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**CARTA DE FECHA 16 DE ENERO DE 1986 DIRIGIDA AL SECRETARIO  
GENERAL POR EL REPRESENTANTE PERMANENTE DE MOZAMBIQUE ANTE  
LAS NACIONES UNIDAS**

Tengo el honor de adjuntar a la presente el texto de un artículo publicado en el boletín TAPOL No. 72, de noviembre de 1985, relativo al colonialismo de Indonesia en Timor Oriental.

A petición de mi Gobierno, agradeceré a Vuestra Excelencia se sirva hacer distribuir ese artículo como documento del Consejo de Seguridad.

**(Firmado) Manuel DOS SANTOS**  
Embajador  
Representante Permanente

Annex

## Indonesian colonialism in East Timor

*"I feel the Timorese are not open. They do not speak out, as if they're hiding something. I would like them to open up."*  
A young doctor from West Java working in East Timor  
quoted in *Asiaweek*, 2 August 1985.

*"People, myself included, we feel as if we are in a jail in our country. The only people who go in and out of Timor are the Javanese."*

Mgr Belo, head of the Catholic Church in East Timor  
in an interview with AFP, 8 August 1985.

Ten years after the Indonesian invasion on 7 December 1975, East Timor displays all the hallmarks of a colonised territory. All the efforts of the military regime to 'integrate and develop' East Timor serve a single purpose, to convince the outside world that Timor's integration is an inevitable and irreversible historical fact.

Jakarta's '27th province' has become the focus for *pembangunan* (development) "so as to catch up with the development of the other provinces (sic) of Indonesia". (Indonesian Embassy Press Release, Bonn, 3 September 1985) According to Indonesian propaganda, extra efforts are needed to 'catch up' because of the 'backwardness' of East Timor and its population. Per capita expenditure is higher in East Timor than any 'other' Indonesian province and it also has more civil servants per capita on the government payroll, a total of 10,050. Behind the fantasy of Indonesian statistics is the reality exposed by Mgr Belo who, when asked to comment on the huge sums Jakarta is pumping into East Timor, replied: "The only problem in Timor is the problem of freedom of the inhabitants." (AFP, 8 August 1985)

In the same interview, Mgr Belo likened East Timor to a jail. It is the jail called East Timor, or more precisely those parts under Indonesian administration, that is the subject of this article. We have carefully studied Indonesian propaganda material and the mass of reports that appear in the Indonesian press, analysing the information with the help of what we know from church sources and letters smuggled out.

Indonesia's chief civilian administrator in Dili

Since his appointment as governor of East Timor in October 1982, Mario Carrascalao has become the focus of Indonesian media attention. He is repeatedly interviewed

by foreign as well as Indonesian journalists. Any public appearance or statement he makes, in Dili or in Jakarta, is widely reported, and he often appears in photographs together with Suharto or Murdani, to emphasise that he has their full backing and blessing. He is often acclaimed as the experienced administrator in charge of *pembangunan* in Indonesia's '27th province'.

Carrascalao is certainly more suited to Jakarta's needs than his predecessors and has been allowed to function more prominently as governor. He has proven capable of serving Jakarta well as a man with administrative experience, sometimes promoting moves to 'clean up' corruption and inefficiency and appearing to be in charge of the huge bureaucracy in East Timor. Whereas before 1983, foreign journalists and diplomats on guided tours of East Timor would be briefed primarily by the area's military commander and the *Sekwilda* (Regional Secretary), a position always held by a military man, Carrascalao has been the main spokesman since then. The emergence of 'Governor' Carrascalao has helped to 'civilianise' and 'Timorise' the administration at a time when East Timor remains Jakarta's most vulnerable target of international condemnation.

Carrascalao comes from one of East Timor's richest families with huge interests in coffee-growing. Jakarta's decision to restore the family's 521 hectares of coffee land in 1980 was instrumental in winning him over to their side. Although he started out in life strongly pro-Portuguese, it required no major adjustment to become as fervently pro-Indonesian; in other words, he is a typical 'native' colonial administrator, working loyally with whatever system has asserted itself.

He has displayed a remarkable adjustment to the arrogant style of Indonesian bureaucrats, sporting their official safari dress, smoking their *kretak* cigarettes

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and propagating their Pancasila ideology. He freely accepts the Jakarta view of East Timorese as a 'backward people', and is indeed a prime advocate of this view. Nor does he gainsay Jakarta's condemnation of Portugal's 'centuries of neglect' for East Timor although up to 1975, he believed that East Timor should remain a Portuguese province.

