

FINAL RECORD OF THE SIX HUNDRED AND FORTY-FIRST MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva  
on Thursday, 9 July 1974, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. M. NISIBORI

(Japan)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

<u>Argentina:</u>	Mr. V.E. BERASATEGUI
<u>Brazil:</u>	Mr. G. ALVARES MACIEL Mr. A. BIER Mr. M.T. DA SILVA
<u>Bulgaria:</u>	Mr. R. NIKOLOV Mr. B. GRINBERG
<u>Burma:</u>	U THAUNG IWIN
<u>Canada:</u>	Mr. A.D. ROWE Mr. D.R. MACPHEE
<u>Czechoslovakia:</u>	Mr. J. STRUCKA
<u>Egypt:</u>	Mr. S.A. ABOU-ABI
<u>Ethiopia:</u>	Mr. G. DEMISSIE
<u>Hungary:</u>	Mr. I. KOMIVES Mr. I. KORMENDY
<u>India:</u>	Mr. B.C. MISHRA Mr. M.K. MANGALMURTI Mr. H.N. SUKHDEV
<u>Italy:</u>	Mr. N. DI BERNARDO Mr. P. BRUNI Mr. A. BIZZARINI
<u>Japan:</u>	Mr. M. NISIBORI Mr. A. YATABE Mr. H. OKA Mr. T. INOUE Mr. H. TSUJIMOTO

Mexico:

Mr. M. MARIN

Mongolia:

Mr. M. DUGERSUREN

Morocco:

Mr. S.M. RAHHALI

Netherlands:

Mr. M.J. ROSENBERG POLAK

Mr. E. BOS

Nigeria:

Mr. B. AKPORODE CLARK

Mr. OLAJIDE ALO

Mr. F.J. OSEMEKEH

Mr. M.G.S. SAMAKI

Pakistan:

Mr. N.A. NAIK

Mr. M.J. KHAN

Poland:

Mr. S. TOPA

Mr. A. CZERKAWSKI

Romania:

Mr. C. ENE

Mr. V. TUDOR

Mr. A. SASU

Sweden:

Mr. L. ECKERBERG

Mr. U. REINIUS

Mr. S. ERICSON

Union of Soviet Socialist  
Republics:

Mr. A.A. ROSHCHIN

Mr. Y.K. NAZARKIN

Mr. N.V. PESTEREV

Mr. I.P. GLAZKOV

Mr. J.P. KLUKIN

Mr. J.D. USPENSKY

United Kingdom:

Mr. D.H. ENNALS

Mr. H.C. HAINWORTH

Mr. D. SUMMERHAYES

Mr. J.G. TAYLOR

Mr. A. WHITE

Mr. I.C. SLOANE

United States of America:

Mr. J. MARTIN

Mr. R.W. DREXLER

Mr. R.J. EINHORN

Mr. J.H. McNALLY

Mr. D.D. STEDHAM

Yugoslavia:

Mr. M. LALOVIC

Mr. M. MIHAJLOVIC

Special Representative of the  
Secretary-General:

Mr. ILKKA PASTINEN

Alternate Representative of the  
Secretary-General:

Mr. A. CORRADINI

Communiqué of the meeting

The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament today held its 641st plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of H.E. Ambassador M. Nisibori, representative of Japan.

Statements were made by the representatives of the United Kingdom and India.

The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday, 11 July 1974, at 10.30 a.m.

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The CHAIRMAN: We have today the pleasure and the privilege of seeing in the seat of the United Kingdom the Right Honourable David Ennals, M.P. and Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs.

On behalf of the members of the Committee, I should like to extend to Mr. Ennals our most cordial welcome and to assure him that we shall listen with particular interest and attention to what he has to say.

Mr. ENNALS (United Kingdom): Although I am by designation the leader of the United Kingdom delegation to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, this is the first opportunity I have had to attend your Committee. And even this first occasion will be short. I had planned to be here for both sessions this week, but have now been summoned back to London for urgent parliamentary votes tomorrow and Thursday. I hope to pay another visit as soon as possible.

