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## Carta de fecha 15 de diciembre de 2023 dirigida a la Presidencia del Consejo de Seguridad por el Grupo de Expertos sobre la República Democrática del Congo

Los miembros del Grupo de Expertos sobre la República Democrática del Congo, cuyo mandato se prorrogó en virtud de la resolución [2688 \(2023\)](#) del Consejo de Seguridad, tienen el honor de transmitir adjunto, de conformidad con lo dispuesto en el párrafo 6 de dicha resolución, el informe de mitad de período sobre su labor.

El informe se presentó al Comité del Consejo de Seguridad establecido en virtud de la resolución [1533 \(2004\)](#) relativa a la República Democrática del Congo el 20 de noviembre de 2023, que lo examinó el 7 de diciembre de 2023.

El Grupo agradecería que la presente carta y el informe se señalaran a la atención de los miembros del Consejo de Seguridad y se publicaran como documento del Consejo.

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## Informe de mitad de período del Grupo de Expertos sobre la República Democrática del Congo

### *Resumen*

Las provincias del este de la República Democrática del Congo y la provincia de Mai-Ndombe se vieron afectadas por episodios de intensa violencia. En el contexto de la continua violencia armada y las tensiones políticas, la organización de las próximas elecciones generales, previstas para el 20 de diciembre de 2023, se vio negativamente afectada. El Grupo seguía preocupado por la posibilidad de que el proceso electoral desencadenara aún más violencia.

La crisis humanitaria en la República Democrática del Congo siguió deteriorándose, en particular en las provincias de Kivu del Norte, Ituri y Mai-Ndombe. El número de desplazados internos alcanzó casi los 7 millones de personas en todo el país, la cifra más alta jamás registrada en la República Democrática del Congo, y una de las mayores crisis de desplazamiento interno del mundo.

El conflicto armado en la provincia de Mai-Ndombe se extendió a las provincias vecinas, incluida la provincia de Kinshasa, y tuvo como saldo cientos de civiles muertos y cientos de aldeas, escuelas e instalaciones médicas destruidas. Las comunidades teke y yaka permanecían armadas y movilizadas. Los combatientes de Mobondo capturados o rendidos fueron reclutados por las Fuerzas Armadas de la República Democrática del Congo (FARDC), entrenados y enviados a Kivu del Norte para que lucharan contra el Movimiento del 23 de marzo (M23).

En la provincia de Ituri fracasaron los diálogos intercomunitarios destinados a poner coto a la violencia desenfrenada. El grupo armado Cooperativa para el Desarrollo del Congo/Union des révolutionnaires pour la défense du peuple congolais (CODECO-URDPC) incrementó los ataques contra civiles, inclusive en campamentos de desplazados internos. El grupo armado Zaïre, que seguía oponiéndose a toda iniciativa de paz, continuó armando y entrenando a sus combatientes.

En Kivu del Norte e Ituri, la intensificación de la operación Shuja contra las Fuerzas Democráticas Aliadas (FDA) siguió afectando al grupo armado sancionado. Sin embargo, las FDA seguían ofreciendo resistencia y adaptando sus estrategias y tácticas, en particular mediante un aumento de los ataques en Uganda.

En el contexto de la lucha por “liberar” territorios de las garras de grupos armados “extranjeros” como el M23, los grupos armados congoleños adoptaron la bandera de los Wazalendo o “verdaderos patriotas” para legitimarse y posicionarse mejor de cara a una posible integración en las FARDC.

En Kivu del Norte, todas las partes en conflicto violaban el acuerdo de alto el fuego. La coalición de grupos armados Voluntarios por la Defensa de la Patria (VDP), de reciente creación y patrocinada por el Gobierno, desencadenó un estallido de violencia. Se reanudaron los intensos combates entre el M23, apoyado por la Fuerza de Defensa de Rwanda (FDR), y las FARDC, apoyadas por los VDP, las Fuerzas Democráticas de Liberación de Rwanda (FDLR), empresas militares privadas y contingentes de las Fuerzas de Defensa Nacional de Burundi. Civiles pertenecientes a todas las comunidades se encontraban en el punto de mira de las distintas partes en conflicto, expuestos a represalias y obligados a huir. Ambas partes perpetraban bombardeos indiscriminados, secuestros y asesinatos selectivos.

Fuerzas especiales de la Guardia Republicana dieron muerte a más de 57 manifestantes desarmados en Goma, tras escucharse rumores de que habían sido infiltrados por el M23.

En Kivu del Sur, la crisis del M23 repercutió en la dinámica de los grupos armados, en particular en sus territorios septentrionales. Grupos armados intentaban beneficiarse de su condición de “wazalendos” para seguir reclutando, ampliar su influencia y llevar a cabo actividades delictivas. Combatientes de varias facciones de Raia Mutomboki y Mai-Mai Kirikicho llegaron a Kivu del Norte para luchar contra el M23. Paralelamente, se confirmó la colaboración entre Twirwaneho y el M23.

Grupos armados y redes delictivas seguían participando en la explotación y el comercio de recursos naturales. En Rubaya, grupos armados “wazalendos” controlaban emplazamientos dentro de los principales perímetros de explotación, poniendo así en peligro la cadena de suministro de tungsteno. No se respetaba la prohibición de la explotación minera impuesta por el Gobierno de la República Democrática del Congo, mientras la cadena de suministro se veía contaminada por minerales cuya explotación beneficiaba a esos grupos “wazalendos”.

Primera Gold RDC continuaba impulsando las exportaciones oficiales de oro desde la República Democrática del Congo. Sin embargo, se observaban grandes deficiencias en el cumplimiento de las obligaciones de diligencia debida de la empresa, sobre todo en relación con el origen del oro comercializado.

Los actos de desobediencia respecto de los funcionarios de minas podrían repercutir en la lucha contra el contrabando de oro, que seguía su curso, sobre todo debido a la financiación anticipada con ayuda del blanqueo de dinero por parte de particulares y redes regionales e internacionales.

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\* Los anexos se distribuyen únicamente en el idioma en que fueron presentados y sin revisión editorial oficial.

## I. Introducción

1. El mandato del Grupo de Expertos sobre la República Democrática del Congo se prorrogó el 27 de junio de 2023 en virtud de la resolución [2688 \(2023\)](#) del Consejo de Seguridad. Seis miembros del Grupo de Expertos fueron nombrados por el Secretario General el 27 de julio de 2023 ([S/2023/567](#)). Tras la dimisión de un experto en recursos naturales y finanzas, se nombró a un nuevo experto el 25 de octubre de 2023 ([S/2023/801](#)).

2. El informe de mitad de período del Grupo se presenta en cumplimiento de lo dispuesto en el párrafo 6 de la resolución [2688 \(2023\)](#). De conformidad con la solicitud formulada por el Consejo en el párrafo 8 de su resolución [2360 \(2017\)](#), reafirmada en la resolución [2688 \(2020\)](#), el Grupo siguió intercambiando información con los grupos de expertos sobre Libia, la República Centroafricana, Somalia, Sudán del Sur y el Yemen.

### **Cooperación con la Misión de Estabilización de las Naciones Unidas en la República Democrática del Congo**

3. El Grupo de Expertos expresa su gratitud por el apoyo y la colaboración prestados por la Misión de Estabilización de las Naciones Unidas en la República Democrática del Congo (MONUSCO) durante el período que abarca el informe.

### **Metodología**

4. El Grupo de Expertos aplicó las normas probatorias recomendadas por el Grupo de Trabajo Oficioso del Consejo de Seguridad sobre Cuestiones Generales Relativas a las Sanciones ([S/2006/997](#)). El Grupo basó sus conclusiones en documentos y corroboró la información recurriendo como mínimo a tres fuentes independientes y fidedignas.

5. Dada la naturaleza del conflicto en la República Democrática del Congo, pocos documentos proporcionan pruebas definitivas de transferencias de armas, reclutamiento, responsabilidad de mando por abusos graves de los derechos humanos y explotación ilícita de los recursos naturales. Por tanto, el Grupo se basó en declaraciones de testigos presenciales de comunidades locales, excombatientes y combatientes activos de grupos armados. El Grupo de Expertos también ha tenido en cuenta testimonios periciales aportados por funcionarios públicos y oficiales militares de países de la región de los Grandes Lagos y otros países, así como por fuentes de las Naciones Unidas.

6. El presente informe abarca las investigaciones realizadas hasta el 5 de noviembre de 2023. Debido a la limitación del número de palabras, el Grupo de Expertos ha descrito algunas de sus conclusiones y pruebas en los anexos.

## II. Mai-Ndombe

7. El conflicto iniciado a mediados de 2022 en el territorio de Kwamouth, en la provincia de Mai-Ndombe, que enfrentaba entre sí sobre todo a las comunidades teke y yaka ([S/2023/431](#), párrs. 9 a 10), se había intensificado y extendido a las provincias vecinas de Kwango, Kwilu, Kinshasa y Kongo Central (véase el anexo 1).<sup>1</sup> La violencia amenazaba con envolver a Kinshasa, la capital, donde viven miembros de las

<sup>1</sup> Fuerzas Armadas de la República Democrática del Congo (FARDC), Misión de Estabilización de las Naciones Unidas en la República Democrática del Congo (MONUSCO), investigadores, fuentes gubernamentales, sociedad civil y testimonios.

comunidades teke y yaka, entre ellos miles de civiles desplazados por el conflicto<sup>2</sup>. La aparición de Mobondo, grupo de combatientes predominantemente yaka (párrs. 11 a 13), obstruyó los esfuerzos de reconciliación. Ambas comunidades permanecían armadas y movilizadas.

8. Aunque las tensiones intercomunitarias seguían siendo pronunciadas, intereses económicos, como el acceso a la tierra y a los bienes, e intereses políticos, como el restablecimiento del poder consuetudinario, influían notablemente en la continuación del conflicto (véase el anexo 2). El aumento de los ataques de Mobondo contra las FARDC llevó a las autoridades militares a calificar el conflicto de “insurreccional”<sup>3</sup>.

9. Los mortíferos ataques de los teke y los yaka provocaron desplazamientos masivos de población, lo que agudizó la grave crisis humanitaria (véase el anexo 3). Desde el inicio del conflicto, se quemaron aldeas enteras y tanto los teke como los yaka establecieron puestos de control en busca de miembros de otras comunidades consideradas hostiles<sup>4</sup>. En el territorio de Kwamouth y en el municipio de Maluku de Kinshasa, se habían destruido casi la mitad de las aldeas<sup>5</sup>. Cientos de escuelas y centros médicos habían quedado destruidos o se habían visto obligados a cerrar. Se denunciaron graves violaciones de los derechos humanos, como violencia sexual, secuestros para obtener rescate y tortura<sup>6</sup>.

10. Cientos de civiles habían perecido en ambas partes<sup>7</sup>. Es probable que las cifras sean mucho más elevadas, ya que siguen sin denunciarse la violencia y los actos delictivos y resulta difícil atribuir responsabilidades debido a la falta de acceso a las zonas de conflicto.

11. Los ataques de los teke contra lo que consideraban comunidades “no nativas” provocaron violentas represalias por parte de los yaka, que empezaron a organizar el grupo de combatientes Mobondo, al que se incorporaron miembros de otras comunidades aliadas, como los suku, mbala, ndinga, songe y ngongo. La organización y el modus operandi de Mobondo se describen en el anexo 4 del presente informe.

12. A lo largo de 2023, Mobondo elevó su grado de organización, aumentó sus capacidades militares y ejecutó ataques de tipo militar<sup>8</sup>. Sin embargo, aún no está claro si Mobondo es un grupo homogéneo estructurado jerárquicamente o una coalición de bandas afines sin una comandancia central.

13. Las operaciones de las FARDC condujeron al desarme y la detención de cientos de combatientes armados, principalmente de Mobondo. Aunque algunos fueron encarcelados y sometidos a juicio, muchos fueron trasladados a centros de capacitación de las FARDC, principalmente a Kitona. Además, Fabrice Zombi “Mini Kongo”, designado por el Presidente de la República Democrática del Congo como jefe negociador entre los yaka y los teke, movilizó a cientos de integrantes de Mobondo para que se unieran a los campos de entrenamiento de las FARDC (anexo 5). “Mini Kongo” es un jefe tradicional suku, reconocido como una figura ceremonial por los yaka. Por ello, los Teke lo acusaron de colaborar con Mobondo y de armarlo<sup>9</sup>.

<sup>2</sup> Sobre todo en las comunas de Maluku, Kimbaseke, Masina y Ndjili.

<sup>3</sup> Fuente de las FARDC.

<sup>4</sup> Testigos presenciales, investigador, MONUSCO y fuentes de la sociedad civil.

<sup>5</sup> Fuentes gubernamentales, representante provincial de Mai-Ndombe, sociedad civil y testigos presenciales.

<sup>6</sup> FARDC, MONUSCO, investigadores, fuentes gubernamentales, sociedad civil y testimonios.

<sup>7</sup> MONUSCO, fuentes humanitarias y de la sociedad civil, investigadores y fuentes gubernamentales.

<sup>8</sup> FARDC, investigadores, sociedad civil y fuentes de la MONUSCO.

<sup>9</sup> Véase el anexo 2.

14. Según pudo documentar el Grupo, más de 1.000 combatientes de Mai-Ndombe y otros lugares, incluidos combatientes de Mobondo que se habían entregado, fueron reclutados, entrenados y enviados a Kivu del Norte, en el este de la República Democrática del Congo, para luchar contra el M23, sin que se hubiesen investigado sus antecedentes. Su presencia en Kivu del Norte entre los contingentes recientemente desplegados de las FARDC fue confirmada por el Grupo<sup>10</sup>.

### **III. Kivu del Norte**

#### **A. Fuerzas Democráticas Aliadas**

##### **Novedades sobre las operaciones de las Naciones Unidas en la República Democrática del Congo**

15. El grupo armado sancionado FDA (CDe.1) siguió ofreciendo resistencia, a pesar de la intensificación y la expansión geográfica de la Operación Shuja que lo afectó ([S/2023/431](#), párrs. 11 y 12). Las Fuerzas de Defensa del Pueblo de Uganda (FDPU), según informaron ellas mismas, habían dado muerte a más de 550 combatientes de las FDA desde el comienzo de la operación y afirmaron que “las FDA pronto serían cosa del pasado” (véase el anexo 6). Según las FDPU y el Presidente de Uganda, Yoweri Museveni, importantes líderes de las FDA, como Mulalo<sup>11</sup> y Meddie Nkalubo<sup>12</sup>, habían sido asesinados (véase el anexo 7). Sin embargo, el Grupo de Expertos no pudo confirmar esas muertes. Las FDA continuaron desplazándose hacia el oeste, a fin de evadir la presión militar, adaptando sus tácticas, operando en pequeños grupos móviles y realizando ataques esporádicos, sobre todo en zonas remotas y a lo largo de las carreteras (en particular la carretera nacional de Beni-Komanda-Mambasa) y en los campos agrícolas, aprovechando la ausencia de la autoridad del Estado (véase el anexo 8)<sup>13</sup>.

16. Los dirigentes de las FDA decidieron reducir los ataques en la República Democrática del Congo, especialmente para granjearse las simpatías y el apoyo de la población (véase el anexo 9) y centrarse en los ataques en Uganda (párrs. 17 y 18). Ello dio lugar a intermitentes pausas en los ataques de las FDA en Ituri y, en particular, en el territorio de Beni desde julio de 2023<sup>14</sup>. En el momento de redactarse el presente informe, dichas demandas seguían pendientes.

##### **Ataques de las Fuerzas Democráticas Aliadas en Uganda**

17. Desde diciembre de 2022, combatientes de las FDA se han infiltrado periódicamente en Uganda, donde han llevado a cabo al menos cinco ataques mortales, entre ellos uno contra una escuela en Mpundwe en junio de 2023 (véase el anexo 10 y el párr. 19). Ello marcó un importante giro en la situación, pues durante más de una década los ataques de las FDA se habían concentrado principalmente en la República Democrática del Congo. Esos recientes ataques en Uganda también se diferenciaban desde el punto de vista operacional de los asesinatos selectivos, ataques con artefactos explosivos improvisados o intentos de atentado ([S/2022/479](#), anexo 26) perpetrados en suelo ugandés en los últimos años y atribuidos a las FDA. Los cinco

<sup>10</sup> FARDC, fuentes de organismos de inteligencia, investigadores, sociedad civil y testigos presenciales.

<sup>11</sup> Véase [S/2021/560](#), anexo 4.

<sup>12</sup> Véase [S/2023/431](#), párrs. 32 y 38.

<sup>13</sup> Excombatientes, colaboradores y fuentes internas de las FDA, exsecuestrados, FARDC, investigadores, sociedad civil, fuentes diplomáticas y de la MONUSCO.

<sup>14</sup> Excombatientes de las FDA, exsecuestrados, FARDC, investigadores, fuentes de la MONUSCO y diplomáticas.

ataques fueron perpetrados por combatientes de las FDA que operaban en la República Democrática del Congo y que habían cruzado la frontera con Uganda, a diferencia de otros ataques en los que la FDA movilizó a colaboradores en Uganda para llevar a cabo matanzas o colocar artefactos explosivos improvisados en la República Democrática del Congo.

18. Los recientes ataques en Uganda reflejaban estrategias ya documentadas de las FDA con el doble objetivo de vengarse de las operaciones de las FDPU y las FARDC y hacer que el centro de la atención de esas operaciones se desviara de las zonas de las FDA en la República Democrática del Congo ([S/2022/967](#), párr. 7)<sup>15</sup>. Además, esos ataques habrían albergado la intención de demostrar que las FDA conservaban su capacidad para llevar a cabo ataques en gran escala y de gran repercusión en los medios y avergonzar así al Gobierno de Uganda, que se había mostrado muy firme en sus victorias contra las FDA en la República Democrática del Congo. Los ataques en Uganda también formaban parte de una nueva estrategia de las FDA para desviar la atención hacia Uganda en detrimento de la República Democrática del Congo.

### **Dinámica interna de las Fuerzas Democráticas Aliadas**

19. Según múltiples fuentes, habrían aumentado las tensiones internas en el seno de las FDA, especialmente entre la dirección central y los comandantes de las FDA destacados en Mwalika, Kivu del Norte, como los comandantes Amigo<sup>16</sup> y Abwakasi<sup>17</sup>. Las tensiones también eran reflejo de algunas líneas de división entre líderes de las FDA procedentes de Uganda, especialmente comandantes históricos, por un lado, y líderes no ugandeses, como Bonge la Chuma ([S/2022/967](#), párr. 23) y algunos de los líderes más radicales de las FDA que se habían unido al grupo en época más reciente, por el otro<sup>18</sup>. Por ejemplo, según fuentes internas de las FDA, el ataque de Mpondwe en Uganda había sido planeado por el comandante Abwakasi de las FDA sin que hubiese recibido ni instrucciones ni la aprobación de la persona sancionada Musa Baluku (CDi.036), líder general de las FDA.

### **Redes de las Fuerzas Democráticas Aliadas**

20. El Grupo siguió investigando las redes de colaboradores de las FDA. Dos estudios de caso (véase el anexo 11) ilustran la capacidad de las FDA para movilizar a colaboradores, incluso fuera de sus bastiones tradicionales, especialmente en Kivu del Sur y en los países vecinos. En lugar de valerse de la ideología, las FDA reclutaron y motivaron a sus colaboradores principalmente en la República Democrática del Congo por medio, sobre todo, del dinero y animándolos a cooptar a nuevos colaboradores, lo que les permitió renovar constantemente sus redes.

### **Adoctrinamiento, esclavitud sexual, reclutamiento local y transfronterizo, en particular de niños**

21. Las FDA prosiguieron su campaña de reclutamiento, tanto en la República Democrática del Congo como en el extranjero ([S/2021/560](#), párr. 15) y se dedicaron a la explotación sistemática de niñas y mujeres secuestradas como esclavas sexuales, bajo la supervisión de comandantes, como se detalla en el anexo 12 del presente informe.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.* Véanse también las declaraciones del Presidente de Uganda, Yoweri Museveni, de 18 de junio y 14 de julio de 2023.

<sup>16</sup> [S/2023/431](#), párr. 17.

<sup>17</sup> Véase especialmente [S/2021/560](#), anexo 4, y [S/2023/431](#), párrs. 24 a 37.

<sup>18</sup> Excombatientes de las FDA, fuentes internas, exsecuestrados, FARDC, investigadores, sociedad civil y fuentes diplomáticas.

## B. Crisis relacionada con el Movimiento 23 de Marzo

### **Violaciones del acuerdo de alto el fuego**

22. En el momento de redactarse el presente informe, todas las partes en el conflicto habían violado el acuerdo de alto el fuego, en vigor desde marzo de 2023.

23. El Gobierno de la República Democrática del Congo contribuyó a la creación de los Voluntarios por la Defensa de la Patria (VDP) a finales de septiembre de 2023 con el fin de desviar las acusaciones de preparar acciones ofensivas en violación del alto el fuego entre las FARDC y el M23 (párrs. 37 y 40).

24. El Mecanismo Conjunto de Verificación Ampliado de la Conferencia Internacional sobre la Región de los Grandes Lagos declaró que la ocupación por el M23, el 26 de septiembre de 2023, de la colina de Kanyamahoro, situada en la zona neutral entre las FARDC y el M23, constituía una violación del acuerdo de alto el fuego (véase el anexo 13 y [S/2023/431](#), anexo 18). Además, tras la muerte de un soldado keniano de las fuerzas de mantenimiento de la paz durante enfrentamientos en Kanyamahoro, la Fuerza Regional de la Comunidad de África Oriental declaró en un comunicado de prensa que el martes 24 de octubre de 2023 se había violado el acuerdo de alto el fuego entre las FARDC y el Grupo Armado M23<sup>19</sup> (véase el anexo 14).

25. Tras varios meses de relativa calma ([S/2023/431](#), párrs. 40 a 46), a partir de principios de octubre de 2023 se reanudaron los combates entre el M23 y diversos grupos armados, especialmente en torno a Kitchanga, Kibumba y Tongo. Los días 21 y 22 de octubre se registraron intensos combates entre el M23, apoyado por la FDR, y las FARDC, apoyadas por grupos armados locales, las FDLR, empresas militares privadas y las Fuerzas de Defensa Nacional de Burundi (FDNB) (párrs. 33 a 51). En el momento de redactarse el presente informe continuaban los combates en varios frentes, especialmente en Kanyamahoro-Kibumba-Rusayo, en el territorio de Nyirongo; Kalengera-Tongo-Bwiza y Bambu-Kishishe-Kibirisi-Rwindi en el territorio de Rutshuru; y Kilolirwe-Burungu-Kitchanga en el territorio de Masisi. Se registraron numerosas bajas entre las FARDC, la Fuerza de Defensa de Rwanda (FDR) y el M23, incluidos varios oficiales del M23 (véase el anexo 15).

### **Operaciones del Movimiento del 23 de marzo con el apoyo de las Fuerzas de Defensa de Rwanda**

#### *Territorios bajo control del Movimiento 23 de Marzo*

26. El Movimiento 23 de Marzo mantenía el control de posiciones estratégicas ([S/2023/431](#), párrs. 41 y 57), había recuperado el territorio perdido y conquistado nuevas zonas, a pesar de los importantes refuerzos de las FARDC y de su uso de apoderados (párrs. 33 a 51). Por ejemplo, el M23 lanzó una contraofensiva y reconquistó Kitchanga el 21 de octubre, dando muerte al menos a 30 miembros de las fuerzas especiales de las FARDC. El M23 también reconquistó varias localidades de la zona de Tongo, territorio de Rutshuru, y avanzó más hacia el norte, haciéndose con el control de Bambo el 26 de octubre de 2023. En el momento de redactarse el presente informe, intensos combates en Kibumba y sus alrededores, a lo largo de la frontera con Rwanda, hacían que aumentara la presión sobre Goma.

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<sup>19</sup> En el momento de redactarse el presente informe, el M23 y la FDR seguían presentes y activos en Kanyamahoro y sus alrededores (véanse los anexos 17 y 32).

*Entrenamiento y reclutamiento*

27. El Movimiento 23 de Marzo siguió consolidando su capacidad militar, en particular por medio del reclutamiento y el entrenamiento. El grupo armado organizó un “curso de repaso” militar de 3 meses de duración en Tshanzu a principios de mayo de 2023 (párr. 77) y entrenamientos en técnicas de combate urbano<sup>20</sup>. Combatientes del M23 rendidos, el portavoz militar del M23 y fuentes de organismos de inteligencia informaron de que el objetivo militar del M23 era hacerse con el control del aeropuerto de Kavumu, Goma y Bukavu, infiltrándose para ello en varias localidades. El equipo de infiltración previsto iba a estar dirigido por el “Comandante” Mirindi ([S/2023/431](#), anexo 25) y el “Coronel” Zairois<sup>21</sup>. Este último murió en combate en Kilolirwe (párr. 25).

28. Desde principios de mayo hasta principios de junio de 2023, el M23 también se entrenó en la Academia Militar de la FDR en Gako, Rwanda, según un oficial de la FDR y fuentes de organismos de inteligencia y de seguridad .

*Continuo apoyo de la Fuerza de Defensa de Rwanda al Movimiento 23 de Marzo*

29. El Gobierno de Rwanda siguió afirmando que Rwanda no apoyaba al M23 y no tenía contingentes en la República Democrática del Congo (véase el anexo 16). Sin embargo, el Grupo de Expertos obtuvo nuevas pruebas —incluidas imágenes aéreas y pruebas fotográficas— de intervenciones directas y refuerzos de contingentes por parte de la FDR en territorio de la República Democrática del Congo, en particular en los territorios de Masisi, Rutshuru y Nyiragongo ([S/2023/431](#), párrs. 54 a 61). La presencia y las operaciones de la FDR fueron confirmadas por combatientes del M23 que se rindieron, exmiembros de la FDR, así como por fuentes de organismos de inteligencia, la sociedad civil y las Fuerza Regional de la Comunidad de África Oriental, líderes y combatientes de grupos armados y testigos presenciales (véase el anexo 17).

30. Según excombatientes del M23 y fuentes de organismos de inteligencia, desde principios de octubre de 2023, soldados de la FDR de cinco batallones diferentes se habían desplegado en los territorios de Nyiragongo, Rutshuru y Masisi. La FDR y el M23 contaban con el apoyo de varios equipos de apoyo de combate y reconocimiento, que sumaban un total de 250 excombatientes de las FDLR y operaban bajo el mando del Departamento de Inteligencia de Defensa de Rwanda (DID)<sup>22</sup>. Testigos presenciales, un oficial de la FDR y fuentes diplomáticas informaron al Grupo de que varias docenas de soldados de la FDR habían resultado heridos y muertos en emboscadas tendidas por grupos armados en el Parque Nacional de Virunga y bombardeos por las FARDC contra posiciones de la FDR en territorio de Nyiragongo. Los heridos y muertos fueron evacuados por carretera a Rwanda.

*Armamento de alta tecnología*

31. En junio de 2023, se recuperó una granada de mortero guiada de 120 mm sin detonar en Murambi, cerca de Mushaki, territorio de Masisi, donde se documentaron hostilidades activas, incluida la presencia y las operaciones de la FDR y el M23 ([S/2023/431](#), párrs. 56 a 57 y anexo 26). El 24 de octubre de 2023, se recuperaron restos de un mortero guiado similar de 120 mm a 15 metros del campamento de las FARDC en Kanyamahoro, que había sido bombardeado desde las colinas controladas por la FDR ese mismo día (anexo 18).

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<sup>20</sup> Combatientes rendidos del M23 y fuentes de organismos de inteligencia.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.* Excombatientes del M23.

32. El Grupo observa que ese tipo de proyectil de mortero, que contiene componentes para la medición por láser y por el Sistema de Posicionamiento Global y, por tanto, proporciona capacidad de ataque de precisión y alta letalidad, no se había documentado en territorio de la República Democrática del Congo, ni tampoco como parte del arsenal de las FARDC.

#### **Grupos armados utilizados como apoderados por la República Democrática del Congo**

33. Durante el período que abarca el informe, el Grupo de Expertos documentó la intensificación de la movilización y el uso, por parte del Gobierno de la República Democrática del Congo, de grupos armados, incluidas las FDLR, como apoderados para luchar contra el M23 y la FDR ([S/2023/431](#), párrs. 79 a 85). Se trata de los mismos grupos armados que han participado en la perpetuación del conflicto en Kivu del Norte y que han perpetrado ataques contra civiles y contra las FARDC ([S/2017/672/Rev.1](#), párrs. 52 a 61, [S/2018/531](#), párrs. 70 a 85)

34. Inicialmente conocida como Alliance des Résistants de la Patrie (ARP) ([S/2022/967](#), párrs. 64 a 71 y [S/2023/431](#), párrs. 75 a 78), la coalición de grupos armados empezó a llamarse a sí misma Wazalendo desde marzo de 2023 (véase el Resumen). La coalición ganó en notoriedad cuando se unieron más grupos de Kivu del Norte y Kivu del Sur (véase el anexo 19 y párrs. 83 a 87).

35. Tras el aumento de los ataques del M23 y su expansión territorial desde principios de 2023 ([S/2023/431](#), párrs. 40 a 46), las FARDC empezaron a planificar operaciones destinadas a “neutralizar al enemigo” y “conquistar las posiciones perdidas” (véase el anexo 20). En reuniones a puerta cerrada, la jerarquía militar también expresó la necesidad de movilizar a los Wazalendo contra el M23 y la FDR<sup>23</sup>. Desde junio de 2023, el Jefe del Estado Mayor de las FARDC, General Tshiweve Songsesha, coordinó varias reuniones ([S/2023/431](#), párr. 79) con la mayoría de los líderes de los grupos armados activos en la región de Petit Nord hostiles al M23 (véase el anexo 21).

36. A finales de septiembre de 2023, el recién nombrado Gobernador *ad interim* y Comandante de Operaciones de Kivu del Norte, General Peter Nkuba Cirimwami, convocó a una reunión en Goma con los líderes de esos grupos armados (véase anexo 22). También asistieron personas sancionadas, como el dirigente de Nduma Defensa del Congo-Renovado (NDC-R) Guidon Shimiray Mwisa (CDi.033) y los dirigentes de las Fuerzas Democráticas de Liberación de Rwanda-Fuerzas Combatientes Abacunguzi (FDLR/FOCA) (véase el anexo 23), según observó el Grupo de Expertos. Veintiún líderes y combatientes de grupos armados fueron trasladados a las reuniones en un helicóptero de las FARDC<sup>24</sup>.

37. La jerarquía militar de las FARDC afirmó que esa reunión se había organizado en el marco del Programa de Desmovilización, Desarme, Recuperación Comunitaria y Estabilización a fin de sensibilizar a los grupos armados para que se desarmaran<sup>25</sup>. Sin embargo, según algunas fuentes, el Programa era un disfraz para evitar acusaciones de comisión de actos sancionables o preparar acciones ofensivas en violación del alto el fuego entre las FARDC y el M23, en vigor desde marzo de 2023.

38. El Grupo de Expertos observa que los funcionarios del Programa de Desmovilización, Desarme, Recuperación Comunitaria y Estabilización no

<sup>23</sup> Fuentes cercanas al mando de las FARDC, líderes de grupos armados, fuentes de las FARDC y de la MONUSCO.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>25</sup> Cirimwami, Gobernador Militar de Kivu del Norte, Ministro encargado de la Defensa Nacional, fuentes de las FARDC.

estuvieron presentes en la reunión. Además, algunas fuentes confirmaron que, de hecho, la reunión había tenido como tema principal la elaboración de una estrategia operacional conjunta de las FARDC y Wazalendo para luchar contra el M23 y la FDR. En la estrategia se definían las respectivas zonas de responsabilidad, las operaciones, la logística y el suministro de armas de los Wazalendo (párr. 39 y [S/2023/431](#), párrs. 79 a 85)<sup>26</sup>. También se establecían los VDP, compuestos por 8.000 combatientes de Wazalendo, dirigidos por Janvier Karairi Boingo de la Alianza de Patriotas por un Congo Libre y Soberano (APCLS), Dominique Ndaruhutse, conocido también como Domi, de Nyatura-Colectivo de Movimientos por el Cambio-Fuerzas de Defensa del Pueblo (CMC-FDP) y Guidon Shimiray Mwisa (véase el anexo 24), para que sirviera como fuerza asociada de las FARDC.

39. A principios de octubre de 2023, una semana después de la reunión de Goma, grupos armados de los VDP lanzaron operaciones ofensivas contra las posiciones del M23. La oficina del Gobernador de Kivu del Norte coordinó las operaciones de los VDP. Combatientes de los VDP y otros combatientes de Wazalendo, a veces junto con las FARDC, se desplegaron en los territorios de Walikale, Nyiragongo, Masisi y Rutshuru, incluidas zonas de despliegue de la Fuerza regional de la Comunidad de África Oriental ([S/2023/431](#), párrs. 44 a 46), bien para defender posiciones estratégicas como Kibumba y Goma, bien para atacar y recuperar zonas controladas por el M23, como Kilolirwe, Kirumbu, Kibarizo, Kitchanga y Bwisa. Las FARDC proporcionaron armas, logística y dinero en efectivo a líderes y combatientes de los VDP, bajo la coordinación del Coronel Christophe Kenge, Administrador Militar Territorial de Masisi y del Coronel de las FARDC Salomon Tokolonga (véase el anexo 25), en violación del embargo de armas y del régimen de sanciones. Combatientes de los VDP, la mayoría vestidos con uniformes de las FARDC, llevaban como identificación brazaletes de distintos colores (véase el anexo 26). El Grupo de Expertos documentó abusos cometidos por combatientes de los VDP contra civiles en las zonas bajo su control (párr. 54).

40. Se informó al Grupo de que el uso de los VDP como apoderados contaba con el apoyo de los más altos mandos del ejército con el fin de asegurar una victoria militar sobre el M23 y la FDR antes de las elecciones presidenciales<sup>27</sup>. Hasta finales de octubre de 2023, las FARDC afirmaron respetar el acuerdo de alto el fuego “tal como había solicitado la jerarquía política”<sup>28</sup>.

### **Fuerza de Reserva de la Defensa Nacional**

41. La ley por la que se instituía una fuerza de reserva de defensa nacional, conocida como RAD<sup>29</sup>, se publicó en el Diario Oficial de la República Democrática del Congo en julio de 2023<sup>30</sup>. Su proyecto de decreto de aplicación, asesorado por el Grupo de Expertos, estaba siendo examinado por el Gobierno en el momento de redactarse el presente informe. El Grupo observó con preocupación que el proyecto de decreto excluía de la RAD únicamente a las personas “condenadas” por crímenes de guerra, crímenes de lesa humanidad o genocidio. Ello no eximirá a la mayoría de los combatientes o líderes de grupos armados, como Guidon Shimiray Mwisa, Janvier Karahiri y Dominique Ndarurutse, conocidos por haber cometido tales delitos pero que han eludido la justicia.

<sup>26</sup> Fuentes cercanas al mando de las FARDC, líderes y combatientes de grupos armados, sociedad civil y fuentes de organismos de inteligencia.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>28</sup> Fuentes de las FARDC y fuentes cercanas al mando de las FARDC.

<sup>29</sup> Réserve Armée de la Défense de la République démocratique du Congo.

<sup>30</sup> Véase [S/2023/431](#), anexo 51.

42. La confusión sobre el estatus jurídico real de la RAD fue aprovechada por los grupos armados. Aunque no se había puesto en marcha el registro oficial de la RAD, varios líderes y combatientes proclamaron que ya eran miembros de la RAD, alegación de la que se valieron para justificar su participación en operaciones militares. Se informó al Grupo de que a varios líderes de grupos armados, incluido el sancionado Guidon Shimiray, se les habían prometido puestos claves en el seno de la RAD a cambio de su apoyo en la lucha contra el M23.

#### **Apoyo de la Fuerzas de Defensa Nacional de Burundi a las Fuerzas Armadas de la República Democrática del Congo**

43. Fuentes cercanas al mando de las FARDC, corroboradas por múltiples fuentes<sup>31</sup>, informaron de que 1.070 efectivos de las FDNB, vestidos con uniformes de las FARDC, permanecían desplegados de forma encubierta desde principios de octubre de 2023 a lo largo de la carretera Sake-Kitchanga con el objetivo de asegurar el territorio de Masisi contra los ataques del M23 y la FDR, junto con las FARDC y Wazalendo. Ese despliegue se realizó fuera del marco de la Fuerza Regional de la Comunidad de África Oriental.

44. Según el comandante de la Fuerza Regional de la Comunidad de África Oriental, los contingentes burundeses que participaban en la zona de operaciones de Masisi se consideraban fuerzas legítimas solo si formaban parte de la Fuerza Regional de la Comunidad de África Oriental. El cuartel general militar y el Gobierno de Burundi negaron que las FDNB se hubiesen desplegado en Kivu del Norte fuera del marco de la Fuerza Regional de la Comunidad de África Oriental (véase el anexo 27). Asimismo, el Ministro de Defensa de la República Democrática del Congo, Jean-Pierre Bemba, y el General Cirimwami declararon al Grupo que no tenían conocimiento de ninguna cooperación bilateral entre las FDNB y las FARDC en la región de Petit Nord (véase el anexo 28). Sin embargo, según fuentes cercanas al mando de las FARDC y fuentes de las FARDC y de los grupos armados, Cirimwami había ordenado y dirigido el despliegue de las FDNB siguiendo instrucciones de su jerarquía militar. El M23 y funcionarios rwandeses denunciaron el despliegue de las FDNB fuera del marco de la Fuerza Regional de la Comunidad de África Oriental (véase el anexo 29).

