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Chairman: Mr. Thor THORS (Iceland).

AGENDA ITEM 21

**Admission of new Members to the United Nations
(continued):**

- (a) **Report of the Committee of Good Offices**
(A/2720, A/AC.76/2, A/AC.76/3, A/AC.76/4, A/AC.76/5, A/AC.76/6, A/AC.76/9, A/AC.76/10, A/AC.76/11, A/AC.76/12, A/AC.76/L.7/Rev.1, A/AC.76/L.8, A/AC.76/L.9, A/AC.76/L.10);
- (b) **Admission of Laos and Cambodia (A/2709 and Add.1, A/AC.76/L.4)**

1. Mr. DERINSU (Turkey) associated himself with previous speakers in paying tribute to the efforts of the Committee of Good Offices. Even if the Committee's report (A/2720) gave rise to a feeling of frustration, it was some consolation to note its view that all possibilities of reaching an understanding had not been exhausted; and the Turkish delegation felt that the Committee should be requested to continue its efforts.

2. Turkey's position on the problem remained unchanged. Applications for admission should be considered individually and on their merits, and only those States which fulfilled the conditions set forth in Article 4 of the Charter should be admitted to membership. However, applications from fourteen States had received more than the required number of votes in the Security Council, and had been approved by the General Assembly; but favourable action had been blocked by the negative vote of one of the permanent members of the Security Council.

3. He would support the joint draft resolution (A/AC.76/L.4), which represented a constructive approach to the problem. On the other hand, the USSR draft resolution (A/AC.76/L.7/Rev.1) was incompatible with his delegation's position and he could not accept it. He would speak at a later date on the Indian draft resolution (A/AC.76/L.8), which his delegation was studying with interest.

4. Mr. WEAVER (Canada) joined with previous speakers in paying tribute to the efforts of the Committee of Good Offices, and said that the Committee's failure to make any progress was certainly not due to any lack of zeal. It should continue its work, in order

that advantage might be taken of any favourable opportunity for solving the problem.

5. There were fourteen States, the admission of which had been overwhelmingly supported by the General Assembly and by the Security Council but which had been denied admission because of the veto of one of the permanent members of the Security Council. The United Nations could not claim to speak for the world as a whole and would be unable to carry out its obligations satisfactorily until a solution had been found to that problem. It was a matter of the greatest importance to bring about a settlement and admit to membership all States which fulfilled the conditions contained in the Charter.

6. The Secretary-General, in the introduction to his annual report (A/2663) had suggested that a beginning towards breaking the present log-jam might be made with some of the countries which did not "directly enter into the balance between the conflicting camps". The Canadian delegation would support any efforts to implement that suggestion, and had therefore listened with regret to the Polish representative's unfavourable comments (18th meeting) on the central idea of the Secretary-General's proposal.

7. Turning to the draft resolution submitted by Australia, Pakistan and Thailand (A/AC.76/L.4) he pointed out that the Canadian Government had recognized the independence of Laos and Cambodia and had in the past supported their applications for membership in the United Nations. After careful consideration it had decided not to change its position despite the fact that the Agreement on the cessation of hostilities had as yet not been fully implemented. Furthermore, the fulfilment of the terms of that agreement appeared to have no significant bearing on the international status of the two countries, in view of the fact that their independence had received very general recognition at Geneva.

8. His delegation would therefore give its wholehearted support to the joint draft resolution which, as the Australian representative had said (17th meeting), could have the effect of breaking the deadlock and leading to the admission of other applicants.

9. Mr. BARRINGTON (Burma) said that the item under discussion was one of the greatest importance and one which, if a solution was not reached, could well jeopardize the future existence of the United Nations.

10. His delegation had little doubt that the veto could be used in the Security Council in connexion with applications for membership. It was a practice that the United Nations had accepted over the years, and unless the Charter was revised—a remedy that might be worse than the disease—it had to be accepted as such. That being so, there was little to be gained by recrimination; the fact that only one permanent member of the

Security Council had used the veto was simply a sad reflection of the international situation, and that State should not be criticized for exercising its legal right. The other permanent members would undoubtedly avail themselves of the same right if they felt that it became necessary; in fact, one of them had already served notice of its intention to do so in connexion with a question which was far more procedural in character than that of the admission of new members.