I have over many years taken a close interest in the whole field of disarmament and arms control, and in the few months since I became a Minister have been active both in following your deliberations and in shaping my Government's policies in the general field of foreign policy and, specifically, in the field of disarmament. I hope therefore that, though a new arrival, you will not feel it presumptuous of me to plunge into the complex issues which are the regular diet of this Conference. I want to reassert that it is the policy of Her Majesty's Government to take every opportunity to promote the cause of disarmament. It will be in the forefront of our policy-making and we shall seek both to take initiatives and to support others in their attempts to bring down the level of armaments and arms expenditure. Multilateral disarmament is an essential ingredient for a safer world.

I start therefore by pledging both myself and my Government to work constructively with other members of this Conference. For some years I worked with Nobel Peace Prize winner Philip Noel-Baker. A previous Labour Government played a prominent part in preparing for the Partial Test-Ban Treaty (ENDC/100/Rev.1); and, more recently, one of my colleagues who held the responsibility I now hold took the initiative which led to the successful negotiation of the Biological Weapons Convention. I hope that I too shall be able to make some modest contribution to the achievement of the objectives of disarmament to which all of us here are committed.

There must be times when some who have been involved in this particular forum have felt discouraged and disillusioned. Over the years, achievements have often fallen short of our hopes. But even when there has been little progress in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament the process of arms limitation and disarmament has not stopped: debate has continued in other arenas, such as the series of bilateral talks between the United States and the Soviet Union. Only last week we saw the conclusion of two important agreements -- on limiting underground nuclear tests and anti-ballistic missile sites -- between President Nixon and Mr. Brezhnev in Moscow; and the assertion of a will to reach new agreements on strategic arms limitation, on the modification of the environment for hostile purposes, and on chemical warfare.

(Mr. Ennals, United Kingdom)

Finally, the evident growth in Moscow of understanding between the two super-Powers can, given perseverance and goodwill, contribute to an increase in the security of us all. On a wider front my Government is playing its full part, with many others, in the Multilateral Balanced Force Reduction talks and the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. The evidence which we see of activity in the field of arms limitation and disarmament is in my view encouraging, and it is wrongheaded to argue that no progress is being made. Disarmament and improvement in the international political situation are inextricably intertwined.

As fears and suspicions between nations are reduced, the atmosphere for constructive negotiations in the fields of disarmament and arms limitation is improved. But it is no less true that the steady, patient work of the experts in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament is itself a contribution towards improved international relations. While we cannot expect spectacular progress here, or in any other conceivable forum which we can hope to devise, without progress in the political climate, I have no doubt that by perseverance in constantly re-examining the problems before us we may hope to contribute towards the development of trust between nations. Equally, we must be ready to exploit improvements in international relations to the advantage of disarmament.

Progress is inevitably gradual. We are all experienced enough to know that success in attaining our objectives does not merely depend on the sincerity of those who are gathered here representing their governments. This Committee alone has the experience and dedication to treat the obstinate problems of disarmament with the respect and stubbornness they demand. We should not throw away this well-proven and practical body in a fit of exasperation at a check in momentum which, we all hope, will be temporary.

The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament has rightly given first place in its deliberations to nuclear disarmament -- not without some success. The Cuban missile crisis of 1963 made us all acutely aware how important it was to create an international framework in which we could control the testing and development of nuclear weapons. Two principal agreements were negotiated for this purpose. The first of these was the Partial Test-Ban Treaty of 1963; following its signature, the number of nuclear tests carried out in the atmosphere rapidly declined, to the benefit of the whole international community. As we have often said, we hope that all countries which have not yet acceded to this Treaty will do so.

(Mr. Ennals, United Kingdom)

The second agreement is, of course, the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968 (ENDC/226). Its purpose was, and still is, to control the spread of nuclear weapons and of nuclear explosive technology. Nuclear weapons exist: the NPT recognized that fact and defined as nuclear-weapon States the five countries that possessed nuclear weapons on 1 January 1967. However, the Treaty also attempted to still the deep-seated fear that the spread of nuclear weapons throughout the world was inevitable, that five nuclear-weapon States would turn into six, six into seven and so on, until we found ourselves living in a nightmare world of nuclear armed States in which even a regional confrontation between rivals could lead to a nuclear war which threatened to encompass the whole globe. For their part, the nuclear-weapon States undertook not to assist or encourage any other Power to obtain nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The non-nuclear weapon States promised not to attempt to develop a nuclear explosive capability themselves.

