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9 February 1948  
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JOINT MEETING OF THE JOINT SUB-COMMITTEE OF THE SECOND AND SIXTH COMMITTEES,  
SUB-COMMITTEE A OF THE THIRD COMMITTEE, AND SUB-COMMITTEE D  
OF THE SIXTH COMMITTEE

CORRIGENDUM TO THE SUMMARY RECORD OF THE FIRST MEETING

On page 5 replace the summary of the speech by Mr. ALAYZA (Peru) by the following summary:

"Mr. ALAYZA (Peru) said that the Working Paper was a reasonable basis for discussion. He agreed with the delegations of the United Kingdom and Canada on the point that there was no parallelism between the Economic Development Committee and the Tariff Committee. He felt that the Tariff Committee would have greater power than the Economic Development Committee. He found the general outline of the principles stated in pages 1 and 2 acceptable, although he thought that the subsequent proposals needed a substantial correction. Making a comparison between the Tariff Committee and the Economic Development Committee, such as they were constituted in the said proposals, he expressed the opinion that both should be permanent bodies of the Organization. He added that the interim character assigned to the Tariff Committee was more apparent than real, because as many speakers had pointed out, it was impossible not to admit that under one name or another there had to be an organ performing, on a permanent basis, the functions of the Tariff Committee. Therefore, the only provisional feature of the Tariff Committee was the membership of the countries composing it, but not the Tariff Committee as an operating body. Furthermore, he stated that in the Working Paper the Economic Development Committee appeared as a subordinate organ of the ITO inasmuch as the Executive Board appointed the members of this Committee; whereas the Tariff Committee depended exclusively on the signature of the GATT, the contracting parties to which alone are to decide on the admittance of new contracting parties. The right to appeal before the Executive Board or the Conference has been considered as the solution to the problem presented by an autonomous body, which would be the GATT parties operating as such or as the Tariff Committee, within the Organization. He felt, however, that this would be no adequate solution, /in view

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in view of the fact that the members of these two bodies are also outstanding members of the Executive Board and of the Conference. Finally, the terms of reference of the Economic Development Committee would be limited for the most part to Article 13, while the Tariff Committee would make decisions arising from Articles 17, 18 and 31, and it would be, in fact, a fundamental organ, particularly if the use of subsidies, and quantitative restrictions are limited, and the commercial policy of members is to be based on tariffs, internal taxes and monopolies referred to in said Articles 17, 18 and 31."

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