

**Septième Conférence des États parties
chargée de l'examen de la Convention
sur l'interdiction de la mise au point,
de la fabrication et du stockage des
armes bactériologiques (biologiques)
ou à toxines et sur leur destruction**

1^{er} décembre 2011

Français

Original: anglais

Genève, 5-22 décembre 2011

Point 10 de l'ordre du jour provisoire

**Examen du fonctionnement de la Convention,
conformément à son article XII**

**Document révisé
Démarches possibles concernant l'éducation
et la sensibilisation des spécialistes des sciences de la vie¹**

**Soumis par l'Australie, le Canada, le Japon, la Nouvelle-Zélande,
la République de Corée et la Suisse (au nom du groupe «JACKSNNZ»²),
le Kenya, la Suède, l'Ukraine, le Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne
et d'Irlande du Nord et les États-Unis d'Amérique**

I. Introduction

1. L'article IV de la Convention sur les armes biologiques ou à toxines fait obligation aux États parties de prendre «les mesures nécessaires pour interdire et empêcher la mise au point, la fabrication, le stockage, l'acquisition ou la conservation des agents, des toxines, des armes, de l'équipement et des vecteurs dont il est question dans l'article premier de la Convention, sur le territoire d'un tel État, sous sa juridiction ou sous son contrôle en quelque lieu que ce soit». Cet article peut être considéré comme un des piliers de la Convention, qui établit un lien spécifique entre les dispositions des articles I^{er} et III et les dispositions du droit interne des États parties, créant ainsi les bases des mesures nationales d'application (voir également d'autres documents de travail tels que le document BWC/CONF.VI/WP.3). Par ailleurs, la formulation de l'article IV, qui est large, sous-entend que, outre les mesures juridiques requises, d'autres mesures sont aussi nécessaires pour garantir une application nationale effective de la Convention.

¹ Dans le présent document, l'expression «spécialiste des sciences de la vie» s'entend de toute personne effectuant des recherches scientifiques sur des organismes vivants et leurs produits; elle englobe les personnes formées dans des secteurs autres que celui des sciences de la vie (tels que l'ingénierie, l'informatique et la physique) qui mènent des activités relevant des sciences de la vie, ainsi que les personnes qui mènent des activités dans ce domaine en dehors des structures institutionnelles officielles (par exemple, les biologistes amateurs).

² «JACKSNNZ» est un groupe informel qui compte parmi ses membres le Japon, l'Australie, le Canada, la République de Corée, la Suisse, la Norvège et la Nouvelle-Zélande.

2. Les réunions d'experts qui se sont déroulées pendant le premier processus intersessions (2003-2005) ont offert un cadre idéal pour examiner les questions afférentes à la supervision, au développement d'une culture tournée vers la sécurité sur le lieu de travail (notamment de codes de conduite), ainsi qu'à l'éducation et à la sensibilisation des spécialistes des sciences de la vie, autant de mesures d'importance dans l'exécution de la Convention au niveau national. Les échanges ont mis en évidence une vision commune du rôle essentiel que les spécialistes des sciences de la vie jouent dans la prévention effective des mauvaises utilisations des biotechnologies et des agents biologiques. Cette vision commune est reflétée dans le Document final de la sixième Conférence d'examen (BWC/CONF.VI/6), dans lequel la Conférence engage les États parties à assurer la sécurité et la sûreté des agents microbiologiques et autres agents biologiques et des toxines (deuxième partie, par. 11 iii)), tout en les exhortant à «appuyer l'élaboration de programmes de formation et d'étude à l'intention de ceux dont ils ont autorisé l'accès à des agents biologiques et des toxines ayant un rapport avec la Convention, ... afin de sensibiliser ces personnes aux risques, de même qu'aux obligations contractées par les États parties au titre de la Convention» (deuxième partie, par. 14). Cette formation et cette éducation sont fondamentales pour garantir des conditions permettant aux États parties d'apporter leur concours à «l'extension future et à l'application des découvertes scientifiques dans le domaine de la bactériologie (biologie), en vue de la prévention des maladies ou à d'autres fins pacifiques», conformément à l'article X de la Convention.

3. En outre, la sixième Conférence d'examen a encouragé les États parties à «prendre les mesures nécessaires pour faire prendre conscience aux professionnels intéressés de la nécessité de signaler toutes activités se déroulant sur leur territoire ou en des lieux placés sous leur juridiction ou leur contrôle, qui pourraient constituer une violation de la Convention ou du droit pénal national en la matière» (deuxième partie, par. 15). Dans ce contexte, la sixième Conférence d'examen souligne également dans le Document final la pertinence de telles mesures d'application au niveau national eu égard à la résolution 1540 (2004) du Conseil de sécurité de l'Organisation des Nations Unies et la nécessité d'éliminer les armes biologiques, dans le cas à l'examen, et d'empêcher leur prolifération.

4. Au cours du deuxième processus intersessions (2007-2010), des études consacrées à la sécurité et à la sûreté biologiques³, ainsi qu'à la supervision, à l'éducation et à la sensibilisation, ont été l'occasion d'échanges de vues autour des différentes méthodes destinées à mobiliser les spécialistes des sciences de la vie. Les discussions ont montré que la participation de ces spécialistes aux débats sur la sécurité et la sûreté biologiques aurait pour effet de les sensibiliser davantage aux risques potentiels et aux obligations découlant de la Convention. Elles ont aussi mis en lumière le concours qu'ils pourraient apporter à la promotion de la sécurité et de la sûreté biologiques en tant que praticiens dans les milieux universitaires, industriels et gouvernementaux. Dans ce contexte, le document de travail soumis par le Japon au nom du Groupe JACKSNNZ (BWC/MSP/2008/MX/WP.21) met en évidence trois moyens efficaces d'empêcher les mauvaises utilisations des biotechnologies, à savoir la supervision, la gestion et le contrôle; l'éducation et la sensibilisation; et l'élaboration de codes de conduite pour les scientifiques. Ce document souligne également

³ Dans le présent document, les expressions «sécurité biologique» et «sûreté biologique» sont employées telles qu'elles sont définies dans les principes directeurs de l'OMS en matière de sûreté biologique en laboratoire (2006): «La "sécurité biologique en laboratoire" s'entend de la mise en œuvre de principes, de techniques et de pratiques de confinement visant à empêcher l'exposition involontaire du personnel à des agents pathogènes ou à des toxines ou la libération accidentelle de tels agents ou toxines.»; «La "sûreté biologique en laboratoire" s'entend de la protection des matières biologiques précieuses, de leur contrôle et de leur comptabilité [...] en laboratoire, afin d'empêcher l'accès non autorisé à ces matières, leur perte ou leur vol, leur utilisation à mauvais escient, leur détournement ou leur libération intentionnelle.».

la nécessité d'associer les partenaires nationaux à tous les stades de la conception et de la mise en œuvre des régimes de supervision, et la nécessité de faire en sorte que ces mesures n'imposent pas de charge de travail inutile ni de restrictions superflues des activités biologiques. En conséquence, lors de leur réunion de 2008, les États parties ont reconnu qu'il importait de sensibiliser les spécialistes des sciences biologiques, ont noté que des prescriptions officielles concernant les formes d'éducation faciliteraient la sensibilisation et la mise en œuvre de la Convention, et ont mesuré la valeur des programmes d'éducation et de sensibilisation (BWC/MSP/2008/5, par. 25, 26 et 27).

