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PROPOSED INTERIM OPIUM AGREEMENT

Study on the Possibilities of Fixing the Price of Opium

Note by the Secretary-General

1. Pursuant to the decision made by the Ad hoc Committee of the Principal Opium-Producing Countries, during its meeting at Ankara from 21 November to 7 December 1949, which requested the Secretary-General

> "to investigate the possibilities of fixing the price of opium for the duration of the life of the proposed interim agreement . . . . and, if possible, to submit the results of such investigations for the consideration of the joint meeting of representatives of the principal drug-manufacturing and opium-producing countries" (E/CN.7/188; E/CN.7/AC.1/1, section 13),

the Secretary-General has the honour to submit the following study on price fixing.

2. This study proceeds upon the assumption that the suggestion made in document E/CN.7/194 on the organization and the financing of the International Opium Monopoly will form the basis for the establishment of that organ. The following terms, corresponding to those used in document E/CN.7/194, have accordingly been employed throughout this paper:

International Monopoly for the International Opium Monopoly;

Regulating Committee for the co-ordinating authority as its policy-making body; and

Agency for the international purchasing and selling agency.

3. The study is intended to provide a basis for discussion of the possibility of fixing opium prices at a relatively stable level, and the conclusion is reached that it should not be difficult for representatives of the opium-producing countries and of the drug-manufacturing countries to agree on practical measures to this end.

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/4. A study

4. A study on currency problems affecting international opium trade and the operations of the proposed International Monopoly will be submitted in due course. Hence, currency problems in regard to price-fixing have not been discussed in the present study.

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I. LONG-TERM PRICE-FIXING

A. Economic and other considerations

1. The question of fixing prices at which the International Monopoly will buy and sell opium should be solved in such a way as to ensure to the producing countries a fair return for their produce and to the manufacturing countries a steady supply of their raw material at a reasonable price.

2. To this end, the price-fixing policy of the Monopoly should be so contrived as to provide that the economic and cognate factors which have hitherto regulated the market value of opium shall, as far as possible, continue so to do.

3. It must be borne in mind, however, that the main objectives of the interim opium agreement and the International Monopoly are, on the one hand, to ensure sufficient supplies of opium to meet fully the medical and scientific requirements of the world, and, on the other hand, by limiting the production of opium strictly to these needs, to suppress illicit traffic and addiction to opiates. In other words, the guiding principles of the International Monopoly will be social and humanitarian.

4. It follows, therefore, that the commercial operations of the Monopoly may be expected to depart at times and in some degree from ordinary business practice.

5. Apart from the overhead costs which an efficient control will necessitate, the Monopoly must bear the cost of maintaining stocks of opium sufficient to meet such emergencies as a severe crop failure or a sudden and unforeseen increase in demand.

6. Moreover, it will have to purchase the stocks in existence when it comes into operation and to pay interest on the capital laid out in this purchase.

7. The report of the Ad hoc Committee of the Principal Opium-Producing Countries provides, among other things, for the purchase of the entire opium production in any given year even if it exceeds the estimated opium requirements of the countries using opium for medical and scientific purposes.[1/] This provision, considered necessary from the point of view of international narcotics control, may, at times, result in the International Monopoly's

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1/ See documents E/CN.7/181 and E/CN.7/AC.1/1, annex D, paragraph 6.

/maintaining

maintaining larger stocks than would, for instance, be necessary for normal buffer stock operations.

B. Restriction of poppy-growing

8. Experiences with measures aimed at restriction of agricultural production have shown that peasants resist such measures unless they are assisted in producing alternative crops.

It may be expected, therefore, (as was pointed out during the meetings of the Ad hoc Committee at Ankara) that some opium-producing countries will experience some difficulties on account of the limitation of production of opium to the quantity required for medical and scientific purposes. The possibilities of overcoming these difficulties by offering "technical assistance" should be carefully examined.

C. Stability of production

9. One of the main advantages to both producing and manufacturing countries will consist in stability of production and prices.

10. Legitimate opium requirements will be calculated on the basis of estimates submitted by the governments of the manufacturing countries. These estimates, after examination and approval by the Supervisory Body, will form the basis for advance orders to be issued by the International Monopoly to each opium-producing country.

11. If fluctuations in the supply of opium occur due to changes in yield or other factors, the stocks maintained by the International Monopoly will serve as a buffer stock and should thus contribute to the maintenance of stable prices. This will be discussed in chapter V (paragraphs 71-83).

