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**C O N T E N T S**

Measures to avert the threat of a new world war and to reduce tension in international relations (*continued*) .... 269

**Chairman: Mr. F. VAN LANGENHOVE (Belgium).**

**Measures to avert the threat of a new world war and to reduce tension in international relations (A/2485/Rev.1 and A/2485/Add.1) (*continued*)**

[Item 73]\*

1. Mr. LOPEZ (Philippines) observed that the reduction of tension in international relations did not depend on the small countries, but, on the other hand, an attitude of resignation was no adequate guarantee of survival in the event of conflict. They were, therefore, entitled to state their point of view. Despite the threat of the atomic weapon, man's desire to live in freedom and dignity was no less strong than his instinct of self-preservation. It was in vain, therefore, that the Soviet Union attempted to impose its conditions for peace. Free men would never accept communist domination, even to avert war, or allow the communists to destroy their freedoms in exchange for a reduction in world tension. Fear of war could never be used by the communists to induce the free nations to expose themselves, defenceless, to communist subversion and attack.

2. It was true that the present tension was so dangerous that a remedy had to be found. Nevertheless, the polemics provoked by the Soviet delegation and the draft resolution which it had submitted (A/2485/Rev.1) were not the proper means of restoring international confidence. Never, indeed, could the free nations be so credulous as to overlook the trap set for them when they were asked to accept a text which would amount to an admission of guilt. Once again, the theme of all the Soviet speeches had been that they alone were endowed with all virtues. But such arguments were of no avail, and the time had come to abandon all unyielding attitudes and concede that none was free from blame. The Soviet Union itself had sinned against the spirit of peace, if only by hurling accusations against the rest of the world.

3. The time had consequently come for a change if not of character, at least of script and setting. It was in the Disarmament Commission that the Soviet Union had to co-operate in finding a solution guaranteeing peace for all while ensuring universal security, in the

spirit of the resolution recently adopted by the Committee (A/C.1/L.88). It was always Mr. Vyshinsky who controlled the temper of the Assembly debates and decided whether the outcome of them would be fortunate or unfortunate. Words by themselves were not enough, but the Soviet Union had at least the possibility of proving by actions that it was really seeking to guarantee peace, since numerous problems called for action: the German and Austrian questions, the Korean political conference, the conflict in Indo-China and the subversive movements in South-East Asia. The foreign policy of the United States had been criticized as merely reflecting a reaction to that of the Soviet Union. As a law of physics said that every action was followed by reaction, any favourable Soviet initiative would certainly provoke a peaceful response of the same kind.

4. On 19 November, the representative of the Soviet Union had observed that the Philippines was within a zone which the United States considered to be part of its defensive frontiers. But nobody could be surprised at the mutual defence treaty and military bases agreement between the United States and the Philippines, which had been allies in the Second World War. The Philippines was certainly very satisfied with that guarantee of powerful assistance, under agreements freely entered into for defensive purposes, in conformity with the Charter. Furthermore, historical ties and similar beliefs in democracy, as well as the proximity of the communist menace, rendered the agreements not only logical, but necessary.

5. The Ukrainian representative had stated (675th meeting) that the term "regional arrangements", used in Article 52 of the Charter, could not cover mutual defence agreements such as those recently signed by the United States and Greece. But the fact that the United States was as remote from the Ukraine as from Greece had not prevented the Soviet Union from welcoming an alliance with the United States in the Second World War.

6. The free countries hoped and prayed that the United States would continue to support all countries where freedom was in jeopardy. Free men desired peace, but they should make certain that the longing for peace was not utilized by the communists for purposes of world domination, and that the desire for a reduction of tension should not lead to any relaxation of precautionary measures. Weakness would only increase the danger of war.

7. Mr. DE KADT (Netherlands) regretted that the Soviet draft resolution (A/2485/Rev.1) offered no real contribution towards a reduction of tension, or any realistic approach towards measures to avert the threat of a new world war. As for the Soviet representative's speech, it had merely condemned as warmongers, or their accomplices, all those whose approach to the

\* Indicates the item number on the agenda of the General Assembly.

problem differed from that of the Soviet Union. The Netherlands Government was always ready to consider any measures for the strengthening of peace. It was natural that the Netherlands which had suffered terribly from war and occupation wished for a lessening of world tension which would enable it to achieve even more than it had in reconstruction, and in social, cultural and economic development.