5. Se fondant sur ces considérations et sur la vision commune exposée plus haut, divers États parties ont pris des initiatives au niveau national. Dans le cas de l'Australie, du Japon, de la Suède et de la Suisse, l'objectif global des activités entreprises à ce titre, qui étaient également menées par des experts de l'Université de Bradford et de l'Université d'Exeter (Royaume-Uni), était de stimuler le débat et la réflexion chez les chercheurs sur les sciences de la vie, la sûreté et l'utilisation potentiellement dangereuse de leurs travaux. Une première série d'exemples, qui mettaient en évidence les expériences et les principales constatations faites par ces États parties, a été présentée dans un document d'information soumis par l'Australie, le Japon et la Suisse (au nom du groupe JACKSNNZ) ainsi que la Suède au Comité préparatoire de la septième Conférence d'examen (BWC/CONF.VII/PC/INF.4). Les initiatives nationales prises au Canada, au Kenya, en République de Corée, en Ukraine, au Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et d'Irlande du Nord et aux États-Unis d'Amérique, dans plusieurs cas en collaboration avec la société civile, ont également permis de faire un grand nombre d'expériences et de constatations importantes. Aux plans national et international, un certain nombre d'organismes scientifiques ont fait campagne pour encourager les activités d'éducation et de sensibilisation. Il semblerait d'ailleurs que de plus en plus d'activités soient menées dans ces domaines, grâce aux efforts de personnes et d'organismes engagés⁴.

6. Le présent document de travail, qui se fonde sur les expériences réalisées par les États parties, a été établi en vue de mettre en lumière les principales constatations et les conclusions préliminaires relatives aux démarches possibles en matière d'éducation et de sensibilisation des spécialistes des sciences de la vie (sect. II). Comme l'ont suggéré les États parties qui le soumettent, il pourrait jeter les bases des considérations que les États parties formuleraient et des décisions qu'ils prendraient à la septième Conférence d'examen (sect. III). Les expériences des États parties sont présentées en annexe.

II. Exemples d'expériences faites par les États parties: principales constatations et conclusions préliminaires

7. L'analyse des différentes expériences faites par les États parties (voir l'annexe) met en évidence un certain nombre de constatations principales:

a) Les programmes d'enseignement ou de formation proposés à l'heure actuelle dans les universités ou les centres de recherche font souvent une place, en effet, à certains aspects de la sécurité (biologique), mais rarement à des aspects de la sûreté (biologique);

⁴ Voir, par exemple, les informations contenues dans *Challenges and Opportunities for Education about Dual Use Issues in the Life Sciences*, National Research Council, 2011, Washington, D.C.: National Academies Press, consultable sur http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=12958, et *JSPS-ESRC Seminar Series, Dual-Use Education for Life Scientists: Mapping the Current Global Landscape and Developments: Seminar Report*, Judi Sture et Masamichi Minehata, 2010, Bradford (Royaume-Uni): Centre de recherche de Bradford sur le désarmement, consultable sur <http://www.brad.ac.uk/bioethics/monographs/>.

b) Si les étudiants et les praticiens ont une bonne connaissance, maintes fois vérifiée, des questions liées à la sécurité (biologique), ils sont en général peu conscients du risque d'utilisation malveillante des sciences biologiques;

c) Les spécialistes des sciences de la vie ne sont souvent pas conscients de l'intérêt que leurs travaux peuvent présenter pour des programmes d'armement biologique, ni du risque que ces travaux soient utilisés pour nuire à des êtres humains, à des animaux ou à des plantes ou pour rendre inutilisables des ressources essentielles. Il a toutefois été constaté qu'une fois avertis des liens possibles de leurs travaux de recherche avec la sécurité, une majorité de ces scientifiques reconnaissent l'importance des activités de sensibilisation et la part de responsabilité qui revenait aux chercheurs;

d) Les spécialistes des sciences de la vie connaissent souvent mal (voire pas du tout) les mécanismes internationaux tels que la Convention ou les dispositions législatives nationales en la matière;

e) Les différentes expériences faites par les États parties mettent également en évidence des similitudes dans la manière dont les autorités s'efforcent de remédier à ces problèmes; ainsi, dans les exemples cités, il est fait référence, entre autres mesures:

- i) Aux méthodes employées pour assurer la coordination nationale des activités de sensibilisation menées au sein des communautés scientifiques, en collaboration avec les établissements d'enseignement;
- ii) À la création de réseaux pertinents, dotés de centres de liaison; ou
- iii) À l'introduction, en parallèle, de directives, de modules éducatifs et d'outils semblables à l'intention des chercheurs.

Cependant, ces mesures n'auront probablement qu'une incidence limitée si elles ne s'inscrivent pas dans la durée.

8. Les recherches sur la bioéthique et la connaissance des risques en matière de sûreté biologique tendent à confirmer que ces risques sont méconnus des spécialistes des sciences de la vie de bon nombre d'institutions et dans bon nombre de pays⁵. L'analyse des raisons de cette méconnaissance met en évidence, entre autres, le manque de cours, au niveau universitaire, qui traiteraient de certains aspects de la Convention et des questions de sûreté (biologique) connexes, soit que les concepteurs des programmes jugent ce thème secondaire ou ont du mal à intégrer un enseignement sur la sûreté biologique à des programmes qu'ils jugent déjà surchargés, soit qu'il manque des personnes compétentes pour donner de tels cours et que l'accès aux outils pédagogiques est insuffisant.

9. Les expériences de certains États parties et les constatations complémentaires de chercheurs concernant la connaissance des questions de bioéthique confirment que les États parties doivent prendre de nouvelles initiatives, afin de promouvoir la mise en œuvre effective de la Convention par l'éducation et la sensibilisation des spécialistes des sciences de la vie, conçues comme des mesures préventives nationales. En conséquence, les États parties qui soumettent le présent document de travail recommandent tout particulièrement

⁵ Voir par exemple: Dando, Malcolm, 2010, *Teaching Biosecurity*, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, consultable sur: <http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/columnists/malcolm-dando/teaching-biosecurity> (consulté le 6 janvier 2011), Rappert, Brian (rédacteur), 2010, *Education and Ethics in the Life Sciences* Canberra: Australian National University E Press, consultable sur: http://epress.anu.edu.au/education_ethics.html, et Whitby, Simon et Malcolm Dando, 2010, *Effective implementation of the BWC: The key role of awareness raising and education*, Review Conference Paper No. 26, Université de Bradford, consultable sur: http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sBWC/briefing/RCP_26.pdf (consulté le 6 janvier 2011).

que les éléments ci-après soient examinés avant et pendant la prochaine Conférence d'examen, à titre de considérations que formulerait la Conférence.

