



## Conseil de sécurité

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### Lettre datée du 24 mai 2022, adressée à la Présidente du Conseil de sécurité par le Groupe d'experts sur la Libye créé par la résolution 1973 (2011) du Conseil de sécurité

Le Groupe d'experts sur la Libye créé par la résolution 1973 (2011) du Conseil de sécurité a l'honneur de vous faire tenir ci-joint, en application du paragraphe 13 de la résolution 2571 (2021), le rapport final sur ses travaux.

Le rapport a été communiqué le 4 mai 2022 au Comité du Conseil de sécurité créé par la résolution 1970 (2011) concernant la Libye, qui l'a examiné le 20 mai 2022.

Le Groupe d'experts vous serait reconnaissant de bien vouloir porter le texte de la présente lettre et du rapport à l'attention des membres du Conseil de sécurité et de le faire publier comme document du Conseil.

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## Rapport final du Groupe d'experts sur la Libye créé par la résolution 1973 (2011) du Conseil de sécurité

### Résumé

La perspective d'élections présidentielle et législatives le 24 décembre 2021, prévue dans la feuille de route adoptée en novembre 2020 par le Forum de dialogue politique interlibyen, a créé une nouvelle dynamique qui a influé sur divers aspects du régime de sanctions.

La position des groupes armés à l'égard des élections a évolué fondamentalement en fonction de leurs propres intérêts, selon les risques et les avantages qu'ils pouvaient en tirer. L'incertitude entourant le processus prévu dans le Forum de dialogue politique interlibyen a accentué les lignes de fracture, tandis que les candidats concurrents rivalisaient d'efforts pour obtenir l'appui des forces sur le terrain. La majeure partie du territoire libyen est ainsi demeurée contrôlée par des groupes armés libyens. Tout au long de la période de préparation électorale, un ensemble de facteurs se sont conjugués pour concourir à la déclaration du 22 décembre 2021, dans laquelle la Haute Commission électorale nationale a invoqué un cas de force majeure l'empêchant d'organiser des élections le 24 décembre 2021. Le 20 février 2022, la Chambre des députés a chargé Fathi Bashagha de former un nouveau gouvernement. Au moment de l'établissement du présent rapport, les dirigeants du Gouvernement d'unité nationale avaient rejeté la formation du nouveau gouvernement et conservaient le pouvoir. Les alliances nouées entre les divers groupes armés sont restées fluides, tandis que l'incertitude sur la façon d'aller de l'avant suscitait une propension à des tractations politiques.

Des groupes désignés comme terroristes sont toujours présents en Libye, où ils continuent d'être actifs, tout en étant visés par des opérations antiterroristes répétées dans tout le pays. La présence persistante dans le pays de combattants soudanais, syriens et tchadiens et de sociétés-conseils militaires privées continue de menacer gravement la sécurité de la Libye et de la région, tandis que les progrès de la Commission militaire conjointe 5+5 relatifs au retrait des combattants étrangers sont entravés par l'impasse politique.

Malgré une baisse notable des hostilités militaires actives durant la période considérée, de graves violations du droit international humanitaire et du droit international des droits de l'homme ont persisté à grande échelle, en toute impunité. Le Groupe d'experts a constaté en particulier que sept groupes armés libyens recouraient systématiquement à la détention arbitraire et illégale comme mesure punitive contre quiconque contesterait leur autorité et comme moyen efficace de faire étalage de leur pouvoir et de leur autonomie par rapport aux institutions étatiques et judiciaires libyennes, ce qui a fortement compromis ces dernières. Ils n'ont systématiquement fait aucun cas des lois internationales et nationales applicables en violation du droit à la vie, du droit à la liberté et à la sûreté de la personne, du droit à un procès équitable et l'interdiction de la torture et autres traitements cruels, inhumains ou dégradants. Au lieu de cela, les détenus ont été cyniquement soustraits à la protection de la loi, entièrement tributaires du pouvoir arbitraire des autorités qui les retenaient dans des conditions mettant gravement en danger leur vie et leur bien-être. Les migrants ont été très exposés aux atteintes aux droits humains et régulièrement soumis à des actes d'esclavage, de viol et de torture.

L'inefficacité de l'embargo sur les armes a persisté, certains États Membres continuant de le violer en toute impunité. Ils ont conservé leur contrôle sur les chaînes d'approvisionnement, ce qui a considérablement entravé la détection, la perturbation

ou l'interdiction. Même si le nombre de violations recensées a été beaucoup plus faible qu'en 2019 et en 2020 et le nombre de ponts aériens a sensiblement baissé, le Groupe d'experts estime que les stocks d'armements restent élevés et suffiraient à alimenter tout conflit futur. Il a actualisé les données de référence relatives aux types d'armes transférées illicitement à la Libye, ce qui aidera à répertorier des violations futures, mais témoigne aussi du mépris total affiché à l'égard de l'embargo sur les armes ces dernières années. La technologie et le coût relativement faible des biens de consommation électroniques intelligents qui évoluent constamment, tels que les dispositifs optiques et les drones aériens, et la facilité avec laquelle des tout-terrains civils peuvent être modifiés de façon à devenir aptes au combat, en font des véhicules rêvés pour un emploi militaire dans des conflits de faible intensité. Cette situation est exploitée par la majorité des groupes armés en Libye.

Concernant les questions maritimes, le Groupe d'experts a établi que les navires battant pavillon zambien dans les eaux internationales le faisaient de manière illicite, la Zambie n'opérant pas de registre maritime international libre et n'immatriculant pas de navires internationaux. L'Organisme d'appui à la stabilité, affilié au Gouvernement d'unité nationale, est apparu comme un nouvel acteur maritime, se servant de navires civils armés et de combat pour intercepter et refouler des migrants qui tentaient de quitter la Libye. L'installation, après la livraison, d'armes à bord de navires de type civil a servi systématiquement à contourner l'embargo sur les armes. Une unité maritime affiliée aux forces d'Haftar a détenu arbitrairement des navires marchands dans une zone maritime autodéclarée. Elle a exigé le versement d'une amende illégale, en échange de la libération et, dans un cas, a volé les biens personnels des membres de l'équipage. Le Groupe d'experts le qualifie d'acte de piraterie.

Les conditions techniques à la réunification de la Banque centrale de Libye ont été définies par un consultant externe à la Banque, mais les progrès ont été lents, sur le plan de l'exécution.

Le secteur public du pétrole s'est retrouvé au centre d'une lutte de pouvoir entre les dirigeants de la National Oil Corporation et le Ministère du pétrole et de l'énergie, qui s'est manifestée par l'incapacité de suspendre de ses fonctions le Président de la Corporation et par des accusations publiques d'irrégularités dans la gestion des opérations quotidiennes. Un fait inquiétant a été la détention de membres de la direction de la Corporation et d'entités affiliées, au motif d'irrégularités administratives supposées. Durant la période considérée, des affrontements entre des groupes armés ont occasionné des dégâts aux installations pétrolières et entraîné le refus, à des fins d'extorsion, de l'utilisation des installations pétrolières.

Durant la période considérée, une tentative illicite présumée d'exportation illicite de pétrole brut de la Libye a été faite. La contrebande de produits pétroliers par la mer n'a pas retrouvé les niveaux antérieurs. La contrebande par les frontières terrestres a persisté, tandis que les divisions intérieures s'accroissaient.

La mesure de gel des avoirs a continué de susciter les mêmes difficultés que durant les mandats antérieurs, reflétant l'absence d'uniformité, sur le plan de l'application, par les États Membres. Certaines juridictions ont continué d'interpréter différemment le paragraphe 19 de la résolution 1970 (2011) concernant la gestion active des avoirs gelés. Le Groupe d'experts est toujours d'avis qu'une telle gestion n'est pas autorisée aux termes du paragraphe 19.

Les entités désignées doivent faire preuve de plus transparence, concernant la propriété effective, la propriété en droit, le contrôle effectif et les activités de leurs filiales. La situation doit continuer d'être surveillée.

Des personnes désignées ont fait des déplacements, durant la période considérée, au titre d'une dérogation permanente. Les directives publiées par le Comité créé par le Conseil de sécurité en application du paragraphe 13 de la résolution [2571 \(2021\)](#) pour faire respecter ces dérogations n'ont pas été suivies par tous les États Membres impliqués.



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\* Les annexes sont distribuées uniquement dans la langue de l'original et n'ont pas été revues par les services d'édition.

## I. Contexte

### A. Introduction

1. Le présent rapport, soumis au Comité du Conseil de sécurité en application du paragraphe 13 de la résolution [2571 \(2021\)](#), porte sur la période écoulée depuis la présentation, le 8 mars 2021, du précédent rapport du Groupe d'experts ([S/2021/229](#)<sup>1</sup>), jusqu'au 25 avril 2022<sup>2</sup>, et comprend une mise à jour des enquêtes en cours qui y étaient citées. On trouvera un aperçu de l'évolution du régime des sanctions concernant la Libye dans l'annexe 1 au présent rapport<sup>3</sup>.

2. Le Groupe d'experts a mené ses enquêtes conformément aux meilleures pratiques et méthodes recommandées par le Groupe de travail informel du Conseil de sécurité sur les questions générales relatives aux sanctions (voir [S/2006/997](#)). Il a maintenu le niveau de preuve le plus élevé possible, même si les déplacements en Libye et ailleurs étaient toujours restreints du fait de la pandémie de maladie à coronavirus (COVID-19).

3. Le Groupe d'experts s'est fié à des éléments de preuve confirmés et a adhéré à ses normes pour ce qui est du droit de réponse<sup>4</sup>. Il a mené ses enquêtes de manière transparente, objective, impartiale et indépendante.

### B. Coopération avec les parties prenantes et les institutions

4. La liste des États Membres, organisations et individus consultés figure à l'annexe 4. On trouvera la correspondance du Groupe d'experts à l'annexe 5. Il a maintenu également des contacts avec le Comité, les États Membres et d'autres interlocuteurs, dont d'autres Groupes d'experts, au moyen de plateformes électroniques.

5. Le Groupe d'experts a tiré profit de ses échanges réguliers avec la Mission d'appui des Nations Unies en Libye (MANUL). Il a également reçu l'aide de l'opération militaire de l'Union européenne en Méditerranée (opération IRINI), concernant notamment les enquêtes qu'il mène sur le non-respect de l'embargo sur les armes et sur l'importation et l'exportation illicites de pétrole brut et de produits pétroliers.

6. Le Groupe d'experts s'est rendu une fois en Libye à la mi-septembre 2021. D'octobre 2021 à février 2022, il a fait des demandes d'aide concernant une visite, qui sont restées sans suite, en raison des contraintes logistiques de la MANUL. Les visas de ses membres pour la Libye sont venus à échéance à la fin de janvier 2022 et n'ont pas été renouvelés par la Libye. Par conséquent, la visite que le Groupe d'experts prévoyait d'effectuer en Libye en mars 2022 n'a pas pu se dérouler. Ses déplacements en Libye lui sont essentiels pour s'acquitter de sa mission et doivent se voir accorder la priorité par les États Membres et les organes d'appui de l'ONU.

<sup>1</sup> Toutes les mentions faites au rapport publié sous la cote [S/2021/229](#) recouvrent également les documents [S/2021/229/Corr.1](#) et [S/2021/229/Corr.2](#).

<sup>2</sup> Tous les hyperliens ont été vérifiés le 8 avril 2022.

<sup>3</sup> Les annexes sont distribuées uniquement dans la langue de l'original et n'ont pas été revues par les services d'édition. Les rapports des mécanismes de surveillance ne pouvant dépasser un certain nombre de mots, le Groupe d'experts a donné un complément d'information sur plusieurs enquêtes dans les annexes du présent document. On trouvera le tableau des sigles et des abréviations à l'annexe 2.

<sup>4</sup> On trouvera de plus amples informations sur la méthode de travail et le droit de réponse à l'annexe 3.

7. Le Groupe d'experts s'est rendu à Benghazi le 21 septembre 2021 et s'est entretenu avec des interlocuteurs de l'Armée nationale libyenne. C'était son premier déplacement dans l'est de la Libye et son premier contact direct avec les forces affiliées à Haftar<sup>5</sup>, depuis sa visite à Tobrouk in juillet 2015<sup>6</sup>.

## II. Actes qui mettent en péril la paix, la stabilité et la stabilité en Libye, entravent ou compromettent la réussite de sa transition politique

### A. Dynamique des groupes armés libyens

8. La mainmise des groupes armés sur le secteur de la sécurité en Libye, qui avait été signalée dans le rapport S/2021/229<sup>7</sup>, s'est poursuivie. Même si bon nombre de ces groupes se trouvant dans l'ouest bénéficiaient de mandats officiels, avaient accès à des fonds publics (voir annexe 6) et relevaient théoriquement d'institutions étatiques, ils ont continué d'opérer en dehors de tout contrôle réel.

9. Un exemple en est le tollé général qui a suivi la lettre du 14 août 2021 adressée par la Commission militaire conjointe 5+5<sup>8</sup> au Conseil de la présidence et au Premier Ministre (voir annexe 7), recommandant l'examen de la structure hiérarchique de plusieurs organismes militaires et de sécurité. L'Organisme d'appui à la stabilité et le chef d'état-major des Forces armées libyennes<sup>9</sup> ont immédiatement réagi en accusant la Commission d'outrepasser son mandat (voir annexe 8). Un représentant diplomatique avec lequel le Groupe d'experts s'est entretenu à Tripoli a considéré l'initiative de la Commission comme une attaque conduite par Khalifa Haftar et visant les institutions libyennes dans l'ouest de la Libye. À l'opposé, un officier militaire de l'est, membre de la Commission<sup>10</sup>, a expliqué au Groupe d'experts que la lettre litigieuse visait à soutenir des collègues militaires dans l'ouest, qui étaient consternés par les excès des groupes armés.

10. La majeure partie de la Libye a néanmoins connu une période de calme relatif au lendemain de la formation du Gouvernement d'unité nationale en février 2021, ce qui pourrait s'expliquer en partie par une « position d'attentisme », avant que la nouvelle équipe exécutive ne définisse de nouvelles orientations. Dans les jours précédant les élections et après le rendez-vous électoral manqué du 24 décembre, les principaux groupes armés ont fait montre de prudence<sup>11</sup>.

<sup>5</sup> Il s'agit notamment du groupe armé précédemment connu sous le nom d'Armée nationale libyenne de Khalifa Haftar (rebaptisé « Forces armées arabes libyennes ») et de groupes armés nationaux et étrangers. Le Groupe d'experts emploie l'expression « forces affiliées à Haftar » pour désigner tous les groupes armés qui lui sont affiliés. Il utilise par ailleurs la minuscule pour évoquer des groupes armés qui se font appeler « Brigade » ou « Bataillon », afin de pouvoir les identifier, sans pour autant leur conférer la légitimité d'une unité militaire gouvernementale constituée. Il emploie de même la minuscule, le cas échéant, pour désigner les autorités de l'est de la Libye.

<sup>6</sup> Voir S/2016/209, par. 11.

<sup>7</sup> Par. 8 et annexe 6.

<sup>8</sup> La Commission militaire conjointe 5+5 est composée de cinq officiers supérieurs relevant du Gouvernement d'unité nationale et de cinq officiers désignés par Khalifa Haftar.

<sup>9</sup> Établi par le Conseil de la présidence le 11 janvier 2021, également appelé Organisme de sécurité et de stabilisation ou Service d'appui à la stabilité.

<sup>10</sup> Réunion du Groupe d'experts (21 septembre 2021).

<sup>11</sup> Voir par. 14 sur l'Organisme d'appui à la stabilité et par. 32 sur les actes qui entravent ou compromettent la transition politique en Libye.

## 1. Situation dans l'ouest

11. Interrogé sur sa position concernant le processus électoral prévu, le chef de la brigade Naouasi, Mustafa Qaddour, a déclaré<sup>12</sup> qu'elle serait fonction de la capacité du gouvernement de transition de s'acquitter de ses promesses. Si le Gouvernement d'unité nationale parvenait à offrir des services tant attendus et des emplois ardemment souhaités par la population civile de Tripoli, laquelle avait pris les armes pour renverser le régime de Qadhafi et repousser l'offensive des forces affiliées à Haftar le 4 avril 2019, il pourrait, selon Qaddour, conserver le pouvoir en toute légitimité. Sous le mandat du Gouvernement d'unité nationale, la brigade Naouasi avait gardé son contrôle sur le port de Tripoli et les services de renseignements généraux. Elle avait également manifesté son influence au moment de la désignation du frère de Mustafa Qaddour, Hafiz Qaddour, au poste de de Ministre des affaires étrangères dans le Gouvernement de stabilité nationale, formé par Fathi Bashagha en mars 2022<sup>13</sup>.

12. Des représentants de la Force spéciale de dissuasion ont exprimé l'espoir que la création du Gouvernement d'unité nationale favorise une meilleure coopération avec les autorités siégeant dans l'est, sur les questions de lutte contre le terrorisme<sup>14</sup>. Comme la plupart des principaux groupes se trouvant dans l'ouest, la Force s'est tenue à distance, du moins en public, des polémiques politiques qui ont éclaté durant la période préélectorale.

13. Des faits de violence sporadiques et limités<sup>15</sup> ont dégénéré en graves affrontements sur la côte ouest<sup>16</sup>, à Tripoli<sup>17</sup> et autour de Bani Walid<sup>18</sup> à compter de juin 2021, auxquels l'Organisme d'appui à la stabilité a souvent été mêlé.

14. Le chef de l'Organisme d'appui à la stabilité, Abdel Ghani Khalifa<sup>19</sup>, a confirmé au Groupe d'experts<sup>20</sup> que l'Organisme avait reçu comme directives générales

<sup>12</sup> Réunion du Groupe d'experts (7 avril 2021).

<sup>13</sup> Durant son exposé du 16 mars 2022 au Conseil de sécurité, la Secrétaire général adjointe aux affaires politiques et à la consolidation de la paix a décrit la situation en Libye comme suit :

Le 10 février 2022, la Chambre des députés, avec l'aval de 52 membres du Haut Conseil d'État... a désigné M. Fathi Bashagha... pour former un nouveau Gouvernement ... Le 24 février, le Haut Conseil d'État a cependant rejeté la formation d'un nouveau Gouvernement... Le 3 mars, les membres du Cabinet de M. Bashagha ont néanmoins prêté serment devant la Chambre des députés... Les dirigeants du Gouvernement d'unité nationale ont contesté la légitimité du vote... Entre-temps, M. Bashagha a insisté sur le fait qu'il dirigeait un Gouvernement légitime (voir [S/PV.8996](#)).

Le Secrétaire général a pris note du vote qui s'est déroulé à la Chambre des députés siégeant dans l'est du pays, concernant la désignation d'un nouveau Premier Ministre (voir la déclaration du porte-parole du Secrétaire général sur la Libye du 11 février 2022, consultable au [www.un.org/sg/en/node/261853](http://www.un.org/sg/en/node/261853)). Aux fins du présent rapport, le Groupe d'experts qualifie M. Bashagha de Premier Ministre et son gouvernement de Gouvernement de stabilité nationale. Pour les mêmes raisons, il qualifie M. Dabiba de Premier Ministre en exercice du Gouvernement d'unité nationale, sans préjuger des résultats, quels qu'ils soient.

<sup>14</sup> Réunion du Groupe d'experts (8 avril 2021).

<sup>15</sup> Le chef de l'organe de sécurité basé à Tripoli a confirmé au Groupe d'experts le 8 mai 2021 des tensions à l'hôtel Corinthia, un des lieux où se réunit le Conseil de la présidence, tandis que des chefs de groupes armés se sont déclarés insatisfaits de la désignation de Hussein al-Ayeb comme chef du service du renseignement libyen (voir <https://apnews.com/article/tripoli-europe-africa-libya-middle-east-afee7cef514a21d4f58b02c0b25ba681>, 8 mai 2021).

<sup>16</sup> Voir <https://twitter.com/ObservatoryLY/status/1403842243014844418/photo/1>, 12 juin 2021.

<sup>17</sup> Voir <http://alwasat.ly/news/libya/331536>, 3 septembre 2021.

<sup>18</sup> Voir <https://libyaalhadath.net/?p=41055>, 19 juillet 2021.

<sup>19</sup> Dit Al-Kikli ou Ghenewa.

<sup>20</sup> Réunion du Groupe d'experts (17 septembre 2021).

d'étendre sa présence<sup>21</sup> et pour mandat de faire appliquer la loi. Il consiste en une alliance de groupes armés de Tripoli, Warchefana et Zaouiya, qui a considérablement renforcé sa visibilité et son influence ces derniers mois<sup>22</sup>. Les efforts déployés tant par le Premier Ministre désigné, Fathi Bashagha<sup>23</sup>, que par le Premier Ministre en exercice, Abdulhamid Al Dabiba<sup>24</sup>, pour recueillir l'appui de l'Organisme témoignent de l'importance acquise par ce dernier, depuis sa création par le Conseil de la présidence le 11 janvier 2021. En décembre 2021, il a été signalé que le Conseil de la présidence avait dû reporter sa décision relative à la désignation d'un nouveau commandant de la zone militaire de Tripoli<sup>25</sup> pour remplacer Abdel Baset Marwan, un proche allié d'Abdel Ghani Khalifa<sup>26</sup>.

15. Des adversaires de l'organe, tels que Mohamed Bahrin (dit Al-Far)<sup>27</sup> (S/2021/229) et Mahmoud Hamza<sup>28</sup>, commandant de la 444<sup>e</sup> Brigade, ont également déclaré au Groupe d'experts qu'un mandat légitime leur avait été conféré par les autorités respectives qui les supervisaient, et qu'ils faisaient appliquer la loi. Cela illustre bien la lutte constante qui se déroule autour des ressources et de l'influence dans l'ouest.

## 2. Situation dans l'est et dans le sud

16. L'assassinat de Mahmud al-Warfalli<sup>29</sup> le 24 mars 2021<sup>30</sup> (voir annexe 9) et de Mohammed El Shgagi (dit Mohammed al-Kani)<sup>31</sup> le 27 juillet 2021<sup>32</sup> s'est produit durant la période considérée. Le Groupe d'experts est parvenu à établir que les relations tendues qu'ils avaient avec les dirigeants des forces alliées à Haftar avaient rapproché les deux hommes peu avant leur décès. Le procureur général militaire siégeant dans l'est, le général de division Faraj Sosaa<sup>33</sup>, a déclaré au Groupe d'experts que les deux hommes avaient été traduits devant un tribunal militaire. Les

<sup>21</sup> En 2020, l'Organisme d'appui à la stabilité a ouvert un bureau à Misrata et un autre à Beïda (district de Jabal el-Akhdar). Le bureau de Beïda comprend 35 éléments et un commandant, Akram Aljarari, membre de la tribu des Baraassa, qui a le rang de lieutenant et a été transféré du Ministère de l'intérieur. Une expansion est envisagée dans le sud et à Bani Walid mais le chef de l'Organisme estime qu'elle sera plus « compliquée ». Des pourparlers sont en cours avec Tobrouk et Marj concernant l'ouverture de bureaux dans ces lieux.

<sup>22</sup> Il a récemment lancé un site Web officiel pour mettre en valeur ses activités : <https://ssa.gov.ly>, 5 avril 2022.

<sup>23</sup> Désignation d'Issam Busriba, frère du commandant adjoint de l'Organisme d'appui à la stabilité, Hassan Busriba, comme Ministre de l'intérieur.

<sup>24</sup> En témoignent la désignation d'Ayoub Abouras de la Brigade des révolutionnaires de Tripoli, un des adjoints de Ghenewa, comme chef de la Garde présidentielle et une visite très médiatisée le 7 mars 2022 du Premier Ministre Dabiba à la prison d'Abou Slim : voir <https://ssa.gov.ly/%d8%b2%d9%8a%d8%a7%d8%b1%d8%a9-%d8%b1%d8%a6%d9%8a%d8%b3-%d8%ad%d9%83%d9%88%d9%85%d8%a9-%d8%a7%d9%84%d9%88%d8%ad%d8%af%d8%a9-%d8%a7%d9%84%d9%88%d8%b7%d9%86%d9%8a%d8%a9-%d9%84%d9%85%d9%86%d8%b7%d9%82>, 7 mars 2022.

<sup>25</sup> Voir S/2022/31, par. 33.

<sup>26</sup> Voir [www.libyaobserver.ly/news/pc-postpones-replacement-tripoli-military-district-commander](http://www.libyaobserver.ly/news/pc-postpones-replacement-tripoli-military-district-commander), 22 décembre 2021.

<sup>27</sup> Réunion du Groupe d'experts (16 septembre 2021).

<sup>28</sup> Réunion du Groupe d'experts (22 septembre 2021).

<sup>29</sup> Voir S/2017/466, par. 100.

<sup>30</sup> [www.libyaobserver.ly/news/gunmen-assassinate-icc-wanted-mahmoud-al-werfalli-libyas-benghazi](http://www.libyaobserver.ly/news/gunmen-assassinate-icc-wanted-mahmoud-al-werfalli-libyas-benghazi), 24 mars 2021.

<sup>31</sup> Voir S/2021/229, par. 36 à 39 et annexe 16.

<sup>32</sup> [www.middleeasteye.net/news/libya-mohammed-kani-militia-leader-reported-killed](http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/libya-mohammed-kani-militia-leader-reported-killed), 27 juillet 2021.

<sup>33</sup> Réunion du Groupe d'experts (21 septembre 2021).

circonstances entourant le décès de ces deux importantes personnalités associées aux forces affiliées à Haftar doivent encore être élucidées.

17. La formation, le 17 juin 2021, par le Conseil de la présidence d'une force de lutte contre le terrorisme et la criminalité organisée dans le sud de la Libye (voir annexe 10) a débouché sur un autre fait marquant. Masoud Abdallah Masoud Abdeljallil (dit Masoud Jeddi)<sup>34</sup>, à l'époque commandant de la 116<sup>e</sup> brigade et principal allié militaire des forces alliées à Haftar à Sabha, a été désigné par le Conseil de la présidence comme chef de cette nouvelle « force ». Par la suite, Khalifa Haftar a promulgué un décret le 11 septembre 2021 portant dissolution de la 116<sup>e</sup> brigade des forces affiliées à Haftar (voir annexe 11), bien que la plus grande faction de ses éléments soit restée du côté des forces affiliées à Haftar, sous le commandement d'Ibrahim Aldib Alslimani, qui utilise encore le nom de « 116<sup>e</sup> brigade »<sup>35</sup>. Depuis, des accrochages mineurs se sont produits entre les forces affiliées à Haftar et le nouveau groupe de Masoud Jeddi.

18. En juillet 2021, le Premier Ministre, M. Dabiba, a ordonné la formation d'un « centre d'opérations de sécurité conjointes » pour sécuriser le sud<sup>36</sup>. Rien n'indique qu'il soit encore opérationnel.

19. Malgré les mesures prises par le Gouvernement d'unité nationale pour étendre son influence dans le sud<sup>37</sup>, la présence des forces affiliées à Haftar est encore prépondérante, ces dernières ayant empêché les visites de responsables du Gouvernement à Sabha, Ghat ou Koufra en août et en octobre 2021. Les principales améliorations apportées aux capacités opérationnelles des forces affiliées à Haftar témoignent d'une volonté de conserver une position dominante dans l'est et dans le sud (voir annexe 12).

### 3. Création d'une équipe spéciale conjointe dans la région centrale

20. À la fin du mois d'août 2021, à la suite d'une nouvelle perturbation de l'alimentation en eau<sup>38</sup> qui a touché la Grande Rivière artificielle<sup>39</sup>, les chefs du 166<sup>e</sup> Bataillon de Misrata et de la brigade Tariq Ibn Ziyad relevant des forces affiliées à Haftar sont parvenus à un accord relatif à des patrouilles conjointes dans le secteur de Bani Walid à Choueïrif<sup>40</sup>. Cette mesure a été avalisée par le Premier Ministre, M. Dabiba, et par Khalifa Haftar et saluée par la MANUL comme « étant très importante en vue de l'unification de l'institution militaire et du pays »<sup>41</sup>.

<sup>34</sup> Voir S/2019/914, par. 31.

<sup>35</sup> Voir <https://twitter.com/alsaaa24/status/1471539343911235592?s=11&t=zcxZyIZm6fvHQUREbJiLYg>, 16 décembre 2021.

<sup>36</sup> Voir [www.libyanexpress.com/prime-minister-issues-order-to-establish-an-operations-room-to-secure-the-southern-region](http://www.libyanexpress.com/prime-minister-issues-order-to-establish-an-operations-room-to-secure-the-southern-region), 15 juillet 2021.

<sup>37</sup> Les responsables du Gouvernement d'unité nationale ont effectué de multiples visites dans le sud : le chef du Conseil de la présidence, Mohamed al-Menfi s'est rendu à Sabha en février 2021, le Vice-Président du Conseil de la présidence, Musa al-Koni, à Oubari, la Ministre des affaires étrangères, Najla el-Mangoush, à Qatroun en mai 2021 et le Premier Ministre Dabiba à Sabha en juillet 2021.

<sup>38</sup> Voir S/2021/229, par. 29.

<sup>39</sup> À l'appui des appels à la libération d'Abdullah el-Senussi qui se trouve en détention.

<sup>40</sup> Voir [www.facebook.com/watch/?v=228392339162709](https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=228392339162709), 25 septembre 2021.

<sup>41</sup> Voir <https://unsmil.unmissions.org/unsmil-welcomes-creation-joint-force-comprising-tareq-bin-ziyad-brigade-and-166-brigade-important>, 26 août 2021.

## B. Individus et groupes terroristes internationaux

### 1. Individus et groupes terroristes internationaux

21. Les Forces affiliées au Gouvernement d'unité nationale et les forces relevant de Haftar ont toutes les deux désorganisé des cellules terroristes et arrêté des individus très médiatisés, affiliés tant à l'État islamique d'Iraq et du Levant-Libye (EIIL-Libye) (QDe.165) qu'à l'organisation Al-Qaida au Maghreb islamique (QDe.014). On trouvera plus d'informations sur les événements liés au terrorisme et au contre-terrorisme en Libye à l'annexe 13.

### 2. État islamique d'Iraq et du Levant-Libye (QDe.165)

22. L'EIIL-Libye (QDe.165) a représenté une menace modérée, tout en continuant de se déplacer dans la partie désertique du sud libyen pour échapper à toute détection. En dépit des revers essuyés à la suite des opérations antiterroristes visant ses capacités, ce groupe a conservé une capacité de perpétrer des attaques. Durant la période considérée, l'EIIL-Libye (QDe.165) a revendiqué la responsabilité de cinq attaques dans le sud, près de Sabha, Zella et dans des secteurs du Mount Harouj, de Qatroun et d'Oum el-Araneb, où opéraient des individus affiliés au groupe. Des personnes relevant de ce groupe ont également été repérées à Misrata, Sabrata et Tripoli<sup>42</sup>. Le 13 mars 2022, le groupe a prêté allégeance à Abu al-Hasan al-Hashimi al-Qurashi<sup>43</sup>, chef nouvellement désigné de l'État islamique d'Iraq et du Levant (EIIL), inscrit sur la Liste comme Al-Qaida en Iraq (QDe.115).

### 3. Al-Qaida au Maghreb islamique (QDe.014)

23. Même si ce groupe terroriste n'a revendiqué la responsabilité d'aucune attaque terroriste contre le territoire libyen durant la période considérée, la présence de quelques-uns de ses membres a été recensée en Libye. Tant le Gouvernement d'unité nationale que les forces affiliées à Haftar auraient procédé à l'arrestation d'individus affiliés à Al-Qaida au Maghreb islamique dans divers secteurs en Libye. Des membres de ce groupe se sont déployés dans des villes comme Brak el-Chatî, Oubari et Ghat dans le sud-ouest du pays<sup>44</sup>.

## C. Groupes et combattants armés étrangers

24. Des agents de sociétés-conseils militaires privées et des combattants étrangers de la République arabe syrienne, du Soudan et du Tchad, affiliés aux parties en conflit, étaient encore présents en Libye. Les autorités disposent de peu de preuves vérifiables relatives à des retraits de grande ampleur effectués à ce jour. Le 3 octobre 2021, la Ministre des affaires étrangères en exercice, Najla el-Mangoush, a confirmé le retrait de « quelques combattants étrangers » de Libye<sup>45</sup>.

25. Dans l'accord de cessez-le-feu du 23 octobre 2020 signé entre le Gouvernement d'entente nationale d'alors et l'Armée nationale libyenne relevant des forces affiliées à Haftar, il était énoncé que tous les « mercenaires et combattants étrangers »

<sup>42</sup> Réunion du Groupe d'experts avec des organismes de sécurité libyens en septembre 2021.

<sup>43</sup> Voir <https://ent.siteintelgroup.com/documents/insite-reports-islamic-state/1553-islamic-state-insite-march-9-15/file.html>, 18 mars 2022.

<sup>44</sup> Voir S/2022/82, par. 32.

<sup>45</sup> [www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/libyan-foreign-minister-says-groups-foreign-fighters-left-libya-2021-10-03](http://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/libyan-foreign-minister-says-groups-foreign-fighters-left-libya-2021-10-03), 3 octobre 2021.



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## 2. Combattants soudanais

29. Les signataires de l'Accord de Djouba pour la paix au Soudan<sup>55</sup>, qui avaient précédemment déployé une partie de leurs forces au Soudan, conformément aux dispositions de sécurité prévues dans l'Accord, ont continué de conserver des forces dans le sud de la Libye, dont la plupart ont fait de fréquents allers retours au Soudan. La plupart d'entre elles étaient visibles dans les secteurs de Syrte, Joufra, Zella, Houn et Sokna, et relevaient du bataillon 128 des forces affiliées à Haftar. Le recrutement de combattants soudanais par les forces affiliées à Haftar et leur intérêt en Libye ont légèrement baissé pour diverses raisons telles que la diminution de l'attrait des incitations financières ou autres incitations au titre de l'Accord. Les parties non signataires de l'Accord, telles que l'Armée de libération du Soudan-Abdul Wahid (ALS-AW) et le groupe d'Abdallah Banda ont continué de compter des membres en Libye (voir annexe 15).

## 3. Combattants syriens

30. Le Groupe d'experts a noté la présence persistante de combattants syriens appuyés par la Turquie dans les camps militaires affiliés au Gouvernement d'unité nationale à Tripoli (voir annexe 17). Le 31 août 2021, le versement des arriérés de salaires a été exigé au cours de manifestations (voir annexe 17). Des responsables proches des Forces affiliées au Gouvernement d'unité nationale ont confirmé la présence de Syriens à Tripoli mais nié toute participation de ces derniers à des activités militaires ou civiles. Ces individus reçoivent un salaire de 800 à 2 000 dollars par mois<sup>56</sup>. Des organisations non gouvernementales syriennes ont informé le Groupe d'experts<sup>57</sup> qu'au moins 200 Syriens étaient retournés en République arabe syrienne pour de bon<sup>58</sup> et que des opérations de transfert de combattants syriens affiliés au Gouvernement d'entente nationale en provenance et à destination de la Libye s'étaient déroulées durant la période considérée, ceux dont le contrat était venu à terme ayant été évacués de Libye et remplacés par d'autres<sup>59</sup>.

31. Les combattants syriens relevant des forces affiliées à Haftar opèrent aux côtés de ChVK Wagner<sup>60</sup> à Joufra et à Syrte. Ils se sont vu confier des tâches d'appui au combat comme creuser des tranchées, construire des pistes improvisées ou garder des positions sensibles de ChVK Wagner<sup>61</sup>. Au moins 300 de ces Syriens sont retournés en République arabe syrienne et n'ont pas été remplacés par des forces affiliées à Haftar<sup>62</sup>.

## D. Actes qui entravent ou compromettent la réussite de la transition politique en Libye

32. Le paragraphe 11 de la résolution 2571 (2021) donne pour mandat au Groupe d'experts d'identifier les personnes et les entités dont il a déterminé qu'elles se

<sup>55</sup> Ces groupes sont l'Armée de libération du Soudan-faction Minni Minawi, l'Alliance des forces de libération du Soudan, le Mouvement pour la justice et l'égalité, l'Armée de libération du Soudan-Conseil de transition et l'Alliance soudanaise.

<sup>56</sup> Contacts du Groupe d'experts avec l'organisation non gouvernementale Syrians for Truth and Justice.

<sup>57</sup> Sources confidentielles de l'organisation Syrians for Truth and Justice.

<sup>58</sup> Voir également [www.syriahr.com/450065/الم-مدیر-الإنسان-لحقوق-السوري](http://www.syriahr.com/450065/الم-مدیر-الإنسان-لحقوق-السوري), 4 octobre 2021.

<sup>59</sup> Voir également annexe 88.

<sup>60</sup> ChVK est un sigle russe voulant dire « société-conseil militaire ». « ChVK Wagner » servira à désigner l'organisation Wagner tout au long du présent rapport.

<sup>61</sup> Voir également annexe 100.

<sup>62</sup> Sources confidentielles, [www.enabbaladi.net/archives/558431](http://www.enabbaladi.net/archives/558431), 22 mars 2022 et <http://ar.libyaobserver.ly/article/18449>, 21 mars 2022.

livraient ou qu'elles apportaient un appui à des actes qui entravaient ou compromettaient les élections, dans le cadre d'un mandat plus large, visant à recenser les actes qui entravent ou compromettent la réussite de la transition politique en Libye.

33. La perspective des élections a dominé la scène en Libye tout au long de la période considérée. Une très grande ligne de fracture séparait ceux qui étaient en faveur d'une présidentielle plutôt que de législatives, et ceux qui préféraient le contraire. Au-delà du débat sur les bases constitutionnelles ou le calendrier électoral, des désaccords ont surgi entre les acteurs, les groupes et les États qui tiraient profit du statu quo et d'autres qui espéraient un retour au pouvoir, voire une consolidation de leur pouvoir.

34. Le 22 décembre 2021, la Haute Commission électorale nationale a, dans une déclaration, rendu publique sa décision de reporter l'annonce de la liste finale des candidats à la présidence, estimant que « l'ingérence des intérêts politiques dans les décisions judiciaires [...] pouvait être qualifiée de cas de force majeure. La Haute Commission n'a pas pu faire son annonce et n'a donc pas pu arrêter la date du 24 décembre comme le jour des élections, même si, d'un point de vue technique, elle était pleinement préparée à mener le processus, ce jour-là » (voir annexe 18).

35. Le Groupe d'experts constate que bon nombre de facteurs ont contribué à entraver ou à compromettre les élections prévues dans la feuille de route du Forum de dialogue politique interlibyen, tels que la contestation du cadre juridique et une multitude de menaces et d'atteintes à la sécurité (voir annexe 19). Les tensions politiques et les problèmes de sécurité avaient atteint un tel niveau que de graves troubles ont été redoutés. Tous ces éléments ont concouru à la déclaration du 22 décembre 2021 dans laquelle la Haute Commission électorale nationale a invoqué un cas de force majeure et l'incapacité de tenir par la suite des élections le 24 décembre. Le Groupe d'experts n'a pas encore établi si des personnes ou des entités précises remplissaient les critères de désignation.

## **E. Actes contraires au droit international des droits de l'homme ou au droit international humanitaire ou constituant des atteintes aux droits humains**

36. Conformément au paragraphe 11 a) de la résolution [2213 \(2015\)](#) et aux résolutions ultérieures, le Groupe d'experts a enquêté sur les violations du droit international humanitaire et du droit international des droits de l'homme et les atteintes aux droits humains, commises en Libye.

37. Ces actes qui menacent la paix, la stabilité et la sécurité en Libye ont persisté à grande échelle, en toute impunité. Des juges et des avocats ont constamment déclaré au Groupe d'experts que les menaces à la sécurité et les conflits armés, ces 10 dernières années, avaient considérablement affaibli le système judiciaire, au point qu'il n'existait plus de possibilité réelle de faire traduire des responsables en justice, à titre individuel : 54 personnes ont témoigné qu'elles ne disposaient pas de recours effectif pour obtenir des réparations à la suite des violations flagrantes des droits humains qu'elles auraient subies et ont toutes estimé que la communauté internationale devait veiller à ce que les auteurs de graves violations du droit international humanitaire et du droit international des droits de l'homme en Libye aient à rendre des comptes<sup>63</sup>.

<sup>63</sup> Ces données qualitatives sont conformes aux statistiques fournies au Groupe d'experts par Lawyers for Justice in Libya (publication à paraître).

## 1. Violations du droit international humanitaire et du droit international des droits de l'homme, commises dans le contexte de la privation de liberté

### Actes commis dans des centres de détention

38. Le Groupe d'experts a enquêté sur 23 cas de violations graves du droit international humanitaire et du droit international des droits de l'homme survenus dans huit centres de détention contrôlés par six groupes armés depuis 2015. On trouvera un résumé de ces incidents à l'annexe 20, illustrant l'ampleur du problème.

#### *Forces spéciales de dissuasion*

39. Le Groupe d'experts a interrogé huit témoins ayant subi une privation illégale et arbitraire de liberté, des actes de torture, des traitements cruels et des atteintes à la dignité de la personne<sup>64</sup> commis par des membres des Forces spéciales de dissuasion dans le centre de détention de Mitiga<sup>65</sup> à Tripoli. Les actes violents comprenaient : a) des passages à tabac constants ; b) des conditions physiques déplorable, à savoir une surpopulation aiguë et des conditions d'hygiène défectueuses ; c) une mise à l'isolement prolongée et la privation de nourriture et d'eau potable ; d) le fait de contraindre des détenus à s'acquitter de tâches militaires<sup>66</sup>. Le Groupe d'experts a établi que les membres des Forces chargés de superviser la détention, Osama Najim et Adel Mohamed Ali (dit Cheik Adel), avaient en toute illégalité transféré des détenus de lieux de détention officiels et officiels à Tripoli au centre de Mitiga, principalement à des fins de travail forcé, comme forme d'esclavage (voir annexe 21)<sup>67</sup>.

#### *Brigade des révolutionnaires de Tripoli*

40. Le Groupe d'experts a répertorié deux cas de privation de liberté arbitraire et illégale, de disparitions forcées et de maltraitances de personnes visées du fait de leur affiliation politique. Elles ont été enlevées illégalement de leur lieu de travail et transférées au camp Saadawi de la Brigade à Aïn Zara. Elles ont été soumises à des traitements cruels sous forme de pratiques violentes, telles que la mise au secret prolongée, des conditions de détention pénibles et des interrogations abusives et extensives portant sur leur participation aux processus électoraux ou leur affiliation supposée aux forces affiliées à Haftar<sup>68</sup>.

#### *Forces armées arabes libyennes relevant des forces affiliées à Haftar*

41. Le Groupe d'experts a enquêté sur six cas de détention arbitraire et illégale, de torture et de mauvais traitements et de déni de droits à un procès équitable, dans des lieux de détention provisoires ou permanents, se trouvant sous le contrôle des forces affiliées à Haftar. Il s'agit du centre Gernada à Beïda, des bureaux de la sécurité intérieure à Marj, du centre de détention de Koueïfiya à Benghazi et d'un lieu de détention officieux sous le contrôle de la brigade Tareq Ibn Ziyad relevant des forces affiliées à Haftar dans le quartier de Sidi Faraj à Benghazi<sup>69</sup>. Dans quatre cas, les

<sup>64</sup> Voir article 3 commun aux Conventions de Genève du 12 août 1949.

<sup>65</sup> On trouvera aux annexes 20, 23 et 24 les emplacements connus de tous les centres de détention établis et d'autres lieux utilisés à des fins de détention.

<sup>66</sup> Entretien du Groupe d'experts avec d'anciens détenus (sources confidentielles en droit international humanitaire 3, 4, 5, 6, 48, 49 et 61) et un membre de famille (source confidentielle 8).

<sup>67</sup> Voir Protocole additionnel aux Conventions de Genève du 12 août 1949 relatif à la protection des victimes des conflits armés non internationaux (Protocole II), art. 4.

<sup>68</sup> Entretien du Groupe d'experts avec des témoins oculaires confidentiels 9, 10 et 38.

<sup>69</sup> Entretien du Groupe d'experts avec d'anciens détenus (sources confidentielles 1, 54, 73, 79 et 80) et des membres de leur famille (sources confidentielles 7, 13 and 81).

détenus ont subi, de façon cumulée : a) des passages à tabac brutaux et systématiques ; b) une mise au secret prolongée ; c) un refus délibéré de soins médicaux ; d) des sévices psychologiques ; e) des actes d'intimidation.

42. Deux anciens détenus qui se trouvaient au centre de Koueïfiya ont reconnu le chef des gardiens, le capitaine Bachir Jahni, comme étant le principal auteur des actes de torture qu'ils avaient subis ; ils ont été roués de coup à l'aide de matraques en bois, administrés à vif sur la peau, après avoir été contraints de se dévêtir. Le Groupe d'experts a établi que ces actes avaient occasionné des lésions corporelles permanentes chez les victimes ainsi que de profonds traumatismes psychiques<sup>70</sup>.

#### *Groupe armé des Kaniyat*

43. Comme indiqué dans le rapport [S/2021/229](#)<sup>71</sup>, le Groupe d'experts a reçu de nouveaux éléments de preuve concernant sept cas d'emprisonnement arbitraire et illégal, de violence et d'atteinte à la vie et à l'intégrité physique, notamment le meurtre de cinq détenus, intervenus dans des lieux étant sous le contrôle effectif du groupe armé des Kaniyat<sup>72</sup>. Trois témoins ont indiqué inmanquablement que trois commandants des Kaniyat, dont Abdurahem El Shgagi (également connu sous le nom d'Abdurahem Al-Kani), étaient responsables de ces actes.

## **2. Attaques contre des défenseurs des droits humains, des militants sociaux et des professionnels des médias**

44. Le Groupe d'experts a répertorié des attaques contre six défenseurs des droits humains, militants sociaux et professionnels des médias, les privant gravement de leurs droits humains, en particulier le droit à la vie, le droit à la liberté et la liberté d'expression (voir annexe 22)<sup>73</sup>. Deux militantes des droits humains fortement médiatisées ont fait l'objet d'intimidations et de menaces, du fait de leur mobilisation dans la vie publique et associative. Des assaillants ont exploité les normes culturelles et de genre, pour les intimider ainsi que les membres de leur famille, les menaçant d'humiliation publique dans leur entourage immédiat.

## **3. Violations du droit international des droits de l'homme contre les migrants et les demandeurs d'asile**

45. Le Groupe d'experts a répertorié 26 cas de violations graves des droits humains, commises contre des migrants et des demandeurs d'asile, dans trois contextes corrélatifs de traite des personnes et de trafic de migrants : a) le long des itinéraires de traite des personnes contrôlés par des réseaux de trafiquants ; b) dans des centres de détention pour migrants ; c) en association avec des opérations maritimes.

### **Actes commis dans des lieux illégaux de détention contrôlés par des trafiquants d'êtres humains**

46. Le Groupe d'experts a établi que des atteintes aux droits humains de quatre migrants s'étaient produites dans des lieux de détention secrets, créés et contrôlés par des réseaux de trafiquants dans les secteurs de Tazerbo et de Bani Walid. Les victimes étaient détenues illégalement dans des conditions sanitaires déplorables, réduites à l'esclavage et torturées, étant rouées de coups jour et nuit, mal nourries et affamées délibérément jusqu'à risquer la mort et privées de soins médicaux. Deux anciennes détenues, qui avaient 14 et 15 ans à l'époque, ont indiqué au Groupe d'experts qu'elles

<sup>70</sup> Dossiers médicaux du 21 février, 31 mars, 3 avril et 21 avril 2021.

<sup>71</sup> Voir [S/2021/229](#), par. 36 à 39.

<sup>72</sup> Article 3 commun aux Conventions de Genève.

<sup>73</sup> Voir Pacte international relatif aux droits civils et politiques, art. 6, 9 et 19.

avaient été violées de manière répétée par de multiples individus et soumises à de l'esclavagisme sexuel et à d'autres formes de violence sexuelle durant plus de 18 mois, dans un lieu de détention secret à Bani Walid (voir annexe 23).

### **Actes commis dans des centres de détention pour migrants**

47. Le Groupe d'experts a répertorié trois systèmes parallèles de détention de migrants et de demandeurs d'asile, opérant sous le contrôle de trois autorités distinctes depuis au moins le mois de décembre 2021 : a) le système de détention officiel composé de quelque 24 centres pouvant héberger de 1 400 à 2 000 migrants<sup>74</sup> sous l'autorité du Service de la lutte contre l'immigration illégale ; b) au moins trois autres centres de détention du Service qui, tout en étant fermés, continuent d'opérer sous la direction de l'ancienne administration du Service ; c) des centres de détention officieux, se trouvant sous l'autorité du Service de la lutte contre l'implantation et l'immigration illégale relevant de l'Organisme d'appui à la stabilité (voir annexe 24).

#### *Centres de détention du Service de la lutte contre l'immigration illégale*

48. Le Groupe d'experts s'est entretenu avec 11 victimes dans cinq centres de détention pour migrants, relevant théoriquement de l'autorité du Service de la lutte contre l'immigration illégale avant décembre 2021 : Aïn Zara, Mabani, Chareh el-Zaouiya et Tariq el-Sikka, situés tous à Tripoli, et Nasr à Zaouiya<sup>75</sup>. Dans tous les cas, des membres de la garde côtière libyenne avaient capturé des personnes en territoire libyen ou dans les eaux internationales qui cherchaient à regagner des ports européens et les avaient transférées dans des lieux de détention où elles avaient été soumises à des actes de torture. Les victimes ont donné des témoignages de première main sur la détention arbitraire et illégale prolongée, le travail forcé, les actes de torture et les traitements cruels et dégradants qu'elles avaient subis. Les méthodes de torture et de mauvais traitements consistaient entre autres à rouer sauvagement les détenus de coups entraînant des lésions corporelles graves, à les dénuder de force, à les priver délibérément de nourriture, d'eau et de soins médicaux adéquats et à les contraindre à vivre dans des conditions de surpopulation humiliantes (voir annexe 24).

49. Le Groupe d'experts constate en outre que les gardiens chargés à titre individuel de protéger les migrants les plus vulnérables retenus dans le centre de détention de Chareh el-Zaouiya ont directement participé à des actes de viol et d'exploitation sexuelle et à des menaces de viol contre des femmes et des filles détenues dans le centre ou ont fait semblant de ne rien voir. Ces infractions se sont produites de janvier à juin 2021.

#### *Centre de détention de l'Organisme d'appui à la stabilité*

50. Le Groupe d'experts a recensé six cas de violations graves des droits humains, en particulier de détention illégale, d'actes de torture et de traitements cruels, inhumains et dégradants qui s'étaient produits à partir de décembre 2021 au centre de détention de Maya pour les migrants, sous le contrôle de l'Organisme d'appui à la

<sup>74</sup> Entretien du Groupe d'experts avec le chef du Service de la lutte contre l'immigration illégale, 23 mars 2022, et sources confidentielles 33 et 45. Le Groupe d'experts note que le nombre exact de migrants et de demandeurs d'asile détenus, ainsi que le nombre et le statut des centres de détention du Service, fluctuent régulièrement. Données au 23 mars 2022.

<sup>75</sup> Le Groupe d'experts protège l'identité des personnes avec lesquelles il s'est entretenu, pour assurer leur sécurité personnelle.

stabilité. Dans les trois cas, les victimes avaient été maltraitées jusqu'à la mort, en violation de leur droit à la vie<sup>76</sup>.

51. Trois anciens détenus ont reconnu le chef du centre de détention de Maya, Mohamed Al-Kabouti, comme étant celui qui les avait directement soumis à des actes brutaux de maltraitements et en particulier à des violents passages à tabac réguliers durant toute la durée de leur détention prolongée illégale<sup>77</sup>.

### **Actes associés aux opérations maritimes**

52. Quatre structures distinctes de commandement et de contrôle ont mené des activités de sécurité maritime dans les eaux libyennes et dans les eaux internationales : a) la marine libyenne ; b) la garde côtière libyenne, qui est également sous le commandement et le contrôle du Ministère de la défense ; c) l'Administration générale de la sécurité côtière, qui relève de l'autorité du Ministère de l'intérieur ; d) des unités maritimes contrôlées par l'Organisme d'appui à la stabilité. Cette fragmentation du point de vue opérationnel a créé de graves lacunes, sur le plan de la protection. La difficulté à identifier l'organe maritime libyen concerné a exposé les migrants et les demandeurs d'asile à un danger réel de violations graves de leurs droits humains et réduit les possibilités de demander des comptes aux responsables. Les témoins oculaires ne savaient plus à quelle unité appartenaient les auteurs de tels actes. La coordination des opérations maritimes parmi les autorités libyennes responsables était faible et souvent contraire aux dispositions du droit international applicables.

#### *Garde côtière libyenne*

53. Le Groupe d'experts a obtenu des preuves de violations des droits humains commises lors de deux faits distincts, le 30 avril et le 30 juin 2021, par la garde côtière libyenne contre quelque 93 migrants et demandeurs d'asile, dont des enfants, qui étaient en détresse dans les eaux internationales<sup>78</sup>. Il a établi que des membres de la garde côtière libyenne avaient soumis ces personnes à des traitements cruels et dégradants et employé une force excessive, exposant les migrants au risque prévisible de perdre la vie (voir annexe 24)<sup>79</sup>. Les comptes rendus de ces violations des droits humains cadrent avec les entretiens menés par le Groupe d'experts avec quatre autres victimes qui ont témoigné, lors d'incidents distincts, avoir fait l'objet de tirs par des membres de la garde côtière libyenne, alors qu'elles cherchaient à traverser la mer Méditerranée. Ces derniers les avaient battues, leur avait confisqué des biens privés en toute illégalité, après les avoir capturées, ou les avaient insultées<sup>80</sup>.

#### *Centre de coordination de sauvetage maritime*

54. Le Groupe d'experts a enquêté sur un naufrage qui s'est produit dans la région de recherche et de sauvetage libyenne le 22 avril 2021. Selon de nombreux éléments de preuve, il a constaté que l'autorité libyenne responsable, le centre de coordination de sauvetage maritime, avait violé le droit à la vie de quelque 130 migrants et

<sup>76</sup> Entretien du Groupe d'experts avec des témoins (source confidentielle 100) et preuves documentaires, dont des dossiers médicaux et des photographies des corps des victimes décédées, portant clairement des traces de mauvais traitements.

<sup>77</sup> Entretiens du Groupe d'experts avec d'anciens détenus (sources confidentielles 101, 102 et 103).

<sup>78</sup> Voir la vidéo Sea-Watch 4 authentifiée du 30 avril 2021 à l'adresse suivante :

[https://twitter.com/seawatch\\_intl/status/1388171810315902976](https://twitter.com/seawatch_intl/status/1388171810315902976) ;

et la vidéo Sea-Watch authentifiée filmée par un appareil de reconnaissance Seabird, datée du 30 juin 2021 : [www.youtube.com/watch?v=62BDsKmjsVY](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=62BDsKmjsVY).

<sup>79</sup> Voir Pacte international relatif aux droits civils et politiques, art. 6 et 7.

<sup>80</sup> Entretiens du Groupe d'experts avec d'anciens détenus (sources confidentielles 6, 17, 18 et 20).



demandeurs d'asile, faute de mesures appropriées pour prêter assistance à des personnes en détresse en mer (voir annexe 24). Il a reçu d'autres informations sur cinq cas analogues, au cours desquels les autorités libyennes n'avaient pas fourni les services requis aux bateaux en détresse transportant des migrants et des demandeurs d'asile, dans la région de recherche et de sauvetage libyenne.

#### *Unités maritimes de l'Organisme d'appui à la stabilité*

55. Le Groupe d'experts a établi que des membres de l'Organisme d'appui à la stabilité avaient employé une force excessive contre des migrants et des demandeurs d'asile lors de deux incidents en mer, le 12 août 2021 et le 19 janvier 2022. Les personnes en détresse avaient été soumises à des traitements dégradants et une personne avait été illégalement privée de la vie<sup>81</sup>. Le Groupe d'experts a également été informé d'un recours légal à la force, attribué aux unités maritimes de l'Organisme, le 21 novembre 2021 et le 18 février 2022, sur lesquels il continue d'enquêter.

### **III. Application de l'embargo sur les armes**

56. Conformément aux dispositions des paragraphes 9 à 13 de la résolution [1970 \(2011\)](#), modifiées par les résolutions ultérieures, le Groupe d'experts a continué de surveiller et de répertorier toutes les violations<sup>82</sup> et le non-respect<sup>83</sup> de l'embargo sur les armes et d'enquêter à ce sujet. Il a continué d'affiner et d'utiliser des indicateurs de profil relatifs à l'acheminement d'articles par voie maritime ou aérienne pour aider à déterminer la probabilité de violations et d'incidents et définir ainsi le champ de ses enquêtes (voir annexe 25). Des indicateurs multiples sont nécessaires avant de classer un navire, un aéronef ou une compagnie aérienne comme présentant un intérêt pour le Groupe d'experts ou avant de signaler des violations ou un cas de non-respect.