11. Once the applicability of the veto was accepted, it became evident that the problem was not a juridical but essentially a political one. The United Nations being a political, not a judicial body, political considerations must inevitably influence the interpretation of Article 4, paragraph 1 of the Charter. Thus the problem had been unable to escape the impact of the political tides of the present time; and as a result a deadlock had been reached. In other words, the United Nations had become a kind of exclusive club in which there were two factions, each of which opposed all new applications for membership by States supported by the other, regardless of their fitness for membership.

12. Since the problem was political, it was obvious that political solutions must be sought, that is, a compromise. To continue to hope for a rapid solution would simply confuse the problem and delay its settlement still further. It was in the search for a compromise that those Members of the United Nations who belonged to neither faction could be of some service, and as in previous years his delegation would spare no efforts to that end. A log-jam, to use the Secretary-General's term, could be broken up in its initial stages by the judicious removal of a few logs; but if ignored for long, dynamite became necessary. It would be unwise to wait for that.

13. His delegation believed that universality of membership would be of great benefit to the United Nations; it therefore wished once again to appeal to the two sides to try to reach an understanding, even if such an understanding was only limited at first. The United Nations could not claim to be a world organization if many countries in all parts of the world were excluded from its membership. The crowning argument in favour of universality was the fact that the world was living in the shadow of the hydrogen bomb. Viewed in that light, the whole question assumed great and compelling urgency, and differences between nations became a reason for their admission.

14. While Chapter VII of the Charter was not obsolete it was likely to become so in time, but the world could not afford to let matters reach a stage where action under that Chapter might be called for. At the same time, greater emphasis and reliance would be placed on Chapter VI; and the first step towards ensuring the effectiveness of that Chapter should be to make certain that every potential party to a dispute, regardless of its political system, became a Member of the United Nations. It was only realistic to assume that in an atomic age every country in the world desired peace.

15. His delegation therefore still felt confidence that a solution to the problem would be found, and would support any efforts in that direction.

16. He thanked the Committee of Good Offices for its efforts; they would undoubtedly be beneficial in the long run.

17. Mr. VAVRICKA (Czechoslovakia) said that the hopes aroused by the establishment of the Committee of Good Offices had not been fulfilled. Unfortunately the Committee's report was very brief; his delegation would have wished for a fuller account of its activities, its consultations with the permanent members of the Security Council and the positions of the great Powers.

18. He drew attention to paragraph 5 of the report, in which applicant States had been classified according to the number of votes they had received in the Security Council. That was an extremely mechanical procedure and unless the Committee of Good Offices had wanted to cast doubt on the principle of unanimity, it served no useful purpose. Applications for membership had to be supported by seven votes, including the concurring votes of the five permanent members; but paragraph 5 conveyed the impression that in the opinion of the members of the Committee of Good Offices, States which had received seven affirmative votes in the Security Council automatically fulfilled the conditions laid down in Article 4 of the Charter, while the States which had not received seven affirmative votes — which happened to be those to which the United States objected — did not fulfil those conditions. That view was quite unacceptable.

19. Furthermore, paragraph 5 gave a distorted picture of the actual situation. It omitted to mention the fact, to which the Indian representative had referred, that the applications of the people's democracies had been rejected only by virtue of abstentions, specifically, those of the Western Powers. The French, United Kingdom and United States representatives had attempted to place the responsibility for the deadlock on the USSR, reproaching it for its use of the veto; but an abstention by one of the permanent members of the Security Council was just as effective a method of rejecting an application. In that light it was clear that the Western Powers were using abstentions as a form of camouflaged veto.

20. Only the principle of unanimity which applied in the Security Council prevented the Western Powers from securing the admission of States which they supported while at the same time excluding other States of whose internal systems they disapproved. For that reason many attempts had been made to put through decisions involving the suspension of principles in connexion with the admission of new Members. Fortunately, the number of States that wished to deal with the problem in that way, which would be a violation of the Charter, was diminishing.

21. It should surely have been recognized in the course of the discussion at the eighth session that the objections to the simultaneous admission of several States were groundless; he drew attention in that connexion to the conclusion set forth in annex 7, paragraph 10, of the report to that session submitted by the Special Committee on Admission of New Members (A/2400). Simultaneous admission would not violate any of the provisions of the Charter. The object of the USSR draft resolution (A/AC.76/L.7/Rev.1) was to put an end to the present situation in which the admission of a number of States to the United Nations was being denied for political reasons. All the States mentioned in the draft resolution fulfilled the conditions contained in Article 4, and their membership in the United Nations would strengthen its universality.