III. Considérations que pourraient formuler les États parties à la septième Conférence d'examen

10. Afin de promouvoir la mise en œuvre effective de la Convention par l'éducation et la sensibilisation des spécialistes des sciences de la vie, conçues comme des mesures de prévention, dans l'esprit de l'article IV de la Convention, les États parties pourraient considérer que:

a) La méconnaissance fréquente des questions liées à la sûreté biologique et des obligations découlant de la Convention chez les spécialistes des sciences de la vie doit être traitée d'une manière plus active, stratégique et complète;

b) Ces efforts pourraient servir, entre autres, de base aux activités entreprises au niveau national par les États parties en matière d'éducation et de sensibilisation, ainsi que dans le cadre de la coopération internationale;

c) Ces activités pourraient notamment conduire à la mise en place et la pérennité de modules et d'activités d'enseignement liés à la Convention et s'inscrire, par exemple, dans le cadre de programmes continus de sensibilisation;

d) Quant aux *partenaires*, ces activités de sensibilisation et les programmes de travail intersessions touchant le problème du double usage⁶, ainsi que la sûreté et la sécurité biologiques, devraient être menés, entre autres, par les ministères compétents, les industriels, les institutions de recherche, les universitaires, les organismes de financement, les rédacteurs de revues scientifiques et les associations scientifiques concernées, à tous les stades de l'élaboration et de la mise en œuvre des dispositifs de supervision. La *forme et la nature* de ces activités doivent être clairement élaborées et mises en œuvre par chaque État partie, sur la base de ses règles et règlements internes, et en complément des activités de communication existantes (autrement dit, il n'y a pas de modèle uniforme);

e) Des activités de sensibilisation efficaces, obligatoires ou non, selon qu'il conviendra, pourraient être élaborées et mises en œuvre à moindre coût; elles comprendraient différentes mesures concrètes, dont:

i) L'explication des risques liés au détournement potentiel des sciences de la vie et des biotechnologies;

ii) La présentation des obligations morales et éthiques qui incombent aux utilisateurs des sciences de la vie en vertu de la Convention;

iii) Un soutien sous forme d'orientations concernant les types d'activités susceptibles d'être contraires aux buts de la Convention, aux lois et règlements nationaux et au droit international;

iv) La promotion d'outils de formation accessibles, de programmes de formation des formateurs, de séminaires, d'ateliers, de publications et d'outils audiovisuels;

⁶ Dans le contexte du présent document, l'expression «double usage» s'entend de la possibilité que des matières, connaissances, installations et technologies destinées à des fins pacifiques puissent être détournées à des fins militaires. Le double usage ne signifie certes pas, en soi, que le détournement est automatique, mais les références à la sensibilisation au problème du double usage, en particulier, visent des modules d'enseignement qui mettent l'accent sur les risques d'utilisation malveillante de travaux de recherche pacifiques, facilitée par la double nature de ces résultats.

v) L'entrée en communication avec des scientifiques de renom et des scientifiques chargés de superviser les recherches ou d'évaluer les projets ou les publications au plus haut niveau, mais aussi avec les générations futures de scientifiques, afin de promouvoir un esprit de responsabilité;

vi) L'intégration de ces activités à l'action déjà menée aux niveaux international, régional et national;

f) Les activités en matière de sensibilisation au problème du double usage, d'éducation à la sécurité et la sûreté biologiques et de réglementation ne doivent pas imposer de charge de travail superflue ni restreindre inutilement le champ des activités biologiques autorisées. Les scientifiques et tous les autres partenaires peuvent empêcher le détournement des sciences de la vie en développant une culture de la responsabilité et de la sécurité par une éducation à la sûreté biologique et à la bioéthique.

g) Les États parties doivent rendre compte plus complètement de leurs activités de sensibilisation au problème du double usage et d'éducation à la sécurité et la sûreté biologiques. (Il est reconnu que les États parties pourraient déjà faire rapport sur de telles activités au titre des mesures de confiance, sous la rubrique «Autres mesures» de la formule E, «Déclaration des lois, règlements et autres mesures», en tant que mesures prises au niveau national pour promouvoir la mise en œuvre effective de la Convention sur les armes biologiques. Par la publication de ces informations, entre autres dans le cadre des déclarations faites au titre des mesures de confiance, les États parties les plus avancés dans la mise en œuvre de leurs activités de sensibilisation au problème du double usage et d'éducation à la sécurité et la sûreté biologiques pourraient savoir quels sont les États parties les moins avancés en la matière et leur accorder leur coopération.);

h) La période intersessions comprise entre les septième et huitième Conférences d'examen doit être mise à profit pour stimuler les échanges et les travaux sur le sujet entre les États parties, de même que la collaboration entre ces derniers et les organisations internationales et les ONG. Dans cette optique, les États parties pourraient définir et communiquer leurs objectifs, ainsi que les résultats visés dans le cadre des activités de sensibilisation et d'éducation, et être encouragés à désigner une entité nationale à contacter pour ces activités.

11. Les États parties qui soumettent le présent document de travail encouragent tous les États parties à la Convention à accepter d'intégrer les différentes propositions susmentionnées dans la section de la déclaration finale de la septième Conférence d'examen qui sera consacrée aux décisions et recommandations de la Conférence.

Annexe

[ENGLISH ONLY]

Examples of experiences by States Parties

Australia

1. Australia commenced its outreach and awareness-raising on BWC-related issues in 1990, with a set of Guidelines developed by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, to raise the awareness of industry and researchers about the risk of inadvertent involvement in the biological weapons programs of other countries. These Guidelines have been circulated to biological industry, universities, relevant professional associations and government agencies.
2. At the BWC Meeting of Experts in 2005, Australia reported that amongst its scientific community, there was a low level of awareness of the risk of misuse of the biological sciences to assist in the development of biological weapons⁷. One problem identified is that many scientists working in the 'dual-use' areas simply do not consider the possibility that their work could inadvertently assist in a biological weapons program.
3. To address this challenge, the Guidelines have been complemented in recent years by more prioritised outreach and awareness-raising activities by Australian government agencies to target those parts of the scientific community which are most directly affected by the BWC and biosecurity-related legislation, as discussed below.
4. An education and awareness-raising program has been developed by Australia's Department of Health and Ageing to promote recognition and understanding of the security sensitive biological agents (SSBAs) regulatory scheme established in November 2008, and to ensure that the regulated community is able to comply with their obligations. Briefings on the BWC and associated legislation, including the Crimes (Biological Weapons) Act 1976, are included in the SSBA outreach activities.
5. Australia's Defence Export Control Office (DECO), as the agency responsible for the Customs Act 1901 and Weapons of Mass Destruction (Prevention of Proliferation) Act 1995 and their associated regulations, undertakes regular outreach seminars to provide information on the obligations related to exports of dual-use biological materials, equipment and technology. DECO also provides a range of publications which provide information on specific areas of export controls.
6. In 2006, Australia's National Framework for the Development of Ethical Principles in Gene Technology ('National Framework') was published to provide a national reference point for ethical considerations relevant to environmental and health issues in gene technology, GMOs and genetically modified products. Many of these considerations are relevant to the prohibitions outlined by the BWC, or strongly complement the objectives of the Convention and/or the promotion of sound biosecurity/biosafety practices. The National Framework can play a role in helping gene technology practitioners determine in a straightforward and non-prescriptive manner how to best carry out their activities without the risk of contravening the provisions of the BWC.

