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# الأمم المتحدة الجمعية العامة

الدورة الأربعون  
البنود ٣ و ٢٢ و ٤٠ من جدول الأعمال

## وشائق تفويض الممثلين في الدورة الأربعين للجمعية العامة

### الحالة في كمبوتشيا

#### مسألة السلم والاستقرار والتعاون في جنوب شرقي آسيا

رسالة مؤرخة في ٦ كانون الأول/ديسمبر ١٩٨٥ وموجهة إلى الأمين العام من الممثل الدائم لجمهورية لاو الديمقراطية الشعبية لدى الأمم المتحدة

بناء على طلب حكومة جمهورية كمبوتشيا الشعبية ، أتشرف بأن أحيل اليكم طلي هذا نسختين من كتاب معنون "الحرب غير المعلنة ضد جمهورية كمبوتشيا الشعبية" (١) ، نشرته وزارة خارجية ذلك البلد في تشرين الثاني/نوفمبر ١٩٨٥ .

وأكون ممتنا لو تفضلتم بالعمل على تعميم هذا الكتاب بوصفه وثيقة رسمية من وشائق الجمعية العامة في إطار البنود ٣ و ٢٢ و ٤٠ من جدول الأعمال .

(توقيع) كيشونغ فونغساي

السفير

الممثل الدائم

(١) متوفر بالانكليزية والفرنسية فقط .

# UNDECLARED WAR AGAINST THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KAMPUCHEA

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Ministry for Foreign Affairs  
of the People's  
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## The Beginnings of the Tragedy

A ghost country thrown back to the "zero year" of its history—this is how foreign observers described Kampuchea in early 1979. The three years, eight months, and twenty days of the murderous "social experiment" conducted by the Pol Pot-Ieng Sary clique had brought the Khmer nation practically to the verge of total annihilation. John Pilger, a well-known British journalist who was among the first foreigners to visit Phnom Penh after the downfall of the tyranny of the Pol Pot regime, described his impressions of the trip. He wrote that the city was a nightmare. You felt as if you found yourself in a big city like Manchester on which a neutron bomb had just been dropped. Houses, offices, schools, hotels and the university were deserted and doors were open wide.

The tragedy of the Kampucheans, about which the world public learned after the nearly four-year-long period of the country's complete isolation from the outside world, staggered millions of people and made their hearts ache. The entire world was filled with grief and indignation and, at the same time, it was puzzled: the possibility of such barbarity in our day seemed so incredible. Yet, unfortunately, at the time far from all people understood the causes of the events of 1975-78 having rushed to put all the blame on the Kampucheans themselves. Few people realised then that the horror of the Pol Pot regime had been predetermined by the earlier interference of external forces into the affairs of the Kampuchean people, and that the beginnings of the tragedy had to be sought in the tragedy of old Cambodia\*, which had lived through a 5-year-long period of US imperialist aggression.

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\* Before 1970 our country was called "The Kingdom of Cambodia" between 1970 and 1975—"The Khmer Republic". Pol Pot's genocidal regime renamed it "Democratic Kampuchea". After the victory over Pol Pot in January 1979 the country was named "The People's Republic of Kampuchea" (PRK).

The Khmers are the most numerous nationality in Kampuchea, but not the only one. That is why the term "Kampuchean people", which is now used, more fully reflects the national composition of the population than the previously used "Khmer people".

In the present booklet the phrase "the Khmer reaction" denotes the three Khmer groups in the "Democratic Kampuchea Coalition Government".

In January 1979 a new state, the People's Republic of Kampuchea, was formed on the ancient land of Angkor.

The years that have passed since those days, memorable to each Kampuchean citizen, were a period of arduous creative labour for all of our people, a period of overcoming incredible hardships that were a legacy left us by the bloodthirsty Pol Pot-Ieng Sary-Khieu Samphan regime and at the same time a period of first successes in national development and the defence of the homeland, a period of the revival of the entire Kampuchean nation.

Because of the incessant scheming of the enemies of the PRK, however, these past years were for our people the years of selfless struggle for the establishment of people's power and the years of the great feat of arms they performed in defending the ancient land of Angkor.

This book is about who and what hinders people's Kampuchea in building a new life and about the undeclared war against our peaceful country unleashed by US imperialism, Peking hegemonism, and international reaction, including the ruling circles of some of the ASEAN countries.

At the same time, this book is about our people's determination to uphold their right to independent development and about the futility of any attempts to deprive them of the gains of the January Revolution.

Some of the material for this work was kindly placed at our disposal by the External Relations Department of the Ministry of Defence of the PRK.

*Press Department of the  
Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the PRK  
Phnom Penh, November 1985*

Let us recall that a 1959 report of the US Department of Defence provided the following assessment of the situation in Kampuchea: the Khmer people is "by and large a passive and docile people" who "cannot be counted upon to act in any positive way for the benefit of US aims and policies".

Nevertheless, just a decade later Washington "hot-heads" decided to use Kampuchea in their military political interests. Trying to scramble out of the Vietnam adventure, the administration of the then US President Richard M. Nixon transferred the warfare from Vietnam to the neighbouring neutral country, grossly violating not only the generally accepted norms of international law, but also the United States' own legislation.

The US intrusion into Kampuchea is rightfully referred to as the "foreign policy Watergate" of the Nixon administration: in March 1969 the US President issued a secret order to start bombing Kampuchean territory, of which not only the US Congress—in spite of the fact that the declaration of war is its constitutional prerogative—but also most of the Pentagon's top officials were not aware. This was done at a time when the US government repeatedly stated its "scrupulous" respect for the sovereignty of Kampuchea.

The first bomb strike at its territory was made by US aircraft on March 18, 1969. It was code-named Breakfast, and was followed by Lunch, Snack, Dinner, Dessert, and so on. In all, B-52 strategic bombers mounted 3,630 raids on the defenceless country. The general code name of the operation—Operation Menu—was downright cannibalistic.

Every precaution was taken in Washington to keep the operation secret from the US and world public. The B-52 Stratofortresses that took off from the US air base on the island of Guam were not instructed to set a course for Kampuchea right away. At first they laid a course for South Vietnam and were given new instructions only when they were in flight. The White House supervised the operation through the command of US occupation troops in Vietnam, bypassing many military channels. Even the Pentagon's statistical service, which maintains flight records for each aircraft of the US Air Force, was deliberately misinformed.

All in all, 104,000 tons of bombs was dropped on Kampuchea over the 14 months preceding the "official" US military intervention in the country. Tens of thousands

of civilians became victims of US imperialism's "undeclared" war against the Kampuchean people.

The barbarous raids, however, by US strategic aircraft on Kampuchean territory failed to improve the position of the US aggressors in Vietnam. So the White House made a decision to resort to a large-scale armed intervention. On April 30, 1970, in an appearance on national television Nixon announced that he was sending US combat troops into Kampuchea, which was allegedly dictated by the need to protect the US servicemen in Vietnam.

By this time the CIA spy ring in Phnom Penh had already staged a coup d'état in Kampuchea that had resulted in the seizure of power by the pro-American Lon Nol puppet regime, which immediately undertook the repression of the leftist and other opposition forces in the country. (Washington, incidentally, did not consider it necessary to notify Lon Nol himself of the intrusion of US troops into the country. It was only after the event that he was informed by the US Embassy in Phnom Penh that a 20,000-strong US-Saigon force had crossed the Kampuchean border.

The period of Kampuchea's peaceful neutral development came to an end. The country was drawn into the war that US imperialism had already been waging for quite a few years against the peoples of Vietnam and Laos.

The effects of US military intervention were truly catastrophic for the Kampuchean people. The fiery inferno brought about by US bombings, which lasted until August 1973, devastated whole regions of the country. According to US sources, US aircraft dropped more than 500,000 bombs (one per 15 residents) and thousands of tons of napalm on Kampuchean "targets". These raids and punitive operations against the country's national liberation forces, which had risen to struggle against the invaders and their stooges, resulted in the death of 600,000 Kampucheans (each tenth resident of the country). Having lost their homes and trying to save their lives, hundreds of thousands of peasants became refugees.

The country's economic life was disrupted. In the regions controlled by the Lon Nol regime, agricultural output dropped to only one-fourth and industrial output to just one-eighth of the prewar level. Four-fifths of industrial enterprises was demolished, two-thirds of the rubber plantations (which had been a major source of foreign ex-



change before the war) destroyed, and most of the railways and motor roads were put out of order. Prices for essential goods skyrocketed to an exorbitant level, and the population suffered from unemployment and the corruption of government officials. Along with Vietnam, Kampuchea was turned into a proving ground for testing US chemical weapons. Today thousands of hectares of land, poisoned by toxic agents sprayed over it in the years of the US aggression, are still unsuitable for farming.

"The Khmer Rouge [*Pol Pot's followers*],"<sup>\*</sup> British journalist William Shawcross wrote in his book *Sideshow. Kissinger, Nixon and the Destruction of Cambodia*, "were born out of the inferno...."

US aggression in Kampuchea and the repressive measures taken by the Lon Nol regime brought about a powerful upsurge in the Kampuchean people's national liberation struggle. Already by the beginning of 1975 nine-tenths of the country's territory was under the control of the patriots. The successes gained by the fraternal peoples of Vietnam and Laos in their struggle against the US aggressor were undoubtedly conducive to the victory of the anti-imperialist forces in Kampuchea. The Kampuchean patriots launched a massive offensive by their forces in the spring of 1975 and overthrew the anti-popular Lon Nol regime on April 17.

The pro-Peking group headed by Pol Pot, however, took advantage of the victory. By deceiving, intriguing, and secretly eliminating its political opponents, it managed to worm its way into the leadership of the national liberation movement. The black night of Pol Pot's tyranny descended upon the country.

In August 1979, the People's Revolutionary Tribunal for the Trial of the Genocide Crime of the Pol Pot-Ieng Sary Clique, held in the presence of prominent foreign jurists in Phnom Penh, rightfully classified the crimes perpetrated by the Khmer Rouge in the period between 1975 and 1978 as genocide against the Kampuchean people. According to the official data (published in 1983), collected by the PRK commission for the investigation of crimes committed by the Pol Pot regime, the policy of genocide resulted in the death of 3,314,768 Kampucheans. Most likely these figures

<sup>\*</sup> Here and elsewhere in this work, notes inside quotations are given in italics.

are not final, since new sites of mass burial of victims of Pol Pot's genocide are still being uncovered in different regions of our country to this day.

In its domestic and foreign policy the Pol Pot-Ieng Sary regime was guided by the ideological and practical principles that once underlied the Chinese "great cultural revolution" and that today have been condemned in China itself. The adventurist experiments, which were passed off as "profound social and economic transformations", resulted in the destruction of industry and transport and in great damage to agriculture. The country's finances and trade were abolished, its health care and public education systems were destroyed, and its centuries-old national culture was undermined. Cities were proclaimed an "offspring of exploiter civilisation", and urban residents were driven into the countryside and forcibly turned into farmers. Labour became involuntary and was in no way remunerated. The Buddhist religion, just as all other religions, was banned, and religious ministers were exterminated en masse. Family ties were undermined, and "new marriages" forcibly imposed by decisions of the authorities were introduced. The country's ethnic minorities were subjected to particularly cruel repression. Pol Pot's chauvinism became ruthless in the extreme.

The characteristic features of the foreign policy of "Democratic Kampuchea" were the artificially imposed isolation of the country from the rest of the world, the building up of tensions and the fanning of hostility towards the neighbouring countries. In Phnom Penh there was a special coordinating bureau that supervised the subversive activities of the pro-Chinese anti-government groups in the countries of the region. There were base camps for Thai anti-government units on the country's territory. The Pol Pot-Ieng Sary regime systematically provoked armed incidents on the Kampuchean-Thai border, which were reported almost daily by Bangkok newspapers in the second half of the 1970s. During the rule of the Khmer Rouge, the ties of friendship and solidarity that had been formed in the years of joint struggle against US aggression between the peoples of Vietnam, Laos, and Kampuchea were ruptured. The Pol Pot regime laid territorial claims to two neighbouring countries of Indochina and subsequently seized some parts of their territories. By 1978, the aggressive and provocative actions of the Pol Pot regime had led to an

open, even though undeclared, conflict with the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.

In resorting to armed clashes with its neighbours and increasingly severe terror inside the country, the Pol Pot-leng Sary clique relied upon the unconditional support of their Peking patrons. The Western mass media, many of which now prefer not to remember Peking's sinister role in the Kampuchean events of 1975-1978, had to admit it during those years.

The US newspaper *The New York Times* wrote while Pol Pot was still in power that the Pol Pot's executioners had sadistically slaughtered many Kampuchean residents, and that China had supplied its Kampuchean vassals with instruments of murder and torture. An Agence France-Presse correspondent reported from Bangkok in 1978: "Over the past three years China has completely equipped 30 to 40 regiments of the Kampuchean army. It has supplied 107-mm rockets, 130-mm rapid-firing guns, AK-47 automatic assault rifles, speedboats, trucks, fuel, and ammunition. Several thousand tons of shipments arrive each week at Pochentong Airport near Phnom Penh in Chinese Boeings or at the port of Kampongson (formerly Sihanoukville) in Chinese cargo ships..." (It should be noted parenthetically that a considerable part of these weapons is still being used by the surviving Pol Pot gangs in their subversive activities against the PRK.) "It is also China," stressed the British weekly *New Statesman* in August 1978, "which props in power the psychopaths who terrorise Kampuchea, having reduced it to a level of destitution and human misery without rival in a troubled world."

Dozens of books and hundreds of articles have been written and numerous films have been made about the rule of the Pol Pot-leng Sary clique and its consequences. The whole world, except the spiritual fathers of the Pol Pot tyranny, has condemned the heinous crimes perpetrated in "Democratic Kampuchea". Thus, the US press, which today rarely recalls the times of Pol Pot's genocide and its effects upon present-day Kampuchea, called the Khmer Rouge regime a "replica of Auschwitz". At the close of 1978, when the ever growing flow of refugees from the Pol Pot torture chambers started bringing information about the atrocities committed in the country, the US press referred to the situation as the "gloomiest period in the 20th-century history." Even J. Carter, then US President,

had to admit that the Pol Pot regime was "the world's worst violator of human rights".

Certain political figures in the West admitted this only too late, after the screening of the film *The Killing Fields*. According to the *Bangkok Post* of May 24, 1985, the Belgian representative at the European Parliament, for example, after seeing this film said that most of the viewers did not know anything about what had happened in Kampuchea under Pol Pot, but that now they would be able to realise how terrible it was.

The Kampuchean people could not put up with the inhuman dictatorship. Despite the system of total surveillance aimed at detecting any manifestation of dissent, the population's spontaneous uprisings were spreading throughout the country. Because it suffered a succession of defeats in the war that it had unleashed at the instigation of China against the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, it was becoming increasingly difficult for the Pol Pot regime to suppress the insurgent movement.

By the autumn of 1978, several districts in a number of Kampuchea's provinces had already been completely liberated. In late November 1978 a national congress of revolutionary patriotic forces convened in one of these districts and formed the United Front for the National Salvation of Kampuchea (UFNSK). On December 2, the UFNSK Central Committee adopted an 11-paragraph political programme and called upon the people to mount a nationwide uprising against the hateful Pol Pot regime. At the same time it applied to Vietnam for help.