D. Possibilities and requirements of agreements on price stability

12. Prices may be fixed:

(a) For the whole life of the interim opium agreement, that is, for five years; or

(b) For a shorter period than five years, but for more than a single crop year; or

(c) For each year.

13. Whatever the period of such agreement the discussions leading thereto must be conducted on agreed principles clearly defined, from the outset, in a price formula.

/14. The formula

14. The formula should express all the elements which have been vital hitherto in price negotiations between producers and manufacturers. The establishment of such a formula would be the best way of facilitating price-fixing by the International Monopoly.

15. Before agreeing on other aspects of the International Monopoly it would be most desirable to agree on price policy. A price settlement adopted for the duration of the Interim Agreement could be incorporated into its text.

16. If such a settlement is not reached at this stage, it must be concluded - for a period of one or more years - before the International Monopoly begins its operations.

17. A long-term price settlement should provide for price adjustments appropriate to fluctuations in demand (paragraphs 47-56) and supply (paragraphs 57-70) or for reconsideration in the event of an appreciable change in the quality of a particular national brand (paragraph 41) or a complete change in the general economic situation (paragraph 56).

II. THE MAIN FACTORS DETERMINING THE PRICE OF OPIUM

A. Quality and fluctuations

18. The most important factors to determine the price of opium after the establishment of the International Monopoly will be:

(a) The quality of the opium;

(b) The total volume of supply;

(c) The total demand for medical and scientific purposes;

(d) The competition encountered from:

(i) Producing and manufacturing countries not parties to the interim opium agreement,

(ii) Synthetic drugs.

B. The national brands of opium

19. The respective qualities of national brands of opium will continue to be the most important single factor affecting price differences. Any method striving for a stable solution of the price problem must be based on these qualities and their relation to the manufacture of drugs.

20. The International Monopoly will have to sell different national brands of opium. This will remain so as long as the proposal of the Ankara meeting that the Agency should "inform an importing country of the country of origin and trade mark of the opium with which it is being supplied"[1] is followed.

21. Some way must, therefore, be found of reflecting in the respective buying and selling prices all differences in the qualities of various national brands of opium. Any price settlement, whether for a longer or shorter period, will have to take account of such differences.

22. The main quality differences are due to the following factors:

(a) Morphine content;

(b) Content of codeine, papaverine, and thebaine;

(c) Variation in transportation costs and other expenses due to difference in the morphine content; and

(d) Variations in costs of processing due to differences in the wrapping, consistency, and general physico-chemical characteristics of the opium.

1/ See documents E/CN.7/188 and E/CN.7/AC.1/1, section 11 (c).

C. The alkaloid content of opium

23. The main product in which drug manufacturers are interested is morphine. Hence, any price formula must attach principal importance to the morphine content In point of fact, prices are at present calculated on the basis of the actual morphine content, determined by laboratory tests. Very rarely, if ever, are the contents of codeine, thebaine and papaverine tested before the price is fixed.

24. It must, however, be noted that the percentage of codeine which can be won from opium directly (and not by conversion from morphine) has assumed more significance in manufacturers' calculations during the past decade.

25. The use of thebaine and papaverine is also of growing importance and affects the price of certain opium brands. Thebaine and papaverine seem to be of greater importance to European than to United States manufacturers.

D. Weight, transportation and handling expenses

26. The differences in content of morphine and other alkaloids are important factors as such and they also influence the price of opium in other ways.

27. If, for instance, opium of brand X has a morphine content of 15 per cent and brand Y of only 11 per cent, a manufacturer will need about 27 per cent more opium to produce the same quantity of morphine from brand Y. In the latter case, he will have higher transportation and handling expenses; more samples will have to be taken for laboratory tests; more storage room will be needed; and other overhead costs will similarly increase. This must affect the relative prices. Hence, a high morphine content commands a premium.

E. Other differences

28. The method of wrapping also can make the handling of opium easier or more difficult. Moreover, certain manufacturers have adapted their machinery to particular types of opium. Although it would perhaps not be unduly difficult to adapt the machinery to other qualities of opium, these factors have created preferences for certain national brands.

29. The International Monopoly will, of course, do its best to cater to these various preferences; and its price policy will take account of existing usages and preferences.

