别已进入缩减期和改组期，还详细说明出现了以摩加迪沙和阿夫戈耶为基地的伊黎伊斯兰国暗杀网络(S/2018/1002，第 93-97 段)。在本报告所述期间，专家小组注意到该派别领导层发生了剧变，该团体显然协同努力，利用与青年党采用的勒索企业和个人的类似战术，建立收入基础。专家小组于 2018 年 11 月下旬获得美国培训的邦特兰安全部队的一项内部评估，该评估估计该团体可能由多达 340 名好战分子组成，如果准确的话，将大大高于监测组先前估计的多达 200 名战斗人员(S/2017/924，第 32 段)。

领导层斗争

57. 2018 年底，阿卜迪拉希德·卢克马安与伊黎伊斯兰国副手默哈德·穆瓦利姆³³ 及其支持者(主要是穆罕默德·艾哈迈德·卡希耶³⁴ 和阿卜迪哈基姆·祖各布)³⁵ 之间进行了一场暴力的领导权争夺。10 月 13 日，穆瓦利姆被发现在摩加迪沙 Hodan 区被枪杀。11 月 18 日前后，当时的邦特兰主席阿布蒂威里·穆罕默德·阿里·“加斯”给予卡希耶赦免，此后卡希耶出于对其安全的担忧离开邦特兰

³³ 2018 年 2 月 27 日，美国国务院宣布默哈德·穆瓦利姆为特别指认的全球恐怖分子，对其进行制裁。

³⁴ 据报告，穆罕默德·艾哈迈德·卡希耶是 2017 年 2 月 8 日对博萨索国际村酒店袭击的主谋(见 S/2017/924，附件 2.4)。

³⁵ 索马里和厄立特里亚问题监测组 2017 年最后报告(见 S/2017/924，附件 2.2)称阿卜迪哈基姆·祖各布为伊黎伊斯兰国的高级领导人和邦特兰戈利斯山区青年党叛乱的前成员。

前往埃塞俄比亚。³⁶ 2019 年 4 月 14 日，阿卜迪哈基姆·祖各布在邦特兰东北部 Xiriir 镇附近被美国空袭打死。³⁷

58. 清洗之后，阿卜迪拉希德·卢克马安(达罗德族/Leelkase 部落)成为伊黎伊斯兰国派别事实上的领导人，尽管阿卜杜勒卡迪尔·穆明仍作为该团体的埃米尔和精神领袖。卢克马安很可能是索马里和厄立特里亚问题监测组 2017 年最后报告中认定的同一人，即伊黎伊斯兰国军事行动负责人阿卜迪加尼·“卢克马安”(达罗德族/Leelkase 部落)(见 S/2017/924，附件 2.2)。邦特兰安全部队内部报告中未经证实的情报表明，卢克马安年龄在 40 到 48 岁之间，2015 年叛逃到伊黎伊斯兰国派别，之前曾是青年党在加勒卡约的一名宗教领袖。

与青年党在巴里州的冲突

59. 2018 年 12 月，伊黎伊斯兰国派别与青年党在巴里州爆发战斗，这是 2016 年初以来爆发的首次战斗，中心地区是巴里州山区的重要水源(见附件 1.9)。伊黎伊斯兰国派别与青年党之间的激烈冲突自 2018 年 11 月以来一直持续，当时两个团体似乎已开始争相在摩加迪沙和邦特兰敲诈企业。2018 年 11 月期间，索马里最大的电信公司 Hormuud 索马里公司的 11 名雇员在摩加迪沙被杀，持枪歹徒据报告与伊黎伊斯兰国和青年党有关联。

伊拉克和黎凡特伊斯兰国筹资

60. 自 2015 年 10 月伊黎伊斯兰国派别出现以来，索马里和厄立特里亚问题监测组对其调查得出的结论是该团体掌握的资金微乎其微，而且不太可能收到索马里以外的大额支持；对前伊黎伊斯兰国成员的约谈表明，该团体几乎没有能力为自己的人员支付工资(S/2017/924，第 36-42 段)。然而，在本报告所述期间，该派别开始努力利用与青年党类似的敲诈勒索方法来获得国内收入。例如，2018 年 10 月，伊黎伊斯兰国派别成功地勒索设在邦特兰的电信公司 Amtel，迫使其支付总计数十万美元的款项。2018 年 8 月和 11 月，邦特兰另一些公司的员工被暗杀，据报告这些公司拒绝接受伊黎伊斯兰国派别的“征税”要求。附件 1.9 包含关于伊黎伊斯兰国派别试图在邦特兰建立收入基础的更多资料。

袭击梵蒂冈的阴谋

61. 2018 年 12 月 17 日，索马里国民、伊黎伊斯兰国有关人员奥马尔·莫欣·易卜拉欣(又称阿纳斯·哈利勒)在意大利巴里被捕，他涉嫌在 12 月 25 日圣诞节庆

³⁶ 邦特兰现任和前任高级情报官员提供的信息，以及邦特兰安全部队的内部情报报告。2019 年 8 月 8 日，专家小组收到一名目击者提供的资料，该目击者声称在亚的斯亚贝巴的 Bole 居民区看到了卡希耶和另一名前伊黎伊斯兰国战斗人员。另见哈伦·马鲁夫，“索马里的伊斯兰国好战分子在压力下前往埃塞俄比亚”，美国之声，2019 年 8 月 19 日，可查阅：www.voanews.com/africa/under-pressure-militants-somalia-look-ethiopia；萨利姆·所罗门，“埃塞俄比亚军方抓获疑似伊斯兰国成员”，美国之声，2019 年 9 月 12 日，可查阅：www.voanews.com/africa/ethiopian-military-captures-suspected-members。

³⁷ 美国非洲司令部，“美国确认对伊黎伊斯兰国在索马里的阿卜杜勒哈基姆·祖各布实施空袭”，新闻稿，2019 年 4 月 15 日。可查阅：www.africom.mil/media-room/pressrelease/31765/u-s-confirms-airstrike-against-isis-somalias-abdulahakim-dhuqub。

祝期间策划袭击梵蒂冈和意大利的其他目标。虽然该阴谋很初步，几乎没有成功的可能，但在意大利当局的协助下，专家小组的调查揭示了“阿纳斯·哈利勒”与索马里兰、邦特兰、利比亚和肯尼亚的重要伊黎伊斯兰国特工人员之间的联系。梵蒂冈阴谋是索马里境内的伊黎伊斯兰国分子首次与境外的恐怖主义袭击企图有直接关联。

奥马尔·莫欣·易卜拉欣

62. 奥马尔·莫欣·易卜拉欣又名阿纳斯·哈利勒，1998年10月出生在邦特兰的 Qardho。他以人道主义理由于2016年底通过西西里进入意大利。³⁸ 在抵达意大利前，“阿纳斯·哈利勒”曾居住在内罗毕，随后于2016年前往利比亚，在那里接受了大半年的培训。在利比亚，“阿纳斯·哈利勒”是阿布·艾曼·阿勒肯涅的部下，据报告后者是一名负责“后勤和移民”的伊黎伊斯兰国官员，³⁹ 他的化名表明与肯尼亚有关系。

63. “阿纳斯·哈利勒”于2017年3月至2018年12月居住在意大利南部的巴里。在意大利期间，他与伊黎伊斯兰国在索马里和肯尼亚的分支机构保持通信。然而，截获的通信表明，“阿纳斯·哈利勒”自行设计了12月25日圣诞节在罗马圣彼得大教堂安放炸弹的计划，并没有收到境外伊黎伊斯兰国特工人员的直接任务。在这些通信之后，意大利当局逮捕了“阿纳斯·哈利勒”，在阴谋进一步发展之前先发制人。

在索马里和肯尼亚的有关人员

64. 存储在“阿纳斯·哈利勒”手机中的联系人中，有一条是阿卜杜拉希·马哈茂德·优素福(又称阿布·哈特姆、疯狂毛拉和马耶尔泰尼)，他生于邦特兰，是伊黎伊斯兰国全球招募者和推动者，2018年在索马里兰被捕并监禁。优素福被捕后，被发现携带概述伊黎伊斯兰国在东非扩张的总体战略的文件。⁴⁰ 根据索马里兰当局提供的信息，优素福访问了非洲和中东的12个国家，包括南非、苏丹、沙特阿拉伯、伊拉克和肯尼亚。⁴¹ 此外，2015年，优素福被派往利比亚供职于伊黎伊斯兰国的“移民部”。⁴² 据报告，他之前还在伊拉克提克里特附近与伊黎伊斯兰国部队一道作战。⁴³ 优素福最初是邦特兰伊黎伊斯兰国派别领导人阿卜杜勒卡

³⁸ 意大利当局于2019年6月向专家小组提供的奥马尔·莫欣·易卜拉欣简介。

³⁹ 同上。

⁴⁰ 2019年2月11日和13日，与索马里兰安全机构和政治官员在哈尔格萨举行会议。专家小组于2019年6月14日向索马里兰发出书信，要求提供这些战略文件的副本，但没有收到答复。

⁴¹ 于2019年2月向专家小组提供的阿卜杜拉希·马哈茂德·优素福档案材料。

⁴² 意大利当局于2019年6月向专家小组提供的奥马尔·莫欣·易卜拉欣简介。

⁴³ 同上。

迪尔·穆明的部下，但优素福后来由于他们对东非伊黎伊斯兰国的愿景不同而与穆明决裂。⁴⁴

65. “阿纳斯·哈利勒”频繁联系的另一个人是其在索马里兰的兄弟阿卜迪拉乌夫·奥马尔·易卜拉欣(又称阿卜迪拉希德·哈利勒、阿卜迪拉乌夫·哈利勒和大德布罗)，在撰写本报告时，他也因恐怖主义指控被关押在哈尔格萨，但定于 2019 年 12 月释放。

66. 伊黎伊斯兰国阴谋的联系图见附件 1.10(绝密)。

C. 商用爆炸物

东方皇后商船

67. 2019 年 3 月 10 日，悬挂坦桑尼亚联合共和国旗帜的杂货船东方皇后商船(海事组织登记号：8200797)驶离土耳其的梅尔辛港口，运载 180 吨爆炸物，包括 165 吨硝酸铵-燃料油以及雷管。这些爆炸物于 5 月 17 日在博萨索港口卸货，随后被运送到邦特兰沿岸加拉阿德镇西北约 65 公里处的 Jariiban 村的一个储藏场所。这些爆炸物旨在用于与建设加拉阿德港以及通往邦特兰首府加罗韦的相应道路有关的爆破。

68. 专家小组在 2019 年 3 月 28 日给安全理事会关于索马里的第 751(1992)号决议所设委员会主席的信中，对货物中包含的物资可能被青年党或设在邦特兰的伊黎伊斯兰国派别挪用制造简易爆炸装置表示关切，并要求该委员会提供指导。委员会随后确定，打算用于商业用途的爆炸物不在武器禁运的范围内，但同意专家小组的看法，即这批货物对索马里的和平、安全和稳定构成威胁。

69. 目前，武器禁运制度没有要求将向索马里转运商业爆炸物通知委员会。因此，专家小组建议，今后交付商业爆炸物时，至少应通知委员会，并且会员国应对其管辖下向索马里供应商业爆炸物的实体保持警惕(见下文第八节)。

D. 联邦与州的关系

70. 在本报告所述期间，索马里联邦政府和联邦成员州之间的政治关系恶化。联邦与州的紧张关系也突出说明，缺乏适当的宪法机制来明确界定联邦政府和联邦成员州当局在州选举进程中的各自作用。

西南州选举进程

71. 2018 年底，西南州总统选举进程受到各种问题的影响，包括多次被推迟，人员辞职，指控联邦政府过度干预以及安全环境恶化导致 15 名平民丧生。

72. 2018 年 11 月和 12 月，由于原西南州选举委员会辞职、关键候选人退出以及在总统候选人资格问题上缺乏共识，西南州选举进程被三次推迟。⁴⁵ 大多数候选

⁴⁴ 2019 年 2 月 11 日对索马里兰安全官员的约谈，以及 2019 年 7 月 30 日对一名西方安全机构成员的约谈。

⁴⁵ 2019 年 2 月 12 日在内罗毕对西南州议员和西南州选举委员会成员的约谈。

人指责联邦政府向其首选提名人 Abdiaziz Mohamed “Laftagareen” 提供政治和资金支持。⁴⁶

穆赫塔尔·罗博夫的候选资格

73. 2018 年 10 月 4 日，2017 年 8 月从青年党叛逃的该团体前副领导人穆赫塔尔·罗博夫宣布竞选西南州总统。⁴⁷ 对此，联邦政府安全部宣布罗博夫没有资格参选，称他尚未满足某些允许他申请政治职位的先决条件。⁴⁸

74. 2018 年 11 月 30 日，一架载有来自摩加迪沙的 130 名联邦政府武装警察的飞机降落在拜多阿。西南州安全部长 Hassan Hussein Elay 为这次部署活动辩护，称选举进程需要额外安全保障。⁴⁹

75. 2018 年 12 月 13 日，西南州官员邀请穆赫塔尔·罗博夫参加在拜多阿非索特派团保护区的西南州总统府举行的会议。在罗博夫抵达后，索马里安全部队在埃塞俄比亚国防军协助下拘留了他。⁵⁰ 在罗博夫被捕期间，一些忠于他的武装人员向保护区大院内的埃塞俄比亚国防军士兵开火，造成双方伤亡。⁵¹ 罗博夫在联邦政府国家情报与安全局监督下乘飞机前往摩加迪沙，在编写本报告时，他仍在那里。埃塞俄比亚国防军部队在逮捕罗博夫事件中的作用可能在该地区当地社区中激起反埃塞俄比亚情绪，此前，众所周知，这些社区与埃塞俄比亚国防军部队分享青年党行动情报。⁵²

杀害示威者

76. 在穆赫塔尔·罗博夫被拘留后，2018 年 12 月 13 日至 15 日，联邦政府和州索马里安全部队以致命武力应对拜多阿的公众抗议，造成 15 名平民死亡。在示威爆发前一天，西南州警察局长 Mahat Abdirahman 上校主张对示威者使用致命武力。⁵³ 2019 年 8 月，Abdirahman 上校被任命为联邦政府看守部队负责人。

⁴⁶ 同上。

⁴⁷ Mohamed Olad Hassan, “索马里政府阻止前好战分子寻求政治职位”，美国之声，2018 年 10 月 5 日。可查阅：www.voanews.com/a/somalia-government-blocks-ex-militant-seeking-political-office/4601493.html。

⁴⁸ 同上。

⁴⁹ 2018 年 12 月 10 日在内罗毕对联合国官员的约谈。

⁵⁰ 非索特派团否认参与逮捕穆赫塔尔·罗博夫。专家小组通过电话约谈了几名西南州议员和当地公民，他们报告说埃塞俄比亚国防军参与了逮捕。然而，由于穆赫塔尔·罗博夫目前被拘留在摩加迪沙，专家小组尚未与他约谈。

⁵¹ 2019 年 2 月 12 日在内罗毕对 4 名西南州议员的约谈。

⁵² 2019 年 4 月 3 日在亚的斯亚贝巴对一名埃塞俄比亚安全官员的约谈。在西南州选举后，青年党于 2019 年 1 月 18 日伏击了在拜多阿附近行驶的埃塞俄比亚国防军车队。青年党声称杀死了 60 名士兵，但这一数字无法得到独立核实。

⁵³ 在 2018 年 12 月发布的一段视频中，Abdirahman 上校威胁要“开枪打人”，并对采访者说，“就算我们打死你也不犯法”。见 Harun Maruf (@HarunMaruf), “视频：拜多阿前警察局长

77. 2019 年 1 月 5 日，西南州当局任命了一个实况调查委员会，对杀害示威者事件进行调查。⁵⁴ 委员会 2019 年 2 月发布了调查结果，承认有 4 人死亡，但未确定相关行凶者。⁵⁵ 相反，专家小组核对了 15 名平民受害者的姓名。⁵⁶

金钱付款

78. 向西南州议员提供金钱付款是影响州选举进程结果的一个重要因素。⁵⁷ 专家小组收到多份报告，显示 82 名西南州议员在 2018 年 11 月初乘飞机前往摩加迪沙，每人得到约 5 000 美元的首笔付款，以换取他们对特定总统候选人的支持。⁵⁸ 与西南州议员进行的约谈证实，在选举进程成功结束后，他们还可支持特定候选人再得到 2 万至 3 万美元。⁵⁹

79. 此外，在选举前几周，西南州高级官员也收到了大笔付款。专家小组审查的财务信息显示，西南州一位重要部长在选举前收到了总计数十万美元的转账。给该部长付款的是在摩加迪沙的 3 名个人，专家小组确认其中一人是联邦政府高级办公室的一名财务办事员。⁶⁰

80. 2018 年 12 月 19 日，西南州总统选举进程结束，州议会投票选出联邦政府支持的候选人 Abdiaziz Mohamed “Laftagareen”。

邦特兰选举进程

81. 邦特兰选举也受到影响，有报告称议员受到贿赂以及议员初选过程受到操纵。在一起案例中，专家小组收到的证据表明，有人向一名可能成为议员的人提供 15 000 美元以使其拒绝任命，从而使支持特定总统候选人的另一人能够获得任命。此外，据报，候选人为争取选票向议员们支付了 3 万至 7 万美元不等的款项。⁶¹

82. 邦特兰选举进程也受到联邦政府企图干涉指控的影响。例如，联邦议会上院一名议员声称，联邦政府试图通过向与联邦政府结盟的候选人提供资金支持来影响

Mahad Abdirahman Aden 将军”，2019 年 8 月 24 日(索马里语视频)，可查阅：
<https://twitter.com/harunmaruf/status/1165333569977425925?s=12>。

⁵⁴ 西南州总统办公室的信，2019 年 1 月 5 日。

⁵⁵ 西南州实况调查委员会关于 2018 年 12 月 13 日至 15 日拜多阿示威活动的评估报告。

⁵⁶ 2019 年 3 月 28 日在内罗毕对个人和西南州政党成员的约谈；索马里民间社会行为体提供的关于在拜多阿杀害平民的机密报告，2019 年 3 月 28 日。

⁵⁷ 2018 年 12 月至 2019 年 3 月在内罗毕对多名西南州议员的约谈，2019 年 3 月在内罗毕对 2 名西南州总统候选人的约谈。

⁵⁸ 同上。

⁵⁹ 2019 年 3 月 12 日在内罗毕对 2 名西南州总统候选人和数名西南州议员的约谈。

⁶⁰ 这些转账的详细资料已在秘书处存档。

⁶¹ 2019 年 1 月和 2 月，两名总统候选人、一名前邦特兰情报官员和民间团体成员向专家小组提供了邦特兰选举期间发生的普遍贿赂议员和其他违规事件的说明。

邦特兰选举结果。⁶² 然而，这种尝试似乎没有成功影响选举进程的结果。2019 年 1 月 9 日，邦特兰议会选举赛义德·阿卜杜拉希·穆罕默德“德尼”为邦特兰总统，其在和平权力交接中，接替了阿布蒂威里·穆罕默德·阿里“加斯”的职责。

朱巴兰选举进程

83. 2019 年 7 月和 8 月，联邦政府、朱巴兰政府和当地反对派利益攸关方之间的政治紧张加剧，成为基斯马尤朱巴兰总统选举进程的特点。如在西南州和邦特兰州选举进程中观察到的情况，就联邦政府在州选举进程中的作用对索马里《临时宪法》的不同解释是政治分歧的核心。7 月 12 日，青年党利用紧张的政治气氛，对基斯马尤的 Medina 酒店进行了一次复合式袭击，造成至少 26 人死亡，50 多人受伤，这是该市首次发生此类袭击。

84. 2019 年 7 月 4 日，朱巴兰独立选举和边界委员会宣布，朱巴兰传统长老代表将任命 75 名议员来选举州总统。联邦政府和一些当地利益攸关方对长老甄选的不透明性表示关切，7 月 6 日，联邦政府发表声明，称这一进程需要得到联邦政府内政和联邦事务部批准。对此，朱巴兰当局指责联邦政府试图不当影响结果，并于 7 月 25 日禁止联邦政府官员前往朱巴兰，直至该进程结束。

85. 因肯尼亚支持朱巴兰现任总统艾哈迈德·穆罕默德·伊斯兰“马多贝”，埃塞俄比亚被视为支持索马里联邦政府，肯尼亚和埃塞俄比亚之间的关系紧张，使基斯马尤的政治环境更加困难。2019 年 8 月 19 日，朱巴兰当局强行阻止一架载有埃塞俄比亚代表的飞机在基斯马尤机场降落，导致肯尼亚和埃塞俄比亚部队在机场发生了武装对峙。⁶³

86. 2019 年 8 月 22 日，朱巴兰独立选举和边界委员会宣布艾哈迈德·穆罕默德·伊斯兰“马多贝”为朱巴兰总统。⁶⁴ 同一天，反对派领导的影子议会选举索马里联邦政府议员 Abdirashid Mohamed Hiddig 为总统。⁶⁵ 也是在 8 月 22 日，索马里联邦政府拒绝承认两个选举进程的结果。

安全部门

87. 在本报告所述期间，安全部门改革的重点是执行 2018 年 4 月通过的《索马里过渡计划》，该计划设想到 2021 年将安全责任从非索特派团移交至索马里安全部队，与此同时非索特派团也要撤离。

88. 虽然《过渡计划》的一些初期目标已经实现，但清理主要补给线并保障其安全的中期目标尚未完成。非索特派团高级官员向专家小组表示，联邦政府部队“没有很好地发挥自己的作用”，经常未能填补非索特派团留下的真空，实例包括拜

⁶² 加罗韦在线，“参议员说，索马里没有朝着正确方向前进”，2019 年 4 月 26 日。可查阅：www.garoweonline.com/en/news/puntland/somalia-is-not-headed-to-the-right-direction-says-senator。

⁶³ 朱巴兰部队将车辆停在基斯马尤机场跑道上，以阻止飞机降落。

⁶⁴ 艾哈迈德·穆罕默德·伊斯兰“马多贝”获得了总共 74 票中的 56 票。

⁶⁵ 第三位总统候选人 Abdinasir Seerar 随后也宣布自己为朱巴兰总统。

州战略城镇 Leego，以及索马里联邦政府没有足够的驻守部队来保障主要补给线的安全。⁶⁶

89. 此外，非索特派团在 2018 年 3 月至 2019 年 1 月期间进行的地区行动准备状态评估得出结论，有 20 000 多名联邦成员州部队人员未被纳入联邦政府指挥和控制体制。非索特派团还在报告中指出，虽然州部队接受了一些训练，但这些部队不能定期得到工资，也缺乏基本的装备和车辆。把联邦成员州部队成功纳入《国家安全架构》至关重要，将使非索特派团能够按计划进行缩编。专家小组目前估计，设想的非索特派团撤离不太可能在 2021 年底前实现。

《过渡计划》和非洲联盟驻索马里特派团缩编

90. 2019 年 2 月 16 日，非索特派团军事指挥官就根据 2018-2021 年行动构想开展的行动活动达成共识，该行动构想此前于 2018 年 11 月 26 日获得核准，于 2019 年 2 月 9 日得到非洲联盟和平与安全理事会核可。⁶⁷

91. 根据行动构想，非索特派团在本报告所述期间继续撤离并向索马里安全部队进行移交：

(a) 2019 年 2 月 28 日，摩加迪沙一所军事学院被移交给联邦政府。迁离了驻扎在那里的 500 名布隆迪士兵：200 人转至摩加迪沙以东 20 公里的马斯拉，300 人转至乔哈尔和 5 区的前沿行动基地；

(b) 2019 年 2 月，按照安全理事会第 2431(2018)号决议第 5 段的要求，驻扎在希尔谢贝利的约 1 000 名布隆迪士兵开始按计划遣返。这一撤离活动在 2019 年 4 月 5 日前完成。

“闪电”营占领下谢贝利村庄

92. 2019 年 5 月至 8 月，非索特派团和索马里国民军在美国特种部队支持下发起进攻，以夺取青年党控制的下谢贝利战略村庄。通过安全行动，成功夺回了巴里雷、萨比德、Anole 和奥代格莱等村庄，这些村庄都位于摩加迪沙 50 公里以内。这些行动是在确保摩加迪沙安全方面的重大进展，因为夺取的地点是青年党用来将战斗人员和简易爆炸装置运入摩加迪沙的重要运输通道上的航路点。然而，8 月 14 日，青年党利用三个车载简易爆炸装置、迫击炮和枪手对奥代格莱前沿行动基地发动了协同进攻。⁶⁸ 这次进攻被非索特派团和索马里国民军部队击退，但该基地依然脆弱，因为青年党持续在附近的 Mubarak 镇存在，该镇先前被确定是简易爆炸装置制造区，用于制作进入摩加迪沙的车载简易爆炸装置。下谢贝利安

⁶⁶ 2019 年 4 月 2 日在亚的斯亚贝巴对非索特派团高级官员的约谈。

⁶⁷ 非索特派团，“非索特派团指挥官就军事行动达成共识”，新闻稿，2019 年 2 月 16 日。可查阅：<http://amisom-au.org/2019/02/amisom-commanders-reach-a-consensus-on-military-operations/>。

⁶⁸ 这些车载简易爆炸装置配有装甲，与青年党 2019 年 1 月 19 日在下朱巴 Bar Sanguni 使用的汽车炸弹类似。

全行动的长期成功将取决于联邦政府是否能够提供有效的驻守部队、治理以及向当地居民提供服务。⁶⁹

将先知的信徒部队编入索马里国民军

93. 联邦政府在 2019 年 6 月最后一周宣布, 先知的信徒一个主要派别将被编入联邦安全部队, 该组织是 1991 年成立的埃塞俄比亚支持的苏菲派军事团体, 是对青年党的有力制衡。将先知的信徒纳入联邦结构是索马里部队从非索特派团接手承担安全责任的重要一步。成功整合先知的信徒部队将取决于联邦政府能否满足该组织对权力和资源的要求, 同时不影响该组织对抗青年党的能力, 也不会疏远贾穆杜格的其他政治派别。

索马里国民军的生物鉴别登记

94. 根据联邦政府向委员会提供的文件, 联邦政府已于 2019 年 3 月底前完成了索马里国民军生物鉴别登记的第一阶段, 这是朝着安全部门改革和确保支付工资迈出的积极一步。⁷⁰ 专家小组独立获得了一份索马里国民军工资单文件, 其中载有截至 2019 年 2 月登记的 15 962 名士兵。不过, 尚不清楚的是, 索马里国民军目前的组成在多大程度上反映了联邦政府先前承认的索马里国民军成员。专家小组在第 60 区、“4 月 12 日”区和戈登将军军事基地对索马里国民军登记情况进行了三个案例研究, 研究结论是, 在 2017 年和 2018 年登记簿中有名可查的索马里国民军士兵中, 只有不到一半的人(678 人中的 315 人)被纳入了 2019 年的生物鉴别登记过程。尚不清楚造成这种差异的原因是否是叛逃、复员、人员死亡或受伤或仍有尚待索马里国民军登记的士兵。

95. 附件 1.12 载有专家小组对索马里国民军生物鉴别登记的三个案例研究资料。

E. 公共财务管理

收取空中导航费

96. 至 2019 年 5 月, 索马里联邦政府在公共财务管理方面取得了重大进展, 完成了国际货币基金组织(基金组织)三个工作人员监测的规划, 这是一系列与扩大联邦政府国内税基有关的技术基准。这些规划强调的一个收入流是直接收取空中导航费, 联邦政府在 2019 年 6 月国际民用航空组织(国际民航组织)移交后承担了这项责任。然而, 专家小组的调查显示, 索马里民航和气象局以前在收取空中导航费方面曾出现财务违规行为, 民航和气象局注销了朱巴航空有限公司欠下的 580 万美元债务, 但没有从该航空公司收取资金。

⁶⁹ 青年党警告巴里雷居民不要返回该地区。2019 年 8 月 13 日在摩加迪沙对消息来源的约谈以及 2019 年 8 月一份机密安全报告。

⁷⁰ 索马里联邦政府按第 2444(2018)号决议第 21 段的要求向安全理事会提交的定期报告, 2019 年 3 月 19 日。

背景

97. 1991 年索马里政府垮台后不久，国际民航组织在一项 1994 年协定中承担了管理索马里空域的责任。根据国际民航组织准则，所有过境索马里空域的飞机都需支付空中导航费，为每次飞行 275 美元。1995 年，国际民航组织与国际航空运输协会(空运协会)签署协议，代表索马里收取这些空中导航费，并将所有收入存入国际民航组织管理的信托基金账户，用于资助和支持索马里空域的安全运营。据空运协会称，从 2008 年 8 月至 2019 年 7 月收取了约 1.12 亿美元并转入国际民航组织信托基金。⁷¹

98. 2012 年，索马里联邦政府得到国际承认，此后，开始筹备将索马里空域控制权从国际民航组织移交给联邦政府，并移交国际民航组织信托基金中的 650 万美元余额。2019 年 6 月，国际民航组织、空运协会和索马里联邦政府签署了一项协议，完成了移交。

索马里联邦政府以往使用国际民用航空组织信托基金的情况

99. 在 2019 年移交国际民航组织信托基金之前，国际民航组织应请求将资金转入索马里联邦政府指定的银行账户，以为具体项目提供资金。联邦政府利用信托基金资助了数个合法项目，但也发生了违规使用事件。例如，2014 年 5 月 29 日，国际民航组织向索马里联邦政府提供的一个设在吉布提的汇款机构的账户转账了 350 000 美元，据称是用于对摩加迪沙索马里民航和气象局工作人员进行一系列培训。国际民航组织怀疑这些资金是否曾用于民航和气象局工作人员的培训，并将案件转交内部调查。⁷²

100. 2015 年，由时任联邦政府运输和民航部长率领的联邦政府代表团前往蒙特利尔国际民航组织总部，要求从信托基金中提取 150 000 美元。⁷³ 转账请求无法完成，因为该代表团指定了一个私人银行账户来接收资金。⁷⁴ 代表团随后要求以现金形式提供资金，国际民航组织也无法满足这一要求。⁷⁵

索马里航空公司所欠空中导航费

101. 国际民航组织先前的一次内部审计指出，设在索马里或索马里国民拥有的航空公司经常拒绝支付每次飞行 275 美元的空中导航费。⁷⁶ 截至 2019 年 7

⁷¹ 空运协会给专家小组的信，2019 年 8 月 8 日。据空运协会称，没有 2008 年 8 月之前的财务记录。

⁷² 2019 年 5 月 29 日至 31 日，专家小组在蒙特利尔对国际民航组织高级代表进行了一系列约谈。在审查国际民航组织对此事进行的调查期间，一名批准转账 350 000 美元的国际民航组织代表后来打趣说，“这笔钱是给他们的奔驰车的”。