The United Nations had been founded to serve as a centre where States having different ideologies and interests could co-operate and resolve their differences. It was therefore not only wrong but dangerous to seek to transform it into a closed organization, open only to States sharing the same ideologies and policies.

22. Obviously the present deadlock was the result of the policy of favouritism and discrimination pursued by some of the great Powers. The United States representative had once again opposed the admission of the peoples' democracies; but his allegation that they did not fulfil the provisions of the Charter had never been substantiated by any factual evidence. That kind of approach would not help to solve the problem. It was the more unfortunate because in 1946 the United States itself had proposed the admission of Albania and the Mongolian People's Republic.

23. The opposition of the Western Powers to the admission of Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania was inconsistent with their obligations under the Potsdam Agreement and the Paris peace treaties. The usual United States objections to admission had been stated by the New Zealand representative, who had said that the signatories of the Potsdam Agreement were not pledged but simply authorized to support the applications of the three States in question. But the Potsdam Agreement specifically mentioned Article 4 of the Charter; and thereby the Powers had recognized that conclusion and ratification of the peace treaties fulfilled the conditions necessary for the admission of Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania to the United Nations.

24. Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, the Mongolian People's Republic and Romania fully satisfied the conditions for admission. They pursued a policy of peaceful economic development, and they had achieved the fundamental freedoms proclaimed in the Charter by constitutional means. The representative of Czechoslovakia cited figures which gave evidence of the peaceful economic development in Hungary. Their foreign policies were based on the principle of international co-operation, and they had repeatedly intimated their desire to become Members of the United Nations and their willingness to carry out the obligations contained in the Charter.

25. The position of the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and a number of other countries was essentially different from that of the Western Powers. The Czechoslovak delegation had always supported the USSR proposals for the simultaneous admission of the fourteen States; it could not support the admission of a single group of States while others remained the victims of discrimination. The simultaneous admission of all the States mentioned in the USSR draft resolution was in the interests of the United Nations and would contribute to the relaxation of international tension. The Czechoslovakian delegation therefore wholeheartedly supported the USSR draft resolution.

26. It would be premature to consider the separate admission of Laos and Cambodia; these countries had not yet been able to fulfil their obligations under the Geneva agreements. Full consideration should be given to the statements of the Indian and Polish representatives, whose Governments were members of the International Supervisory Commission. Both had expressed fears that discussion on the separate admission of Laos and Cambodia would hamper the work of that commission. The Czechoslovak delegation agreed with that

view, and accordingly urged that consideration of the question of the admission of Laos and Cambodia should be postponed.

27. Mr. SUDJARWO (Indonesia) said that although a more elaborate account of the conversations held by the Committee of Good Offices would have been helpful, he appreciated the reasons for the brevity of the report. He noted the Committee's opinion that the possibilities of reaching an understanding had not been exhausted, and agreed that in view of the importance for the Organization of admitting qualified new Members, there was reason to hope that the differing views might eventually be harmonized, in the spirit of the Charter.

28. The General Assembly must continue its efforts to solve the problem, particularly since in consequence of the relaxation of world tension to which the Geneva Conference and the recent General Assembly debates on disarmament had contributed, the world situation was more favourable than it had been for some time.

29. His delegation still supported the principle of universality of membership, which it considered vital to the life and purposes of the Organization.

30. The real problem lay in the interpretation of Article 4 of the Charter. He recognized that juridical factors were involved, but the main problem was political and could be satisfactorily solved by a political approach. Consequently, his delegation saw the greatest hope for an eventual solution in the improved international situation, and did not feel that the veto was the crux of the matter. The central problem was to find a common criterion so that States of any political or social structure could be admitted to the Organization, which had been founded by States of differing political structure willing to subscribe to the Charter in order to work towards universal peace. It had never been intended that all Members should be like-minded and have the same ideologies.