45. A partir del 21 de septiembre, contingentes de las FDNB fueron transportados de Buyumbura a Goma en aviones y con uniformes y equipo de las FARDC (véase anexo el 30) y desplegados en Minova y sus alrededores, en Kivu del Sur ([S/2023/431](#), párr. 42)<sup>32</sup>.

46. El 7 de octubre de 2023, dos compañías de las FDNB se desplegaron de Minova a Kabati, varios kilómetros al este de Kitchanga<sup>33</sup>. El 16 de octubre de 2023, a petición de las FARDC, la empresa militar privada Congo Protection transportó a Kitchanga seis camiones de efectivos de las FDNB que vestían uniformes de las FARDC<sup>34</sup>. El despliegue de las FDNB continuó hasta por lo menos el 20 de octubre de 2023. Posteriormente, contingentes de las FDNB, junto con las FARDC y Wazalendo, sostuvieron enfrentamientos con el M23 en los alrededores de Kitchanga y Kilolirwe<sup>35</sup>.

<sup>31</sup> Fuentes de organismos de inteligencia y de seguridad, investigadores, fuentes cercanas al mando de las FARDC.

<sup>32</sup> Fuentes de organismos de inteligencia y de seguridad, fuentes cercanas al mando de las FARDC.

<sup>33</sup> Fuentes de organismos de inteligencia y de seguridad y de las FARDC, combatientes de grupos armados.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.* Fuentes cercanas al mando de las FARDC.

<sup>35</sup> Líderes de grupos armado, fuentes de organismos de seguridad, FARDC y sociedad civil.

### **Apoyo táctico de empresas militares privadas a la contraofensiva de las Fuerzas Armadas de la República Democrática del Congo**

47. Dos empresas militares privadas, Agemira RDC y Congo Protection, intensificaron su apoyo estratégico y táctico a la contraofensiva de las FARDC contra el M23 y la FDR en la región de Petit Nord (véase el anexo 31 y [S/2023/431](#), párrs. 41, 47 y 48).

48. Además de entrenar e instruir a las unidades de las FARDC ([S/2023/431](#), anexo 23), Congo Protection supervisó los ataques de artillería contra posiciones del M23 y de las FDR, ordenados por las FARDC siguiendo la asesoría estratégica de Agemira. Por ejemplo, el 6 de octubre de 2023, tras ser blanco de ataques con mortero de 120 mm contra una posición de las FARDC en Kanyamahoro, las FARDC lanzaron 27 granadas de mortero de 82 mm y diez de 120 mm contra una posición conjunta M23-RDF (véase el anexo 32).

49. La jerarquía de las FARDC y Agemira RDC solicitaron el despliegue de Congo Protection en zonas de combate como Kitchanga y Rwindi. Tras una misión de reconocimiento, los dirigentes de Congo Protection desestimaron la solicitud<sup>36</sup>. En cambio, Congo Protection aceptó transportar a fuerzas especiales de las FARDC y a las FDNB a Kitchanga y sus alrededores. Desde agosto de 2023, se desplegaron 80 efectivos de Congo Protection para que protegieran el aeropuerto de Kavumu, en Bukavu, contra un ataque que se esperaba lanzaría el M23.

50. El reacondicionamiento por Agemira RDC de los activos aéreos militares de las FARDC permitió llevar a cabo operaciones aéreas específicamente contra posiciones del M23 y de las FDR. Por ejemplo, el 28 de octubre de 2023, con el apoyo de Agemira RDC, las FARDC planificaron y ejecutaron ataques aéreos utilizando un avión SukhoiSu-25, en el curso de los cuales se arrojaron dos bombas de 250 kg y dos de 500 kg y cohetes de 57 mm sobre una posición conjunta M23-RDF a lo largo de la carretera nacional Rutshuru-Bunagana cerca de Kibumba (véase el anexo 33).

51. La dirección de Agemira también prestó apoyo estratégico a la planificación y el mando de las operaciones de las FARDC en la región de Petit Nord, llevó a cabo operaciones de reconocimiento del terreno en tiempo real, planificó el suministro de armas, el entrenamiento de las FARDC y la logística con vistas a esas operaciones<sup>37</sup>.

### **C. Incitación a la hostilidad y a la violencia**

52. Continuaron proliferando el discurso del odio y la incitación a la violencia, en particular contra las poblaciones rwandófonas ([S/2022/967](#), párrs. 72 a 77 y [S/2023/431](#), párrs. 98 a 103).

53. Justin Bitakwira<sup>38</sup>, miembro de la Asamblea Nacional, continuó recurriendo al discurso de odio, valiéndose para ello de un lenguaje excluyente, fomentando la discriminación y la hostilidad hacia las comunidades tutsi y banyamulenge ([S/2021/560](#), párr. 154, [S/2022/967](#), párr. 73), en particular durante una entrevista emitida en YouTube el 6 de julio de 2023 (véase el anexo 34). El 20 de julio de 2023, Bitakwira fue citado por la fiscalía ante el Tribunal de Casación e interrogado sobre su uso de “lenguaje tribal” contra la comunidad tutsi (véase el anexo 35)<sup>39</sup>. Las autoridades no emprendieron acciones judiciales contra Bitakwira.

<sup>36</sup> Empresas militares privadas, FARDC, fuentes de organismos de seguridad y gubernamentales.

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>38</sup> Justin Bitakwira está sometido a sanciones de la Unión Europea por propagar discursos de odio.

<sup>39</sup> Declaración de Justin Bitakwira el 20 de julio de 2023.

54. En el contexto de la reanudación de los combates en la región de Petit Nord a partir de principios de octubre de 2023, reapareció la retórica beligerante dirigida contra la comunidad tutsi, de la que se percibía que apoyaba colectivamente al M23 ([S/431/2023](#), párrs. 100 y 101). Tras la toma de Kitchanga por los VDP los días 4 y 5 de octubre, la comunidad tutsi que vivía en la zona<sup>40</sup> huyó de nuevo (véase el anexo 36) y se destruyeron casas pertenecientes a tutsis<sup>41</sup>. Un anciano discapacitado fue brutalmente asesinado en su casa de Burungu por ser tutsi y el pueblo de Nturo fue incendiado por los VDP con el pretexto de que los tutsis acogían a elementos del M23 (véase el anexo 37)<sup>42</sup>.

#### **D. Masacre de manifestantes desarmados a manos de la Guardia Republicana**

55. La secta místico-religiosa Foi Naturelle Judaïque Messianique vers les Nations (FNJMN) planeó una manifestación el 30 de agosto de 2023 contra la MONUSCO y algunos organismos de las Naciones Unidas<sup>43</sup>. Información no corroborada procedente de archivos militares de que la secta había sido infiltrada por elementos del M23 condujo a un brutal ataque contra los miembros de la secta por parte de las fuerzas especiales de la Guardia Republicana, que dieron muerte a más de 57 civiles desarmados el 30 de agosto de 2023. Para una descripción detallada del incidente, véase el anexo 38.

56. La justicia militar incoó procedimientos penales por delitos flagrantes contra dos oficiales de la Guardia Republicana, el Coronel Mikombe Mike, comandante del mando militar conjunto de la Guardia Republicana (*commandant interarmées*) en Kivu Norte, y el Teniente Coronel Bawili Donatien, comandante de la Unidad Especial del 19º Regimiento de la Guardia Republicana, también conocida como “Hiboux”, y cuatro soldados. A principios de octubre, el tribunal militar condenó a muerte al Coronel Mikombe y absolió de todos los cargos al Teniente Coronel Bawili. Investigaciones del Grupo de Expertos basadas en videos y testimonios de testigos oculares confirmaron la presencia de ambos agentes en la escena del crimen.

57. El Fiscal Militar no llevó a cabo más investigaciones sobre las órdenes dadas por el alto mando de la Guardia Republicana, en particular el papel del General de División Ephraïm Kabi, Comandante de la Guardia Republicana. Tampoco se prosiguieron las investigaciones sobre otros posibles sospechosos, identificados por el Grupo a partir de las pruebas de video disponibles (véase el anexo 39).

58. En el momento de redactarse el presente informe, el Grupo de Expertos señala que la Unidad Especial Hiboux de la Guardia Republicana que había participado en la masacre seguía combatiendo en Kivu del Norte contra el M23.

#### **E. Colapso de la diligencia debida en el sector del estaño, el tantalio y el tungsteno en Rubaya**

59. Durante el período sobre el que se informa, la diligencia debida se vio gravemente comprometida en los dos sitios de explotación minera autorizados en Rubaya, en particular el PE4731 y el PE76, debido a la injerencia generalizada de

<sup>40</sup> En poblados como Nturo, Kilorirwe, Burnugu, Kitchanga, Kabarekasha.

<sup>41</sup> MONUSCO, sociedad civil y fuentes humanitarias.

<sup>42</sup> Sociedad civil, MONUSCO y fuentes humanitarias.

<sup>43</sup> MONUSCO, FARDC, sociedad civil y testigos.

grupos armados y otras redes delictivas en la explotación y el comercio de estaño, tantalio y tungsteno (véase el anexo 40).

*Grupos armados en Rubaya*

60. En septiembre de 2023, el Grupo de Expertos observó que combatientes de la coalición Wazalendo, la mayoría de los cuales vestían uniformes de las FARDC, controlaban la zona de Rubaya, se movían con toda libertad y controlaban los puestos de control donde cobraban impuestos a los civiles.

61. Combatientes de Wazalendo enlistados en los grupos armados Nyatura Abazungu (ANCDH) y Coalición de Patriotas Resistentes Congoleños-Fuerza de Choque (PARECO-FF), entre otros, participaron en actividades mineras en el PE4731 y el PE76. Trabajadores de las minas, la sociedad civil y otras fuentes informaron de las actividades de los combatientes de Wazalendo en varias explotaciones mineras situadas en el PE4731, entre ellas D4 Gakombe, Luwovo, Bundjali, Koyi, D2 Bibitama, D3 Bibitama y D2 Mataba<sup>44</sup>. Las mismas fuentes mencionaron la participación cada vez mayor de combatientes de PARECO-FF en Bihula, explotación minera situada en el PE76. PARECO-FF controla la zona desde junio de 2023, cuando los combatientes abandonaron el emplazamiento PE4731 tras desacuerdos entre su líder, Sendugu Museveni, y dos dirigentes de Nyatura, los “Generales” Mahoro y Mutayombwa, principalmente por el reparto de los ingresos procedentes del cobro de impuestos.

62. Desde mayo de 2023, los Wazalendo exigían a cada grupo de 2 a 5 excavadores, conocidos como *kinamba*, el pago de 10.000 francos congoleños (4 dólares) al día para poder acceder a las minas y por su “seguridad”. Fuentes locales estimaron que un mínimo de 100 excavadores trabajaba en cada uno de esos lugares, generando entre 15.000 y 20.000 dólares al mes para los grupos armados. Los comerciantes y los encargados de los pozos también debían pagar entre 100 y 150 dólares al mes, además de los 40 dólares que debían abonar cuando los pozos estaban en funcionamiento<sup>45</sup>.

63. Combatientes de Wazalendo y algunos extrabajadores de las minas accedieron por la fuerza a los minerales. Por ejemplo, Nyatura “General” Mutayombwa exigió parte de la producción a los excavadores del yacimiento de Gakombe<sup>46</sup>.

64. El Grupo de Expertos observó a civiles que celebraban la presencia de Wazalendo en la zona de Rubaya. También se informó ampliamente de la colaboración entre combatientes de Wazalendo y autoridades gubernamentales. Por ejemplo, fuentes y testigos presenciales informaron de patrullas nocturnas conjuntas de Wazalendo y las FARDC y de la presencia de dirigentes y combatientes de Wazalendo en reuniones de seguridad en Rubaya organizadas por el representante del gobernador militar, Selkali Bihame.

65. Los representantes de la administración de minas estaban ausentes de los lugares controlados por los grupos armados. El Grupo de Expertos señala que ello viola sus recomendaciones sobre directrices para la diligencia debida aprobadas por el Consejo de Seguridad<sup>47</sup>.

*Actividades mineras que infringen el marco regulatorio*

66. El 15 de junio de 2023, las autoridades provinciales reiteraron la prohibición de toda actividad de explotación en los yacimientos mineros PE4731 ([S/2023/431](#),

<sup>44</sup> Fuentes de la sociedad civil y trabajadores de las minas.

<sup>45</sup> Fuentes de la sociedad civil, trabajadores de las minas y agentes económicos.

<sup>46</sup> Tres trabajadores de las minas.

<sup>47</sup> <https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1533/due-diligence-guidelines>.

párrs. 91 a 97). Sin embargo, continuaban las actividades de explotación de las minas y el transporte de minerales desde los yacimientos PE4731 al centro de Rubaya, como observó el Grupo de Expertos en septiembre de 2023.

67. La producción de los yacimientos PE4731 se introdujo de contrabando en Rwanda o se blanqueó en la cadena de suministro oficial utilizando las etiquetas de la Iniciativa de la International Tin Association sobre la Cadena de Suministro de Estaño para los minerales producidos en el PE76, donde las actividades de explotación de las minas seguían estando autorizadas (véase el anexo 41)<sup>48</sup>.

68. Los transportistas de minerales que trabajaban en Rubaya informaron de que la ruta para el contrabando fraudulento de minerales hacia Kivu del Sur, cada vez más utilizada desde que el M23 había ocupado Mushaki (véase S/2023/431, párr. 97), había sido gradualmente abandonada en favor de los comptoirs con sede en Goma, que volvió a convertirse en punto de tránsito para el contrabando hacia Rwanda (S/2021/560, párr. 74).

#### *Conflictos de propiedad en Rubaya*

69. El 14 de julio de 2023, el Ministerio de Minas despojó a la Société Minière de Bisunzu (SMB)<sup>49</sup> de su permiso de explotación minera en el PE4731, concediéndole un plazo de 30 días para que apelaran (véase el anexo 42). SMB apeló, pero no había recibido respuesta en el momento de redactarse el presente informe.

70. Según funcionarios de la administración de las minas y fuentes gubernamentales, el Gobierno no estaba dispuesto a revocar su decisión de despojar a SMB de su permiso, ya que prefería conceder los permisos para el PE4731 y el PE76 a empresas pertenecientes a determinadas personas políticamente expuestas y a Primera Mining Limited, empresa mixta y asociación público-privada entre los Emiratos Árabes Unidos y la República Democrática del Congo. Algunos funcionarios del Gobierno también invocaron las tensiones existentes desde hace tiempo entre SMB y Coopérative des Exploitants Artisanaux Miniers du Masisi (véase el anexo 43), para privilegiar a Primera Mining frente a SMB.

71. El 17 de julio de 2023, el Gobierno de la República Democrática del Congo, Primera Mining y la Société Aurifère du Kivu et du Maniema firmaron un acuerdo por el que se creaba una empresa mixta para la explotación de varias zonas mineras, incluida la que abarca el PE76. El acuerdo fue impugnado por varios actores (véase el anexo 44).

## IV. Ituri

### A. Fracaso de la iniciativa de paz de Aru y recrudecimiento de la violencia

72. Iniciado en 2022, el proceso de paz de Nairobi y varios otros diálogos de paz locales que le siguieron y que tenían como objetivo detener la violencia en Ituri, han fracasado (véase el anexo 45)<sup>50</sup>. La violencia de los grupos armados se ha cobrado la vida de más de 1.100 civiles en la provincia de Ituri desde enero de 2023<sup>51</sup>. El aumento

<sup>48</sup> Trabajadores de las minas e intermediarios que trabajan para *négociants*, agentes de la sociedad civil, funcionarios de la administración de minas.

<sup>49</sup> El Grupo recibió una carta de SMB en la que se aclaraba al Grupo que Edouard Mwangachuchu ya no ocupaba ningún cargo en la empresa.

<sup>50</sup> Véase S/2023/431, párrs. 104 a 110.

<sup>51</sup> MONUSCO y fuentes humanitarias.

de los combates en torno a los emplazamientos mineros y de desplazados internos siguió afectando gravemente a la población civil.

73. Las autoridades de la República Democrática del Congo, con el apoyo de la MONUSCO, organizaron otro diálogo de paz con los grupos armados activos en la provincia de Ituri, en Aru, del 25 de mayo al 1 de junio de 2023. Asistieron representantes de los grupos armados Cooperativa para el Desarrollo del Congo/Union des révolutionnaires pour la défense du peuple congolais (CODECO-URDPC), el Frente Patriótico e Integracionista del Congo (FPIC), la Fuerza de Resistencia Patriótica de Ituri (FRPI) y el Mouvement d'autodéfense populaire de l'Ituri (MAPI).

74. Los participantes firmaron un acta de compromiso con el objetivo de poner fin a las hostilidades (véase el anexo 46). El grupo Zaïre no asistió a la reunión de Aru, presuntamente en protesta por la creación del MAPI y la falta general de reconocimiento de lo que consideran un genocidio en curso contra la comunidad hema<sup>52</sup>. Posteriormente, Zaïre intentó sabotear el acuerdo provocando al MAPI y a CODECO/URDPC (véase el anexo 47).

75. Los compromisos adquiridos volvieron a durar poco, ya que se reanudó el ciclo de provocaciones y ataques de venganza. La CODECO/URDPC, el FPIC (véase el anexo 48), así como las facciones de Zaïre no signatarias, siguieron adquiriendo armas, entrenando a combatientes y lanzando ataques mortales contra las FARDC, la policía, los grupos armados rivales y la población civil, como los ataques contra el emplazamiento de desplazados internos de Lala. (párrs. 78 a 80).

#### **B. Consolidación del mando central de la Cooperativa para el Desarrollo del Congo/Union des révolutionnaires pour la défense du peuple congolais y continuo fortalecimiento del grupo Zaïre**

76. La CODECO/URDPC seguía siendo el grupo armado más beligerante en Ituri, responsable de la mayoría de los ataques y de las bajas civiles. También el grupo Zaïre permanecía activo y se rehusaba a desarmarse, al tiempo que seguía consolidando su capacidad militar, en particular mediante el reclutamiento y entrenamiento de combatientes dentro y fuera del país. Para más información sobre la evolución de la CODECO/URDPC y de Zaïre, véanse los anexos 49 y 50, respectivamente<sup>53</sup>.

#### **C. Vínculos de Zaïre con el Movimiento 23 de Marzo**

77. El grupo Zaïre sacaba provecho de sus vínculos históricos con algunos líderes del M23 para enviar combatientes a Kivu del Norte para ser entrenados por el M23. Por ejemplo, el Comandante Logo Marine, uno de los líderes de Zaïre y exmiembro de la Unión de Patriotas Congoleños (UPC)<sup>54</sup>, envió a 50 elementos de Zaïre para que fueran entrenados por el M23 en Bunagana (República Democrática del Congo) entre mayo y junio de 2023<sup>55</sup>.

<sup>52</sup> Véase [S/2023/431](#), párrs. 114 a 116.

<sup>53</sup> MONUSCO, organismos de inteligencia, fuentes humanitarias y de la sociedad civil, investigadores. Véase también [S/2023/431](#), párrs. 114 a 116.

<sup>54</sup> Véase [S/2022/479](#), párr. 103.

<sup>55</sup> Líderes de grupos armados, excombatientes del M23 y fuentes de organismos de seguridad y de la sociedad civil.

## D. Ataque contra un emplazamiento de desplazados internos en Lala

78. Durante la noche del 11 de junio de 2023 y en las primeras horas de la mañana del 12 de junio de 2023, combatientes de la CODECO/URDPC atacaron el emplazamiento de desplazados internos de Lala, situado cerca de Bule, habitado principalmente por miembros de la comunidad hema. Masacraron a 46 civiles, la mitad de ellos niños, quemaron más de 240 casas y saquearon ganado<sup>56</sup>.

79. El día anterior a la masacre, combatientes de Zaïre provenientes de Bule dirigidos por el Comandante Chura habían dado muerte a cinco civiles lendu en el grupo Walendu-Djatsi, y a uno en Petro, del grupo Walendu-Pitsi. En venganza por esos asesinatos, la CODECO/URDPC planeó un ataque de represalia contra el emplazamiento de desplazados internos, al tiempo que algunos combatientes de Zaïre dirigidos por Chura se retiraban al interior del campamento de Lala, mezclándose con los desplazados internos<sup>57</sup>. En un esfuerzo coordinado, los combatientes de la CODECO/URDPC convergieron desde varias direcciones, especialmente desde Petro, Gokpa y Djauda en el Walendu-Djatsi para lanzar un ataque contra el emplazamiento de desplazados internos (véase el anexo 51).

80. Antes de la masacre, la comunidad de desplazados internos había expresado su temor de que fuera inminente un ataque de represalia en gran escala por parte de la CODECO/URDPC, pues periódicamente se informaba de asesinatos esporádicos de desplazados internos que se desplazaban a la zona, junto con el asesinato de civiles lendu por parte de elementos de Zaïre<sup>58</sup>.

### Vulneración del carácter humanitario de los emplazamientos de desplazados internos

81. Múltiples fuentes informaron de la presencia, en los campos de desplazados internos de Bule y sus alrededores, incluido el de Lala, de combatientes armados de Zaïre dirigidos por Chura, oficialmente el líder de los jóvenes hema en Bule<sup>59</sup>. Presuntamente, su objetivo era defender los emplazamientos de desplazados internos en los alrededores de Bule, especialmente los de Plaine Savo ([S/2022/479](#), párrs. 90 a 93) y Lala. Sin embargo, se observó con regularidad a combatientes con armas de fuego y armas blancas no solo en los alrededores, sino también dentro de los emplazamientos, violando así su carácter civil-humanitario y provocando ataques de represalia por parte de la CODECO/URDPC. La comunidad local negó la presencia de combatientes armados de Zaïre en los emplazamientos de desplazados internos, por temor a castigos y porque confiaban en ellos para su protección<sup>60</sup>.

82. Al Grupo le preocupa que el carácter civil y humanitario de los emplazamientos de desplazados internos en el territorio de Yugu<sup>61</sup> se vea cada vez más comprometido por la presencia de combatientes armados y la proximidad de actividades armadas, lo que provoca la pérdida masiva de vidas y medios de subsistencia entre los desplazados internos debido a los repetidos ataques dirigidos contra ellos ([S/2022/479](#), párrs. 87 a 93), y afecta negativamente a los agentes humanitarios.

<sup>56</sup> FARDC, organismos de inteligencia, sociedad civil, investigadores y fuentes humanitarias y de la MONUSCO.

<sup>57</sup> FARDC, organismos de inteligencia, sociedad civil, investigadores, fuentes humanitarias y de la MONUSCO y testigos presenciales.

<sup>58</sup> FARDC, organismos de inteligencia, fuentes locales y de la MONUSCO e investigadores.

<sup>59</sup> Fuentes de organismos de inteligencia, combatientes de Zaïre y de la CODECO y testigos presenciales.

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>61</sup> Incluidos Pleine Savo y Rhoe y los emplazamientos de desplazados internos en torno a Bule, Drodro y Blukwa.

## V. Kivu del Sur

### A. Impacto de la crisis relacionada con el Movimiento 23 de Marzo en la dinámica de los grupos armados

83. La crisis del M23 siguió fomentando la reactivación de grupos armados en Kalehe, Kabare y Shabunda, los territorios septentrionales de Kivu del Sur, durante el período que abarca el informe ([S/2023/431](#), anexo 73). Esos grupos, principalmente las facciones Raia Mutomboki y los grupos Nyatura, aprovecharon la crisis del M23 para volver a movilizarse e intensificar sus respectivas actividades (véase el anexo 52)<sup>62</sup>.

84. Además, la mayoría de los grupos armados de Kivu del Sur también empezaron a llamarse a sí mismos Wazalendo para recibir el apoyo de las FARDC y de las autoridades locales y para aumentar la legitimidad de sus acciones y posicionarse mejor de cara a futuras negociaciones con el Gobierno y a una posible integración en las FARDC o en la RAD (párrs. 34, 41 y 42)<sup>63</sup>.

85. Los rumores generalizados sobre infiltraciones y operaciones del M23 y de la RDF en Kivu del Sur, algunos confirmados por el Grupo de Expertos (párrs. 88 a 90), y la consiguiente paranoia, a veces deliberadamente alimentada por los propios grupos armados (véase el anexo 53), contribuyeron a la proliferación del fenómeno de Wazalendo.

86. Sin embargo, hasta hace poco solo unos pocos de esos grupos armados intentaban llegar a Kivu del Norte para luchar contra el M23 y las RDF (párr. 34). En cambio, se valían de su recién autoproclamado estatus de Wazalendo para reclutar, ampliar su zona de influencia, actuar como autoridades *de facto* e impulsar sus actividades delictivas<sup>64</sup>. Entre estas últimas cabe mencionar la explotación de los recursos naturales y numerosos ataques y abusos contra la población, como violencia sexual, reclutamiento de menores, asesinatos y malos tratos a civiles, secuestros para pedir rescate, extorsión e imposición ilícita de impuestos a la población. También eran frecuentes los combates entre grupos armados<sup>65</sup>. La debilidad o ausencia de las autoridades del Estado, especialmente de los servicios de seguridad en todo Kivu del Sur, incluso debido a la concentración de las FARDC en la lucha contra el M23 en Kivu del Norte, agravó esa situación. Es probable que las próximas elecciones y la retirada prevista de la MONUSCO de Kivu del Sur empeoren la situación en Kivu del Sur.

87. En octubre de 2023, cientos de combatientes de la Force d'Autodéfense Biloze Bishambuke (FABB) fueron bloqueados en Baraka cuando intentaban unirse a Wazalendo en Kivu del Norte<sup>66</sup>. En octubre y principios de noviembre, cientos de combatientes de Raia Mutomboki se desplazaron a Kivu del Norte, a veces transportados en vehículos proporcionados por las autoridades locales<sup>67</sup>. La FABB y Raia Mutomboki se coordinaron con los líderes del grupo Wazalendo en Kivu del Norte, como Janvier Karahiri y Guidon Shimiray Mwisa, así como con las autoridades militares y provinciales para autorizar y facilitar sus desplazamientos (véase el anexo 54)<sup>68</sup>.

<sup>62</sup> FARDC, organismos de seguridad, investigadores, fuentes de la sociedad civil y de la MONUSCO.

<sup>63</sup> Dirigente de Wazalendo, FARDC, autoridades locales, organismos de seguridad, organismos de inteligencia, investigadores, sociedad civil y fuentes de la MONUSCO.

<sup>64</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>65</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>66</sup> Líderes de Wazalendo y de las FARDC.

<sup>67</sup> Investigadores, sociedad civil y fuentes de organismos de seguridad.

<sup>68</sup> Líderes Wazalendo, FARDC, organismos de seguridad, sociedad civil y fuentes de la MONUSCO.

## B. Colaboración entre Twirwaneho y el Movimiento 23 de Marzo

88. El Grupo de Expertos documentó la colaboración entre Twirwaneho y el M23. Múltiples fuentes, incluidos excombatientes del M23 y de Twirwaneho y personas cercanas a ambos grupos, corroboraron que los dirigentes de ambos grupos, en particular Charles Sematama ([S/2023/431](#), párr. 143) por Twirwaneho y el sancionado Sultani Makenga (CDi.008) por el M23, mantenían contactos periódicos entre sí.

89. El comandante de Twirwaneho, “Coronel” Thomas Ndori, confirmó los vínculos entre ambos grupos en un mensaje de audio que se filtrara en junio de 2023, autentificado por el Grupo. El “Coronel” Ndori afirmó que “no había diferencias” entre ambos y que Twirwaneho esperaba la llegada de tropas mixtas, incluidos combatientes banyamulenge procedentes de Masisi dirigidos por un coronel que traería armas y municiones. El coronel era Moïse Byinshi Gakunzi<sup>69</sup>, desertor munyamulenge de las FARDC, considerado como uno de los principales vínculos entre ambos grupos desde que se unió al M23 en marzo de 2023 ([S/2023/431](#), párr. 145). El audio condujo a la detención de Ndori por los dirigentes de Twirwaneho durante varios meses<sup>70</sup>.

90. A nivel regional se seguía reclutando a jóvenes banyamulenge para su utilización por el M23, con el apoyo de personas próximas a Twirwaneho. Algunos de esos nuevos reclutas habían muerto recientemente en combate en los territorios de Rutshuru y Masisi ([S/2023/431](#), párrs. 146 a 49)<sup>71</sup>. Además, varias fuentes informaron de que representantes de Twirwaneho y del M23 habían participado en cursos de formación y reuniones organizados en varios lugares de Rwanda y en Tshanzu, territorio de Rutshuru, a partir de mayo de 2023 (párr. 28)<sup>72</sup>. Se citó de manera persistente al coordinador de Twirwaneho, Kamasa Ndakize ([S/2021/560](#), anexo 95) como uno de los representantes de Twirwaneho que habían participado en una reunión a mediados de 2023 para debatir la coordinación entre el M23 y Twirwaneho, y posibles operaciones contra las FARDC en Kivu del Sur<sup>73</sup>.

## C. Novedades en el centro de comercio de oro de Bukavu

### Primera Gold RDC

91. Desde el anterior informe del Grupo de Expertos ([S/2023/431](#)), Primera Gold RDC siguió impulsando las exportaciones oficiales de oro desde la República Democrática del Congo, que alcanzaron la cifra de más de 4 toneladas de oro entre enero y octubre de 2023. Primera Gold RDC informó al Grupo de que más del 90 % de las transacciones se habían realizado a través de canales bancarios, lo que garantizaba la trazabilidad financiera. Sin embargo, el Grupo detectó deficiencias en las obligaciones de diligencia debida de Primera Gold RDC.

<sup>69</sup> Excombatientes de Twirwaneho, fuentes de organismos de seguridad y organismos de inteligencia, investigador y fuentes de la sociedad civil

<sup>70</sup> Excombatientes de Twirwaneho, investigador, fuentes de organismos de seguridad y de la sociedad civil.

<sup>71</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>72</sup> Excombatientes de Twirwaneho y del M23 y fuentes de organismos de inteligencia y de seguridad, de la sociedad civil y de la MONUSCO.

<sup>73</sup> Excombatientes de Twirwaneho y fuentes de organismos de inteligencia y de seguridad, de la sociedad civil y de la MONUSCO.

### *Monopolio de facto*

92. Las ventajas institucionalizadas, los beneficios fiscales y el monopolio *de facto* de Primera Gold RDC sobre las exportaciones oficiales de oro de la República Democrática del Congo ([S/2023/431](#), párr. 172) han recibido críticas de múltiples actores<sup>74</sup>.

93. Varias voces políticas, como el diputado nacional Alfred Maisha (véase también el párr. 71), se pronunciaron públicamente en contra de la exclusividad concedida a Primera Gold RDC. Mientras Primera pagaba el impuesto único del 0,25 % del valor de las mercancías a exportar, otros exportadores pagaban más del 6 %, lo que había provocado descontento entre agentes económicos. El Gobierno de la República Democrática del Congo rebatió tales críticas (véase el anexo 55).

94. El monopolio *de facto* de Primera Gold RDC hizo que algunos de sus directivos y compradores adoptaran una postura privilegiada, desafiando a las autoridades mineras de la República Democrática del Congo. Varios funcionarios de minas informaron al Grupo de Expertos de que veían obstaculizado su trabajo por temor a represalias de los representantes de Primera Gold RDC. Por ejemplo, el 14 de agosto de 2023, un directivo de Primera reprendió a un agente de minas del territorio de Fizi que había detenido a un individuo sospechoso de transportar oro ilícito. En relación con este incidente, Primera Gold RDC declaró al Grupo que su director había intervenido para protestar contra un puesto de control ilícito. Ello se contradice con las conclusiones del Grupo (véase el anexo 56), que señala que tales incidentes obstaculizan la lucha contra el contrabando de oro.

### *Origen dudoso del oro*

95. El Grupo de Expertos detectó una serie de deficiencias en las fuentes de suministro de Primera Gold RDC y se las comunicó a la empresa. En primer lugar, Primera puede comprar y exportar solo oro extraído artesanalmente, a menos que la empresa obtenga una exención para comprar en otros lugares<sup>75</sup>. Sin embargo, según la información recibida por el Grupo de Expertos, existe un grave riesgo de que Primera no haya cumplido ese requisito en su relación comercial con Tanganyika Gold (véase el anexo 57).

96. La segunda deficiencia guardaba relación con la falta de transparencia de Primera Gold RDC en cuanto al origen del oro adquirido en varios sitios. Uno de los principales proveedores de Primera Gold RDC, Regimalic, que vendió a Primera el equivalente a casi 6 millones de dólares en enero y febrero de 2023, no especificó el origen del oro en los documentos consultados por el Grupo. Otros proveedores, como la Coopérative Minière de Kimbi, tampoco especificaron el origen del oro vendido a Primera. Varias fuentes informaron de que esos proveedores obtenían la mayor parte del oro de explotaciones mineras situadas en el territorio de Fizi, zona controlada por Mai-Mai Yakutumba. En respuesta a las preocupaciones del Grupo, Primera Gold RDC informó de que el oro procedía de yacimientos validados.

97. Asimismo, el Grupo de Expertos confirmó que, en varias ocasiones, Primera Gold RDC había comprado oro obtenido ilícitamente por la Coopérative Minière Emmanuel du Kivu (COOPEMEK) en yacimientos lugushwa situados en Wamuzimu, territorio de Mwenga. El Grupo obtuvo una carta de una autoridad minera en la que se afirmaba que la explotación minera realizada por COOPEMEK en esa zona era ilícita (véase el anexo 58). En octubre de 2023, Primera Gold RDC informó al Grupo de que estaba en negociaciones con los propietarios del solar.

<sup>74</sup> Administración de minas, fuentes de la sociedad civil, agentes económicos y políticos.

<sup>75</sup> Según confirmó Primera Gold RDC al Grupo de Expertos.

### **Contrabando continuo de oro con fondos extranjeros**

98. Las actividades de Primera Gold RDC no frenaron significativamente el contrabando de oro en la región, como era la intención del acuerdo original. Los *négociants* y *comptoirs* (compradores y casas comerciales) vendieron a Primera solo el 50 % del oro recogido; aproximadamente solo el 50 % del oro recogido se exportaba a través de rutas de contrabando<sup>76</sup>.

99. *Négociants* y *comptoirs* preferían no vender a Primera Gold RDC porque preferían conservar el efectivo, mientras que Primera bancarizaba sus pagos, que se veían además gravados por los impuestos bancarios sobre las transacciones. Primera también ofrecía un precio inferior al del mercado negro. Primera proporcionó antecedentes adicionales sobre ese aspecto (véase el anexo 59).

100. El contrabando siguió prosperando, ya que los agentes económicos implicados en el comercio de oro continuaban recibiendo una importante prefinanciación del extranjero. El Grupo de Expertos tuvo acceso a las cuentas de varios *comptoirs* en Bukavu y observó, por ejemplo, que entre el 3 de enero y el 26 de abril de 2023, el *comptoir* SOCREAT había recibido más de 14 millones de dólares de redes en Kigali, y 26 millones de dólares de personas localizadas en Dubai. El *comptoir* Namukaya recibió más de 23 millones de dólares de redes en Kigali entre el 14 de noviembre de 2022 y el 7 de marzo de 2023. La mayoría de esas transferencias escapaban a los canales bancarios oficiales, lo que limitaba su trazabilidad.

### **Novedades sobre la refinería de oro del Congo**

101. Se esperaba que la Refinería de Oro del Congo comenzara a funcionar en 2022 ([S/2022/479](#), párr. 178). Los últimos acontecimientos apuntan a una paralización de las actividades de la refinería (véase el anexo 60).

## **VI. Recomendaciones**

102. El Grupo de Expertos formula las recomendaciones siguientes.

### **Gobierno de la República Democrática del Congo**

103. El Grupo de Expertos recomienda al Gobierno de la República Democrática del Congo que:

- a) Le proporcione información sobre las armas y municiones recuperadas en el campo de batalla o incautadas a combatientes rendidos o capturados a fin de permitir el rastreo adecuado del origen de las armas (véanse los párrs. 30, 31 y 32);
- b) Ponga fin inmediatamente a la utilización de grupos armados como apoderados y proveedores de armamento e inste a los grupos armados a que se atengán al Programa de Desarme, Desmovilización, Recuperación Comunitaria y Estabilización (véanse los párrs. 33 a 42);
- c) Inicie un proceso de investigación de antecedentes y selección para el reclutamiento en las filas de las fuerzas de seguridad congoleñas, incluida la RAD, y garantice que los combatientes y líderes de grupos armados sospechosos de haber cometido crímenes internacionales o graves abusos contra los derechos humanos queden excluidos del reclutamiento (véanse los párrs. 41 y 42);
- d) Investigue y procese a las personas que apoyan a los grupos armados implicados en la minería ilegal en Rubaya (véase el párr. 70);

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<sup>76</sup> Agentes económicos de Bukavu y fuentes familiarizadas con el tema.

e) Trabaje con los países de tránsito y destino de los minerales procedentes de Rubaya, a fin de armonizar la cadena de suministro con las directrices de diligencia debida del Grupo (véanse los párrs. 60 a 65).