8. It was foolish to claim that peoples and governments like those of the Netherlands saw in the growth of the war menace a method of escape from economic and social problems, the solution of which absolutely demanded the consolidation of peace. There were doubtless irresponsible elements in every country, but the Government and people of the Netherlands could easily hold in check all warmongers, if any existed. Generally speaking, the countries accused by the Soviet Union were not threatening peace, nor were there any forces strong enough to break the will for peace of the freely elected governments. On the other hand, no internal or external force would be strong enough to make those peoples accept a despotic system or a way of living which they considered beneath human dignity. The peace-loving world would deal with any government which endeavoured to impose such a system by force just as it had dealt with the Kaiser and Hitler. As for cunning, propaganda, and scraps of paper, the peace-loving world would never again be deceived. It would always demand proof, by means of deeds, that the other side accepted the burden of control instead of the burden of armaments. It went without saying that the free world was also prepared to accept control, and did not claim any privileged position in the matter.

9. The Soviet representative had denounced the Baruch plan. The United Nations would impartially accept any better suggestions, irrespective of their source. Moreover, the Baruch plan put forward at a time when the United States had a monopoly of the atomic bomb, constituted a generous and peace-loving offer, since the United States was willing to accept control provided all nations engaged in the manufacture of similar weapons did the same. Consequently, any person who denounced that plan proved that his intentions were neither generous nor peace-loving.

10. If the Soviet Union was in possession of atom bombs and hydrogen bombs, the peace-loving peoples would conclude that international control should be better organized to prevent any clandestine manufacture of such weapons, and of the conventional weapons which, in their way, could also be very efficient weapons of mass destruction. So long as the Soviet Union declined to admit that a growing control of armaments might be conducive to peace, all peace-loving peoples would be convinced that the communists were accumulating propaganda and manœuvring to divide their opponents.

11. The USSR representative confused reality with a curious mixture of Press clippings, quotations, wishful thinking and propaganda. The only possible method of dealing with the free world was that followed by the overwhelming majority of the United Nations. The USSR should therefore accept the proposals concerning a conference on the unification and liberation of Germany and take serious steps to secure peace in Korea and a solution of the Asian problems and other world problems. If that were done, tension would be

reduced and some of the USSR proposals that were at present unacceptable to many governments would be considered with higher regard.

12. The Netherlands delegation hoped that the USSR would give up unfruitful methods, propaganda and wishful thinking, and it was in that spirit that it would vote against the dishonest and hollow draft resolution, which was not in keeping with the serious problem at issue.

13. Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that the USSR draft resolution had served as a basis for a debate on the measures that the United Nations should take to secure peace. In discussing the draft, however, certain representatives had expressed themselves in terms that did not even deserve a reply. The USSR delegation's sole intention was to find a practical and realistic solution for the problems confronting the General Assembly.

14. The representatives of the Dominican Republic, the Philippines and the Netherlands had sought to blame the USSR for the armaments race and international tension. The Dominican representative, in particular, had stated (673rd meeting) that the USSR's isolationist policy and its refusal to sign or give effect to peace treaties frustrated the efforts of those who desired disarmament. Similarly, the Philippine representative had described the USSR as a warmonger and had reproached it for making its proposals for the settlement of international problems subject to unacceptable conditions. The Philippine representative wanted the Soviet Union to accept conditions fixed not, of course, by the Philippines, but by the ruling circles of the United States. Thus the USSR's critics accused it of imposing its own conditions and at the same time stated in all seriousness that all it had to do if it desired a peaceful settlement was to accept aggressive plans and ultimatums.

15. The USSR had been depicted as a State that was preparing plans of aggression. In reply to those allegations, which were as absurd as they were calumnious, it would suffice to note the views of persons who could scarcely be considered spokesmen for Soviet policy. For example, Mr. Leopold Bravo, the Argentine Ambassador to Moscow, on completing a 15,000 kilometre tour of the USSR, had described the progress the country had made in its work of reconstruction. In Stalingrad, which had been completely destroyed, few traces of the war remained. He had observed that every city was carrying out the work with its own resources, and had added that diplomats who saw only Moscow had no idea of the progress that was being made in reconstruction, town planning, culture and education. Innumerable sanatoria and rest homes on the Black Sea coast accommodated USSR workers and officials. Kiev was a flourishing city, and the Volga Canal defied description. The Argentine Ambassador's tour had left him with the impression that the USSR was a gigantic construction site.

