



General Assembly

Distr.: General
16 July 2020

Original: English

Seventy-fifth session

Item 84 of the preliminary list*

Consideration of effective measures to enhance the protection, security and safety of diplomatic and consular missions and representatives

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Report of the Secretary-General

Summary

Six States submitted reports, pursuant to paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution [73/205](#), by the established deadline (see sect. II of the present report).

Five views were received from States pursuant to paragraph 13 of resolution [73/205](#) (see sect. III).

Three additional States became participants to the instruments relevant to the protection, security and safety of diplomatic and consular missions and representatives (see sect. IV) since the previous report on the topic ([A/73/189](#)).

* [A/75/50](#).



I. Introduction

1. On 20 December 2018, the General Assembly adopted resolution [73/205](#), entitled “Consideration of effective measures to enhance the protection, security and safety of diplomatic and consular missions and representatives”. Paragraphs 11, 13 and 14 of the resolution read as follows:

“*The General Assembly,*

...

“11. *Urges:*

“(a) All States to report to the Secretary-General, in a concise and expeditious manner and in accordance with the guidelines prepared by the Secretary-General, serious violations of the protection, security and safety of diplomatic and consular missions and representatives as well as missions and representatives with diplomatic status to international intergovernmental organizations;

“(b) The State in which the violation took place — and, to the extent possible, the State where the alleged offender is present — to report to the Secretary-General, in a concise and expeditious manner and in accordance with the guidelines prepared by the Secretary-General, on measures taken to bring the offender to justice and to communicate, in accordance with its laws, the final outcome of the proceedings against the offender, and to report on measures adopted with a view to preventing a repetition of such violations;

...

“13. *Also requests* the Secretary-General to invite States, in the circular note referred to in paragraph 12 (a) above, to inform him of their views with respect to any measures needed or already taken to enhance the protection, security and safety of diplomatic and consular missions and representatives as well as missions and representatives with diplomatic status to international intergovernmental organizations;

“14. *Further requests* the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its seventy-fifth session a report containing:

(a) Information on the state of ratification of and accessions to the instruments referred to in paragraph 9 above;

(b) A summary of the reports received and views expressed pursuant to paragraphs 11 and 13 above.”

2. By notes dated 4 January 2019 and 3 March 2020, the Secretary-General drew the attention of States to the request contained in paragraphs 11 and 13 of resolution [73/205](#) and invited them to report to the Secretary-General any serious violations of the protection, security and safety of diplomatic and consular missions and representatives as well as missions and representatives with diplomatic status to international intergovernmental organizations, and to inform the Secretary-General of their views with respect to any measures needed or already taken to enhance the protection, security and safety of diplomatic and consular missions and representatives as well as missions and representatives with diplomatic status to international intergovernmental organizations.

3. The present report has been prepared pursuant to paragraph 14 of resolution [73/205](#).

4. Section II of the report contains a summary of the reports received and the text of those reports relevant to paragraph 11 of the resolution, in chronological order of receipt.¹

5. Section III of the report contains the views expressed pursuant to paragraph 13 of the resolution, also in chronological order of receipt.

6. Section IV of the report contains information on the status of participation of States, as at 30 June 2020, in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961, the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations of 1963, and the respective optional protocols thereto, as well as the 1973 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents.

II. Reports received from States pursuant to paragraph 11 of resolution [73/205](#)

7. **Turkey** (1 June 2018) submitted the following information on incidents concerning its diplomatic and consular missions and representatives in the United States of America, Ireland, Switzerland, Italy, Germany, Austria, Belgium, Denmark and Greece:²

United States

On 24 March 2018, a protest was organized in front of the Embassy of Turkey in Washington, D.C., by a group of 30 sympathizers of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) terrorist organization.

Despite federal legislation of the United States forbidding two or more people to gather closer than 100 feet (30 metres) to foreign missions in order to scare, force, threaten or harass foreign officials or official residences, it was not possible to receive a positive response to our request that the demonstrators who were at 10 metres from the entrance and the windows of the residence be moved to the opposite sidewalk; it was moreover observed that the United States – host State – authorities did not exert any effort to stop the action against the statue of Atatürk.

Ireland

On 24 January 2018, a group of approximately 70 members of the PKK terrorist organization arrived in front of the Embassy of Turkey in Dublin. A vehicle and two police officers had been waiting in front of the Embassy upon prior notification through a note verbale about the demonstration.

During this incident, seven or eight demonstrators were able to enter the garden of the Embassy. Some of the demonstrators threw stones at the Embassy staff. The Counsellor of the Embassy was injured as a result of the stones and the blow that he received to his face during the brawl that ensued. The Embassy Attaché and a driver were also slightly injured during the brawl. The

¹ During the period under review, the Secretary-General received other communications regarding acts committed against diplomats and diplomatic premises. The transmitting States requested that those communications be instead circulated as documents of the General Assembly. The texts of such communications are not reproduced herein and may be found in the following documents: [A/73/708](#), [A/73/767](#), [A/73/806](#), [A/73/959](#), [A/73/962](#), [A/74/577](#) and [A/74/683](#) submitted by the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela; [A/73/728](#) submitted by Peru in response to [A/73/708](#) from the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela; [A/73/811](#) submitted by Ecuador in response to [A/73/767](#) from the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela; and [A/73/832](#) submitted by Costa Rica in response to [A/73/767](#) from the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela.

² Submitted pursuant to paragraph 10 (a) of resolution [71/145](#).

demonstrators were stopped and taken out of the Embassy garden through the efforts of the staff and security personnel of the Embassy.

Switzerland

On the evening of 1 May 2017, an attack was carried out against the Consulate-General of Turkey in Zurich by a group of 60 people wearing snow masks. The attack caused damage to the walls of the Consulate-General.

On 2 April 2018, at 1 a.m., a Molotov cocktail attack was carried out against the Turkish Consulate in Zurich by four individuals.

On 16 April 2018, the front façade, entry, windows of the first floor as well as the signboard of the Office of the Culture and Tourism Attaché of the Consulate-General of Turkey in Zurich were soiled by a paint material similar to “tar”.

Italy

On 20 January 2018, a group of approximately 40 sympathizers of the PKK terrorist organization organized a protest in front of the Embassy of Turkey in Rome. The police did not allow the protesters to approach the Embassy building, but could not prevent them from writing slogans on a portion of the walls and from throwing stones.

On 23 March 2018, a group of approximately 23 PKK sympathizers organized a protest in front of the Embassy of Turkey in Rome. During the protest, the front door of the Embassy was forced open and some of the protesters chained themselves to the entrance. Even though security personnel as well as armoured vehicles were present at the beginning of the protest, there was no immediate intervention. The police intervened only half an hour after the incident started.

On 14 March 2018, a group of sympathizers of the PKK terrorist organization forced their way into the Turkish Honorary Consulate in Venice. The Secretary of the Honorary Consulate was subjected to physical violence and the coat of arms was painted red.

Germany

On 10 March 2018, a group of approximately 350 sympathizers of the PKK terrorist organization staged an unauthorized protest in front of the Consulate-General of Turkey in Hamburg and a stone attack ensued. Although the German police team of approximately 30 officers intervened to some extent with some of the protesters, the protest was not ended.