⁷³ 2019 年 5 月 29 日至 31 日在蒙特利尔对国际民航组织工作人员的约谈。

⁷⁴ 同上。

⁷⁵ 同上。

⁷⁶ 国际民航组织，“Som/03/016 和 Som/95/901 财务审计(索马里民航事务代管当局)”，2011 年 4 月 6 日。

月 31 日,拖欠空运协会的空中导航费总额为 2 550 万美元。⁷⁷ 在这笔债务中,超过 2 000 万美元是在索马里注册的航空公司或索马里国民拥有的航空公司所欠。Bluebird 航空有限公司欠款最多,截至 2019 年 7 月,该公司欠款已达 520 万美元。⁷⁸

清理朱巴航空公司债务

102. 2018 年 2 月之前,朱巴航空有限公司所欠空中导航费债务数额最大,为 580 万美元,该公司首席执行官也是联邦政府议员。在 2017 年 12 月的一封信中,当时的索马里民航和气象局局长通知国际民航组织和空运协会,朱巴航空有限公司已“与[索马里民航和气象局]结算了所有与空中导航费有关的发票”。⁷⁹ 专家小组获得的 2018 年 2 月的内部账目显示,朱巴航空公司的 580 万美元债务已清账。然而,据联邦政府运输和民航部长称,朱巴航空公司或任何其他设在索马里的航空公司都未曾直接与索马里民航和气象局或任何其他联邦政府机构结算导航费欠债。⁸⁰ 朱巴航空公司没有向专家小组提供所要求的付款证明。⁸¹

指定以索马里民航和气象局账户接收空中导航费

103. 2019 年 6 月 27 日,国际民航组织、空运协会和联邦政府运输和民航部长签署协议,终止了国际民航组织在收取空中导航费方面的作用。该协议指定以索马里民航和气象局在索马里中央银行的账户(账号 1040)来接收今后收取的空中导航费。⁸² 根据联邦政府财务管理准则(以及基金组织工作人员监测的规划的基准),这笔收入本应转至中央银行的财政单一账户。运输和民航部长表示,尽管有协议案文,但今后收取的空域导航费将直接计入财政单一账户。⁸³

104. 继 2019 年 6 月协议后,国际民航组织将该组织信托基金中的 650 万美元余额汇给了索马里联邦政府;用于接收资金的是索马里民航和气象局的账户(账号 1040)。⁸⁴

105. 附件 1.13 载有与收取空中导航费和核销朱巴航空公司债务有关的证明文件。

⁷⁷ “未结项目报告摘要——截至 2019 年 7 月 31 日”,空运协会 2019 年 8 月 8 日向专家小组提供。

⁷⁸ 同上。

⁷⁹ 索马里民航和气象局局长 Yusuf Abdi Abdulle 给国际民航组织驻摩加迪沙项目协调员的信,2017 年 12 月 12 日。

⁸⁰ 2019 年 9 月 12 日对索马里联邦政府运输和民航部长 Mohamed Abdullahi Salat 的约谈。

⁸¹ 2019 年 8 月 23 日在内罗毕对朱巴航空公司首席执行官 Said Nur Qailie 的约谈。

⁸² 在过去的报告中,索马里和厄立特里亚问题监测组强调,存在使用联邦政府部门专门账户的问题,目的是绕过财政单一账户,从而规避联邦政府财政当局对收入的监督(例如见 S/2015/801,附件 3.3)。

⁸³ 2019 年 9 月 12 日对 Mohamed Abdullahi Salat 的约谈。

⁸⁴ 国际民航组织代表的电子邮件,2019 年 9 月 24 日。

F. 石油和天然气部门

与肯尼亚的海上边界争端

106. 自 2014 年 8 月以来，肯尼亚和索马里之间关于印度洋一块超过 100 000 平方公里区域的海上边界争端一直在国际法院待决。⁸⁵ 2019 年 2 月 7 日，索马里联邦政府与地震石油勘探数据公司 Spectrum Geo(现称 TGS)合作，在伦敦主办了一次石油会议，旨在介绍 2016 年在索马里近海完成的地震勘探研究的结果。一周后，肯尼亚政府临时召回了驻索马里大使，称索马里联邦政府在会上拍卖了位于肯尼亚专属经济区内的石油和天然气区块。然而，此次会议重点介绍的数据不涉及争议地区，也没有进行石油区块的拍卖或投标。尽管如此，目前的海上争端加剧了肯尼亚与索马里联邦政府的紧张关系，产生了可供青年党利用的潜在空间，⁸⁶ 还可能在肯尼亚和其他更支持索马里联邦政府的非索特派团部队派遣国之间制造分歧。两国的积极关系对区域安全至关重要，在打击青年党跨越两国共同边界开展的行动方面尤为如此(见上文“跨界袭击肯尼亚”)。

G. 海上海盗行为

107. 在本报告所述期间，索马里沿海发生了一起海上海盗成功劫持船只事件。2019 年 4 月 19 日，悬挂也门旗帜的 *Al Ahzam* 号道船在摩加迪沙以北的阿代尔附近被武装海盗劫持。这艘道船后来被用作母船，于 4 月 21 日对 *Adria* 号、*Txori Argi* 号和 *Shin Shuen Far 889* 号渔船发动海盗袭击，但未获成功。

108. 4 月 23 日，打击海盗的欧盟海军特派团部队拦截并登上了 *Al Ahzam* 号。5 名海盗被转至塞舌尔以进行起诉，其中 3 人受了枪伤。据欧盟海军称，其中一名被抓获的海盗此前曾因参与 2017 年 11 月 18 日企图劫持 *Galerna III* 号渔船活动而在塞舌尔被起诉(S/2018/1002，第 135 段)，但后来因法律技术性问题而获释。⁸⁷ 随后从国际刑事警察组织(国际刑警组织)收到的生物识别证据证实，在 2019 年 4 月劫持 *Al Ahzam* 号事件后被捕的一名海盗，即 Mohamed Dahir Wehliye，此前曾因参与企图劫持 *Galerna III* 号以及悬挂巴拿马旗帜的 *Ever Dynamic* 号商船的活动而于 2017 年被拘留⁸⁸ (更多详情见附件 1.14)。

⁸⁵ 肯尼亚声称，海上边界应以平行于纬度线(位于南纬 1 至 2 度之间)的方式从其与索马里的陆地边界延伸。索马里联邦政府的立场是，索马里的海上边界应从海岸沿东南方向延伸，作为索马里陆地边界的扩展。

⁸⁶ 青年党领导人 Ahmad Umar 在 2019 年 9 月 19 日发布的音频讯息中，敦促索马里人与肯尼亚对抗，因为肯尼亚企图吞并“大片土地，然后试图占领我们的海洋”。

⁸⁷ 2019 年 4 月 30 日在内罗毕对欧盟海军人员的约谈。

⁸⁸ 2019 年 6 月从国际刑警组织海事安全分司收到的资料。

三. 武器禁运

A. 索马里联邦政府遵守部分解除武器禁运的义务

109. 在本报告所述期间，索马里联邦政府遵守安全理事会通知要求的情况有所改善，委员会收到的 7 份通知中有 5 份履行了索马里联邦政府根据部分解除武器禁运所承担的义务。

110. 然而，索马里联邦政府在本报告所述期间拒绝准许进入其军事储存设施，损害了专家小组充分监测索马里联邦政府全面遵守部分解禁条款的能力。不过根据安全理事会第 2444(2018)号决议第 32 段的要求，2019 年 6 月 22 日至 28 日，秘书长派出技术评估团在内罗毕和摩加迪沙进行了一次旨在改善武器禁运执行情况的审查。评估团在审查期间获得索马里联邦政府允准进入军事储存设施。索马里联邦政府承认内部协调问题是造成以往未收到通知或迟发通知的一个因素，但向评估小组表示，负责供应的会员国在安排运送时，往往绕过了索马里国家安全顾问办公室。⁸⁹

111. 附件 2.1 介绍了本报告所述期间索马里联邦政府向委员会发送通知的详细情况，而附件 2.2 和 2.3(绝密)通报委员会的武器弹药运送情况以及自 2013 年部分解除武器禁运以来向索马里联邦政府运送的武器弹药总量。

武器弹药管理

112. 秘书长在技术评估团的评估后得出的结论是，索马里联邦政府在“加强新近进口的物资问责制方面取得了重大进展”，但在向索马里联邦政府安全部队各单位分发武器和弹药的问责制方面，但“挑战依然存在”，尤其在协调能力方面。⁹⁰ 评估团的结论基本上符合索马里和厄立特里亚问题监测组 2018 年的调查结果，即进入哈拉内中央军械库的武器虽然总体上具有充足的可视性，但关于向外地单位分发物资的记录仍有缺陷(S/2018/1002，第 17-20 段)。附件 2.4 提供了索马里联邦政府和索马里联邦成员国在武器弹药管理方面的更多详细情况。

已查明由军火商拥有的索马里联邦政府的武器

113. 专家小组利用当地消息灵通人士，从 2019 年 1 月至 8 月记录了黑市军火商持有的 38 件武器，这些武器的标记与索马里联邦政府进口的武器一致：⁹¹ 摩加迪沙有 7 支 AK 型步枪和 6 支 9 毫米手枪，拜多阿有 25 支 AK 型步枪。⁹² 专家小组能够利用序列号追踪到 2014 年 9 月、2017 年 6 月和 2017 年 7 月交付给索

⁸⁹ S/2019/616。

⁹⁰ 同上。

⁹¹ 在其 2018 年最后报告中，索马里和厄立特里亚问题监测组记录了军火商拥有的 48 件武器，这些武器的标记与由索马里联邦政府进口的材料标记是一致的(S/2018/1002，第 24-25 段)。

⁹² 根据当地消息灵通人士收集的数据，自 2018 年以来，武器的黑市价格一直保持稳定，AK 型突击步枪在 1 300 美元至 1 400 美元之间，9 毫米手枪在 600 美元至 700 美元之间。

马里联邦政府的一些武器。⁹³ 所记录的摩加迪沙的一支手枪显示，有证据表明有人试图去除索马里联邦政府的明显标记，这是专家小组第一次观察到这种做法。

114. 在调查期间，带有索马里联邦政府明显标记的武器在专家小组当地消息灵通人士所观察到武器总数中的占比为 12%。摩加迪沙三名军火商提供的证词证实，带有索马里联邦政府标记的武器多数是从索马里安全部队的低级成员、初级和高级军官以及索马里联邦政府官员那里购买的。这些证词与索马里和厄立特里亚问题监测组 2018 年最后报告所述调查结果是一致的(S/2018/1002，第 24-25 段)。

115. 2018 年 3 月，总部设在拜多阿的国民军第 60 区副指挥官向索马里和厄立特里亚问题监测组提供了一份日志，其中详细记录了向 277 名士兵分发武器的情况包括武器的序列号。⁹⁴ 通过相互参照拜多阿军火商拥有的 25 件武器的序列号，专家小组确定，17 件武器以前曾发放给 60 区的国民军的士兵。截至 2019 年 2 月，这 17 名士兵中只有 8 名正式登记为国民军的士兵(见上文“对索马里国民军的生物特征登记”)。⁹⁵

116. 关于已查明由军火商拥有的武器弹药的进一步详情载于有关摩加迪沙的附件 2.5 和 2.5.1 以及有关拜多阿的附件 2.5.2(绝密)。

索马里联邦政府根据第 2444(2018)号决议第 21 段提交报告

117. 索马里联邦政府按照规定的截止日期于 2019 年 3 月 15 日提交了根据安全理事会第 2444(2018)号决议第 21 段应予提交的定期报告。在该报告中，索马里联邦政府宣布了几项措施，这些措施将标志着在对索马里国家安全部队问责方面有所进展，包括完成对索马里国民军生物特征的登记，颁布概述武器弹药管理框架相关标准作业程序的总统令。然而，该报告缺少第 2182(2014)号决议第 9 段最初规定的强制性报告内容，特别是关于索马里联邦政府安全部队的结构、组成、兵力和部署包括其地区安全部队及民兵地位情况的内容。附件 2.7 载有依照第 2444(2018)号决议第 21 段对索马里联邦政府的报告所做的进一步分析。

118. 根据安全理事会第 2444(2018)号决议第 21 和 24 段，索马里联邦政府的第二份定期报告定于 2019 年 9 月 15 日提交委员会，该报告预计载有关于向索马里联邦政府安全部队分发进口的武器弹药的通知。截至本报告撰写之时，索马里联邦政府尚未向委员会提交报告。

青年党拥有的军事装备

119. 专家小组记录了青年党在本报告所述期间缴获和使用武器、弹药和车辆的几起事件，包括至少 14 枚 81 毫米迫击炮弹和一辆索马里联邦政府的装甲运兵

⁹³ 委员会分别于 2015 年 3 月 3 日、2017 年 10 月 2 日和 2018 年 2 月 2 日得到的通报。

⁹⁴ 据索马里国民军第 60 区副指挥官称，日志中详细记载的武器已于 2017 年 11 月和 12 月分发给士兵。

⁹⁵ 基于对第 60 区 17 个士兵的索马里国民军身份证号码与专家小组所获 2019 年 2 月索马里国民军工资单的相互参照。

车。此外，2019 年 1 月 27 日，青年党在摩加迪沙用索马里联邦政府 2014 年进口的 9 毫米鲁格手枪杀害了一名索马里联邦政府的警察。青年党在 2019 年 9 月 22 日和 2018 年 6 月 1 日对下谢贝利州 EL Salini 和希兰州 Moqokori 的是索马里国民军基地的两次袭击中缴获了军用车辆、高射炮和大量弹药。附件 2.6 和 2.6.1 载有关于青年党缴获的军事装备和弹药的更多详细情况。

B. 会员国遵守武器禁运的情况

国有金属和工程公司的武器弹药供应

120. 专家小组所获证据表明，埃塞俄比亚国有金属和工程公司——一家总部设在亚的斯亚贝巴的工程和武器制造公司——在至少十年的时间里系统地违反了武器禁运。专家小组在 2019 年 4 月 4 日与埃塞俄比亚国有金属和工程公司高层主管的一次会议上，查看了详细介绍向索马里各地区行政当局包括次级分区一级行政当局供应武器和弹药情况的数百份文件。这些高管表示，该公司认为向索马里各地区行政当局供应武器弹药并不违反武器禁运，并且它将邦特兰和索马里兰视为“主权国家”。⁹⁶

121. 虽然埃塞俄比亚国有金属和工程公司的高管称，这些文件将由埃塞俄比亚外交部提供给专家小组，但外交部后来以法院诉讼正在进行之中为由拒绝提供文件。⁹⁷ 然而，专家小组在与国有金属和工程公司的高管会面期间获准对所述文件拍摄了两张照片，这些照片载于附件 2.8。

122. 2018 年 11 月，埃塞俄比亚政府以腐败指控逮捕了国有金属和工程公司的数十名高层官员。⁹⁸ 自 2019 年 2 月以来，该公司不再从事军工生产，其武器制造部门已被并入埃塞俄比亚国防部。⁹⁹

关于提供培训、津贴、基础设施和军事装备的通知

123. 安全理事会要求在运送任何军事装备或提供咨询、援助或培训之前至少提前五天通知委员会以供参考。安理会在其第 2444(2018)号决议第 26 段中回顾道，支持索马里国家安全部队的发展，除其他外，可包括建设基础设施以及向索马里国家安全部队提供薪金和津贴。

124. 尽管有这些要求，但提供培训、津贴和发展基础设施仍然基本上没有通报委员会；专家小组了解到，有一些会员国、国际机构和其他组织在报告所述期间未将其从事上述活动的某种组合通报委员会。

⁹⁶ 2019 年 4 月 4 日在亚的斯亚贝巴对埃塞俄比亚国有金属和工程公司两名高管的约谈。

⁹⁷ 2019 年 5 月 16 日在纽约和 2019 年 9 月 4 日在亚的斯亚贝巴对外交部官员的约谈。

⁹⁸ Katharine Houreld, “埃塞俄比亚以额外腐败案件指控埃塞俄比亚国有金属和工程公司负责人”，路透社，2019 年 1 月 15 日。可查阅 <https://af.reuters.com/article/topNews/idAFKCN1P90KO-OZATP>。

⁹⁹ 2019 年 4 月 4 日对国有金属和工程公司高管的约谈。

125. 与此同时，一些会员国定期向索马里国家安全部队通报诸如拖鞋、袜子和睡衣等非致命物品的运送情况，认为这些物品属于“军事装备”或“援助”，因此需要予以通报。因此，专家小组向安全理事会提出了两项建议，以澄清和简化在武器禁运下的要求，即修改相关规定，对提供咨询、援助或培训不再需要予以通报，在其下一次的决议中增设一个附件，列明需要通报委员会的军事装备的类别(见下文“建议”)。

非洲联盟驻索马里特派团

126. 安全理事会第 2182(2014)号决议第 6 段要求非索特派团记录和登记作为进攻行动一部分缴获的所有军事装备，并便利索马里和厄立特里亚问题监测组在所有军事物品重新分配或销毁之前对其进行检查。¹⁰⁰ 索马里和厄立特里亚问题监测组以及后续的专家小组，要求提供自该项要求获得授权以来的五年中从青年党缴获的六批重要武器弹药的信息；然而，非索特派团虽然表示愿意合作，但仅就其中一次收缴提供了切实可行的信息。¹⁰¹ 索马里和厄立特里亚问题监测组寻求支持非索特派团履行其在这方面的义务，包括为此提供 2017 年已缴获物资的日志模板。虽然这些日志已分发给非索特派团的各部门，但从未投入使用。然而，专家小组了解到，非索特派团关于追回武器的政策草案正等待非洲联盟予以通过。非索特派团改进信息共享将会大大提升专家小组有关青年党武器、弹药和装备来源的评估能力，并因此就如何限制青年党获得这些物品向安理会提出建议。

阿拉伯联合酋长国在柏贝拉的军事基地

127. 在其 2017 年和 2018 年以来的报告中，索马里和厄立特里亚问题监测组报告称，阿拉伯联合酋长国违反武器禁运，正在柏贝拉建造一个军事基地(S/2017/924，第 146-150 段和第 S/2018/1002 号文件，第 40-43 段)。

128. 专家小组注意到，阿拉伯联合酋长国一再拒绝对监测组以前的询问做出实质性答复，这些询问要求提供关于移交给索马里兰的物资确切性质及基地东道国合同协议的细节。此外，在专家小组 2019 年 2 月 12 日和 13 日访问柏贝拉期间，索马里兰当局拒绝了它访问该基地的请求。

129. 2018 年 9 月和 2019 年 8 月关于军事基地的卫星图像(见附件 2.9)显示，基地建设取得了重大进展，包括跑道竣工及邻近停机坪和(或)营房设施的建设。

¹⁰⁰ 此外，安全理事会第 2444(2018)号决议第 27 段敦促索马里联邦政府、索马里联邦成员国和非索特派团加强合作，以记录和登记所有已缴获的军事装备。专家小组在报告所述期间未曾收到索马里联邦政府或索马里联邦成员国关于该主题的任何此类报告。

¹⁰¹ 2018 年 5 月 9 日，索马里和厄立特里亚问题监测组收到了非索特派团乌干达人民国防军特遣队在下谢贝利州布洛马雷尔缴获的武器弹药的照片。事实证明，这些照片对监测组调查青年党采购武器的情况很有价值(S/2018/1002，第 47-49 段)。

C. 武器非法流入索马里

邦特兰

130. 邦特兰仍然是非法武器进入索马里的主要入境点；武器通常经由也门使用小型快艇运送。例如，2019年3月4日，一艘来自也门的运送武器和弹药的小船抵达博萨索和坎达拉之间的邦特兰海岸。根据邦特兰安全部门提供的信息，这批货物包括6架火箭榴弹发射器、8挺PKM机枪、15支AK型突击步枪、3挺DSHK重机枪、50多枚手榴弹和数量不明的弹药。博萨索港海事警察部队领导了一次不成功的拦截行动。

131. 2019年4月17日，一艘从也门运载武器的小型船只抵达博萨索机场附近的海岸线。通过博萨索警察部队前副指挥官艾哈迈德·巴希尔·艾哈迈德·贾拉尔的斡旋，¹⁰² 该小船绕过了安全部队，把武器卸上岸并运到一个私人住宅。第二天，邦特兰部队控制了武器存放地并随后缴获了19支AK型突击步枪，但当局认为这些步枪可能仅占非法运送的武器总数的一部分。¹⁰³ 虽然邦特兰行政当局最初表示将向专家小组提供步枪的照片和序列号，但最终还是没有提供这份文件。附件2.10(绝密)载有关于2019年4月向邦特兰运送武器的补充信息。

也门和邦特兰之间的武器走私网络

132. 在报告所述期间，专家小组继续开展索马里和厄立特里亚问题监测组先期对邦特兰军火商与其驻也门供应商之间的通信和金融联系进行的调查(见S/2018/1002,附件1.9(绝密))。附件2.11(绝密)载有关于专家小组调查的最新情况。

四. 阻碍人道主义援助

联合国粮食及农业组织向索马里兰提供种子和肥料的项目

133. 索马里兰接连经历两个不利的雨季并且持续干旱，从而导致2019年粮食安全局势急剧恶化，并造成大面积作物歉收。¹⁰⁴

134. 2018年1月，联合国粮食及农业组织(粮农组织)在索马里兰启动了一个到2018年5月进口并向农民供应10 000吨种子和肥料的项目。2018年2月，粮农组织挑选20名农产品经销商负责进口，对此索马里兰农业部当时已经予以批准。然而，在已获批准的经销商当中，除了一名经销商之外，该农业部拒绝向其余所有经销商提供结关信和进口许可证。此后，该农业部和粮农组织达成协议，允许

¹⁰² 邦特兰在安全方面的两名消息灵通人士报告了艾哈迈德·“贾拉尔”作为非法货物主要进口商参与运送的情况，该情况在2019年4月25日对邦特兰行政当局一名高级官员的约谈中得到证实，并且通过对“贾拉尔”电话记录的分析已予核实。

¹⁰³ 2019年4月25日对邦特兰行政当局的一名高级官员的约谈。邦特兰在安全方面的两名消息灵通人士还告知专家小组，邦特兰当局缴获的武器仅占所运送的全部武器中的一小部分，这些武器还包括了重型武器和弹药。

¹⁰⁴ 联合国粮食及农业组织和世界粮食计划署，“监测处于冲突局势中国家的粮食安全”，第6号(2019年8月，罗马)。可查阅<http://www.fao.org/3/ca5938en/CA5938EN.pdf>。

四个农产品经销商进口这些材料，但 2018 年 5 月和 6 月，农业部再次阻止进口，拒绝向四个已商定经销商中的三个提供许可证。粮农组织拒绝了允许由该部首选的农产品经销商进口和分发该项目所需全部 10 000 吨种子的提议。

135. 2018 年 6 月，粮农组织就农业部对项目的干预所持的关切向该部发送了一封内容全面的信函。由于农业部的阻挠，未能及时进口种子和肥料以满足农作季节的需要，因此粮农组织于 2018 年 7 月取消了该项目。

以人道主义工作者为目标

盖多地区

136. 2018 年 11 月至 2019 年 8 月，专家小组记录了 12 起针对人道主义工作者的袭击，其中大多数是青年党在盖多地区实施的绑架勒索，这是本报告所述期间观察到的一个新趋势。¹⁰⁵ 此外，2019 年 7 月 2 日，青年党在盖多州的布卢洛·凯迪杀害了非政府组织“生命线”的一名救援工作者。

137. 2018 年 11 月 8 日，一个国际非政府组织的两名救援工作者在盖多州贝莱德哈瓦以东 5 公里的图鲁罗·贾布里勒村遭到青年党的绑架。¹⁰⁶ 2019 年 2 月 27 日，当地一个提供营养支持的非政府组织的五名雇员在加尔巴哈里区古拉附近遭到青年党的绑架。¹⁰⁷ 2019 年 5 月 14 日，青年党绑架了一直在位于多洛镇和卢克镇之间的吉德温村提供基本人道主义救助的两个非政府组织的两名雇员。¹⁰⁸ 他们被带到青年党控制的埃尔阿德村。5 月 26 日，两名人道主义救助工作者分别被青年党的一个法庭宣布罚款 55 000 美元和 32 000 美元。7 月 20 日，其中一名救助工作者在缴纳了 21 000 美元的罚款后获释。截至本报告撰写之时，当地至少有 6 名人道主义工作者仍被青年党关押。

国际人道主义工作者

138. 青年党在本报告所述期间还以国际人道主义工作者为目标。2018 年 11 月 20 日，一名为非政府组织 Africa Milele Onlus 工作的意大利自愿救助工作者在肯尼亚马林迪镇被涉嫌是青年党枪手的嫌疑人绑架。专家小组得到确认，她被带到了索马里下朱巴地区。¹⁰⁹ 2019 年 4 月 12 日，两名为肯尼亚卫生部工作的古巴医生在 Mandera 被怀疑是青年党成员的枪手绑架。一名守卫医务人员的警官当场

¹⁰⁵ 相比之下，索马里和厄立特里亚问题监测组在其 2018 年报告中报告了 34 起袭击人道主义工作者的事件，其中大多数是当地的工作者(S/2018/1002，第 168 段)。

¹⁰⁶ 救援工作者被带到盖多州的埃尔阿德镇，并于 2018 年 11 月 21 日获释，他们每人为此分别缴纳了 3 000 美元和 1 500 美元的罚款。根据摩加迪沙的一名联合国工作人员于 2019 年 7 月 23 日至 24 日及基斯马尤的一名联合国工作人员于 2019 年 7 月 24 日发来的电子邮件。

¹⁰⁷ 他们一直被关押在埃尔阿德地区，直到 2019 年 3 月 14 日各自被罚款 3 000 美元后获释。联合国保密人权报告，2019 年 2 月 28 日-3 月 2 日。

¹⁰⁸ 非索特派团媒体监测，2019 年 5 月 15 日；以及根据摩加迪沙一名联合国工作人员于 2019 年 6 月 18 日发来的电子邮件。

¹⁰⁹ 2019 年 8 月对国际安全问题消息灵通人士的约谈。

死亡，另一名受伤。持枪者挟持医生越过边境进入了索马里，据报将他们带到了盖多地区的埃尔阿德镇或贝莱特哈瓦镇。截至本文撰写之时，医生仍在被囚禁之中。

五. 涉及以平民为目标的违反国际人道主义法行为

A. 青年党¹¹⁰

139. 在索马里发生的违反国际人道主义法针对平民发动的有系统广泛袭击中，由青年党发动的袭击仍然数目最多。¹¹¹ 这些袭击主要发生在索马里南部、摩加迪沙、拜多阿、下谢贝利、巴科勒、下朱巴和拜州地区。该激进组织在国内流离失所者营地、餐馆、市场、购物中心、政府办公楼和酒店使用简易爆炸装置杀害和伤害平民。报告所述期间的一次重大袭击发生在 2019 年 2 月 28 日，当时青年党在摩加迪沙马卡穆卡拉马酒店周围地区发动袭击，造成至少 31 名平民死亡，112 人受伤。3 月 23 日，青年党在摩加迪沙尚加尼区对劳工部和公共工程部发动袭击，造成一名副部长和另外 16 名平民死亡，26 人受伤。5 月 8 日，农业和灌溉部的生产司司长在摩加迪沙 Dharkenley 区被简易爆炸装置炸死。2019 年 6 月和 7 月，青年党进一步强化了对简易爆炸装置和车载简易爆炸装置的使用，在摩加迪沙和基斯马尤至少造成 68 名平民死亡，超过 119 人受伤。2019 年 7 月 12 日，该组织袭击了基斯马尤的麦地那酒店，造成至少 26 名平民死亡，56 人受伤。

140. 青年党继续施行其主要在摩加迪沙暗杀政府官员和议员的政策。2018 年 12 月 24 日，青年党在 Daynile 区的 Haanta Dheer 地区杀害了索马里联邦政府宗教事务部的一名雇员，2019 年 2 月 20 日，为总检察长办公室工作的一名检察官在 Hodan 区遇害，2019 年 2 月 23 日，一名联邦议会议员在 Karan 区被杀害。

141. 青年党经常处决被指控从事间谍活动和提供导致美国空袭的信息的平民。例如，2019 年 3 月 31 日，青年党在下朱巴卡姆苏马村公开处决了四名被控从事间谍活动的男子。2018 年 12 月 18 日，专家组还在中谢贝利州乔哈尔镇以西的甘布尔村公开处决了一名被控与非索特派团合作的平民。2019 年 7 月 3 日和 4 日，青年党在夏加尔和中朱巴地区萨拉格由行刑队公开处决了 10 名平民，指控他们为外国和索马里安全部队从事间谍活动。2019 年 7 月 7 日，该组织在下朱巴地区的贾迈又处决了被控为索马里和肯尼亚政府从事间谍活动的四名平民。

142. 青年党继续以 2016 年参与联邦选举进程的代表为目标。大多数袭击发生在摩加迪沙、拜多阿、博萨索和下谢贝利地区。2019 年 5 月 31 日，三名前政界代表在摩加迪沙霍丹和达尔肯莱区分别发生的事件中丧生。2019 年 6 月 29 日，参与 2016 年联邦选举进程的另一名代表在摩加迪沙被绑在他汽车上的一个简易爆

¹¹⁰ 关于本节所述事件的资料主要来自联索援助团人权和保护小组的报告以及秘书长关于索马里的报告 S/2019/393 和 S/2019/661。

¹¹¹ 根据联合国索马里援助团人权和保护小组的记录，2018 年 12 月 14 日至 2019 年 7 月 21 日有 1 079 名平民伤亡；其中 791 人的伤亡(73%)是青年党造成的。(S/2019/393, 第 55 段和 S/2019/661, 第 46 段)。

炸装置炸死。青年党 2019 年 7 月 15 日发表了确认其所持政策的声明，呼吁参加 2016 年选举进程的长老公开向真主忏悔，并在 2019 年 9 月 1 日前向青年党各省登记和确认其忏悔。该组织威胁说，长老们如果不予遵守，则将无法在索马里过上和平的生活，也不会得到青年党的保护。