**Gobierno de la República Democrática del Congo y Consejo de Seguridad**

104. El Grupo de Expertos recomienda que el Gobierno de la República Democrática del Congo y el Consejo de Seguridad mantengan una capacidad analítica y de derechos humanos de la MONUSCO en Kivu del Sur y una capacidad de proyección en caso de violaciones que puedan amenazar la estabilidad en Kivu del Sur (véase el párr. 86).

**Gobierno de la República Democrática del Congo, con el apoyo de la Misión de Estabilización de las Naciones Unidas en la República Democrática del Congo y otros asociados internacionales**

105. El Grupo de Expertos recomienda que el Gobierno de la República Democrática del Congo, con el apoyo de la MONUSCO y otros asociados internacionales:

- a) Fortalezcan los medios de los servicios judiciales y de inteligencia implicados en la investigación y el desmantelamiento de las redes de las FDA (véanse los párrs. 15 a 20);
- b) Elaborar directrices generales sobre la integración del derecho internacional humanitario en todos los programas de instrucción militar y en todos los aspectos de la adopción de decisiones militares (véanse los párrs. 55 a 58);
- c) Mejore las medidas destinadas a salvaguardar el carácter civil y humanitario de los lugares que acogen a desplazados internos (véanse los párrs. 78 a 82).


## Anexos

### Annex 1 (para. 7)

#### Map of the five provinces affected by the conflict that originated in Kwamouth, Mai-Ndombe province

#### Carte des cinq provinces touchées par le conflit qui a commencé à Kwamouth, dans la province de Mai-Ndombe

Throughout 2023, the conflict that originated in the **Mai-Ndombe** province in 2022 expanded into the neighbouring provinces of **Kwilu**, **Kwango**, **Kinshasa**, and **Kongo Central**.



Map of the Democratic Republic of Congo, showing the western provinces of Kongo Central, Kinshasa, Kwango, Kwilu and Mai-Ndombe.

The approximate demarcation of the area affected by the conflict is indicated in pink color and has been added by the Group of Experts

Map provided by MONUSCO

## Annex 2 (para. 8)

### Conflict fueled by economic and political interests

#### Le conflit alimenté par des intérêts économiques et politiques

##### Disagreements over the payment of customary taxes and land ownership

As previously reported (see [S/2023/431](#), paras. 9-10), the spark that ignited the conflict in Mai-Ndombe province around May 2022 was a disagreement over a customary tax on agricultural products imposed by the so-called “native” Teke community (considered as the customary landowners) who settled in the area<sup>77</sup> before the “non-native” communities, in majority the Yaka, but also the Suku, Mbala and Songe (originally from the Kwango and Kwilu provinces), who came to work as farmers on the fertile lands of the Bateke Plateau over five decades ago. The farmers “rented” the land from the Teke chiefs in exchange for the payment of this customary tax. Until recently, the communities lived in harmony and the various communities inter-married.<sup>78</sup>

According to local sources and researchers, the first disagreements arose already in 2021 and escalated in early 2022 when “non-native” communities refused to pay the increased tax. The Teke tried to forcefully recover the tax payments, supported by some local members of the Congolese National Police (PNC) and FARDC elements,<sup>79</sup> and the Teke chiefs began asking farmers who did not want to pay to leave their lands.<sup>80</sup> The Yaka, in turn, presented a letter purportedly issued by the Ministry of the Interior, Security, Decentralization and Customary Affairs, which would have exempted its holders from the payment of customary taxes. This letter was not signed by the Minister, and it has since been proven to be fake.<sup>81</sup> Nevertheless, the letter created a climate of mistrust between the Teke and the other communities.

The violence started on 9 June 2022 in the village of Masia-Mbe, in the Bateke Sud sector of Mai Ndombe, where a Yaka farmer was injured during the collection of the taxes on behalf of Teke customary chief. In revenge, farmers attacked the chief’s brother, who shot a farmer from Kwilu in self-defence. In retaliation, Yaka farmers set houses on fire and the villagers fled.<sup>82</sup>

Emboldened by the lack of resistance of the villagers, who preferred abandoning their village rather than facing more violence, the Yaka farmers began inciting others to refuse the payment of taxes. The issue of tax payments soon morphed into a land issue, with farmers - mainly Yaka - beginning to claim the lands owned by the Teke. Another complaint of the Yaka farmers was that the landowners – generally the Teke – had been selling off the land to rich investors, although that land already belonged to the Yaka. Several sources reported that Yaka and other “non-native” farmers began organizing gatherings and inciting members of their community to claim that in the past, Kwamouth in Mai Ndombe province used to belong to the Yaka.<sup>83</sup>

<sup>77</sup> A vast area called the Bateke Plateaux, named after the Teke people. The Bateke Plateaux spans three countries, notably Gabon, Republic of Congo and DRC. The area referred to as Bateke Plateau in the DRC stretches from the commune of Maluku in Kinshasa province to the Mai-Ndombe and the Kwango river.

<sup>78</sup> Local sources, researchers, UN sources, civil society, open-source research.

<sup>79</sup> Ibid.

<sup>80</sup> A provincial member of parliament, researchers, civil society.

<sup>81</sup> Local sources, researchers, civil society. See also <https://congovirtuel.com/information/rdc-kwamouth-une-fausse-correspondance-a-la-base-du-conflit-entre-teke-et-yaka/?amp=1>

<sup>82</sup> Local sources, researchers, civil society. See also <https://ouragan.cd/2022/10/kwamouth-huit-8-lecons-et-sept-7-recommandations-de-fridolin-ambongo>

<sup>83</sup> MONUSCO and civil society, sources, local notables, researchers.

Subsequently, attacks on Teke villages, notably along the RN17 road, began multiplying.<sup>84</sup> Reports began emerging that the non-Teke farmers began to organize, arm, and incite other members of their community to join their group, with the intention of forcefully driving out all the Teke from their lands.<sup>85</sup>

Thereafter, incidents of Teke attacking Yaka and vice-versa have multiplied.

According to several members of the Teke community interviewed by the Group, the Yaka realized that killing Teke village chiefs would lead to members of these chiefs' community leaving the village, without much resistance, thus allowing the Yaka to occupy the farms and lay claim to their ownership. According to the same sources, additional proof of the Yaka's intent to appropriate all the lands and chase out the Teke were the burning and destruction of Teke villages, the installation of new Yaka chiefs in the abandoned villages and giving Yaka names to the conquered villages.

### **Customary power**

According to Congolese law, customary chiefs wielded significant institutional and political power. Among their prerogatives recognized by the law were the collection of taxes and the management of the land.<sup>86</sup>

- *The Yaka King or "Kiamvu"*

The Yaka people, descendants of the Lunda Kingdom, lived in the territory south of the Kwango river since the 17<sup>th</sup> century in the modern-day provinces of Kwilu, Kwango and Kongo Central of the DRC, and the north-western part of Angola.<sup>87</sup> The traditional king of the Yaka, who carries the title of "Kiamvu", rules over all the Yaka people.<sup>88</sup>

After the death of the last ruling Kiamvu in December 2021,<sup>89</sup> the title was claimed by Odon Kimona. However, he was accused of being a "fake" Kiamvu,<sup>90</sup> allegedly having usurped the title with the help of the Suku king, Mini-Kongo.<sup>91</sup>

Kiamvu Odon has been widely cited as the instigator of the Teke-Yaka conflict and was accused of being among the founders of the group of Mobondo fighters, with the intention of chasing the Teke off their land (see also annex 4 below). Several local sources reported that since early 2022, Kiamvu Odon began organizing the Yaka and other "non-native" farmers to take up arms and that he was instrumental in unearthing the "mobondo" formula that is believed to have enabled the Yaka to resist the settlers' firearms.<sup>92</sup> In September 2022, a Teke chief, head of the Twa *groupement* in MaiNdombe province, denounced an annihilation plan devised by the King Kiamvu, i.e. Odon Kimona, with the aim of establishing the hegemony of the Yaka communities throughout the Bateke Plateau. He claimed that the Yaka chief wanted to change the name of the area from "Bateke Plateau" to "Lunda Plateau"<sup>93</sup> – with reference to the ancient Lunda Kingdom to which the Yaka belonged.<sup>94</sup>

<sup>84</sup> MONUSCO sources, local sources, including a member of the provincial parliament, researchers, civil society.

<sup>85</sup> Local sources, civil society, UN sources, researchers, and a local member of Parliament.

<sup>86</sup> See the text of the *Loi N° 15/015 du 25 aout 2015 fixant le statut des chefs coutumiers*

<https://leganet.cd/Legislation/Droit%20Public/Administration.ter/Loi.15.015.25.08.2015.html>

<sup>87</sup> See [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kingdom\\_of\\_Lunda](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kingdom_of_Lunda)

<sup>88</sup> See <https://lemandat.cd/2022/01/19/programme-dinhumation-du-roi-des-bayaka-ikomba-diwulu-tintin/>

<sup>89</sup> Idem.

<sup>90</sup> The Minister of the Interior, Security, Decentralization and Customary Affairs has officially recognized Frederik Inkani of Kasongo-Lunda as the real Kiamvu, King of the Yaka people. See <http://voiceofcongo.net/conflict-teke-yaka-le-vpm-daniel-aselo-annonce-la-preparation-de-la-table-ronde-intercommunautaire-entre-les-yaka-et-les-teke>

<sup>91</sup> See <https://congointer.info/2022/09/25/conflict-teke-yaka-le-ministere-de-linterieur-accuse-le-mini-kongo-fabrice-kavabioko-davoir-presente-un-faux-chef-yaka/>, and <https://www.election-net.com/article/rdc-la-cenco-accuse-le-pouvoir-detre-complice-du-conflict-teke-yaka>

<sup>92</sup> Local sources, civil society sources, researchers, a provincial member of parliament, community leaders.

<sup>93</sup> See <https://7sur7.cd/index.php/2022/09/14/mai-ndombe-le-roi-kiamfu-cite-comme-instigateur-du-conflict-teke-yaka> ; and

<sup>94</sup> See [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kingdom\\_of\\_Lunda](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kingdom_of_Lunda)

A search warrant was issued by the police against Odon Kiamvu for his alleged involvement in the conflict.<sup>95</sup>

- *The Suku King or Mini-Kongo*

The King of the Suku people, allied with the Yaka, is the descendant of the kings who ruled the ancient Kingdom of Kongo, which existed until 1914.<sup>96</sup> According to the website representing the Kingdom of Mini-Kongo, the King is recognized by the traditional chiefs of the Kwango and Kwilu provinces as their representative at a higher level.<sup>97</sup> That would include Kiamvu Odon, who rules over the Yaka in the Kwango and Kwilu.

The current King Mini-Kongo, Kavabioko Fabrice Zombi, wields significant political influence in Kinshasa,<sup>98</sup> including through his aunt Nana Manwanina Kiumba, Minister to the President of the Republic and representative of the Head of State.<sup>99</sup> Mini-Kongo was personally appointed by the President to lead a commission for the resolution of the conflict in the Mai-Ndombe.<sup>100</sup> However, he was accused of having been an instigator of the conflict and one of the main figureheads of the Mobondo, who allegedly worship him and chant his name. He was cited, alongside the Kiamvu Odon, as the main *fetisheurs* of the fighters.<sup>101</sup>

The Teke vehemently denounced the nominations of Fabrice Zombi Mini-Kongo, Minister Nana Manawanina and Kiamvu Odon in official reconciliation efforts, accusing them of only representing the interests of the Yaka, Suku and other allied communities.<sup>102</sup>

### **Fetishism<sup>103</sup> emboldening fighters**

Rituals and fetishism play a central role in the culture of both the Yaka and Suku communities, which are closely related and have lived together for centuries.<sup>104</sup> Both communities believe in the power of fetishes to make them stronger, invisible, and invincible to the enemy.

- *The Suku “Kakuungu” mask*

In June 2022, the Kingdom of Belgium returned to the DRC a traditional Suku mask (the Kakuungu). The mask, revered by both the Suku and the Yaka as having enormous spiritual powers, was ceremonially received by President Tshisekedi.<sup>105</sup> Minister Nana Manawanina, member of the Suku royal family, was instrumental in organizing celebrations for the subsequent visit to the mask by the Suku, on 20 August 2022, represented by King Mini-Kongo, who was accompanied by other traditional chiefs (see images below).

<sup>95</sup> See <https://actualite.cd/2022/11/25/violences-communautaires-kwamouth-la-police-recherche-6-presumes-auteurs-intellectuels>

<sup>96</sup> See [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kingdom\\_of\\_Kongo](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kingdom_of_Kongo)

<sup>97</sup> See the official website of the Kingdom of Mini-Kongo, at <https://minikongu.com/l/le-roi/>.

<sup>98</sup> Local sources, researchers, civil society, MONUSCO sources.

<sup>99</sup> See <https://liberteplus.net/2021/04/29/rdc-professeur-nana-manwanina-nouveau-ministre-pres-le-president-de-la-republique-nous-connaissions-ce-que-nous-devons-faire-pour-accompagner-efficacement-le-chef-de-l-etat-dans-sa-lourde-t/>

<sup>100</sup> See <https://infocongo.net/2023/06/15/envoye-special-de-tshisekedi-dans-les-conflits-de-kwamouth-le-roi-mini-kongo-fabrice-zombi-aux-arrets/>

<sup>101</sup> FARDC, MONUSCO sources, local and civil society sources, community leaders, eyewitnesses, video footage .

<sup>102</sup> Members of the Teke community, civil society, researchers, MONUSCO sources. See also

<https://www.afrrowave.com/2023/05/18/rdc-le-phenomene-milice-mobondo-aux-portes-de-kinshasa-le-role-trouble-de-fabrice-zombi/>, and <https://congovirtuel.com/information/rdc-mai-ndombe-controverse-autour-des-chefs-coutumiers-yakas-recus-a-kinshasa/>

<sup>103</sup> “Fetishism” is used with the meaning of worship of or belief in magical fetishes, namely objects believed to have supernatural powers, or in particular, a human-made object that has power over others, used in rituals.

<sup>104</sup> According to information on the official website of the Kingdom of Mini-Kongo, at <https://minikongu.com/l/origine/>

<sup>105</sup> See <https://culturecongo.com/tradition-masque-suku-kakuungu-porteur-denormes-vertus-spirituuelles/> The mask was most used as an “instrument of terror” by the Suku community, but also by the Yaka and the Nkanu, during circumcision initiation rituals.



King Mini-Kongo (on the left), Minister Nana Manwanina (in the middle) and Prime Minister Sama Lukonde (on the right), during the ceremonial visit of the Suku mask, on 20 August 2022

Source: <https://www.facebook.com/profile/100067140183263/search/?q=masque%20suku>



Screenshot from the official Facebook page of Minister Nana Manwanina, posting about the event organized for the official visit of the Suku mask.

Source: <https://www.facebook.com/profile/100067140183263/search/?q=masque%20suku>

In an interview focusing on the significance of the mask and its return to the Suku people, Minister Nana Manwanina explained the power of fetishes, feared and revered in her culture. She stated that the mask had enormous significance for the social cohesion of the Suku, as even those who were divided gathered around the mask. According to her Suku ancestors, the Minister explained, the mask was designed for war, when the ancient king Mini-Kongo<sup>106</sup> remained alone to confront the white man – the mask gave the power to disappear, alone or in a group, and this is how Mini-Kongo was able to resist the colonizers. It was also used in rituals (circumcision, initiation) and to help heal the wounds quickly. Minister Nana emphasized that the Suku firmly believe in this story. She added that the Suku were a forgotten people, neglected and little known, but when the President Tshisekedi worked to bring back the Suku mask, it gave power back to the Suku people, like in the story of the lost child.<sup>107</sup>



Screenshot from the interview posted online with Minister Nana Manwanina, where she talked about the significance of the Suku mask and the power of *fetisheurs*

Source: <https://www.youtube.com/live/V0DaHMZSmgs?si=-YgmHLNU98yE3rA9>, streamed live on 2 September 2022

<sup>106</sup> In the Suku tradition, since the 5<sup>th</sup> century, every Suku king takes the royal title “Mini-Kongo” (or formerly Meni-Kongo), which means “Congo is me”. See <https://minikongu.com/I/origine/>

<sup>107</sup> See <https://www.youtube.com/live/V0DaHMZSmgs?si=-YgmHLNU98yE3rA9>

**Annex 3 (para 9)****Humanitarian crisis in provinces affected by the conflict****Crise humanitaire dans les provinces touchées par le conflit**

According to humanitarian sources, at least 160,000 persons, including more than 55,000 children, have reportedly been displaced, including over 60 percent of the population in the territory of Kamouth.<sup>108</sup>

Gathering accurate data on the displaced and returnees, as well as the number of casualties and the extent of destruction, remained a major challenge as reported by humanitarian agencies, due to extremely limited access to the conflict areas. A significant part of the population fled into the forests or farms in remote areas, and many have taken refuge with host families in larger cities, including in Kwamouth city, Bandundu, Kinshasa and Kikwit.<sup>109</sup>

Humanitarian sources and members of the affected communities reported that displaced population was affected by famine, as local agricultural activities have been suspended for more than two harvest seasons, and the distribution of humanitarian aid was insufficient.

The prevailing insecurity and the large-scale destruction of schools has prevented displaced children from attending school or participating in school exams.<sup>110</sup>

<sup>108</sup> Humanitarian and MONUSCO sources, civil society.

<sup>109</sup> Humanitarian sources, civil society, researchers, local sources, and MONUSCO sources.

<sup>110</sup> Idem.

## Annex 4 (para. 11)

### The organisation and modus operandi of the Mobondo

#### L'organisation et le mode opératoire des Mobondo

The “Mobondo” emerged in mid-2022, organized around the self-proclaimed Yaka king, Odon Nkumbu, who carries the title of “Kiamvu” (see above annex X). The police issued search warrants on Odon Kiamvu and against five other suspects, including the individuals known as Cobra and Saddam, for their alleged leadership of “Mobondo”.<sup>111</sup> Odon Kiamvu was accused by the Teke of aiming to establish the hegemony of the Yaka communities throughout the Bateke Plateau, by chasing the Teke out of their land.<sup>112</sup>

The Kiamvu is also the spiritual chief (*feticheur*) of the Yaka, with the prerogative of administering fetishist rituals called “bondo” to fighters.<sup>113</sup> The Yaka and the Suku believe in the ancestral power of fetishes that can render them invisible to the enemy and immune to bullets.<sup>114</sup> Kiamvu Odon was accused of having been instrumental in reviving the powerful Mobondo formula that enabled the Yaka to resist the settlers' firearms (see annex 2 above, regarding the importance of fetishism).

In a video circulating on social media, a Mobondo fighter explained the significance of fetishes, what they are and how they are administered, and that it is the Kiamvu and Mini-Kongo who make them perform those rituals before going to fight. He said that the fetishes make them invisible (“if you see me as one person, we are in fact 100”), and insensitive (“you no longer have a heart – and then you start cutting”). He explained that the Kiamvu takes them to the cemeteries for rituals - he depicted with hand gestures some of the rituals, how they sleep in the cemeteries - and when they come out of the cemeteries, no one can catch them.

The Mobondo fighter also explained that they kill because their land is “sold off jokingly”, whereas that land belongs to the Mobondo – so they kill “them” (the Teke) to bring peace to the village.



Screenshot from video where Mobondo fighters explain the fetishist rituals given to them by the Kianvu and Mini-Kongo before going into battle

Source: <https://www.facebook.com/100090430952899/videos/2432117686953462/?mibextid=rS40aB7S9Ucbxw6v>

<sup>111</sup> FARDC, MONUSCO, researchers, community leaders, civil society sources.

<sup>112</sup> Civil society, researchers, and local sources. See also <https://7sur7.cd/index.php/2022/09/14/mai-ndombe-le-roi-kiamfu-cite-comme-instigateur-du-conflit-teke-yaka>.

<sup>113</sup> FARDC, MONUSCO, researchers, community leaders, civil society sources.

<sup>114</sup> Idem.

## Mobondo organisation and recruitment

Throughout 2023, the Mobondo continued to grow in numbers and expand geographically. Since August 2023, the Mobondo controlled a vast territory, including over half of Kwamouth territory (the Bateke Sud *groupement*) and Bandundu territory in the north, westwards to the periphery of Maluku commune of Kinshasa, and southwards to the vicinity of Kimvula and Popokabaka in Kongo Central.<sup>115</sup> FARDC controlled the river coastline from Kwamouth to Bandundu, and patrolled the national roads RN17 and RN1, but the rest of Kwamouth territory was entirely under Mobondo control. Mobondo also controlled the area of Mongata and Mbakana,<sup>116</sup> a key junction between the RN1 and RN17 linking several provinces in the area.

At the time of drafting, the Mobondo had various bases, each with a commander. They occupied abandoned farms where they gathered and planned attacks. They executed military-like attacks and withdrew once their goal was achieved. They allegedly established lists of targets, notably of villages, chiefs and farms they intended to attack.<sup>117</sup> However, it was yet unclear whether the Mobondo was a hierarchically structured, homogenous group, or rather a coalition of like-minded gangs without a central command.

The Mobondo have become more organized and gradually increased their military capabilities by attacking FARDC and police elements, stealing weapons and ammunition. Initially, they were armed with machetes and 12-calibre hunting rifles, but the Mobondo's current arsenal includes AK-type assault rifles, PKM machine guns and grenade launchers.<sup>118</sup> They sold part of the looted goods to purchase ammunition and have been seen conducting business with some FARDC elements.<sup>119</sup> The Group notes that transfers of weapons and ammunition from the FARDC to the Mobondo constitute a violation of the arms embargo. They also increased recruitment of the youth, who are particularly vulnerable to voluntary recruitment due to the prevailing economic hardships. The Mobondo also recruited by force, including minors as young as 14 years old. They radicalized new recruits and imposed the practice of fetishism.<sup>120</sup>

The FARDC deployed substantial troops along the main axes RN1 and RN17, and to the Mobondo-affected areas, particularly to Kwamouth territory and Kwango province. Deployments were also aimed at preventing the conflict from reaching the capital Kinshasa.<sup>121</sup> However, despite the FARDC deployment and operations against them, the Mobondo maintained their ability to successfully strike by adapting their *modus operandi* to FARDC tactics. While its operations have temporarily lowered the frequency of clashes, FARDC has failed to retake control of Mobondo-controlled areas and has suffered serious losses.<sup>122</sup>

<sup>115</sup> FARDC, MONUSCO sources, researcher, local residents and notabilities, civil society sources.

<sup>116</sup> Local witnesses, civil society, member of the provincial parliament for Mai-Ndombe.

<sup>117</sup> FARDC, MONUSCO sources, researcher, local residents and notabilities, civil society sources.

<sup>118</sup> I FARDC, MONUSCO sources, researchers, community leaders, civil society, eyewitnesses.

<sup>119</sup> Several eyewitnesses, community leaders, researcher.

<sup>120</sup> MONUSCO, researchers, community leaders, civil society sources, eyewitnesses.

<sup>121</sup> FARDC, MONUSCO sources, civil society sources, researchers.

<sup>122</sup> Idem.

## Annex 5 (para. 13)

### Mobondo conscription into FARDC

#### Enrôlement des Mobondo dans les FARDC

On 29 January 2023, a delegation led by Minister Nana Manwanina Kiumba and Fabrice Zombi, the King Mini-Kongo, oversaw the handover to the Etat-Major of the FARDC of over 50 young recruits, who expressed their desire to help fight and “finish the enemy”; namely the Rwandans and their allies the M23 in eastern DRC. The young recruits were flown to Kitona military base for training.<sup>123</sup>

The Minister reiterated that recruitment of young fighters was the explicit desire of President Tshisekedi and announced that with the voluntary conscription of young fighters, peace was returning to the conflict-affected region in the west of the DRC.<sup>124</sup>

This was the third transport of recruits from Mai-Ndombe to the Kitona military base.<sup>125</sup> For example, on 9 January 2023, it was reported that at least 100 surrendered fighters had been received at the military base in Kitona, following the intervention of the delegation mandated by the Minister of Interior.<sup>126</sup>

Below: Selection of screenshots from a video reporting of the ceremonial departure of young fighters from Kinshasa airport, on 29 January 2023, accompanied by a delegation led by the Minister and the King Mini-Kongo. Source:

<https://fb.watch/oLG7GVOLYg/>



Above: Fabrice Zombi Mini-Kongo (on the left) and Minister Nana Manwanina (center)

<sup>123</sup> See <https://fb.watch/oLG7GVOLYg/>


<sup>124</sup> Idem.

<sup>125</sup> Idem.

<sup>126</sup> See <https://actualite.cd/2023/01/08/rdc-kwamouth-plus-de-100-assaillants-qui-setaient-rendus-aux-fardc-ont-ete-recus-kitona>



Above : Mini-Kongo addressing the young fighters at Kinshasa airport



Above: images depicting the young recruits aboard a transport aircraft on their way to the Kitona military base

**Annex 6 (para. 15)**

**UPDF press release of 17 August 2023 on Operation Shuja results**

**Communiqué de l'UPDF du 17 août 2023 sur l'opération Shuja**



The joint operation codenamed 'Operation Shujaa' by the Uganda Peoples' Defence Forces (UPDF) and the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo (FARDC) have so far recovered 9500 rounds of ammunition from the ongoing operation against the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) that began on the 30<sup>th</sup> November 2021.

The Commander of the UPDF Mountain Division and Operation Shujaa, Major General Dick Olum said that the operation has degraded ADF's capacity to cause war. "The ADF will soon get into the books of the past. We have reduced their capacity to cause war, we have depleted their manpower, their weaponry and their morale is at the lowest."

Maj Gen Olum made the remarks yesterday while displaying a catchment of the weaponry and equipment captured from the ADF at the UPDF Mountain Division Headquarters, Muhooti Barracks Fort Portal.

In addition to the ammunition, 548 ADF terrorists have been put out of action (POA), 50 have been captured alive and 31 have surrendered to the joint forces after intense pressure.

The weapons recovered from the enemy are 151 including 142 submachine guns (SMG), 08 pieces of PMK Machine gun and 01 piece of 60 millimetres mortar. Also, recovered are 111 military radios from the ADF, 45 radio charger ports and 10 batteries.

The joint forces have so far rescued 156 persons including women and children. The children, most of whom were in bad health conditions are currently receiving medical care from the various health facilities of the Uganda Peoples' Defence Forces.

According to the overall UPDF Commander of Operation Shujaa, Major General Dick Olum, the figures above do not include weapons and equipment under the FARDC. "The figures are only inclusive of what we have recorded and we have in our custody as UPDF. FARDC has weapons and equipment captured from ADF and are in DRC, so the figures could be double what we have just given you," said Maj Gen Olum.

Maj Gen Olum added that "For those ADF put out of action, we only count the dead bodies. those we fight with and ran in the wild and die from there are excluded. Therefore, each figure could be double what we have as UPDF."



Available on UPDF's website

<https://www.updf.go.ug/operation-shujaa/adf-will-soon-be-history-major-general-dick-olum/> (Last accessed by the Group on 10 November 2023)

**Annex 7 (para. 15)**

**President Museveni's tweet of 23 September 2023 on the killing of Meddie Nkalubo**

**Tweet du président Museveni du 23 septembre 2023 sur la mort de Meddie Nkalubo**



**Yoweri K Museveni**   
@KagutaMuseveni

...

Fellow Ugandans and, especially the Bazzukulu.

This is to inform you that last Saturday, the 16th of September, 2023, our Air Force attacked four ADF terrorists' targets that were between kms 100 and kms 150 from the Ugandan border on the Ntoroko side. These targets had been located by assets from our Special Duties Regiments (SDR) that have good reconnaissance assets.

According to subsequent intelligence, it seems that a lot of terrorists were killed, including the notorious Meddie Nkalubo, who has been the author of the bombs in Kampala – e.g. those near the Police Station in Kampala, that one near Parliament and the ones that were discovered recently near Kayanja's Church and in the Bunamwya area.

These uninformed People, have been playing with deadly fire for a long time. They will now discover that killing Ugandans is not a good hobby. In this part of the World, there is nowhere we cannot get them, if we coordinate with the Governments of the sister countries.

We salute His Excellency Felix Tshisekedi for allowing us to work with the Congo Army to liberate this part of Congo from these mindless criminals and also punish them for killing Ugandans using infiltrators. You remember the recent killing of the Nyabugaando children by cutting them with pangas, the Sheikhs, Major Kiggundu, Gen. Katumba's daughter, Joan Kagezi, etc. All those involved will perish unless they surrender.

Signed:

Yoweri K. Museveni  
Gen. (Rtd) Ssaabalwanyi

[Traduire le post](#)

11:02 AM · 23 sept. 2023 · 240,1 k vues

Available on X (formerly Twitter)

<https://twitter.com/KagutaMuseveni/status/1705507889316573584?s=20>

(Last accessed by the Group on 10 November 2023)

## Annex 8 (para. 15)

### ADF attacks and movements in the DRC

#### Attaques et mouvements des ADF en RDC

In **Ituri**, ADF continued attacking civilians, often in retaliation for military action against them or to resupply, as observed in the past (see see [S/2022/967](#), para. 12 and [S/2023/431](#), paras. 18 and 20). Intermittent lulls in attacks were also observed.<sup>127</sup> ADF generally tried avoiding contact with FARDC and UPDF, regularly moving west, away from FARDC/UPDF operations, to reach some of their strongholds around Butani, Monge and Otomaber. On their way, they often killed civilians on the road and farmers tending their fields. In August 2023, ADF raided mining sites around that area, including *Independent* and *Russie* mining sites, abducting hundreds of civilians,<sup>128</sup> some of whom were later released (see annex 9). According to several sources, including abductees' testimonies, ADF were not interested in the gold at these mining sites, but rather in food and other subsistence goods.

ADF's expansion in Ituri, and particularly their presence around mining sites, where they established some of their camps, attracted the presence of the armed group *Front des Patriotes pour la Paix/Armée du Peuple* (FPP/AP) from Lubero since a few months, notably at the request of Nande businessmen from Beni and Butembo, who want to protect their economic interests.<sup>129</sup> ADF and FPP/AP clashed on several occasions since May 2023.

In **Beni territory**, ADF attacks considerably reduced since the end of July 2023,<sup>130</sup> particularly as one of ADF's most important strongholds, Mwalika (see [S/2021/560](#) annex 3), was repeatedly hit by Operation Shuja, temporarily dislodging ADF from the area.<sup>131</sup> Since July 2023, important movements of ADF combatants and dependents were reported from east to west of RN4, including into Ituri, some coming from the camps recovered by FARDC and UPDF.<sup>132</sup> These ADF groups were mobile, fast and able to split and regroup as necessary.

In their movement westward, they abducted and killed numerous civilians, particularly on and around the Kainama-Eringeti road and the RN4 around Eringeti and Luna. ADF, however, maintained and/or reconstituted a presence in the Beni-Mbau sector and in the areas south of Eringeti and of Oicha and Mamove, from where they conducted attacks, including the deadly 23 October attack in Oicha.<sup>133</sup> This attack, during which they killed 26 civilians, including 12 children, contrasted with the more sporadic attacks of the last months and with ADF's strategy to rather concentrate on Uganda (see para 16-18).

At the time of drafting, ADF attacks had resumed in Beni territory, as FARDC and UPDF intensified their operations in Ituri and west of RN4, where ADF leadership was mainly concentrated. In line with their usual strategies, the surge of ADF attacks aimed at redirecting the focus of the operations towards other areas. The arrest and killing by UPDF on 2 November 2023 in Uganda of several ADF combatants who were part of the unit conducting attacks in Uganda, as well as the reinforcement of UPDF troops in strategic areas of Uganda at the border with DRC, may also in part explain the recent multiplication of attacks in the DRC.

<sup>127</sup> FARDC, researchers, civil society, intelligence, diplomatic and UN sources.

<sup>128</sup> Ex-ADF abductees, FARDC, researchers, civil society, intelligence and UN sources.

<sup>129</sup> FARDC, researchers, civil society, intelligence and UN sources.

<sup>130</sup> Ex-ADF abductees, FARDC, researchers, civil society, diplomatic, intelligence and UN sources.

<sup>131</sup> Although during the drafting of this report, the Group received information that Amigo's group was attempting to go back to Mwalika.

<sup>132</sup> FARDC, researchers, civil society, intelligence and UN sources.

<sup>133</sup> FARDC, researchers, civil society and UN sources.

**Annex 9 (para. 16)**

**Release of 104 abductees by ADF in September 2023**

**Libération de 104 personnes enlevées par les ADF**

In mid-September 2023, ADF freed over 100 abductees in Ndalya, Ituri province, at the border with Beni territory. The FARDC and UPDF claimed that the release was a result of their operations. However, this liberation was decided by the ADF leadership.<sup>134</sup> As stated by ADF leader Mzee Mayor, alias Mzee Meya (see [S/2021/560 annex 4](#)), in one of the videos filmed by ADF moments before the release of the abductees, their intention was to “win hearts and minds”, and to appear merciful. The video was largely circulated on social media.

In the video, Mzee Mayor proclaimed, speaking to the abductees, that “no one forced him to free you, and no one was tortured! You are released thanks to the good will of the Mzee”, referring to Musa Baluku. Anticipating that the FARDC and UPDF would try to attribute the success of the release to their operations, Mzee Mayor emphasized in the video that FARDC-UPDF spokesperson will “tell on the radio that the FARDC led to the release of the hostages and killed ADF and recovered weapons, although these weapons actually come from FARDC storage and they will kill civilians that they will dress with uniforms to show that they killed ADF, and then you will applaud the FARDC, although their propaganda only aims at killing the population.” The video also contained a title in French translated as “refuting UPDF / FARDC lies”.

Among the abductees, the majority had been taken hostage at the end of August 2023, in and around the mines and fields of *Independent* and *Elake*, Ituri province, by a group of ADF combatants led by a certain Sereka, under the leadership of Mzee Meya. They were almost immediately told that they would shortly be released.

**Screenshot of the video in which Mzee Mayor explaining the release of the abductees**



Video circulating in the social media and provided to the Group by security sources.


<sup>134</sup> ADF ex-abductees, ADF internal sources, FARDC, intelligence and UN sources.

## Annex 10 (para. 17)

### ADF attacks in Uganda

#### Attaques ADF en Ouganda

Since December 2022, several attacks were conducted by ADF combatants who infiltrated Uganda from the DRC territory on several occasions, taking advantage of the porous border between Uganda and the DRC.



Map made by the Group

#### Failed attack in Ntoroko, December 2022

On 13 December 2022, a group of over 30 ADF combatants and 10 female dependents infiltrated Uganda in Ntoroko district to conduct attacks in the area. Yet, local population alerted the UPDF which pursued the group, killing some and capturing the rest. Many of these ADF combatants and female dependents were children who

had been abducted in the DRC by the ADF in 2021 and 2022. Some were militarily trained. The commanders of the group - Yakuti, Mediso and Abu Shaku - were Ugandans. Mediso and Abu Shaku were killed during combat with the UPDF, while Yakuti was arrested, along with over a dozen ADF combatants and dependents. According to those arrested, Mzee Mayor had planned the attack in Ntoroko, selecting the team that was composed of combatants from his camp in Ituri, and some of their dependents. He instructed them to conduct attacks against UPDF positions or alternatively against civilians, hoping that as a result the UPDF would withdraw from the DRC back into Uganda to protect their citizens.

### **Attack on Lhubirira boarding school in June 2023**

On 16 June 2023, armed assailants killed over 40 civilians including 37 students<sup>135</sup> attending the Lhubirira Secondary School in Mpondwe town.<sup>136</sup> At least 20 female students were hacked or bludgeoned to death, including 13 minor girls aged between 12 and 17 years of age. In addition, 17 bodies burnt beyond recognition were retrieved from the school, while some victims also displayed gunshot or cut wounds. DNA analysis allowed for the identification of 13 of the burned victims, all males, confirming the narrative that the male dormitory was set on fire while the victims were locked inside. Six critically injured civilians were evacuated to Bwera hospital by the UPDF; two subsequently succumbed to their injuries. Only four students were found alive. At least six students were abducted during the attack.

Investigations revealed that at approximately 10:30pm on Friday 16 June 2023, after the 60 students in Lhubirira school's dormitories had retired to sleep, a small group of about 10 ADF combatants entered the school, first killing the guard. They then knocked on the door of the male dormitory, but as the students refused to open, the assailants forced their way in, firing several rounds of gunshots. They then began hacking students to death and set the dormitory on fire (see picture below). Only four male students were able to escape, one of whom alerted the nearby police. The assailants also attacked the female student dormitory, killing 20 female students using machetes and other blunt objects.

The headmaster's wife,<sup>137</sup> who was living at the premises of the school, testified that an ADF combatant, wearing military trousers and armed with an assault rifle, entered her house and looted money and phones. He intended to kill her but decided to spare her when he realized she had an infant child, claiming that they are "rebels from the Congo" and as Muslims, they do not kill a mother who has babies.<sup>138</sup> He told her to convey this message in the morning when she would tell others what had happened. She, as well as a civilian living near the school, reported having heard the assailants crying out "Allahu Akbar".<sup>139</sup>

The attack lasted for about an hour and a half and ended around midnight. While the assailants retreated on foot to the DRC territory, they looted shops and wounded and killed several shop keepers and villagers. According to UPDF and FARDC sources, the military chased the assailants into the Virunga National Park in the DRC.

The body of one of the abducted students, a 17-year-old female, was found hacked to pieces, on 19 June 2023, three days after the attack, on DRC territory. The Group is yet to confirm whether any additional abductees from the attack in Uganda are still alive. The timing and location of the killings, as well as the number of reported students killed, could coincide with the students abducted from Lhubirira School.