### A military project

But for all Carrascalao's prominence, East Timor is primarily a military project. In late 1983, centralised control of the East Timor military command structure was reinforced when Kostrad, the Army's Strategic Reserve Command, set up a *Komando Operasi Pemulihan Keamanan Timor Timur* (Operational Command for the Restoration of Security in East Timor) to take control of all military and security operations in the region. Thus while Colonel Rahardjo, commander of *Korem Wira Dharma*, the sub-regional military command based in Baucau is under *Kodem IX/Udayana*, the Nusatenggara regional military command based in Bali, he is at the same time operationally under Kostrad's special East Timor Command. The first commander of this Command was Brigadier-General Sugito of the paracommandos (Kopassus) who has recently been appointed commander of the crucially important Jakarta Military Command, a post that always goes to an officer highly regarded by the Armed Forces leadership. (See *Military Profile* in this Bulletin.) We do not know who has been appointed as Sugito's successor in East Timor.

Unlike Colonel Purwanto who, as East Timor *Korem* commander, entered into negotiations with Fretilin in March 1983 and enjoyed a low profile, Colonel Rahardjo takes a low profile and is rarely mentioned in the press. (Colonel Purwanto's immediate successor was Colonel Rudito who was apparently taken ill and died not long after he took up the post.)

Rahardjo's troops are responsible for security and order in the *penitensians* or concentration-camp villages where the vast majority of East Timorese live. At this level, civil administration as the local extension of Carrascalao's bureaucracy has virtually no role to play. It is Army control that is the reality for people in the countryside, not the fantasy world of development projects which Carrascalao and the bureaucrats so energetically promote.

The troops on operational and territorial duties in East Timor are continually replenished with troops from Java. Thus, for instance, Infantry Battalion 403/Wira Sada Pratista of Jagjakarta has been on one-year stints doing 'territorial guidance duty' in East Timor three times since 1975. (*Indonesia Reports*, No 11, September 1985, quoting *Kedaulatan Rakyat*, 27 August.) Troops of the Air Defence Artillery Regiment 1 of Jakarta Military Command, the regiment involved in shooting down demonstrators in Tanjung Priok in September 1984, have regularly served in East Timor. (*Indonesia Reports*, quoting *Angkatan Bersenjata*, 21 August.)

### The colonial bureaucracy


East Timor is administered by a bureaucracy the upper echelons of which are composed of civil servants brought in from various parts of Indonesia. According to Lincoln Kaya (*Far Eastern Economic Review* 8 August 1985), posting to East Timor is coveted by ambitious officials not only because of premium salaries, which now include 'hardship' bonuses of up to 25%, according to a presidential decree introduced earlier this year, but also because a stint in East Timor promotes career prospects. These special bonuses are also paid to Indonesians working in health, education and the military. Since the military alone account for well over 10,000 people, the burden on East Timor's 'high per capita' budget of these inflated Indonesian salaries is clearly enormous.

Besides Carrascalao's 'handpicked', 'top-notch' administrators (to use Kaya's turn of phrase) brought in from all parts of Indonesia to run his 'provincial' administration, the development programmes in East Timor are run by the *Kepala Kantor Wilayah* (Kakanwil) or Heads of Regional Offices representing all the Jakarta-based government departments. These Kakanwil are oil officials from Java or Bali as is patently obvious from their names which frequently appear in the Indonesian press. They control the programmes and activities mapped out for East Timor in Jakarta. Moreover, since 1978, the administration of East Timor has been the responsibility not of the Interior Affairs Department but of the Department of Defence and Security.

The civil service in East Timor now consists of 10,050 people but as Carrascalao himself admits, many are Timorese who are kept on the payroll without being required to do a job of work because, he asserts, if they work, 'they can hurt people'. (Aslawati, 2 August 1985) Many of these Timorese worked for the former Portuguese colonial administration or were brought into the service by Carrascalao's predecessors, both of them from the Apodeti party. They appear to come low in Carrascalao's estimation though he seems keen enough to buy their loyalty.