Austria

On the night of 21 January 2018, some unidentified individuals entered the garden of the Consulate-General of Turkey in Salzburg.

Representatives of the police reported initially that three people had been detained and had confessed to their crime, but later reported that the detained individuals had modified their testimony and denied the accusations. The Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution and Counter-Terrorism, which is responsible for the safety and security of the Consulate, later reported that the detained persons had been released on the grounds that they had no link with the attack and that the camera records did not permit visual identification.

Belgium

On the morning of 23 March 2018, a group of 10 people organized an attack directed against the chancery building of the Embassy of Turkey in

Brussels. The Belgian police was informed of the attack, and officers arrived at the Embassy 25 to 30 minutes later.

Denmark

On 19 March 2018, around 3 a.m., a group of four people attacked the Embassy of Turkey in Copenhagen by throwing four Molotov cocktails, one of which hit the window of the office of the Ambassador and burned the protective film of the window.

A permanent guard measure was initiated by the Danish police in the morning, including for the chancery, the residence, the office of the Attachés and the office of Turkish Airlines, but that was ended in the afternoon on the grounds that “there was no threat level justifying permanent protection”. The Danish police indicated that four people had been taken into custody on suspicion of organizing the attack and that proceedings had been initiated.

Greece

On 4 April 2018, a group of 20 members of the anarchist group Rubikonas organized a paint attack against the chancery of the Consulate-General in Athens.

A group of four people believed to be behind the attack were detained but subsequently released.

8. **Ukraine** (4 June 2018) reported the following information concerning violations of the protection, safety and security of the Embassy of Ukraine in the Russian Federation for 2017–2018:³

During the period 2017–2018 systematic picketing (more than 15 cases) involving up to 400 people took place near the Embassy of Ukraine in the Russian Federation. The participants in those unauthorized actions used posters with anti-Ukrainian propaganda, distributed agitation newspapers in support of the restoration of the borders of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, conducted unauthorized filming, including by using a quadcopter, and so on. These actions created pressure on Ukrainian diplomats and their family members and impeded the proper functioning of the diplomatic mission. There were no actions taken by the Russian Federation law enforcement agencies in this regard.

9. **Germany** (14 August 2018) submitted information concerning the incident reported by Turkey on 1 June 2018:⁴

The German Government takes extremely seriously all complaints regarding perceived acts of violence against diplomatic and consular missions and representatives located in Germany.

The German Federal Foreign Office, in collaboration with other relevant German authorities, remains in close contact with the Embassy of Turkey regarding the incident referenced in the report submitted to the Office of the Secretary-General by the Permanent Mission of Turkey. The German Federal Foreign Office will take all necessary steps to ensure the protection and safety of Turkish diplomatic and consular missions and representatives in Germany.

The German Government hereby reaffirms that it has treated this incident in accordance with its legal obligations under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid.

10. **Italy** (16 August 2018) submitted information concerning the incidents reported by Turkey on 1 June 2018:⁵

Questions related to the security of diplomatic and consular missions in Italy are handled by the relevant national authorities, in consultation with the Office of Diplomatic Protocol. The merits and needs of each situation are assessed on a case-by-case basis. Communications from accredited diplomatic offices are monitored around the clock by the Office of Diplomatic Protocol, in close coordination with the competent domestic authorities at the national and local levels, so as to swiftly ensure appropriate responses in constant contact with the diplomatic or consular mission concerned.

With regard to the events reported by Turkey, the following information is provided:

As for the 20 January 2018 episode regarding the Embassy of Turkey, it is worth noting that on 18 January the Office of Diplomatic Protocol had already informed the Interior Ministry that the said Embassy had expressed concerns over possible attacks on its offices, requesting increased security. The police headquarters in Rome promptly issued instructions to strengthen vigilance and security around potential Turkish targets in Rome, to prevent protests at those locations from growing out of control. As reported by Turkey, protesters were not allowed to approach the Turkish Embassy building.

With regard to the 14 March 2018 episode concerning the Honorary Consulate in Venice, the Office of Diplomatic Protocol, upon receipt of a communication from the Turkish Embassy, immediately informed the police headquarters and the Prefecture of Venice, as well as the Interior Ministry. According to the latter, “about 20 people had entered the offices of the Honorary Consulate to protest some policies of the Turkish Government. Police officers were immediately dispatched to the scene and the situation was kept under control. The activists left the offices and no acts of violence against persons are known to have been committed”. Investigations are currently under way to identify the culprits. The Honorary Consul of Turkey and the Turkish Embassy in Rome were duly and promptly informed.

With regard to the 23 March episode, as soon as the Turkish Embassy informed the Office of Diplomatic Protocol that 15 demonstrators wanted to chain themselves to the gates, the Office of Diplomatic Protocol contacted the Ministry of the Interior. The Ministry reported that following an intervention by the police approximately 20 protesters were in the process of leaving the premises and that the chains had been removed.

The three reported episodes were promptly addressed, and any further activity directed against the relevant diplomatic and consular missions was effectively prevented.

11. **The Islamic Republic of Iran** (10 October 2018) reported the following incident that occurred in Iraq:⁶

On Friday, 7 September 2018, at 5 p.m., a large number of Iraqi protesters in the city of Basrah gathered in an organized manner in front of the Iranian Consulate-General. Despite the presence of about 50 members of the security forces, about 200 of the protesters assaulted the Consulate-General and made their way inside the building without any intervention by security forces.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Ibid.

By 11 p.m., the attackers had entered the offices and meeting rooms of the Consulate-General and destroyed all property, supplies, equipment and documents. They had also dishonoured and burned the Iranian flag and eventually the Consulate-General, causing the destruction of the entire building. It is worth noting that repeated calls by the Iranian Consul-General to contact and request local authorities in Basrah to dispatch forces went unanswered.

This is despite the fact that the Embassy of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Baghdad and the Consulate-General in Basrah had warned Iraqi government officials and Basrah provincial officials, the day before and during this horrendous attack, regarding the likelihood of such an invasion and had requested that serious measures be taken to avoid an assault on the Consulate-General building.

It is important to note that, under international law and relevant international treaties, especially the 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and specifically its article 31 (3), “the receiving State is under a special duty to take all appropriate steps to protect the consular premises against any intrusion or damage and to prevent any disturbance of the peace of the consular post or impairment of its dignity”. This obligation by the receiving State is clear and applies, regardless of the intent of the protesters.

The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, while recalling and emphasizing the international obligations of the Republic of Iraq as the receiving State with regard to ensuring the protection and safety of the Consulate-General’s premises, requests the Government of the Republic of Iraq, in accordance with its international obligations, to take all actions and measures necessary to ensure the security of the diplomatic and consular premises of the Islamic Republic of Iran, as well as the safety of its staff members in Iraq.

The Islamic Republic of Iran further requests the Government of Iraq to identify, arrest and prosecute the assailants, remedy the situation, bear the costs of damages inflicted and take effective preventive measures to ensure that such an unfortunate situation never occurs in the future.

12. **Austria** (27 April 2020) submitted information concerning the incident reported by Turkey on 1 June 2018:

The reported incident concerning the attempted intrusion into the Consulate-General of Turkey in Salzburg on 21 January 2018 has led to increased security measures, i.e. police patrolling in front of the Consulate-General. In the absence of new evidence, the proceedings against three suspects were closed and further investigations suspended.