16. Such a statement was the best rebuttal of allegations that the USSR was preparing for war and that it was not sincere in its struggle against warmongers.

17. Some representatives, including those of the United States and the United Kingdom, had claimed that the fourteen-Power draft resolution previously adopted by the First Committee (A/C.1/L.88) had already covered the questions raised by the USSR

draft (A/2485/Rev.1). Mr. Lloyd, for example, had asserted (673rd meeting) that the idea expressed in the second paragraph of the preamble of the Soviet draft was embodied in a form acceptable to the majority in the fifth paragraph of the preamble of the fourteen-Power draft resolution. However, the fourteen-Power draft referred not to an "armaments race" but to "competition in the development of armaments". The USSR draft pointed out that weapons of mass destruction were becoming "ever more destructive and dangerous for many millions of people".

18. Mr. Lloyd had claimed that paragraphs 1 and 2 of the operative part of the USSR text were identical to those of resolution 504 (VI). That was not exact, for the latter actually only referred to the Disarmament Commission proposals without indicating the Committee's attitude to them.

19. Mr. Lloyd had asserted that the Disarmament Commission had already received appropriate instructions. But the Commission should be sharply reminded that the instructions that it had received during the seventh session had not been applied.

20. Mr. Lloyd had also said that the Disarmament Commission might make substantial progress on the basis of the proposals, but he had added that their adoption would increase international tension; those two statements were contradictory.

21. The Committee should in fact either ask the General Assembly to declare a ban on weapons of mass destruction or frankly tell the whole world that it considered such a ban to be impossible. For its part, the USSR regarded the question as one of honour and conscience; the proposals could not be brushed aside by contradictory phrases such as Mr. Lloyd had used, without even proposing concrete measures to take their place.

22. Moreover, delegations should at least have explained their position on the second part of the first operative paragraph, which would give the Security Council certain instructions. But they had merely repeated old arguments that did not enter into the essence of the problem, in order to disguise their purely negative attitude towards the USSR proposals.

23. According to Mr. Lloyd, the USSR was trying to isolate the prohibition of atomic weapons, which would be in its interest, from the reduction of conventional armaments, in which it saw no advantage. But the idea of the superiority of certain countries over the USSR in the atomic field was an illusion that dated from the years 1946 and 1947, when certain countries had been delighted with their possession of a monopoly that they had since lost forever. At the present time the USSR had atomic and hydrogen bombs and was on equal terms with all other countries, whether they had those weapons or not. Despite that fact, the USSR persisted in its proposal for the prohibition of those weapons.

24. The atomic weapon was always destructive, whichever State possessed it. If it was the key weapon of the United States it could equally be the key weapon of the USSR. Since the situation was the same for both countries, it could not be claimed that the USSR urged the prohibition of atomic weapons in order to secure a dominant position. Furthermore Mr. Lloyd was wrong in saying that the USSR was at a disadvantage in the field of atomic development; he should read the statements of British scientists.

25. It was inexact, moreover, to claim that the USSR was trying to isolate the question of atomic weapons from that of conventional armaments. In fact, at the sixth session the USSR had proposed the simultaneous solution of the two problems: the prohibition of atomic weapons and the institution of international control, and the reduction of conventional armaments; and at the same time it had proposed the calling of a world conference. On the other hand, in Sub-Committee 18 presided over by Mr. Padilla Nervo during the same session it had been Mr. Lloyd, Mr. Jessup and Mr. Moch who had tried artificially to isolate the prohibition of atomic weapons from the reduction of conventional armaments.

26. But, Mr. Vyshinsky stated, it was becoming more and more difficult to discuss serious business with speakers who were no longer present when he wanted to answer them or whose government might be replaced at any moment by one of another complexion.