#### *Information on the assailants*

In addition to the investigations conducted by Ugandan and DRC authorities, which attributed the attack to ADF, multiple sources, including ADF sources, confirmed that ADF had planned and executed the attack. According to these sources, the attack had been planned by ADF commander Abwakasi (see para. 19), while some mentioned that Musa Kamusi was the commander who executed the operation (see [S/2022/479](#), para. 42 and [S/2023/431](#), annex 5).

<sup>135</sup> <https://www.upf.go.ug/lhubirira-school-terror-attack-death-toll-still-stands-at-42-and-not-50-as-alleged-25-bodies-identified-so-far/>

<https://www.upf.go.ug/death-toll-from-terrorist-attack-on-lhubirira-ss-rises-to-44/>. Last accessed by the Group on 5 November 2023.

<sup>136</sup> Located in Kasese district in Uganda, less than 10km south-west of Kasindi, DRC.

<sup>137</sup> According to the account of a source who interviewed the victim.

<sup>138</sup> The Group would however like to recall that despite this statement, ADF have repeatedly killed mothers with infants as well as infants themselves.

<sup>139</sup> According to the account of a source who interviewed the victim and the neighbor.

According to UPDF Major-General Fick Olum, commander of the Mountain Division covering the Mpondwe sector, and also alluded to by President Museveni, ADF were led to the school by local collaborators after having spent two days in the area.<sup>140</sup> Over 20 individuals characterized as local collaborators, including the Director of the school, were arrested in the following days by Ugandan authorities.

As mentioned in para. 18 of this report, the attack intended to avenge UPDF/FARDC operations conducted against ADF, particularly around Mwalika and Rwenzori, and to divert the focus of these operations by having the UPDF retreating to Uganda.<sup>141</sup> By attacking a boarding school hosting a large number of unarmed and unsuspecting students, ADF undoubtedly intended to inflict the maximum number of civilian casualties, as well as raising their profile and the threat on Ugandan territory, all the while avoiding an armed confrontation with UPDF.

In his 18 June 2023 address to the nation, President Museveni stated that the presumed ADF objective to recall UPDF to Uganda had failed, and that Uganda would send even more troops to fight ADF.<sup>142</sup>



Pictures of the male dormitory of Lhubirira Secondary School set on fire by the ADF, which were provided to the Group by a researcher who visited the site of the attack a few days later.

<sup>140</sup> <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lCFHOcv7Zpk> and <https://twitter.com/KagutaMuseveni/status/1670417511001513984>. Last accessed by the Group on 5 November 2023.

<sup>141</sup> See S/2021/560, para. 12 and S/2022/967, para. 8. See also Museveni's statements of 18 June and 14 July 2023 on the attack.

<sup>142</sup> <https://twitter.com/KagutaMuseveni/status/1670417511001513984>. Last accessed by the Group on 5 November 2023.

## Attacks conducted in October 2023

In October 2023, a small ADF unit infiltrated again into Uganda, where it conducted several attacks, including the Queen Elizabeth Park attack.<sup>143</sup> In addition, several attempted attacks were spoiled by prompt intervention of the UPDF.

### Attacks in Mpondwe area

On 6 October, the ADF unit attempted to attack a neighbourhood of Mpondwe Lhubirira town, a few kilometers from the Kasindi border with the DRC and from the Lhubirira Secondary School. The UPDF intervened immediately after the unit crossed the border and exchanged fire with ADF.

A week later, during the night of 12-13 October, ADF combatants attacked a truck and killed at least two of its occupants, still in the Mpondwe Lhubirira area, at the Katojo junction, Kasese district. Da'esh claimed this attack. Shortly after the attack, Ugandan authorities, including President Museveni, warned the population about possible future attacks and requested maximum vigilance.<sup>144</sup>



Picture of the site of the attack provided to the Group by security sources



*"By the grace of God Almighty, the soldiers of the Caliphate ambushed the infidel Christians, near the village of Kinyamasiki in the Kasese area of western Uganda yesterday, and targeted them with machine guns, which led to the killing of two people, the injury of another, and the burning of a truck, and praise be to God."*

Translation of Da'esh's claim made by the Group

<sup>143</sup> FARDC, security, intelligence, diplomatic, researchers and civil society sources.

<sup>144</sup> <https://twitter.com/KagutaMuseveni/status/1713520225239351354?s=20>. Last accessed by the Group on 5 November 2023.

### Attack in the Queen Elizabeth National Park

On 17 October 2023, ADF combatants ambushed and killed a newlywed couple visiting Queen Elizabeth National Park from the United Kingdom and South Africa, respectively, as well as their Ugandan guide. The attack took place around Nyamunuka, along Katwe Road, about 30km southeast from the site of the 13 October attack. This attack was the first documented by the Group where ADF targeted foreigners in Uganda. On 18 October, Da'esh claimed responsibility for the attack.

Multiple sources, including internal ADF sources, confirmed that Abwakasi had also planned the aforementioned October attacks, sending combatants under his command, based in Mwalika. They also confirmed that for the October attacks including the attack in the Queen Elizabeth National Park, the decision to conduct them was ordered by the main ADF leadership, including Musa Baluku, contrary to the attack against Lhubirira Secondary School in June 2023, which was without prior instruction or approval from Musa Baluku. (see para 20).

Several sources reported that Musa Kamusi was the main commander of the ADF unit that carried out the attack in the Park, and possibly also the Lhubirira Secondary School.<sup>145</sup> This would mean that Musa Kamusi evolved in a short period of time from being an ADF collaborator to a key ADF commander leading attacks in Uganda.<sup>146</sup> Musa Kamusi was the imam of Kasindi helping with recruitment, and was arrested in January 2020. He then became one of ADF's main coordinator of collaborators along the Beni-Kasindi road.

On 1 November, the UPDF arrested and killed several ADF combatants who were part of the ADF unit that conducted the October attacks; several others were able to escape. According to several sources, the ADF combatants, when arrested or killed, were returning to the DRC through Lake Edward, using a pirogue.<sup>147</sup> One of the arrested combatants, a Ugandan national called Kyoto Abdul Rashid alias Njovu, was allegedly carrying some of the documents belonging to the couple and the guide killed in Queen Elizabeth National Park.



Picture of the attack site provided to the Group by security sources

<sup>145</sup> Ibid.

<sup>146</sup> Musa Kamusi was the imam of Kasindi helping with recruitment, and was arrested in January 2020, he then escaped from Kangbayi during the October 2020 jailbreak (see S/2021/560, para. 28 and annex 19) and joined ADF in the bush where he grew close to Amigo and Abwakasi and became one of ADF's main coordinator of collaborators along the Beni-Kasindi road.

<sup>147</sup> FARDC, intelligence, security, researchers and UN sources.

  
ISLAMIC STATE

## مقتل 3 نصارى أحدهم بريطاني بهجوم جديد لجند الخلافة العربي أوغندا

ولاية وسط إفريقيا الأربعة 3 ربيع الآخر 1445 هـ

ب توفيق الله تعالى، هاجم جنود الخلافة آلية كان يسْتَقلُّها 3 من السياح النصارى أحدهم بريطاني، بين منطقة موي (موي) وكيكورونغو في كاسيسى، غربي أوغندا أمس، حيث استهدفوهما بالأسلحة الرشاشة، مما أدى لمقتلهما وأحرق المقاتلون آليتهم، وعادوا إلى مواقعهم سالمين، ولله الحمد والمنة.

*"By the grace of God Almighty, the soldiers of the Caliphate attacked a vehicle in which 3 Christian tourists, one of whom was British, were traveling, between the areas of Muya and Kikurongo in Kasese in western Uganda, yesterday, where they targeted them with machine guns, which led to their deaths. The Mujahideen burned their vehicle and returned to their positions. We are safe, praise be to God.*

Translation of Da'esh's claim made by the Group



Picture of Njovu following his arrest on a boat by UPDF on 2 November 2023.

Picture circulating on social media and provided to the Group by a security source.

## Annex 11 (para. 20)

### Case studies on ADF networks

#### Cas d'étude sur les réseaux ADF

Two case studies illustrate how ADF collaborators are recruited and coordinated, including by Abwakasi or Meddie Nkabulo. The Group is concerned, *inter alia*, about the fact that ADF continued to recruit new collaborators in prison, by using their existing collaborators or combatants. The Group's investigations also revealed that ADF mainly used financial incentives to recruit collaborators, exploiting the difficult living conditions in the DRC to attract individuals looking for quick cash and thus willing to transport recruits, supplies, improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and IED components for just a few dollars.

The different cells of ADF collaborator networks did not usually communicate with each other, in order to avoid the total dismantlement of the network in case of the arrest of one or more collaborators. ADF chose to rely only on some trusted collaborators to communicate with and/or coordinate several cells.

As a result, ADF were able to easily recruit and restructure their networks (crucial for ADF's survival and expansion), rendering more difficult the work of intelligence and judicial actors working on dismantling ADF networks.

#### ADF collaborators network linked to the 25 January 2023 bombing in Beni town

In April 2023, the FARDC intelligence and judicial services in Beni dismantled a network of ADF collaborators linked to the 25 January 2023 bombing in the market of Beni town's sub-district called *Ma Campagne* ([S/2023/431](#), para. 27), during which at least 18 civilians, including ten children, were injured. Three ADF elements were involved and played a key role: Erick Muhindo Kamabu, Oscar Katembo Sivalingana and Alpha Mumbere Midugi. The Group interviewed all three individuals.

Erick Muhindo Kamabu was the first to be recruited by ADF, following a short stay in Kangbayi prison in Beni in 2022, where he met ADF collaborator Erasme Mumbere Bolingo. After Erick's release from prison in December 2022, Erasme facilitated his recruitment by putting him in contact with Abwakasi. The latter initially sent Erick some money destined for Erasme. Abwakasi then continued exchanging with Erick, including through the phone of Alpha, Abwakasi's brother-in-law. Alpha had a smartphone, which allowed Erick and Abwakasi to communicate through Whatsapp. In parallel, Erick recruited Alpha, who was a moto taxi driver, to drive him around on his motorbike for the errands provided to him by Abwakasi, although at first, Erick did not reveal the identity of Abwakasi to Alpha.

Shortly after the Kasindi bombing ([S/2023/431](#), paras. 22-28), Abwakasi asked Erick to pick up a package in Butembo in exchange for \$US 200. Erick called Alpha, as well as his friend Oscar to go with him to Butembo, where he received the package, most probably from Yahya, one of Abwakasi's trusted collaborators ([S/2023/431](#), annex 5). The three individuals transported the package, which contained an improvised explosive device (IED), back to Beni. There they decided to store it at Oscar's house in *Ma Campagne*.

Soon after, Abwakasi called Erick and Oscar to explain how to assemble and activate the IED through the use of a telephone, as reported by the Group in its last final report ([S/2023/431](#), para. 27). Abwakasi then instructed them to place the IED in a crowded area, to ensure it killed a maximum number of persons. They thus decided to place it at *Ma Campagne* market and detonated it a few minutes later. Shortly after, Abwakasi wrote to Alpha's phone, congratulating them for their work, and sent him \$US 100, which Alpha shared with the two others.

Subsequently, Oscar and Erick continued exchanging with Abwakasi using other phones. They were arrested in April 2023 as Oscar was picking up another IED in Kyondo, between Butembo and Kasindi, which he claimed Abwakasi had ordered him to deliver to Erick in Beni. This time, Oscar had used another motorbike driver that he had recruited to run his errands. The IED that he was going to retrieve was assembled using components bought by yet another ADF collaborator, Patrick Bahati, who was outside this cell, although also in contact with Yahya, who had recruited Bahati.

When asked by the Group about their motivations to collaborate with ADF, while Alpha denied having full knowledge of what was happening, Erick, Oscar, Alpha and Patrick acknowledged that they had been financially motivated to execute their tasks.

#### **ADF collaborators network in South Kivu**

In August 2023, DRC authorities arrested Rashidi Kupa Patrick alias Pili Pili, one of ADF's main collaborators in South Kivu, whom the Group also interviewed. Pili Pili was part of a large collaborator network in Burundi, Mozambique, South Africa, Tanzania, as well as in South Kivu, Goma, and Butembo in the DRC, to facilitate the recruitment and transit of recruits, goods, including IED components and money, to ADF camps.

Initially, Pili Pili had been recruited in 2015 by his uncle, Sumaili Husseini, whom he described as a former Burundian military officer, who had established an ADF training camp in Kafulo, near Baraka in Fizi territory, along with several Tanzanian individuals. Although Pili Pili denied being aware of their activities, he acknowledged helping them to transport food and other goods to their camp in Kafulo. In 2017, following the dismantlement of the camp by the DRC authorities, who had been alerted by the local population, some Tanzanian individuals who had founded the camp fled to Mozambique and Tanzania.

In 2019, Pili Pili was contacted by one of these Tanzanian individuals, Abu Suleifa, who was in Mozambique in another "Muslim camp". Abu Suleifa put Pili Pili in touch with Meddie Nkalubo to coordinate the sending of 25 Motorola radios to Mozambique. Pili Pili, who was then living in Uvira, explained that the radios were sent to him from Goma, and that Meddie Nkalubo had ordered him to send them to Mozambique through Tanzania by boat.

A few months later, Pili Pili was contacted by two other Tanzanian individuals, Bonge and Abdulaziz, who had returned to Tanzania after the dismantling of the Kafulo camp and were active ADF collaborators. They asked Pili Pili to contact Masika, one of the ADF collaborators involved in the Katindo bombing in Goma on 7 April 2022 (see [S/2022/967](#), paras 64-71), with whom they were collaborating. Shortly after, Masika put Pili Pili in touch with Abwakasi and again with Meddie Nkalubo, with whom Pili Pili had lost contact. Masika also put Pili Pili in contact with a certain Mashaka, alias Abu Rashid Muslim, alias Mashata Leonard Rashidi, an ADF collaborator based in Baraka working as a fisherman, which provided an easy cover for his activities.

Mashaka was responsible for receiving recruits, supplies and money arriving at Baraka port mainly from Burundi and Tanzania, including with the help of Bonge and Abdulaziz. He then coordinated with Masika who picked up the recruits and sometimes supplies in Uvira or Bukavu and facilitated their transportation to ADF camps, passing through Masika's house in Goma. According to several sources, Pili Pili became another intermediary in this network, facilitating the transit through South Kivu, principally from Kalemie to Uvira.

Pili Pili also acknowledged that in January 2023, Abwakasi had asked him to facilitate the transport of fertilizers coming from Dar es Salaam in Tanzania to Beni, through South Kivu.

Although of Muslim faith, Pili Pili asserted that he was not ideologically motivated but rather was interested in earning money and as result was regularly contacting Abwakasi and Meddie Nkalubo.

**Annex 12 (para. 21)****ADF recruitment, including of children, and sexual exploitation of women and girls****Recrutement des ADF, y compris des enfants, et exploitation sexuelle des femmes et des filles***Abductions during attacks*

ADF continued its recruitment drive, both domestically and abroad, despite the continuous threat posed by Operation Shuja,<sup>148</sup> which led to a significant increase in the number of abductees escaping from ADF camps<sup>149</sup> (see [S/2021/560](#), para. 15).

During raids on villages, ADF systematically abducted civilians, mainly children and young adults, considered to be more malleable to indoctrination than adults.<sup>150</sup> Survivors interviewed by the Group reported that civilians abducted by ADF during attacks were forced to carry loot, and once reaching an area considered safe from reprisals, or their camps, the abductees were “sorted out” and categorized according to necessity: adults or weak individuals were left behind or killed; boys and young adults were recruited into the ranks of ADF, trained in warfare and indoctrinated; girls from the ages of 10-12 were separated and given by the leaders as wives to combatants (see below),<sup>151</sup> in continuation of a practice documented by the Group in the past ([S/2020/1283](#) paras. 11 and 20, and [S/2019/469](#), paras. 100-101 and 113-115).

Children aged between 6 and 17, abducted in 2022, reported having been abducted and taken to camps under the leadership of commanders Mulalo, Baluku, Amigo, Defender<sup>152</sup> or “Difenda” (see picture below), Seka Hassani, and Chalamanda,<sup>153</sup> among others. This practice was also reported in the camp led by commander Audi (see picture below) by his real name Hassan Nianzy,<sup>154</sup> alias Isaac, the son of the “great ADF leader”, Jamil Mukulu.

The commanders controlled everything in their respective camps, including the indoctrination, military training, and the distribution of abducted girls to be given as wives to combatants. The children all reported having to participate daily in religious ceremonies, praying, and studying the Quran. Those who refused were tortured (see also [S/2015/19](#), para. 137). They were all given new names to reflect the Muslim faith that was forced upon them. All the abductees had to carry out forced labour, such as carrying loot, working in the fields, cooking, or fetching water, under strict supervision<sup>155</sup> (see also [S/2019/469](#) para. 101, and [S/2015/19](#), para. 133). Many took the opportunity to escape when sent on chores outside the camps. Those who were caught were executed on the orders of commanders.<sup>156</sup>

*Recruitment abroad*

Recruitment abroad also continued through a network of recruiters operating in Uganda, including by deceiving victims with false promises.<sup>157</sup> This practice followed the *modus operandi* of similar operations conducted by recruiters and focal points along the Kenyan and Tanzanian coastlines and in Burundi, as previously reported (see [S/2022/479](#), para. 35). Several children who escaped from ADF camps reported to the Group having been lured by recruiters from their homes in Uganda with promises of free schooling or work opportunities.

<sup>148</sup> See [S/2023/431](#), para. 11.

<sup>149</sup> MONUSCO sources, NGO source.

<sup>150</sup> According to statements of former ADF abductees .

<sup>151</sup> Statements of five minors, former ADF abductees; MONUSCO and NGO sources

<sup>152</sup> See [S/2015/19](#), annexes 4 and 9.

<sup>153</sup> [S/2021/560](#), annexes 18 and 20.

<sup>154</sup> Commander Audi was leader of an ADF splinter group called “Puli”, that has re-joined ADF in early 2023. See also [S/2015/19](#), annex 3 and [S/2021/560](#), para. 15 and annex 5.

<sup>155</sup> Statements of 71 children, former ADF abductees

<sup>156</sup> FARDC, MONUSCO and NGO sources; statements of former ADF abductees.

<sup>157</sup> See [S/2021/560](#), para. 16 and annex 6.

The accounts of the children depicted the existence of a well-organized recruitment scheme, targeting school-aged children as well as adults in impoverished villages in Uganda. The recruiters used an elaborate scheme to convince the children and their parents that their intentions were genuine and moved the children through several locations and several intermediaries before handing them over to ADF combatants in the Rwenzori Park along the DRC border, who then smuggled them into the DRC. Recruiters in Uganda working on behalf of the “Puli” splinter group, led by commander Audi (see para. 25), often used a transportation company called “Link Bus Services”<sup>158</sup> based in Kampala to transport the children.<sup>159</sup> Four children interviewed by the Group reported having been recruited in such circumstances into the splinter group led by commander Audi, in 2022.

ADF occasionally selected women or men, released them from ADF camps with strict instructions not to reveal their links to ADF, and tasked them with intelligence-gathering or recruitment.<sup>160</sup> A child who had spent several years in an ADF camp led by commander Audi told the Group that her mother<sup>161</sup> was an agent recruiting for commander Audi in Kampala. Another child identified the same woman as the person who had recruited him in 2022 and facilitated his transport from Uganda to Nyabugando, on the DRC border.<sup>162</sup>

### **Systematic practice of sexual slavery in ADF camps**

The Group documented a well-established practice of sexual slavery by ADF, whereby all girls from the age of 12, the majority abductees, were systematically assigned as wives to combatants (see also [S/2015/19](#), para. 139). Each ADF combatant was given a wife, and higher-ranking commanders would generally keep multiple wives. Unmarried girls younger than 12 years of age were segregated from boys and men, and entrusted to women who were responsible for indoctrinating them into the faith of Islam and grooming them to become wives of combatants and commanders when they became older.<sup>163</sup> A 7-year-old girl who escaped from an ADF camp identified her elder sister, the wife of commander Audi (see photograph below), as one of the women in charge of grooming girls to become wives.

Survivors of sexual slavery and former abductees interviewed by the Group reported that camp commanders decided the fate of each hostage and were the ones distributing the girls and women to combatants. Love affairs outside marriage or rape were not permitted and were punished by death. Survivors reported that commanders Mulalo and Musa Kamusi (see [S/2022/479](#), para. 42 and annex 11) had forcefully taken minor girls as wives, and that Kayiira,<sup>164</sup> Chalamanda, Yusufu, among others, were commanders who had ordered the assignment of minor girls to combatants.<sup>165</sup> This practice was established in all ADF camps, including in the camp of commander Audi.

<sup>158</sup> [Facebook page of Link Bus Services Ltd, Uganda.](#)

<sup>159</sup> Testimonies of three children, former ADF abductees.

<sup>160</sup> MONUSCO and NGO sources.

<sup>161</sup> The name of the woman is on file with the Group but withheld from this report to protect the identity of the child.

<sup>162</sup> 7-year-old child who escaped from an ADF camp.

<sup>163</sup> Statements of survivors, MONUSCO sources, NGO sources, FARDC, researcher .

<sup>164</sup> See [S/2021/560, annex 4](#).

<sup>165</sup> Testimonies of five children, former ADF abductees; and statements by seven survivors of sexual slavery who escaped from ADF.

**Photograph of Defender alias “Difenda”:**



Picture provided by security sources

**Photograph of ADF commander Hassan Nyanzi, alias Isaac, alias Audi:**



Picture provided by security sources

**Annex 13 (para. 24)**

**Excerpt of the 29 September 2023 findings of the Expanded Joint Verification Mechanism on the violation of the cease-fire agreement<sup>166</sup>**


**Extrait des conclusions du Mécanisme conjoint de vérification élargi sur la violation de l'accord de ces-sez-le-feu du 29 septembre 2023**

**CONSTATS**

9. L'ECV a constaté ce qui suit :

- a. La colline de KANYAMAHORO est située entre la position avancée des FARDC dans la vallée de KANYAMAHORO (02 km) et la position de l'EACRF KENCON à KIBUMBA (03 km) ;
- b. Dans la nuit du 26 septembre 2023, des éléments du M23 ont occupé la colline de KANYAMAHORO, située dans la zone neutre entre les FARDC et le M23, en violation du cessez-le-feu ;
- c. L'intervention du Commandant du Contingent KENYAN de l'EACRF a permis de désamorcer la tension qui aurait pu s'aggraver. Ceci est le résultat d'une bonne collaboration entre les FARDC, l'EACRF et les dirigeants locaux ;
- d. La colline de KANYAMAHORO est désormais occupée par les troupes du Contingent KENYAN de l'EACRF ;
- e. L'absence de mesures contre les violations de cessez-le-feu encourage les Groupes Armés à continuer leur activisme ;
- f. Le non-respect des décisions des processus de paix de Luanda et Nairobi est à la base de cette violation de cessez-le-feu par les groupes armés.

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RESTREINT



Annex 32 provides additional information on the EJVM findings and occupation by M23 of positions in Kanyamahoro and Kibumba area.

Provided to the Group by DRC Government sources.

<sup>166</sup> Report on the file the Secretariat.

**Annex 14 (para. 24)****EACRF Press Release referring to a violation of the cease-fire agreement**

**Communiqué de presse de la force régionale de la Communauté des États de l'Afrique de l'Est faisant état d'une violation de l'accord de cessez-le-feu**

**PRESS RELEASE****OPERATIONAL UPDATE**

**Wednesday, 25 October 2023:** On Tuesday 24 October 2023, the ceasefire agreement between the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo (FARDC) and the M23 Armed Group was breached.

The hostile clashes fatally wounded a Kenyan Peacekeeper stationed at Kanyamahoro, near Kibumba, 15Km North East of Goma. Consequently, investigations to establish circumstances under which this incident occurred have commenced.

The East African Community Regional Force (EACRF) calls for the return to ceasefire agreement and cessation of hostilities between the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo (FARDC) and the M23 Armed Group.

EACRF remains committed to the Protection of Civilians in line with its mandate.

**- END -**

Press release provided to the Group by EACRF sources

**Annex 15 (para. 25)****Additional information on M23 combatants, RDF and FARDC soldiers killed in combat****Informations complémentaires sur les morts au combat des combattants M23, et des soldats RDF et FARDC**

Despite substantive FARDC reinforcements sent to *Petit Nord*, many FARDC, notably FARDC Special Forces, were killed during clashes, notably in the Kitchanga area according to FARDC sources, sources close to the FARDC command, armed group leaders and combatants, and civilian society sources.

For example, during fighting in Kilolirwe area on 8 October 2023, five special forces were killed and 20 special forces were wounded in combat against M23 and/or RDF. More precisely, the FARDC special forces were killed in the close vicinity of the location named “**Pos 1**” on the map below:




Also, on 16-17 October 2023, in the area between Kitchanga and Bwiza, as FARDC fled during an RDF counter-offensive, FARDC Special Forces were left without substantial protection. During the attack, 13 Special Forces were killed and many wounded.

Armed group leaders informed the Group that during fighting in Nturo area, south of Kilolirwe, on 5-6 October 2023, VDP combatants killed M23 “Colonel” Zaïrois Ngabo, amongst other M23 combatants. Sources close to M23 and armed groups in the area informed the Group that during fighting in Nturo at least 70 M23 combatants were killed. The Group received pictures of killed M23 combatants, on file with the Secretariat.

Multiple sources, including eyewitnesses, one RDF officer and diplomatic sources, informed the Group that several dozen RDF were wounded or killed following ambushes by armed groups in Virunga National Park, and FARDC’s bombing of RDF positions in Nyiragongo territory (see also [S/2023/431](#), annex 29). The dead and wounded were evacuated by road to Rwanda (see also para. 30).

A video from early November showed RDF soldiers south of Nturo, close to “**Ferme Espoir**” (see the first map below), marching as part of a column and carrying 6 dead or wounded soldiers (screenshot of the video below):



Screenshot of video footage obtained from a confidential source with knowledge of the matter.

The Group obtained pictures of dead M23 combatants or RDF soldiers at a mixed M23/RDF position. The picture below shows a dead RDF or M23 combatant in a position east of the three antennas area, Nyiragongo territory (1.505255 S-29.291441 E):



Footage obtained from a confidential source with knowledge of the matter.

**Annex 16 (para. 29)**

**Excerpts of remarks by Vincent Biruta, Rwandan Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, on 11 October 2023 in Kigali**

**Extraits de l'intervention de Vincent Biruta, ministre rwandais des Affaires étrangères et de la Coopération internationale, le 11 octobre 2023 à Kigali**

**Remarks by Vincent Biruta, Minister of Foreign  
Affairs and International Cooperation**

**DIPLOMATIC BRIEFING**

11 October 2023

We are aware of efforts by some to keep accusing Rwanda of supporting M23 and being in Eastern DRC. We wish to remind the international community that this approach is unproductive and does not contribute to bringing peace in the DRC.

M23 is a Congolese problem, involved in the issues of Congolese citizens. Rwanda does not support M23 and does not have troops in the DRC.

Finally, Rwanda takes the security of our citizens and residents very seriously. This is why the defensive and preventive mechanisms in place at our borders will remain, to counter any spillover into Rwanda from any armed group.

Rwanda will not initiate an escalation with the DRC. However, should our security be endangered, we reserve the right to retaliate significantly.

I will now give the floor to the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Emergency Management for his update.

I thank you for your kind attention.

Remarks by Minister Vincent Biruta, provided by a diplomatic source.

**Annex 17 (para. 29)**

**Examples of aerial footage and photographic evidence confirming the presence of RDF soldiers on DRC territory, and additional information on the presence of RDF elements in North Kivu**

**Exemples de séquences aériennes et de preuves photographiques confirmant la présence de soldats des FRD sur le territoire de la RDC, et informations complémentaires sur la présence d'éléments des FRD au Nord-Kivu**

Regarding the presence of RDF soldiers on DRC territory, see also [S/2022/967](#), paras. 47-51 and annexes 29-32, as well as [S/2023/431](#), paras. 54-61 and annexes 28-35.

Aerial footage shot on 17 October 2023 shows columns of soldiers in uniforms equipped with weaponry and backpacks similar to standard RDF-issued equipment, marching from Kalengera towards Tongo, Rutshuru territory, through Virunga National Park. The imagery also shows two objects considered to be 120mm mortars (see also annex 18).

Civil society sources and eyewitnesses reported that on 16 October 2023, an RDF column came from the Bunagana area, passed through Rukoro, close to Rutshuru, and was then spotted on the Kalengera-Tongo axes the following day. The sources identified the armed and uniformed men, estimated at around 250, as RDF soldiers because of their distinct military equipment and uniforms, their organized structure and *modus operandi*.





Video footage obtained from a confidential source

The Group obtained photographic evidence and eyewitness reports of RDF presence in the Kanyamahoro and Kibumba areas in October and November 2023. Civil society sources and eyewitnesses identified the armed and uniformed men in the area as RDF personnel because of their distinct military equipment and uniforms, their organized structure, *modus operandi* and spoken language. The presence of RDF soldiers in the Kanyamahoro and Kibumba areas was confirmed to the Group by intelligence sources, who reported an important increase of RDF in the area in October and November 2023.

For example, on 29 October 2023, RDF soldiers were spotted at a position between Kibumba and Kanyamahoro (1.505486 S – 29.284994 E and 1.505486 S – 29.285275 E):



Footage obtained from a confidential source

On 30 October 2023, RDF soldiers were spotted at a position west of the “three antennas” area of Kibumba (1.505350 S-29.285125 E) (see also [S/2023/431](#), annex 34). The imagery also shows 82mm mortars and a VHF radio:








Footage obtained from a confidential source

Eyewitnesses, civil society actors and local authorities reported that on 29 October 2023, a large number of RDF troops marching in columns arrived from the Rwandan side of the border and passed through Buhumba, south of Kibumba, Nyiragongo territory, to move to the “three antennas” area of Kibumba to reinforce positions further west (see also [S/2023/431](#), Annex 34). One video of 29 October 2023 shows more than 70 soldiers in uniform equipped with weaponry and backpacks similar to standard RDF-issued equipment marching as part of a column and carrying goods. The video is on file with the Secretariat.


Drone footage of 28 October 2023 shows at least 50 soldiers in uniform equipped with weaponry and backpacks similar to standard RDF-issued equipment posted in trenches on a hill located west of the RN2, at the level of Buhumba (see map below):



Footage obtained from a confidential source

In early November 2023, more than 70 soldiers in uniforms equipped with weaponry and backpacks similar to standard RDF-issued equipment were spotted northeast of Kilolirwe:






Footage obtained from a confidential source

According to intelligence sources and sources with knowledge of the matter, RDF troops deployed on DRC territory belonged to five different battalions as well as RDF special forces (see also [S/2022/967](#), Annex 29). In addition, the same sources reported that RDF and M23 units were supported by “combat/recce teams” totaling 250 former FDLR combatants and operating under the Rwanda Defence Intelligence Department (DID) (see para. 30 and also [S/2023/431](#), para. 59).

Sources close to the M23 and intelligence sources reported to the Group that from September 2023 onwards, there was a sharp increase in the contacts and coordination between RDF officers responsible for the coordination of the operations in North Kivu and M23 leadership – notably “Brigadier-General” Bernard Byamungu, “Colonel” Castro Mberabagago and sanctioned individual Baudoin Ngaruye (CDi.019) (see also [S/2023/431](#), para. 61, 50 and Annex 25).


Multiple sources reported that RDF troops continued to enter DRC territory through Kabuhanga, south of Kibumba, Nyiragongo territory, which the Group had already documented as one of the RDF entry points (see also [S/2023/431](#), Annex 34).

Civil society and intelligence sources reported that RDF’s increased presence in the Kibumba-Kanyamahoro area and the creation of new RDF positions west of the RN2 aimed at securing RDF access to Rusayo, a location situated between the two principal roads leading to Goma, i.e., the Goma-Kanyamahoro-Rutshuru road and the Goma-Sake road. This, in turn, would allow the RDF to eventually cut access to both roads:



**Annex 18 (para. 31)****Additional information on several recovered 120mm mortars****Informations complémentaires sur plusieurs mortiers de 120 mm retrouvés**

Picture of unexploded 120mm guided mortar shell recovered in Murambi, close to Mushaki, Masisi territory (picture 1) and a sample picture of a similar, functional 120mm guided mortar shell (picture 2):



Pictures provided by MONUSCO

Picture of the remnants of the 120mm mortar recovered on 24 October 2023 some 15 meters from the FARDC camp in Kanyamahoro:



Pictures obtained from a confidential source

The Group is working on tracing the origins of these 120mm mortar shells.

The Group notes that this weapon system is new and expensive; the transport of this system, as well as its storage, is complicated and sensitive, due to its electrical and electronical components ; the use of the weapon system requires extensive training. It is therefore highly unlikely that local armed groups or the FDLR possess and/or use this type of weapon system.

The Group notes that on 27 February 2023, north of Sake ( $1^{\circ}31'26.1''$  S –  $29^{\circ}04'24.1''$  E), Masisi territory, a T-54 tank belonging to the FARDC was hit by a mortar strike. Active fighting, including RDF and M23 presence and operations, was documented in that area at that time (see [S/2023/431](#), Annex 26). Given the high precision strike, military analysts concluded that the T-54 tank was most likely hit by a guided mortar shell containing the components for laser and GPS-measurements.



Screenshot of a video of the 27 February 2023 strike provided by a confidential source with knowledge of the matter



Map indicating the location (in red) of the 27 February 2023 strike

**Annex 19 (para. 34)****Non-exhaustive list of armed groups from North Kivu and South Kivu provinces part of the “Wazalendo coalition”****Liste non-exhaustive des groupes armés des provinces du Nord-Kivu et du Sud-Kivu faisant partie de la “coalition Wazalendo”**

Armed groups active in North Kivu continued to build and strengthen their coalition against the M23. This resulted in a loose umbrella group of armed groups calling themselves the Alliance of Resistant and Patriots (*Alliance des résistants de la patrie* or ARP) (see also [S/2023/431](#), paras.75-78), which came to be known by the local population as the “Wazalendo” (patriots in Swahili). Over time, this armed group alliance has grown to include more armed groups (see below) totalling 28,700 local and foreign combatants. These groups also continued to communicate with, and receive support from, FARDC military hierarchy (see annexes 22 and 25 below and [S/2023/431](#), paras. 79-85). The Group notes that this support constitutes a violation of the arms embargo and sanctions regime.

According to armed group leaders and combatants, civil society sources, sources close to the FARDC command and intelligence sources, the following armed groups were part of the Wazalendo coalition and deployed in North Kivu:

<b>Armed group</b>	<b>Commander</b>	<b>Area of operations</b>
Alliance du Peuple pour un Congo Libre et Souverain (APCLS)	“General” Janvier Busingo Karahiri	Walikale / Masisi
Nduma Defense du Congo - Renove (NDC-R)	Guidon Shimirayi Mwisa	Walikale / Masisi
Collectif des mouvements pour le changement/ Forces de défense du peuple (CMC/FDP)	“General” Dominique Ndaruuhuste, alias Domi	Walikale / Masisi
Alliance des nationalistes congolais pour la défense de droits humains/Alliance de force de défense du peuple	Jean-Marie Bonane	Walikale / Masisi
Mai-Mai Kifuafua		Walikale / Masisi
Union des peuples congolais libres de la nation (UPCLN)	“General” Janvier Mayanga	Masisi
Nyatara Abazungu	“General” Mahoro	Masisi
Patriotes résistants congolais-Forces de frappe (Pareco-FF)	Sendugu Hakizimana (alias Museveni)	Masisi
Mouvement patriotique d'autodéfense (MPA)	“General” Nyonzima Janvier	Rutshuru
Collectif des mouvements pour le changement/Forces armées du peuple congolais (CMC/FAPC)	“General” Bigabo	Rutshuru
Nduma Defense du Congo-Renove (NDC-R/Bwira)	“General” Mapenzi	Rutshuru
Forces démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda (FDLR-FOCA)	“Colonel” Protogene Ruvugayimikore Ruhinda	Rutshuru
Union des Patriotes Congolais pour la reconstruction du Congo (UPCRL)	“General” Mugabo	Rutshuru
Eveil patriotique pour la libération du Congo (EPLC)	Florentin Mzembe	Rutshuru
Brigade Humanitaire (BH)	“Colonel” Makasi	Rutshuru
Coalition des forces unies wazalendo (CF'UW).	“General” Mhuindo	Rutshuru
Coalition Nationale du Peuple pour la Souveraineté du Congo, abbreviated as the (CNPSC) also known as Mai Mai Yakutumba	“General” William Amuri Yakutumba	Rutshuru

Front des Patriotes pour la Paix/Armée du Peuple (FPP-AP)	Kabidon	
MRP	Lumoo motata alias Chinois	
Corps de patriotes congolais (COPACO)-Sud Kivu	John Kudia	Massisi
Union de Forces Patriotique du Congo (UFDPC)	Mbokani Cimanuka Grâce	Nyiragongo
UPLC	Kambale Mayani	

**Annex 20** (para. 35)**Additional information on FARDC planned operations in July 2023 and September/October 2023****Informations supplémentaires sur les opérations planifiées par les FARDC en juillet 2023 et septembre/octobre 2023**

In July 2023, the Group received information and reviewed documents, on file with the Secretariat, regarding the preparation of FARDC operations in North Kivu Province aimed at (i) neutralizing the enemy (i.e. M23); (ii) conquering lost positions; (iii) controlling strategic positions; (iv) protecting the civilian population and returning to normal activities of daily living; and (v) re-establishing State authority. The FARDC documents dating from July 2023 referred to an “aggression” by two neighbouring countries, Rwanda and Uganda, using a “pseudo-rebellion”, and stated that despite the relative calm in the area, the “RDF/M23 and UPDF allies continued to strengthen their ranks” which meant that “they are preparing a violation of the cease-fire”.