From August 2016 to November 2018 the Austrian military has supported the Austrian police forces in protecting embassies, international organizations and other diplomatic representations in Vienna. This support was resumed in March 2020 in the light of a possible risk to public order and security posed by the current coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic.

13. **Cuba** (7 May 2020, revised on 4 June 2020) reported that the following incident occurred in the United States of America:

I have the honour of addressing you in your capacity as Secretary-General of the United Nations to draw your attention to the serious terrorist attack involving a firearm perpetrated against the Embassy of the Republic of Cuba to the United States of America, on Thursday, 30 April 2020.

On that day, at 2.05 a.m., Cuban-born citizen Alexander Alazo Baró fired 32 rounds with a semi-automatic assault rifle at the Embassy building, where 10 Cuban diplomats were present at the time. This serious event endangered the

lives and the safety of the Embassy staff and their families. As a result of the impacts, material damage to the building was reported.

The Government of the United States has chosen not to condemn or reject this serious terrorist attack. Its complicit silence encourages the execution of similar actions by violent individuals and groups existing in the United States itself.

The perpetrator of the attack was arrested by the local authorities at the scene and remains in their custody. We have publicly acknowledged the professional conduct and swift response of the local police forces and the secret service, who rushed to the scene at the time of the attack.

At noon that same day, 30 April, the Cuban Minister for Foreign Affairs summoned the Chargé d'Affaires of the United States Embassy in Havana to express his strongest protest against the serious terrorist attack. So far, the Department of State has not issued an official public statement. Its official reaction to the Government of Cuba was issued through the diplomatic channel almost five days after the event.

Alexander Alazo Baró planned the attack well in advance, was the holder of a licence to carry firearms and owned a Glock pistol; he obtained an AK-47 rifle in the period leading up to the attack and, two weeks beforehand, visited the crime scene for reconnaissance purposes. He travelled from the State of Pennsylvania to the Embassy of Cuba carrying the firearm and ammunition. The Government of the United States failed in its obligation to prevent this attack, of which there were sufficient signs.

This terrorist act is a direct result of the aggressive and hateful policy and rhetoric of the Government of the United States against Cuba and the ongoing incitement to violence by United States politicians, including senior officials from the Department of State and the Embassy of the United States in Havana, as well as by anti-Cuban extremist groups who have made this kind of attack their means of living.

An event such as this cannot be dissociated from the tightening of the illegal economic, commercial and financial blockade imposed by the United States of America, which includes non-conventional measures and persists even during the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic that is affecting the entire planet. We note that the United States campaign against international medical cooperation and its slanders against Cuban medical personnel working in third countries also constitute incitement to violence against them, as has been demonstrated in recent months.

For Cuba, this is a serious incident, which took place in the capital of a country in which a significant number of diplomatic missions are present. The silence of the Government of the United States could become a stimulus for those who identify diplomatic missions as targets of violent or terrorist attacks.

There is a serious history of violent and hostile acts, including terrorist attacks against Cuban diplomatic officials based in the United States, both at the Embassy in Washington, D.C., and at the Permanent Mission to the United Nations in New York. It should be recalled, for example, that Cuban diplomat Félix García Rodríguez was assassinated in New York on 11 September 1980 and that direct attacks with the use of explosive devices were carried out against the Permanent Mission of Cuba in that city. The groups and individuals that have committed terrorist acts against Cuba in the past have operated with impunity on United States soil for years, and continue to do so, with the full knowledge of the law enforcement agencies of the Government of the United States.

The General Assembly has reiterated on numerous occasions its outright and unequivocal rejection of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, committed by whomever, wherever and for whatever purposes.

We recall that, in its resolution [74/194](#), entitled “Measures to eliminate international terrorism”, adopted on 18 December 2019, the General Assembly calls upon all States to adopt further measures, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the relevant provisions of international law, to prevent terrorism and to strengthen international cooperation.

It also calls upon all States to enhance the effective implementation of the relevant legal instruments, in order to intensify, as and when appropriate, the exchange of information on facts related to terrorism and, in so doing, to avoid the dissemination of inaccurate and unverified information; and, in accordance with their obligations under applicable international law and the Charter, to deny safe haven to and bring to justice perpetrators of terrorist acts or those who support, facilitate, participate or attempt to participate in the financing, planning or preparation of terrorist acts.

On behalf of the Republic of Cuba, I respectfully call upon you to encourage the United States authorities to observe, implement and enforce thoroughly all the principles and norms of international law governing consular and diplomatic relations, and to take all the necessary measures for the protection and safety of the consular and diplomatic missions and representations accredited in its territory.

14. **Belgium** (13 May 2020) reported the following incidents against diplomatic and consular missions and representatives in Belgium and incidents against diplomatic missions and consular posts of Belgium abroad:

Incidents against diplomatic and consular missions and representatives in Belgium, as well as the measures taken by the relevant authorities of Belgium

| <i>Country/organization</i> | <i>Date</i> | <i>Incident</i> |
|-----------------------------|------------------------|---|
| Russia | 3 January 2018 | Attempted burglary at a diplomat’s residence. |
| Russia | 3 January 2018 | Burglary at a diplomat’s residence |
| Iran | 5 January 2018 | Act of vandalism. Two Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) demonstrators entered the Embassy compound illegally to lower the Iranian flag. |
| Slovakia | 9 January 2018 | Attempted burglary at a diplomat’s residence. |
| Algeria | 25 and 30 January 2018 | Attempted burglary at the Ambassador’s residence and threats and insults over the telephone against the Ambassador. The competent authorities made an assessment and concluded that the incident would be a crime under ordinary law rather than a terrorism-related crime. The Crisis Centre of the Ministry of the Interior was informed in order to take the appropriate security measures in the light of the circumstances. Patrols and police surveillance were stepped up. |
| Turkey | 5 March 2018 | Acts of vandalism. Demonstrators threw red paint at the walls and windows of the Embassy. A report was prepared. The Crisis Centre was informed so that police patrols could be notified of the incident and that the appropriate security measures could be taken. An offer was made to the Turkish Embassy for reimbursement of the costs of cleaning up the façade. |