The framers of the NPT had no desire to deprive any country -- least of all the developing countries -- of the potential benefits of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The parties to the Treaty have specifically undertaken to facilitate the exchange of equipment, material and information for this purpose. To ensure that there should be no abuse of such exchanges, the Treaty, however, made provision for international safeguards designed to deter States from diverting material and information to the wrong ends, by creating the certainty of detection. The safeguards system which has been devised and is being implemented conscientiously, painstakingly and with expert thoroughness by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), testifies to the good faith of the very large number of countries -- now over 80 -- who have considered it in their best interests to accede to the NPT.

As the Conference will recall, in 1967 the United Kingdom Government voluntarily offered to afford an opportunity for safeguards to be applied to the peaceful nuclear programme of the United Kingdom, and we are now negotiating with the International Atomic Energy Agency on the application of the Agency's safeguards. We have done this in the hope of facilitating the acceptance and ratification of the NPT by those who have not yet done so.

I have just said that the Treaty is not designed to interfere with the development of nuclear energy for peaceful uses; but there is one important area where special problems arise -- the application of nuclear explosive technology to peaceful purposes. As the Treaty in effect recognises, in terms of nuclear proliferation there is no distinction between an explosive nuclear device intended for peaceful purposes, and one designed as a weapon. The Treaty therefore explicitly prohibits the proliferation of



(Mr. Ennals, United Kingdom)

nuclear explosive devices, as well as of nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, the Treaty recognizes that if nuclear explosive devices should at some future date -- which we believe to be still some years off -- become a commercially significant engineering technique, then non-nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty would not be deprived of the potential benefits of peaceful nuclear explosives. Indeed, they would be entitled to obtain them without themselves developing or acquiring nuclear explosives, with all the consequent demands on their resources. The Treaty makes provision for this in Article V.

It was our great hope that the NPT would effectively call a halt to the numbers of nuclear-weapon States. We believed -- and still believe -- that it could make the world a safer place and bring about a new climate of trust and confidence in which further arms-limitation agreements in the nuclear field can be negotiated. We hoped that at the Review Conference in Geneva next year the success of the NPT would be confirmed and that many non-signatories of the Treaty would have signed and ratified it by next year.

This is still our hope, but the Indian nuclear test has cast a shadow over these hopes. The Indian Government have since stated categorically that it is still opposed to the development of nuclear weapons and that its explosion was designed solely for peaceful purposes. But the NPT depends on the principle that, if non-proliferation is to work, the development of all explosive nuclear technology must be strictly controlled. My Government cannot hide our deep concern nor disguise our disappointment. Whatever may be the declarations of peaceful intent of the Indian Government -- and we have noted its assurances -- we cannot doubt that India's decision as a non-signatory Power to "go it alone" has awoken once again the fears and increased the danger that others may decide to follow suit.

It has been estimated that ten or so of those countries which have not signed the NPT already have the capability to produce a nuclear device even at the cost of a crippling diversion of national resources, and that yet others might seek to demonstrate the political will to do so in search of protection, deterrence or a status symbol. The world would thus become a more dangerous place and the aims of the non-proliferation initiative would be frustrated. It is still open to India to accede to the NPT and to join the majority of States Members of the United Nations, including the United Kingdom, who are placing their peaceful nuclear facilities under international safeguards.

(Mr. Ennals, United Kingdom)

My Government shares the view expressed in this Committee on 2 July by Mr. Martin (CCD/PV.639, page 9) that the NPT is one of the most significant contributions to disarmament and world peace. We believe that it is more than ever important for us now to strengthen the non-proliferation régime and encourage all countries to play their part. It may now prove necessary for the parties to the Treaty to consider whether there are ways in which the guarantees and safeguards contained in the Treaty can be strengthened, to give greater assurance and confidence to those who have by failure to adhere to the Treaty indicated their wish to keep their nuclear options open.