⁷ Raising Awareness: Approaches and Opportunities for Outreach, working paper submitted by Australia, BWC/MSP/2005/MX/WP.29.

7. In 2009, members of Australia's National Centre for Biosecurity (a collaboration of the University of Sydney and the Australian National University) conducted a pilot series of four interactive seminars for Australian scientists and students on the potential security risks of laboratory research on pathogens micro-organisms, including the relevance of the BWC. This series of seminars, funded by the US-based Alfred P. Sloan Foundation, was based on the program developed in the United Kingdom by University of Bradford and University of Exeter.

8. In recognition of the high levels of cooperation necessary between Government officials and the relevant scientific communities to achieve progress in awareness-raising activities, there has been engagement by Government officials with a number of Australian universities, as well as the Australian Academy of Science, the National Centre for Biosecurity and relevant scientific societies, to develop a program to enable more effective outreach activities.

Canada

9. As Canada raised in its opening statement at the 2008 Meeting of States Parties, oversight, education, and awareness-raising among life scientists is essential for full implementation of the BTWC. As part of our ongoing commitments, Canada will be undertaking the following activity to educate and promote BTWC awareness and compliance in 2012.

10. The Public Health Agency of Canada (PHAC) and the University of Bradford, United Kingdom (UoB) are collaborating in the development and delivery of a curriculum for a university-level accredited pilot course on Applied Dual-use Biosecurity; Biosafety and Bioethics to be in Ottawa in 2012. With the aim of promoting BTWC awareness and compliance in Canada, the objectives of this course are to develop a foundation of the concepts of biosafety and biosecurity in the trainee such that increased awareness in regards to the ethical, legal and social relevance of dual-use biosecurity, as well as the responsible conduct of research can provide a foundation for the development of policies and procedures to enhance responsibility and prevent the malicious or misuse of pathogens and toxins.

11. This course will also assist in compliance promotion, and therefore, compliance with those undertaking activities with human pathogens and toxins, within the sphere of oversight of the Human Pathogens and Toxins Act (HPTA), one of Canada's primary tools in BTWC compliance. This course is intended for those with low-level knowledge of biosafety, but a high level of responsibility with respect to compliance with the HPTA.

12. Dependent on a successful delivery of the first course, future plans include expansion into a 60 UK credit Post-graduate Certificate for delivery across Canada, and potentially the transition to a full MA programme (180 UK credits) accessible by the global community.

Japan

13. Japan expressed in its working paper submitted to the Meeting of Experts in 2008 (BWC/MSP/2008/MX/WP.21) that education and awareness-raising among scientists are basic means for preventing the misuse of biotechnology, while recognizing the importance to respect the autonomous responsibility of scientists without obstructing scientific development. In the same working paper, though, Japan also acknowledged that 'the development of educational programmes at the governmental level has not seen great progress'.

14. In order to mitigate such deficiencies, the National Defense Medical College (NDMC) in Japan and the University of Bradford in the UK conducted collaborative research to analyse the current state of biosecurity education in Japan⁸. The research found that there was a lack of educational topics on biosecurity despite a certain level of presence on dual-use references, mainly due to an absence of space in the existing curricula, an absence of time and resources to develop new curricula, an absence of expertise as well as doubt about the need for biosecurity education. Parallel to this survey, the NDMC and the University of Bradford also jointly developed an online learning module in applied dual-use biosecurity education.

15. In addition to the efforts by the NDMC, other universities and institutions in Japan are also taking various approaches to tackle bio-threats. These approaches include a course on bio-ethics and the social responsibility of scientists conducted by Waseda University, a project on anti-bioterrorism conducted by Keio University, and a table-top exercise on response measures in the event of bioterrorism by Jikei Medical University. The University of Tokyo has also launched a Global Health Leadership Program aimed at cultivating human resources capable of addressing global health challenges from cross-sectional perspectives including life ethics. In August 2011, the Science Council of Japan hosted a symposium on "Emerging risks posed by the development of life sciences and the role of scientists" where presentation were made by the leading life scientists in Japan followed by discussions including on the necessity of a code of conduct.

16. Encouraged by such individual activities, a wide range of measures are required for preventing the misuse of biotechnology. It is, therefore, important to share best practices among scientists and institutions at national and international levels and to examine how to apply and implement such practices appropriately.

Kenya

17. In Kenyan universities or research facilities there are already references to aspects related to biosafety. However, these aspects rarely address issues related to biosecurity or dual-use issues. The level of awareness of the risk of misuse of bioscience research is very limited and in instances where the term Biosecurity is used, it is usually in reference to other issues, e.g. Food security or sustainability. Consequently, in the recently drafted Biosecurity policy, emphasis was put on the need to create awareness among the life science community on Biosecurity and also develop education programmes on the same.

18. University of Nairobi and the University of Bradford in the UK are in the early stages of planning a collaborative research to analyse the current state of biosecurity education in Kenya and the East African Region. The research results will be used to guide development of subsequent Dual-use biosecurity education programmes and curricula

19. University of Nairobi, in collaboration with the University of Bradford plans to conduct an online Biosecurity Education course for the life science community in East Africa. In the planned programme, experts will be invited to Nairobi where an intensive one week dual-use biosecurity education course will be delivered online by the University of Bradford.

⁸ Masamichi Minehata and Nariyoshi Shinomiya, 'Chapter 5: Japan: Obstacles, Lessons and Future' in Brian Rappert ed., *Education and Ethics in the Life Sciences: Strengthening the Prohibition of Biological Weapons*, The ANU E Press, 2010.

20. The University of Nairobi, Centre of Biotechnology and Bioinformatics (CEBIB), is reviewing its curricular to introduce Dual-Use Biosecurity Education in its Masters Biotechnology course.

Republic of Korea

21. The Ministry of Health & Welfare has exerted efforts to strengthen national biosafety and biosecurity supervision through comprehensive legislative acts such as the 2005 amendment of ‘Act on the Prevention of Infectious Disease’ and the 2008 enactment of ‘Act on the Transnational Transportation of Genetically Modified Organisms.’ The two legislations serve as a basis for various permission and control measures of highly dangerous pathogens such as *Bacillus anthracis* and living modified microorganisms containing genes of highly dangerous pathogens that have a high potential of being used in bio-terrorist attacks. The Ministry is also working to establish and strengthen biosafety and biosecurity culture in the domestic biomedicine field.

22. The recent outbreaks of infectious diseases such as AI (Avian Influenza) and PI (Pandemic Influenza) caused by new and mutated pathogens, as well as the growing possibility of bioterrorism have magnified the importance of biosafety and biosecurity. Add to this the increased probability of biomedical laboratory workers being infected by highly dangerous pathogens and living modified microorganisms containing the genes of such pathogens. Against this backdrop, the Republic of Korea has reorganized its legislative systems and amended biosafety guidelines to reinforce biosafety management in biomedical research. Such efforts have been led by the Ministry of Health & Welfare and the Korea Center for Disease Control and Prevention (KCDC). The two organizations are also working to develop and provide education and awareness-raising programs for scientists and workers in the bio-field.