招募和绑架儿童

143. 在本报告所述期间，青年党继续尤其在拜州、中谢贝利州和巴科勒州施行为招募目的绑架儿童的政策。2018 年 12 月，青年党从中谢贝利州阿达勒镇以东 Ceel Muluq 村的苏菲派宗教营地绑架了 18 名成年平民和 7 名儿童。¹¹² 据报道，2019 年 1 月 17 日发生了一次类似的事件，当日，青年党从巴科勒州胡杜尔区 Eedkiyal、Dino 和 Sarmaan 村的古兰经学校绑架了 15 名 8 岁至 15 岁的男孩。2019 年 2 月，在社区长老未能交出 17 名 10 至 14 岁的儿童接受军事训练后，青年党还在拜州地区的米希尔村强行招募了这些儿童。2019 年 3 月，青年党在社区长老拒绝让 70 名 10 至 12 岁的男孩接受军事训练后，从拜州的 Tuugsoy、Lowi Saab、Esow、Raydable 和 Omar Ilaan 村绑架了这些男孩。

144. 专家小组的分析表明，青年党的大部分新兵是来自好战团体控制的海湾地区乡村区域的儿童，那里的儿童以前曾受到过青年党宗教教育系统的影响。¹¹³

对联合国人员的袭击

145. 此外，在报告所述期间，青年党对联合国人员进行了直接袭击。2019 年 1 月 1 日，该组织向摩加迪沙丁阿德国际机场建筑群内的联合国大院发射了 7 发迫击炮弹，打伤两名联合国工作人员和一名承包商。袭击还破坏了联合国基础建筑和设施，违反了《联合国人员和有关人员安全公约》。上一次在摩加迪沙针对联合国的袭击发生在 2014 年 12 月 3 日，当时青年党袭击了机场附近的一个联合国车队，造成 15 人死亡(S/2015/801，第 116 段)。

146. 2019 年 5 月 31 日，一名在联合国安全和安保部工作的联合国工作人员在穆杜格州加尔卡尤被怀疑与青年党有关联的身份不明的武装人员杀害。

B. 索马里联邦和联邦成员国的行为体

147. 在报告所述期间，索马里联邦政府和索马里联邦成员国的军事行为体在索马里全境犯下严重侵权行为，包括索马里国民军指挥官在盖多州地区巴尔代拉的法外处决、在西南州总统选举过程中杀害示威者、邦特兰安全部队对包括儿童在内的被拘留者实施酷刑、长期拘留和军事审判，以及索马里兰当局长期/非法拘留囚犯。

¹¹² 《联合国机密人权报告》，2019 年 1 月 2 日。

¹¹³ 另见希拉勒研究所，“青年党的军事机器”，(摩加迪沙，2018 年 12 月)。可查阅 <https://hiraal institute.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/The-Al-Shabab-Military.pdf>。

索马里国民军的法外处决

148. 2018 年 12 月 31 日，索马里国民军根据所谓索马里国民军高级领导层的命令，由行刑队在盖多州巴德拉镇即决处决了被怀疑与青年党有关联的 6 名成员。被告在被处决之前已经在监狱里呆了五个月，被控是对杀害一名政府士兵负有责任的青年党暗杀部队的一员。¹¹⁴ 这些嫌疑人没有受到指控，也没有获得公平审判或正当法律程序的权利，这违反了国际人道主义法和人权法。¹¹⁵ 索马里联邦政府国防部或索马里国民军没有就这些处决发表正式声明。

博萨索军事法庭的审判和据称由邦特兰安全部队实施的酷刑

149. 在报告所述期间，包括儿童在内的平民继续受到邦特兰军事法庭的拘留和军事审判。2019 年 2 月和 3 月在博萨索和加尔卡尤的安全扫荡后，许多被告因与恐怖主义有关的指控被拘留。邦特兰军事法庭对包括 4 名 16 至 17 岁的儿童在内的一些被告进行了判决。¹¹⁶ 截至 2019 年 9 月，这四名儿童仍在被监禁之中。

150. 对军事法庭的监管不在邦特兰民事司法机构的管辖权限之内。担任法官的反而没有法律资质的军事人员。军事法庭对平民拥有广泛的管辖权，包括有权审理涉及间谍活动、叛国、非法接触敌人和恐怖主义的案件。

151. 对律师的约谈显示，恐怖主义嫌疑人在军事法庭上未经过正当法律程序：他们在没有律师在场的情况下受到审讯、被长时间审前拘留、对其酷刑逼供并利用逼供对其定罪、法庭对所做裁定未加解释、任意判决及其享有有限的上诉权。

邦特兰安全部队

152. 邦特兰安全部队是在美国指导和支持下由 600 多名精锐人员组成的反恐部队，它对邦特兰的军事法庭具有重大影响力，并根据 2011 年邦特兰反恐法享有非常或特别的管辖权。¹¹⁷ 邦特兰安全部队设有程度有限的问责机制；安全部队的人员在博萨索开展安全行动、实施逮捕行动和管理拘留中心均不会受到惩罚，也不接受独立的民事监督。嫌疑犯在邦特兰安全部队拘留中心被无限期关押后将被移交军事法庭予以起诉。律师及其委托人还向专家小组报告称，如果被告或证人在法庭上批评邦特兰安全部队，军事法庭将会对其罚款 1 500 美元。¹¹⁸

153. 专家小组与前被拘留者、律师和受害者家属进行了约谈，他们都声称被邦特兰安全部队关押的被拘留者遭受了有系统的各种酷刑以及不人道和有辱人格的待

¹¹⁴ Mohamed Olad Hassan, “索马里军方未经审判处决 6 名激进分子”，美国之音，2019 年 1 月 1 日。可查阅 <https://www.voanews.com/a/somalia-military-executes-6-militants-without-trial/4724579.html>。

¹¹⁵ 1949 年 8 月 12 日日内瓦四公约第 3 (d)条禁止在没有司法保障情况下的起诉。

¹¹⁶ 《联合国机密人权报告》，2018 年 8 月 28 日，2019 年 3 月 7 日至 9 日；根据联合国驻索马里工作人员 2019 年 6 月 18 日和 2019 年 8 月 28 日发来的电子邮件；2019 年 7 月 23 日的电话约谈。

¹¹⁷ 2011 年《邦特兰反恐主义法》第 5 条第 1 款和第 4 款(安全机构)规定，邦特兰安全部队全权负责“调查和跟踪恐怖主义活动”，并拥有“打击、扣押、调查、防止任何人参与恐怖主义行为和防止其犯罪财产”的广泛权力。

¹¹⁸ 2019 年 6 月 30 日和 7 月 23 日对了解博萨索局势的个人进行的电话约谈。

遇。¹¹⁹ 2019 年 8 月 30 日，专家小组就邦特兰安全部队实施酷刑的指控和军事法庭对儿童的审判致函邦特兰行政当局，但截至本报告撰写之时，尚未收到答复。

154. 附件 3 载有对邦特兰军事法庭的情况和嫌疑人在被邦特兰安全部队拘留期间据称遭到酷刑情况的详细介绍。

索马里兰的恐怖主义罪犯遭到长期监禁

155. 2007 年 5 月 31 日，当时的索马里兰总统达希尔·雷亚尔·卡欣对哈尔格萨的 14 名因 2004 年恐怖主义罪行被判刑的囚犯予以减刑。¹²⁰ 五名囚犯在减刑后获释，其余九名囚犯的刑期从无期徒刑减为 24 年(两名囚犯)和 15 年(七名囚犯)。¹²¹ 2008 年 11 月 2 日，总统发函以 2008 年 10 月 29 日在索马里兰发生了与囚犯无关的“恐怖袭击”为由撤销了赦免。¹²²

156. 2016 年，囚犯向索马里兰宪法法院提出申诉要求获得释放。囚犯的律师辩称，总统的赦免是有法律约束力的，并且他没有推翻赦免的法定权力。截至本报告撰写之时，宪法法院尚未做出裁定。索马里兰总检察长辩称，总统撤销赦免的决定是有法律约束力的，因此囚犯尚未服满其刑期。¹²³ 2019 年 8 月 30 日，专家小组致函索马里兰行政当局，请求提供撤销总统赦免的法律依据和囚犯所提申诉的细节，但截至本报告撰写之时，尚未收到回复。

C. 非洲联盟驻索马里特派团和其他国际行为体

非洲联盟驻索马里特派团杀害平民

157. 在本报告所述期间，非索特派团部队据报对 5 名平民之死负有责任。¹²⁴ 2018 年 11 月 6 日，非索特派团布隆迪特遣队的车队所经过的道路附近发生简易爆炸装置爆炸，据称该部队随后在摩加迪沙 Balad 出口检查站附近的 Huriwa 区肆意开火，

¹¹⁹ 见大赦国际，“紧急行动，五名儿童被处决，另外两名面临风险”，2017 年 4 月 28 日。可查阅 www.amnesty.org/en/documents/afr52/6112/2017/en/；及人权观察，“就像我们总是在监狱里：虐待被指控在索马里犯有国家安全罪的男孩”，2018 年 2 月，可查阅 www.hrw.org/report/2018/02/21/its-were-always-prison/abuses-against-boys-accused-national-security-offenses。

¹²⁰ 2007 年 5 月 31 日第 0285/2007 号总统令。

¹²¹ 根据索马里兰囚犯律师 2019 年 1 月 22 日发来的电子邮件。

¹²² 索马里兰总统取消囚犯大赦信，Dahir Riyale Kahin，2008 年 11 月 2 日。

¹²³ 2019 年 2 月 12 日和 13 日在哈尔格萨对了解案情的律师和个人的约谈。

¹²⁴ 这表明，非索特派团部队造成的平民死亡人数比上个报告所述期间有所增加。见 S/2018/1002，第 159 段。

造成 4 名平民死亡。¹²⁵ 次日，非索特派团表示已与联邦政府合作启动全面调查，确定导致人员死亡的情况。¹²⁶ 但截至编写本报告时，调查结果尚未公布。¹²⁷

158. 2019 年 2 月 17 日，专家小组收到报告称，非索特派团埃塞俄比亚特遣队据称在拜多阿机场逮捕、以酷刑折磨并杀害了一名患有精神残疾的 17 岁男童。¹²⁸ 非索特派团警察部门负责人在 2019 年 4 月 14 日给专家小组的电子邮件中声称，死者是在距离埃塞俄比亚部队驻守的机场外围几米处被身份不明的枪手射死，西南州警察正在开展调查。¹²⁹ 非索特派团在 2019 年 9 月 8 日给专家小组的信中指出，将在适当时候与专家小组分享调查委员会关于 2018 年 11 月事件的报告，但非索特派团没有关于该名精神残疾男童被杀一事的信息。

Hormuud 和 Safaricom 公司的基础设施和雇员成为袭击目标

159. 专家小组收到报告称，肯尼亚国防军自 2017 年以来袭击了索马里 Hormuud 电信公司运营的 12 座通信塔。这些袭击几乎全部发生在盖多州。专家小组已独立证实其中 5 起袭击，包括在本报告所述期间发生的 3 起，这些袭击造成 2 名平民死亡。专家小组还收到照片证据，其中显示 2019 年 3 月 2 日盖多州 El Wak 区的 Hormuud 公司塔台遭袭现场存在一枚未爆集束弹药，《集束弹药公约》和习惯国际法均禁止使用此类弹药。¹³⁰

160. 2018 年 7 月 24 日，肯尼亚国防军部队据称对 Hormuud 公司在 El Wak 区 Hiis Ugur 地区的一座通信塔进行炮击，造成该公司看守人员及其亲属死亡。¹³¹ 2019 年 1 月 15 日，肯尼亚国防军部队据称摧毁了 Hormuud 公司在 Afmadow 区

¹²⁵ Abdirisak M Tuuryare, “尸体、鲜血、子弹：非盟士兵在摩加迪沙杀害平民”，马雷格传媒，2018 年 11 月 6 日，可查阅：www.mareeg.com/bodies-blood-bullets-au-soldiers-kill-civilians-in-mogadishu/；《国防邮报》，“当地人指控非索特派团布隆迪部队杀害 4 名索马里平民”，2018 年 11 月 6 日，可查阅：www.thedefensepost.com/2018/11/06/burundi-amisom-troops-kill-4-mogadishu-civilians-somalia。

¹²⁶ 非索特派团，“非索特派团对关于 Balaad 平民死亡事件的媒体指控表示关切”，新闻稿，2018 年 11 月 7 日。可查阅：<http://amisom-au.org/2018/11/amisom-concerned-with-media-allegations-on-civilian-deaths-in-balaad/press-statement-amisom-concerned-with-media-allegations-on-civilian-deaths-in-balaad/>。

¹²⁷ 与非索特派团部队发言人和非索特派团保护、人权和性别平等股的电子邮件往来，2019 年 4 月 4 日。

¹²⁸ 对联合国驻摩加迪沙工作人员的约谈，2019 年 4 月 13 日。

¹²⁹ 与非索特派团驻拜多阿工作人员的电子邮件往来，2019 年 4 月 14 日。

¹³⁰ 2008 年 12 月 3 日，肯尼亚签署《集束弹药公约》。专家小组于 2019 年 5 月 28 日致函中国，并于 2019 年 8 月 29 日致函肯尼亚，试图追查该集束弹药的来源，但未获答复。2019 年 9 月 19 日，肯尼亚空军指挥官与专家小组举行会议，指挥官在看到照片时自称对该弹药并不熟悉。

¹³¹ 对受害者亲属的约谈，2019 年 7 月 26 日和 27 日。2018 年 7 月 25 日，联合国的机密人权报告也证实了 2 名平民在袭击中丧生。另见希兰在线，“肯尼亚国防军在索马里盖多州杀害 Hormuud 电信公司员工并破坏通讯”，2018 年 7 月 26 日。可查阅：www.hiiraan.com/news4/2018/July/159237/kdf_killed_hormuud_telecom_workers_and_destroyed_communication_in_gedo_region_somalia.aspx。

Alibuley 村的一座通信塔，并对该公司看守人员施加人身伤害。¹³² 2019 年 3 月 27 日，肯尼亚国防军的飞机据称摧毁了 Hormuud 公司在下朱巴州 Afmadow 区 Jaldeyse 村的一座通信塔。¹³³ 2019 年 8 月 22 日，肯尼亚国防军据称摧毁了 El Wak 区 Caws-Quran 的一座电信塔。¹³⁴

161. 肯尼亚国防军否认参与过对 Hormuud 公司基础设施的任何袭击。在与专家小组举行的会议上，肯尼亚国防军国防部参谋长指出，自 2015 年以来，Safaricom 公开股份有限公司在肯尼亚境内的 29 处设施遭到袭击，主要是青年党所为，造成大量平民和后备警察伤亡。¹³⁵

162. 双方之所以毁坏电信基础设施，可能是为了限制传输关于部队调动或武装行动的情报。肯尼亚国防军还可以此阻止青年党使用手机信号引爆简易爆炸装置。但索马里境内长期缺乏电信覆盖会产生人道主义问题，包括对协调救济工作、发放粮食券和收取国外汇款造成阻碍。

美利坚合众国的空袭

163. 2019 年 1 月 1 日至 9 月 17 日期间，美国在索马里实施了 50 次公开承认的空袭，而美国在 2018 年全年的空袭次数为 47 次，2017 年为 35 次。仅在 2019 年 2 月，美国就实施了 15 次公开承认的空袭，据报击毙了 97 名青年党作战人员，这是有数据以来在索马里境内击毙青年党人数最多的月份。¹³⁶ 美国非洲司令部一直报告称，这些空袭中没有任何平民伤亡。

164. 2019 年 3 月 20 日，大赦国际发布报告称，美国过去 2 年在下谢贝利州实施的 5 次空袭造成 14 名平民死亡，另有 8 人受伤；¹³⁷ 美国非洲司令部随后否认了这些指控。但 2019 年 4 月 5 日，美国承认 2018 年 4 月 1 日其在加尔古杜德州 El Bur 镇附近实施的空袭造成 2 名平民死亡，而大赦国际的报告未提及此事。¹³⁸

性暴力和性别暴力

165. 在本报告所述期间，索马里境内持续存在针对妇女、女童、男子和男童的性暴力问题，妇女和女童面临的风险更高。索马里旷日持久的冲突使政府机构基

¹³² 联合国机密人权报告，2019 年 1 月 16 日。

¹³³ 联合国机密人权报告，2019 年 3 月 28 日至 30 日。

¹³⁴ 联合国机密人权报告，2019 年 8 月 26 日。

¹³⁵ 肯尼亚国防军领导层与专家小组在内罗毕举行的会议，2019 年 9 月 19 日。2019 年 8 月 29 日，专家小组还向肯尼亚常驻联合国代表团发送了正式信函，但截至编写本报告时未获答复。

¹³⁶ 以美国非洲司令部的新闻稿为依据，可查阅：www.africom.mil/media-room/press-releases。

¹³⁷ 大赦国际，“美国/索马里：平民死亡谜团或涉及战争罪”，2019 年 3 月 20 日。可查阅：www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2019/03/usa-somalia-shroud-of-secrecy-around-civilian-deaths-masks-possible-war-crimes/。

¹³⁸ 美国非洲司令部，“美国非洲司令部司令主持开展的审查确认存在平民伤亡”，新闻稿，2019 年 4 月 5 日。可查阅：www.africom.mil/media-room/pressrelease/31697/u-s-africa-command-commander-directed-review-reveals-civilian-casualties。

本无力记录、调查并起诉性暴力施害者。因此，性暴力幸存者及其家属对正规部门主持正义的能力几乎不抱信心。许多案件通过部族长老的干预得到处理。在这种情况下，占幸存者大多数的妇女不参与谈判，通常也无法从支付的任何赔偿金中获取一定份额。

166. 2018 年，联合国核实了多起与冲突有关的性暴力案件，受害者包括 20 名妇女、250 名女童和 1 名男童。¹³⁹ 性暴力和性别暴力的主要类型包括绑架妇女和女童进行强迫婚姻和强奸的事件(施害者以非国家武装团体居多)，以及强奸和轮奸事件(施害者是国家人员、部族民兵和身份不明的武装人员)。¹⁴⁰ 绑架 34 名女童进行强迫婚姻和强奸的案件系青年党成员所为。司法系统薄弱，安全问题持续存在，青年党控制区出入受限：这些都使妇女和女童的处境极为脆弱。¹⁴¹

六. 违反木炭禁令

167. 自 2018 年 8 月以来，索马里和厄立特里亚问题监测组以及后来的专家小组未记录到任何违反安全理事会禁令、从索马里出口木炭的情况，而上一次报告所述期间出口的木炭量约为 300 万袋(75 000 吨)。会员国实施的措施日益严格，可能迫使木炭贩运者暂停活动，因为他们需要制作新型伪造文书，并(或)安排使用其他港口运输木炭(见下文“实施禁令”)。

168. 索马里当局采取的举措可能也是 2019 年木炭非法贸易减少的原因之一。2019 年 5 月 16 日，联邦政府发布新闻稿，通知国际合作伙伴有 3 艘单桅帆船正在从阿拉伯联合酋长国迪拜驶往基斯马尤，打算装载索马里木炭以供出口。¹⁴² 这些船只于 2019 年 5 月抵达基斯马尤，但离开时并未装载任何木炭。2019 年 8 月朱巴兰的选举进程也影响到木炭出口，因为朱巴兰行政当局希望避免负面新闻。但朱巴兰行政当局仍然依赖贸易税收入，木炭出口预计将恢复。¹⁴³

169. 索马里最近一次主要的木炭出口发生在 2018 年 8 月，那批木炭经基斯马尤出境，运往伊拉克祖拜尔港。该货船运输了 190 000 袋(4 750 吨)木炭。2019 年 1 月至 4 月期间，这些木炭经重新包装，从伊拉克转运至邻近会员国(见下文“非法出口、进口和转运”)。

¹³⁹ 其中，83 起案件系不明武装行为体所为，34 起系青年党所为，33 起系部族民兵所为；其他案件系各州部队所为，即朱巴兰武装部队(26 起案件)、贾穆杜格部队(9 起案件)、邦特兰部队(2 起案件)、西南州部队(9 起案件)和准军事组织利尤警察部队(6 起案件)。联合国还核实了索马里国民军成员对 48 人(3 名妇女、44 名女童和 1 名男童)实施强奸和轮奸的案件，以及索马里警察部队警员侵犯 5 名妇女和 12 名女童的事件(见 S/2019/280)。

¹⁴⁰ 2019 年 5 月、6 月和 7 月期间，邦特兰、中谢贝利、拜、索马里兰、朱巴兰等各州武装行为体针对女童和老年妇女实施了多起性暴力和性别暴力事件。

¹⁴¹ S/2019/280，第 72-73 段。

¹⁴² 联邦政府总检察长办公室的声明。这些单桅帆船经确认为 *MVAzmaad* 号、*MVDwood* 号和 *MV Yasin Shah* 号。

¹⁴³ 对业内消息人士的约谈，迪拜，2019 年 6 月 25 日。

170. 但索马里的大规模木炭生产仍在进行,参与贸易的国际犯罪网络依然活跃。专家小组从业内消息人士处获悉,2019 年初通过伊拉克进行的转运是木炭贩运者的一次“试验”。他们使用一艘大型货船从索马里出口木炭,而非使用单桅帆船多次运输,这样会降低全年多次出口的需求,减少印度洋季风季不利海况的影响。

171. 尽管青年党仍可通过对索马里境内木炭运输车辆“征税”获取一定收入,但该团体维持着多样化的收入基础,在财政上并不依赖木炭贸易。¹⁴⁴ 专家小组认为,如果索马里木炭贸易全线崩溃,青年党发动叛乱的能力不会受到实质影响(见上文“青年党筹资”)。

172. 附件 4 载有与下文概述的木炭问题调查有关的证明文件,包括卫星图像、照片证据、伪造原产地证书、提货单和所涉犯罪网络信息。

A. 生产、运输和储存

173. 尽管出口中断,但在本报告所述整个期间,中朱巴和下朱巴的大规模木炭生产仍在继续。木炭主要在下朱巴的 Badhadhe 区生产,通过公路运输至布尔加博港和基斯马尤港。

174. 2019 年 8 月,木炭行业消息人士告知专家小组,下朱巴约有 600 000 至 900 000 袋木炭正在等待出口。¹⁴⁵ 根据迪拜每袋 50 美元的批发价格计算,这些库存的总价值约为 3 000 万至 4 500 万美元。迪拜的批发价格据报正在上涨,而索马里当地的价格则在下降。随着时间的推移,对木炭贩运者的经济激励只会增加。¹⁴⁶

175. 正如索马里和厄立特里亚问题监测组 2018 年的报告所详述,青年党利用内地的检查站网络对过路货物和车辆“征税”,获取大量国内收入。¹⁴⁷ 木炭在从 Badhadhe 的生产地点运输至基斯马尤的出口地点过程中,可能会被青年党以这种方式“征税”。但专家小组注意到,在整个 2019 年期间,青年党袭击索马里木炭贸易商的次数与以往报告所述期间相比有所增加。¹⁴⁸ 青年党对木炭贸易商的袭击可能表明,该团体企图扰乱贸易,减少朱巴兰行政当局的财政收入,因为该州当局历来通过对基斯马尤港和布尔加博港出口的木炭征税,获得巨额利润(每袋 7 美元)。¹⁴⁹

¹⁴⁴ 据估计,2018 年青年党通过在中朱巴和下朱巴的检查站收取木炭税,获得了至少 750 万美元的收入(S/2018/1002,第 171 段)。监测组估计,仅在拜州一处检查站,青年党每年通过对过路车辆和货物征税就获得了约 1 000 万美元的收入(S/2018/1002,第 87 段)。在本报告所述期间,据报没有木炭从该检查站通过。

¹⁴⁵ 对非法贸易业内消息人士的约谈,2019 年 8 月 14 日。地理信息系统分析师在检查卫星图像后估计,截至 2019 年 9 月 16 日,布尔加博和基斯马尤的库存在 400 000 至 800 000 袋之间。

¹⁴⁶ 截至 2019 年 8 月,基斯马尤的木炭批发价格为每袋 6 美元,而 2018 年的价格为每袋 11 至 12 美元。

¹⁴⁷ S/2018/1002,附件 2.4。

¹⁴⁸ 专家小组在本报告所述期间记录了 5 起青年党袭击木炭运输车的事件。例如,2019 年 3 月 18 日,青年党烧毁了一辆从下谢贝利前往基斯马尤的木炭运输车。2018 年,索马里和厄立特里亚问题监测组未记录到青年党袭击木炭贸易商的事件。

¹⁴⁹ 在内罗毕对联邦政府部长的约谈,2019 年 3 月 14 日;在内罗毕对朱巴兰官员的约谈,2019 年 2 月 27 日。索马里和厄立特里亚问题监测组 2018 年报告中记录的转账收据显示,迪拜的 All

B. 非法出口、进口和转运

通过伊拉克祖拜尔港转运木炭

176. 2018 年 8 月，由 Oryx 航运有限公司运营的大型货船 MV *Best* 号违反安全理事会禁令，装载 190 000 袋(4 750 吨)木炭驶离基斯马尤。船上有伪造的原产地证书，显示发运的木炭源自加纳，并注明出口商为 Blue Whale 航运和货运公司。2018 年 10 月末，MV *Best* 号抵达伊拉克祖拜尔港。木炭在港口卸载，然后通过公路运输至伊拉克巴士拉当地的收货方 Bayta Akdhar 贸易公司。2019 年 1 月初，木炭在巴士拉一处仓库内被重新包装为巴格达公司 Dar Alahbab 的产品。

177. 随后，这些木炭在 2019 年 1 月至 4 月期间至少分 5 次转运至邻近会员国。例如，2019 年 1 月 26 日，*Northern Dedication* 号船只装载约 29 000 袋木炭，从伊拉克乌姆盖斯尔出发，前往科威特和沙特阿拉伯。该船首先在科威特舒瓦伊赫港卸载了 9 600 袋木炭，交给当地收货方 Frontline 物流公司。然后，该船驶往沙特阿拉伯达曼港，将 19 242 袋木炭交付给收货方 Omar Abdullah Al Faleh。2019 年 3 月 7 日，*Nordspring* 号船只将 24 000 袋木炭从伊拉克乌姆盖斯尔转运至迪拜杰贝阿里。

178. 通过祖拜尔港转运木炭的情况与 2018 年利用伊朗伊斯兰共和国基什自由区和格什姆自由区港口转运索马里木炭的情况类似。¹⁵⁰

2018 年通过伊朗伊斯兰共和国转运木炭

179. 2019 年 2 月 24 日至 3 月 1 日，专家小组访问了伊朗伊斯兰共和国的德黑兰、基什和格什姆，调查 2018 年经该国转运索马里木炭的情况。据伊朗当局称，就违反索马里木炭禁令一事开展的国内调查表明，负责重新包装和再出口木炭的伊朗公司对货物的非法来源并不知情。专家小组审查了进口木炭所用的伪造原产地证书副本，这些证书来自科摩罗、科特迪瓦和加纳。上述伪造文件在外观上与索马里和厄立特里亚问题监测组之前发现的例子极为相似(S/2018/1002, 附件 7.5)。

180. 专家小组与伊朗伊斯兰共和国境内私营部门实体代表举行会议，这些实体经确认曾协助将索马里木炭从伊朗伊斯兰共和国转运至阿拉伯联合酋长国。受访者证实，索马里木炭在基什和格什姆自由区内被从原装袋子中取出，重新装入标有“伊朗产品”的白色袋子。¹⁵¹ 最值得注意的是，基什的一名海关清关人员告诉专家小组，2019 年 2 月初，一名身份已知的木炭贩运者与他联系，请他协助转

Star 集团代表每月向基斯马尤港管理人员转账 500 000 美元，作为木炭出口税款(S/2018/1002, 附件 7.2(严格保密))。

¹⁵⁰ 经确认，Blue Whale 航运和货运公司是这两起事件中使用伪造加纳文书的出口商。

¹⁵¹ 在基什和格什姆对私营部门实体的约谈，2019 年 2 月 24 日至 3 月 1 日。标有“伊朗产品”的袋子也是由相同的木炭贸易商从阿拉伯联合酋长国进口。伊朗当局告知专家小组，进口到基什和格什姆自由区的货物如果附加值等于或高于 2.5%，则可作为伊朗伊斯兰共和国产品再出口。在德黑兰、基什和格什姆进行的约谈，2019 年 2 月 24 日至 28 日。

运索马里木炭。这名清关人员声称，由于伊朗伊斯兰共和国政府正在进行调查，他拒绝了这项请求。¹⁵²

C. 犯罪网络

181. 基斯马尤和迪拜的犯罪网络继续支持索马里木炭非法贸易。在基斯马尤，商业财团 All Star 集团¹⁵³ 负责在索马里生产木炭并将其从内陆运输至出口点。而在迪拜，All Star 集团代表通过设在阿拉伯联合酋长国的公司、尤其是 Zuri 煤炭公司为贸易提供便利。这些公司还与伊拉克、科威特、沙特阿拉伯和阿拉伯联合酋长国的航运代理人建立了联系，以便在整个区域内转运索马里木炭。

D. 实施禁令

182. 2018 年 11 月 28 日，阿拉伯联合酋长国告知专家小组，该国已暂停进口带有伊朗伊斯兰共和国原产地证书的木炭。¹⁵⁴ 2018 年 8 月 28 日，伊朗当局宣布暂停进口源自科摩罗、科特迪瓦和加纳的木炭。2018 年 3 月 8 日，阿曼从 *Al Azhar 3* 号上收缴了 37 000 袋木炭，该船之前向杜克姆港的阿曼当局提交了虚假文书。¹⁵⁵ 此后，阿曼便发布命令，暂停进口源自非洲会员国的木炭。¹⁵⁶ 此外，科威特工商部也于 2019 年 9 月 15 日宣布全面禁止从索马里进口木炭。¹⁵⁷

183. 除了会员国采取的上述行动外，专家小组还发现，索马里和厄立特里亚问题监测组在前几次报告中提及参与木炭贸易的实体名称和个人姓名，影响到木炭贩运者开展国际交易的能力。¹⁵⁸ “世界核查”和其他“了解客户”工具的应用使得与非法贸易有关的个人无法开立新的银行账户或转账超过 10 000 美元。

Al Sahil 号和 *Haruni* 号单桅帆船的最新情况

184. 2017 年 4 月 30 日，科威特当局与海上联合部队合作，在科威特多哈港羁押了 2 艘单桅帆船——*Al Sahil* 号和 *Haruni* 号，怀疑其违反索马里木炭禁令。索马里和厄立特里亚问题监测组在审查了吉布提原产地证书后，认定其为伪造证书，木炭实际源自索马里(见 S/2017/924，附件 12.2.3)。2017 年 8 月 13 日，科威特当局告知监测组，*Al Sahil* 号和 *Haruni* 号所载木炭已被科威特海关收缴，船长将依照国内法受到起诉。