If existing parties to the NPT will co-operate to the full in implementing international safeguards, and if those States now considering ratification will end their indecision and ratify without further delay, the Review Conference in 1975 could prove an historic occasion and demonstrate our determination to control the dangers which could engulf us. I therefore wholeheartedly support the view expressed by Mr. Roshchin in this Committee on 23 May (CCD/PV.638, page 23) that it will be the most important task of the Review Conference to devise practical steps for strengthening the NPT in every possible way. The aim of my delegation -- at the Preparatory Committee as well as at the Review Conference itself -- will be to concentrate upon essentials and to ensure that the Review Conference gets its priorities right. We want this Review to achieve a positive extension of the international anti-proliferation régime. We want to see it find positive ways to allay the anxieties which originally called forth the Treaty itself. We shall do all in our power to demonstrate our continuing faith in the NPT and our intention that it should be fully effective.

I have already referred briefly to the Partial Test-Ban Treaty, which many of us regard as a step -- a big step -- on the path towards a comprehensive test-ban agreement. Another step took place last week with the signature in Moscow of the new threshold agreement on underground nuclear tests. The implications of this agreement are not limited to the bilateral relations of the United States and the Soviet Union. My Government have already welcomed this agreement and have declared that the United Kingdom will support it. We hope that others also will follow our lead in voluntarily committing themselves to abide by its provisions. The new agreement places important new limits on the size of those nuclear explosions which are still permitted under the Partial Test-Ban Treaty and reflects the significance of remote seismic monitoring techniques, to which my delegation has often drawn attention.

The preamble to the agreement reaffirms the determination of both parties to pursue the goal of a comprehensive test-ban. We share that aim. The technical difficulties still before us are great, but we believe that with patience and persistence yet further

(Mr. Ennals, United Kingdom)

progress can be made. To this end my delegation will shortly be tabling a working paper which will deal with some of the problems of discriminating between earthquakes and explosions, problems which are directly relevant to establishing an effective monitoring régime for a comprehensive test-ban agreement.

The United Kingdom Government also welcome the announcement at last week's Moscow summit that the United States and the Soviet Union have agreed to consider a joint initiative in this Committee with respect to the conclusion, as a first step, of an international convention dealing with lethal chemical weapons (CW). We hope that this declaration of intent, together with the Japanese draft convention which is already before us, will lead to new movement in the difficult negotiations on CW. We have often stated our position on this topic. We want, and are committed to seek, effective measures for a comprehensive prohibition of chemical weapons and for the destruction of existing stockpiles. We have also said that we are prepared to consider partial measures.

However, chemical weapons are of considerable military importance. A State which possessed them would have a potential military advantage over a State which did not. Any State which commits itself to renounce CW under an international agreement must be satisfied that other States would not be able to contravene that agreement. A comprehensive prohibition which did not cater for the need of the signatories to be assured of other States' compliance would bring risks of military instability and might have results of the utmost gravity.

It is against this appraisal that we have studied the proposals put forward by the Japanese Government for a comprehensive prohibition of CW. I am glad to say that its draft contains much with which my Government can agree. Our Japanese colleagues are to be congratulated not only on their courage in bringing new ideas to chemical disarmament, but also on the ingenuity with which they have sought to find common ground on the major obstacle of verification. Whether their attempt will succeed will perhaps become clearer as our debate here continues. We believe that the establishment of an international verification agency, with an independent standing and the right to initiate a number of significant actions, is an interesting idea which needs developing further.

We also believe that the suggested complaints procedure includes some useful provisions. By putting the onus of rejecting inspection on to the State accused of contravening the Treaty, prohibited activities would be discouraged and a State which cheated might be gravely embarrassed. However, a falsely-accused State would have nothing to fear from this procedure, for by inviting an inspection it could prove its innocence.

(Mr. Ennals, United Kingdom)

On the details of the suggested complaints procedure; therefore, we have little to criticize. However, I hope that my Japanese colleague will understand me when I say that, whereas his draft comprehensive convention tackles constructively the problem of what the international community should do once a breach of the convention has been detected, it does not, as it stands, show how the early detection of any suspected breach would take place.