23. To strengthen institutional capacities for biosafety and biosecurity at biomedical research laboratories, the KCDC has worked with Korea Human Resource Development Institute for Health & Welfare (KOHI) to develop an education program for public officers and researchers working in the field of biomedical science. The program has offered ‘Laboratory Biological Safety Course’ since 2006, and provides information on laboratory bio-risk management, risk assessment, and biosecurity control management.

24. Heightened international concern regarding the use of modern biotechnology and the increased use of highly dangerous pathogens in biomedical laboratories have led to calls for the establishment of a national and international regulatory framework for biosafety, as well as national oversight and management measures for highly dangerous pathogens. The ‘Infectious Disease Control and Prevention Act’ was enacted following the comprehensive amendment of ‘Act on the Prevention of Infectious Disease’ and provides that all institutions working with highly dangerous pathogens should have biosafety-level laboratories. The Act also calls for related facilities to implement legal and administrative national security mandates that encompass the concept of biosecurity.

Sweden

25. In Sweden, no formal survey on awareness of obligations under the BWC or of potential risks related to misuse of biological sciences/biotechnology among life scientists has been carried out to date. Although biosafety aspects are considered in national life science fora, it has become apparent from networking, discussions and informal information gathering that dual-use and biosecurity issues are less well cared for.

26. As a result of contacts generated over time at BWC- and related meetings a series of awareness-raising seminars were arranged and conducted by experts of the University of Bradford (UK) and the University of Exeter (UK) in 2009, at three academic institutions in Sweden. In conjunction with these seminars, an informal network was established with the aim of developing a national education approach, covering biosecurity and dual-use aspects within life science, adapted to local education and curriculum at each academic institution. The Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the Swedish Ministry of Education took positions in the margins of this initiative.

27. The informal network has agreed to endorse the establishment of biosafety/biosecurity committees at all academic institutions that undertake education and research in relevant fields, as one area of specific importance and with great significance for future work also in dual-use education. These committees were suggested to have comprehensive responsibility for biosafety and biosecurity and, also, an advisory role in matters involving genetic modifications and education related to biosafety and biosecurity. Furthermore, the Centre for Research Ethics and Bioethics at Uppsala University was identified as a crucial element in any initiative to develop national bioethics, dual-use and biosecurity education. Existing educational programmes, which to some extent have started to include these topics in for instance biotechnology/engineering programs and biomedicine master programs, were identified as useful starting points for the formation of national networks with great potential for future implementation of dual-use education in Sweden.

28. Regarding awareness raising and dual-use education it has become evident that, from a European perspective, there is a convergence of BWC- and EU CBRN Action Plan⁹-related national commitments. The initiated bottom-up approach in this area is promising, but will require dedicated durable top-down support including provision of financial resources in order to establish a sustainable framework for facilitating the establishment of national biosecurity education in conjunction with related international efforts.

Switzerland

29. In Switzerland, initial surveys on awareness of potential security risks among life scientists revealed, in the vast majority of cases, a well-developed sense for aspects related to biosafety, but a considerably limited knowledge of aspects related to biosecurity. Moreover, most life scientists seem to be unaware of the BWC's obligations as well as the obligations' relevance to their work. In the same context, existing national legislation relevant for the domain of natural scientific research in general or biological research in particular seemed to be unknown to many.

30. Based on these findings, the Swiss government started to sensitize researchers with a brochure in 2008 ("Biology for Peace") and accompanied a series of awareness-raising seminars conducted by experts of the University of Bradford (UK) as well as the University of Exeter (UK) at various academic institutions in Switzerland in 2009. Further awareness-raising sessions organized and conducted by the Swiss government itself took place in 2010. The analysis of reactions by the attending audience revealed:

(a) that life scientists consider awareness-raising on aspects related to security as important (some even spoke of an "eye-opener"),

⁹ EU CBRN Action Plan:
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/justice_freedom_security/fight_against_terrorism/jl0030_en.htm
 [viewed 5 April 2011].

(b) that, due to the general academic autonomy and freedom of research and teaching in Switzerland, a governmental imposition of content within the curriculum would be met with scepticism,

(c) that particularly legally binding top-down approaches would therefore be inappropriate,

(d) that it is important to consider existing patterns of cooperation among researchers, institutions, and authorities, and that these existing patterns provide ideal platforms for an outreach, and

(e) that awareness-raising activities in the regular study and work environment of life scientists similarly provide an ideal base.

31. These lessons learned provide the base for possible ways forward, such as the inclusion of educational modules on biosecurity for biosafety officers in research facilities, or the encouragement to introduce educational modules on biosecurity in academic courses for future life scientists.

Ukraine

32. In 2004 Commission on Biosafety and Biosecurity (CBB) at the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine (NSDCU) was established by the Decree of the President of Ukraine. CBB serves as advisory body to NSDCU headed by the President of Ukraine and it deals, inter alia, with all issues of national obligations relevant to the BWC.

33. In the frame of the “Biological Weapons Proliferation Prevention Program” the Ukrainian Ministry of Health and US Department of Defence have signed in 2005 an Implementation Agreement on cooperation in Biological Threat Reduction. Successful implementation of this Agreement? Including provisions on biological research, biological threat detection and response, will provide fundamentals for Biosecurity (physical safeguard of pathogens’ collections) and for prevention and eradication of infectious diseases in Ukraine.

34. Since BWC States Parties Meeting in 2005 Ukrainian delegation permanently stresses on the necessity to raise awareness and education amongst life scientists and professionals in the field of Biotechnology and Pharmaceutical industry on dual use issues and on Biosafety and Biosecurity. Ukraine also reported that amongst its scientific community, there was a low level of awareness of the risk of misuse of the biological sciences’ results.

35. National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine (NASU) and CBB in cooperation with Bradford and Exeter Universities (UK) have organised an interactive Seminar in 2007 on Biosafety education including the relevance of the BWC for Ukrainian scientists and students. NASU and CBB, under the patronage of Science and Technology Centre of Ukraine, have also conducted an International Conference on Biosafety and on national implementation of BWC in 2009. Another International Conference on Biosafety and on national implementation of BWC under the patronage of BWC Implementation Support Unit in Geneva is planned to be organised in Ukraine in spring 2012. The detailed list of activity of different interested authorities of Ukraine in this field, inter alia, is traditionally reported through providing annual declarations on Confidence Building Measures in the frame of BWC.

36. In February 2009 NSDCU held a special meeting on Biosafety and Biosecurity when the whole range of Biosafety problems was addressed. State Programme on Biosafety

and Biosecurity is under final approval now by the Ukrainian Government now. This State Programme includes issues of Biosafety and Biosecurity education and awareness rising.

