

ОРГАНИЗАЦИЯ  
ОБЪЕДИНЕННЫХ НАЦИЙ

СОВЕТ  
БЕЗОПАСНОСТИ



Distr.  
GENERAL

S/15753  
9 May 1983  
RUSSIAN  
ORIGINAL: SPANISH

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ПИСЬМО ПРЕДСТАВИТЕЛЯ НИКАРАГУА В СОВЕТЕ БЕЗОПАСНОСТИ ОТ 9 МАЯ  
1983 ГОДА НА ИМЯ ПРЕДСЕДАТЕЛЯ СОВЕТА БЕЗОПАСНОСТИ

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Виктор Уго ТИНОКО ФОНСЕКА  
Заместитель Министра иностранных дел  
Представитель Никарагуа в Совете  
Безопасности

5 MAY 1983

THE NEW YORK TIMES

# Transcript of President's News Conference on Foreign and Domestic Matters

WASHINGTON, May 4 — Following is a White House transcript of President Reagan's interview today by George Condon of Copley News Service, Bruce Drake of The New York Daily News, Sara Fritz of U.S. News & World Report, Carl Leubsdorf of The Dallas Morning News, Chris Wallace of NBC News and Steven R. Weisman of The New York Times:

## Action Against Nicaragua

Q. Mr. President, moving on to another topic, before this session began, you asked why you should not be scolding members of the House committee that voted yesterday to stop funding for covert operations against Nicaragua. Do you really see any consequences of that action? Does that vote stop you from doing anything, or hinder anything your Administration is doing?

A. It is in a committee. And there is the Senate yet to go on this. And I would hope that, maybe, we could do better there.

It, also, had an element in it that looked at partisanship, since the vote was on straight party lines. And I do not believe that that reflects the thinking of a great many Democrats, because many of them spoke up right after my speech.

## Nicaraguan Hypocrisy

Q. Does this vote indicate that you failed in your objectives in that speech?

A. No, as I say, because I know that there are still a great many Democrats who have been quite outspoken, including some of the leadership in the House of their party, in support of what I had proposed — of making this a bipartisan approach, and even being critical of some of their members who did seem to sound partisan.

The thing that needs telling about this whole situation in Nicaragua — I thought I had covered this subject but, maybe, I did not cover it enough the other night. And that is that, right now, these forces that have risen up in opposition to the Sandinista Government are — under what you might say is a sort of a group — a controlling body that formed in the northern part of Nicaragua. There are about seven leading members to this kind of committee. Most of them were former anti-Somoza people. They are people who simply want this Government of Nicaragua to keep its promises.

If you remember, the Organization of American States asked Somoza to resign at that time. And Somoza, his reply to them was that if it would benefit his country, Nicaragua, he would. And he did resign.

The Organization of American States also gave four points to the Sandinistas that they, the Organization of American States, would support them if their goal was these four things: of promoting democracy, of immediate elections, of a concern for human rights, and the Sandinistas acceded to that and said yes, those were their goals and they would keep those four provisions or promises. And they haven't. They never made an effort to keep them. They violated all of them.

Now, this is what makes me say that there's a great hypocrisy there of the Sandinista Government protesting what is happening in its own country and from people who were once a part of its own revolution at the same time that they are supporting people in another country who are seeking to overthrow a duly elected government of the people.

## Export of Revolution

Q. Mr. President, you — in referring to these groups, you seem to suggest that these groups are seeking a change in Nicaragua itself. And how does that statement square with your saying that we're not violating the law in aiding groups who seek the overthrow of the Nicaraguan Government?

A. Well, do they? Or are they asking that Government — or that revolution of which they themselves were part — asking it to go back to its revolutionary promises and keep faith with the revolution that the people of Nicaragua supported.

Many of these people are businessmen whose businesses have been taken over. They are farmers whose land was seized by this Government, farmers whose crops were — they were forced to sell them to the Government at less than the cost of production. And they're protesting this

violation of what had made them support the revolution to begin with.