According to FARDC sources and confidential sources with knowledge of the matter, in July 2023 the plan was to launch operations in the event of attacks on the Kibumba, Sake, Kitshanga or Mabenga roads, on an FARDC position, or against Goma town. Other scenarios - such as an M23 cantonment refusal, the worsening of the humanitarian situation of the IDPs, or M23 movements towards FARDC and EACRF positions - could *de facto* also trigger the operations. The preceding information was reported to the Group in July 2023.

In July 2023, the strategy was to reinforce FARDC troops with 2,000 Republican Guards<sup>167</sup> and 1,000 Special Force combatants. Moreover, military contractors from the private military companies Congo Protection (numbering around 900 in October 2023) and Agemira (numbering around 100 in October 2023 (see [S/2023/431](#), annex 23) were also envisaged to provide substantial reinforcement to the FARDC’s military operations, the former on the ground and the latter through strategic advice and support to airstrikes (see also paras. 47-51).

In September and October 2023, the Group was informed that 2,000 FARDC Special Forces would be deployed instead of the 1,000 originally envisaged.

On 21 September 2023, the Group was informed by sources close to the FARDC hierarchy that the military operation, by land and air, against the M23 would start “after 28 October 2023” and that these operations were called for by President Tshisekedi and Minister of Defence Bemba. The concept of operations was approved by the Chief of Army Staff, General Christian Tshiwele Songsesha, on 12 October 2023 (see also [S/2023/431](#), para. 79). The initial plan was to liberate the RN2 and protect the borders, including by taking control of Bunagana and Kitagoma border crossings.

Five conditions were articulated for the launching of full-scale military operations: (i) the availability of armed drones; (ii) the availability of sufficient armoured personnel carriers to ensure increased mobility of FARDC troops; (iii) the deployment of 2,000 FARDC Special Forces in *Petit Nord*; (iv) clarification of the EAC position in view of full-scale military operations, in particular the status of EACRF troops in the area, since operations would impinge on the agreed EACRF buffer zones; (v) clarification of the position of the Ugandan Government in view of planned operations at the DRC-Uganda border.

The Group notes that three CH-4 drones arrived from Kinshasa to Goma, and further to Kavumu, in early November. The armed drones were supposed to be operational around 20 November 2023. In addition, several armoured vehicles were transported to Goma in October, and an additional 10 were supposed to arrive early November 2023. The number of Mi24 helicopters were planned to be increased to 6 (4 in addition to the ones present in Goma in October 2023); the number of Mi8 helicopters increased to 4 (2 extra to the ones present in Goma in October 2023).

<sup>167</sup> 1000 deployed in Goma area, and 1000 coming from Beni.

**Annex 21 (para 35)****Meetings between the FARDC Chief of Staff and the Wazalendo armed groups****Réunions entre le chef d'état-major des FARDC et les groupes armés du Wazalendo**

Combatants and ex-combatants from the Wazalendo coalition interviewed in June 2023 confirmed that following the M23 attacks and the subsequent occupation of Kitchanga in late January 2023, the FARDC Chief of Staff, General Christian Tshiwewe Songesha, instructed local armed groups to remobilize and to defend their communities. On the 8 and 15 June 2023, in Bukobo and Tongo respectively, Tshiwewe Songesha held coordination meetings with the “Wazalendo” and instructed them to remobilize, defend their communities and the DRC’s territorial integrity.<sup>168</sup> The military authorities tolerated the Wazalendo’s presence in parts of eastern DRC with weapons, including in Goma, and tolerated that Wazalendo imposed illegal taxation on communities, including in the Rubaya mine area (see paras 59-71).

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<sup>168</sup> VDP combatants and ex-combatants, sources close to FARDC command, civil society sources and researchers.

**Annex 22 (para. 36)****Additional information on the Goma meeting and the role of Major-General Cirimwami****Informations complémentaires sur la réunion de Goma et le rôle du Major-Général Cirimwami**

On 16 September 2023, Major-General Peter Nkuba Cirimwami was appointed Military Governor *ad interim* and North Kivu Operations Commander. For additional information on Major-General Cirimwami, see also [S/2022/967](#), annexes 19, 41 and 50.

Upon his arrival in Goma, Major-General Cirimwami toured the frontline in Petit Nord and called for several meetings with nearly all Congolese armed groups active under the “Wazalendo” banner there (see the introductory Summary of the report), as well as the FDLR. Meetings were held on 22 and 23 September 2023 at several locations, including the Serena Hotel (Goma), the Hotel Grand Lac (Goma), the Governor’s office (Goma) and the P-DDRCS site in Mubambiyo. Armed group leaders were hosted in hotels in Goma, which were guarded by FARDC soldiers, as observed by the Group. For example, on 24 September, the Group spoke with sanctioned individual Guidon Shimiray Mwisa (CDi.033) at the Hotel Grand Lac and saw Dominique Ndarurutse alias Domi there.

Armed group leaders arrived on 20, 21 and 22 September 2023, either by road or air-lifted by a FARDC Mi-8 transport helicopter. On 25 September 2023, 21 armed group leaders and combatants were transported back to the field by a FARDC Mi-8 transport helicopter. The Group was told that initially the transport by air of a total of 40 armed group leaders and combatants had been planned that same day, but only 21 took the helicopter. Instead, some armed group representatives travelled back to their respective areas by road. The Group notes that FARDC provided transport, including through helicopters and vehicles, to several UN-, US- and EU-sanctioned individuals. According to the official narrative presented by all parties involved, the Goma gathering aimed at sensitising rebels toward disarmament through the P-DDRCS (see paras. 37-38). However, *de facto*, the meetings focused on developing a joint FARDC-Wazalendo operational strategy to fight M23 and RDF, and the creation of the “Volontaires pour la défense de la Patrie (VDP)” composed of 8,000 Wazalendo combatants to serve as a proxy force for the FARDC. The operational strategy also involved the FDLR, although officially they were not part of the Wazalendo or VDP coalition. The Group notes, however, that the FDLR was also tasked to operate against the M23 and RDF, either unilaterally or jointly alongside the VDP armed groups.

The operational strategy discussed and agreed upon during the Goma meetings included, amongst others, the allocation of operational axes to the different armed groups (see annex 24).

When asked by the Group of Experts about the cooperation between the FARDC and the armed groups, Major-General Cirimwami pointed out that the involvement of the armed groups labelled “Wazalendo” or VDP was not a government initiative but was triggered by M23’s provocations. He also reiterated the Government’s call for the cantonment and disarmament of armed groups. When asked about the weaponry of the armed groups in *Petit Nord*, Major-General Cirimwami informed the Group that the weapons in the hands of the VDP had been found on the battlefield or seized from the M23 during fighting. The Group notes that Major-General Cirimwami’s statements are contradicted by its own findings.

**Annex 23** (para. 36)**Armed groups, armed group leaders and representatives documented as having participated at the Goma meeting and related meetings****Groupes armés, chefs et représentants de groupes armés ayant participé à la réunion de Goma et aux réunions connexes**

According to armed group leaders and combatants, civil society sources, intelligence sources and sources close to the FARDC command, the following armed groups participated to the Goma meeting and break-out sessions:

ARMED GROUP	REPRESENTATIVE AT GOMA MEETING
APCLS	- Elie
ANCDH/ABAZUNGU	- Identity unknown
CMC-FDP	- Dominique "Domi" Ndaruhutse - Jules Mulumba
CMC-FAPC	- Bigabo
EPLCS	- Identity unknown
FDLR/FOCA	- Identity unknown
FDDH / Delta	- Libende
FDDP	- Identity unknown
FPP/AP	- Kabidon Kisanyo - Raus
FPLC	- Identity unknown
NDC-R / Mapenzi	- Desire Ngabo
PARECO	- Mahoro
PARECO-FF	- Innocent Kigingi
UPCRN	- Identity unknown
MAC	- Identity unknown
MAI-MAI UHURU	- Identity unknown
MPA	- Nzamuye Bahati - Janvier Niyonzima
NDC-R / Guidon	- Guidon Shimiray Mwisa

## Annex 24 (para. 38)

### **Leadership of the VDP coalition and repartition of operational zones**

### **Commandement de la coalition du VDP et répartition des zones d'opération**

VDP's command was placed in the hands of the main armed groups active in *Petit Nord*, i.e., NDC-R/Guidon, CMC-FDP of Dominique Ndarakutse, FPP/AP of Fidele Mapenzi and Kabidon Kasanyo, APCLS of Janvier Karairi Boingo and ANCDH of Jean-Marie Bonane.

While the official leadership of the VDP had not yet been announced at time of drafting, multiple sources informed the Group that Janvier Karairi Boingo of APCLS served as the overall leader of the VDP, while CMC-FDP leader Dominique Ndarakutse was his deputy entrusted with logistics. NDC-R's leader and sanctioned individual Guidon Shimiray Mwisa (CDi.033) was reported to be in charge of the military operations (see also [S/2023/431](#), para.75). Jules Mulumba, the spokesperson of the CMC-FDP, served as the coordinator and communication officer of the VDP.

Armed group leaders and combatants, as well as sources close to the FARDC command, reported the division of operational axes as follows:

- **Pinga-Kashuga-Mweso-Kitchanga axis:** NDC-R/Guidon of Guidon Shimiray Mwisa;
- **Bukombo-Tongo-Kalengera axis:** CMC-FDP of Domi Ndarakutse;
- **Rwindi-Nyamilima axis:** FPP/AP of Kabidon Kazanyo and NDC-R of Fidel Mapenzi;
- **Masisi-Sake axis:** APCLS of Janvier Karairi;
- **Busumba-Burungu axis:** ANCDH of Jean-Marie Bonane.

Armed group combatants also reported some additional axes and locations to be included in the VDP and Wazalendo's area of responsibility:

Tuesday	21	الثلاثاء	شباط / فبراير ٢٠٢٣	1 Shabaan 1444 H الإثنين - Tuesday
GROUPE,	Comd/Nom.	Positionnement		
FDDH	Delta	Kazinga		
UPCRN	Divin Kany andekwe	Haut plateau de Bishange		
MRP	Col Pascal (FAROC) LUMOO MATATA chinois	Bweremana Mendova		
PARECO/FF	Maroc	Rebaya		
CMC-NYIRAGO NGO	Janvier	Kitarava/ Nyiragongo		
UPCRN	Flory	Murambi/ Nyiragongo		
UPCRN	Col NZABI	KIBE x RUGAEI		
FAR - W	Gen love	Kanyangoma/ Nyiragongo		
EPLC	cherubin	Kanyangoma/ Nyiragongo		
NDC-RM PENZI	LIKUWE MAPENZI	Kinyumba Hubero		

FEBRUARY 2023	شباط / فبراير ٢٠٢٣	FEBRUARY 2023
Wednesday	22	الأربعاء
		٢ شبابان ١٤٤٤ هـ الإثنين - Tuesday
FDDP	Defender & MKAT	Kingi Kaissa

Document obtained from combatants active in Nyiragongo territory and confirmed by APCLS leaders, civil society and FARDC sources

**Annex 25** (para. 39)

**Additional information on weaponry, logistics and cash money provided to the armed groups active in *Petit Nord* against the M23 and RDF**

**Informations complémentaires sur l'armement, la logistique et l'argent liquide fournis aux groupes armés actifs dans le Petit Nord contre le M23 et les FDR**

The Group notes that the mobilisation and coordination of armed groups active in *Petit Nord* by the FARDC, as well as the provision of weapons, logistics and financial support to these armed groups, was documented prior to the Goma gathering (see also [S/2023/431](#), paras. 79-85).

For instance, in mid-May 2023, the Group received authenticated video footage showing an FARDC helicopter delivering food and other materiel to the NDC-R leader, sanctioned individual Guidon Shimiray Mwisa (CDI.033), in Pinga, Masisi territory:



Screenshots of a video showing Guidon Shimiray Mwisa (texting on his mobile phone) provided to the Group by a confidential source

When Major-General Peter Nkuba Cirimwami was appointed Military Governor *ad interim* and North Kivu Operations Commander, armed groups were requested to identify their needs in terms of armament and logistics and submit them to FARDC authorities.<sup>169</sup>

<sup>169</sup> Armed group leaders and combatants, sources close to FARDC command, intelligence sources and researchers.

Armed group combatants and sources close to the FARDC command reported that Colonel Christophe Kenge, Military Territorial Administrator of Masisi, was appointed to channel food and ammunition supplies to the armed groups, which he executed. For example, on 16 October 2023, the Group viewed a photo showing a transfer of four boxes of ammunition, stored in the vehicle of Colonel Christophe Kenge, to Mai-Mai combatants in Sake on 15 October 2023. Colonel Christophe Kenge denied being in touch with the armed groups in *Petit Nord*. He also reported to be unaware of the presence of Wazalendo armed groups in Kitchanga in the aftermath of the 4-5 October 2023 VDP takeover of the town, although the town falls within his area of responsibility.

Armed group combatants and sources close to the FARDC command also reported the continued role of Colonel Salomon Tokolonga as relay for the cooperation between the FARDC on the one hand, and the VDP and the FDLR on the other (see also [S/2022/967](#), paras. 65 and annex 41; [S/2023/431](#), paras. 81 and annex 49).

The Group documented the transfer of boxes of ammunition, cash money and goods, on several occasions. For example, in Sake and Rwindi, in late September and early October 2023 respectively, meetings took place between armed group leaders and FARDC representatives during which armed groups leaders were provided with new materiel, financial support, goods and foodstuffs.

The Group notes that in the aftermath of the Goma meetings, the Wazalendo armed group leaders and combatants appeared well-armed, mostly dressed with FARDC uniforms and carrying radios, as illustrated in the following pictures/screenshots:

- 5 October 2023, Tongo, CMC/FDP combatants (pictures 1 and 2)
- 5 October 2023, Busumba, NDCR-Colonel Guidon Shimiraye (picture 3)
- 6 October, Kitchanga, ANDCH Colonel Bigirabagabo Nzita (picture 4)
- 6 October 2023, APCLS “general” Janvier Karahiri and FARDC colonel Salomon Tokolonga leaving an FARDC vehicle (picture 5)
- 16 October 2023, Kitchanga, NDCR-Guidon combatant called “Effacer” (picture 6)

Picture 1 :



Picture 2 :



Picture 3 :



Picture 4 :



Picture 5 :



Picture 6:



The Group directly observed the distribution of envelopes by an FARDC commander to armed group leaders on 24 September 2023 at the Hotel Grand Lac in Goma. Armed group combatants reported that the FARDC commander was distributing cash. The FARDC commander was identified by several sources as Colonel Sokololo, T1 of the FARDC Etat-Major in Goma:

Picture 1 below: Colonel Sokololo on the terrace of Grand Lac Hotel in Goma, about to hand over money to a person approaching on his right.<sup>170</sup>



Picture 2: Picture taken few seconds after Picture 1 above. Colonel Sokololo handed over a bundle of cash to the person approaching on his right.<sup>171</sup> In the foreground, CMC-FDP commander Domi Ndaruhutse passing by.




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<sup>170</sup> Witnessed by members of the Group.

<sup>171</sup> Ibid.

Pictures 3 and 4: Pictures taken at the same location (different angle), several hours later, depicting Colonel Sokololo (on the left of the image, partially visible, wearing the same red striped-shirt and sitting at the same table) still distributing cash to other armed group members, with both parties signing in a notebook.




Pictures 1 to 4 above taken by the Group of Experts at the Grand Lac Hotel in Goma, on 24 September 2023

**Annex 26 (para. 39)**

**VDP samples of armbands**

**Échantillons de brassards VDP**



Blue-green: NDCR-Guidon

Yellow: APCLS

Purple: CMC-Domi

Red: ANCDH

**Annex 27 (para. 44)**

**Press statement of the FDNB spokesperson on the deployment of FDNB troops within EACRF framework and elements provided by the Government of Burundi following information requests by the Group of Experts**

**Communiqué de presse du porte-parole de la FDNB sur le déploiement des troupes de la FDNB dans le cadre de la force régionale de la Communauté de l'Afrique de l'Est et éléments fournis par le Gouvernement du Burundi suite aux demandes d'information du Groupe d'experts**

REPUBLIQUE DU BURUNDI

Bujumbura, le...../10/2023




FORCE DE DEFENSE NATIONALE  
DU BURUNDI  
ETAT MAJOR GENERAL

**COMMUNIQUE DE PRESSE**

1. Depuis la décision des Chefs d'Etat de la Communauté Est Africaine (EAC) de déployer à l'Est de la République Démocratique du Congo une Force Régionale de l'EAC pour soutenir le gouvernement de la République Démocratique du Congo dans la restauration de la paix dans cette partie de ce pays, le Burundi a déployé un contingent au Nord Kivu au mois de mars 2023.
2. Ce contingent burundais accomplit sa mission conformément au cadre légal régissant la Force Régionale de la Communauté de l'Afrique de l'Est. Sous les ordres du commandement de cette Force Régionale, les militaires burundais exécutent entre autres missions: assurer la sécurité de la population et de ses biens, la libre circulation des personnes et des biens sur les principaux axes routiers dans leur secteur de responsabilité. Ils exécutent leurs missions dans le strict respect du mandat de la Force Régionale de l'EAC.
3. Partout où les militaires burundais sont déployés à l'Est de la République Démocratique du Congo, ils sont hautement appréciés par les populations qu'ils protègent contre toute menace y compris le vol de leurs biens par les groupes armés.
4. Les militaires burundais agissent en tout lieu et à tout moment avec professionnalisme, l'une des valeurs principales de la Force de Défense Nationale du Burundi.

Colonel BIYEREKE Floribert

Porte-parole de la FDNB

P.O  
 Lt-col BAHONGAHO Emmanuel  
 SS 1044  


- *Regarding the deployment of FDNB troops outside the EACRF framework:*

In reply to information requests of the Group regarding the deployment of FDNB troops outside the EACRF framework, on 7 November 2023 the Government of Burundi stated, *inter alia*, the following:

“At the EAC Heads of State summit held in Nairobi on 20 June 2022, the concept of operations (CONOPS) was validated and a decision was taken on the deployment of a regional force (EACRF) in eastern DRC to combat all local and foreign armed groups that have not signed up to the Nairobi peace process. It is within this framework that the FDNB has deployed troops on the Congolese territory, particularly in South Kivu, as described in the CONOPS.”<sup>172</sup>

“With the upsurge in fighting between the FARDC and armed groups, including the M23, in North Kivu, the Heads of State of the EAC partner countries have decided to create a multinational sector where the Regional Force will focus on tackling this situation of insecurity. It is in this regional context that the FDNB has deployed another contingent in North Kivu in the sector comprising the localities of Kitchanga, Kilolirwe and Sake.”<sup>173</sup>

The Government thus denied the deployment outside the EACRF framework, contrary to the Group’s findings.

- *Regarding FDNB soldiers wearing FARDC uniforms:*

In reply to an information request by the Group regarding uniforms and military equipment of the FDNB troops deployed outside the EACRF framework, the Government of Burundi stated the following:

“The FDNB has deployed troops in North and South Kivu as part of the Regional Force under the command of EACRF. However, FDNB contingents, like other contingents deployed in the DRC, wear their own uniforms.”<sup>174</sup>

The Government thus denied that its deployed FDNB soldiers wear FARDC military uniforms, contrary to the Group’s findings.

- *Regarding confrontation between Burundian troops and armed groups:*

The Government of Burundi, in reply to the Group’s information requests, informed the Group that “no confrontations with armed groups have yet been reported, and consequently no loss of men and/or equipment has been incurred in the Burundi contingent’s area of responsibility.”<sup>175</sup>

The Group notes that it obtained information from multiple sources that FDNB soldiers were killed on the battlefield. For example, on 5 November 2023, at least 10 Burundian soldiers were killed in confrontations with the M23 and/or RDF south of Kitchanga.

In early November 2023, EACRF sources also informed the Group that “Lance Corporal Emerance Ndikumwibana<sup>176</sup>, Army Nr. HR 83678, from Burundian Army but not EACRF”, had been captured by M23 as a prisoner of war. This was confirmed to the Group by sources close to the FARDC and later relayed by M23 in a video, taken off the Internet shortly after.<sup>177</sup> The Group was able to confirm that the soldier portrayed in the video, wearing an FARDC uniform, belongs to the FDNB. This was also stated by the soldier himself.

The soldier declared that his contingent had departed Burundi on 19 September and arrived in North Kivu on 20 September 2023. In the video, he also declared that they were asked to dress in FARDC military attire at the airport in Bujumbura, and that their mission was to fight the M23.

He noted that upon arrival at Goma airport, they were brought to a military camp and thereafter deployed to the battlefield, where he was captured by M23. His contingent was composed of 300 soldiers. He declared that they left their weapons in Burundi and were provided with other weapons upon arrival in the DRC.

<sup>172</sup> Translation from French into English by the Group.

<sup>173</sup> Ibid.

<sup>174</sup> Ibid.

<sup>175</sup> Ibid.

<sup>176</sup> Note: M23 communications refer to the soldiers as “Ndikumana”.

<sup>177</sup> Video on file with the Secretariat. Part of the video can be watched on [Youtube](#).

The M23 military spokesperson, Willy Ngoma, told the Group that the M23 had captured “many Burundian soldiers and many FARDC”. He was, however, unwilling to provide any further details and/or evidence to substantiate these allegations.

**Annex 28 (para. 44)**

**Bilateral Defence Agreements between the DRC and Burundi**

**Accords bilatéraux de défense entre la RDC et le Burundi**

Both the DRC Minister of Defence, Jean-Pierre Bemba, and the Governor *ad interim* and then North Kivu Operations Commander, Major-General Peter Nkuba Cirimwami, told the Group that they were unaware of this bilateral FDNB-FARDC cooperation in Petit Nord. This is in contradiction with the findings of the Group.

In addition, the Group notes that in August 2023, the Governments of the DRC and Burundi signed a technical agreement on reinforced military cooperation and defence assistance, the latter made under the bilateral defence cooperation agreement of 6 March 2023.<sup>178</sup>

In this August 2023 agreement, the parties undertake to continue and intensify their joint military operations to combat all forms of aggression on the territory of either Party; to combat terrorism and insurgency; to coordinate, plan and effectively execute concerted missions (Article 3.1).

In Article 5, the parties also agreed to strengthen their commitment to provide assistance in the event of a direct threat or armed aggression against one of them (Article 5.1). In the event of such a direct threat or armed aggression against one of the Parties, the other Party undertakes to provide military, humanitarian, logistical or diplomatic assistance (Article 5.2). The specific procedures and modalities for providing this assistance are detailed in joint operational plans, notably the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), the Concept of Operations (CONOPS) and the Rules of Engagement (ROE) (Article 5.3).

The Group did not obtain these operational plans.

Since both the DRC Government and the Government of Burundi have not acknowledged the presence of FDNB troops in North Kivu outside the EACRF framework, it is unknown whether the deployment of some 1,070 FDNB troops in the context of the M23-related crisis was agreed based on the concluded defence agreements.

The Group notes, however, that the above-mentioned articles do refer to “forms of aggression” and “direct threat or armed aggression”, most likely a reference to the RDF support to the M23.

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<sup>178</sup> On file with the Secretariat.

**Annex 29 (para. 44)****M23 open letter addressed to the UN Secretary-General and Rwandan media referring to FDNB deployment****Lettre ouverte du M23 adressée au Secrétaire général des Nations unies et médias rwandais évoquant le déploiement de la FDNB**

Object: Ongoing Ethnic Cleansing in Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)

The M23 Movement Directorate acknowledges Your Excellency's endless efforts to find a peaceful resolution to the ongoing conflict in the Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo. Following the accusations mentioned therein our correspondence to your Excellency on October 11th, 2023, reference: 119/PDT/M23/2023 (herein attached). The M23 draws Your Excellency's attention to the following:

1. The ethnic cleansing continues, perpetrated by Président Tshisekedi Tshilombo's coalition forces of FARDC, FDLR, MERCENARIES, MILITIAS and BURUNDI NATIONAL DEFENSE FORCES under the total silence of the International Community.
2. As evidence: we, hereby, confirm Your Excellency that while defending ourselves and protecting the targeted civilian population by the said coalition in Kitchanga, Bwiza, Burungu and their surroundings, our forces (M23/ARC) have captured a BURUNDI NATIONAL DEFENSE FORCES' soldier who was embedded within the DRC government forces during their slaughtering of the innocent civilian population. Here is his identity:

Rank: 1<sup>st</sup> class  
 Names: KUBWIMANA MERENCE  
 Army Number: 83678HR 27742

Unit of origin in Burundi:  
 4<sup>th</sup> Division  
 Bataillon: 412  
 2<sup>nd</sup> company  
 Platoon One  
 Section One

Deployed to DRC under the 6<sup>th</sup> Bataillion TAFOC

3. The Humanitarian crisis has reached an unprecedented level in Bwiza and its surroundings.
4. War crimes continue to be committed by the said coalition under the watchful eyes of the International Community

The evidence raises tremendous concern Your Excellency, regarding the implication of the States in ethnic cleansing against a section of the population (TUTSI COMMUNITY) in this 21st century. Surprisingly the said countries are United Nations' State members, ICGLR members, EAC Chair State and EAC members.

The M23 continues to defend itself and protect the civilian population against this extermination ideology.



**OPEN LETTER TO UN SECRETARY-GENERAL ANTÓNIO GUTERRES**

H.E. Mr. Antonio Guterres  
United Nations Secretary-General  
42<sup>nd</sup> Street,  
New York, NY 10017

Reference: 120/PDT/M23/2023

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The evidence raises tremendous concern Your Excellency, regarding the implication of the States in ethnic cleansing against a section of the population (TUTSI COMMUNITY) in this 21st century. Surprisingly the said countries are United Nations' State members, ICGLR members, EAC Chair State and EAC members.

The M23 continues to defend itself and protect the civilian population against this extermination ideology.

Please accept, Your Excellency, the expression of our highest consideration.

Kavumu, November 7<sup>th</sup>, 2023

The Chairman of M23 Movement

Bertrand BISIMWA

### **Great Lake Eye article:**

“On October 6, Congolese soldiers, local militia and Wazalendo, were seen entering Kitchanga, a town in the Rutshuru Territory of North Kivu Province in eastern DRC, armed to the teeth with guns and other traditional weapons.

Videos circulating in the media showed ‘a triumphant entry’ of the militia groups and Congolese troops, who are ready to fight the M23 rebels, in violation of a ceasefire earlier established by the Nairobi and Luanda peace initiatives.

Kitchanga, like many other areas, in eastern DRC, has been in control of the East African Community Regional Force (EACRF). A Burundi contingent of the EAC Regional Force is deployed to the area.

During their 22<sup>nd</sup> Ordinary Meeting held on July 22, 2022 in Arusha, Tanzania, the Summit of East African Community (EAC) Heads of State directed to expeditiously deploy a joint regional force in eastern DRC to restore peace and security.

The first troops, a Kenyan contingent, under the regional force landed in Goma, in November 2022.

They were joined, a few months later, by contingents from Burundi, Uganda and South Sudan.

The EAC Regional Force’s mandate and mission was simple; to create a buffer zone to prevent confrontations between the government forces (FARDC) and M23 rebels, take over areas the rebels withdrew from, prepare and observe the pre-cantonment process, all the while protecting civilians from armed groups.

In May, the EAC noted that EACRF has made tremendous progress in its efforts to restore peace and stability in eastern DRC as envisaged by the Summit of EAC Heads of State.

“In line with Decisions of the Summit, the EACRF has continued to ensure observance of ceasefire and in addition overseeing the withdrawal of armed groups who have handed over to the EACRF most of the areas that were under their control. These areas include Karuba, Mushaki, Kiloriwe, Kitchange, Mweso, Kishishe, Bambo, Mnagana, Tchengerero, Kiwanja and Kinyandoni. These areas have since been under the control of various EACRF contingents which will now enable residents to return to their homes and businesses,” stated an EAC statement in May.

“The EAC is proud of the work that has so far been accomplished by the EACRF towards restoration of Peace and Security in the eastern DRC.”

Five months later, however, the situation in eastern DRC is worrying.

Despite the EAC stressing that it is “fully committed to ensure restoration of peace and security in eastern DRC and any other part of the region,” the Burundian contingent has failed to adhere to the regional bloc’s mandate and has failed the Congolese civilians they were expected to protect.

Upon landing in Goma in March, the Burundi National Defence Force (FDNB) were immediately deployed to take control of Kitchanga and Sake areas from the M23 rebels, who had voluntary withdrawn from the areas.

However, since October 1, fighting between FARDC, their allies comprising of genocidal FDLR, Wazalendo and other militias, against the M23 erupted. The rebels were attacked at Kilolirwe, Nturo, Gicwa, and some other areas in Masisi Territory. In addition to the fighting, houses of Congolese Tutsi communities were set on fire in the town of Nturo. The government coalition killed a number of unarmed civilians and looted their property.

All the fighting and atrocities happened in the areas under the control of the Burundian contingent.

The Burundian government also deployed more than 1,000 other troops to North Kivu and South Kivu provinces outside the framework of the EAC, to support the Congolese army.

Sources from Gitega and Kinshasa confirmed that this bilateral military agreement will see Burundian soldiers fighting alongside the FARDC, wearing the latter's uniform.

The Burundian troops under this bilateral arrangement receive instructions directly from Kinshasa. Their mission is directed by Congolese President Felix Tshisekedi. They will not be constrained by any regional protocols and regulations.

Amid the crisis the Burundian army released a statement, on October 6, claiming that their soldiers under EACRF operate professionally.

“Wherever Burundian soldiers are deployed in eastern DRC, they are highly appreciated by the populations they protect against any threat, including the theft of their property by armed groups,” read part of the statement.

But for the Congolese civilians co-habiting with the Burundian soldiers, many questions remain unanswered. How can they claim to be acting professionally when the Congolese Tutsi are being killed in their presence? How do they explain the pillaging of cows, burning of houses of these people? Why have they ceded the areas under their control to FARDC and its militia allies?

What’s now clear is that Burundi’s actions encouraged the FARDC’s belligerence to violate the ceasefire in place since February. If nothing changes, for the better, Burundi’s stance in eastern DRC threatens to make a bad situation worse by minimizing the progress already made.

Observers of the peace process in the DRC had already painted a complex picture of the conflict, with parties routinely shifting bases or allegiance depending on interests.

The situation is very complicated, with very many forces and interests at play.

But it gets even worse, with some countries in the region and the larger international community paying lip service to peace, and actually ending up complicating matters, which undermines the regional processes.”

Source: [https://thegreatlakeseye.com/post?s=Shifting--allegiance%3F--Burundi's--actions--in--eastern--DRC--look--to--undermine--regional--peace--efforts--\\_1164](https://thegreatlakeseye.com/post?s=Shifting--allegiance%3F--Burundi's--actions--in--eastern--DRC--look--to--undermine--regional--peace--efforts--_1164)

## **Annex 30 (para. 45)**

### **Information on flights transporting FDNB troops**

### **Informations sur certains vols transportant des troupes de la FDNB**

FARDC and security sources informed the Group regarding the following flights transporting Burundian troops outside the EACRF framework, as also confirmed by intelligence sources:

- 21 September 2023, 02h38: Flight from Burundi to Goma with 150 FDNB troops; flight tzero 9T-TCR
- 21 September 2023, 05h30: Flight from Burundi to Goma with 150 FDNB troops; flight tzero 9T-TCR
- 23 September 2023, 21h08: Flight from Burundi to Goma with 150 FDNB troops; flight tzero 9T-TCR
- 24 September 2023, 21h26: Flight from Burundi to Goma with 150 FDNB troops; flight tzero 9T-TCR
- 24 September 2023, 23h40: Flight from Burundi to Goma with 76 FDNB troops; flight 9T-TCR

The Iliouchine fixed-wing aircraft with tail number 9T-TCR, known as “Tolerance Zero”, belongs to the FARDC.



Above: Iliouchine fixed-wing aircraft photographed landing at Goma airport on 19 October 2023, at 13h12.

Picture taken and provided to the Group by a confidential source

The Group notes that information provided by EACRF and the Government of Burundi confirms that the above flights transported FDNB troops to Goma outside the EACRF framework:

EACRF informed the Group that part of the Burundian contingent, part of EACRF, was airlifted by the Kenya Air Force on 5 and 6 March 2023. Other Burundian personnel arrived by road during the same period. EACRF also informed the Group that on 15 and 16 March 2023 part of the Burundian contingent, which was claimed to be part of EACRF, was airlifted by the FARDC. EACRF informed the Group that beyond the above-mentioned dates (5, 6, 15 and 16 March), no elements of the Burundian contingent part of EACRF were transported by plane, or arrived by road to North Kivu.

In reply to information requests of the Group, the Government of Burundi stated on 7 November 2023 that “the deployment in the framework of the Regional Force of the EAC was carried out following the EACRF-CONOPS (...); in North Kivu in the multinational sector was done on 05 March 2023 with a contingent of 900 soldiers”.<sup>179</sup>

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<sup>179</sup> Translation from French into English.

**Annex 31 (para. 47)****Additional information on the negotiations conducted by Erik Prince****Informations complémentaires sur les négociations menées par Erik Prince**

In late June and mid-July 2023, the Group was informed by several sources with knowledge of the matter that the plan of the DRC authorities to send 2,500 military contractors from Colombia, Mexico and Argentina to North Kivu,<sup>180</sup> aimed at stopping the M23 advance and secure mining areas in eastern DRC (see [S/2023/431](#), annex 23), was reinitiated. Military barracks in Mubambo were in construction, close to Sake, next to Congo Protection's training camp, to host the first 250 contractors who were intended, at first, to arrive late July 2023. Containers with equipment had already arrived at the site in July 2023.

The Group obtained evidence that Erik Prince, founder of the former security firm Blackwater and currently head of Frontier Resources Group (FSG), was leading the negotiations for this deployment, which had been promoted and engineered by Kahumbu Bula Mandungu, alias "Kao", the Privy Councillor of President Félix Tshisekedi.

The Group also obtained evidence that around that time, Erik Prince was searching for evidence – such as photos, video and audio files – that could be used against MONUSCO, so as to precipitate MONUSCO's departure in favour of the deployment of his military contractors.

The Group was informed that the plan to conclude a contract with Erik Prince has been halted.

<sup>180</sup> The Group notes that the contractors did not travel to the DRC.

**Annex 32 (para. 48)****Additional information on 6 October mortar strikes in Kibumba-Kanyamahoro area****Informations complémentaires sur les tirs de mortier du 6 octobre dans la région de Kibumba-Kanyamahoro**

In late September 2023, M23<sup>181</sup> was posted on a hill in Buhumba (see “Position 3” on the map below), about 4 kilometers northeast of the FARDC position in Kanyamahoro (see “position FARDC Kanyamahoro” on the map below) and 1.5 kilometers southeast from the Kenyan contingent of EACRF in Kibumba (see “EAC Buhumba” on the map below).<sup>182</sup>

The FARDC position in Kanyamahoro also served as a training camp where FARDC have been trained by, and receive instructions from, Congo Protection instructors.

On the night of 26-27 September, M23 also occupied another position (see “Position 2” on the map below), as confirmed to the Group by EACRF, FARDC, PMC and civil society sources. Position 2 is located 2 kilometers north from FARDC position in Kanyamahoro and 3 kilometers southwest from EAC position in Buhumba.<sup>183</sup>

The Group notes that Position 3 and Position 2 were located inside the neutral zone between FARDC and M23 positions.

The FARDC commander of the 3408<sup>th</sup> Infantry Regiment reported to the Joint Verification Team of the EJVM that on 27 September 2023, approximatively 110 M23 combatants were posted on a hill in Kanyamahoro, and 50 M23 combatants in the adjacent portion of the Goma-Kibumba road (RN2).<sup>184</sup> The commander of the Kenyan contingent of the EACRF estimated the visible number of M23 elements occupying Kanyamahoro hill and the surrounding area at around one company.<sup>185</sup>

The commander of the Kenyan contingent of EACRF, informed about the situation, intervened to assess the situation and established that the M23 had occupied the Kanyamahoro hill.

After an 8-hour negotiation between EACRF and M23, M23 left Position 2 that same day. Subsequently, the Kenyan contingent of the EACRF deployed to Position 2.<sup>186</sup> M23 did not withdraw from Position 3.<sup>187</sup>

On 5 October 2023, EACRF troops left Position 2 following fighting further west of the RN2 between M23 and some Wazalendo armed groups. That same day, M23 reoccupied Position 2.

On 6 October 2023, M23 based in Position 2 and Position 3 launched attacks, including four 120-mm mortar attacks, on the FARDC position at Kanyamahoro. Two mortar shells landed 200 meters from the FARDC camp; two others 300 meters from the same camp. That same day, the FARDC, trained and supervised by Congo Protection, fired back.

While EACRF troops went back to Position 2 to renegotiate the departure of M23, the FARDC position at Kanyamahoro continued to be attacked by M23 stationed at Position 3, and by M23 deployed west from Position 2.