31. He submitted that the question of the admission of new Members should be viewed against that background. The time was ripe to encourage the General Assembly and Security Council to seek ways and means of admitting all States having a recognized Government. All the applicants were able and willing to carry out the obligations of the Charter. Article 4, paragraph 1 of the Charter, it would be noted, referred to "other peace-loving States"; it was to be inferred, therefore, that all existing Members of the Organization were peace-loving merely because they were Members. In all humility, the States within the Organization should not brand any applicant as non-peace-loving; the world was free from war, and peace was no monopoly of any group of nations. All nations wanted peace and it was the task of the United Nations to achieve it. All nations should be enabled to share in that task.

32. The Secretary-General had pointed out in his annual report (A/2663) that almost half the countries of Europe were absent from the council tables of the United Nations, whose effectiveness and influence were inevitably reduced by their absence. The World Federation of United Nations Associations had noted with regret, at a meeting held in Geneva in September 1954, that applicants for membership fulfilling the conditions of Article 4 of the Charter had not been admitted, and had urged the General Assembly at its ninth session, and all Member States to secure, through agreement in the Security Council and a favourable vote in

the General Assembly, the immediate admission of qualified applicants.

33. It was clear that in order to carry that recommendation into effect a liberal and conciliatory view must be taken of Article 4 of the Charter. The fact that States outside the United Nations had been able at the Geneva Conference to co-operate with Member States and conclude an agreement to end war and establish peace should be a further encouragement to the admission of applicants regardless of their political ideologies. Their presence in the Organization would obviate the need for peace conferences, or any other conferences, outside the United Nations and would thus enhance its authority and universality.

34. For those reasons, his delegation had voted at previous sessions for a draft resolution calling for the simultaneous admission of fourteen applicant States of varying political complexions, in the belief that such action would ensure a compromise on the interpretation of Article 4 of the Charter. He would again vote for a similar draft resolution (A/AC.76/L.7/Rev.1), and would have no objection if Japan were included in the list of States mentioned.

35. His delegation looked forward to the unification of Korea and was ready to support the admission of a free, unified and democratic Korea under a single Government. During the war in Indo-China his Government had adopted a similar attitude regarding the four régimes in the Indo-Chinese peninsula. In consequence of the Geneva Conference, those régimes had been given the opportunity to stabilize themselves and to secure their independence and sovereignty. So far as Viet-Nam as a whole was concerned, his Government was awaiting the general election of 1956, which would establish a free and independent government in that country. He welcomed any attempt to accelerate the admission to membership of Laos and Cambodia, as free and sovereign countries, and would therefore support the draft resolution sponsored by Australia, Pakistan and Thailand (A/AC.76/L.4).

36. With regard to the Indian draft resolution (A/AC.76/L.8), his delegation agreed that the Security Council should make a new effort to solve the problem of the admission of new Members, since the Council bore the prime responsibility in the matter and had not considered the question for some two years. The Security Council should take cognizance of the improved world situation and perform its functions in the light of current developments.

37. Mr. SOHLMAN (Sweden) said that his delegation maintained its previous view that the principle of the universality of the United Nations should be given effect and that only a liberal attitude on outstanding applications would lead to a solution of the problem of membership.

38. He still thought that the draft resolution submitted by the Soviet Union offered a possibility of compromise, and would therefore support it as he had done in the past.

39. He noted the statement of the Committee of Good Offices that the possibilities of finding a solution had not been exhausted and that the work should therefore be continued. His delegation supported that proposal, but felt that the Committee should not be restricted by the advisory opinion of the International Court of

Justice¹; he believed that the dissenting opinion² was more likely to facilitate a solution of the problem.

40. He doubted whether the Security Council should be requested, as suggested in the Indian draft resolution to consider the desirability of invoking the provisions of Article 28, paragraph 2 of the Charter to help resolve the problem. From a juridical point of view the Council was entitled to take such a decision; but the Swedish delegation would like to hear the opinions of the delegations more directly concerned in order to form its own opinion on the practical application of the proposal.

41. Mr. DE KADT (Netherlands) observed that the Committee of Good Offices had been established not because prospects for agreement seemed promising but because there appeared to be little possibility of reconciling the opposing points of view, at least in public debates in the United Nations.

42. He regretted that the Committee had met with little success, the basic positions and oppositions having remained unchanged.

43. The Polish representative had described the advantages of a "package deal", but the Netherlands delegation remained unconvinced. The test of whether a particular State was peace-loving could not be applied without first deciding whether the entity in question was a State with a life and responsibility of its own or merely a tool of another State. That criterion had nothing to do with any like or dislike of the political and social structure of a State. All States should be represented in the United Nations provided they were sovereign and fulfilled the requirements of Article 4 of the Charter.