185. 专家小组审查了 2019 年 5 月 20 日的科威特法庭文件，其中显示 *Sahil* 号船长走私索马里木炭和伪造运输文书的相关指控已被撤销。专家小组还审查了

¹⁵² 在基什和格什姆对私营部门实体的约谈，2019 年 2 月 24 日至 3 月 1 日。

¹⁵³ S/2018/1002，附件 7.6。

¹⁵⁴ S/2018/1002，第 175-177 段，附件 7.4 和 7.5。

¹⁵⁵ 见 S/2018/1002，附件 7.7。

¹⁵⁶ 联合国毒品和犯罪问题办公室于 2019 年 4 月对阿曼进行的正式访问。

¹⁵⁷ 《阿拉伯时报》，“科威特因恐怖主义融资问题发布索马里煤炭禁令”，2019 年 9 月 15 日。可查阅：www.arabtimesonline.com/news/kuwait-slaps-ban-on-somalian-coal-due-to-terror-financing/。

¹⁵⁸ 在迪拜对业内消息人士的约谈，2019 年 6 月 25 日。

2017 年 5 月 3 日吉布提驻科威特大使馆给检察官办公室的信件副本，其中证明 *Sahil* 号所运货物的原产地为吉布提，这一说法与索马里和厄立特里亚问题监测组以及海上联合部队收集的证据不符。尽管会员国已作出最大努力，但从该案仍能明显看出实施木炭禁令所涉及的挑战。

七. 国家和非国家行为体的合作情况

186. 专家小组感谢埃及、伊朗伊斯兰共和国、意大利、土耳其和阿拉伯联合酋长国政府接待专家小组或以其他方式协助调查。

187. 专家小组要感谢美国联邦调查局恐怖主义爆炸装置分析中心协助调查青年党制造和使用简易爆炸装置的情况。

188. 非政府组织 C4ADS 大力协助专家小组开展多项调查，特别是进行手机网络分析。

189. 专家小组最后要感谢班克罗夫特全球发展组织、欧盟海军、粮农组织、空运协会、民航组织、国际刑警组织、一个地球未来基金会、联合国毒品和犯罪问题办公室以及 Vulcan 公司对专家小组的工作作出贡献。

不合作情况

190. 索马里联邦政府妨碍索马里问题专家小组开展工作，对其首次任务造成影响。尽管安全理事会关于索马里的第 751(1992)号决议所设委员会主席作出重大外交努力，但专家小组自 2019 年 3 月起便无法按照索马里常驻纽约代表团所传达的指示，前往索马里。专家小组无法前往该国，对其工作产生不利影响。特别是联邦政府阻止专家小组进入索马里军事储存设施，从而使小组能力受限，难以核查联邦政府对部分解除武器禁运条款的遵守情况。此外，由于无法进入该国，专家小组不能约谈违反国际人道主义法事件的受害者，也不能调查妨碍和转用人道主义援助的情况。

八. 建议

A. 对和平、安全和稳定的威胁

191. 专家小组建议安全理事会：

(a) 促请会员国采取适当措施，促使那些参与为索马里生产或采购或向索马里销售、供应或转让可用于制造简易爆炸装置的前体化学品(特别是硝酸铵、硝酸钾和氯酸钠)的本国国民、受本国管辖的人员和在本国境内组建或受本国管辖的公司保持警惕；

(b) 决定，为制止青年党获取浓硝酸或硝硫混酸，会员国应采取适当措施保持警惕，保存交易记录，并就索马里境内个人或实体购买或查询上述化学品的可疑情况与索马里联邦政府和委员会共享信息；

(c) 鼓励会员国采取适当措施，确保那些为索马里生产或采购或向索马里销售、供应或转让商用爆炸物的本国国民、受本国管辖的人员和在本国境内组建或受本国管辖的公司向索马里联邦政府和联邦成员州提供充分的财政和技术援助，为此类材料的储存和配送建立适当的保障措施；

(d) 促请索马里联邦政府加强国际合作，特别是与区域内会员国的合作，通过双边和多边机制，确保有效交流相关金融情报，包括索马里联邦政府金融报告中心收集的数据，从而防止并打击资助恐怖主义行为；

(e) 决定索马里联邦政府应向委员会提交机密的年度最新情况介绍，向委员会通报金融报告中心的进展情况，并酌情纳入汇总摘要，介绍国内金融机构提交的可疑活动报告、金融报告中心开展的调查和为打击资助恐怖主义行为而采取的具体行动。

B. 武器禁运

192. 专家小组建议安全理事会：

(a) 决定修改安理会第 2142(2014)号决议第 2 段和安理会第 2111(2013)号决议第 11(a)段的规定，在提供咨询、援助或训练，以组建索马里国家安全部队和索马里安全部门机构，包括建设基础设施以及提供薪金和津贴方面，不再要求发出通知；

(b) 在安理会下一项决议中纳入附件，明确规定应就哪些类别的军事装备通知委员会；

(c) 决定应就向索马里运送商用爆炸物(如用于采矿和建筑业的硝酸铵/燃料油、电雷管和导爆索)的事项通知委员会，供其知悉；

(d) 决定索马里联邦政府将分别在 2020 年 2 月 15 日和 2020 年 8 月 15 日之前根据安理会第 2182(2014)号决议第 9 段向安理会提交两份定期报告，以便专家小组在提交关于索马里问题的中期最新情况通报和最后报告之前有充分时间审议这两份报告；

(e) 决定安理会第 2182(2014)号决议第 7 段所设联合核查小组将在今后报告中尽可能对该小组记录的武器序列号和索马里联邦政府关于向安全部队分发武器详情的现有记录进行相互对照。

193. 专家小组建议主席致函非洲联盟委员会主席索马里问题特别代表和非索特派团团长，鼓励非索特派团部队根据安全理事会第 2182(2014)号决议记录和登记在进攻行动中缴获的所有军事装备，并制定切实可行的程序，以便与专家小组分享相关结果。

C. 木炭禁令

194. 专家小组建议安全理事会表示打算在 2020 年审查木炭禁令，以期评估是否应继续实施禁令。

D. 违反国际人道主义法的行为

195. 专家小组建议安全理事会：


(a) 鼓励索马里联邦政府和联邦成员州加强平民对其安全部队的监督，调查并起诉对严重违反国际人道主义法行为负有长官责任的高级政治和军事领导人；

(b) 提醒所有会员国，其在索马里境内开展行动的军事部队必须严格遵守国际人道主义法，包括与敌对行为有关的习惯法，并立即调查和起诉严重违反国际人道主义法的人员；

(c) 鼓励非索特派团继续执行在联合国向非联合国安全部队提供支持的人权尽职政策框架内制定的建议，强化平民伤亡情况跟踪、分析和处理小组，以便在开展军事行动时减少平民伤亡；立即调查涉及杀害平民的事件，提供适当赔偿。

Annex 1.1: Extent of Al-Shabaab's territorial control

Figure 1: Map showing Al-Shabaab-administered areas, areas of significant Al-Shabaab military presence, and Al-Shabaab's taxation catchment.



Annex 1.2: Al-Shabaab's use of IEDs

During the mandate, the Panel has established that Al-Shabaab is manufacturing home-made explosives (HME). The first confirmed incident of Al-Shabaab using HME in Somalia was on 20 July 2017, when the Somali Police Force Criminal Investigative Division interdicted a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) at a checkpoint at Elasha Biyaha, on the outskirts of Mogadishu (see figures 1 and 2, below). A laboratory analysis of sample from the VBIED confirmed the presence of nitroglycerin, potassium nitrate and a component consistent with charcoal. According to laboratory analyses provided by the FBI's Terrorist Explosive Device Analytical Center (TEDAC) and additional analysis by UNMAS Somalia, the trend of Al-Shabaab producing HME by mixing nitroglycerin (a high-explosive) with potassium nitrate (an oxidizer) and charcoal (a fuel) increased from mid-2018.¹

Figure 1: Dashboard of the VBIED recovered on 20 July 2017 in Elasha Biyaha.



¹ Eleven out of the fifty Laboratory analyses from IED samples received from a Member State confirm the use of HME. Nine out of the eleven incidents occurred after July 2018.

Figure 2: Sample of explosive material from a VBIED seized at Elasha Biyaha on 20 July 2017, photographed by the SEMG on 21 July 2018.



Between July 2018 and July 2019, Improvised Explosive Device (IED) incidents across Somalia increased by approximately 32 per cent compared to the same period the previous year. There was also a 36 per cent increase in IED incidents in Benadir region, which includes Mogadishu, between July 2018 and July 2019, compared to the same period the previous year (see figures 3 and 4, below).

Figure 3: IED incidents in Somalia, July 2016 to July 2019. Source: UNMAS Somalia.





Figure 4: IED incidents in Benadir region July 2016 to July 2019. Source: UNMAS Somalia



Since May 2019, improved security measures in Benadir district, including additional Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) checkpoints, has led to an increase of interdictions of Al-Shabaab's vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs). From 14 May to 2 September 2019, one VBIED out of nine reached its intended target in Benadir.² Nevertheless, interdictions often still result in civilian casualties; for instance, on 22 July 2019 a VBIED intercepted at an FGS checkpoint in Mogadishu detonated, killing 23 people and injuring 32 others.

Supply of IED components to Somalia

Potassium nitrate fertilizer

Potassium nitrate fertilizer may be used for effective IED construction if the content of potassium surpasses 40 per cent, which is not commonly found in agricultural fertilizers in Somalia.³

In July and August 2019, the Panel of Experts documented two brands of potassium nitrate fertilizer available at local markets in Kismayo and Mogadishu (see figures 6-9, below). The percentage of potassium contained in the documented fertilizers were 5 percent and 10 percent, respectively.⁴ According to a 2019 UNMAS Somalia report, potassium nitrate fertilizer has also been documented in Middle Juba, an Al-Shabaab stronghold. However, the concentration of the potassium nitrate was not specified.

According to UN Comtrade data, during 2017 and 2018 approximately 60 tons of potassium nitrate of unspecified concentration were exported to Somalia from Kenya.⁵ Moreover, in its 2017 report, the SEMG presented evidence of at least one company which exports

² A 14 May 2019 VBIED detonated at the gate of a district police headquarters in Mogadishu, killing at least three people.

³ Interview with EOD specialist 12 August 2019.

⁴ Letter from fertilizer supplier on 8 August 2019.

⁵ Available from <https://comtrade.un.org/Data/>, HS code 283421. The Panel wrote to the Government of Kenya on 22 August 2019 but is yet to receive a reply.

potassium nitrate fertilizer of above 40 per cent in bulk to Yemen; Yemen is a known supply route for illicit weapons and IED components to Somalia.⁶

Diammonium phosphate and urea fertilizers

The bulk of documented fertilizers in Somalia consist of either urea or diammonium phosphate (DAP). DAP, which contains approximately 18 per cent nitrogen and 46 per cent phosphate, cannot be used in the production of HME.⁷

In July 2019, the Panel documented the sale of urea-based fertilizers in Kismayo, which is also sold in bulk to areas under Al-Shabaab-control in Middle Juba.⁸ Urea, which contains 46 per cent nitrogen, cannot be used to construct HME without being exposed to concentrated nitric acid, which produces urea nitrate explosive.⁹ On 5 April 2019, FGS security forces searching an underground site near Elasha Biyaha, a suburb of Mogadishu, recovered components and chemical substances used by Al-Shabaab to manufacture IEDs. Among the items seized were empty bottles of nitric acid.¹⁰ However, the compound urea nitrate has not appeared in any of TEDAC's post-blast laboratory analyses since 2012.¹¹

⁶ See S/2017/924, para 25.

⁷ UNMAS Somalia report, January 2017.

⁸ Five major suppliers of fertilizers in Kismayo informed the Panel that urea and fertilizers containing potassium nitrate are sold to farmers in Bu'aale, Jilib and Jamame, which are Al-Shabaab-controlled areas.

⁹ In Nigeria, large shipments of urea are subject to military escort, due to concern regarding diversion to the militant group Boko Haram. Interviews with researchers from business intelligence site Argusmedia on 16 August and 19 August 2019.

¹⁰ In February 2015, following the siege of the ISIL stronghold of Kobane, Syria, a Conflict Armament Research (CAR) team documented quantities of urea in the town. CAR found evidence that ISIL had used urea mixed with other chemical precursors to make improvised explosive devices which it used to attack Kurdish YPG forces. See Conflict Armament Research, "Tracing the Supply of Components Used in Islamic State IEDs", February 2016. Available at https://www.conflictarm.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Tracing_The_Supply_of_Components_Used_in_Islamic_State_IEDs.pdf.

¹¹ Email from EOD analyst, 16 August 2019. UNMAS Somalia, "Explosive Hazard Awareness Report", January 2017 suggested that the use of urea nitrate as an HME in Somalia is possible, but unconfirmed.

Figure 5: Nitric acid bottles recovered by Somali National forces in a raid in Elasha Bihaya on 5 April 2019.



Nitric acid

UN Comtrade data indicates that from 2017 to 2018 approximately 44 tons of nitric/sulfonitric acid were exported to Somalia from Kenya and the UAE.¹² Nitric acid is commonly used in the production of plastics, dyes, and explosives. According to information received by the Panel, there is no industrial demand for concentrated nitric acid in Somalia.¹³ The Panel is continuing to investigate the prevalence and origins of nitric acid found within Somalia.

Nitroglycerin

According to EOD specialists, nitric acid can be mixed with sulfuric acid and glycerine to produce nitroglycerin, a powerful and unstable explosive. While laboratory analyses have consistently revealed the presence of nitroglycerin in Al-Shabaab IEDs, it is not yet clear whether Al-Shabaab is producing nitroglycerin domestically or is procuring the material from elsewhere.¹⁴

C-DET detonators

Electric detonators manufactured by C-DET Explosive Industries continue to be used in various IED attacks across Somalia since their initial documentation in 2013.¹⁵ In April 2017, C-DET electric detonators were among the IED components discovered by Puntland security forces in Bosaso, Puntland. On 20 July 2017, C-DETs were recovered from the scene of a vehicle-borne IED (VBIED) attack in Elasha Biyaha.¹⁶ In 2017, the SEMG documented evidence of at least one arms market in Galkayo where C-DET detonators are

¹² Sulfonitric acid is a mixture of sulfuric and nitric acid.

¹³ Email from EOD specialist on 16 August 2019; interviews with Mogadishu based researchers, August and September 2019.

¹⁴ According to UNMAS Somalia, it is unlikely that Al-Shabaab has procured nitroglycerin from explosive remnants of war; UNMAS Somalia report, April 2019. In an interview with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) on 15 April 2019, it was suggested that significant amounts of ice would be required to produce nitroglycerin in Somalia.

¹⁵ In 2013 and 2014, the SEMG documented at least four cases in which C-DETs were recovered during seizures and following IED attacks in Somalia. See [S/2014/726](#), annex 6.6.

¹⁶ C-DETs were found among seizures in Belet Weyne in May 2017, and in Leego in January 2017. See [S/2017/924](#), annex 1.2 (strictly confidential).

available for \$67 each.¹⁷ On 19 May 2019, the M *Oriental Queen* consignment (see annex 1.11) also contained a delivery of 500 C-DET electric detonators, which were intended for commercial use in Puntland.

Figure 6: Fertilizer containing 5 per cent potassium, documented in Kismayo, July 2019.



Figure 7: Fertilizer containing 10 per cent potassium, documented in Kismayo, July 2019.



¹⁷ Photographic evidence provided via email from an analyst on Somalia, 7 August 2017. The analyst had received the evidence from a reliable source in Galkayo.

Figure 8: Fertilizer containing 5 per cent potassium, documented in Mogadishu, August 2019.



Figure 9: Urea fertilizer documented in Kismayo in July 2019.



Annex 1.3: Sahafi Hotel attack

Figure 1: On 9 November 2018, Al-Shabaab detonated three VBIEDs outside the Sahafi Hotel in Mogadishu. Source: Bancroft Global Development.



Figure 2: Five deceased attackers dressed in Somali security forces uniforms.



The Panel received reports, including from EOD specialist, that some of the victims of the blast had been treated for unusual burns and respiratory problems not seen in the aftermath of previous VBIED attacks in Mogadishu. This may indicate that Al-Shabaab added elements such as aluminium powder or paste to the explosive mixtures to intensify the heat from the blast.¹⁸

¹⁸ See S/2018/1002 annex 2.1 (strictly confidential).

Additionally, an AK-pattern assault rifle recovered from one of the Sahafi Hotel attackers had markings consistent with materiel imported by the FGS in July 2017.¹⁹ At least two unexploded hand grenades captured from the gunmen also bore markings almost identical to those on several hand grenades seized from Al-Shabaab in Bullo Mareer in Lower Shabelle, by the Uganda People's Defence Force in March 2018.²⁰ Photographs of these weapons are available in annex 2.6.

¹⁹ Consignment from the People's Republic of China delivered in July 2017 (notified 2 February 2018).

²⁰ See [S/2018/1002](#) paras 47-49. Both hand grenades bore the factory marking 349, corresponding to a factory in St. Petersburg. The grenades captured by Ugandan forces were manufactured in 1980, while those captured from the Sahafi hotel attack were manufactured in 1979.

Annex 1.4: Al-Shabaab financing (STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL)*

Annex 1.5: Al-Shabaab's justice system

Figure 1: Al-Shabaab decree of a death sentence, listing two witnesses (names redacted), dated 2 February 2017 (5/5/1438 of the Islamic calendar).




Figure 2: Summons to an Al-Shabaab court, dated 14 October 2018 (6/2/1440 of the Islamic calendar).




Figure 3: Case involving the arrest of a man for the possession of an AK-pattern rifle and magazine, dated 8 July 2017 (13/10/1438 in the Islamic calendar).

Date: 13/10/1438 / 8/7/17

Subject: Walad BTF

gawar duseen Cali yabiz

Cali yow ABU KAR MAAMAD

Plan aaw

da janoow sidow maxmada

Plan aaw

idris mad gaab Cabraha

sa-madoolu

1 = 2000

AK rifle

2 = 1300 SH

Empty magazine

gawar: faruk

Figure 4: Divorce settlement in Gof Gaduud, Bay region, dated 23 July 2017, in which the mother is awarded child support for a daughter of \$200 (4,500,000 Somali shillings).

Date: 28/10/1438 / 23/7/17

Subject: Maxamad Cali Axmad 9606639

Location: Gof Gaduud

fur ga war taaga ex

Baqaawo Cali yow Maxamad Cali

loof fur: sadox dhalaa ka ta

ABaxo

Witnesses

Cali maxamad Cali

Shalka duseen maxmadi

Walaal: loof 5 = ABaxo =

da janoow Cali yow Maxamad

Salidhi-Ga Gof Gaduud

Child support

Mat Gud ex = 4,500,000 Adan

Adan Mitayan 1/2 = 2,250,000

mad ABU KAR maxamad

Figure 5: Al-Shabaab dispute resolution involving the sale of a camel, dated 1 January 2018 (13/4/1439 in the Islamic calendar).

Date: 13/4/1439
 Type of animal: Camel
 Baydho = El Weaki # Garba
 Broker fee(?) Kengor 40
 Sale price \$ 400
 Dalaat ka = Cabdulaahi Nur-dulaya
 Age of camel: 6 - 12 years
 da god. yi
 Bin: Bin: 8 660496 = Garasi
 Cabdulaahi Goodir
 Marichen
 Cabdulaahi Garob Gab
 = Garo Garaci
 MtsLINE

Figure 6: Case involving a stolen camel in Gof Gaduud, Bay region, dated 8 July 2017 (13/10/1438 in the Islamic calendar).

[illegible]

Annex 1.6: DusitD2 attack in Nairobi

On 15 January 2019, Al-Shabaab militants attacked a commercial business complex in Nairobi containing the DusitD2 Hotel. The attack began at 15:28 local time (12:28 UTC+3), with a detonation of a suicide bomber, Mahir Riziki. Four gunmen – Ali Salim Gichunge, Osman Ibrahim Gedi, Siyat Omar Abdi, and an unknown individual – then proceeded to attack the compound using AK-pattern rifles and grenades, targeting people within the DusitD2 hotel and surrounding shops.

The attack resulted in 21 civilian deaths, as well as the four gunmen. Al-Shabaab dubbed the operation *Al-Quds Lan Tuhawwad* (“Jerusalem will never be Judaized”) and stated that it had targeted “western and Zionist interests worldwide and in support of our Muslim families in Palestine”²¹ (see figure 1, below). This rhetoric was atypical for Al-Shabaab, which typically justifies its attacks based on the presence of foreign troops in Somalia. The DusitD2 attack was the most significant operation carried out by Al-Shabaab in a regional Member State since the Garissa University College massacre of April 2015 (see S/2015/801, annex 4.2).

The DusitD2 attack was carried out on a significant date, coinciding with the third anniversary of Al-Shabaab’s overrunning of a Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) base in El Adde, Gedo region. In 2018, Kenyan police had disrupted a similar attempt when they intercepted a VBIED destined for Nairobi near Merti, Isiolo County (see S/2018/1002, annex 2.3); the operation had likely been originally been planned to coincide with the second anniversary of the El Adde attack. The Panel’s investigations have revealed links between the organization of the two operations, including a common financier based in Mandera, Kenya (see annex 1.6.1(strictly confidential)) and the identical origin of a Type 56-2 assault rifle used by one of the DusitD2 gunmen (see “Type 56-2 rifle”, below). It is likely that Al-Shabaab learned lessons from the failure of the Merti plot and adapted their tactics in order to carry out the successful DusitD2 operation (see “Comparison with the 2018 failed Merti VBIED plot”, below).

Figure 1: Deceased Al-Shabaab attacker shown wearing a headband with the word “Jerusalem” (القدس) in Arabic.



Condensed timeline of the plot

²¹ Al-Shabaab statement available at <https://ent.siteintelgroup.com/Statements/shabaab-media-unit-presents-detailed-report-on-nairobi-attack-suggests-that-attack-bears-message-to-jerusalem.html> (subscription required).

2015: Cell leader Ali Salim Gichunge travels to Somalia.

March 2018: Facilitators in Jilib, Somalia, organize a fake ID for Siyat Omar Abdi.

c. April 2018: Gichunge and his wife Violet Wanjiru establish a safehouse at Guango Estate, on the northern outskirts of Nairobi.

15 Dec. 2018: Unknown attacker travels to Eastleigh, Nairobi from Dadaab refugee camp.

2 Jan. 2019: Osman Gedi Ibrahim travels to Roysambu area of Nairobi from Danaba, north-east Kenya.

5 Jan. 2019: Siyat Omar Abdi travels to Nairobi, Eastleigh from Dadaab refugee camp.

10 Jan. 2019: Osman Gedi Ibrahim moves to the safehouse on the outskirts of Nairobi.

11 Jan. 2019: Suicide bomber Mahir Khalid Riziki travels to the Nairobi safehouse from Somalia through El Wak, north-east Kenya.

13 Jan. 2019: Siyat Omar Abdi and the Unknown Attacker move to the safehouse.

14 Jan. 2019: Entire cell assembles at the safehouse on the day prior to the attack.

15 Jan. 2019: **Day of the attack**

15:14 (UTC+3): Suicide bomber Mahir Riziki arrives at the DusitD2 complex. Between 15:14 and 15:25 he exchanges six calls with Ali Salim Gichunge averaging 30 seconds each.²²

15:21: The four suicide gunmen Ali Salim Gichunge, Siyat Abdi Omar, Osman Gedi Ibrahim and the unidentified Somali attacker arrive in a Toyota Ractis, registration KCN340E. They change into black outfits.

15:28: Mahir Riziki detonates himself outside Secret Garden restaurant.

15:32: The four gunmen walk into the Dusit complex and begin throwing grenades and firing indiscriminately.²³

c. 15:37: Kenyan security forces arrive at the scene.

16 Jan., 08:00: The four gunmen have been neutralized and the complex cleared, 16 hours after the commencement of the attack.

²² Confidential communications seen by the Panel of Experts, Nairobi, July 2019. This was Riziki's first and only visit to DusitD2, likely indicating that he required specific instructions from Gichunge regarding the layout of the complex.

²³ CCTV footage seen by the Panel of Experts indicated that the delay between the detonation of the suicide bomber and the arrival of the four gunmen was due to the latter's purchase of credit for their mobile phones, likely to enable them to stream footage and contact others in the likely event of a prolonged siege once security forces arrived.

Figure 2: CCTV footage of Ali Salim Gichunge and Siyat Omar Abdi entering the DusitD2 complex.




The safehouse

A bungalow in Guango Estate, Muchatha, on the outskirts of Nairobi – a middle-class Kenyan estate where rentals are approximately KES 40,000 (\$400) per month – served as the safehouse for the attack. Cell leader Ali Salim Gichunge and his wife Violet Wanjiru established the safehouse approximately nine months prior to the attack. Mobile phone tower data analyzed by the Panel showed that other members of the cell stayed at the bungalow sporadically in the lead up to the attack, with all of the attackers coming together at the house the night prior.

Police recovered phones, a laptop, flash disks, SIM cards, and an Internet router from the safehouse. Evidence extracted from these devices revealed communications between Ali Salim Gichunge and a cell coordinator based the Al-Shabaab ‘capital’ of Jilib, in Middle Juba region. Electronic communications also revealed that the Al-Shabaab coordinator in Jilib had arranged for the manufacture of a falsified secondary school identity card for one of the non-Kenyan attackers, Dadaab refugee camp resident Siyat Omar Abdi.²⁴

²⁴ The falsified document identified Siyat Omar Abdi as a student at Arabia Boys Secondary School, located in Mandera, 2 km from the Kenya-Somalia border. The school was attacked by Al-Shabaab in October 2018, resulting in the deaths of two non-Muslim teachers. Lynet Igadwah, “Al-Shabaab kills 2 teachers in Mandera school attack”, Business Daily, 10 October 2018. Available at <https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/news/counties/Al-Shabaab-kills-2-teachers-in-Mandera-school-attack/4003142-4800422-kxtqsvz/index.html>.

Figure 3: Falsified school ID arranged for Siyat Omar Abdi by an Al-Shabaab cell coordinator in Jilib.




Extractions from the devices of the DusitD2 attackers also revealed the existence of a broader Al-Shabaab network in East Africa, details of which are available in annex 1.7 (strictly confidential).

The attacking team

In mid-December, the unknown attacker of Somali origin traveled from Dadaab, and was hidden in the predominately Somali neighbourhood Eastleigh, Nairobi.

In early January 2019, three additional members of the cell made their way to Nairobi from different locations and following two different routes, two utilizing the A2 highway from Moyale and the third the A3 highway from Garissa. The suicide bomber, Mahir Riziki, departed for Nairobi on 11 January 2019, four days prior to the attack. As with plots of a similar nature, the members of the attacking team came together as late as possible in order to avoid being compromised by the security forces; the full team met together for the first time on 14 January 2019, and stayed together at the safehouse that evening. Ali Salim Gichunge and with his wife Violet Wanjiru were based in the safehouse throughout the preparations for the attack.

Figure 4: Movements of the Al-Shabaab cell in the lead up to the 15 January 2019 attack.

*Mahir Khalid Riziki*

Mahir Khalid Riziki, born on 5 February 1993, was the longest serving member of Al-Shabaab in the attack group and was designated as the suicide bomber. Aged 25 at the time of the attack, Riziki was born raised in the Majengo area of Mombasa.²⁵ Ramadhan Hamisi Kufungwa, a well-known Kenyan Al-Shabaab recruiter now located in Somalia, recruited Riziki at Musa Mosque in early 2014.²⁶ Musa Mosque has long been associated with radicalization, recruitment for Al-Shabaab, and religious violence.²⁷

²⁵ Confidential report seen by the Panel of Experts, Nairobi, June 2019.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Ibid.

In 2014, Riziki formed part of an assassination cell tasked by Al-Shabaab to assassinate security personnel in the coast region. In October 2014, Riziki was involved in the killing of a police officer at Royal Court Hotel in Mombasa.²⁸ He fled to Tanzania in November 2014 after being placed on Kenya's most wanted list with a KSH 2,000,000 (\$20,000) bounty on his head. In early 2015, Riziki contacted family members in Mombasa to inform them that he had relocated to Somalia where he was undergoing training by Al-Shabaab.²⁹

Riziki crossed the border from Somalia to Kenya through El Wak on 11 January 2019. He activated a Kenyan phone registered in the name of "Hibo Ahmed" that same morning, immediately placing a call to Somalia. At 18:21, Riziki placed his first call to Ali Salim Gichunge, arriving at the safehouse in the outskirts of Nairobi later in the evening. Except for his Somali contact and Gichunge, Riziki placed calls to only one other number from the time he entered Kenya until his death four days later, thereby limiting his exposure to Kenyan security forces.

On the day of the attack, Riziki departed the safehouse via taxi at approximately 14:15. Between 12:54 and the time of his death, he exchanged 11 phone calls with Gichunge, including a final 91-second call at 15:25.³⁰ At 15:28, while standing outside to Secret Garden restaurant within the DusitD2 complex, Riziki detonated himself.

Figure 5: CCTV footage of the moment Mahir Riziki detonates himself outside Secret Garden restaurant at 15:28.



²⁸ The team to which Mahir Riziki belonged was headed by Ismael Mohamed Shosi, also known as Ismael Mmanga, a former resident of Bondeni, Mombasa County. Shosi was killed by security agencies on 27 September 2016 at his hideout in Mwandoni after he resisted arrest. Ibid.

²⁹ Ibid.


³⁰ Communications data analyzed by the Panel of Experts.

Ali Salim Gichunge

The cell leader, Ali Salim Gichunge, was born in 1992 in Isiolo. In 2015, his mother reported that he had travelled to Somalia. His sister indicated that he also travelled to Somalia in 2017 through Lamu.³¹ Based on analysis of his mobile phone data, Gichunge acted as the coordinator and organizer while Gedi, the other Kenyan national in the attack group, served as Gichunge's lieutenant. Gichunge was highly conscious of the security of communications; for instance, he never contacted Somalia by phone – only using Facebook – turned his phone off when he travelled to meet associates, and spoke to Riziki only on a

dedicated phone line.