27. Regarding the reduction of armed forces by one-third, Mr. Lloyd had merely said that the proposal represented a step backward in comparison with the amendment submitted to the fourteen-Power draft resolution, which had mentioned only a substantial reduction. But in the first place the resolution referred to the reduction of armed forces by one-third within a year, and not in an unspecified period. Secondly, a reduction of 33 per cent was surely a substantial reduction: how, then, could Mr. Lloyd speak of a contradiction between the two texts?

28. Mr. Lloyd had stated that the phrase "a substantial reduction" was more flexible. But should a mere matter of drafting allow an important problem to be side-stepped? None of the delegations had ever seriously discussed the question, hoping that it would be consigned to permanent oblivion in the Disarmament Commission.

29. In flatly denying the statement contained in paragraph 3 of the operative part, that military bases in the territories of other States increased the threat of a new war and undermined the national sovereignty and independence of States, Mr. Lloyd had relied on personal impressions instead of studying history. True, he had added that the territory of the United Kingdom was too small to allow of defence in depth, so that the country's security depended on distant bases. But did it depend on Suez or Hong Kong? Furthermore, the United Kingdom had demonstrated its gratitude towards the United States by giving up its bases in the western hemisphere, an action which settled the question of its security.

30. In his book *America and World Mastery*, Mr. MacCormac had recalled that those bases were still managed by Great Britain, but that in reality the United States was the master of the western hemisphere. How then could the United Kingdom's security be described as dependent on the establishment of distant bases? Accordingly, it was vain for Mr. Lloyd to take refuge in the arguments used by the Labour Party when it was in power and to refer to the verbal agreements between Mr. Bevin and the United States Ambassador authorizing the United States to maintain two bomber squadrons temporarily in the United Kingdom. That temporary arrangement was still in force, and the number of American bases on British territory was constantly growing.

31. The truth was that, to quote a statement made at the time by Sir Winston Churchill, leader of the opposition, those bombers were to be used to drop atomic bombs on the Soviet Union. Sir Winston had added that the communists used that fact to charge the United Kingdom with being a mere aircraft carrier. Similarly, the *Sunday Times* had commented that the United Kingdom would become the NATO airfield.

32. There was a complete contrast between that policy and the peaceful work of the Soviet Union. True, however, objections had been raised in England itself. Thus Mr. Emrys Hughes had stated on 11 October 1950 that the Government's foreign policy would bring the United Kingdom to disaster. And since that date the number of American bases had steadily increased. In 1952, Mr. Hughes had said that American bombers should be transferred to American territory, since far from ensuring the safety of the British people they represented a terrible danger; and he added that the shortest route from the United States to Russia passed over the North Pole.

33. Unfortunately, Mr. Lloyd did not understand the danger in which the American policy of siting bomber plane bases as near as possible to Russia involved the United Kingdom. Since it represented a danger to the Soviet Union, Mr. Lloyd considered that it could not harm the United Kingdom. Mr. Hughes, however, had been more perspicacious when he had pointed out the danger to his country of the plan for a tourist trip by American airplanes into Soviet territory. For it could not be maintained that the American bases in England had been established for defensive purposes: like all the military bases installed in the territory of other States, they were part of the war plans of the North Atlantic aggressive bloc.

34. The review *U. S. News & World Report* had recently said that the American bases in England were only 900 kilometres from Moscow. Similarly, it had been calculated that American bases in Turkey were only 800 kilometres from the Ukraine. Such avowals did not allow the Soviet Union to ignore the fact that an attack was being prepared against it and against the people's democracies.

35. The aggressive character of the NATO bloc had been again confirmed by the agreement concluded between the United States and Franco; yet the wounds inflicted by the Blue Division in the Soviet Union were still not completely healed. True, those bandits had met the fate which awaited all those who attacked the Soviet Union, like the Japanese, American, English and French interventionists who had once sought to aid the White generals.

36. Were the same senseless ideas to be resuscitated, at the very moment that the Soviet Union was being reproached for not being peacefully minded? The truth was that the Soviet Union was a nation of peace-mongers. But if love of peace was to stifle hate, the truth must be told, instead of mouthing meaningless phrases about propaganda and honesty.