In a few days the uprising spread all over the country. The Vietnamese people, just as they had more than once in the years of the struggle against their common enemies, responded to the Kampucheans' call for help. Under the blows dealt by the revolutionary patriotic forces and units of Vietnamese volunteers, the Pol Pot-leng Sary regime fell, and on January 7, 1979, the Kampuchean capital was captured by the insurgent people. A new state, the People's Republic of Kampuchea, was born on the Kampuchean soil.

The Kampucheans justifiably refer to January 1979 as a turning point in their history. The nation was saved from the mad cutthroats, intoxicated by the blood of millions of defenceless victims. The prospect for a national revival opened up before the long-suffering Kampuchean people.

At the same time, the elimination of "Democratic Kampuchea", which had been a permanent seat of tension in Southeast Asia, created prerequisites for normalising the situation in that region.

Millions of people throughout the world regarded the victory of the Kampuchean people as a triumph of justice and humanity. It was welcomed by many socialist and developing states, several Western countries, and broad circles of the world public.

The downfall of "Democratic Kampuchea", however, and the formation of a new peaceful state on the Kampuchean soil was by no means to everyone's liking. A number of states, above all China, the United States, and the ASEAN countries, not only did not recognise the PRK but, in effect, began working for its elimination. A real undeclared war, still going on today, was started against the Kampuchean people.

The enemies of the PRK maintain and provide arms for the surviving gangs of the Pol Pot group and for other groups of the reactionary Khmer emigration that have found shelter on the territory of neighbouring Thailand, from where they are conducting sabotage and terrorist activities against the PRK. For several years now the enemies of the PRK have been deliberately stirring up the so-called "Kampuchean problem", which arose, they allege, because of the overthrow of the Pol Pot regime in 1979 and the presence of Vietnamese volunteer units on the territory of the PRK. The enemies of our country are interfering in its internal affairs, mounting psychological warfare against it, attempting to undermine the growing international prestige of the PRK, misrepresenting relations between people's Kampuchea and the countries friendly to it, above all its relations with Vietnam, and are hampering the economic revival of the country.

Because of efforts by the USA, China, and NATO and ASEAN countries, for several years the PRK's lawful government has not been represented at the UN. Instead, the seat belongs to the "government of Democratic Kampuchea" of Pol Pot, which since mid-1982 has been called the "Democratic Kampuchea Coalition Government". It was created from heterogeneous elements of Khmer émigrés, entrenched on Thai territory, by the West, ASEAN countries, and Peking.

The initiators and moving spirits of the continuing

undeclared war against the Kampuchean people are Washington and Peking. Those who had been systematically exterminating the Kampuchean nation by the Pol Pot regime's napalm and hoe are now shedding crocodile tears over its "tragic fate" and openly interfere in the internal affairs of the PRK. In trying to realise their imperialist and hegemonist aspirations in that region of the world, the United States and China are instigating the ASEAN countries to a confrontation with Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea. They are stoking the fires of tension in Southeast Asia and hindering the creation of a zone of peace, stability and cooperation in the region.

## Rescuing the Pol Pot Gang

Under the onslaught of the revolutionary patriotic forces and the Vietnamese volunteer units, the Pol Pot troops fled in panic westward to the Thai border in 1979. En route they destroyed crops, burned down villages and bridges, destroyed provision depots and seed stocks, blew up industrial installations, and put motor roads, railways, and telephone and telegraph lines out of order.

The surviving Pol Pot bands forced the civilian population to go with them as they withdrew. The Khmer Rouge made desperate attempts to retain control over these people, who had been utterly emaciated by famine, diseases, and back-breaking labour; they still hoped to return to Kampuchea with their help. Tens of thousands of these hostages for whom the incredible hardships of the long march were too much to endure died, not having reached the border.

It seemed that Pol Pot and the remnants of his military machine, which their own people had rejected and thrown out of the country, had nothing left to count on. Yet foreign benefactors turned up once again to help out these monsters of cruelty, who were guilty of the deaths of millions of their compatriots.

In 1978, China, having a presentiment of the approaching crisis of the regime headed by its henchmen, undertook diplomatic manoeuvres to settle the Thai-Kampuchean conflict. On July 14, following talks with the Chinese leaders, Ieng Sary, Vice-Premier in Charge of Foreign Affairs of "Democratic Kampuchea", visited Bangkok and promised to put an end to armed incidents on the Thai border, which, as has already been noted, had been endlessly provoked by the Pol Pot troops in the period of 1975-1978.

Quite soon, on November 5, 1978, Deng Xiaoping, Vice-Premier of the People's Republic of China, paid a visit to Bangkok and assured the Thai leadership that the Pol Pot troops would no longer attack the frontier regions of Thailand. In exchange, he obtained Bangkok's consent to use Thailand's airspace to carry supplies to the Pol Pot troops. The deliveries of Chinese armaments via Thai territory enabled the regime of "Democratic Kampuchea" to increase the numerical strength of its armed units from 17

to 23 divisions, 19 of which were stationed in the eastern districts of the country for waging war against the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. Peking itself was busy concentrating its strike forces on the Chinese-Vietnamese border, getting ready for the February (1979) attack on Vietnam.

Nevertheless, the downfall of the regime of "Democratic Kampuchea" took China by surprise. Geng Biao, the then Secretary of the Chinese Central Military Commission, admitted that in January 1979 "Phnom Penh was lost seven months too soon" (Geng Biao's diary, containing secret information about Peking's unleashing of the undeclared war against the P.R.K. was published by the Taiwan periodical *Studies of Communist China* in October 1980).

To take measures for rescuing the remnants of the Pol Pot army, Peking sent Geng Biao and Han Nianlong, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, on an emergency mission to Bangkok. On January 13, 1979, during a secret conference with the Thai Prime Minister, Geng Biao, having confirmed China's determination to render all-round assistance and support to "Democratic Kampuchea", requested that Thailand give shelter to the Pol Pot units and that it persuade other ASEAN countries not to recognise the new Kampuchean government. During the conference, an understanding was reached on the use of Thailand's territory for providing supplies to the Pol Pot bands.

On January 18, Han Nianlong informed Ieng Sary on the outcome of the secret Thai-Chinese talks, stating, in particular that weapons could not be conveyed through Koh Kong\*, they would be sent in cargo ships sailing to Bangkok, under the guise of civilian goods. Thailand's authorities would take measures to supply facilities for their transportation.

Thailand's granting of shelter to the surviving Pol Pot troops and rendering them every kind of assistance, including supplying them with Chinese weapons, was soon attested by many foreign observers. Already on February 7, 1979, *The New York Times* reported that Washington was aware "that Thailand ... was permitting China to resupply insurgent forces in Cambodia through Thai ports and possibly airfields". On February 27, the *Malaysian Star*

\* A Kampuchean province bordering on Thailand.

wrote: "Chinese cargo ships and Thai trawlers are secretly carrying arms for Pol Pot troops to Thailand's Kut island to be later supplied to the Khmer Rouge by Thai trawlers." The *Newsweek* pointed out that well-armed Pol Pot's soldiers were moving along Thailand's eastern border together with refugees. This tactical retreat was carried out with the active support by Thai troops. The number of the Khmer Rouge soldiers who managed to escape at that time (from the pursuit of the revolutionary patriotic forces) was about 10,000. On October 26, 1979, the French magazine *Paris-Match* reported that the Khmer Rouge had fled across the border in confusion, after which they had been taken by Thai trucks to a special camp. There they rested, were given provisions by the Thai military, and subsequently were brought back to Kampuchea to continue the unending war.

In rescuing the remnants of the Pol Pot bands Peking set their leaders the task of preventing the normalisation of the situation in the PRK. On January 13, 1979, Deng Xiaoping instructed Leng Sary in Peking: "One must have a firm grasp of guerilla warfare. When conditions permit, one should engage in mobile warfare. One must conduct a people's war, fight the enemy along the border and in his positions, pin him down there, and cut his supply lines."

In adapting itself to the new alignment of forces, China recommended that its puppets modify their "strategic line" and renounce the most dogmatic political principles of the days of "Democratic Kampuchea", which had scared off quite a few potential "allies" of the "popular movement for the liberation of the motherland" (this is how Peking wanted to represent the Khmer Rouge's subversive activities).

In the talks with Leng Sary mentioned above, Deng Xiaoping advised one of the leaders of the Khmer Rouge to "bring about a broad union on the basis of nationalism and patriotism, think of establishing a united front with Sihanouk\*, refrain from highlighting the role of the Communist Party."

Carrying out the instructions of their mentors, Pol Pot's followers soon began to state the need for the "unification

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\* Prince Norodom Sihanouk is the former Cambodian monarch who abdicated the throne in 1955 in order to take over the leadership of the executive power. He was removed from office by Lon Nol in 1970.

of the entire Kampuchean people" into the "broadest national front", in which "contradictions between the classes and political groups" would be relegated to the background. Sihanouk, who had been almost forgotten after his nearly three-year-long "house arrest" under the Pol Pot regime, was prevailed upon to assist. Early in January 1979, he was transported to Peking and then promptly delivered to New York to address a session of the UN Security Council as a "top-level representative of Democratic Kampuchea". There he delivered a stream of mendacious accusations at the revolutionary patriotic forces of Kampuchea, trying at the same time to slander the fraternal aid rendered to them by the Vietnamese volunteers. Yet, probably taking revenge for his personal tragedy (the Khmer Rouge had killed five of his children and fourteen nephews and grandchildren), Sihanouk at the same time offered an extremely bitter view of the regime of "Democratic Kampuchea" on whose behalf he was speaking.

The Pol Pot supporters nevertheless continued to bring pressure to bear upon Sihanouk, aiming to set up a "united front" of counterrevolutionary forces. Their spokesman Khieu Samphan said in an interview with the French newspaper *Le Monde* on September 2, 1979: "We offered Sihanouk the post of Chairman of the Front of the Great National Patriotic and Democratic Union... If he accepts it, we are ready to reorganise the government to provide for the formation of such a front. In this event, he will also take the office of Chairman of the State Presidium."

Complying with Peking's new strategic directive, the Pol Pot supporters "reorganised" the government of "Democratic Kampuchea". In late 1979, Pol Pot's resignation from the post of "Prime Minister" was announced; he retained the office of Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, though. Khieu Samphan became the new "Premier" of "Democratic Kampuchea". Of course, this action was purely propagandist: having retreated to the background, Pol Pot retained the actual levers of power in the Khmer Rouge camp. At the same time, the renovated facade of "Democratic Kampuchea" became more attractive to those imperialist forces that would willingly have joined in the anti-Kampuchean campaign on the side of the Khmer Rouge, but that had been reluctant to deal with Pol Pot.

Flirting with the West became still another important activity of the Pol Pot followers after their expulsion from Kampuchea. Trying to deceive world public opinion, they began "repenting" of the "errors" they had previously committed. For example, Ieng Sary stated the following on March 1, 1980: "We admit that errors were made and leftist extremes. We acted too hastily. There were political errors. We thought insufficiently over the concrete structure of the state. We placed too great an emphasis on the political consciousness and had too little experience in administering the state."

The commentator Jacques Bekaert wrote in the *Bangkok Post* on August 2, 1985: "A couple of years ago in Peking, a senior official told us: 'OK, they made mistakes in the past. We all know that. But they have changed, they have recognised their errors. How could the Party of Democratic Kampuchea find any popular support for its struggle if people hate it...'

"Others will not be that easily convinced. Some would even say that even if the Khmer Rouge have changed, they still don't want them. It takes indeed more than a few good words to reassure those who have seen the Khmer Rouge in action in the seventies. The human conscience finds it hard to accept the conversion of such immense sinners."

This "repentance" by the Pol Pot followers was addressed, above all, to Washington, which was to a certain extent tied down by the framework of the campaign for "human rights" in its relations with the Khmer Rouge. While making numerous concessions to the West, however, in the hope of enlisting military political support, the Pol Pot adherents were fully aware not only of their weak points, but of their trump cards as well. They alone represented then and still represent the only organised "internal opposition" to the PRK government, capable, as some people in the West believe, to hamper the building of a new society in Kampuchea. It was precisely for this reason that the Pol Pot "representative" at the United Nations, expounding the programme of action of "Democratic Kampuchea" at a press conference, bluntly said: "Western countries, in particular the USA, and also Japan, ASEAN states and China are interested in our victory."

The united anti-Kampuchean front of the forces of imperialism, expansionism, and international reaction,

which was already taking shape in early 1979, permitted the regime of "Democratic Kampuchea" to usurp the right to represent Kampuchea at the United Nations. Thanks to the support offered by their patrons, the Khmer Rouge, who had been doomed to total military and political defeat at the beginning of that year, were now made use of by Peking and Washington in their new game of "anti-Kampuchean solitaire".

## Yesterday: War Against Vietnam, Today: War Against Kampuchea

The United States' defeat in Vietnam compelled Washington temporarily to renounce the policy of direct interference in the affairs of the sovereign states of Indochina. Already from the late 1970s, however, the United States began to exert ever more active efforts to recover the positions in Southeast Asia it had lost and, at least in an indirect way if not directly, restore its military presence there.

The victory of the Kampuchean revolutionary patriotic forces and the formation of the PRK were seen in Washington as a blow to these imperialist strivings. Acting in unison with Peking, the United States began a sharp attack on the peaceful policy of people's Kampuchea and its friend Vietnam, misrepresenting the aid rendered to the Kampuchean people by the fraternal Vietnamese nation. The United States was one of the few countries that not only did not condemn China's February aggression against the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, but even managed to find "mitigating arguments" to justify it. Despite the fact that representatives of the Carter administration had previously more than once criticised the misanthropic system that existed in "Democratic Kampuchea", after its downfall the White House rendered every kind of assistance to the Pol Pot supporters to retain their UN membership.

Acting in conjunction with Peking and other reactionary forces, Washington joined in subversive activities against the PRK. It used the reactionary circles of the Khmer emigration, entrenched near the Thai-Kampuchean border, as a trump card in the dirty game of anti-PRK politics.

In the second half of the 1970s, the press of several countries in the region occasionally published reports about the "wrapped-in-mystery" activity of armed units of the so-called Khmer Serei (Free Khmer), which were rendered clandestine support by the US and Thai secret services. In 1978, certain periodicals even asserted that a secret meeting of US and Chinese representatives had been held in Bangkok, at which the possibilities of cooperation between the Pol Pot adherents and the units of the Khmer Serei in setting up reserve support bases for the Khmer

Rouge in the western regions of Kampuchea were discussed.

It should be explained that the name "Khmer Serei" has been known since the mid-1950s: this was how small armed gangs of criminals and smugglers operating in the vicinity of the Thai-Cambodian border used to call themselves. In 1975 they were joined by remnants of the Lon Nol troops that had managed to escape pursuit by the Khmer Rouge. According to the press, the Khmer Serei bands began to receive aid from abroad beginning at that time.

Nevertheless, in the period of the Pol Pot regime the Khmer Serei proved unable to grow into a more or less substantial military political force and remained, in the main, just a number of small isolated gangs of looters and smugglers. It was only the mass influx of refugees driven in by the Khmer Rouge that changed the situation: the Khmer Serei gangs received an opportunity to recruit fresh forces, as well as to live well and get rich off the aid that started to come to the refugees through specialised international organisations in September 1979.

