



**Asamblea General**

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CONSEJO DE DERECHOS HUMANOS  
Cuarto período extraordinario de sesiones  
12 de diciembre de 2006

**Nota verbal de fecha 8 de diciembre de 2006 dirigida a la Secretaría del  
Consejo de Derechos Humanos por la Misión Permanente de la  
República del Sudán ante la Oficina de las Naciones Unidas en Ginebra**

La Misión Permanente de la República del Sudán ante la Oficina de las Naciones Unidas y otras organizaciones internacionales en Ginebra saluda atentamente a la Secretaría del Consejo de Derechos Humanos y, en referencia a la decisión del Consejo de convocar un período extraordinario de sesiones sobre la situación en los estados de Darfur, en el Sudán, el 12 de diciembre de 2006, tiene el honor de solicitar que los nueve folletos informativos adjuntos\* se distribuyan como documentos oficiales del período extraordinario de sesiones.

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\* El texto se reproduce como se recibió, en el idioma en que se presentó solamente.

**Annex**

**Excerpts of some statements  
made by  
regional and international officials on Darfur**

**Leaflet N° 1**

1. Ambassador Sam Lbock, Chairman of the AU Team for the implementation of DPA (Darfur Peace Agreement), (statements made in Khartoum on 12.10.2006): **“Most areas in Darfur are safe. I visited vast areas in Darfur and got sure that the region is safe except some areas in Northern Darfur where non-signatory rebels are active”**.
2. Mr. Mark Malloch Brown, Deputy Secretary-General of the U.N.: **“Washington and London are exaggerating the situation in Darfur”**, (The Independent, 29/9/2006).
3. Mr. Jan Pronk, former U.N. Secretary-General Representative to the Sudan: **“The security situation in Darfur is now better than the year 2003 and 2004. The death casualties are among the rebels themselves with a limited number of civilians”**, (Al-Jazeera, 2/10/2006).
4. Mr. Andrew Natsios, President Bush’s special Envoy to Sudan said that: **“Vast number of the American media coverage on Darfur and generally on Sudan throughout the last decade is put to doubt. That is because fabrication and propaganda permeate most of the news on Sudan, if not all of them”**.

**NUMBER OF DECEASED AND DISPLACED PERSONS**

**Leaflet N° 2**

The number of the deceased persons who lost their lives in Darfur conflict is estimated at 9,000 from all parties to the conflict. This reveals the distance between reality and the allegations repeated in this regard by international parties, media and non-governmental organizations and many other countries. The authorities in the three States of Darfur have lists with names and dates and venues of the conflicts.

The number of displaced persons in Darfur is estimated at 677 000, living in 15 camps in Darfur (at Nyala, El Fasher, Jenina, Zalingi and Kaas). The authorities have a detailed number by each IDPs camp.

Those affected by the war and who have been receiving humanitarian assistance in their places of residence, i.e. they did not move from their villages, are estimated to be 1490 000 in the three states.

A considerable number of the displaced persons have returned voluntarily to their villages in the three states, as part of the programme of voluntary return before and after the Peace Agreement. The number is estimated at 100 000 persons on 2006.

## **DISARMING OF THE JANJAWEEED AND MILITIAS**

### **Leaflet N° 3**

The Government of Sudan took a number of measures to disarm the Janjaweed who are outlaw groups that seek to serve by the force of arms individual and self-interests, exploiting the situation in Darfur. They are composed of members of tribes of Arab and African origin. This is the definition which the government representative to the third round of the Abuja negotiations presented to the Secretariat of the African Union. Other steps were taken also to disarm the militias according to the following:-