In total, 27 mortar shells of 82mm and 10 mortar shells of 120-mm calibre were launched on Position 2 by the FARDC controlled and supervised by Congo Protection.

<sup>181</sup> The Group notes that according to multiple sources M23 was operating together with RDF in that area at that time.

<sup>182</sup> FARDC, EACRF, PMC and civil society sources.

<sup>183</sup> FARDC, EACRF, PMC and civil society sources.


<sup>184</sup> Expanded Joint Verification Mechanism report of 29 September 2023, on file with the Secretariat.

<sup>185</sup> Ibid.

<sup>186</sup> Expanded Joint Verification Mechanism report of 29 September 2023, EACRF and PMC sources.

<sup>187</sup> Ibid.

- Map indicating Position 3 and Position 2:



- Below: Picture of one of the 120 mm mortar shells launched on the FARDC position in Kanyamahoro



Picture provided by a confidential source


**Annex 33 (para. 50)**

**Additional information on the 28 October 2023 air strikes**

**Informations complémentaires sur les frappes aériennes du 28 octobre 2023**

On 28 October 2023, with the support of Agemira, the FARDC planned and executed air strikes using an SU25 aircraft on a mixed M23-RDF position. They dropped two 250 kgs bombs, two 500 kgs bombs and launched 57-mm rockets on the position, located west of the RN2 (see “Position 4” on the map below).

The M23/RDF position, labelled “Position 4”, was targeted on 28 October 2023:



Document obtained from sources with knowledge of the matter

On the right, in the red-coloured circle, the impact of the bombing of Position 4 on 28 October 2023. On the left, in the green-colored circle, the M23/RDF position which was still occupied by RDF troops at the time of the Group's drafting of this report.



Document obtained from a confidential source

## Annex 34 (para. 53)

### **Justin Bitakwira interview on *Bosolo na Politik* avec Mutombo Israël, posted on Youtube on 6 July 2023**

#### **Interview de Justin Bitakwira sur *Bosolo na Politik* avec Mutombo Israël, postée sur Youtube le 6 juillet 2023**

1. On 6 July 2023, Justin Bitakwira appeared in a televised interview moderated by Mutombo Israël,<sup>188</sup> investigative journalist at *Bosolo Télévision*.<sup>189</sup> The interview was re-posted on the Youtube channel *Bosolo na Politik Officielle* on 24 July 2023.<sup>190</sup>
2. During the interview, which lasted nearly two hours, Bitakwira exposed what he called the “autopsy of a nation in danger”.<sup>191</sup> Bitakwira presented himself as an “indispensable political solution” for the country because, he claimed, he holds “secrets” and “expertise” that could solve the social and security problems in the context of the war raging in the east of the DRC.<sup>192</sup> He claimed that the war in the east was a problem between the Bantu and the Nilot tribes.<sup>193</sup> He blamed former President Joseph Kabilé for removing Mai-Mai generals from eastern DRC and replacing them with Rwandophones, and stated that until the Congolese army was not “cleaned” of Rwandophones, the east would not be liberated.<sup>194</sup> He embarked on an antagonizing speech, framed in terms of “us” (the Bantu tribes, legitimate Congolese”) and “them” (the Tutsi and Banyamulenge, labelled as refugees, foreigners, with a genocidal past and genocidal intentions towards the real Congolese), blaming all the historical and present misfortunes of the country on the two communities, the Tutsi and Banyamulenge, accusing them of alliance with the enemy (labelled as “the Kagame virus”), thereby implying an imminent threat to the safety and physical integrity of the Congolese (“us”).<sup>195</sup>
3. He depicted the Banyamulenge and the Tutsi as a power-thirsty ethnic group which has “exterminated people like [he] had never heard of in history”, and no Tutsi can ever be trusted. When the moderator asked whether one should therefore be wary of a Tutsi, Bitakwira stated that they [the Tutsi] are all natural-born criminals, and that their creator must have been the one who also created the devil. Justin Bitakwira then went on to depict in detail how “those people” [the Tutsi] would skin their enemies with a sharp knife, like they do with cows.<sup>196</sup>
4. With his statements, the intention of Justin Bitakwira’s speech was to defame and to generate hatred and hostility towards an entire section of the population, notably the Tutsi and Banyamulenge.
5. The Group recalls that Justin Bitakwira has had a long history of virulent anti-Banyamulenge and anti-Tutsi statements, denying their right to Congolese citizenship and suggesting that they should be removed from the country (see [S/2021/560](#), para. 154 and annex 113, and [S/2022/967](#), para. 73 and annex 53). The Group recalls that such fearmongering propagated by a public figure with a substantial following is extremely dangerous in the context of the brewing ethnic tensions and ongoing armed violence. The interview had 79,910 views, as last consulted by the Group on 12 November 2023.
6. The declarations listed above may at least constitute incitement to discrimination, hostility, and violence, and thus sanctionable acts under paragraphs 7 (e) of Security Council resolution 2293 (2016), as renewed by Council resolution 2688 (2023).
7. The Group reiterates its recommendation that concrete steps should be taken by the Congolese government to deter such practices and curb the propagation of ethnic hatred (see [S/2023/431](#), para. 188(d)), including by prosecuting individuals responsible.

<sup>188</sup> <https://brothermyephre.com/2023/07/07/rdc-interview-de-justin-bitakwira-face-au-journaliste-israel-mutombo-de-ce-jeudi-06-juillet-2023-video-complete/>

<sup>189</sup> Bosolo Télévision is advertised as an investigative television channel in the DRC. See [www.youtube.com/@BOSOLOTV](http://www.youtube.com/@BOSOLOTV)

<sup>190</sup> Full length interview with Justin Bitakwira posted on Youtube at <https://youtu.be/1ztbPXeoIKU?si=6ItUYz8y6nVGkq0v>.

<sup>191</sup> See video at timestamp 1:04:41.

<sup>192</sup> See from timestamp 00:17:40.

<sup>193</sup> See from timestamp 00:49:00.

<sup>194</sup> See from timestamp 00:47:15.

<sup>195</sup> See from timestamp 01:00:00.

<sup>196</sup> See from timestamp 01:17:00.



Above: screenshot taken from the interview of Justin Bitakwira of 6 July 2023, re-posted on the Youtube channel *Bosolo na politik officielle* on 24 July 2023 (last accessed by the Group on 12 November 2023)

Note: The video, initially aired on 6 July 2023 on Bosolo TV, is no longer available for public viewing online (see <https://brothermyephre.com/2023/07/07/rdc-interview-de-justin-bitakwira-face-au-journaliste-israel-mutombo-de-ce-jeudi-06-juillet-2023-video-complete/>)

**Annex 35 (para. 53)****Justin Bitakwira speech upon leaving the *Cour de cassation* on 20 July 2023****Discours de Justin Bitakwira lors de son départ de la Cour de cassation le 20 juillet 2023**

1. On 20 July 2023, Justin Bitakwira was summoned to the *Cour de Cassation* for questioning over the statements he made during the interview of 6 July 2023 on *Bosolo na Politik* with Mutombo Israël (see annex 33 above).
2. In a video available on Youtube, Justin Bitakwira shared his comments on the hearing, upon exiting the meeting at the public prosecutor's office at the *Cour de Cassation* on 20 July. He stated that he had only done his job to inform and enlighten the national and international opinion about the tragedy that Kagame's Rwanda has been committing for over 20 years in the Democratic Republic of Congo (translation from French by the Group):

*"I was well received by the inspector who interviewed me, and then I was received by the public prosecutor. It was about my television program on Bosolo na Politik with Mutombo Israël. I told the inspector that I couldn't answer the various questions he was going to ask me if he hadn't yet read the book Holocauste au Congo by Charles Onana. Because all I did was comment on what was written in the book Holocauste au Congo. When you have read this book, we will have the same understanding. (...) We're talking about giving them maybe two weeks to finish reading this book that I'm just paraphrasing."*

Original in French:

*« J'ai été bien reçu par l'inspecteur qui m'a auditionné, ensuite, j'ai été reçu par le Procureur général. Il s'agissait de mon intervention à la télévision dans le programme Bosolo na Politik avec Mutombo Israël. J'ai dit à l'inspecteur que je ne saurais répondre aux différentes questions que qu'il allait me poser s'il n'avait pas encore lu le livre Holocauste au Congo de Charles Onana. Parce-que je n'ai fait que commenter ce qui est écrit dans le livre Holocauste au Congo. Quand vous aurez lu ce livre, nous aurons la même compréhension. (...) Il est question de leur donner peut-être deux semaines, qu'il termine de lire ce livre que je ne fais que paraphraser », a-t-il dit, au sortir du Parquet. »*



Video of Justin Bitakwira's comments upon exiting the *Cour de Cassation* on 20 July 2023 (posted on Twitter at <https://x.com/sergesindani01/status/1682101603870949376?s=20>)

## Annex 36 (para. 54.1)


### The Tutsi community fleeing VDP operations

#### La communauté tutsie fuyant les opérations du VDP

Since 1 October 2023, as fighting between the M23 and VDP combatants intensified in Masisi and Rutshuru territories, the Tutsi population living in the area of Kitchanga and Kilorirwe, and in villages such as Nturo, Burnugu, Kabarekasha,<sup>197</sup> was once again forced to flee.<sup>198</sup>

More than 4,500 households from the Tutsi community, amounting to over 20,000 individuals, fled before the arrival of the VDP, the majority seeking shelter in the mountains of Bwiza.<sup>199</sup> Encircled from all sides by hostile armed groups, they were left stranded for days without food and shelter. Members of the community raised concerns about their survival due to fears that they will be attacked by VDP combatants. As previously recorded, the displaced Tutsi community chose not to converge towards the large IDP sites, in fear of being targeted by members of other communities who continued associating them with the M23 (see [S/2023/431](#), annex 54).<sup>200</sup>

Several villages were burned down by VDP combatants, including the village of Nturo, inhabited mainly by Tutsi (see annex 37 below). Several houses belonging to Tutsi inhabitants in Kitchanga were also destroyed.<sup>201</sup>



Above: Infographic on the internal population displacement due to ongoing fighting in Masisi and Rutshuru territories, as on (information published on [8 October 2023 by the UN Office of Coordination for Humanitarian Affairs](#))

<sup>197</sup> MONUSCO, humanitarian sources, civil society, researchers, local sources, and photographic and video evidence

<sup>198</sup> The majority had fled the area in January 2023 under the threat of hostile armed groups, as they were accused of collaborating with the M23. They had returned under EAC protection during the ceasefire. Sources: local sources, civil society and humanitarian sources, researchers.

<sup>199</sup> Local sources, civil society, MONUSCO, and humanitarian sources.

<sup>200</sup> Sources from the Tutsi community.

<sup>201</sup> Local sources, civil society, humanitarian sources.

**Annex 37 (para 54.2)****VDP burning down the village of Nturo on 7 October****VDP brûlant le village de Nturo le 7 octobre**

Between 4 and 8 October 2023, heavy fighting was ongoing between the coalition of VDP combatants and M23 around Kitchanga, Kilorirwe and Bwiza. The VDP coalition took over the village of Nturo, close to Kilorirwe, around 5 October, and burnt down the entire village which was inhabited by the Tutsi community. The armed groups NDC-R of Guidon, Nyatura Abazungu and APCLS, all members of the VDP coalition, participated in the operations in the area.

Videos of the VDP burning the village of Nturo circulated on social media. The Group obtained two videos (on file with the Secretariat) on which VDP combatants explain that they have burnt down Nturo.

**Video 1 – showing images of Nturo village burning** [several sources confirmed that it is the village of Nturo, often referred to as Kilorirwe since it is how the wider area is known; Nturo is identified based on the topography and the proximity of the antennas, visible in the video]. The person filming the video states the following (translation obtained by the Group):

*"Right now, we're in Kilorirwe, we're sabotaging Kilorirwe, these people thought they were strong...but God gave us power. We are going to hit them until they feel it. We're going to burn down [the village] without leaving any houses. They came from Rwanda. God gave us the power to hit the Rwandans, we must hit them until they cross into their own country [followed by victory cries]."*



Above: Screenshots from Video 1, depicting the village of Nturo burning and VDP combatants converging towards the village



Above: VDP groups converging towards the village of Nturo. Some are seen wearing blue-green armbands, the distinctive mark of NDC-R fighters under the command of Guidon



Above: screenshot of a commander with a handheld radio, seen among the VDP combatants heading towards the burning Nturo village. He was identified by a member of the VDP as Colonel Gady of the Nyatura Abazungu armed group

**Video 2: showing images of Nturo village burning.** The person filming the video states the following (translation obtained by the Group):

*"Right now, we're in Nturo, we're burning down the houses where the Tutsis were hiding, we were just hearing gunshots without knowing where they were coming from. Thankfully we have just burned this place down. This was the place that was not easy to take, at the antennas in Nturo."*



Above: screenshot from the video showing the burning houses in the village of Nturo



Above: The ruins of Nturo village. Photographs taken in Nturo several days after the incident, by a confidential source

### **VDP communiqué denying the involvement of VDP in the burning of Nturo village**

After the circulation on social media of the videos depicting the burning of Nturo village by VDP combatants (see videos 1 and 2 above), a press statement was issued in the name of the VDP and of the “chief of the ‘Wild Geese’ operations” (*commandant des opérations des Oies Sauvages*), Guidon Shimiray Mwisa, denying the involvement of VDP combatants in the burning of villages inhabited by the Tutsi community. The video containing the press statement was shared on social media and is on file with the Secretariat.

The press statement was read by a female combatant introducing herself as assistant to the Chief of “the Wild Geese” operations and commander of the VDP, Lt-gen Guidon Shimiray Mbwisa. She is seen wearing military attire and a blue-green armband, the distinctive insignia of NDC-R combatants (see also annex 26) identical to the ones seen on combatants on Video 1 above, filmed at Nturo when the village was being burnt.

**English translation [original French transcript below]:** *"I am the assistant to the commander of the "Wild Geese (Les Oies Sauvages)" operations and the VDP, the Volunteers for the Defence of the Homeland (Volontaires Pour la Defense de la Patrie). Press release Nr 001/VDP/LesOiesSauvages/2023. We have learned through the airwaves and social networks of rumors according to which the VDP, the Volontaires Pour la Defense de la Patrie, are in the process of setting fire to the homes of Tutsis on the battlefield. With this message, we are telling both national and international opinion that these reports are false. As we are well informed and trained in international humanitarian law, we cannot commit such despicable acts. This is why we vehemently condemn these ill-intentioned people who once again want to tarnish the image of the Volontaires Pour la Defense de la Patrie. We call on the population to be vigilant and to continue to trust us, as we remain at the service of the nation. We know that there are Congolese Tutsis who have the right to be protected like so many other Congolese. Long live the DRC, long live the VDP, long live the commander of the VDP, Lieutenant-General Guidon Shimiray Mwisa."*

**Original French transcript:** *« Je suis l'assistante du commandant des opérations « Les Oies Sauvages » et des VDP, les Volontaires Pour la Défense de la Patrie. Communiqué de presse Nr 001/VDP/Les Oies Sauvages/2023. Nous avons appris par les voies des ondes et les réseaux sociaux des rumeurs selon lesquelles les VDP, les Volontaires Pour la Défense de la Patrie, sont en train d'incendier les maisons des Tutsis sur le champ de bataille. Par ce message, nous signifions à l'opinion tant nationale qu'internationale que ces informations sont fausses. Nous sommes d'ailleurs bien informés et formés sur le droit international humanitaire, nous ne pouvons pas commettre des actes si ignobles. C'est pourquoi nous condamnons avec véhémence ces personnes mal intentionnées qui veulent encore une fois ternir l'image des Volontaires Pour la Défense de la Patrie. Nous appelons la population à la vigilance et à continuer de nous faire confiance car nous restons au service de la nation. Nous savons qu'il y a des Tutsi Congolais qui ont le droit de jouir de la protection comme tant d'autres Congolais. Vive la RDC, vive les VDP, vive le commandant des VDP, le lieutenant-général Guidon Shimiray Mwisa ».*



Above: Screenshot from the video containing the VDP press release, depicting the person reading out the press release, identifying herself as assistant to the “Chief of the Wild Geese operations, Lt-gen Guidon Shimiray Mbwisa, commander of the VDP”.

Note: She is depicted wearing a blue-green armband identical to the one worn by Guidon Shimiray and some of the combatants at Nturo (see below)



Above: Image of “Lieutenant-general” Guidon Shimiray Mwisa, NDC-R, wearing the same blue-green armband



Above: screenshot depicting VDP fighters at Nturo, wearing blue-green armbands

## Annex 38 (para. 55)

### **Massacre of demonstrators by the Republican Guard in Goma on 30 August 2023**

### **Massacre de manifestants par la Garde républicaine à Goma le 30 août 2023**

#### ***The FNJMN's anti-MONUSCO agenda and prior demonstrations***

1. The mystic-religious group *Foi Naturelle Judaïque Messianique vers les Nations/ Agano La Uwezo wa neno* (FNJMN), self-declared as “messianic Wazalendo”,<sup>202</sup> was led by pastor Efraim Bisimwa. The sect had more than 1,000 followers<sup>203</sup> who regularly frequented the FNJMN temple in the Nyabushongo neighbourhood of Goma. The FNJMN also operated a local radio station, Radio-Television Uwezo Wa Neno (RTUN), based in the Ndoshó neighbourhood in Goma, which also regularly transmitted audio-visual material online, including on YouTube.<sup>204</sup>
2. In mid-2023, FNJMN emerged and suddenly became vocal against the United Nations. On 30 June 2023, over 600 FNJMN sect members demonstrated in front of MONUSCO’s Logistical Base in Goma, known as “RVA”, demanding the allocation of the RVA parcel for the construction of a monument in the memory of Lumumba, revered by FNJMN as a national hero. The demonstrators dispersed peacefully after performing mystical rituals and animal sacrifices.<sup>205</sup> They handed over a 12-page manifesto to MONUSCO accusing the UN, MONUSCO and certain UN agencies (FAO, UNESCO, WFP, UNHCR) of being responsible for the insecurity in eastern DRC.<sup>206</sup>
3. On 30 July 2023, FNJMN organized another demonstration at the BDGL roundabout in Goma, gathering more than 1,000 followers. Efraim Bisimwa announced the FNJMN’s intention to participate in the struggle for the departure of MONUSCO by latest 31 December 2023.<sup>207</sup> On that occasion, he also announced the demonstration to be held on 30 August 2023 with the intent of installing the movement’s general headquarters at MONUSCO’s RVA parcel in Goma.<sup>208</sup>

#### ***Operational plan to contain the demonstration***

4. In an official communiqué issued on 23 August 2023, the mayor of Goma banned the demonstration planned for 30 August.<sup>209</sup> Given the ban, Efraim Bisimwa claimed he intended to suspend the demonstration and submit a memo addressed to MONUSCO instead. Subsequent negotiations with a representative of the DRC Police (PNC) led to an agreement that the PNC would accompany an FNJMN delegation to hand in the memo to MONUSCO and the authorities.<sup>210</sup> On the evening of 29 August, Bisimwa asked his followers not to march through town, but to gather at a church at 7am the next day.<sup>211</sup>

<sup>202</sup> As described in a letter addressed by FNJMN to the President of the Republic, according to MONUSCO sources.

<sup>203</sup> Estimate based on accounts of sect members, and on the number of individuals that attended demonstrations. According to Efraim Bisimwa, the sect has more than 5,000 followers.

<sup>204</sup> See RTUN channel on YouTube

<sup>205</sup> MONUSCO, local sources, researchers, open sources/media.

<sup>206</sup> MONUSCO sources. The manifest was also partially read out by an elderly figurehead during the sit-in, see [Youtube video](#).

<sup>207</sup> MONUSCO, local and open sources, media.

<sup>208</sup> MONUSCO, local sources.

<sup>209</sup> A copy of the official communique signed by Kapend Kamand Faustin, Mayor of Goma, is on file with the Group.


<sup>210</sup> FARDC, MONUSCO, local sources, and Efraim Bisimwa.

<sup>211</sup> Efraim Bisimwa and two members of the sect.

5. Fearing that despite the interdiction, the FNJMN would proceed with the demonstration and that it might escalate into violence, Lt-Gen Constant Ndima, then Governor and Commander of military operations in North Kivu, gave instructions to the FARDC and PNC to develop an operational plan to contain the situation.

*Roles assigned to FARDC and PNC*

6. In military documents consulted by the Group and on file with the Secretariat, on 23 August the Governor gave instructions to the Commander of the 34<sup>th</sup> Military Region (34 Reg Mil) and to the PNC Provincial Commissioner to take appropriate measures in response to the planned demonstration, and to urgently engage with the leaders of the sect. The Governor's instructions did not include the *Garde Républicaine* (GR) in this operational order as, according to the Governor, it was not within the GR's prerogatives to be involved in law-and-order operations.
7. On 25 August, a telegram was dispatched by the Governor to the Commander of the 34th Regiment Militaire to the Commander of the Sukola II operations in North Kivu and to the PNC Commissioner, informing that the sect had "pro-terrorist M23/RDF" tendency and there was risk of an M23/RDF infiltration to "cause trouble" in Goma. Consequently, it instructed to secure MONUSCO facilities and deploy a "security apparatus" in Goma.<sup>212</sup>
8. The PNC Commissioner and the 34 Reg Mil Commander prepared their mission and issued their respective operational orders. Both framed the projected demonstration within the context of the M23/RDF aggression. They both foresaw the potential intervention of the GR as a supplementary force in the operations (see excerpts below), with the 34 Reg Mil referring to the "BIA GR" (*Brigade interarmées*, under the command of Mike Mikombe – see para. 56 of the report) and the PNC referring to the "Bn GR" (GR battalion). Several military sources confirmed to the Group that the GR was not supposed to intervene unless there was a serious armed threat or attack.
9. An FARDC military intelligence officer told the Group that the FARDC was on high alert due to rumours which suggested a potential risk of M23 infiltration in Goma, projected for the 30 August, thus coinciding with the planned demonstration. However, these reports were not based on verified information and turned out to be false.
10. Below: excerpts from the 34 Reg Mil operational order, dated 28 August 2023.<sup>213</sup>



<sup>212</sup> Copy of the telegram on file with the Group.

<sup>213</sup> Document dated 28 August 2023, on file with the Group.

## **COMPOSITION ET ARTICULATION DES FORCES**

<u>Unités Organiques</u>	<u>U SComdt Ops</u>	<u>U SCtl Ops</u>
• Bn PM	• 33 Gpt Nav	• PNC
• Bn QG	• BIA GR	
• Bn AC		
• Cie Recce	• 31 Regt Gn	
• Cie Interv		

Instructions to regular FARDC forces:

Interdire l'incursion Eni, sur toutes les voies probables et possibles menant vers la ville de GOMA.

### **A cet effet,**

- Dans un premier temps, avec le Bn QG, constituer des Elm d'Interdiction sur différentes voies pouvant mener jusqu'en ville sur différents S/Axes.
- Deuxième temps, avec Cie Interv 34Rgn Mil, constituer un Elm d'intervention rapide.
- Ensuite, avec les Elm PNC, Cie Recce 34Rgn Mil, Bn PM et les Elm FN, assurer le CtlZ permanent terrestre et lacustre (Pat Cbt, dispersion des manifestants, érection des barrières improvisées, sécurisation des installations MONUSCO).

Operations envisaging the intervention of GR as a **supplementary** force:

Avec le Det BIA GR et la FN, être EMD assurer Sp Feu aux unités engagées soit dans la ZAcn 34Rgn Mil, soit dans la ZAcn Sect Ops SUKOLA II NK.

Specific instructions on rules of engagement:

### **c) Instruction de coordination**

- a) Tr Rap immédiatement en cas d'un incident ou arrestation
- b) Ne faire l'usage d'armes à feux qu'en cas de légitime défense
- c) Respect strict de règles d'engagement et de comportement
- d) Fin Ops sur Ordre

11. Below: excerpts from the PNC operational orders<sup>214</sup> regarding the planned demonstration:

<sup>214</sup> Document on file with the Group.

**1.2. Situation particulière**

Depuis un certain temps il s'observe dans la Ville de GOMA une Secte appelée Eglise des WAZALENDY y semant des troubles et envisage d'organiser des manifestations des grandes envergures ce 30 Aou 23, avec comme motif de la continuité de la lutte pour l'indépendance du Congo, de l'Afrique et le départ effectif de la MONUSCO.

**1.3. Situation amie**

Le Ciat Prov PNC Nord-Kivu peut recevoir l'appui d'autres structures notamment :

- Les FARDC (34Rgn Mil, Sect Ops SKL II, 33Gpt Nav, Bn GR) ;
- L'ANR ;
- La DGM ;

**2. MISSION**

Sans préjudice de ses missions ordinaires, le Commissariat Provincial de la Police Nationale Congolaise du Nord-Kivu Va :

- ✓ Intensifier les patrouilles et les tournées ;
- ✓ Occuper les points chauds ;
- ✓ Disperser tout attroupement plus de 10 Pers ;
- ✓ Maintenir et rétablir l'ordre public le cas échéant.

Specific instructions on rules of engagement of PNC elements:

**CONSIGNES PARTICULIERES**

- Interdiction formelle d'usage d'armes à feu ;
- Briefing AVANT le début de déploiement. Exécuter correctement la mission en utilisant aussi le bon sens ;
- Observer l'unicité de commandement et veiller à une bonne coordination dans la conduite des opérations à tous les échelons ;
- Suivre le processus de décision (Perception, Evaluation, Décision et Action) ;
- Avoir le contrôle permanent des hommes sous vos ordres ;
- Respecter scrupuleusement les droits humains ;
- Eviter toute forme de tracasseries à l'égard de la population (vol, escroquerie, concussion, extorsion, violence, arrestation arbitraire, corruption, ...);
- INTERDICTION de provoquer les paisibles citoyens et NE PAS céder à la provocation ;
- Être vigilant, rigoureux, ferme et courtois (parfois utiliser le dialogue si nécessaire) ;
- EEI (Elément Essentiel d'Information) : Attitude générale de la population en rapport avec les menaces et les différentes interventions de la Police ;
- Privilégier la dissuasion que la répression ;

*The role of the Garde Républicaine*

12. On 29 August 2023, the North Kivu Chief of Staff of the *Brigade interarmées* (BIA), under the command of Colonel Mike Mikombe, issued its operational orders in response to what it described as the “presence of a hostile pressure group” that acts like a substitute of M23/RDF and seeks to “cause trouble [in Goma] and facilitate the infiltration of the enemy”.<sup>215</sup> Its stated mission was to conduct a “motorized dissuasion march” on the main axes of Goma. In terms of execution of the mission, it foresaw the deployment of the 121st Bn Inf (infantry battalion), the “1<sup>st</sup> Bn Interv” (intervention battalion), and the “19Regt FS” (the 19<sup>th</sup> Regiment Special Forces, under the command of Colonel Bawili – see para. 55 of the report), including “Un Bn FS” (FS Battalion). The latter was designated as “OPCON”,

<sup>215</sup> “Ordre de mouvement routier” issued by the GIA command on 29 August 2023, at 13:34. Document on file with the Group.

which in military jargon means an authority to perform functions of command over subordinate forces.

13. The BIA foresaw to deploy its forces to the main arteries of Goma, to “nip in the bud the attempt of the MESSIANIC pressure group”.<sup>216</sup> It planned to deploy forces starting at 4:00 a.m., until 11:30 a.m. on 30 August 2023. The general gathering was planned at the Etat-Major (EM) of the BIA, with a briefing by the Commander BIA. Instructions were given to only use firearms on explicit orders, or in case of legitimate defence.
14. A high-ranking military official with knowledge of the matter told the Group that the involvement of the GR was ordered by the GR hierarchy in Kinshasa, notably by Maj-Gen Ephraïm Kabi (see para. 57 of the report), and that as a result, Colonel Mike Mikombe refused obey the Governor’s orders. Other high-ranking military officials and sources close to the FARDC command stated that Mike Mikombe could not have taken such initiative without expressed orders from his hierarchy.

#### ***Events leading up to the killing of demonstrators on 30 August 2023***

15. During the night of 30 August 2023, at around 3:30–4:00 a.m., the RTUN radio station in Ndoso was raided by a group of military men in combat gear, some wearing balaclavas. According to FNJMN pastor Efraim Bisimwa, who was at the radio station along with nine others (the staff working at the radio and some of their relatives), the group of soldiers invaded the premises through the neighbouring properties, in a commando-style operation, held them at gunpoint and threatened to kill them. The soldiers rounded up everyone at the radio, tied them up and pillaged the premises, taking all the equipment, documents and more than USD 25,000 in cash. Before being tied up, Efraim Bisimwa managed to send out a message to his followers on a WhatsApp group informing them that the radio was under attack. The hostages were then taken outside and forced to sit on the pavement, in front of the CBCA Ndoso hospital, where at least five military jeeps were parked.
16. According to credible reports<sup>217</sup> and based on the eyewitness testimony of Efraim Bisimwa, some members of the local population and members of the sect who rushed to the scene after receiving the alert from the radio began claiming the liberation of the hostages. Subsequently, the soldiers began shooting and executing some of the hostages. After the shooting stopped, Efraim Bisimwa and another individual were loaded on the jeeps and driven away. Several confidential sources, including a GR soldier, confirmed that the hostages were taken to Mike Mikombe’s base near the airport.
17. At least six people were executed during this raid at the radio station.<sup>218</sup>
18. At around 6:00-7:00 a.m., FARDC and GR units deployed around the FNJMN temple. Hundreds of sect members were gathered inside the temple, and a large crowd of demonstrators blocked the road leading to the temple. A stand-off between the sect members and the security forces ensued. Colonel Frank Mutunda, director of military intelligence at the 34 Reg Mil, engaged in lengthy negotiations with the leaders of the demonstrators. Video recordings of the stand-off confirmed that Colonel Frank’s attempts to negotiate with the unarmed demonstrators were suddenly interrupted by Colonel Mike Mikombe, who ordered the negotiators to step aside and verbally aggressed the demonstrators.<sup>219</sup> Eyewitness testimonies confirmed that minutes later the GR, including elements of the 19 Rgt FS special forces, in the presence of Colonel Mike Mikombe and Lieutenant-Colonel Bawili, opened fire on the

<sup>216</sup> Language used in the document

<sup>217</sup> Local sources and researchers

<sup>218</sup> Photographic evidence, medical records, FARDC sources

<sup>219</sup> Videos are on file with the Secretariat.

unarmed demonstrators. An FARDC eyewitness, Colonel Yves Rubenga testified during the trial of Colonel Mike Mikombe that he heard the latter giving order to the soldiers to shoot.

19. When the shooting stopped, after several minutes of continuous firing, eyewitnesses from the FARDC reported having counted 42 civilians killed, including women and children. One seriously wounded civilian died shortly thereafter, raising the immediate death toll to 43. On videos depicting partial scenes of the shooting, the sound of machine gun fire is distinguishable.<sup>220</sup> Below are images of the FS soldiers and their weaponry, filmed at the scene of the crime minutes before the shooting:



Above: Screenshots depicting members of the GR Special Forces (FS) and their weaponry, as filmed at the scene of the stand-off, minutes before the shooting began

<sup>220</sup> Video footage on file with the Secretariat.

20. Concomitantly with the standoff between the sect members and the security forces, a crowd close to the temple captured a police officer, allegedly involved with three other PNC members in the killing of a sect member. The captured officer was stoned to death by the crowd.<sup>221</sup>
21. Around 7:00 am, the temple was also raided, and eyewitnesses reported that an unknown number of civilians were killed after they were forced out of the temple. Many others were arrested, including children.<sup>222</sup> The death toll could not be confirmed.
22. GR elements collected the bodies and loaded them onto “Kamaz” military trucks parked nearby. Eyewitnesses claimed that some of the wounded were executed.<sup>223</sup> Video footage captured GR soldiers dragging the bodies and throwing them onto the trucks, treating them with visible contempt. Video footage<sup>224</sup> and eyewitnesses also confirmed that the wounded and the hostages were loaded onto the same trucks with the bodies of the deceased.
23. The GR elements were also seen looting goods and livestock. Around 10 a.m., they set the FNJMN temple on fire.<sup>225</sup>
24. The Group could not independently establish the total death toll, which was likely higher than the 57 presented by the Congolese authorities (see para. 55 of the report). Some families were unable to find the bodies of their family members who were at the temple, and who have been missing since the killings. The bodies of the victims were kept for several weeks and presented to their families for identification in a state of advanced putrefaction.<sup>226</sup>
25. FARDC sources confirmed that no firearms were found on the demonstrators or at the temple.
26. The Group notes that the military authorities have thus failed to take all possible measures to prevent the dead from being despoiled and did not take any measures to facilitate the identification and the proper disposal of the victims’ remains.
27. *The GR chain of command:* The Group established the command structure of the GR as follows, starting with the highest-ranking officer, followed in decreasing order by subordinate commanders<sup>227</sup>:
  - a. Major-General Ephraïm Kabi, Chief Commander of the GR, based in Kinshasa;
  - b. Colonel Mike Mikombe, Commander of the GR Brigade, and commander of the joint GR military command (or *Brigade interarmées*, GIA), chief of GR units in Goma;
  - c. Lieutenant-Colonel Donatien Bawili, commander of the GR’s 19th Regiment Special Unit, also known as the « Hiboux », based in Goma;
  - d. Major Peter, commander of the 192<sup>nd</sup> GR Battalion (part of the 19<sup>th</sup> Regiment), responsible for the GR Special Forces (FS), based in Goma.

<sup>221</sup> The incident was captured on video, on file with the Group.

<sup>222</sup> The Group obtained video footage of several hostages, including small children, stripped from their shirts and with their hands tied up, being led in a file by GR elements.

<sup>223</sup> One eyewitness interviewed by the Group has seen two women being executed by a soldier on the back of a truck.

<sup>224</sup> Videos on file with the Group.

<sup>225</sup> Eyewitnesses, photographic and video evidence, FARDC sources. A confidential source with knowledge of the matter claimed that there were prior orders to neutralize the demonstrators and burn down the temple.

<sup>226</sup> Military, medical, and eyewitness testimonies, as well as public media reports.

<sup>227</sup> FARDC and military intelligence sources.

28. The above commanders, notably Colonel Mike Mikombe, Lieutenant-Colonel Donatien Bawili, and Major Peter, were all present during the events of 30 August 2023. According to the BIA operational orders for the 30 August 2023, the FS Battalion was designated as “OPCON” (see also para. 12 above). According to eyewitness testimonies and video evidence, Major Peter was the “closest” to the FS armed soldiers that were at the scene during the standoff. An eyewitness claimed to have heard Major Peter giving orders to shoot, but the Group was unable to corroborate this claim, which is contradicted by another testimony (see point 18)
29. The image below depicts Colonel Mike Mikombe arriving at the scene of the stand-off near the temple, interrupting the negotiations:



Above: screenshot of video depicting Colonel Mike Mikombe (on the left of the image, in military uniform, with right arm raised)

30. The image below depicts Major Peter at the scene of the stand-off:



Above:


Image 1 (on the left): Screenshot depicting Major Peter in military uniform, in the center of the image, during discussions with the members of FNJMN

Image 2 (on the right): Screenshot depicting Major Peter (in the center-left of the image, in military uniform without combat gear) discussing with members of the FNJMN, behind him his FS soldiers in full combat gear



Above: Screenshot from video showing the loading of the bodies into a “Kamaz” truck. Major Peter is seen in the middle of the picture, overseeing the loading of the bodies, surrounded by FS soldiers in combat gear.

31. Less than two hours following the massacre, FARDC spokesperson Lieutenant-Colonel Guillaume Ndjike Kaiko, issued a first public statement about the events and presented some of the arrested FNJMN members to the press. A written official communiqué issued concomitantly on behalf of the Cabinet of the Governor of North Kivu, signed by its spokesperson Lieutenant-Colonel Ndjike, praised the Defense and Security Forces for having “professionally stopped the adventures of [the] troublemakers who played the game of the M23/RDF aggressor”. It presented the members of FNJMN as a “group of bandits, armed, drugged and manipulated, posturing as Wazalendo” who had premeditated and brought chaos upon the city of Goma during the night of 30 August 2023. It presented a death toll of six FNJMN members killed, a few injured and 158 arrested; and one PNC stoned to death and a few injured FARDC. See the full text of the communiqué below.



## Annex 39 (para. 57)

### The judicial process and the lack of inquiry into other potential suspects of the 30 August 2023 killings in Goma

#### La procédure judiciaire et l'absence d'enquête sur d'autres suspects potentiels des meurtres du 30 août 2023 à Goma

32. On 2 September 2023, an inter-ministerial commission of inquiry arrived in Goma to investigate the events of 30 August 2023. The commission, sent on the orders of President Tshisekedi, was led by the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Interior, Peter Kazadi, and was composed of the Deputy Prime Minister for Defence, the Minister for Human Rights, the Minister of State for Justice, and the Auditor General of the FARDC.<sup>228</sup> The commission conducted investigations and made recommendations upon its findings, which led to the opening of a trial in *flagrante delicto* against six suspects, including Colonel Mike Mikombe and Lieutenant-Colonel Donatien Bawili.
33. On 5 September 2023, it was announced that the Governor of North Kivu, General Constant Ndima, had been recalled to Kinshasa, following the events of 30 August.<sup>229</sup> On 16 September 2023, Major-General Peter Nkuba Cirimwami was appointed as new Military Governor *ad interim* and Commander of the North Kivu Operations (see annex 22).