57. L'embargo sur les armes continuera d'être totalement inefficace, tant que des États Membres continueront de contrôler les flux logistiques et les chaînes d'approvisionnement aux parties distinctes qu'ils appuient. Étant donné qu'aucune action n'a été menée contre les personnes et les entités signalées comme ayant violé l'embargo sur les armes et qui remplissent les critères cités au paragraphe 11 e) de la résolution [2213 \(2015\)](#), l'effet dissuasif du régime des sanctions demeure très faible.

<sup>81</sup> Voir Pacte international relatif aux droits civils et politiques, art. 6 et 7. Le Service de la lutte contre l'implantation et l'immigration illégale de l'Organisme d'appui à la stabilité a nié de manière peu convaincante toute responsabilité dans l'incident du 19 janvier 2022 (voir <https://twitter.com/rgowans/status/1486032462564278281?s=21>, 25 janvier 2022).

<sup>82</sup> Le Groupe d'experts considère qu'une « violation » s'est produite lorsqu'il y a eu un transfert physique d'armes et de matériel militaire, une formation ou la fourniture d'une aide matérielle. Il emploie également le terme de « violation technique » en cas de transfert provisoire de matériel militaire en Libye, tel que des navires et des aéronefs-cargos militaires, lorsqu'il n'existe pas d'intention manifeste de fournir des capacités militaires aux parties au conflit. Un exemple en est l'utilisation d'aéronefs ou de navires militaires par des États Membres visant à réapprovisionner des missions diplomatiques, à acheminer des articles humanitaires ou à fournir une assistance humanitaire.

<sup>83</sup> Le « non-respect » désigne les cas dans lesquels une entité n'a pas pris la mesure requise, comme indiqué dans la résolution, par exemple pour empêcher « une violation », en s'abstenant d'inspecter des aéronefs ou des navires à destination de la Libye, ou pour fournir les informations demandées ou requises au Comité ou à son Groupe d'experts. Par « non-respect technique », on entend une situation dans laquelle la partie responsable ne pouvait pas logiquement savoir au moment du transfert qu'il s'agirait d'un cas de non-respect et devrait prendre des mesures pour améliorer ses protocoles et procédures de diligence raisonnable.



58. Onze années se sont écoulées depuis l'adoption de la première résolution imposant des mesures restrictives sur la fourniture et le transfert d'armes et de matériel militaire à la Libye. On trouvera à l'annexe 26 un résumé des types d'armes et de matériel militaire, transférés à la Libye durant cette période, en violation du paragraphe 9 de la résolution 1970 (2011). Le présent résumé illustre la diversité et la complexité technique des armes et du matériel militaire qui sont aujourd'hui disponibles en Libye même : il sert également de données de référence pour aider à l'identification de toute violation future.

## A. Violations techniques et technologie à double usage

59. L'introduction de moyens militaires navals ou aériens en territoire libyen par des États Membres a été un problème chronique durant toute la durée de l'embargo sur les armes, qui a amené le Groupe d'experts à enquêter jusqu'à pouvoir établir la raison de cette présence. Il a déterminé que beaucoup de ces moyens avaient été déployés en Libye en invoquant les dispositions du paragraphe 3 de la résolution 2214 (2015)<sup>84</sup>, une question qu'il a soulevée à maintes occasions<sup>85</sup>.

60. Et pourtant, dans certains cas, pendant la période considérée, des États Membres ont utilisé des moyens aériens militaires pour acheminer une aide humanitaire<sup>86</sup> ou des moyens navals pour acheminer des « fournitures de matériel militaire non légal destiné exclusivement à un usage humanitaire ou de protection »<sup>87</sup>, conformément aux dispositions du paragraphe 9 de la résolution 2095 (2013) ; aucun des types de cargaison ne nécessite de notification préalable au Comité. Le moyen de livraison comprend néanmoins l'introduction d'aéronefs ou de navires militaires en territoire libyen, ce qui, d'après le Groupe d'experts, constitue une violation technique du paragraphe 9 de la résolution 1970 (2011). Compte tenu du fait que les États Membres n'avaient pas pour intention, dans ces cas, de fournir une capacité militaire à un groupe armé en Libye, quel qu'il soit, le Groupe d'experts estime qu'il n'est pas tenu de signaler ces cas comme étant des violations du paragraphe 9 de la résolution 1970 (2011). Chaque incident comporte néanmoins un risque d'atteinte à la réputation des États Membres et nécessite une enquête de la part du Groupe d'experts, ce qui pourrait être évité si les États Membres notifiaient le Comité de la livraison d'un tel matériel ou d'une telle aide et s'ils recouraient à des moyens aériens ou navals pour ce faire (voir recommandation 1).

61. La technologie et le coût relativement faible de biens de consommation électroniques intelligents en évolution constante, tels que les dispositifs optiques et

<sup>84</sup> Dans ce paragraphe, le Conseil de sécurité a invité les États Membres à aider à renforcer la capacité des autres États d'écarter, s'il y a lieu, selon qu'il convient et sur demande, la menace que représentent l'État islamique d'Iraq et du Levant (EIL), les groupes qui lui ont prêté allégeance, Ansar el-Charia et tous les autres individus, groupes, entreprises et entités associés à Al-Qaida qui opèrent en Libye, en coordination avec le Gouvernement libyen.

<sup>85</sup> Signalé dans les rapports S/2016/209, par. 126, S/2017/466, par. 147, S/2018/812 et S/2018/812/Corr.1, par. 108 et 109, S/2019/914, par. 93 et S/2021/229, par. 59. Dans le rapport S/2019/914, le Groupe d'experts a recommandé que le Comité donne des directives pour savoir si l'expression « combattre par tous les moyens » figurant au paragraphe 3 de la résolution 2214 (2015) prévaut sur les dispositions énoncées au paragraphe 9 de la résolution 1970 (2011), compte tenu des modifications apportées par la suite (voir par. 93).

<sup>86</sup> L'Égypte a livré par exemple des fournitures médicales à Sabha le 14 avril 2021 au moyen d'aéronefs-cargos militaires de type C-130 Hercules et la Turquie des vaccins contre la COVID à Tripoli le 14 avril au moyen d'aéronefs-cargos militaires A400M de type Atlas.

<sup>87</sup> Le 2 décembre 2021 par exemple, le transport de chalands de débarquement de la marine italienne *San Giorgio* (L9892) a été utilisé pour livrer une installation ayant trait au centre de coordination de sauvetage maritime à la garde côtière et à la marine libyennes (voir annexe 31).

les drones aériens<sup>88</sup>, et la facilité avec laquelle des tout-terrains civils peuvent être transformés en véhicules aptes au combat<sup>89</sup> rendent ces articles à double usage<sup>90</sup> incomparables, pour ce qui est d'un emploi militaire dans des conflits de faible intensité. Durant le cycle considéré, le Groupe d'experts a continué de répertorier les cas d'acquisition et d'utilisation à des fins militaires de technologie de biens de consommation à évolution rapide en Libye. Il estime que de tels transferts, lorsque ces technologies sont principalement importées par des acteurs participant activement à un conflit armé et utilisées à des fins militaires constituent une violation du paragraphe 9 de la résolution 1970 (2011).

## B. Questions maritimes

### 1. Réponse régionale

62. Par sa résolution 2578 (2021), le Conseil de sécurité a prorogé jusqu'au 3 juin 2022 l'autorisation d'inspecter les navires en haute mer au large des côtes libyennes. Les inspections menées durant la période considérée par l'opération militaire de l'Union européenne en Méditerranée (opération EUNAVFOR MED IRINI) n'ont cependant débouché sur aucune saisie d'armes.

63. Le 29 juillet 2021, en réponse à une notification relative à l'inspection du navire *Antalya* (numéro Organisation maritime internationale (OMI) d'identification du navire 7615232) battant pavillon zambien, la Mission permanente de la Zambie a informé le Comité qu'elle ne disposait pas de libre registre d'immatriculation et n'immatriculait pas de navires internationaux. Un autre navire battant pavillon zambien, le *Gauja* (numéro OMI 7612474), naviguait aussi donc sous un faux pavillon lorsqu'il a été inspecté par les moyens navals de l'opération IRINI le 11 mai 2021.

### 2. Navires présentant un intérêt considérable et violations maritimes

64. Bon nombre de navires sont considérés comme présentant « un intérêt considérable » pour le Groupe d'experts à partir d'informations tirées de sources en accès libre, d'informations confidentielles, d'indicateurs de profil maritime, tels que la désactivation du système d'identification automatique, le changement du port de destination en route, le refus d'inspection par l'État du pavillon et la structure des sociétés propriétaires ou exploitantes des navires. Le Groupe d'experts a écrit aux États Membres ainsi qu'aux propriétaires et exploitants concernés de bon nombre de navires et attend leurs réponses.

#### Forces affiliées au Gouvernement d'unité nationale

65. Dans le rapport S/2019/914<sup>91</sup>, le Groupe d'experts avait soulevé la question des navires de type patrouilleur, fournis à la Libye au titre de l'exception non létale prévue

<sup>88</sup> Voir S/2021/229, annexe 73 et figure 77.8 à l'annexe 77 et annexe 80.

<sup>89</sup> Telle la conversation d'utilitaires légers 4x4 visant à servir de plateformes d'armes, connus sous le nom de « technicals ». Voir S/2021/229, appendice A à l'annexe 35.

<sup>90</sup> Il est à noter que le terme « à double usage » employé dans le rapport ne correspond pas à la définition des « biens et des technologies à double usage » utilisée dans l'Arrangement de Wassenaar sur le contrôle des exportations d'armes classiques et de biens et technologies à double usage ou à la définition de « biens à double usage » utilisée dans le régime de l'Union européenne de contrôle des exportations [Règlement (UE) 2021/821 du Parlement européen et du Conseil du 20 mai 2021 instituant un régime de l'Union de contrôle des exportations, du courtage, de l'assistance technique, du transit et des transferts en ce qui concerne les biens à double usage (refonte)]. Voir par. 61 pour l'emploi de « à double usage » par le Groupe d'experts.

<sup>91</sup> Par. 78 à 80.

au paragraphe 10 de la résolution 2095 (2013) et qui avaient été armés consécutivement à la livraison. Il a noté que, durant le cycle considéré, l'Organisme d'appui à la stabilité avait créé sa propre unité maritime, qui menait des opérations de répression et autres opérations maritimes en territoire libyen et dans les eaux de la région de recherche et de sauvetage, parallèlement à la garde côtière libyenne, à l'Administration générale de la sécurité côtière et aux opérations de la marine libyenne (voir également par. 52)<sup>92</sup>.

66. Les unités maritimes de l'Organisme d'appui à la stabilité gèrent au moins cinq navires, notamment deux navires civils transformés en patrouilleurs côtiers : a) l'*Alqayid Saqar*, de couleur jaune, ce qui dénoterait des activités de recherche et de sauvetage, sauf qu'il avait été doté d'une mitrailleuse lourde ; b) l'*Alqayid 1*, aperçu dans une formation civile mais aussi avec une mitrailleuse lourde détachable ; c) une vedette rapide Lambro Olympic D74 de type patrouilleur naval (voir tableau 1 et annexe 27)<sup>93</sup>. Alors que les transferts dans les cas a) et b), s'ils ne sont pas armés, ne tombent pas sous le coup de l'embargo sur les armes, leur armement consécutivement au transfert est un contournement de l'embargo. Le Groupe d'experts estime que le transfert dans le cas c) ne relève pas des exceptions relatives au matériel non létal figurant au paragraphe 9 (usage humanitaire et de protection) ou au paragraphe 10 (aide pour la sécurité ou le désarmement) de la résolution 2095 (2013).

67. Le paragraphe 10 de la résolution 2095 (2013) s'applique seulement au Gouvernement libyen et donc uniquement aux forces qui sont sous son contrôle. À cette fin, en réponse au paragraphe 6 de la résolution 2278 (2016), le Gouvernement d'entente nationale avait soumis au Comité, en mai 2017, des informations sur les forces placées sous son contrôle, qui avaient été intégrées au paragraphe 6 de la résolution 2362 (2017). L'Organisme d'appui à la stabilité n'était pas une des unités qui avaient été établies comme faisant partie « de la structure des forces de sécurité placées sous son contrôle »<sup>94</sup>. Le Groupe d'experts comprend que les unités qui sont placées sous le contrôle du Gouvernement ont considérablement changé depuis cette notification, compte tenu notamment de la formation depuis 2017 de l'Organisme d'appui à la stabilité, d'une salle d'opérations conjointe et de sept zones militaires. Une mise à jour des « forces de sécurité placées sous le contrôle » du Gouvernement permettrait d'avoir plus de clarté, concernant l'application de l'embargo sur les armes (voir recommandation 2).

### Forces affiliées à Haftar

68. Dans le rapport S/2019/914<sup>95</sup>, le Groupe d'experts a signalé le transfert en 2013 de navires, dont des patrouilleurs, qui avaient échoué aux mains des forces affiliées à Haftar. Il a établi à présent que des membres d'une unité maritime des forces affiliées à Haftar, l'Escadron de combat maritime Soussa<sup>96</sup> s'étaient servis de ces navires et d'un bateau pneumatique à coque rigide de type naval nouvellement identifié, au cours d'actes entravant la liberté de navigation qui constituaient des actes de piraterie, lors de cinq incidents au moins, sur lesquels il enquêtait. Ces actes de piraterie avaient été menés en haute mer, sous forme de détention arbitraire et illégale des membres de l'équipage d'un navire marchand neutre battant pavillon étranger et de saisie illégale

<sup>92</sup> Voir [https://twitter.com/SSA\\_Gov/status/1480979918456504331](https://twitter.com/SSA_Gov/status/1480979918456504331), 11 janvier 2022.

<sup>93</sup> Voir <https://twitter.com/SARwatchMED/status/1485711494633472000>, 24 janvier 2022 et <https://twitter.com/SARwatchMED/status/1487425542441820163>, 29 janvier 2022.

<sup>94</sup> Ces forces étant la garde côtière libyenne, les unités de neutralisation des explosifs et munitions et la Garde présidentielle.

<sup>95</sup> Par. 79 et annexe 33.

<sup>96</sup> Également connu sous le nom d'escadron de combat de la marine Soussa et de compagnie de combat marin Soussa.

de leurs biens (voir annexe 28)<sup>97</sup>. Depuis au moins la fin de 2020, le mode de comportement illégal des membres de l'Escadron a consisté à agir comme la garde côtière libyenne et à se faire passer pour elle<sup>98</sup> dans l'intention d'obtenir illégalement des gains financiers des navires capturés. Pour obtenir leur libération, les navires étaient contraints de verser une amende négociable pouvant atteindre 200 000 dinars libyens (quelque 42 000 dollars) en espèces, les membres de l'Escadron prétendant que ces navires avaient enfreint une des deux zones maritimes proclamées illégalement par les forces affiliées à Haftar, à savoir la « zone d'exclusion maritime » et la zone maritime « interdite », qui s'étendent toutes deux dans les eaux internationales (voir figure)<sup>99</sup>.

69. Décrétée premièrement par l'Armée nationale libyenne en 2015 comme une mesure coercitive visant à interdire les livraisons d'armes<sup>100</sup>, la zone « d'exclusion maritime » est demeurée active à ce jour. Elle recouvre le secteur au sud du 34<sup>e</sup> parallèle et, tout en n'étant pas clairement définie dans son extension latérale, s'étend de Beïda à Derna, voire jusqu'à Benghazi<sup>101</sup>. Cette zone ambiguë recouvre donc jusqu'à 70 milles marins depuis le rivage de la Libye, bien au-delà de ses eaux territoriales<sup>102</sup> et se trouve seulement à 10 milles marins de la principale voie de navigation traversant la Méditerranée.

70. La date exacte de la promulgation de la « zone interdite » n'est pas précisément connue, mais une notification non datée à des navires marchands et à d'autres navires, définissant la zone, a été communiquée en janvier 2022 par des agents locaux à une société de services maritimes, (voir annexe 29). Elle fait partie de la « zone d'exclusion maritime » mais s'étend plus à l'est. Seule la partie orientale dépasse les eaux territoriales libyennes, à son point d'extension maximale, de 16,9 milles marins. Un représentant de l'Escadron de combat maritime Soussa a confirmé au Groupe d'experts la véracité de la « zone interdite » et déclaré que les navires se voyaient accorder le passage à condition de fournir des informations concernant leur itinéraire et leur cargaison. Il a indiqué que la « zone interdite » avait été établie pour intercepter les mouvements d'armes et de personnes au profit de groupes terroristes à Derna. Le

<sup>97</sup> Le Groupe d'experts adopte les définitions des termes « liberté de navigation » et de « piraterie » tels qu'employés en droit international coutumier et codifiés aux articles 87 et 101 de la Convention des Nations Unies sur le droit de la mer. Voir également Commission du droit international, articles relatifs au droit de la mer et commentaires, *Annuaire de la Commission du droit international*, 1956, vol. II, arts. 27 et 39. L'utilisation de ces termes par le Groupe d'experts est sans préjudice du statut des acteurs non étatiques concernés au regard du droit international.

<sup>98</sup> Le Groupe d'experts considère seulement la garde côtière libyenne comme étant sous le contrôle du Gouvernement d'unité nationale en tant que garde côtière libyenne officielle de l'État.

<sup>99</sup> Source confidentielle et <https://safety4sea.com/libya-releases-turkish-owned-cargo-ship-after-paying-fine>, 14 décembre 2020.

<sup>100</sup> Le Groupe d'experts n'a pas trouvé la source première de la déclaration de l'Armée nationale libyenne qui semble avoir été faite sur une page Facebook, depuis disparue. Sources secondaires : <https://medium.com/libya-security-monitor/libya-situation-update-12-15-december-4aa69983ad01>, 16 décembre 2015, <https://twitter.com/Oded121351/status/676999971082780672>, 16 décembre 2015, 24 mars 2020.

<sup>101</sup> <https://mc.nato.int/nsc/operations/news/2020/threat-to-commercial-shipping-operating-in-the-mediterranean-2>, <https://safety4sea.com/update-situation-of-libyan-ports>, 7 janvier 2021 et [www.gard.no/web/content/libya-port-situation](http://www.gard.no/web/content/libya-port-situation), 24 février 2022.


<sup>102</sup> Sans remettre en cause l'interprétation par les États Membres de l'étendue des eaux territoriales, le Groupe d'experts utilise la définition de « mer territoriale » de 12 milles marins figurant à l'article 3 de la Convention des Nations Unies sur le droit de la mer, en conformité avec la législation libyenne pertinente ; voir loi n° 2 du 18 février 1959 concernant la délimitation des eaux territoriales libyennes, consultable à l'adresse suivante : [www.un.org/depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/LBY\\_1959\\_Act.pdf](http://www.un.org/depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/LBY_1959_Act.pdf).

Groupe d'experts note que Derna avait été déclarée « libérée des terroristes » par les forces affiliées à Haftar à la fin du mois de juin 2018<sup>103</sup>.

71. La Libye a déclaré officiellement une zone maritime destinée à la protection de la pêche, décrite comme une « zone de protection de la pêche libyenne ». Cela ne concerne que la gestion de la pêche et la protection des stocks (voir figure)<sup>104</sup>.

Figure

« Zone d'exclusion maritime » et « zone interdite » des forces affiliées à Haftar et zone de pêche protégée officiellement déclarée



<sup>103</sup> [www.france24.com/ar/20180629-المشير-خليفة-حفتر-يعلن-تحرير-درنة-شرق-ليبيا-من-الارهابيين](http://www.france24.com/ar/20180629-المشير-خليفة-حفتر-يعلن-تحرير-درنة-شرق-ليبيا-من-الارهابيين), 29 juin 2018.

<sup>104</sup> Voir la Déclaration sur une zone de pêche protégée libyenne en Méditerranée, 24 février 2005 [Bulletin du droit de la mer n° 58, 2005, sect. II.A.1 b)], disponible au : [www.un.org/Depts/los/doalos\\_publications/LOSBulletins/bulletinpdf/bulletin58e.pdf](http://www.un.org/Depts/los/doalos_publications/LOSBulletins/bulletinpdf/bulletin58e.pdf) ; et la décision n° 105 du Comité populaire général n° 105 de l'an 1373 (après la mort du Prophète) (soit 2005) relative à la délimitation de la zone de pêche protégée libyenne en Méditerranée (Bulletin du droit de la mer, n°59, 2005, sect. II.A.1 b), consultable à l'adresse suivante : [www.un.org/Depts/los/doalos\\_publications/LOSBulletins/bulletinpdf/bulletin59e.pdf](http://www.un.org/Depts/los/doalos_publications/LOSBulletins/bulletinpdf/bulletin59e.pdf).

### 3. Violations maritimes

72. Le Groupe d'experts a recensé une violation maritime confirmée, une violation maritime très probable et deux violations maritimes techniques (voir tableau 1)<sup>105</sup>.

Tableau 1  
Violations maritimes

| Nom/type                                                                  | Numéro OMI              | Pavillon    | Violation |               | Violation technique | Nombre d'indicateurs de profil | Observations                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------|-------------|-----------|---------------|---------------------|--------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|                                                                           |                         |             | Confirmée | Très probable |                     |                                |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    |
| <i>Luccello</i> <sup>a</sup>                                              | 7800112                 | Comores     | ✓         |               |                     | 9                              | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 100 véhicules blindés militaires</li> <li>• Déchargés à Benghazi (forces affiliées à Haftar)</li> <li>• Voir annexe 30</li> </ul>                                                                         |
| Patrouilleur rapide <i>Lambro Olympic D74</i>                             | Inexistant              | À confirmer |           | ✓             |                     | Sans objet                     | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Patrouilleur utilisé par la composante maritime de l'Organisme d'appui à la stabilité (Forces affiliées au Gouvernement d'unité nationale)</li> <li>• Moyens et date de livraison indéterminés</li> </ul> |
| Transport de chalands de débarquement <i>San Giorgio</i> <sup>b</sup>     | L9892                   | Italie      |           |               | ✓                   | Sans objet                     | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Navire militaire ayant servi à la livraison d'articles ne tombant pas sous le coup de l'embargo sur les armes (centre de coordination de sauvetage maritime)</li> <li>• Voir annexe 31</li> </ul>         |
| Navires de transport côtier <i>Capri, Tremiti et Caprera</i> <sup>c</sup> | A5353<br>A5348<br>A5349 | Italie      |           |               | ✓                   | Sans objet                     | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Présente continue à la base navale d'Abou Sitta depuis 2018</li> <li>• Voir annexe 31</li> </ul>                                                                                                          |

<sup>a</sup> Voguant à présent sous le nom de *Victory Roro* et battant pavillon équato-guinéen.

<sup>b</sup> Transport de chalands de débarquement de la classe San Giorgio de la marine italienne.

<sup>c</sup> Navire de transport côtier de la classe Gorgona de la marine italienne.

<sup>105</sup> Le Groupe d'experts a écrit aux États Membres et aux propriétaires et exploitants de navires concernés et reçu quelques réponses. On trouvera des détails à l'annexe relative aux éléments de preuve.



73. Le Groupe d'experts estime que les propriétaires et l'exploitant du navire décrits dans le tableau 2 ont violé les dispositions du paragraphe 9 de la résolution 1970 (2011) sur le transfert de matériel militaire à la Libye.

Tableau 2

**Violations confirmées de transfert maritime**

| <i>Navire</i>                             | <i>Pavillon</i> | <i>Propriétaire</i>                          | <i>Exploitant</i> | <i>Transfer à l'entité</i>   | <i>Observations</i> |
|-------------------------------------------|-----------------|----------------------------------------------|-------------------|------------------------------|---------------------|
| Luccello <sup>a</sup><br>(n° OMI 7800112) | Comores         | Medred Ship<br>Management Co Ltd,<br>Turquie | Propriétaire      | Forces affiliées à<br>Haftar |                     |

## C. Violations relatives à des transferts d'armes et à une formation militaire

### 1. Contexte

74. Le Groupe d'experts a établi que 18 transferts d'armes<sup>106</sup> et quatre exemples de formations militaires<sup>107</sup> s'étaient produits durant la période considérée, en violation des dispositions du paragraphe 9 de la résolution 1970 (2011). Il a également recensé 26 violations sur le plan du transfert d'armes et 5 sur le plan de la formation, qui n'avaient pas été signalées durant les précédentes périodes considérées ; elles ont été intégrées au présent rapport pour apporter des éléments de preuve concernant les données de référence citées au paragraphe 58. Le Groupe d'experts a également été en mesure d'attribuer la responsabilité dans deux cas qui avaient été cités comme étant non identifiés dans le rapport S/2021/229.

75. Les violations de l'embargo sur les armes sont présentées dans un tableau chronologique à l'annexe 32, pour en faciliter la consultation. On trouvera des infographies sur les transferts constituant des violations dans les annexes 33 à 76 et sur les formations constituant des violations dans les annexes 77 à 85.

### 2. Formation militaire fournie par la Turquie aux Forces affiliées au Gouvernement d'unité nationale

76. On voit sur le site Web officiel de la présidence de l'état-major de l'Armée libyenne le général de division Nouri Shenuk, chargé des activités de formation à l'Armée libyenne, visitant le siège de l'autorité de la gestion de la formation et des opérations du Ministère turc de la défense le 16 novembre 2021<sup>108</sup>. Il s'est entretenu avec ses interlocuteurs de la coopération conjointe en cours entre les deux pays dans les domaines de la formation militaire et a examiné les progrès de la formation actuelle fournie par la Turquie à l'Armée libyenne<sup>109</sup>. Par la suite, le 30 novembre

<sup>106</sup> Par « transfert », on entend un transfert d'armes et de matériel militaire.

<sup>107</sup> Par « formation », on entend une formation assurée par une partie tierce et liée à des activités militaires.

<sup>108</sup> Voir [www.facebook.com/LibyaAlAhrarTV/posts/5196300483741754?\\_rdc=1&\\_rdr](https://www.facebook.com/LibyaAlAhrarTV/posts/5196300483741754?_rdc=1&_rdr), 16 novembre 2021 et [www.facebook.com/The.presidency.of.the.General.Staff.To.Libyan.Army/posts/275452701190177?\\_rdc=1&\\_rdr](https://www.facebook.com/The.presidency.of.the.General.Staff.To.Libyan.Army/posts/275452701190177?_rdc=1&_rdr), 20 novembre 2021, confirmé également par une lettre de l'État Membre au Groupe d'experts datée du 15 février 2022.

<sup>109</sup> Conformément aux dispositions d'un mémorandum d'entente entre le Gouvernement de la République turque et le Gouvernement d'entente nationale-État de Libye sur la coopération militaire et de sécurité, du 27 novembre 2019 (voir « *Full text of new Turkey, Libya sweeping security, military cooperation deal revealed* », *Nordic Monitor*, 16 décembre 2019, consultable au

2021, la porte-parole du Ministère de la défense, Pinar Kara, a déclaré que la Turquie poursuivrait son « assistance militaire à la Libye au titre d'un accord bilatéral, à l'invitation du gouvernement légitime reconnu au plan international »<sup>110</sup>. Elle a révélé également que les forces turques avaient, au 30 novembre 2021, formé 6 799 soldats libyens en Libye et en Turquie, tandis que 974 autres étaient toujours en formation. Le Groupe d'experts a écrit à la Turquie le 10 décembre 2021 pour demander des précisions sur la formation. La Turquie a confirmé dans sa réponse datée du 14 février 2022 la visite effectuée par le général de division, Nouri Shenuk, du 14 au 21 novembre 2021, sans fournir de détails supplémentaires sur le type ou l'ampleur de la formation.

77. Le Groupe d'experts constate qu'une certaine formation spécialisée fournie par la Turquie concernant par exemple la neutralisation des explosifs et munitions<sup>111</sup> tombe sous le coup de la dérogation de « formation...humanitaire », conformément au paragraphe 9 de la résolution 2095 (2013). Le restant de la formation fournie par la Turquie aux Forces affiliées au Gouvernement d'unité nationale est de nature militaire ou maritime et constitue donc une violation du paragraphe 9 de la résolution 1970 (2011).<sup>112</sup>

### 3. Lutte contre le trafic

78. La frontière terrestre longue de 4 348 kilomètres reste poreuse et la contrebande d'armes de petite ampleur (« trafic de fourmis ») se poursuit sans relâche à une échelle qu'il est difficile de cerner ou de contrôler. Les saisies sont rares de part et d'autre de la frontière et, durant la période considérée, quatre seulement ont été signalées : a) 80 armes au Niger le 13 avril 2021<sup>112</sup> ; b) 37 armes au Soudan le 13 septembre 2021 ; c) des munitions d'armes de petit calibre au Soudan le 8 janvier 2022 (voir annexe 71)<sup>113</sup> ; d) des armes et des munitions d'armes de petit calibre à la frontière algérienne, saisies par la 106<sup>e</sup> brigade des forces affiliées à Haftar le 4 janvier 2022<sup>114</sup>.

## D. Violations et non-respect sur le plan de l'aviation

### 1. Ponts aériens

79. En 2020, le Groupe d'experts a établi, à partir de ses indicateurs de profil (voir annexe 25) que des ponts aériens planifiés de façon centrale étaient en place, principalement entre : a) les Émirats arabes unis et la partie ouest de l'Égypte/est de la Libye (forces affiliées à Haftar) ; b) la Fédération de Russie, via la République arabe syrienne, et la partie est de la Libye (forces affiliées à Haftar) ; c) la Turquie et l'ouest de la Libye (Gouvernement d'unité nationale). Dans le rapport S/2021/229, le Groupe d'experts a constaté que les exploitants des aéronefs constituant le pont aérien étaient en non-conformité avec le paragraphe 9 de la résolution 1970 (2011).

80. Le trafic sur ces ponts aériens a été considérablement plus faible durant la période considérée, par rapport à la période antérieure. Par exemple, les vols des

<https://nordicmonitor.com/2019/12/full-text-of-new-turkey-libya-sweeping-security-military-cooperation-deal-revealed>.

<sup>110</sup> Voir [www.libyaobserver.ly/news/turkey-reiterates-our-presence-libya-legitimate](http://www.libyaobserver.ly/news/turkey-reiterates-our-presence-libya-legitimate), 2 décembre 2021, [www.libyaakhbar.com/libya-news/1729919.html](http://www.libyaakhbar.com/libya-news/1729919.html), 30 novembre 2021 et <https://nabd.com/s/96772656-b6f28d/ليبيا-الدفاع-التركية-لسنا-قوة-أجنبية-في-ليبيا>, 30 novembre 2021.

<sup>111</sup> Voir <https://twitter.com/tcsavunma/status/1475029180207271942>, 26 décembre 2021 ; et <https://twitter.com/Oded121351/status/1475831938514575365>, 28 décembre 2021.

<sup>112</sup> Voir <https://wmuayqih5acbvrij5vul3ddnjia-adwhj77lcyoafdy-alwasat-ly.translate.google/news/libya/317324>, 14 avril 2021.

<sup>113</sup> Voir <https://rsf.gov.sd/news/1467>, 18 septembre 2021.

<sup>114</sup> Voir <http://nabdapp.com/t/99061768>, 5 janvier 2022.



avions-cargos militaires depuis la Fédération de Russie vers l'ouest de la Libye ont baissé de 61 % (voir annexe 86). Le Groupe d'experts note également que des avions-cargos militaires russes ont utilisé la Libye comme escale technique pour des vols à destination par exemple du Mali et de la République centrafricaine. Les vols des avions-cargos militaires turcs vers l'est de la Libye ont baissé de 62 % (voir annexe 87). À l'inverse, les vols de la compagnie syrienne Cham Wings Airlines ont augmenté de 79 % (voir annexe 88) et, tout en continuant de servir à la relève des combattants étrangers, ont également été utilisés dans le cadre d'un itinéraire de migration irrégulier.

## 2. Violations et non-respect liés à l'aviation

81. Le Groupe d'experts a continué d'enquêter sur les propriétaires et les exploitants d'aéronefs qui l'intéressent ou qu'il a recensés comme violant l'embargo sur les armes (voir le résumé à l'annexe 89 et les annexes 90 à 96).

82. Des aéronefs ont encore été régulièrement échangés entre des propriétaires et des exploitants, l'objectif étant d'introduire une couche d'opacité pour camoufler les opérations de vol illicites. Le Groupe d'experts a noté en particulier une augmentation du nombre d'aéronefs appartenant à la société émirienne Space Cargo Inc<sup>115</sup> opérant à l'appui des forces affiliées à Haftar et donc en violation de l'embargo sur les armes.

## E. Violations par des sociétés-conseils militaires privées

### 1. « Project Opus »

83. Le Groupe d'experts a répertorié un programme de Space Cargo Inc et de BU Shames FZE, tous les deux immatriculés aux Émirats arabes unis, relatif à la réparation, à l'entretien et aux essais en vol des trois hélicoptères AS332L Super Puma déployés par l'organisation Project Opus et signalés à l'annexe 76 du rapport S/2021/229. Des techniciens sud-africains recrutés par Space Cargo Inc se sont déployés d'abord à Benghazi le 18 décembre 2020. Les aéronefs ont été rendus aptes aux essais en vol et ont été aperçus pour la première fois en vol au cours du défilé marquant le septième anniversaire de l'opération Dignité des forces affiliées à Haftar le 29 mai 2021 (voir annexe 97).

84. On trouvera à l'annexe 99 des informations actualisées sur : a) l'aéronef T-Bird de LASA enregistré sous le nom de YU-TSH ; b) l'utilisation d'une compagnie dont la propriété a été masquée. L'enquête se poursuit.

### 2. ChVK Wagner

85. Le Groupe d'experts continue d'enquêter sur le déploiement de ChVK Wagner et sur les transferts d'armes et de matériel visant à appuyer les opérations de cette société. On trouvera à l'annexe 100 de plus amples informations sur les opérations et la logistique en 2020 et notamment des détails sur une violation du droit international humanitaire.

### 3. AR Global Group FZE LLC

86. Le Groupe d'experts a établi que la société AR Global Group FZE LLC, immatriculée aux Émirats arabes unis<sup>116</sup>, faisait office de médiateur ou d'agent

<sup>115</sup> Voir également par. 83 concernant la participation de Space Cargo Inc à des opérations militaires privées.

<sup>116</sup> A-0059-03 Flamingo Villas, Ajman (Émirats arabes unis), dont le Président-Directeur général est Hazem Abdurrahim Imam.

d'approvisionnement pour le compte des forces affiliées à Haftar. Elle a cherché à acquérir le 27 septembre 2020 un système de surveillance des communications à double usage. L'achat a été entravé en mai 2021 lorsque la Lituanie a refusé une licence d'exportation concernant des composantes à double usage du système élargi. On trouvera à l'annexe 101 les certificats d'utilisateur final fournis par les forces affiliées à Haftar. AR Global Group FZE LLC a eu l'occasion d'exercer un droit de réponse, le 14 février 2021 mais ne l'a pas fait.

## F. Résumé des responsabilités en matière de violations et de non-respect

87. Le Groupe d'experts estime que les États Membres, les entités ou les personnes énumérés dans le tableau 3 sont :

- a) en violation du paragraphe 9 de la résolution 1970 (2011) ;
- b) en situation de non-respect des dispositions du paragraphe 19 de la résolution 2213 (2015), n'ayant pas dûment inspecté les navires ou les aéronefs en provenance ou à destination de la Libye ;
- c) en situation de non-respect des dispositions des paragraphes 14 et 15 de la résolution 2571 (2021), n'ayant pas communiqué les informations dont ils disposaient sur l'application des mesures ou fourni un libre accès aux documents considérés comme pertinents par le Groupe d'experts pour l'exécution de son mandat.

Tableau 3

### Résumé des responsabilités en matière de violations et de non-respect

| <i>Pays/entité/individu<sup>a</sup></i>                    | <i>Violation du paragraphe 9 de la résolution 1970 (2011)</i> | <i>Non-respect du paragraphe 19 de la résolution 2213 (2015)</i> | <i>Non-respect des paragraphes 14 ou 15 de la résolution 2571 (2021)</i> | <i>Motif</i>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |
|------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Libye (Forces affiliées au Gouvernement d'unité nationale) | ✓                                                             | ✓                                                                | ✓                                                                        | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Achat d'armes et de matériel connexe sans avoir demandé au préalable l'approbation du Comité</li> <li>• Non-inspection à l'arrivée de navires et d'aéronefs ayant servi au transfert d'armes et de matériel connexe à la Libye</li> <li>• Non-communication d'informations au Groupe d'experts, à sa demande</li> </ul> |
| Jordanie                                                   |                                                               | ✓                                                                |                                                                          | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Non-inspection de navires et d'aéronefs ayant servi au transfert d'armes et de matériel connexe à la Libye</li> </ul>                                                                                                                                                                                                   |
| Fédération de Russie                                       | ✓                                                             |                                                                  |                                                                          | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Transfert de routine d'armes et de matériel connexe à destination et en provenance de la Libye, notamment d'avions-cargos militaires</li> </ul>                                                                                                                                                                         |
| République arabe syrienne                                  |                                                               | ✓                                                                |                                                                          | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Non-inspection à l'arrivée de navires et d'aéronefs ayant servi au transfert de combattants étrangers en Libye</li> </ul>                                                                                                                                                                                               |

| <i>Pays/entité/individu<sup>a</sup></i>               | <i>Violation<br/>du paragraphe 9<br/>de la résolution<br/>1970 (2011)</i> | <i>Non-respect<br/>du paragraphe 19<br/>de la résolution<br/>2213 (2015)</i> | <i>Non-respect<br/>des paragraphes<br/>14 ou 15<br/>de la résolution<br/>2571 (2021)</i> | <i>Motif</i>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |
|-------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Turquie                                               | ✓                                                                         | ✓                                                                            |                                                                                          | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Transfert d'armes et de matériel connexe à la Libye à des fins d'utilisation par les Forces affiliées au Gouvernement d'unité nationale</li> <li>• Fourniture d'une formation liée à des activités militaires aux Forces affiliées au Gouvernement d'unité nationale</li> <li>• Non-inspection de navires et d'aéronefs ayant servi à transférer des armes et du matériel connexe à la Libye</li> </ul> |
| Émirats arabes unis                                   | ✓                                                                         | ✓                                                                            |                                                                                          | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Transfert d'armes et de matériel connexe à la Libye devant être utilisés par les forces affiliées à Haftar</li> <li>• Non-inspection d'aéronefs ayant servi à transférer des armes et du matériel connexe à la Libye</li> </ul>                                                                                                                                                                         |
| Forces affiliées à Haftar                             | ✓                                                                         | ✓                                                                            | ✓                                                                                        | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Achat d'armes et de matériel connexe</li> <li>• Non-inspection à l'arrivée de navires et d'aéronefs ayant servi au transfert d'armes et de matériel connexe à la Libye</li> <li>• Non-communication d'informations au Groupe d'experts, à sa demande</li> </ul>                                                                                                                                         |
| Alpha Air LLC (Ukraine)                               | ✓                                                                         |                                                                              |                                                                                          | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Opérations de vols en vue de l'acheminement direct et indirect de matériel militaire et autre assistance à la Libye</li> </ul>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          |
| Cham Wings Airlines (SAW) (République arabe syrienne) | ✓                                                                         |                                                                              | ✓                                                                                        | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Opérations de vols en vue de l'acheminement direct ou indirect de matériel militaire et autre assistance à la Libye</li> <li>• Non-communication d'information au Groupe d'experts, à sa demande</li> </ul>                                                                                                                                                                                             |
| FlySky Airlines LLC (FSQ) (Kirghizistan)              | ✓                                                                         |                                                                              |                                                                                          | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Opérations de vols en vue de l'acheminement direct ou indirect de matériel militaire et autre assistance à la Libye</li> </ul>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          |
| FlySky Airlines LLC (FSU) (Ukraine)                   | ✓                                                                         |                                                                              |                                                                                          | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Opérations de vols en vue de l'acheminement direct ou indirect de matériel militaire et autre assistance à la Libye</li> </ul>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          |
| Green Flag Aviation (GNF) (Soudan)                    | ✓                                                                         |                                                                              | ✓                                                                                        | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Fourniture d'une autre assistance ayant trait à des activités militaires, notamment un appui aérien logistique aux opérations militaires des forces affiliées à Haftar en Libye</li> <li>• Non-communication d'information au Groupe d'experts, à sa demande</li> </ul>                                                                                                                                 |

| <i>Pays/entité/individu<sup>a</sup></i>  | <i>Violation du paragraphe 9 de la résolution 1970 (2011)</i> | <i>Non-respect du paragraphe 19 de la résolution 2213 (2015)</i> | <i>Non-respect des paragraphes 14 ou 15 de la résolution 2571 (2021)</i> | <i>Motif</i>                                                                                                                                                                                                                        |
|------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Medred Ship Management Co Ltd (Turquie)  | ✓                                                             | ✓                                                                |                                                                          | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Transfert d'armes et de matériel connexe à la Libye</li> <li>• Non-inspection d'un navire ayant servi à transférer des armes et du matériel connexe à la Libye</li> </ul>                  |
| Sapsan Airlines LLC (KGB) (Kirghizistan) | ✓                                                             |                                                                  |                                                                          | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Opérations de vols en vue de l'acheminement direct ou indirect de matériel militaire et autre assistance à la Libye</li> </ul>                                                             |
| Space Cargo Inc (Émirats arabes unis)    | ✓                                                             |                                                                  |                                                                          | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Fourniture d'une autre assistance ayant trait à des activités militaires, notamment un appui aérien logistique aux opérations militaires des forces affiliées à Haftar en Libye</li> </ul> |

<sup>a</sup> Par ordre alphabétique par groupe générique.

## G. Réponses aux violations de l'embargo sur les armes

88. Certains États Membres et des organisations régionales ont pris toute une série de mesures à la suite du non-respect de l'embargo sur les armes, par des entités établies ou immatriculées dans leurs territoires (voir annexe 102).

## H. Tir de missiles balistiques tactiques par les forces affiliées à Haftar

89. Le tir d'essai d'au moins trois missiles balistiques tactiques le 7 mars 2022 par les forces affiliées à Haftar a été pour le moins inattendu, le consensus général parmi les organisations de déminage et de gestion des stocks étant qu'il ne restait pas de missiles balistiques tactiques opérables en Libye. Voir annexe 103 pour l'analyse de cet épisode.

# IV. Unité des institutions de l'État

90. La question de l'unité des institutions de l'État a été examinée au vu des exigences du paragraphe 5 de la résolution 2509 (2020).

## A. Processus de réunification de la Banque centrale de Libye

### 1. Aperçu

91. En juillet 2018, l'ancien Premier Ministre de Libye, Faiez al-Sarraj, a adressé une lettre au Secrétaire général dans laquelle il a demandé que l'ONU facilite un audit de la Banque centrale de Libye à Tripoli et de la section parallèle se trouvant à Beïda, dans l'est, dans l'objectif de rétablir l'intégrité et la transparence du système financier libyen et la confiance à l'égard de ce système, et de créer les conditions nécessaires à l'unification des institutions financières libyennes.

92. En juillet 2021, après avoir examiné attentivement les états financiers des deux sections de Tripoli et de Beïda, Deloitte a communiqué un rapport final fondé sur six

pilliers principaux et un ensemble de 15 recommandations (voir annexe 104). Le Groupe d'experts note que les principales questions entravant la procédure de réunification, recensées dans le rapport, sont les suivantes :

- a) la nécessité de réformer et d'améliorer la procédure d'émission de lettres de crédit ;
- b) le non-recours aux Normes internationales d'information financière<sup>117</sup> ;
- c) la nécessité d'évaluer l'effet de la dévaluation du dinar libyen ;
- d) la nécessité d'établir les conditions requises à une gouvernance et à des contrôles internes effectifs ;
- e) le rejet répété des projets de budget par la Chambre des députés ;
- f) les questions liées à la direction des deux sections<sup>118</sup>.

## 2. Feuille de route et actualisation du cycle de négociations en cours

93. Les recommandations de Deloitte constituent le fondement du mandat émis le 9 juillet 2021, qui oriente à présent le processus de réforme et de réunification. Le Groupe d'experts a été informé que le 20 février 2022, le Gouverneur de la section de la Banque centrale de Libye se trouvant dans l'est, Ali al-Hibri<sup>119</sup>, avait confirmé l'approche suivante<sup>120</sup> : un accord serait d'abord conclu sur des mesures à court terme portant sur les liquidités, les soldes dans la partie est et la compensation des chèques, après quoi le Conseil d'administration de la Banque centrale de Libye se pencherait sur les banques commerciales, reverrait la composition du Conseil d'administration de la Libyan Foreign Bank, de façon à inclure des experts bancaires, et restructurerait au bout du compte la Banque centrale de Libye. Entre-temps, le bureau chargé de la gestion du projet, dirigé dans la section de la Banque centrale se trouvant dans l'est par Ali Jehani, procéderait au niveau des effectifs à l'intégration de la supervision et de la réglementation de la banque, Beïda s'occupant de l'est et Tripoli de l'ouest, sans que les programmes soient concurrents (par exemple, la Jumhuriya Bank aurait une assemblée générale, avec la participation de la Banque centrale de Libye et de la section de la Banque se trouvant dans l'est, et disposerait d'une représentation équilibrée au Conseil d'administration de la Jumhuriya Bank).

94. Le Conseil d'administration de la Banque centrale de Libye n'a pas encore entamé ces travaux. Les directeurs des deux sections ont cependant eu des entretiens préliminaires. Deloitte a organisé parallèlement un atelier à la mi-février 2022, pour faire avancer l'exécution du mandat, à commencer par l'établissement d'objectifs précis. Le calendrier convenu est énoncé dans le tableau 4.

<sup>117</sup> Les Normes internationales d'information financière sont un ensemble de règles comptables applicables aux états financiers des entreprises publiques, visant à les rendre cohérents, transparents et facilement comparables dans le monde entier. Elles ont été élaborées par le Conseil des normes comptables internationales (voir [www.ifrs.com](http://www.ifrs.com)).

<sup>118</sup> Il convient de noter que la Chambre des députés a cherché à remplacer le Gouverneur actuel de la Banque centrale en septembre 2014 et en avril 2015 ; il a refusé cependant de quitter son poste.

<sup>119</sup> Nominalelement le Vice-Gouverneur de la Banque centrale.

<sup>120</sup> Source confidentielle.

Tableau 4

**Délais prévus concernant l'exécution du mandat relatif à la réunification et à la réforme de la Banque centrale de Libye**

| <i>Question</i>                        | <i>Date de début visée</i>  | <i>Durée</i> | <i>Observations</i>                                                                                                                                |
|----------------------------------------|-----------------------------|--------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Préparatifs en vue de la réunification | Fin du mois de janvier 2022 | Trois mois   | –                                                                                                                                                  |
| Mise en œuvre de la réunification      | Fin du mois d'avril 2022    | Trois mois   | –                                                                                                                                                  |
| Évaluation                             | Fin du mois de juillet 2022 | Un mois      | –                                                                                                                                                  |
| Objectifs de la réforme                | Fin du mois de juillet 2022 | Six mois     | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Amélioration de la comptabilité</li> <li>• Supervision de la banque</li> <li>• Restructuration</li> </ul> |

95. La procédure est appuyée par sept axes de travail :

- a) vision et modèle d'opération ;
- b) dette publique ;
- c) émission et circulation de la monnaie ;
- d) système de compensation ;
- e) distribution de devises fortes ;
- f) extension de l'audit financier aux comptes à partir de la mi-2020 jusqu'à la fin de 2021 ;
- g) budget de l'État et dépenses publiques.

96. Aucun progrès n'a été accompli pour ce qui est d'amener le Conseil d'administration à entamer les travaux susmentionnés, qui sont considérés comme étant essentiels au succès de la réforme. On estime cependant que des avancées ont été faites, concernant les autres axes de travail.

### **3. Rapport du Bureau d'audit de Libye sur la Banque centrale de Libye**

97. Le rapport du Bureau d'audit de 2020 a été publié le 24 août 2021<sup>121</sup> et les pratiques dysfonctionnelles de la Banque centrale de Libye y ont été soulignées. Les principales constatations portent sur le département des opérations de la Banque.

98. La scission au sein de la Banque centrale a entravé le cours de ses activités normales à bien des égards. Il convient notamment de mentionner des systèmes de paiement divergents, les banques dans l'est opérant de manière indépendante. Un système double a été créé : a) les banques dans la partie ouest traitent les versements au moyen du système à règlement brut en temps réel ; b) dans l'est, les opérations sont traitées manuellement, la section de la Banque centrale se trouvant dans l'est ayant été déconnectée du système à règlement brut en temps réel. Cela s'est répercuté négativement sur les obligations à remplir, étant donné que la Banque centrale ne reconnaît pas le système manuel.

<sup>121</sup> Voir [www.audit.gov.ly/ar/report2020.pdf](http://www.audit.gov.ly/ar/report2020.pdf), 24 août 2021.

99. Il est également noté dans le rapport que la Banque centrale n'a pas réussi à passer à un ordinateur de compensation, du fait de son incapacité d'unifier les systèmes bancaires susmentionnés ou encore les frais, qu'elle ne contrôle pas. En conséquence, chacune des deux sections de la banque décide unilatéralement du montant des frais imposés.

100. Le Bureau d'audit a également rapporté que la Banque centrale avait refusé de fournir les documents et les données nécessaires liés aux mesures de lutte contre le blanchiment d'argent.

## B. National Oil Corporation

101. La période considérée a été marquée par un bras de fer concernant l'influence sur le secteur pétrolier national entre le Ministre du pétrole et de l'énergie, Mohamed Aoun, et le Président du Conseil d'administration de la National Oil Corporation, Mustafa Sanalla. En août et en octobre 2021, Aoun a cherché sans succès à suspendre de ses fonctions Sanalla au motif d'irrégularités administratives<sup>122</sup>. En octobre 2021 également, quatre personnes affiliées à la Corporation, dont un membre du Conseil d'administration<sup>123</sup> et l'administrateur du bureau de Sanalla ont été arrêtées sur ordre du Procureur général<sup>124</sup>. La Corporation a dénoncé l'arrestation et la détention arbitraires de personnalités publiques, comme tactique d'intimidation pouvant se répercuter sur les opérations du secteur pétrolier. Elle s'est déclarée préoccupée que des groupes armés cherchent de plus en plus à exercer une influence sur le Ministère et sur la Corporation<sup>125</sup>.

102. Les affrontements armés qui se sont produits à la raffinerie de Zaouiya le 26 octobre 2021 ont occasionné des dégâts au niveau des réservoirs de stockage et la fuite de pétrole brut et de produits pétroliers raffinés<sup>126</sup>. Si les attaques peuvent s'expliquer par des rivalités et des griefs historiques entre des groupes armés basés à Zaouiya, le contrôle sur la raffinerie de Zaouiya et son réseau de distribution demeure un prix très convoité.

103. Les niveaux de production ont augmenté pour se stabiliser principalement entre 1,2 et 1,25 million de barils par jour. La production a cependant été entravée par plusieurs événements montrant que les infrastructures pétrolières du pays continuent d'être utilisées par diverses parties comme outil de coercition. Le 20 décembre 2021, la National Oil Corporation a confirmé un arrêt de la production dans les champs pétrolifères de Charara, Fil, Wafa et Hamada en raison d'un blocage des oléoducs et des terminaux par des éléments de Zintan des forces de surveillance des champs pétrolifères. Cet acte est survenu à la suite de l'éviction du Président du Conseil

<sup>122</sup> Voir [www.theafricareport.com/165206/mustafa-sanalla-libyas-undisputed-oil-boss-locked-in-a-power-struggle](http://www.theafricareport.com/165206/mustafa-sanalla-libyas-undisputed-oil-boss-locked-in-a-power-struggle), 11 janvier 2022 ; <https://noc.ly/index.php/en/new-4/7526-the-national-oil-corporation-an-important-clarification>, 19 décembre 2021.

<sup>123</sup> <https://noc.ly/index.php/en/new-4/7353-abulgasem-shengheer-unlawfully-stopped-at-mitiga-airport>, 4 novembre 2021.

<sup>124</sup> Voir [www.libyaherald.com/2021/11/04/the-attorney-general-arrests-noc-board-member-oil-minister-supports-enforcement-of-law](http://www.libyaherald.com/2021/11/04/the-attorney-general-arrests-noc-board-member-oil-minister-supports-enforcement-of-law), 4 novembre 2021 et réunion virtuelle du Groupe d'experts, 2 décembre 2021.

<sup>125</sup> Voir <https://noc.ly/index.php/en/new-4/7353-abulgasem-shengheer-unlawfully-stopped-at-mitiga-airport>, 30 octobre 2021 ; <https://noc.ly/index.php/en/new-4/7403-the-national-oil-corporation-welcomes-the-statement-issued-by-the-us-ambassador-and-special-envoy-to-libya-richard-norland>, 16 novembre 2021 et une lettre (non datée) de Sanalla au Groupe d'experts reçue le 25 novembre 2021.

<sup>126</sup> Source confidentielle et <https://noc.ly/index.php/en/new-4/7339-the-national-oil-corporation-condemns-acts-78of-sabotage-that-took-place-at-the-zawiya-oil-complex>.



d'administration d'Akakus Oil Operations<sup>127</sup> qui était également de Zintan<sup>128</sup>. La Corporation a déclaré un cas de force majeure<sup>129</sup> et la production au début de janvier 2022 a baissé à 729 000 barils par jour<sup>130</sup> avant qu'un accord ne soit conclu<sup>131</sup>. Au même moment, des tribus de l'est ont menacé de fermer les installations de Sidra et de Ras Lanouf en raison d'arriérés de salaires, concernant les forces affiliées à Haftar<sup>132</sup>. Le 6 mars 2022, la Corporation a déclaré un cas de force majeure après la fermeture, par un groupe local, des soupapes de pompe dans les champs pétrolifères de Charara et de Fil, ce qui a réduit la production de 330 000 barils par jour. Étant donné que les pertes quotidiennes étaient estimées à plus de 16 millions de dinars libyens par jour, la question a été renvoyée au Procureur général<sup>133</sup>. Le groupe venu de Zintan et les chefs tribaux ont participé à la négociation d'une reprise des opérations<sup>134</sup>. Deux jours plus tard, il a été annoncé que la situation avait été réglée<sup>135</sup>.

104. Les scissions internes entre le Ministère et la Corporation ont fini par gagner le cadre des opérations. Du 23 février au 3 mars 2022 au moins, la Corporation a suspendu les exportations à titre provisoire, affirmant que tous les ports pétroliers avaient été affectés par le mauvais temps dans tout le pays<sup>136</sup>. Le Ministère a contesté publiquement la décision, affirmant que les conditions météorologiques convenaient aux exportations et déplorant les pertes de revenus éventuelles<sup>137</sup>. Le Groupe d'experts note que durant la période en question, certains jours, l'état de la mer atteignait le niveau 6 de l'Organisation météorologique mondiale (OMM), (vagues hautes de 4 à 6 mètres) mais était de niveau 5 en moyenne (vagues hautes de 2,5 à 4 mètres). L'état de la mer à un niveau 5 ne devrait pas considérablement entraver les opérations de chargement. D'après les données maritimes disponibles, les terminaux ne semblent pas avoir été fermés pendant toute la période en question, sachant que des opérations de chargement se sont déroulées pendant plusieurs jours dans les terminaux touchés. L'étalage public des désaccords entre les dirigeants du secteur a entravé l'unité institutionnelle.

<sup>127</sup> [www.akakusoil.com](http://www.akakusoil.com).

<sup>128</sup> Source confidentielle et [https://noc.ly/index.php/en/new-4/7531-stopping-the-production-of-the-el-sharara-el-feel-al-wafa-and-hamada-fields-and-the-loss-of-more-than-300,000-barrels-per-day-at-the-hands-of-members-of-the-petroleum-facilities-guard-as-a-result-of-wasting-the-country%E2%80%99s-wealth](https://noc.ly/index.php/en/new-4/7531-stopping-the-production-of-the-el-sharara-el-feel-al-wafa-and-hamada-fields-and-the-loss-of-more-than-300000-barrels-per-day-at-the-hands-of-members-of-the-petroleum-facilities-guard-as-a-result-of-wasting-the-country%E2%80%99s-wealth), 20 décembre 2021.

<sup>129</sup> <https://twitter.com/MedWave1/status/1472996496064798720?s=20>, 20 décembre 2021.

<sup>130</sup> Voir <http://en.alwasat.ly/news/economy/344958>, 6 janvier 2022.

<sup>131</sup> Voir <https://libyaupdate.com/libyan-oilfields-to-reopen-after-deal-between-dbeibeh-and-pfg-italian-press-reports>, 10 janvier 2022 ; et [www.libyaobserver.ly/inbrief/sharara-oilfield-production-hits-190000-bpd](http://www.libyaobserver.ly/inbrief/sharara-oilfield-production-hits-190000-bpd), 12 janvier 2022.

<sup>132</sup> Voir <https://libyareview.com/20276/libyan-tribes-threaten-to-block-oil-exports>, 8 janvier 2022.