37. Like NATO, the European Defence Community was in reality an aggressive plan; but it was meeting with ever-increasing opposition in Western Europe, particularly in France. Mr. Lloyd had denied that the military measures taken by the United States, which was day by day strengthening its grip on Western Europe, affected the sovereignty of States, and had

insisted that the establishment of bases supposed the conclusion of agreements between governments. But in spite of all juridical forms a weaker State was in a position of inferiority. Treaties were the expression of policy, and where one contracting party had greater power, the weaker was obliged to accept the agreement. Thus a State which depended economically and financially on another State was obliged to take military measures that bore no relation to its national interests and were incompatible with its independence and sovereignty. That was the conclusion to be drawn from the North Atlantic Treaty.

38. Mr. Lloyd had said that before delivering an opinion on the bases it was necessary to know what aim they had been established to serve. But it was very well known why the Americans had constructed bases in England and France and other countries of Western Europe, and it was therefore easy to judge those who had handed over their territory on loan.

39. Mr. Lloyd had claimed that the Soviet Union could use bases situated on its immense territory and that of its neighbours for both offensive and defensive purposes; but he must know that the Soviet Union had no aggressive intentions. Moreover it had no military bases in the territories of other States. The very small number of troops which it maintained in Hungary and Romania were there in accordance with the peace treaties only in order to secure the Soviet Army's lines of communication.

40. Mr. Lloyd had said that the Soviet Union ought to rejoice at the Bermuda Conference as a mere friendly meeting which could not aggravate tension. In reality a bargain was to be concluded at that Conference between certain Powers against the interests of other countries on questions affecting international peace and security. The mere fact that all the States affected had not been invited rendered impossible any solution of the problems which would be examined there.

41. Mr. Vyshinsky also wished to make several observations on certain points of Mr. Lodge's statement. Like some other representatives in the Committee, Mr. Lodge had striven to shift the responsibility for international tension from the Atlantic bloc to the Soviet Union. He had tried to prove his case by reference to Berlin and the German problem, the history of which since 1949 he had outlined in support of his charges. He would have been more honest to have begun with 1945, the year in which the great Powers took their historic decisions at Yalta and Potsdam. It had been the United States, the United Kingdom and France which had undermined those agreements. As far back as 1947, at the meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, Mr. Molotov had urged the implementation of those agreements and had submitted proposals for a provisional political organization of Germany designed to pave the way for its unification. Although it was based on the same principles as the undertakings subscribed to by the Powers which had defeated Nazi Germany, the plan had encountered a variety of obstacles. The Western representatives had proceeded to submit an alternative plan which, in contravention of the principles of Yalta and Potsdam, was designed to impede the economic rehabilitation of Germany—a potential competitor on the European market. Mr. Molotov had described that plan as a threat to European democracy and peace, emphasizing that it would serve only the interests of the German

reactionaries, who were always ready to take up the cause of German unification and exploit it to further their revanchist objectives. He had added that the Powers which needed German territory in order to develop war industry and the reactionary forces within Germany, in order to reinforce a policy of domination over the democratic countries, would undoubtedly utilize the plan for those ends. Events had fully borne out the correctness of that prophecy.

42. In 1946, for example, the Western Governments had concluded an agreement to combine their zones and had taken a series of separate measures, declining to submit them to the Control Council, the organ symbolizing the joint policy of the four occupying Powers towards Germany. A year later, the Ruhr had been removed from quadripartite control. A bizonal German economic council had been set up, while the Soviet proposals for the establishment of central German administrative departments for finance, industry, transport, communications, and foreign trade had been rejected, despite the fact that they were in conformity with the Potsdam decisions. In 1948, Mr. Dulles had informed the General Assembly that there would be no return to Yalta and Potsdam, a clear indication of the manner in which the United States intended to honour its signature.

43. The USSR had protested against that policy, but in vain. In 1948, as the culmination of their separatist policy, the Western Powers had brought inter-allied control to an end, carried out a currency reform in Western Germany and attempted to convert Berlin into a centre of agitation against Eastern Germany.

44. In 1949, the Conference of Foreign Ministers of the Western Powers held in Washington approved the Statute of Western Germany, designed to prolong the occupation for an indefinite period and to frustrate all efforts to bring about the conclusion of a treaty of peace. In order to camouflage that imperialist policy, a State of Western Germany was created and furnished with an appropriate constitution. When, a little later in the same year, the Soviet Foreign Minister had proposed to the Foreign Ministers the preparation of a treaty of peace and consideration of measures for the unification of Germany, the Western representatives had rejected his proposal.