37. National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine (NASU), which is the main scientific Institution in Ukraine responsible, inter alia, for strategic planning and expertise of fundamental research in the country, has adopted in 2009 National Code of Ethics for Scientists (including Bioethics for Life Scientists) in. This National Code has been circulated to government agencies, universities, research institutes, biological and pharmaceutical industry, relevant professional associations etc. National Committee on Bioethics was established in Ukraine and this Committee organizes National Congresses (with wide international participation) on Bioethics each two years.

38. Ukrainian Biochemical Society (UBS), which unites scholars in the field of Biochemistry, Molecular and Cell Biology, has organised special sessions and/or lectures on Biosafety and Biosecurity during IX (2006) and X (2010) Ukrainian Biochemical Congresses, VII (2009) and VIII (2011) International Parnas Conferences on Biochemistry and Molecular Biology, as well as during III (2010) Ukrainian-German Symposium on Nanotechnologies. UBS also launched an initiative to create special Committee dedicated to Biosafety education at the Federation of European Biochemical Societies.

39. Ukraine's State Export Control Administration (USECA) undertakes regular outreach seminars to provide information on the obligations related to exports of dual-use biological and chemical materials, equipment and technology. UECA takes part in meetings of states parties to the Australia Group.

40. NASU in cooperation with the Canadian Global Partnership Program and the UK University of Bradford is conducting a collaborative research survey now (2011-2012) on the current state of Biosecurity education, of BWC awareness and of dual use issues in Ukrainian Universities and Medical Schools. A Conference and series of seminars are envisaged discussing the results of the survey, and the brochure to be published as recommendations to the education on Biosafety and Biosecurity in Ukraine.

United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

41. Since 2003 the UK has held five Biological & Toxin Weapons Convention-related seminars for academics, research councils, professional and trade organisations, and the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries. These seminars assisted the UK's preparations for the intersessional meetings on codes of conduct issues by ensuring that we had, and continue to have, a clear sense of the views of relevant stakeholders as well as their advice. Our most recent event took place in March 2008 and was devoted primarily to oversight, education and awareness-raising. While previous seminars largely focussed on the theory and general principles, the March 2008 seminar concentrated on the practicalities such as:

- (a) What are the emerging lessons from work on elaborating codes of conduct and practice?
- (b) What are the problems that have been encountered during the promulgation and implementation of codes of conduct? What are the solutions?
- (c) How can we develop effective and practical oversight mechanisms for research?
- (d) How can we develop educational programmes? (There have been many statements calling for such programmes, but specifics on what that education should cover are often absent).

42. At the 2008 Meeting of Experts we also presented a paper on examples of UK approaches to the oversight of emerging technologies, focussing on nanotechnologies and synthetic biology, which had been included in the UK contribution on scientific and technological developments to the Sixth Review Conference. This suggested that these approaches might be relevant for other States Parties as they grapple with the complex issues that are associated with dual-use technology.

43. We would note that there are still considerable difficulties in convincing some members of the academic community that oversight and awareness in the context of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) and Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) are issues deserving attention and action. We had, for instance, developed plans, in collaboration with two universities, for a series of awareness raising seminars in 2009 at various UK universities. These would have addressed CWC issues such as the problems posed by the governance of dual-use technology and codes of conduct, oversight, awareness raising and education, but it was not possible to proceed because of a lack of interest on the part of universities.

44. A more recent initiative in the chemical context however comes from the UK's National Counter Terrorism Security Office. This is an awareness-raising project aimed at universities known as REVISE (REducing Vulnerability In the Scientific Environment) that seeks to inform academics and laboratory personnel about the potential dual use of everyday lab-based resources and the terrorist aspiration to acquire them without attracting attention. It encourages those responsible for laboratory security to introduce a culture change within the laboratory environment which in turn develops baseline levels of access control, challenge culture and stock control.

45. We have also taken opportunities where they arise to address awareness raising with the academic and industrial communities – for instance presentations at the annual Institute of Safety in Technology and Research's Biosafety Section's autumn symposium in 2008 and at other conferences addressing relevant biological science issues, and at seminars organised by the chemical industry.

46. Within the UK, the University of Bradford has devoted considerable efforts to developing educational material to support awareness-raising and education. The University's Education Module Resource (EMR) offers content that includes history and national implementation of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, dual-use issues in the contemporary life sciences, and responsible conduct in scientific research. The EMR is freely available online and the content can be tailored in order to fit it into different educational contexts. It is currently available in English, Japanese, Russian, French and Romanian/Moldovan, and will shortly be available in Spanish, Urdu, Polish, Portuguese, Arabic and other languages. In order to facilitate development of best practice so that biosecurity education can be assimilated and implemented in different academic contexts in different regions, the University of Bradford has tested the EMR at universities in Italy, Japan, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the Netherlands and the UK.

47. The UK Global Partnership Programme is currently funding Bradford University to develop a National Series for a number of specific countries including in the Former Soviet Union. This series includes the essential values of the current EMR, but the themes, contents and learning outcomes for educational contexts are designed to be country specific. The main objective is to provide user friendly educational resources for use in the immediate introduction of short educational programmes for higher education. By providing detailed teaching guidelines (MS Word) and teaching material (Power Point) for a facilitator (not necessarily an expert of biosecurity issues), the National Series will help a range of universities and other educational institutes to implement biosecurity education programmes.

48. The University of Bradford is also the only higher education institution globally currently offering university-accredited training in biosecurity, via its Train-the-Trainer programme, which is offered in 6-week and 12-week versions at UK Masters level.¹⁰ This innovative provision uses online teaching technology and allows classes of students to take part in the programme via web connections for twice-weekly classes and seminars. Assessment is via online group presentations and by traditional written assignments. Now in its second year, the programme has attracted praise from students and sponsors and has accredited participants in over 20 countries. Students have included lecturers, science professionals, security personnel, military personnel and government policy-makers. Bradford is also currently planning a full Masters degree in Applied Dual Use Biosecurity to begin in September 2012, which will be provided online using the same technology, teaching and assessment techniques as the Train-the-Trainer programme.

United States of America

A. Overview

49. Managing security risks associated with life-sciences research is a shared responsibility of all those engaged in the life sciences, including the researcher, institution, local community, national government, and international community. Biosafety/Biosecurity education and awareness-raising across the life sciences communities is a critical component of effective risk management and is also a shared responsibility.

50. Over the past 10 years the U.S. government, academic and scientific institutions, industry and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have worked together to develop, implement and raise awareness about biosecurity and biosecurity education. Diverse groups, including the biosafety community, scientific societies, and pertinent professional and institutional associations have also played critical roles in advancing the dialogue and engaging stakeholders on these issues.

51. These education and awareness-raising efforts have sought to expand the robust culture of responsibility that already exists within the life-sciences community¹¹ to include biosecurity. They have focused on raising awareness about the threat of/potential for misuse and on developing and making available the tools, information and resources needed to empower the life sciences communities to manage security risks associated with life-sciences research.

52. Recent advances in science and technology have expanded the 'individual researchers' beyond the traditional life-sciences communities to include groups such as engineers, informaticists, amateur biologists and researchers conducting work outside traditional institutions. In response the U.S. Government has expanded its educational target audiences to include these communities.