| <i>Country/organization</i> | <i>Date</i> | <i>Incident</i> |
|-----------------------------|-------------------------------|--|
| Turkey | 26 March and 5 April 2018 | Photographs of the Embassy taken by an individual. The Crisis Centre was informed. |
| Turkey | 6 April 2018 | Photographs of the Embassy taken by an individual. The Crisis Centre was informed. |
| Poland | Shortly before 30 May 2018 | Acts of vandalism. Damage caused to the external windows of the Permanent Mission of Poland to the European Union and of the Permanent Representative's residence. 23 September 2018 |
| Korea | 1 June 2018 | Theft in the basement of a diplomat's residence. |
| Russia | 11 June 2018 | Acts of vandalism. Balls were thrown at the Embassy compound during a demonstration by Amnesty International. |
| Guinea | 11 August 2018 | Robbery at the Embassy. |
| Turkey | 16 September 2018 | Acts of vandalism. A vehicle approached the Ambassador's residence at high speed and knocked over cones placed near the residence. The Crisis Centre was informed. |
| Ireland | 23 September 2018 | Sexual aggression against the child of a diplomat. The police opened an investigation and one individual was arrested. The family received care from social services. |
| Kuwait | 27 and 30 September 2018 | Burglary at a diplomat's residence. A complaint was filed, and the Crisis Centre was informed. |
| Spain | 30 September 2018 | Acts of vandalism. Graffiti in Catalan on the walls of the Embassy. Measures were enhanced in view of the national holiday. |
| China | 9–10 October 2018 | Burglary at a diplomat's residence. |
| Kuwait | 13 October 2018 | Burglary at a diplomat's residence. The Crisis Centre was informed, and a complaint was filed. |
| Senegal | 20 October 2018 | Burglary at a diplomat's residence. |
| Italy | 10 November 2018 | Act of vandalism. The tyres of a diplomat's vehicle, with a diplomatic licence plate, were punctured with knives. A complaint was filed. |
| Finland | 13 November 2018 | Burglary at the property next to the Ambassador's residence. The lock on the gate leading to the garden of the residence was broken to facilitate entry to the neighbouring property through the garden. |
| Bangladesh | 22 November 2018 | Illegal entry. An individual entered the Embassy compound to take photographs. The Crisis Centre was informed. |
| Czech Republic | 26 November 2018 | Burglary at a diplomat's residence. A complaint was filed. |
| Dominican Republic | 28 November 2018 | Burglary at the Ambassador's residence. |
| Belarus | 1 December 2018 | Violent break-in and theft at the Ambassador's residence. The Crisis Centre was notified. |

| <i>Country/organization</i> | <i>Date</i> | <i>Incident</i> |
|-----------------------------|------------------------|--|
| Togo | 1 December 2018 | Acts of vandalism. Sticky lime was splashed on the walls, doors and floor of the Embassy. |
| Bulgaria | 18 December 2018 | Theft at a diplomat's residence. |
| Togo | 11 January 2019 | Act of vandalism. An individual threw bags of excrement in the Embassy. A complaint was filed. |
| Cameroon | 26 January 2019 | Illegal entry and acts of vandalism. A dozen people attempted to enter the Embassy compound following the re-election of Paul Biya the previous weekend, damaging the main entrance door. The frequency of police patrols was increased. |
| Turkey | 27 January 2019 | Acts of vandalism. Some 20 people passed within the vicinity of the Embassy and the words "Biji Kurdistan" were written on the wall of the Embassy façade. The Crisis Centre was informed. |
| Cameroon | 28–29 January 2019 | Three waves of attacks against the Embassy compound were thwarted by the police. The Crisis Centre was informed and a request for an assessment was sent to the competent authorities. |
| Korea | January 2019 | Burglary in the basement of a diplomat's residence. The Crisis Centre was informed. |
| Poland | 1 February 2019 | Theft at a diplomat's residence. |
| Venezuela | 21 February 2019 | Acts of vandalism. A sign was hung on the outside gate of the Embassy to "welcome the new Ambassador Mary Ponte" and to recommend that the current Ambassador "pack his things". A complaint was filed. |
| Korea | February 2019 | Robbery at the Ambassador's residence. The Crisis Centre was informed. |
| Italy | 10–11 March 2019 | Acts of vandalism. Insulting inscription against a personality of the Italian Government on the perimeter wall of the Permanent Mission of Italy to the European Union. |
| Mexico | 18 March 2019 | Theft of a diplomat's backpack. |
| Denmark | 13–14 April | Robbery at the residence of the Permanent Representative of Denmark to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) |
| Belarus | 29–30 April | Theft in the basement of the Ambassador's residence. |
| United Arab Emirates | 26 May 2019 | Three people holding a poster showed up at the entrance of the Embassy entrance to place a chain on the door. |
| Lebanon | 8 July 2019 | Theft of the Ambassador's briefcase. |
| Norway | 12 August 2019 | Burglary at the residence of a diplomat of the Permanent Mission of Norway to NATO. |
| Gambia | 29 August 2019 | Theft of an Embassy vehicle. |
| Brazil | 4 and 5 September 2019 | Acts of vandalism. Graffiti on the main façade of the Embassy. |

| <i>Country/organization</i> | <i>Date</i> | <i>Incident</i> |
|----------------------------------|------------------|--|
| Democratic Republic of the Congo | 5 September 2019 | Two individuals took down the flags flying at the Embassy entrance. |
| Japan | 6 September 2019 | Act of vandalism. Graffiti tagged on the wall of the Ambassador's residence. |
| Qatar | 6 September 2019 | Act of vandalism. Threatening inscription in blue chalk on the external pillars of the Embassy. |
| Chile | 24 October 2019 | Act of vandalism. Graffiti on the front door and garages of the Embassy. |
| Serbia | 10 November 2019 | Act of vandalism. Graffiti on the façade of the Embassy. |
| Turkey | 22 November 2019 | Act of vandalism. Graffiti on the front façade of the Mission of Turkey to the European Union. The Crisis Centre was informed. |
| Turkey | 28 November 2019 | Act of vandalism. Posters stuck on the Embassy façade with the inscription "Stop army R-Turkey #RiseUp4Rojava". The Crisis Centre was informed. |
| Poland | 1 December 2019 | Theft at a diplomat's residence. |
| United States | 20 December 2019 | Attempted illegal entry. Scaling of the Embassy's perimeter wall by an individual. |
| Ukraine | 25 December 2019 | Attempted break-in at the offices of the Mission of Ukraine to the European Union. |
| Japan | 7 January 2020 | Burglary at the private residence of a diplomat of the Mission of Japan to the European Union. A complaint was filed, and the Crisis Centre was informed. |
| Poland | 7 January 2020 | Theft of the vehicle of a diplomat of the Permanent Mission of Poland to the European Union. A complaint was filed, and the Crisis Centre was informed. |
| Ukraine | 9 January 2020 | Attempted break-in at the offices of the Mission of Ukraine to the European Union. The Crisis Centre was informed. |
| Turkey | 20 January 2020 | Act of vandalism. Attempt to set fire to objects in front of the Embassy. The Crisis Centre was informed. |
| Saudi Arabia | 13 February 2020 | Act of vandalism. Two Embassy vehicles were vandalized (windows broken). A complaint was filed, and the Crisis Centre was informed. |
| Ireland | 24 February 2020 | Burglary at the private residence of the Deputy Permanent Representative to the European Union. A complaint was filed, and the Crisis Centre was informed. |
| Sweden | 3 March 2020 | Robbery. The son of a diplomat of the Permanent Mission of Sweden to the European Union was robbed. A complaint was filed, and the Crisis Centre was informed. |
| Serbia | 11 March 2020 | Burglary at the Ambassador's residence and theft of valuables. A complaint was filed, and the Crisis Centre was informed. |

| <i>Country/organization</i> | <i>Date</i> | <i>Incident</i> |
|------------------------------------|------------------|--|
| Saudi Arabia | 11 March 2020 | Act of vandalism. Golf balls thrown at the Embassy façade during a protest by Amnesty International. The Crisis Centre was informed. |
| Croatia | 14 March 2020 | Theft of diplomat's vehicle. A complaint was filed, and the Crisis Centre was informed. |
| North Atlantic Treaty Organization | 25 March 2020 | Theft of an official's vehicle. A complaint was filed, and the Crisis Centre was informed. |
| Turkey | 3 April 2020 | A sign was abandoned at the Mission of Turkey to the European Union. A sign was inserted into the gate of the Consulate General in Antwerp, and two bags of paint were thrown at the front facade, causing damage. The Crisis Centre was informed. |
| Guinea | 14–15 April 2020 | Burglars penetrated the Embassy compound, broke doors, destroyed equipment and spread white powder in the offices. |