44. His delegation felt that each application must be considered on its merits, and could not be made conditional on the acceptance of other applications. That view rejected any suggestion of favouritism or of coercion. All qualified applicants should be admitted without delay, but the responsibility for delay must be clearly laid upon those who ignored the relevant provisions of the Charter.

45. The Polish representative's observations on the draft resolution recommending the admission of Laos and Cambodia seemed to indicate that the hopes which had been entertained of a relaxation of international tension following the Geneva Conference were doomed to disappointment. The Netherlands delegation would vote for that resolution; he called upon others to do likewise and thus give life to the fine words which had been spoken at the time of the settlement in Indo-China about a new spirit in international affairs and the possibility of peaceful coexistence. If agreement was still impossible on those two applications it would seem that little could be expected of the future work of the Committee of Good Offices.

46. Whilst not accepting the Indian representative's line of reasoning, he supported the view expressed in the Indian draft resolution that pending applications should be sent back to the Security Council; but he felt that the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee must first make it clear where it stood on the issue of Laos and Cambodia. He realized that the final decision lay with the Security Council, and suggested that the question of

¹ See *Admission of a State to the United Nations (Charter, Art. 4), Advisory Opinion: I.C.J. Reports 1948, p. 57.*

² *Ibid.*, p. 82.

the use of the veto on the admission of new Members would have to be discussed as a whole elsewhere.

47. His first impression of the amendments submitted by Argentina, Cuba and El Salvador (A/AC.76/L.9) was that they defeated the object of the draft resolution itself, which had been meant to show that at a certain moment it might be possible, as a consequence of the Geneva Conference, to take at least one step forward. He hoped that the Committee would take a firm stand on the issue of Laos and Cambodia and thus put to the test the view that a better political climate did in fact exist.

48. His delegation would vote against the Soviet draft resolution (A/AC.76/L.7/Rev.1).

49. Mr. Chih-mai CHEN (China) observed that in the ninth year of its existence the Organization must justify itself in the opinion of the peace-loving peoples of the world; yet it was unfortunately true that it had met with failure in attempting to solve the problem of the admission of new Members.

50. His delegation fully supported the view that all suitably qualified applicants should be admitted to membership. A number of former colonial territories had achieved independence during the post-war period, and while the United Nations could claim credit for having assisted in their liberation it had failed in many instances to enable them to play their proper role in the world community by becoming Members of the Organization.

51. His delegation did not subscribe, however, to the theory of mechanical universality of admission, which was inconsistent with the Charter. States not properly qualified for admission should be excluded; indeed they could be expelled under Article 6. In line with that position, his delegation had always rejected the so-called "package deal". He agreed with the Netherlands representative that some of the applicants mentioned in the Soviet draft resolution were really not States at all, and deplored the persistent use of the veto by the Soviet Union in the Security Council. Many proposals had been made, unfortunately with no success, to overcome that veto which, in his view, represented the real obstacle to the admission of many qualified States.

52. He welcomed the suggestion that the Committee of Good Offices should be continued.

53. His delegation agreed with the view expressed in the joint draft resolution that Laos and Cambodia, being suitably qualified applicants, should be admitted to the Organization. The basic agreements leading to the independence of Laos, Cambodia and Viet-Nam had been signed by those States and France in 1949. Many free nations had accorded them diplomatic recognition immediately afterwards and they had since participated in a number of international conferences, joined several United Nations specialized agencies, and become parties to international conventions.

54. He agreed with the French representative that the qualifications of Viet-Nam were in no way inferior to those of Laos and Cambodia. In 1952, the French delegation had sponsored draft resolutions calling for the admission of Viet-Nam, Laos and Cambodia and the General Assembly had adopted, by 38 affirmative votes, resolution 620 (VII). The States in question still fulfilled the conditions of Article 4 of the Charter and the Chinese delegation still supported their admission. Unfortunately, the reference to the Geneva Conference in the first paragraph of the preamble of the Australian

draft resolution (A/AC.76/L.4) ignored the previous recommendation in resolution 620 (VII), and thus tended to imply that that resolution had been premature.

55. His delegation's support of the admission of Laos and Cambodia did not mean that it was singling those two States out for special consideration at the expense of other peace-loving States. He hoped that the Committee of Good Offices, if continued, would find a way to circumvent the Soviet veto, which had prevented the admission of so many qualified applicants.