But the whole purpose of the Sandinista Government seems to be not only with El Salvador but the export of revolution to their other neighbors, to countries that are already democracies. Honduras has taken that step; Costa Rica, the oldest democracy of all. And all of them are plagued by radicals in their midst who are encouraged by the Sandinista Government.

## Effect of a Cutoff

Q. Mr. President, I'd like to go back to what the committee actually did yesterday in voting the cutoff. C.I.A. Director Casey is reported to have said it would lead to a bloodbath for the guerrillas inside the country. Do you agree with that? And how seriously do you take what the committee does? How bad would it be if that cutoff of covert aid went through?

A. Well, I'm saying if — well, if that became the policy, I think it would set a very dangerous precedent. The executive branch of Government and the Congress have a shared responsibility, as I pointed out in my speech, for foreign policy. And we have — we each have a place in formulating foreign policy, but we each have a responsibility also. And I think that what I said about this was that it was very irresponsible. And it was — it literally was taking away the ability of the executive branch to carry out its constitutional responsibilities.

Q. Do you believe that it would lead to the bloodbath that the C.I.A. Director talked about?

A. Well, I haven't heard his entire remark in connection with that term or how he described it or what he meant with it. I'll make it a point to find out. I once used a "bloodbath" term as Governor of California, and one individual reversed it in the press and had it saying the opposite of what I had intended it to say and I never did quite get the situation cleared up.

## Method Held Ineffective

Q. Well, what — I don't understand. What's wrong with the committee's position? What difference does it make if instead of giving covert aid to the guerrillas in Nicaragua, you give overt aid to the countries of El Salvador and Honduras to stop the flow of weapons through their countries, which is what you say you want in the first place? What's wrong with that?

A. Except then the only help that you can give is through other governments. And I don't think that — I don't think that's an effective thing to do, and how do you know that the other governments would want to themselves, then, participate in helping the people that need the help? In other words, we'd be asking some other government to do what our own — what our Congressional, or our Congress, has said that we can't do.

### Overt Aid on Nicaragua

Q. Mr. President, can I follow up on something you said earlier? Did I understand you to say that if you were forced to stop aid to the Nicaraguan guerrillas, that you would try to funnel through other countries?

A. No, I was saying that's what the committee said, that the committee said we would have to go over it, and, then, in going over it, you can only give money to another government. And, if you did that, then you would have to be depending on — well, maybe those other governments in Central America would give that money to the freedom fighters in Nicaragua.

Now, if they want to tell us that we can give money and so the same things we've been doing — money, giving, providing subsistence and so forth to these people directly and making it overt instead of covert — that's all right with me. I just don't want the restrictions put on it that they might put on.

Q. You'd be willing to accept the idea of overt aid to the anti-Sandinista guerrillas in Nicaragua?

A. Yes, but not if they do it as one individual or more than one, as suggested on the Hill — that they would do it and, then, we would have to enforce restrictions on the freedom fighters as to what tactics they could use.

And I have said that if we were to do that, then I would expect that the only fair thing would be that the Nicaraguan Government would itself impose the same restrictions on the freedom in El Salvador, only I don't call them freedom fighters because they've got freedom and they're fighting for something else. They're fighting for a restraint on freedom.

### Fighters Betrayed

Q. Can I just — all of a sudden now we're aiding freedom fighters. I thought we were just interdicting supplies into —

A. I just used the word, I guess, "freedom fighters," because the fact that we know that the thing that brought those people together is the desire, as I said, for the same revolutionary principles that they once fought for and have been betrayed in. As I say, they have made it plain. They want what they once fought beside the Sandinistas to get. And they have been betrayed. And I thought that the use of freedom fighters was because — I found out that it seems as if there is a kind of a bias in the treatment of guerrilla fighters. It depends on what kind of a government they are opposing. And some are treated more kindly than others.

Now, I think the ones in El Salvador who are fighting against an elected Government, they are guerrillas. But in reality, when we talk about Nicaragua and everyone says, "the Government in Nicaragua," well, it was a Government out of the barrel of a gun. And, true, we favored it before I got here. We did not lift a hand for the existing Government of Nicaragua, because we did not believe that it was treating its people fairly.