45. United States assertions designed to shift the blame for the failure of German unity to the Soviet Union were therefore pure demagoguery which could deceive no one. The Western Powers had prevented the establishment of a council of state for the whole of Germany, a co-ordinating body which would have paved the way for unification. They had rejected Soviet proposals for the preparation of a treaty of peace and the withdrawal of the occupation forces. It was in fact significant that the proclamation of the People's Council and provisional government of the German Democratic Republic in 1949 had taken place after the events of September of that year culminating in the establishment of the Adenauer Government in Bonn. That was clear proof that the setting up of the German Democratic Republic had merely been a rejoinder to the action taken by the Western Powers.

46. Under United States direction, the Bonn Parliament had sought to make Western Germany a member of the Council of Europe, the Schuman Plan and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, where places had

been reserved for the former Nazi generals who were eager for revenge.

47. Throughout that period, the Government of the German Democratic Republic had exerted every effort to bring all Germans around one table, to use the phrase of Minister Grotewohl.

48. On 10 March 1952, the Soviet Government had invited the Western Powers to accept a draft treaty of peace, and had added that it was prepared to consider any other proposal on the subject. That was a proposal which Mr. Lodge could not pass over in silence on the pretext that the United States, Great Britain and France had not answered. On 15 August, the Soviet Union Government had sent a further note incorporating its draft treaty of peace, but in their reply of 2 September the three Western Powers had again made no reference to the matter.

49. Thus, Mr. Lodge had not traced the history of the German question but had given a grossly distorted and clumsy account of it. The same was true of the statement he had made on 24 November concerning the Soviet note of 3 November. That note had proposed, first, that measures for the easing of international tension should be considered at a conference of the Foreign Ministers of the United Kingdom, France, the United States, the Peoples' Republic of China and the Soviet Union; and, secondly, that the German question should be discussed at a conference of the Foreign Ministers of the aforementioned countries less the Peoples' Republic of China, all proposals put forward in the preparatory stages of the conference being taken into account. That differed considerably from Mr. Lodge's assertion that the Soviet Union had made agreement between the two Germanies a condition for the convening of the conference. The Soviet Union Government had not in fact laid down any conditions; it had been the Western Powers which had sought to impose their own in order to postpone the holding of the conference.

50. Mr. Lodge appeared to feel particularly strongly about the paragraph in the Soviet draft resolution (A/2485/Rev.1) condemning the propaganda being conducted in some countries with the aim of inciting enmity and hatred among nations. In criticizing that paragraph, he had attempted to prove that every shade of sentiment towards the Soviet Union from hatred to ecstatic admiration was to be found in the United States Press. But all that the Soviet Union asked was that the United States Press should abstain from abusing it. Mr. Lodge had refrained from discussing the statements he had quoted; he was very well aware that they proved beyond a doubt that attempts were being made to incite hatred of the Soviet Union. What, on the other hand, had Mr. Lodge found in the Soviet Press? He had read articles from which it appeared that school teachers were required to tell their pupils the truth about, for example, the poverty of the masses, the few rights enjoyed by the peoples in the Anglo-American imperialist countries, the crimes committed against humanity. The truth was that the war party desired war, that the reactionary circles of the United States wished to perpetuate the exploitation and enslavement of other peoples. Should those teachers be criticized for telling their pupils the truth? Should they conceal from them the discrimination against coloured people which existed in the United States, the Union of South Africa and elsewhere? Was it not

essential to warn the peace-loving peoples of the threat of a new world war brought about by the atrocities of reactionaries in the imperialist countries?

51. The recent book by George Marion, *Stop the Press!*, sufficiently demolished the legend of so-called freedom of the Press in the United States. A special commission under Robert Hutchins had carried out an enquiry into the freedom of the Press under the auspices of the United States Congress. Its report had indicated that, concentrated as it was in the hands of vast concerns, the American Press in no way fulfilled its democratic duty; that while it was capable of promoting the development of thought and discussion, it was also capable of degrading mankind and endangering the general peace by disseminating lies more rapidly and on a more extensive scale. That was what it could do and was in fact doing. That criticism did not of course apply to a certain section of the United States Press, which was valiantly battling for the truth.