This brings us back to the problem of the verification of a comprehensive prohibition, which has caused such difficulties in the past. I do not think that my Japanese colleague will be disheartened by what I have said. We all noted his wise words at the meeting of the Committee on 18 April (CCD/PV.628, page 8) that it is essential in negotiations on disarmament to seek measures to assure the fulfilment of agreements. Our aim is the same. But it would be wrong to underestimate the very real difficulties involved or to believe that they can somehow be smoothed over or talked away. They are difficulties of substance based not only on an assessment of State interest, but also on a judgment of what is the best way to ensure peace and stability.

We hope that discussions of the Japanese draft convention, and of the ideas which the United States and the Soviet Union may be putting forward, will enable us to find common ground; we intend to approach it in that spirit. A British expert will be present at the meeting next week which will discuss the technical aspects of the Japanese draft. I hope that that meeting will be useful.

Before I conclude, I should like to comment briefly on one or two other subjects which have attracted the attention of this Committee. If I have dwelt so far on nuclear and chemical weapons, this does not mean that my country regards the continuing spread of other weapons with equanimity. A recent report from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute has suggested that, although during the last five years total world expenditure on arms has probably remained constant, the expenditure of some countries has risen. NATO expenditure, according to the report, has dropped by 17 per cent since 1968, and Warsaw Pact spending has remained roughly constant.

But the expenditure of some countries in the developing world has risen, especially in the Middle East, where it is said to have doubled between 1970 and 1973 and to account now for 14 per cent of the gross domestic product of some States. This is a disturbing picture. We hope that it will be possible for all States, not just the major military powers, to reduce the amounts they now spend on armaments and devote more resources to peaceful purposes. My Government is at present conducting a review of defence commitments and capabilities with a view to substantial cuts in defence expenditure.

(Mr. Ennals, United Kingdom)

The United Kingdom Government attaches importance to the forthcoming Conference of Government Experts to be held in Lucerne, which will discuss "Weapons which may cause unnecessary suffering or have indiscriminate effects". We hope that this Conference will further the humanitarian aims which we all hold in common. We have agreed to support it and intend to send a strong team of experts. The legal, military and medical problems involved will be complex, but it will be our intention to submit positive proposals for consideration.

One of the functions of arms limitation and disarmament in general, and of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in particular, is to create an atmosphere of trust among the nations. The Swedish representative, Mrs. Thorsson, made a notable contribution to the discussion of this topic in introducing on 14 May (CCD/PV.635, pages 6 et. seq.) the Swedish working paper CCD/421 -- an approach which the representative of the United States, Mr. Martin, endorsed at the opening meeting of this session (CCD/PV.639, pages 7,8). Openness is a vital quality across the whole field of disarmament; for reductions can only take place against a known base, and States can only agree to general prohibitions if they are confident that they will know that other States are abiding by them. We therefore attach importance to the concept of openness on military expenditure, which was the subject of the Swedish working paper. Details of the United Kingdom defence budget are of course published each year and are available to all. We hope that other States which do not already do so will now make details of their spending public.

The suggestion that States should make proportionate reductions in their military expenditure as a means of disarmament is also being studied under the auspices of the Secretary-General of the United Nations. I am very pleased that the Secretary-General has appointed a distinguished Briton, Professor John Erickson of Edinburgh University, to his panel of experts on this subject. We look forward to seeing their report. It is possible that these discussions about military expenditure might eventually help us to develop new techniques of disarmament, leading to the reduction of the great sums now spent for military purposes throughout the world.

I have already spoken of some of the frustrations that face the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and of my Government's belief that we should not allow the Conference to falter. Rather, we hope to see the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament develop further. We shall be happy to see a modest enlargement, if that is the desire of other member States, and in particular to welcome the Governments of the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic, which I understand have now made formal application to the co-Chairmen to be admitted to the Conference.

(Mr. Ennals, United Kingdom)

However, it would be a mistake if, in the course of enlargement, we were radically to alter the structure of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. The present balance of membership has, I know, been the subject of criticism in the past, but in general it reflects political realities. This is one of its most important characteristics, which make it a useful forum for negotiation and, as Mr. Naik said in his statement of 25 April, we must ensure that the negotiating role of the Committee is effectively preserved and strengthened (CCD/PV.630, page 16).