<sup>133</sup> Voir [https://noc.ly/index.php/en/new-4/7806-the-illicit-closure-of-crude-pumping-valves-from-the-al-sharara-and-al-feel-fields-puts-offline-330,000-barrels-per-day-and-leads-to-a-daily-loss-to-the-public-of-more-than-160-million-libyan-dinars](https://noc.ly/index.php/en/new-4/7806-the-illicit-closure-of-crude-pumping-valves-from-the-al-sharara-and-al-feel-fields-puts-offline-330000-barrels-per-day-and-leads-to-a-daily-loss-to-the-public-of-more-than-160-million-libyan-dinars), 6 mars 2022.

<sup>134</sup> Source confidentielle et [www.marsad.ly/en/2022/03/07/un-envoy-to-libya-says-oil-blockade-should-be-lifted](http://www.marsad.ly/en/2022/03/07/un-envoy-to-libya-says-oil-blockade-should-be-lifted), 7 mars 2022.

<sup>135</sup> Voir <https://noc.ly/index.php/en/new-4/7813-the-opening-of-the-al-riyayna-valves-%E2%80%A6-the-resumption-of-production-in-the-al-sharara-field-and-lifting-of-force-majeure-status>, 8 mars 2022.

<sup>136</sup> Voir <https://noc.ly/index.php/en/new-4/7749-the-national-oil-corporation-announces-that-the-weather-is-disrupting-the-country-s-oil-exports>, 23 février 2022 et <https://noc.ly/index.php/en/new-4/7796-the-continuation-of-oil-production-and-incapability-of-the-sea-locomotives-to-connect-the-vessels-due-to-bad-weather>, 3 mars 2022.

<sup>137</sup> Voir [www.reuters.com/article/oil-libya-ports-idINL2N2V60R9](http://www.reuters.com/article/oil-libya-ports-idINL2N2V60R9), 3 mars 2022.

## V. Prévention des exportations ou importations illicites de pétrole

### A. Exportations illicites de pétrole brut

105. Aucun navire n'a été désigné en application des dispositions du paragraphe 11 de la résolution 2146 (2014).

106. Le 23 janvier 2022, la personne référente, conformément à la résolution 2146 (2014)<sup>138</sup>, a informé le Groupe d'experts d'une tentative imminente d'exportation illicite de 400 000 barils de pétrole brut depuis Marsa el-Hariga<sup>139</sup>. Les données fournies ont permis au Groupe d'experts de répertorier le pétrolier qui aurait été utilisé. Le 1<sup>er</sup> février 2022, des sources confidentielles ont confirmé au Groupe d'experts que ce pétrolier, qui aurait dissimulé son signal de système d'identification automatique pendant des mois, se trouvait dans la zone de mouillage au large de Marsa el-Hariga. Il y est demeuré sans entrer au port, jusqu'au moment de quitter les eaux territoriales libyennes, le février 2022. Aucun chargement de navire à navire ne s'est déroulé au poste de mouillage. Le Groupe d'experts a écrit aux États Membres concernés ainsi qu'au propriétaire et à l'exploitant du navire ; les enquêtes se poursuivent.

### B. Exportations illicites de produits pétroliers raffinés

107. Malgré les augmentations constantes du prix des produits pétroliers raffinés au cours de la période considérée, la contrebande par la mer n'a pas retrouvé les niveaux antérieurs. Plusieurs facteurs ont contribué à un changement de dynamique au niveau de la contrebande, tels que des activités d'exécution forcée par l'Italie et Malte et l'élan qu'a connu le marché pétrolier. La contrebande de pétrole s'est déroulée à une échelle bien plus réduite, des navires polyvalents servant simultanément ou consécutivement à transporter d'autres biens licites ou illicites. Si ce *modus operandi* a, en toute probabilité, augmenté les activités de contrebande individuelles, des cargaisons plus petites ont restreint la portée géographique des contrebandiers, le transport d'autres articles illicites offrant des marges plus importantes. Cela n'exclut pas la possibilité d'un transbordement de petits bateaux à des navires plus grands qui prendrait place dans les eaux internationales, mais le Groupe d'experts n'a pas relevé de cas précis à cet égard, durant la période considérée. À la fin de la période d'établissement du présent rapport, une hausse soudaine des exportations présumées de produits pétroliers a été signalée dans les médias<sup>140</sup> et par des sources confidentielles. L'on ne sait encore si cela est annonciateur d'une tendance plus large ; le Groupe d'experts continue d'enquêter.

108. Si la contrebande de carburant par voie terrestre se poursuit, principalement à travers les frontières méridionale et occidentale de la Libye, le détournement dans le pays même est devenu plus marqué. Cela s'est traduit par des pénuries chroniques de carburant dans les stations-essence, en particulier dans le sud du pays, ce qui a contraint la population à recourir au marché illicite et entraîné une hausse de

<sup>138</sup> La personne référente a été reconfirmée par le Gouvernement d'unité nationale durant la période considérée.

<sup>139</sup> Répertoire de codes des Nations Unies pour les lieux utilisés pour le commerce et les transports.

<sup>140</sup> Voir [www.theguardian.com/world/2022/apr/17/tunisia-fuel-ship-sinking-nearby-countries-offer-help-to-prevent-disaster](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/apr/17/tunisia-fuel-ship-sinking-nearby-countries-offer-help-to-prevent-disaster) ; 17 avril 2022 ; <https://twitter.com/TurquieAffairs/status/1515821968943112202?s=20&t=pET11oq7FJ4EI5TxIzflCQ&fbclid=IwAR2xj2K4y0ZbMgtuIcZKdrNr3l3RiVk6ImHsTvD2Q43R8ukSIWlmbDdKaMe>, 17 avril 2022, et <https://libyareview.com/23164/libya-seizes-turkish-owned-tanker-suspected-of-fuel-smuggling>, 24 avril 2022.

l'inflation dans le nord<sup>141</sup>. Des groupes armés dans tout le pays ont tiré profit des recettes, tout au long de la chaîne d'approvisionnement en carburant détourné, qui était tentaculaire et bien organisée.

## VI. Application du gel des avoirs à des entités désignées

### A. Aperçu général

109. Le Groupe d'experts a poursuivi sa mobilisation auprès de la Libyan Investment Authority (LYe.001), de la Libyan Africa Investment Portfolio (LAIP) (LYe.002) et d'autres parties intéressées. Les entités désignées ont fait généralement preuve de coopération. Du fait de la complexité des questions financières, il a dû contacter des interlocuteurs multiples dont des États Membres, des gestionnaires de fonds et des représentants d'entités désignées.

110. Le Groupe d'experts a continué de porter son attention sur : a) la perception d'intérêts et d'autres gains découlant d'avoirs gelés, sous forme de dividendes ; b) des demandes ou des notifications d'États Membres concernant des dérogations au gel des avoirs ; c) le paiement de frais de gestion et les dépenses de base ; d) le traitement différencié des filiales dans diverses juridictions.

111. La Libyan Investment Authority a fourni au Groupe d'experts des mises à jour sur la progression de sa stratégie visant à diriger et à gérer la société, conformément aux Principes de Santiago<sup>142</sup>. Même si les efforts de l'Autorité sont efficaces, il faut poursuivre les travaux pour respecter pleinement les Normes internationales d'information financière (voir annexe 105). Les préoccupations du Groupe d'experts concernant l'absence de transparence de la direction n'ont pas été dissipées, au vu de la réticence à fournir des mises à jour sur certaines des activités de ses filiales. Dans ce sens, le Groupe d'experts estime que faire des affaires sous l'égide des filiales pourrait entraîner une situation de non-conformité, par rapport au régime des sanctions, et présenter un risque de détournement d'actifs.

### B. Présentation mensongère de la Libyan Foreign Investment Company et de la Libyan Arab Foreign Investment Company comme autres appellations de la Libyan Investment Authority

112. Le Groupe d'experts note que la désignation initiale de la Libyan Investment Authority (LYe.001), dans la résolution 1973 (2011), comprenait la Libyan Arab Foreign Investment Company (LAFICO) comme autre appellation. La notice n°1 d'aide à l'application du 7 mars 2012 comprenait également la LAFICO comme autre appellation de l'entité désignée. Le 27 juin 2014, après une recommandation du Groupe d'experts (voir S/2014/106)<sup>143</sup>, le Comité avait modifié l'inscription sur la Liste relative aux sanctions, de LAFICO à « Libyan Foreign Investment Company (LFIC) ». Aucun changement visant à refléter ce changement n'a été apporté à la notice n°1 d'aide à l'application. Dans les rapports S/2018/812 et

<sup>141</sup> Sources confidentielles et <http://alwasat.ly/news/libya/353324>, 22 mars 2022.

<sup>142</sup> Il s'agit de 24 principes et pratiques qui sont généralement acceptés et adoptés de leur propre gré par les membres du Forum international des fonds souverains. Ils favorisent la transparence, la bonne gouvernance, l'obligation de rendre des comptes et des pratiques d'investissement prudentes, tout en encourageant un dialogue plus ouvert et une meilleure appréciation des activités des fonds souverains (voir [www.ifswf.org/sites/default/files/santiagoprinciples\\_0\\_0.pdf](http://www.ifswf.org/sites/default/files/santiagoprinciples_0_0.pdf)).

<sup>143</sup> Par. 238 et 289 a).

[S/2018/812/Corr.1](#)<sup>144</sup>, le Groupe d'experts a noté que la personnalité juridique de la LFIC, opérant sous le sigle LAFICO, avait été évoquée dans des rapports antérieurs (voir [S/2013/99](#)<sup>145</sup> et [S/2017/466](#)<sup>146</sup>). Il répète que l'inscription de la LFIC (et initialement de la LAFICO) en tant qu'autre appellation de la Libyan Investment Authority (LYe.001) était incorrecte et que la Libyan Investment Authority en est propriétaire à 100 % (voir recommandation 3).

### C. Nouveaux éléments concernant l'affaire Euroclair examinée par un tribunal belge

113. Dans les rapports [S/2018/212](#) et [S/2018/212/Corr.1](#)<sup>147</sup>, le Groupe d'experts a signalé que les intérêts et autres dividendes provenant des avoirs gelés de la Libyan Investment Authority détenus à la banque Euroclear avaient été transférés dans d'autres comptes bancaires de l'Autorité, durant la période allant de 2011 à 2017, de façon non conforme au gel des avoirs. Le 25 octobre 2017, les autorités judiciaires belges avaient ordonné la saisie de ces fonds et intérêts, comme mesure préliminaire dans l'enquête pénale en cours portant sur des soupçons de blanchiment d'argent et autre inconduite liée à la gestion des avoirs gelés de l'Autorité dans ce pays.

114. Dans le cadre de ces procédures pénales, le Président de l'Autorité, Ali Mahmoud Hassan Mohammed, avait été cité à comparaître devant un tribunal belge à l'automne 2021. Il n'avait pas obtempéré, affirmant que le droit interne libyen l'empêchait de témoigner<sup>148</sup>. Le 9 janvier 2022, le juge d'instruction belge a donc émis un mandat d'arrêt international contre lui<sup>149</sup>. Le Procureur général de Libye s'est entretenu avec son homologue belge, dans une tentative de régler la question<sup>150</sup>.

115. Le Groupe d'experts continue de suivre l'affaire et rappelle qu'en cas de déblocage d'intérêts et de dividendes découlant d'avoirs gelés, ceux-ci doivent rester gelés, eux aussi, comme énoncé dans les rapports [S/2018/812](#) et [S/2018/812/Corr.1](#)<sup>151</sup>.

### D. Dérogations au titre du gel des avoirs

116. Le Groupe d'experts a noté une application incohérente du paragraphe 17 de la résolution [1970 \(2011\)](#), qui établit les prescriptions relatives au gel des avoirs.

117. On entend habituellement par gel des avoirs « tout acte visant à empêcher tout mouvement, transfert, modification, utilisation, manipulation de fonds ou accès à ces fonds, qui aurait pour conséquence un changement de leur volume, de leur montant, de leur localisation, de leur propriété, de leur possession, de leur nature, de leur destination ou toute autre modification qui pourrait en permettre l'utilisation, y compris la gestion de portefeuille »<sup>152</sup>.

<sup>144</sup> Par. 232.

<sup>145</sup> Par. 225.

<sup>146</sup> Par. 237 et 238.

<sup>147</sup> Par. 197 à 207.

<sup>148</sup> Réunion du Groupe d'experts avec Ali Mahmoud et la direction de la Libyan Investment Authority le 2 février 2022.

<sup>149</sup> Ibid.

<sup>150</sup> Voir [www.libyaherald.com/2022/01/attorney-general-in-bid-to-end-belgian-legal-moves-to-seize-lia-assets](http://www.libyaherald.com/2022/01/attorney-general-in-bid-to-end-belgian-legal-moves-to-seize-lia-assets), 24 janvier 2022 et <https://libyaupdate.com/libya-attorney-general-in-belgium-for-talks-on-frozen-assets>, 2 février 2022.

<sup>151</sup> Paragraphes 200 à 207.

<sup>152</sup> Voir la définition énoncée au paragraphe 165 du rapport [S/2021/229](#) comme celle étant communément définie dans la législation financière et les instructions administratives de beaucoup d'États Membres.

118. Le Groupe d'experts note que le Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et d'Irlande du Nord continue d'interpréter systématiquement le paragraphe 19 a) de la résolution 1970 (2011) comme une autorisation d'émettre des licences en vue d'une gestion active des fonds gelés, le raisonnement étant qu'une gestion active est nécessaire pour conserver la valeur des fonds, qui doivent au bout du compte être mis à la disposition du peuple libyen, afin qu'il puisse en tirer profit. L'État Membre note que la délivrance de ces licences ne donne pas à l'entité désignée l'accès aux fonds gelés et que l'objectif du gel des avoirs est donc maintenu.

119. Le Groupe d'experts est d'avis contraire, estimant qu'une activité de gestion d'actifs impliquant une gestion discrétionnaire ou des revenus locatifs, même si ces revenus restent gelés, ne relève pas actuellement du champ des « dépenses de base » ou de la « détention ou de l'entretien courant » des fonds gelés, énoncés au paragraphe 19 a) de la résolution 1970 (2011). Les dérogations citées aux paragraphes 19 à 21 de la résolution 1970 (2011) continuent d'être en vigueur. Toute notification de dérogation ne peut pas être prise en compte si elle n'est pas couverte par l'une des dispositions en vigueur, que l'entité désignée ait ou non accès aux fonds.

120. Compte tenu des divergences d'interprétation du paragraphe 19 de la résolution 1970 (2011), le Groupe d'experts continue d'aider le Comité en fournissant d'autres directives adaptées sur la question. Cela fait ressortir la nécessité de surveiller l'application des dispositions du paragraphe 19 de cette résolution, concernant la gestion active<sup>153</sup>.

## E. Autres questions

121. La Libyan Investment Authority continue d'insister sur les sujets de préoccupation relatifs au régime de sanctions la concernant, ainsi que la LAFICO et la Libyan Africa Investment Portfolio et leurs différentes filiales, comme suit : a) la non-disponibilité des intérêts conformément à la notice n°6 d'aide à l'application du Comité ; b) des taux d'intérêt négatifs ; c) l'impossibilité de réinvestir et de maintenir les investissements existants ; d) des problèmes de procédure avec les États Membres.

122. L'Autorité décrit le gel des avoirs comme la principale cause des pertes enregistrées, estimées à 4 milliards de dollars dans le rapport d'audit d'un consultant international<sup>154</sup>. Elle estime que sans accès aux fonds gelés, la société ne peut pas être correctement gérée et se voit contrainte de puiser dans ses ressources non gelées qui vont en s'amenuisant, pour couvrir les dépenses de fonctionnement courantes. Elle considère que le régime des licences ne permet pas d'opérer un fonds souverain qui a besoin de dextérité, sur le plan des prises de décisions commerciales ou stratégiques<sup>155</sup>.

### Évaluation de la politique de taux d'intérêt négatifs dans un climat de gel des avoirs

123. Le Comité a reçu plusieurs demandes de déblocage de certains fonds de la Libyan Investment Authority, relatives au versement de droits ou de commissions, conformément à la législation nationale des États Membres. Le paragraphe 19 a) de la résolution 1970 (2011) est généralement invoqué. Quelques-unes de ces requêtes correspondent à l'application de taux d'intérêt négatifs, conformément à la législation nationale.

<sup>153</sup> Voir S/2021/229, par. 168, au sujet de certains avoirs de LIA et de LAIP qui sont activement gérés, et l'opinion du Groupe d'experts sur la question.

<sup>154</sup> Ibid., par. 152 à 163.

<sup>155</sup> Réunion du Groupe d'experts (20 septembre 2021).

124. Le Groupe d'experts estime que la politique de taux d'intérêt négatifs utilisée dans le système bancaire commercial est contestable, dans la situation exceptionnelle de fonds assujettis à une mesure de gel des avoirs. Elle débouche sur l'érosion des fonds gelés, ce qui va à l'encontre de l'objectif du régime des sanctions, à savoir préserver ces fonds pour le bienfait du peuple libyen. La politique bancaire de taux d'intérêt négatifs est imposée aux soldes de trésorerie longs afin de dissuader les clients de conserver des fonds en espèces pendant une longue période, ce qui désavantage l'Autorité, qui ne peut transférer des fonds gelés pour éviter des taux d'intérêt négatifs.

125. Le Groupe d'experts comprend que cette situation soit problématique pour les États Membres mais suggère l'examen d'une telle politique au niveau national, pour savoir si elle devrait être applicable aux avoirs gelés en vertu des sanctions des Nations Unies (voir recommandation 6).

## **VII. Mise en œuvre du gel des avoirs et de l'interdiction de voyager contre des personnes désignées**

### **A. Saadi Qadhafi**

126. Le 6 septembre 2021, le Gouvernement d'unité nationale a annoncé la libération de Saadi Qadhafi (LYi.015) qui était en détention à Tripoli (voir annexe 106). Des sources libyennes officielles ont confirmé au Groupe d'experts qu'il avait quitté la Libye dans la soirée du 5 septembre 2021, à bord d'un avion appartenant au Gouvernement libyen (un Falcon 900EX de Dassault, numéro d'immatriculation 5A-DCN), qui a atterri à Istanbul (Turquie) le 6 septembre 2021 à 1 h 37. Le Groupe d'experts a écrit à la Turquie et à la Libye le 8 septembre 2021, et à la Turquie de nouveau le 17 novembre 2021, pour demander des éléments d'identification supplémentaires. Il n'a pas reçu de réponse, et continue d'enquêter.

### **B. Abu Zayd Umar Dorda**

127. Des rapports dans les médias ont fait état du décès le 27 février 2022 d'Abu Zayd Umar Dorda (LYi.006)<sup>156</sup>. Le Groupe d'experts a écrit à la Libye et à l'Égypte, les pays de nationalité et de résidence, conformément à l'entrée sur la Liste. L'Égypte a répondu que Dorda était décédé de causes naturelles le 28 février 2022 et a fourni un exemplaire de son certificat de décès (voir annexe 107) dans lequel le second nom de Hmeid avait été rajouté, comme suit : Abu Zayd Umar Hmeid Dorda. La Libye n'a fourni aucune réponse (voir recommandation 5).

### **C. Dérogations permanentes à l'interdiction de voyager**

128. Le 1<sup>er</sup> décembre 2020, le Comité a décidé d'accorder une dérogation « illimitée » à l'interdiction de voyager pour raison humanitaire, valable pendant six mois, à trois personnes inscrites sur la Liste<sup>157</sup>. Cela signifie que les personnes peuvent voyager pendant cette période, sans avoir à demander une dérogation distincte, pour chaque déplacement, tant qu'elles communiquent des informations pertinentes sur

<sup>156</sup> Voir <https://al-ain.com/article/abuzeid-dorda-libya-intelligence>, 28 février 2022 et [www.libyaobserver.ly/inbrief/former-regime-official-died-cairo](http://www.libyaobserver.ly/inbrief/former-regime-official-died-cairo), 28 février 2022.

<sup>157</sup> Voir <https://www.un.org/press/fr/%202020/sc14369.doc.htm>, 1<sup>er</sup> décembre 2020 ; ces personnes étaient Safia Farkash Al-Barassi (LYi.019) ; Aisha Muammar Muhammad Abu Minyar Qadhafi (LYi.009) et Mohammed Muammar Qadhafi (LYi.012).

leur voyage au Comité à l'avance. Cela permet au Comité d'être informé des activités de ces personnes et de l'objet de leur voyage.

129. Cette dérogation a depuis, été constamment prorogée, la dernière en date venant à expiration le 31 mai 2022. Le Comité a fourni dans les communiqués de presse<sup>158</sup> et les notes verbales pertinents à tous les États Membres des informations sur chaque voyage que chaque personne doit lui transmettre, avant et dans le mois suivant le voyage, conformément aux directives provisoires régissant la conduite des travaux du Comité et à la notice n° 4 d'aide à l'application<sup>159</sup>. Il a également indiqué que « tout État autorisant l'entrée ou le passage en transit sur son territoire de l'une ou l'autre des trois personnes visées sera tenu de l'en aviser par écrit dans un délai de 48 heures suivant l'arrivée ou le passage sur son territoire. La notification devrait être par écrit, indiquant la date d'entrée et la durée prévue du séjour ».

130. Durant la période considérée, deux personnes bénéficiant de dérogation se sont rendues ou ont transité par l'Égypte, les Émirats arabes unis et la Turquie. Aucun de ces États Membres n'a notifié le Comité, selon la directive susmentionnée émise par le Comité. Oman et la Suisse ont tous les deux notifié le Comité du voyage des personnes faisant l'objet d'une dérogation, conformément à la directive.

131. Dans l'intérêt de la pleine application des directives du Comité et de la notice n° 4 d'aide à l'application, la fourniture d'informations opportunes et plus ciblées aux États Membres concernés pourrait être exigée (voir recommandation 4).

## VIII. Recommandations

132. Le Groupe d'experts recommande :

### Au Conseil de sécurité :

Recommandation 1. D'envisager d'exiger des États Membres qu'ils notifient le Comité lorsqu'ils livrent des articles diplomatiques humanitaires ou de protection à la Libye à l'aide de navires ou d'aéronefs militaires [voir par. 60]

Recommandation 2. D'exiger du Gouvernement libyen, conformément aux dispositions du paragraphe 6 de la résolution 2278 (2016), d'actualiser les informations concernant sa personne référente et de fournir des informations relatives aux travaux du Comité ou à la structure des forces de sécurité qui sont sous son contrôle [voir par. 67]

### Au Comité :

Recommandation 3. De supprimer l'information « autre appellation » en ce qui concerne la « Libyan Foreign Investment Company (LFIC) », dans l'inscription portant sur la Libyan Investment Authority (LYe.001) sur la Liste relative aux sanctions, et d'envisager d'y inscrire la Libyan Foreign Investment Company (également connue sous le nom de Libyan Arab Foreign Investment Company) comme une entité désignée distincte [voir par. 112]

<sup>158</sup> Voir [www.un.org/press/fr/2021/sc14543.doc.htm](http://www.un.org/press/fr/2021/sc14543.doc.htm), 7 juin 2021 et [www.un.org/press/fr/2021/sc14718.doc.htm](http://www.un.org/press/fr/2021/sc14718.doc.htm), 3 décembre 2021.

<sup>159</sup> Voir [www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1970/guidelines](http://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1970/guidelines) et [www.un.org/securitycouncil/sites/www.un.org.securitycouncil/files/1970\\_ian4\\_0.pdf](http://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sites/www.un.org.securitycouncil/files/1970_ian4_0.pdf).

- Recommandation 4. De rappeler aux États Membres leurs obligations de notification lorsque qu'il obtient des informations relatives à un déplacement imminent, en vertu d'une dérogation à l'interdiction de voyager [voir par. 131]
- Recommandation 5. De mettre à jour l'entrée sur la Liste relative aux sanctions d'Abu Zayd Umar Dorda (LYi.006) pour indiquer son décès et inclure son second nom [voir par. 127]

**Aux États Membres :**

- Recommandation 6. De prendre en compte la situation exceptionnelle des fonds qui sont soumis aux mesures de gel des avoirs conformément au régime de sanctions des Nations Unies dans les politiques nationales concernant les taux d'intérêt négatifs [voir par. 125]



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## Annex 1      Overview of the evolution of the Libya sanctions regime

1. By resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#), the Council expressed grave concern at the situation in Libya, condemned the violence and use of force against civilians and deplored the gross and systematic violation of human rights. Within that context, the Council imposed specific measures on Libya, under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, including the arms embargo, which relates to arms and related materiel of all types, including weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary equipment, and spare parts for the aforementioned, in addition to the provision of armed mercenary personnel. The arms embargo covers both arms entering and leaving Libya. The Council also imposed travel ban and asset freeze measures, and listed individuals as subject to one or both measures, in the resolution. Furthermore, the Council decided that the travel ban and the asset freeze were to apply to the individuals and entities designated by the Committee established pursuant to resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#) concerning Libya involved in or complicit in ordering, controlling or otherwise directing the commission of serious human rights abuses against persons in Libya.
2. By resolution [1973 \(2011\)](#), the Council strengthened the enforcement of the arms embargo and expanded the scope of the asset freeze to include the exercise of vigilance when doing business with Libyan entities, if States had information that provided reasonable grounds to believe that such business could contribute to violence and use of force against civilians. Additional individuals subject to the travel ban and asset freeze were listed in the resolution, in addition to five entities subject to the freeze. The Council decided that both measures were to apply also to individuals and entities determined to have violated the provisions of the previous resolution, in particular the provisions concerning the arms embargo. The resolution also included the authorization to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in Libya. In addition, it included a no-fly zone in the airspace of Libya and a ban on flights of Libyan aircraft.
3. On 24 June 2011, the Committee designated two additional individuals and one additional entity subject to the targeted measures. By resolution [2009 \(2011\)](#), the Council introduced additional exceptions to the arms embargo and removed two listed entities subject to the asset freeze, while allowing the four remaining listed entities to be subjected to a partial asset freeze. It also lifted the ban on flights of Libyan aircraft.
4. By resolution [2016 \(2011\)](#), the Council terminated the authorization related to the protection of civilians and the no-fly zone. On 16 December 2011, the Committee removed the names of two entities previously subject to the asset freeze.
5. In resolution [2040 \(2012\)](#), the Council directed the Committee, in consultation with the Libyan authorities, to review continuously the remaining measures with regard to the two listed entities – the Libyan Investment Authority and the Libyan Africa Investment Portfolio – and decided that the Committee was, in consultation with the Libyan authorities, to lift the designation of those entities as soon as practical.
6. In resolution [2095 \(2013\)](#), the Council further eased the arms embargo in relation to Libya concerning non-lethal military equipment.
7. By resolution [2144 \(2014\)](#), the Council stressed that Member States notifying to the Committee the supply, sale or transfer to Libya of arms and related materiel, including related ammunition and spare parts, should ensure such notifications contain all relevant information, and should not be resold to, transferred to, or made available for use by parties other than the designated end user.
8. By resolution [2146 \(2014\)](#), the Council decided to impose measures, on vessels to be designated by the Committee, in relation to attempts to illicitly export crude oil from Libya and authorized Member States to undertake inspections of such designated vessels.
9. By resolution [2174 \(2014\)](#), the Council introduced additional designation criteria and requested the Panel to provide information on individuals or entities engaging or providing support for acts that threaten the peace, stability of security of Libya or obstructing the completion of the political transition. The resolution strengthened the arms embargo, by requiring prior approval of the Committee for the supply, sale or transfer of arms and related materiel, including related ammunition and spare parts, to Libya intended for security or disarmament assistance to the Libyan government, with the exception of

non-lethal military equipment intended solely for the Libyan government. The Council also renewed its call upon Member States to undertake inspections related to the arms embargo, and required them to report on such inspections.

10. By resolution [2213 \(2015\)](#), the Council extended the authorizations and measures in relation to attempts to illicitly export crude oil from Libya until 31 March 2016. The resolution further elaborated the designation criteria listed in resolution [2174 \(2014\)](#).

11. By resolution [2214 \(2015\)](#), the Council called on the 1970 Committee on Libya to consider expeditiously arms embargo exemption requests by the Libyan government for the use by its official armed forces to combat specific terrorist groups named in that resolution.

12. By resolution [2259 \(2015\)](#), the Council confirmed that individuals and entities providing support for acts that threaten the peace, stability or security of Libya or that obstruct or undermine the successful completion of the political transition must be held accountable, and recalled the travel ban and asset freeze in this regard.

13. By resolution [2278 \(2016\)](#) the Council extended the authorizations and measures in relation to attempts to illicitly export crude oil, while calling on the Libyan Government of National Accord (GNA) to improve oversight and control over its oil sector, financial institutions and security forces.

14. By resolution [2292 \(2016\)](#), the Council authorized, for a period of twelve months, inspections on the high seas off the coast of Libya, of vessels that are believed to be carrying arms or related materiel to or from Libya, in violation of the arms embargo.

15. By resolution [2357 \(2017\)](#), the Council extended the authorizations set out in resolution [2292 \(2016\)](#) for a further 12 months.

16. By resolution [2362 \(2017\)](#), the Council extended until 15 November 2018 the authorizations provided by and the measures imposed by resolution [2146 \(2014\)](#), in relation to attempts to illicitly export crude oil from Libya. These measures were also applied with respect to vessels loading, transporting, or discharging petroleum, including crude oil and refined petroleum products, illicitly exported or attempted to be exported from Libya.

17. By resolution [2420 \(2018\)](#), the Council further extended the authorizations, as set out in resolution [2292 \(2016\)](#) and extended by resolution [2357 \(2017\)](#), for a further 12 months from the date of adoption of the resolution.

18. By resolution [2441 \(2018\)](#), the Council extended until 15 February 2020 the authorizations provided by and the measures imposed by resolution [2362 \(2017\)](#), in relation to attempts to illicitly export crude oil from Libya.

19. By resolution [2473 \(2019\)](#), the Council further extended the authorizations, as set out in resolution [2292 \(2016\)](#) and extended by resolutions [2357 \(2017\)](#) and [2420 \(2018\)](#), for a further 12 months from the date of adoption of the resolution.

20. By resolution [2509 \(2020\)](#), the Council extended until 30 April 2021 the authorizations and the measures in resolution 2146 (2014), as amended by paragraph 2 of resolutions [2362 \(2017\)](#) and [2441 \(2018\)](#), and modified the designation period in paragraph 11 of resolution 2146 (2014) to be one year, and requested the Panel to report any information relating to the illicit export from or illicit import to Libya of petroleum, including crude oil and refined petroleum products.

21. By resolution [2526 \(2020\)](#), the Council further extended the authorizations, as set out in resolution [2292 \(2016\)](#) and extended by resolutions [2357 \(2017\)](#), [2420 \(2018\)](#), and [2473 \(2019\)](#), for a further 12 months from the date of adoption of the resolution.

22. By resolution [2571 \(2021\)](#), the Council extended until 30 July 2022 the authorizations and the measures in resolution 2146 (2014), as amended by paragraph 2 of resolutions [2362 \(2017\)](#), [2441 \(2018\)](#) and [2509 \(2020\)](#), in relation to attempts to illicitly export petroleum, including crude oil and refined petroleum products, from Libya.

23. By resolution [2578 \(2021\)](#), the Council further extended the authorizations, as set out in resolution [2292 \(2016\)](#) and extended by resolutions [2357 \(2017\)](#), [2420 \(2018\)](#), [2473 \(2019\)](#), and [2526 \(2020\)](#) for a further 12 months from the date of adoption of the resolution.

24. To date the Committee has published six implementation assistance notices which are available on the Committee's website.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> <http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1970/notices.shtml>.

## Annex 2      Abbreviations and acronyms

|           |                                                                                            |
|-----------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| AQIM      | Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb                                                            |
| BPD       | Barrels Per Day                                                                            |
| CBL       | Central Bank of Libya                                                                      |
| CCMSR     | Conseil de Commandement Militaire pour le Salut de la République                           |
| CEO       | Chief Executive Officer                                                                    |
| ChVK      | Russian language abbreviation for private military enterprise                              |
| Committee | Committee established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1970 (2011) concerning Libya |
| DCIM      | Directorate for Combating Illegal Migration                                                |
| DCSIM     | Department for Combating Settlement and Illegal Migration                                  |
| DOB       | Date of Birth                                                                              |
| ECBL      | Eastern Central Bank of Libya                                                              |
| EOD       | Explosive Ordnance Disposal                                                                |
| EUNAVFOR  | EU Naval Force Mediterranean                                                               |
| EUR       | Euro                                                                                       |
| FACT      | Front pour l'Alternance et la Concorde au Tchad                                            |
| FMCG      | Fast Moving Consumer Goods                                                                 |
| FNDJT     | Front de la Nation pour la Démocratie et la Justice                                        |
| FZE       | Free Zone Enterprise (UAE)                                                                 |
| GACS      | General Administration for Coastal Security                                                |
| GMMR      | Great Man Made River                                                                       |
| GNA       | Government of National Accord                                                              |
| GNA-AF    | Government of National Accord Affiliated Forces                                            |
| GNU       | Government of National Unity                                                               |
| HAF       | Haftar Affiliated Forces                                                                   |
| HNEC      | High National Election Commission                                                          |
| HoR       | House of Representatives                                                                   |
| IAN       | Implementation Assistance Notice                                                           |
| IFSWF     | International Forum of Sovereign Wealth Funds                                              |
| IHL       | International Humanitarian Law                                                             |
| IHRL      | International Human Rights Law                                                             |
| IMO       | International Maritime Organization                                                        |
| ISIL      | Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant                                                       |
| JMC       | Joint Military Commission                                                                  |
| JPA       | Juba Peace Agreement                                                                       |
| km        | Kilometre(s)                                                                               |
| LAAF      | Libyan Arab Armed Forces (HAF)                                                             |
| LAFICO    | Libyan Arab Foreign Investment Company                                                     |
| LAIP      | Libyan Africa Investment Portfolio                                                         |
| LCG       | Libyan Coast Guard                                                                         |
| LFB       | Libyan Foreign Bank                                                                        |
| LFIC      | Libyan Foreign Investment Company                                                          |
| LIA       | Libyan Investment Authority                                                                |
| LIA       | Libyan Investment Authority                                                                |
| LIDCO     | Libyan Investment and Development Company                                                  |
| LN        | Libyan Navy                                                                                |
| LNA       | Libyan National Army (now LAAF)                                                            |

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|        |                                                 |
|--------|-------------------------------------------------|
| LPDF   | Libyan Political Dialogue Forum                 |
| LYD    | Libyan Dinar(s)                                 |
| m      | Metre(s)                                        |
| MAV    | Military Armoured Vehicle                       |
| MRCC   | Maritime Rescue and Coordination Centre         |
| MV     | Motor Vessel                                    |
| NGO    | Non-governmental organization                   |
| nm     | Nautical Miles                                  |
| NOC    | National Oil Corporation                        |
| Panel  | Panel of Experts                                |
| PC     | Presidency Council                              |
| PFG    | Petroleum Facility Guard                        |
| PMC    | Private Military Company                        |
| PMO    | Project Management Office                       |
| RHIB   | Rigid Hulled Inflatable Boats                   |
| RTGS   | Real-Time Gross Settlement System               |
| SAR    | Search and Rescue                               |
| SCMS   | Susah Combat Marine Squadron                    |
| SDF    | Special Deterrence Force                        |
| SLA/AW | Sudan Liberation Army/Abdul Wahid               |
| SSA    | Stability Support Apparatus                     |
| SWF    | Sovereign Wealth Funds                          |
| TBM    | Tactical Ballistic Missile(s)                   |
| TBZ    | Tariq Ibn Ziyad (brigade)                       |
| ToR    | Terms of Reference                              |
| TRB    | Tripoli Revolutionary Brigade                   |
| UAE    | United Arab Emirates                            |
| UFR    | Union des Forces de la Resistance               |
| UN     | United Nations                                  |
| UNCLOS | United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea |
| UNSMIL | UN Support Mission in Libya                     |
| USD    | United States Dollars                           |
| WMO    | World Meteorological Organization               |



## **Annex 3      Methodology**

1. The Panel ensured compliance with the methodological standards recommended by the Informal Working Group of the Security Council on General Issues of Sanctions (S/2006/997). Those standards call for reliance on verified, genuine documents and concrete evidence and on-site observations by the experts, including taking photographs, wherever possible. When physical inspection is not possible, the Panel will seek to corroborate information using multiple, independent sources to appropriately meet the highest achievable standard, placing a higher value on statements by principal actors and first-hand witnesses to events.
2. The Panel used satellite imagery of Libya procured by the United Nations from private providers to support investigations, as well as open-source imagery. Commercial databases recording maritime and aviation data were referenced. Public statements by officials through their official media channels were accepted as factual unless contrary facts were established. Any mobile phone records from service providers were also accepted as factual. While the Panel wishes to be as transparent as possible, in situations in which identifying sources would have exposed them or others to unacceptable safety risks, the Panel decided not to include identifying information in this document and instead placed the relevant evidence in United Nations secure archives.
3. The Panel reviewed social media, but no information gathered was used as evidence unless it could be corroborated using multiple independent or technical sources, including eyewitnesses, to appropriately meet the highest achievable standard of proof.
4. The spelling of toponyms within Libya often depends on the ethnicity of the source or the quality of transliteration. The Panel has adopted a consistent approach in the present update. All major locations in Libya are spelled or referenced as per the UN Geographical Information System (GIS) map at appendix A.
5. The Panel has placed importance on the rule of consensus among the Panel members and agreed that, if differences and/or reservations arise during the development of reports, it would only adopt the text, conclusions and recommendations by a majority of five out of the six members including the Coordinator. In the event of a recommendation for designation of an individual or a group, such recommendation would be done based on unanimity.
6. The Panel is committed to impartiality in investigating incidents of non-compliance by any party.
7. The Panel is equally committed to the highest degree of fairness and has offered the opportunity to reply to Member States, entities and individuals involved in the majority of incidents that are covered in this update. Their response has been taken into consideration in the Panel's findings. The methodology for this is provided in appendix B.
8. The Panel's methodology, in relation to its investigations concerning IHL, IHRL and human rights abuses, is provided in appendix C.



**Appendix B to Annex 3: ‘The opportunity to reply’ methodology used by the Panel**

1. Although sanctions are meant to be preventative not punitive, it should be recognized that the mere naming of an individual or entity<sup>2</sup> in a Panel’s report could have adverse effects on the individual. As such, where possible, individuals concerned should be provided with an opportunity to provide their account of events and to provide concrete and specific information/material in support. Through this interaction, the individual is given the opportunity to demonstrate that their alleged conduct does not fall within the relevant listing criteria. This is called the ‘opportunity to reply’.
2. The Panel’s methodology on the opportunity to reply is as follows:
  - (a) Providing an individual with an ‘opportunity to reply’ should be the norm;
  - (b) The Panel may decide not to offer an opportunity of reply if there is credible evidence that it would unduly prejudice its investigations, including if it would:
    - (c) Result in the individual moving assets if they get warning of a possible recommendation for designation;
    - (d) Restrict further access of the Panel to vital sources;
    - (e) Endanger Panel sources or Panel members;
    - (f) Adversely and gravely impact humanitarian access for humanitarian actors in the field; or
    - (g) For any other reason that can be clearly demonstrated as reasonable and justifiable in the prevailing circumstances.
3. If the circumstances set forth in 2 (b) do not apply, then the Panel should be able to provide an individual an opportunity to reply.
4. The individual should be able to communicate directly with the Panel to convey their personal determination as to the level and nature of their interaction with the Panel.
5. Interactions between the Panel and the individual should be direct, unless in exceptional circumstances.
6. In no circumstances can third parties, without the knowledge of the individual, determine for the individual its level of interaction with the Panel.
7. The individual, on the other hand, in making their determination of the level and nature of interaction with the Panel, may consult third parties or allow third parties (for example, legal representative or his/her government) to communicate on his/her behalf on subsequent interactions with the Panel.

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<sup>2</sup> Hereinafter just the term individual will be used to reflect both.

### **Appendix C to Annex 3: Violations relating to IHL, IHRL, and acts that constitute human rights abuses investigative methodology**

1. The Panel's methodology, in relation to its investigations concerning IHL, IHRL and human rights abuses, is set out as below:

- (a) All Panel investigations are initiated based on verifiable information being made available to the Panel, either directly from sources or from media reports.
- (b) In carrying out any investigations on the use of explosive ordnance against the civilian population, the Panel will rely on at least three or more of the following sources of information:
  - (i) At least two eye-witnesses or victims;
  - (ii) At least one individual or organization (either local or international) that has also independently investigated the incident;
  - (iii) If there are casualties associated with the incident, and if the casualties are less than ten in number, the Panel obtains copies of death certificates and medical certificates. In incidents relating to mass casualties, the Panel relies on published information from the United Nations and other organizations;
  - (iv) Technical evidence, which includes imagery of explosive events such as the impact damage, blast effects, and recovered fragmentation. In all cases, the Panel collects imagery from at least two different and unrelated sources. In the rare cases where the Panel has had to rely on open-source imagery, the Panel verifies that imagery by referring it to eye or by checking for pixilation distortion;
    - a. In relation to air strikes, the Panel often identifies the responsible party through crater analysis or by the identification of components from imagery of fragmentation; and
    - b. The Panel also analyses imagery of the ground splatter pattern at the point of impact from mortar, artillery, or free flight rocket fire to identify the direction from which the incoming ordnance originated. This is one indicator to assist in the identification of the perpetrator for ground fire when combined with other source information.
  - (v) The utilisation of open source or purchased satellite imagery wherever possible, to identify the exact location of an incident, and to support analysis of the type and extent of destruction. Such imagery may also assist in the confirmation of timelines of the incident;
  - (vii) Access to investigation reports and other documentation of local and international organizations that have independently investigated the incident;
  - (vii) Other documentation that supports the narrative of sources, for example, factory manuals that may prove that the said factory is technically incapable of producing weapons of the type it is alleged to have produced;
  - (viii) In rare instances where the Panel has doubt as to the veracity of available facts from other sources, local sources are relied on to collect specific and verifiable information from the ground. (For example, if the Panel wished to confirm the presence of an armed group in a particular area);
  - (ix) Statements issued by or on behalf of a party to the conflict responsible for the incident; and/or
  - (x) Open-source information to identify other corroborative or contradictory information regarding the Panel's findings.
- (c) In carrying out its investigations on deprivation of liberty and associated violations the Panel relies on the following sources of information:

- (i) The victims, where they are able and willing to speak to the Panel, and where medical and security conditions are conducive to such an interview;
  - (ii) The relatives of victims and others who had access to the victims while in custody. This is particularly relevant in instances where the victim dies in custody;
  - (iii) Interviews with at least one individual or organization (either local or international) that has also independently investigated the incident;
  - (iv) Medical documentation and, where applicable, death certificates;
  - (v) Documentation issued by prison authorities;
  - (vi) Interviews with medical personnel who treated the victim, wherever possible;
  - (vii) Investigation and other documentation from local and international organizations that have independently investigated the incident. The Panel may also seek access to court documents if the detainee is on trial or other documentation that proves or disproves the narrative of the victim;
  - (viii) Where relevant, the Panel uses local sources to collect specific and verifiable information from the ground, for example, medical certificates;
  - (ix) Statements issued by the party to the conflict responsible for the incident; and/or
  - (x) Open-source information to identify other corroborative or contradictory information regarding the Panel's findings.
- (d) In carrying out its investigations on other violations, which can include forced displacement and threats against medical workers, the Panel relies on information that includes:
- (i) Interviews with victims, eyewitnesses, and direct reports where they are able and willing to speak to the Panel, and where conditions are conducive to such an interview;
  - (ii) Interviews with at least one individual or organization (either local or international) that has also independently investigated the incident;
  - (iii) Documentation relevant to verify information obtained;
  - (iv) Statements issued by the party to the conflict responsible for the incident; and/or
  - (v) Open-source information to identify other corroborative or contradictory information regarding the Panel's findings.
- (e) Upon completion of its investigation, wherever possible, the Panel provides those responsible with an opportunity to respond to the Panel's findings in so far as it relates to the attribution of responsibility. Detailed information on incidents will not be provided when there is a credible threat that would threaten Panel sources.
- (f) If a party does not provide the Panel with the information requested, as called upon by paragraph 14 of resolution [2571 \(2021\)](#), the Panel may consider this for reporting to the Committee.

2. The Panel will not include information in its reports that may identify or endanger its sources. Where it is necessary to bring such information to the attention of the Council or the Committee, the Panel may include more source information in confidential annexes.

3. The Panel will not divulge any information that may lead to the identification of victims, witnesses, and other particularly vulnerable Panel sources, except: 1) with the specific permission of the sources; and 2) where the Panel is, based on its own assessment, certain that these individuals would not suffer any danger as a result. The Panel stands ready to

provide the Council or the Committee, on request, with any additional imagery and documentation to supports the Panel's findings beyond that included in its reports. Appropriate precautions will be taken though to protect the anonymity of its sources.

## Annex 4 Member States, organizations and institutions consulted

This list excludes individuals and certain organisations or entities with whom the Panel met, in order to maintain the confidentiality of the source(s) and so as not to impede the ongoing investigations of the Panel.

Table 4.1  
Member States, organizations and institutions consulted <sup>a b c</sup>

| <i>Country/ Location</i> | <i>Government</i>                                                      | <i>Representative or International Organization</i>                                                               | <i>Institution / NGO</i>                                                            |
|--------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Algeria                  |                                                                        | Permanent Mission to the UN                                                                                       |                                                                                     |
| Australia                |                                                                        |                                                                                                                   | Federal Police <sup>c</sup>                                                         |
| Austria                  | Ministry of Foreign Affairs <sup>c</sup>                               | Permanent Mission to the UN <sup>c</sup><br>UNODC <sup>c</sup><br>Office of the Public Prosecutor <sup>c</sup>    |                                                                                     |
| Belgium                  |                                                                        | EU EEAS                                                                                                           |                                                                                     |
| Chad                     |                                                                        | Permanent Mission to the UN <sup>c</sup>                                                                          |                                                                                     |
| China <sup>a</sup>       |                                                                        | Permanent Mission to the UN                                                                                       |                                                                                     |
| Cyprus                   | Ministry of Foreign Affairs <sup>c</sup>                               |                                                                                                                   |                                                                                     |
| Egypt                    |                                                                        | Permanent Mission to the UN <sup>c</sup>                                                                          |                                                                                     |
| France <sup>a</sup>      | Ministry of Foreign Affairs                                            | Permanent Mission to the UN<br>Embassy to Libya (in Tunis)<br>UNESCO <sup>c</sup>                                 | NGOs                                                                                |
| Germany                  |                                                                        | Embassy to Libya (in Tunis)                                                                                       | NGOs <sup>c</sup>                                                                   |
| India <sup>b</sup>       |                                                                        | Permanent Mission to the UN <sup>c</sup>                                                                          |                                                                                     |
| Ireland <sup>b</sup>     | Ministry of Foreign Affairs <sup>c</sup>                               | Permanent Mission to the UN                                                                                       |                                                                                     |
| Italy                    | Ministry of Foreign Affairs<br>and other ministries and<br>departments | Permanent Mission to the UN <sup>c</sup><br>HQ EU NAVFOR<br>Guardia di Finanza<br>Office of the Public Prosecutor | NGOs                                                                                |
| Jordan                   |                                                                        | Permanent Mission to the UN <sup>c</sup>                                                                          |                                                                                     |
| Kazakhstan               |                                                                        |                                                                                                                   | Civil Aviation<br>Authority <sup>c</sup>                                            |
| Libya                    | Ministry of Foreign Affairs,<br>security agencies                      | Permanent Mission to the UN<br>IOM <sup>c</sup><br>UNHCR<br>UNICEF <sup>c</sup><br>UNSMIL<br>UNODC <sup>c</sup>   | Designated<br>entities,<br>Office of the<br>Attorney General,<br>CBL<br>NOC<br>NGOs |

| <i>Country/ Location</i>    | <i>Government</i>                                                                 | <i>Representative or International Organization</i>                      | <i>Institution / NGO</i> |
|-----------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------|
| Liechtenstein               |                                                                                   | Permanent Mission to the UN <sup>c</sup>                                 |                          |
| Malta                       | Ministry of Foreign Affairs                                                       | Permanent Mission to the UN                                              | NGOs                     |
| Mexico <sup>b</sup>         |                                                                                   | Permanent Mission to the UN                                              |                          |
| Netherlands                 |                                                                                   | Embassy to Libya                                                         |                          |
| Nigeria                     |                                                                                   | Permanent Mission to the UN <sup>c</sup>                                 |                          |
| Norway                      |                                                                                   | Permanent Mission to the UN                                              |                          |
| Poland                      |                                                                                   | FRONTEX <sup>c</sup>                                                     |                          |
| Russian Federation          |                                                                                   | Permanent Mission to the UN <sup>c</sup>                                 |                          |
| Serbia                      | Ministry of Foreign Affairs                                                       |                                                                          |                          |
| Sweden                      | Ministry of Foreign Affairs<br>(Inspectorate for Strategic Products) <sup>c</sup> |                                                                          |                          |
| Switzerland                 |                                                                                   | UN OHCHR                                                                 | NGOs                     |
| Tunisia                     | Ministry of Foreign Affairs<br>and other ministries and<br>departments            | EU Delegation to Libya<br>EUBAM <sup>c</sup><br>UNODC <sup>c</sup>       | NGOs                     |
| Turkey                      |                                                                                   | Permanent Mission to the UN<br>Embassy to Libya                          |                          |
| United Kingdom <sup>a</sup> | Foreign, Commonwealth and<br>Development Office, and<br>Treasury <sup>c</sup>     | Permanent Mission to the UN                                              | NGOs                     |
| UAE                         |                                                                                   | Permanent Mission to the UN                                              |                          |
| USA <sup>a</sup>            | State Department and other<br>departments                                         | Mission to the UN<br>SRSG SVC <sup>c d</sup><br>SRSG CAAC <sup>c e</sup> | C4ADS <sup>c</sup>       |

<sup>a</sup> Countries indicated ‘a’ are permanent members of the Security Council.

<sup>b</sup> Countries indicated ‘b’ are non-permanent members of the Security Council (2022).

<sup>c</sup> Via VTC or other electronic platform only.

<sup>d</sup> Sexual Violence in Conflict.

<sup>e</sup> Children and Armed Conflict.



## Annex 5 Summary of Panel correspondence

Table 5.1

**Correspondence with Member States (2571 (2021) Mandate)<sup>3</sup>**  
**(15 May 2021 to 25 April 2022) <sup>a</sup>**

| <i>Member State / country</i> | <i># letters sent by<br/>the Panel <sup>b</sup></i> | <i># replies from<br/>Member State</i> | <i># awaiting<br/>reply from<br/>Member State</i> |
|-------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------|
| Armenia                       | 1                                                   | 1                                      | 0                                                 |
| Azerbaijan                    | 1                                                   | 1                                      | 0                                                 |
| Belarus                       | 4                                                   | 4                                      | 0                                                 |
| Bulgaria                      | 1                                                   | 1                                      | 0                                                 |
| Chad                          | 4                                                   | 2                                      | 2                                                 |
| Cyprus                        | 3                                                   | 3                                      | 0                                                 |
| Egypt                         | 4                                                   | 3                                      | 1                                                 |
| France                        | 2                                                   | 2                                      | 0                                                 |
| India                         | 1                                                   | 1                                      | 0                                                 |
| Greece                        | 2                                                   | 0                                      | 2                                                 |
| Iran (Islamic Republic of)    | 1                                                   | 1                                      | 0                                                 |
| Italy                         | 4                                                   | 2                                      | 2                                                 |
| Jordan                        | 4                                                   | 1                                      | 3                                                 |
| Kazakhstan                    | 1                                                   | 1                                      | 0                                                 |
| Kyrgyz Republic               | 9                                                   | 7                                      | 2                                                 |
| Lebanon                       | 1                                                   | 0                                      | 1                                                 |
| Libya                         | 24                                                  | 3                                      | 21                                                |
| Moldova                       | 2                                                   | 1                                      | 1                                                 |
| Qatar                         | 2                                                   | 1                                      | 1                                                 |
| Russian Federation            | 4                                                   | 3                                      | 1                                                 |
| Saudi Arabia                  | 1                                                   | 0                                      | 1                                                 |
| South Africa                  | 3                                                   | 0                                      | 3                                                 |
| Sudan                         | 4                                                   | 1                                      | 3                                                 |
| Tunisia                       | 1                                                   | 1                                      | 0                                                 |
| Turkey                        | 15                                                  | 7                                      | 8                                                 |
| Turkmenistan                  | 1                                                   | 1                                      | 0                                                 |
| Uganda                        | 1                                                   | 0                                      | 1                                                 |

<sup>3</sup> Excluding updates to the Committee, letters to the Chair or visa requests to Member States.

| <i>Member State / country</i> | <i># letters sent by<br/>the Panel <sup>b</sup></i> | <i># replies from<br/>Member State</i> | <i># awaiting<br/>reply from<br/>Member State</i> |
|-------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------|
| Ukraine                       | 3                                                   | 2                                      | 1                                                 |
| United Arab Emirates          | 7                                                   | 4                                      | 3                                                 |
| United Kingdom                | 2                                                   | 2                                      | 0                                                 |
| <b>Total</b>                  | <b>113</b>                                          | <b>56</b>                              | <b>57</b>                                         |

<sup>a</sup> 15 May 2021 being the date the Panel was appointed pursuant to resolution [2571 \(2021\)](#), and 25 April 2022 being the last date for which responses had been requested by the Panel. Letters requesting responses after 25 April 2022 are not included in the table.

Table 5.2

**Correspondence with regional organizations and other entities (2571 (2021) Mandate)  
(15 May 2021 to 25 April 2022) <sup>a</sup>**

| <i>Organization or entity</i>                          | <i># letters sent<br/>by the Panel</i> | <i># replies <sup>b</sup></i> | <i># awaiting<br/>reply</i> |
|--------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------|-------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| Attorney General's Office Libya                        | 2                                      | 0                             | 2                           |
| European Union (FRONTEX)                               | 2                                      | 1                             | 1                           |
| <i>Front pour l'Alternance et la Concorde au Tchad</i> | 1                                      | 1                             | 0                           |
| HAF LAAF                                               | 1                                      | 0                             | 1                           |
| Libyan Investment Authority                            | 1                                      | 1                             | 0                           |
| <b>Total</b>                                           | <b>7</b>                               | <b>3</b>                      | <b>4</b>                    |

<sup>a</sup> 15 May 2021 being the date the Panel was appointed pursuant to resolution [2571 \(2021\)](#), and 25 April 2022 being the last date for which responses had been requested by the Panel.

Table 5.3

**Correspondence with commercial companies (2571 (2021) Mandate)  
(15 May 2021 to 25 April 2022) <sup>a</sup>**

| <i>Organization or entity</i> | <i># letters sent by<br/>the Panel</i> | <i># replies <sup>b</sup></i> | <i># awaiting reply</i> |
|-------------------------------|----------------------------------------|-------------------------------|-------------------------|
| Aerobusiness FZE, UAE         | 1                                      | 0                             | 1                       |
| Africo 1, Lebanon             | 1                                      | 0                             | 1                       |
| Airbus, France                | 1                                      | 1                             | 0                       |
| Akar Group, Turkey            | 1                                      | 0                             | 1                       |
| Alpha Express, Ukraine        | 1                                      | 0                             | 1                       |
| Antonov Airlines, Ukraine     | 1                                      | 0                             | 1                       |

| <i>Organization or entity</i>          | <i># letters sent by<br/>the Panel</i> | <i># replies <sup>b</sup></i> | <i># awaiting reply</i> |
|----------------------------------------|----------------------------------------|-------------------------------|-------------------------|
| AR Global FZE, UAE                     | 1                                      | 0                             | 1                       |
| Arkas Denizcilik Ve Nakliyat, Turkey   | 1                                      | 0                             | 1                       |
| CAE Aviation LLP, Luxembourg           | 1                                      | 1                             | 0                       |
| Ceha Hempel LLP, Austria               | 1                                      | 0                             | 1                       |
| CMA CGM, France                        | 1                                      | 1                             | 0                       |
| EOTech Ltd, USA                        | 1                                      | 1                             | 0                       |
| Grimaldi Group SpA, Italy              | 1                                      | 1                             | 0                       |
| Hilton Group, USA                      | 1                                      | 1                             | 0                       |
| Holman Fenwick Willan MEA LLP, UAE     | 4                                      | 3                             | 1                       |
| Iveco D.V, Italy                       | 1                                      | 1                             | 0                       |
| Jabal Alkowf, Libya                    | 1                                      | 0                             | 1                       |
| Jamaluddin Trading, UAE                | 1                                      | 0                             | 1                       |
| Jeep LLC, USA                          | 1                                      | 1                             | 0                       |
| Kapeks Kimya Sanayi A.S, Turkey        | 1                                      | 1                             | 0                       |
| L3 Harris LLC, USA                     | 1                                      | 0                             | 1                       |
| Mehdi Bros, India                      | 1                                      | 1                             | 0                       |
| Meridien Airlines FZE, UAE             | 2                                      | 1                             | 1                       |
| MNG Airlines, Turkey                   | 1                                      | 1                             | 0                       |
| MSPV LLC, UAE                          | 1                                      | 1                             | 0                       |
| Novi Automax LLC, UAE                  | 1                                      | 0                             | 1                       |
| RAK Leisure FZE, UAE                   | 1                                      | 0                             | 1                       |
| Roland Aviation FZE, UAE               | 2                                      | 0                             | 2                       |
| Sberbank Magyarorszag Zrt, Hungary     | 1                                      | 1                             | 0                       |
| South Florida Jeeps Ltd, USA           | 1                                      | 0                             | 1                       |
| Space Cargo FZE, UAE                   | 6                                      | 6                             | 0                       |
| Steyr Arms, Austria                    | 1                                      | 1                             | 0                       |
| Sur Arms, Turkey                       | 1                                      | 1                             | 0                       |
| Syrian Arab Airlines, Syria            | 2                                      | 0                             | 2                       |
| Toba Ship Management, Marshall Islands | 1                                      | 1                             | 0                       |
| Toyota Motor Company, Japan            | 1                                      | 0                             | 1                       |
| ZMT LLC, Poland                        | 1                                      | 0                             | 1                       |
| <b>Total</b>                           | <b>48</b>                              | <b>26</b>                     | <b>22</b>               |

<sup>a</sup> 15 May 2021 being the date the Panel was appointed pursuant to resolution [2571 \(2021\)](#), and 25 April 2022 being the last date for which responses had been requested by the Panel.