The internecine strife between different groupings of the Khmer Serei, that were in permanent conflict with one another gained fresh momentum. In October 1979, five bands of the Khmer Serei joined forces round Son Sann, the former Prime Minister of royal Cambodia, and announced the formation of the so-called "Khmer People's National Liberation Front", which allegedly had several thousand men at its disposal. In the next few months the Son Sann "front" succeeded in seizing control over a number of neighbouring refugee camps and taking up leading positions among the right-wing émigré forces.

The promotion of Son Sann alarmed Sihanouk, who was claiming the role of the leader of the "united front" of the Khmer emigration, being put together by Peking, Washington, and the ASEAN countries. Sihanouk lacked a political and military organisation on which he could rely. Nevertheless, in the summer of 1981 in Pyongyang, the capital of North Korea, he formed a "united national front for an independent, neutral, peaceful, and cooperating Cambodia". This front was really a facade insufficient for gaining broad international support.

That is why, without hesitating too long, he accepted the proposal to head the armed bands of the so-called

Moulinaka Movement (*Moulinaka* is an abbreviation of the "Mouvement pour la Libération Nationale du Kampuchea", the French name for the "National Liberation Movement of Kampuchea"), which a certain Kong Syleah set up in 1979 by merging several small Khmer Serei gangs into a single body. (Kong Syleah himself was poisoned in the summer of 1981. The Sihanouk followers accused the Son Sann supporters of the poisoning, which brought about fierce clashes between the two rival groupings. Kong Syleah was succeeded by In Tam who, in turn, broke with the Sihanouk supporters in January 1985, having seen the hopelessness of struggling against people's power and being deeply convinced that Thailand was hatching pre-datory plans with regard to Kampuchean provinces that were incorporated into the Kingdom of Cambodia back in 1907).

Sihanouk's involvement in the armed struggle against his own people was the natural outcome of his political and moral degradation. It vividly showed that all his previous—and subsequent—statements to the effect that he had ostensibly "become tired" of political activity and "could no longer indifferently watch the Khmers killing one another" were nothing but the pose of a "suffering humanist", which he adopted for the sole purpose of making political capital. Indeed, how else could Sihanouk's actions be regarded? While saying, "I do not want Cambodian blood to be shed again. There has already been enough bloodshed as it is", he at once justifies his decision to lead the antipopular war: "... There are people who are ready to fight—to fight for me. Staying by the Thai border are some 2,000 Sihanouk supporters armed only with a small amount of rifles and ammunition. They are asking for help... I have not been the organiser of that movement. In effect, I even disagree with them: I think they are acting unwisely. But I cannot leave them in the lurch. I must get weapons, medicines and money for them. China has promised to help me in this." (Both these quotations are excerpts from the interview that Sihanouk gave to the West German magazine *Der Spiegel* in July 1981.)

Despite their high-sounding names, the rightist émigré units of Son Sann and Sihanouk, set up under the patronage of the external enemies of the PRK, were by far inferior to the well-armed Pol Pot troops in terms of their military organisation. This was noted by many foreign correspond-

ents who made familiarisation trips along the Thai-Kampuchean border. For example, a commentator of the Australian newspaper *The Sydney Morning Herald*, who visited the area at the close of 1984, wrote that the three-day trip, 1,200 km long, along the Thai-Kampuchean border where refugees' camps are located showed that standard propagandist statements at the UN which were eagerly reiterated in the Thai press to the effect that the non-communist forces of Prince Sihanouk and former Prime Minister Son Sann were growing stronger and would one day swallow the 35,000-strong Khmer Rouge army were utterly absurd. The commentator concluded that the only military force in the coalition which could be indeed regarded as a force were Pol Pot's Khmer Rouge.

Nevertheless, neither the gang leaders, nor their foreign patrons were shy about advertising their "wares". For example, during his trip to Paris in 1979 Sihanouk announced his intention to form a "national army" and expected to enlist 100,000 "patriots" in it before long. One would like to ask Sihanouk today: "Begging your pardon, esteemed Prince, several years have already passed, but where is your '100,000-strong resistance movement'? Why is it that your glorious host (the Moulinaka units) is still afraid of not only the Pol Pot troops that now and then 'instill' (of course, by force of weapons) their 'comrades-in-arms' with respect, but even of the Son Sann 'front'?"

The other ringleaders of the émigré rabble were laying plans, no less insane, for launching a "nationwide war" against the PRK government. In the already mentioned interview with *Der Spiegel*, Sihanouk split the beans: "The Khmer Rouge maintain that they have already liberated two-fifths of the country's territory over the past two years //let us recall that the interview was given in the middle of 1981/ and that they will liberate Phnom Penh in the next three years, i.e. in 1984.

"Son Sann holds that the Vietnamese will be defeated in four years."

At the moment, more than three (Pol Pot's target date) and even more than four years (Son Sann's deadline) have passed; yet not only has Phnom Penh not been "liberated", but, quite the opposite. By the spring of 1985 the émigré "fronts" and "movements" no longer held a single foot of Kampuchean territory that they had earlier controlled. Is this not evidence of the irreversibility of the changes that



are under way in people's Kampuchea? Is this not a reason for the uninvited "saviours of the motherland" to ponder the futility of their attempts to eradicate the gains of the Kampuchean Revolution?

Those countries, however, that were trying to hatch their imperialist and predatory plans for Kampuchea, and that had formed the gangs of "popular opposition" to this end, were not in the least doubtful of whether the escalation of interference in the internal affairs of the Kampuchean people was expedient or not. They demanded action, if only superficial activity, by their puppets.

In November 1979, Son Sann's "front" advanced the initiative of setting up an "overland bridge" from Thailand to Kampuchea ostensibly to supply the famine-stricken population of the country with provisions. The scheme provided that "authoritative countries" should arrange for the protection of the provisions convoy, using, among others, the Son Sann units as a support force. Thus Son Sann openly called upon the West for an armed intrusion into the territory of the sovereign Kampuchean state.

In the meantime, a much broader anti-Kampuchean and anti-Vietnamese campaign was launched in Washington. This campaign was aimed not only at discrediting the PRK government and bringing economic pressure to bear upon it, but also at opening a reliable channel for supplying the Khmer émigré gangs stationed near the Thai-Kampuchean border. It included pressuring a number of specialised international organisations that had started distributing food, medical and other aid among the Kampuchean refugees, and were getting ready to extend the programme to the territory of the PRK.

After the first notes were struck by the White House, a whole choir of politicians, journalists, and all kinds of experts broke out lamenting the tragic fate of hundreds of thousands of Kampuchean refugees who had found themselves in the districts near the Thai-Kampuchean border. The organisers of this anti-Kampuchean spectacle showed no less "sympathy" for the population of the PRK itself, which was allegedly in danger of starving to death. But what a nuisance, they kept saying in the West, that the Heng Samrin government "is not in control" of the situation in the country and, therefore, that there is no guarantee that the aid rendered to it will reach the starving population and will not be confiscated by the "Vietnamese

occupation troops" instead. These anti-Kampuchean and anti-Vietnamese insinuations were not only actively discussed in the press and on TV, but also were submitted for discussion to the Pledging Conference for Emergency Humanitarian Relief to the People of Kampuchea, held under the auspices of the United Nations in New York at the close of 1979.

Indeed, the food situation in the PRK was not at all easy at the time, and the leadership of the young republic did not conceal it, having applied for international support and having offered guarantees that the aid received would be used most effectively.

Subsequently many workers of specialised organisations, who were active in the PRK when, at last, Western aid started coming into the country, spoke out about the malicious character of the West's "doubts" concerning the PRK government's "inability" to control the distribution of international food relief. For example, here is what Agence France-Presse reported from Bangkok: "Jacques Danois, a UNICEF representative supervising the delivery and distribution of relief to Kampuchea, said after an inspection tour of the country's towns and villages: 'I personally saw the foodstuffs and medications being distributed among Kampuchean women, children, old and sick people, and refugees all the way from Ho Chi Minh City to Phnom Penh—both in town and in the country. I can confirm that the foodstuffs and other relief sent over by the International Red Cross and UNICEF is systematically distributed among refugees from the northwestern districts, captive Pol Pot soldiers, and civilians returning to their homes. I have filmed all this.'

"'I visited Vietnamese doctors who are rendering aid to the local population at improvised hospitals and first-aid stations. I had a chance to see a convoy of trucks with a cargo of rice coming in from Vietnam: they started distributing it among the local population without delay. All this is more evidence of the complete lack of any logic in the assertions made by certain political figures in the West to the effect that Vietnam is allegedly lining its pockets off the Kampuchean tragedy.'"

It is necessary to point out the following facts in connection with the discussions of Kampuchea's "food problem" that were forced upon the United Nations. First, the difficult situation with food supplies in Kampuchea had

developed through no fault of the new power, although the Western press and UN experts, for the most part, passed over this fact in silence for reasons best known to themselves: it was inherited from the Pol Pot regime, which had completely ruined the country's economy. Second, the threat of famine had already been practically eliminated by that time thanks to the Kampuchean people's tremendous efforts and the timely aid provided by Vietnam, the Soviet Union and other socialist states. Although our country was still in need of foodstuffs and many other essential goods, nobody was dying of malnutrition in the PRK. And, third and last, the republic's government could not be made responsible for the fate of the hundreds of thousands of refugees who had been driven abroad by the Pol Pot troops and who found themselves on the verge of starvation.

Having pressed all the buttons, however, Washington and its allies nevertheless managed to channel most of the international humanitarian relief intended for the Kampuchean people to the area near the Thai-Kampuchean border, where it has been and still is accumulating at the camps of Kampuchean refugees, instead of directing it to Kampuchea itself where it would have been used for its proper purpose. These camps, in effect, have been turned into support bases for the armed bands of Khmer émigrés engaged in sabotage and terrorist activities against the PRK. And however hard they try to conceal it in the West, international relief is getting not only to the Son Sann and Sihanouk supporters, but also to the Pol Pot bands whose support the West officially renounces. For example, a correspondent of the British newspaper *The Guardian* wrote in a report from the Thai-Kampuchean border on November 24, 1979, that there "is incontrovertible evidence that Western relief aid is keeping the Pol Pot regime supplied".

The author of the report also noted with bitter irony that the Khmer Rouge "whom President Carter in 1978 termed the world's worst violators of human rights have been dignified by Western powers as *resistants*". He gave a detailed account of the methods used to deliver provisions and medicines to the Pol Pot supporters via Thai territory. Here is one of the methods he described: "... Thai authorities cooperate in delivering the rice to this border area in what are called 'handclapping operations'. Khmer Rouge

porters waiting at designated points come and pick up the rice when they hear the signal—a handclap, followed by the discreet retreat of the delivery men. The operation is shrouded in secrecy."

Although, wrote the author of the report, "Bangkok continues to maintain that the Pol Pot forces are not being supplied across Thai territory, ... relief agency officials in Bangkok say they know that many relief supplies" coming in via the International Red Cross and UNICEF "go to feed the guerillas or to replenish stockpiles, and only then to feed hungry civilians".

Having placed international humanitarian relief at the disposal of the armed bands of Khmer émigrés, Washington has also increased their supply through its own channels. In particular, a special mission for providing "humanitarian relief for Kampuchean refugees" was set up in Thailand with this end in view. As it became known later, the funds allocated by the US Congress for rendering this "relief" were directed via Thailand by the US secret services to the Khmer "resistance forces".

In order to conduct subversive activities against the PRK, an operational base of a "special group for the affairs of Kampuchea", directly subordinated to the CIA, was set up in the Thai border town of Aranyaprathet in 1979. It became the main US centre for organising and carrying out subversive actions against the PRK. One of its staff members once said frankly to a Western journalist who had got interested in the activities of that centre: "What we are doing here is a kind of a sequel of our war in Vietnam."

Thus, together with Peking, Washington has proved itself to be one of the organisers of the undeclared war against the PRK. This is, specifically, a manifestation of the notorious "community" of strategic interests that the United States and China have in that region, where both are striving to eliminate the PRK and aggravate the situation in Southeast Asia in general. Within the framework of this "community", however, each side has gone its own way, as the phrase goes. In forming and equipping the "non-communist factions" of Khmer émigrés—the Son Sann and Sihanouk groups—Washington and its ASEAN allies, above all Thailand, were striving to create a counter-balance to the pro-Peking Pol Pot forces so as to have an opportunity to influence the course of the undeclared war by putting pressure upon Peking whenever necessary. At

the same time, the weakness of the Son Sann and Sihanouk groupings and their helplessness in armed clashes with units of the People's Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea and Vietnamese volunteer units compelled Washington and the ASEAN countries to resort to setting up a "united front" of all forces fighting against the PRK as soon as possible.

## The "Coalition" Soap Bubble

China, the United States and the ASEAN countries forced a discussion of "The Situation in Kampuchea" on the 34th Session of the UN General Assembly in November 1979, launched a noisy anti-PRK and anti-Vietnamese propaganda campaign, and succeeded in persuading a majority of the members of the international community to endorse the authority of the "representative of Democratic Kampuchea" at the United Nations. In the course of time, however, this majority, put together in a hurry, began to dissolve. Quite a few delegations tried to avoid voting for the "government" that was guilty of the death of millions of its compatriots and that had been expelled from its own country. For example, in 1979 India proposed to leave Kampuchea's seat at the United Nations vacant. A similar solution of the issue of Kampuchea's representation at international organisations was adopted that same year by the 6th Conference of Heads of State and Government of Non-Aligned Countries in Havana.

At the same time, positive changes that were under way in the PRK, such as the stabilisation of the internal political situation, the initial successes in the rehabilitation of the economy, and the adherence to a peace-loving foreign policy, more and more convinced the world public that the deliverance of Kampuchea from the Pol Pot dictatorship marked the salvation of the entire Kampuchean people. The international prestige of the PRK, which was recognised by many of the UN member states, kept growing. Under these conditions not only was the discredited Pol Pot regime subjected to increasingly sharp criticisms, but so were the forces supporting it.

The prospect of international isolation, which was threatening Pol Pot's supporters, worried China, the United States and the ASEAN countries that had made use of the outcome of the vote on the "Kampuchean issue" to legalise their subversive activities against the PRK. A search for ways to salvage the Pol Pot regime was started in Peking, Washington and the ASEAN capitals. As a result, after appropriate consultations, the enemies of the PRK decided to create an alliance of the three Khmer émigré groups. This alliance was presented to the international community as a "coalition government of Democratic Kampuchea" fighting

for the "liberation of the country from foreign occupation". The organisers of the undeclared war against the PRK also counted on using the formation of the "coalition" of Khmer émigrés to reinforce the potential of the "resistance forces", increase interest in the so-called "Kampuchean problem", and facilitate Pol Pot's supporters access to Western aid.

The unification of the Pol Pot, Son Sann, and Sihanouk forces into a single "patriotic movement", however, proved to be no easy task for the initiators of this anti-Kampuchean act. The reason for this was not simply the atmosphere of strife and vendality that reigned in the camp of the Khmer émigrés, nor the personal ambitions of its leaders. (As a correspondent of the Italian newspaper *Repubblica* in Bangkok noted, "the individuals who are to enter the coalition are mutually suspicious of one another, and all their past is marked with treachery and murder".) The implementation of this scheme was further impeded by the differences in the goals pursued by the forces that were backing the Khmer reactionaries and by the incompatibility of their expansionist ambitions in Southeast Asia with the actual national interests of the states in the region.