52. That negative appraisal did not, however, extend in any way to the American people as a whole, for whom the Soviet Union had the greatest respect. That was indeed the impression given by the film *Silvery Dust* to which Mr. Lodge had referred. That film did, to be sure, criticize certain types of Americans; but it showed mainly authentic representatives of the American people who were honest, generous and devoted to the cause of peace and international co-operation.

53. It should also be added that the political atmosphere in the United States was marked by such obscurantist measures as the removal from government libraries of books considered dangerous, including those of many classical writers.

54. Mr. Lodge would even reproach the Soviet Union for its satirical literature. It would thus also be necessary to burn the writings of Dickens, Jerome K. Jerome, Mark Twain, Gogol, Molière, Cervantes and the many other classical writers who had attempted to pillory the shortcomings of mankind.

55. Mr. Lodge had quoted at length from an article in the Moscow *Literary Gazette*, which he had said had been inspired by an extremist newspaper. It would, however, have been well if he had mentioned the sources used by the writer, especially an article concerning American prisons, an account by a former inmate of a Macon prison, and to a book on *methods of police interrogation*, in which a police officer, called Mr. Heed, described the "third degree". The *Literary Gazette* also referred to an article in the *Readers' Digest* concerning the plight of inmates of the Kilby prison in Alabama, and to a study by Virginia Kellogg, published in *Collier's*, describing a prison for women in one of the large northern states. Mr. Lodge should have directed his criticism to that quarter instead of attacking a publication that merely defended truth and reproduced articles published in the United States. To attack conduct incompatible with civilized society could hardly be called hate propaganda.

56. Concerning regional agreements which called for special notice in the light of the most recent agreement signed by Greece, Mr. Vyshinsky said they were clearly concluded for an aggressive purpose. Following the established practice, Mr. Kyrrou had stated that the agreement between the United States and his country conformed with Article 52 of the Charter, and to

support his argument, had cited Kelsen. However, Kelsen, when speaking of Article 52, failed to mention that that article indicated the nature of matters which should be the subject of regional agreements. According to Article 52, the purpose of the regional agreements was to deal with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as were appropriate for regional action. Kelsen understood that text so well that he had been very careful when speaking of the questions of regional agreements. Though he clearly favoured the North Atlantic Treaty, he avoided saying that it was a regional agreement. He merely said that inasmuch as the Charter did not define a regional agreement and inasmuch as the operation of the defence system was not related to Article 53, it was not impossible to consider the North Atlantic Treaty as an agreement distinct from a regional agreement, according to Article 51. That statement by a man eminent in bourgeois international law therefore made it, on the one hand, clear that the Charter did not define a regional agreement therefore permitted all kinds of interpretations and, on the other, that nothing in the Charter prevented the North Atlantic Treaty from being considered as different from a regional agreement—as the Soviet Union considered it.

57. The fact was that the North Atlantic Treaty was designed for a purpose completely contrary to the purposes of the Charter, and, despite Kelsen's efforts to justify that treaty, an unlawful act could not create a new right.

58. The comments by Goodrich and Hambro cited by Mr. Kyrrou referred to regional agreements, such as the League of Arab States and western European agreements which respected the essential principle of geographical proximity.

59. The existing situation therefore made more necessary than ever the draft resolution which had been submitted by the Soviet Union and was intended to lead to an agreement that would make it possible to eliminate weapons of mass destruction and limit the armaments race. The Soviet delegation thus ardently hoped that its draft resolution would be adopted by the First Committee.

60. Mr. LODGE (United States) said that in replying to the Soviet representative's speech he intended to stress three main points: namely, who was responsible for the present international tension, who was responsible for the hate campaign, and who really wanted to negotiate and encourage disarmament? Mr. Vyshinsky's speech showed once again that if the Soviet Union really wished to reduce international tension it could do so. The Government of the Soviet Union had been invited by the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom and France to attend a conference for that purpose. It could accept that invitation and attest by actions rather than words the good intentions which it proclaimed.