III. A PRICE FORMULA FOR THE INTERNATIONAL MONOPOLY

A. The objectives of a price formula

30. The general objectives of any price formula to govern the fixing of opium prices have been defined in paragraphs 13-16.

31. Any price policy adopted by the International Monopoly must, as already stated, take into consideration all differences in qualities and all preferences at present affecting the international opium trade.

32. With these objectives in mind, the following formula has been conceived:

$$O_p = m_v \cdot m_c \cdot n$$

O_p denotes the price per kilogramme of opium;

m_v the value per kilogramme of morphine contained in the opium (the unit price of unmanufactured morphine);

m_c the percentage content of morphine (to be established by laboratory tests); and

n the "national factor", varying according to the country of origin.

33. The opium price would, thus, be determined by

(a) The so-called unit value of morphine;

(b) The actual percentage content of morphine which will be established by laboratory tests in the usual way[1]; and

(c) Certain national qualities of the various brands which were discussed in chapter II, paragraphs 18-22.

B. The "national factor"

34. Where the content of alkaloids other than morphine is of interest to manufacturers and such content is not determined by chemical analysis, it can only be expressed in the "national factor" (n).

35. Other considerations such as variations in wrapping, consistency, and physico chemical characteristics, would similarly be embodied in the "national factor".

1/ It would considerably simplify the international opium trade if the Agency were provided with a laboratory which would establish the morphine content by an agreed form of test.

/C. Long- and

C. Long- and short-term price fixing according to the formula

36. The figures representing the various "national factors" will require full discussion. Negotiations between the representatives of manufacturers and producers may focus on this feature of the formula.

37. The formula should facilitate long-term and short-term price settlements. The latter would require annual decisions on the co-efficients to be substituted for the symbols of the formula. The formula itself, however, would remain unchanged.

38. Discussion of long-term price settlements should include consideration of the following matters:

39. The value of m_v may be fixed for the duration of the settlement, possibly for five years.

40. It may also be possible to determine the various "national factors" for the duration of the agreement. If this could be done in addition to fixing the value of m_v, the price ingredients would be stabilized except for the morphine content, which would be established by test of representative samples taken from each major consignment.

41. Reconsideration of "national factors" should be made possible in order to encourage producing countries to improve the standard of their opium.

42. Reconsideration of the value of m_v also could be provided in the event of a radical change in the economic situation and the general price trend (see paragraphs 17 and 44-45).

43. Perhaps in time it may be possible to devise price formulae which would take into account the contents of codeine, thebaine and papaverine by test of individual consignments. But this is not yet practicable or requisite. However, more and complicated laboratory tests would be necessary for such formulae.

D. How prices would be computed.

44. After computing the purchase price of opium in accordance with the prescribed formula the Regulating Committee will decide what sum, if any, is deductible by way of commission (see E/CN.7/194, paragraph 47, and paragraphs 59 to 63 of the present study).

45. Ordinarily the selling price will be fixed by adding to the purchase price the commission on sales and the levy proposed in paragraph 50 of document E/CN.7/194.

IV. PRICE ADJUSTMENTS

46. The price of opium is subject in some degree to fluctuations in demand and supply.

A. Fluctuations in demand

47. World requirements of opium for medical purposes have shown a definitely increasing trend in recent years. With the expansion of health services and extension of obligatory health insurance to large sections of the world's population, the legitimate consumption of narcotic drugs is likely to continue to rise.

48. The use of synthetic drugs has absorbed some but not all of the increased demand for opium. The International Monopoly will, of course, watch the competition which may come from this quarter, but it is improbable that during the proposed five-year term of the interim opium agreement any sudden shift from opium drugs to synthetic drugs will take place.

49. Hence, plans for the International Monopoly and its price policies can be based on the assumption of a steady and perhaps increasing demand.

50. Since the suggested procedure requires that definite estimates of the expected demand shall be sent to the Regulating Committee before the production in any given year is ordered, no difficulty should ordinarily arise from variation in demand.[1]

51. It is possible to imagine circumstances in which manufacturers might not be able to honour their advance estimates, as, e.g., in the event of an economic depression.

52. Even in a grave depression, however, the need for manufactured drugs is hardly likely to be seriously affected and it should accordingly not be difficult to devise safeguards which would protect the International Monopoly from becoming burdened with unduly large stocks during such a period.