Incidents against diplomatic missions and consular posts of Belgium abroad

| <i>Country</i> | <i>Date</i> | <i>Incident</i> |
|----------------|------------------------|---|
| France | 1 December 2018 | Illegal entry into the Embassy compound and property damage during yellow vest demonstrations at the Place CDG-Etoile and in the surrounding streets. |
| Jamaica | 15 January 2019 | A stray bullet struck the Embassy façade. |
| Chile | End of January 2019 | Burglary at the Honorary Consulate in Concepción. |
| South Africa | 6 November 2019 | Theft of an Embassy service vehicle. |
| Tanzania | 2 July 2019 | Armed attack against a diplomat and his partner. |
| Panama City | 14 August 2019 | Theft of the handbag of a visitor at the Embassy. |
| Lebanon | 18 and 19 January 2020 | Damage to the façade and the entrance of the Embassy building in Beirut following the burning of demonstrators' tents on the sidewalk in front of the building. |

15. **Finland** (14 May 2020) submitted information on the following incidents that targeted foreign diplomatic missions on its territory:

On 31 August 2018, a person trespassed in the fenced area of the residence of the Ambassador of Japan in Helsinki. The trespasser grabbed a member of staff by the neck at the door of the residence and caused damage to some property. The Embassy of Japan and the staff member did not demand punishment or claim compensation for the offence. The public prosecutor decided not to bring charges against the trespasser because the person was not criminally accountable.

On 5 October 2019, a person trespassed in the fenced area of the Embassy of the Republic of Iraq in Helsinki. The person managed to steal the national flag of Iraq and to raise a rainbow flag on the pole. At present, the public prosecutor is assessing the case for consideration of charges against the trespasser.

On 22 November 2019, a person caused damage to the property of the Embassy of the Islamic Republic of Iran by spraying the fence in front of the chancery. The public prosecutor brought charges against the suspect, and the person has been summoned to appear before the Helsinki District Court charged with damage to property. The Embassy has been asked to present a demand for compensation for the damage at the court hearing.

Between summer 2017 and winter 2020, there were several incidents where the chancery of the Embassy of Israel was a target for different forms of mischief. This mischief includes breaking a glass panel of the front door of the Embassy and kicking the front door, throwing eggs at the door and placing stickers with antisemitic motifs on the shield of the Embassy. The Embassy also received emails with a menacing tone. In addition, a wireless network under the name “death to all Jews” was opened near the Embassy for public use. Currently, the police are investigating the suspected offences, which involve several suspects. The suspected crimes include minor damage to property, hate crime with an antisemitic motive and ethnic agitation. Police surveillance near the Embassy has been strengthened by means of electronic surveillance, around-the-clock readiness of the police and more effective patrolling near the Embassy.

The Finnish authorities wish to assure the Secretary-General that they take very seriously their duty to take all appropriate action to protect the premises of diplomatic missions against any intrusion or damage, and to prevent any attack on the person of the staff members of the missions. Finland also wishes to emphasize the importance of cooperation on security matters, not only at the international level but also at the national level, between the missions and the competent local authorities.

16. **Ireland** (15 May 2020) submitted information concerning the incident reported by Turkey on 1 June 2018:

The Government of Ireland takes extremely seriously all complaints regarding acts of violence against diplomatic missions and representatives located in Ireland.

Ireland’s Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, in collaboration with other relevant Irish authorities, has been in close contact with the Embassy of Turkey regarding the incident of 24 January 2018 referred to in the report submitted to the Office of the Secretary-General by the Permanent Mission of Turkey.

The Government of Ireland hereby affirms that it treated the incident at the Turkish Embassy in Dublin in accordance with its legal obligations under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. Ireland’s national police force, An Garda Síochána, moved swiftly to launch a full investigation following its occurrence. An Garda Síochána also conducted a comprehensive security review of the premises. In May 2019, the Director of Public Prosecutions, who works completely independently of the Government, decided not to prosecute those involved.

The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and other relevant Irish authorities continue to take all appropriate measures to ensure the protection, security and safety of Turkey’s Embassy and representatives in Ireland.

17. **The United States** (13 July 2020) submitted information concerning the incident reported by Cuba on 7 May 2020:

The United States Mission has the pleasure of reporting that municipal and federal authorities responded promptly to the 30 April 2020 shooting incident at

the Cuban Embassy and took a suspect into custody. No one was injured. The investigation remains ongoing and the suspect faces numerous federal charges. The prosecution of the suspect will proceed in accordance with applicable United States laws. The Department of State and other United States authorities have already engaged and continue to engage directly with the Embassy of the Republic of Cuba regarding this incident. The United States takes seriously its duty to take all appropriate steps to protect the premises of a diplomatic mission against any intrusion or damage, or to prevent any disturbance of the peace of the mission.

III. Views expressed by States pursuant to paragraph 13 of resolution [73/205](#)

18. **Qatar** (25 February 2019) expressed the following views:

With regard to paragraph 13 of the resolution, the competent department of the Ministry of the Interior of Qatar devotes particular attention to the security and safety of the members and premises of diplomatic and consular missions and events organized by such missions and strives to prevent acts of violence from being committed against them, in particular by taking preventive security measures.

19. **Belarus** (31 May 2019) expressed the following views:

The Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Belarus implements on a permanent basis the necessary set of measures to ensure the security of diplomatic missions, missions to international organizations and consular institutions of foreign States, including their employees in the territory of the country.

20. **Belarus** (8 May 2020) expressed the following views:⁷

The authorities of Belarus take seriously their duty to take all appropriate action to protect the premises of diplomatic missions against any intrusion or damage and to prevent any attack on the person of the staff of those missions.

Belarus, in implementing all applicable norms of international law governing diplomatic and consular relations and relations with international organizations, is assiduous in taking all measures to protect missions and their staff.

We separately note that Belarus is introducing new practices on an ongoing basis to ensure the security of missions. For example, the protection of diplomatic missions is increased when, on foreign countries' election days, their premises serve as polling stations, and also when national receptions are held. Additional security measures are put in place when missions report the possibility of wrongful acts against them.

21. **Belgium** (13 May 2020) expressed the following views:

General measures

Security arrangements for diplomatic missions and consular posts are based on the threat analysis conducted by the Threat Analysis Coordination Agency. The Agency determines a threat level for every diplomatic mission in Belgium. The threat level allows the Crisis Centre of the Ministry of the Interior to ask the police to make specific security arrangements adapted to each mission. The Crisis Centre holds a monthly meeting attended by the Protocol

⁷ Submitted pursuant to paragraph 12 of resolution [71/145](#).