## Annex 6 Urgent expenditures committed by the GNU

### Panel's observations:

- Line 16 allocates LYD 16.8 million to the Stability Support Agency
- Line 24 allocates LYD 15 million to the Internal Security Service
- Line 65 allocates LYD 25 million to the Joint Task Force
- Line 87 allocates LYD 15 million to the Special Deterrence Force

Figure 6.1

Urgent expenditures committed by the GNU (source: Confidential Source)

| إدارة الميزانية<br>قسم التمويل<br>موقف بما تم تمويله على الباب الخامس (نفقات الطوارئ) للعام 2021م |               |             |                 |                                                                                     |                                                 |    |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|-------------|-----------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------|----|
| 2021 / 08 / 19                                                                                    |               |             |                 |                                                                                     |                                                 |    |
| ملاحظات                                                                                           | 5,000,000,000 | القيمة      | رقم أذن التمويل | رقم الكتاب أو القرار                                                                | الجهة                                           | ت  |
|                                                                                                   | 4,900,000,000 | 100,000,000 | 3204            | قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (16) لسنة 2021م                                               | وزارة الصحة                                     | 1  |
|                                                                                                   | 4,882,000,000 | 18,000,000  | 3221            | كتاب رئيس مجلس الوزراء رقم (660) بتاريخ 2021/4/5                                    | ديوان وزارة المواصلات                           | 2  |
|                                                                                                   | 4,876,182,236 | 5,817,764   | 3228            | كتابي وزير الدولة (1524) - (1569) بتاريخ 2021/4/21-20                               | وزارة الصحة                                     | 3  |
|                                                                                                   | 4,849,182,236 | 27,000,000  | 3233            | قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (54) لسنة 2021م                                               | وزارة الداخلية                                  | 4  |
|                                                                                                   | 4,845,082,236 | 4,100,000   | 3234            | قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (49) لسنة 2021م                                               | وزارة الثروة البحرية                            | 5  |
|                                                                                                   | 4,775,082,236 | 70,000,000  | 3235            | قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (50) لسنة 2021م                                               | الجهات التنفيذية للطيران الخاص                  | 6  |
|                                                                                                   | 4,690,082,236 | 85,000,000  | 3236            | قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (44) لسنة 2021م                                               | جهاز تنمية وتطوير المراكز الإدارية              | 7  |
|                                                                                                   | 4,540,082,236 | 150,000,000 | 3237            | قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (53) لسنة 2021م                                               | وزارة الدفاع                                    | 8  |
|                                                                                                   | 4,534,082,236 | 6,000,000   | 3238            | قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (62) لسنة 2021م                                               | ديوان مجلس الوزراء                              | 9  |
|                                                                                                   | 4,524,082,236 | 10,000,000  | 4239            | قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (69) لسنة 2021م                                               | وزارة الحكم المحلي - شركة الخدمات العامة طرابلس | 10 |
|                                                                                                   | 4,523,818,236 | 264,000     | 4241            | قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (67) لسنة 2021                                                | وزارة الإسكان والتعمير                          | 11 |
|                                                                                                   | 4,433,470,616 | 90,347,620  | 4843            | قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (85) لسنة 2021                                                | وزارة المواصلات لصيانة الطائرات                 | 12 |
|                                                                                                   | 4,383,470,616 | 50,000,000  | 5609            | قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (144) لسنة 2021 مكتب وزير الدولة رقم (4668) بتاريخ 13/6/2021م | مكتب النائب العام                               | 13 |
|                                                                                                   | 4,371,167,335 | 12,303,281  | 5610            | قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (111) لسنة 2021م                                              | وزارة الحكم المحلي - شركة الخدمات العامة طرابلس | 14 |
|                                                                                                   | 4,356,167,335 | 15,000,000  | 5611            | قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (114) لسنة 2021م                                              | ديوان وزارة الخارطة                             | 15 |
|                                                                                                   | 4,339,367,335 | 16,800,000  | 5766            | قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (127) لسنة 2021م                                              | جهاز دعم الاستقرار                              | 16 |
|                                                                                                   | 4,329,367,335 | 10,000,000  | 5767            | قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (124) لسنة 2021م                                              | المجلس الرئاسي                                  | 17 |
|                                                                                                   | 4,279,367,335 | 50,000,000  | 5768            | قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (131) لسنة 2021م                                              | جهاز المخابرات الطبية                           | 18 |
|                                                                                                   | 4,271,712,335 | 7,655,000   | 5769            | قرار رئيس مجلس الوزراء رقم (144) لسنة 2021م                                         | قوة مكافحة الارهاب                              | 19 |
|                                                                                                   | 4,269,312,335 | 2,400,000   | 5770            | قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (123) لسنة 2021م                                              | ديوان وزارة الاقتصاد والتجارة                   | 20 |
|                                                                                                   | 4,252,640,770 | 16,671,565  | 5771            | قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (105) لسنة 2021م                                              | المركز الوطني للأمن وإدارة الأزمات              | 21 |
|                                                                                                   | 4,242,640,770 | 10,000,000  | 5772            | قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (128) لسنة 2021م                                              | وزارة الرياضة                                   | 22 |
|                                                                                                   | 4,240,648,583 | 1,992,187   | 5773            | قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (130) لسنة 2021م                                              | وزارة الحكم المحلي - بلدية العزيزية             | 23 |

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| ت  | الجهة                                        | رقم الكتاب أو القرار                                       | رقم فن التمويل | القيمة     | 5,000,000,000 | ملاحظات |
|----|----------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------------|------------|---------------|---------|
| 24 | جهاز الأمن الداخلي                           | قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (129) لسنة 2021م                     | 5774           | 15,000,000 | 4,225,648,583 |         |
| 25 | مؤسسة الشارقة                                | قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (106) لسنة 2021م                     | 5878           | 8,000,000  | 4,217,648,583 |         |
| 26 | جهاز الردع لمكافحة الجريمة المنظمة والإرهاب  | قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (138) لسنة 2021م                     | 5991           | 15,000,000 | 4,202,648,583 |         |
| 27 | ديوان وزارة الاقتصاد والصناعة                | قرار مجلس الوزراء حكومة الوحدة الوطنية رقم (58) لسنة 2021م | 6868           | 4,707,820  | 4,197,940,763 |         |
| 28 | ديوان وزارة المواصلات                        |                                                            | 6869           | 22,993,349 | 4,174,947,414 |         |
| 29 | وزارة الصحة                                  |                                                            | 6870           | 1,080,702  | 4,173,866,712 |         |
| 30 | وزارة الإسكان والمرافق                       |                                                            | 6871           | 5,207,130  | 4,168,659,582 |         |
| 31 | الهيئة العامة للموارد المائية                |                                                            | 6872           | 8,190,678  | 4,160,468,904 |         |
| 32 | ديوان الهيئة العامة للثقافة والمجتمع المدني  |                                                            | 6873           | 3,134,180  | 4,157,334,724 |         |
| 33 | هيئة المشروعات العامة                        |                                                            | 6874           | 1,714,806  | 4,155,619,918 |         |
| 34 | الهيئة العامة لتشجيع الاستثمار وشؤون الخصخصة |                                                            | 6875           | 11,955,823 | 4,143,664,095 |         |
| 35 | دار الإفتاء الليبية                          | قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (134) لسنة 2021م                     | 6876           | 3,000,000  | 4,140,664,095 |         |
| 36 | المحكمة العليا                               | قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (142) لسنة 2021م                     | 6877           | 10,000,000 | 4,130,664,095 |         |
| 37 | وزارة التربية والتعليم                       | قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (137) لسنة 2021م                     | 6878           | 10,000,000 | 4,120,664,095 |         |
| 38 | وزارة السياحة والصناعات التقليدية            | قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (146) لسنة 2021م                     | 6879           | 3,000,000  | 4,117,664,095 |         |
| 39 | وزارة الصناعة والمعادن                       | قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (145) لسنة 2021م                     | 6880           | 2,000,000  | 4,115,664,095 |         |
| 40 | وزارة المواصلات (مصلحة المطارات)             | قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (147) لسنة 2021م                     | 6881           | 2,000,000  | 4,113,664,095 |         |
| 41 | وزارة الداخلية (جهاز المباحث الجنائية)       | قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (148) لسنة 2021م                     | 6882           | 10,000,000 | 4,103,664,095 |         |
| 42 | ديوان وزارة الاقتصاد والصناعة                | قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (58) لسنة 2021م                      | 6883           | 10,800     | 4,103,653,295 |         |
| 43 | جهاز تنمية وتطوير المراكز الإدارية           |                                                            | 6884           | 13,648,849 | 4,090,004,446 |         |
| 44 | وزارة الإسكان والمرافق                       |                                                            | 6885           | 907,604    | 4,089,096,842 |         |
| 45 | الهيئة العامة لتشجيع الاستثمار وشؤون الخصخصة |                                                            | 6886           | 2,280,960  | 4,086,815,882 |         |
| 46 | جهاز استثمار مياه النهر الصناعي - الحصانة    |                                                            | 6889           | 179,040    | 4,086,636,842 |         |
| 47 | الهيئة العامة لتشجيع الاستثمار وشؤون الخصخصة |                                                            | 6890           | 140,904    | 4,086,495,938 |         |
| 48 | وزارة الإسكان والمرافق                       |                                                            | 6891           | 44,748     | 4,086,451,190 |         |

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| ت  | الجهة                             | رقم الكتاب أو القرار                   | رقم آذن التمويل | القيمة      | 5,000,000,000 | ملاحظات |
|----|-----------------------------------|----------------------------------------|-----------------|-------------|---------------|---------|
| 49 | ديوان مجلس الوزراء                | قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (156) لسنة 2021م | 6895            | 10,000,000  | 4,076,451,190 |         |
| 50 | وزارة الدفاع                      | قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (244) لسنة 2021م | 6896            | 200,000,000 | 3,876,451,190 |         |
| 51 | شركة الخدمات العامة طرابلس        | قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (162) لسنة 2021م | 6897            | 17,015,180  | 3,859,436,010 |         |
| 52 | وزارة الحكم المحلي                | قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (243) لسنة 2021م | 6898            | 45,000,000  | 3,814,436,010 |         |
| 53 | ديوان مجلس الوزراء                | قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (240) لسنة 2021م | 6899            | 10,000,000  | 3,804,436,010 |         |
| 54 | الرقابة على الأغذية والأدوية      | قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (181) لسنة 2021م | 6900            | 23,300,000  | 3,781,136,010 |         |
| 55 | وزارة الحكم المحلي                | قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (168) لسنة 2021م | 6901            | 13,131,878  | 3,768,004,133 |         |
| 56 | وزارة التعليم العالي              | قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (238) لسنة 2021م | 6902            | 19,700,000  | 3,748,304,133 |         |
| 57 | وزارة الحكم المحلي - بلدية مصراته | قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (254) لسنة 2021م | 6904            | 8,000,000   | 3,740,304,133 |         |
| 58 | وزارة الصحة                       | قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (227) لسنة 2021م | 6905            | 500,000,000 | 3,240,304,133 |         |
| 59 | وزارة الصحة                       | قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (248) لسنة 2021م | 6906            | 600,000,000 | 2,640,304,133 |         |
| 60 | صندوق الضمان الاجتماعي            | قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (247) لسنة 2021م | 6907            | 500,000,000 | 2,140,304,133 |         |
| 61 | المجلس الأعلى للدولة              | قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (157) لسنة 2021م | 6908            | 50,000,000  | 2,090,304,133 |         |
| 62 | وزارة الحكم المحلي - بلدية طبرق   | قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (150) لسنة 2021م | 6909            | 4,910,365   | 2,085,393,768 |         |
| 63 | ديوان مجلس الوزراء                | قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (152) لسنة 2021م | 6910            | 15,000,000  | 2,070,393,768 |         |
| 64 | شركة الخدمات العامة طرابلس        | قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (161) لسنة 2021م | 6911            | 10,558,500  | 2,059,835,268 |         |
| 65 | قوة العمليات المشتركة             | قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (158) لسنة 2021م | 6912            | 25,000,000  | 2,034,835,268 |         |
| 66 | مركز زليتن الطبي                  | قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (255) لسنة 2021م | 6913            | 6,000,000   | 2,028,835,268 |         |
| 67 | المفوضية الوطنية للانتخابات       | قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (143) لسنة 2021م | 6915            | 50,000,000  | 1,978,835,268 |         |
| 68 | مركز بحوث التقنيات الحيوية        | قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (265) لسنة 2021م | 6916            | 5,000,000   | 1,973,835,268 |         |
| 69 | وزارة الدفاع                      | قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (239) لسنة 2021م | 6917            | 300,000,000 | 1,673,835,268 |         |
| 70 | وزارة الداخلية                    | قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (246) لسنة 2021م | 6918            | 500,000,000 | 1,173,835,268 |         |
| 71 | التعليم التقني والفني             | قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (164) لسنة 2021م | 6919            | 2,000,000   | 1,171,835,268 |         |

إدارة الميزانية  
قسم التمويل  
موقف بما تم تمويله على الباب الخامس (نفقات الطوارئ) للعام 2021م

2021 / 08 / 19

| ت        | الجهة                                                                         | رقم الكتاب أو القرار                   | رقم إذن التمويل | القيمة        | 5,000,000,000 | ملاحظات |
|----------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------|-----------------|---------------|---------------|---------|
| 72       | الهيئة العامة للبحث والتعرف على المظالم                                       | قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (144) لسنة 2021م | 6920            | 3,000,000     | 1,168,835,268 |         |
| 73       | نيوان مجلس الوزراء                                                            | قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (272) لسنة 2021م | 6921            | 50,000,000    | 1,118,835,268 |         |
| 74       | وزارة الحكم المحلي                                                            | قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (78) لسنة 2021م  | 7473            | 6,000,000     | 1,112,835,268 |         |
| 75       | وزارة العدل                                                                   | قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (287) لسنة 2021م | 7309            | 10,000,000    | 1,102,835,268 |         |
| 76       | المحكمة العليا                                                                | قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (289) لسنة 2021م | 7310            | 3,011,000     | 1,099,824,268 |         |
| 77       | المركز الليبي للبحوث والدراسات الاستراتيجية والأمن القومي                     | قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (155) لسنة 2021م | 8082            | 25,000,000    | 1,074,824,268 |         |
| 78       | وزارة الموارد المائية                                                         | قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (286) لسنة 2021م | 8090            | 5,000,000     | 1,069,824,268 |         |
| 79       | وزارة الشباب                                                                  | قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (293) لسنة 2021م | 8091            | 12,000,000    | 1,057,824,268 |         |
| 80       | وزارة المواصلات                                                               | قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (296) لسنة 2021م | 8092            | 3,000,000     | 1,054,824,268 |         |
| 81       | وزارة المواصلات (تفويضات مشاريع الطرق بالمواثيق البحرية - وزارة طرابلس مطرقي) | قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (295) لسنة 2021م | 8093            | 10,000,000    | 1,044,824,268 |         |
| 82       | مصلحة الطيران المدني                                                          | قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (297) لسنة 2021م | 8095            | 5,000,000     | 1,039,824,268 |         |
| 83       | مصلحة المطارات                                                                | قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (297) لسنة 2021م | 8095            | 15,000,000    | 1,024,824,268 |         |
| 84       | وزارة الثقافة والتنمية المجتمعية                                              | قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (276) لسنة 2021م | 8096            | 4,000,000     | 1,020,824,268 |         |
| 85       | وزارة الخدمة المدنية                                                          | قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (277) لسنة 2021م | 8097            | 4,000,000     | 1,016,824,268 |         |
| 86       | الجامعة الوطنية للعلوم والتكنولوجيا                                           | قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (318) لسنة 2021م | 8101            | 150,000       | 1,016,704,268 |         |
| 87       | جهاز الردع لمكافحة الجريمة المنظمة والإرهاب                                   | قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (327) لسنة 2021م | 8102            | 15,000,000    | 1,001,704,268 |         |
| 88       | مستوفى تسوية ممرات العاملين بالشركات                                          | قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (58) لسنة 2021م  | 8103            | 7,670,700     | 994,033,568   |         |
| 89       | وزارة الدفاع                                                                  | قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (140) لسنة 2021م | 6746            | 34,653,450    | تحت الاجراء   |         |
| 90       | الثروة البحرية                                                                | قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (140) لسنة 2021م | 8104            | 7,996,950     | تحت الاجراء   |         |
| الإجمالي |                                                                               |                                        |                 | 4,048,616,832 |               |         |

رئيس قسم التمويل

الرصيد المتبقي في حساب الطوارئ حتى 25 أغسطس  
951,383,168اعداد  
كريمة الشهوي  
محمد يحيى أحمد

|   |                                            |                                         |            |             |
|---|--------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------|------------|-------------|
| 2 | بقي مخصص قرار تسوية ممرات الشركات المتعجرة | قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم ( 58 ) لسنة 2021م | 16,131,907 | تحت الاجراء |
|---|--------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------|------------|-------------|

إدارة الميزانية  
قسم التمويل  
موقف بما تم تمويله على الباب الخامس (نفقات الطوارئ) للعام 2021م

2021 / 08 / 19

| ت        | الجهة                                      | رقم الكتاب أو القرار                    | رقم إذن التمويل | القيمة        | 5,000,000,000 | ملاحظات                                 |
|----------|--------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------|-----------------|---------------|---------------|-----------------------------------------|
| 2        | بقي مخصص قرار تسوية ممرات الشركات المتعجرة | قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم ( 58 ) لسنة 2021م |                 | 16,131,907    |               | لم يتم تمويله حتى الآن للشركات المتعجرة |
| الإجمالي |                                            |                                         |                 | 4,064,748,739 |               |                                         |



# Annex 7 Letter addressed by the 5+5 Joint Military Commission (JMC) to the Presidential Council and to the Prime Minister

Figure 7.1

Letter addressed by the 5+5 Joint Military Commission (JMC) to the Presidential Council and to the Prime Minister (14 August 2021)

للمرسل: السيد الرئيس / السيد رئيس الوزراء  
موضوع: 2021/08/14  
تاريخ: 32/167/2021

اللجنة العسكرية المشتركة  
5+5

السيد / رئيس المجلس الرئاسي  
رئيس حكومة الوحدة الوطنية

**تقارير مستقلة.. اللجنة العسكرية المشتركة (5+5) في جلستها المنعقدة**  
بمدينة سرت بتاريخ 2021/08/14 م الوضع الأمني داخل الدولة الليبية وما يؤثر  
بشكل مباشر على خطط عمل اللجنة في أبعاد شبح الحرب وعودة الأمن  
والاستقرار، حيث لاحظت العديد من الأجهزة والأجسام الأمنية والعسكرية تم  
تكليفها بمهام أو منحها صلاحيات متداخلة عسكرية وأمنية خاصة وتتبع جهات  
مختلفة (المجلس الرئاسي - القائد الأعلى - وزير الدفاع)، دون وضع حدود واضحة  
لواجباتها ومهامها والذي أدى إلى خلق زعزعة وضعف في أداء دور المؤسسة  
العسكرية والأمنية وهو أخطر ما يمكن أن تعانيه المؤسسات وهي -

01. جهاز دعم الاستقرار .... 02. جهاز الأمن العام ..
03. قوة مكافحة الإرهاب .... 04. مركز عمليات طرابلس الكبرى ..
05. جهاز قوة الردع الخاصة .... 06. القوة المشتركة معصية ..
07. المناطق العسكرية (الوسطى - الغربية - طرابلس) -
08. غرف العمليات بمسقة عامة ..
09. وإلى جهة أخرى تتبع القائد الأعلى مباشرة أن لم يرد ذكرها ..

**عليه..** توصي اللجنة بضرورة إعادة النظر في تبعية تلك الأجهزة  
وأعادة تبقيتها إلى رئاسة الأركان العامة ووزارة الداخلية حسب المهام المكلفين  
بها، حتى يتم إعادة تقييمها وإعادة هيكلتها وتحديد مهامها وفق دراسة علمية  
ومهنية، ووضع ميزانياتهم المالية برئاسة الأركان العامة ووزارة الداخلية وليست  
مستقلة .....

والسلام عليكم ورحمة الله وبركاته

الفرق /  
أحمد علي عمران أبو نوحه  
رئيس لجنة (5+5)

أ. راجع محمد أحمد العاصي  
رئيس لجنة (5+5)

مجلس النواب الليبي، للتفضل بالامتلاء -



**Official UN Translation**

2113678E

Translated from Arabic

I. Letter to PC-GNU on AGs (14 August 2021)

5+5 Joint Military Commission

Re: Review of agencies

Date:.....

Corresponding to: 19 August 2021

Joint Military Commission 32/167

**To: The President of the Presidency Council  
President of the Government of National Unity**

At its meeting held in Sirte on 14 August 2021, the 5+5 Joint Military Commission, considered the security situation in the State of Libya as it impinges directly the Commission's action plans for banishing the spectre of war and restoring security and stability. It noted that there is a multiplicity of security and military agencies and bodies that have been charged with overlapping tasks or granted overlapping military and security authorities. These agencies are subsidiary to a variety of different entities (the Presidency Council, the Commander-in-Chief, the Minister of Defence) and have not had their tasks and duties clearly defined. This has created instability and severely undermined the performance of military and security institutions.

The agencies in question are as follows:

- |                                                                                                        |                                    |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------|
| 1. The Stability Support Apparatus                                                                     | 2. The General Security Service    |
| 3. The Counter-Terrorism Force                                                                         | 4. The Emergency Operations Centre |
| 5. The Special Deterrent Force                                                                         | 6. The Misratah Joint Force        |
| 7. The Military zones (Central - West - Tripoli)                                                       |                                    |
| 8. The operations rooms in general                                                                     |                                    |
| 9. Any other agencies directly subsidiary to the Commander-in Chief that we may have failed to mention |                                    |

The Commission recommends that the hierarchical structure of these agencies be reviewed and rearranged to bring them under the Joint Chiefs of Staff or the Ministry of Interior depending on the tasks assigned to them, so they can be re-evaluated and restructured, have their tasks defined by a scientific and professional study, and have their budgets placed under the Joint Chiefs of Staff or the Ministry of Interior rather than being independent.

May peace and God's mercy and blessings be upon you.

(Signed) Major General Ahmed Ali Abu Shahma  
Chair of the 5+5 Commission

(Signed) Lieutenant General Emraja'a Emhammed  
Mohammed Al-Ammami  
Chair of the 5+5 Committee

Libyan Parliament/ Please be advised . . .

## Annex 8 Statements by the Chief of Staff of the Libyan Armed Forces and the Stability Support Apparatus (SSA)

Figure 8.1  
Statement of Al Haddad (17 August 2021)



وَزَارَةُ الدِّفَاعِ  
رَئِيسُ الأَرْكَانِ العَامَةِ للجيشِ الليبي  
مَقَرُّ رَئِيسِ الأَرْكَانِ

الموضوع: بيان لجنة 5+5  
الرقم الإشاري: / /  
الموافق: 17 / 08 / 2021 م

### 218 بيان رئاسة الأركان العامة للجيش الليبي

**نُشِيد...** ونؤمن ما حققته لجنة 5+5 العسكرية من إنجازات ساهمت في خفض مستوى التوتر وخطاب الكراهية بين أبناء الوطن الواحد وخلق مناخ مناسب لنقاش سياسي بين الفرقاء، حيث أشرفت على عودة أعداد من المحتجزين من الطرفين إلى أهلهم وذوهم، وساهمت في فتح الطريق الساحلي لتسهيل حركة تنقل المواطنين بين شرق البلاد وغربها.

**وإذ...** تقترب من موعد الاستحقاق الانتخابي في 24 ديسمبر نتفاجأ بانحراف لجنة 5+5 عن مسارها المهني واللفني المرسوم وتدخلها في الشؤون السياسية المناطة حصراً بالسلطة التنفيذية القائمة، هذه التدخلات المرفوضة وغير المهنية لها انعكاسات سلبية على مهام المجلس الرئاسي باعتباره القائد الأعلى للوحدة وعلى مهام حكومة الوحدة الوطنية المناطة بها إدارة الشأن العام وحدها دون غيرها.

**نحن...** نستغرب خطوات هذه اللجنة وخطاباتها الأخيرة التي قد يفسرها الكثير من المهتمين بالشأن الوطني والسياسي بأن دورها أصبح كسلطة جديدة فوق السلطات الوطنية القائمة، نذكر من أهمها والتي طالت وخلقت جدل كبير بين فئات عريضة من أبناء الشعب الليبي ومؤسساته، طلبها تعيين وزير دفاع على الفور رغم أننا نعلم قصر المدة المتبقية وصعوبة الاتفاق على شخصية في هذا الزمن القصير، كما تناولت خطاباتهم الأجهزة الأمنية والعسكرية القائمة وفقاً للتشريعات التي كان معمولاً بها في زمنها وأغفلت الجهود الكبيرة التي قامت بها بعضها في مكافحة الإرهاب والجريمة وساهمت في الاستقرار الأمني.

**ونأسف...** على ذلك وحتى نبدد المخاوف الناشئة عن هذه الخطابات فأنا نطلب من القائد الأعلى ورئيس حكومة الوحدة الوطنية ووزير الدفاع التدخل بوقف هذه التجاوزات التي لا تخدم حالة السلم السياسي والمجتمعي، وبأن يكون عملها مهنياً طبقاً لسياسات هذه السلطات القائمة.

حفظ الله ليبيا وشعبها

الفريق أول ركن  
محمد علي أحمد الحداد

رئيس الأركان العامة للجيش الليبي

00218 21 462 4103 WWW.PGSLA.GOV.LY

الغرداية - طرابلس - ليبيا

**Official UN Translation**

2113678E

*Translated from Arabic*

Ministry of Defence  
Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Libyan Armed Forces  
Headquarters of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Re: Statement by the 5+5 Commission  
Ref. No.:  
Corresponding to: 17 August 2021

218

**Statement of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Libyan Armed Forces**

We appreciate and commend the achievements of the 5+5 Military Commission, which has contributed to reducing the level of tension and hate speech among the people of our one country and creating an atmosphere conducive to political debate among various factions. It has overseen the return of numerous detainees from both sides to their families and helped to open the coastal road, thereby facilitating the movement of citizens between the country's east and west.

However, as we approach the 24 December election deadline, we are surprised that the 5+5 Commission has deviated from its customary professional and technical approach and chosen to interfere in political affairs that should be the exclusive purview of the current executive branch. These unacceptable and unprofessional interventions are having negative repercussions for the functions of the Presidency Council as the Commander-in-Chief and functions of the Government of National Unity as the sole entity entrusted with managing public affairs.

We are particularly dismayed by recent steps and statements of the Commission that could be interpreted by those who take an interest in national political affairs as arrogating to itself the role of a new authority above existing national authorities. One of the steps it has taken that has created considerable friction among broad segments of the Libyan public and its institutions has been its request for the immediate appointment of a new Minister of Defence, even though we all know that that it would be difficult to reach agreement on any particular person for the short time available. Its statements regarding security and military agencies formed in accordance with previously existing legislation ignore the significant efforts made by some of those agencies in the fight against terrorism and crime and their contributions to national stability.

Given the preceding, and with a view to dispelling the concerns raised by these statements, we call on the Commander-in-Chief and President of the Government of National Unity, as well as the Minister of Defence, to intervene to put a stop to these infringements, which do not serve the cause of political and social peace, and to ensure that the Commission behaves professionally and in accordance with the policies of these existing authorities.

May God save Libya and its people.

(Signed) Staff Major General  
Muhammad Ali Ahmad al-Haddad  
Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Libyan Armed Forces

Figure 8.2  
Statement of SSA (18 August 2021)



**دولة ليبيا**  
**المجلس الرئاسي**  
**جهاز دعم الاستقرار**

Index :.....  
Date : / /

الرقم الإشرافي : .....  
التاريخ : / /

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## بيان

في الوقت الذي نؤكد فيه على الجهود المبذولة من قبل اللجنة العسكرية 5+5 والتي توجت بحل العديد من المشاكل العالقة من بينها فتح الطريق الساحلي الرابط ما بين الشرق والغرب ، نؤكد ونؤيد أيضا على ما جاء في بيان غرفة العمليات المشتركة بالمنطقة الغربية التابعة لرئاسة الأركان العامة بالجيش الليبي والذي يؤكد على ضرورة ان لا تتجاوز اللجنة العسكرية 5+5 اختصاصاتها الموكلة لها . حيث تدخلت هذه اللجنة في إعادة هيكلة الأجهزة الأمنية والعسكرية التي شكلتها حكومة الوفاق السابقة وهذا ليس من اختصاص اللجنة العسكرية 5+5 حيث ان هذا العمل هو من اختصاص الحكومة . إضافة الى عدم ذكرها إعادة تنظيم القيادة العامة في الشرق لتكون من ضمن أجهزة الدولة العسكرية وتناست وتغافلت تعافا عن ذلك ، وكذلك تدخلها في تعيين وزير دفاع وهو اختصاص اصيل للحكومة بالتشاور مع المجلس الرئاسي واعتماد مجلس النواب .

جهاز دعم الاستقرار يطالب لجنة 5+5 بالتزام بالمهام المكلفة بها من المجلس الرئاسي وعدم الانحياز إلى طرف دون آخر ، وذلك ضماناً للحفاظ على وحدة الوطن وامله واستقراره .

**حفظ الله ليبيا آمنه ومستقرة**

**جهاز دعم الإستقرار**

**صدر بتاريخ : 18 اغسطس 2021م**



المقر الرئيسي طرابلس بالقرب من برج ابوليلة

ssa.ly

**Official UN Translation**

2113678E

*Translated from Arabic*

State of Libya  
Presidency Council  
Stability Support Apparatus

State of Libya  
Libyan Presidency Council  
Stability Support

Ref. No.:  
Date: / /

Index.....  
Date: / /

**Statement**

While we commend the efforts of the 5+5 Military Commission, which have culminated in the resolution of many outstanding problems, including the opening of the east-west coastal road, we must express our support for the statement of the Western Region joint operations room (subsidiary to the Joint Chiefs of Staff), which emphasizes the need for the 5+5 Joint Commission not to exceed the authorities assigned to it. That Committee has intervened in the restructuring of the security and military agencies formed by the previous government of reconciliation. That is not a prerogative of the 5+5 Military Commission; it is a competence of the Government. It also failed to mention the reorganization of the General Command in the east to become part of the State's military apparatus. It completely ignored that. It also interfered in the appointment of a Minister of Defence, which is the prerogative of the Government in consultation with the Presidency Council and subject to approval by the House of Representatives.

The Stability Support Authority calls on the 5+5 Commission to stick to the tasks assigned to it by the Presidency Council and not to align itself with one side at another's expense. That would ensure the preservation of the unity, security and stability of the nation.

May God keep Libya safe and stable.

Stability Support Apparatus  
Issued: 18 August 2021

Main headquarters, Tripoli, near the Abu Layla tower

ssa.ly

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## Annex 9 Mahmoud Al Warfalli's death and burial certificates

Figure 9.1

Al Warfalli's death certificate

الجمهورية العربية الليبية الشعبية الاشتراكية العظمى  
اللجنة الشعبية العامة للأمن العام  
مصلحة الأحوال المدنية

مكتب السجل المدني بـ

رقم ورقة العائلة: 65259  
رقم قيد العائلة: 2045604

رقم القيد بالسجل: 1651  
رقم الصفحة: 1651

الشعبية: الدره  
الحلة: المؤتمر الشعبي الأساسي  
رقم مكتب العائلة:                       
مكان صدور:                     

**شهادة وفاة**  
مستخرج رسمي لاثبات واقعة وفاة

اسم المبلغ:                       
عنوانه:                       
مستند اثبات الشخصية ورقمه: 28 12 28

اسم المتوفي ثلاثي: محمد بن يوسف الوزلي  
السن: 43  
تاريخ الولادة: 1978  
الجنس: مذكر  
الدين: مسلم  
الجنسية: ليبية  
الأسباب الوفاة (تذكر مفصلة): انحسار عضلة شري  
العنوان ومحل الإقامة: بنغازي  
تاريخ الوفاة / الساعة: 24  
الموافق اليوم: 24  
مكان الوفاة: بنغازي  
الاسم الذي قامت بالتبليغ: يذكر الاسم والمهنة  
اسم والد المتوفي:                       
اسم والدته:                       
لقبه: الوزلي  
لقبها:                       
قد استحق من البيانات أعلاه وقيدت بسجل الوفيات بالرقم أعلاه  
مكتب الذي قام بالقيد:                       
التوقيع والختم:                       
تاريخ القيد:                       
تاريخ التبليغ اليوم: 25  
الموافق اليوم: 25  
الشهر:                       
الشهر: 2021  
الشهر: 2021

(ملاحظات)

Source: Confidential



**Official UN Translation**

2204597E

Translated from Arabic

Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya  
General People's Committee on Public Safety  
Civil Registry Authority  
Form No. 10 bis

**Civil Registry Office: Benghazi**

Family sheet No.: 65258  
Family registration number:  
2045604

Entry No. in the register:  
Page No.: 1651

District  
Locality: Birkah  
Basic People's Congress  
-  
Family booklet No.  
Issued at:

Death certificate  
Official extract establishing death

Informant's name: [Redacted]  
Address: Benghazi  
Identification document and No.:  
281228 ba'

Three-part name of the deceased: Mahmud Mustafa Busif Surname: Al-Warfalli  
Sex: Male

Age: 43 Profession: Soldier Religion: Muslim  
Nationality: Libyan

Date of birth: 1978, Benghazi  
Causes of death (detailed): gunshots  
Address and place of residence: Benghazi

|                          |      |              |            |
|--------------------------|------|--------------|------------|
| Date/time of death:      | Day: | Month:       | Sunnah:    |
| Corresponding to/day: 24 |      | Month: March | Year: 2021 |
| Place of death: Benghazi |      |              |            |

Reporting party (provide name and address):

Name of deceased's father: [Redacted] Surname: Al-Warfalli  
Mother's name: [Redacted] Surname:  
The data above have been verified and recorded in the register of deaths under the  
number given above

Registering official: Misbah Amir Title: Employee

Signature/seal:

Date of registration: Corresponding to:

Reported on/Day: Month: Sunnah:  
Corresponding to/day: 25 Month: April Year: 2021  
(Comments):

Figure 9.1  
Al Warfalli's burial certificate

نموذج رقم ( 40 )

دولة ليبيا

مكتب السجل المدني / بنغازي

تصريح بالدفن

التاريخ: 2021 - 3 - 24

اسم المتوفي: محمد بن علي بن علي الورفالي

وجنسه: (ذكر أو أنثى): ذكر

وجنسيته: ليبية

وبطاقته الشخصية إن وجدت أو جواز سفره: 9

تاريخ وجهة صدورهما: 9

تاريخ ميلاده: 1978

عمره: 43

محل إقامته: بنغازي

محل وفاته: بنغازي

اسم والد المتوفي إن كان معروفا للمبلغ: # ولقبه: #

اسم والدته المتوفي إن كانت معروفة للمبلغ: # ولقبها: #

سبب الوفاة: #

صرحنا بدفن الجثة بعد أن تحققنا من شخصية المتوفي وسبب الوفاة.

توقيع أمين السجل المدني

Source: Confidential



**Official UN Translation**

2204597E

*Translated from Arabic*

**State of Libya**

**Civil Registry Authority**

Form No. 40

Civil Registry Office: Benghazi

**Burial permit**

Date: . 24 March 2021

Name of the deceased: Mahmud Mustafa Busif Surname: Al-Warfalli Sex (Male/female): Male Nationality: Libyan

Identity card or passport, if any: - Date and place of issuance: -

Date of birth: 1978 Age: 43

Name of deceased's father, if known to informant: [Redacted] Surname: -

Name of deceased's mother, if known to informant: [Redacted] Surname: Cause of death: -

Having verified the identity of the deceased and the cause of death, we hereby authorize burial

Signed by the registrar: *(Signed)*

## Annex 10 Decrees by the Presidential Council

Figure 10.1

Decree no. 7 creating a force for combating terrorism and organized crime in southern Libya



Source: Confidential

*Official UN Translation  
2205125E  
Translated from Arabic*

State of Libya Decisions  
Libyan Presidency Council  
Office of the Commander-in-Chief

**Decision of the Commander-in-Chief of the Libyan Army No. 7 (2021) concerning the establishment of a counter-terrorism and organized crime force in the Libyan south**

The Commander-in-Chief of the Libyan Army,

*Having considered the following:*

The Constitutional Declaration of 3 August 2011 and amendments thereto; The Libyan Political Agreement signed on 17 December 2015;

The outcomes of the Libyan Dialogue Forum adopted on 9 November 2020; Act No. 40 (1974) concerning military service and amendments thereto; Act No. 43 (1974) concerning military retirement and amendments thereto; Act No. 35 (1977) concerning reorganization of the Libyan army (formerly the armed forces); Act No. 5 (1978) amending certain provisions of military laws;

Act No. 11 (2012) approving certain provisions concerning the authorities of the leadership ranks of the Libyan army;

And the minutes of the meeting of the Presidency Council in its capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the Libyan army (No. 6 on 17 June 2021).

*Hereby decides as follows:*

*Article 1*

A military force to be called the Counter-Terrorism and Organized Crime Force is hereby established in the Libyan south. It shall be made up of the first company of the 116th infantry brigade and shall be subordinate to the Commander-in-Chief of the Libyan Army.

*Article 2*

An officer of the rank of no less than major shall be appointed as commander of the Counter-Terrorism and Organized Crime Force in the Libyan south by decision of the Commander-in-Chief of the Libyan Army.

*Article 3*

The force shall assume the following functions:

- It shall apprehend armed gangs that threaten the security of the South.
- It shall confront terrorism through arrests and investigations, with assistance and coordination from the relevant authorities

Figure 10.2

Decree no. 9 appointing Masud Jeddi as Commander of the force (17 June 2021)

Source: [https://twitter.com/W\\_Lacher/status/1406505082066149379/photo/3](https://twitter.com/W_Lacher/status/1406505082066149379/photo/3)

*Official UN Translation  
2205125E  
Translated from Arabic*

State of Libya    Decisions  
Libyan Presidency Council  
Office of the Commander-in-Chief

**Decision of the Commander-in-Chief of the Libyan Army No. 9 (2021) concerning the appointment of a commander of the counter-terrorism and organized crime force in the Libyan south**

The Commander-in-Chief of the Libyan Army,

*Having considered the following:*

The Constitutional Declaration of 3 August 2011 and amendments thereto; The Libyan Political Agreement signed on 17 December 2015;

The outcomes of the Libyan Dialogue Forum adopted on 9 November 2020; Act No. 40 (1974) concerning military service and amendments thereto; Act No. 43 (1974) concerning military retirement and amendments thereto;

Act No. 35 (1977) concerning reorganization of the Libyan army (formerly the armed forces); Act No. 5 (1978) amending certain provisions of military laws;

Act No. 11 (2012) approving certain provisions concerning the authorities of the leadership ranks of the Libyan army;

The minutes of the meeting of the Presidency Council in its capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the Libyan army (No. 6 on 17 June 2021);

And the Decision of the Commander-in-Chief of the Libyan Army No. 7 (2021) concerning the establishment of a counter-terrorism and organized crime force in the Libyan south.

*Hereby decides as follows:*

*Article 1*

Major Mas'ud Abdullah Mas'ud Abduljalil is hereby appointed commander of the Counter-Terrorism and Organized Crime Force in the Libyan south.

*Article 2*

This decision shall enter into force as of its date of issue and the relevant parties are required to implement it.

The Commander-in-Chief of the Libyan Army

Done on 7 Dhu al-Qa'dah A.H. 1442  
17 April 2021

## Annex 11 Decree by Haftar disbanding 116 brigade (11 September 2021)



Source: <https://www.facebook.com/sebha.press/posts/2923631484553823>.



**Official UN translation**  
*Translated from Arabic*

General Command of the Libyan Armed Forces

Decisions

**General Commander Decision No. 311 (2021) concerning the disbanding of the 116th and 117th infantry brigades**

The General Commander,

Having considered the following:

- Act No. 40 (1974) concerning service in the armed forces and amendments thereto;
- Act No. 1 (2015) amending Act No. 11 (2012) concerning the powers and leadership ranks of the Libyan army;
- House of Representatives Decision No. 20 (2014) concerning delegation of the Office of the Speaker of the House of Representatives of the competences of the Commander-in-Chief of the Libyan Army;
- And Commander-in-Chief Decision No. 20 (2015) appointing a General Commander of the Libyan Arab Armed Forces,

*Hereby decides as follows:*

*Article 1*

The 116th and 117th infantry brigades are hereby disbanded. All their personnel, functions, vehicles, weapons and ammunition in their entirety are hereby assigned to the Sabha military district.

*Article 2*

The present decision shall enter into force on the date of its issuance, all provisions contradicting it are hereby rescinded, and the relevant parties shall be required to implement it.

(Signed) Khalifah Abu al-Qasim **Haftar**  
Field Marshal  
General Commander of the Libyan Arab Armed Forces

Done at General Command headquarters - Rajmah  
11 September 2021



## Annex 12 Improvement of HAF operational capability

1. On 19 October 2021 HAF 106 brigade released a video on their official social media<sup>4</sup> of their latest combined arms firepower demonstration and exercise. The Panel believes that this demonstrates a significant increase in the professionalism of this unit from the 2019 conflict. Indicators of this include:

- (a) The activities shown on the imagery demonstrates a reasonable understanding and execution of combined arms manoeuvre [0:25] and armoured infantry tactics deploying from armoured fighting vehicles (AFV) [27''00'];
- (b) The low-level infantry tactics are reasonable, with proper fire and manoeuvre and aimed shots the norm [4''30'];
- (c) The main battle tank (MBT) gunnery tactics are good. The MBT are firing from hull-down, protective positions with the appropriate use of camouflage and concealment [8''30' and 9''20'];
- (d) The all arms capability very likely includes engineer manoeuvre support with gap crossing capabilities [30''10'];
- (e) The capability to deliver an integrated indirect fire plan was demonstrated using a combination of: (i) fighter ground attack aircraft [22''00']; (ii) BM-21 free flight rocket units [23''35']; 3) field artillery [25''12']; and 4) heavy mortars [24''58' and 27''28']; and
- (f) The use of ZSU-23/4 for integrated formation air defence along the line of advance [25''36' and 30''08'].

This brings the 106 Brigade, under the command of Khaled Khalifa Haftar<sup>5</sup> much closer to the qualities of an army unit. Indeed, many of the officers have a "Libyan Army" patch on their uniforms and vehicles display the national flag of Libya.

<sup>4</sup> <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sdYN0wA6AiU>, 19 October 2021.

<sup>5</sup> <https://libyaupdate.com/photos-lna-106-brigade-commander-checks-on-final-arrangements-for-big-tactical-training/>, 20 March 2022.

## Annex 13 Counterterrorism and terrorism related events in Libya (2021)

1. The Panel has not been able to independently verify some of the events listed in tables 12.1 and 12.2. For those verified the date is in bold type.

Table 12.1

### Reported terrorism related events in Libya

| <i>Date</i>        | <i>Event</i>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          |
|--------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <b>6 Jun 2021</b>  | ISIL-Libya claimed responsibility in the official ISIL (QDe.115) weekly publication “Annaba’a”, of a suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (SVBIED) attack targeting a HAF checkpoint at the ‘Mafreq Abnae Maziq’ Gate, near Sebha. The explosion killed at least two people including the head of the Sebha Criminal Investigation Department, Captain Ibrahim Abdunabi Mannae, and injured several others. <sup>a</sup> |
| <b>14 Jun 2021</b> | ISIL-Libya claimed Improvised Explosive Device (IED) attack against a HAF patrol in the Mount of Al Haruj, killing the commander of the “Martyrs of Al-Waw” company, Ali Mohammed Othman Al Tibaoui. <sup>b</sup>                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |
| <b>19 Jul 2021</b> | ISIL-Libya released a photo set entitled ‘Diaries of Caliphate Soldiers in Libya during Eid Al Adha’ showing a small group of fighters celebrating the Islamic holiday of Eid al-Adha, presumably in southern Libya. <sup>c</sup>                                                                                                                                                                                                     |
| <b>22 Aug 2021</b> | HAF 128 brigade was attacked at the Zillah gate checkpoint near Jufra by a suicide bomber, whose associate survived the blast, identified as a Sudanese national. He was shot as he tried to escape. On 23 August 2021, ISIS claimed responsibility for this attack that wounded some HAF personnel, through ISIL’s official media branch “Aamaq”. <sup>d</sup>                                                                       |
| <b>27 Sep 2021</b> | ISIL-Libya claimed an attack on a HAF checkpoint south of Sebha. According to initial reports there were no injuries, but the specific details of the incident remain unclear. <sup>e</sup>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           |
| <b>18 Jan 2022</b> | ISIL-Libya claimed an IED attack on a HAF camp in Umm al-Aranib, on 17 January 2022, which killed one person and injured two others. <sup>f</sup>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |
| <b>24 Jan 2022</b> | ISIL-Libya claimed an attack against two HAF vehicles, on the road between the towns of Um al-Aranib and al-Qatrun, disabling one vehicle and killing two of its occupiers. <sup>g</sup>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              |
| <b>13 Mar 2022</b> | ISIL-Libya published photos of its members swearing allegiance to the new leader of the ISIL mother group, Abu al-Hasan al-Hashimi al-Qurashi appointed on 10 March 2022. <sup>h</sup>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                |
| <b>31 Mar 2022</b> | ISIL-Libya published a video of one of its members called “Abu Tabet Al Muhajer” giving a speech where the latter pledged allegiance to the new leader of core ISIL and urging muslims to join the terrorist groups and fight on behalf of the terrorist group. <sup>i</sup>                                                                                                                                                          |

<sup>a</sup> Official ISIL weekly publication “Annaba’a” n°291. <https://letsupload.io/2dtmw>, 21 June 2021.

<sup>b</sup> Ibid.

<sup>c</sup> [https://archive.org/details/haded\\_80-61](https://archive.org/details/haded_80-61), 30 July 2021.

<sup>d</sup> <https://www.afrigenews.net/article/هجوم-زلة-الانتحاري-جنوب-ليبيا>, 25 August 2021.

<sup>e</sup> <https://ent.siteintelgroup.com/Statements/is-division-in-libya-claims-bombing-lna-checkpoint-in-sabha.html>, 27 September 2021.

<sup>f</sup> <https://ent.siteintelgroup.com/Jihadist-Threat-Statements/is-libya-province-claims-blast-on-lna-position-in-sabha.html>,

18 January 2022.

<sup>g</sup> <https://ent.siteintelgroup.com/Jihadist-Threat-Statements/exactly-1-week-after-blast-in-sabha-is-libya-province-claims-armed-attack-on-lna-vehicles-in-same-city.html>, 24 January 2022.

<sup>h</sup> <https://ent.siteintelgroup.com/documents/insite-reports-islamic-state/1553-islamic-state-insite-march-9-15/file.html>, 18 March 2022.

<sup>i</sup> <https://libyasecuritymonitor.com/isis-wiliyat-libya-issues-pledge-of-allegiance-to-new-caliph/>; 31 March 2022

Table 12.2

**Reported counterterrorism related events in Libya**

| <i>Date</i>        | <i>Event</i>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           |
|--------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 4 Mar 2021         | The AGO announced the Misratan Special Task Force arrested six ISIL-Libya members in Zliten, Garabulli, Tripoli and Zawiya. <sup>a</sup>                                                                                                                                               |
| <b>14 Mar 2021</b> | HAF spokesperson Al Mismari announced the arrest of an ISIL-Libya leader named Mohammed Miloud Mohammed (a.k.a. Abu Omar), in Al Shareb neighbourhood in the city of Awbari. <sup>b</sup>                                                                                              |
| 18 Mar 2021        | The Tripoli AGO stated that 10 women and 14 children of Tunisian origin, detained during the recapture of Sirte from ISIL-Libya, have been transferred to Tunis. The women implicated in terrorist cases are still under investigation in Libya. <sup>c</sup>                          |
| 2 Jun 2021         | Open-source media reported that the HAF Tareq Bin Ziyad brigade arrested three Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) affiliated individuals in the village of Tarout, 30km from Brak al-Shati in the south of Libya. <sup>d</sup>                                                     |
| 19 Jun 2021        | Libyan open source media reported that HAF have undertaken airstrikes within the area of the Harouj Mountains against ISIL-Libya positions around the same area. <sup>e</sup>                                                                                                          |
| 19 Jul 2021        | The AGO filed criminal lawsuits against 54 suspected ISIL-Libya members who were arrested during security operations after the liberation of Sirte. They are accused of different crimes against the State. <sup>f</sup>                                                               |
| 11 Aug 2021        | HAF's spokesperson Ahmed al-Mismari announced the arrest of a suspected ISIL-Libya operative of Sudanese origin, named Adam Ibrahim Ahmed, during a security operation near Qatrun. His associates have reportedly fled to the Chadian border. <sup>g</sup>                            |
| 11 Aug 2021        | The Libyan Minister of Justice announced the future closing of a few prisons and deportation of 100 ISIL members of Arab and African origins to their home countries. <sup>h</sup>                                                                                                     |
| 1 Sep 2021         | The Misratan Special Task Force (MSTF) had an armed clash with 'extremist and terrorist' elements (wanted by the AGO) in the '11 July area' of Misrata, which resulted in the killing of an element of the Force. <sup>j</sup>                                                         |
| <b>3 Sep 2021</b>  | The HAF Tareq Bin Ziyad brigade (TBZ) arrested a suspected AQIM member named Al-Ajili Ali al-Hasnawi, near Brak al-Shati. Ajili was reportedly responsible for arms and ammunition transfers to terrorist organisations in neighbouring countries. <sup>k</sup>                        |
| <b>7 Sep 2021</b>  | GNU Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibah announced that the Misratan Joint Operations Force had arrested an ISIL-Libyan leader named M'barek Al Khazmi. <sup>l</sup>                                                                                                                     |
| 22 Sep 2021        | Open-source media reported that HAF military intelligence arrested an Al Qaida affiliated Egyptian national in Tobruk named Saad Desouqi Sayyed Mohamed Issa. He is believed to have entered Libya on 12 September 2021 in an attempt to reach the south of Libya. <sup>m</sup>        |
| 23 Oct 2021        | Libyan open-source media reported that the GNU-affiliated Counter Terrorism Force (CTF) arrested at least two members of ISIL-Libya in the town of Misrata, one of whom fought previously in Syria. This operation was reportedly conducted in coordination with the OGA. <sup>n</sup> |
| 28 Nov 2021        | HAF 106 Brigade announced, through their official Facebook page, the arrest of an alleged terrorist named Ali Al Bakir in his residence neighbourhood of Hejara, in the city of Sebha. <sup>o</sup>                                                                                    |
| 20 Jan 2022        | HAF's Commander of the Moral Affairs, Khaled Mahjoub, reported that the 106 Brigade's 'Sahrawi' unit had arrested members of a criminal gang that trades arms and deals with extremist groups in Algeria and Mali. <sup>p</sup>                                                        |

|             |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               |
|-------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 28 Jan 2022 | HAF's spokesperson Ahmed al-Mismari announced in a press conference that 24 members of ISIL-Libya members of different nationalities were killed and one was captured during three days of clashes with LNA forces near Qatrun in south-western Libya. <sup>q</sup>                                                                                                                           |
| 02 Feb 2022 | Libyan open-source media reported that the GNU-affiliated security services underwent terrorist search and track operations in the areas of Sabratha and Mount Nafousa which resulted in the arrest of an alleged terrorist of Tunisian nationality named Bilal Bin Abdelwahab Bin Torad. <sup>r</sup>                                                                                        |
| 19 Feb 2022 | The Misratan Joint Operations Force published the confessions of four detained members of AQIM and ISIL-Libya who were based in Tripoli. These individuals revealed plans of terrorist attacks against governmental sites in Libya. <sup>s</sup>                                                                                                                                              |
| 7 Mar 2022  | The 10 <sup>th</sup> Unit of TBZ published on its official page a video of six HAF units/brigades affiliated to the Southern Operations room carrying out patrols in the Niger-Tchad border area with Libya, where they had reportedly been able to find a hideout, and a secret prison belonging to ISIL-Libya as well as a grave of one of the members of the terrorist group. <sup>t</sup> |

<sup>a</sup> <https://akhbarlibya24.net/2021/03/07/معلومات-استخباراتية-وتعاون-دولي-تتحجج>, 6 March 2021.

b <https://www.france24.com/ar/الأخبار-المغاربية/20210314-ليبيا-قوات-حفظت-تعان-القبض-على-قيادي-بارز-في-تنظيم-الدولة-الإسلامية-مجنوب-البلاد>, 20 March 2021.

<sup>c</sup> <https://www.eanlibya.com/ترحيل-10-نساء-و-14-طفلاً-من-أبناء-عناصر-داع>, 23 March 2021.

<sup>d</sup> <https://al-ain.com/article/libyan-military-sources-qaeda-arrested>, 5 June 2021.

<sup>e</sup> <https://thenewkhalij.news/article/234318/قوات-حفتر-تقصف-جنوب-غربي-ليبيا-وتزعم-استهداف-تنظيم-الدولة>, 23 June 2021.

<sup>f</sup> [https://arabic.rt.com/middle\\_east/1253410-لبيبا-النيابة-تحيل-54-عصر-اتابعا-لتنظيم-داعش-لمحكمة-الجنايات](https://arabic.rt.com/middle_east/1253410-لبيبا-النيابة-تحيل-54-عصر-اتابعا-لتنظيم-داعش-لمحكمة-الجنايات), 23 July 2021.

<sup>g</sup> <https://libyanstand.com/defaultnews/2021-08-12/18501>, 12 August 2021.

<sup>h</sup> <http://alwasat.lv/news/libya/329131>, 13 August 2021.

<sup>j</sup> <https://web.facebook.com/100471891533689>-قوة المهام الخاصة بمديرية امن-مصراته, 3 September 2021.

<sup>k</sup> <https://anbaa.info/?p=66642>, 5 September 2021.

<sup>1</sup> <https://www.alarabiya.net/north-africa/2021/09/07/ليبيا-الدبيبة-يعلم-القبض-على-أخطر-قادة-داعش>, 10 September 2021.

<sup>m</sup> [https://web.facebook.com/permalink.php?story\\_fbid=391121039125768&id=100667168171158](https://web.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=391121039125768&id=100667168171158), 24 September 2021.

<sup>n</sup> <https://www.maghrebvoices.com/cve/2021/10/23/قوة-مكافحة-الإرهاب-في-ليبيا-تعتقل-عنصر-إباز-زانتتظيم-داعش/>, 24 October 2021.

<sup>0</sup> <https://www.facebook.com/Brigade106/photos/a.1731529457062609/3063934390488769>, 28 November 2021.

<sup>p</sup> <https://www.libyaakhbar.com/libya-news/1767883.html>, 20 Jan 2022.

<sup>q</sup> Press conference of HAF's Spokesperson <https://youtu.be/1Kqkyga8UU>, 28 January 2022.

<sup>f</sup> <https://www.alchourouk.com/article/القض-على-الارهابي-التونسي-جلال-بن-عبد-الوهاب-في-العاصمة-النبيهة-طرابلس>, 3 February 2022.

<sup>s</sup> <https://akhbarlibya24.net/2022/02/20/خليفة-ارهابية-في-طرابلس/>, 20 February 2022.

<sup>t</sup> <https://fb.watch/bP3lQsQhY8/>, 11 March 2022.