56. Mr. PALAMAS (Greece) said that he would vote for the joint draft resolution on Laos and Cambodia in token of his Government's devotion to the principle of universality and of its satisfaction that the international community had been enriched by the emergence of two free and independent States in the Far East. That development had been to some extent the result of the Geneva Conference, but credit should also be given to France for its contribution. Even though adoption of the joint draft resolution was not likely to lead to immediate favourable action by the Security Council, the Assembly's support of the applications of Laos and Cambodia would constitute a message of confidence and friendship to the new Governments.

57. Like the representative of France, he considered that Viet-Nam was both a legal and an international entity, and Greece fully recognized the right of the Viet-Name people to be represented in the United Nations. As soon as the difficulties in the administrative arrangements for the two parts of the country had been disposed of, he hoped that the Assembly would vote for Viet-Nam's admission to membership.

58. Regardless of the divergent views which existed on the legal position with regard to the membership issue, all members of the Committee must recognize that a solution could be found only by achieving the co-operation between the Security Council and the General Assembly prescribed in the Charter. That co-operation was essential; it could not be evaded or by-passed even by a revision of the Charter, especially as any revision was certain to be blocked by the same veto which was currently paralysing the Security Council in a number of cases. Only an understanding between the two principal organs of the Organization could bring about a solution. It was in the light of that situation that the Assembly had established the Committee of Good Offices. Within the very narrow limits of its terms of reference, the Committee of Good Offices had done all that could be done. The criticism directed against it by the Polish representative had been unfair; the Committee was not to be blamed for not finding an understanding which did not exist. If the Assembly wished to persevere in its efforts to reach a solution through an understanding, it should widen the terms of reference of the Committee of Good Offices.

59. The Indian representative had argued that requests for admission could come before the Assembly only on the recommendation of the Security Council. If that was so, all the work done by the Assembly on the membership question through the years would be legally invalid. But that work in itself was sufficient proof that the Assembly was fully empowered to debate the general issue and to deal with specific applications. The priority attributed to the Security Council under Article 4, paragraph 2 applied solely to the machinery of admission. The Assembly, under Article 10, was always free to discuss any matters within the purview

of the United Nations, and to make recommendations on such matters to Member States or to the Council. Consequently, even the machinery provided in Article 4, paragraph 2 was in a sense superseded by the powers conferred upon the Assembly in Article 10. Clearly, the Security Council held no supremacy over the Assembly; each organ had its special responsibilities, and both must co-ordinate their efforts to achieve the purposes of the Charter. To send all pending applications back to the Security Council, as suggested in the Indian draft resolution, would be to imply that the final decision rested with the Council and that once that decision had been taken there was no further problem for the Assembly. That was contrary to the facts. Even if a decision was reached among the permanent members of the Council, only the political aspect of the question would have been resolved. It was a mistake to consider that aspect alone; there was also the question of principles, principles laid down in the Charter and endorsed by all Member States. The Assembly was a force for the defence of principles. Even if an understanding could be reached in the Council, it must be an understanding acceptable to the Assembly.

60. In order to bring about the co-operation between the two organs which, as he had explained, was essential, it might be useful to set up a joint committee. If that suggestion was viewed favourably by the Committee, it would require more detailed study, particularly with regard to the composition of the proposed committee. In any event, the least that could be done was to continue the Committee of Good Offices in existence and broaden its terms of reference.

61. Mr. MUÑOZ (Argentina) referred to the analysis of the Charter provisions on the admission of new Members given by the representatives of Colombia, Cuba and El Salvador, and reaffirmed Argentina's conviction that the veto was not applicable in questions of admission. As the Advisory Committee of Jurists at San Francisco had held,³ the General Assembly was free to accept or reject a Security Council recommendation on the admission of any applicant State. It could reject a negative recommendation, and could admit a State to membership in the absence of a favourable Council recommendation. Moreover, the word "recommendation" in Article 4 did not have the same meaning and impact as the same word in Articles 5, 6 and 97, for it had been clearly established at San Francisco that the veto did apply under those three articles. Thus, while the veto was operative and decisive in cases of suspension and expulsion of Member States and in the appointment of the Secretary-General, it was not applicable to the membership provisions of Article 4. Nevertheless, as the majority of Member States were obviously not prepared to concede that the Assembly was incontestably sovereign in questions of membership, Argentina did not wish to impose its view and could only hope that there would be a change in the majority position. In any case, the time had evidently not come when the Assembly would be ready to reject and override the repeated negative recommendations of the Security Council.