- 1) The Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA), signed in Abuja on 5<sup>th</sup> May 2006, prescribes that the Government shall devise a plan for the disarming of the Janjaweed and militias, to be submitted to the African Mission in Sudan (AMLS). The plan was submitted on 7<sup>th</sup> July, 2006. The Chairman of the Commission on Cease-fire of AMLS prepared his remarks on the plan and the Government took note of that and is in process of executing the plan.
- 2) In June, 2006, the local authorities of the Kas locality, Southern Darfur, established contact with Janjaweed elements in the area of Kargo. A number of 137 of them declared repentance from their ways after they had been offered amnesty in regard to the public right in the crimes committed by them. They also handed in their arms. Arrangements were made to rehabilitate these persons and to secure for them decent livelihoods by putting in their possession production equipment or employing them in jobs. It is worth mentioning that those persons belong to different tribes.
- 3) The Commission on Disarmament, demobilization and Re-integration made contacts with the council of Arab tribal chiefs in Darfur and it was agreed that their tribes to be disarmed, according to international norms. The international community bore witness to that as the Ambassadors accredited to Khartoum and the AU and UN attended the meeting in August, 2006 in which the agreement took place.

It is to be noted that the disarmament of warring groups, as attested to by the African Union, is the most cumbersome phase after peace and during the period of implementation of the agreement. This requires of course full cooperation between the Government, the community leaders and the international community.

## **IS THE SECURITY AND HUMANITARIAN SITUATION BETTER OR WORSE AFTER THE DARFUR PEACE AGREEMENT ?**

### **Leaflet N° 4**

#### **1. Background**

The Darfur Peace Agreement was signed on 5 May 2006 between the Government of the Sudan and the then Chief Rebel Group (the Sudan Liberation Movement). The United Nations, African Union and the peace partners (the US, EU, Arab League and other countries) witnessed the signing of the Agreement.

But for no apparent reason, and before its being signed, the US and the UK moved to impede the conclusion of the Agreement. On 30 April, 2006, Tanzania tabled at the Security Council a draft resolution calling for support to the Abuja negotiations and encouragement all parties to sign the Agreement. Instead of passing the said draft resolution, action on it was postponed and the two countries tabled another draft resolution imposing sanctions on Sudanese Government officials.

After signature, the Security Council issued its resolution 1679, setting an ultimatum for the refraining parties to sign the Agreement or face measures against them by the Council. Now six months after this resolution, the Council is yet to take these measures and the factions opposing the Agreement and rejecting the cease-fire are in fact being assisted with arms, and funds and the enjoy political support and de-facto recognition.

2. Within four months after the Agreement, the number of returning IDPs reached 30 000, that is, one third of the total number of the returnees since the emergence of the crisis. This indicates the positive effect of the Agreement on voluntary return.

3. Following the signing of the Agreement, roads and passages were opened as a result of the work of the joint committees. The following roads are now open:-

- Nyala – Qereida-Buram
- Nyala - Labado
- Mehajneya – Nyala
- Nyala – Deacin
- Kolbos – Jeneina

4. The Sudan Liberation Movement, the Free Will and Justice and Equality (the signatory group) have all been declared as political movements active politically in the three States of Darfur.

5. The Movements opposing the Agreement also announced commitment to the cease-fire, except for the Redemption Front which was established after the Agreement, and which is the only group that violates the cease-fire.

6. Joint Committees have been set up by AMIS and UNMIS and non-governmental organizations, the government and signatory groups, for the purposes of addressing security and humanitarian issues. The Committees represent important mechanisms for consolidating transparency and joint work for monitoring the implementation of the Agreement.

7. The joint survey by the UNICEF, WHO revealed the decrease of malnutrition and infant mortality rate, and that there is no occurrence of epidemic in Darfur.

## **THE HUMANITARIAN SITUATION IN DARFUR**

### **Leaflet N° 5**

#### The contribution of the Government towards Darfur 2006

- Food: 35000 tons at a cost of USD 28 million.
- Shelter: USD 25 million in assistance to 300 000 families
- Health (environment / treatment / inoculation) USD. 32 million, to the displaced and affected persons.
- Water: UDS. 21 million
- Coverage of the affected persons includes food, medicines and shelter is as follows:-
  - 100 % coverage of the displaced persons until November
  - 98 % coverage of the affected persons, an increase in the percentage occurred due to the collaboration of the factions which signed the Abuja Agreement and improved access to areas inaccessible previously. The 2 % deficit in coverage is the result of the infiltration of rebels of the Redemption Front (RF) to some areas.