Division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to review the security arrangements for the various diplomatic missions in Belgium.

Specific measures

Diplomatic missions and consular posts that have a security problem contact the Protocol Division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Each specific problem is therefore referred by the Protocol Division to the competent security service, and is addressed accordingly.

22. **El Salvador** (15 May 2020) expressed the following views:

El Salvador recognizes the importance of fulfilling the commitments under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, which are based on the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations concerning the sovereign equality of States, the maintenance of international peace and security and the promotion of friendly relations among nations.

It is therefore especially important that States take all appropriate measures to prevent attacks on diplomatic and consular representatives and those accredited to international intergovernmental organizations, to protect the premises of missions against any intrusion or damage and to prevent any disturbance of the peace of the mission or impairment of its dignity. They also need to have adequate national laws to prevent, investigate and prosecute such illegal acts and to implement related plans and initiatives.

As stated in previous reports, El Salvador has set up effective protection mechanisms, including standing measures, to meet the requirements of missions and their representatives. They involve the Directorate-General of Protocol and Honours of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the National Civil Police, through the Division of Protection of Dignitaries. The Salvadoran authorities have thus met all requirements and put in place the security and protection measures requested by the missions and international bodies accredited to El Salvador.

Under the criminal law of El Salvador, a serious offence against the individual freedom of persons entitled to special protection under international law is considered an aggravated offence and hence punishable with a higher prison term. Security protocols and those regarding threats to missions and their representatives have also been bolstered, with a view to facilitating the investigation of such incidents and bringing legal action against the perpetrators.

With regard to the measures needed to enhance the protection, security and safety of diplomatic and consular missions and representatives in the country, the National Civil Police has been alerted to all illegal acts affecting diplomatic agents, their mission premises and those of international organizations with a view to initiating the corresponding investigations and bringing the perpetrators to justice, in compliance with the obligations acquired under the aforementioned conventions. That said, to date no serious violations of the protection, security and safety of diplomatic and consular missions or representatives based in El Salvador have been committed.

In addition, with reference to the guidelines embodying the relevant questions that States may wish to consider when reporting serious violations of the protection, security and safety of diplomatic and consular missions and representatives, as well as of missions and representatives with diplomatic status to international intergovernmental organizations, set out in the annex to a report of the Secretary-General (A/42/485), El Salvador reaffirms the importance of

States abiding by good practices in terms of reporting under those guidelines and enforcing the applicable rules of international law in that regard.

The security and safety of diplomatic and consular missions is always under threat and subject to risks. In June 2018, for example, the Permanent Mission of El Salvador to the United Nations in New York learned that one of its diplomatic agents had been attacked in the New York City subway system and, in August 2019, that one of its official vehicles had been vandalized. El Salvador appreciates the readiness with which the local authorities responded to both of those unfortunate incidents. Nonetheless, in accordance with the applicable conventions, measures to protect diplomatic and consular missions and representatives accredited to their territory must be strengthened.

El Salvador recognizes the importance of continued compliance with its obligations in this regard, to enable diplomatic and consular missions and their representatives to efficiently carry out their functions, including the protection and defence afforded to the nationals of sending States. Our country therefore will continue to participate in discussions on the issue in the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly and to closely monitor emerging risks and threats to security and safety, such as that generated by the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic, which poses a major challenge to the international community.

23. **The Philippines** (18 May 2020) expressed the following views:

The Philippine Government is not aware of any notable incident affecting the security and safety of diplomatic missions or their personnel that has taken place within its territory during the relevant reporting periods.

The Philippines has acceded to the three most significant conventions with regard to the protection, security and safety of diplomatic and consular missions and representatives, to wit: the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents.

In compliance with its international obligations to uphold the inviolability of diplomatic premises as well as to protect diplomatic agents in its territory, the Philippine Government has established a specific unit under the Philippine National Police, namely the Police Security and Protection Group, mandated to secure and protect national government officials, members of the diplomatic corps and visiting foreign dignitaries in the country. Requests for the deployment of the Police Security and Protection Group to an embassy or consular premises are sent to the Department of Foreign Affairs and considered by its Intelligence and Security Unit.

With regard to possible ways forward to enhance the security measures for diplomatic agents and premises, the Philippines recommends the establishment of security units in all receiving States, similar to its Police Security and Protection Group, that specifically cater to the security and protection needs of the members of the diplomatic corps as a better alternative to deploying random personnel from the police or military arm of the Government for this purpose. In addition to deployment of permanent and round-the-clock guards at the premises, the said unit, equipped with staff with specific training to render surveillance, close-in and escort services to diplomatic agents, can effectively enhance security for the persons of diplomatic agents and thwart unwanted incidents against them.

IV. Status of participation in international conventions pertaining to the protection, security and safety of diplomatic and consular missions and representatives as at 30 June 2020

24. Each instrument listed below is represented in tables 1 and 2 by the letter shown on the left in the list.

- A. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961 (signed at Vienna on 18 April 1961; entered into force on 24 April 1964, in accordance with article 51);
- B. Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations concerning Acquisition of Nationality of 1961 (signed at Vienna on 18 April 1961; entered into force on 24 April 1964, in accordance with article VI);
- C. Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes of 1961 (signed at Vienna on 18 April 1961; entered into force on 24 April 1964, in accordance with article VIII);
- D. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations of 1963 (signed at Vienna on 24 April 1963; entered into force on 19 March 1967, in accordance with article 77);
- E. Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations concerning Acquisition of Nationality of 1963 (signed at Vienna on 24 April 1963; entered into force on 19 March 1967, in accordance with article VI);
- F. Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes of 1963 (signed at Vienna on 24 April 1963; entered into force on 19 March 1967, in accordance with article VIII);
- G. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, of 1973 (adopted by the General Assembly on 14 December 1973; entered into force on 20 February 1977, in accordance with article 17).

Table 1

Total participation in international conventions pertaining to the protection, security and safety of diplomatic and consular missions and representatives

| <i>Signature, succession to signature</i> | | | | | | |
|--|----|----|-----|----|----|-----|
| A | B | C | D | E | F | G |
| 60 | 18 | 28 | 48 | 19 | 38 | 25 |
| <i>Ratification, accession or succession</i> | | | | | | |
| A | B | C | D | E | F | G |
| 192 | 51 | 70 | 180 | 41 | 52 | 180 |