62. In the circumstances, Argentina favoured a political, or compromise, solution. As early as the sixth session of the Assembly, Argentina, in the First Committee, had submitted an amendment (A/C.1/705) to

a USSR draft resolution (A/C.1/703), which indicated its support for such a solution. It was not prepared, however, to accept a "package deal" or an all-or-none approach to the membership question. For that reason, it favoured a solution which would give at least some hope of the admission of a number of States still barred from membership by the absence of a favourable recommendation from the Security Council.

63. It would be noted that the USSR draft resolution before the Committee (A/AC.76/L.7/Rev.1) restated the earlier USSR draft; the addition of the word "simultaneous" merely gave concrete form to the spirit of that earlier draft. If the intention of the proposal was that the Council should recommend that the Assembly should simultaneously admit the States enumerated, it was contrary to the majority interpretation of Article 4. Moreover, no guarantee could be given in advance that if the Council did make such a recommendation, the Assembly would automatically decide to admit the States concerned *en bloc*. The Assembly could not commit itself *a priori*, or commit future Assemblies, to any specific decision. If it was to remain faithful to the letter and spirit of Article 4, it was bound to decide each case on its merits.

64. Nevertheless, if the word "simultaneous" was deleted from the USSR text and if a few other countries, among them Japan, were added to the countries listed, Argentina would be prepared to support the draft resolution. It would do so on the understanding that the Assembly was making no other commitment than to consider each application on its merits in the light of the Council's recommendation, and to admit those States which it considered qualified under the Charter. That did not mean that the Assembly would take a decision in advance to admit some States and reject others. The principle of universality represented an objective towards which the Organization must strive; it did not, however, commit either the Council or the Assembly to admitting any State applying for membership.

65. Argentina considered that the draft resolution it was sponsoring together with Cuba and El Salvador (A/AC.76/L.10) represented the best way to reach a compromise solution on the membership problem. It was an effort to ensure that the Security Council should come to an understanding with the Assembly, with a view to breaking the existing deadlock. It reaffirmed the principle of universality, but qualified it in terms of Article 4; it reserved the Assembly's power to accept or reject a Security Council recommendation in each specific case, according to its merits; and it instructed the Committee of Good Offices to further the achievement of its objective by continuing its consultations with the members of the Council. The Committee and its eminent Chairman deserved high praise for their efforts, notwithstanding their failure to achieve success, which, he believed, was largely due to the fact that the Assembly had not given them powers adequate for a satisfactory solution.

66. Finally, the draft resolution which Argentina was co-sponsoring called for urgent and decisive action by the Council. The solution of the deadlock on membership could not be left to time; decisive progress must be made at the current session. If the Council disappointed that hope, the Assembly would have to continue along the lines of a policy of good offices; or, in view of the Council's negative position, it might wish

³ See *United Nations Conference on International Organization*, II/1/39.

to seek some other solution more in line with its obligations and powers in the matter.

67. Two concurrent courses of action were open to the Assembly at the present juncture: it could seek a final solution of the problem; and it could make declarations of opinion respecting applications for membership. When it expressed such opinions, however, it should take care to mention all States which it considered qualified under the Charter. For that reason, Argentina had submitted amendments (A/AC.76/L.9) to the joint draft resolution on Laos and Cambodia. The recital of the other States which had been deemed qualified for admission would emphasize the Assembly's continued adherence to its earlier decisions. However, the declaration of opinion, as amended by Argentina, applied to the whole question of member-

ship, not merely to the applications of Laos and Cambodia.

68. The Indian draft resolution calling for the continuation of the Committee of Good Offices had the same object as the proposal sponsored by Argentina, but it left the final solution to some future date. Argentina, Cuba and El Salvador sought a more positive commitment from the Security Council; their proposal was more immediate and should be given precedence when the various proposals were put to a vote.

69. As a purely procedural suggestion, it might be wise, in view of the number of draft resolutions and amendments before the Committee, to establish a sub-committee to bring them into line before they were put to the vote.

The meeting rose at 1.15 p.m.