53. The obvious corollary to the provision that the International Monopoly should honour its advance orders is that manufacturers should be put under obligation to purchase a quantity of raw opium corresponding to their respective shares in their

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1/ On fluctuations in supply, see paragraphs 57-70.

/Governments'

Governments' estimates of opium requirements.[1]

54. Such an obligation would not impose an unduly heavy responsibility on manufacturers, since the consumption of manufactured drugs is unlikely to fall short of estimates based on previous actual consumption. Moreover, a long-term price settlement would provide for reconsideration of the price in such circumstances. (See paragraphs 17 and 42)

55. Even supposing, however, that consumption did in fact decline in a particular year, the manufacturing countries could reduce their estimates and their purchases in the following year and in this way adjust their positions.

56. If, on the other hand, demand should in any particular year exceed the estimates submitted by Governments, the difference between the estimated and actual demand could be supplied by the Agency from stock.

B. Fluctuations in supply

57. Fluctuations in the supply of opium may be caused by

(a) Surplus production due to yields above average (bumper crops, hereinafter referred to as surplus yield);

(b) Surplus production due to poppy-growing on a larger area than that assigned by the Regulating Committee (hereinafter referred to as surplus area)[2]; and

(c) Short crops.

(a) Surplus production

58. As recommended by the Ad hoc Committee at its Ankara meeting, the Agency wil have to take over the whole current opium production. It need hardly be said

1/ Such a guarantee would amount to the conclusion of a purchasing contract between the Agency and the manufacturers immediately after the Regulating Committee has allocated the production between the producing countries. At this time the opium price would have to be fixed even if no long-term price settlement should be reached. If the latter should be achieved it would be even easier for the manufacturers to bind themselves since the selling price would then remain unchanged throughout the five-year period.

2/ The size of the area will be determined on the basis of average yields during the past years.

/that storage

that storage of the opium produced in excess of requirements for the current year will increase the Agency's administrative expenditure.

59. This obligation will also entail additional financing either through the capital or the revolving funds or by commercial or long-term loans on which interest must be paid.[1/] For these and possibly other reasons the Agency will not be able to pay for excess production, due to surplus yield, the same price as for opium specifically budgeted for.

60. Since the International Monopoly will take over the storage of surplus stocks now carried by individual producing-countries, a deviation from the principle of paying each country the same price for opium of comparative quality would be justified. Prices paid to each country should thus be allowed to vary inversely with the yield. The following scale has been computed principally on the basis of the costs of interest, storage and handling that would fall on the International Monopoly. The scale is to be considered experimental and subject to change.

61. If due to surplus yield, the total annual production of an opium-producing country exceeds the "advance orders" to the producing country, the price paid by the Agency to the producing country should be reduced as follows:

Surplus production (per cent)	Price reduction for surplus (per cent)
5-10	5
11-25	10
26-50	15
51-75	20
76-100	25
over 100	30

62. Some adjustments of this scale may, at times, be possible and desirable. If, for instance, surplus yield in one country coincides with short crops in other countries so that the Agency would not be burdened by additional stocks, the Regulating Committee should have the power to make appropriate variations in the scale, having regard to the Agency's commercial situation.

63. On the other hand, if the stocks of the International Monopoly are already at their maximum of one year's world requirements before the excess production is

1/ See E/CN.7/194, sections 17 and 18

/taken over

taken over by the International Monopoly,[1] the scale may have to be revised upwards and may then range from 7.5 to 40 per cent.

(b) Surplus area

64. Growing opium on a larger area than that necessary to produce the amount of opium assigned to a producing country in a particular year will be a violation of the interim opium agreement. It will be the duty of the Regulating Committee to investigate such violations, and after establishing the facts, to decide on appropriate measures.[2]

65. In the interests of international narcotics control, the Agency will have to take over the total opium production even from a country that has violated the interim opium agreement. As with any other excess production, this will increase the Agency's cost but since in this case the excess will have derived from avoidable causes, the following measures may be considered:

(a) The excess production due to surplus area should be delivered to the Agency on credit (without interest);

(b) The surplus quantity should be absorbed by the quotas pertaining to the country in the following year (or years, if the amount is large);

(c) Payment should be made only when the surplus is thus absorbed by the country's "normal" quota and the Agency's storage cost till that time should be deducted from the price.

66. Such an arrangement would oblige the country concerned to reduce its area under poppies in the year or years following the surplus cultivation.