#### Humanitarian indicators:

A joint survey by the United Nations, UNICEF, WHO, Ministry of Health, WFP is as follows:

- The rates and indicators of nutrition are good and less than emergency indicators
- Mortality rate : normal
- Health indicator: no occurrence of communicable diseases.

After the Abuja Agreement:

- Access has been obtained to previously inaccessible areas.
- Because of tribal reconciliation, some citizens returned to their home areas.
- Prices of cereals dropped as a result of the return of displaced persons and the cultivation of some land.

Humanitarian facilitation

- There are 150 foreign and local organizations operating in Darfur they employ 1250 foreign and 14000 local workers and are using around 2000 vehicles.
- The Fast Track System procedures have been reinforced, which facilitated the work and access by organizations to Darfur.
- No new displacement occurred since September 200 except for a small number of areas that witnessed attacks by the S.F.

Impediments

- Violations perpetrated by the factions which did not sign the Abuja Agreement.
- Slowing of donor payment of their commitments.
- Some organizations spread fear among the displaced persons so that they do not return to their areas, especially in west Darfur.

## **CHILD RECRUITMENT**

### **Leaflet N° 6**

The laws governing the armed forces, the police force, the popular defense and police and the national service stipulate that persons of less than 18 years of age shall not be recruited. This contravenes the Convention on the Child. Mr. Olara A. Otunnu, the Representative to the Secretary General for Children and Armed Conflict, witnessed the Human Rights Commission since March 1998 that the Sudan Government is abiding by that Convention.

The Statute of the Joint Forces that have been established by the comprehensive Peace Agreement of January, 2004 also stipulates that recruitment age shall not be less than 18 years.

There are programmes implemented by the Government to reintegrate the children who the Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement used to recruit in southern Sudan before the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. The programme provides for reintegration with their families, health and education.

There are no cases of children of less than 18 years of age being recruited in any of the regular armed forces.

Sudan was of the first countries to sign and ratify the Convention on the Child and the two optional protocols concerning children, involvement in armed conflicts and trafficking of children and abusing them in prostitution.

The Sudan also signed the African Convention on the child and is abiding by it.

## **SECURITY SITUATION**

### **Leaflet N° 7**

The security situation in Darfur became more stable after the Abuja Agreement and not a single violation was committed of the cease-fire in the three States, by the Sudan Government or even by the groups that refrained as yet from signing the Agreement. Arrangement for the cease-fire:

- It is true that some incidents took place in North Darfur. These were retaliations against attacks by the Salvation Front which is not party to the concluded agreement and which is not bound by the cease-fire.
- The incidents of Western Darfur (Jabal Moon) were the result of confrontation between the Movements (Justice and Equality, SLM- the Jibreel faction) and the local population in that area.
- The incidents of South Darfur (Qereida, Mehajreyah) were part of the struggle between the Movements for the control of positions, besides tribal conflicts.
- One main reason of the improvement in the security situation is the major role played by the joint committees which were composed by the Government and the Movements after the Abuja Agreement. These committees achieved notable successes, including opening of roads and passage ways that remained closed for a long time.
- There is also the Tripoli Agreement, which brought to peace a faction with a notable presence on the ground which is the Sudan Liberation Movement – Faction of Abulgasim Imam.

## **IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DARFUR PEACE AGREEMENT**

### **Leaflet N° 8**

The strategic target of solving the Darfur problem is the effective and prompt implementation of the Darfur target that includes power and wealth sharing, comprehensive cease-fire, final security arrangements and the Darfur – Darfur dialogue. Setting of this target seeks to realize stability and security, and the complete normalization of life in Darfur and the consolidation and sustaining of peace.