For example, from the very beginning of its diplomatic bargaining with the United States and the ASEAN countries, China, which was first in speaking up for the creation of the "united front", firmly adhered to a policy of preserving the basic structure of the Khmer Rouge military-political organisation and their maintenance of the dominant position among the other groups of the Khmer reactionary forces. It needed the coalition only as a mask for the Pol Pot gangs, which had compromised themselves and whom it intended to restore to power in Phnom Penh.

Washington and the ASEAN countries, in their turn, aware that the Pol Pot group was the only real force within the anti-Kampuchean "resistance movement", counted on using its military potential to escalate subversive activities against the PRK and, at the same time, planned to reduce its dependence on Peking and erode the repressive-administrative structure of the Khmer Rouge. This would facilitate the future reorientation of the Pol Pot gangs towards the West.

Looking ahead, it should be noted that Washington and

the ASEAN countries faced truly insoluble contradictions in putting their plans into effect. Thus, in the spring of 1982 the influential Hong Kong weekly *Far Eastern Economic Review* reported the failure of Malaysia's attempt to bring pressure to bear upon the obstinate Khmer Rouge by threatening to withdraw support from them at the United Nations. This attempt caused displeasure in certain ASEAN circles. To corroborate this, the *Far Eastern Economic Review* quoted a comment made by a certain Malaysian political figure who stressed that ASEAN could not but support Khieu Samphan at the United Nations, since the entire ASEAN strategy of putting pressure upon Vietnam was based precisely on that support, and Pol Pot's followers were well aware of the fact.

Nevertheless, the urgent need to set up an alliance of anti-government groups of the Khmer émigrés compelled their patrons to suppress these contradictions for a while and get to work on Sihanouk and Son Sann. At the time, the ringleaders of the "non-communist factions" of the Khmer counterrevolutionaries were still refusing to agree to an alliance with the Khmer Rouge.

On July 20, 1982, WBAI, a New York-based radio station, broadcast the text of an article by the well-known Australian journalist Wilfred Burchett (who recently died), a noted expert on the problems of Indochina, closely acquainted with Norodom Sihanouk. He wrote in that article that the vacillations and changes which Sihanouk made on the agonising road that had brought him to his current humiliation (*Burchett meant Sihanouk's consent to enter into the coalition with Pol Pot and Son Sann*) can be illustrated by several extracts from the telephone conversation, which lasted about one hour, that Burchett had with Sihanouk on January 9, 1980. Sihanouk told Burchett that he had received an invitation to visit Singapore at once. "I cannot refuse," he said, "since Lee Kuan Yew is an old friend of mine and that is why I replied I'd come, but only next year. This enables me to avoid a trap. I know everything perfectly well. China and the ASEAN countries are trying to find a solution to the Kampuchean problem by means of cunning tactics—they want to form a tripartite alliance between Khieu Samphan, Son Sann and me. I don't want to have anything to do with this. All of this is actually a part of an American-Chinese plot aimed at continuing support for Pol Pot and the Khmer Rouge." As

another proof of his words Sihanouk said that two months previously, before he went to Paris from Peking where he had enjoyed the status of a very important person, albeit in a cage, he had been visited by Leonard Woodcock, the US Ambassador to China, who urged him to reach agreement with Pol Pot.

Woodcock said that only the Khmer Rouge were sufficiently strong to oppose the Vietnamese. "So I was expected to enter into a collusion with the murderers of my compatriots and even of my own children and grandchildren," exclaimed Sihanouk. "They hoped to present me with a *fait accompli* in case I went to Singapore. Khieu Samphan and Son Sann would be waiting for me there. Above all they need my signature. But I wouldn't go," he concluded.

As a matter of fact, Sihanouk did not go to Singapore. Yet in his conversation with W. Burchett he was obviously trying to make an effect. For only a year and a half later, this man who, according to his own words, did not want to take part in the US-Chinese plot and who dissociated himself from an alliance with the murderers of his compatriots, cynically answered *Der Spiegel's* question about his reason for joining the coalition in the following way: "The Chinese want it that way. They insist on setting up a united front... That is why I'm joining that front and will not stand in its way." (*Der Spiegel*, June 9, 1981.)

The founders of the coalition were simultaneously putting pressure upon Son Sann. As a result, he changed his initial attitude, which had ruled out any contact with the Khmer Rouge whatsoever, and he spoke up in August 1980 for the development of a "comprehensive active strategy" of the West in the struggle against the PRK and the SRV which, among other things, would provide for military cooperation with the Pol Pot group. Some time later Son Sann, trying to wrest the political initiative from Sihanouk, advanced his own plan for the formation of a "provisional government" of the Khmer émigrés.

Pol Pot's followers, for their part, continued to coax Sihanouk. In March 1981, he had a meeting with Khieu Samphan which, according to the nominal leader of the Khmer Rouge, went off successfully. Soon Khieu Samphan stated that relations between the Pol Pot group and Son Sann were also "developing along good lines" (*Remmin*

*ribo*, March 13, 1981). Subsequently it was announced that an understanding had been reached in principle on the formation of a "united front" of the three groups of Khmer émigrés. Finally, in September 1981 a meeting of Sihanouk, Son Sann, and Khieu Samphan was held in Singapore, at which a "tripartite committee" was set up for the purpose of forming a "coalition government".

It was only in June 1982, however, that this "unholy trinity" managed once more to assemble under one roof (this time, in Kuala Lumpur) and agree on the formation of a tripartite "Democratic Kampuchea Coalition Government". Throughout these nine months, fierce backstage fighting kept raging in the Khmer reactionary camp. For example, the West-oriented Son Sann asked his bosses to "provide him with a good stick before he goes into the cage with the tiger", meaning that they should supply the Son Sann "front" with additional Western aid, above all weapons.


In trying to overcome the centrifugal tendencies threatening the alliance, the Pol Pot group underwent a fresh "cosmetic operation": it announced the dissolution of its "communist party" in December 1981. This manoeuvre, undertaken by orders from Peking, was aimed at eliminating the "ideological barriers" separating the future allies and promoting "mutual understanding" between the three factions of Khmer émigrés.

During all this time, no unanimous decision on the formation of the coalition had been reached by the foreign patrons of the Khmer émigrés, either. For example, the *Far Eastern Economic Review* reported in March 1982 that, prior to the Kuala Lumpur meeting, Bangkok had made an attempt to convene the leaders of the émigrés in Peking which, to the satisfaction of the other ASEAN countries, ended in failure. Thailand's partners in the association had good grounds to fear that Peking would resort to the "arm-twisting" policy towards representatives of the Son Sann group during the meeting. But even if a coalition had been formed along ASEAN lines, the magazine pointed out, a "Made in China" label would have made it unsuitable to ASEAN anyhow.

The compromise reached in Kuala Lumpur was used by the originators of the "coalition government" for launching a massive anti-PRK propaganda campaign. The puppets' masters did their utmost to advertise the new leadership of


The People's Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea is formed on a voluntary basis. Its ranks are replenished by young patriots who are ready to sacrifice even their lives in defending the gains of the revolution.

The photo shows a military parade to mark the 6th anniversary of the establishment of the People's Republic of Kampuchea.







Every step the People's Republic of Kampuchea makes along the difficult road of resurrection causes the violent hatred of its enemies. The remnants of Pol Pot's gangs and of other forces of the reactionary Khmer emigration, hiding in the republic's districts bordering on Thailand, murder defenseless women, children and old people. Yet Western propaganda attempts to present these actions of sabotage and terror as "successes" of the armed struggle waged by the "coalition" against the legitimate government of the People's Republic of Kampuchea.



The photo shows a village in the province of Battambang after a raid by Pol Pot killers.





The forces of reaction and hegemonism are trying once again to impose their murderous stooges on our country which has gone through the Pol Pot inferno. But the Kampuchean people will never forget the atrocities of the Pol Pot clique and will not allow the restoration of its rule in their country.

... By decision of the National Assembly of the People's Republic of Kampuchea May 20 has been declared the day of remembrance of the victims of the genocide regime. Each year on this day wreaths are laid at the monument to the fallen revolutionary fighters in Phnom Penh. Men and women, young and old, all over the country mourn millions of Kampucheans who were brutally murdered, tortured to death, reported missing or were maimed by the Pol Pot butchers, and swear to spare no effort in the struggle against the enemies of people's power.


Vietnamese volunteer units give fraternal assistance to the People's Republic of Kampuchea in its struggle against the counterrevolutionary gangs.

The photo shows brothers-in-arms, a Vietnamese and a Kampuchean officer.




The fourth partial withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Kampuchea took place in April-May 1985. The total strength of the Vietnamese volunteers who have left the People's Republic of Kampuchea has reached one-third of the initial contingent.

The photo shows grateful Kampuchean bidding farewell to Vietnamese volunteers going home after the fulfillment of their internationalist duty.






More and more enemy soldiers refuse to fight against the legitimate government of people's Kampuchea and go over to the side of people's power. The photos show Pol Pot men Thang Oih, Meas Meng and Hon Henn who surrendered to the revolutionary authorities of Maung Russey district on October 23, 1983.




A Son Sann combat unit which surrendered on October 26, 1984 to the authorities in Bakann district of Pousat province.



Persons who have taken the side of the people's government become full-fledged citizens of the People's Republic of Kampuchea and can return to their families and work in their native village. The photo shows San Mao, 27 years old, a former paratrooper, who joined the government's side together with his wife in 1982 and now lives in the village of Dam Bauk Khpus, Sankhe district of Battambang province.

Yot Sek, 29 years old who left the ranks of the reactionary Khmers in December 1982, with his family in Varrai district, Kompong Thom province.



port from Washington in their dispute with China. This is not an accident. Washington saw its principal goal not as the search for ways to solve the so-called Kampuchean problem, whose unsettled state caused anxiety in the ASEAN capitals from time to time, but in aggravating tensions in Southeast Asia. That is why Washington silently joined with Peking in its striving to frustrate any attempts by the ASEAN countries to enter into a dialogue with the countries of Indochina. And, vice versa, any aggravation of the situation in the region was used by the United States for manipulating the ASEAN countries, above all Thailand, in implementing its military political plans. This will be discussed in more detail further on.

The formation of the "coalition" did not solve the problem of unity in the camp of the Khmer émigrés, either. Bitter rivalry between the three factions over the control of refugee camps and foreign aid is in full swing and they are making no bones about their intention to get rid of their competitors.

"Brothers and sisters," calls out a leaflet recently put out by the Pol Pot group, "destroy all enemies any way you can. Join in the resistance only with us. Otherwise ask for no mercy."

The Son Sann followers, in their turn, are disseminating the following proclamation among the Kampuchean refugees: "Dear brothers! In order to liberate our nation from the Pol Pot yoke and to ensure that his regime should never return, you must, brothers, join forces with the national front headed by Marshal Son Sann."

The strife between the groups inside the coalition often develops into bitter armed clashes. As Agence France-Presse reported from Bangkok in September 1984, Norodom Sihanouk announced that he intended to resign from the office of "President of the Democratic Kampuchea Coalition Government" (he had previously made several similar attempts) because of the Khmer Rouge's attacks on his guerrillas (*i.e., Moulinaka units*).

Previously, representatives of the two anti-communist factions (*meaning the Son Sann and Sihanouk supporters*), continued France-Presse, had reported periodic attacks on them by the Khmer Rouge over the past 18 months.

The report noted that the issue of the Khmer Rouge's

attacks on the troops of their partners in the coalition was expected to be settled that month at the ASEAN foreign ministers' meeting in New York, where the 39th Session of the UN General Assembly was to be opened. According to available information, the ASEAN ministers were going to make a joint appeal to China and ask it to restrain the Pol Pot group. France-Presse stressed that China was the only channel for putting effective pressure on the Khmer Rouge.

All the attempts, however, to reconcile the Pol Pot, Son Sann, and Sihanouk factions that were feuding with one another met with no success. Sihanouk still keeps threatening to resign from the post of "President of Democratic Kampuchea". According to the *Newsweek* (January 14, 1984), one Western diplomat in Bangkok made the following comment on the outcome of the "peacemaking" mission by the patrons of the coalition: "When we talk about improved contacts between the coalition members, we mean that armies from different groups now do not always shoot at each other when they meet."

The permanent crisis that the coalition has been experiencing since the day of its founding shows that it was stillborn from the very beginning. Neither the pompous ceremonies of submitting credentials by foreign ambassadors (of China, Egypt, Pakistan, Mauritania, and some other countries) to the "President of Democratic Kampuchea", nor its gangleaders' camping on the doorsteps of many Western capitals in search of assistance, nor, finally, the military, political, and material support given by its inspirers can breathe life into it. This ghost of a state, which has neither territory, nor population of its own, has and can have no future. The future belongs to the Kampuchean people, who are building a new life in the People's Republic of Kampuchea.

Obviously it is not easy to give the reader an idea of such a controversial phenomenon as the "Democratic Kampuchea Coalition Government" in only one sentence. In our view, a correspondent of a French newspaper, who compared the coalition with a soap bubble, which, while being inflated, shines with all the colours of the rainbow in front of the public, but which will inevitably burst sooner or later, did it best.

## Where the Enemies Come From

Calling on refugees to join the Pol Pot troops, their propagandists declare: "We now have only victories on our record" (from a Khmer Rouge leaflet being distributed in the refugee camps on Thai territory). What are these "victories" won by the surviving bandits? Against whom and in what manner are they waging warfare? To answer these questions, it is necessary first to examine the events in the province of Battambang on the western frontier of the PRK. Not long ago, two Soviet correspondents—Ye. Fadeyev (the newspaper *Pravda*) and V. Vinogradov (the newspaper *Izvestia*)—visited that province.

"... Here it is, the Kampuchean-Thai border zone: we are at the encampment of one of the units of the People's Revolutionary Army of the republic. Battalion Commander Khiong gives an unhurried, detailed account of the difficult and anxiety-ridden everyday life in this sector of the border..."

"The attempts of the Khmer reactionaries to invade the PRK under the fire cover provided by Thai artillery were again resolutely repulsed," he says. "We have killed more than 270 bandits and captured a substantial amount of weapons, ammunition, and documents in this sector." (*Pravda*, March 3, 1985.)

"Sisophon Valley forms a broad wedge into the Phnom Mai Mountains towering in the west. In the south it is bordered by the spurs of the Kravang (Cardamom Mountains). The dark low peaks indent the horizon, where the borders of the two states, Kampuchea and Thailand, join together. This is where the Pol Pot bands and the armed gangs of the other factions of the Khmer reactionary forces have dug themselves in.

"From that side, military danger permanently threatens peaceful Kampuchea. Using their furtive tactics, the bandits make constant attempts, usually at night, to sneak into Kampuchean territory to burn down villages, plunder, and murder peasants. These frontier districts have not known peace since January 1979.

"Together with other journalists, I have had a chance to visit these places and see with my own eyes the scars left by the Pol Pot bands' barbarous raids, to see villages that had been shelled, and to listen to the evidence of wounded

residents and the accounts of servicemen from advance frontier posts.