53. Below is a summary of U.S. government and non-government biosafety/biosecurity outreach, training and awareness-raising activities. While not exhaustive, the list is representative of the diverse efforts the United States conducts and resources available.

¹⁰ This work is supported by funding from the US Department of State.

¹¹ For example the National Institutes of Health Policy on the responsible conduct of research requires all trainees, fellows, participants, and scholars receiving support through any NIH training, career development award (individual or institutional), research education grant, and dissertation research grant receive instruction in responsible conduct of research:
<http://grants1.nih.gov/grants/guide/notice-files/NOT-OD-10-019.html>

B. United States Government

The National Institutes of Health (NIH) Office of Biotechnology Activities (OBA): manages a program to address concerns about dual use research and research done for legitimate purpose that could yield information, products or technologies that could be misused by those who would intend to harm national security or public health. <http://oba.od.nih.gov/oba/index.html>

The National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB): is a Federal advisory committee (managed by NIH OBA) that provides advice to the United States government (USG) regarding biosecurity oversight of dual use research. A key charge to the NSABB is to provide recommendations on the development of programs for outreach, education, and training on dual use research issues for all scientists and laboratory workers at federally funded institutions. http://oba.od.nih.gov/biosecurity/about_nsabb.html

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Biological Science Outreach: FBI conducts outreach to the scientific community (academia and industry) to raise awareness the biosecurity roles and responsibilities of law enforcement, research institutions, and community stakeholders and build a culture of responsibility and trust between the scientific and security communities. <http://academicbiosecurityworkshop.org>

U.S. Department of State Biosecurity Engagement Program (BEP): BEP's mission is to engage biological scientists and combat bioterrorism worldwide by providing assistance to improve biosecurity, biosafety, pathogen surveillance, and infectious disease surveillance and response. <http://www.bepstate.net/>

U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) Cooperative Biological Engagement Program (CBEP): CBEP aims to cooperatively assist partner nation governments to counter the threat of bioterrorism and prevent proliferation of biological weapons technology, pathogens and expertise. CBEP provides education and training to enhance clinical, laboratory and epidemiological safety and security and works to strengthen the partner nation's disease detection, diagnostic and reporting systems.

C. U.S. Government outreach to emerging life sciences communities

FBI Synthetic Biology Program: FBI outreach to public and private synthetic biology companies to raise awareness about the potential security risks inherent to the industry, and work with the companies to develop common standards and best practices for risk management. The international component of this program fosters dialogue between international companies and their respective government/law enforcement agencies to develop processes to mitigate the risk of misuse of harmful DNA sequences.

FBI Amateur (Do-It-Yourself) Biology Initiative: FBI outreach to amateur biologists and biologists that conduct projects outside the traditional research setting to promote a culture of responsibility by raising the level of awareness regarding potential security vulnerabilities and exploitation, developing lines of communication between members of the community and their respective local FBI WMD Coordinator who serves as a resource to assist community members in the development of a safety and security best practices.

D. Training programs

The National Biosafety and Biocontainment Training Program (NBBTP): <http://www.nbbtp.org>

Emory University -Biosafety Training Course: Biosafety Level 4: This five-day training offers participants the opportunity to learn and practice new skills for BSL4 laboratories. <http://www.sph.emory.edu/CPHPR/biosafetytraining/bsl4.html>

University of Texas Medical Branch (UTMB) - National Biocontainment Training Center (NBTC) dedicated to preparing the worldwide community of infectious disease scientists to work safely in high-containment research laboratories: <http://www.utmb.edu/nbtc/>

Select Agent Program Training Workshops: U.S Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) conduct a yearly training workshop to inform individuals of their legal responsibilities for implementing the Select Agent Regulations. <http://www.selectagents.gov/Training.html>

Joint Criminal and Epidemiological Investigation Training Program: developed jointly by the FBI and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) to improve efforts to identify and investigate potential overt or covert biological threats. Initially designed as a domestic program, FBI and CDC have expanded this training to international partner countries.

The Field Epidemiology Training Program (FETP) and the Field Epidemiology and Laboratory Training Program (FELTP): applied epidemiology programs offered by CDC to help foreign countries develop, set up, and implement dynamic public health strategies to improve and strengthen their public health system and infrastructure. The FE(L)TP programs include biosafety and bioethics training in support of epidemiological activities. <http://www.cdc.gov/globalhealth/fetp/>

E. On-line resources

1. Education/training

The CDC Learning Connection: maintains a compendium of free learning products on a wide variety of health issues, including Emergency Management, Infectious Disease, Legal/Ethical Issues, Policy/Planning, Preparedness and Response, and Public Health. <http://www.cdc.gov/Features/CDCLearning/>

The CDC Online Training Course: provides education regarding key principles for securing biological agents in research laboratories and biomedical facilities where loss, theft, release or intentional misuse of the agent might have significant public health or economic consequences. <http://www.cdc.gov/biosafety/biosecuritytraining/page1024.html>

The FDA's Food Defense and Emergency Response-Training: The U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) works with other government agencies and private sector organizations to help reduce the risk of tampering or other malicious, criminal, or terrorist actions on the food and cosmetic supply. Web-based training and additional educational resources: <http://www.fda.gov/Food/FoodDefense/default.htm>

NIH materials for Research Conduct and Ethics Instruction: including case studies for the 2010 theme (Science and Social Responsibility): <http://sourcebook.od.nih.gov/resethticscases/2010-cases.pdf>

Federation of American Scientists (FAS) Case Studies in Dual-Use Biological Research: <http://www.fas.org/biosecurity/education/dualuse/>

Dual Use Dilemma in Biological Research, Southeast Regional Center of Excellence for Emerging Infections and Biodefense (SERCEB): <http://www.serceb.org/dualuse.htm>

Biosecurity: Risks, Responses and Responsibilities, Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation.

http://www.armscontrolcenter.org/policy/biochem/biosecurity_educational_materials

The Life Sciences, Biosecurity and Dual Use Research: Dual Use Role Playing Simulation, University of Exeter (UK), University of Bradford (UK), and University of Texas at Dallas (USA).

<http://projects.exeter.ac.uk/codesofconduct/BiosecuritySeminar/Education/index.htm>

Biology and Security, Student Pugwash USA (USA)
http://www.spusa.org/pubs/peace_security/biosecurity/index.html

BSL-3 Facility Inspection videos. These informational videos are for entities or individuals who currently possess, store, or transfer Select Agents and those who are planning to begin work with Select Agents or toxins. <http://www.selectagents.gov/FIV.html>

Emergency Preparedness and Biodefense: NIH Videocasting and Podcasting. Seminars and training events broadcasted live to a world-wide audience over the Internet and also recorded and made available for viewers to watch at their convenience as an on-demand video or a downloadable podcast. <http://videocast.nih.gov/PastEvents.asp?c=58>

Global Biorisk Management Curriculum Development (GBRMC): CBEP is developing and implementing a biorisk management curriculum to address biosafety and biosecurity training. Users of the training materials can participate in a virtual network of trainers via a web-based portal, and provide lessons learned, updates, and feedback for the continual improvement of the materials. The network of trainers currently consists of over 100 biosafety professionals active in the United States, Europe, Asia, and Africa.