#### Established Implementation mechanisms:

1. The High Committee for addressing the Darfur Issue, which is chaired by the President of the Republic.
2. The Executive Committee for Addressing the Darfur issue, chaired by the Minister for the Presidency.
3. Operation cell for the implementation of the Darfur Peace, chaired by the Advisor to the President.
4. The Darfur Committee for the Implementation of the Darfur Peace, chaired by the Governor or the Rotating Chair of the Darfur Transitional Authority in each of the three States.

#### Steps taken:

1. The President of the Republic issued a decree granting amnesty to these who signed the DPA and to those detained in connection of the crisis.
  - a) The Constitutions of the three States of Darfur have been amended to ensure concurrence with the Agreement.
  - b) Institution of some localities, while others are to follow soon. Other localities were reviewed to arrange for incorporation as stipulated by the Agreement.
2. Appointment of the Chairman of the Sudan Liberation Movement as Senior Assistant to the President.
3. Presidential decrees have been issued to:
  - a) declare coming into being of the Darfur Transitional Authority.
  - b) create the Darfur Fund for Reconstruction and Development.
  - c) establish the Darfur Commission for Rehabilitation and Resettlement.
  - d) establish the Commission for Compensation.
  - e) create the commission for Land.



4. The following appointments have been made on the presidential and state levels:

- Minister of State at the Ministry of Energy.
- Commissioner for Reconstruction and Development
- Commissioner for Land.
- State Minister at the State of Khartoum.
- Chairman of the Darfur Dialogue, appointed by the A.U., and sub-committees to the same on both state and federal levels.

5. There are detailed tables of the implementation of the DPA under the auspices of the African Union which is responsible for monitoring implementation.

## **EFFORTS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF SUDAN IN COMBATING VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN (VAW)**

### **Leaflet N° 9**

#### **1. Historical background for combating VAW in Sudan**

- July 6, 2005, Mr. Robert Zolleic (Assistant to the American Secretary of State) proposed various steps to prevent and respond to VAW to be taken by Government.
- Mr. Robert Zolleic suggested that these steps will send a clear message to the international community about the Government's commitment to end VAW in Darfur.
- This initiative was considered and accepted by the Government of Sudan because it was built upon the basis of positive dialogue.

#### **2. National action plan to eliminate and combat VAW**

- According to the endeavour of the Sudan Government to combat VAW, a committee headed by His Excellency the Vice President was established, composed of all the ministries related to human rights in general and women rights in particular, to plan for comprehensive measures to combat that phenomenon.
- A national plan of action to eliminate VAW was drafted and passed to the UN agencies and all embassies in Khartoum for comment. All comments received were taken into consideration.
- The plan mainly aimed at raising awareness that VAW is a serious crime punishable by law and for referring victims to medical and psychological care and legal remedy.

3. Ministry of Justice role

A special highly authorized inter-Ministerial Federal Unit was established to combat VAW under the supervision of Ministry of Justice.

Activities conducted by the Special Federal Unit:

- A workshop was conducted to train trainees from NGOs in the social and psychological aspects of VAW victims' rehabilitation, 15 from each of Darfur States.
- Press conferences for media personnel were held to raise their awareness in VAW problems, reminding them of the importance of their role in disseminating the true information.
- The Unit attended the regional symposium in Brussels on VAW and shared experiences with other countries.
- The Federal Unit to combat VAW established three subcommittees in the three Darfur States to collect information, file reports to the police, conduct research on the magnitude of the gender-based violence and its causes. The subcommittees regularly contribute in submitting periodic reports on the status of VAW.

4. Indicators of success for Government efforts in combating VAW

- The number of reported VAW cases has decreased in the last six months in Darfur.
- A number of awareness raising workshops at the States level were conducted, targeting the women sector, accordingly access to justice for victims improved.
- In relation to VAW cases, legislative amendments were made allowing for the priority of treatment for victims of VAW, without the requirement of Criminal Procedure act form 8 being completed by police.

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