Ali Salim Gichunge was an ideal recruit for Al-Shabaab; he was the son of a retired military officer, embracing of Western culture, and did not fit the profile of an extremist.

Osman Ibrahim Gedi

Osman Ibrahim Gedi was a Kenyan national born in 1992. On 2 January 2019, he registered a new Kenyan mobile phone in Danaba, in north-east Kenya, in the name of “Abdikadir Mohamud Sabdow”. He arrived in Nairobi early on 4 January, and Gichunge and Gedi travelled together to the safehouse on the evening of 10 January 2019. Gedi visited the Dusit complex twice in the week prior to the attack.

Analysis of Gedi's mobile phone communications did not show any contacts with Somalia.


Kenyan investigators recovered a Tanzanian driver's license from Gedi's body. Investigations by the Panel indicated that the license was genuine and had been registered in Moshi, Tanzania.³² However, the biographical details provided in the application proved to be false, and the fingerprint used to obtain the license did not match Gedi's.³³

³¹ Confidential report seen by the Panel of Experts, Nairobi, July 2019.

³² The license was registered in the Tanzanian Revenue Authority database.

³³ Interview with Tanzanian security official, Dar es Salaam, May 2019.

Figure 6: Tanzanian license issued to Osman Ibrahim Gedi under the name “Abduli Salim Ally”.



Siyat Omar Abdi



Siyat Omar Abdi was born in 1992 in Dagahaley, one of the Dadaab refugee camps. Abdi activated a new Kenyan phone on 4 January 2019 in preparation for the attack and travelled to Nairobi from Dagahaley the next day. The phone immediately placed a call to Somalia after its activation, and Abdi continued to contact numbers in Somalia until 14 January 2019, when the phone was last used. On 13 January 2019, Abdi moved to the Gichunges' safehouse on the outskirts of Nairobi, where he stayed until the attack.³⁴

The Panel obtained a Dadaab camp identification and ration card number attributed to Abdi through his fingerprint; however, World Food Programme and UNHCR officials in Dadaab stated that there was no record of Abdi in their databases.

Unknown gunman of Somali origin



An unknown member of the attacking team, presumed to be of Somali origin, activated a new Kenyan mobile phone in Dagahaley, Dadaab refugee camp, on 15 December 2018. On 17 December 2018 he travelled from Dagahaley to Eastleigh, a predominantly Somali neighbourhood in Nairobi. The journey lasted eight hours, which due to the duration suggested that it was undertaken in a private vehicle rather than with public transportation. He was hidden in Eastleigh Nairobi until 12 January 2019, when he was in contact with Gedi and subsequently moved to the Nairobi safehouse on 13 January.³⁵ He spoke no English or Kiswahili, which likely was the rationale for concealing him in Eastleigh for a month, where he

was unlikely to arouse suspicion.

³⁴ Communications data analyzed by the Panel of Experts.

³⁵ Ibid.

Violet Wanjiru, also known as Kemunto and Khadija



Violet Wanjiru was married to the cell leader Ali Salim Gichunge in 2016. Wanjiru primary role was in assisting Gichunge with the management of the safehouse. Wanjiru was unaware of the suicidal nature of the impending attack, and she believed that Gichunge would later flee to Somalia to join her.

Wanjiru's inside knowledge of the Al-Shabaab cell meant it was vital to Al-Shabaab that she not be arrested. She moved from the Nairobi safehouse on 11 January 2019 and travelled through Wajir and El Wak to Mandera along the B9 highway, arriving in Mandera on the evening of the same day. She remained in Mandera until 14 January, and then crossed into Somalia. Throughout this journey she was aided by Yusuf Ali

Adan, a Mandera-based Al-Shabaab operative, with whom she communicated on a newly activated phone line. Wanjiru was housed in the border region in a safehouse under Al-Shabaab control for a number of weeks before being moved further into Al-Shabaab territory and into isolation to observe *Iddah*, a period of waiting following the death of a husband. As of this writing she remains in Somalia, with her exact whereabouts unknown.

Figure 7: Violet Wanjiru's escape route to Somalia.





Figure 8: The DusitD2 operation.



Comparison with the 2018 failed Merti VBIED plot

On 15 February 2018, Kenyan police on a routine patrol in Merti Division, Isiolo County, witnessed a vehicle stopped by the side of the road.³⁶ When police approached the vehicle, an occupant shot at the officers, who then returned fire, killing Mbarak Abdi Huka a.k.a. “Sa’ad”. Four individuals attempted to flee the scene and two were arrested, Abdimajit Hasan Adan and Mohammed Osman Nanne; two others escaped capture. The vehicle, a 2003 Mitsubishi Airtrek, had been converted into a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) containing approximately 100 kg of explosives.

Also discovered in the vehicle were 5 Type 56-2 AK-pattern assault rifles, 36 magazines of ammunition, 36 unprimed F1 grenades and their firing pins, 3 knives, and an Al-Shabaab flag. The operation appeared to have been patterned after the *modus operandi* of Al-Shabaab complex attacks in Somalia, whereby a VBIED would have been used to breach the perimeter of an unknown target, followed by a wave of ‘suicide gunmen’. In this case, the

³⁶ A detailed account of the failed Merti VBIED plot is presented in annex 2.3 of the Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group’s 2018 report (S/2018/1002).

number of rifles recovered from the vehicle most likely point to the possibility of five suicide gunmen.

The Merti plot was orchestrated by an Al-Shabaab operative based in Jilib, known only as “Dere” (“tall”), who personally conveyed instructions to Abdimajit Hasan Adan and Mohammed Osman Nanne. “Dere” also either personally provided cash to the two operatives or arranged for large instalments of up to \$9,000 to be sent to them from Somalia via *hawala* transfer.

The Merti attack had likely been intended to take place in Nairobi on 15 January 2018, to coincide with the second anniversary of Al-Shabaab’s killing of 150 soldiers at a KDF base in El Adde, Gedo region. However, the Al-Shabaab operatives experienced a number of delays in the execution of the plot, including a mechanical failure that forced them to abandon an initial VBIED and construct a second device.

There are two indications that the Merti and DusitD2 plots involved a cross-over in Al-Shabaab planning networks. First, a financier of the DusitD2 plot based in Mandera, Kenya, had previously transferred funds to Abdimajit Hasan Adan (see annex 1.6.1 (strictly confidential)); in addition, a Type 56-2 assault rifle used by one of the DusitD2 gunmen originated in the same arms consignment delivered to the FGS in 2013 as four rifles recovered from the Merti plotters (see “Type 56-2 rifle”, below). It is likely that the DusitD2 cell adapted their behaviour in response to the shortcomings of the Merti operation.

Adaptations in the DusitD2 operation

The DusitD2 operation appeared to have been refined in response to the failure of the Merti plot in 2018 in several significant ways. First, rather than constructing a VBIED, the DusitD2 attackers employed a person-borne improvised explosive device (PBIED). The PBIED was easier to conceal and did not risk the mechanical risks inherent with a vehicle loaded with explosives undertaking the 800 km journey from the Kenya-Somalia border to Nairobi. Instead of using the same route as the Merti VBIED, the DusitD2 attackers altered their route from northern Kenya to Nairobi, bypassing the area where the Merti VBIED had been intercepted by Kenyan police (see figure 9, below).


Second, the Al-Shabaab leaders in Somalia used a financial intermediary based in Mandera, Kenya, to transfer funds to the operations cell in Nairobi. The transfers were completed through cash and M-PESA mobile money, which has a transfer limit of KES 70,000 (\$700). The operatives likely chose this method of transfer because it is not closely monitored by the Kenyan security forces like *hawala* money transfers (see annex 1.6.1 (strictly confidential)).

Finally, the leader of the DusitD2 cell, Kenyan national Salim Ali Gichunge, was given wide autonomy with respect to the target and the plan of attack.³⁷ Unlike the cell leader of the Merti plot, Gichunge did not communicate directly with individuals based in Somalia, reducing the likelihood of detection.³⁸

³⁷ Up to one day prior to the DusitD2 attack, the Al-Shabaab cell was continuing to scout possible alternative targets.

³⁸ Additionally, due to the possibility of his presence compromising the operation, Gichunge used a dedicated mobile phone line to contact Mahir Riziki, who was already known to the Kenyan security services.

Figure 9: GPS track of the Merti VBIED vehicle (number plate KBM200D), which was intercepted by Kenyan police stopped at the roadside on 15 February 2018. The DusitD2 plotters took a different route to Nairobi.



Type 56-2 rifle

A Type 56-2 rifle recovered from one of the deceased attackers, bearing serial number 412222, provides further indication of a link between the DusitD2 and Merti plots. The serial number and factory marking likely indicates that the weapon originated in a consignment of 3,500 Type 56-2 rifles purchased by the FGS from the Government of Ethiopia in July 2013, following the partial lifting of the arms embargo.³⁹ In 2013, the Government of Ethiopia provided the Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group (SEMG) with a partial list of 2,500 serial numbers of weapons included in the consignment. While the serial number 412222 does not itself appear in this partial list obtained by the SEMG, 13 other Type 56-2 rifles with serial numbers beginning with the sequence “4122” are present, indicating that the rifle’s serial number was likely contained amongst the 1,000 not provided by Ethiopia.

The Al-Shabaab operatives arrested by Kenyan police in connection with the Merti plot were found in possession of four Type 56-2 rifles that had also formed part of the 2013 consignment (see [S/2018/1002](#), annex 2.3).

Figures 10 and 11: One of the Type 56-2 rifle recovered from the Merti plotters in February 2018 (left) and a Type 56-2 (serial number 412222) used in the DusitD2 attack (right).



Annex 1.6.1 (strictly confidential) provides additional details on the financing of the DusitD2 operation.

³⁹ The consignment was notified to the Committee on 29 July 2013.

Annex 1.6.1: Financing of the DusitD2 attack (STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL)*

**Annex 1.7: Additional Al-Shabaab regional operations (STRICTLY
CONFIDENTIAL)***

Annex 1.8: Kenya-Somalia border incidents

From June to July 2019, cross-border attacks by Al-Shabaab into Kenya increased in frequency, possibly due to heightened diplomatic tensions between the two countries, which Al-Shabaab may be seeking to exploit. This increased frequency of incidents followed a statement released by Al-Shabaab through its Shahada propaganda agency in June 2019, in which the group claimed to have mobilized “an army of fighters” from within the Muslim population of Kenya.⁴⁰ It refers to the closing of the Kenya-Somalia border in Lamu County by the Kenyan Authorities in early June.⁴¹ The full statement reads:

Observers also see that the closure of the Kenyan-Somali border will not work to reduce the frequency of attacks, as the Shabaab al-Mujahideen Movement has succeeded in establishing an army of fighters from the Kenyan population itself, who believe in the same objectives as the Movement and fight for issues they believe to be just, at a time of persistent grievances and assaults by the Kenyan government on the rights of Muslims in the country, and the corruption rampant in the joints of the Kenyan government, in marginalizing Muslims and depriving them of their rights.⁴²

The geographical scope of these attacks ranged from the northern-most border point with Somalia, at Mandera, to the southern border in Lamu, a distance spanning almost 700 kilometres.

Table 1: Al-Shabaab cross-border incidents, April-May and June-July 2019

Type of Incident	June/July 2019	April/May 2019	June/July 2019
IED		3	19
Firefight		0	3
Movement of Al-Shabaab fighters/weapons		6	2
Kidnap or attempted kidnap		2	4
Attack on telecommunications infrastructure		1	2
Total		12	30

In April and May 2019, the Panel recorded four separate incidents of Al-Shabaab movements along the Kenya-Somalia border in preparation for the offensive. For example, on 21 April 2019 in Hulugho, Garissa County, a group of approximately 30 armed individuals gathered east of Elkambere. The group had eight vehicles (three cars, two battlewagons, and three motorbikes) and were armed with assorted weapons and carrying bags suspected to contain IED materials.⁴³


⁴⁰ Al-Shabaab statement available from <https://ent.siteintelgroup.com/Statements/shabaab-claims-two-car-bombings-in-mogadishu-killing-31-boasts-multiple-attacks-in-kenya-in-2-days.html> (subscription required).

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ Confidential international agency security reports, April and May 2019. Reports also stated that on 23 April 2019 in Wajir County, a group of Al-Shabaab fighters armed with rifles and rocket-propelled grenades were seen between Khorof Harar and Kotulo. They were also carrying bags suspected to contain IED materials and ammunition.

Figure 1: Map showing approximate location of cross-border attacks, June-July 2019.



Annex 1.9: ISIL financing in Puntland

Conflict with Al-Shabaab in Bari region

In December 2018, fighting broke out between the ISIL faction and Al-Shabaab in the Bari region for the first time since early 2016. The most intense clashes took place on 16 December 2018 at B'ir Mirale, a critical water source located in the river valley southwest of Qandala occupied by ISIL militants (see figure 2, below). According to the ISIL-affiliated Amaq News Agency, which also released a video (see figure 1, below) purportedly showing the bodies of Al-Shabaab fighters, 14 Al-Shabaab militants were killed during the fighting. On 21 December, Al-Shabaab spokesman Sheikh Ali Rage vowed to “uproot” members of the ISIL faction.⁴⁴

During the week of 28 January 2019, Al-Shabaab launched an operation that captured B'ir Mirale, as well as the town of Shebaab, to the southeast (see figure 2, below, for a map of key strongholds for the ISIL faction in Bari region). ISIL-aligned militants reportedly withdrew further into the surrounding mountains.


Figure 1: Still from an 18 December 2018 video posted by Amaq News Agency purporting to show fighting between the ISIL faction and Al-Shabaab at B'ir Mirale.



Intense conflict between the ISIL faction and Al-Shabaab had been ongoing since November 2018, when both groups appear to have begun competing over ‘taxation’ revenues from businesses in Mogadishu and Puntland, resulting in the killings of as many as 11 employees of Hormuud Telecom Inc. in Mogadishu over the course of the month.

⁴⁴ Mohamed Olad Hassan, “Somalia's Al-Shabab Declares War on Pro-Islamic State Group”, Voice of America, 21 December 2018. Available from <https://www.voanews.com/a/somalia-al-shabab-declares-war-on-pro-islamic-state-group/4711075.html>.

Figure 2: Approximate locations of ISIL faction strongholds in Puntland's Bari region.⁴⁵



Extortion of Amtel by the ISIL faction

The Puntland-based Amtel telecommuting company, a member of the conglomerate Amal Group,⁴⁶ was successfully pressured by the ISIL faction into paying extortion money totalling several hundred thousand dollars. The money was delivered by two company representatives to Dhasaan, an ISIL-controlled town in eastern Bari region (see figure 2, above) on 8 October 2018.⁴⁷ Upon their return on 10 October, the two Amtel employees were temporarily detained by Puntland security forces in the town of Balidhidhin, before senior officials in the Puntland administration reportedly ordered their release.⁴⁸

The Panel of Experts has reviewed evidence corroborating these events, including photographs of the two Amtel employees taken during their detention in Balidhidhin, a photograph of their vehicle, and mobile phone records.⁴⁹ Furthermore, in September 2018 Amal Bank's headquarters in Mogadishu had been targeted by an IED and one of its managers had been killed by unknown gunmen, events consistent with extortion practices by militant groups in Somalia.

According to the Chairman of Amal Bank, the two Amal Group employees had been surveyors seeking to establish mobile phone towers in Bari region for the telecommunications company Amtel, a subsidiary of Amal Group.⁵⁰ The Chairman of Amal

⁴⁵ Harti Deeq, also known as Buqu, was the site of a US airstrike on 3 November 2017 that reportedly killed around 20 militants. See [S/2018/1002](#), para. 94.

⁴⁶ Amal Group is also the parent company of Amal Bank, Puntland's largest bank.

⁴⁷ Information provided by two current and two former Puntland intelligence officials, a commander in the Puntland security forces, and a Puntland businessman, in October and November 2018.

⁴⁸ Interviews with two Puntland intelligence officials in Bosaso, 26 November 2018, and a former intelligence official, 15 November 2019. Analysis of mobile phone records confirmed that one of the Amtel employees exchanged two phone calls with the arresting officer in the Puntland security forces on 10 and 11 October 2019.

⁴⁹ Mobile phone data for one of the Amtel employees demonstrated that he was located in or near the ISIL-controlled town of Shebaab (see figure 2, above) from 6-9 October 2018, during which period he made two phone calls to the CEO of Amal Bank.

⁵⁰ Phone interview with the Chairman of Amal Bank, 6 November 2018.

Bank acknowledged that Amal had received extortion demands from the ISIL faction, but denied having made any payments to the group or even having had contact with it.⁵¹ Another senior employee of Amal Bank informed the Panel that the two Amtel employees had contacted members of the ISIL faction while in Bari region, but only for the purpose of gaining access to conduct their survey.⁵²

Additional cases of extortion by the ISIL faction

The Panel of Experts is aware of several additional instances where the ISIL faction has used violence or the threat thereof in an attempt to extort revenues. On 7 August 2018, for instance, the Deputy Manager of Golis Telecom in Bosaso, Abdullahi Ali Omar, was shot dead reportedly in order to pressure the company into paying ISIL ‘taxation’.⁵³ On 22 November 2018, Ahmed Ali Nur “Dalaqo”, the owner of Saabir General Trading Company, was shot dead in Bosaso reportedly because he had refused to accede to the ISIL faction’s extortion demands.⁵⁴

The Panel also received electronic evidence of an ISIL extortion attempt. In a text message sent to employees of a major money transfer company, the militant group warned employees not to report for work after 14 July 2019 (11/11/1440 of the Islamic calendar) if the company had failed to pay its ‘taxation’ to ISIL (see figure 3, below). According to a Puntland security source, the same phone number had been used in September 2018 to threaten an employee of a telecoms company, who shortly afterwards fled to Hargeisa.⁵⁵ Analysis of mobile phone records confirmed that the ISIL-affiliated number had placed a total of 10 calls between 10 September and 29 November 2019 to the telecoms employee, with mobile tower data indicating the caller’s location to be proximate to the ISIL stronghold of Shebaab.⁵⁶

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² Interview with senior Amal Bank employee in Bosaso, 27 November 2018.

⁵³ Interviews with two intelligence officials in Bosaso, 26 November 2018. See also Harun Maruf, “In Somalia, Businesses Face ‘Taxation’ by Militants”, Voice of America, 3 December 2018. Available at <https://www.voanews.com/africa/somalia-businesses-face-taxation-militants>.

⁵⁴ Interviews with two intelligence officials and a businessman in Bosaso, 26 and 27 November 2018.

⁵⁵ Information provided by a former Puntland intelligence officer, 6 August 2019.

⁵⁶ Analysis of call records also showed multiple calls by the ISIL-affiliated phone number to southern Somalia, Yemen, and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

Figure 3: Extortion message from the ISIL faction warning Puntland employees of a money transfer company not to report for work.

FYI
Dhammaan shaqaalaha ([REDACTED])
waxaa la amrayaa ineesan ushaqa tagi
karin xafiisyada shirkadda wa digniintii
ugu dambeesay ciddii lagu arkaa
xafiisyada shirkadda laga bilaabo
malinka axadda [11/11/1440](#) wixi so gara
ayada aya kamasuul ah! <dowladda
islaamiga>.

11:23 PM

Annex 1.10: ISIL plot to attack the Vatican (STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL)*

Annex 1.11: MV Oriental Queen shipment

On 17 May 2019, 180 tons of explosive material, including 165 tons of Ammonium Nitrate Fuel Oil (ANFO), was delivered to Puntland, Somalia for commercial use. The explosives were intended to support the construction of Garacad port and associated road networks. However, the Panel determined that the shipment represented a potential threat to peace and security in Somalia.

The Panel has assessed guidelines provided by Madser and Kapeks in Turkey, the manufacturer and shipper of the explosives, as well as measures implemented by TTN, the construction company involved in the project, and Puntland authorities. The Panel has consulted the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines (IATG) for the temporary storage of explosive material.

Despite the efforts of the Puntland authorities to implement mitigation measures for the transportation and storage of the commercial explosives, concerns remain regarding future deliveries of similar amounts of commercial explosives. Due to the conditions on the ground in Puntland, as well as financial limitations, the implementation of some of the IATG standards for temporary storage remain challenging. Furthermore, given the Panel's restricted access to travel to Somalia, the Panel's monitoring of the implementation of the mitigation measures is limited.

Kapeks and Madser

In May 2019, the Panel travelled to Ankara, Turkey to meet with representatives from Madser, which had shipped the explosives to Somalia, as well as the manufacturers of the ANFO, Kapeks. Both entities provided the Panel with information on recommended safety guidelines, which included;⁵⁷

- (a) Removal of the ANFO from shipping containers;
- (b) Storage of ANFO in a ventilated and dry facility;
- (c) Separate storage for detonators and detonator cords, and other primers/initiators in cool and dry conditions (see figure 2, below);
- (d) No buildings within a 270 m radius of the storage facility;
- (e) 24-hour security, CCTV, and limited access to explosive material.

They also provided sample logbooks for ANFO, detonators, and detonator cord, recording how much material is present, used, and remaining at the end of each day.

IATG guidelines for temporary storage of 200 tons of explosives:

- (a) Material should be divided into 50 storage containers;
- (b) Each container should not contain more than 40 tons of explosives;
- (c) The storage facility should be 400 m from residential housing and 270 m from major roads;
- (d) The facility should ideally be protected by razor wire fencing, armed guards and patrol.

⁵⁷ Interviews with Kapeks and Madser in Ankara, Turkey on 23 and 24 May 2019.

Figure 2: C-DET material data safety sheet specifying that detonators must be stowed separately in a dedicated storage facility.

C DET Explosive Industries Private Limited	Document No.: CDET/MSDS/02/00
Material Safety Data Sheet	Issue Date: 10.10.06
Electric Detonators	Page 5 of 8

7. HANDLING AND STORAGE

Precautions for:

Safe Handling:	Handle with care - avoid rough handling. Avoid impact, friction, sparks or heat. Wear eye protection
Ventilation:	Not applicable
Dust:	Not applicable
Aerosol Effects:	Not applicable
Fire:	Refer to local emergency procedure (also refer to information under Section 5)

Note: Care should be exercised when handling detonators in the proximity of any electrical apparatus capable of producing currents of this order, radio equipment and areas of static electricity to avoid current pick up and possible premature detonation.

Avoid build up of electrostatic charge when handling ordinary detonators, as premature initiation may occur if excessive charge is allowed to accumulate. Keep protected from lightning discharges or, if impossible to attain, leave the area until risk of lightning has receded.

Do not attempt to cut open, drill, bend or strike with any degree of force. Do not force into primers or detonator pockets in cast products. Keep from all sources of radio energy and sources of electromagnetic radiation.

Storage Precautions:

Incompatible materials:	Do not store with flammable / combustible materials Do not store with explosives of different Compatibility Group Detonators must be stored separately in a detonator magazine or store
Temperature:	Avoid external heat sources in excess of 50°C Prolonged exposure to temperatures above 50°C may lead to deterioration of the internal components
Humidity:	Avoid storage in humid conditions. Store in a dry and appropriately licensed magazine
Electrical Equipment:	To appropriate electrical classification Battery operated equipment prohibited
Static Electricity:	Normal requirements for licensed storage buildings - product has high level of immunity to static electricity
Quantity Limits:	As per licensed storage capacity

8. EXPOSURE CONTROLS PERSONAL PROTECTION

Respiratory Protection:	Not required - only in event of exposure to fume due to fire
Hand Protection:	Not required
Eye Protection:	Recommended
Skin protection:	Not required
Other Protective Clothing:	Not required

THIS PAGE FORMS PART OF THE COMPLETE DOCUMENT WHICH IS APPROVED AND DATED ON THE FIRST PAGE AND CARRIES THE SAME ISSUE DATE AND DOCUMENT NO ON ALL PAGES. NO PART OF THIS DOCUMENT SHOULD BE READ AND ACTED UPON IN ISOLATION.

Implementation of measures by the Puntland administration

In June 2019, Puntland authorities provided a report to the Panel outlining the mitigation measures it had implemented for the safe storage of the explosive material. Puntland authorities also informed the Panel that they would apply international ammunition technical guidelines (IATG) for temporary storage. The authorities added that further details, including progress reports would be shared in the future.⁵⁸

Figure 3: Garacad, Mudug region, the location of the planned port project; and Jariiban, the storage site for the explosives.



The measures outlined by Puntland authorities and TTN include;

- (a) 100 soldiers to provide escort for transportation of explosives between Bosaso and Jariiban;
- (b) 30 soldiers with two vehicles to provide 24-hour security at the facility in Jariiban. (an additional salary is provided by TTN/Wadaagsan company to the soldiers);⁵⁹
- (c) 150 soldiers to provide additional security at the construction site;
- (d) Organized and limited access to explosives, including inventory management by three mining experts;
- (e) CCTV to be installed;
- (f) Each container will have three locks with keys held separately by the three mining experts.

⁵⁸ As of this writing, the Panel had yet to receive any further details.

⁵⁹ Wadaagsan is a Bosaso based company involved in the port development. See <http://garacadseaport.com/>.

Figure 4: Explosives utilization report from Puntland dated 9 July 2019.

DOWLADDA PUNTLAND
ولاية بونت لاند - الصومالية
Madaxtooyada
الرئاسة
XAFIISKA AGAASIMAHA GUUD
مكتب مدير العام
PUNTLAND STATE OF SOMALIA – PRESIDENCY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF

Ref: AGM/DPS/150/2019
Date: 09/07/2019

To: **Sana Khan.**
Senior committee secretary
council committee pursuant to resolution 751 (1992) concerning Somalia
Security

Subject: **first Utilization report of the commercial explosive materials**

Excellence,


Upon receiving the commercial explosive materials via Bosaso port, all protocols for offloading, transportation, storage in Jariban town and later transport to the construction site has been observed and adhered to.

That includes static and escort guards, securing the explosive through proper storage SoPs, having 3 different key holders to the containers for access control, inventory documentation and control as well as proper reporting to the office of the president and to the ministry of security. All of these protocols has been part of the mitigation plan that was shared with the monitoring group.

So far, the construction activity has been going on well and three explosions have been carried out. This means, three different withdrawals have been made with the following details.

S/N	Item description	First withdrawal 6 th June 2019	Second withdrawal 20 th June 2019	Third withdrawal 29 th June 2019
1	Arfo Booster Sensitive Commercial explosive	10,000kg	7,000kg	9100kg
2	Kapaks Detonation Wires	509 Pieces	344 Pieces	285 Pieces
3	Kapaksdet NOVA (Cap Sensitive Emulsion Explosive)	220kg	120kg	140kg

Some pictures showing the different activities are captured below



Excellencies;


Puntland government will remain open and transparent and will fully collaborate with the committee on the process. We will welcome any field visits if required to verify any aspect of the protocols we are putting in place.

Cc:

His Excellency
Mr. Said Abdullahi Mohamed
President of Puntland Garowe, Puntland



Mr. Abdissamad Mohamed Gallan
Minister of Security and DDR, Puntland

Excellency, please allow me to offer you the assurances of my highest consideration.


Mohamed Abdilladif
Chief of Staff
Office of the President, Puntland

Tel: +252-90-7290151; Email: DG.ooo@psl.state.so; ooo@psl.state.so; Website: www.psl.state.so

Figure 5: Cargo manifest of the MV Oriental Queen.

CARGO MANIFEST				
VESSEL NAME : M/V "ORIENTAL QUEEN"		VESSEL FLAG : TANZANIA		PORT OF LOADING : MERSIN - TURKEY
SAILED DATE : 10.03.2019		PORT OF DISCHARGING : BOSASO-SOMALIA		MASTER NAME : AHMED MOUSTAFA ALI
B/L NO	SHIPPERS	CO : CONSIGNEE NF : NOTIFY	DESCRIPTION	WEIGHT KGS
4	MADSER PATLAYICI MADDELER MADENCILIK MAK. SAN. TIC. LTD. ŞTİ.ÇETİN EMEÇ AVE. 1322ND STREET NO.4517A.ÖVEÇLER / ÇANKAYA/ ANKARA /TURKEY - WWW.MADSER.COM.TR - TEL: +90 312 472 63 77 METEHAN DERYA GSM: 0 530 630 48 38	CO TTN CONSTRUCTION COMPANY MINISTREAL ZONE STREET, GAROWE PUNTLAND / SOMALI - TEL: +252 906 148 298 NECDET CEVDET TATAR GSM: 0 543 505 03 44 TACI TURAN GSM: 0 532 700 49 13	KAPEKS NOVA CAP SENSITIVE EXPLOSIVE IMDG/UN NO 1.1D / 0241 QUANTITY: 15000 KG NET (750 ADET KUTU) KONTEYNER NO: LLTU204562-0 SEAL NO:1102 ANFO IMDG UN NO: 1.1D / 0082 QUANTITY: 165000 KG NET (6600 ADET TORBA) KONTEYNER NO. SEAL NO. KONTENEYER NO. SEAL NO. GVCU228017-1 1104 LLTU205437-0 1791 XINUJ48337-3 1792 LLTU205884-3 1994 XINUJ165055-2 1108 XINUJ161114-0 1810 XINUJ50806-5 1112 XINUJ164871-9 1110 LLTU204545-0 1107 GVCU223325-1 1103 KAPEKSDT NON-ELECTRIC DETONATOR IMDG /UN NO: 1.1B / 0360 CIVIL EXPLOSIVES QUANTITY: 11130 ADET (390 ADET KUTU) KONTEYNER NO. GVCU227235-0 ELECTRIC DETONATOR IMDG / UN NO: 1.1B / 0030 QUANTITY: 500 ADET (1 ADET KUTU) KONTEYNER NO. GVCU227235-0 SEAL NO:1106 KAP SAYISI 7741 ADET NET 181.345,33 KG	183.930,08 KG
		NF		

Annex 1.12: Biometric registration of the SNA

The Panel has conducted case studies on the biometric registration of three SNA units – Sector 60 (Baidoa), Sector 12 April (Mogadishu) and General Gordon Military base (Mogadishu), by comparing SNA registration documents obtained by the SEMG with a payroll of those biometrically registered as of February 2019. Analysis of these case studies shows that fewer than half of the soldiers in these three units (315 of 672) were captured during the biometric registration process.

Sector 60 (Baidoa)

In March 2018, the SNA Deputy Commander of Sector 60, headquartered in Baidoa, provided the SEMG with logbooks detailing the distribution of weapons, including serial numbers, to 277 SNA soldiers. Of the total 277 Sector 60 soldiers issued with weapons, only 53 – fewer than one-fifth – appeared on the SNA registration roll as of February 2019. It would therefore appear that four-fifths of the Sector 60 soldiers noted in the logbook are no longer considered members of the SNA; whether due to defection, death, injury, or another rationale, has not yet been possible to determine due to the lack of FGS assistance to the Panel.