The Jakarta government is always boasting about the large sums of money poured into its '27th province'. There is little the outsider can do to examine the reliability of official figures, but some simple comparisons make their claims suspect. For instance, Antara News Agency claimed in July this year that expenditure in East Timor in the past nine years has amounted to \$320 million (*Jakarta Post*, 19 July), but according to a Press Release of the Indonesian Embassy in Bonn (3 September 1985), it was \$361 million. The rupiah equivalents showed an even greater discrepancy... in the opposite direction! Antara said it was Rp 350 billion, while the Bonn Embassy's figure was Rp 278 billion.

For fiscal 1984/85, the budget was given as \$46 million with \$20 million for routine expenditures, \$23 million for development projects and \$23 million for *Impres*



In national gatherings, it is the Timorese participant who invariably gets the spotlight. Here, Mrs Suharto 'symbolically' pins a badge on a Timorese woman at a Pancasila indoctrination course. (*Jakarta Post*, 16 June)

(special presidential decision) projects. The routine budget was more than double the previous year's figure of \$9 million due to the sharp rise in the number of government officials. Carrascalao told a meeting of district chiefs in May this year that Jakarta had authorised another 290 development projects worth about \$22 million, but a few months earlier he had complained that only a quarter of the development expenditure budgeted for 1983/84 had been spent. There were even projects from the year before that had not yet been implemented; some of them had been simply abandoned. (Sinar Harapan 19 July)

The development projects being sponsored by Jakarta have given contractors and sub-contractors a field-day. The building fever has led to rampant land speculation in and around Dili. It was reported in July this year that government officials are buying up land from local peasants for the construction of luxury homes for Dili's new elite of bureaucrats. *Pejabats* (Indonesian officials) are acquiring land at \$3.5 per square meter, a fraction of land prices in Java. Things have become so bad that Carrascalao has complained of widespread corruption and the harmful effects of this land speculation.

The appearance of Dili has inevitably undergone a drastic transformation. An East Timorese who has been away from Timor for some years was struck during a recent visit to see how Dili has lost its Timorese character and has become a Javanese town.

#### Agriculture

According to Indonesia's fourth Five-Year Plan (1984-1989), food production, plantation crops, animal-husbandry and fisheries are the main areas of 'growth' in East Timor. Jakarta claims that a 'food surplus' has already been achieved in the districts of Alnaro, Bobonaro, Kovalima, Baucau, Manatuto and Liqueia. Rice production has gone up from 16,521 tons in 1979 to 33,572 tons in 1984. This is clearly the result of foreign aid programmes which are financing irrigation projects in certain parts of the country like the 10,000 hectare project in the district of Bobonaro. But these 'achievements' are irrelevant to the vast majority of Timorese peasants stashed away in heavily-controlled *permukimans*. Nothing has been done to restore East Timorese agriculture which has been wrecked by the catastrophic population upheavals that followed in the wake of the Indonesian occupation and the countrywide bombing campaign in the late 1970s.

The authorities show nothing but contempt for East Timor's 'backward' farmers and constantly emphasise that the rise in rice production is the result of 'the increase in the farming skills of the people' made possible by the influx of 'model' farmers from Bali. These Balinese farmers, brought over in the course of transmigration programmes implemented since 1982, have been placed in several new villages together with East Timorese villagers, known in Indonesia's developmentalist jargon as 'translocals', people who were uprooted from their own villages.

The myth of these 'model' farmers was shattered by a recent report in the Indonesian press that young Balinese transigrants had told journalists they were not farmers at all but senior high school graduates who had gone to East Timor under the impression that they would get jobs as businessmen or civil servants. (Indonesia Reports, September 1985, quoting Sinar Harapan, 28 August)

It is clear that *permukiman* in East Timor is producing two quite distinct types of new *permukiman* or settlements. There are the settlements where the vast majority of the population live, under tight control of the military and constantly restricted in their movements. These villages have been completely sidetracked by Indonesian-style development. But there are also a small number of settlements being set up in conjunction with new irrigated-rice projects and plantation sites which are getting a great deal of attention and capital investment from local and central government. These are known as *desa potensial* or 'villages of potential'.



