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SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS

SUMMARY RECORD OF THE SEVENTEENTH MEETING

Held at Headquarters, New York,  
on Wednesday, 25 August 1965, at 3.15 p.m.

PRESENT:

<u>Chairman:</u>	Mr. GEBRE-EGZY	(Ethiopia)
<u>Members:</u>	Mr. PAZHWAQ	Afghanistan
	Mr. BOUATTOURA	Algeria
	Mr. GARCIA DEL SOLAR	Argentina
	Mr. SHAW	Australia
	Mr. WALDHEIM	Austria
	Mr. CARVALHO SILOS	Brazil
	Mr. TREMBLAY	Canada
	Mr. HAJEK	Czechoslovakia
	Mr. VEGA-GOMEZ	El Salvador
	Mr. ABEBE	Ethiopia
	Mr. TINE	France
	Mr. CSATORDAY	Hungary
	Mr. PARTHASARTHY	India
	Mr. PACHACHI	Iraq
	Mr. VINCI	Italy
	Mr. MATSUI	Japan
	Mr. BA	Mauritania
	Mr. CUEVAS CANCINO	Mexico
	Mr. QUARLES VAN UFFORD	Netherlands
	Mr. ANYAOKU	Nigeria
	Mr. Amjad ALI	Pakistan
	Mr. LEWANDOWSKI	Poland
	Mr. MORARU	Romania
	Mrs. COLLIER	Sierra Leone
	Mr. de PINIES	Spain
	Mr. HEDIN	Sweden
	Mr. PACHARIYANGKUN	Thailand
	Mr. MOROZOV	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
	Mr. KHALIL	United Arab Republic
	Lord CARADON	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

PRESENT (continued):

<u>Members</u> (continued):	Mr. GOLDBERG	United States of America
	Mr. ALVARADO	Venezuela
	Mr. CVOROVIC	Yugoslavia
<u>Secretariat:</u>	U THANT	Secretary-General
	Mr. VELLODI	Secretary of the Committee

Mr. CUEVAS CANCINO (Mexico) said that the discussion had entered into a new phase and the Committee was now in a position to propose measures that would make the problem of peace-keeping operations a less serious one, on the basis of the general agreement that the parliamentary procedure prescribed in the Charter would be applied. There were three fundamental aspects of the problem: the legal question of the applicability of Article 19, the financial difficulties of the United Nations and the question of future peace-keeping operations and their financing.

As regards the first point, the extremely grave crisis in the United Nations had had its origin in the clash of two opposing theses: that which held the sanction provided for in Article 19 to be obligatory in character, and that which regarded it as a parliamentary question open to discussion and negotiation within the appropriate bodies of the General Assembly. The latter thesis, which represented the majority position, had in the end become a consensus. The fact that an important group of States had agreed to modify their position of principle was a precedence of great importance for the future of the United Nations: the triumph of moderation and conciliation, in a spirit of genuine democracy, would enable the Assembly not only to resume its normal business but also to undertake its own renovation.

The Latin American States wished to emphasize, however, that the agreement reached on the question of application of Article 19 in one particular instance should not be given general significance. The agreement was simply that the sanctions prescribed in that Article were deemed not to apply to debts arising out of emergency operations in the Middle East and the Congo. Like Canada, they considered that the agreement should not be allowed to undermine the indisputable obligation of all Member States to contribute to the regular budget approved by the General Assembly; they also considered that the agreement, far from constituting a limitation on future peace-keeping operations, merely established that, in the case of emergency operations which might create precedents, sanctions of an extremely delicate nature could not and should not be applied. Apart from the conditional exception made in the case of the Congo and Middle East expenses, the Latin American delegations were not prepared to prejudge in any way the inapplicability of Article 19. The importance of the unanimous agreement lay in the fact that it enabled the difficulties to be solved by parliamentary means appropriate to the

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(Mr. Cuevas Cancino, Mexico)

General Assembly; the fact remained that the agreement had no bearing on the problem itself but only on the procedure for ending the deadlock. It now remained to consolidate the results achieved and move forward cautiously and without undue optimism.

The crisis through which the United Nations was passing was one of confidence. The agreement which had just been reached was the best omen to appear in a long time and it should not be compromised by a draft resolution that would define its limits too precisely; it was sufficient for the present that the General Assembly should be able to resume its work and the Special Committee would thus have succeeded in its most important task. Some would claim that that solution was superficial and would ask what had been done to make the United Nations solvent. The Latin American delegations believed that many difficulties had arisen from the fact that the financial problems had been linked with controversies of a constitutional nature. In point of fact, the United Nations had shown greater powers of resistance than its critics had expected; despite the difficulties of 1965, the United Nations had survived and had even managed to reduce its debt. The situation was at present no worse than it had been a year before and, clearly, financial wounds were not mortal.

The financial problems arose from the non-payment of a number of the assessments for the operations in the Congo; from a similar percentage which some States had withheld with respect to the Middle East operations - the Middle East operation was continuing and a time-limit would therefore have to be established for a comprehensive solution; as no budget had been approved for UNEF in 1964, it appeared desirable to include the expenditures effected up to and including 1965; from the debts to Member States which had bought United Nations bonds, the settlement of which had been placed in doubt; and, lastly, from the sums relating to earlier peace-keeping operations which had originally been included in the regular budget and to which some Member States had objected, from 1963 onwards, in the same way as they had objected to the first two categories. The Latin American delegations considered that the problem of the debts could perhaps be solved in a practical manner by establishing, for example, a special refinancing account which, through voluntary contributions, would settle any credits and debts still outstanding on 31 December 1965. They might in due course submit a plan on those lines to the Special Committee.

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(Mr. Cuevas Cancino, Mexico)

There remained the question of future peace-keeping operations and their financing. That was a question which could not be settled immediately. It had proved possible only to lay down broad guidelines and the next step was to develop some of them. Like the Canadian delegation, the Latin American delegations welcomed the similarity of views on certain aspects of future operations that had become apparent in the course of the discussions; they believed that the Special Committee, or any other body the General Assembly might set up, would be able to reach an agreement.

In conclusion, the Latin American delegations - on whose behalf he was speaking - believed that the Special Committee would have successfully completed its task if it was able to submit to the General Assembly a statement reflecting the unanimous desire of its members to strengthen the United Nations through a co-operative effort and enabling the General Assembly to resume its work as soon as possible, in accordance with the normal procedure laid down in its rules of procedure.

The meeting rose at 3.40 p.m.