And here was a revolution that took place that seemed to express all the things that we all believe in. Well now, they have not carried out those things. And they are there by force. And what really — other than being in control of the capital, you might say, and having a handle on all the levers — what makes them any more a legitimate Government than the people of Nicaragua who are asking for a chance to vote for the kind of government they want?

Q. Thank you, Mr. President.

# The Washington Post

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SUNDAY, MAY 8, 1983

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## U.S.-Backed Nicaraguan Rebel Army Swells to 7,000 Men

By Don Oberdorfer and Patrick E. Tyler  
Washington Post Staff Writers

In December, 1981, the CIA informed congressional oversight committees that it had begun building a highly trained commando force of 500 Latins to strike at targets in Nicaragua. Sixteen months later, this force has swelled to an army of 7,000 Nicaraguan men with ambitious political goals and uncertain U.S. control.

Members of the House and Senate Intelligence committees said in interviews that growing concern about the size of this CIA-supported army, its objectives and the question of control over it were major factors in their decisions last week to put brakes on the "secret war" in Central America.

Information now available from a variety of sources, viewed with the benefit of hindsight, raises questions about the candor of the CIA briefings for members of the Intelligence committees. Nevertheless, most of the lawmakers interviewed said they still believe they were informed accurately about details of the operation at every step.

The central problem for many of them, they said, was the growing contradiction between the limited objectives that Reagan administration officials stated for the covert operation in a dozen secret briefings on Capitol Hill and the ceaseless, sometimes startling growth of the insurgent force and the shifting focus of its activity from one month to the next.

"There is no question that the numbers increased far beyond what the committee anticipated," said Rep. William F. Goodling (R-Pa.). "I think as the force increases and diversifies, controlling it would be an impossibility."

Rep. Lee H. Hamilton (D-Ind.) said, "The committee kept track of it pretty well, but it got out of hand." Once this happened, he said, "there were great restraints on the capability of the committee to turn it around."

"What was particularly difficult for Congress," said Sen. Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D-N.Y.), "was that the definition kept changing of what the objectives were, and when the president proclaimed these people to be 'freedom fighters' there was an unmistakable sense that we were not fully apprised of the purposes."

Initially, administration officials characterized the missions of the secret army as the interdiction of arms traffic through Nicaragua to leftist rebels in El Salvador and the exertion of pressure to force the leftist Sandinista leadership of Nicaragua to "look inward" rather than exporting revolution, according to participants in the congressional briefings. Additional objectives, added months later, were to pressure the Sandinistas to be more democratic and to go to the negotiating table.

Despite President Reagan's reference last Wednesday to the CIA-supported anti-Sandinista guerrillas as "freedom fighters," his administration did not suggest in briefings for Congress that the secret army's real purpose was to bring down the Nicaraguan government.

Increasingly, though, the very size of the secret army, the intensity of its attacks inside Nicaragua and explicit statements by its leaders appeared to outpace the limited purposes outlined to Congress.

By the administration's figures, the 7,000 U.S.-backed Nicaraguan guerrillas now outnumber the 6,000 communist-backed guerrillas whose threat to the government of nearby El Salvador was the original justification for the CIA effort. In meetings with congressmen and senators, CIA Director William J. Casey has refused to set any limit on the ultimate size of the force, made up of Nicaraguan exiles of various factions and native Miskito Indians.

In the last week, the House Intelligence Committee voted to ban covert actions in Nicaragua, the Senate committee voted to permit continuation of the actions for a limited time subject to legislative approval, and Reagan stepped up his appeals for public support of the Nicaraguan insurgents.

Taken together, these events represent the most serious struggle between the executive branch and the congressional committees overseeing the intelligence agencies since the committees were established as permanent arms of the two houses in 1976 and 1977.

The congressional oversight machinery was created to establish, under law, the authority of the legislative branch of an open and democratic government to monitor executive activities that are secret, sensitive and have the potential for major international repercussions. As pioneers in an area where the legislative bodies of most other nations do not tread, the congressional committees operate in a twilight zone, where both sides are still feeling their way.