I very much hope that it will not be too long before France decides that it will be in her interests to take up her place in this Committee, and that China will decide to find a more effective way of associating herself with this vitally important task of disarmament and arms control. Even without their participation the British Government believe that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament is a worthwhile body, a realistic and practical forum in which negotiations on disarmament can take place. We want to sustain it and to ensure that in future it has an important part to play on the international stage.

We shall therefore look for positive initiatives to strengthen the Committee's work. We shall give early and full consideration to all constructive proposals put forward. We shall approach these matters with a sense of urgency, for we believe that the context of the Committee's work has changed. There are now serious and urgent dangers which were not so apparent a matter of weeks ago. All those engaged in the field of disarmament and arms control now face a challenge of great gravity. Governments have a continuing obligation to the peoples of the world to make that world a safer place. We now need to redouble our efforts, for there is a prospect that our environment will become not safer but more dangerous in the months and years ahead. This Committee has an important role to play in eliminating that danger.

Mr. MISHRA (India): May I also join you, Mr. Chairman, in welcoming the Right Honorable David Ennals here among us? It is indeed a great pleasure and privilege to listen to him, and we do hope that in future, despite his preoccupations, he will be able to find the time to come to us and make further contribution to our work, as he himself has just said in his statement.

It was not my intention to take the floor today, but one or two points need some clarifications in the light of the previous statement. It is not a matter of any personal reply at all; it is a question of stating my Government's position on one or two points. As I listened to the very important statement of Mr. Ennals the thought struck me that it was predicated on the United Kingdom's adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty as a nuclear-weapon State and India's non-adherence to the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon State.

Now, our reasons for not adhering to the NPT are fundamental reasons. They go to the very philosophy of international relations which we have tried to follow since we became independent; and one of the basic points of this philosophy is equality in international life. We have considered and we continue to consider that the NPT is not an equal legal instrument. It is a discriminatory instrument; and I must categorically state here that we will not become a party to that instrument as long as the discriminatory character of that instrument remains as it is today. When the Review Conference takes place -- but naturally we have no right to propagate this view, since we are not a party to that Treaty -- perhaps it will take a look at this character of the NPT and try to change it so as to make it acceptable universally.

The second point -- and I must thank the Minister for taking note of the assurances given by the Government of India in regard to its peaceful intentions -- which is perhaps forgotten sometimes is that these assurances, although they were reiterated after the explosion on 18 May, had been given for the last twenty years. I can go back to 1954 or I can go back to even earlier years and quote from the statements of my Government on this question. Now these are solemn statements, solemn declarations which have not been violated so far, and they must be treated as solemn declarations.

After all, even if we were to join the NPT there is a clause for withdrawal. In this sense is the Treaty more solemn than the declarations which we have made? This is a point which I believe should be taken note of and should be welcomed as far as the Government of India is concerned: that it continues to abide by solemn

(Mr. Mishra, India)

declarations which are not new but have been given over the years, and which have been reiterated very recently, and which I reiterate on behalf of my Government here today. We intend to use nuclear energy solely for peaceful purposes.

There was also a reference -- and this has also been made from time to time not only here but also in other fora -- that nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes are something which is not immediately of benefit to the international community, and that in any case the NPT provides for giving the benefit of this technology to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT. Well, since we are not a party to the NPT we do consider that it is our right to develop this technology for peaceful purposes.

Moreover, it will not be contended by any side that a technology which is limited or which is being developed by five nuclear States alone -- if all of them are developing it I do not know -- should be the end of the story and that it is not possible that another State with some knowledge, with some experience will be able to contribute towards the development of this technology and thus give the benefit to the international community as a whole, as the nuclear States parties to the NPT have undertaken to do. Again, we feel that there should be no discrimination in this regard. If we are able to contribute, we should be allowed to contribute keeping in mind the very solemn declaration that we have made in regard to peaceful uses of this technology.

I apologise to this Committee, Mr. Chairman, for taking the floor at this stage, but it was necessary to make our point of view clear.

The meeting rose at 11.35 a.m.