"We've learnt their habits well," says Captain Mon Nien, who accompanied us during our trip through the western communities in the province of Battambang. "The Thai army helps them by covering their nighttime raids with artillery fire, using their air force and staging diversionary tactics. But, in most cases, we already know where an attack will originate, and receive the raiders as they deserve." (*Izvestia*, June 2, 1985.)

Since its earliest days the People's Republic of Kampuchea, while revitalizing its ruined economy, rebuilding its public education and health care systems, and reviving its national culture, was compelled to give primary attention to the defence of its borders and to combat the sabotage and terrorist activities of the bandits sent into its territory. Armed provocations on the border have not stopped for even a day which can be seen, in part, from the following table.

### Violations of the territorial integrity of the People's Republic of Kampuchea by Thailand (1980 through September 30, 1985)

	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	January- September 30, 1985
1. Violations of airspace	1,646	567	249	306	1,806	797
2. Violations of land frontiers	1,764	6,690	2,374	3,885	2,951	778
3. Violations of sea frontiers	65	1,574	2,974	8,460	6,768	3,906
(Compiled from the data of the Kampuchea Information Agency)						

It should be noted that even the Thai leadership could not always deny that Thailand had violated the land, air and sea frontiers of the PRK. On March 31, 1984, for example, Gen. Arthit Kamlang-ek, Supreme Commander and Army Commander of Thailand, had to admit that on that day a Thai A-37 plane twice bombed an ammunition depot of the Pol Pot troops on Kampuchean territory which had been captured from the enemy by units of the People's Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea (PRAK).

Under the cover of provocation forays staged by the Thai military, subversive and terrorist units of the enemy occasionally penetrate into the territory of the PRK. More often than not these units consist of Pol Pot bandits and, sometimes, those of the other two factions of the coalition. As a rule, these are small groups of cutthroats who have undergone special training on the territory of Thailand and some other countries. The secret circular distributed among the ringleaders of the bands before they are dispatched to the territory of the PRK provides an idea of the tasks set before the diversionists. Here are some excerpts from that incoherent and inarticulate document, pretentiously entitled *A Guide for the Staffs of the National Liberation Army of Democratic Kampuchea for the Elimination of Local Government Bodies in Communities*. "Local government bodies in villages and communities should actively be destroyed. This means destroying the military, political, economic and cultural power of the Vietnamese and their control in the field of education.

"... The means to this end is the use of our secret forces in the provinces. Groups of 2, 3 or 4 people having weapons should be assembled.

"... During attacks on community centres all establishments of political, cultural, economic and military power should be wiped out.

"... In a liberated community or village... the victory of the power of Democratic Kampuchea should be announced and a secret (underground) group should be formed."

This "document", signed by the "General Staff of the National Army of Democratic Kampuchea" on April 20, 1984, even provided a timetable for seizing power in the country: "... It is essential that the rule of the Vietnamese should be overthrown in each province and new power should be established in 30 to 40 per cent of communities by the end of 1984... Between the beginning of 1985 and June 1985 our power should be established in another 30 to 40 per cent of communities. Thus, it is necessary to aim at establishing our power in 60 to 90 per cent of the communities throughout the country by March 1985."

After the overthrow of the Pol Pot regime the PRK's enemies tried to install their people in local government bodies so that they could support them when the time came. This scheme failed, however: a sizable portion of the spies were either denounced by the local population or

voluntarily came over to the side of the people's government.

The calculations of the Khmer counterrevolutionaries fell through once again. By the summer of 1985 their bands not only had not "established power" in most of the country's areas, but, as was already noted, had lost their last footholds on Kampuchean territory as a result of the successful offensive of the PRAK and the Vietnamese volunteer units.

The failure of the plans to stage a "popular war against the foreign invaders" and the degradation of the self-styled "national liberation movement" of the Kampuchean counterrevolution also clearly manifested themselves in the gradual change of tactics in subversive activities directed against the PRK. Whereas in the initial stage of the "struggle" the surviving bandits (mostly Pol Pot units) attacked mainly Vietnamese volunteers and PRAK servicemen, later on the "fighters for the freedom of the Khmer people" began terrorising above all the civilian population of the country, while avoiding encounters with armed enemy units. The bands of counterrevolutionaries that succeed in penetrating into Kampuchean territory confiscate provisions and drive young people at gunpoint into Thailand. As numerous deserters from the enemy camp have admitted, these actions have nothing in common with the "struggle for the liberation of the motherland" and evoke hatred among the population.

Some of the actions of savage bandits against the civilian population were marked by such cruelty that they can be compared only with the atrocities committed by the executioners in the Pol Pot torture chambers between 1975 and 1978. For example, in May 1985 a Pol Pot unit stopped a train going from Phnom Penh to Kompong Som at a remote section of the railway and mercilessly shot down the passengers, including women, children and old people. Commenting on this attack, a correspondent of the London *Sunday Times* wrote that the Khmer Rouge killed 150 to 200 peaceful civilians, showing in this way that the former ringleaders of the criminal genocidal regime are savage murderers.

What did the Pol Pot degenerates want to demonstrate by their barbaric deeds? Their strength? Their ability to instil fear? Perhaps. The Kampuchean people who lived through the nightmare of Pol Pot's tyranny, however, will

never permit the restoration of the old order of things on their native soil. Most likely, these crimes were acts of despair committed by cruel fanatics who had been cornered and who sensed their inevitable defeat. Having become total savages, hungry and enfeebled by incessant night marches, they saw only one enemy before their eyes--their own people building a new life.

The US bulletin *Indochina Issues*, published by the Center for International Policy in Washington, noted that the small groups of Pol Pot diversionists infiltrating into Kampuchea are afraid of not only the government troops, but also of the population itself.

The government of the PRK relies on the broadest sections of the population to solve successfully the tasks of ensuring the security of the young republic. The combat power of the PRAK is growing: self-defence units subordinated to the local communities have been formed in all places. Broad-scale explanatory and propaganda work is conducted among rural residents. All this provides a reliable barrier against those who are striving to undermine the PRK from within and to deprive the government of mass support. And the very subversive and terrorist acts of the Pol Pot, Son Sann, and Sihanouk bands (blowing up bridges and railways, plundering on the forest and mountain roads, etc.) are rallying the Kampuchean people ever closer round the Kampuchean United Front for National Construction and Defence (KUFNCD) and the Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Party (KPRP).

According to the testimony of quite a few foreigners who have recently visited the PRK, the situation in our country is more stable than ever before. Starting with the spring of 1985, all sectors of the frontier have been protected from penetration by subversive groups of Khmer émigrés. The bands that have previously been dispatched to the territory of the PRK are completely isolated both from their command centres and from the local population.

All this compels the propagandists of the "Democratic Kampuchea Coalition Government" simply to fabricate "successful military operations" allegedly carried out by the "resistance forces" on the territory of the PRK. For example, in February 1985 the Pol Pot faction boasted in front of Western diplomats and journalists about its "military successes" in Battambang. In actual fact, however, there were no "successes". On February 15, representa-

tives of FAO visited Battambang and subsequently released a statement to the press in which they described the situation in the province as calm. Another time, while the Pol Pot faction was trumpeting its "new victory" in Siem Reap, a large group of Western tourists was staying there. They, too, could find no traces of an "attack of the Khmer Rouge".

It is easy to understand why it was necessary for the surviving Pol Pot bandits to proclaim imaginary victories. They want to convince their foreign patrons of the efficacy of the aid the latter are giving the Khmer reaction and to demonstrate the effectiveness of the "Democratic Kampuchea Coalition Government" to the whole world. For without external support not only the "coalition" soap bubble will burst, but also its component parts will inevitably fall apart, since they are nothing more than a rabble of outcasts ready to pay with the blood of their compatriots for the generous handouts of their Washington and Peking bosses.

## Money and Weapons for the Murderers

The initiators of the undeclared war against the PRK do not advertise the fact of the complete material dependence of the "fighters for the freedom of the Khmer people" on their foreign patrons. Nevertheless, information about the huge size of the secret military supplies and financial subsidies granted to the three factions of Khmer émigrés leaks out to the world press from time to time.

"... On the northwest border with Thailand," Michael Vickery, a noted expert on Indochina, wrote in his book *Cambodia: 1975-1982*, "the remnants on the DK armed forces and administration which were virtually destroyed and starving by mid-1979 have been revived, rehabilitated, and rearmed with indecent haste by an informal Chinese-US-Thai consortium acting on the ostensible grounds that Cambodia has been invaded. The two other anti-PRK factions on the border, Son Sann's KPRLF and the forces loyal to Sihanouk, could never have developed at all without such foreign aid."

China is the biggest supplier of weapons to the Kampuchean counterrevolution. Peking not only provides for the full maintenance of the surviving Pol Pot bands, but also regularly supplies arms to the other two factions of the "coalition"—the Sihanouk and Son Sann troops.

For example, the Indian newspaper *Telegraph* (November 1, 1984) estimated that 95 per cent of China's military supplies for the forces of the "coalition" went to the Khmer Rouge, and 5 per cent to the Sihanouk and Son Sann factions. Most likely, the share of the aid received by the Pol Pot troops is somewhat overstated in this estimate. Yet there is no doubt that Peking continues to pursue its course to secure the dominant position of the Pol Pot degenerates among the Khmer reactionary forces.

Unlike the carefully concealed supplies for the Khmer Rouge, China's military and financial support for the "anti-communist" factions of the "coalition" is not so secret. This, incidentally, is largely explained by the "revelations" periodically made by Sihanouk at his meetings with foreign correspondents. Specifically, in an interview with the *Newsweek* he noted that his followers received firearms for 3,000 men from China, and then more firearms for another

2,000. He added that they were receiving weapons and ammunition not only from China, but from one or two other friendly Southeast Asian countries, which he could not name.

Chinese aid for the anti-Kampuchean "resistance forces" keeps growing year after year. Early in November 1984, the *Far Eastern Economic Review* reported that China had promised to give each faction arms, ammunition and equipment for 2,000 men (that is to equip a total of 6,000 new combatants) and US \$ 413,000 in cash each. It also promised to increase pressure on Vietnam's border. According to one of the December issues of the magazine, a month and a half later the bandits received the aid they had been promised. (It should be noted that this "Christmas gift" did not save the counterrevolutionary rabble from a crushing defeat during the offensive of the PRAK and the Vietnamese volunteer units in the spring of 1985.)

Trying to rescue the defeated bandit units of Pol Pot, Son Sann and Sihanouk driven out of the PRK, China sent them the largest shipment of military supplies in May 1985. As the *Far Eastern Economic Review* noted on May 23, most of the arms went to the Khmer Rouge. At the same time, the Sihanouk faction received 1,500 AK-47 assault rifles, an assortment of grenade-launchers and anti-tank weapons, and a huge supply of ammunition.

Simultaneously, Peking tried to teach Vietnam a "second lesson" on the Chinese-Vietnamese border.

Prasong Soonsiri, Secretary General of Thailand's National Security Council, who visited the Chinese-Vietnamese border area in July 1985, told a correspondent of the Bangkok newspaper *Nation Review* that during his trip the Chinese military leaders had assured him of Peking's intention to continue "strong military pressure" on Vietnam until Hanoi withdraws its troops from Kampuchea.

During Soonsiri's visit to one of the Chinese artillery units in the border area (incidentally, in April 1985 there had been fierce fighting there) the Chinese subjected Vietnamese territory to intensive shelling. The Chinese also told the members of the Thai delegation that in April their artillery had fired 700,000 shells at the Vietnamese positions. (Nevertheless, this did not help Peking to teach Vietnam the promised "second lesson". Just as in 1979, the aggressor was duly repulsed by the Vietnamese armed forces.)

Along with China, certain ASEAN countries, above all Thailand and Singapore, provide extensive aid to the counterrevolutionary émigré groups. There is a kind of "division of labour" among the ASEAN patrons of the "coalition": Singapore is the largest supplier of weapons for the Khmer reactionary units from among the countries of the region, while Thailand has undertaken the role of a kind of a "frontline state" in the undeclared war against the PRK, giving the Khmer émigré bands shelter on its territory. It has turned into a transshipment point for all types of foreign aid provided to the anti-Kampuchean subversive elements. The huge size of the support given to the "coalition" by ASEAN reactionary circles is attested by numerous deserters from the enemy camp and also by reports in the world press.

According to the well-informed Hong Kong weekly *Asiaweek*, the first shipment of Singapore-made M-16 automatic rifles was sent to the Son Sann troops back in April-May 1982, i.e., at a time when the Singapore leadership was pressuring Son Sann to force him to enter into the coalition with the Sihanouk and Pol Pot factions. Subsequently Singapore's military supplies for the forces of the "coalition" became regular. For example, the November 1982 statement of the PRK Ministry of Foreign Affairs pointed out that Singapore had secretly supplied 2,640 automatic rifles to the Son Sann "front" and promised an equal number of rifles to the Sihanouk forces. The Singapore weapons were delivered to the bandits via Thailand, and part of them got into the hands of the Pol Pot troops.

As reported by the *Far Eastern Economic Review*, one of the latest shipments of Singapore weapons reached the bandits in the autumn of 1984. The Son Sann and Sihanouk troops received 2,000 and 1,000 firearms respectively at that time.

The key role in organising subversive activities against the PRK is played by Thailand. It is safe to say that without the all-round support given to the Khmer émigré movement by Bangkok's ruling circles, the schemes of the enemies of people's Kampuchea would not be as massive and regular.

"Pol Pot bases occupy vast areas on Thai territory, where they enjoy complete immunity," admitted Samat Ladanhat, arrested in May 1984 by the Kampuchean security service together with a number of other Thai citizens engaged in illegal activities on PRK territory. He

noted that the Thai government in fact protects the areas from which the local population has been evicted and where armed units of Khmer émigrés are stationed.

Ignoring the true national interests of their country, Thai authorities are pursuing a policy of further escalating subversive activities against the PRK. In so doing, they make active use of Thailand's "status" as a "frontline state", which they themselves have widely advertised in order to derive dubious "benefits". And the reason for doing this is not simply that, as many foreign observers point out, Bangkok is lining its pockets with the international humanitarian relief sent to the Kampuchean refugees (according to numerous sources, most of it goes to the leaders of the bandit units, the Thai military authorities, and the provincial administration in Thailand's border areas). Exploiting the mythical "threat" to its security from the PRK and Vietnam, Bangkok ever more often requests weapons, loans, and credits from Washington. The United States readily responds to these requests, and the military partnership of the two countries keeps expanding year after year.

In the 1983 fiscal year US military aid to Thailand amounted to 80 million dollars; in 1984 it rose to 91 million dollars; and in 1985 it reached 110 million dollars. In recent years the Pentagon has become the principal military contractor for Thailand, responsible for 85 per cent of arms transfer to Bangkok. The biggest transactions between the Thai rulers and the US military establishment include the delivery of medium tanks to Thailand in 1984 (which nearly doubled the total number of tanks in the Thai army) and the recent purchase by Bangkok of a large number of the latest US F-16 fighter-bombers.