Unless a consensus can be formed in the coming weeks and months, the struggle over undercover action in Central America could bring about an even more serious crisis between Congress and the Reagan White House. Should the administration persist in backing the insurgents, against increasingly explicit opposition in Congress, the stage would be set for a battle of constitutional proportions involving war and peace, and the power to commit the United States to the use of force abroad.

As representatives and senators sketched the history of their involvement, the secret operations in Central America seemed at the beginning to be hardly big or tangible enough to merit concern.

In early March, 1981, within six weeks of Reagan's inauguration, CIA Director Casey brought the Intelligence committees a presidential "finding" that secret operations in Central America were important to U.S. national security. Such a presidential finding is required by a 1974 law. Under a 1980 law, it must be reported in a timely fashion to the two committees.

The initial Reagan administration program was outlined to the committees in very general terms, centering on the protection of the Salvadoran government from the communist-supported insurgency there. Casey also portrayed the program as resulting from inquiries from

# Nicaraguan Guerrillas' Growing Power and Bolder Attacks...

neighboring countries, such as Honduras and Costa Rica, about help against the spread of revolution.

The administration's emphasis was on undercover political and propaganda efforts and improved collection of intelligence about outside direction and arms for the Salvadoran rebels. An internal administration document of April, 1982, also spoke of the "9 March 1981 Presidential Finding on Central America" as an effort to interdict arms.

Despite the relatively vague nature of the finding and the proposed activity, some in Congress were concerned enough to dispatch personal letters of caution to the administration because of worries that, once begun, these activities could take on a life of their own.

For the new administration, 1981 was a year of deepening concern about Central America and high-level conflicts over what to do. The insurgency in El Salvador continued apace and, by the end of October, the State Department had failed in efforts to negotiate a cutoff of Nicaraguan support for the Salvadoran rebels.

Some officials, led by then-Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig Jr., favored a naval quarantine of Cuba and Nicaragua, but the Pentagon was leery. As the result of a National Security Council meeting on Nov. 16, 1981, Reagan approved a 10-point program including economic and military aid to friendly nations, U.S. contingency planning and military preparedness—but no U.S. military action.

One of the 10 points, according to NSC records, was to "work with foreign governments as appropriate" to conduct political and paramilitary operations "against [the] Cuban presence and Cuban-Sandinista support infrastructure in Nicaragua and elsewhere in Central America."

An accompanying document explained that this initially would involve a \$19 million program to build a 500-man force, but that "more funds and manpower will be needed."

The document added:

"Covert activities under the CIA proposal would be intended to:

- Build popular support in Central America and Nicaragua for an opposition front that would be nationalistic, anti-Cuban and anti-Somoza. [Gen. Anastasio Somoza, assassinated in 1980, was the Nicaraguan president overthrown by the Sandinistas.]

- Support the opposition front through formation and training of action teams to collect intelligence and engage in paramilitary and political operations in Nicaragua and elsewhere.

- Work primarily through non-Americans to achieve the foregoing, but in some circumstances CIA might, (possibly using U.S. personnel) take unilateral paramilitary action against special Cuban targets."

A few days later, on Dec. 1, Reagan signed the required "finding" that this new undercover effort in Central America was in the national interest. Shortly thereafter, in accordance with the law, Casey went to Capitol Hill to inform the two oversight panels of the presidential decision. There is no requirement under the law that he obtain their approval.

The CIA director spoke of the planned 500-man force as a carefully limited group whose target was the Cuban support structure in Nicaragua. No Americans and no mercenaries were to be involved, and no economic targets such as dams and power facilities were to be attacked.

The impression left with some members of the Intelligence committees was of crack teams of commandos hitting arms caches, ammunition dumps, Cuban military patrols and a couple of key bridges along the arms supply route in the dead of night and withdrawing unseen from Nicaragua to their Honduran bases.