#### The military trial

34. The Group notes that the trial of the two officers, Mike Mikombe and Donatien Bawili, and of four GR soldiers, did not inquire into the role played by other military personnel including of the hierarchy, potentially complicit in the commission of the crimes.
35. As stated above (see paras. 27, 28 and 30 of this annex), Major Peter was present during the stand-off and the shooting of the demonstrators near the temple, and oversaw the collection of the bodies (as shown in the image above, at para. 30 of this annex). Given the video and testimonial evidence of other crimes and misconduct – potential execution of wounded civilians loaded onto the trucks, the burning of the temple, the allegations of mistreatment of prisoners who were forced onto the trucks containing the dead bodies, and the looting by the FS soldiers – further investigations would have been warranted.
36. In addition, the implication of other individuals identifiable on the videos of the shooting and of the collection of the bodies were not investigated. Other shortcomings of the investigation – such as the lack of in-depth video analysis, lack of proper identification of the bodies (including photographing the victims for subsequent identification and conducting autopsies), or the failure to conduct an exhaustive body count – have called into question the integrity of the judicial process. In addition, given that GR units involved in the shooting remain engaged in combat in North Kivu against the M23, the lack of judicial or disciplinary accountability of all those involved raises legitimate concerns about the risk of further crimes against civilians being committed by these units.

#### The trial of FJNMN sect members and of their leader, Efraim Bisimwa

37. In parallel with the trial of the officers, judicial proceedings were initiated against 115 members of the FNJMN, accused of killing a police officer and participation in an insurrectional movement. Half of the accused were sentenced for murder, although no evidence was presented at trial ascertaining their direct participation in the mob

<sup>228</sup> See <https://www.radiookapi.net/2023/09/03/actualite/securite/repression-militaire-du-30-aout-une-commission-interministerielle-goma>

<sup>229</sup> See <https://www.radiookapi.net/2023/09/05/actualite/securite/repression-militaire-du-30-aout-le-gouverneur-constant-ndima-rappele>

killing of the police officer. The leader of FNJMN, Ephraim Bisimwa, was sentenced to death,<sup>230</sup> including for the lynching of the police officer, although he had already been captured by the GR hours prior to the lynching.

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
<sup>230</sup> Although Congolese law still foresees the death sentence, since 2003 there has been a *de facto* moratorium on the execution of death sentences, which are automatically commuted to life imprisonment.

## Annex 40 (para 59)

### Mining Exploitation permits

#### Permis d'exploitation minière

The two key mining concessions in Rubaya are Exploitation Permit 4731 and Exploitation Permit 76. PE 4731 was operated until early 2023 by Société manière de Bisunzu (SMB). PE 76 belongs to Sakima, a state-owned mining company, and is currently operated in collaboration with Congo Fair which submits to the International Tin Association's Tin Supply Chain Initiative (ITSCI), and physically wraps around the SMB site.



Source: [www.congomines.org](http://www.congomines.org) with additions from Group of Experts

**Annex 41 (para. 67)**

**Laundering of minerals using ITSCI program**  
**Blanchiment des minerais à travers ITSCI**

Two diggers and a transporter based in Rubaya confirmed that they transported minerals from Rubaya to Kibabi, a location where minerals produced in PE76 are tagged. The transporter brought a total of 400 kg of coltan to Kibabi. This coltan belonged to a trader from Goma who had bought the minerals in Rubaya.


The Group presented its findings to ITSCI program. In a letter sent to the Group early November 2023, ITSCI declared that “the only instance of PARECO involved in, and controlling mining activities, is at PE 4731. ITSCI does not have any information or did not receive any reports of cases of PARECO controlling or involved in mining activities at ITSCI sites in Masisi territory”.

The Group understands from the information provided by ITSCI that the latter is aware of the tense security situation in the area, which led to the suspension of ITSCI’s activities in February 2023. ITSCI also declared that since April 2023, when ITSCI’s activities resumed, “a total of 19 ITSCI incident were opened in relation to the presence of state or non-state armed groups controlling mineral transport routes in Masisi territory, thus creating risks of illegal taxation by these groups of passers-by, including mineral transporters.”

## Annex 42 (para. 69)

### Withdrawal of the SMB permit on PE4731

### Déchéance du permis de SMB sur le PE4731



Document provided to the Group by an economic entity

**Annex 43 (para 70)**

**Disputes between SMB and COOPERAMMA**

**Tensions entre la SMB et la COOPERAMMA**

COOPERAMMA always refused to recognize the right of SMB and its predecessor, Mwangachuchu Hizi International (MHI), to exploit mining sites in the area, even though they held a valid mining license. Overall, COOPERAMMA's stance was explained by the frustration that the rights of the artisanal workers who had always operated on these sites were not properly considered by SMB. COOPERAMMA also denounced the fact that SMB had acquired the title after the area had been occupied by an armed group, *Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie* (RCD).

Efforts to settle these disputes were the subject of a past memorandum of understanding between COOPERAMMA and SMB, which did not lead to a resolution and was terminated in 2019.

Several sources told the Group that since the beginning of the M23 crisis, individuals close to COOPERAMMA had incited young people, including miners, to join the Nyatura armed group to fight against the M23, attack SMB and force it to abandon its mining sites. Shamamba Barigaruye Enoch (see [S/2021/560](#), para.62) and MP Justin Ndaishimiye<sup>231</sup> ([S/2021/560](#), para.64) were pointed out as some of the instigators of this plan.

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<sup>231</sup> He is also the promoter of another cooperative in Rubaya: Coopérative Minière des Terriens (CMT)

**Annex 44 (para 71)****Dispute over Sakima-Primera agreements****Contestation de l'accord entre Sakima et Primera**

On 17 July 2023, the DRC Government, Primera Mining Limited and Société Aurifère du Kivu et du Maniema (SAKIMA) signed an agreement creating a joint venture for the exploitation of several mining areas, including the one covered by PE76.

This agreement has been denounced by the Coopérative des artisanaux miniers du Congo (CDMC), which holds the mining rights to this PE (see below).

Subsequently, on 23 August 2023, national MP Alfred Maisha Bishobibiri (from South Kivu) sent a written question to three ministers: Nicolas Kazadi of finance, Antoinette N'Samba of mines and Adèle Kayinda of the State portfolio. He also gave several interviews to the national and local media. He was also seen at public demonstrations with *negociants* from South Kivu province. The MP denounced both this agreement and the one on gold with Primera Gold. The Group was unable to speak with the MP at the time of drafting.

Economic actors, as well as sources at the Presidency and at the central mining administration, told the Group that protests against the agreement had forced the Government to re-evaluate the accord and remove the controversial clauses, in particular those depriving companies of their rights resulting from agreements with SAKIMA. At the time of drafting, a final decision was not made on the matter.

- 1 Nous, Entreprises minières privées de droit congolais, implantées en République Démocratique du Congo, plus précisément dans les provinces du Nord-Kivu, du Sud-Kivu et du Maniema, partenaires de l'entreprise du Portefeuille de l'Etat congolais SAKIMA SA (Société Aurifère du Kivu et du Maniema) sur fond de divers accords et contrats valides et en cours, notamment les accords de joint-venture (JV) et contrats d'amodiation en vue du développement des projets industriels, avons suivi la signature d'un accord de joint-venture entre SAKIMA SA et PRIMERA MINING LIMITED en date du 17 juillet 2023.
2. Diffusée sur les antennes de la télévision nationale, cette signature a revêtu un caractère plus que solennel parce que le Président de la République et Chef de l'Etat, Son Excellence Monsieur Félix Antoine TSHISEKEDI TSHILOMBO, a rehaussé de sa présence la cérémonie y relative.
3. Nous saluons toute initiative qui va dans le sens d'impulser la politique minière du Gouvernement pour la maîtrise continue du flux des minerais congolais sur le territoire national aux fins, d'une part, d'endiguer la fraude et la contrebande minières, et, d'autre part, de créer la plus-value par la mise en œuvre des projets de transformation et d'exploitation minière industrielle afin de doter l'Etat congolais des ressources suffisantes pour la réalisation de son programme socio-économique visant principalement le bien-être de son peuple.
4. Mais en lieu et place de s'inscrire dans la dynamique observée depuis 2018 qui a vu la RDC, de par les efforts des entreprises minières existantes, devenir premier producteur mondial du coltan et huitième producteur mondial de la cassitérite, ce qui constitue une preuve éloquente des retombées positives des efforts de renforcement du contrôle et de la transparence de la chaîne d'approvisionnement initiés par le Gouvernement depuis la mise en œuvre du Mécanisme Régional de Certification de la CIRGL en 2011, cette signature vient, au mépris de la loi, briser l'élan ainsi pris du fait que l'accord de joint-venture entre SAKIMA SA et PRIMERA MINING LIMITED a lieu dans l'ignorance de ceux antérieurs encore valides et en cours qui portent sur des Périmètres d'Exploitation (PE) irrévocables et dont les titres, notamment, ne sont plus au nom de SAKIMA SA ou sont régulièrement enregistrés sous contrat d'amodiation durant toute la durée concernée par les projets.
5. Pis encore, SAKIMA SA a postposé la procédure unilatérale de résiliation des contrats avec ses partenaires après la signature de ladite JV, faisant ainsi fi de ses obligations envers eux.

En effet, c'est à partir du 18 juillet 2023, soit un jour après la signature officielle de l'accord de joint-venture avec PRIMERA MINING LIMITED, que SAKIMA SA a

commence, de manière inappropriée, à écrire à ses différents partenaires pour leur signifier son retrait des différents accords et contrats qui les lient à elle. Et cela sans signification, concertation et évaluation préalables tel que le recommandent le bon sens, les termes de ces différents accords et les lois de la République.

6. Tout en reconnaissant à l'Etat congolais le droit de signer des protocoles, contrats et accords avec des partenaires de son choix dans la perspective de sa vision sur le développement de l'activité minière, il sied cependant de souligner que cela importe d'être fait dans le respect de ses propres lois et règlements.
7. Ainsi donc, nous tenons à faire savoir que l'accord de joint-venture SAKIMA SA - PRIMERA MINING LIMITED porte sur des périmètres couverts par nos accords de joint-venture et contrats d'amodiation encore valides contractuellement et légalement en date du 17 juillet 2023.

Par ailleurs, il y a lieu de souligner que ledit accord ignore que les gisements miniers concernés ne sont plus la propriété exclusive de SAKIMA SA dont elle peut disposer à sa guise, sans concertation avec nous ses partenaires.

8. De ce fait, nous invitons :

Primo :

SAKIMA SA à revenir à la raison et au bon sens en se conformant aux différents instruments juridiques en sa possession, aux accords et aux contrats librement signés qui la lient aux tiers et à opter pour une voie conduisant à calmer la tempête qu'elle a semée. La voie de la résiliation unilatérale ne doit pas pour autant occulter les divers financements et sacrifices engagés par ses partenaires pour le développement de différents projets au titre, notamment, de paiement de pas de porte, des droits superficiaires, des impôts et taxes, de paiement des salaires de ses agents, de signature des cahiers de charges, voire des études amorcées et arrêtées pour cas de force majeure avec la réurgence de la guerre dans certaines parties du Kivu.

Par ailleurs, il est à peine compréhensible que SAKIMA SA ne puisse, avec un portefeuille important de concessions, s'acharner que sur les quatorze PE couverts par des accords et contrats encore valides et en cours, au lieu de conduire le nouveau partenaire vers des sites libres de tout engagement.

Secundo :

PRIMERA MINING LIMITED, de ne pas faire fi de nos revendications légitimes au risque de se retrouver devant une montagne d'obstacles et de contentieux interminables sur le plan tant national qu'international, d'autant que les entreprises

détentrices des titres en passe de lui être attribués illégalement ont également des partenaires sur le plan international.

D'autre part, il est, à la limite, impensable que PRIMERA MINING LIMITED, avec sa grande renommée sur le plan international, notamment en matière d'expertise, puisse signer un contrat sur des concessions qui n'appartiennent plus substantiellement à SAKIMA SA.

9. Enfin, nous lançons un pressant et pathétique appel à Son Excellence Monsieur le Président de la République qui voit ainsi sa religion être éclairée par la présente Déclaration de s'impliquer, en sa qualité de Garant de la Nation, des lois de la République et de Magistrat suprême, et d'œuvrer pour contenir cet énorme contentieux que vient d'engendrer l'accord sus-indiqué qui sape déjà l'image du pays aussi bien sur le plan national qu'international et décourage davantage les investisseurs.
10. Nous profitons de l'occasion pour solliciter une rencontre avec le Chef de l'Etat et les Autorités gouvernementales afin de leur présenter la vraie situation et les perspectives de nos partenariats avec SAKIMA SA.

Avec l'expression de notre très haute considération


Fait à Kinshasa, le 27 juillet 2023

Pour les entreprises minières privées du Nord-Kivu, du Sud-Kivu et du Maniema,  
partenaires de SAKIMA SA :

- STONE MINING COMPANY SARL

 NACHIK MUNINDE

- CDMC SARL

 HULUNAA KILONAY SERGE

- AMUR SARL

 Ruzera Aymone

- DFSA MINING GONGO

 EHIPPE KAZAM' T.

Document provided to the Group by the companies

## Annex 45 (para. 72)

### Withered community dialogues and peace initiatives

#### Dialogues communautaires et initiatives de paix dans l'impasse


*Mahagi meeting, 4-6 September 2023:*

From 4 to 6 September 2023, armed groups and community leaders met in Mahagi to resolve divergences and chart a path to reconciliation between communities in Mahagi and Djugu territories. The social dialogue aimed at curbing the widespread violence affecting all the communities in Djugu, Aru and Mahagi territories.

*Babelebe Chefferie intercommunity Dialogue, August 2023:*

Another community dialogue took place in August 2023 resulting in a commitment to end hostilities between FPIC and the community of the Babelebe *chefferie*, signed on 17 August 2023. Despite this, tensions remained among FPIC factions.

The Group noted that neither this meeting, nor the previous ones held elsewhere brought the violence to an end. Recurrent attacks between or within armed groups continued with dire consequences for the civilians.



4. Tout notable, acteur politique ou leader communautaire (d'une des Entités Bira) qui serait en connivence avec les groupes armés dans la commission des forfaits doit être arrêté et jugé conformément aux lois de la République Démocratique du Congo ;
5. Le groupe armé FPIC accepte de laisser libre passage aux acteurs politiques afin de battre campagne lors de ce processus électoral 2023 ;
6. Toute attaque contre les édifices publiques (Écoles, Hôpitaux, Centres de Santé, Églises, marchés, bureaux administratifs, ...) ou trouble de la rentrée scolaire 2023-2024 est considéré comme un acte de crime de guerre ;
7. Toute personne qui toucherait aux Chefs des Entités Bira : Chefferies, Groupements et Villages doit être arrêtée et déférée devant la justice pour répondre de ses actes ;
8. Interdiction formelle à tous les éléments de la FPIC de commettre des tracasseries contre la population à travers les barrières érigées sur les axes routiers dans les entités BIRA et ailleurs en vue d'assurer la libre circulation de la population ;
9. Le redressement et la codification de l'arbre généalogique des chefs coutumiers à travers les entités Bira en conflit de pouvoir coutumier seront suivis par l'Administrateur du territoire dans le respect des règles de succession.


Fait à MWANGA, le 17 août 2023

Document provided to the Group by a civil society source

**Annex 46 (para.74)**

**Memorandum of understanding of the Aru dialogue between FRPI, URDPC/CODECO, FPIC and MAPI for peace, security, and social cohesion in Ituri Province, held from May 26 to June 1, 2023**

**Protocole d'accord du dialogue d'Aru entre FRPI, URDPC/CODECO, FPIC et MAPI pour la paix, la sécurité et la cohésion sociale en Province de l'Ituri, tenu du 26 mai au 1<sup>er</sup> juin 2023**



Nous, FRPI, URDPC/CODECO, FPIC et MAPI, participants au dialogue tenu du 26 mai au 1<sup>er</sup> juin 2023 à Aru, Chef-lieu du Territoire portant le même nom, devant nos responsabilités respectives et devant la nation, prenons les engagements et les résolutions de :

01. Cesser, pour ceux qui s'y sont livrés, toute hostilité et toute violence contre les populations civiles, les forces de défense et sécurité dans le respect des instruments juridiques nationaux et internationaux.
02. Faciliter la libre circulation des personnes et leurs biens sur toute l'étendue de la Province de l'Ituri.
03. Favoriser le retour des déplacés et le rapatriement volontaire des réfugiés dans leurs milieux respectifs.
04. Ne plus communautariser les conflits et les violences.
05. Ne pas entraver le retour des Chefs des Secteurs, Chefferies, Groupements et Villages, pour ceux dont les activités ont entravé le bon fonctionnement de l'administration.
06. Ne plus circuler avec les armes et ne plus porter les indices militaire et policier.
07. Matérialiser notre adhésion au PDDRCS.
08. Ne pas interférer ou entraver l'organisation des élections libres, démocratiques et transparentes sur toute l'étendue de la Province.
09. Etre disponible à participer à la défense de la patrie conformément aux textes légaux en la matière.
10. Ne plus céder à toute influence, manipulation et intoxication endogène et exogène visant à perturber la paix, la sécurité ainsi que la cohésion sociale et dénoncer les tireurs de ficelle en Province de l'Ituri pour qu'ils soient recherchés et arrêtés.


Nous encourageons les leaders de toutes les communautés au pardon et au vivre ensemble pour la restauration d'une paix durable à travers la justice transitionnelle.

Nous demandons aux autorités provinciale et nationale ainsi qu'à la communauté internationale d'appuyer la mise en œuvre de la feuille de route du présent dialogue.


En foi de quoi, avons signé le présent Protocole d'accord, expression de notre patriotisme et de notre ferme détermination pour le retour de la paix, gage de développement de notre chère Province.

Fait à Aru, le 01 juin 2023


Pour la FRPI

  
ADI BOBU-MBAFELÉ


Pour la FPIC

  
TAKANI BAKO MAYANGI

Pour l'URDPC/CODECO

  
Isaac ROTHOMA

Pour le MAPI

  
BHTI LONBJIRINGA

## Annex 47 (para. 74)

### **Tensions between the *Mouvement pour l'autodéfense de la province de l'Ituri (MAPI)* and Zaïre<sup>232</sup>**

#### **Tensions entre le Mouvement pour l'autodéfense de la province de l'Ituri (MAPI) et Zaïre**

*MAPI became an armed group:*

The Provincial government's call for disarmament led to disagreements among Zaïre leaders, leading to a split within the armed group, and the creation of MAPI. MAPI's commitment to join the peace process, including its participation in the Aru peace initiative, heightened tensions between MAPI and Zaïre.<sup>233</sup>

Headquartered in Lokpa, between Lingo and Iga-barriere, MAPI had its own command and control structure distinct from that of Zaïre.<sup>234</sup> The armed group was under the leadership of Ndjangu Liripa Geremi. MAPI leadership was made of former UPC members.<sup>235</sup>

At the time of drafting the report, MAPI leaders claimed to have between 3,000 and 5,000 combatants, most of whom were armed and prepared to defend its positions.

Disputes also arose over mining sites in Djugu, Mahagi and Aru territories. Several clashes were also reported between Zaïre elements and MAPI combatants in Pluto, a Zaire stronghold, and Iga-Barriere, a MAPI stronghold, between June and August 2023.

In early September 2023, violent clashes in Mbidjo between Zaïre and MAPI resulted in the killing of commander Joballo, one of the Zaïre leaders. Certain sources claimed that CODECO-URDPC was also involved, helping MAPI during the attack.

Beyond skirmishes between Zaïre and MAPI, tensions were also on the rise between MAPI and some Hema community leaders due to MAPI's participation in peace initiatives.

Tensions between MAPI and Zaïre's factions have created further insecurity for civilians in Ituri.

#### *Kidnapping of MAPI leader Roger Mokili*

On 2 June 2023, the armed group Zaïre kidnapped Roger Mokili, one of MAPI's leaders, on his return from the Aru peace talks (see para. 78 of the report), in a move that signified Zaïre's staunch opposition to any peace initiative on behalf of the Hema community.

Roger Mokili was detained for several days at Mabanga, at commander Baraka's headquarters, questioned, and subjected to ill-treatment. Zaïre's military command accused him of having betrayed the Hema community by participating in the Aru peace talks. Several Zaïre commanders including Pharaon, Fidele Babala and Logo Marine Mungeyi held a council to decide on Mokili's fate. Some of the radical Zaïre members wanted to have him killed. Commander Baraka wielded his influence within the group to save him, as they were both members of the former UPC and close collaborators at the time. Roger was subsequently released.<sup>236</sup>

<sup>232</sup> See S/2023/431, para. 113

<sup>233</sup> Civil society, researchers, Intelligence, armed groups elements sources.

<sup>234</sup> See S/2023/431, paras. 113-116

<sup>235</sup> See S/2023/431, paras.115 and also Anne 62. Sources informed the Group that most of MAPI leaders were battalions' commanders with UPC.

<sup>236</sup> Armed groups elements, intelligence, FARDC, MONUSCO and civil society sources

**Annex 48 (para.75)**

***Front Patriotique et Intégrationniste du Congo (FPIC) internal conflict***

**Les dissensions internes du Front Patriotique et Intégrationniste du Congo (FPIC)**

FPIC continued to face internal dissensions and remained a threat to peace in Ituri.

Since the dismissal of its leader “General” Somgabéle Malali in 2022, the armed group was under the command of Kakani Tondabo alias « General » Herode, who established his Headquarters in Nyakunde.<sup>237</sup> « General » Herode renamed the FPIC to *Sanduku Chambre Noire*. He also attempted since to consolidate his control in Nyakunde and Mwanga. .

Herode’s ambition faced resistance by the commander of Mwanga, who challenged Herode’s authority and called for his dismissal from the movement (see letter below).

Since August 2023, the internal rift led to armed clashes between the two factions, resulting in 23 civilians killed, nine wounded and seven kidnapped in Babelebe and Baboa-Bokoe *chefferies* in Irumu territory. Several houses were set ablaze, forcing the displacement of civilians.<sup>238</sup>

Below: Letter issued by “General Saddam calling for the destitution of “General” Herode:

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<sup>237</sup> See S/2023/567, paras 118-123.

<sup>238</sup> MONUSCO, Intelligence, FARDC, armed groups and civil society sources.

REPUBLIQUE DEMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO  
 MINISTERE DE LA DEFENSE  
 NATIONALE  
 PROVINCE DE L'ITURI

FORCE PATRIOTIQUE ET INTEGRATIONISTE DU CONGO  
**FPIC**



Transmis copie pour information

- A Son Excellence Monsieur le Gouverneur militaire de la Province de l'Ituri ;
- A Monsieur le Directeur Provincial de l'ANR Ituri ;
- A Monsieur le Commandant de la 32eme région militaire ;
- A Monsieur le DIRENS FARDC (Tous à Bunia) ;
- A Monsieur le Commandant Régima 32 01 basé à MARABO ;
- A leurs Majestés Chefs des chefferies des Entités Bira tous ;
- ✓ ➤ A Monsieur HERABO TONDABO Alias HERODE à NYANKUNDE

Objet : Désaveu de Mr. HERABO TONDABO alias A Monsieur l'Administrateur Militaire du Territoire Hérode à la tête de la FPIC et la suppression du nom « Chambre noire Sanduku » dans le mouvement

Mon colonel,

J'ai l'honneur de venir auprès de votre autorité présenter ce dont l'objet est ci haut repris en marge.

En effet, c'est avec un sentiment de regret que nous vous informons de la restructuration de notre mouvement et la dénomination originale de cet dernier suite à l'irresponsabilité notoire d'un parvenu commandant se prétendant chef d'Etat-major général de la FPIC dit CHAMBRE NOIR SANDUKU que nous croyions sérieux, for mal heureusement nous nous sommes rendu compte que nous avions à faire à un détraqué mental au sens strict et réel du mot, à la tête du mouvement.

Monsieur l'administrateur, vous vous souviendrez qu'à l'espace seulement de six mois que Mr HERODE a dirigé notre mouvement après sa campagne mensongère dans les cinq chefferies, entre autre : *la restauration de salaire des éléments, remise de pouvoir des chefs coutumiers, cessation de tracasserie de la population*, et. Nous avons constaté avec beaucoup des douleurs que sa gestion est de très loin cruelle et irresponsable que le régime de SONGAMBELE durant trois ans. Pour preuve, en voici quelques griefs terrifiants lui reprochés :


1. Massacre systématique et clandestin de plus de 200 personnes dans Irumu centre et ses environs ;
2. Tire à bout portant sur la population et les éléments FARDC de façon délibérée et répétée ;
3. La manipulation du mouvement FPIC sous la dictature d'un seul parti politique dont nous taisons expressément le nom, pour les besoins électoralistes qui pointent à l'orison en prenant en otage toute la population des entités Bira;
4. Assassinat des officiers supérieur parmi lesquels le Chef MAKIZALA de LENGABO, FLAURENTIN et le Général DACHABO CHUKISABO Dieu donné en tant que Chef de la délégation FPIC au processus de paix de Nairobi 3 sous prétexte qu'ils sont en connivence avec le PDDRCS ;
5. Viol systématique des femmes de ses officiers sous prétexte qu'ils n'ont pas le droit d'avoir des jolies femmes appart lui-même en tant que Chef d'Etat-major ;
6. Divagation des éléments en tenu militaire et la prolifération des armes au vue et au su de tout le monde la nuit comme la journée comme si nous n'étions pas dans le processus de paix ;
7. Tracasserie en outrance des commerçants et la population locale dans les entité Bira comme si tous les habitants étaient devenus ses esclaves ;
8. La profanation des notables et chefs coutumiers en présence de la population sans aucun respect à leur égard dont le cas récent remonte à NYAKUNDE au mois de mai dernier, où le chef de chefferie des Andisoma a été giflé en plein visage par Mr HERODE lui-même devant sa population, un acte qui nous a très énervé et déshonoré ;
9. Esprit patrimonialiste toujours de Mr Hérode de tout l'arsenal militaire (arme et munition) de la FPIC pour son prestige personnel au détriment de la sécurité de la population ;
10. Pillage en répétition des sites minier des sociétés chinoises installées dans la chefferie des Babelebe et Baboa/bokoe ;
11. Discrimination ouverte vis-à-vis des éléments qui ne sont pas originaires de sa chefferie ;
12. Blocage de développement dans d'autres entités Bira en interdisant la fréquentation intercommunautaire en dehors des Andisoma, une façon de saper la réputation d'autres chefferies qui ont aussi besoin de s'épanouir ;
13. Non intervention d'état-major sur les éléments en cas de détresse ;
14. Non intervention d'état-major lors d'attaque de neuf village dans la chefferie des Babelebe et Baboa/bokoe par la CODECO ;
15. Manque de considération vis-à-vis des autorités politico sécuritaires ;
16. Dissipation des munitions en outrance ;
17. Népotisme exagéré en installant ses frères dans toutes les entités Bira pour installer une sorte de colonisation qui ne dit pas son nom ;

Sur ce, en dépit de toutes ces humiliations et répétition de notre mouvement par ce détraqué mental, nous informons à l'opinion publique ce qui suit :

- Le mouvement FPIC est désormais dirigé sous le commandement du nouveau chef d'Etat-major Général à la personne du Général Major SADAM KALEBE ;
- Il est strictement interdit à tous les éléments FPIC de se rendre à NYAKUDE pour remonter les rapports chez HERODE qui est désormais déchu et par conséquent, tous les foulards islamistes doivent disparaître sur toute l'étendue des entités Bira y compris le nom de CHAMBRE NOIR SANDUKU ;
- Il est strictement interdit à Mr. HERODE de circuler en dehors de Nyakunde sous peine d'inciter la colère des opprimés.

Fait à MWANGA, le 26/06/2023

POUR L'ETAT MAJOR GENERAL DE LA FPIC



Gén Maj SADAM KALEBE  
CHEF EMG

Letter provided to the Group by confidential source

## Annex 49 (para. 76)

### Recent dynamics within CODECO/URDPC

#### Dynamiques récentes au sein de CODECO/URDPC

CODECO/URDPC's well-established command (see S/2023/431, paras 104-105) centralised its communication strategy with one spokesperson, Basa Zukpa Gerson, issuing communiques and social media messages on behalf of all factions (see excerpts from Twitter below).<sup>239</sup>



Gerson Basa  
@gerson\_basa

...

URGENT ! URGENT ! URGENT !

L'URDPC CODECO dénonce avec amertume une nouvelle incursion de la milice ZAÏRE/MAPI allié du #M23 visant village GORA groupement LADDEDOJO, W/PITSI auj'd'8 02/juin/2023, malgré implication de L'URDPC dans le processus de paix. Bilan fait 4maisons brûlées.

[Translate post](#)



3:55 AM · Jun 2, 2023 · 131 Views

Source: [https://twitter.com/gerson\\_basa/status/1664541325813850112?s=48&t=oT9StWa0RjcInyuvFVEygQ](https://twitter.com/gerson_basa/status/1664541325813850112?s=48&t=oT9StWa0RjcInyuvFVEygQ)



Gerson Basa  
@gerson\_basa

...

Au lieu d'attaquer l'URDPC CODECO, les #FARDC en provenance de BULE viennent d'attaquer officiellement le village Petro, secteur des W/PITSI. L'URDPC CODECO demande à ses éléments d'être prudents sur toute l'étendue sous son contrôle.

#MONUSCO et #gouvernement votre implication.-

[Translate post](#)



2:17 AM · Jun 17, 2023 · 717 Views

Source: [https://twitter.com/gerson\\_basa/status/1669952463275716608?t=nRfjkcdQo\\_M4US9dHBFoIg&s=08](https://twitter.com/gerson_basa/status/1669952463275716608?t=nRfjkcdQo_M4US9dHBFoIg&s=08)

<sup>239</sup> Civil society, armed groups, FARDC, intelligence sources.



**Gerson Basa**  
@gerson\_basa

...

L'URDPC/CODECO vient de déloger les #FARDC qui avaient attaqué et incendié les 7 localités de PETRO, W/PITSI avant-hier et les a pourchassé près de BULE où une position des FARDC est aussi incendiée. Enfin L'URDPC/CODECO demande à tous ses éléments de se réveiller 🔥🔥🔥

[Translate post](#)



6:11 AM · Jun 19, 2023 · 636 Views

[https://twitter.com/gerson\\_basa/status/1670736062065278976?t=zQ6pl1KJ\\_vJKutGSP8y7kQ&s=08](https://twitter.com/gerson_basa/status/1670736062065278976?t=zQ6pl1KJ_vJKutGSP8y7kQ&s=08)

The above message were also provided to the Group by CODECO/URDPC leaders.

CODECO/URDPC also continued to expand its territorial control, occupying 10 of the 13 *groupements* of Djugu territory.<sup>240</sup> Five main brigades of CODECO/URDPC fighters were reported in these *groupements*. These included the first CODECO/URDPC brigade, located at the armed group's headquarters in Jiba, the second in Rethy under the command of « General » Maki Kasongo, the third in Tslaka and Hiro under the command of « General » Serge, the fourth in Mbau and Budhu under « Colonel » Lango, and the last brigade in the area between the Kambala forest, Berunda and Jukoth 2 (in Mahagi territory) respectively under « Colonel » Dhelo and “Colonel” Agenongha Maneno. The ultimate objective of CODECO/URDPC was to control the entirety of Djugu territory and the key axis along the RN27.<sup>241</sup>

<sup>240</sup> Ibid.

<sup>241</sup> Ibid.

## Annex 50 (para. 76)

### Continued reinforcement of Zaïre

#### Renforcement continu de Zaïre

Zaïre remained active and radical, refusing to disarm. It continued consolidating its capacity to resist or launch attacks on CODECO factions, FARDC and civilians.<sup>242</sup>

Zaïre continued to recruit and to train combatants in Lalu, Mabanga, Dala and Iga-Barriere, under the command of an individual known as Mugavu.<sup>243</sup> Zaïre also benefited from training by foreign instructors, notably from Uganda, and has sent hundreds of combatants for training in Uganda, since 2022.<sup>244</sup>

One of the main weapons suppliers of Zaïre, Baraka Jérémie, alias “*le commerçant*”, was arrested in August 2023. Baraka trafficked weapons, ammunition and military uniforms through Uganda and Rwanda to Ituri.<sup>245</sup> His trial was ongoing in Bunia at the time of drafting (see details below).

Mabanga, a strategic gold mining area, became Zaïre’s stronghold. It is where Zaïre leaders stocked up most of their weaponry and held strategic meetings, including for planning attacks.<sup>246</sup> Gold mining in Mabanga provided resources to purchase military equipment. Money collected elsewhere by Zaire, including through membership fees and illegal taxation, was often sent to Mabanga.<sup>247</sup>

Multiple sources pointed at leaders of the “G5”<sup>248</sup> ([S/2023/431](#), para. 110), and its *Chambre de conseil*, such as President Christian Uteki and spokesperson Vicky Ngona,<sup>249</sup> as masterminds behind Zaïre and instigators of community violence. The military prosecutor issued arrest warrants against individuals suspected of fueling violence through Zaïre, including Christian Uteki, who was subsequently arrested.

During the arrest of Christian Uteki, Zaïre mobilised its armed combatants to force his release, threatening to attack Bunia, but were dissuaded by some community leaders and government authorities. The military prosecutor used this element as one of the key pieces of evidence in its attempt to prove Uteki’s influence on Zaïre. His trial was ongoing in Bunia at the time of drafting.

#### *Case of Baraka Jérémie alias “le commerçant”:*

The Group gathered information on an individual named Baraka Jérémie, also known as “Baraka “*le commerçant*”, who for many years has played a central role in the weapons, ammunition, and uniforms supply network for Zaïre, with the support of G5 community leaders.

According to several sources closed to Baraka, he was one of the main logistics providers to Zaïre under the cover of his trading activities. He sourced arms, ammunition, and uniforms through informal networks in Uganda and Rwanda for Zaïre combatants.

Interviewed by the Group, Baraka denied being involved in the networks and claimed he was merely trading in trucks and commodities between Rwanda, the DRC and Uganda. Yet, as stated above, several sources recognised him as one of the masterminds of the trafficking for Zaïre.<sup>250</sup>

<sup>242</sup> See [S/2022/479](#), para. 101 and [S/2022/967](#), Paras. 87-91.

<sup>243</sup> Armed groups elements, researchers, civil society, FARDC and intelligence sources.

<sup>244</sup> Zaïre combatants, armed groups elements, and video footage on file with the Group.

<sup>245</sup> Zaïre combatants, FARDC, intelligence, researchers, civil society sources.

<sup>246</sup> Zaïre combatants, FARDC, intelligence, researchers, civil society sources.

<sup>247</sup> Ibid.

<sup>248</sup> Organisation representing the five communities that had been victims of attacks by the various CODECO factions

<sup>249</sup> [S/2022/967](#), para 91

<sup>250</sup> Zaïre combatants, FARDC, intelligence, researchers, civil society sources.

The Group received and reviewed videos and photos of Zaïre combatants parading, some well-armed and in new uniforms, which according to sources were obtained through Baraka's trafficking network. See images below of Zaïre commander Pharaon wearing one of the newly acquired uniforms.

Below: On the first photograph on the left, Zaïre leader Pharaon speaking on the phone. On the second photograph a Zaïre leader on the left, with his escort on the right, both wearing newly acquired uniforms.



Below: Screenshot from a video depicting Pharaon's escorts wearing the newly acquired uniforms:



All screenshots are from a video provided to the Group by a Zaïre combatant, on file with the Secretariat.

**Annex 51 (para. 79)****CODECO/URDPC attack on Lala IDP camp near Bule, Bahema Badjere groupement, 12 June 2023****Attaque par CODECO/URDPC du camp de déplacés de Lala, près de Bule, dans le groupement de Bahema Badjere, le 12 juin 2023**

During the weeks preceding the attack on the Lala IDP site, significant CODECO/URDPC movements and threats to IDP settlements were reported around Drodro and Bule, in the vicinity of IDP camps, and merely a few kilometers from the Lala camp. Sporadic killings of IDPs commuting in the area were also reported almost on a weekly basis.<sup>251</sup> Concomitantly, Zaïre elements based in and around Bule have been attacking Lendu civilians in the area. Given CODECO/URDPC's track-record of disproportionately responding to attacks by Zaïre militias (see S/2023/431, para. 125-126), any provocation was predicted to trigger a large-scale retaliatory attack.<sup>252</sup>

According to Government authorities, prior to the attack, Zaïre combatants met at Dala to plan a series of incursions into Lendu dominated areas,<sup>253</sup> notably in the Gokpa and Ndjauda groupements, in the Walendu Pitsi sector, Djugu territory (neighboring the small Bahema Badjere collectivity where the Lala site is located). Zaïre combatants, intelligence sources and civil society actors confirmed that a certain Chura, leader of the Zaïre faction in Dala, planned, coordinated, and conducted incursions into CODECO/URDPC areas.<sup>254</sup> For example, several days prior to the Lala massacre, Zaïre combatants had paraded the severed arm of a Lendu in the center of Bule.<sup>255</sup> CODECO/URDPC planned a coordinated reprisal attack to punish Zaïre combatants operating from Bule, some of whom were seen retreating inside Lala camp, mingling with the IDPs.