67. The arrangements suggested in paragraphs 59 to 66 are based on the assumption that statistics of both acreage and yield are supplied regularly to the International Monopoly.

1/ Not counting the so-called "old stocks", i.e., stocks already in existence at the beginning of the International Monopoly's operations which the Agency will if possible take over (E/CN.7/194, section 18, paragraph 62).

2/ See E/CN.7/194, section 2, paragraph 7 (b) and section 10, paragraph 28(1).

68. It may be objected that countries will be unwilling to admit the existence of surplus areas and that, accordingly, surplus crops will tend to appear as being due to surplus yeilds rather than surplus areas. If so, the apparent average yield for the country in question will gradually increase and the area allocated to it by the Regulating Committee, for the growing of poppies being based on the average yields during the previous five or ten years, will be gradually reduced. Thus a producing country could hardly in the long run reap any benefit from the use of misleading statistics.[1]

69. Moreover, the International Monopoly should be able to check the acreage under poppies by its inspectors.

(c) Under-production

70. Under-production of opium due to reduction of poppy-growing below the area prescribed by the International Monopoly is improbable, at any rate during the early years, though it may conceivable occur at a later stage. During the early years of the International Monopoly the emphasis is likely to be on the restriction of poppy cultivation.

1/ See Report of the Ad hoc Committee of the Principal Opium-Producing Countries (E/CN.7/188; E/CN.7/AC.1/1, Annex D, paragraph 6): "The co-ordinating Authority may request the Government concerned to furnish a statement of the reasons for such excess for communication, through the intermediary of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, to the other parties to the Agreement, and shall take such measures as may be necessary with a view to reducing such excess production in future years."

V. BUFFER STOCK OPERATIONS[1/]

A. The objectives of stocks

71. The International Monopoly will have to maintain large stocks because of:

(a) Short crops or other emergencies during which the supply of opium for medical and scientific purposes must be maintained; and

(b) The obligation to purchase the whole current production even if it exceeds the annual requirements.

B. Selling operations

72. The holding of an adequate stock should enable the Agency to supply the manufacturing countries with opium in accordance with their requirements, and at fixed and stable prices.

73. The opium should be bought at such prices as to enable the Agency to pay interest on commercial or other loans by which the stocks will have to be financed, to pay the cost of storage, and to sell the opium at normal prices without incurring losses (section O(a)).

C. Buying operations

74. The stock of opium will not be increased when prices seem inclined to fall, for its purpose is not to maintain prices. The reason for concentrating all supplies of opium in the hands of the International Monopoly is to ensure that opium is utilized only for medical and scientific purposes and that those needs are fully and regularly satisfied without check or intermission.

D. The size of the stock

75. The size of buffer stocks of other commodities differ.

76. The cane-sugar agreement of 1942, for instance, provided for a buffer stock of not less than 10 per cent or more than 25 per cent of the cane-sugar exporting countries' annual production.

77. Other commodity agreements have fixed the size of buffer stocks at a certain percentage of the annual exports of the respective countries.

1/ For a definition of the term buffer stock, see League of Nations, Report of the Committee for the Study of the Problems of Raw Materials, document A.27.1937.II.B.

"In order to increase the elasticity of producing countries operating under regulation schemes by enabling them to meet sudden additional demands, experiments have more than once been made in forming 'buffer stocks' of regulated commodities, that is, stocks which are segregated from the market and released only when there are particular reasons for doing so". Page 57.

/78. In some

78. In some commodity agreements the size of the buffer stock is regarded as absolutely flexible, solely dependent on price movements.

79. In the case of the International Monopoly, a principal objective in holding stocks is to provide an uninterrupted supply to countries using opium for medical and scientific purposes. Therefore, it seems appropriate to fix the size of the buffer stock in relation to demand rather than to supply. Moreover, climatic variations may cause major fluctuations in the volume of production so that it might be difficult to define the stocks in terms of annual crops.

80. It has been suggested that the stock of the International Monopoly should be large enough to cover one year's world opium requirements for medical and scientific purposes.

81. This is a larger stock than is isually provided for in commodity agreements. However, the obvious necessity for keeping medical and scientific needs fully satisfied in respect of narcotic substances is alone a valid reason for an adequate stock. Account must also be taken of the fact that opium is produced chiefly in countries with considerable annual variations in rainfall with consequent fluctuations not only in an individual country's production but, indeed, in world production, since droughts may occur simultaneously in more than one country. Finally, the International Monopoly must purchase excess production in the interest of international narcotics control.