Despite Casey's relatively low-key approach, lawmakers immediately recognized the plan as a serious advance in U.S. undercover activity. In the House committee room, there was almost a visible jolt, followed by a profusion of questions the CIA chief found difficult to answer.

What happens if you get caught, Casey was asked. What if the Nicaraguans enter Honduran territory in pursuit of the commandos? What happens if the beleaguered Nicaraguans ask for Cuban troops to defend their territory?

A Republican member said it was obvious that Casey had not thought through all the potential repercussions. A Democratic member was concerned even at that early stage about the legality, under the 1947 Rio Pact of hemispheric cooperation, of what the United States planned to do.

The reaction was not as strong in the Senate committee, according to participants, but concern was expressed there about the ultimate direction of the new program.

The CIA director presented the operation as one already under way. He mentioned at one point, in almost off-hand fashion, according to participants, that Argentines already had set up training camps for Nicaraguan exiles inside Honduras. In effect, the United States would be "buying in" to an existing operation, he was quoted as saying.

Casey's briefing in December, as participants recalled it, did nothing to suggest an anti-Sandinista political dimension, despite the discussion in the November NSC records of a broad opposition front backed by paramilitary action.

Casey returned to the congressional committees in February, 1982, and briefed the members, who had said they wanted to be closely informed on the progress of the operation. The meeting with House members was not particularly eventful, participants recalled, until the CIA's Latin America director, Dewey Clarridge, was asked how many commandos had been trained and replied that the force stood at 1,000 men.

To those who had thought of the force as 500 men, this was a disturbing revelation. CIA officials insisted they had informed the committee that the 500-man force did not include an additional 1,000 Miskito Indians who were undergoing training as commandos.

Records from the Nov. 16, 1981, NSC meeting reflect the administration's knowledge at the time that "The Argentines are already training over 1,000 men."

The oversight committees did not meet to review the program again until May, 1982. In the interim, newspaper stories revealed the existence of the CIA paramilitary program and President Reagan's approval to strike at targets inside Nicaragua.

News reports from Nicaragua on March 14, 1982, also revealed that two major bridges near the Honduran border had been blown up by saboteurs. The protesting Nicaraguan government immediately attributed the destruction to Reagan's reported covert operation and declared a state of emergency that is still in effect.

Casey, speaking in a different context the day before the bridges were blown, told a student group in Washington: "It is much easier and much less expensive to support an insurgency than it is for us and our friends to resist one. It takes relatively few people and little support to disrupt the internal peace and economic stability of a small country."

CIA officials confirmed to the House Intelligence Committee in May, 1982, that the key bridges had been blown up by a CIA-trained and -equipped demolition team. This confirmation brought no objection from the committee because the bridges were seen as supporting illicit arms traffic from Nicaragua to guerrillas in El Salvador, according to House committee members. "We had to do that," one member said.

Committee members questioned the CIA officials at length about the arms they had interdicted by this time and about whether they had discovered any Cuban military patrols, which they expected to find in the Nicaraguan countryside. The CIA officials said they had not actually captured or blown up any caches of arms or ammunition but that the presence of the paramilitary teams in the arms-trafficking corridors was dramatically reducing the arms flow to El Salvador.

The CIA officials reported that the force stood at about 1,100 men and that training was going well. No Cuban units, however, had been sighted, they reportedly said.

Over the summer of 1982, a decision was made to move the camps of the insurgents from Honduras, where there was increasing uneasiness among civilian officials, across the border into Nicaragua. House members, who were concerned about potential trouble for Honduras, were relieved to hear of this decision when informed in an August briefing.

The number of U.S.-supported insurgents had risen to nearly 1,500, according to the briefing. They were being outfitted with U.S.-financed equipment through Honduran military depots and were paid a subsistence fee of \$23 per month, according to CIA officials.

The steadily growing size and public prominence of the secret war brought a reaction from Congress. In August, a conference of the Senate and House committees amended the secret intelligence authorization bill so as to limit the purpose of the CIA effort.