2. Awareness-raising

The Executive Office of the President, Office of Science and Technology Policy website: established to inform the public, academic and private sector research communities about government policies related to the safe and secure conduct of biological research and the technologies arising out of the application of the life sciences. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop/ostp/nstc/biosecurity>

The S3 (Science, Safety, and Security) website: provides information on biosafety, biosecurity, biocontainment, and biorisk management. <http://www.phe.gov/s3/Pages/default.aspx>

NSABB Dual Use Research video:
<http://oba.od.nih.gov/biosecurity/biosecurity.html>

NSABB Dual Use Research Brochure:
<http://oba.od.nih.gov/biosecurity/pdf/EducationalBrochureDualUseResearch.pdf>

NSABB Responsible Communication of Life Sciences Research with Dual Use Potential:
http://oba.od.nih.gov/biosecurity/pdf/Communication_Tools%20Dual_Use_Potential.pdf

Biological Risk Management and Nonproliferation website: established by HHS, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response (ASPR) for increased awareness of BWC and UN Security Council Resolution 1540 (UNSCR 1540). <http://www.phe.gov/about/OPP/Pages/bwc.aspx>

The FBI's International Biosecurity and Prevention Forum (IBPF) Currently under development this website is intended to provide an international forum for the coordination and sharing of information and best practices related to the prevention and response to the misuse of biological agents as weapons of mass destruction.

F. International efforts

1. U.S. Government-supported

The International Centers for Excellence in Research (ICER) program: An NIH/National Institute of Allergies and Infectious Disease (NIAID) program to develop and sustain research programs in resource-poor countries through partnerships with local scientists. NIAID has developed core programs at the ICER sites and, over time, has facilitated the expansion of research capacity by training young scientists, improving laboratory and clinical infrastructure, and enhancing information technology capabilities. <http://www.niaid.nih.gov/about/organization/dir/Pages/internationalCenters.aspx>

International workshops and tabletop exercises with BWC-relevant lessons learned: HHS/ASPR co-organized with DOD three international workshops and tabletop exercises in 2010–2011 strengthening the core capacities required by the WHO International Health Regulations (IHRs) and existing national measures consistent with the obligations under the BWC and UNSCR 1540 to deter, prevent, and respond to biological incidents or threats.

“Applied Dual-Use Biosecurity Education Train-the-Trainer Course” run by Bradford University - (Bursaries for participation provided by BEP since 2009. The program is taught on line and over the four semesters of funding, will reach 60 students from over 20 countries

American National Academy of Sciences project (2011): *Develop Global Norms and Educational Standards Against the Misuse of Biotechnology*, aims to develop said standards. (BEP funded)

American National Academy of Sciences in 2011 project (2011): *Implementing an International Faculty Development Project on Dual Use Education*. (BEP funded)

Landau Network Centro Volta’s survey-based work on biosafety, biosecurity and bioethics education in Morocco and Pakistan. This work included the workshop referenced in the LNCV text (see para 23), as well as activities to develop educational programs to rectify knowledge gaps elucidated in the survey. (BEP funded since 2009)

CWA 15793-Laboratory Biorisk Management standard Set requirements necessary to control risks associated with the handling or storage and disposal of biological agents and toxins in laboratories and facilities. (CBEP and BEP support implementation of the CWA and supported the development of and participation by international representatives in the development of the accompanying guidance document)

WHO Biorisk Management Advanced Trainer Program (BRM ATP) aims to increase the number of qualified trainers who train and educate others in biorisk management. (Department of State funded development and initial implementation)

2. Non-U.S. Government

AAAS: Responsible Bioscience for a Safe and Security Society These workshops incorporate ethical and risk management (including security risks) in special sessions and throughout the meeting and address underlying issues associated with international scientific cooperation/collaboration. <http://cstsp.aaas.org/InternationalMeeting/home.html>

G. Studies, reports and articles

Ethics Education: What's Been Learned? What Should be Done? 2009. NAE (National Academy of Engineering). Washington, DC: National Academies Press. <http://www.nae.edu/nae/engethicscen.nsf/weblinks/NKAL-7LHM86?OpenDocument>.

2nd International Forum on Biosecurity: Report of an International Meeting, Budapest, Hungary, March 30-April 2, 2008. 2009. NRC. Washington, DC: National Academies Press.

A Survey of Attitudes and Actions on Dual Use Research in the Life Sciences: A Collaborative Effort of the National Research Council and the American Association for the Advancement of Science. 2009. NRC. Washington, DC: National Academies Press. http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=12460

Responsible Research with Biological Select Agents and Toxins. 2009. NRC. Washington, DC: National Academies Press.

Challenges and Opportunities for Education About Dual Use Issues in the Life Sciences. Washington, DC: National Academies Press. http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=12958

Outreach and Education in the Life Sciences A Case Study of the U.S. Department of Energy National Laboratories. Weller RE, RL Burbank, and HA Mahy. 2010. PNNL-19237, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, Richland, WA.

http://www.pnl.gov/main/publications/external/technical_reports/PNNL-19237.pdf

Competing Responsibilities? Addressing the Security Risks of Biological Research in Academia. 2010. AAAS/AAU/APLU. <http://cstsp.aaas.org/content.html?contentid=2331>

Professional and Graduate-Level Programs on Dual Use Research and Biosecurity for Scientists Working in the Biological Sciences. 2008. AAAS. <http://cstsp.aaas.org/content.html?contentid=1899>

Biological Safety Training as a Component of Personnel Reliability. 2009. AAAS. <http://cstsp.aaas.org/content.html?contentid=2049>

Workforce Development: Preparing the Next Generation for Infectious Disease Threats. 2009. AAAS. <http://cstsp.aaas.org/files/Preparing%20the%20Next%20Generation%20for%20Infectious%20Disease%20Threats.pdf>

Building the Biodefense Policy Workforce. 2009. AAAS http://cstsp.aaas.org/files/AAAS_BiodefensePolicyWorkforce_Report.pdf

Guidance for Enhancing Personnel Reliability and Strengthening the Culture of Responsibility, NSABB, September 2011.

http://oba.od.nih.gov/biosecurity/pdf/CRWG_Report_final.pdf

Strategies to Educate Amateur Biologists and Scientists in Non-life Science Disciplines About Dual Use Research in the Life Sciences, NSABB, June 2011. http://oba.od.nih.gov/biosecurity/pdf/FinalNSABBReport-AmateurBiologist-NonlifeScientists_June-2011.pdf

Addressing Biosecurity Concerns Related to Synthetic Biology, NSABB, April 2010. [http://oba.od.nih.gov/biosecurity/pdf/NSABB%20SynBio%20DRAFT%20Report-FINAL%20\(2\)_6-7-10.pdf](http://oba.od.nih.gov/biosecurity/pdf/NSABB%20SynBio%20DRAFT%20Report-FINAL%20(2)_6-7-10.pdf).