82. Hence, larger stocks will have to be kept than might be necessary for purely economic and commercial reasons, or for buffer stock operations as practised in regard to other commodities.

/83. This must be

83. This must be borne in mind when the financing of the International Monopoly and the expenses for interest on long-term and other loans are considered.[1/] The International Monopoly's general policies also will be determined by other than purely economic considerations, for its main objectives differ considerably from those of commodity agreements.

1/ On the problems of financing buffer stock operations and the cost of maintaining stocks, see League of Nations, Report of the Committee for the Study of the Problems of Raw Materials, document 27.1937.II B, page 58: "... there might be great difficulty, more particularly from a financing point of view, in arranging that substantial reserve stocks of this kind should in fact be held in producing countries. The establishment of the stocks would involve the provision of capital to finance the stocks themselves and perhaps to erect accommodation for them, and also the payment of recurrent charges for maintenance. Even if the general obligation of the producing countries to hold these stocks were recognized, it would not be easy to convert this general obligation upon the country into a specific obligation upon the producer to hold his share of the stock since almost every producer might well find good reason for arguing that he at any rate should be exempted. Indeed, they might even argue that, since the buffer stock was being created primarily in the interest of the consumers, the consumers themselves should accept the liability involved."

ANNEX I. THE APPLICABILITY OF THE PRICE FORMULA

84. In order to test the price formula suggested in the body of the study (see chapter III, paragraphs 30-45), several assumptions must be made, which anticipate actual figures to be substituted for the symbols in the formula. Such figures will, in practice, be arrived at only after negotiations between the representatives of the producing and the manufacturing countries have resulted in agreement or, if necessary, by a decision of the Regulating Committee.

85. The suggested formula is: $O_p = m_v \cdot m_c \cdot n$

86. The first assumption concerns m_v, which denotes the value per kilogramme of morphine contained in the opium. On the basis of the price paid for opium in the United States in 1949, the anhydrous morphine costs about $140 per kilogramme while still in the opium. Let us take this as the value of m_v, for the sake of the present example.

87. It is also necessary to make certain assumptions for the so-called "national factors" of several countries. Merely for this example, it is assumed that

brand A has an average morphine content of 15 per cent
brand B has an average morphine content of 13 per cent
brand C has an average morphine content of 11 per cent
brand D has an average morphine content of 9 per cent

However, it must be assumed that there are other quality differences due to varying contents of codeine, thebaine, and papaverine, and other preferences by manufacturers for certain brands of opium (see paragraphs 26 to 29).

88. On this basis, the assumption is made, that brand A should receive a premium of about 8 per cent over the basic price, brand B a premium of 10 per cent, brand C of 7 per cent, and brand D of 4 per cent. Hence the various "national factors" would be:

n_a (national factor for brand A) 1.08
n_b 1.1
n_c 1.07
n_d 1.04

89. One further assumption is necessary in regard to the morphine content of the opium actually shipped, in order to substitute the corresponding figures for the sumbol m_c. Under this assumption, the actual morphine content, as established by laboratory tests is taken to be: 15 per cent for brand A, 13 per cent for brand B, 11 per cent for brand C, and 9 per cent for brand B.

/90. Hence, the

90. Hence, the actual price per kilogramme of opium, as computed on the basis of the price formula, would be for:

					Per kilogramme of opium
brand A	140	. 0.15	. 1.08	=	$22.68
brand B	140	. 0.13	. 1.1	=	$20.02
brand C	140	. 0.11	. 1.07	=	$16.48
brand D	140	. 0.09	. 1.04	=	$13.10

ANNEX II. ALKALOID CONTENTS OF VARIOUS BRANDS OF OPIUM

91. The following table shows the average contents of alkaloids in various brands of opium; the averages are based on laboratory tests run on a number of representative samples:

	Percentage of:			
	Morphine	Codeine	Thebaine	Papaverine
Brand A	15	1.1	0.75	1
Brand B	13	1.25	1.5	1.75
Brand C	11	3.5	2	2
Brand D	9	3	0.05	0.75

92. The above averages show that a high percentage of morphine content does not always coincide with equally high contents of other alkaloids.

93. Conclusions from this fact are presented in chapter II, paragraphs 18-25, and chapter III, paragraphs 36-43.