Figure 1: Sample of the list of soldiers (names redacted) registered within Sector 60 in March 2018.

Maqaa - no Sedexan		No. Qaaga	Qasna	Bosh	Roos
1- 20172 - M		23984	3	1	90
2- 22620 - IS		09387	3	1	90
3- 22617 - M		11194	3	1	90
4- 19950 - N		04010	3	1	90
5- 22638 -		5274	3	1	90
6- 23231 -		15663	3	1	90
7- 22756 -		27952	3	1	90
8- 23209 -		43910	3	1	90
9- 20175 -		13371	3	1	90
10- 22625 -		24903	3	1	90
11- 22745		34176	3	1	90
12- 20218		13876	3	1	90
13- 23194		26539	3	1	90
14- 22673		85565	3	1	90
15- 22729		21476	3	1	90
16- 19962		33278	3	1	90
17- 20062		80807	3	1	90
18- 20010		7662	3	1	90
19- 19963		38104	3	1	90
20- 23239		92992	3	1	90
21- 20087		28873	3	1	90
22- 2260					

Sector 12 April (Mogadishu)

On 7 August 2018, the SEMG was provided with samples of SNA payroll documentation, dated August 2017, which included the names and identification numbers of 384 soldiers from various units from SNA Sector 12 April, headquartered in Mogadishu, including Birjex, Danab, and the 2nd and 4th brigades.⁶⁰ The Panel identified 262 soldiers – around two-thirds of the total – whose names and ID numbers appeared on the biometric payroll document dated February 2019.

Figure 2: Sector 12 April SNA registration in 2017 compared with those biometrically registered as of February 2019.

Unit	Soldiers registered in the 2017 payroll document	Soldiers registered in the February 2019 biometric payroll document	Percentage matching
Unknown unit	23	18	78%
Birjex	62	16	26%
Danab	118	80	68%
4 th Brigade	60	44	73%
Air Force	70	59	84%
2 nd Brigade	16	14	87%
Music band	17	14	82%
Training Unit	18	17	94%
TOTAL	384	262	68%

The analysis also highlights a large disparity between the biometric capturing of officers versus enlisted men:

- (a) The total number of officers (from Sergeant to Brigadier) included in the 2017 document is 171, 156 of whom appear in the 2019 payroll document, representing a match rate of 91 per cent.
- (b) 213 Sector 12 April soldiers with the rank of private are listed in the 2017 document, 106 of whom appear in the 2019 document, representing a match rate of less than 50 per cent.


General Gordon military base (Mogadishu)

In a letter dated 17 May 2018, the FGS National Security Adviser supplied a list of 17 soldiers who had been registered as trainees within the General Gordon military base (see [S/2018/1002](#), para. 26 to 28). The Panel no matches between the soldiers registered on this list and the biometric payroll document dated February 2019.

⁶⁰ Document on file with the Secretariat.

Figure 3: List of trainees at the Gen. Gordon Military base (names redacted).

URURKA HUB BIXINTA URURKA 1aad
EE GUUTDA 24aad
DUGSIGA TABABARKA GEN.GORDAN



270

TR	NAMBAR	MAGAC	Nambar Giri	Bed Number	Radio
1	1006		2014		
2	1007		03023		
3	1010		22844		
4	1011		11837		
5	1017		80804	Isiitad	
6	1019		32324		
7	1020		95941		
8	1023		21686		
9	1024		12442		
10	1028		39926		
11	1029		98482		
12	1034		70048		
13	1037		83419		
14	1045		22074		
15	1049		21523		
16	1063		74509		
17	1090		69074		

Annex 1.13: Collection of air navigation fees

Figure 1: 12 December 2017 letter from SCAMA informing IATA that Jubba Airways Limited had “settled all the invoices pertaining to Air Navigation Charges”.



Figure 2: ICAO internal accounts for December 2017 showing Jubba Airways air navigation debt at approximately \$5.8 million.

ICAO - FLIGHT INFORMATION SERVICES FOR SOMALIA

Report Type	CUSTOMER AGING- ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE REPORT
Account	EF_E54/0010216571
Customer Name	CACAS (KE) - ICAO - FISS
Report generated on	05/01/2018
Reporting period	31/12/2017

Sum of Document Amount	Aging Range						
Airline Name	0-Not due	1-30	31-90	91-180	181D-1Y	Over 1Y	Grand Total
JORDAN AVIATION					1,650	23,375	25,025
JRA FLIGHT SOLUTIONS, LLC						1,925	1,925
JUBBA AIRWAYS	12,375	17,600	74,800	64,625	173,840	5,231,255	5,574,495
JUBBA AIRWAYS KENYA	20,625	20,900	24,200	56,650	56,375	55,550	234,300
KABO AIR				550	550	1,375	2,475
KABUL AIR STS					275		275
KALLAT EL SAKER AIR						550	550

Figure 3: ICAO internal accounts for January 2018 showing Jubba Airways removed from accounts owing.

ICAO - FLIGHT INFORMATION SERVICES FOR SOMALIA

Report Type	CUSTOMER AGING- ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE REPORT
Account	EF_E54/0010216571
Customer Name	CACAS (KE) - ICAO - FISS
Report generated on	05/02/2018
Reporting period	31/01/2018

Sum of Document Amount	Aging Range						
Airline Name	0-Not due	1-30	31-90	91-180	181D-1Y	Over 1Y	Grand Total
JORDAN AVIATION					1,650	23,375	25,025
JRA FLIGHT SOLUTIONS, LLC						1,925	1,925
KABO AIR				550	550	1,375	2,475
KABUL AIR STS					275		275
KALLAT EL SAKER AIR						550	550

Figure 4: Airlines with the greatest outstanding debt owing to IATA as of 31 July 2019. Amount owed by Jubba Airways stands at \$402,955.

E54 - Civil Aviation Caretaker Authority for Somalia (CACAS)

Open Items Report Summary - As of 31st July 2019



Sum of Document Amount	Aging Range						Total
	Airline Name	0-Not due	1-30	31-90	91-180	D181-1Y	
	BLUEBIRD AVIATION LTD	37,645.00	37,170.00	74,250.00	101,495.00	209,885.00	5,231,485.00
	AFRICAN EXPRESS AIRWAYS	31,220.00	33,015.00	85,480.00	156,215.00	202,240.00	3,719,090.00
	SKYWARD INTERNATIONAL			590.00	3,300.00	93,395.00	2,717,330.00
	DJIBOUTI AIRLINES					2,002,720.00	2,002,720.00
	DAALLO AIRLINES	13,240.00	15,205.00	23,180.00	36,890.00	54,490.00	1,538,895.00
	EAST AFRICAN EXPRESS					28,995.00	974,790.00
	UNOS	36,535.00	43,690.00	91,985.00	71,545.00	83,770.00	331,700.00
	Jetways Airlines Limited	53,320.00	61,100.00	85,455.00	92,330.00	326,470.00	37,480.00
	FREEDOM AIRLINE EXPRESS LTD	22,930.00	15,330.00	25,945.00	2,560.00	51,735.00	457,935.00
	AIR MOBILITY COMMAND (AMC)	15,475.00	8,865.00	24,075.00	27,740.00	22,310.00	452,325.00
	AIR DJIBOUTI - RED SEA AIRLINES	14,300.00	17,920.00	40,425.00	62,740.00	158,400.00	129,525.00
	JUBBA AIRWAYS	6,875.00	20,350.00	45,100.00	23,650.00	130,350.00	176,630.00
	HORN AFRICA AIRLINE (GALLAD AIRLINE		5,775.00	550.00		550.00	393,800.00
	SHURA AIR TRANSPORT SERVICES						359,700.00

Figure 5: The 27 June 2019 contract between IATA, ICAO, and the FGS Ministry of Transport and Civil Aviation designated SCAMA's account at the Central Bank of Somalia (#1040) to receive air navigation charges.

claims or demands against ICAO and IATA, and releases ICAO and IATA from any liability it may assert in that respect.

1.7 IATA does hereby release and discharge ICAO of and from the observance and performance of the covenants, agreements and obligations on the part of ICAO to be observed and performed under the E&F Agreement from and after the Effective Date, however, nothing herein contained shall be construed as a release of ICAO from any obligation or liability owed to IATA on behalf of FGS which may have accrued prior to the Effective Date.

2. AMENDMENTS TO THE E&F AGREEMENT

The Parties agree that, effective as of the Effective Date, the E&F Agreement shall be amended as follows:

2.1 Section 2.2 of the E&F Agreement is hereby deleted in its entirety and replaced with the following:

The Charges shall be used to finance the costs of providing, operating and financing the development of the Facilities and Services.

2.2 Sections 6.2, 6.3 and 6.5 of the E&F Agreement is hereby deleted in its entirety.

2.3 Section 7.2.2 of the E&F Agreement is hereby deleted in its entirety and replaced with the following:


"Unless otherwise notified in writing, remit the Charges to:

ACCOUNT NAME: SOMALI CIVIL AVIATION & METEOROLOGY AUTHORITY (SCAMA)
1040
CENTRAL BANK OF SOMALIA
PO BOX 50511
MOSHI, SOMALIA
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Annex 1.14: Maritime piracy

Figure 1: Link chart showing Mohamed Dahir Wehliye's connections to piracy attacks in 2017 and 2019.



Annex 2.1: Notifications of consignments of weapons and ammunition by the FGS

Paragraphs 3 to 7 of resolution 2142 (2014) establish the notification requirements established pursuant to the partial lifting of the arms embargo in resolution 2093 (2013).¹ The Federal Government of Somalia has primary responsibility for informing the Committee at least five days in advance of deliveries – advance delivery notification (ADN) – of weapons, ammunition or military equipment or the provision of advice, assistance or training to its security forces (para. 3). Member States or organizations delivering assistance, in consultation with the Federal Government, may instead provide the advance delivery notification (para. 4). No later than 30 days after the delivery of arms or ammunition, the Federal Government must submit to the Committee a written confirmation – post-delivery confirmation (PDC) – of the completion of the delivery (para. 6).

Since August 2018, the Committee has received seven notifications of shipments of weapons and ammunition, five of which were in line with Security Council requirements:

- (a) A shipment of 2,000 assault rifles was notified on 2 August 2018 by the FGS as a donation from the Republic of Djibouti. This consignment was expected to be delivered on 10 August 2019. However, at the time of writing, the Panel had not received any confirmation of the delivery.²
- (b) A donation of 1,000 assault rifles from the Republic of Djibouti was notified on 27 September 2018 by the FGS. This shipment was expected to be delivered before 30 September 2018, but the Panel had not received any confirmation of its delivery at the time of writing.³
- (c) A donation of 12 heavy machine guns was notified by the United States of America on 12 December 2018 to equip the Danab special forces and was delivered on 13 August 2019. The PDC was properly and timely issued, less than 30 days after the delivery.⁴
- (d) A donation of 1,000 assault rifles from the Republic of Djibouti was notified on 25 January 2019. This shipment was due to be delivered on 26 January 2019, but neither the Committee nor the Panel had received confirmation of its delivery at the time of writing.⁵
- (e) A PDC related to a donation to the Danab special forces of 300 assault rifles, 50 pistols, and 20 light machine guns from the United States was sent by the FGS on 19 March 2019, without any ADN. According to the FGS, the absence of an ADN was caused by “miscommunication”. The shipment was delivered on 12 March 2019.

¹ Paragraph 38 of resolution 2093 (2013) had previously established a requirement for advance delivery notification, which was then revised in paragraphs 3 to 5 of resolution 2142 (2014).

² Official correspondence was also sent to the Republic of Djibouti on 29 August 2019 to confirm whether this consignment have been delivered to the FGS.

³ Ibid.

⁴ PDC dated 26 August 2019.

⁵ Official correspondence was also sent to the Republic of Djibouti on 29 August 2019 to confirm whether this consignment was delivered to the FGS.

- (f) A donation of weapons and ammunition⁶ was notified by the Republic of Turkey on 23 July 2019 to equip the 3rd, 4th and 5th light infantry battalions of the SNA.⁷ The shipment was planned to be delivered no sooner than 2 August 2019. At the time of writing, this shipment has not yet been delivered.⁸
- (g) A PDC related to a donation to the Danab special forces of four 12.7-mm machine guns (DSHKs) was sent by the FGS on 26 August 2019. However, according to the information from the US Mission to Somalia, this consignment was initially received by Danab on 23 July 2018, and then brought to Halane for marking in August 2018. Consequently, the PDC was sent to the Committee over a year late.

In addition to the above, on 6 June 2019 the MV *Gulf Angel* docked in Mogadishu port to deliver 33 containers of non-lethal military equipment (uniforms and outfits) from the Republic of Turkey for the SNA, as well as the Somali Coastguard and Navy. An advance delivery notification had been sent by the FGS on 28 May 2019 in accordance with Security Council requirements, and in full coordination with Turkey, who sent two *notes verbales* dated 31 May 2019, and amended on 6 June, to notify the Committee of the shipment.

The *notes verbales* submitted by the Permanent Mission of Turkey included a notification for an additional container of 550 G3 assault rifles and 9 MG3 light machine guns to be used for training purposes within the TURKSOM military base in Mogadishu, which was correctly submitted under paragraph 14 of resolution [2444 \(2018\)](#) given that this training was aimed at the security forces of the FGS.

Annexes 2.2 and 2.3 (strictly confidential) provide updated tables on consignments of weapons and ammunition delivered to the FGS since the partial lifting of the arms embargo in 2013, consisting of approximately 21,000 weapons and 75 million rounds of ammunition.

⁶ 1,569 assault rifles, 102 light machine guns, 36 RPG-7 rocket launchers, 350,000 rounds of assault rifle ammunition, 244,800 of light machine gun ammunition, 16,200 rounds of heavy machine gun ammunition, and 216 RPG-7 rockets.

⁷ Notification received on 24 July 2019.

⁸ Email from the Permanent Mission of Turkey to the United Nations, 4 September 2019.

Annex 2.2: Consignments of weapons and ammunition notified to the Committee since the partial lifting of the arms embargo (STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL)*

Annex 2.3: Weapons and ammunition delivered since the partial lifting of the arms embargo (STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL)*

Annex 2.4: Weapons and ammunition management

Weapons marking

According to the FGS, a total of 20,240 weapons have been marked since the implementation of the weapons marking programme in 2014.⁹ As noted by the SEMG in its reports, marked weapons are, for the most part, properly registered in logbooks stored at Halane Central Armoury. According to the Secretary-General's technical assessment team, the FGS is now seeking international support for the roll-out of the mobile marking programme at the sector level.¹⁰

Record-keeping

While record-keeping at Halane Central Armoury is generally adequate, gaps remain with respect to the distribution of weapons and ammunition from Halane to the receiving units. The SEMG noted in 2018 that distribution logs managed at Halane Central Armoury in Mogadishu lacked precision and consistency to the extent that it was not possible to accurately determine where, when, why, how or to whom most weapons and ammunition had been allocated (see [S/2018/1002](#)). Similarly, the Secretary-General's assessment mission noted that a national weapons registration system, which would enable the accurate tracking of domestic transfers of military materiel, remains a gap in the WAM system.

Stockpile management

Despite the construction of a second storehouse to separate weapons from ammunition at Halane Central Armoury in late 2018, the facility remains non-compliant with the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines and continues to present a significant threat to the heavily populated international airport complex. The persistent danger of an uncontrolled detonation of FGS ammunitions dumps is underlined by ongoing mortar attacks on the airport complex by Al-Shabaab. These attacks highlight the urgency of constructing a central armoury facility at a safe distance from populated areas, in line with international standards.

WAM at the FMS level

In order to assess the safe and effective management, storage, and security of weapons and ammunition stockpiles belonging to the FMS, as underlined in paragraph 16 of resolution [2444 \(2018\)](#), in June 2019 the Panel sent an official correspondence to the administrations of Galmudug, HirShabelle, Jubbaland, Puntland, and SWS, requesting information on each FMS' WAM procedures as well as weapons and ammunitions supplied by the FGS since the partial lifting of the arms embargo. At the time of writing, only the SWS administration had provided the Panel with a response, in which it stated that the administration had received no records concerning WAM upon assuming office in December 2018.¹¹ The SWS administration was in the process of establishing a Regional Security Office (RSO) which is planned to internally coordinate WAM procedures.¹² According to the Chief of Staff of the Presidency, SWS has requested supplies of weapons from the FGS but had not received a response.¹³

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Email from the Chief of Staff of the SWS Presidency, 8 August 2019.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Ibid.

Annex 2.5: FGS-marked weapons found in possession of arms dealers in Mogadishu

From January to August 2019 the Panel documented 38 weapons in the possession of arms dealers in Mogadishu and in Baidoa with characteristics consistent with those imported by the FGS.

In Mogadishu, the Panel found 13 weapons in the possession of arms dealers including seven AK-pattern rifles and six 9-mm (KM 5, Bakara market, Hodan and Daynile districts). Based on their serial numbers, the Panel was able to trace some of the weapons to consignments delivered to the FGS in September 2014, June 2017, July 2017 and June 2018. Twenty-five AK-pattern rifles documented in Baidoa are displayed in annex 2.5.3 (strictly confidential).

Table 1: 13 weapons with apparent or erased FGS markings found in the possession of arms dealers in Mogadishu, January-July 2019.

Date	Location	Model	Serial no.	FGS marking	Consignment
March 2019	Mogadishu, Hodan district	Type 56-2	4081622	SO XDS-2017	July 2017 ¹⁴
March 2019	Mogadishu, Hodan district	Type 56-2	4074933	SO XDS-2017	July 2017
March 2019	Mogadishu, Hodan district	Tokarev 54-1 (9 - mm pistol)	49002016	SOGC-344/2016	N/A
March 2019	Mogadishu, Daynile district	Type 56-2	4122556	SO XDS-2017	July 2017
March 2019	Mogadishu, Daynile district	Type 56-1	60060687	SO CBS-2018	N/A
March 2019	Mogadishu, Daynile district	Type 56-2	4068426	SO XDS-2017	July 2017
July 2019	Mogadishu, Daynile district	Norinco CF98-9 (9-mm pistol)	15-CN 030930	SO-NISA-2018	June 2018 ¹⁵
July 2019	Mogadishu, Daynile district	Norinco NP-42 (9-mm pistol)	Unclear	SO-CBS-0066-16	N/A
July 2019	Mogadishu, Bakara Market	Norinco Makarow (9-mm pistol)	E03056	SOGC-1139/3056	N/A

¹⁴ Delivery from the People's Republic of China.

¹⁵ Delivery from the Republic of Djibouti.

July 2019	Mogadishu, Bakara Market,	Type 56-1	600 13577	SO XDS-2017	June 2017
July 2019	Mogadishu, Bakara Market,	Type 56-2	41110319	SO XDS-2018	July 2017
July 2019	Mogadishu, Daynile district	Norinco Makarow (9-mm pistol)	D1 1243	Erased marking	N/A
August 2019	Mogadishu, Bakara Market	Norinco Makarow (9-mm pistol)	22 1308	SO XDS-2015	N/A

From January to March 2019 weapons bearing apparent FGS markings constituted 12 per cent of the total number of weapons observed by the Panel's local sources in Baidoa and Mogadishu over the period of investigation.¹⁶

From July to August 2019 in Mogadishu only, data collectors informed the Panel that the number of FGS-marked weapons being sold by arms dealers decreased significantly between March and July 2019. One possible explanation for this decrease could be the substantively lower number of weapons delivered to the FGS during this mandate compared to the last one. As of September 2019, 941 weapons had been delivered, to Danab and the TURKSOM training base, compared with 7,262 delivered between September 2017 and September 2018 (see annex 2.3 (strictly confidential)). Conversely, this decrease could be a result of better management of weapons and ammunition procedure by the SNA, and specifically the implementation of the standard operating procedures for weapons and ammunition management at Halane Central Armoury issued by the Office of the National Security Adviser in May 2018.

Testimonies received from three arms dealers in Mogadishu confirmed that weapons bearing FGS markings had largely been purchased from low-ranking members of the Somali security forces, as well as from junior and senior officers and FGS officials. These testimonies were consistent with findings presented in the SEMG's 2018 final report (see [S/2018/1002](#), paras. 24-25).

¹⁶ Between January and March 2019, local data collectors witnessed 25 of 159 weapons in Baidoa arms markets and 13 of 163 weapons in Mogadishu arms markets that bore apparent FGS markings. Due to practical limitations, the local data collectors were only able to photograph and obtain the serial numbers of weapons displayed in the tables.

Based on data gathered by data collectors and local sources the prices of black-market weapons have remained stable from 2018, at between \$1,300 and \$1,400 for an AK-pattern assault rifle and between \$600 to \$700 for a 9-mm pistol.

One pistol found in the possession of an arms dealer in Mogadishu in July 2019 shows evidence of an attempt to remove apparent FGS markings. This is first time this practice has been observed by the SEMG or the Panel of Experts (see figures 5 and 6, below).

Sample weapons found in the possession of arms dealers

Figure 1: Type 56-2 rifle documented in March 2019 in Mogadishu, Hodan district, serial number 4081622.



Figure 2: Norinco Tokarev 54-1 pistol documented in March 2019 Mogadishu, Hodan district, serial number 49002016.



Figure 3: Type 56-22 documented in March 2019, Mogadishu, Daynile district, serial number 4122556.



Figure 4: Norinco CF98-9 pistol documented in July 2019 in Mogadishu, Daynile district with unclear serial number but with NISA markings.



Figures 5 and 6: Norinco model 59 (Makaroy) pistol found in the procession of an arms dealer in Mogadishu in July 2019, showing evidence of an attempt to remove apparent FGS markings, the first occasion this practice has been observed by the Panel.



Annex 2.5.1: FGS ammunition found in possession of arms dealers in Mogadishu

In March 2019, the Panel's sources documented two Type-69 HEAT rocket-propelled grenades in Daynile district of Mogadishu, with characteristics consistent with materiel imported by the Federal Government on 13 January 2018 from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

Figure 1: Type-69 HEAT rocket-propelled grenades, documented in Mogadishu, March 2019.



Figure 2: Type-69 HEAT rocket-propelled grenades and associated igniters.



In March 2019, the Panel's sources also documented small calibre ammunition that, according to the arms dealers, had been sold by FGS security personnel (either SNA soldiers or NISA officers). The Panel was however unable to conclusively trace this ammunition to specific consignments delivered to the FGS. The ammunition was also not possible to trace by referencing records from Halane Central Armoury, given that it was not SNA practice in 2017 and 2018 to indicate the lot number in ammunition logbooks in Halane.¹⁷

¹⁷ According to the standard operating procedures for weapons and ammunition management at Halane Central Armoury from the Office of the National Security Adviser, provided the SEMG on 17 May 2018, the logbooks pertaining to ammunition delivered to Halane would thenceforth indicate the lot number.

Location	Model	Headstamp marking	Observations
Mogadishu, KM 5	Tracing 7.62x39	Egypt, factory 27, 1983	Reportedly supplied by SNA soldiers; Possible shipment: 20 July 2016 from Egypt (which included 12,000 7.62x39-mm tracing ammunition).



Location	Model	Headstamp marking	Observations
Mogadishu, KM 5	7.62 x 39	PRC, factory 61, 1975	Reportedly supplied by SNA soldiers; Same ammunition (same factory and year) documented by the SEMG on 11 July 2018 in the SNA Sector 60 armoury in Baidoa.



Location	Model	Headstamp marking	Observations
Mogadishu, KM 5	7.62x54	Romania, SADU factory, 2011	Reportedly supplied by SNA soldiers; More than 21 million rounds of this type of ammunition was delivered to the FGS since 2013.



Location	Model	Headstamp marking	Observations
Mogadishu, KM 5	7.62x25 Tokarev	Russia, factory 3, 1944	Reportedly supplied by a NISA officer; Same ammunition documented by the SEMG in Halane on 26 April and 29 August 2017 from a shipment notified by Egypt in 2014 (See S/2017/924 , annex 8.1).



**Annex 2.5.2: FGS-marked weapons found in possession of arms dealers in Baidoa
(STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL)***

Annex 2.6: Weapons and ammunition in the possession of Al-Shabaab

Since July 2018, the Panel of Experts has traced the origins of a number of arms, ammunition, and other materiel used by Al-Shabaab in a range of attacks within Somalia and Kenya. The following materiel documented by the Panel has characteristics consistent with materiel used by or delivered to the FGS or AMISOM forces.

81-mm mortars

Since July 2018, Al-Shabaab has conducted three attacks in Mogadishu using 81-mm mortars:

- (a) On 1 July 2018, five to seven mortar rounds landed near the airport's Jazeera gate;
- (b) On 1 January 2019, seven mortar rounds aimed at the UN compound within the Mogadishu International Airport complex;
- (c) On 2 March 2019, at least two mortar rounds hit Villa Somalia, the official residence and workplace of the President of Somalia.

In correspondence with the SEMG in August 2018, and to the Panel on 18 March 2019, the United Kingdom confirmed that the cartridges of the 81-mm mortar rounds documented in the attacks had been manufactured by the Royal Ordnance Factory, now part of BAE systems plc, in 1975 and 1976. However, BAE was unable to provide records to assist with the Panel's investigation given the antiquated nature of the materiel.

According to the Defence publication IHS Jane's, Kenya is the only troop contributing country in AMISOM equipped with 81-mm mortars. Furthermore, the SEMG reported on the capture by Al-Shabaab of 81-mm mortars following an attack on 27 January 2017 against a KDF forward operating base at Kulbiyow, on the Kenya-Somalia border (see [S/2017/924](#), para. 21). The Panel therefore requested the assistance of the Kenyan Government on 18 March 2019 in providing additional information on 81-mm mortar tubes and rounds that may have been seized by Al-Shabaab during attacks perpetrated against the KDF in Somalia. At the time of writing, the Panel had not received a response. Figures 1-4, below, display photographs of mortars casings recovered from the scenes of two attacks.

Figure 1: Base stamp from a primary propelling cartridge of one of the recovered fin assemblies from the 1 July 2018 attack on the airport's Jazeera gate.



Figures 2, 3 and 4: Photographs of a mortar casing from the 2 March 2019 attack on Villa Somalia.



Pistol Luger K100 Grand Power

On 27 January 2019, a police officer was killed by an Al-Shabaab operative in Yaqshid District, Mogadishu. The pistol used for this attack is a 9-mm Luger pistol K100 manufactured by Grand Power LLD based in Slovakia, serial number K050020. The Panel traced this pistol as part of the consignment of 510 pistols delivered by the UAE to the FGS in September 2014.¹⁸

Figure 5: 9-mm Luger Grand Power K 100 pistol bearing serial K050020.



9-mm Norinco CF 98-9 pistol

On 16 August 2019 at 15:00 UTC+3, four Al-Shabaab operatives attacked an official from the FGS Ministry of Education in Bakara Market. The official survived the attack, but the four Al-Shabaab operatives were killed. One pistol retrieved from the scene had characteristics consistent with Norinco 9-mm CF 98-9 pistols delivered to the FGS in June 2018.¹⁹

¹⁸ Advance delivery notification from the UAE dated 5 September 2014. This consignment was reportedly to be delivered to the FGS on 13 September 2014, but no post-delivery confirmation was sent to the Committee.

¹⁹ Post-delivery confirmation dated 18 July 2018.

Figure 6: 9-mm Norinco pistol bearing serial number 15-CN 006321 recovered from the scene of an attempted Al-Shabaab assassination on 16 August 2019.



9-mm Luger ammunition

Luger 9-mm bullet casings were recovered from the scene of an Al-Shabaab assassination of an alleged NISA informant, whose identity is unknown, on 28 July 2019 in Mogadishu's Kahda district.²⁰

Figure 7: Cases of 9mm bullets with headstamps showing "ZVS 9mm Luger".



According to the notifications on file with the Panel, at least 190,000 rounds of 9-mm Luger was delivered to the FGS in 2014 and 2015.²¹ The SEMG documented this type of ammunition during an inspection of Halane Central Armoury on 26 April 2017. According to the Panel's sources and to a confidential report seen by the Panel in August 2019, 9-mm Luger ammunition is readily available in Mogadishu arms markets.

²⁰ Confidential report from a private company operating in Mogadishu, August 2019.

²¹ Advance delivery notifications from the UAE dated 5 September 2014 and 7 May 2015.

Figure 8: 9-mm Luger ammunition photographed by the SEMG at Halane Central Armoury, 26 April 2017.



Sahafi Hotel attack

On 9 November 2018, Al-Shabaab detonated three VBIEDs outside the Sahafi Hotel in Mogadishu.²² At least 50 people were killed and 100 injured in the attack, making it the deadliest since the 14 October 2017 attack, which killed almost 600.

An AK-pattern assault rifle recovered from one of the gunmen had markings consistent with materiel imported by the FGS in July 2017.²³ At least two unexploded hand grenades also captured from the gunmen bore markings almost identical to those on several hand grenades seized from Al-Shabaab in Bulo Mareer by the Uganda People's Defence Forces in March 2018.²⁴

²² Al-Shabaab had previously attacked the hotel on 1 November 2015, killing at least 24 civilians and injuring 30 others.

²³ Consignment from the People's Republic of China delivered in July 2017 (notified 2 February 2018).

²⁴ See S/2018/1002 paras 47-49. Both hand grenades bear the factory marking 349, corresponding to a factory in St. Petersburg. The grenades captured by Ugandan forces had been manufactured in 1980, while those captured from the Sahafi hotel attack had been manufactured in 1979.

Figure 9: AK-pattern assault rifle recovered from one of the Sahafi Hotel gunmen had markings consistent with materiel imported by the FGS in July 2017.



Figures 10 and 11: Unexploded hand grenades captured from gunmen at Sahafi Hotel (l). Markings of the hand grenade are almost identical to a hand grenade pin seized from Al-Shabaab in Bulo Mareer by the Uganda People's Defence Forces in March 2018 (r).



DusitD2 attack

A Type 56-2 rifle was recovered from one of the deceased gunmen who carried out an attack at the DusitD2 complex in Nairobi on 15 January 2019, bearing serial number 412222. The serial number and factory marking likely indicates that the weapon originated in a consignment of 3,500 Type 56-2 rifles purchased by the FGS from the Government of Ethiopia in July 2013, following the partial lifting of the arms embargo.²⁵ Additional details on this rifle are provided in annex 1.6.