The sale and purchase of military hardware is only part of the story. Joint US-Thai war games are held on a regular basis. The largest of them, Cobra Gold-85, that took place in the Gulf of Siam in the summer of 1985, involved 7,400 US Marines, more than 3,000 Thai servicemen, 20 US and 17 Thai warships, and over a hundred fighters and bombers.

It should be pointed out that the militarisation of Thailand and the consolidation of its military cooperation with the United States are taking place against the background of increasing anti-communist and anti-Vietnamese hysteria in Bangkok. In other words, Thailand's military preparations, together with its support for re-



against pro-communist regimes from Nicaragua to Angola and from Afghanistan to Kampuchea.

It is important to explain here what governments are considered "pro-communist" by the White House. As a rule, all progressive regimes pursuing a policy independent of the United States are included in this category.

In the summer of 1985, in conformity with the new sentiments currently prevailing in Washington in favour of "a more active involvement in the solution of the Cambodian problem", the US Congress for the first time voted for openly granting 5 million dollars to the Son-Sann and Sihanouk groups in the 1986 fiscal year.

Commenting on the resolution of the Congress, which was then being drafted, *The Christian Science Monitor* wrote in its issue of March 31, 1985, that Stephen Solarz (Dem., N.Y.), a member of the House of Representatives and Chairman of the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, put forward the following initiative. According to his plan, aid to assist the Khmer resistance movement should be channelled via Thailand by any means found suitable by Thailand's government. Solarz' assistants said that although formally it was not military aid, the money sent could be used for purchasing arms. They said that the assistance to Khmer guerrillas pursued the same goals as the United States' secret aid to the Afghan "freedom fighters".

The proviso made by the initiators of the overt financing of the undeclared war against the PRK, which specifies that the aid allocated by the United States will not necessarily be used for supplying arms to the bandits, is most likely a residue of the so-called "Vietnam syndrome", which still continues burning in America today, ten years after the failure of US aggression in Vietnam. The US legislators are compelled to a certain extent to take account of the sentiments of the public, which fears that the United States may be drawn into yet another Indochina adventure. It was not accidental that quite a few congressmen sharply criticised the bill during its discussion.

That the funds thus allocated are probably aimed, in the first place, at arming the "Khmer freedom fighters" is also confirmed by certain official US sources. On April 11, 1985, *The New York Times*, for example, quoted a State Department spokesman as saying that the US did not rule out military aid if the resistance movement could not rely on its own forces.

But the armed bands of Khmer émigrés have never relied on their own resources. A consequence of crushing defeats in the spring of 1985 was the urgent arrival in Washington of the leaders of non-communist groups of the "coalition": only fresh US subsidies could ensure the continued existence of the "liberation movement" of the Khmer émigrés.

As reported by the press, the issue of providing military aid to the Kampuchean counterrevolution was the focal point of George P. Shultz's talks with Son Sann and Norodom Ranariddh. The appeals for help made by the ringleaders of the counterrevolution were not left unanswered. After the meeting with Shultz, Son Sann held a press conference, at which he said that he was "quite optimistic" about the prospects of the United States providing military aid for his forces.

Worried by the unfavourable turn of events on the Thai-Kampuchean border, Washington sent its high-ranking emissaries there in the summer of 1985. First William J. Casey, Director of the CIA, visited Thailand. He made an inspection tour of the Pol Pot and other surviving bandit camps in order personally to ascertain exactly what kind of assistance was needed by the "Khmer people freedom fighters". Next George P. Shultz paid a visit to Bangkok. He met with the three leaders of the "Khmer resistance" and visited one of the camps of the Khmer émigrés.

"Just two and a half miles from Cambodia," reported the *Newsweek*, "the secretary of state hauled himself up into a US-built M 48 A5 battle tank as photographers snapped pictures."

The reader may well draw a parallel between this situation and the notorious picture of Zbigniew K. Brzezinski who, while visiting the camps of the Afghan counterrevolutionaries on Pakistani territory, took aim at the territory of sovereign Afghanistan with a US-made weapon—one of those supplied for the "Afghan people freedom fighters".

Commenting on the results of the US visitors' tour of Thailand (in addition to Casey and Shultz, former US President Jimmy Carter also made a visit there at the time), the press noted: "... American involvement in the Cambodian problem is growing." (*Newsweek*, July 22, 1985). Washington's activity is "a sign of growing US support for non-communist rebels fighting the commun-



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actionary Khmer émigré bands, are directed against the PRK and Vietnam.

One can hardly find another explanation for the purchase by Thailand of F-16 warplanes, capable of reaching the territory of Vietnam from Thai airfields, or for Bangkok's and Washington's harping on the possibility of an outbreak of a "major armed conflict" on the Thai-Kampuchean border. As the *Nation Review* reported in the spring of 1985, Thai and US military officials are already considering the question of setting up Pentagon weapons and munitions depots on Thai territory "in case of emergency".

The intensive militarisation of Bangkok has been accompanied by the growth of its aggressiveness. Not only the PRK, but also the Lao People's Democratic Republic has become the object of the Thai military's hostile sallies. Thailand has more than once staged provocations against the civilian population of Laos. For example, on June 6, 1984, Thai troops invaded the territory of Laos and captured three villages in the Lao province of Sayaboury, which they subsequently held for several months. Up to now, Thai troops have not been completely withdrawn from Laotian territory.

Trying to conceal numerous armed provocations against the PRK from the world public, the Thai authorities are slandering the PRK and Vietnam, representing their own aggressive actions on the Kampuchean-Thai border as a "retaliation for the Vietnamese invasion of the territory of Thailand". Trying to lay the blame at somebody else's door, the Thai ruling circles are threatening people's Kampuchea with massive armed aggression.

For example, on March 24, 1985, a Xinhua News Agency report from Bangkok quoted the following statement by Thai Prime Minister Prem Tinsulanond who was making an inspection tour of the border province of Surin at the time: "Any actions and measures aimed at defending our sovereignty are justified." In reply to the correspondent's question whether Thai troops would invade Kampuchean territory Prem Tinsulanond said: "Measures to defend our sovereignty may well include such a step."

The fact that Bangkok is passing over in silence its involvement in revitalising the surviving Pol Pot bandits and other gangs of reactionary Khmer émigrés and in setting them against people's Kampuchea is also explained

by its intention to justify its hostile actions against the PRK. All this, however, cannot mislead the world public. The ugly role played by Thailand in organising the undeclared war against the PRK is no longer a secret to anyone and is subjected to ever greater denunciations by the world community.

The major source of supplies for the Khmer émigrés is the aid provided by the United States. It is varied in character and is rendered both through official channels and from the top secret funds of the CIA and other US secret services.

Until quite recently, Washington has officially denied that it was equipping and financing the bands of Khmer émigrés.

In April 1985, a statement circulated by the US Department of State on the occasion of the visit to Washington by Son Sann and Norodom Ranariddh, "Supreme Commander" of the Sihanouk forces, stressed that the United States was providing moral and political support for the non-communist resistance factions (as the "coalition" bands are called by the *White House*), which was manifested by the President's meetings with Prince Sihanouk and Son Sann in 1983 and 1984. The document said that the US also rendered humanitarian aid in the frameworks of the UN operation and the International Red Cross, providing relief to about 250,000 civilians—Khmer who are in search of refuge in the Thai-Kampuchean border area. In 1984 this relief exceeded 15 million dollars in money and foodstuffs. In 1985 the US promised 4 million dollars in the frameworks of the UN border operation and another 1.5 million through the Red Cross. The statement added that the US did not supply arms to any of the Khmer factions, nor did it render any support to or have any contacts with the Khmer Rouge, whose atrocities in the past it allegedly condemned.

In the summer of that same year, however, spokesmen for the Department of State refused for some reason to comment on *The Washington Post's* report stating that over the past three years the United States had rendered secret aid worth several million dollars to the anti-Kampuchean "resistance movement" via the CIA. Yet this information was corroborated by other sources. The Indian newspaper *Link*, for example, wrote on September 16, 1984: "The CIA, it is confirmed by recent reports, has been

regularly financing the rebel organisations pitted against the present Kampuchean regime for the last several years." The *International Herald Tribune*, referring to reliable sources in Washington, reported in the summer of 1985: "The Central Intelligence Agency has been providing millions of dollars a year since 1982 ... to two non-communist Cambodian groups, including more than \$ 5 million this year."

Washington's covert support for the armed bands of Khmer émigrés played an important part in launching the undeclared war against the PRK. Thus, the *Far Eastern Economic Review* noted in August 1984 that the US aid rendered to the counterrevolutionaries (according to the weekly, somewhere in the vicinity of 4 million dollars) contributed greatly to the formation of the "coalition" of the three anti-Kampuchean factions.

More often than not, the secret character of the programme for providing aid to the rebels through CIA channels has made it impossible fully to estimate its actual size. Even the data that have been made public, however, can give an idea of the impressive scope of Washington's subversive activities against the PRK.

For example, the *Far Eastern Economic Review* on August 16, 1984, described the following mechanism for secretly financing the self-styled "fighters for the freedom of the Khmer people": "The /US/ administration has informed ASEAN that it is willing to double its assistance to the resistance—bringing it, according to one estimate, to around US \$ 15 million. ... What the US has been doing ... is to provide a 'fungible' fund for non-lethal purchases, which would release the ASEAN aid money towards purchasing arms for guerrillas."

"The word 'fungible,'" explains the weekly, "can refer to a commodity, all or part of which may be used to replace another in the discharge of a debt. Washington bureaucrats dealing with Cambodia use the word to refer to funds which might ultimately be used for purposes other than those officially stated. Official sources are reluctant to discuss how 'fungible' aid is being provided to the Cambodian resistance forces, but it is believed to come from the CIA's covert-operation fund and channelled to the resistance through a number of ASEAN countries. Money earmarked for 'humanitarian assistance', for example, is handed over to ASEAN countries, who use an equivalent

sum from their own budgets to buy weapons and ammunition for the resistance.

"Apart from the CIA money," stresses the *Far Eastern Economic Review*, "US \$ 5 million in economic-support funds provided to Thailand by the US to help people affected by the war along the Thai-Cambodian border is believed to be another 'fungible fund' meant for use by the resistance. Since the amount is a contribution to the Thai budget and no accounting is required by US law as to how it is used, the Thais could provide all or part of it to the resistance." (It should be noted here that US Secretary of State George P. Shultz announced during his visit to Thailand in July 1985 that Washington would allocate another 3 million dollars to Bangkok on top of the 5 million dollars already granted and allegedly earmarked for assistance to the Thai residents who had "suffered from the border conflict".)

"... The US," noted the *Far Eastern Economic Review*, "has also been helping the resistance by providing limited training to paramedics and radio technicians. The US is also believed to have helped the KPRLF produce propaganda material."

In addition to the secret supplies via the CIA and other secret services, the reactionary Khmer émigrés continue to derive benefits from the international humanitarian relief coming to the Thai-Kampuchean border area. The United States not only allocates substantial funds for this purpose (let us recall that the above statement by the US Department of State mentioned 15 million dollars for the 1984 and 5.5 million dollars for the 1985 fiscal year), it has also engaged in lobbying its allies, urging them to increase their contribution to the cause of "rescuing" the Kampuchean refugees.

The present Washington administration, however, is no longer satisfied with these covert and overt multimillion dollar injections of aid given to the "fighters for the freedom of the Khmer people".

The newspaper *Los Angeles Times* wrote in the summer of 1985 that the Reagan administration was working on (and in our opinion, it has already begun practical implementation of) a new large-scale foreign policy doctrine that would ensure a more active role for the US in third world countries. The administration believed the US should actively and openly help the rebels who were fighting

against pro-communist regimes from Nicaragua to Angola and from Afghanistan to Kampuchea.

It is important to explain here what governments are considered "pro-communist" by the White House. As a rule, all progressive regimes pursuing a policy independent of the United States are included in this category.

In the summer of 1985, in conformity with the new sentiments currently prevailing in Washington in favour of "a more active involvement in the solution of the Cambodian problem", the US Congress for the first time voted for openly granting 5 million dollars to the Son-Sann and Sihanouk groups in the 1986 fiscal year.

Commenting on the resolution of the Congress, which was then being drafted, *The Christian Science Monitor* wrote in its issue of March 31, 1985, that Stephen Solarz (Dem., N.Y.), a member of the House of Representatives and Chairman of the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, put forward the following initiative. According to his plan, aid to assist the Khmer resistance movement should be channelled via Thailand by any means found suitable by Thailand's government. Solarz assistants said that although formally it was not military aid, the money sent could be used for purchasing arms. They said that the assistance to Khmer guerrillas pursued the same goals as the United States' secret aid to the Afghan "freedom fighters".

The proviso made by the initiators of the overt financing of the undeclared war against the PRK, which specifies that the aid allocated by the United States will not necessarily be used for supplying arms to the bandits, is most likely a residue of the so-called "Vietnam syndrome", which still continues burning in America today, ten years after the failure of US aggression in Vietnam. The US legislators are compelled to a certain extent to take account of the sentiments of the public, which fears that the United States may be drawn into yet another Indochina adventure. It was not accidental that quite a few congressmen sharply criticised the bill during its discussion.

That the funds thus allocated are probably aimed, in the first place, at arming the "Khmer freedom fighters" is also confirmed by certain official US sources. On April 11, 1985, *The New York Times*, for example, quoted a State Department spokesman as saying that the US did not rule out military aid if the resistance movement could not rely on its own forces.

But the armed bands of Khmer émigrés have never relied on their own resources. A consequence of crushing defeats in the spring of 1985 was the urgent arrival in Washington of the leaders of non-communist groups of the "coalition"; only fresh US subsidies could ensure the continued existence of the "liberation movement" of the Khmer émigrés.

As reported by the press, the issue of providing military aid to the Kampuchean counterrevolution was the focal point of George P. Shultz's talks with Son Sann and Norodom Ranariddh. The appeals for help made by the ringleaders of the counterrevolution were not left unanswered. After the meeting with Shultz, Son Sann held a press conference, at which he said that he was "quite optimistic" about the prospects of the United States providing military aid for his forces.

Worried by the unfavourable turn of events on the Thai-Kampuchean border, Washington sent its high-ranking emissaries there in the summer of 1985. First William J. Casey, Director of the CIA, visited Thailand. He made an inspection tour of the Pol Pot and other surviving bandit camps in order personally to ascertain exactly what kind of assistance was needed by the "Khmer people freedom fighters". Next George P. Shultz paid a visit to Bangkok. He met with the three leaders of the "Khmer resistance" and visited one of the camps of the Khmer émigrés.

"Just two and a half miles from Cambodia," reported the *Newsweek*, "the secretary of state hauled himself up into a US-built M 48 A5 battle tank as photographers snapped pictures."

The reader may well draw a parallel between this situation and the notorious picture of Zbigniew K. Brzezinski who, while visiting the camps of the Afghan counterrevolutionaries on Pakistani territory, took aim at the territory of sovereign Afghanistan with a US-made weapon—one of those supplied for the "Afghan people freedom fighters".

Commenting on the results of the US visitors' tour of Thailand (in addition to Casey and Shultz, former US President Jimmy Carter also made a visit there at the time), the press noted: "... American involvement in the Cambodian problem is growing." (*Newsweek*, July 22, 1985). Washington's activity is "a sign of growing US support for non-communist rebels fighting the commun-

ist regime installed in Cambodia by Vietnam." (*International Herald Tribune*, July 9, 1985.)