## Annex 14 Statement of the HAF representatives of the 5+5 JMC

الموضوع: بيان  
التاريخ: 2021/11/11  
الموافق: 2021/11/11

اللجنة العسكرية المشتركة  
5+5

اللجنة العسكرية المشتركة  
5+5

**بيان اللجنة العسكرية المشتركة (5+5)  
ممثلي القيادة العامة للقوات المسلحة العربية الليبية**

انطلاقاً من حرص اللجنة العسكرية المشتركة (5+5) على تنفيذ بنود اتفاق وقف إطلاق النار في 2020/10/23 م بجينيف .  
ودعماً من القيادة العامة للقوات المسلحة العربية الليبية وتحفيزها لأعضاء اللجنة العسكرية المشتركة (5+5) على المضي قدماً وبخطوات شجاعة تحفظ كرامة الوطن والمواطن وحتى تتحرر كافة الأراضي الليبية بعزيمة أبناء الوطن وحرصاً من القيادة العامة على السيادة الوطنية والأمنية للارضى الليبية ولتطلب القيادة الفرنسية للقيادة العامة بشأن إطلاق مبادرة عملية لإخراج دفعة أولى من المرتزقة والمقاتلين الأجانب والمتواجدين في مناطق سيطرة القوات المسلحة العربية الليبية وذلك كاستثناء من شرط الخروج المتزامن والمتوازن الذي تم الاتفاق عليه بين أعضاء اللجنة العسكرية المشتركة (5+5) في خطتها لإخراج المرتزقة والمقاتلين الأجانب والقوات الأجنبية برعاية بعثة الأمم المتحدة للدعم في ليبيا .

قررت القيادة العامة للقوات المسلحة العربية الليبية إخراج عدد (300) فرد من المرتزقة والمقاتلين الأجانب كدفعة أولى وسيتم التنسيق المباشر مع بعثة الأمم المتحدة أثناء عملية نقل المقاتلين إلى دولهم وبمراعاة كافة المحاذير والأوضاع الأمنية وذلك بالتنسيق مع هذه الدول لتحقيق السلام والاستقرار في ليبيا ودول الجوار

حفظ الله ليبيا

اللجنة العسكرية المشتركة 5+5  
ممثلي القيادة العامة للقوات المسلحة العربية الليبية

Source: <https://www.alghad.tv/> لجنة-55-البدء-في-سحب-300-مرتزق-من-ليبيا/ 11 November 2021

**Official UN translation**  
*Translated from Arabic*

5+5 Joint Military Commission  
Subject: Statement

Date:  
Corresponding to: 11 November 2021

**Statement of the 5+5 Joint Military Commission**

**Representatives of the General Command of the Libyan Arab Armed Forces**

In keeping with the commitment of the 5+5 Joint Military Commission to implementing the terms of the ceasefire agreement signed in Geneva on 23 October 2020,

With the support of the General Command of the Libyan Arab Armed Forces; with a view to encouraging the members of the 5+5 Joint Military Commission to move forward with bold steps to preserve the dignity of the Libyan homeland and its citizens; with a view to seeing all of Libyan territory liberated in accordance with the determination of our homeland's citizenry; in keeping with the commitment of the General Command to the sovereignty and security of Libyan territory; and in response to the request made by the French leadership to the General Command to take the initiative on the ground to evacuate an initial group of mercenaries and foreign fighters from areas controlled by the Libyan Arab Armed Forces – as an exception to the condition of synchronized and balanced withdrawal agreed to between members of the 5+5 Joint Military Commission in its plan to remove mercenaries, foreign fighters and foreign forces under the auspices of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL),

The General Command of the Libyan Arab Armed Forces has decided to evacuate an initial group of 300 mercenaries and foreign fighters. There will be direct coordination with the United Nations Mission during the process of transferring fighters to their countries, accompanied by security precautions and coordination with the countries involved, with a view to bringing about peace and stability in Libya and neighbouring countries.

May God preserve Libya.

The 5+5 Joint Military Commission  
Representatives of the General Command of the Libyan Arab Armed Forces

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## Annex 15 Sudanese groups in Libya

1. Since the entry into force of the Juba Peace Agreement, most of the signatories who had an important presence in Libya, namely Sudan Liberation Army / Minni Minawi (SLA/MM), Sudan Liberation Army / Transitional Council (SLA/TC), Gathering of the Sudan Liberation Forces (GSLF) and Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), have brought their elements back to Sudan (paragraph 19 to [S/2021/229](#)). However, it is estimated that their forces still in Libya are scattered in the areas of Hun, Suknah, Jufra, Zilla, Brak al-Shatii and Ghat. Since October 2020, other subgroups of non-signatories, such as Sudan Liberation Army/Abdul Wahid (SLA/AW) and the Sudanese Revolutionary Awakening Council (SRAC), have not had an effective military capability in Libya due to internal divisions.
2. SLA/MM is still receiving salaries and equipment from HAF however they have been reduced over the last months. This group is recruiting fighters in Sudan and training new members in Darfur, some of whom are sent to Libya. On 29 April 2021, the Sudanese Prime Minister Abdallah Hamdok issued a decree appointing Minni Minawi, leader of SLA/MM, as governor of the Darfur region<sup>6</sup>. The members of this group move back and forth between Darfur and Libya.
3. Abdallah Banda's group is still active in Libya in the area of Jufra, providing support personnel to HAF there. It has been reported that some of his members have allied to the SLA/MM group remaining in Libya, from whom they receive salaries.
4. By December 2021, half of Taher Hajar's GSLF group remained in Libya and are positioned around Surt and Jufra.
5. On 30 June 2021, the social media website of the military operation "Volcano of Rage" reported that a group of armed Sudanese nationals attacked a police station in Hun, in an attempt to free one of their members, who had been arrested by the local authorities for the killing of a Libyan national.<sup>7</sup> This incident was later confirmed and described<sup>8</sup> by Mahmud Ghmed, President of the "Jufra Society".<sup>9</sup>
6. In mid October 2021, at least 150 vehicles belonging to Sudanese armed groups, escorted by vehicles marked as belonging to HAF 116 and 117 brigades<sup>10</sup> relocated from the area of Al Fawwar<sup>11</sup> (south-east of Waw al-Kabir) to the region of Kilinja<sup>12</sup> (west of Kufra).
7. In early December 2021, at least 300 members of SLA/TC led by Saleh Jabal Si have moved from Libya to Korma in Sudan where a field visit was undertaken by UNITAMS, a team of experts from United Nations headquarters and members of the Darfur Permanent Ceasefire Committee ([S/2022/172](#)).
8. On 1 March 2022, during a patrol, the HAF Subul Al Salam battalion clashed with a Sudanese armed group that used to serve under HAF 128 in the Al-Rubyana, 90 km from Tazerbu area. Sources of the Panel indicated that after their defection from the latter, this group of armed Sudanese engaged in criminal activities and set up checkpoints to rob the population in the area. The group was composed of at least 18 individuals and 3 armed vehicles with HAF 128 brigade insignia.

<sup>6</sup> <https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/rebel-leader-minawi-appointed-governor-of-darfur>, 21 May 2021

<sup>7</sup> <https://www.facebook.com/Burkanly/posts/2916186455324164>, 20 September 2021.

<sup>8</sup> <https://web.facebook.com/watch/?v=302701233762470>, 20 September 2021.

<sup>9</sup> "Al Jufra Society" is a social group created in February 2021, based in Hun. It is a civil society organization that cares of all social issues related to the Jufra region including human rights.

<sup>10</sup> See annex 10 HAF disbanding 116 brigade. The Panel has yet to reconcile the status of this military grouping.

<sup>11</sup> 24°03'08.5"N 17°35'37.9"E

<sup>12</sup> 23°16'35.80"N, 20° 1'37.02"E



## **Annex 16      Front pour l'Alternance et la Concorde (FACT) and other Chadian opposition groups in Libya**

### **Background on FACT**

1. By early 2021, this group held several bases in the areas of Tamenhint, Brak Shati and Jabal Al Aswad. Comprised of at least 1,500 fighters, it was affiliated to HAF for which it operated surveillance and patrol missions in the south of Libya in cooperation with the 128 brigade and the 116brigade (prior to its disbandment). The leader of FACT, Mahamat Mahdi Ali, claimed that during their stay in Jufra in 2020, they collaborated with ChVK Wagner operatives in security missions in Brak Shati, adding that this PMC distrusted him because of his close relationship with France (where he was a political refugee for 25 years). Mahamat Mahdi denied to the Panel receiving any kind of training from ChVK Wagner, and further added that all contact with HAF stopped in April 2021.

### **FACT military activities in Libya**

2. On 11 April 2021, FACT launched its offensive against the Chadian forces from its bases in south Libya to Tibesti in Chad, which coincided with the presidential election day in Chad. The Chadian army claimed more than 300 FACT fighter fatalities and imprisonment of 150 others, whilst losing five of its soldiers in the clashes.<sup>13</sup> FACT counter-claimed that they took control of two Chadian bases in Wour and Zouarké.<sup>14</sup> The FACT leader claimed that drones of unknown origin constantly monitored his forces' movement.

3. On 18 April 2021, the Chadian President was reported to be dead, from wounds suffered on the combat front against FACT.<sup>15</sup> However, the FACT leader claimed that his group had no knowledge of the presence of Deby on the battlefield<sup>16</sup> and was unsure whether his forces were directly responsible for the Deby's death.

4. On 14 September 2021, the HAF Tariq Bin Ziyad (TBZ) special forces battalion led an offensive against a FACT base in the area of Terbu that lasted at least 4 days. FACT later issued two communiqués<sup>17</sup> on the incident describing the armed clashes against their group. <sup>18</sup> The HAF official media branch reported on its official social media page<sup>19</sup> that the offensive was led by the TBZ battalion supported by the 116 brigade, with air support from its air force.

5. FACT members are still present in Libya, reportedly south of Qatrun.<sup>20</sup>

<sup>13</sup> <https://fr.africanews.com/2021/04/19/tchad-plus-de-300-rebelles-et-cinq-militaires-tues-samedi-dans-le-nord-selon-l-armee/>, 4 May 2021.

<sup>14</sup> FACT communiqué of 11 April 2021. <https://bit.ly/2YsD5Wn>.

<sup>15</sup> [https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2021/04/20/mort-d-idriss-deby-le-sud-libyen-troublante-base-arriere-des-rebelles-tchadiens\\_6077460\\_3212.html](https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2021/04/20/mort-d-idriss-deby-le-sud-libyen-troublante-base-arriere-des-rebelles-tchadiens_6077460_3212.html), 20 April 2021.

<sup>16</sup> Panel interview with Mahamat Mahdi Ali, Leader of FACT, July 2021.

<sup>17</sup> FACT communiqué of 14 September 2021. <https://web.facebook.com/LeFACT/photos/3067447253544786>.

<sup>18</sup> FACT communiqué of 15 September 2021. <https://web.facebook.com/LeFACT/photos/3068023780153800>.

<sup>19</sup> [https://web.facebook.com/mediawarinformationdivision/?\\_rdc=1&\\_rdr](https://web.facebook.com/mediawarinformationdivision/?_rdc=1&_rdr), 20 September 2021.

<sup>20</sup> "Soldiers of fortune: The future of Chadian fighters after the Libyan ceasefire"

<https://globalinitiative.net/analysis/chadian-fighters-libyan-ceasefire/>, 3 December 2021

## FNDJT and CCMSR:

6. On 26 January 2022 FNDJT claimed responsibility for an armed attack launched from its rear bases in south of Libya on a Chadian military post (Post 35) in Kouri Bougoudi, in the Tibesti region, north of Chad.<sup>21</sup> FNDJT and CCMSR<sup>22</sup> are both members of a military-political coalition created on 28 March 2021 along with two other Chadian opposition groups namely *L'union des mouvements pour la démocratie et le développement* (UMDD), *l'Union Nationale pour le Changement* (UNC)(Fig.1).

Figure 16.1

### Constitution of the alliance




Source: <https://www.facebook.com/www.CCMSR>, 28 March 2021.

<sup>21</sup> <https://www.facebook.com/tchadienne.larevolutionpopulaire>, 26 January 2021.

<sup>22</sup> The Panel has reported on the activities of CCMSR in Libya in to [S/2021/229](#), annex 9.

## Annex 17 Syrian fighters in Libya

Figure 17.1  
Alaa Al-Junaid at Tikbali Camp, Tripoli



1. On 18 July 2021, in a video interview,<sup>23</sup> Colonel Fadl Allah Hajji<sup>24</sup> of the 'Syrian National Army' admitted sending Turkish backed Syrian combatants to Libya "as part of a strategic plan of the cooperation between the (Syrian) National Army and the Turkish Army...and they are not considered as mercenaries by the Turks nor by the Libyans...we didn't send fighters to kill the Libyans, but to maintain peace and security, to protect airports and the Libyan oil interests...".

<sup>23</sup> [https://mobile.facebook.com/watch/?v=294256929137721&\\_rdr](https://mobile.facebook.com/watch/?v=294256929137721&_rdr), 18 July 2021.

<sup>24</sup> Identified from figures 13.2 and 13.3.

Figure 17.2  
Colonel Fadl Allah Hajji



Figure 17.3  
Video still of Hajji



Source: <https://jisrtv.com/الأخبار-الجسر-السورية-استقالة-القائد-العام-للجبهة-الوطنية-للتحرير>, 1 August 2021.

2. On 31 August 2021 a group of GNU-AF Syrians demonstrated outside their base camp of Al Yarmouk against the delay in their salaries for over four months (figure 13.4). They put road blockades on a main road and set small fires in the immediate surroundings in front of the entrance gate of the camp. A GNU-AF commander stated to the Panel that the Syrians present in those camps were not engaged in any military activity and some escaped to attempt to migrate illegally to Europe.

Figure 17.4  
Demonstration at Al Yarmouk Camp, Tripoli

**Al Yarmouk Camp, Tripoli**  
(32°47'52.9"N 13°13'26.9"E)  
(31 August 2021)

On 31 August 2021, a video widely published on social media shows a group of individuals, later identified as Syrians based in the Al Yarmouk Camp, putting blockades on a road, setting fire and demonstrating in front of the main gate of the same camp.

**Primary sources**

1. <https://web.facebook.com/AACNEWSLY/videos/1045475682876324>, 3 September 2021.
2. Google Earth Pro.

Developed by UN Panel of Experts.



## Annex 18 22 December 2021 HNEC statement



## بيان مجلس المفوضية: بشأن تحديد يوم الاقتراع (للمرحلة الأولى) من الانتخابات الرئاسية

2021-12-22 12:09 م

لقد اخذت المفوضية على عاتقها تحقيق (إرادة الشعب) في انتخابات حرة ونزيهة تقود إلى تغيير سلمي للسلطة تُنتج حالة من الاستقرار كخطوة نحو بناء دولة المؤسسات والقانون التي ينشدها الليبيون. وعلى الرغم من الصعوبات والتحديات الفنية والقانونية التي واجهتها منذ استلامها للقوانين الانتخابية إلا أنها أنجزت الكثير وباتت على مشارف انجاز تاريخي يسطع نوره على كافة ارجاء الوطن.

غير أن تلك الصعوبات لا تنفك حتى تأتي بأخرى. فقد شكلت مرحلة (الطعون) المنعطف الخطير على مسار العملية الانتخابية. وكانت بمثابة المحطة التي توقفت عندها مساعي الجميع لإنجاز هذا الاستحقاق التاريخي المسؤول لاعتبارات لم تكن في متناول الفائزين عليها كان أبرزها: قصور التشريعات الانتخابية فيما يتعلق بدور القضاء في الطعون والنزاعات الانتخابية. الأمر الذي انعكس سلباً على حق المفوضية في الدفاع عن قراراتها. وأوجدت حالة من عدم اليقين من أن قرارات المفوضية جانبها الصواب فيما يتعلق باستبعادها لعدد من المترشحين الذين لا تنطبق عليهم الشروط. كما أن التداخل القائم بين المعطيات السياسية والاحكام القضائية الصادرة دفع بقرار الإعلان عن (القائمة النهائية) للمترشحين إلى ما يعرف بحالة (القوة القاهرة) التي أفضت إلى عدم تمكن المفوضية من الإعلان عنها ومن ثم عدم قدرتها على تحديد يوم 24 ديسمبر يوماً للاقتراع على الرغم من جاهزيتها الفنية الكاملة لإنجاز العملية في التاريخ المذكور.

ووفقاً لما ورد بالمادة (43) من القانون رقم (1) لسنة 2021 بشأن انتخاب رئيس الدولة وتحديد صلاحياته. وتعديلاته. والتي تنص على أن تُعلن المفوضية عن تأجيل عملية الاقتراع. ويحدد مجلس النواب موعداً آخر لإجراء عملية الاقتراع خلال (30) يوماً. فأن المفوضية تقترح بعد التنسيق مع مجلس النواب أن يؤجل يوم الاقتراع (للمرحلة الأولى) إلى 24 يناير 2022 عملاً بنص المادة أعلاه. على أن يتولى (مجلس النواب) العمل على اتخاذ الإجراءات الكفيلة بإزالة حالة (القوة القاهرة) التي تواجه استكمال العملية الانتخابية.

وعلى مستوى عملية انتخاب مجلس النواب المقررة بموجب القانون رقم (2) لسنة 2021. فأن عملية التدقيق في طلبات المترشحين البالغ عددها (5385) قد قاربت على الانتهاء وهي في طور المراجعة النهائية. وحال استلامنا لردود شركائنا في عملية التدقيق ومدى انطباق شروط الترشح الواردة بالقانون. سوف تصدر المفوضية قرارها المتعلق بالإعلان عن القوائم الأولية لمترشحي مجلس النواب. ومن ثم البدء في مرحلة الطعون.

وبالمناسبة نود أن نؤكد على أننا لم نتخل عن تحمل مسؤولياتنا. وانجزنا ما يتوجب علينا القيام به بما لا يدع مجالاً للشك في حيادتنا واستقلاليتنا. وأن الاتهامات الموجهة إلينا بالتقصير والتسييس ما هي إلا مجرد حملات للتشويش والتظليل هدفها النيل من سمعة المفوضية وعرقلة هذا الاستحقاق بما يخدم اجنداتهم العنيفة. وفي الوقت نفسه نضع السلطات التشريعية والقضائية أمام مسؤولياتهم والتزاماتهم في الأخذ بإجراءات تُفضي إلى نجاح هذا الاستحقاق بما يحقق آمال شعبنا وتطلعاته نحو غد أفضل يزخر بالسلام والتنمية والرخاء.

وُفّقنا جميعاً إلى ما فيه صالح البلاد والعباد والله ولي التوفيق

مجلس المفوضية الوطنية العليا للانتخابات

في 22 ديسمبر 2021





### بيان مجلس المفوضية بشأن تحديد يوم الاقتراع (للمرحلة الأولى) من الانتخابات الرئاسية

لقد اخذت المفوضية على عاتقها تحقيق (إرادة الشعب) في الانتخابات حرة ونزيهة تقود إلى تغيير سلمي للسلطة تُنتج حالة من الاستقرار كخطوة نحو بناء دولة المؤسسات والقانون التي ينشدها الليبيون، وعلى الرغم من الصعوبات والتحديات الفنية والقانونية التي واجهتها منذ استلامها للقوانين الانتخابية إلا أنها التجزت الكثير ويات على مشارف انجاز تاريخي يسطع نوره على كافة أرجاء الوطن.

غير أن تلك الصعوبات لا تفسد حتى ثاني باخري، فقد شكلت مرحلة (الطمون) المتعطف الخطير على مسار العملية الانتخابية، وكانت بمثابة المحطة التي توقفت عندها مساعي الجميع لإنجاز هذا الاستحقاق التاريخي المسؤول لا اعتبارات لم تكن في متناول القانونيين عليها فكان أبرزها، قصور التشريعات الانتخابية فيما يتعلق بدور القضاء في الطمون والنزاعات الانتخابية، الأمر الذي انعكس سلباً على حق المفوضية في الدفاع عن قراراتها، وأوجدت حالة من عدم اليقين من أن قرارات المفوضية جانبها الصواب فيما يتعلق باستبعادها لعدد من المترشحين الذين لا تنطبق عليهم الشروط، كما أن التداخل القائم بين المحميات السياسية والاحكام القضائية الصادرة دفع بقرار الإعلان عن (القائمة النهائية) للمترشحين إلى ما يعرف بحالة (القوة القاهرة) التي اقتضت إلى عدم سكون المفوضية من الإعلان عنها ومن ثم عدم قدرتها على تحديد يوم 24 ديسمبر يوماً للاقتراع على الرغم من جاهزيتها الفنية الكاملة لإنجاز العملية في التاريخ المذكور.

وفقاً لما ورد بمادة (43) من القانون رقم (1) لسنة 2021 بشأن انتخاب رئيس الدولة وتحديد صلاحياته، وتعديلاته، والتي تنص على أن تُعلن المفوضية عن تأجيل عملية الاقتراع، ويحدد مجلس النواب موعداً آخر لإجراء عملية الاقتراع خلال (30) يوماً، فإن المفوضية تقترح بعد التنسيق مع مجلس النواب أن يؤجل يوم الاقتراع (للمرحلة الأولى) إلى 24 يناير 2022 عملاً بنص المادة أعلاه، على أن يتولى (مجلس النواب) العمل على اتخاذ الاجراءات الكفيلة بإزالة حالة (القوة القاهرة) التي تواجه استكمال العملية الانتخابية.



وعلى مستوى عملية انتخاب مجلس النواب المقررة بموجب القانون رقم (2) لسنة 2021، فإن عملية التدقيق في طلبات المترشحين البالغ عددها (5385) قد قاربت على الانتهاء وهي في طور المراجعة النهائية، وحال استلامنا لردود شركائنا في عملية التدقيق ومدى انطباق شروط الترشح الواردة بالقانون، سوف تصدر المفوضية قرارها المتعلق بالإعلان عن القوائم الأولية لترشيح مجلس النواب، ومن ثم البدء في مرحلة الطمون.

وبالنسبة لود أن تؤكد على أننا لم نخلى عن تحمل مسؤولياتنا، وإنجازنا ما يتوجب علينا القيام به بما لا يدع مجالاً للشك في حيادتنا واستقلاليتنا، وأن الاتهامات الموجهة إلينا بالتقصير والتسييس ما هي إلا مجرد حملات للتشويش والتظليل هدفها النيل من سمعة المفوضية وعرقلة هذا الاستحقاق بما يخدم أجنداتهم الميثية، وفي الوقت نفسه نضع السلطتين التشريعية والقضائية أمام مسؤولياتهم والتزاماتهم في الأخذ بإجراءات تُفضي إلى نجاح هذا الاستحقاق بما يحقق آمال شعبنا وتطلعاته نحو هذا أفضل بزخر بالسلام والتنمية والرخاء.

**وُفقنا جميعاً إلى ما فيه صالح البلاد والعباد  
والله ولي التوفيق**

**مجلس المفوضية الوطنية العليا للانتخابات**  
**في 22 ديسمبر 2021**

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مجلس المفوضية يعقد اجتماعاً استثنائياً مع أعضاء اللجان الانتخابية بنغازي

إعلان عن تمديد فترة تسجيل المرشحين

عضو مجلس المفوضية يستقبل المستشار الدولي

2014-05-07

"جاستن ماروزي" - بيان-مجلس-المفوضية-بشأن-تحديد-

Source: <https://hnec.ly/2021/12/22/الاق-يوم-بشأن-تحديد-يوم-الاق>

*Translated from Arabic*  
*Official UN translation*

**High National Elections Commission**

**Statement of the Commission board on setting a polling date for the first round of presidential elections**

22 December 2021, 12:09 hours

The Commission is carrying out its responsibility to see the will of the people realized in free and fair elections leading to a peaceful transfer of power that brings about stability as a step towards building the State of institutions and law to which Libyans aspire. Despite the technical and legal difficulties and challenges it has faced since it received the elections laws, it has accomplished a lot and is on the verge of a historic achievement that will shine its light throughout the whole country.

Unfortunately, no sooner is one set of difficulties resolved than another emerges. The challenge stage marked a dangerous turning point in the electoral process. It in effect became the station stop at which efforts to carry forward this historical election came to a halt, owing to considerations that were beyond election officials' control. Most notably, electoral laws were deficient with respect to the role of the judiciary in electoral challenges and disputes. That had a negative impact on the right of the Commission to defend its decisions. It created uncertainty about the correctness of decisions by the Commission to disqualify a number of candidates who did not meet conditions. The interference of political interests with the judicial rulings issued pushed the decision to announce the final list of candidates into what may be described as a force majeure situation. The Commission was unable to make its announcement, and therefore unable to set 24 December as election day even though, from a technical standpoint, it was fully prepared to conduct the process on that date.

Article 43 of Act No. 1 (2021) on the election and definition of powers of the Head of State and amendments thereto provides that the Commission shall announce the postponement of the voting process and the House of Representatives shall set another date for conduct of the voting process within 30 days. After coordinating with the House of Representatives, the Commission proposes to postpone the polling date for the first round to 24 January 2022 in accordance with the above-mentioned article. Meanwhile, the House of Representatives must act to take measures to remove the force majeure situation standing in the way of the electoral process.

As far as election for the House of Representatives – as provided for by Act No. 2 (2021) – is concerned, the vetting process for the 5,385 candidate applications is nearing completion and is at the final review stage. Once we have received the responses of our partners in the vetting process on whether the conditions for candidacy provided for by the law have been met, the Commission will issue a decision announcing preliminary candidate lists for the House of Representatives. Then the challenge phase will begin.

We would like to take this opportunity to stress that we have not abdicated our responsibilities. We have carried out our duties in a way that leaves no doubt as to our neutrality and independence. The accusations of negligence and politicization being made against us are just efforts to cast a shadow over the Commission's reputation and obstruct this election in the interests of unconstructive agendas. In the meantime, we encourage the legislative and judicial branches to carry out their responsibilities and take the actions needed for the success of this election in order to achieve the hopes and aspirations of our people for a better tomorrow full of peace, development and prosperity.

May we all succeed achieving the interests of the country and the people, with God's help.

The High National Elections Commission

22 December 2021



## Annex 19 Various factors impacting the electoral process

### 1. A disputed legal framework

The electoral laws adopted by the House of Representatives (HOR)<sup>25</sup> failed to offer a largely agreed constitutional basis.<sup>26</sup> Several sources believe that these texts were deliberately devised to create dissension and prevent the elections from happening; they would have been adopted only to demonstrate goodwill and avoid sanctions.<sup>27</sup> Similarly, the UN and various Member States received their share of criticism<sup>28</sup> for failing to achieve consensus among the Libyans in a timely manner after the adoption of the roadmap<sup>29</sup> and for supporting the electoral process despite the flaws affecting the laws finally adopted.

### 2. Controversial candidacies

The successive candidacies for presidential election of prominent figures across Libya of Saif al-Islam Qadhafi (LYi.015),<sup>30</sup> Khalifa Haftar,<sup>31</sup> the HoR Speaker, Aguila Saleh,<sup>32</sup> and incumbent Prime Minister Dbeibah<sup>33</sup> stirred controversies over their legality and/or legitimacy.<sup>34</sup> The confirmation of Saif al-Islam Qadhafi's (LYi.015) candidacy by the Sebha court on 5 December 2021 antagonized both Haftar and Libyan figures and armed groups from the west. This has exacerbated the challenge of publishing the final list of candidates by HNEC.

### 3. Threats and security incidents

The Panel identified several problematic incidents that preceded the planned elections, such as forced closure of electoral offices, public calls to boycott the elections, and threats addressed to the HNEC (table 19.1).

<sup>25</sup> On 8 September 2021, HoR issued Law No. 1 (2021) on the elections of the president; on 1 November 2021, HoR issued Law No. 9 (2021) amending Law No. 1: [https://liasinstitute.com/PDFs/HoR\\_Law\\_No\\_1\\_2021.pdf](https://liasinstitute.com/PDFs/HoR_Law_No_1_2021.pdf), 8 September 2021.

<sup>26</sup> See SG Report 2022/31, paragraph 5 regarding the amendment of the electoral framework, SG Report 2022/31.

<sup>27</sup> Confidential sources and Jalel Harchaoui and Wolfram Lacher in <https://www.franceculture.fr/emissions/cultures-monde/de-tripoli-a-bagdad-voter-suffit-il-a-faire-etat>, 10 January 2022.

<sup>28</sup> Confidential sources and Jalel Harchaoui and Wolfram Lacher in <https://www.franceculture.fr/emissions/cultures-monde/de-tripoli-a-bagdad-voter-suffit-il-a-faire-etat>, 10 January 2022.

<sup>29</sup> According to the roadmap, the 75 participants to the LPDF should have agreed on the constitutional basis for the elections by July 2021.

<sup>30</sup> On 14 November 2021

<sup>31</sup> On 16 November 2021

<sup>32</sup> On 17 November 2021

<sup>33</sup> On 21 November 2021

<sup>34</sup> <https://www.skynewsarabia.com/video/1480989-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A8%D8%A9-%D9%8A%D9%82%D8%AF%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%94%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82-%D8%AA%D8%B1%D8%B4%D8%AD%D9%87-%D9%84%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%94%D8%A7%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A7>, 22 November 2021.

## Threats and security incidents

<https://mubasher.aljazeera.net/news/politics/2021/11/5/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B4%D8%B1%D9%8A-%D9%84%D9%84%D8%AC%D8%B2%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D9%85%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B4%D8%B1-%D8%A5%D8%AC%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A1>, 4 November 2021.

[https://m.facebook.com/story.php?story\\_fbid=1553940311640789&id=625474811154015&m\\_entstream\\_source=video\\_home&player\\_suborigin=entry\\_point&player\\_format=permalink&\\_ft\\_=qid.-7380469463049397347%3Amf\\_story\\_key.91791707478938268600%3Atop\\_level\\_post.id.425419515814851%3Acontent\\_owner\\_id\\_new.625474811154015%3Apage\\_id.625474811154015%3Atracking\\_source.video\\_home%3Astory\\_location.31%3Astory\\_attachment\\_style.video\\_inline%3Aott.AX90DCVHFNVO\\_Zsl%3Atds\\_flg.3,11%3Atds\\_flg.3,11](https://m.facebook.com/story.php?story_fbid=1553940311640789&id=625474811154015&m_entstream_source=video_home&player_suborigin=entry_point&player_format=permalink&_ft_=qid.-7380469463049397347%3Amf_story_key.91791707478938268600%3Atop_level_post.id.425419515814851%3Acontent_owner_id_new.625474811154015%3Apage_id.625474811154015%3Atracking_source.video_home%3Astory_location.31%3Astory_attachment_style.video_inline%3Aott.AX90DCVHFNVO_Zsl%3Atds_flg.3,11%3Atds_flg.3,11)

[africa/2021/11/15/%D9%85%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%B4%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A8%D8%BA%D8%B1%D8%A8-%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%81%D8%B6-%D8%AA%D8%B1%D8%B4%D8%AD-%D8%B3%D9%8A%D9%81-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B0%D8%A7%D9%81%D9%8A-%D9%88%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%AF%D8%AF-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B1%D8%A8-, 15 November 2021.](#)

<sup>39</sup> <https://h nec.ly/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/scan0001-1.pdf>. Accessed 13 April 2022

| <i>Date</i> | <i>Event</i>                                                                                                                                         | <i>Remarks</i>                                                                                                                                                                      |
|-------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|             |                                                                                                                                                      | Despite this intimidation, the procedure ended on 5 December 2021 with a decision favourable to Saif al-Islam Qadhafi's (LYi.015) inclusion in the list of presidential candidates. |
| 16 Dec 2021 | Salah Badi (LYi.028) threatened to shut down State institutions in Tripoli <sup>41</sup> and asserted that elections would not happen. <sup>42</sup> |                                                                                                                                                                                     |

<sup>41</sup> <http://en.alwasat.ly/news/libya/342713>, 16 December 2021.

<sup>42</sup> [https://www.facebook.com/watch/?ref=search&v=291163996357697&external\\_log\\_id=9f7ac813-f3ff-40d3-9aa1-abfc9a2bf367&q=%D8%B5%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AD%20%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AF%D9%8A%20%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A7%20%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AA](https://www.facebook.com/watch/?ref=search&v=291163996357697&external_log_id=9f7ac813-f3ff-40d3-9aa1-abfc9a2bf367&q=%D8%B5%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AD%20%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AF%D9%8A%20%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A7%20%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AA), 16 December 2021.

## **Annex 20 Incidents of violations of international humanitarian law and international human rights law committed in detention facilities under the control of armed groups in Libya**

1. The Panel has interviewed twenty-three victims and their family members<sup>43</sup> in regard to alleged violations of international humanitarian law and human rights law that took place during the period from 2015 to 2021. The incidents were perpetrated in official and unofficial places of detention including: (a) the Mitiga detention facility in Tripoli, under the exclusive responsibility and control of the Special Deterrence Forces (SDF); (b) the Saadawi Camp in Ain Zara under the control of Tripoli Revolutionaries Brigade (TRB); (c) the Gernada detention facility in Al Bayda under the control of the HAF Libyan Arab Armed Forces (LAAF); (d) Al Kweifiya detention facility in Benghazi under the control of the HAF LAAF; (e) unofficial place of detention (“military prison”) in Sidi Freij in Benghazi under the control of HAF Tariq Ibn Ziyad brigade; (f) HAF LAAF military intelligence facilities in Benghazi; (g) unofficial place of detention under the internal security agency (ISA) facility in Al Marj; and (h) the detention facility in Tarhuna under the control of Al Kaniyat until June 2020. Summary information is at table 20.1.

2. The Panel identified that officials of SDF, TRB and the four LAAF armed groups had complete control over the victims during the period of their arrest, detention, and transfers to other locations. In all twenty-three cases the Panel found that the detaining authorities: (a) violated victims’ right to liberty and security of person by arresting them on arbitrary grounds; and (b) intentionally depriving them of core procedural and judicial guarantees. This equates to arbitrary and unlawful detention.<sup>44</sup>

3. Fifteen individuals consistently reported that different methods of torture and other mistreatment were administered on detainees, including severe beatings with pipes and cables, suspension, sleep deprivation, denial of food and potable water, and deliberate denial of medical care. Some of these methods were used in combination and repeatedly on a regular basis for the purpose of obtaining information, punishing, or otherwise coercing the detainees.<sup>45</sup> Four family members of individuals detained in the Gernada, Saadawi and Mitiga detention facilities reported inhuman treatment caused by prolonged incommunicado detention and harsh material conditions.<sup>46</sup>

4. Five of seven detainees were executed in detention facilities under the control of Al-Kaniyat.<sup>47</sup> The five victims were identified among excavated bodies from mass graves in the Tarhuna area. All victims and witnesses attributed the seven incidents to individuals of the Al-Kaniyat armed group. Three witnesses consistently stated that the three Al-Kani brothers who were Al-Kaniyat’s top commanders, Abdurahem El Shgagi (a.k.a. Abdurahem Al-Kani), Mohammed El Shgagi (a.k.a. Mohammed Al-Kani),<sup>48</sup> and Mohsen<sup>49</sup> El Shgagi (a.k.a. Mohsen Al-Kani), ordered and in five cases executed acts of torture and murder of detainees.

5. Six members of the legal profession told the Panel that armed groups operating in the above locations have seriously undermined the role of judges and lawyers in: (a) ensuring respect for detainees’ procedural rights; and (b) in preventing torture and other ill-treatment in detention. These armed groups act with complete impunity from the judicial system. The Panel identified that in two documented cases, the SDF refused to implement decisions of Libyan judicial and government institutions in violation of procedural and judicial safeguards of detainees held in the SDF Mitiga detention facility.

<sup>43</sup> Where a victim was unable to give testimony due to an ongoing detention the Panel interviewed an immediate family member.

<sup>44</sup> Article 9 of the ICCPR; UN Human Rights Committee, *General Comment No. 35*, CCPR/C/GC/35, 16 December 2014.

<sup>45</sup> See Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions; article 7 of the ICCPR.

<sup>46</sup> Panel interview with family members (CS 07, 08, 09 and 13).

<sup>47</sup> Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions.


<sup>48</sup> Deceased, reportedly on 27 July 2021, <https://apnews.com/article/middle-east-africa-shootings-libya-13a98c8ccac6def7c4ebd381e7e32fbc>.

<sup>49</sup> Deceased, reportedly on 13 September 2019, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-libya-security-idUSKCN1VY2L2>.

## Appendix A to Annex 20: Locations of detention facilities under the control of armed groups

Figure 20.1

Map of detention facilities



**CONFIDENTIAL** Appendix B to Annex 20: Summary of investigated incidents

## Annex 21      Slavery of migrant detainees in the Mitiga detention facility

1. Four migrant detainees testified to the Panel that individuals of the SDF formed and supervised groups of able-bodied migrants in the Mitiga detention facility (“Mitiga”) for the primary purpose of forced labour. Former detainees identified Osama Najim and Adel Mohamed Ali (a.k.a. “Sheikh Adel”) as individuals directly responsible for their unlawful transfer and unlawful labour that violated the prohibition of slavery, cruel treatment and outrages upon personal dignity under international humanitarian law.<sup>50</sup>
2. Migrant detainees were unlawfully transferred to Mitiga from official and unofficial detention places in Tripoli by a well-organised scheme operated by SDF individuals since at least April 2019.<sup>51</sup> The migrants were captured by the Libyan Coast Guard while attempting to cross the Mediterranean Sea and taken to temporary detention places in the Tripoli area (see figure 21.1).
3. SDF members responsible for the supervision of detainees deliberately exercised power of ownership over migrant detainees under their exclusive control. They forcibly deployed detainees in various locations inside and in close vicinity of Mitiga, primarily as a labour force in support of SDF military operations. In addition to being unlawfully recruited to participate in military operations, detainees had to perform labour under dangerous conditions and inside legitimate military objectives. Military-related tasks included: (a) cleaning and loading weapons; (b) unloading arms shipments in Tripoli port; and (c) unloading arms and other military equipment into underground ammunition storage sites around Mitiga (see appendix C), where they were occasionally exposed to shelling. Other tasks involved collecting and managing dead bodies of fighters and migrant detainees who were killed on the front lines;<sup>52</sup> and reparation and reconstruction work on facilities belonging to the SDF that were damaged or destroyed during the active military hostilities.<sup>53</sup>
4. Under armed supervision, migrant detainees worked for twelve to fourteen hours a day to the point of physical exhaustion, without any form of compensation. When they refused to engage in unlawful labour or were unable to perform enforced tasks due to fatigue, they were punished by severe beatings and prolonged solitary confinement in an inadequate isolation cell under poor sanitary conditions and without access to food and potable water (for the Panel’s findings on mistreatment in Mitiga, see annex 20). They performed assigned tasks feeling degraded and humiliated, and under the constant fear of violence.


<sup>50</sup> Common article 3 of the Geneva Conventions; Article 4 of Additional Protocol II.

<sup>51</sup> Victims testified that the scheme of unlawful transfers of migrants for forced labour existed at least since the military offensive on Tripoli by HAF LAAF started in April 2019.

<sup>52</sup> Victims testified that groups of migrant detainees were forcibly sent to the front lines to directly participate in the hostilities.

<sup>53</sup> Common article 3 of the Geneva Conventions.




**Appendix A to Annex 21: Scheme of unlawful transfers of migrants to the Mitiga detention facility**

## Appendix B to Annex 21: Locations of forced labour in the Mitiga detention facility

Figure 21.B.1

Former detainee's sketch of Mitiga



Source: Confidential

Figure 21.B.2

Satellite imagery of Mitiga for comparison<sup>54</sup>



Source: Google Earth

<sup>54</sup> The veracity of the detainee's evidence was supported by the accuracy of his hand-drawn map which matches the actual geographic features shown on the satellite imagery.

## Appendix C to Annex 21: Satellite imagery and locations of GNU-AF underground ammunition storage sites where migrant detainees were forced to perform military tasks

Figure 21.C.1

### Underground ammunition storage site 1



Source: Google Earth



Figure 21.C.2  
Underground ammunition storage site 2



Source: Google Earth

Figure 21.C.3  
Underground ammunition storage site 3



Source: Google Earth

## **Annex 22     Attacks on human rights defenders, social activists and media workers**

1. The Panel identified six incidents of attacks committed against individuals who participated in public life as human rights defenders, social activists, or media workers. Attacks were perpetrated in the form of unlawful deprivation of life, unlawful deprivation of liberty, enforced disappearance, intimidation, and threats to life.
2. Two female human rights defenders were further intimidated into withdrawing from public life by being subjected to gender-based violence, which included repeated online harassment for reasons related to their gender, receiving humiliating and degrading messages of misogynistic nature on their social media accounts, and online threats of exposing intimate photographs in public.<sup>55</sup>
3. Two prominent human rights defenders were unlawfully abducted from their workplaces by masked armed men and taken in Toyota vehicles to unknown locations shortly after they actively promoted free and democratic elections in Libya. The victims have been kept outside the protection of the law and their whereabouts were deliberately concealed for an extended period of time. The Panel continues to investigate to identify the perpetrators.
4. The Panel found that all these violent acts violated the victims' human rights and in particular the right to life, liberty, and freedom of expression.<sup>56</sup> A summary is at table 22.1 in confidential appendix A.

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<sup>55</sup> Article 1 of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women.

<sup>56</sup> See articles 6, 9 and 19 of the ICCPR. See also UN CAT, *Francisco Dionel Guerrero Larez v. Venezuela*, Communication No. 456/2011, 15 May 2015, para. 6.6; UN Human Rights Committee, *General Comment No. 35*, para. 58 (incommunicado detention or enforced disappearance as a form of ill-treatment).



**CONFIDENTIAL** Appendix A to Annex 22


**Annex 23      Human rights abuses in unlawful detention places under the control of networks of human traffickers in Bani Walid and Tazirbu**

1. This annex contains evidence of human rights abuses committed against four migrants in unlawful detention facilities under the control of networks of human traffickers: (a) Bani Walid (appendix A); and (b) Tazirbu (confidential appendix B).

## Appendix A to Annex 23: Locations of unlawful detention places under the control of human traffickers in Bani Walid

Figure 23.A.1


Excerpts from a video footage of detention places in Bani Walid



Source: <https://twitter.com/rgowans/status/1368703470702845959?s=20&t=vlxBPEs4Bs7gYPy9ZQmUJg>.

Figure 23.A.2

Network of identified human traffickers in control of detention places in Bani Walid and responsible for serious human rights violations against migrants and asylum seekers



Sources: CS 85 and 86.

1. Witnesses identified four individuals responsible for running a well-organised network of human trafficking of persons from, among others, Eritrea, Somalia and Sudan. Abdel Al Munam owns private detention facilities in Bani Walid where trafficked persons were imprisoned and subjected to serious human rights violations. Hassan Qidi manages the detention facilities and Abdel Al Munam's brothers, Waleed and Ashraf, assist him in running the trafficking chain.
2. Two female victims, who were children at the time of captivity, identified Hassan Qidi and Abdel Al Munam as individuals who repeatedly raped them, subjected them to sexual enslavement and other forms of sexual violence in the period from 2018 until 2020.
3. Hassan Qidi was arrested on 5 March 2021 during a law enforcement operation by members of the Libyan Ministry of Defence.<sup>57</sup>

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<sup>57</sup> <https://twitter.com/rgowans/status/1368703470702845959?s=20&t=vkxBPes4Bs7gYPy9ZQmUJg>.

**CONFIDENTIAL** Appendix B to Annex 23: Locations of unlawful detention places under the control of human traffickers in Tazirbu

## **Annex 24      Violations of international human rights law against migrants and asylum seekers**

1. This annex contains evidence of serious violations of international human rights law against migrants and asylum seekers: (a) in detention centres for migrants under the authority of the DCIM prior to December 2021, and (b) under the authority of the SSA (appendices A and B); and 2) associated with maritime operations (appendix C).<sup>58</sup>
2. The Panel sent five letters to Libya requesting information regarding the human rights situation in DCIM detention facilities and associated with maritime operations, and responses are awaited.
3. On 23 March 2022, the Panel had a telephone call with the new Head of DCIM, Mr. Mohamed Salem al-Khodja,<sup>59</sup> to discuss the human rights situation of migrants and asylum seekers under the control and authority of the DCIM and in particular the identified human rights violations in DCIM detention centres for migrants.

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<sup>58</sup> See articles 6, 7 and 9 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

<sup>59</sup> Mohamed Salem al-Khodja was appointed as Head of DCIM by GNU Decree 742 (2021) on 23 December 2021.

## Appendix A to Annex 24: Violations of international human rights law committed against migrants in detention centres

Table 24.A.1

### Location of DCIM detention facilities for migrants prior to December 2021

| <i>Facility</i>     | <i>Operator</i> | <i>Latitude (°N)</i> | <i>Longitude (°E)</i> | <i>Remarks</i> |
|---------------------|-----------------|----------------------|-----------------------|----------------|
| Abu Salim           | DCIM            | 32.830867            | 13.158163             | Operational    |
| Ain Zara            | DCIM            | 32.783611            | 13.28545              | Operational    |
| Ajdabiya            | DCIM            | 30.75967             | 20.223749             | Empty          |
| Al Bayda            | DCIM            | 32.768295            | 21.741761             | Operational    |
| Al Falah            | DCIM            | 32.849505            | 13.14872              | Operational    |
| Al Gatroun          | DCIM            | 24.933333            | 14.633333             | Empty          |
| Al Kufra            | DCIM            | 24.184672            | 23.275175             | Empty          |
| Al Mabani           | DCIM            | 32.849937            | 13.111648             | Operational    |
| Al Marj             | DCIM            | 32.29559             | 20.49483              | Empty          |
| Al Qubba            | DCIM            | 32.758201            | 22.241164             | Operational    |
| az-Zawiyah Abu Isa  | DCIM            | 32.753059            | 12.631052             | Operational    |
| az-Zawiyah Al-Nasr  | DCIM            | 32.771767            | 12.696328             | Operational    |
| Baten al Jabal      | DCIM            | 32.071312            | 11.43797              | Operational    |
| Bir al Ghanam       | DCIM            | 32.2904663           | 12.4932337            | Operational    |
| Dirj                | DCIM            | 30.172877            | 10.455851             | Operational    |
| Ganfouda Benghazi   | DCIM            | 32.042797            | 20.028183             | Operational    |
| Gharyan Abu Rashid  | DCIM            | 32.205972            | 12.980663             | Operational    |
| Gharyan al Hamra    | DCIM            | 32.30664             | 12.989343             | Empty          |
| Sabrata             | DCIM            | 32.79193             | 12.484716             | Empty          |
| Shahhat             | DCIM            | 32.808215            | 21.869684             | Operational    |
| Shara az-Zawiyah    | DCIM            | 32.874982            | 13.191959             | Operational    |
| Shati               | DCIM            | 27.53884             | 13.987545             | Empty          |
| Suq al Khamis       | DCIM            | 32.604361            | 14.342944             | Empty          |
| Talmetha (as-Sahel) | DCIM            | 32.31056             | 20.342                | Empty          |
| Tarik al-Sikka      | DCIM            | 32.877049            | 13.196427             | Empty          |
| Tobruk              | DCIM            | 32.083611            | 23.976389             | Operational    |
| Twesha              | DCIM            | 32.694866            | 13.1588745            | Empty          |
| Wadi Al Hai         | DCIM            | 32.191               | 12.4454               | Empty          |
| Zintan              | DCIM            | 31.991556            | 12.515028             | Empty          |



| <i>Facility</i> | <i>Operator</i> | <i>Latitude (<sup>0</sup>N)</i> | <i>Longitude (<sup>0</sup>E)</i> | <i>Remarks</i> |
|-----------------|-----------------|---------------------------------|----------------------------------|----------------|
| Zliten          | DCIM            | 32.472881                       | 14.57121                         | Empty          |
| Zwara           | DCIM            | 32.938242                       | 12.063675                        | Empty          |

**Sources:** CS 24, 36, 45, and Panel analysis.

Table 24.A.2

**Location of DCIM detention facilities for migrants as of March 2022**

| <i>Facility</i>     | <i>Operator</i> | <i>Latitude (<sup>0</sup>N)</i> | <i>Longitude (<sup>0</sup>E)</i> | <i>Remarks</i> |
|---------------------|-----------------|---------------------------------|----------------------------------|----------------|
| Abu Salim           | DCIM            | 32.830867                       | 13.158163                        | Operational    |
| Ain Zara            | DCIM            | 32.783611                       | 13.28545                         | Operational    |
| Ajdabiya            | DCIM            | 30.75967                        | 20.223749                        | Empty          |
| Al Bayda            | DCIM            | 32.768295                       | 21.741761                        | Operational    |
| Al Gatroun          | DCIM            | 24.933333                       | 14.633333                        | Empty          |
| Al Kufra            | DCIM            | 24.184672                       | 23.275175                        | Empty          |
| Al Marj             | DCIM            | 32.29559                        | 20.49483                         | Empty          |
| Al Qubba            | DCIM            | 32.758201                       | 22.241164                        | Operational    |
| az-Zawiyah Abu Isa  | DCIM            | 32.753059                       | 12.631052                        | Operational    |
| Daraj               | DCIM            | 30.172877                       | 10.455851                        | Operational    |
| Ganfouda Benghazi   | DCIM            | 32.042797                       | 20.028183                        | Operational    |
| Gharyan Abu Rashid  | DCIM            | 32.205972                       | 12.980663                        | Operational    |
| Gharyan al Hamra    | DCIM            | 32.30664                        | 12.989343                        | Empty          |
| Sabrata             | DCIM            | 32.79193                        | 12.484716                        | Empty          |
| Shahhat             | DCIM            | 32.808215                       | 21.869684                        | Operational    |
| Shara az-Zawiyah    | DCIM            | 32.874982                       | 13.191959                        | Operational    |
| Shati               | DCIM            | 27.53884                        | 13.987545                        | Empty          |
| Suq al Khamis       | DCIM            | 32.604361                       | 14.342944                        | Empty          |
| Talmetha (as-Sahel) | DCIM            | 32.31056                        | 20.342                           | Empty          |
| Tarik al-Sikka      | DCIM            | 32.877049                       | 13.196427                        | Empty          |
| Tobruk              | DCIM            | 32.083611                       | 23.976389                        | Operational    |
| Twesha              | DCIM            | 32.694866                       | 13.1588745                       | Empty          |
| Zintan              | DCIM            | 31.991556                       | 12.515028                        | Empty          |
| Zwara               | DCIM            | 32.938242                       | 12.063675                        | Empty          |

Table 24.A.3

**Location of detention facilities for migrants under the former DCIM administration as of December 2021**

| <i>Facility</i> | <i>Operator</i>            | <i>Latitude (°N)</i> | <i>Longitude (°E)</i> | <i>Remarks</i> |
|-----------------|----------------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|----------------|
| Al Mabani       | Former DCIM administration | 32.849937            | 13.111648             | Operational    |
| Baten al Jabal  | Former DCIM administration | 32.071312            | 11.43797              | Operational    |
| Wadi Al Hai     | Former DCIM administration | 32.191               | 12.4454               | Operational    |

Table 24.A.4

**Location of SSA DCSIM detention facilities for migrants as of December 2021**

| <i>Facility</i>    | <i>Operator</i> | <i>Latitude (°N)</i> | <i>Longitude (°E)</i> | <i>Remarks</i> |
|--------------------|-----------------|----------------------|-----------------------|----------------|
| Al-Maya            | SSA DCSIM       | 32.808367            | 12.900751             | Operational    |
| Al-Zahra           | SSA DCSIM       | 32.41347             | 12.52082              | Operational    |
| az-Zawiyah Al-Nasr | SSA DCSIM       | 32.771767            | 12.696328             | Operational    |

**Sources:** CS 24, 28, and Panel analysis.

Figure 24.A.5

**DCIM Ain Zara [L] and DCIM Al Mabani [R]**

**Source:** Google Earth

Figure 24.A.6

DCIM An Naser [L] and DCIM Tarik al-Sikka [R]



Source: Google Earth

Figure 24.A.7

DCIM Shara Zawiya [L] and SSA Al-Maya [R]



Source: Google Earth

**CONFIDENTIAL** Appendix B to Annex 24: Summary of investigated incidents

## Appendix C to Annex 24: Violations of international human rights law committed against migrants and asylum seekers associated with maritime operations

### A. Maritime incidents of 30 April 2021 and 30 June 2021

Figures 24.C.1<sup>a</sup> and 24.C.2<sup>b</sup>

**Excerpts from video imagery showing the acts of ill-treatment and excessive use of force committed against persons in distress by the Libyan Coast Guard at sea**



LCG member beating migrants in distress with a bullwhip.



LCG members shooting at and making hazardous manoeuvres against migrants.

<sup>a</sup> Sea-Watch 4 crew video of 30 April 2021.

[https://twitter.com/seawatch\\_intl/status/1388171810315902976](https://twitter.com/seawatch_intl/status/1388171810315902976), 30 April 2021. The Panel authenticated the video with the primary source.

<sup>b</sup> Seabird – Sea-Watch reconnaissance aircraft video of 30 June 2021.

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=62BDsKmjsVY>, 5 July 2021. The Panel authenticated the video with the primary source.

### B. Maritime incidents of 12 August 2021 and 19 January 2022

1. The Panel identified that on the night of 12 August 2021, in a supposedly law enforcement operation, armed individuals of SSA maritime units used deadly force against migrants, located in a boat in the waters that survivors claimed to be an hour away from the coast of Zawiya, in violation of their right to life.<sup>60</sup> In particular, SSA individuals performed hazardous movements, including by hitting the migrant boat, and fired gunshots at the passengers that caused the death of one person on board.<sup>61</sup> The surviving eyewitnesses, whom SSA embarked on their boat and returned to Libya, recognised the SSA boat as responsible for the incident (see figure 24.C.3)

<sup>60</sup> Article 6 of the ICCPR.

<sup>61</sup> CS 38 and 60; Forensic death report dated 23 August 2021.



2. The Panel identified the same pattern of violence in an incident of 19 January 2022, when the armed individuals of SSA maritime units used excessive force against around fifty migrants at sea and subjected them to degrading treatment (see Figures 24.C.4 to 24.C.6).<sup>62</sup>

Figures 24.C.3 to 24.C.6

**Imagery of SSA maritime units involved in excessive use of forces and degrading treatment against migrants at sea<sup>63</sup>**



SSA boat *Alqayid-2* identified by eyewitnesses of 12 August 2021 incident.<sup>a</sup> Source CS 38 and 60.



SSA Lambro Olympic D74 boat identified by eyewitnesses of 19 January 2022 incident.<sup>b</sup> Source CS82.



Individual of SSA kicking a person in distress during the 19 January 2022 incident.<sup>c</sup>



Two individuals of SSA armed with AK-type assault rifles engaged in the 19 January 2021 incident.<sup>d</sup>

<sup>a</sup> SSA DCSIM official Facebook page: <https://www.facebook.com/107789065107358/posts/113202834565981/?d=n>, 03 January 2022.

<sup>b</sup> MV Louise Michel: <https://twitter.com/mvlouisemichel/status/1483861110470107140?s=21>, 19 January 2022.

<sup>c</sup> SSA DCSIM official video of the 19 January 2022 incident: [https://twitter.com/rgowans/status/1486032488149438464?s=20&t=bxYGk7i5hyWSXXz\\_sCz0MA](https://twitter.com/rgowans/status/1486032488149438464?s=20&t=bxYGk7i5hyWSXXz_sCz0MA), 25 January 2022.

<sup>62</sup> Articles 6, 7 and 9 of the ICCPR.

<sup>63</sup> For a detailed overview of SSA naval assets, see annex 27.

<sup>d</sup> SSA DCSIM official video of the 19 January 2022 incident:

[https://twitter.com/rgowans/status/1486032462564278281?s=20&t=bxyGk7i5hyWSXXz\\_sCz0MA](https://twitter.com/rgowans/status/1486032462564278281?s=20&t=bxyGk7i5hyWSXXz_sCz0MA), 25 January 2022.