Table 2
**Status of participation in international conventions pertaining to the protection,
 security and safety of diplomatic and consular missions and representatives**

| State | Signature, succession to signature | | | | | | | Ratification, accession or succession | | | | | | |
|----------------------------------|------------------------------------|---|---|---|---|---|---|---------------------------------------|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | A | B | C | D | E | F | G | A | B | C | D | E | F | G |
| Afghanistan | | | | | | | | A | | | | | | G |
| Albania | A | | | | | | | A | | | D | | | G |
| Algeria | | | | | | | | A | | | D | | | G |
| Andorra | | | | | | | | A | | | D | | | G |
| Angola | | | | | | | | A | | | D | | | |
| Antigua and Barbuda | | | | | | | | A | | | D | | | G |
| Argentina | A | B | | D | | F | | A | B | | D | | | G |
| Armenia | | | | | | | | A | | | D | | | G |
| Australia | A | | | D | | | G | A | | C | D | | F | G |
| Austria | A | | C | D | | F | | A | | C | D | | F | G |
| Azerbaijan | | | | | | | | A | | | D | | | G |
| Bahamas | | | | | | | | A | | C | D | | | G |
| Bahrain | | | | | | | | A | | | D | | | G |
| Bangladesh | | | | | | | | A | | | D | | | G |
| Barbados | | | | | | | | A | | | D | | | G |
| Belarus | A | | | | | | G | A | | | D | | | G |
| Belgium | A | | C | D | | F | | A | B | C | D | E | F | G |
| Belize | | | | | | | | A | | | D | | | G |
| Benin | | | | D | | F | | A | | | D | | | G |
| Bhutan | | | | | | | | A | | | D | | | G |
| Bolivia (Plurinational State of) | | | | D | | | | A | | | D | | | G |
| Bosnia and Herzegovina | | | | | E | F | | A | B | C | D | | | G |
| Botswana | | | | | | | | A | B | C | D | E | F | G |
| Brazil | A | | | D | E | | | A | | | D | | | G |
| Brunei Darussalam | | | | | | | | A | | | D | | | G |
| Bulgaria | A | | | | | | G | A | | C | D | E | F | G |
| Burkina Faso | | | | D | | F | | A | | | D | | F | G |
| Burundi | | | | | | | | A | | | | | | G |
| Cabo Verde | | | | | | | | A | | | D | | | G |
| Cambodia | | | | | | | | A | B | C | D | | | G |
| Cameroon | | | | D | E | F | | A | | | D | | | G |
| Canada | A | | | | | | G | A | | | D | | | G |
| Central African Republic | A | B | C | D | | F | | A | B | C | | | | G |
| Chad | | | | | | | | A | | | | | | |
| Chile | A | | | D | | F | | A | | | D | | | G |
| China | | | | | | | | A | | | D | | | G |
| Colombia | A | | C | D | E | F | | A | | | D | | | G |
| Comoros | | | | | | | | A | | | | | | G |
| Congo | | | | D | E | F | | A | | | | | | |

| <i>State</i> | <i>Signature, succession to signature</i> | | | | | | | <i>Ratification, accession or succession</i> | | | | | | |
|---------------------------------------|---|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|--|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| | <i>A</i> | <i>B</i> | <i>C</i> | <i>D</i> | <i>E</i> | <i>F</i> | <i>G</i> | <i>A</i> | <i>B</i> | <i>C</i> | <i>D</i> | <i>E</i> | <i>F</i> | <i>G</i> |
| Cook Islands | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Costa Rica | A | | | D | | | | A | | C | D | | | G |
| Côte d'Ivoire | | | | D | | F | | A | | | | | | G |
| Croatia | | | | | | | | A | | | D | | | G |
| Cuba | A | | | D | | | | A | | | D | | | G |
| Cyprus | | | | | | | | A | | | D | | | G |
| Czechia | | | | | | | | A | | | D | | | G |
| Democratic People's Republic of Korea | | | | | | | | A | | | D | | | G |
| Democratic Republic of the Congo | A | | | D | E | F | | A | B | C | D | | | G |
| Denmark | A | B | C | D | E | F | G | A | B | C | D | E | F | G |
| Djibouti | | | | | | | | A | | | D | | | G |
| Dominica | | | | | | | | A | | C | D | | | G |
| Dominican Republic | A | B | C | D | E | F | | A | B | C | D | E | F | G |
| Ecuador | A | | C | D | | | G | A | | C | D | | | G |
| Egypt | | | | | | | | A | B | | D | E | | G |
| El Salvador | | | | | | | | A | | | D | | | G |
| Equatorial Guinea | | | | | | | | A | | C | D | | | G |
| Eritrea | | | | | | | | A | | | D | | | |
| Estonia | | | | | | | | A | B | C | D | E | F | G |
| Eswatini | | | | | | | | A | | | D | | | G |
| Ethiopia | | | | | | | | A | | | | | | G |
| Fiji | | | | | | | | A | | C | D | | | G |
| Finland | A | B | C | D | E | F | G | A | B | C | D | E | F | G |
| France | A | | C | D | | F | | A | | C | D | | F | G |
| Gabon | | | | D | | F | | A | B | C | D | E | F | G |
| Gambia | | | | | | | | A | | | D | | | |
| Georgia | | | | | | | | A | | | D | | | G |
| Germany | A | B | C | D | E | F | G | A | B | C | D | E | F | G |
| Ghana | A | B | C | D | E | F | | A | | | D | E | | G |
| Greece | A | | | | | | | A | | | D | | | G |
| Grenada | | | | | | | | A | | | D | | | G |
| Guatemala | A | | | | | | G | A | | | D | | | G |
| Guinea | | | | | | | | A | B | C | D | | | G |
| Guinea-Bissau | | | | | | | | A | | | | | | G |
| Guyana | | | | | | | | A | | | D | | | G |
| Haiti | | | | | | | | A | | | D | | | G |
| Holy See | A | | | D | | | | A | | | D | | | G |
| Honduras | | | | | | | | A | | | D | | | G |
| Hungary | A | | | | | | G | A | | C | D | | F | G |
| Iceland | | | | | | | G | A | B | C | D | E | F | G |
| India | | | | | | | | A | B | C | D | E | F | G |
| Indonesia | | | | | | | | A | B | | D | E | | |

| State | Signature, succession to signature | | | | | | | Ratification, accession or succession | | | | | | |
|----------------------------------|------------------------------------|---|---|---|---|---|---|---------------------------------------|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | A | B | C | D | E | F | G | A | B | C | D | E | F | G |
| Iran (Islamic Republic of) | A | B | C | D | | | | A | B | C | D | E | F | G |
| Iraq | A | B | C | | | | | A | B | C | D | E | | G |
| Ireland | A | | C | D | | F | | A | | | D | | | G |
| Israel | A | | C | D | | | | A | | | | | | G |
| Italy | A | B | C | D | E | F | G | A | B | C | D | E | F | G |
| Jamaica | | | | | | | | A | | | D | | | G |
| Japan | A | | C | | | | | A | | C | D | | F | G |
| Jordan | | | | | | | | A | | | D | | | G |
| Kazakhstan | | | | | | | | A | | | D | | | G |
| Kenya | | | | | | | | A | B | C | D | E | F | G |
| Kiribati | | | | | | | | A | | | D | | | G |
| Kuwait | | | | D | E | F | | A | | C | D | | | G |
| Kyrgyzstan | | | | | | | | A | | | D | | | G |
| Lao People's Democratic Republic | | | | | | | | A | B | C | D | E | F | G |
| Latvia | | | | | | | | A | | | D | | | G |
| Lebanon | A | B | C | D | | F | | A | | | D | | | G |
| Lesotho | | | | | | | | A | | | D | | | G |
| Liberia | A | | | D | E | F | | A | B | C | D | | | G |
| Libya | | | | | | | | A | B | | D | | | G |
| Liechtenstein | A | | C | D | | F | | A | | C | D | | F | G |
| Lithuania | | | | | | | | A | | C | D | | F | G |
| Luxembourg | A | | C | D | | F | | A | | C | D | | F | G |
| Madagascar | | | | | | | | A | B | C | D | E | F | G |
| Malawi | | | | | | | | A | B | C | D | E | F | G |
| Malaysia | | | | | | | | A | B | C | D | | | G |
| Maldives | | | | | | | | A | | | D | | | G |
| Mali | | | | | | | | A | | | D | | | G |
| Malta | | | | | | | | A | | C | D | | | G |
| Marshall Islands | | | | | | | | A | | | D | | | G |
| Mauritania | | | | | | | | A | | | D | | | G |
| Mauritius | | | | | | | | A | | C | D | | F | G |
| Mexico | A | | | D | | | | A | | | D | | F | G |
| Micronesia (Federated States of) | | | | | | | | A | | | D | | | G |
| Monaco | | | | | | | | A | | | D | | | G |
| Mongolia | | | | | | | G | A | | | D | | | G |
| Montenegro | | | | | E | F | | A | B | C | D | | | G |
| Morocco | | | | | | | | A | B | | D | E | | G |
| Mozambique | | | | | | | | A | | | D | | | G |
| Myanmar | | | | | | | | A | B | | D | | | G |
| Namibia | | | | | | | | A | | | D | | | G |
| Nauru | | | | | | | | A | | C | D | E | | G |
| Nepal | | | | | | | | A | B | C | D | E | F | G |