It should be added that the consultations the US representatives held with their Thai "colleagues" in Bangkok are another reminder of the existence of a broad international conspiracy by enemies of the PRK who are striving to eliminate the legitimate Kampuchean government with the aid of armed bands of Khmer reactionaries.

Touching upon the coordination of efforts by various patrons of Khmer émigrés, the *Far Eastern Economic Review* in October 1984 reported the formation of a special four-nation committee to coordinate the flow of aid to the "non-communist" factions of the "coalition". "The committee," wrote the weekly, "consists of representatives from Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia, and the US. The Americans are reportedly represented by the CIA."

The recent stepping up of the undeclared war against the PRK, however, is encountering growing opposition by the world public and by many prominent political and public figures.

At a briefing for local and foreign journalists in April 1985, Mochtar Kusumaatmadja, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Indonesia, expressed his regret about the possible re-ndering of military aid by the United States to the "non-communist" factions of the "Democratic Kampuchea Coalition Government". In the Indonesian minister's view, this step could undermine the ASEAN efforts towards a political settlement in Kampuchea.

*The New York Times* wrote on May 1, 1985, that, in the opinion of the noted Australian scholar David Chandler, the Americans are more interested in encouraging the Kampuchians to kill one another and the Vietnamese in the name of "freedom".

## A Criminal Conspiracy

Foreign policy actions, propaganda and economic subversion occupy an important place in the openly hostile actions undertaken by the forces of imperialism, hegemonism and international reaction against the PRK. These component parts of the undeclared war not only supplement the strategy of military pressure and determine in many respects the potential of the armed aggression against the PRK, but they are also aimed directly at eliminating the popular rule that exists in our country and at aggravating the situation in the whole of Southeast Asia.

As was already noted, immediately after the formation of the PRK a whole number of states, above all China, the US and the ASEAN countries, came out against the young republic. These countries are following a policy aimed at internationally isolating our state, specifically, by preventing its representatives from taking their legitimate place at the United Nations and other international organisations in every way.

Yet no legal grounds exist for not admitting the PRK to the United Nations. A number of UN documents clearly and unambiguously specify the demands placed on a government claiming the right to represent its country at the UN (a situation is meant when two governments put in a claim for the seat of a given state at that international organisation). According to these demands, in such an event priority rests with the government that is in fact capable of using the resources and administering the people of the state so as to meet the commitments of a UN member.

Let us compare the PRK government and the "Democratic Kampuchea Coalition Government" from this standpoint. The PRK government was formed as a result of free democratic elections held in Kampuchea in 1981, in which 98 per cent of the country's adult population took part. The PRK government has control over the entire territory of the country. Under its leadership the Kampuchean people have gained well-known successes in the economy, health care, education, and culture. Still another weighty argument in favour of the government of the PRK is the peaceful foreign policy pursued by our state, wholly conforming to the aims and principles of the United

Nations. As a result, the international prestige of the PRK is steadily growing. At present, the republic has been officially recognised by more than 40 states and national liberation movements whose overwhelming majority are full-fledged members of the UN.

If one takes an unbiased look at the claims advanced by the "Democratic Kampuchea Coalition Government", the following facts stand out: first, the "state" administered by that "government" has neither territory, nor population, nor resources (unless, of course, the armed bandits terrorising the Kampuchean refugees are considered "population" and the lavish foreign aid as "resources"). Second, as was already noted, the "coalition" has been in a state of permanent crisis since it was set up; it has not fallen apart only because its foreign patrons have prevented this. And, lastly, the main argument against that "government" is the hatred that the Kampuchean people, who are full of determination not to permit the restoration of the rule of the Pol Pot fanatics hiding behind the mask of the "coalition", have for the bandits.

Nevertheless, in spite of these obvious facts the initiators of the undeclared war against the PRK have managed for 7 years already to impose discussions "on the situation in Kampuchea" upon the annual sessions of the UN General Assembly and to force anti-Kampuchean resolutions through that international organisation that are unjust and unacceptable for the PRK. The scheming of the forces hostile to the PRK has resulted in turning the United Nations, in effect, into an instrument for interfering in the internal affairs of our state and into an arena for dirty anti-PRK and anti-Vietnamese propaganda campaigns.

One of the vivid examples of the unseemly attitude towards the PRK that the enemies of the Kampuchean people forced upon that authoritative international body was the resolution of the General Assembly on convening a so-called international conference on Kampuchea in July 1981. The greatest zeal for organising and carrying out the conference was shown by Washington, which counted on using that gathering to bring massive international pressure upon the PRK.

Addressing the "conference", the then US Secretary of State Alexander Haig demagogically expatiated upon the "more than ten-year-long sufferings" of the Kampuchean

people. At the same time, of course, he said nothing about the actual culprits of that tragedy—the United States and China, which had for ten years been trying to implant their order in the Kampuchean soil. Instead, he tried to put the blame for the situation that had developed in Kampuchea on Vietnam and the Soviet Union which had helped the Kampuchean people get rid of the US aggressor and the Pol Pot bandits and which are now rendering all-round assistance to it. The "representatives" of the Kampuchean people, Ieng Sary and Son Sann, who had been invited to the "conference", made similar attacks against the PRK, Vietnam, and the Soviet Union.

Despite all the efforts of its organisers, however, the "International Conference on Kampuchea" failed. As a matter of fact, this outcome had been predicted by many authoritative political and public circles all over the world before the "conference" began its work. For example, the major Indonesian newspaper *Kompas* noted on May 17, 1981, that sober-minded figures in ASEAN had no doubt that the absence from the "conference" of representatives of the USSR, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, and the People's Republic of Kampuchea doomed that gathering. This proved to be a justified opinion. For it is evident that no resolutions on Kampuchea, adopted contrary to the will of the Kampuchean people and in the absence of their legitimate representatives, can and shall carry any weight. For the same reason, all of the current attempts by the enemies of the PRK to revive the activity of the "International Conference on Kampuchea" are likewise doomed to failure.

The Kampuchean people believe that the United Nations must be more realistic and take a neutral standpoint pending a political settlement of the situation round Kampuchea. The policy followed by the non-aligned movement which, it should be repeated, has decided on keeping Kampuchea's place in that movement vacant, can set an example to the United Nations.

It is important to stress, however, that UN specialised agencies should already have adopted a stand dictated by common sense: oust the Pol Pot regime, representing no one and hiding behind the cover of the "coalition", and grant a seat in these agencies to the PRK representatives. Indeed, how can the presence of a Pol Pot "observer" on the UN Commission on Human Rights be tolerated? Isn't

the absence of any mention of the Pol Pot genocide in the renewed draft report on crimes of genocide and their punishment, discussed in the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities of the Commission on Human Rights an insult to the memory of the three million Kampuchean who fell victim to that genocide? And what is to be said about the participation of the Pol Pot followers in such specialised UN agencies as the Universal Postal Union, the International Civil Aviation Organisation, or the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organisation? Don't the Kampuchean people live in the PRK, to which letters, including those sent by Khmer emigrants living in France, the United States, Australia, Thailand, and other countries, are addressed? Does the "coalition" have a territory so that foreign airlines should request air passage over it? Does the "coalition" have control over the Kampuchean seaports at which foreign ships make calls? Of course, not. All of these—the territory, the ports, and the population—today constitute nothing but the People's Republic of Kampuchea, a sovereign and independent state whose people have forever rid themselves of the Pol Pot executioners and shall on no account permit them to return to their native soil.

In the spring of 1985, the foreign press reported that a conference was held in Washington on the problems of preserving Kampuchea's cultural monuments, including the world-famous temple of Angkor Wat, one of the wonders of world civilisation. By a bitter irony of fate, a delegate of the "coalition", or, rather, a representative of the Pol Pot regime which had been systematically destroying its country's cultural and historical monuments in 1975-1978 (in particular, over 2,000 statues of Buddha were demolished in Angkor Wat during that period), took part in that conference. Contrary to common sense, a representative of UNESCO participated in that dirty propaganda venture as well. According to the logic of things, UNESCO is an organisation that should have been more concerned with showing specific care for protecting and restoring this masterpiece of human heritage (which the government of the PRK on whose territory Angkor Wat stands is calling for), than with supporting a propaganda campaign against the PRK.

The absurdity of the stand adopted by the United

Nations and some of its agencies becomes particularly clear when compared with the policy followed by a number of international organisations and specialised UN bodies, such as UNICEF, FAO, and several others that successfully cooperate with the government and public organisations of the PRK. The trade union, women's and youth associations of the PRK are members of respective international associations. The Kampuchean teachers have recently joined the World Confederation of Teachers. Public organisations of the PRK are taking an active part in the peace movement and in the activities of the Organisation of Afro-Asian, Latin American Peoples Solidarity and the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organisation. Representatives of the Kampuchean mass media are members of the International Organisation of Journalists. The country's national sports federations, which have resumed their work after the four-year-long period of the bloodthirsty Pol Pot-Ieng Sary dictatorship, have been officially recognised by the international athletic association, football, basketball, volleyball, wrestling, and other federations.

Despite the policy of non-recognition of the PRK on the part of the United States, China, and their allies, over the past 2 to 3 years alone parliamentarians from Japan, France, Australia and the United States, as well as delegations from many countries, including ASEAN member states, have visited the PRK. In addition, the PRK has been exchanging numerous visits on all levels with socialist countries and the developing states of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. All of this demonstrates that the stability of the PRK's international standing cannot be swayed by a mechanical majority at the United Nations, where many delegates have been influenced by mendacious enemy propaganda and vote in favour of the "Democratic Kampuchea Coalition Government" because they lack truthful information.

How do the enemies of people's Kampuchea justify the "necessity" of depriving the PRK government of its legitimate seat at the United Nations and, on a broader plane, of exerting massive military, political, diplomatic, propaganda, and economic pressure on the independent state? Their main argument is that the territory of Kampuchea is allegedly "occupied by Vietnamese troops" and that the PRK government is just a "puppet manipulated by the Socialist Republic of Vietnam", incapable of controlling the



situation in its own country. The "Vietnamese invasion" in Kampuchea is declared to be a violation of generally accepted international legal norms and is seen as a direct threat to the security of Thailand and other countries in Southeast Asia. All this is a gross distortion of the essence of Kampuchean-Vietnamese relations.

Vietnamese Minister of Foreign Affairs Nguyen Co Thach once answered the question of a *Far Eastern Economic Review* correspondent about why Vietnamese volunteer units had entered into Kampuchea and why they were still remaining there. He explained that there were two reasons for this. The Pol Pot regime's atrocities and policy of genocide went beyond all limits. The people of Kampuchea had the right to overthrow it and appeal to Vietnam for help in order to defeat the Pol Pot army, trained and equipped by the Chinese.

The second reason for the Vietnamese troops' presence in Kampuchea, said Nguyen Co Thach, was that Vietnam had the right to self-defence. This right is written down in the UN Charter. The Pol Pot troops launched a war against Vietnam in April 1977. As for Vietnam, it wanted peace. Vietnam proposed to establish an internationally-controlled demilitarised zone on the Vietnamese-Kampuchean border. In February 1978 Nguyen Co Thach voiced this proposal at a press conference and subsequently made it at the United Nations. Pol Pot and Ieng Sary, however, did not want peace, and neither China, nor the ASEAN nations backed the proposal. For this reason Vietnam was acting to ensure its self-defence, not only against Pol Pot, but also against China, said Nguyen Co Thach.

The Kampuchean people's appeal to the fraternal Vietnamese people for assistance in eliminating the blood-thirsty Pol Pot-Ieng Sary clique and the subsequent presence of Vietnamese volunteers on Kampuchean territory is an internal affair of Kampuchea and Vietnam and is dictated by the security needs of the two countries. This presence conforms to the provisions of the Kampuchean-Vietnamese Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation and in no way contradicts the UN Charter which provides for the possibility of collective defence against the aggressive schemes of external forces.

History, incidentally, provides quite a few examples of the overthrow of misanthropic dictatorial regimes through

the joint efforts of peoples of different countries. It was precisely in this way that the Allied forces helped France liberate itself from Nazi occupation in the years of the Second World War. Similarly, Tanzania helped the people of Uganda overthrow Idi Amin's bloodthirsty regime. It should be noted that the United Nations recognised the new Ugandan government without delay.

The fraternal alliance of the two countries, one of whose manifestations is the presence of Vietnamese volunteer units on Kampuchean territory, is exclusively defensive and threatens no one. The governments of the People's Republic of Kampuchea and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam have repeatedly stated that the presence of Vietnamese volunteers in Kampuchea is caused solely by the threat to the security of the PRK.

This fact is recognised by realistically-minded statesmen of ASEAN countries. For example, in February 1984 Commander-in-Chief of the Indonesian Armed Forces Gen. Benny Murdani openly said that Vietnam did not pose a threat to Southeast Asia. A month later, according to the *Far Eastern Economic Review*, he offered the opinion that the bringing in of the Vietnamese troops into Cambodia "was a question of national survival, not of territorial ambition".

In addition, certain circles inside the "coalition" itself admit every now and then that the presence of Vietnamese volunteer units in Kampuchea is on the whole justified. Even Sihanouk once said during a talk with Wilfred Burchett that the unconditional withdrawal of the Vietnamese troops demanded by Peking, Washington, and ASEAN countries would not solve anything and power in the country would simply be seized by the Khmer Rouge.

In the initial period of the PRK's existence, our armed forces were not strong enough to ensure the security of our country. At the same time, remnants of Pol Pot's army, which had fled to the Kampuchean-Thai border, were hastily reformed and equipped with the aid of the PRK's external enemies and were thrown into the war against the national government. Shortly afterwards the Son Sann and Sihanouk forces joined the bandit forays of the surviving Pol Pot gangs. Under such conditions, the presence of Vietnamese volunteer units was a guarantee against the restoration of the old order in Kampuchea.



As the situation in the PRK grew more stable and the PRAK became stronger, the conditions for a gradual withdrawal of the Vietnamese volunteer contingent from Kampuchea began taking shape. Since 1982, four such reductions had been made. This was in keeping with the basic policy of the PRK and Vietnam governments, which stated on several occasions that the Vietnamese volunteers would be completely withdrawn from Kampuchea as soon as the necessary conditions for this existed. These conditions included the elimination of the threat to the PRK's security and the sufficient growth in the strength of the People's Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea, enabling it to defend the country on its own.

Even the flood of obviously slanderous fabrications in the mass media of the West, China and some ASEAN countries could not drown objective assessments of this important initiative by the governments of the PRK and Vietnam.

Unfounded accusations were levelled at the PRK and Vietnam, claiming that the reductions of the Vietnamese volunteer contingent in Kampuchea were nothing but the replacement of some military units by others. For example, Michael Vickery testified in his book *Cambodia: 1975-1982*: "The favourable trends for the PRK seemed to continue into early 1983. Edmund McWilliams, of the US Embassy in Bangkok and one of the American anti-Vietnamese hard-liners, admitted that the Vietnamese forces in Cambodia had been reduced in 1982 from about 180,000 to 150,000."