### C. Maritime incident of 22 April 2021

1. The Panel investigated a shipwreck incident that had resulted in approximately 130 fatalities to individuals in distress<sup>64</sup> in the Libyan Search and Rescue region (SRR) on 22 April 2021. During the investigation, the Panel interviewed ten witnesses and collected forty-seven elements of documentary evidence, including imagery of the shipwrecked boat.<sup>65</sup>

2. The boat (designated by Panel as BD01) with approximately 130 passengers on board left Al Khoms at approximately 22:00 hours CEST<sup>66</sup> on 20 April 2021<sup>67</sup> and set course for Italian ports. BD01 was accompanied by a second boat (designated by Panel as BD02), which had approximately 100 passengers on board. The vessels became “in distress” on the morning of 21 April 2021 due to deteriorating weather conditions. This was a complex incident which is best explained by summarising the facts (see table 24.C.7).<sup>68</sup>

Table 24.C.7

#### Maritime incident with boat BD01 (20 – 22 April 2021)

| <i>Date</i> | <i>Time <sup>a</sup></i> | <i>Event</i>                                                                                                                  | <i>Remarks</i>                                                                                                                                                                      |
|-------------|--------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 20 Apr 2021 | 22:00                    | BD01 and BD02 depart Al Khoms, Libya                                                                                          | ▪ 230+ migrants and asylum seekers on board.                                                                                                                                        |
| 21 Apr 2021 | 09:52                    | NGO Alarm Phone alert Libya, Italy and Malta MRCCs via email to possible Search and Rescue (SAR) incident.                    | ▪ No acknowledgement or response from any MRCC.                                                                                                                                     |
| 21 Apr 2021 | 10:03                    | NGO Alarm Phone establish contact with BD01.                                                                                  |                                                                                                                                                                                     |
| 21 Apr 2021 | 11:00                    | NGO Alarm Phone receive coordinates and details of dangerous conditions on board.                                             | ▪ NGO Alarm Phone maintain contact with BD01 throughout day until evening.                                                                                                          |
| 21 Apr 2021 | 11:28                    | NGO Alarm Phone send full details of incident to Libya, Italy and Malta MRCCs by email, including conditions and coordinates. | ▪ Figures 24.C.9 and 24.C.10.<br>▪ Seven updates sent during day (see figures 24.C.11 to 24.C.14, 24.C.16, 24.C.17 and 24.C.20).<br>▪ No acknowledgement or response from any MRCC. |

<sup>64</sup> International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue (SAR Convention) defines “distress phase” as “a situation wherein there is a reasonable certainty that a person, a vessel or other craft is threatened by grave and imminent danger and requires immediate assistance”, Annex, Chapter 1, para. 1.3.13, SAR Convention.

<sup>65</sup> The Panel considers a boat in this context as a small watercraft designed for use on inland waterways or protected coastal areas. This is to distinguish it from a vessel, which has a sea going capability.

<sup>66</sup> All times are in Central European Summer Time (CEST).

<sup>67</sup> Panel interviews with CS 69 and 88; and <https://alarmphone.org/en/2021/04/22/coordinating-a-maritime-disaster-up-to-130-people-drown-off-libya/>.

<sup>68</sup> For another detailed timeline of the incident, see <https://alarmphone.org/en/2021/04/22/coordinating-a-maritime-disaster-up-to-130-people-drown-off-libya/>; [https://alarmphone.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/20210716\\_AP182\\_BF-COE.pdf](https://alarmphone.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/20210716_AP182_BF-COE.pdf); and [https://www.lemonde.fr/international/video/2021/10/31/migrants-enquete-sur-le-role-de-l-europe-dans-le-piege-libyen\\_6100475\\_3210.html](https://www.lemonde.fr/international/video/2021/10/31/migrants-enquete-sur-le-role-de-l-europe-dans-le-piege-libyen_6100475_3210.html).



| <i>Date</i> | <i>Time <sup>a</sup></i> | <i>Event</i>                                                                                                  | <i>Remarks</i>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             |
|-------------|--------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 21 Apr 2021 | 12:05                    | NGO Alarm Phone make first attempt to contact Libya MRCC by phone.                                            | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Only one of the seven phone lines was responsive. Libya MRCC operator informed about alert messages sent via email.</li> </ul>                                                                                                                                      |
| 21 Apr 2022 | 18:39                    | Frontex patrol plane streams live video from the scene.                                                       | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No acknowledgement or response from any MRCC.</li> </ul>                                                                                                                                                                                                            |
| 21 Apr 2021 | 18:51                    | Frontex send email to Libya, Italy and Malta MRCCs containing extensive information on the incident.          | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Details obtained from a Frontex flight.</li> <li>No acknowledgement or response from any MRCC.<sup>69</sup></li> </ul>                                                                                                                                              |
| 21 Apr 2021 | 18:58                    | Contact lost with BD01.                                                                                       | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Assuming satellite phone batteries exhausted.</li> </ul>                                                                                                                                                                                                            |
| 21 Apr 2022 | 19:14                    | Frontex asset broadcasts an initial “Mayday” call to all ships in vicinity of BD01 regarding the incident.    | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><i>MV Ocean Viking</i> (IMO 8506854) and <i>MV Alk</i> [IMO 9298612] receive the MAYDAY call (see figures 24.C.18 and 24.C.19).</li> </ul>                                                                                                                          |
| 22 Apr 2021 | 12:42                    | Shipwreck of BD01 found by Frontex patrol plane. <sup>70</sup>                                                | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No survivors found.</li> </ul>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      |
| 22 Apr 2021 | 12:43                    | Frontex asset broadcasts a second “Mayday” call to all ships in vicinity of BD01 call regarding the incident. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No acknowledgement or response.</li> </ul>                                                                                                                                                                                                                          |
| 22 Apr 2021 | 13:08                    | Frontex send email to Libya, Italy and Malta MRCCs containing extensive updated information on the incident.  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Details obtained from a Frontex flight.</li> <li>No acknowledgement or response from any MRCC.<sup>71</sup></li> </ul>                                                                                                                                              |
| 22 Apr 2021 | 13:23                    | Last attempt [by <i>MV Ocean Viking</i> ], of 38 attempts, made to contact Libya MRCC by phone and VHF radio. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>NGO Alarm Phone, <i>MV Ocean Viking</i> and Frontex attempt to reach the Libyan MRCC by phone and VHF radio <b>38 times</b> in total.</li> <li>Libya MRCC respond to only seven phone calls of NGO Alarm Phone. See paragraph 4 for Libya MRCC response.</li> </ul> |

<sup>a</sup> All timings are CEST (GMT+1).

<sup>69</sup> Frontex letter of 8 November 2021 (IEC/ICU/IAGA/10803/2021).

<sup>70</sup> Two vessels that arrived in the location of the capsized BD01 on 22 April 2022 observed several dead bodies floating in the water (see figures 24.C.27 and 24.C.28), <https://twitter.com/sosmedintl/status/1385297161550798851>. The Panel received the information on the identity of 18 people who were boarded on BD01 and have been disappeared since the shipwreck. In its letter of 10 March 2022 to Libya, the Panel requested information on the actions that Libyan authorities took to recover and manage the dead bodies after the shipwreck, in particular the identification of the bodies and the delivery of the bodies to family members. A response is awaited.

<sup>71</sup> Frontex letter of 8 November 2021 (IEC/ICU/IAGA/10803/2021).

3. Responsible officials of all three notified States, Libya, Italy and Malta, were obliged to protect and respect the lives of individuals who found themselves in a situation of distress at sea on 21 and 22 April 2021 in accordance with their international obligations on rescue at sea,<sup>72</sup> provided that they exercised power or effective control over the enjoyment of the right to life of the distressed individuals.<sup>73</sup> The Panel notes that legal obligations of the three MRCCs regarding this incident, other than under international human rights law, are outside of the Panel's mandate.<sup>74</sup>

4. Since the incident took place in the Libyan Search and Rescue Region (SRR) (see figure 24.C.8), the Libyan national authority, Libyan MRCC, had the primary obligation under international law to actively proceed with all possible speed to the rescue of persons in distress, if informed of their need of assistance.<sup>75</sup> The Panel considers that Libya MRCC was well informed about the emergency situation that threatened the lives of all estimated 130 passengers, as established above, but failed to take appropriate measures to provide the needed assistance to BD01.<sup>76</sup> NGO Alarm Phone informed the Panel that Libya MRCC had provided three conflicting scenarios to them as a justification for this failure: (a) that the Libyan patrol boat was on the way to search and rescue BD01 on 21 April 2021; (b) that the Libya MRCC was unaware of BD01 distress case; and (c) that Libyan maritime units were unable to execute SAR operation on 21 April 2021 due to bad weather.

5. The Panel finds these justifications problematic. Firstly, none of the actors that had visuals on BD01, including Frontex and private vessels, received any information that Libyan patrol boats were engaging in a SAR operation that involved BD01 (for example, see figures 24.C.27 and 24.C.28). To the contrary, NGO Alarm Phone, Frontex and *MV Ocean Viking* all reported that Libya MRCC officers were consistently unresponsive to distress calls and alert messages that these three entities conveyed to them multiple times. Secondly, the overwhelming evidence of the direct knowledge of the Libya MRCC officers contradicts the claim that they were unaware of the incident (for example, see figures 24.C.9 to 24.C.28). Finally, whilst the Panel appreciates that the assessment of operational conditions that might have endangered the boat or the crew members due to bad weather was at the relevant authorities' discretion,<sup>77</sup> Libya MRCC was responsible at the minimum to engage in activities aimed at rendering assistance to BD01 such as: (a) providing shelter to BD01; and (b) actively coordinating SAR operation with neighbouring MRCCs and merchant vessels that were attempting to search and rescue BD01.<sup>78</sup> Additionally, the ability of Libyan officers to search and rescue BD01 on time was indicated in the morning hours of 21 April, 2021 when the Libyan Coast Guard found BD02 and returned the surviving passengers to Libya.<sup>79</sup> The Panel wrote to Libya on 10 March 2022 and has yet to receive a response.

6. While the primary responsibility for the search and rescue operation of BD01 fell to Libya MRCC, the Italian and Maltese MRCC also had a duty to cooperate with and provide assistance to Libya MRCC to rescue people in distress at sea and to take all feasible measures to prevent loss of life at sea.<sup>80</sup>

<sup>72</sup> Article 98 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS); Chapter 5, Regulation 33 of the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS); Annex, paras. 4.2.1 and 4.3 of the International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue (SAR Convention).

<sup>73</sup> Articles 2(1) and 6 of the ICCPR; Human Rights Committee, General comment No. 36 (2018) on article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, on the right to life, para. 63. This obligation applies to all individuals within the power or effective control of the said authorities, regardless of their nationality, statelessness or other status.

<sup>74</sup> Paragraph 11(a) of resolution 2213 (2015). International humanitarian law is inapplicable in this incident due to the absence of the required link (or "nexus") of alleged acts to the armed conflict in Libya.

<sup>75</sup> Although Libya is not State Party to the UNCLOS, it is bound by the duty to render assistance to persons in distress at sea as a norm of customary international law codified in article 98(1) of the UNCLOS: "Every State shall require the master of a ship flying its flag, in so far as he can do so without danger to the ship, the crew or the passengers: (a) to render assistance to any person found at sea in danger of being lost; (b) to proceed with all possible speed to the rescue of persons in distress, in so far as such action may reasonably be expected of him." See also Chapter 5, Regulation 33 of the SOLAS; Annex, paras. 4.2.1 and 4.3 of the SAR Convention; International Law Commission, Commentary to draft article 36 of the Articles concerning the Law of the Sea, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, Volume II (1956).

<sup>76</sup> Article 6 of the ICCPR.

<sup>77</sup> Article 98(1) of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.

<sup>78</sup> Chapter 4, Regulation 33 of SOLAS Convention; Chapter 2, para. 2.1.9 of the SAR Convention.

<sup>79</sup> [https://twitter.com/alarm\\_phone/status/1384973210702200835?s=21](https://twitter.com/alarm_phone/status/1384973210702200835?s=21).

<sup>80</sup> SAR Convention, Annex, paras. 4.2.1.1. and 4.3.

(a) Malta MRCC did not engage in such cooperation, despite their knowledge of BD01, their position being that “*Malta was not the responsible nor the coordinating authority on this particular case*” given that the incident took place outside the Maltese SRR.<sup>81</sup>

(b) Italy MRCC was also uncooperative in providing assistance to BD01. In addition to multiple email messages, Italy MRCC received at least five telephone calls from NGO Alarm Phone and *MV Ocean Viking* asking the Italian authorities to provide assistance to search and rescue of BD01. The Italian officers referred them to the Libyan MRCC as a competent authority. Furthermore, according to the NGO Alarm Phone report, Libya MRCC claimed that Italy MRCC engaged with them to request authorisation for an Italian flagged merchant vessel engage in SAR operations for BD01. The Panel was unable to verify this claim.

7. While the passive attitude of the Italian and Maltese MRCCs to alert messages might be qualified as a serious failure in the response to assist in the search and rescue operation under the international law of the sea, having assessed all the evidence available, the Panel was unable to establish a jurisdiction link between these authorities and BD01, necessary to make the findings on the responsibility of Italy and Malta MRCCs officials under international human rights law.


8. Shipmasters of private vessels that were in sufficient proximity to the boat in distress also had the duty under international law to proceed with all possible speed to render assistance to persons in distress. Four private vessels – *MV Alk* (IMO: 9298612), *VS Lisbeth* (IMO: 9309978), *MY Rose* (IMO: 8207381), and *MV Ocean Viking* (IMO: 8506854) were the only vessels that actively searched for BD01 for over ten hours.<sup>82</sup> They, however, reached the site of BD01 on 22 April only to find a number of dead bodies in the sea and a capsized boat without survivors.

<sup>81</sup> Written response to the Panel’s request for information by Malta, dated 12 July 2021. Malta reiterated its position at the meeting with representatives of the Government of Malta on 15 February 2022 in Valletta.

<sup>82</sup> Merchant vessels ALK and BRUNA [IMO 7601073] were in close proximity of BD01 at around noon of 21 April but Bruna declined to engage in the search and rescue and instead changed its course for unestablished reasons (see figures 24.C.11 and 24.C.13).

Figure 24.C.8

Map of Central Mediterranean Search and Rescue Regions (SRR) and locations of boat in distress on 21 and 22 April 2021



Figures 24.C.9 to 24.C.28

# Copies of email correspondences between involved actors of the 22 April 2021 incident

Figure 24.C.9




Figure 24.C.10






Figure 24.C.11






Figure 24.C.12




Figure 24.C.13




Figure 24.C.14




Figure 24.C.15




Figure 24.C.16




Figure 24.C.17




Figure 24.C.18






Figure 24.C.19




Figure 24.C.20




Figure 24.C.21




Figure 24.C.22




Figure 24.C.23




Figure 24.C.24




Figure 24.C.25






Figure 24.C.26




Figure 24.C.27



Figure 24.C.28



## Annex 25 Maritime and air delivery non-compliance profile indicators

1. The Panel has continued to use a set of profile indicators<sup>83</sup> of suspicious activities and documentation that, when considered collectively, indicate that a vessel or aircraft is likely to be carrying illicit cargo (see tables 25.1 and 25.2). Multiple indicators are required before a vessel, aircraft or airline is classified as of interest to the Panel or reported as being a violation of or non-compliance with the arms embargo. This annex summarises these indicators.

Table 25.1

### Maritime non-compliance profile indicators

| #  | Type                     | Indicator                                                         | Remarks                                                                                                                                                                                             |
|----|--------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 1  | Visibility               | Automatic Identification System(AIS) <sup>a</sup>                 | ▪ “Dark activity” periods.                                                                                                                                                                          |
| 2  | Route(s)                 | Destination Ports                                                 | ▪ The ports of Gabes and Algiers are often inaccurately declared.<br>▪ Unusual routing from past voyages.                                                                                           |
| 3  | Ownership                | Frequent change of vessel’s owners                                | ▪ Lack of corporate on-line presence.                                                                                                                                                               |
| 4  | Operators                | Frequent change of vessel’s operators                             | ▪ Lack of corporate on-line presence.                                                                                                                                                               |
| 5  | Vessel Name              | Frequent change of vessel’s name                                  |                                                                                                                                                                                                     |
| 6  | Vessel Tonnage           | Tonnage Range                                                     | ▪ Comparison to historical tonnage of vessels known to be non-compliant.                                                                                                                            |
| 7  | Vessel Draught           | Change of Draught                                                 | ▪ Comparison of draught at loading and discharge.                                                                                                                                                   |
| 8  | Commercial Relationships | Linkages                                                          | ▪ Links between owners / operators / agents.                                                                                                                                                        |
| 8  | Commercial Activity      | Uneconomic behaviour                                              | ▪ Low utilization profile                                                                                                                                                                           |
| 9  | Flag of Registry         | Flags of convenience and multiple flag changes                    | ▪ Includes Flag refusal to allow inspections when requested.                                                                                                                                        |
| 10 | Documentation            | Accuracy                                                          | ▪ Transparency in information supplied to Panel.<br>▪ Accuracy of completion.                                                                                                                       |
| 11 | Cargo Shielding          | Container layout on weather deck<br>Container layout on port dock | ▪ Containers are used to line the edge of the weather deck to shield the remainder of the deck from external view.<br>▪ Containers are used to shield offloading sites at ports from external view. |

<sup>83</sup> First developed for use in [S/2021/229](#).

| #  | Type               | Indicator                               | Remarks                                                                                                                                                                  |
|----|--------------------|-----------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 12 | Cargo Analysis     | Volumetric and mass analysis            | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Do reported weight and packaging match declaration on documentation?</li> </ul>                                                   |
| 13 | Sanctions Listings | Sanctions designated or reported vessel | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Previous reports by other UN Panels and Monitoring Groups.</li> <li>Sanctions notices by subscription-based resources.</li> </ul> |

<sup>a</sup> Or Long-Range Identification and Tracking system (LRIT).

Table 25.2

**Profile indicators of airbridge and air delivery**

| # | Activity       | Details                                                                                                                                            | Remarks                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                |
|---|----------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 1 | Flight volume  | The number of unscheduled flights on a previously little used route                                                                                | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>For example, a significant number of flights over a short period indicates a centrally organized supply chain.</li> </ul>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |
| 2 | Flight timings | Most flights are planned so that the cargo aircraft are unloaded during darkness                                                                   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Disguises the nature of cargo being offloaded from onlookers in areas where access is difficult to control.</li> </ul>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          |
| 3 | Flight routing | The flights often take off from a civilian airport, then land at a military airbase before departing on a flight track directly towards Libya      | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Civilian cargo aircraft require time in civilian airports where the appropriate servicing and maintenance capabilities exist.</li> <li>Indicative of the loading of military related equipment.</li> </ul>                                                                                                                                                                                                                      |
| 4 | Flight safety  | Signals from the aircraft ADS-B <sup>a</sup> transponders are not visible on open-source ADS-B monitoring shortly after entering Egyptian airspace | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Airline captains sometimes “go dark” when approaching Libyan airspace as a countermeasure against being targeted by air defence systems, but usually not for the majority of the flight.</li> <li>Deliberately switched off due to the covert nature of these flights.</li> <li>Other legitimate flights (for example the scheduled Afriqiyah Airlines A320 from Benghazi to Alexandria always displays ADS-B data).</li> </ul> |
| 5 | Flight safety  | Signals from the aircraft ADS-B transponders are switched to MLAT (multilateration) mode <sup>84</sup> for the whole flight                        | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>MLAT mode only transmits aircraft code, heading, altitude and speed but NOT current location.</li> </ul>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        |

<sup>84</sup> Aircraft without, or that are not broadcasting on, ADS-B transponders do not broadcast their latitude/longitude, so flight monitoring software uses multilateration of 1090 MHz Mode S transponder signals to determine the aircraft's location by using the time difference of arrival (TDOA) when an aircraft is detected across four or more receivers/ground stations.

| #  | Activity                     | Details                                                                                                                                       | Remarks                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    |
|----|------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 6  | Flight transparency          | Signals from aircraft ADS-B transponders are not available for all flights                                                                    | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Airlines have utilised a “blocking” service provided by some of the open-source ADS-B monitoring providers.</li> <li>A deliberate attempt by the airline to avoid scrutiny and disguise covert or illicit flights.</li> </ul>                                                                                                                                                       |
| 7  | Flight availability          | Scheduled or non-scheduled route                                                                                                              | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Ticket unavailability from the air operator for passenger aircraft flights suggests movement of military personnel. For example: Cham Wings flights from Syria to Benghazi.</li> </ul>                                                                                                                                                                                              |
| 8  | Aircraft documentation       | The use of fake Air Operating Certificates (AOC)                                                                                              | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The Panel has identified the use of at least one fake AOC used to justify an ADS-B signal blocking service.</li> </ul>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              |
| 9  | Flight documentation         | <p>The submission of incomplete or inaccurate Cargo Manifests and Air Waybills</p> <p>The lack of detailed flight documentation submitted</p> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Fake consignees listed.</li> <li>Fake consignors listed.</li> <li>Used to disguise the true nature of the actual cargo.</li> <li>Customs value listed as zero.</li> <li>Failure to supply, for example: 1) Flight Plan; 2) Aircraft Technical Logbook; 3) Journey Flight Log; 4) Weight and Balance Report; 5) Take-off and Landing Balance; and 6) General Declaration.</li> </ul> |
| 10 | Air operator transparency    | Limited, inaccurate or no information provided to requests for information                                                                    | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Indicative of covert or illicit activity.</li> </ul>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                |
| 11 | Air operator web presence    | Lack of corporate website or very limited contact information on website                                                                      | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>A reputable cargo aircraft company would have an easily sourced online presence as part of the company marketing strategy.</li> </ul>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               |
| 12 | Cargo agency web presence    | Lack of corporate website                                                                                                                     | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>A reputable cargo agent would have an easily sourced online presence as part of the company marketing strategy.</li> </ul>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          |
| 13 | Air operator’s relationships | Corporate links                                                                                                                               | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Change of ownership or operating conditions for aircraft between linked companies.</li> </ul>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |
| 14 | Sanctions Listings           | Current or previous listings of owner, operator, or aircraft                                                                                  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Previous reports by other UN Panels and Monitoring Groups.</li> <li>Sanctions notices by subscription databases.</li> </ul>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         |

## Annex 26 Summary of arms embargo equipment violations (26 Feb 2011 - 25 Apr 2022)

1. Tables 26.1 and 26.2 summarises confirmed arms and military materiel transferred into Libya in violation of paragraph 9 of resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#), as modified by subsequent resolutions.<sup>85</sup> It does not include arms and military materiel transferred to Libya for which exemptions were provided for by the Committee.

Table 26.1

**Confirmed arms and military materiel transferred from Libya (26 Feb 2011 - 25 Apr 2022) (weapon systems and equipment)**<sup>86</sup>

| <i>Generic type</i>          | <i>Nomenclature / Calibre</i>              | <i>Panel Report</i>                                      | <i>Responsible</i> | <i>Remarks</i>                                                                                                                              |
|------------------------------|--------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------|--------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Aircraft (FGA) <sup>87</sup> | IOMAX AT-802i                              | <a href="#">S/2017/466</a>                               | UAE                | ▪                                                                                                                                           |
|                              | Dassault <i>Mirage 2000/9</i>              | <a href="#">S/2021/229</a>                               | UAE                | ▪ Operated from Sidi Barani airbase in Egypt.                                                                                               |
|                              | General Dynamics F-16                      | <a href="#">S/2021/229</a>                               | Turkey             | ▪ Overflight.                                                                                                                               |
|                              | ** MiG-21MF                                | <a href="#">S/2015/128</a><br><a href="#">S/2016/209</a> | Egypt              | ▪                                                                                                                                           |
|                              | MiG-23ML(D)                                | New <sup>88</sup>                                        | UID <sup>89</sup>  | ▪ Identification from 2017 imagery and unreported by Panel.<br>▪ Other aircraft restored to flight status by cannibalization. <sup>90</sup> |
|                              | MiG-29                                     | <a href="#">S/2021/229</a>                               | Russian Federation | ▪                                                                                                                                           |
|                              | Su-24                                      | <a href="#">S/2021/229</a>                               | Russian Federation | ▪                                                                                                                                           |
| Aircraft (ISR) <sup>91</sup> | <i>Pilatus PC-6</i>                        | <a href="#">S/2021/229</a>                               | Lancaster6         | ▪ Project Opus.                                                                                                                             |
| Aircraft (Rotary Wing)       | ** AS332L <i>Super Puma</i> Medium Utility | <a href="#">S/2021/229</a>                               | Lancaster6         | ▪ Project Opus.                                                                                                                             |
|                              | Mi-8                                       | <a href="#">S/2015/128</a><br><a href="#">S/2016/209</a> | Egypt              | ▪                                                                                                                                           |
|                              | Mi-24                                      | <a href="#">S/2016/209</a>                               | Sudan              | ▪                                                                                                                                           |
|                              | Mi-24V                                     | <a href="#">S/2016/209</a>                               | UID                | ▪                                                                                                                                           |
|                              | Mi-24P                                     | <a href="#">S/2017/466</a>                               | UAE                | ▪                                                                                                                                           |
|                              | SA341 <i>Gazelle</i> Light Utility         | <a href="#">S/2021/229</a>                               | Lancaster6         | ▪ Project Opus.                                                                                                                             |
|                              | UH-60M <i>Blackhawk</i>                    | <a href="#">S/2017/466</a>                               | UAE                | ▪                                                                                                                                           |
| Aircraft (Transport)         | Airbus A400B <i>Atlas</i>                  | <a href="#">S/2021/229</a>                               | Turkey             | ▪ For transfer of military materiel into Libya.                                                                                             |

<sup>85</sup> This annex updates and clarifies information within the previous original work at <https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2020/06/types-of-arms-and-equipment-supplied-to.html>, 23 March 2021.

<sup>86</sup> Items marked \*\* appeared in the 29 May 2021 7th Anniversary of Operation Dignity parade in Benghazi. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mbIDXxITPa0>.

<sup>87</sup> Fighter Ground Attack.

<sup>88</sup> <https://medium.com/war-is-boring/it-looks-like-russia-gave-a-fighter-jet-to-libyas-warlord-1a564098b223>, 1 March 2017. Although the imagery shows the MiG-23 in Libya the Panel does not endorse the supply chain in the article.

<sup>89</sup> UID, in all uses, means unidentified, or low evidential levels, and responsibility has yet to be attributed by the Panel.

<sup>90</sup> <https://www.africanmilitaryblog.com/2019/08/libya-frankenstien-mig-23-flogger-fighter-jet-take-flight>, 3 August 2019.

<sup>91</sup> Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance.



| <i>Generic type</i>                   | <i>Nomenclature / Calibre</i>           | <i>Panel Report</i>                                      | <i>Responsible</i>  | <i>Remarks</i>                                  |
|---------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------|---------------------|-------------------------------------------------|
|                                       | Antonov AN-12A [#2340806] <sup>92</sup> | New <sup>93</sup>                                        | Space Cargo Inc     | ▪ Operating in Libya in direct support of HAF.  |
|                                       | Antonov AN-12BP [#5342908]              | New                                                      | Space Cargo Inc     | ▪ Operating in Libya in direct support of HAF.  |
|                                       | Antonov AN-12BP [#5343005]              | <a href="#">S/2021/229</a>                               | Space Cargo Inc     | ▪ Operating in Libya in direct support of HAF.  |
|                                       | Antonov AN-26 [#503]                    | <a href="#">S/2017/466</a><br><a href="#">S/2019/914</a> | Space Cargo Inc     | ▪ Operating in Libya in direct support of HAF.  |
|                                       | Antonov AN-32B [#2009]                  | <a href="#">S/2021/229</a>                               | Space Cargo Inc     | ▪ Operating in Libya in direct support of HAF.  |
|                                       | C-17A <i>Globemaster</i>                | <a href="#">S/2021/229</a>                               | Turkey              | ▪ For transfer of military materiel into Libya. |
|                                       | C-130E <i>Hercules</i>                  | <a href="#">S/2015/128</a><br><a href="#">S/2016/209</a> | Sudan               | ▪ For transfer of military materiel into Libya. |
|                                       | C-130E <i>Hercules</i>                  | <a href="#">S/2021/229</a>                               | Turkey              | ▪ For transfer of military materiel into Libya. |
|                                       | Ilyushin IL-18D [#172001401]            | <a href="#">S/2021/229</a>                               | Space Cargo Inc     | ▪ Operating in Libya in direct support of HAF   |
|                                       | Ilyushin IL-18D [#187009903]            | <a href="#">S/2017/466</a>                               | Space Cargo Inc     | ▪ Operating in Libya in direct support of HAF   |
|                                       | Ilyushin IL-76TD [#73479367]            | <a href="#">S/2021/229</a>                               | Space Cargo Inc     | ▪ Operating in Libya in direct support of HAF   |
|                                       | Ilyushin IL-76TD [#1013405167]          | <a href="#">S/2021/229</a>                               | Space Cargo Inc     | ▪ Operating in Libya in direct support of HAF   |
|                                       | Ilyushin IL-76TD [#1013409282]          | <a href="#">S/2021/229</a>                               | Green Flag Aviation | ▪ Operating in Libya in direct support of HAF   |
|                                       | Ilyushin IL-76TD [#1023411378]          | <a href="#">S/2021/229</a>                               | Space Cargo Inc     | ▪ Operating in Libya in direct support of HAF   |
|                                       | ** Ilyushin IL-76TD [5A-ILA]            | New                                                      | UID                 | ▪                                               |
|                                       | Ilyushin IL-76TD Various                | <a href="#">S/2021/229</a>                               | Russian Federation  | ▪ For transfer of military materiel into Libya. |
| Air Defence (Guns)                    | ** 23mm ZSU-23-2CP                      | New                                                      | UID                 | ▪                                               |
|                                       | 35mm <i>Korkut</i> Cannon               | <a href="#">S/2021/229</a>                               | Turkey              | ▪                                               |
| Air Defence (Missiles)                | MIM-23 <i>Hawk</i>                      | <a href="#">S/2021/229</a>                               | Turkey              | ▪                                               |
|                                       | MIM-104 <i>Patriot</i>                  | New <sup>94</sup>                                        | UAE                 | ▪                                               |
|                                       | <i>Pantsir</i> S1                       | <a href="#">S/2021/229</a>                               | Russian Federation  | ▪ On KaMAZ platform.                            |
|                                       | <i>Pantsir</i> S1                       | <a href="#">S/2021/229</a>                               | UAE                 | ▪ On MAN platform.                              |
| Anti-Tank (ATGW) <sup>95</sup>        | 9K115-2 <i>Metis-M</i>                  | <a href="#">S/2019/914</a>                               | UID                 | ▪ With GNU-AF.                                  |
|                                       | 9M133 <i>Kornet</i>                     | <a href="#">S/2019/914</a>                               | UID                 | ▪ With GNU-AF.                                  |
|                                       | <i>Dehleyvah</i>                        | <a href="#">S/2021/229</a>                               | UID                 | ▪ With GNU-AF.                                  |
| Armoured Vehicles (APC) <sup>96</sup> | AMN 233114 <i>Tigr-M</i>                | New                                                      | Likely Russian PMC  | ▪                                               |

<sup>92</sup> These are the manufacturer's serial numbers (MSN).

<sup>93</sup> Where indicated as new, the evidence appears elsewhere in the annexes to the report as an infographic, unless otherwise indicated by a footnote reference.

<sup>94</sup> In a single open-source report in <https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2020/06/types-of-arms-and-equipment-supplied-to.html>, 23 March 2021. A confidential source informed the Panel that the system was only very briefly deployed to Libya and soon withdrawn.

<sup>95</sup> Anti-Tank Guided Weapon.

<sup>96</sup> Armoured Personnel Carriers. Sometimes also referred to as Protected Patrol Vehicles (PPV).

| <i>Generic type</i>                    | <i>Nomenclature / Calibre</i>   | <i>Panel Report</i>                                                                                                  | <i>Responsible</i> | <i>Remarks</i>                                           |
|----------------------------------------|---------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------|----------------------------------------------------------|
|                                        | <i>Irigiri 4x4</i>              | <a href="#">S/2019/914</a>                                                                                           | UID                | ▪ First seen 2015.                                       |
|                                        | <i>Inkas Titan-DS 4x4</i>       | <a href="#">S/2021/229</a>                                                                                           | UAE                | ▪                                                        |
|                                        | <i>Inkas Titan-S 6x6</i>        | New                                                                                                                  | UID                | ▪                                                        |
|                                        | <b>** KADDB Al Wahsh 4x4</b>    | <a href="#">S/2016/209</a>                                                                                           | Jordan             | ▪                                                        |
|                                        | <i>KADDB Al Wahsh 4x4</i>       | <a href="#">S/2018/812</a>                                                                                           | Jordan             | ▪ "Snake Head" Turret fitted.                            |
|                                        | <i>Katmerciler Kirac</i>        | New                                                                                                                  | Turkey             | ▪                                                        |
|                                        | <i>Lenco Bearcat G3 4x4</i>     | <a href="#">S/2021/229</a>                                                                                           | UID                | ▪ With GNU-AF.                                           |
|                                        | <i>Mezcal Tygra 4x4</i>         | <a href="#">S/2017/466</a>                                                                                           | UAE                | ▪                                                        |
|                                        | <i>MIC VPK Tigr-M</i>           | <a href="#">S/2021/229</a>                                                                                           | Russian PMC        | ▪                                                        |
|                                        | <b>** MSPV Panthera T6 4x4</b>  | <a href="#">S/2016/209</a><br><a href="#">S/2017/466</a><br><a href="#">S/2018/812</a><br><a href="#">S/2021/229</a> | UAE                | ▪ From different shipments.                              |
|                                        | <i>MSPV Panthera F9 4x4</i>     | <a href="#">S/2018/812</a>                                                                                           | UAE                | ▪                                                        |
|                                        | <b>** Streit Cobra 4x4</b>      | <a href="#">S/2016/209</a>                                                                                           | UAE                | ▪ Transferred in 2012.                                   |
|                                        | <i>Streit Cougar 4x4</i>        | <a href="#">S/2016/209</a>                                                                                           | UAE                | ▪ Transferred in 2012.                                   |
|                                        | <b>** Streit Cougar 4x4</b>     | <a href="#">S/2019/914</a>                                                                                           | Jordan             | ▪ "Snake Head" Turret fitted.                            |
|                                        | <i>Streit Spartan 4x4</i>       | <a href="#">S/2016/209</a><br><a href="#">S/2018/812</a><br><a href="#">S/2021/229</a>                               | UAE                | ▪ From different shipments.                              |
|                                        | <i>TAG BATT APC</i>             | New                                                                                                                  | UID                | ▪                                                        |
|                                        | <b>** TAG Terrier LT-79 4x4</b> | <a href="#">S/2021/229</a>                                                                                           | UAE                | ▪ New attribution. <sup>97</sup>                         |
|                                        | <i>Tundra Variant</i>           | <a href="#">S/2021/229</a>                                                                                           | UID                | ▪                                                        |
| Armoured Vehicles (IAFV) <sup>98</sup> | <i>FNSS ACV-15</i>              | <a href="#">S/2021/229</a>                                                                                           | Turkey             | ▪                                                        |
|                                        | <i>KADDB Mared 8x8</i>          | <a href="#">S/2019/914</a>                                                                                           | Jordan             | ▪                                                        |
|                                        | <b>** KADDB Mared 8x8</b>       | <a href="#">S/2021/229</a>                                                                                           | Jordan             | ▪ "Snake Head" Turret fitted.                            |
|                                        | <i>Paramount Mbombe 6x6</i>     | <a href="#">S/2019/914</a>                                                                                           | UID                | ▪ With HAF.                                              |
|                                        | <i>Ratel-60</i>                 | <a href="#">S/2019/914</a>                                                                                           | UID                | ▪ With HAF.                                              |
| Armoured Vehicles (MRAP) <sup>99</sup> | <i>BAe Cayman</i>               | <a href="#">S/2016/209</a>                                                                                           | UID                | ▪ First seen 2012.                                       |
|                                        | <i>BMC Kirpi 4x4</i>            | <a href="#">S/2019/914</a>                                                                                           | Turkey             | ▪                                                        |
|                                        | <i>BMC Vuran 4x4</i>            | <a href="#">S/2019/914</a>                                                                                           | Turkey             | ▪                                                        |
|                                        | <i>Evro-Polis Valkyrie 4x4</i>  | <a href="#">S/2021/229</a>                                                                                           | ChvK Wagner        | ▪ Based on a Ural-432007 platform.<br>▪ New attribution. |
|                                        | <i>NIMR Jais 4x4</i>            | <a href="#">S/2016/209</a>                                                                                           | UAE                | ▪ First seen 2013.                                       |
|                                        | <i>Streit Typhoon 4x4</i>       | New                                                                                                                  | UID                | ▪                                                        |

<sup>97</sup> [https://www-africaintelligence-com.eul.proxy.openathens.net/north-africa\\_business/2019/12/19/un-supplier-tag-supplies-armoured-cars-to-haftar,108386984-art](https://www-africaintelligence-com.eul.proxy.openathens.net/north-africa_business/2019/12/19/un-supplier-tag-supplies-armoured-cars-to-haftar,108386984-art), 19 December 2019.

<sup>98</sup> Infantry Armoured Fighting Vehicles.

<sup>99</sup> Mine Resistant Armoured Protected.

| Generic type                  | Nomenclature / Calibre                 | Panel Report               | Responsible | Remarks                                                                                                                                                                                                                   |
|-------------------------------|----------------------------------------|----------------------------|-------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Artillery<br>(Towed)          | ** 122mm M1938 M-30 Howitzer           | New                        | UID         | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>This weapon system was NOT reported in the inventory of the Libyan Armed Forces prior to the 2011 arms embargo.<sup>100</sup></li> <li>Identified with HAF 106 brigade.</li> </ul> |
|                               | ** 155mm G5 Howitzer                   | <a href="#">S/2021/229</a> | UID         | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>With HAF.<sup>101</sup></li> </ul>                                                                                                                                                 |
| Artillery<br>(Self-Propelled) | 155mm <i>Firtina</i> T-155             | <a href="#">S/2021/229</a> | Turkey      | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li></li> </ul>                                                                                                                                                                        |
| Artillery<br>(MLRS)           | Rocketsan 122mm <i>Sakarya</i> T-122   | <a href="#">S/2021/229</a> | Turkey      | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li></li> </ul>                                                                                                                                                                        |
|                               | ** 128mm LSRVM <i>Morava</i>           | <a href="#">S/2021/229</a> | UID         | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The 107mm variant may also have been supplied.<sup>102</sup></li> </ul>                                                                                                            |
|                               | 122mm Hybrid Version                   | New                        | UAE         | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li></li> </ul>                                                                                                                                                                        |
| Logistic Vehicles             | ** CFORCE All-Terrain Vehicle          | New                        | UID         | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li></li> </ul>                                                                                                                                                                        |
|                               | ** Jeep Gladiator                      | New                        | UID         | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Militarised.</li> </ul>                                                                                                                                                            |
|                               | KamAZ 6x6 Truck                        | New                        | UID         | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Identification from 2018 and unreported by Panel.</li> <li>Also delivered to Libya on <i>MV Fehn Calypso</i> in 2020.<sup>103</sup></li> </ul>                                     |
|                               | KamAZ 8x8 Truck                        | <a href="#">S/2021/229</a> | Russian PMC | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Identified as the mobility platform for the ChVK Wagner operated Pantsir-1.</li> </ul>                                                                                             |
|                               | Militarised Toyota Land Cruiser 79 4x4 | New                        | UID         | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li></li> </ul>                                                                                                                                                                        |
|                               | ** Toyota 6x6 Light Utility Vehicle    | New                        | UID         | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li></li> </ul>                                                                                                                                                                        |
|                               | UAZ-469 Light Communications Vehicle   | New                        | UID         | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li></li> </ul>                                                                                                                                                                        |
|                               | Ural-4320 Truck                        | New                        | UID         | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Some identified on deck of <i>MV Fehn Calypso</i> on 25 April 2020 during transit of Bosphorus, but these offloaded in Alexandria according to shipping company.</li> </ul>        |
|                               | Ural-4320 Truck (Armoured)             | New                        | UID         | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li></li> </ul>                                                                                                                                                                        |
| Mortars<br>(Field)            | 120mm 120-PM-43 M1943                  | New                        | UID         | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li></li> </ul>                                                                                                                                                                        |
|                               | 120mm M-74                             | New                        | UID         | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>With HAF Tariq bin Ziyad brigade.</li> </ul>                                                                                                                                       |

<sup>100</sup> Pre-2011 Libyan inventory based on that equipment reported in Jane's publications and the IISS Military Balance (<https://www.iiss.org/publications/the-military-balance-plus>).

<sup>101</sup> Also <https://twitter.com/Oded121351/status/1328016339072638978>, 15 November 2020.

<sup>102</sup> Single source report in <https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2020/06/types-of-arms-and-equipment-supplied-to.html>, 23 March 2021. Extract imagery from a video dated 29 May 2021 (<https://youtu.be/mbIDXxITPa0>) (2:37:26) may also show the 107mm variant, but resolution was insufficient to allow confirmatory analysis by photogrammetry.

<sup>103</sup> Information from shipping company.

| Generic type                 | Nomenclature / Calibre                                          | Panel Report                                             | Responsible                    | Remarks                                                                                                                      |
|------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Naval Vessels                | Corrubia Class patrol boats                                     | <a href="#">S/2019/914</a>                               | Member State                   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Converted to naval vessels post-delivery.</li> </ul>                                  |
|                              | Damen Stan Patrol 1605 Class patrol boats                       | <a href="#">S/2018/812</a>                               |                                | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li></li> </ul>                                                                           |
|                              | Gabya Class Frigates                                            | <a href="#">S/2021/229</a>                               | Turkey                         | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li></li> </ul>                                                                           |
|                              | Lambro Olympic D74 Fast Patrol Boat                             | New                                                      | Libya SSA                      | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>In use with SSA</li> <li>a.k.a. <i>Javelin</i> Class.</li> </ul>                      |
|                              | MRC-1250 Rigid Hulled Inflatable Boats                          | <a href="#">S/2021/229</a>                               | Lancaster6                     | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Project Opus.</li> </ul>                                                              |
|                              | Offshore Patrol Vessel <i>Alkarama</i>                          | <a href="#">S/2018/812</a><br><a href="#">S/2019/914</a> | Universal Satcom Services, UAE | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li></li> </ul>                                                                           |
|                              | Patrol Boat <i>Alqayid Saqar</i>                                | New                                                      | Libya SSA                      | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Type UID.</li> <li>Classed as military as dual use and subsequently armed.</li> </ul> |
| Radars and EW                | Raidco RPB 20 class patrol boats                                | <a href="#">S/2019/914</a>                               | Member State                   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Converted to naval vessels post-delivery.</li> </ul>                                  |
|                              | Aselsan Koral Electronic Warfare System                         | <a href="#">S/2021/229</a>                               | Turkey                         | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li></li> </ul>                                                                           |
|                              | ** 1RL131 P-18 Early Warning Radar                              | New                                                      | UID                            | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li></li> </ul>                                                                           |
|                              | LEMZ 96L6/E Target Acquisition Radar                            | <a href="#">S/2021/229</a>                               | UID                            | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li></li> </ul>                                                                           |
|                              | Samel-90 Mobile IED Jammer                                      | <a href="#">S/2019/914</a>                               | UID                            | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li></li> </ul>                                                                           |
| Small Arms and Light Weapons | 5.56mm AK-103 Assault Rifles                                    | New                                                      | Likely Russian PMC             | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li></li> </ul>                                                                           |
|                              | 5.56mm JAWS-556 Assault Rifles                                  | New                                                      | Jordan                         | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li></li> </ul>                                                                           |
|                              | 5.56mm MFR Multi-Functional Rifles                              | New                                                      | Turkey                         | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li></li> </ul>                                                                           |
|                              | 5.56mm MPT 55K Assault Rifles                                   | New                                                      | Turkey                         | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li></li> </ul>                                                                           |
|                              | 7.62 x 39mm AK-103-1 Assault Rifles                             | New                                                      | UID                            | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li></li> </ul>                                                                           |
|                              | 7.62 x 39mm AR-M9F Assault Rifles                               | <a href="#">S/2016/209</a>                               | UAE                            | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li></li> </ul>                                                                           |
|                              | 7.62 x 39mm Type 63-1 Assault Rifle                             | New                                                      | UID                            | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li></li> </ul>                                                                           |
|                              | 7.62 x 51mm FN FAL Assault Rifle                                | <a href="#">S/2013/99</a>                                | UAE                            | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li></li> </ul>                                                                           |
|                              | 7.62 x 51mm JNG-90 <i>Bora -12</i> Sniper Rifle                 | New                                                      | Turkey                         | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li></li> </ul>                                                                           |
|                              | 7.62 x 51mm MPT 76 Assault Rifles                               | New                                                      | UID                            | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li></li> </ul>                                                                           |
|                              | 7.62 x 54mmR Type-80 General Purpose Machine Gun <sup>104</sup> | New                                                      | UID                            | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li></li> </ul>                                                                           |
|                              | 0.308 Sako TRG Sniper Rifle                                     | New                                                      | UID                            | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li></li> </ul>                                                                           |
|                              | 0.338 Orsis T-5000 Sniper Rifle                                 | New                                                      | UID                            | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Chambered for <i>Lapua</i> rounds.</li> </ul>                                         |
|                              | 0.338 Steyr SSG-08 Sniper Rifle (Variant or Copy)               | New                                                      | Russian PMC                    | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Chambered for <i>Lapua</i> rounds.</li> </ul>                                         |
|                              | 0.50 Barrett M82 variant Anti-Materiel Rifle                    | New                                                      | UID                            | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li></li> </ul>                                                                           |
|                              | 9mm Caracal F Pistols                                           | <a href="#">S/2015/128</a>                               | UAE                            | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li></li> </ul>                                                                           |
|                              | 9mm <i>EKOL</i> P29 Blank Firing Pistols                        | <a href="#">S/2019/914</a>                               | UID                            | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li></li> </ul>                                                                           |
|                              | 9mm <i>SUR</i> BRT M9 Blank Firing Pistols                      | New                                                      | UID                            | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li></li> </ul>                                                                           |
|                              | 12.7 x 108mm W-85 Heavy Machine Gun                             | New                                                      | UID                            | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li></li> </ul>                                                                           |

<sup>104</sup> [https://twitter.com/r\\_u\\_vid/status/1221227142911905793](https://twitter.com/r_u_vid/status/1221227142911905793), 26 January 2020.

| <i>Generic type</i>                    | <i>Nomenclature / Calibre</i>                                       | <i>Panel Report</i>        | <i>Responsible</i>          | <i>Remarks</i>                                           |
|----------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------|-----------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------|
|                                        | AGS 30mm Grenade Launcher                                           | <a href="#">S/2021/229</a> | Russian PMC                 | ▪ Either AGS-17 or AGS-30 based on ammunition recovered. |
|                                        | VOG-25 40mm Grenade Launcher                                        | <a href="#">S/2021/229</a> | Russian PMC                 | ▪ Based on ammunition recovered.                         |
|                                        | 40 x 46mm Akdas AK-40-GL Grenade Launchers                          | New                        | Turkey                      | ▪                                                        |
|                                        | RPG-32 <i>Nashbab</i> Rocket Launcher                               | <a href="#">S/2019/914</a> | Jordan                      | ▪                                                        |
|                                        | ** SPG-9 73mm Recoilless Rifle                                      | New                        | UID                         | ▪                                                        |
|                                        | Type-69 85mm Rocket Launcher                                        | New                        | UID                         | ▪                                                        |
| Tanks (MBT)                            | M-60 <i>Patton</i> <sup>105</sup>                                   | New                        | Turkey                      | ▪                                                        |
|                                        | T-62MV                                                              | <a href="#">S/2021/229</a> | Russian PMC                 | ▪ Also see annex 56.                                     |
| Uncrewed Aerial Vehicles (UAV)         | Adcom <i>Yabhon-HMD</i>                                             | <a href="#">S/2019/914</a> | UAE                         | ▪                                                        |
|                                        | Aeryon <i>Scout Micro</i>                                           | <a href="#">S/2013/99</a>  | Zariba Security Corporation | ▪                                                        |
|                                        | Chilong CL-11 VTOL                                                  | <a href="#">S/2019/914</a> | UID                         | ▪ Dual use system.                                       |
|                                        | ** DJI Inspire                                                      | New                        | UID                         | ▪                                                        |
|                                        | Mohajer-2                                                           | <a href="#">S/2019/914</a> | UID                         | ▪                                                        |
|                                        | Orbiter-3                                                           | <a href="#">S/2019/914</a> | GNA-AF                      | ▪ Dual use system.                                       |
|                                        | Orlan-10                                                            | <a href="#">S/2019/914</a> | HAF                         | ▪ Possibly from ChVK Wagner.                             |
|                                        | Schiebel Camcopter S-100                                            | <a href="#">S/2017/466</a> | UID                         | ▪ With a UID Militia.                                    |
|                                        | Xiamen <i>Mugin 4450</i>                                            | <a href="#">S/2021/229</a> | UID                         | ▪ Dual use system.                                       |
|                                        | Zala 421-16E                                                        | New                        | UID                         | ▪ With HAF.                                              |
| UAV (Loitering Munition)               | IAI <i>Harpy</i>                                                    | <a href="#">S/2021/229</a> | UID                         | ▪ With GNU-AF.                                           |
|                                        | STM <i>Kargu-2</i>                                                  | <a href="#">S/2021/229</a> | Turkey                      | ▪                                                        |
|                                        | WB <i>Warmate</i>                                                   | <a href="#">S/2021/229</a> | UID                         | ▪                                                        |
| Uncrewed Aerial Combat Vehicles (UACV) | Bayraktar TB2                                                       | <a href="#">S/2019/914</a> | Turkey                      | ▪                                                        |
|                                        | TAI <i>Anka</i>                                                     | <a href="#">S/2021/229</a> | Turkey                      | ▪                                                        |
|                                        | Wing Loong I                                                        | <a href="#">S/2017/466</a> | UAE                         | ▪                                                        |
|                                        | Wing Loong II                                                       | <a href="#">S/2019/914</a> | UAE                         | ▪                                                        |
| Miscellaneous                          | AN/PEQ-15 Advanced Target Pointer Illuminator Aiming Laser (ATPIAL) | New                        | UID                         | ▪                                                        |
|                                        | AN/PVS-7 Night Vision Goggles                                       | New                        | UID                         | ▪                                                        |
|                                        | Aselsan A100 Night Vision Monocular                                 | New                        | Turkey                      | ▪                                                        |
|                                        | Dahua DHI-UAV-D-1000JHV2 Anti Drone Gun                             | <a href="#">S/2021/229</a> | UID                         | ▪                                                        |
|                                        | Holographic Weapon Sights (HWS)                                     | New                        | Turkey                      | ▪                                                        |

<sup>105</sup> Also <https://twitter.com/MiddleEastWatc1/status/1281616199957323776>, 10 July 2020.

| <i>Generic type</i> | <i>Nomenclature / Calibre</i>           | <i>Panel Report</i> | <i>Responsible</i> | <i>Remarks</i> |
|---------------------|-----------------------------------------|---------------------|--------------------|----------------|
|                     | Sordin Supreme Pro-X Hearing Protectors | New                 | UID                | ▪              |

Table 26.2

**Confirmed arms and military materiel transferred to Libya (26 Feb 2011 - 25 Apr 2022) (ammunition and explosive ordnance)**

| <i>Generic type</i>              | <i>Nomenclature / Calibre</i> | <i>Panel Report</i>                                      | <i>Responsible</i> | <i>Remarks</i>                                         |
|----------------------------------|-------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------|--------------------|--------------------------------------------------------|
| Air to Ground Missiles (AGM)     | BA-7 Blue Arrow               | <a href="#">S/2019/914</a>                               | UAE                | ▪                                                      |
| Anti-Tank (ATGM)                 | FGM-148 <i>Javelin</i>        | <a href="#">S/2019/914</a>                               | Member State       | ▪ Present under resolution 2214 (2015). <sup>106</sup> |
|                                  | <i>Rocketsan</i> UMTAS        | <a href="#">S/2021/229</a>                               | Turkey             | ▪                                                      |
| Anti-Tank (Rockets)              | M-79 Osa                      | New                                                      | UID                | ▪                                                      |
| Engineer Stores                  | ML-8 anti-lift initiators     | <a href="#">S/2021/229</a>                               | Russian PMC        | ▪                                                      |
| Free Flight Rockets (FFR)        | 122mm <i>Rocketsan</i> FFR    | New                                                      | Turkey<br>UAE      | ▪                                                      |
| Grenades                         | F1 Fragmentation              | New                                                      | ChVK Wagner        | ▪                                                      |
|                                  | 30mm VOG-17M Grenades         | <a href="#">S/2021/229</a>                               | ChVK Wagner        | ▪                                                      |
|                                  | 40mm VOG-25 Grenades          | <a href="#">S/2021/229</a>                               | ChVK Wagner        | ▪                                                      |
| Laser Guided Bombs (LGB)         | GBU-12 <i>Paveway</i> II      | <a href="#">S/2017/466</a>                               | UAE                | ▪                                                      |
| Laser Guided Projectiles (LGP)   | 155mm GP-1A                   | <a href="#">S/2017/466</a><br><a href="#">S/2018/812</a> | UAE                | ▪                                                      |
|                                  | 155mm GP-6                    | <a href="#">S/2019/914</a>                               | UAE                | ▪                                                      |
| Mines (Anti-personnel)           | MON-50                        | New                                                      | ChVK Wagner        | ▪                                                      |
|                                  | MON-90                        | New                                                      | ChVK Wagner        | ▪                                                      |
|                                  | MON-200                       | New                                                      | ChVK Wagner        | ▪                                                      |
|                                  | OZM-72                        | New                                                      | ChVK Wagner        | ▪                                                      |
|                                  | PMN-2                         | <a href="#">S/2021/229</a>                               | ChVK Wagner        | ▪                                                      |
|                                  | POM-2R                        | <a href="#">S/2021/229</a>                               | ChVK Wagner        | ▪                                                      |
| Mines (Anti-Tank)                | TM-62M                        | New                                                      | Russian PMC        | ▪                                                      |
| Mortar Bombs                     | 120mm high explosive          | <a href="#">S/2021/229</a>                               | UID                | ▪                                                      |
|                                  | 120mm M62P8 high explosive    | <a href="#">S/2021/229</a>                               | UAE                | ▪                                                      |
|                                  | 120mm M62P10 high explosive   | New                                                      | UAE                | ▪                                                      |
| Small Arms and Cannon Ammunition | 7.62 x 39mm                   | <a href="#">S/2015/128</a><br><a href="#">S/2016/209</a> | Belarus<br>UID     | ▪ For Ministry of Interior.                            |
|                                  | 7.62 x 39mm                   | <a href="#">S/2016/209</a>                               | Sudan              | ▪                                                      |
|                                  | 7.62 x 39mm TulAmmo           | <a href="#">S/2021/229</a>                               | Russian PMC        | ▪ Lot A421/2019.                                       |
|                                  | 7.62 x 51mm M80               | <a href="#">S/2016/209</a>                               | Qatar              | ▪                                                      |
|                                  | 7.62 x 54Rmm                  | <a href="#">S/2016/209</a>                               | UID                | ▪ Manufactured in 2012.                                |

<sup>106</sup> In [S/2019/914](#), the Panel recommended that the Committee provide guidance as to whether the term “combat by all means” in paragraph 3 of resolution 2214 (2015) overrides the requirements of paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011) and as subsequently amended.

| <i>Generic type</i>   | <i>Nomenclature / Calibre</i> | <i>Panel Report</i>                                     | <i>Responsible</i> | <i>Remarks</i>                   |
|-----------------------|-------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------|--------------------|----------------------------------|
|                       | 12.7 x 108mm                  | <a href="#">S/2013/99</a><br><a href="#">S/2015/128</a> | UAE<br>Belarus     | ▪<br>▪ For Ministry of Interior. |
|                       | 14.5 x 114mm                  | <a href="#">S/2015/128</a>                              | Belarus            | ▪ For Ministry of Interior       |
|                       | 23 x 115mm                    | <a href="#">S/2015/128</a>                              | Belarus            | ▪ For Ministry of Interior.      |
| Thermobaric Munitions | KBP RPO-A <i>Shmel</i>        | <a href="#">S/2021/229</a>                              | ChVK Wagner        | ▪                                |

2. Tables 26.3 and 26.4 summarises arms and military materiel that have been reported in open-sources as new transfers. The Panel is still investigating these alleged transfers as: (a) in some cases the arms and military materiel were in the inventory of the Libyan Armed Forces prior to the 2011 arms embargo; and/or (b) the imagery was not of high enough resolution to identify serial numbers or lot/batch numbers to confirm post-2011 manufacture, and thus enable the initiation of tracing requests to identify supply chains. The Panel continues to investigate to find confirmatory information to the appropriate evidential standards.

Table 26.3

**Reported but not yet confirmed arms and military materiel transferred to Libya (26 Feb 2011 - 25 Apr 2022) (weapon systems and equipment)** <sup>107</sup>

| <i>Generic type</i>     | <i>Nomenclature / Calibre</i>       | <i>Remarks</i>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      |
|-------------------------|-------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Air Defence (Missiles)  | S-125 (SA-3)                        | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ This system was in the inventory of the Libyan Armed Forces prior to the 2011 arms embargo.</li> <li>▪ Reports in June 2020 of supply from Ukraine to Turkey,<sup>108</sup> and then deployed to Al Watiya.<sup>109</sup> No S-125 appear on satellite imagery of Al Watiya at that time, only <i>HAWK</i> MIM.</li> </ul>                                                                                 |
| Anti-Tank (ATGW)        | 9M113 <i>Konkurs</i> <sup>110</sup> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ This system was in the inventory of the Libyan Armed Forces prior to the 2011 arms embargo.</li> <li>▪ Also seen with HAF 106 brigade in November 2020 exercise, but resolution of imagery insufficient to identify if post-2011 production.</li> <li>▪ More confirmatory evidence required before post-2011 transfer to Libya can be proven.</li> </ul>                                                   |
| Armoured Vehicles (APC) | <i>NIMR</i> II <sup>111</sup>       | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ This vehicle was in the inventory of the Libyan Armed Forces prior to the 2011 arms embargo. The unit badge on the vehicle dates back to 1970.</li> <li>▪ Supplied under a contract signed in 2009 between Libya and the Bin Jamr Group, UAE.<sup>112</sup></li> <li>▪ The imagery was not sufficient to allow for confirmation of a new transfer to Libya without other confirmatory evidence.</li> </ul> |

<sup>107</sup> Listed primarily in <https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2020/06/types-of-arms-and-equipment-supplied-to.html>, 23 March 2021.