| <i>State</i> | <i>Signature, succession to signature</i> | | | | | | | <i>Ratification, accession or succession</i> | | | | | | |
|----------------------------------|---|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|--|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| | <i>A</i> | <i>B</i> | <i>C</i> | <i>D</i> | <i>E</i> | <i>F</i> | <i>G</i> | <i>A</i> | <i>B</i> | <i>C</i> | <i>D</i> | <i>E</i> | <i>F</i> | <i>G</i> |
| Netherlands | | | | | | | | A | B | C | D | E | F | G |
| New Zealand | A | | C | | | | | A | B | C | D | E | F | G |
| Nicaragua | | | | | | | G | A | B | C | D | E | F | G |
| Niger | | | | D | | F | | A | B | C | D | E | F | G |
| Nigeria | A | | | | | | | A | | | D | | | G |
| Niue | | | | | | | | | | | | | | G |
| North Macedonia | | | | | | | | A | B | C | D | | | G |
| Norway | A | B | C | D | E | F | G | A | B | C | D | E | F | G |
| Oman | | | | | | | | A | B | C | D | E | F | G |
| Pakistan | A | | | | | | | A | | C | D | | F | G |
| Palau | | | | | | | | | | | | | | G |
| Panama | A | | | D | E | F | | A | B | C | D | E | F | G |
| Papua New Guinea | | | | | | | | A | | | D | | | G |
| Paraguay | | | | | | | G | A | B | C | D | E | F | G |
| Peru | | | | D | | F | | A | | | D | | F | G |
| Philippines | A | B | C | D | | F | | A | B | C | D | E | F | G |
| Poland | A | | | D | | | G | A | | | D | | | G |
| Portugal | | | | | | | | A | | | D | | | G |
| Qatar | | | | | | | | A | | | D | | | G |
| Republic of Korea | A | B | C | | | | | A | B | C | D | E | F | G |
| Republic of Moldova | | | | | | | | A | | | D | | | G |
| Romania | A | | | | | | G | A | | C | D | | F | G |
| Russian Federation | A | | | | | | G | A | | | D | | | G |
| Rwanda | | | | | | | G | A | | | D | | | G |
| Saint Kitts and Nevis | | | | | | | | A | | | D | | | G |
| Saint Lucia | | | | | | | | A | | | D | | | G |
| Saint Vincent and the Grenadines | | | | | | | | A | | | D | | | G |
| Samoa | | | | | | | | A | | | D | | | |
| San Marino | A | | | | | | | A | | | | | | G |
| Sao Tome and Principe | | | | | | | | A | | | D | | | G |
| Saudi Arabia | | | | | | | | A | | | D | | | G |
| Senegal | A | B | | | | | | A | | | D | E | F | G |
| Serbia | | | | | E | F | | A | B | C | D | | | G |
| Seychelles | | | | | | | | A | | C | D | | F | G |
| Sierra Leone | | | | | | | | A | | | D | | | G |
| Singapore | | | | | | | | A | | | D | | | G |
| Slovakia | | | | | | | | A | | C | D | | F | G |
| Slovenia | | | | | | | | A | | C | D | | | G |
| Solomon Islands | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Somalia | | | | | | | | A | | | D | | | |
| South Africa | A | | | | | | | A | | | D | | | G |
| South Sudan | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |

| <i>State</i> | <i>Signature, succession to signature</i> | | | | | | | <i>Ratification, accession or succession</i> | | | | | | |
|--|---|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|--|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| | <i>A</i> | <i>B</i> | <i>C</i> | <i>D</i> | <i>E</i> | <i>F</i> | <i>G</i> | <i>A</i> | <i>B</i> | <i>C</i> | <i>D</i> | <i>E</i> | <i>F</i> | <i>G</i> |
| Spain | | | | | | | | A | | C | D | | F | G |
| Sri Lanka | A | | | | | | | A | B | C | D | | | G |
| State of Palestine | | | | | | | | A | | C | D | | F | G |
| Sudan | | | | | | | | A | | | D | | | G |
| Suriname | | | | | | | | A | B | C | D | E | F | |
| Sweden | A | B | C | D | E | F | G | A | B | C | D | E | F | G |
| Switzerland | A | | C | D | | F | | A | B | C | D | E | F | G |
| Syrian Arab Republic | | | | | | | | A | | | D | | | G |
| Tajikistan | | | | | | | | A | | | D | | | G |
| Thailand | A | B | | | | | | A | B | | D | E | | G |
| Timor-Leste | | | | | | | | A | | | D | | | |
| Togo | | | | | | | | A | | | D | | | G |
| Tonga | | | | | | | | A | | | D | | | G |
| Trinidad and Tobago | | | | | | | | A | | | D | | | G |
| Tunisia | | | | | | | G | A | B | | D | E | | G |
| Turkey | | | | | | | | A | | | D | | | G |
| Turkmenistan | | | | | | | | A | | | D | | | G |
| Tuvalu | | | | | | | | A | | | D | | | |
| Uganda | | | | | | | | A | | | | | | G |
| Ukraine | A | | | | | | G | A | | | D | | | G |
| United Arab Emirates | | | | | | | | A | | | D | | | G |
| United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland | A | | C | D | | F | G | A | | C | D | | F | G |
| United Republic of Tanzania | A | B | C | | | | | A | B | C | D | | | |
| United States of America | A | | | D | | | G | A | | | D | | | G |
| Uruguay | A | | | D | | F | | A | | | D | | | G |
| Uzbekistan | | | | | | | | A | | | D | | | G |
| Vanuatu | | | | | | | | A | | | D | | | |
| Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) | A | | | D | | | | A | | | D | | | G |
| Viet Nam | | | | | | | | A | | | D | E | F | G |
| Yemen | | | | | | | | A | | | D | | | G |
| Zambia | | | | | | | | A | | | D | | | G |
| Zimbabwe | | | | | | | | A | | | D | | | |