61. If, moreover, the Soviet Union really desired to stop the hate campaign, it could easily do so, since its Government controlled all information media in the Soviet Union. The United States Government did not possess the same powers, and Mr. Vyshinsky was well aware that when he cited a particular statement by a member of Congress, he could easily find other statements upholding contrary views. The Soviet representative had dealt at length with quotations and with excerpts from the *Congressional Record*. He had even

given a lecture on the best way to run a jail which would not surprise anyone who had heard of the Lubianka prison and the Siberian concentration camps.

62. Evidence could easily be adduced to show that the State Department libraries contained many books that would not be found in libraries behind the Iron Curtain. Everyone knew, however, that Mr. Vyshinsky was in that regard merely indulging in propaganda tactics unworthy of the United Nations. The representatives sitting about the conference table were representatives of the human race, which the new weapons produced by science now enabled to destroy itself. The danger of the annihilation of human life could not be warded off by propaganda, startling statements or international haggling. Why did the Soviet Union and its allies refuse to follow the path of good will and good faith?

63. Mr. KYROU (Greece) objected to the attacks made against the North Atlantic Treaty and against the agreement between the United States and Greece. As he had said at the 671st meeting, those agreements were in full accord with the letter and spirit of the Charter, and more particularly, with its Article 52. It was regrettable that Mr. Vyshinsky had used the works of Professor Kelsen and of authors Goodrich and Hambro in order to twist their thoughts. He had cited only those passages which would support his point of view, and had thus once again given evidence of the partiality which he liked to lay at the door of others.

64. The documents previously cited by the Greek representative showed clearly that, in the mind of those distinguished jurists and in the light of the records of the San Francisco Conference, geographical propinquity was not a prerequisite for participation in a regional agreement. That conclusion could be drawn from the report of the special sub-committee of Committee III/4, and also from the verbatim record of that Committee's meeting of 8 June 1945. Those documents showed that the Committee had rejected an amendment intended to make geographical propinquity the basis for all regional agreements.

65. Some representatives had pretended not to know that a spiritual kinship could exist between the United States and Greece, the signatories of one of the impugned agreements. There was, however, between those two countries the same spiritual kinship that existed among all the partners of the North Atlantic bloc, namely the kinship of members of a free society based on respect for human worth and dignity. The growing use of the term "Atlantic community" was the sign of a common desire not merely to remove the fear of aggression, but also to satisfy the aspirations aroused by the Atlantic Charter and the experiences of the war.

That implied a will to contribute to the strengthening of international co-operation—economic, social or, if need be, military.

66. Although the North Atlantic Treaty was of a strictly defensive character despite what was said by those who attacked it, it might not be purposeless to recall that NATO had to some extent been forced on its participants by events which in 1946, 1947 and 1948 had resulted from action set on foot exclusively by the Soviet Union. The truth could be found merely by looking at the facts.

67. The establishment of NATO and its extension to Greece and Turkey was not a source of danger to anyone. Those who pretended to understand the fears of the Greek people could, by reviewing the recent history of that country, understand those fears. Moreover, the Soviet representative and those who seemed to share his apprehensions could rest assured that the bases against which they were protesting would never be used to launch attacks against other countries.

#### DRAFT RESOLUTION SUBMITTED BY THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS (A/2485/Rev.1)

68. The CHAIRMAN said that, at the request of the Indian delegation, the draft resolution would be voted on paragraph by paragraph.

*The first paragraph of the preamble was adopted by 21 votes to none, with 30 abstentions.*

*The second paragraph of the preamble was rejected by 26 votes to 7, with 18 abstentions.*

*Paragraph 1 of the operative part was rejected by 32 votes to 5, with 14 abstentions.*

*Paragraph 2 of the operative part was rejected by 32 votes to 5, with 14 abstentions.*

69. The CHAIRMAN stated that at the request of the Indian delegation paragraph 3 of the operative part be voted on in two parts. He called for a vote on the first part: "Recognizes that the establishment . . . independence of States;"

*The first part of paragraph 3 was rejected by 29 votes to 12, with 9 abstentions.*

*The second part of paragraph 3 was rejected by 32 votes to 7, with 12 abstentions.*

*Paragraph 4 of the operative part was rejected by 32 votes to 6, with 13 abstentions.*

70. The CHAIRMAN said that, since all the paragraphs of its operative part had been rejected, draft resolution A/2485/Rev.1 as a whole had been rejected and need not be put to the vote.

The meeting rose at 2 p.m.