<sup>108</sup> <https://avia-pro.net/news/na-vooruzhenii-livii-poyavilis-ukrainskie-s-125-protiv-rossiyskih-mig-29-i-su-24>, 8 July 2020.

<sup>109</sup> [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=\\_mPg5CTUJHQ](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_mPg5CTUJHQ), 12 July 2020.

<sup>110</sup> Reported capture. <https://twitter.com/AnalystMick/status/1249681644933599233>, 13 April 2020.

<sup>111</sup> <https://twitter.com/oded121351/status/966794267585925120>, 22 February 2018.

<sup>112</sup> <http://www.army-guide.com/eng/product.php?prodID=3936&printmode=1>. Accessed 21 January 2022.



| <i>Generic type</i>         | <i>Nomenclature / Calibre</i>               | <i>Remarks</i>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               |
|-----------------------------|---------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Armoured Vehicles<br>(IAFV) | BRDM-2                                      | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>This weapon system was in the inventory of the Libyan Armed Forces prior to the 2011 arms embargo.</li> <li><a href="#">S/2016/209</a> reported the transfer of these APC types from Libya to Mali.</li> <li>Ukraine sold 108 BRDM to a UAE customer in 2017.<sup>113</sup></li> <li>More confirmatory evidence required before post-2011 transfer to Libya can be proven.</li> </ul>                                                                                                                 |
| Artillery<br>(Towed)        | ** 122mm D-30 Howitzer <sup>114</sup>       | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>This weapon system was in the inventory of the Libyan Armed Forces prior to the 2011 arms embargo.</li> <li>More confirmatory evidence required before post-2011 transfer to Libya can be proven.</li> </ul>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          |
|                             | 152mm 2A65 Msta-B Howitzer                  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>This weapon system was NOT in the inventory of the Libyan Armed Forces prior to the 2011 arms embargo.</li> <li>The open-source imagery that initially referred to this weapon was later updated to attribute the gun as a G5 Howitzer.<sup>115</sup></li> <li>The Panel has yet to find any imagery of the weapon system deployed in Libya.</li> </ul>                                                                                                                                               |
|                             | 155mm Norinco AH4 Gun-Howitzer              | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>This weapon system was NOT in the inventory of the Libyan Armed Forces prior to the 2011 arms embargo.</li> <li>Procured by UAE in 2019.<sup>116</sup></li> <li>Ammunition for the weapon system reported in <a href="#">S/2017/466</a>, <a href="#">S/2018/812</a> and <a href="#">S/2019/914</a>, but this may be compatible with the 155mm G5 Howitzer known to have been transferred.</li> <li>The Panel has yet to find any imagery of the weapon system proving deployment in Libya.</li> </ul> |
| Artillery<br>(MLRS)         | 107mm LSRVM <i>Morava</i>                   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The 128mm version was reported in <a href="#">S/2021/229</a>.</li> <li>Also see table 26.1.</li> </ul>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                |
|                             | 107mm <i>Taka</i>                           | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Copy of Chinese Type-63 manufactured in Sudan.</li> <li>The single source imagery cannot confirm the weapon type, nor deployment in Libya.<sup>117</sup></li> </ul>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   |
| Logistic Vehicles           | Safir Light Utility Vehicle                 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>This vehicle was in the inventory of the Libyan Armed Forces prior to the 2011 arms embargo.</li> <li>More confirmatory evidence required before post-2011 transfer to Libya can be proven.</li> </ul>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                |
| Mortars<br>(Field)          | 60mm Type-32                                | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Image resolution insufficient for 100% identification.<sup>118</sup></li> </ul>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |
|                             | 82mm 82-BM-37 <sup>119</sup>                | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>This weapon system was in the inventory of the Libyan Armed Forces prior to the 2011 arms embargo.</li> <li>More confirmatory evidence required before post-2011 transfer to Libya can be proven.</li> </ul>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          |
| Mortars<br>(Self-propelled) | 120mm <i>Boragh</i> Armoured Mortar Vehicle | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The single source imagery identified is insufficient to allow for confirmation of a new transfer to Libya.<sup>120</sup></li> </ul>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   |
| Radars and EW               | Grozna-S Counter UAV                        | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The single source imagery identified is insufficient to allow for confirmation of a new transfer to Libya.<sup>121</sup></li> </ul>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   |

<sup>113</sup> <https://defence-blog.com/ukraine-sold-108-brdm-2-armoured-reconnaissance-vehicles-to-uae/>, 1 August 2017.

<sup>114</sup> <https://twitter.com/Oded121351/status/1328016339072638978>, 15 November 2020.

<sup>115</sup> <https://twitter.com/Oded121351/status/1328016339072638978/photo/1>, 15 November 2020; and <https://twitter.com/darksecretplace/status/1328024363887595520>, 15 November 2020.

<sup>116</sup>

[https://www.armyrecognition.com/march\\_2019\\_global\\_defense\\_security\\_army\\_news\\_industry/norinco\\_ah4\\_155\\_mm\\_howitzers\\_for\\_united\\_arab\\_emirates\\_army.html](https://www.armyrecognition.com/march_2019_global_defense_security_army_news_industry/norinco_ah4_155_mm_howitzers_for_united_arab_emirates_army.html), 1 March 2019.

<sup>117</sup> <https://postimg.cc/fkz4Rqhp>, undated. Accessed 23 January 2022.

<sup>118</sup> <https://twitter.com/libyatogether20/status/1378031351132254209>, 2 April 2021.

<sup>119</sup> <https://twitter.com/Oded121351/status/1328012799948312576>, 15 November 2020.

<sup>120</sup> <https://twitter.com/tariqgibrel/status/601900388267208704>, 23 May 2015; and <https://postimg.cc/4K7MjjVH>, undated. Accessed 23 January 2022.

<sup>121</sup> <https://twitter.com/towersight/status/1292885386902069249>, 10 August 2020.

| Generic type                 | Nomenclature / Calibre                       | Remarks                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 |
|------------------------------|----------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|                              | Grozna-6                                     | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The single source image is of a Grozna-6 deployed in the UAE,<sup>122</sup> but the Panel has yet to see imagery of the system deployed in Libya.<sup>123</sup></li> </ul>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |
|                              | Krasuha                                      | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Single source on 18 May 2020 with no supporting high-resolution imagery to allow for confirmation of type or location in Libya.<sup>124</sup></li> </ul>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         |
| Small Arms and Light Weapons | 7.62 x 54mmR PKM General Purpose Machine Gun | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>This system was in the inventory of the Libyan Armed Forces prior to the 2011 arms embargo.</li> <li>More confirmatory evidence required before post-2011 transfer to Libya can be proven.</li> </ul>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            |
| Tanks (MBT)                  | T-55E                                        | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The T-55 was in the inventory of the Libyan Armed Forces prior to the 2011 arms embargo.</li> <li>HAF official social media showed a T-55 variant with the Tariq bin Ziyad brigade in 2020.<sup>125</sup></li> <li>ChvK Wagner personnel also repaired 16 and overhauled 31 T-55 variants in 2019, so possible these are from that work.<sup>126</sup></li> <li>More confirmatory evidence required before post-2011 transfer to Libya can be proven.</li> </ul> |
|                              | T-62M                                        | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>T-62 variants were in the inventory of the Libyan Armed Forces prior to the 2011 arms embargo.</li> <li>ChvK Wagner personnel also repaired 4 and overhauled 9 T-62 variants in 2019.<sup>127</sup></li> <li>The imagery was not sufficient to allow for confirmation of a new transfer to Libya.</li> </ul>                                                                                                                                                     |
| UAV                          | Ababil-2                                     | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Reported as operated by HAF.</li> <li>Image resolution insufficient for 100% identification of type or location.<sup>128</sup></li> </ul>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        |
|                              | Zagil                                        | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The Panel has identified a single-source report alleging Sudan supplied this UAV type in 2014.<sup>129</sup> The imagery shows Libyan officers but is insufficient to prove the presence of this UAV type in Libya.</li> <li>No open-source imagery of a "Zagil" UAV could be found to allow for confirmation of UAV type.</li> </ul>                                                                                                                            |

Table 26.4

**Reported but not confirmed arms and military materiel transferred to Libya (26 Feb 2011 - 25 Apr 2022) (ammunition and explosive ordnance)**

| Generic type | Nomenclature / Calibre                        | Remarks                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                |
|--------------|-----------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Artillery    | 155mm 2K25 Krasnopol laser guided projectile. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Reported as being for the 152mm 2A65 Msta-B Howitzer (see table 26.3), so possible calibre error in report.</li> <li>Imagery insufficient to confirm calibre or transfer to Libya.<sup>130</sup></li> <li>The imagery could equally be of a GP1, which is a direct copy.<sup>131</sup> GP1 reported in in <a href="#">S/2017/466</a> and <a href="#">S/2018/812</a>.</li> </ul> |

<sup>122</sup> <https://www.menadefense.net/mideast/les-emirats-arabes-unis-se-dotent-de-brouilleurs-bielorusses-groza-6/>, 25 June 2020.

<sup>123</sup> <https://army-tech.net/forum/index.php?threads/الطائرة-الصاروخية-البيلاروسية-groza-18194.العاصفة-أو-،> 25 April 2020.

<sup>124</sup> <https://libya.liveuamap.com/en/2020/18-may-gna-turkish-uav-airstrike-on--electronic-warfare-system>, 20 May 2020.

<sup>125</sup> <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LXt5d1iacEk>, 14 November 2020. [14min 29sec].

<sup>126</sup> Table 77.2 to [S/2021/229](#).

<sup>127</sup> Table 77.2 to [S/2021/229](#).

<sup>128</sup> <https://postimg.cc/3dNhpry1>. Accessed 23 January 2022.

<sup>129</sup> <https://m.facebook.com/1445146409065850/photos/a.1445154462398378/1484269561820201/?type=3&source=54>, 9 August 2014.

<sup>130</sup> <https://twitter.com/lostweapons/status/1243787785724542976?lang=he>, 28 March 2020.

<sup>131</sup> Confidential source analysis.

| <i>Generic type</i>       | <i>Nomenclature / Calibre</i>      | <i>Remarks</i>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |
|---------------------------|------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Engineer Stores           | Fateh-4 mine clearance line charge | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ The single source imagery identified is insufficient to allow for confirmation of a transfer to Libya.<sup>132</sup></li> </ul>                                                                                                                                                                             |
| Mines<br>(Anti-personnel) | MON-100                            | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ The Libyan Mine Action Centre (LibMAC) have confirmed that no mines of this type have been reported, identified or rendered safe in Libya to date.<sup>133</sup></li> <li>▪ The single source imagery identified is insufficient to allow for confirmation of a transfer to Libya.<sup>134</sup></li> </ul> |
| Mines<br>(Anti-Tank)      | TM-83                              | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ LibMAC have confirmed that no mines of this type have been reported, identified or rendered safe in Libya to date.<sup>135</sup></li> <li>▪ The single source imagery is insufficient to confirm type or transfer to Libya.<sup>136</sup></li> </ul>                                                        |

<sup>132</sup> [https://vk.com/wall-98555648\\_224885?lang=en](https://vk.com/wall-98555648_224885?lang=en), 10 August 2021.

<sup>133</sup> Email to Panel of 25 January 2022.

<sup>134</sup> [https://www.libyaobserver.ly/news/libyas-interior-ministry-urges-south-tripoli-residents-not-return-home-just-yet?qt-libya\\_weather=1&qt-sidebar\\_tabs=1](https://www.libyaobserver.ly/news/libyas-interior-ministry-urges-south-tripoli-residents-not-return-home-just-yet?qt-libya_weather=1&qt-sidebar_tabs=1), 8 June 2020.

<sup>135</sup> Ibid.

<sup>136</sup> <https://twitter.com/analystmick/status/1125785280626200576>, 7 May 2019.

## Annex 27 Naval assets used by the Stability Support Apparatus

### A. Overview of SSA naval assets

1. The newly formed maritime unit of the SSA operates at least six vessels, including the *Alqayid-1*, the *Alqayid-2*, *Alqayid Saqar* and a fast patrol boat (FPB) whose name is unknown to the Panel (figures 27.1 through 27.5). Further context on the use by the SSA on its naval assets can be found in Annex 24.

### B. Civilian-type vessels

#### 1. Alqayid 1 and 2

2. The Panel has identified the *Alqayid 1*, and the *Alqayid 2* as being operated by the SSA.<sup>137</sup> *Alqayid 1* has been observed both with and without a heavy machine gun mounted on its bow (figure 27.1). No imagery has emerged of the *Alqayid 2* being armed (figure 27.2). They are not specifically designed for intercepting migrant boats for return, mainly owing to their limited passenger and life-saving equipment capacity. The SSA addresses this shortcoming by operating these boats in tandem with a large wooden boat with higher passenger capacity (also pictured in figure 27.1).<sup>138</sup>

Figure 27.1

Vessel *Alqayid 1* in unarmed (left) <sup>a</sup> and armed configuration (right)<sup>b</sup>



Sources: <sup>a</sup> <https://twitter.com/SARwatchMED/status/1485711494633472000>, 24 January 2022;

<sup>b</sup> <https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=305766508128448>, 28 December 2021

<sup>137</sup> At least two further, unidentified civilian vessels are presented on the SSA's official social media: [https://twitter.com/SSA\\_Gov/status/1480979918456504331](https://twitter.com/SSA_Gov/status/1480979918456504331), 11 January 2022.

<sup>138</sup> <https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=305766508128448>, 28 December 2021.

Figure 27.2

**Vessel *Alqayid 2***


Source: <https://twitter.com/SARwatchMED/status/1485711494633472000>, 24 January 2022

**2. Alqayid Saqar**

3. The *Alqayid Saqar* has a yellow paint scheme that would suggest SAR use (see figure 27.3). While appearing to be a tender or a pilot boat, it also has features that support use as a SAR vessel. These being a deck to accommodate a limited number of survivors and a low stern platform for ease of recovery and man-overboard assistance. However, the vessel also has a 12.7mm DShK variant heavy machine gun (HMG) mounted to its bow, which gives the vessel a role as a fast patrol boat (FPB), even if other features of a naval-type vessel<sup>139</sup> are missing.

<sup>139</sup> Annex 32 of [S/2019/914](#) explains the rationale for the classification of specifically naval designed vessels as military materiel, regardless of whether armed or not.

Figure 27.3

FPB *Alqayid Saqar* with mounted 12.7mm DShK variant HMG

### 3. Military conversion of dual-use items

4. All of these vessels are civilian in design and thus are not classified as naval-type vessels by virtue of design, hence they are not classified as military materiel *per se*.<sup>140</sup> While an initial transfer of a vessel in a civilian configuration, be it as

<sup>140</sup> Annex 32 of S/2019/914 explains the rationale for the classification of specifically naval designed vessels as military materiel, regardless of whether armed or not.



tender, pilot boat or as SAR vessel, would not be a violation of the arms embargo, a post-transfer mounting of weaponry is problematic. This clearly shows how modification, even if post-transfer, converts dual-use into military materiel (see paragraph 61 of main body of report). The Panel is still investigating the exact type, capabilities, and supply chain of this vessel.

### C. Naval-type vessel

#### 1. Lambro Olympic D74 (Javelin 74) Fast Patrol Boat

5. The SSA also operates a FPB that has design features consistent with the Lambro Olympic D74 (Javelin 74) FPB previously used by the Hellenic Coast Guard. The vessel was first observed unarmed (figure 27.4) and later with a twin mounted machine guns on its bow (figure 27.5). Regardless of being armed or unarmed and regardless of its eventual capabilities for SAR use, it is by design a naval-type fast patrol boat, and hence classified as military materiel. The Panel has written to Greece to establish the supply chain and is awaiting a response. The transfer of this vessel is a violation of paragraph 9 of resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#).

Figure 27.4

**Lambro Olympic D74 used by the SSA, unarmed (in red, left) and used by the Greek Coast Guard (right)**






Figure 27.5

**Lambro Olympic D74 used by the SSA, in armed configuration**



Source: <https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=6977063982334836>, 15 February 2022.

## Annex 28 Activities by HAF naval units

### 1. Overview

1. The Panel is investigating 24 incidents of unlawful hailing, boarding and detention of foreign-flagged vessels by members of the HAF Susah Combat Marine Squadron (SCMS) that have taken place since late 2020. The SCMS individuals execute these unlawful acts under the justification that the targeted vessels violated a restricted zone unilaterally declared by the LNA in 2015 (see paragraphs 68-71 in main body of report). The majority of the hailing incidents occurred between January and November 2021. While the Panel is still investigating each individual case, it has established the *modus operandi* and highlights one incident as a case study.

### 2. Modus operandi

2. While its selection criteria are so far unclear to the Panel, the SCMS intercepts on average one to two vessels per month, although on an irregular basis. In 2021, only March, April, July and December saw no interceptions. Once members of the SCMS identify a vessel, they hail the vessel over the radio (VHF channel 16) and ask it to reduce speed and prepare for inspection. Vessels are regularly intercepted around 20 nautical miles (nm) from the Libyan shore, in international waters, that fall within the unlawfully demarcated HAF “no-sail zone” but mostly outside the “prohibited zone” (see paragraphs 68-71 in main body of the report). Vessels are then approached by naval-type vessels flying the Libyan flag, that most often are high-speed rigid-hulled inflatable boats (RHIB) of the same type widely used by Coast Guards, military or law enforcement agencies of other Member States.<sup>141</sup> SCMS also operates a Damen Stan 1605 patrol boat.<sup>142</sup> The use of these boats gives merchant vessels the first impression that they are being hailed by an authorised enforcement unit of a Member State.<sup>143</sup>

3. Once merchant vessels have stopped, armed members of SCMS in camouflage uniforms with distinct insignia board. They present themselves as the Libyan Coast Guard and inform the master of the merchant vessel that the vessel is being stopped for having violated a “no-sail zone” (see paragraphs 68-71 in main body of the report). Ship and crew documents are confiscated, and vessels are detained and forced to follow the SCMS to the anchorage area 2 nm off Ras El Hilal, within Libyan territorial waters.

4. Once at anchorage off Ras El Hilal, crews remain detained on the merchant vessel, while the vessel’s insurance company, through local intermediaries, arranges for the payment of an unlawful fine for the violation of the “no-sail zone”. The fine of LYD 200,000 (approximately USD 42,000) is negotiable and has to be paid in cash. Once paid, the master of the merchant vessel has to sign a document declaring that an agreement to pay the fine for having violated the “no-sail zone”. Documents are then returned and the vessel is released.

### 3. Case study: MV *Corona J*

5. On 24 May 2021, the MV *Corona J* (IMO: 9238686) on track from Port Said, Egypt to Misrata, Libya, was hailed via radio by members of the SMCS identifying themselves as Libyan Coast Guard, instructed to reduce speed, and then boarded by members of SMCS around 20 nm off the coast of Libya, north of Ras El Hilal (interception point: 33°14'30.00"N, 22°17'18.00"E). SMCS used two naval-type RHIBs with Libyan flags, one approaching and one trailing several miles behind. Once on board, members of SMCS, wearing uniforms and being armed with assault rifles and sidearms, informed the vessel’s master that the *Corona J* had been stopped for violating the “no-sail zone” then, and also a few years earlier; thus a fine needed to be paid. SMCS collected the ship’s and crew’s documents but refused to inspect the documents on

<sup>141</sup> The Panel has recently identified the type of RHIB used by SMCS but has yet to give the relevant Member State appropriate time to respond. That Member State is therefore not named here.

<sup>142</sup> Confidential sources.

<sup>143</sup> Panel interviews with primary sources.

board the *Corona J*; instead, they returned to their RHIB and instructed the *Corona J* to follow them to anchorage off Ras El Hilal.

6. En route to the anchorage position SMCS did not respond to radio calls. During that time, the *Corona J* was in contact with the vessel's owner, who informed the insurance company and the flag State (Antigua and Barbuda). Once at anchor off Ras El Hilal (32°53'60.00"N, 22°11'0.00"E), a six-member SCMS team arrived, again all armed, wearing uniform and identifying themselves as Libyan Coast Guard. They told the master of the *Corona J* to assemble the crew on the bridge, from where they were prohibited to leave by two armed SMCS members. They ordered the seal on one container to be removed, opened the container, superficially checked the cargo, and then closed the container again. No certificate of inspection was issued. Thereafter, they started to search the crew's quarters, while the crew was not allowed inside, despite request. When they were finished, crew checked and noted that currency and personal valuables of crew members had been taken (value totaling around USD 11,000). The ship's safe in the master's quarters had signs of (failed) attempted forceful entry. The crew protested the theft but were threatened with the use of force. The SCMS members left the *Corona J*.

7. On 25 May 2021, the *Corona J* protection and indemnity insurance mutual (P&I Club) negotiated the settlement of the fine for having violated the "no-sail zone", through a local agent. In the end, LYD 180,000 (USD 41,000) was paid in cash. In addition, to secure the release of the vessel, the master of the *Corona J* was forced to sign a document stating that he was guilty of "entering territorial waters without authorization" by "entering the restricted area in Ras El Hilal" and accepted the fine. He also needed to provide a letter from the vessel's owner, to also be counter-signed by him, in which he apologized for having brought forward unwarranted allegations of theft against the Libyan Coast Guard.<sup>144</sup> The stolen currency and valuables were not returned. The ship was allowed to sail after having spent about one day in detention.

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<sup>144</sup> The Panel has reviewed the relevant documentation and established its veracity to reach these findings.

## Annex 29 “Prohibited zone” declared by HAF

SUBJECT:- LIBYAN COAST GUARD PROHIBITED ZONE

TO ALL SHIP MASTERS, SHIP OWNERS, CHARTERS, AND SHIP AGENTS

THIS IS TO INFORM YOU ALL THAT SAILING THROUGH AND/OR CROSSING THE FOLLOWING COORDINATES IS PROHIBITED.

32 54 42N, 022 04 22 E

33 04 11 N, 022 01 55 E

32 59 22 N, 022 40 59 E

32 65 12 N, 023 14 40 E

32 36 21 N, 023 07 57 E

MUST SAIL 5 NM NORTH TO ABOVE COORDINATES

ANY VESSEL DOES NOT CONFORM AND COMPLY TO THE LIBYAN COAST WARNING, WILL BE SUBJECTED TO DETAINING AND FINANCIAL PENALTIES.

IN CASE OF EMERGENCY TO ENTER PROHIBITED ZONE PERMISSION MUST BE OBTAINED FROM THE RESPONSIBLE PERSONS;

**CAPT. HUSSEIN ALSHARAA-ISPS OFFICER**, MOB. +218 92 580 7934 /+218 91 052 0474

EMAIL: beng.safetyport@gmail.com


**MR. MUFTAH AL GHOUL** : MOB.+218 92 756 9391

**NAVY COAST GUARD OFFICER, MOHAMED AL MAJDOUB**: MOB. +218 92 579 84 65

**NAVY OFFICER : MR KHALED ABOKHAID**: MOB. +218 91 382 7051

EMAIL: khaledboket@gmail.com

OR CALL YOUR LOCAL SHIPPING AGENCY FOR GUIDE LINES.

RECEIVED BY : 

NAME:-

DATE:





Source: Confidential

## Annex 30 Military Armoured Vehicles on board MV Luccello (4 March 2022)

### Introduction

1. Open and confidential sources have informed the Panel that on 4 March 2022 the MV *Luccello* (IMO: 78100112) offloaded 100 military armoured vehicles (MAV) in Benghazi Port (LYBNG, 32°06'04"N, 20°02'52"E). This was confirmed by satellite imagery of 6 March 2022, which showed 100 MAV parked in the port area behind shielding (figure 30.1).

Figure 30.1

**Satellite imagery of armoured vehicles at Benghazi Port on 6 March 2022**



Source: Confidential

### Voyage

2. The vessel arrived at Aqaba, Jordan (JOAQJ) on 18 February and left on 21 February 2022. The draft of the vessel had changed from 4.7 to 5.8 m (+1.1 m), confirming that a cargo was embarked at Aqaba. On 22 February 2022, whilst still in the Gulf of Aqaba, the vessel declared Suez Canal, Egypt (EGSUZ) as the next destination.

3. On 24 February 2022, after transit of the Suez Canal, the vessel continued north towards Antalya, Turkey with intermittent AIS transmissions. On 26 February 2022, on approaching Turkish territorial waters the vessel declared Tripoli, Libya (LYTIP) as the next destination. The vessel's track was then erratic, first heading west into Greek territorial waters, then west and finally north to an anchorage off Kemen Marina, 15 nautical miles (NM) south of Antalya, Turkey (TRAYT).

4. On 27 February 2022 the vessel continued its voyage on a south-west track, passing south of Crete, until on the evening of 1 March 2022 the vessel turned onto a southerly track when 55nm north of Al Bayda, well within the HAF "no-sail zone", but outside of the HAF "prohibited zone" (see paragraphs 68-71 of main part of the report). The AIS transmission was lost soon thereafter north of Ras Al Hilal (LYREH) until 2 March 2022 when the vessel was near Derna (LYDRX). AIS was lost again until 3 March 2022 close to Ras Al Hilal, when the vessel track was then west in close proximity to the coast. The vessel stayed within Libyan territorial waters until approaching Benghazi port on 4 March 2022. The vessel then changed its declared destination to Benghazi before entering the port and making a port call. Elements of the unusual routing and track changes of the vessel from Aqaba to Benghazi is shown at figures 30.2 to 30.4.

Figure 30.2  
Track from Aqaba




Figure 30.3  
Track near Turkish anchorage




Figure 30.4  
Track along Libyan coast



Source: IHS Maritime and Trade (Subscription).

5. A draft change for the vessel from 5.8m to 5.5m (-0.3m) indicates that the vessel discharged cargo in Benghazi between 4 and 6 March 2022. Change of draft cannot be used as a sole indicator of cargo discharge as the vessel could be ballasting. In this case cargo discharge is supported by the presence of MAV in the port area immediately after the vessel's arrival (see below). The vessel departed Benghazi on 6 March 2022 on a north-east track.

#### Analysis of voyage, seizure claims and cargo

6. The initial detour of the vessel via Antalya, Turkey can plausibly be explained by the inclement weather conditions known to be prevailing during the transit days in the south-eastern Mediterranean. One subscription-only source reports that the vessel declared a technical issue on 26 February 2022 and might have anchored off Antalya for repairs.

7. On 15 March 2022, a claim surfaced on social media<sup>145</sup> that HAF had intercepted a vessel 70nm off Libya's coast that was carrying 100 armoured vehicles, worth 100 million LYD, destined for Abdel Raouf Kara's Special Deterrent Force (SDF). The report stated the vehicles were coming from Aqaba, Kingdom of Jordan, and that the vessel was intercepted "70 miles" off Libya's eastern coast, boarded and redirected under the threat of force to the port of Derna.<sup>146</sup> The vessel was later released after the vehicles had been seized. A confidential source confirmed to the Panel that the background of the image that accompanied the report indeed shows the MV *Luccello* and its cargo in question (see figure 30.5 below).

8. At this stage it is unclear whether the above-described seizure indeed took place. The AIS signal loss north of Ras Al Hilal (LYREH), followed by a dark period of almost two days, the subsequent sailing in Libyan territorial waters within the NSZ, and the declaration of Benghazi as of destination only upon arrival at that port supports are indicators that would support that a seizure took place. However, were this to be the case, and the true destination was Tripoli and the SDF, this would be remarkable as it would indicate shifting alliances. Such a large military cargo could not have been loaded in Aqaba, Jordan without permission of, at least, local port officials. The interception point, regardless if 70 nm as per the open-source report or if 55 nm as per the vessel's sudden change of direction, would be at a far greater distance to the Libyan coast than the area that members of the SCMS have so far undertaken interceptions in (see annex 27).

<sup>145</sup> <https://www.facebook.com/113742230465858/posts/491945085978902/?sfnsn=mo>, 15 March 2022; and <https://twitter.com/libyapress2010/status/1503683044615593984>, 15 March 2022.

<sup>146</sup> The social media sources give different dates for this event, ranging from 1 March to the evening of 2 March 2022.



9. A confidential source has stated that the MAV offloaded in Benghazi are *Spartan-2*<sup>147</sup> manufactured by Streit Group (figure 30.5). In 2011 Streit Group opened a manufacturing facility in Aqaba, Jordan,<sup>148</sup> and the port of departure of the voyage of the MV *Luccello*. HAF have previously received deliveries of Streit Group MAV, and such vehicles form a major component of its military capability.

Figure 30.5

*Spartan-2* MAV on board the MV *Luccello* (left) <sup>a</sup> and manufacturer's image (right) <sup>b</sup>



Sources: <sup>a</sup> <https://twitter.com/libyapress2010/status/1503683044615593984>; <sup>b</sup> <https://www.armored-cars.com/products-services/military-vehicles/spartan-mav/>

10. After delivery, the MAV were temporarily stored in an area with a perimeter wall (see figure 30.1). A confidential source informed the Panel that the approximately 6 metres high perimeter wall had only been erected between November 2021 and January 2022. This indicates that deliveries of sensitive cargo were expected, as this is a common concealment tactic used in Libya.

#### Other indicators

11. The vessel changed its name and flag a few days after the voyage, to MV *Victory Roro* under Equatorial Guinea flag. This is the third name and second flag change in five years for this vessel. Frequent name and flag changes for vessels are both indicators of illicit activity.

#### Violation

12. The Panel continues its investigation into the full supply chain and the perpetrators of this transfer of MAV from Jordan to Libya. The transfer is a violation of paragraph 9 of resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#) and a non-compliance by Jordan for failure to inspect the vessel.

<sup>147</sup> <https://www.armored-cars.com/products-services/military-vehicles/spartan-mav/>.

<sup>148</sup> <https://www.armored-cars.com/company/manufacturing-facilities/>.



## Annex 31 Italian naval vessel presence in Libya

### 1. Delivery of equipment intended solely for humanitarian or protective use

1. On 7 December 2021, a media article reported the delivery of a Maritime Rescue and Coordination Centre (MRCC) to Libya, on board the MM *San Giorgio* Landing Platform Dock (L9892).<sup>149</sup> Italy informed the Panel that on 2 December 2021, the Italian MM *San Giorgio* Landing Platform Dock (L9892) docked at Tripoli's commercial harbour and delivered an MRCC facility to the Libyan Coast Guard and Navy. The delivery was undertaken within the framework of the EU program "Support to Integrated Border and Migration Management in Libya" (SIBMMIL). The MRCC consisted of ten containers that serve for lodgings, office space, mobile kitchen, storage, electricity generation and MRCC functions and activities. The *San Giorgio* departed Libya the next day.

2. The MM *San Giorgio* is operated by the Italian Navy and is equipped with an Oto Melara 76mm / 62 calibre gun and two Oerlikon 20mm cannons, and clearly falls under the category of arms and related materiel in the sense of paragraph 9 of resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#) (see figure 31.1).

3. While the items delivered by the MM *San Giorgio* fall under the exception of "supplies of non-lethal military equipment intended solely for humanitarian or protective use, ..." under the auspices of paragraph 9 of resolution [2095 \(2013\)](#), in the Panel's view, the entering and exiting of Libyan territory by the vessel is by itself a technical violation of paragraph 9 to resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#), even if there is no intent to transfer arms and related materiel to Libya.

Figure 31.1

MM *San Giorgio* Landing Platform Dock (L9892)



Source: Panel of Experts, Brindisi, 8 April 2022.

<sup>149</sup> [https://www.repubblica.it/esteri/2021/12/07/news/nave\\_italiana\\_libia-329232874/?fbclid=IwAR1V3mGgd\\_WZWfdWjSfBk2TV1Y1sIvtDDXJUmfUeA2VQJeUzUf70BR8F8f0](https://www.repubblica.it/esteri/2021/12/07/news/nave_italiana_libia-329232874/?fbclid=IwAR1V3mGgd_WZWfdWjSfBk2TV1Y1sIvtDDXJUmfUeA2VQJeUzUf70BR8F8f0), 7 December 2021.


## 2. Presence in Abu Sitta naval base

4. In [S/2019/914](#),<sup>150</sup> the Panel noted the activities of Italian Navy *Gorgona* class coastal transport ships (CTS) MTC<sup>151</sup> *Capri* (A5353) and MTC *Tremiti* (A5348). The Panel has identified that a *Gorgona*-class vessel has continued to be regularly moored at Abu Sitta navy base, Tripoli (32°54'24.68"N, 13°13'12.48"E). Open-source satellite imagery shows that the vessel has been present there consistently since 2018 (for the latest image, see figure 31.2). There has been also a rotation that included the MTC *Caprera* (A5349).<sup>152</sup> The Panel has written to Italy to inquire about the vessels' activities and is awaiting a response.

5. The *Gorgona*-class vessels are operated by the Italian Navy and are equipped with an Oerlikon 20mm cannon and two 7.62mm machine guns, and clearly falls under the category of arms and related materiel in the sense of paragraph 9 of resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#).

6. In the Panel's view, the entering and exiting of Libyan territory by the vessel is by itself a technical violation of paragraph 9 to resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#), even if there is no intent to transfer arms and related materiel to Libya.

Figure 31.2



<sup>150</sup> Table 27.3, page 189.

<sup>151</sup> Moto Trasporto Costiero (MTC).

<sup>152</sup> See also

[https://www.difesa.it/OperazioniMilitari/op\\_intern\\_corso/Libia\\_Missione\\_bilaterale\\_di\\_supporto\\_e\\_assistenza/notizie\\_teatro/Pagine/Nave\\_Caprera\\_sostituisce\\_la\\_Capri\\_nella\\_missione\\_bilaterale\\_di\\_assistenza\\_e\\_supporto\\_in\\_Libia.aspx](https://www.difesa.it/OperazioniMilitari/op_intern_corso/Libia_Missione_bilaterale_di_supporto_e_assistenza/notizie_teatro/Pagine/Nave_Caprera_sostituisce_la_Capri_nella_missione_bilaterale_di_assistenza_e_supporto_in_Libia.aspx)

## Annex 32 Summary of newly identified arms embargo equipment transfer and training violations and non-compliances

1. Sources for tables 32.1 and [32.2](#), which are shown in the appropriate annexes, are primarily from a combination of: (a) Member States responses to Panel enquiries; (b) entity responses to Panel enquiries; (c) official social media of national armed forces; (d) official social media of armed groups; (e) other social media; (f) authoritative specialist military media; (g) imagery supported by geo-location; and/or (h) imagery supported by technical analysis.
2. Transfer violations that took place and went unreported during previous mandates are included in table 32.1 to provide the evidence for the baseline data necessary to assist in the identification of any future violations.

Table 32.1

### Summary of equipment transfer violations

| Annex                                                                                                | Date identified in Libya or by Panel | End User    | Equipment nomenclature                                                                                                   | Responsible      | Cross-references |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|-------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------|------------------|
| <b>Previously unreported</b>                                                                         |                                      |             |                                                                                                                          |                  |                  |
| 33                                                                                                   | 31 Dec 2014                          | GNA         | Streit Typhoon 4x4                                                                                                       | UID <sup>a</sup> | ▪                |
| 34                                                                                                   | 1 Jun 2018                           | HAF         | KaMaz 6x6 Military Truck                                                                                                 | UID              | ▪                |
| 35                                                                                                   | 5 Mar 2019                           | HAF         | SPG-9 73mm Rocket Launcher                                                                                               | UID              | ▪                |
| 36                                                                                                   | 7 May 2019                           | HAF         | Orsis T-5000 Sniper Rifle                                                                                                | UID              | ▪                |
| <b>During resolution <a href="#">2509 (2020)</a> reporting period and unreported or unattributed</b> |                                      |             |                                                                                                                          |                  |                  |
| 37                                                                                                   | 26 Jan 2020                          | HAF         | 7.62 x 39mm Type 63-1 Assault Rifle<br>7.62 x 54mmR Type-80 General Purpose Machine Gun<br>Type 69 85mm Grenade Launcher | UID              | ▪                |
| 38                                                                                                   | 15 Mar 2020                          | HAF         | Inkas Titan-S 6x6 APC                                                                                                    | UID              | ▪                |
| 39                                                                                                   | 21 Mar 2020                          | HAF         | 12.7mm W-85 Heavy Machine Gun                                                                                            | UID              | ▪                |
| 40                                                                                                   | 17 Apr 2020                          | HAF         | Zala 421-16E UAV                                                                                                         | UID              | ▪                |
| 41                                                                                                   | 14 June 2020                         | HAF         | ZSU 23-2-CP 23mm Twin Cannon                                                                                             | UID              | ▪                |
| 42                                                                                                   | 3 Jun 2020                           | HAF         | 120mm HE Mortar Bomb M62P10                                                                                              | UAE              | ▪                |
| 43                                                                                                   | 18 Jun 2020                          | HAF         | 1RL131 P-18 Early Warning Radar                                                                                          | UID              | ▪                |
| 44                                                                                                   | 12 Jul 2020                          | Russian PMC | Ural 4320 6x6 Military Truck                                                                                             | Russian PMC      | ▪                |
| 45                                                                                                   | 1 Aug 2020                           | Russian PMC | TM-62M Anti-Tank Mine                                                                                                    | UID              | ▪                |

| <i>Annex</i>                                                                                    | <i>Date identified<br/>in Libya or by<br/>Panel</i> | <i>End User</i> | <i>Equipment nomenclature</i>                                        | <i>Responsible</i>                               | <i>Cross-references</i>                                           |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------|-----------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 46                                                                                              | 9 Oct 2020                                          | GNU             | 120mm HE Mortar Bomb                                                 | Turkey                                           | ▪ Update to table 4, and annex 41 to <a href="#">S/2021/229</a> . |
| 47                                                                                              | 15 Nov 2020                                         | HAF             | 120mm 120-PM-43 M1943 Mortar                                         | UID                                              | ▪                                                                 |
| 48                                                                                              | 21 Nov 2020                                         | GNU             | Holographic Weapon Sights (HWS) virtually identical to EOTECH design | Turkey                                           | ▪                                                                 |
| 49                                                                                              | 21 Nov 2020                                         | GNU             | MKEK 5.56mm MPT 55K Assault Rifles                                   | Turkey                                           | ▪                                                                 |
| 50                                                                                              | 4 Jan 2021                                          | HAF             | 120mm M-74 Mortar                                                    | UID                                              | ▪                                                                 |
| 51                                                                                              | 28 Jan 2021                                         | GNU             | Akdas AK40-GL 40x46mm Grenade Launchers                              | Turkey                                           | ▪ Also a training violation.                                      |
| 52                                                                                              | 30 Jan 2021                                         | HAF             | 5.56mm AK-103 Assault Rifles                                         | UID                                              | ▪                                                                 |
| 53                                                                                              | 2 Feb 2021                                          | GNU             | System Defence MFR 5.56mm Multi-Functional Rifle                     | Balance of<br>Probability<br>Turkey <sup>b</sup> | ▪                                                                 |
| 54                                                                                              | 4 Feb 2021                                          | HAF             | JAWS-556 5.56mm Assault Rifle (14.5" barrel)                         | Jordan                                           | ▪                                                                 |
| 55                                                                                              | 23 Mar 2021                                         | HAF             | 122m M-30 M1938 Howitzer                                             | UID                                              | ▪                                                                 |
| 56                                                                                              | 23 Mar 2021                                         | HAF             | T-62MV variant Main Battle Tanks                                     | UID                                              | ▪ Update to annex 64 to <a href="#">S/2021/229/Corr.1</a> .       |
| 57                                                                                              | 27 Mar 2021                                         | GNU             | Patton M60 Main Battle Tanks.                                        | UID                                              | ▪ Also a training violation.                                      |
| 58                                                                                              | 30 Mar 2021                                         | PMC /<br>HAF    | AMN 233114 <i>Tiger-M</i> Multi-Purpose Vehicle                      | UID                                              | ▪                                                                 |
| <b>During resolution <a href="#">2571 (2021)</a> reporting period (all new identifications)</b> |                                                     |                 |                                                                      |                                                  |                                                                   |
| 59                                                                                              | 5 May 2021                                          | HAF             | Sordin Supreme Pro-X Max Black hearing protectors                    | UID                                              | ▪                                                                 |
| 60                                                                                              | 18 May 2021                                         | UID             | SUR BRT M9 blank firing pistols                                      | UID                                              | ▪                                                                 |
| 61                                                                                              | 24 May 2021                                         | HAF             | UAZ-469 light communications vehicle                                 | UID                                              | ▪                                                                 |
| 62                                                                                              | 24 May 2021                                         | HAF             | Militarized Jeep Gladiator light 4 x 4 vehicle                       | UID                                              | ▪                                                                 |
| 63                                                                                              | 27 May 2021                                         | HAF             | Militarized Toyota light 6 x 6 vehicle                               | UID                                              | ▪                                                                 |
| 64                                                                                              | 29 May 2021                                         | HAF             | TAG BATT 4x4 APC                                                     | UID                                              | ▪                                                                 |

| <i>Annex</i> | <i>Date identified in Libya or by Panel</i> | <i>End User</i> | <i>Equipment nomenclature</i>                                       | <i>Responsible</i>            | <i>Cross-references</i>                 |
|--------------|---------------------------------------------|-----------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------|-----------------------------------------|
| 65           | 3 Jun 2021                                  | Russian PMC     | Steyr SSG 08 variant or copy Sniper Rifle                           | UID                           | ▪                                       |
| 66           | 3 Jun 2021                                  | Russian PMC     | Militarized Toyota Land Cruiser 79 4 x 4 vehicle                    | UID                           | ▪                                       |
| 67           | 5 Jul 2021                                  | GNU             | GFORCE all-terrain vehicle ('ATVG')                                 | UID                           | ▪                                       |
| 68           | 11 Jul 2021                                 | GNU             | MKEK JNG-90 Bora-12 Sniper Rifle                                    | Balance of Probability Turkey | ▪ Also a training violation.            |
| 69           | 9 Aug 2021                                  | HAF             | AN/PVS-7 Night-Vision Goggles                                       | UID                           | ▪                                       |
| 70           | 17 Aug 2021                                 | GNU HAF         | Rocketsan 122mm Free Flight Rocket pods                             | Turkey UAE                    | ▪ Battlefield capture of hybrid system. |
| 71           | 18 Sep 2021<br>9 Jan 2022                   | UID             | Small arms and ammunition                                           | UID                           | ▪ Transfer from Libya to Sudan.         |
| 72           | 24 Dec 2021                                 | GNU             | Katmerciler KIRAC Armoured Personnel Carriers                       | Turkey                        | ▪                                       |
| 73           | 31 Dec 2021                                 | GNU             | AN/PEQ-15 Advanced Target Pointer Illuminator Aiming Laser (ATPIAL) | UID                           | ▪                                       |
| 74           | 8 Feb 2022                                  | GNU             | Aselsan A100 Night Vision Monocular                                 | Turkey                        | ▪                                       |
| 75           | 8 Feb 2022                                  | GNU             | MKEK 5.56mm MPT 55K Assault Rifles                                  | UID                           | ▪                                       |
| 76           | 24 Mar 2022                                 | UID             | M79 OSA Anti-tank Rockets                                           | UID                           | ▪                                       |

<sup>a</sup> Unidentified as yet.

<sup>b</sup> International arms sales are virtually always widely reported by the manufacturer in authoritative defence media as it is their major means, other than conflict, of attracting publicity for future sales. Authoritative media includes: Janes Defence Weekly (<https://www.janes.com/defence-news/>); Janes Intara (<https://www.janes.com/intara-interconnected-intelligence/defence-industry>); Defence Procurement International (<https://www.defenceprocurementinternational.com/magazine>); Military Systems and Technology (<https://www.militarysystems-tech.com/>); and Army Technology (<https://www.army-technology.com/>). Covert arms transfers go unreported until identified by investigation.

1. The Panel has determined that none of the training listed in table 32.2 falls under the exception contained in paragraph 10 of resolution [2095 \(2013\)](#), which is for disarmament and security purposes only.

Table 32.2

**Summary of training violations**

| <i>Annex</i>                                                                                         | <i>Date identified in Libya or by Panel</i> | <i>End User</i> | <i>Type of training support</i>                                                                     | <i>Responsible</i> | <i>Cross-references</i>                                                               |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------|-----------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <b>During resolution <a href="#">2509 (2020)</a> reporting period and unreported or unattributed</b> |                                             |                 |                                                                                                     |                    |                                                                                       |
| 77                                                                                                   | 1 Feb 2021                                  | GNU             | Air defence systems, <i>iHASAVAR</i> and <i>iHATAR</i> anti-drone systems training in Konya, Turkey | Turkey             | ▪                                                                                     |
| 78                                                                                                   | 6 Feb 2021                                  | GNU             | Military diving training                                                                            | Turkey             | ▪                                                                                     |
| 79                                                                                                   | 7 Feb 2021                                  | GNU             | Officer Cadet training                                                                              | Turkey             | ▪                                                                                     |
| 80                                                                                                   | 25 Mar 2021                                 | GNU             | Training to Unit 444 in UAV use. <i>Foxtech</i> Baby Shark 260 VTOL UAV.                            | UID <sup>a</sup>   | ▪                                                                                     |
| 81                                                                                                   | 30 Mar 2021                                 | GNU             | Operation of <i>Firtina</i> T-155 artillery                                                         | Turkey             | ▪ Transfer reported in table 4, and annexes 28 and 34 to <a href="#">S/2021/229</a> . |
| <b>During resolution <a href="#">2571 (2021)</a> reporting period (all new identifications)</b>      |                                             |                 |                                                                                                     |                    |                                                                                       |
| 82                                                                                                   | 7 Aug 2021                                  | GNU             | Special Forces unit from Misrata training in Turkey                                                 | Turkey             | ▪                                                                                     |
| 83                                                                                                   | 8 Sep 2021                                  | HAF             | Official HAF social media report that elements of HAF 106 brigade were training in Egypt            | UID                | ▪ Egypt denies such training.                                                         |
| 84                                                                                                   | 3 Oct 2021                                  | GNU             | Sniper training of GNU-AF                                                                           | Turkey             | ▪                                                                                     |
| 85                                                                                                   | 9 Oct 2021                                  | GNU             | Mountain Corps Academy training of GNU-AF in Turkey.                                                | Turkey             | ▪                                                                                     |

<sup>a</sup> Unidentified as yet.

## Synergy with other arms embargo violation attempts

2. The Panel also identified a synergy between an attempted arms embargo violation reported in the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1874 (2009) report [S/2016/157](#)<sup>153</sup> and Panel report [S/2021/229](#).<sup>154</sup> [S/2016/157](#) reported on an attempt by a UAE resident, Abdulrahman Bager, to procure arms for an entity named Al Mutlaq Technology through the auspices of the Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation (KOMID) of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

3. The complete list of arms requested by the UAE from KOMID is at figure 32.1. In [S/2021/229](#) the Panel reported on a Serbian manufactured P62M8 120mm Mortar Bomb and provided a copy of the End User certificate (DP3/2/50/1/2015/64/185) dated 21 October 2015 from the UAE, which was supplied to Serbia for the purchase of the ammunition (see figure 32.2). A comparison of the two lists shows them to be over 75% identical (see table 32.3). The Panel considers that the purchase from Serbia was made after the failure of the deal through KOMID. Table 32.3 also identifies the arms subsequently identified as being transferred to Libya.

Figure 32.1

UAE Products List for procurement from KOMOD, DPRK (2 May 2015)

| Requirement list |                                           |              |
|------------------|-------------------------------------------|--------------|
| #                | Item                                      | Qty.         |
| 1                | M92 Cal 7.62x39                           | 5,000        |
| 2                | 7.62X39Ammunition                         | 5,000,000    |
| 3                | Sniper Rifle 7.62x54 (Draganov)           | 150          |
| 4                | 7.62x54 R ammunition                      | 15,000       |
| 5                | 7.62PKM Machine Gun                       | 1,000        |
| 6                | 7.62x54 ammunition                        | 10,000,000   |
| 7                | Sniper Rifle 12.7x108                     | 50           |
| 8                | Ammunition 12.7x108                       | 10,000       |
| 9                | Heavy Machine Gun M02 Coyote Cal 12.7x108 | 200          |
| 10               | 12.7mmx108 Ammunition                     | 10,000,000   |
| 11               | Mortar 60mm M57                           | 100          |
| 12               | Mortar Shell 60mm                         | 50,000       |
| 13               | Mortar 82mm M69                           | 100          |
| 14               | 82mm Mortar Shells                        | 50,000       |
| 15               | 120mm PM-38 Mortar                        | 40           |
| 16               | 120mm Mortar Shell                        | 30,000.00    |
| 17               | 14 Sx114mm 8-32, 82T Cartridges           | 2,000,000.00 |
| 18               | 23mm HEI with Link                        | 1,500,000.00 |
| 19               | 107 MULTIROCKET Launcher                  | 30.00        |
| 20               | 107mm Rocket                              | 40,000.00    |
| 21               | 122MM rocket Projectile M210              | 40,000.00    |
| 22               | Hand Grenade                              | 3,000.00     |
| 23               | Armor Vest                                | 5,000.00     |
| 24               | Anti-Tank 106mm HEAT Ammunition           | 5,000.00     |

<sup>153</sup> Annexes 104 and 105.

<sup>154</sup> Annex 52.



Figure 32.2

## UAE End User Certificate from UAE to Serbia (5 October 2015)

|                                                                                                                                         |                                                                                   |                                                                                                                               |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| UNITED ARAB EMIRATES<br>G. H. Q ARMED FORCES<br>LOGISTICS STAFF<br>DEPARTMENT OF GENERAL PURCHASING<br>Our Ref.: DP3/2/50/1/2015/64/185 |  | دولة الامارات العربية المتحدة<br>القيادة العامة للقوات المسلحة<br>هيئة الامداد<br>مديرية المشتريات العامة<br>Date: 21/10/2015 |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

**DECLARATION BY END-USER  
TO THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIA**

WE, THE GOVERNMENT OF UNITED ARAB EMIRATES HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THE GOODS LISTED BELOW AND ORDERED BY USE FROM

„Jugoimport - SDPR“ J.P., Beograd, Bulevar Umetnosti 2, 11150 Novi Beograd, Republic of Serbia


IS FOR THE EXCLUSIVE USE OF: GHQ UAE ARMED FORCES, UAE  
 AND WILL NOT BE EXPORTED OR RE-EXPORTED WITHOUT A PRIOR WRITTEN CONSENT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC SERBIA.

We confirm that the goods will not be used in any activities related to the development nor production of chemical or biological weapons.

PURCHASER.: GHQ UAE ARMED FORCES, UAE  
 CONTRACT NUMBER: DP3/2/50/1/2015/64 dated: 05/10/2015

| No | Description                                                            | Quantity-pcs. |
|----|------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|
| 1  | 7.62x39mm small arms FMJ ammunition                                    | 5,000,000     |
| 2  | Sniper Rifle M91 7.62x54R with optical sight and accessories           | 150           |
| 3  | 7.62x54mm Sniper ammunition                                            | 15,000        |
| 4  | 7.62x54mm general purpose machine gun M84 (PKM Machine gun substitute) | 1,000         |
| 5  | 7.62x54mm R M30 FMJ ammunition                                         | 10,000,000    |
| 6  | 12.7x108mm Black Arrow Sniper Rifle                                    | 50            |
| 7  | 12.7x108mm M09 Sniper Ammo                                             | 10,000        |
| 8  | Machine gun 12.7x108mm with tripod                                     | 200           |
| 9  | Mortar 60mm M57                                                        | 100           |
| 10 | 60mm mortar shells HE                                                  | 50,000        |
| 11 | 82mm mortar                                                            | 100           |
| 12 | 82mm mortar HE 82 bomb                                                 | 50,000        |
| 13 | 120mm mortar                                                           | 40            |
| 14 | 120mm mortar rounds                                                    | 30,000        |
| 15 | 23mm Ammo HE                                                           | 1,000,000     |
| 16 | 23mm Ammo APIT                                                         | 500,000       |
| 17 | Hand grenades                                                          | 3,000         |
| 18 | 107mm HE Rocket M15/ type 63                                           | 40,000        |
| 19 | 128 mm M63 multiple rocket launcher towed                              | 26            |
| 20 | Armor vest Level 3A                                                    | 5,000         |
| 21 | Ballistic plates L4                                                    | 10,000        |

Upon request by the competent authorities of Serbia we undertake to confirm the receipt of the goods listed above.



STAFF BRIGADIER ENGINEER  
 DIRECTOR GENERAL PURCHASING  
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Source: Member State.

Table 32.3  
Comparison of arms requirements

| # <sup>a</sup> | Description <sup>b</sup>                         | Quantity in<br>Products List to<br>KOMID DPRK<br>(5 May 2015) | Quantity<br>UAE EUC to<br>Serbia<br>(5 Oct 2015) | # <sup>c</sup> | Remarks                             |
|----------------|--------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------|----------------|-------------------------------------|
| 1              | M92 Rifle 7.62x39mm                              | 5,000                                                         |                                                  |                | KOMID request only.                 |
| 2              | <b>7.62x39mm ammunition</b>                      | 5,000,000                                                     | 5,000,000                                        | 1              |                                     |
| 3              | Sniper Rifle 7.62x54Rmm Draganov                 | 150                                                           | 150                                              | 2              |                                     |
| 4              | <b>7.62x54mm R ammunition</b>                    | 15,000                                                        | 15,000                                           | 3              |                                     |
| 5              | 7.62mm PKM Machine Gun                           | 1,000                                                         | 1,000                                            | 4              | Type M84 requested as substitute    |
| 6              | <b>7.62x54mm ammunition</b>                      | 10,000,000                                                    | 10,000,000                                       | 5              |                                     |
| 7              | <b>Sniper Rifle 12.7x108mm</b>                   | 50                                                            | 50                                               | 6              | Black Arrow requested as substitute |
| 8              | <b>12.7x108mm ammunition</b>                     | 10,000                                                        | 10,000                                           | 7              |                                     |
| 9              | Heavy Machine Gun M02 Coyote 12.7x108mm          | 200                                                           | 200                                              | 8              |                                     |
| 10             | <b>12.7x108mm ammunition</b>                     | 20,000,000                                                    | 0                                                |                | KOMID request only.                 |
| 11             | 60mm Mortar M57                                  | 100                                                           | 100                                              | 9              |                                     |
| 12             | 60mm Mortar Bombs                                | 50,000                                                        | 50,000                                           | 10             |                                     |
| 13             | 82mm Mortar M69                                  | 100                                                           | 100                                              | 11             |                                     |
| 14             | 82mm Mortar Bombs                                | 50,000                                                        | 50,000                                           | 12             |                                     |
| 15             | 120mm Mortar PM-38                               | 40                                                            | 40                                               | 13             |                                     |
| 16             | <b>120mm Mortar Bombs</b>                        | 30,000                                                        | 30,000                                           | 14             |                                     |
| 17             | 14.5x114mm B-32 BZT ammunition                   | 2,000,000                                                     | 0                                                |                | KOMID request only.                 |
| 18             | 23mm HEI Linked ammunition                       | 1,500,000                                                     | 1,500,000                                        | 15 and 16      |                                     |
| 19             | <b>107mm Multi-Barrel Rocket Launcher (MBRL)</b> | 30                                                            | 0                                                |                | KOMID request only.                 |
| 20             | <b>107mm Rockets</b>                             | 40,000                                                        | 40,000                                           | 18             |                                     |
| 21             | 122mm Rocket Projectile M210                     | 40,000                                                        | 0                                                |                | KOMID request only.                 |
| 22             | Hand Grenade                                     | 3,000                                                         | 3,000                                            | 17             |                                     |
| 23             | Armour Vest                                      | 5,000                                                         | 5,000                                            | 20             |                                     |
| 24             | 106mm Anti-Tank HEAT ammunition                  | 5,000                                                         |                                                  |                |                                     |
| N/A            | 128mm M63 MBRL (Towed)                           |                                                               |                                                  | 26             | 19                                  |
| N/A            | Ballistic Plates                                 |                                                               | 10,000                                           | 21             |                                     |

<sup>a</sup> Serial is from the Products List requirement submitted to KOMID, DPRK by the UAE.

<sup>b</sup> Items in bold text have been identified as transferred to Libya in violation of the arms embargo.

<sup>c</sup> Serial is from the EUC supplied to Serbia by the UAE.