These 'model' Balinese farmers, photographed in May this year, turn out not to have been farmers at all. The Balinese governor seeing them off can't have been unaware of that! (Jakarta Post, 13 May)

Two of these 'desa potensial' are runubibi in Bobonaro district and Beco in Kovalima district both of which are frequently spotlighted in the Indonesian press. They are the pet projects of Drs Basuki Adikusuma, head of the provincial office (Kowwil) of the Department of Transmigration in East Timor. Tunubibi was founded in 1982 and has a population of 30 Balinese families and 50 'translocals'. As a result of considerable government investment, Tunubibi is now using solar energy for its electricity and fresh-water supplies; it also has equipment for producing bio-gas and a whole range of other hi-tech facilities. During a visit to Beco earlier this year, Drs Basuki Adikusuma said that the village was inhabited by 169 'translocal' families. In May, 37 Balinese ('model farmer?') families were brought in and later, another 66 families were transported from Bali. Indonesian-style development requires that a Balinese family must live alongside each 'translocated' Timorese family.

At present it is impossible to know how many of these 'desa potensial' have been set up but their creation is clearly part of a major project to obliterate Timorese village life-styles once and for all, while at the same time transforming agriculture in East Timor to make it serve a cash-crop-based market economy. It is a system which enables Jakarta to control a potentially huge agricultural surplus while leaving the vast majority of Timorese to wither away in concentration camps with little land to cultivate and subjected to security regulations limiting their agricultural pursuits. These *permukiman* are kept strictly out of the view of visiting diplomats and journalists.

Ir Hadiono, the Javanese head of the East Timor office of the Department of Agriculture, recently gave foreign journalists a glowing picture of the direction being taken by Indonesian plans for East Timor's agriculture. He told them that one day, East Timor's 14,600 square kilometers will be transformed into a neatly and carefully organised 'cottage garden' with 15% of the land given over to producing vegetables, 9% aside for pasturing, 10% for tree-crop plantations, 2-3 commercial forests, 10% for irrigated-rice production and the remainder for non-agricultural uses. That's all very neat and tidy, but Ir Hadiono was silent on how the Timorese population would fit in with these plans and it seems that the journalists didn't question him on this aspect of the plan, either.

Because of the highly controlled nature of press reporting about East Timor, virtually nothing has seeped

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through about the economic position of Timorese peasants who have been incorporated into the rice projects. But Far Eastern Economic Review journalist, Lincoln Kaya provided a brief insight into the plight of Timorese growers of the country's main cash crop, coffee. In the first place, he discovered that PT Denak, the military-backed trading monopoly that was set up immediately after the Indonesian invasion in 1975 has not, as some reports claim, disappeared from the scene. It has simply been transformed into a company with a new name, PT Batara Indra whose directors are the same Java-based Chinese known to have managed PT Denak. In fact, Batara Indra is still popularly known in East Timor as 'PT Denak' and continues to exercise a monopoly over the purchase of coffee and other cash crops.

Although the amount of land now being used for coffee production has, according to Ir Hadiono, increased by 44,560 hectares, production has not increased. Carrascao blames the fall in yield per hectare on the aging bushes and the logging rejuvenation programme, but a retired coffee-grower interviewed by Lincoln Kaya blamed 'Denak' for "all the unpicked beans you see rotting on the bushes in the coffee regions. Back in Portuguese times, you could buy four packs of cigarettes



for what a kilo of coffee earned you. Nowadays, you could just about buy one pack." (Far Eastern Economic Review, 8 August 1983)

## Nearly 22,000 orphans in East Timor

There are no fewer than 21,833 orphans in East Timor, according to Nawawi Jufri, an Indonesian parliamentarian, following a visit to the region earlier this year. (Suara Karya, 27 April) He also discovered that there were 7,900 cripples, 11,231 homeless children, 17,403 elderly people without sustenance, 13,701 uncared-for widows, and a further 2,800 people bereft of social care (tuna sosial).

According to these figures, there are altogether 74,848 people (nearly 12% of the population of just over 500,000) "in need of social support" (pendayang masalah sosial) which, as far as one can make out from this statement, is simply not available.


He also said that 20% of the population of East Timor are living in isolated mountainous areas and that 60% of the territory of East Timor is inaccessible by available means of transport. Could he be referring to areas of the country that are beyond the control of the Indonesian forces of occupation?



This travel pass from Baucau to Dili, a distance of about 80 kilometres, had to be stamped on the way at 16 military and police posts.


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according to a report of the  
Revolutionary Council for  
National Resistance (CRRN),  
broadcast by Radio Maubere on 16  
September 1985.




## East Timor Guerilla activities, January-February 1985

Source: Fretilin radio, 23 June 1985



## East Timor Guerilla activities, March-April 1985

Source: Fretilin radio,  
8 September 1985



(Source: ACFOA East Timor Report, No.11 October 1985)