²⁵ The consignment was notified to the Committee on 29 July 2013.

Figure 12: Type 56-2 (serial number 412222) used in the DusitD2 attack in Nairobi on 15 January 2019.



SNA armoured vehicle seized by Al-Shabaab

On 26 January 2019, Al-Shabaab-affiliated media released photographs of an armoured vehicle allegedly seized from the SNA by Al-Shabaab in Lower Shabelle.²⁶ The vehicle is consistent with those delivered to the FGS in August 2017, namely Tiger Armoured Personnel Carriers (APC).²⁷

²⁶ See Som Tribune “Al Shabaab Releases Pictures of Captured Somalia Army APC”, 27 January 2019, available from <https://www.somtribune.com/2019/01/27/al-shabaab-releases-pictures-of-captured-somalia-army-apc>.

²⁷ Post-delivery confirmation dated 2 February 2018 of a shipment of military equipment donated by the People’s Republic of China and delivered to the FGS in July 2017.

Figure 13: APC in the possession of Al-Shabaab.



Figures 14 and 15: SNA markings on the APC (left) and SNA number plate (right).




Annex 2.6.1: El Salini and Moqokiri attacks on the SNA

On 22 September 2019, Al-Shabaab conducted a complex attack on the El Salini (Ceel Saliini) SNA base, located approximately 30 km west of Mogadishu in Marka district, which the group claimed resulted in the deaths of 23 SNA soldiers.²⁸ Photographs subsequently released by Al-Shabaab-affiliated media outlets depicted the seizure of military vehicles, Type 85 anti-aircraft machine guns, and ZU-23-2 anti-aircraft guns with characteristics consistent with materiel imported or owned by the FGS.²⁹

Figure 1: Two military vehicles with characteristics consistent with ACM 80 (FIAT 6613) trucks notified to the Committee by Italy in February 2015 (r); and two Toyota Landcruiser single cabin vehicles equipped with a mounted 12.7-mm machine-gun DShK, matching characteristics of vehicles delivered to the FGS by Egypt in July 2016 (l).



Figure 2: Wooden crate reportedly captured by Al-Shabaab at El Salini, bearing the number Y072-7A-061.



²⁸ Reuters, "Somalia's al Shabaab raid military base, loot weapons", 22 September 2019. Available at <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-somalia-violence/somalias-al-shabaab-raid-military-base-loot-weapons-idUSKBN1W70CG>.

²⁹ Amiirnuur, "Sawirro: Al-Shabaab Oo baahiyay Sawirrada Dagaalkii Ceel Saliini (Al-Shabaab releases photos of El Salini battle)", 23 September 2019. Available at <http://www.amiirnuur.com/?p=6281>.

Figures 3, 4, and 5: Wooden crates and packing list from a consignment of Type 85 anti-aircraft machine guns delivered by the People's Republic of China to the FGS on 17 August 2017 and photographed in Halane Central Armoury by the SEMG on 29 August 2017. The crate identification number depicted in Figure 2, above, is consistent with the sequence of identification numbers from this consignment.




Figure 6: Tanker seized by Al-Shabaab with characteristics consistent with 20 5M925 fuel/water tankers notified to the Committee in March 2016 by the United States.



According to the photographs analyzed by the Panel, Al-Shabaab also captured an anti-ZU-23-2 aircraft autocannon, with an effective firing range of two and a half kilometres. According to the Defence publication IHS Jane's, the SNA is equipped with 88 ZU-23-

2s.³⁰ The Panel has no knowledge of how many of these ZU-23-2 are currently serviceable.

Figure 7: An ACM80 mounted with an anti-aircraft twin-barreled autocannon with characteristics consistent with the ZU-23-2s operated by the SNA.



³⁰ Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment - North Africa, "Somalia – Army", 30 October 2018 (subscription required).

Moqokori attack

On 6 June 2019, Al-Shabaab-affiliated media released photographs allegedly related to an attack carried out against the Moqokori SNA military base, in Hiran district, that had taken place on 1 June 2018.³¹

Photographs released on Al-Shabaab media clearly show wooden munition crates that the Panel of Experts traced to assault rifle and heavy machine gun ammunition distributed to the SNA and also documented by the SEMG in July 2018 the SNA Sector 60 armoury in Baidoa.

Figure 8: Ammunition crates reportedly seized by Al-Shabaab during the Maqokori attack bearing identification number Y072-4A 94/2174.



Figure 9: 11 crates of 7.62 x 39-mm ammunition documented by the SEMG on 11 July 2018 in the SNA Sector 60 armoury, Baidoa, bearing the identification number Y072-4A - XX/2174.



³¹ Caroog News, “Daawo sawirrada: alshabaab oo soo bandhigtay hubkii ugu badnaa ee ay dagaal kaga qabsatay ciidamada dawladda soomaaliya”, 6 June 2019. Available at <http://www.caroog.net/daawo-sawirrada-alshabaab-oo-soo-bandhigtay-hubkii-ugu-badnaa-ee-ay-dagaal-kaga-qabsatay-ciidamada-dawladda-soomaaliya/>.

Figure 10: Ammunition crates reportedly seized by Al-Shabaab during the Maqokori attack, bearing lot numbers 2017-9631.



Figure 11: Wooden crate of 12.7 x 108-mm ammunition documented by the SEMG on 11 July 2018 in the Sector 60 armoury, Baidoa, bearing lot number 1-2017-9631.



Figure 12: Wooden crates of 12.7 x 108-mm ammunition bearing the same lot numbers 1-2017-9631 and 2-2017-9631, documented in Halane central armoury by the SEMG on 29 August 2017. This ammunition was delivered to the FGS by the People's Republic of China on 17 August 2017.



Annex 2.7: FGS report pursuant to paragraph 21 of resolution 2444 (2018)

The periodic report pursuant to paragraph 21 of resolution 2444 (2018) was received from the FGS on 15 March 2019, in accordance with the mandated deadline. However, the report lacked elements of the mandatory reporting originally stipulated by paragraph 9 of resolution 2182 (2014), particularly as regards the structure, composition, strength and disposition of FGS security forces, including the status of regional and militia forces.

The Panel found some discrepancies regarding the numbers displayed in the structure of the Somali security forces, notably for the Somali Police (see “Somali Police Force (SPF)”, below) and the regional forces. Additionally, the report failed to provide the strength of the various SNA units. The Panel also noted that the numbering of the SNA units is continually changing, making it difficult to obtain a reliable operational picture of the SNA from one report to the next.

The report also failed to provide details on the weapons and ammunition distributed to units within the last six months, as requested in paragraph 24 of resolution 2444 (2018).

Nevertheless, the report announced several measures that would constitute progress regarding the accountability of the Somali national security forces, including the finalization of the biometric registration of the SNA and the promulgation of a Presidential decree dated 26 September 2018, formalizing the distribution of weapons to all Somali security institutions. The Panel has obtained a copy of this decree, which aims to establish proper mechanisms and good practices regarding the distribution of weapons and ammunition, notably the registration of all weapons, regular inspections of armouries, and the submission by the FMSs and security agencies to the National Security Council of their needs and their “action plans”. However, the Panel has not yet obtained the “Arms and Ammunitions Control Procedure” which was reportedly attached to this decree.

Somali Police Force (SPF)

The Panel has noted inconsistencies in the 15 March 2019 FGS report with respect to the strength of SPF divisions. For instance, Table II.III provides the strength of the entire SPF, across five regions; while the individual entries add up to a total of 7,157 officers, the total provided in the table is 13,874 (see figure 1, below).

Figure 1: Strength of the Somali Police Force as provided on page 3 of the FGS report pursuant to paragraph 21 of resolution 2444 (2018).

II.III Somali Police Force

The strength of the Somali Police Force is currently:

STATE	NUMBER
Galmudug	890
South West State	350
Puntland	180
Jubaland	87 + 780 Darawiish
Hirshabelle	370
Banadir Region	4,500
Total	13,874

In a second table outlining the strength of the SPF as of 15 March 2019, the total number of personnel is given as 14,769 (see figure 2, below). Most notably, the strength of the Benadir Division is reported to be 12,032, contrasting with the first table's figure of 4,500. The reported strengths of the other SPF divisions are also inconsistent – although the discrepancies are far less significant – from the first table to the second.

Figure 2: Strength of the Somali Police Force as provided in Annex 03-A of the FGS report pursuant to paragraph 21 of resolution 2444 (2018).

No.	DISTRICT / REGION	NUMBER OF OFFICERS
1.	Banadir Division	12,032
2.	South West State	380
3.	Galmudug State	928
4.	Jubaland State	872
5.	Puntland Division	194
6.	Hirshabelle	363

Joint Verification Team (JVT)

The Joint Verification Team (JVT) was mandated under resolution 2182 (2014) to conduct routine inspections of Government security forces' stockpiles, inventory records, and the supply chain of weapons, and provide its findings to the Committee.³² Between October 2018 and February 2019, the JVT reported documenting 381 weapons over the course of 16 site visits to 15 of the 17 Benadir district police stations as well as the SPF headquarters. According to the SPF's own records, obtained by the JVT, the SPF in Benadir region are in possession of 3,929 functioning weapons, corresponding to a total of either 4,500 or 12,032 officers, depending on which FGS accounting is accurate (see figures 1 and 2, above). Since the JVT report did not cross-reference the serial numbers of the weapons they documented with the SPF distribution records, it was not possible for the Panel to assess the SPF's arms management procedures.

³² Resolution 2182 (2014), paragraph 7. See S/2015/801, annex 7.5 and paras. 110-111 for background on the establishment of the JVT.

Annex 2.8: Supply of weapons and ammunition by MetEC

During a meeting with executives from the Ethiopian State-owned Metals and Engineering Corporation (MetEC) on 4 April 2019 in Addis Ababa, the Panel of Experts was permitted to view hundreds of pages of documentation detailing arms and ammunition sales to the FGS and every regional administration in Somalia over the course of the preceding decade. The Panel photographed two pages of this documentation, at random, which provided a small snapshot of sales dating from 2013 to 2015 to the FGS, Somaliland, Jubbaland, South-West State, and the Dollow district administration (see figures 1 and 2, below).

These two documents detail sales of weapons and ammunition totalling approximately \$3.1 million and comprising 4,600 AK-pattern rifles, over 2 million rounds of AK-pattern ammunition, over 600,000 rounds of PKM ammunition, and over 70,000 rounds of 12.7-mm ammunition, amongst others (see table 1, below).

Approximately \$2.0 million of this materiel was destined for the FGS, with the remainder supplied to regional or district administrations. The material supplied to the FGS appear to have formed part of consignments correctly notified to the Committee in 2013 and 2015,³³ although the Panel observed some discrepancies, including NP-17 pistols that do not appear to have been notified (see figure 1, below).

By contrast, no weapons or ammunition supplied to regional or district administrations were notified to the Sanctions Committee. MetEC executives informed the Panel they did not believe that the provision of arms to regional administrations had constituted a violation of the arms embargo.³⁴

In one sale consisting of PKM light machine guns, PKM ammunition, and NP-17 pistols to the Jubbaland administration in 2013, the MetEC document indicates that that materiel was supplied “by request of MOND”, referring to the Ethiopian Ministry of National Defense (see figure 2, below).

The Panel also obtained an end user certificate, supplied by the Somaliland administration to MetEC dated 28 September 2014 (see figure 3, below). When shown this document, MetEC officials informed the Panel that the company’s policy had been to consider Somaliland and Puntland as “sovereign states”.³⁵

Table 1: Sample of arms and ammunition supplied by MetEC, 2013-2015.

Item	Type	Quantity	Sale value
AK-pattern rifle 7.62 x 39-mm	Weapon	4,600	\$1,104,000
	Ammunition	2,243,800	\$673,140
	Magazine	3,300	\$39,600
Heavy Machine Gun 12.7-mm	Weapon	72	\$165,522
	Ammunition	71,130	\$248,975
Light Machine Gun PKM 7.62-mm	Weapon	280	\$297,085
	Ammunition	609,000	\$200,970
NP-17 9-mm pistol	Weapon	152	\$37,360
	Ammunition	3,912	\$7,295
	Magazine	262	\$7,624
Heavy Machine Gun	Weapon	5	\$85,000

³³ Notifications received 29 July 2013 and 24 February 2015. No pistols or pistol ammunition were notified as part of these consignments.

³⁴ Interviews with two MetEC executives in Addis Ababa, 4 April 2019.

³⁵ Ibid.

14.5-mm	Ammunition	6,000	\$27,000
Rocket-Propelled Grenade	RPG launcher	40	\$79,800
	RPG round	700	\$142,555
Total sale value			\$3,115,925

Figure 1: Arms and ammunition sales by MetEC to the FGS, Somaliland, Jubbaland, and Dollow district administration, 2013-2015.

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ተ.ቁ	የጥቅም ስራ ስም	አገልግሎት	የጥቅም ስራ ዓይነት	የጥቅም ስራ መጠን	የጥቅም ስራ ዋጋ	የጥቅም ስራ አገልግሎት	የጥቅም ስራ አገልግሎት
1	Ak-47 Gun 9MMx39	3,035	280	728,400.00	METCZ/ N6517095113	Federal Government of Somalia	METCZ/ N6517095113
	Ak-47 (7.62x29 mm) Ammunition	1,951,500	0.30	585,450.00			
	DShK anti-aircraft light machine gun (12.7mm) with accessories	46	1443	66,378.00			
	7.62 MM Squad machine gun 67.2(P-KM) heavy type	15	1277	19,155.00			
	7.62 MM P-KM Ammunition	11,092	0.26	2,883.92			
	Type NP-17 Pistol tocarove with all accessories	20	230	4,600.00			
	Type NP-17 Pistol tocarove Ammunition.	320	15	4,800.00			
	Type NP-17 Pistol tocarove magazine/Reserve	20	12	240.00			
2	14.5 mm ammunition	90,000	3.50	315,000.00			
3	Ak-47 Gun 9MMx39	50	240	12,000.00		Somaliland	METCZ/ N6517095113
	Ak-47 Ammunition	10,500	0.30	3,150.00			
4	Ak-47 Gun 9MMx39	15	240	3,600.00			
	Ak-47 Ammunition	1,600	0.30	540.00			
	Type NP-17 Pistol tocarove ammunition	320	0.65	208.00			
	Type NP-17 Pistol tocarove magazine/Reserve	20	230	4,600.00			
	7.62mm Squad heavy Machine gun type 67-2 (PKM)	10	1684	16,840.00			
	7.62x64 mm PKM Ammunition	1,000	0.70	700.00			
	Ak-47 Gun 9MMx39	1,000	240	240,000.00			
	Ak-47 Ammunition	200,000	0.30	60,000.00			
5	7.62mm Squad heavy Machine gun with accessories	100	0.70	70.00		Interim Juba Administration of Somalia	METCZ/ N6517095113
	PKM Ammunition	100,000	0.70	70,000.00			
	DShK anti-aircraft light machine gun (12.7mm) with accessories	10	3300	33,000.00			
	12.7 mm Ammunition	40	4	160.00			
	Type NP-17 Pistol tocarove with accessories	10	320	3,200.00			
	Type NP-17 Pistol tocarove ammunition	640	0.65	416.00			
	Type NP-17 Pistol tocarove magazine/Reserve	80	12	960.00			
	Type 69 HP93 40mm anti-tank rocket launcher with its accessories	40	1995	79,800.00			
	14.5 mm Ammunition	200	203.65	40,730.00			
	14.5 machine gun with accessories	6,000	4.50	27,000.00			
	AK-47 Magazine	05	17000	85,000.00			
		3,000	12	36,000.00			

Figure 2: Arms and ammunition sales by MetEC to the FGS, Jubbaland, Somaliland, and South-West State, 2013-2015.

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ተ.ቁ	የአቅርቦት ዓይነት	መጠን	ዋጋ	ሀ.ፖሊስ	የዋጋ መረጃ	የጥያቄ ዓይነት	የሀገር/ዞን
1	7.62 MM Squad machine gun 67.2(P.K.M) heavy type		10	1684	16,840.00	JLAS (By Request of MOND)	MetEC
	Ak-47 magazine		1,000	0.25	250.00		Jubaland,
	Type NP-17 Pistol tocarove with all accessories		300	12	3,600.00		by request of the
	Type NP-17 Pistol tocarove magazine/Reserve		2	230	460.00		Ethiopian Ministry
	Type NP-17 Pistol tocarove magazine/Reserve		32	0.65	20.80		of National Defence
	Type NP-17 Pistol tocarove magazine/Reserve		2	12	24.00		
2	7.62 MM Squad machine gun 67.2(P.K.M) heavy type		45	1684	75,780.00		MetEC
	7.62 MM P.K.M Ammunition		440,000	0.2	88,000.00		N66/T/497/15
	RPG-7 Ammunition		500	203.65	101,825.00		
	7.62x54 MM P.K.M Ammunition		38,908	0.70	27,235.60		
	Type NP-17 Pistol tocarove Ammunition		680	0.65	442.00		
	Type NP-17 Pistol tocarove magazine/Reserve		20	12	240.00		
	12.7 mm machine gun type- 77 Dish.K Anti Air craft (light)		16	4134	66,144.00		
	12.7*108 mm Ammunition		70,000	3.50	245,000.00		
3	Type NP-17 Pistol tocarove with all accessories		20	230	4,600.00		
	Type NP-17 Pistol tocarove Ammunition		320	0.65	208.00		
	Type NP-17 Pistol tocarove magazine/Reserve		20	12	240.00		
	12.7x108 mm Ammunition		1,000	3.50	3,500.00		
	7.62x54 mm P.K.M Ammunition		2,000	0.70	1,400.00		
	Ak-47Ammunition		30,000	0.30	9,000.00		
4	Ak-47 rifle gun		500	240	120,000.00		
	7.62 MM Squad machine gun 67.2(P.K.M) heavy type		100	1684	168,400.00		
	Ak-47Ammunition		50,000	0.30	15,000.00		
	7.62x54 mm P.K.M Ammunition		15,000	0.70	10,500.00		
	12.7*108 mm Ammunition		90	3.50	315.00		
	Type NP-17 Pistol tocarove with all accessories		100	245	24,500.00		
	Type NP-17 Pistol tocarove Ammunition		1,600	0.75	1,200.00		
	Type NP-17 Pistol tocarove magazine/Reserve		100	13.20	1,320.00		

Figure 3: End user certificate dated 28 September 2014, provided by the Somaliland administration to MetEC.



Taliska Guud ee C/Qaranka
Jam. S/Land.

The National Army
Republic of Somaliland

Xafiiska Taliyaha

Ref/KT/CQ/07-431/14
 T O : The Metals & Engineering Corporation. ✓
 Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.
 C C : The Ethiopian Defense Attache.
 Hargeisa, Republic of Somaliland.
 Date: 28th Sept, 2014.

S U B J E C T :- END USER CERTIFICATE

With the National Army of Somaliland are end user of the goods supplied by the Metals & Engineering Corporation (METEC) of the Federal Republic of Ethiopian preforma N0 METEC/N66/T/2727/13.

Therefore we guarantee that, without written consent authority of Federal Republic of Ethiopian Government, we will not transfer the aforementioned items to any party.


1- PKM Machine Gun	-	20 Pcs	X 1,450 \$ =	29,000 USD.
2- 7.62mm AKM. Ammunition	-	1,000,000 Pcs	X 0,35 \$ =	350,000 "
3- 14,5MM	"	40,000 "	X 4 \$ =	160,000 "
4- PKM	"	100,000 "	X 0,75 \$ =	75,000 "
5- Ranger	-	2,000 Pairs	X 26,5 \$ =	53,000 "
6- Army Shoes	-	2,000 "	X 15,8 \$ =	31,600 "
			TOTAL :	698,600 USD.

S/No	Description	Size 32	Size 34	Size 36	Size 38	Size 40	TOTAL
1-	Ranger	200	800	800	140	60	2000

S/N0	Description	Size 40	Size 41	Size 42	Size 43	Size 44	Size 45	TOTAL
2	Shoes	206	506	856	330	62	40	2000

Thanks.

Maj. Gen. Ismail M. Osman (Shaqalle)
 The Commander General S/Land N. Army.



Annex 2.9: UAE military base in Berbera

Figure 1: Berbera airport and military base under construction, 21 September 2018.



Figure 2: Berbera airport and military base under construction, 8 August 2019, highlighting the completion of the runway and a hangar/barracks facility.



**Annex 2.10: April 2019 illicit arms shipment into Puntland (STRICTLY
CONFIDENTIAL)***

**Annex 2.11: Yemen-Puntland arms smuggling networks (STRICTLY
CONFIDENTIAL)***

Annex 3: The PSF and the Puntland Military Courts

The Puntland Security Force (PSF) functions as Puntland's primary counter-terrorism unit, comprising of approximately 600 soldiers who are mentored and supported by the United States of America.¹ The Puntland Anti-Terrorism Act, 2011 gives the PSF full authority to "investigate and combat terrorist activities".² The PSF reports directly to the President of Puntland, with limited parliamentary oversight. The PSF also manages detention centres in Bosaso,³ while detainees who are charged with terrorism offences are tried before Puntland Military Courts.

During its mandate, the Panel has received multiple allegations that detainees in PSF custody were subject to torture during detention. The Panel also found that a number of detainees' confessions were obtained under duress and without legal representation, which were subsequently used for convictions before Puntland Military Courts. The Panel also found evidence of children convicted by Puntland Military Courts on terrorism charges and accusations of the Military Courts suppressing claims of the PSF's involvement in torture.

Accusations of torture at PSF detention centre in Bosaso

From May to July 2019, the Panel interviewed former PSF detainees and their relatives, who stated that they had been exposed to systematic forms of torture and inhumane treatment by PSF officials while in detention at the PSF base in Bosaso.⁴ The interviewees stated that they were held at the PSF detention centre in Bosaso in February 2017 on terrorism charges.⁵ According to the detainees, they were blindfolded, naked, tied, and subjected to mock drownings.⁶ Other detainees stated that they were subjected to electrocution, burned with cigarettes on their genitals, and deprived of sleep and food.⁷ They also stated that they were kept in solitary confinement in steel containers without toilet facilities or windows.⁸ The Panel also received reports that detainees were forced to confess for alleged crimes under duress, whereby they were required to sign a declaration of confession and forced to provide a video-recorded confession.⁹ Interviewees stated that the entire process was conducted under duress with no legal representation present.

¹ The PSF's Director is Muhamud Abdullahi Osman "Diano". Members of the "Diano" family hold significant influence within the PSF. Ahmed Abdullahi Osman Diano, a brother of the PSF director, is in charge of the PSF sector based in Galkayo. Their mother, Hali Abdullahi, is the head of projects and logistic support to the PSF.

² Article 5 (Security Agencies), (1) and (4), Puntland Anti-Terrorism Act, 2011.

³ The PSF detention centre is under the command of three officers: Abdigani Jamac Muse ("Fandoul"), Dadir Said Sheikh Muhamud, and Ahmed Dhakoo.

⁴ Interviews with victims' relatives on 28 May 2019. Phone interviews with former detainees from Bosaso on 13 July 2018 and 22 July 2018.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Phone interviews with former detainees from Bosaso, 25 May 2018.

⁷ Phone interviews with former detainees from Bosaso, 30 June 2019.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ The video recording of confessions in detention centers contradicts international human rights and humanitarian law fair trial standards in Article 14 of the ICCPR; article 3 (d) of the Four Geneva Conventions of 1949.

Previous reports by local and international human rights organizations also referred to the systematic abuse of detainees at the PSF base in Bosaso.¹⁰ Additionally, on 6 June 2017, the SEMG interviewed two suspected members of Al-Shabaab in Bosaso Central Prison, who provided accounts of torture consistent with the Panel's investigations during the current mandate. One of the suspects informed the SEMG that while at the PSF base he was regularly beaten, tied, and subject to mock drownings until he confessed to be a member of Al-Shabaab. Another detainee, a 16-year-old child, informed the SEMG that he was regularly assaulted by PSF officers during interrogation at the PSF base in Bosaso. Both suspects were executed by Puntland authorities on 30 June 2017.¹¹

Romah and halaleen

Detainees who confess to terrorism-related charges at the PSF detention centres are transferred to Bosaso Central Prison before facing trial before Puntland military courts, a period known as "*romah*". While remanded in prison, detainees, including children, wear yellow uniforms, while convicted prisoners wear red uniforms.

The Puntland Military Courts convict and often execute personnel involved in high-profile terrorism cases.¹² However, detainees accused of involvement in lower profile terrorism cases may be released before trial following the intervention of influential clans. These detainees may also avail of the opportunity to purchase their release.¹³ This process is carried out by brokers who facilitate payments to a network of PSF officers, prison personnel and military court judges to secure the release of the individual; a practice known as "*halaleen*".¹⁴ The Panel carried out a series of interviews with detainees and their families, who informed the group that they had paid \$5,000 to secure their releases.¹⁵ Other interviewees stated that they paid \$50,000 to release a child from Bosaso Central Prison in February 2017.¹⁶ If detainees are unable to pay for their release, they will normally be subject to long-term prison sentences or execution following trial.¹⁷

Military Courts

¹⁰ See also Human Rights Watch "It's Like We're Always in a Prison: Abuses against boys accused of national security offenses in Somalia", February 2018. Available at <https://www.hrw.org/report/2018/02/21/its-were-always-prison/abuses-against-boys-accused-national-security-offenses>. Also, on 25 February 2017, Maxamed Yuusuf Cali, from the office of Human Right Defenders in Puntland wrote a letter to Puntland authorities referencing "allegations of torture conducted by law enforcement agencies in Puntland".

¹¹ "Al Shabaab militants executed in Somalia's Puntland for bomb plots, killings", Reuters, 30 June 2017. Available at <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-somalia-security/al-shabaab-militants-executed-in-somalias-puntland-for-bomb-plots-killings-idUSKBN19L2AO>. See also S/2017/924, annex 1.4.

¹² See BBC News Somali, "Maxkamad xukun adag ku riday rag lagu eedeeyay dilka madixii DP World ee dekada Boosaaso" (Court hands down heavy sentences on men accused of killing DP World Bosaso port manager), 29 July 2019. Available at <https://www.bbc.com/somali/war-49150788>; and Garowe Online, "Madaxii Amniyaatka Al-Shabaab ee Muqdisho oo dil lagu xukumay" (Head of Amniyat is sentenced to death), 29 July 2019. Available from <https://www.garoweonline.com/so/news/madaxii-amniyaatka-al-shabaab-ee-muqdisho-oo-dil-lagu-xukumay>.

¹³ Interviews with families of detainees on 30 June 2019 and clan representatives on 25 May 2018.

¹⁴ *Halaleen*: "making release from detention legitimate or legal".

¹⁵ Interviews with families of detainees on 30 June 2019. At the time, the Panel was told that 80 detainees were remanded at Bosaso Central Prison awaiting trial.

¹⁶ Interviews with families of detainees and clan representatives on 30 June 2019 and 25 May 2018.

¹⁷ Detainees who originate from minority clans are often unable to secure their release through payment.

The Puntland Military Courts do not fall under the authority of the Puntland civil judiciary. Military personnel are directly appointed by the President of Puntland to serve as judges and are not required to have formal legal training. The Puntland Military Court directly appoints their own lawyers to represent the accused in court. However, legal proceedings before military courts are often based on confessions obtained from detainees under duress, who were not afforded the right to legal representation during their detention.¹⁸

The PSF holds significant influence over the Puntland Military Courts under the Puntland Anti-Terrorism Act, 2011.¹⁹ The Panel received multiple reports that the Military Courts would fine individuals \$1,500 if they criticized the PSF in the court.²⁰

On 25 February 2017, the Military Court found seven children guilty of “offending the military institution” for stating that they had been raped and tortured in PSF custody. Their defense lawyer was also jailed in Bosaso Prison for accusing the PSF of torture. Additional legal representatives were also detained when the authorities found that they had revealed accusations regarding PSF torture to international organizations.

Conviction of children by Puntland military courts

During this mandate, the Panel also noted the previous arrest of four children by PSF on terrorism-related charges.²¹ As of September 2019, the four children are located at Bosaso Central Prison. One of the children, aged 17 years, was arrested on 1 September 2017 by the PSF in Galkayo, and was convicted by the Puntland Military Courts on 25 April 2018. The other three children, all aged 16 years, were convicted of being members of Al-Shabaab and sentenced by the Military Court of the First Instance in Bosaso on 11 August 2018.

¹⁸ Telephone interview with a lawyer in Bosaso, 29 June 2019. See also Human Rights Watch “It’s Like We’re Always in a Prison: Abuses against boys accused of national security offenses in Somalia”, February 2018. Available at <https://www.hrw.org/report/2018/02/21/its-were-always-prison/abuses-against-boys-accused-national-security-offenses>.

¹⁹ See Article 5 of the Puntland Anti-Terrorism Act, 2011.

²⁰ Telephone interview with a lawyer in Bosaso, 29 June 2019.

²¹ Email communication from UN agencies in Garowe, 9 August 2019.

Annex 4: Violations of the charcoal ban

Production, transport and stockpiles

Figures 1 and 2: Satellite imagery of Kismayo showing examples of the increase in charcoal stockpiles from 14 October 2018 to 20 August 2019.





Illicit export, import and trans-shipment

Figure 3: On 10 August 2018 the MV Best departed Kismayo destined for Iraq carrying 190,000 bags of charcoal with falsified certificates of origin stating the consignment originated in Ghana. The exporter was Blue Whale Shipping and Cargo Co.


1. Goods consigned from (Exporter's business name, address, country) BLUE WHALE SHIPPING AND CARGO Co TEMA (GHANA)		Reference No, 10 5 1 2			
2. Goods consigned to (consignee's name, address) BAYTA AKHDAR TRADING BASRA, IRAQ		GENERALISED SYSTEM OF PREFERENCES CERTIFICATE OF ORIGIN (Combined declaration and certificate) FORM A GHANA issued in (Country) See Notes overleaf			
3. Means of transport and route (as far as known) BY SEA, " MV BEST"		4 For Official use			
5. Item Number	6 marks and number of packages	7 Number and kind of packages; description of goods 190000 BAGS OF BIO WOOD	8 Origin criterion (see Notes Overleaf) TEMA GHANA	9 Gross weight or other quantity 4,750,000 KGS	10. Number and date of invoices B/L No BWSS20122
11. Certification It is hereby certified on the basis of control carried out that the declaration by the exporter is correct TEMA: 10/08/18 Place and date, Signature and stamp of Certifying authority			12 Declaration by the exporter The undersigned hereby declares that the above details and statements are correct; that all the goods were produced in GHANA (country) and that they comply with the origin requirements specified for those goods the Generalised System of Preferences for goods exported to IRAQ (Importing Country) TEMA: 10/08/18 Place and date signature of authorised signatory		



Figure 4: Blue Whale Shipping and Cargo Co. was also identified as the company responsible for trans-shipping Somali charcoal through the Islamic Republic of Iran in 2018 using false certificates of origin stating the charcoal originated from Ghana.