Local sources, eyewitnesses, and civil society sources interviewed by the Group, as well as Congolese judicial authorities who had investigated the incident, confirmed that on the eve of the attack, CODECO/URDPC combatants began mobilizing in various Lendu localities, and gathering in Petro, Walendu Pitsi groupement, and Gokpa and Djauda in the Walendu-Djatsi groupement, with the intent of carrying out a revenge attack on Bule. An eyewitness saw more than a dozen motor-bikes with CODECO/URDPC armed combatants driving through Drodro, coming from the direction of Masumbuko and heading towards Bule, just hours before the attack. The same witness stated that he had received alerts from a person in Pimbo, the evening before the attack, alerting that combatants in Pimbo were preparing for an attack. Other sources conveyed similar alerts from Masumbuko. In addition, a source had intercepted Motorola communications among Lendu combatants who were saying that they will go "play football in Bule". Other sources have confirmed that messages were intercepted in the leadup to the attack, with CODECO/URDPC menacing to attack Bule.

The assailants attacked during the night of 12 June, killing 46 people, including 23 children (12 boys and 11 girls); 13 people were burned to ashes. According to reliable sources, the CODECO/URDPC combatants did exchange fire with Zaïre combatants at the site, and even killed an FARDC soldier. However, women and children were mostly killed by machetes, and the assailants had time to set hundreds of shelters on fire, pillage, and retreat with at least 96 stolen goats. Although several alerts preceded the attack, intervention by FARDC and MONUSCO arrived late, hours after the attack had ended.

The above is consistent with the usual *modus operandi* of CODECO/URDPC combatants, who mobilize and plan larger attacks in advance, gather in strategic locations close to their target, and execute the attacks in a well-coordinated fashion.

The Group notes that the CODECO/URDPC leadership did not publish any denials of their involvement in the attack, as they have done for other attacks in the past, such as the attack on Plaine Savo IDP camp in January 2023.<sup>256</sup>

**Annex 52 (para. 83)**

<sup>251</sup> FARDC, intelligence sources, MONUSCO sources, researchers, and local sources.

<sup>252</sup> See S/2022/967, paras. 82-86; S/2023/431, paras. 104-112.

<sup>253</sup> According to FARDC and PNC sources, the attacks on the IDPs site of Lala stemmed from attempts by Zaïre combatants to undermine the Aru peace initiative and to promote the genocide narrative against the Hema community.

<sup>254</sup> FARDC, intelligence, civil society, researchers, humanitarian and MONUSCO sources, Twitter account of Basa Zukpa Guerson, CODECO/URDPC's spokesperson.

<sup>255</sup> MONUSCO and civil society sources.

<sup>256</sup> See the Twitter account of the CODECO/URDPC spokesperson, Basa Zukpa Guerson, @BasaZukpa, notably the statements issued on 19 January 2023, denying responsibility for the massacre of civilians at Plaine Savo near Bule, and on 13 February 2023 denying involvement in the killing of civilians at Mongwali.

## Continued remobilization and reorganization of Raïa Mutomboki and Nyatura groups

### Poursuite de la remobilisation et de la réorganisation des groupes Raïa Mutomboki et Nyatura

Following their remobilization since at least mid-2022 (see S/2023/431, annex 73) and in parallel with their adoption of “Wazalendo” status, some Raïa Mutomboki (RM) factions reinforced their coordination and reorganized into several different movements, which triggered internal tensions. Between July and October 2023, several RM leaders participated in meetings to restructure their movements and reassigned roles and responsibilities. For example, RM leaders Kasereka Malibababa, Matabaro Fiston alias Jésus and Blaise Lukisa alias Gaston reorganized under the name of *Alliance des Patriotes pour la Défense du Congo* (ADPC).<sup>257</sup> They tried to also rally other RM leaders, such Shabani Mirasano alias Ouragan, who had himself reorganized his group under the name of *Mouvement Patriotique pour le Changement et la Défense du Congo* (MPCDC) and refused to join them.<sup>258</sup> As a result, while many RM factions decided to reach North Kivu with their combatants and commanders to fight M23 (see annex 54 below), Shabani remained in South Kivu with his troops.<sup>259</sup>

Similarly, several Nyatura groups active in Kalehe territory also remobilised and reorganised under the name of *Mouvement Congolais pour la Défense du Peuple et de l’Intégrité Nationale* (MCDPIN) with their main headquarters around Lumbishi.<sup>260</sup> MCDPIN was mainly represented by four “Generals” who divided the areas under their control. “General” Mathias Karume, based in Lumbishi, was the leader of the movement until his natural death on 2 November 2023.<sup>261</sup> At the time of drafting, his replacement was still uncertain. “General” Yakaremie, “General” Bahige and “General” Nzabona were the other leaders of MCDPIN, along with a certain Monsieur Grevisse, civilian coordinator and president of the movement.<sup>262</sup> “General” Yakaremie’s group was partly based in Kahuzi Biega national park.

Regardless of these dynamics, which were merely a new cycle of the known continuous reconfiguration of armed groups in South Kivu, all RM factions and Nyatura groups that recently remobilized have been responsible of serious abuses against the population in Kalehe, Shabunda and Kabare territories. These abuses included killings, sexual violence, ill-treatment, forced recruitment of children, kidnappings for ransom and illegal taxation. RM factions and Nyatura groups were also involved in the illegal exploitation of natural resources, particularly in the Kahuzi-Biega national park. Clashes and tensions between these groups were also regularly reported. The Group notes that the above undermined the security and stability of Kalehe, Shabunda and Kabare territories and contributed to revive tensions between communities living in these territories. In particular, tensions were reported between the Tembo communities, generally affiliated to RM, and the Hutu communities considered close to Nyatura groups.

<sup>257</sup> FARDC, security, intelligence, researchers, civil society and UN sources.

<sup>258</sup> Security, intelligence, civil society and UN sources.

<sup>259</sup> Security and civil society sources.

<sup>260</sup> FARDC, security, intelligence, researchers, civil society and UN sources.

<sup>261</sup> Ibid.

<sup>262</sup> Ibid.

**Annex 53 (para. 85)****Example of rumours and manipulation by armed groups about M23 and RDF presence in South Kivu****Exemple de rumeurs et de manipulations par des groupes armés sur la présence du M23 et des RDF au Sud-Kivu**

In September 2023, MCDPIN issued a press release about the infiltration of RDF troops in the Kahuzi-Biega national park, with the support of Shabani from Raïa Mutomboki. The press release refers to the RDF plan to attack Kavumu airport.

In response, Shabani's movement, MPCDC (see annex 52 above), also issued a press release, accusing MCDPIN of collaborating with M23 and Rwanda. However, multiple sources confirmed that these mutual accusations were part of internal struggles within MCDPIN, as well as tensions between MCDPIN and MPCDC, who mutually accused the other of collaboration with M23 and Rwanda to tarnish the reputation of the opposite group and in the hopes that FARDC might conduct attacks against the accused group.

**RÉPUBLIQUE DÉMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO**  
**PROVINCE DU SUD KIVU**  
**MOUVEMENT CONGOLAIS POUR LA DÉFENSE DU PEUPLE ET DE L'INTÉGRITÉ NATIONALE**  
**<<MCDPIN>> en sigle**

**COMMUNIQUÉ DE PRESSE N° 02/09/2023**

Le mouvement congolais pour la défense du peuple et de l'Intégrité Nationale dénonce et alerte l'opinion nationale qu'internationale sur le plan odieux des infiltrés du RDF à travers ses supplétifs du M23 qui ont formé depuis le 01/09 année en cours un groupe armé nommé RS MUTETEZI, ces criminels étant Vénus du Rwanda et acostant à KASHEKE sont passés par Chayi plantation du nommé MUYEYE et s'installent à présent dans le parc national de KAUZIBIEGA dans les lieux : KARAWE, NYAWEZA communément appelé kuki Vocat et à TINGITINGI où l'hélicoptère les amène des vivres et minutes de guerre nuitamment. Ainsi il convient de préciser que tout comme ces envahisseurs un nommé SHABANI ancien combattant aux côtés du Gen BUTACHIBERE dans le groupe armé maimai à Hombo reste leur incontournable éclaireur dans la forêt. Cependant, il est à noter qu'après beaucoup de crimes dans les différentes entités de Masisi et Ruchuru en Province du Nord Kivu un autre plan d'agression de la RDC par le Rwanda vient de voir le jour en voulant commencer ses exactions dans cet autre coin du pays avec l'objectif de déstabiliser la situation sécuritaire pendant cette période pré-électorale dans le but de conquérir l'aéroport de KAVUMU tel que nous renseignent nos sources.

Au regard des renseignements à notre disposition, les forces patriotiques réservistes ne cessent de dénoncer, d'alerter et promettent au peuple congolais des réactions incessantes afin de traquer et/ou d'empêcher ces criminels à commettre d'autres atrocités dans cette partie du territoire national.


Nonobstant, les patriotes du MCDPIN demandent à la population congolaise de rester vigilant et dénoncer toute réalité y relative à temps convenable.

La patrie ou la mort

Fait à Lumbishi le.. 02/09/2023

**Le Porte parole**

Augustin BUDENGERI





REPUBLIQUE DEMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO

PROVINCE DU SUD-KIVU



MOUVEMENT PATRIOTIQUE POUR LE CHANGEMENT ET LA DEFENSE DU CONGO

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## COMMUNIQUE DE PRESSE N°08/MPCDC/2023

Le mouvement patriotique pour le changement et la défense du Congo MPCDC en sigle a avec consternation lu le communiqué de presse N°02/09/2023 d'un groupe armé étranger dénommé MCDPIN.

Le mouvement patriotique pour le changement et la défense du Congo alerte l'opinion locale, national et internationale que le groupe armé dénommé MCPDPIN sous la responsabilité d'un certain général KARUME BARIGE résident à LUMBISHI secondé par BAHIGE MWAGURU résident à KATASOMWA est un groupe armé soutenu par le RWANDA et en étroite collaboration avec M23 via leurs éléments représentantes au M23 par le MAJOR (M23) GAKWEREREE DEBENI BUCHIBABA fils de BUGIMBI BUCHIBABA résident à BUSHAKU II (MUCHACHA).

Le MPCDC rappelle au public que depuis son installation à TCHIBATI, le plan de ces collaborateurs du M23 (MCDPIN) a été déstabilisé car ils avaient le plan d'attaqué l'aéroport de KAVUMU et la ville de BUKAVU en passant par le parc national de KAHUZI BIEGA.

On ne sait pas où est ce que le responsable de MCDPIN ont tiré le nom du commandant du MPCDC à la personne de SHABANI, sans savoir son parcouru dans la lutte de libération du Congo d'où leurs tâtonnement, ils montrent qu'il est anciens combattant au cote du général BUTACHIBERA dans le mouvement MAI-MAI à HOMBO ; nous rappelons que le général SHABANI est un grand laideur dans la défense de notre pays mais nous savons que beaucoup de gens lui prennent a mauvais messier suite à son esprit patriotique et comme il décisif elle exceptent pas de collaborer avec les ennemis de la nation congolais, c'est par là que ceux qui collaborent avec les ennemis du Congo lui prennent en ennemi et lui créent souvent de motif non valable voulant sui salir dans sa digne lutte de défendre notre nation.

Alors toutes ces mauvaises actions envers notre leader ne nous décourageront jamais dans notre noble lutte de défendre notre pays.

Alors, pour distraire la population ces ennemis du pays veulent accuser les vrais patriotes.

En autre, le mois passé le MPCDC via son responsable le général SHABANI à arrêter un groupe de quinze personnes envoyées par le MCDPIN pour exploité les minerais dans le parc national de KAHUZU-BIEGA et qui ont été remis entre les mains du responsable du parc ; ce même groupe armé est à la base de coup de bois et destruction de l'environnement dans le PNKB.

Enfin, le MPCDC dément tout information selon laquelle il collabore avec le M23 et prêt à défendre son pays, sa province et mettre hors d'état de nuire l'ennemi du peuple congolais.

Ne jamais trahir le Congo

Pour le MPCDC

COL. WILLIAM MBESHE  
Porte-parole

Press release circulated on social media

**Annex 54 (para. 87)****South Kivu armed groups mobilization to reach North Kivu****Mobilisation des groupes armés du Sud-Kivu pour atteindre le Nord-Kivu**

Since March 2023, most armed groups in South Kivu started calling themselves “Wazalendo” (see para 84). However, since the arrival of several Mai-Mai Yakutumba combatants in Goma, documented in the Group’s last final report (see S/2023/431, annex 73), and until October 2023, no other movements of armed groups from South Kivu to North Kivu were reported.

In October 2023, however, several armed groups sent or attempted to send combatants to North Kivu. On 20 October 2023, combatants<sup>263</sup> of the Force d’auto-défense Biloze Bishambuke (FABB) arriving from their headquarters in Fizi territory and intending to reach North Kivu were stopped in Baraka by the FARDC. They immediately published a press release regretting the refusal to let them proceed to North Kivu to “reinforce the Wazalendo of North Kivu” and called on the relevant authorities to facilitate their movement. FARDC authorities in Baraka said that they had not been notified by their military hierarchy to authorise this movement of FABB combatants, and therefore had blocked their passage until further notice. During a conversation with the Group late October 2023, FABB spokesperson and commander of these combatants, Aimable Nabulizi, confirmed that they were in contact with the Governor of South Kivu and the Commander of the 33th military region, General Robert Yav Avula Ngola. According to Aimable Nabulizi, General Robert Yavr was waiting for the authorisation of the military leadership of North Kivu, who is “the one recruiting the Wazalendo”, to then authorise the FABB combatants to go to North Kivu. Aimable Nabulizi also mentioned that they were in contact with one of the “Wazalendo” leaders in North Kivu, NDC-R leader Guidon Shimiray Mwisa (Cdi. 33) who would assign them their deployment area. Aimable Nabulizi also explained that they would receive most of their weapons and ammunition once in North Kivu, “as the other Wazalendo in North Kivu”. Finally, he also informed that the Mai-Mai Yakutumba combatants who arrived in March 2023 were now deployed in Kibumba.

End of October, Mai-Mai leader “General” Kirikicho and several Raïa Mutomboki (RM) leaders such as “General” Butachibera and “General” Mungoro, mobilized their combatants in Kalehe and Kabare territories, and led them to North Kivu to fight against M23 (see below).<sup>264</sup> According to several sources, this followed a meeting early October and was the result of Kirikicho’s advocacy to join the “Wazalendo” in North Kivu following coordination with APCLS leader, Janvier Karahiri.<sup>265</sup> Local authorities, including FARDC, encouraged the mobilisation and/or facilitated the transport of some of the combatants to North Kivu.<sup>266</sup> In North Kivu, “General” Kirikicho and several RM leaders deployed to several areas with their combatants, such as Sake.<sup>267</sup> However, at the time of drafting, some had already returned to South Kivu following disagreements on the support they were expecting to receive from the Wazalendo of North Kivu and FARDC.<sup>268</sup>

<sup>263</sup> Around 60 according to the FARDC authorities, while FABB claimed to have over 130 combatants.

<sup>264</sup> FARDC, civil society, researchers, intelligence and security sources.

<sup>265</sup> FARDC, civil society and security sources.

<sup>266</sup> Ibid.

<sup>267</sup> CMC leader, civil society, intelligence and security sources.

<sup>268</sup> Civil society, researchers, intelligence and security sources.

**Screenshots of two videos showing the mobilization of RM combatants under “General” Butachibera leadership in Bunyakiri in October 2023**



David Bakenzanya,<sup>269</sup> a local customary authority in Bunyakiri, Kalehe territory, appears in the video’s screenshots above and below (left) encouraging RM combatants under the leadership of “General” Butachibera (see below in FARDC uniform) to fight M23 in North Kivu on 26 October 2023.



Videos circulating on WhatsApp and provided to the Group by civil society sources.

<sup>269</sup> In the video, David Bukenya claims that he is also speaking on behalf of other local authorities, such as Ntale Shosho Kamirogosa and Katora Ndalemwa, customary chief and *chef de groupement*, respectively.

**Screenshot of a video and picture showing the mobilization of RM combatants under “General” Gaston’s leadership in October 2023**



On the video screenshot above: Combatants under the leadership of “General” Blaise Lukisa alias Gaston, currently one of the leaders of the RM faction called *Alliance des Patriotes pour la Défense du Congo* (ADPC). The video was reportedly shot around Kavumu, Kabare territory,<sup>270</sup> before the combatants’ travel to North Kivu. In the video, a man is speaking. He claimed that a delegation representing NDC-R leader Shimiraye Guidon was present alongside the leadership of APDC, including Jesus alias Matabaro Fiston, appearing in the picture below (third from the left with the green hat and the glasses).



Video and picture circulated on WhatsApp and provided to the Group by civil society sources.

<sup>270</sup> Civil society, researchers and security sources.

**Screenshot of a video showing the mobilization of RM combatants under “General” Mungoro’s leadership in October 2023**



On the video screenshot above, RM combatants after their arrival in Bweremana, Kalehe territory, north of Minova at the border between South Kivu and North Kivu, en route towards Goma. In the video, “General” Mungoro Matafari Bernard is explaining that the combatants are under his leadership, that they arrived from Bunyakiri to fight for their country, and that they are behind President Felix Tshisekedi, to whom they request support. He then gives the floor to “General” Imani Kachamba Samson, chief of operations (T3) of their RM group who encourages the combatants to fight against M23, reminding that President Tshisekedi “gave them the power” and reiterating the support of their customary chiefs in Kalehe territory, namely Ntale Shosho Kamirogosa and Katora Ndalemwa (similarly to David Bakenzanya in the first video of this annex).

Video circulated on social media and provided to the Group by civil society sources.

**Annex 55 (para. 93)**

**Reaction from the DRC Government on criticisms regarding Primera's monopoly**

**Réaction du Gouvernement de la RDC sur les critiques concernant le monopole de Primera**

On 28 August 2023, the Minister of Finance, Nicolas Kazadi, the Minister of Communication, Patrick Muyaya and the Deputy chief of staff of the Office of the President of the Republic, André Wameso, held a press conference during which they discussed developments relating to Primera Gold.

According to the Government, this project was part of a sustained strategy of the top State leaders to recover the DRC's economic sovereignty, and to fight against smuggling which contributes to fueling the conflict in eastern DRC.

Government representatives further said that they were convinced that the tax measures granted to Primera would enable it to compete more effectively with the low prices offered by criminal networks based in neighboring countries.

**Annex 56 (para. 94)****A director of Primera abusively reprimanding a local mining official****Un directeur de Primera blâme abusivement un responsable local des mines**

The Group obtained an audio recording, which it could authenticate, in which Mr. Amisi, who introduced himself as the deputy director of Primera Gold, reprimanded a local mining official in Fizi territory about the arrest of a gold transporter. The Group also consulted detailed reports of the incident and interviewed some persons involved in this specific case.

The transporter did not have the required documentation authorizing him to transport minerals. Accordingly, the mining officers, who are responsible for the fight against gold smuggling, had the right/duty to arrest the transporter. According to the Group's information, in this particular case, the transporter had not been instructed to deliver the minerals to Primera, but to a Bukavu-based woman with no connection to Primera.

The arrest of the transporter revealed one of the strategies used by the *negociants* to smuggle gold. Although mining officials seized 1,118.00 grams of gold, it turned out that only 68.09 grams had actually been declared in Nyange, where the gold was produced. The traders thus falsely declared only 68.09 grams, hoping to fraudulently sell the remaining 1049.91 grams.

The Group also confirmed that in another incident, one of Primera's appointed buyers, Chikonza Muka Adhemar, dissuaded a mining officer from controlling a *negociant* who sold gold to Primera.

**Annex 57** (para. 95)

**Primera and Tanganyika Gold**

**Primera et Tanganyika Gold**

Primera told the Group that it had received 32 kg of gold from Tanganyika Gold, which the company decided to purchase after receiving confirmation from the seller and the mining authorities that the gold was from artisanal production.

Several sources familiar with the matter, including mining officials, *negociants* and individuals close to Tanganyika Gold, reported to the Group that gold from Tanganyika Gold was produced in the small scale mine operated by Tshisangama Simeon Mining (TSM) in Fizi territory, and was accordingly not from artisanal production.

The Group consulted an internal report dated 7 June 2023, drawn up following a fact-finding mission to TSM by the mining authorities. This report indicates, among other things, that TSM's production was transported without authorization to Kalemie, where Tanganyika Gold is based.

**Annex 58 (para. 97)****Letter from SAEMAPE declaring illegal mining by COOPEMEK in Lugushwa****Lettre du SAEMAPE déclarant illégale l'activité de COOPEMEK à Lugushwa**

*République Démocratique du Congo*

**Ministère des Mines**



*Service d'Assistance et d'Encadrement  
de l'Exploitation Minière Artisanale et à Petite  
Échelle*

*Direction Provinciale du Sud-Kivu*

Bukavu, le 13.01.2023

N/Réf : SAEMAPE-SK/DPSK/002/DP/2023

**Transmis copie pour information à :**

- Son Excellence Monsieur le Gouverneur de la Province du Sud-Kivu ;
  - Son Excellence Monsieur le Ministre Provincial en charge des Mines ;
  - Monsieur le Chef de Division Provinciale des Mines et Géologie de la Province du Sud-Kivu ;
  - Monsieur le Procureur Général Prés la Cour d'Appel du Sud-Kivu ;
  - Monsieur le Directeur Provincial de l'ANR au Sud-Kivu ;
  - Monsieur le Directeur Provincial de la DGM au Sud-Kivu ;
  - Monsieur le Commandant de la 33<sup>ème</sup> Région Militaire du Sud-Kivu ;
  - Monsieur le Secrétaire Exécutif du Gouvernement Provincial ;
  - Monsieur le Directeur Provincial du CEEC et Coordonnateur de la CNLFM au Sud-Kivu
- (Tous) à BUKAVU

**Concerne : Information sur nos activités et**

**partenariat avec la Société**

**LOUIS SARL à Lugushwa**

**ACCUSE DE RECEPTION**

A Monsieur le Président de la Coopérative  
Minière Emmanuel du Kivu

Monsieur le Président de la Coopérative,

J'accuse la réception de votre lettre sans numéro du 24 Novembre 2022, dont l'objet est bien repris en concerne et vous en remercie.

En effet, après analyse de votre correspondance, je tiens à vous préciser que la Coopérative minière ne peut être opérationnelle que dans une Zone d'Exploitation artisanale lui attribuée conformément aux dispositions de l'article 10 du

SAEMAPE Direction Provinciale du Sud-Kivu. E-mail : [saeampsudkivu@gmail.com](mailto:saeampsudkivu@gmail.com) Twitter : @SaemapeSud  
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Portables : +243 819 749 502 ; +243 977 136484

Scanné avec CamScanner

du code minier en vigueur, et non sur base de ses relations avec la Communauté locale ou une éventuel partenaire dont nous n'avons d'ailleurs aucun document juridique le concernant.

Qui plus est, je vous informe si pas vous rappeler que ses sites miniers alluvionnaires de Lugushwa dans lesquels souhaite travailler votre coopérative se situent dans le Périmètre d'Exploitation 38 appartenant à la société BANRO et que STRATAGOS Group venait d'acquérir, par conséquent, le SAEMAPE Sud-Kivu ne saurait vous accompagner dans vos activités qui se trouvent en marge des dispositions légales, à moins de trouver une autorisation expresse du détenteur du titre minier conformément à l'article 30.e du code Minier en vigueur.

Agréez, Monsieur le Président de la COOPEMEC, l'expression de mes sentiments patriotiques.



SAEMAPE Direction Provinciale du Sud-Kivu. E-mail : [sae map sud kivu@gmail.com](mailto:sae map sud kivu@gmail.com) Twitter : @Sae map Sud  
Av. de la Résidence, N° 54 A, Q. Nyalukemba, Commune d'Ibanda, Ville de Bukavu  
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Document provided to the group by a confidential source

**Annex 59 (para. 99)****Response from Primera on the price of gold****Réponse de Primera sur le prix de l'or**

Primera confirmed to the Group that the price of purchased gold is currently lower than before Primera's arrival in South Kivu. The reason for the decrease of the price of purchased gold was reported by Primera to be the following: for several years, funds entering the gold market were untraced and untaxed, which in turn allowed gold prices to be higher than those on the international market.

**Annex 60** (para. 101)

**Update on Congo Gold Refinery**

**Etat des lieux sur Congo Gold Refinery**

During the period under review, the Group visited Congo Gold Refinery (CGR) and was told by its managers that it was ready for operation. On 25 July 2023, a decree issued by the Minister of Mines (see below) withdrew CGR's license, forcing the company to cancel the opening ceremony scheduled for the following day.

The DRC authorities informed the Group that this measure resulted from a recommendation by CENAREF (see below) pending the completion of investigations into the refinery's owners and shareholders. CGR managers told the Group that CENAREF's letter did not take into account the changes in the list of shareholders ([S/2022/479](#), annex 86) and that it had appealed the decision. CGR did not receive a reply to their appeal at the time of drafting.

Mining administration officials told the Group that CGR's owner, Karim Somji (see [S/2020/482](#), para. 89 and [S/2013/433](#), annex 70), remained controversial. However, several sources told the Group that the blocking of CGR's activities was primarily due to the Government's desire not to allow a potential competitor to Primera Gold to operate. These same sources also explained to the Group that, in order to avoid attracting criticism due to the presence of Sibtein Alibhai, a former partner of Karim Somji, at the head of Primera Group's Board of Directors, Sibtein was asked to resign in June 2023.

## Decree by the Minister of Mines



02374

N/R&amp;F : CAB.MIN/MINES/MKN/...../03/2023

Kinshasa, le 25 JUIL 2023

Transmis copie pour information à :

- Son Excellence Madame la Ministre des Mines ;
- Son Excellence Monsieur le Vice-ministre des Mines ;
- Monsieur le Coordonnateur de la CTCPM ;
- Monsieur le Directeur-Chef de Service des Mines  
(Tous) à Kinshasa/Gombe

Objet : Transmission Arrêté Ministériel.

A Monsieur le Secrétaire Général aux Mines  
à Kinshasa/Gombe

Monsieur le Secrétaire Général,

Je vous transmets, en annexe à la présente, pour dispositions utiles et compétence, l'Arrêté Ministériel n°00267/CAB.MIN/MINES/01/2023 du 24 juillet 2023 portant déchéance de la Société CONGO GOLD RAFFINERIE « CGR » de son agrément au titre d'Entité de traitement catégorie B.

Je vous en souhaite bonne réception.

Veuillez agréer, Monsieur le Secrétaire Général.

L'expression de mes sentiments patriciaux.

Michel KINONGE NY EKUMA

Directeur du Cabinet





MINISTÈRE DES MINES

La Ministre

ARRETE MINISTERIEL N° 00267 /CAB.MIN/MINES/01/2023  
DU... 24..JUL..2023..... PORTANT DECHEANCE DE LA SOCIETE CONGO GOLD  
RAFFINERIE « CGR » DE SON AGREEMENT AU TITRE D'ENTITE DE  
TRAITEMENT CATEGORIE B

LA MINISTRE,

Vu la Constitution, telle que modifiée par la Loi n°11/002 du 20 janvier 2011 portant révision de certains articles de la Constitution de la République Démocratique du Congo du 18 février 2006, spécialement en ses articles 93, 202 point 36 litera f et 203 point 16 ;

Vu la Loi n°007/2002 du 11 juillet 2002 portant Code Minier, telle que modifiée et complétée par la Loi n°18/001 du 19 mars 2018 spécialement en ses articles 10 litera b ;

Vu l'Ordonnance n°22/002 du 07 janvier 2022 portant organisation et fonctionnement du Gouvernement, modalités de collaboration entre le Président de la République et le Gouvernement ainsi qu'entre les Membres du Gouvernement ;

Vu l'Ordonnance n°22/003 du 07 janvier 2022 fixant les attributions des Ministères, spécialement en son article 1er B, point 35 ;

Vu l'Ordonnance n° 21/012 du 12 avril 2021 portant nomination des Vice-Premiers Ministres, des Ministres d'Etat, des Ministres, des Ministres Délégués et des Vice-Ministres, telle que modifiée et complétée par l'Ordonnance n°23/030 du 23 mars 2023 ;

Vu le Décret n°038/2003 du 26 mars 2003 portant Règlement Minier, tel que modifié et complété par le Décret n° 18/024 du 08 juin 2018, spécialement en son article 561 ;

Vu l'Annexe XVII du Règlement Minier portant Directive relative au modèle-type de cahier des charges de responsabilité sociétale ;

Vu l'Arrêté Ministériel n°00131/CAB.MIN/MINES/01/2023 du 19 avril 2023 portant règlementation des Activités de l'Entité de Traitement ;

Revu l'Arrêté Ministériel n° 0010/CAB.MIN/MINES/01/2022 du 15 février 2022 portant renouvellement d'agrément au titre d'entité de traitement catégorie B dans la Province du Sud-Kivu au profit de la Société CONGO GOLD RAFFINERIE SARL ; anse



00267

Page 2 de l'Arrêté Ministériel n° ..... /CAB.MIN/MINES/01/2023

Attendu que la Société CONGO GOLD RAFFINERIE « CGR » n'a pas respecté ses obligations sociales, notamment celles relatives à l'élaboration du cahier des charges des responsabilités sociétales ;

Considérant la lettre de mise en demeure n° Réf.: CAB.MIN/MINES /ANSK/01512/01/2022 du 06 mai 2022, relative à l'exécution du Cahier des charges des Responsabilités Sociétales ;

Considérant l'expiration de délai de 6 mois suivant la mise en demeure adressée notamment à la Société CONGO GOLD RAFFINERIE « CGR » ;

#### A R R E T E :

##### Article 1<sup>er</sup>:

Sans préjudice d'autres sanctions prévues par les dispositions des Code et Règlement Miniels ainsi que de l'Arrêté Ministériel n°00131/CAB.MIN/MINES/01/2023 du 19 avril 2023 portant réglementation des Activités de l'Entité de Traitement, la Société CONGO GOLD RAFFINERIE « CGR » est déchue de son agrément au titre d'Entité de traitement catégorie B.

##### Article 2 :

La Société CONGO GOLD RAFFINERIE « CGR » dispose d'un délai de 30 (trente) jours à compter de la notification du présent Arrêté par le Secrétaire Général aux Mines pour exercer son droit de recours.

##### Article 3 :

Le Secrétaire Général aux Mines est chargé de l'exécution du présent Arrêté qui entre en vigueur à la date de sa signature.

Fait à Kinshasa, le 24 JUIL 2023

Antoinette N'SAMBA KALAMBAYI

Annexes :

- Cabinet du President de la Republique	: 1;
- Cabinet du Premier Ministre	: 1;
- Cabinet du Ministre des Mines	: 2;
- Secrétaire Général des Mines	: 1;
- Cadastre Miner	: 1;
- CTCPM	: 1;
- Div Prov des Mines & Géologie du ressort	: 1;

## Investigation report from CENAREF

REPUBLIQUE DEMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO



CELLULE NATIONALE  
DES RENSEIGNEMENTS FINANCIERS  
(CENAREF)

Kinshasa, le 24 JUL 2023

N/Réf: 0581/CENAREF/S.E./2023-

Le Secrétaire Exécutif

Transmis copie pour information à :

- Son Excellence Monsieur le Président de la République, Chef de l'Etat  
*(Avec l'expression de mes hommages les plus déferents)*  
Palais de la Nation
- Son Excellence Monsieur le Premier Ministre, Chef du Gouvernement  
*(Avec l'expression de ma très haute considération)*  
Hôtel du Gouvernement
- Monsieur le Procureur Général près la Cour de Cassation
- Monsieur l'Auditeur Général près la Haute Cour Militaire
- Son Excellent Monsieur le Vice-Premier Ministre, Ministre de l'Intérieur, Sécurité, Décentralisation et Affaires Coutumières
- Son Excellent Monsieur le Vice-Premier Ministre, Ministre de la Défense Nationale et des Anciens Combattants
- Son Excellence Madame le Ministre d'Etat, Ministre de la Justice et Garde des Sceaux
- Son Excellence Madame le Ministre des Mines
- Monsieur l'Administrateur Général de l'Agence Nationale de Renseignement, « ANR »
- Monsieur le Sous-Chef d'Etat-Major chargé de Renseignement Militaire
- Son Excellence Madame le Vice-Ministre des Finances
- Monsieur le Secrétaire Général aux Mines
- Monsieur le Secrétaire Exécutif Adjoint de la CENAREF ;  
(Tous) à Kinshasa/Gombe

Kinshasa, le

Le Secrétaire Exécutif

**KISULA BETIKA YEYE Adler**

Premier Avocat Général près la Cour de Cassation

A Excellence Monsieur le Ministre des Finances  
à Kinshasa/Gombe

**OBJET : Rapport partiel de l'enquête en cours sur les activités de la Société CONGO GOLD RAFFINERIE SARL**

- 2 -

**Excellence Monsieur le Ministre,**

J'ai l'honneur de porter à votre connaissance que la CENAREF mène des investigations relativement aux activités de la Société CONGO GOLD RAFFINERIE SARL basée dans la Province du Sud-Kivu. Celle-ci est une entité de traitement de Catégorie B suivant l'Arrêté Ministériel n° 0503/CAB.MIN/MINES/01/2019 du 19 juillet 2019.

Des informations à notre possession, tirées principalement des rapports des experts des Nations-Unies et de Global Witness, la Société CONGO GOLD RAFFINERIE SARL est détenue indirectement par deux Sociétés, chacune faisant partie de différents réseaux dont :

- GLOBAL INVESTMENT CONGO qui compte parmi ses actionnaires des entités gérées par Messieurs Alain WAN (partenaire du millionnaire américain Erik PRINCE, homme d'affaires qui aurait par le passé été l'un des intermédiaires de l'ancien président congolais et un trafiquant d'or présumé) et LIU ZHIGANG, un haut Responsable de Frontier Service Group, une société de sécurité créée par le millionnaire Erik PRINCE qui œuvre dans le secteur de sécurité privée ;
- MARATHON SARL qui appartient à un sujet belgo-burundais du nom de KARIM SOMJI, lequel aurait par le passé fait de la contrebande d'or, à Robert MUTESA, l'associé-gérant d'une compagnie aérienne qui aurait assuré le transport d'armes pendant la deuxième guerre du Congo et Joyce OTSHIMO EKANGA, un homme d'affaires, fils d'un ancien dignitaire du régime passé.

Selon Jean-Luc BLAKELY, Responsable senior des Campagnes à Global Witness, CONGO GOLD RAFFINERIE SARL « est détenue ou gérée par différents personnages aux antécédents qui soulèvent des questions. Cela va des personnes accusées de contrebande d'or congolais à un proche associé de l'ancien président, en passant par un cadre supérieur d'une compagnie créée par l'un des mercenaires les plus notoires au monde ».

En effet, les Statuts de la Société CONGO GOLD RAFFINERIE SARL déposés au Ministère des Mines renseignent Messieurs KARIM SOMJI et Dieudonné KASEMBO NYEMBO comme les deux actionnaires à parts égales de la Société.

L'organisme IMPACT renseigne que KARIM SOMJI est parmi les personnes impliquées dans le commerce illicite des minéraux aurifères de la RDC depuis plus de deux décennies en connivence avec certains pays voisins, notamment le Rwanda, et qu'il a été associé dans nombreuses sociétés de commerce et d'exportation d'or dans la région, dont AR GOLD SARL à Goma, GOLDEN GOLD à Bujumbura, GOLDEN GOLD LTD au Rwanda ainsi que GOLDEN GOLD ET MINES PROPRES SARL à Bukavu en RDC.

Selon IMPACT, plusieurs sources renseignent que KARIM SOMJI a créé sur divers territoires de la région des Sociétés qui exportent de l'or à des nombreuses entreprises situées à Dubaï portant toutes un nom différent, que les activités de commerce et d'exportation passent régulièrement d'une société à l'autre et qu'aucune de ces entreprises ne génère un volume suffisamment important pour attirer l'attention du Groupe d'experts des Nations-Unies ou d'autres organismes chargés de l'application de la loi.

Aussi, le rapport du Secrétaire Général aux Mines nous transmis par la lettre n° BUR/SG.MINES/01/1111/2023 du 20 juillet 2023, fait état de ce que la Société CONGO GOLD RAFFINERIE SARL est sans activités, car le Secrétariat Général aux Mines ne détient aucune donnée statistique d'achat, de traitement ni de stockage d'or la concernant.

- 3 -

Au regard de ce qui précède et tenant compte de la situation sécuritaire à l'Est de la RDC, envahie par plusieurs groupes armés et par les terroristes du M23 soutenus par le Rwanda, il y a lieu de surseoir aux activités de CONGO GOLD RAFFINERIE SARL, afin de pousser plus loin les enquêtes sur ses activités récentes dans la région et sur les bénéficiaires effectifs des activités de ladite Société conformément à la Loi n°22/068 du 27 décembre 2022 portant lutte contre le blanchiment de capitaux et le financement du terrorisme et de la prolifération des armes de destruction massive, spécialement à son article 40.

Pour ce, la CENAREF poursuit ses investigations auprès de banques commerciales, de services de l'Etat et d'autres structures internationales dont la Cellule sœur des Emirats Arabes Unis. Le résultat de ces investigations vous seront communiquées au fur et à mesure.

Veuillez agréer, **Excellence Monsieur le Ministre**,  
l'expression de ma haute considération.



*Croisement Boulevard du 30 Juin et Avenue Mbuji-Mayi, en face de la CNSS (ex. INSS), Commune de la Gombe  
(+243) 85 52 82 223 - [mail@cenaref.org](mailto:mail@cenaref.org)*

Document provided to the Group by confidential sources