While exploiting the topic of the "Vietnamese presence" in Kampuchea, the PRK's enemies are also persistently spreading inventions about the ostensible "Vietnamisation" of our country. This is the most shameless lie of all.

Ethnic Vietnamese have lived on the territory of Kampuchea for generations. They were brought there by French colonialists for working on the hevea plantations. The number of the Vietnamese was growing from generation to generation and reached 500,000 under Sihanouk. In March and April 1970, following the mass Vietnamese pogroms staged by the Lon Nol regime, about 200,000 Vietnamese were exiled from Kampuchea. The second phase of the persecution of ethnic Vietnamese began when the Pol Pot regime came to power. According to the official

data published in Vietnam, over 268,000 Vietnamese refugees crossed the border from Kampuchea into Vietnam before October 1978. After the overthrow of the Pol Pot clique, the PRK government allowed the Vietnamese that had formerly lived in Kampuchea to return to the country. Yet even today their number is only about 57,000, or one-tenth of the total number of ethnic Vietnamese who lived on the territory of Kampuchea in 1969, i.e., before the beginning of the mass repressions.

It should be added that many foreign observers have attested that the Kampuchean population's attitude towards the Vietnamese volunteers is marked by cordiality and a feeling of gratitude. "In contrast to the propaganda churned out by DK, the Khmer Serei, and Son Sann's KPRLF and retailed via a number of Bangkok based journalists," wrote Michael Vickery, "the policies of the PRK regime and its Vietnamese backers have been human, pragmatic, and unoppressive." "The people's desire to live," the French magazine *Le Monde diplomatique* wrote about Kampuchea in 1982, "manifests itself in everything every minute. They want to do away with their recent past as soon as possible, although any talk with urban residents or out in the rice paddies inevitably turns to life under Pol Pot. So the presence of the Vietnamese army is regarded as a guarantee against the return of the Khmer Rouge."

The propaganda campaigns launched by the inspirers of the undeclared war against the PRK are accompanied and supplemented by incessant diplomatic pressure upon people's Kampuchea. As a rule, this pressure is aimed at opposing the PRK's and the Indochina countries' peaceful initiatives for settling the situation around Kampuchea and improving the situation in the whole of Southeast Asia. The numerous demarches by the "coalition" and its patrons are also aimed at reinforcing the diversionist-terrorist activities of the "Khmer people freedom fighters" and at stirring up interest in the so-called "Kampuchean problem". In particular, the PRK's opponents have tried more than once to force the government of people's Kampuchea to compromise with the enemies of its own people and to create the prerequisites to restore to power the Pol Pot regime and the other outcasts who have been dumped into the dustbin of history.

Western observers have estimated that in the more than

six years that the so-called Kampuchean problem has existed (or, rather, been continuously galvanised), ASEAN countries have brought forward 13 "peaceful proposals" for settling that "problem". Most of these "initiatives", however, were prompted by the inspirers of the undeclared war against the PRK and were *a priori* unacceptable to the Indochina countries.

The metamorphosis of the last, thirteenth, proposal by ASEAN countries, advanced at the July (1985) conference of the ASEAN "six", provides a vivid example of this kind of diplomacy. According to the press, the ASEAN foreign ministers intended to approve Malaysia's proposal for conducting "indirect talks" between the "coalition" and the PRK government. At the last moment, however, the Thai version, calling for talks between the "coalition" and Vietnam, was adopted.

Yet the countries of Indochina have stated repeatedly that the internal affairs of Kampuchea must be settled by the Kampuchean people themselves. The latest proposal by ASEAN, however, is unacceptable to both the PRK and Vietnam, which respects Kampuchea's sovereignty. Certain influential circles, both inside and outside the association, are more interested in putting up insurmountable barriers on the road towards normalising the situation in the region, than in developing a dialogue between the Indochina states and the ASEAN countries. In this connection it is worth mentioning the fact that before the latest "initiative" was advanced, the Thai foreign minister made a trip to Peking where the draft of the Malaysian proposal was first censored and then substantially transformed.

The organising of an economic blockade of the young republic and the creation of all kinds of obstacles to providing international humanitarian aid for the PRK play a significant part in the unceasing schemes of the enemies of the PRK. "Many Western nations," attested the *Asian Survey* in a review of the situation in Kampuchea in 1983, "refused to help and lobbied to discourage international organisations from giving aid to the Heng Samrin regime", because they considered it inexpedient "to shore up the Phnom Penh government".

When a number of districts in our country were hit by a drought in 1983, the *Far Eastern Economic Review* reported that the ASEAN countries had made

attempts to block international food relief for the PRK government.

As *The New York Times* reported in one of its May issues this year, one of the results of the policy the US had been recently pursuing was that Western aid to a great majority of the Kampucheans had been exhausted.

A broad international conspiracy against the People's Republic of Kampuchea is under way.

The PRK government decisively rejects all these schemes by the forces of imperialism, hegemonism, and international reaction. Together with the fraternal countries of Indochina, the PRK has advanced a whole series of measures aimed both at settling the situation around Kampuchea and improving the situation in the whole of Southeast Asia.

The Indochina states' proposals to the ASEAN countries include the idea of signing bilateral or multilateral non-aggression treaties between the Indochina countries and Thailand; the proposal to discuss the prospects for the creation of a zone of peace and stability in Southeast Asia (rejected by the ASEAN countries); the proposal to establish a demilitarised zone on the Thai-Kampuchean border or, if the Thai side is not ready for this, to set up "security zones" on both sides of the border (which implies the withdrawal of Vietnamese volunteers from the Thai-Kampuchean border and the transfer of the "hideouts" of the Khmer reactionaries deep into the Thai territory); the proposal to hold consultations on the situation in the area of the South China Sea; and the PRK's proposal to receive in an orderly fashion the refugees staying in Thailand.

The consistent course of the three Indochina countries to normalise the situation around Kampuchea and the situation in Southeast Asia as a whole was reaffirmed at the 11th Conference of Foreign Ministers of Vietnam, the PRK and Laos held in Phnom Penh in August 1985. A communiqué on the results of the conference was published. It said that the three fraternal peoples of the Indochina states achieved significant successes in carrying out revolutionary construction in their countries and in ensuring their defence.

The document pointed out that because of the substantial progress made by the PRK over the past six years,

Kampuchea and Vietnam decided to proceed with a stage-by-stage withdrawal of the Vietnamese volunteer units from the PRK, to be completed by 1990. At the same time, should the return home of the Vietnamese troops be used to undermine security in Kampuchea, both countries reserve the right to take retaliatory measures.

After considering the ASEAN states' proposal on negotiations to normalise the situation around Kampuchea, the ministers stated that it was particularly important to establish exactly who would participate in them. The communiqué says that the PRK is ready to begin direct or indirect talks on national reconciliation with any Khmer opposition groups or their individual representatives on the condition that the Pol Pot clique be eliminated as a military-political organisation and that free elections be held after the complete withdrawal of the Vietnamese voluntary units from Kampuchea.

The parties confirmed their basic policy aimed at normalising their relations with China. The peoples of Indochina, the communiqué pointed out, are sincerely striving to establish good-neighbourly relations with Thailand.

The document expressed confidence that if all interested parties make efforts towards establishing a dialogue, favourable conditions would be created for signing an agreement on settling all existing problems in the region and for setting up a zone of peace, stability, and cooperation in Southeast Asia. The Indochina countries reaffirmed their willingness to take part in an international conference to solve the problems of ensuring peace and security in Southeast Asia.

The constructive initiatives of the Indochina states evoked a broad response from the world public, as well as from statesmen and political figures all over the world, including the ASEAN countries. In these proposals they saw reasonable grounds for establishing a dialogue between the Indochina and ASEAN states. As General Secretary of the Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Party Central Committee and President of the Council of State of the PRK Heng Samrin pointed out, "it is quite obvious that the only way to turn Southeast Asia into a zone of peace, stability, and cooperation is through peaceful negotiations between the Indochina and ASEAN countries without external interference."

The People's Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea is maturing in the struggle against its enemies. During the 1984-85 dry season the PRAK servicemen carried out, jointly with Vietnamese volunteers, a series of successful operations against armed units of the reactionary Khmer groups and routed 18 Pol Pot, Son Sann and Sihanouk bases on the Kampuchean-Thai border.

1. North-West  
Preiengkul, the Pulro Base, January 4-5, 1985. 901 men were put out of action and 4,221 weapons, 400 tons of ammunition and 14 motor vehicles captured.

2. Phnom Kombot, Choem Khsan, March 18-December 22, 1984. 160 men were put out of action and 372 weapons captured.

3. North-East  
Olomgen, February 25-March 8, 1985. 263 men were put out of action and 42 weapons captured.

4. Chong Chaoom, February 25-March 11, 1985. 1,200 men were put out of action, including a Sihanouk general killed during the operation, and 1,500 weapons captured.

5. North-East  
Yingdonkum, December 25, 1984. 31 men were put out of action, 35 weapons captured, and an A-37 plane was shot down.

6. North-West Ampil, March 5, 1985. 150 men were put out of action and 100 weapons captured.

7. Srodei, Ampil, January 7, 1985. 500 men were put out of action and 1,300 weapons captured.

8. Phnom Chhokro, December 25, 1984. 150 men were put out of action and 50 weapons and 20 tons of provisions captured.

9. North-West  
Yingdonkum, December 25, 1984. 150 men were put out of action and 269 weapons and 30 tons of provisions captured.

10. Nong Samet, Nong Chan, February 18-26, 1985. 130 men were put out of action and 93 weapons captured.

11. Phnom Malai, January 6-February 13, 1985. 80 men were put out of action and 250 weapons and 15 tons of provisions captured.

12. Iuda, January 31-February 13, 1985. 250 men were put out of action and 800 weapons captured.

13. Chamkasrey, January 11, 1985. 274 men were put out of action and 100 weapons captured.

14. Sokean, December 11, 1984. 26 men were put out of action and 100 weapons captured.

15. West Smetdaeng, January 2-7, 1985. 150 men were put out of action and 44 weapons, 10 tons of ammunition and 1.6 tons of provisions captured.


16. Thalben Head-quarters, February 8-11, 1985. 223 men were put out of action and 1,177 weapons, 75 tons of mortar and artillery shells, 13 motor vehicles and 84 tons of provisions captured.

The counterrevolution now has not a single inch of land left on the territory of People's Kampuchea.

This chart shows the counterrevolutionaries' bases, the dates when they were wiped out, and the losses suffered by the enemy.

17. West Pursat, October 2-7, 1984. 100 men were put out of action and 121 weapons, 150 tons of ammunition and 25 tons of provisions captured.

18. Hill 322, December 21-22, 1984. 380



## The Enemies' Schemes Are Doomed to Failure

The years that have passed since the day the Pol Pot troops were expelled from the ancient land of Angkor are eloquent testimony to the irreversibility of the process of the national revival of the Kampuchean people and of the futility of the attempts by US imperialism, Peking expansionism, and international reaction to eliminate the gains of the January revolution and restore the old order of things in Kampuchea.

The period since the revolution was marked by great successes in the political, economic, and cultural life of the country, as well as in the areas of public education and health care. Having been thrown back to the "zero year" of its history by the bloodthirsty clique, the country has demonstrated to the whole world the unfailing creative potential of its people, liberated from the chains of the Pol Pot slavery.

People's revolutionary power has grown stronger, and the internal political situation has stabilised. The 4th Congress of the Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Party held in 1981 outlined the tasks that our revolution faced and mapped out a clear course for domestic and foreign policy.

Having expelled the Pol Pot clique, the Kampuchean people eliminated the danger of famine within a year, that had been left by the genocidal regime. And already in 1983 two million tons of rice was harvested on an area of 1.74 million hectares. The national industry is also being revitalised at a rapid pace.

The activity of the popular government in the field of public education has reached an unprecedented scope. Never before in the history of our country have so many children attended schools (over 1.8 million). Social life has become much more active, and national culture is being revived.

In spite of the fierce resistance put up by the enemies of the republic, the international prestige of the People's Republic of Kampuchea is growing steadily, and the fraternal alliance of the three Indochina countries is getting stronger.

"Our successes would have been even greater,"

or indirect talks with the groups of Khmer oppositionists or their individual representatives for achieving national reconciliation once the Pol Pot clique has been eliminated, and would be willing to discuss the question of holding general elections in the country after the withdrawal of Vietnamese volunteer units from Kampuchea. "In this connection we will try to reach a political solution on a basis acceptable to the various interested parties," noted Hun Sen at a press conference devoted to the results of the August 1985 meeting of the foreign ministers of the Indochina states. At present it can be said that all interested parties have recognised the need to open a dialogue. The PRK welcomes Malaysia's proposal, which in spirit is in keeping with the view that Kampuchea's internal affairs should be decided by the Kampuchean people themselves. The PRK thinks that this initiative is worth consideration. It is first necessary to know, however, who will participate in the dialogue.

In reply to the question whether the "removal of Pol Pot" implies the elimination of Pol Pot alone or the Pol Pot forces as a whole, Hun Sen said at the above-mentioned press conference: "We demand the elimination of the Pol Pot clique as a political and military organisation and not the removal of Pol Pot alone. This is not to be understood in the sense that we demand the execution of Pol Pot or the extermination of the Pol Pot forces. We demand the political and military elimination of Pol Pot. As for those who are in the ranks of the Pol Pot forces, they should be reformed so that they should become good citizens useful to society." "With regard to the groups or individual leaders of the Khmer opposition," Hun Sen went on, "we must draw your attention to the following: formerly we said that we would hold talks with Sihanouk and Son Sann if they agreed to dissociate themselves from Pol Pot. Today, however, such talks may be held before they break with Pol Pot. In other words, if they wish to reach national reconciliation on the basis of eliminating Pol Pot, they may hold talks with us before they break with Pol Pot."

When asked whether such talks would be direct or indirect Hun Sen replied: "If tomorrow Sihanouk and Son Sann announce their readiness to hold talks with the PRK, then the day after tomorrow I will be ready to leave Phnom Penh and go to a convenient place to meet them face to face."

As for the international conference on Kampuchea, the PRK government believes that the best way towards the settlement of the situation around Kampuchea is to give the Kampuchean people an opportunity to decide their internal affairs without outside influence. If the settlement can be reached through negotiations between the sides concerned, then there will be no need to call an international conference on Kampuchea. But, whereas the conference on Kampuchea is by no means an urgent necessity, this is not the case with an international conference for the solution of problems of peace and stability in Southeast Asia. Such a conference is needed in order to settle the general problems of that region, and the PRK government supports the idea.

Responding at the press conference to the question about the possible effect of the victories won by the PRAK in the course of the 1985 spring offensive against the bases of the "coalition" along the Kampuchean-Thai border on the presence of "representatives of Democratic Kampuchea" at the United Nations, Hun Sen said: "We think that this year there will be no serious changes in this respect, because the Chinese expansionists and the US imperialists are still very obstinate about it. Regardless of whether there is any change or not, however, this will not be important to us, as everything will be decided by the situation inside Kampuchea."

The People's Republic of Kampuchea is developing and growing stronger. The achievements of our state would be unthinkable without the general support of the population. The Kampuchean people are confident of the irreversibility of the revolutionary transformations in the country. They trust their government and will never permit a repetition of the Pol Pot tragedy. The schemes of Kampuchea's enemies are doomed to failure.