BLUE WHALE SHIPPING AND CARGO CO.

Community Number 5, PO Box 1075, TEMA, GHANA Tel :(+253) 48263595



Ref: BWS/108/2018

Date: 08/06/2018

COMERCIAL INVOICE

N°108/2018

Shipper BLUE WHALE SHIPPING AND CARGO CO. TEL: +233 548263595 TEMA, GHANA	Method of Payment T.T. OR CAD
Consigner Name: SAMIN TEJARAT KISH TRADING CO. KISH ISLAND, ISLAMC REPUBLIC OF IRAN	Final Destination PORT OF KISH (IRAN) BAHMAN PORT QESHM ISLAND
VESSEL NAME: HAMEEM (002410)	

N°	DESCRIPTION	ORIGIN	QNTY	UNITE PRICE	TOTAL PRICE
1	WOODEN CHARCOAL IN 25KG PER BGS	TEMA, GHANA	25000	4.25 PER BAG	106,250 USD
SAY: ONE HUNDRED SIX THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIFTY ONLY				TOTAL	106,250 USD
					US DOLLARS




Figure 5: In October 2018, the MV Best arrived at Khawr al-Zubayr port, Iraq carrying 190,000 bags of Somali charcoal. The charcoal was stored at a warehouse in Basra, Iraq.



Figure 6: In early 2019, the charcoal was re-packaged at the warehouse as a product of Iraq, originating with a company, Dar Alahbab Co.



Figure 7: On 26 January 2019, the vessel Northern Dedication loaded approximately 29,000 bags of the re-bagged charcoal and departed Umm Qasr, Iraq. The vessel unloaded 9,610 bags of charcoal at Shuwaikh port, Kuwait to a consignee identified as Frontline Logistics Co.

Carrier: Hapag-Lloyd Aktiengesellschaft, Hamburg		Bill of Lading		Multimodal Transport or Port to Port Shipment	
VAT-ID-No: DE813960018 Ballindamm 25 - D-20095 Hamburg	Shipper: DAR AL AHAHBAB CO PO. BOX NO. 61006, ALSAKHRA INTERSECTION, PALESTINE STREET, BAGHDAD IRAQ TEL : + 964 7800255300 EMAIL 00198800@GMAIL.COM				
	Consignee (not negotiable unless consigned to order): FRONTLINE LOGISTICS CO WLL PO BOX : 314 FARWANIYA, 81014 - KUWAIT		Carrier's Reference: 52417267 B/L-No.: HLCUBS2190100668 Page: 2 / 3		
	Notify Address (Carrier not responsible for failure to notify; see clause 20 (1) hereof): FRONTLINE LOGISTICS CO WLL PO BOX : 314 FARWANIYA, 81014 - KUWAIT		Export References:		
	Vessel(s): NORTHERN DEDICATION		Forwarding Agent:		
	Voyage-No.: 1904E		Consignee's Reference:		
Port of Loading: UMM QASR		Place of Receipt:			
Port of Discharge: SHUWAIKH		Place of Delivery:			
Container Nos., Seal Nos., Marks and Nos.		Number and Kind of Packages, Description of Goods		Gross Weight:	Measurement:
DRYU 9151145		1 CONT. 40'X9'6" HIGH CUBE CONT. SLAC* 960 BAGS BIO CHARCOAL - NON HAZ		24000,000 KGM	
CAIU 8533950		1 CONT. 40'X9'6" HIGH CUBE CONT. SLAC* 960 BAGS BIO CHARCOAL - NON HAZ		24000,000 KGM	
FSCU 8235680		1 CONT. 40'X9'6" HIGH CUBE CONT. SLAC* 965 BAGS BIO CHARCOAL - NON HAZ		24125,000 KGM	
HLBV 1546984		1 CONT. 40'X9'6" HIGH CUBE CONT. SLAC* 960 BAGS BIO CHARCOAL - NON HAZ		24000,000 KGM	
TCKU 6606491		1 CONT. 40'X9'6" HIGH CUBE CONT. SLAC* 960 BAGS BIO CHARCOAL - NON HAZ		24000,000 KGM	
Shipper's declared Value [see clause 7(2) and 7(3)]		Above Particulars as declared by Shipper. Without responsibility or warranty as to correctness by Carrier [see clause 11]			
Total No. of Containers received by the Carrier: 10		RECEIVED by the Carrier from the Shipper in apparent good order and condition (unless otherwise noted herein) the total number or quantity of Containers or other packages or units indicated in the box opposite entitled "Total No. of Containers/Packages received by the Carrier" for Carriage subject to all the terms and conditions hereof (INCLUDING THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS ON THE REVERSE HEREOF AND THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF THE CARRIER'S APPLICABLE TARIFF) from the Place of Receipt or the Port of Loading, whichever is applicable, to the Port of Discharge or the Place of Delivery, whichever is applicable. One original Bill of Lading, duly endorsed, must be surrendered by the Merchant to the Carrier in exchange for the Goods or a delivery order. In accepting this Bill of Lading the Merchant expressly accepts and agrees to all its terms and conditions whether printed, stamped or written, or otherwise incorporated, notwithstanding the non-signing of this Bill of Lading by the Merchant.			
Movement: FCL/FCL		Currency:			
Charge	Rate	Basis	W/Vol/Val	P/C	Amount
Total Freight Prepaid		Total Freight Collect		Total Freight	
Freight payable at: DESTINATION		Number of original Bs/L: 3			
FOR ABOVE NAMED CARRIER UASC FOR MARITIME SERVICES LLC (AS AGENT)					

Hapag-Lloyd Aktiengesellschaft, Hamburg



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B/L-No. HLCUBS2190100668

Cont/Seals/Marks	Packages/Description of Goods	Weight	Measure
TCKU 6606275	1 CONT. 40'X9'6" HIGH CUBE CONT. SLAC* 960 BAGS BIO CHARCOAL - NON HAZ	24000,000 KGM	
TCKU 6082007	1 CONT. 40'X9'6" HIGH CUBE CONT. SLAC* 960 BAGS BIO CHARCOAL - NON HAZ	24000,000 KGM	
TCLU 5431098	1 CONT. 40'X9'6" HIGH CUBE CONT. SLAC* 960 BAGS BIO CHARCOAL - NON HAZ	24000,000 KGM	
BEAU 4204756	1 CONT. 40'X9'6" HIGH CUBE CONT. SLAC* 965 BAGS BIO CHARCOAL - NON HAZ	24125,000 KGM	
GLDU 9982424	1 CONT. 40'X9'6" HIGH CUBE CONT. SLAC* 960 BAGS BIO CHARCOAL - NON HAZ	24000,000 KGM	

*SLAC = Shipper's Load, Stow, Weight and Count


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9610 BAGS

SHIPPED ON BOARD, DATE : JAN-26-2019
 PORT OF LOADING: UMM QASR
 VESSEL NAME: NORTHERN DEDICATION VOYAGE: 1904E

ORIGIN PORT CHARGE COLLECT
 SEA FREIGHT + ADDITIONALS COLLECT
 DESTINATION PORT CHARGE COLLECT

Figure 8: The vessel continued to Dammam port, Saudi Arabia, where 19,242 bags of charcoal were delivered to the consignee, Omar Abdullah Al Faleh.

Carrier: Hapag-Lloyd Aktiengesellschaft, Hamburg		Bill of Lading		Multimodal Transport or Port to Port Shipment	
Shipper: DAR AL AHAHBAB CO PO. BOX NO. 61006, ALSAKHRA INTERSECTION, PALESTINE STREET, BAGHDAD IRAQ TEL : + 964 7800255300 EMAIL 001988000@GMAIL.COM				Carrier's Reference: 52748958 BL-No.: HLCUBS2190100679 Page: 2 / 4	
Consignee (not negotiable unless consigned to order): OMAR ABDULLAH AL FALEH FOR TRADING PO BOX NO. 11421 ABU BAKER AL SIDDEEQ ROAD, MANSOURA RIYADH SAUDI ARABIA TEL : 05525881808 EMAIL : QASIMUMMARAA@GMAIL.COM		Forwarding Agent: FRONTLINE LOGISTICS OFFICE # 4, FLOOR 1, TOWER 1 ARBEED PLAZA, FARWANIYA SAFAT, KUWAIT		Consignee's Reference:	
Notify Address (Carrier not responsible for failure to notify; see clause 20 (1) hereof): OMAR ABDULLAH AL FALEH FOR TRADING PO BOX NO. 11421 ABU BAKER AL SIDDEEQ ROAD, MANSOURA RIYADH SAUDI ARABIA TEL : 05525881808 EMAIL : QASIMUMMARAA@GMAIL.COM		Place of Receipt:		Place of Delivery:	
Vessel(s): NORTHERN DEDICATION		Voyage-No.: 1904E		Port of Loading: UMM QASR	
Port of Discharge: DAMMAM		Container Nos., Seal Nos., Marks and Nos.			
HLBU 1931928		1 CONT. 40'X9'6" HIGH CUBE CONT. SLAC* 960 BAGS BIO CHARCOAL - NON HAZ HS-CODE : 44 02 90		Gross Weight: 24000,000 Measurement: KGM	
HLXU 8622363		1 CONT. 40'X9'6" HIGH CUBE CONT. SLAC* 960 BAGS BIO CHARCOAL - NON HAZ HS-CODE : 44 02 90		Gross Weight: 24000,000 Measurement: KGM	
HLXU 8388661		1 CONT. 40'X9'6" HIGH CUBE CONT. SLAC* 960 BAGS BIO CHARCOAL - NON HAZ HS-CODE : 44 02 90		Gross Weight: 24000,000 Measurement: KGM	
CAIU 7953053		1 CONT. 40'X9'6" HIGH CUBE CONT. SLAC* 960 BAGS BIO CHARCOAL - NON HAZ HS-CODE : 44 02 90		Gross Weight: 24000,000 Measurement: KGM	
Shipper's declared Value [see clause 7(2) and 7(3)] Total No. of Containers received by the Carrier: 20		Package received by the Carrier:		Above Particulars as declared by Shipper. Without responsibility or warranty as to correctness by Carrier [see clause 11]	
Movement: FCL/FCL		Currency:		DRAFT	
Charge	Rate	Basis	W/Vol/Vol	P/C	Amount
Freight		Freight		Freight	
Total Freight Prepaid		Total Freight Collect		Total Freight	
Freight payable at: ELSEWHERE		Number of original B/Ls: 3		FOR ABOVE NAMED CARRIER UASC FOR MARITIME SERVICES LLC (AS AGENT)	

Hapag-Lloyd Aktiengesellschaft, Hamburg



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B/L-No. HLCUBS2190100679

Cont/Seals/Marks	Packages/Description of Goods	Weight	Measure
CAIU 8314144	1 CONT. 40'X9'6" HIGH CUBE CONT. SLAC* 963 BAGS BIO CHARCOAL - NON HAZ HS-CODE : 44 02 90	24075,000 KGM	
TCLU 5992740	1 CONT. 40'X9'6" HIGH CUBE CONT. SLAC* 960 BAGS BIO CHARCOAL - NON HAZ HS-CODE : 44 02 90	24000,000 KGM	
FDCU 0106965	1 CONT. 40'X9'6" HIGH CUBE CONT. SLAC* 970 BAGS BIO CHARCOAL - NON HAZ HS-CODE : 44 02 90	24250,000 KGM	
TEMU 7809013	1 CONT. 40'X9'6" HIGH CUBE CONT. SLAC* 970 BAGS BIO CHARCOAL - NON HAZ HS-CODE : 44 02 90	24250,000 KGM	
TCKU 6463209	1 CONT. 40'X9'6" HIGH CUBE CONT. SLAC* 900 BAGS BIO CHARCOAL - NON HAZ HS-CODE : 44 02 90	22500,000 KGM	

*SLAC = Shipper's Load, Stow, Weight and Count

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19242 BAGS


SHIPPED ON BOARD, DATE : JAN-26-2019
 PORT OF LOADING: UMM QASR
 VESSEL NAME: NORTHERN DEDICATION VOYAGE: 1904E

ORIGIN PORT CHARGE COLLECT
 SEA FREIGHT + ADDITIONALS COLLECT
 DESTINATION PORT CHARGE COLLECT

Carrier shall be entitled to hold this shipment as per Saudi Arabia
 Port Authority Regulation No. (6/G1/D1) effective as of (19/11/2018),
 should there be any outstanding payments owing by the Consignee to the

Carrier, until such outstandings are paid in full.

Figure 9: The trans-shipment of Somali charcoal from Iraq to neighbouring states continued throughout 2019. For instance, on 7 March 2019, 24,000 bags of the Somali charcoal were trans-shipped via the vessel Nordspring from Umm Qasr, Iraq to Jebel Ali, Dubai, UAE.

Carrier: Hapag-Lloyd Aktiengesellschaft, Hamburg		Bill of Lading		Multimodal Transport or Port to Port Shipment	
Ballindamm 25 - D-20095 Hamburg VAT-ID-No: DE813960018	Shipper: DAR AL AHBAB COMPANY BAGHDAD - IRAQ. TELE. +9647700441500 FAX +9647800255300				
	Consignee (not negotiable unless consigned to order): AL ZAIM COALS TRADING FZE AJMAN FREE ZONE, UAE TEL/FAX .. 97142517350 EMAIL.. ELAN@ADOONGROUP.COM		Carrier's Reference: 53088388 BL-No.: HLCUBS2190300230 Page: 2 / 3 Export References:		
	Notify Address (Carrier not responsible for failure to notify; see clause 20 (1) hereof): AL ZAIM COALS TRADING FZE AJMAN FREE ZONE, UAE TEL/FAX .. 97142517350 EMAIL.. ELAN@ADOONGROUP.COM		Forwarding Agent:		
	Vessel(s): NORDSPRING Voyage-No.: 1910E		Consignee's Reference: Place of Receipt:		
Port of Loading: UMM QASR Port of Discharge: JEBEL ALI		Place of Delivery:			
Container Nos., Seal Nos.; Marks and Nos.: 25 CNTRS 24000 BAGS BIO WOOD CHARCOAL HS-CODE : 44 02 90		Number and Kind of Packages, Description of Goods		Gross Weight: 579100,000 KGM Measurement: 510000,000 NET KGM	
HLXU 8035319 40'HC SLAC*:960 BAGS SEAL: 7956593 HLBU 1308369 40'HC SLAC*:960 BAGS SEAL: 7956529 HLBU 1012464 40'HC SLAC*:960 BAGS SEAL: 7956557 HAMU 1149415 40'HC SLAC*:960 BAGS SEAL: 7956547 GESU 6147420 40'HC SLAC*:960 BAGS SEAL: 7956542 CAXU 8058466 40'HC SLAC*:960 BAGS SEAL: 7956525 CAIU 4516342 40'HC SLAC*:960 BAGS SEAL: 7956550		25 CNTRS 24000 BAGS BIO WOOD CHARCOAL HS-CODE : 44 02 90		22800,000 KGM 21900,000 KGM 24800,000 KGM 20300,000 KGM 22900,000 KGM 21600,000 KGM 20600,000 KGM	
Shipper's declared Value [see clause 7(2) and 7(3)] Total No. of Containers received by the Carrier: 25		Above Particulars as declared by Shipper. Without responsibility or warranty as to correctness by Carrier [see clause 11]			
Movement: FCL/FCL Currency:		RECEIVED by the Carrier from the Shipper in apparent good order and condition (unless otherwise noted herein) the total number or quantity of Containers or other packages or units indicated in the box opposite entitled "Total No. of Containers/Packages received by the Carrier" for Carriage subject to all the terms and conditions hereof (INCLUDING THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS ON THE REVERSE HEREOF AND THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF THE CARRIER'S APPLICABLE TARIFF) from the Place of Receipt or the Port of Loading, whichever is applicable, to the Port of Discharge or the Place of Delivery, whichever is applicable. One original Bill of Lading, duly endorsed, must be surrendered by the Merchant to the Carrier in exchange for the Goods or a delivery order. In accepting this Bill of Lading the Merchant expressly accepts and agrees to all its terms and conditions whether printed, stamped or written, or otherwise incorporated, notwithstanding the non-signing of this Bill of Lading by the Merchant.			
Charge Rate Basis W/Vol/Val P/C Amount		IN WITNESS WHEREOF the number of original Bills of Lading stated below all of this tenor and date has been signed, one of which being accomplished the others to stand void. Place and date of issue: BASRA MAR-07-2019			
Freight payable at: ELSEWHERE Number of original BsL: 3		FOR ABOVE NAMED CARRIER UASC FOR MARITIME SERVICES LLC (AS AGENT)			
Total Freight Prepaid Total Freight Collect Total Freight					

Hapag-Lloyd Aktiengesellschaft, Hamburg



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B/L-No. HLCUBS2190300230

Cont/Seals/Marks	Packages/Description of Goods	Weight	Measure
FSCU 8077667	40'HC SLAC*:960 BAGS	24000,000	
SEAL: 7956531		KGM	
AMFU 8909360	40'HC SLAC*:960 BAGS	24500,000	
SEAL: 7956521		KGM	
UACU 5604335	40'HC SLAC*:960 BAGS	23600,000	
SEAL: 7956523		KGM	
UACU 5107600	40'HC SLAC*:960 BAGS	23400,000	
SEAL: 7956558		KGM	
TEMU 7653023	40'HC SLAC*:960 BAGS	25800,000	
SEAL: 7956536		KGM	
TCNU 4205323	40'HC SLAC*:960 BAGS	21000,000	
SEAL: 7956554		KGM	
TCNU 3767455	40'HC SLAC*:960 BAGS	25000,000	
SEAL: 7956553		KGM	
HLXU 8480530	40'HC SLAC*:960 BAGS	21100,000	
SEAL: 7956500		KGM	
HLXU 8163412	40'HC SLAC*:960 BAGS	25200,000	
SEAL: 7956535		KGM	
HLBU 1892760	40'HC SLAC*:960 BAGS	25600,000	
SEAL: 7956545		KGM	
HAMU 1203579	40'HC SLAC*:960 BAGS	22900,000	
SEAL: 7956541		KGM	
GLDU 7599191	40'HC SLAC*:960 BAGS	25100,000	
SEAL: 7956546		KGM	
GESU 5486841	40'HC SLAC*:960 BAGS	20200,000	
SEAL: 7956499		KGM	
FSCU 9499950	40'HC SLAC*:960 BAGS	21000,000	
SEAL: 7956522		KGM	
FSCU 8081409	40'HC SLAC*:960 BAGS	24000,000	
SEAL: 7956528		KGM	
FCIU 7044593	40'HC SLAC*:960 BAGS	22700,000	
SEAL: 7956539		KGM	
CAIU 8466002	40'HC SLAC*:960 BAGS	22900,000	
SEAL: 7956537		KGM	
FSCU 9854801	40'HC SLAC*:960 BAGS	26200,000	
SEAL: 7956549		KGM	

*SLAC = Shipper's Load, Stow, Weight and Count

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24000 BAGS

SHIPPED ON BOARD, DATE : MAR-07-2019
 PORT OF LOADING: UMM QASR
 VESSEL NAME: NORDSPRING VOYAGE: 1910E


PORT CHARGE ORIGIN COLLECT
 SEAFREIGHT + ADDITIONALS PREPAID
 PORT CHARGE DESTINATION COLLECT

Figures 10 and 11: Re-bagged Somali charcoal unloading at Shuwaikh port, Kuwait in January 2019, delivered to a consignee identified as Frontline Logistics Co.



False certificates of origin

Figure 12: The original charcoal shipment from Somalia to Iraq utilized falsified certificates of origin from Ghana (see figure, 3 above). Trans-shipments from Iraq to neighbouring Member States employed falsified certificates of origin stating the charcoal was from Iraq.

DAR ALAHBAB CO. Trading General LTD.		شركة دار الأحباب للتجارة العامة المحدودة			
COMMERCIAL INVOICE					
SELLER: DAR ALAHBAB CO. BAGHDAD - ALBAYAA - IRAQ TEL: +964 77004411500 FAX: +964 7800255300		Invoice No & Date: DAC/001/CC2018/26 05.04.2019 Exporter's Ref. No: T014			
BUYER: Al Zaim Coals Trading FZE Ajman Free Zone UAE		Buyer's Order No / Contract No: Other References: Buyer (if Other Than Consignee): Country of Origin of Goods: GHANA Country of Final Destination: JEBEL ALI UAE			
BL NO: HLCUBS2190400059 Carrier's Ref: S1428894		Pre-Carriage By: Place of Receipt by Pre-Carrier: Terms of Delivery and Payment: Vessel/Voyage No: NORDSPRING 1914E Port Of Loading: UMM QASR PORT, IRAQ Port of Discharge: JEBEL ALI PORT Final Destination: JEBEL ALI PORT			
Marks & Nos. / Container No.	No. & Kind of Pkgs.	Description of Goods	Quantity BAGS	Price in USD	Amount in USD
10 x 40" FCLs SAID TO CONTAIN BIO WOOD CHARCOAL (H.S. Code : 44 02 90), PRODUCT OF GHANA REPACKED IN IRAQ PACKED IN 25 KG PP BAGS NO OF BAGS : 9600 BAGS OF 25 KGS Container No: TGBU6880763 TCKU6455477 TEMU7556738 TEMU6707980 TLLU5349100 TEMU7089377 UACU5742205 UACU5215858 TCLU9558563 UACU5885660 Total Net Weight :240.00 MT / Total Gross Weight: 278.28 MT OUR BANK DETAIL : BENEFICIARY NAME: ACCOUNT NO: IBAN NO: BANK NAME : SWIFT CODE : BANK ADDRESS : CURRENCY :			9,600.00	11.00	105,600.00
			TOTAL VALUE		105,600.00
			LESS: ADVANCE		0.00
			BALANCE AMOUNT		105,600.00
(Amount Chargeable in words) ONLY : One Hundred Five Thousand Six Hundred USA Dollars Declaration : We declare that this invoice shows the actual price of the goods described and that all particulars are true and correct.			Signature & Date DAR ALAHBAB CO. Authorised Signature		

10 X 40' FCL UMM QASR TO JEBEL ALI PORT UAE

Reference No: BAS404FZ

Certificate of Origin

Issued:

IRAQ

(country)

Date: 05.04.2019

(1) Exporter & Address
DAR ALAHBAB COMPANY
BAGHDAD - IRAQ

(2) Corp. National No:

(3) Producing Company

(4) Importer & Address
Al Zaim Coals Trading FZE
Ajman Free Zone UAE

(5) Inv. No.: DAC/001/CC2018/26

(6) Inv. Date: 05.04.2019

(7) LC. NO: CAD BASIS



(8) Country of Origin :	GHANA
(9) Description of Goods	BIO WOOD CHARCOAL H.S. Code : 440290
(10) Number & Kind of Packing	10X40FT CONTAINERS, 25KG IN BAGS (TOTAL 9600 BAGS IN 10 x 40FT CONTAINERS
(11) Shipping Marks	HLCUBS2190400059
(12) Gross WT.	278.28 MT
(13) Net WT.	240.00 MT
(14) Value	

Total Value

105,600.00 U.S.A. Dollars

(15) Remarks

CARGO SHIPPED FROM GHANA, PACKED IN KHZ FREE ZONE IRAQ

Criminal networks

In its 2018 report, the Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group (SEMG) identified the All Star Group as the principal network involved in charcoal trafficking. During this mandate, the majority of these actors, including additional individuals also identified below, were active in the illicit charcoal trade by supporting charcoal production in Somalia and facilitating the trans-shipment of charcoal through Iraq. All Star Group representatives facilitated the trans-shipment of charcoal through Iraq using a UAE-based company, Zuri Coals. Zuri Coals, and two associated companies based in Dubai, UAE, also established ties with local agents in Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE as detailed below.

All Star Group representatives based in Dubai, UAE:¹

- (a) Abdisalan Salad Hussein.
- (b) Mahad Said Mohamed.
- (c) Basheer Khalif Moosa (Djibouti).
- (d) Suleyman Adna Farah.
- (e) Hassan Mohamed Ahmed “Masry”.
- (f) Norodin Za’aim.
- (g) Salah Yusuf Yare.
- (h) Deq Gariyow
- (i) Ahmed Ali Haji.
- (j) Abdishakur Salad Elay.
- (k) Abdi Salah.
- (l) Mohamud Ali Osman “Oonof”.
- (m) Ahmed Mohamed Barre.
- (n) Abdirahman Mohamed Warsame “Dhaqalayste”, “BBC”.

All Star Group representatives based in Kismayo, Somalia:²

- (a) Ali Ahmed Naaji.
- (b) Abdishakur Salad Elay.
- (c) Hassan Mohamed Yusuf “Awlibaax”.
- (d) Farah Jama Awil “Degdeg”.
- (e) Muhammad Abdullahi.

¹ See also [S/2018/1002](#), annex 7.6. Additional names in the current report were provided by a Member State and investigations by the Panel.

² See also [S/2018/1002](#), annex 7.6. Additional names provided in confidential report by Member State and investigations by the Panel.

- (f) Jama “Dhuxul”.
- (g) Ahmed Sahal.
- (h) Saeed Mahamud “Dheere”.

Charcoal Facilitation Companies based in UAE:

- (a) Zuri Coals FZE, PO Box 21158, Ajman, UAE. (Zuri coals also operates under a number of aliases including falsified documentation pertaining to Blue Whale Shipping and Cargo Co. Community Number 5, PO Box 1075, Tema, Ghana).

Local agents utilized by illicit charcoal networks:

- (a) Al Zaim Coals Trading FZE, Ajman Free Zone, UAE.
- (b) Bayta Akhdar Trading, Basra, Iraq.
- (c) Dar Al Ahbab Co. Po Box 61006, Al-sakhra Intersection, Palestine Street, Baghdad, Iraq.
- (d) Frontline Logistics Co. PO Box 314, Farwaniya, 81014, Kuwait.
- (e) Omar Abdullah Al Faleh For Trading, PO Box 11421, Abu Baker Al Siddeeq Road, Mansoura, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.

Implementation of the ban

Figure 14 and 15: On 28 August 2018, Iranian authorities declared a moratorium on the import of charcoal originating from Comoros, Côte d'Ivoire, and Ghana.

۹۷ / ۱۰۰ / ۹۱۱

۱۳۹۷ / ۲ / ۳

بسمه تعالی
«حمایت از کالای ایرانی»



سازمان منطقه آزاد قشم
رئیس هیات مدیره و مدیر عامل

جناب آقای امیری، مدیر محترم کرک
جناب آقای سیدی، مدیر کل محترم کرک قشم

با سلام

احتراماً، با توجه به دستور العمل دریافتی از مراجع ذیربط در ارتباط با مقررات تحریمی شورای امنیت سازمان ملل در خصوص سومالی، از تاریخ ابلاغ این دستور العمل، لازم است کلیه شرکت های فعال این حوزه، از ورود یا صادرات مجدد هرگونه ذغال چوب با منشأ مشکوک به کشور سومالی شامل بارنامه ها و گواهی های مبدأ کشورهای کومور، ساحل عاج و یا غنا و نیز سایر مبادی مظنون خودداری نمایند. بدیهی است ثبت، ورود، خروج و بارگیری اقلام مذکور ممنوع بوده و سازمان مناطق آزاد از آن جلوگیری به عمل خواهد آورد.

محمد رضا مومنی

تهران - کدپستی: ۱۳۳۱۳-۱۵۱۶۶ / تلفن: ۰۲۱-۸۸۷۷۰۲۳۵ / فکس: ۰۲۱-۸۸۷۷۱۰۶۸
قشم - کدپستی: ۱۷۴۴۳-۷۹۵۱۶ / تلفن: ۰۷۶۳-۵۲۴۱۷۱۰ و ۰۷۶۳-۵۲۴۱۷۰۰ / فکس: ۰۷۶۳-۵۲۴۱۷۱۲



برستعلی

شماره: ۹۲۱۵-۹۷/۳۴

تاریخ: ۱۳۹۷/۰۷/۱۰

تعداد: ۲-۳ نفر

جناب آقای سائق جلالی

مدیر محترم توسعه تجارت

باسلام و احترام،

با توجه به دستورالعمل دریافتی از مراجع ذیربط در ارتباط با مقررات تحریمی شورای امنیت سازمان ملل در خصوص سومالی، از تاریخ ابلاغ این دستورالعمل لازم است کلیه شرکتهای فعال این حوزه از ورود یا صادرات مجدد هر گونه زغال چوب با منشا مشکوک به کشور سومالی شامل بارنامه ها و گواهی های مبدا کشورهای کومور، ساحل عاج و یا غنا و نیز سایر مبادی مظنون خودداری نمایند. بدیهی است ثبت، ورود، خروج و بارگیری اقلام مذکور ممنوع بوده و سازمان مناطق آزاد از آن جلوگیری به عمل خواهد آورد.

محمد مهدی
۱۳۹۷/۰۷/۱۰
مدیر امور اقتصادی و سرمایه گذاری

دفتر مرکزی: جویه کیش - خیابان سنایی
تلفن: ۰۷۶۶۱۲۴۲۲۱۵۱-۶۲
۰۷۶۶۱۲۴۲۲۳۵۴۱-۶۲
سایت: ۰۷۶۶۱۲۴۲۲۳۷۳۱-۶۲
کد پستی: ۷۹۴۱۷-۸۳۷۷۵
دفتر تهران: خیابان خالد اسلایسولی خیش
خیابان ۲۹، ساختمان دبیرخانه شورای
هماهنگی مناطق آزاد، پلاک ۱۹، طبقه اول
تلفن و فکس: ۰۲۱) ۸۸ ۷۷ ۱۰ ۶۰
۰۲۱) ۸۸ ۷۷ ۱۰ ۶۲
۰۲۱) ۸۸ ۷۷ ۱۰ ۶۳

Figure 16: A letter dated 3 May 2017 from the Djiboutian Embassy in Kuwait to the prosecutor's office attesting the origin of the Al Sahil shipment to be Djibouti, a claim inconsistent with the evidence collected by the SEMG and the Combined Maritime Forces.