In language made public and enacted anew as "the Boland amendment" last December, Congress declared that no funds could be spent to support irregular activities "for the purpose of overthrowing the government of Nicaragua or provoking a military exchange between Nicaragua and Honduras."

In light of the congressional concern, heightened by a Nov. 8 Newsweek cover story on the secret war, last December's briefing was a shocker. Suddenly the number of U.S.-supported insurgents had jumped to 4,000, nearly three times as many as four months before.

This news closely followed public statements by Nicaraguan exile leaders associated with the CIA effort that their objective was to overthrow the Sandinista government.

In a closed-door meeting on Capitol Hill, Casey said the numbers had swelled because Nicaraguans were "recruiting themselves" to join the fight against the unpopular Sandinista regime.

Under close questioning, one of Casey's aides admitted for the first time that "command and control problems" had been encountered. He attributed these to the withdrawal of Argentine advisers because of the war with Britain over the Falkland Islands and declared that "firm control" over the operation had been reestablished.

The operation also had been forced to employ more ex-Somoza Nicaraguan National Guardsmen than had been planned, lawmakers were told, because they were the only ones who wanted to fight.

One result of the redoubled concern on Capitol Hill was enactment in public session of the Boland amendment. Another was a request to the CIA for summaries of the secret operation at least once a month from then on.

By the first week of February, lawmakers were informed that the ranks of the U.S.-supported warriors had swelled to 4,500. There had been a discernible shift in their targets—a ranch had been hit, a granary burned—and in the avowed objectives, which now included pressure to bring the Sandinistas to the negotiating table.

There was a stormy meeting of the House Intelligence Committee, with many members reportedly feeling they had been misled about the size and scope of the enterprise. The chairman of the subcommittee on oversight, Rep. Wyche Fowler Jr. (D-Ga.), announced that he planned an inspection trip to the region.

On the Senate side, similar concerns had prompted an inspection trip in January by Sen. Patrick J. Leahy (D-Vt.) and a bipartisan staff group. Neither fact-finding mission did anything to allay congressional concern. Both groups of travelers reportedly concluded that the Boland amendment was being violated in spirit if not in letter.

Beginning this March, argument increased between the committees and Casey over the nature and purposes of the covert operation and whether the Boland amendment was being violated. A flurry of publicity in late March and early April—including detailed accounts by Washington Post and Newsweek correspondents of their observations of the CIA-supported guerrillas as invited guests of the supposedly secret force—provoked consternation in Congress.

CIA and State Department officials, called to Capitol Hill to explain, denied they had approved the reporters' visits. In lawmakers' minds, this raised even more urgently the question of U.S. control, especially since the size of the force was moving up toward the most recent estimate of 7,000 men.

The administration, under fire, sent Secretary of State George P. Shultz to the House committee to augment Thomas O. Enders, assistant secretary of state for inter-American affairs, who had been present with CIA Director Casey in nearly all the previous briefings on Capitol Hill, representing the State Department. On April 26, President Reagan himself summoned several House members to an Oval Office meeting to plead for a continuation of the secret operation.


In the view of some lawmakers, Reagan's unusual speech to a joint session of Congress on April 27 was designed to win support for the secret war in Nicaragua as much as it was to gain approval for more military aid for El Salvador.

But the public exhortation and private pleas to members of Congress, including a telephone call by Reagan from Air Force One to Sen. Walter D. Huddleston (D-Ky.) last week, failed to stop a majority of both the House and Senate Intelligence committees from acting to have the covert operation curtailed or much more clearly defined.

"We want the president to tell us in plain language just what it is he wants to do relative to Nicaragua," Senate Intelligence Committee Chairman Barry Goldwater (R-Ariz.) said in explaining the vote in his committee on Friday.

To make certain this is done, the Senate unit voted to permit the undercover war to continue only through Sept. 30 without a new presidential finding that must satisfy a majority of the committee.

In Honduras yesterday, a spokesman for the CIA-backed guerrilla force told United Press International that this deadline is acceptable. "There's no problem," he said. "We'll be in Managua in five months."



...Increasingly Contradict the Stated Goals of U.S. Involvement