## Annex 33      Streit Typhoon 4x4 APC (13 December 2014)


### Streit Typhoon 4x4 MRAP (Libya) (13 December 2014)

The Panel has identified from open-source media the presence of Streit Typhoon 4x4 mine resistant armour protected (MRAP) vehicles in the possession of the then Government forces on 13 December 2014.

This military vehicle type was NOT reported in the inventory of the Libyan Armed Forces prior to the 2011 arms embargo.

The Panel notes that an attempt was made to illicitly transfer Streit Typhoon MRAP to Libya on board the MV *TYCHY* (IMO: 8302284) during Summer 2015. Eight such vehicles were impounded by Greek Customs at Keratsini Port (UN: GRKRS) on 15 June 2015.

The transfer to Libya of this military vehicle type is a violation of paragraph 9 to resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#).



#### Primary sources

1. <https://www.annahar.com/arabic/article/197840-الطيفون-4x4-مركبة-مقاومة-للمناجم-موجودة-في-مصر-ت-تدعم-الحل-التفاوضي>, 13 December 2014;
2. <https://www.fleetmon.com/maritime-news/2015/8539/mysterious-ro-ro-tychy-armoured-vehicles-board/>, 22 July 2015; and
3. <https://www.army-technology.com/projects/typhoon-mine-resistant-ambush-protected-mrap-apc/>, 23 July 2014. (For identification).

Developed by UN Panel of Experts

## Annex 34      KaMaz 6x6 Military Trucks (1 June 2018)

### Kamaz 43118 6x6 Military Truck (Dirne) (1 June 2018)

The Panel has identified from open-source media the presence of a KaMaz 6x6 Military Truck in the possession of HAF on 1 April 2018.

This military vehicle type was NOT reported in the inventory of the Libyan Armed Forces prior to the 2011 arms embargo.

The Panel has also identified that Kamaz 43118 6x6 Trucks were shipped to Benghazi on the MV *Fehn Calypso* on 24 April 2020. These were declared as civilian vehicles, but have obvious dual-military use.

The transfer to Libya of this military vehicle type is a violation of paragraph 9 to resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#).

#### Primary sources

1. <https://twitter.com/Oded121351/status/1002608845762555905>, 1 June 2018;
2. Confidential source, 15 June 2020; and
3. <https://kamazexport.com/truck/kamaz-43118/>. Accessed 22 January 2022.

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3. Cargo

- a. We herewith also attach the respective B/L for shipment in question.
- b. We herewith provide a list of Specification of cargo stuffed into boxes, which have been loaded per trunks of trucks KAMAZ destination Benghazi.
- c. Further and as absolutely usual, we are (at least yet) not in possession of any further cargo related documentation as this solely rests with cargo interest and Charterers. At the moment, we thus cannot provide a detailed specification of the cargo other than those evidenced by the letter from [REDACTED] the B/L, the additional list (see item 3.b.).
- d. However, we kindly refer to Kamaz website (<https://kamazexport.com/truck/kamaz-43118/>) showing the details of the trucks shipped (model no. 43118, 6x6) and also pointing to the trucks being solely designed for civil use only.

## Annex 35 SPG-9 73mm Grenade Launcher (5 March 2019)

### SPG-9 73mm Recoilless Rifle (Al Gharefa) (05 March 2019)

The Panel has now identified the presence of an SPG-9 73mm Recoilless Rifle in the possession of HAF near Al Gharefa, which went unreported in [S/2021/229](#).

These weapon types were not reported to be in the inventory of the Libyan Armed Forces prior to the 2011 arms embargo.

The transfer to Libya of these weapon types is a violation of paragraph 9 to resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#).



#### Primary sources

1. Extract from video imagery at <https://twitter.com/Mansourtalk/status/1102893338057981952>, 5 March 2019; and
2. Jane's Defence.

Developed by UN Panel of Experts

## Annex 36      *Orsis T-5000 Sniper Rifle (7 May 2019)*

### 0.338in Orsis T-5000 Sniper Rifle (HAF) (7 May 2019)

The Panel has identified from open-source imagery the presence of an early version of an *Orsis T-5000* Sniper Rifle in the possession of HAF. The magazine profile suggests that this weapon is chambered for 0.338in *Lapua* Magnum ammunition.

These is the first sighting of this weapons system in Libya. This weapon type has been manufactured since 2011 and is in service with at least seven Member States. Without the serial number a tracing request would be ineffective.

The transfer of this weapon type to Libya is a violation of paragraph 9 of resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#).

#### Primary sources

1. <https://twitter.com/analystmick/status/1125785280626200576>, 7 May 2019;
2. <http://orsis.com/en/production/product/202/> . Accessed 22 January 2022;
3. Confidential source for identification; and
4. [customer.janes.com](https://www.janes.com), 20 October 2020. (Subscription).

Developed by UN Panel of Experts





## Annex 37      Type 56-1 Assault Rifle, Type-80 GPMG and Type-69 Grenade Launcher (26 January 2020)

### 7.62 x 39mm Type 56-1 Assault Rifle, 7.62 x 54mmR Type-80 General Purpose Machine Gun and Type 69 40mm calibre Grenade Launcher (Eastern Libya) (26 January 2020)

The Panel has now identified the presence of 7.62 x 39mm Type 56-1 Assault Rifles, 7.62 x 54mmR Type-80 General Purpose Machine Guns and Type 69 40mm calibre Grenade Launchers in the possession of the Municipal Guard Fighting Unit in Benghazi, which went unreported in [S/2021/229](#).

These weapon types were not reported to be in the inventory of the Libyan Armed Forces prior to the 2011 arms embargo.

The transfer to Libya of these weapon types is a violation of paragraph 9 to resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#).

#### Primary sources

- [https://twitter.com/t\\_u\\_vid/status/1221227142911905793](https://twitter.com/t_u_vid/status/1221227142911905793), 26 January 2020; and
- Jane's Defence.

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7.62 x 39mm Type 56-1  
Assault Rifles

Type 69 40mm calibre  
Grenade Launchers

7.62 x 54mmR Type-80  
GPMG



## Annex 38      Inkas *Titan-S* 6x6 APC (15 March 2020)

### **Inkas *Titan-S* 6x6 APC (HAF Tariq bin Ziyad brigade) (15 March 2020)**

The Panel has identified from official HAF social media the presence of Inkas *Titan-S* 6x6 APCs in the possession of the HAF Tariq bin Ziyad brigade on 15 March 2020.

This military vehicle type was manufactured in the United Arab Emirates by Inkas Armoured Vehicle Manufacturing. It is no longer advertised as being in production on the manufacturers website.

The transfer to Libya of this military vehicle type is a violation of paragraph 9 to resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#).

#### **Primary sources**

1. [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JGN\\_nFJ9m18](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JGN_nFJ9m18), 15 March 2020. [Extract at 5"21"]; and
2. <https://inkasvehiclesuae.com/armored/inkas-titan-s-apc/>. Accessed 22 January 2022. (For identification).

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


## Annex 39 12.7mm W-85 Heavy Machine Gun (21 March 2020)

### 12.7mm W-85 Heavy Machine Gun (Benghazi) (21 March 2020)

The Panel has now identified from open-source imagery the presence of a 12.7mm W-85 Heavy Machine Gun in the possession of HAF in Benghazi on 21 March 2020 and with the HAF Tariq Ibn Ziyad brigade on 4 January 2021, which went unreported in [S/2021/229](#).

The transfer to Libya of this weapon type is a violation of paragraph 9 to resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#).



#### Primary sources

1. <https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/04/07/coronavirus-libya-civil-war-pandemic/>, 07 April 2020;
2. Abdullah Doma, AFP via Getty Images;
3. <https://twitter.com/Oded121351/status/1346162906967191553>, 4 January 2021; and
4. Jane's Defence.


Developed by UN Panel of Experts

## Annex 40 ZALA 421-16E UAV (20 April 2020)

### ZALA 421-16E UAV (Near Ain Zara) (17 April 2020)

The Panel has now identified from open-source imagery the presence of a Zala 421-16E UAV that was downed near Ain Zara, south of Tripoli during the conflict in that area. This event was unreported in [S/2021/229](#).

The Panel considers that as this dual-use technology is primarily being imported by actors actively participating in armed conflict, and then used for military purposes, such transfers are a violation of paragraph 9 to resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#).



#### Primary sources

1. <https://twitter.com/oded121351/status/1251052368906596352>, 17 and 18 April 2020;
2. <https://southfront.org/gna-forces-shot-down-russian-made-drone-near-libyas-ain-zara-photos/>, 18 April 2020;
3. <https://zala-aero.com/en/production/bvs/zala-421-16e/>. Accessed 18 January 2022.

Developed by UN Panel of Experts

## Annex 41 ZSU-23-2-CP 23mm Twin Cannon (14 June 2020)

### ZSU-23-2-CP 23mm Twin-Cannon (HAF Al Saiqa Special Forces) (14 June 2020)

The Panel has identified from open-source media the presence of ZSU-23-2-CP 23mm Twin Cannon retrofitted to Toyota 4x4 "Technicals" in the possession of HAF Al Saiqa Special Forces on 14 June 2020.

The weapon system was also seen on "Technicals" taking part in the 29 May 2021 HAF 7th anniversary "Operation Dignity" parade near Benghazi.

This weapon type is manufactured in Poland by Zakłady Mechaniczne Tarnow S.A.. The Panel wrote to the manufacturer on 14 February 2022 and a response is awaited.

The transfer to Libya of this weapon type is a violation of paragraph 9 to resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#).



14 June 2020

Al Saiqa SF  
Logo

14 June 2020



29 May 2021



Manufacturer's Image

#### Primary sources

1. <https://www.facebook.com/Alhadath.Libya/photos/pcb.2122974801160775/2122974251160830/>, 14 June 2020;
2. <https://www.alhadath.net/maghreb/2020/06/14/البحري-يبي-لل-ش-ج-ال-14/>, 14 June 2020;
3. Extract from <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mbHDXxITPa0&t=10354s>, 31 May 2021. (At 1.51.36 in video);
4. <https://www.zmt.tarnow.pl/wordpress/en/item/przeciwlotniczy-zestaw-artyleryjski-zu-23-2cp/>, 1 October 2018; and
5. Identification confirmed by confidential source.

Developed by UN Panel of Experts



## Annex 42 120mm High Explosive (HE) Mortar Bomb M62P10 (3 June 2020)

### 120mm M62P10 High Explosive (HE) Mortar Bomb (GNA-AF Omar Al-Mukhtar Training Centre, Tripoli) (21 November 2020)

The Panel identified imagery showing a 120mm High Explosive (HE) mortar bomb being used as the main charge of an improvised explosive device (IED) in a civilian property in the Ain Zara area of Tripoli. The device was recovered from an area previously occupied by armed groups affiliated to Khalifa Haftar (HAF).

The item was positively identified as a 120mm M62P10 HE mortar bomb with Lot Number #01/19. A tracing request was sent to the country of manufacture, who stated that mortar bombs of that lot/batch were supplied to the International Golden Group PJSC company (see appendix A) of the United Arab Emirates in 2018 as part of a batch of 15,000 rounds under Contract No: ICG/Krusik/2018/3527 of 21 March 2018. The Delivery Verification Certificate DP3/2/50/2018/30/10018 was supplied by the United Arab Emirates on 25 September 2019.

The United Arab Emirates have not responded to a Panel request for information sent on 15 November 2021. The transfer of this explosive ordnance to Libya by the United Arab Emirates is a violation of paragraph 9 of resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#).

#### Primary sources

- <https://twitter.com/CalibreObscura/status/1268446698642321408>, 4 June 2020; and
- Member State (6 October 2021).

Developed by UN Panel of Experts



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http://dms-app-test.mta.gov.ae/...  
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تلفون : 4978939  
فاكس : 4414842

Date: 14/03/2018

Our Ref: DP3/2/50/2018/30/10018

END USER CERTIFICATE  
TO THE AUTHORITIES OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIA

1. Name and address of the End User: CHQ UAE Armed Forces Directorate General Purchasing Post Box No: 2501, Abu Dhabi, Fax: +971 2 441 41 46

2. Name and address of the Importer: INTERNATIONAL GOLDEN GROUP PJSC Nation Tower, Corniche Road, Post Box: 4399, Abu Dhabi, UAE Tel: +971 2 66661, Email: info@iggroup.ae

3. Name and address of the Seller: HOLDING CORPORATION "KRUSIK" A.D. Vukla Nikola 59, 14000 Valjevo Republic of Serbia

4. Name and address of the Exporter: HOLDING CORPORATION "KRUSIK" A.D. Vukla Nikola 59, 14000 Valjevo Republic of Serbia

5. Description and full description of the goods:

| No | DESCRIPTION OF ITEM          | QUANTITY |
|----|------------------------------|----------|
| 1  | MORTAR SHELL 60mm M73 HE     | 10,000   |
| 2  | MORTAR SHELL 81mm M72 HE     | 10,000   |
| 3  | MORTAR SHELL 120mm M62 HE    | 15,000   |
| 4  | MORTAR SHELL 120mm M62P10 HE | 15,000   |

6. Place of use of the goods: United Arab Emirates

7. Purpose of use of the goods: Use for own needs of Armed Forces of United Arab Emirates

8. The End User: Armed Forces of United Arab Emirates confirms with the present document that the proper indicated by the points No 5 will not be used in a different way from the way indicated in point No 7 and will not be exported, sold or transmitted to the third country without the corresponding written permission of the State Service of Export Control of Republic of Serbia and United Arab Emirates.

9. It is undertaken to do "Delivery Verification Certificate" after received of goods by the End User if required.

STAFF BRIG. GENERAL (ENG.)  
DIRECTOR GENERAL PURCHASING  
WAREED HASAN IBRAHIM AL ZAARI

1. The Panel noted that the broker for this procurement was the United Arab Emirates based International Golden Group PJSC<sup>155</sup> ([www.iggroup.ae](http://www.iggroup.ae)). The Panel has reported before on the involvement of this company in the illicit transfer of arms and military materiel to Libya in Panel reports [S/2013/99](#)<sup>156</sup> and [S/2016/209](#).<sup>157</sup>

2. Open-source media has reported that International Golden Group PJSC is an essential link in Haftar's equipment supply chain.<sup>158</sup> It was reported that the company plays a key role in the procurement of weapons from Serbia and other Eastern European countries in support of Haftar.<sup>159</sup>

### International Golden Group PJSC involvement in previous violations of arms embargoes (Libya)

3. In [S/2013/99](#) the Panel identified that the International Golden Group PJSC procured 800,000 rounds of 12.7 x 108mm small arms ammunition from the Military Export Import Company (MEICO)<sup>160</sup> of Albania through a Ukrainian broker (Ukrinmash) and an Armenian facilitator (DG Arms Corporation). Although the end user was falsely declared as the United Arab Emirates the ammunition was shipped by air directly to Benghazi, Libya on the Ayk Avia<sup>161</sup> owned Ilyushin IL-76 (#EK-76659). This was a post-departure diversion, as the flight plan filed with the Albanian authorities showed the United Arab Emirates as the destination. A Delivery Verification Certification dated 24 February 2012 was provided to Albania by the International Golden Group PJSC stating that the ammunition had been delivered to the declared end user, the United

<sup>155</sup> Private Joint Stock Company.

<sup>156</sup> Para. 81, figure 3 and annex 7.

<sup>157</sup> Annex 27.

<sup>158</sup> IOL, "International Golden Group key Emirati supporter of Haftar", in *Intelligence Online*, Issue 862, 7 October 2020.

<sup>159</sup> IOL, "Despite its exposure in Libya ...", in *Intelligence Online*, 2 March 2021.

<sup>160</sup> <https://www.mod.gov.al/eng/index.php/ministry/subordinate-structures/meico>. Accessed 5 December 2021.

<sup>161</sup> Ayk Avia was reported in the Somalia Panel report [S/2011/433](#), annex 6.3 for breaching the Somalia arms embargo.

Arab Emirates Armed Forces. Note that a commercial company, albeit an official supplier to the United Arab Emirates Armed Forces, is authorised to sign DVC on their behalf. The United Arab Emirates did not respond to a tracing request from the Panel.<sup>162</sup>

4. In [S/2016/209](#)<sup>163</sup> the Panel identified a Bulgarian manufactured AR-M9F assault rifle<sup>164</sup> (#AB 46 7722) being offered for sale on open-source social media. Bulgaria informed the Panel that the weapon had been procured by the International Golden Group PJSC using a United Arab Emirates end user certificate. The United Arab Emirates did not respond to a tracing request from the Panel.<sup>165</sup>

5. On 21 February 2019 the UAE announced at IDEX 2019 that it had procured Norinco 155mm AH4 gun howitzers, and that International Golden Group PJSC was awarded a US\$2.8 million contract to supply the ammunition.<sup>166</sup> This weapon system fires the GP6 155mm Laser Guided Projectile (LGP). In [S/2019/914](#)<sup>167</sup> the Panel reported on the presence of GP6 155mm LGP from a consignment supplied to the United Arab Emirates prior to 2019. In its response, 14 months after the Panel tracing request,<sup>168</sup> the United Arab Emirates "rejected the allegation" but provided no information or clarification as to how ammunition delivered to their armed forces was present in Libya.<sup>169</sup>

### Previous violations of arms embargoes (other)

6. In [S/2016/157](#)<sup>170</sup> the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1874 (2009) investigated International Golden Group PJSC in relation to the attempted procurement of conventional arms for a contract worth US\$100 million by the Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation (KOMID).

### Signatory

7. The Panel notes that the end user certificate signatory for the 12.7 x 108mm small arms ammunition shipment reported in [S/2013/99](#) is the same individual that signed the end user certificate in 2018 for the 120mm High Explosive M62P10 Mortar Bombs referred to in this annex; Staff Brigadier General (Engineering) Waheed Hasan Ibrahim Al Zaaki, Director of General Purchasing, GHQ Armed Forces Logistics Staff.

8. The General Headquarters of the United Arab Emirates Armed Forces appears to be selective as to when and when not to use the auspices of the International Golden Group PJSC for the procurement of ammunition. In annex 52 to [S/2021/229](#)<sup>171</sup> the Panel reported on the sale of 120mm High Explosive M62P8 Mortar Bombs, identified in Libya, to the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the United Arab Emirates in September 2016. Whereas in 2018 the importer for 120mm High Explosive M62P10 Mortar Bombs referred to in this annex was International Golden Group PJSC.

<sup>162</sup> Panel letter of 21 December 2012.

<sup>163</sup> Annex 27.

<sup>164</sup> <https://www.arsenal-bg.com/c/556x45-762x39-mm-assault-rifles-barrel-length-415-mm-44/556x45-and-762x39-mm-ar-m9f-44>. Accessed 5 December 2021.

<sup>165</sup> Panel letter of 22 December 2015.

<sup>166</sup> Christopher F Foss, "UAE confirms Chinese 155mm AH4 gun-howitzer acquisition", in *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 28 February 2019.

<sup>167</sup> Para. 95 and annex 39.

<sup>168</sup> 12 July 2019.

<sup>169</sup> Member State letter of 3 September 2020.

<sup>170</sup> Annex 104.

<sup>171</sup> Annex 52 (p.281).

## Annex 43 1RL131 P-18 early warning radar (18 June 2020)

### 1RL131 P-18 early warning radar (29°12'41.25"N, 15°59'28.63"E - Al Jufra) (18 June 2020)

The Panel has now identified the presence of 1RL131 P-18 early warning radars at Al Jufra military air base on 18 June 2020, which were unreported in [S/2021/229](#).

The same equipment type also featured on the official HAF social media covering the HAF 7th Anniversary Operation Dignity parade in Benghazi on 29 May 2021.

The transfer of this military material to Libya is a violation of paragraph 9 of resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#).



18 June 2020 - Al Jufra



18 June 2020 - Al Jufra



29 May 2021 - Benina, Benghazi

Manufacturer's reference image.  
(Jane's Defence)

#### Primary sources

1. <https://www.africom.mil/pressrelease/32941/new-evidence-of-russian-aircraft-active-in-li>, 20 June 2020;
2. <https://twitter.com/Oded121351/status/1287019300281352192>, 25 July 2020;
3. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mbIDXxITPa0>, 31 May 2021; and
4. [customer.janes.com](https://www.janes.com), 13 December 2021. (Subscription).

Developed by UN Panel of Experts



## Annex 44 Ural 6x6 Military Trucks (12 July 2020)

### Ural 4320 6x6 Military Truck (Russian PMC Convoy) (12 July 2020 and 10 May 2021)

The Panel has identified from open-source media the presence of Ural 4320 6x6 Military Trucks in a Russian PMC convoy on 12 July 2020. An armoured version was identified in Houn on 10 May 2021.

This military vehicle type was NOT reported in the inventory of the Libyan Armed Forces prior to the 2011 arms embargo.

The transfer to Libya of this military vehicle type is a violation of paragraph 9 to resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#).

#### Primary sources

1. Extract from <https://www.facebook.com/FebruaryBN/videos/2384205178548707/>, 12 July 2020. [18 sec];
2. <https://twitter.com/Oded121351/status/139169145343323523/photo/2>, 10 May 2021;
3. <https://1cars.org/426-ural-4320-specifications-modifications-photos-videos-reviews.html>. Accessed 21 January 2022; and
4. Janes Defence. 31 March 2004. (Subscription).

Developed by UN Panel of Experts



## Annex 45 TM-62M Anti-Tank Mine (1 August 2020)

### TM-62M Anti-Tank Mine (Russian PMC) (Summer 2020)

The Panel has identified from open-source media and confidential sources the presence of TM-62M anti-tank mines in Southern Tripoli. The mines were made safe and recovered from areas previously occupied by Russian PMC. Many had anti-lift devices underneath.

The mines identified had 1981 lot numbers, so tracing is no longer possible due to their age and the wide spread export of such mines.

This explosive ordnance was NOT in the inventory of the Libyan Armed Forces prior to the 2011 arms embargo.

The transfer to Libya of this explosive ordnance type is a violation of paragraph 9 to resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#).

#### Primary sources

1. <https://postimg.cc/G9rPsG6F>. Accessed 23 January 2022;
2. Confidential source; and
3. <https://cat-uxo.com/explosive-hazards/landmines/tm-62m-landmine>. Accessed 23 January 2022.

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## Annex 46 120mm High Explosive (HE) Mortar Bomb (9 October 2020)

### 120mm High Explosive (HE) Mortar Bombs (GNA-AF in Western Libya) (9 October 2020)

Imagery from the website of the "Sons of Lions" Mortar Unit of the GNA Western Command showed the presence of a batch of 120mm high explosive (HE) Mortar Bombs not previously seen in Libya before. This is an update to that reported in table 4 and annex 41 of Panel report [S/2021/229](#).

The markings on the ammunition identify that it was produced in January 2018, whereas markings on primary packaging shows ammunition manufactured in April 2017. The markings also indicate that the ammunition was manufactured by the Arsenal 2000 JSCo Dunarit company of Bulgaria. The Panel has confirmed that the bombs are from a consignment under Export Licences 017610 (18 February 2020) and 017677 (18 March 2020) for the Turkish Land Forces Command as the end user.

The Panel offered an opportunity to respond to Turkey on 8 March 2021. No response was received.

The transfer of this ammunition to Libya by Turkey is a violation of paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011).

#### Primary sources

- <https://twitter.com/i/status/1314628386258653185>, 9 October 2020;
- [https://www.facebook.com/pages/category/Interest/115506966518255/?\\_rdc=2&\\_rdc=2](https://www.facebook.com/pages/category/Interest/115506966518255/?_rdc=2&_rdc=2), Accessed 17 October 2020;
- [customer.janes.com](https://customer.janes.com), 14 October 2019. (Subscription); and
- Member State, 18 February 2021 and 28 August 2021.

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| END USER CERTIFICATE                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          |                          |                   |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------|-------------------|
| TO: INTERMINISTERIAL COMMISSION FOR EXPORT CONTROL AND NON-PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |                          |                   |
| 1. Name of the Exporter:                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      |                          |                   |
| 2. Name of the Buyer/Importer: <b>Neftürk Savunma ve Havaçılık Sanayi AŞ</b><br>İçerenköy Mah. Prof.Dr.Hecmettin Erbakan Cad.<br>Özce Yılmaz İş Merkezi No: 97 İç Kapı No: 14<br>Alagehir-İstanbul / TURKEY<br>Tax ID: Kozysatış VD 6300974451 204003-S                                                                                                                                                       |                          |                   |
| 3. Name of the End User: <b>Turkish Land Forces Command</b>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   |                          |                   |
| 4. Full description of the goods and quantity:                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                |                          |                   |
| NO                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            | DESCRIPTION OF THE GOOD  | QUANTITY / PIECES |
| 1                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             | 120MM MORTAR BOMB HE 120 | 3.000             |
| 5. Place of the use of the goods: <b>Republic of Turkey</b>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   |                          |                   |
| 6. Purpose of use of the goods: <b>For the requirement of Land Forces Command</b>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             |                          |                   |
| 7. The End-User of the goods hereby guarantees that the goods defined in the clause N° 4 of the present certificate will not be used other than for the purpose defined in the clause N° 6 and will not be transferred to any other person of the business activity in the territory of the Republic of Turkey or re-exported, lent or rented without written permission of the Bulgarian Export authorities. |                          |                   |
| 8. We also certify that the items defined in the clause N° 4 will not be used for the purpose of violating the human rights.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  |                          |                   |
| 9. We confirm that the items defined in the clause N° 4 will not be used for the purposes associated with chemical, biological or nuclear weapons or missiles capable to deliver such weapons, nor will they be resold if we know or suspect that it is likely intended to be used for such purpose.                                                                                                          |                          |                   |
| (Signature and stamp from the End User)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |                          |                   |
| Government Certification                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      |                          |                   |



## Annex 47 120mm 120-PM-43 M1948 Mortar (15 November 2020)

### 120mm 120-PM-43 M1943 Mortar (HAF) (15 November 2020)

The Panel has identified from open-source social media the presence of 120mm 120-PM-43 M1943 Mortars in the possession of HAF on 15 November 2020.

This weapon system was NOT reported in the inventory of the Libyan Armed Forces prior to the 2011 arms embargo.


The transfer to Libya of this weapon type is a violation of paragraph 9 to resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#).



#### Primary sources

1. <https://twitter.com/Oded121351/status/1328012799948312576>, 15 November 2020;
2. [https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:120\\_mm\\_regimental\\_mortar\\_M1943.jpg](https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:120_mm_regimental_mortar_M1943.jpg). Accessed 22 January 2022;
3. Confidential source for identification; and
4. Jane's Defence.

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## Annex 48 XP Type Holographic Weapon Sights (HWS) (21 November 2020)

### EOTECH "Type" Holographic Weapon Sights (HWS) (HAF Omar Al-Mukhtar Training Centre, Tajoura) (21 November 2020)

From imagery of a GNA-AF training demonstration at the Omar Al-Mukhtar Training Centre near Tajoura on, 21 November 2021 the Panel has identified weapon sights, virtually identical to the XP type holographic weapon sights (HWS) manufactured by EOTECH LLC, USA. The HWS were fitted to 5.56mm MKEK MBT 55K assault rifles in the possession of the armed forces of the then Government of National Accord (GNA-AF). Weapons sights fall under the auspices of "arms and related materiel of all types" under the arms embargo.

The present owners of the US company claim that they cannot be sure that HWS were not supplied to Libya prior to 31 July 2020, the date they purchased the company. The company also informed the Panel that the XP HWS was widely counterfeited by "Far East based" companies.

Although the Panel cannot positively identify the supplier of the HWS to Libya, the transfer of this military material to Libya is a violation of paragraph 9 of resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#).

#### Primary sources

1. <https://twitter.com/Oded121351/status/1330225538875658242>, 21 November 2020;
2. Location confirmed from <https://twitter.com/TRTArabi/status/1330177488580960263>, 21 November 2021;
3. <https://www.facebook.com/Erdoganarabie/posts/412139096861489>, 21 November 2021; and
4. Manufacturers image for comparison and identification.

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## Annex 49 MKEK MBT 55K Assault Rifles (21 November 2020)

### 5.56mm MKEK MBT 55K Assault Rifles (HAF Omar Al-Mukhtar Training Centre, Tajoura) (21 November 2020)

The Panel identified from imagery of a GNA-AF training demonstration at the Omar Al-Mukhtar Training Centre near Tajoura on 21 November 2020, 5.56mm MKEK MBT 55K assault rifles in the possession of the armed forces of the then Government of National Accord (GNA-AF).

These weapons are designed and manufactured by Mechanical and Chemical Industry Company (MKEK) (Makina ve Kimya Endüstrisi Kurumu) of Turkey. This weapon type entered service with the Turkish Armed Forces in 2018, and no exports were made until 2021, after they were first identified in Libya. These exports being 30 weapons to two Balkan countries for evaluation. Over 60 weapons were identified at the training demonstration in Khoms.

The Panel offered an opportunity to respond to Turkey in letters of 8 March 2021 and 5 October 2021. No response was received.

The transfer of these weapons to Libya by Turkey is a violation of paragraph 9 of resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#).

#### Primary sources

1. <https://twitter.com/Oded121351/status/1330225538875658242>, 21 November 2020;
2. Location confirmed from <https://twitter.com/TRTAraabi/status/1330177488580960263>, 21 November 2021;
3. <https://www.facebook.com/Erdoganarabie/posts/412139096861489>, 21 November 2021;
4. <https://www.mkek.gov.tr/en/product.aspx?id=52&source=Products&pid=1383>. Accessed 23 March 2021; and
5. [customer.janes.com](https://customer.janes.com). 12 July 2021.(Subscriber).

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## Annex 50 120mm M-74 Mortar (4 January 2021)

### 120mm M-74 Mortar (HAF Tariq Ibn Ziyad brigade) (4 January 2021)

The Panel has identified from official HAF social media the presence of 120mm M-74 Mortars in the possession of the "10th Unit" of the HAF Tariq Ibn Ziyad brigade on 4 January 2021.

This weapon system was NOT reported in the inventory of the Libyan Armed Forces prior to the 2011 arms embargo.

The transfer to Libya of this weapon type is a violation of paragraph 9 to resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#).



#### Primary sources

1. Extract from <https://www.facebook.com/sreya10.army.ly/videos/229234458726136/>, 4 January 2021. (7min 24sec);
2. <https://www.yugoimport.com/en/proizvodi/120mm-mortar-m74>. Accessed 22 January 2022; and
3. Jane's Defence.

Developed by UN Panel of Experts



## Annex 51 Akdas AK40-GL type 40x46mm Grenade Launchers (28 January 2021)

### Akdas AK-40 GL variant 40x46mm SR Grenade Launchers (GNA-AF Khoms Joint Naval Training Centre) (28 January 2021)

On 28 January 2021 imagery was published on official social media of the Turkish Armed Forces of the then GNA-AF receiving training in the use of the Akdas AK-40 GL variant 40x46mm SR grenade launchers from Turkish military instructors.

This is the first time that Akdas AK-40 GL variant 40x46mm SR grenade launchers have been identified in Libya. These weapons are designed and manufactured by the Akdas Arms Company of Turkey ([www.akdassilah.com](http://www.akdassilah.com)). This weapon type entered service with the Turkish Armed Forces in October 2019, and deliveries of the 8,000 units ordered continued through 2020. No exports have been reported in the authoritative defence trade media. They are also designed for use as under barrel grenade launchers fitted to the Turkish MKEK 5.56mm MBT 55K assault rifles, also supplied to Libya by Turkey.

The Panel offered Turkey an opportunity to respond in letters dated 9 February and 5 October 2021. No response was received.

This military training undertaken within the scope of the Military Training, Cooperation and Consultancy Agreement between Turkey and the GNA is a violation of paragraph 9 of resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#).

#### Primary sources

1. <https://twitter.com/tcsavunma/status/1354772279897563136>, 28 January 2021;
2. <https://silahreport.com/2020/02/11/akdas-ak-40gl-turkeys-new-underbarrel-grenade-launcher/>, 11 February 2020;
3. <https://akdassilah.com/en/ak-40gl.html>. Accessed 11 November 2021; and
4. [customer.janes.com](http://customer.janes.com).

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The transfer of these weapons to Libya by Turkey, is also a violation of paragraph 9 of resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#).

## Annex 52      AK-103 Assault Rifles with HAF 106 brigade (30 January 2021)

### 7.62mm AK-103 variant Assault Rifle (HAF 106 brigade, Eastern Libya) (30 January 2021)

The Panel has identified from official and open-source imagery of a training exercise on 30 January 2021 the presence of AK-103 variant assault rifles in the possession of HAF 106 brigade.

The Panel is confident these are a new import into Libya due to the two digit year code [20] that forms part of the serial number [201109571].


On 12 May 2021 the Panel wrote to the Member State that designed and manufactures the weapon, and also the two Member States that manufacture them under licence. No responses have yet been received by the Panel, so supply chain tracing is stalled.

The transfer of these weapons to Libya is a violation of paragraph 9 of resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#).

#### Primary sources

1. <https://www.facebook.com/mediawarinformationdivision/videos/406443407317097>, 28 January 2021;
2. <https://twitter.com/Oded121351/status/1355414260034260993>, 30 January 2021;
3. <https://twitter.com/CalibreObscura/status/1355434875214585857>, 30 January 2021; and
4. [customer.janes.com](https://customer.janes.com). Subscriber only.

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## Annex 53 *System Defence 5.56mm Multi-Functional Rifle (MFR) (2 February 2021)*

### **System Defence 5.56mm Multi-Functional Rifle (MFR) (GNU Ministry of Interior security agencies) (2 February 2021)**

The Panel has identified from official GNU Ministry of Interior and open-source imagery the presence of System Defence 5.56mm multi-functional rifles (MFR) in the possession of Ministry of Interior personnel on 2 February 2021. Subsequent official social media posted on 2 July 2021 confirmed the presence of this weapon type with the Ministry of Interior security agencies.

These are the first sightings of this weapon type in Libya. This weapon type has only been manufactured since 2018 and there have been no reported foreign sales in the authoritative trade media.

The Panel offered Turkey an opportunity to respond in a letter of 12 July 2021. On 12 September 2021 Turkey stated that, based on inventory analysis, it had not sold, transferred or exported such weapons to Libya.

The transfer of this weapon type to Libya, in the absence of an approved exemption request, is a violation of paragraph 9 to resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#).

#### **Primary sources**

1. [https://www.facebook.com/enfad.alkanon/photos/2810902145798509?\\_rdc=1&\\_rdr](https://www.facebook.com/enfad.alkanon/photos/2810902145798509?_rdc=1&_rdr), 2 February 2021;
2. <https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=333678458468381>, 2 July 2021; and
3. <http://www.nowyousafe.com/rifles/>. Accessed 10 August 2021.

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## Annex 55 122mm M-30 M1938 Howitzer in Libya (23 March 2021)

### 122mm M-30 M1938 Howitzer (HAF 106 brigade) (23 March 2021)

The Panel has identified from open-source media the presence of 122mm M-30 M1938 Howitzers in the possession of HAF 106 brigade on 23 March 2021.

This weapon system was NOT reported in the inventory of the Libyan Armed Forces prior to the 2011 arms embargo.

The transfer to Libya of this weapon type is a violation of paragraph 9 to resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#).



#### Primary sources

1. [https://twitter.com/Libya\\_OSINT/status/1374424342608547843](https://twitter.com/Libya_OSINT/status/1374424342608547843), 23 March 2021;
2. <https://www.istockphoto.com/photo/soviet-122-mm-howitzer-m1938-back-view-gm495566889-41002254>, Accessed 22 January 2022; and
3. Jane's Defence.

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## Annex 56 T-62 variant Main Battle Tank (MBT) in Libya (23 March 2021)

### HAF T- 62 MV variant Main Battle Tank (MBT) (Update) (near Benghazi) (23 March 2021)

The Panel corrected its initial report (annex 64 to [S/2021/229](#)) on the presence of T-62 main battle tanks (MBT) in Libya in annex 64 to [S/2021/229/Corr.1](#). Subsequent to the drafting of that corrigendum the Panel has identified further information on social media from third-party investigators on the presence of the T-62 MV variant in Libya, who identified the variant from imagery in official media of HAF 106 brigade.

The Panel initially considered that the presence of the T-62 MV variant may have been due to upgrades made to T-62 MBT by ChVK Wagner personnel to T-62 already in possession of the Libyan Armed Forces prior to the arms embargo. Further investigations, including consideration of the findings of independent OSINT analysts, now consider that option as highly unlikely due to the design differences between the two variants, and the extensive engineering work necessary to make such modification.

The transfer of this military materiel into Libya is a violation of paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011).

#### Primary sources

1. Twitter, @HasairiOuais. 5 June 2020;
2. <https://twitter.com/oryxspioenkop/status/1371893466641354757>, 16 March 2021;
3. <https://www.facebook.com/aljishlibya/photos/pcb.1779681972210482/1779680602210619>, 23 March 2021;
4. <https://www.facebook.com/Brigade106/photos/pcb.287275536273323/2872753766273500>, 29 March 2021;
5. <https://twitter.com/oryxspioenkop/status/1376829002015514629>, 30 March 2021; and
6. [customer.janes.com](https://customer.janes.com). (Subscription).

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## Annex 57 GNU-AF training on M60 *Patton* Main Battle Tank in Libya (27 March 2021)

### GNU-AF M60 *Patton* Main Battle Tank Transfer and Training (Joint Land Training Centre, Tajoura) (27 March 2021)

The Panel identified from open source information, including a subsequently deleted 'tweet' from the official Turkish Ministry of Defence social media account, Turkish military personnel training GNU-AF personnel on M60 *Patton* main battle tanks (MBT). This is the first sighting of an M60 *Patton* MBT in Libya as this equipment was not in the past inventory of the Libyan Armed Forces.

In response to an enquiry by the Panel, Turkey denied transferring M60 *Patton* MBT to Libya, denied providing training and denied having a surplus of such MBT in the Turkish Armed Forces.

The Panel has evidence that contradicts the Turkish response to the Panel:

- 1) Copy of the imagery [R] from the official Turkish Ministry of Defence social media account;
- 2) Credible evidence that the Turkish Armed Forces have a surplus of M60 *Patton* MBT, which were originally procured from the USA during 1992/1993; and
- 3) Confidential information that the M60 *Patton* MBT were delivered to Misrata, Libya on 28 May 2020 onboard the MV Cirkin. [See appendix D to annex 34 to S/2021/229].

#### Primary sources

1. <https://twitter.com/tcsavunma/status/1375719303471898630>, subsequently deleted;
2. <https://www.savunmatr.com/savunma-sanayii/msb-den-libyali-askerlere-sinif-okulu-intibak-egitimi-h10067.html>;
3. <https://twitter.com/BurkanLy/status/1376617705009188869>, 29 March 2021;
4. <https://www.janes.com/defence-news/news-detail/m60-tanks-transferred-to-libya>, 31 March 2021;
5. [https://customer.janes.com/Janes/Display/JAA\\_0085-JAFV](https://customer.janes.com/Janes/Display/JAA_0085-JAFV), Accessed 15 April 2021. (Subscription);
6. Member State (20 May 2021); and
7. Confidential source.

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This training in the operation of M60 *Patton* MBT undertaken within the scope of the Military Training, Cooperation and Consultancy Agreement between Turkey and the GNU is a violation of paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011).

This transfer of M60 *Patton* MBT into Libya by Turkey is a violation of paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011).



## Annex 58 AMN 233114 Tiger-M MPV deployed with HAF (30 March 2021)

### AMN 233114 Tiger-M Multi-Purpose Armoured Vehicle (MPV) (HAF Live Firing Exercise and Benina, Benghazi) (30 March 2021)

The Panel reported on the presence of a Tigr-M variant with ChVK Wagner operatives in annex 63 to [S/2021/229](#). The vehicles covered in that report were painted grey or black.

Since then the Panel has identified some AMN 233114 Tiger-M MPV present at the HAF 106 brigade live firing exercise in late March 2021. These vehicles were painted in a sand colour. Four vehicles were also seen with the Tariq Ibn Ziyad brigade on the HAF 7th Anniversary of Operation Volcano parade at Benina, Benghazi on 29 May 2021. A further vehicle was identified with HAF 106 brigade on 8 July 2021.


The Panel has not yet identified whether these vehicles are in operational use by HAF, or whether they are used by ChVK Wagner personnel embedded within HAF units as advisors.

The transfer of this military materiel to Libya is a violation of paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011).

#### Primary sources

1. <https://twitter.com/Oded121351/status/1376806109416144897>, 30 March 2021;
2. <https://twitter.com/Oded121351/status/1376812499954241542>, 30 March 2021;
3. <https://twitter.com/RS0TM/status/1400586112574406657>, 3 June 2021;
4. <https://milindcom.ru/EN/catalog/voennaya-produktsiya/avtomobil-mnogotselevogo-naznacheniya-amn-233114-tigr-m/>. Accessed 10 June 2021; and
5. [https://twitter.com/Libya\\_OSINT/status/1413082728422117378](https://twitter.com/Libya_OSINT/status/1413082728422117378), 8 July 2021.

Developed by UN Panel of Experts



## Annex 59 HAF Sordin Supreme Pro-X Max Black hearing protectors (5 May 2021)

### Sordin Supreme Pro-X Max Black hearing protectors (HAF 106 brigade) (5 May 2021)


The Panel has identified from official social media of HAF and other open-source imagery the presence of Swedish-manufactured Sordin Supreme Pro-X Max Black hearing protectors being used by fighters of HAF 106 brigade. The Member State confirmed that these items are not subject to export controls, nor specifically classified as military material or dual-use. Yet they they have obvious military utility.

The Panel considers that as this dual-use technology is primarily being imported by actors actively participating in armed conflict, and then used for military purposes, such transfers are a violation of paragraph 9 to resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#).

#### Primary sources

1. [https://twitter.com/Libya\\_OSINT/status/1390066440254992386](https://twitter.com/Libya_OSINT/status/1390066440254992386), 5 May 2021;
2. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aBiya-OpBfI>, 28 May 2021;
3. Member State (11 May 2021); and
4. <https://www.sordin.com/products/supreme-pro-x-neckband>.

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
## Annex 60      Seizure of SUR BRT M9 blank firing pistols in Misrata (18 May 2021)

### SUR MRT M9 blank firing pistols (Misrata) (18 May 2021)

The Panel has identified from social media the seizure of 2,000 Surarms SUR BRT M9 blank firing pistols by customs authorities in Misrata port on 18 May 2021. The pistols were concealed within a shipping container [#280132.3] full of clothes, which was offloaded from the MV *Medkon Azmir* (IMO 9103374). This information was confirmed to the Panel on 22 October 2021 and 24 February 2022 by the Libyan authorities who are investigating the case.

These pistols can be readily converted into live firing weapons and the Panel assesses that they were destined to be such converted and then sold on the black market by an organized criminal group.

The transfer of these weapons to Libya is a violation of paragraph 9 of resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#).



#### Primary sources

1. [https://twitter.com/Libya\\_OSINT/status/1394787951058505731](https://twitter.com/Libya_OSINT/status/1394787951058505731), 18 May 2021;
2. Member State (22 October 2021 and 24 February 2022); and
3. <http://en.surarms.com/bri-m9/>. Accessed 18 November 2021.

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**Annex 61      UAZ-469 communication vehicles with HAF 166 brigade (24 May 2021)****UAZ-469 communication vehicles  
(Eastern Libya)  
(24 May 2021)**

The Panel has identified from open-source media the presence of UAZ-469 variant communication vehicles in the possession of HAF 166 brigade. The vehicle type had not been seen in Libya before.

This particular vehicle has been exported to over 80 countries, so a tracing request would be highly unlikely to provide any useful information as to the supply chain to Libya.

The transfer of this military materiel to Libya is a violation of paragraph 9 of resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#).

**Primary sources**

1. [https://twitter.com/Libya\\_OSINT/status/1396868224696963077](https://twitter.com/Libya_OSINT/status/1396868224696963077), 25 May 2021; and
2. [customer.janes.com](https://customer.janes.com), 23 March 2020. (Subscription).

Developed by UN Panel of Experts



## Annex 62 Militarized Jeep Gladiator with HAF (27 May 2021)

### Militarized Jeep Gladiator light utility vehicle (Benghazi) (27 May 2021)

The Panel has identified from open-source media the presence of two militarized Jeep Gladiator light utility vehicles preparing to take part in the HAF 7th anniversary "Operation Dignity" parade near Benghazi, which was held on 29 May 2021.

The manufacturer has stated that the paint colour of the vehicles is Gobi (Code: PUA), for which 6,965 vehicles were manufactured in 2020. Of these 55 were exported to distributors or individuals in 6 middle eastern countries. None were exported direct to Libya. A tracing request is thus unlikely to yield results.

The transfer of this military materiel to Libya is a violation of paragraph 9 of resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#).

#### Primary sources

1. Extract from video at [https://twitter.com/Libya\\_OSINT/status/1397790180476608517](https://twitter.com/Libya_OSINT/status/1397790180476608517), 27 May 2021; and
2. Letter from manufacturer (2 July 2021).

Developed by UN Panel of Experts





## Annex 63 Militarized Toyota Land Cruiser 6x6 variant with HAF (29 May 2021)

### Militarized Toyota 6x6 light utility vehicle (Eastern Libya) (29 May 2021)

The Panel has identified from open-source media the presence of a militarized Toyota Land Cruiser 6x6 type light utility vehicle in Libya for the first time. It was participating in the HAF 7th anniversary "Operation Dignity" parade held on 29 May 2021 at Benina, Benghazi .

The Panel wrote to the manufacturer on 11 June 2021 requesting further information. No response was received.

The transfer of this military materiel to Libya is a violation of paragraph 9 of resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#).



#### Primary source

1. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mbIDXxITPa0>, 31 May 2021.

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## Annex 64 TAG BATT 4x4 APC (29 May 2021)

### TAG BATT 4x4 APC (Benghazi) (29 May 2021)

The Panel has identified from open-source social media the presence of a TAG BATT 4x4 APC taking part in the 29 May 2021 HAF 7th anniversary "Operation Dignity" parade near Benghazi. The antenna array on the vehicle indicates it is equipped for communications, electronic warfare or electronic countermeasures.

This military vehicle type was first manufactured by The Armored Group (TAG) in 2011, which complicates tracing requests due to the requirement to only keep records for 10 years under the auspices of the Arms Trade Treaty. It is no longer in production.

The transfer to Libya of this military vehicle type is a violation of paragraph 9 to resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#).

#### Primary sources

1. <https://postimg.cc/LhXkM4nv>. Accessed 23 January 2022; and
2. <https://www.armoredcars.com/batt-ap-swat-truck-canada/batt-ap/>, 6 April 2011.

Developed by UN Panel of Experts





**Annex 65      Steyr SSG 08 variant or copy Sniper Rifle (3 June 2021)****Steyr SSG 08 variant or copy Sniper Rifle  
(Russian PMC in Eastern Libya)  
(3 June 2021)**

The Panel has identified from open-source imagery the presence of a weapon virtually identical to a Steyr SSG 08 variant sniper rifle in the possession of a Russian PMC operative in Eastern Libya.

The Panel was informed by the manufacturer that they had not exported any weapons to Libya, and that the finish on the weapon was not a standard production finish. They also stated that this weapon type has had worldwide sales, and that copies are now being made. This precludes further tracing by the Panel unless a serial number can be obtained.

The transfer of this weapon type to Libya is a violation of paragraph 9 of resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#).

**Primary sources**

1. <https://twitter.com/RS0TM/status/1400585777394900995>, 3 June 2021;
2. <https://twitter.com/Oded121351/status/1401482925212905474>, 6 June 2021;
3. <https://www.steyr-arms.com/en/sporting-rifles/ssg-08/>. Accessed 6 June 2021; and
4. Letter from manufacturer, 24 June 2021.

Developed by UN Panel of Experts



## Annex 66 Armoured Toyota Land Cruiser 79 variant with Russian PMC (3 June 2021)

### Armoured Toyota Land Cruiser 79 light utility vehicle (29°13'21.03"N, 16°11'22.29"E) (3 June 2021)

The Panel has identified from open-source media the presence of armoured Toyota 79 Land Cruiser light utility vehicles in Libya for the first time. The vehicles were heading North East in a Russian PMC convoy from Al Jufra to Sirte.

Panel research has identified that numerous companies provide this up-armouring option to the standard Toyota Land Cruiser 79. Successful tracing of the supply chain is not possible without more detailed information,

The Panel also notes that the GNU-AF (Misrata militias) may also have possession of similar vehicles, but the imagery resolution available does not allow for a 100% identification (see primary source 4).

The transfer of this military materiel to Libya is a violation of paragraph 9 of resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#).



#### Primary sources

1. <https://twitter.com/RS0TM/status/1400582605431619587>, 3 June 2021;
2. Geo-referenced at <https://twitter.com/CourtenaySargon/status/1401503780596768768>, 7 June 2021; and
3. Extract from <https://twitter.com/salaaah62/status/1401893333044244484>, (0.46min), 7 June 2021.

Developed by UN Panel of Experts

## Annex 67 GNU-AF CForce All-Terrain Vehicles (ATV) (4 July 2021)

### CForce All Terrain Vehicles (ATV) (GNU-AF in South Tripoli) (4 July 2021)

The Panel has identified from official social media of the GNU Ministry of Interior and other open-source imagery the presence of CFMoto CForce All Terrain Vehicles (ATV) being used by the GNU Ministry of Interior's General Department of Security Operations in southern Tripoli. Although these items are not subject to export controls, nor specifically classified as military material or dual-use, they have obvious military utility.

This has been included in the report as a further example of the ease with which arms embargos can be negated by the innovative use of commercial or dual use products. In this case all the vehicles were seen in black or green "military" colours.

CFMoto is a global brand with high production levels and global distribution, which means that without vehicle identification numbers (VIN) supply chain tracing is not possible.

The Panel considers that as this dual-use technology is primarily being imported by actors actively participating in armed conflict, and then used for military purposes, such transfers are a violation of paragraph 9 to resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#).

#### Primary sources

1. <https://www.facebook.com/moi.gov.ly/photos/pcb.4108454315917896/4108453999251261>, 4 July 2021.
2. [https://twitter.com/Libya\\_OSINT/status/1412183012960260098](https://twitter.com/Libya_OSINT/status/1412183012960260098), 5 July 2021; and
3. <https://www.cfmoto.co.uk/atv/>. Accessed 21 November 2021.

Developed by UN Panel of Experts



## Annex 68 MKEK JNG-90 Bora Sniper Rifles in Libya (11 July 2021)

### **MKEK 7.62mm JNG-90 Bora Sniper Rifle (GNU Ministry of Interior security agencies) (11 July 2021 and 9 March 2022)**

The Panel has identified from official GNU Ministry of Interior and open-source imagery the presence of MKEK 7.62mm JNG-90 Bora Sniper Rifles in the possession of Ministry of Interior security agencies on 11 July 2021 and 9 March 2022. The weapons were being used as part of sniper training provided by Turkey.

These are the first sightings of this weapons system in Libya. This weapon type has been manufactured since 2008. The two Member States also licensed to produce the weapon have confirmed to the Panel that they have yet to manufacture any weapons.

The Panel offered Turkey an opportunity to respond in a letter of 22 July 2021. On 12 September 2021 Turkey stated that, based on inventory analysis, it had not sold, transferred or exported such weapons to Libya.

This military sniper training undertaken within the scope of the Military Training, Cooperation and Consultancy Agreement between Turkey and the GNA, and the transfer of this weapon type to Libya, are both violations of paragraph 9 of resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#).

#### **Primary sources**

1. <https://www.facebook.com/Ministry.of.Interior.Libya/posts/4127878207308840>, 11 July 2021;
2. <https://twitter.com/Oded121351/status/1414847896751648771>, 13 July 2021;
3. <https://web.archive.org/web/20101126225913/http://mkek.gov.tr/english/foUrunDetaylari.aspx?iKodUrun=335&iKodUrunKategorisi=131>, Accessed 22 July 2021;
4. <https://www.facebook.com/photo?fbid=511947766965593&set=pcb.511948683632168>, 9 March 2022; and
5. [customer.janes.com](https://www.janes.com), 20 October 2020. (Subscription).

Developed by UN Panel of Experts





## Annex 69 AN/PVS-7 Night Vision Goggles (9 August 2021)

### AN/PVS-7 Night Vision Goggles (PNG) (Benina, Benghazi) (9 August 2021)

The Panel has identified from official HAF social media imagery of the 81st Anniversary parade of the formation of the Libyan Army, held at Benina on 9 August 2021, HAF personnel equipped with Army/Navy Portable Visual Search 7 (AN/PVS-7) type Night Vision Goggles (NVG). This is the first reporting of this military materiel by the Panel, although independent research has identified a single image of the same equipment with a HAF fighter on 3 August 2017, which went unreported by the Panel at the time.

Designed in the United States in 1982, in-service since 1985, with many manufacturers, means that a tracing request is unlikely to identify the supply chain unless serial numbers can be identified.

Weapons sights fall under the auspices of *arms and related materiel of all types* under the arms embargo.

Although the Panel cannot positively identify the supplier of the AN/PVS-7 NVG to Libya, the transfer of this military material to Libya is a violation of paragraph 9 of resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#).

#### Primary sources

1. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Vscz8zHfL70>, 9 August 2021;
2. <https://twitter.com/Oded121351/status/1425789777975074821>, 12 August 2021;
3. <https://twitter.com/Oded121351/status/892972404833734656>, 3 August 2017; and
4. Manufacturers image for comparison and identification.

Developed by UN Panel of Experts



## Annex 70 122mm *Rocketsan* FFR Pods and Hybrid Launcher (17 August 2021)

### 122mm *Rocketsan* Free Flight Rockets (FFR) and Hybrid Launcher (Sidi Bilal, 32°48'56.73"N, 12°57'19.76") (17 August 2021)

A Hybrid Multi-Barrel Rocket Launcher (MBRL) was identified in the possession of the GNU-AF entering Camp Sidi Bilal, near Janzour, on 17 August 2021. The location was confirmed by an independent OSINT analyst using geo-location, and the Panel concurs with the coordinates identified.

This MBRL is of interest as further research identified that a very similar hybrid MBRL was seen in the possession of HAF in Tarhuna on 5 June 2020. In 1989/1990 the DPRK supplied the UAE with some 240mm M-1985 MBRL, and the erector launcher seen on the hybrid MBRL is of the same type. The manufacturer has confirmed to the Panel that Iveco 230.35 WM chassis were supplied to the UAE during 1991/1992.

The Hybrid MBRL seen at GNU-AF Camp Sidi Bilal has the Turkish manufactured *Rocketsan* 122mm free flight rocket (FFR) pods mounted on an M-1985 MBRL erector launcher on an uparmoured Iveco 230.35WM chassis.

This makes it almost certain that the Hybrid MBRL identified with the GNU-AF at Camp Sidi Bilal is the result of a battlefield capture from HAF.

The transfer of this Hybrid MBRL to Libya is a violation of paragraph 9 of resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#) by the UAE. The supply of the *Rocketsan* 122mm FFR is a violation of paragraph 9 of resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#) by Turkey.

#### Primary sources

1. [www.politico.eu/article/libya-khalifa-haftar-in-retreat-france-hedges-its-bets/](http://www.politico.eu/article/libya-khalifa-haftar-in-retreat-france-hedges-its-bets/), 5 June 2020;
2. [www.oryxspioenkop.com/2020/11/inconvenient-arms-north-korean-weapons.html](http://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2020/11/inconvenient-arms-north-korean-weapons.html), 2 November 2020;
3. [twitter.com/Oded121351/status/1427514232749404180](https://twitter.com/Oded121351/status/1427514232749404180), 17 August 2021;
4. [twitter.com/oryxspioenkop/status/1427536079981322241](https://twitter.com/oryxspioenkop/status/1427536079981322241), 17 August 2021;
5. [twitter.com/azyakancokkacan/status/1427552230912241671](https://twitter.com/azyakancokkacan/status/1427552230912241671), 17 August 2021;
6. Geo-located at [twitter.com/il\\_kanguru/status/1427520357867696139](https://twitter.com/il_kanguru/status/1427520357867696139), 17 August 2021;
7. [www.oryxspioenkop.com/2021/12/the-mystery-mrls-that-fuelled-both.html](http://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2021/12/the-mystery-mrls-that-fuelled-both.html), 14 December 2021; and
8. [customer.janes.com](http://customer.janes.com). (Subscription).

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Iveco 230/35 WM Chassis  
HAF Hybrid 122mm MBRL in Tarhuna  
(5 June 2020)



GNU-AF Hybrid 122mm MBRL in Janzour  
(17 August 2021)



Rocketsan 122m FFR Pod >>



<< DPRK M-1985 erector launcher

## Annex 71 SALW seizures in Sudan (18 September 2021 and 8 January 2022)

### Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) Transfers to Sudan (18 September 2021 and 8 January 2022)

On 18 September 2021 imagery was published on official social media of the Sudanese Rapid Support Forces (RSF) of an SALW seizure in the area of Sidi al-Barli, Sudan. It was reported that four smugglers, two Libyans and two foreign nationals, were arrested, but the Panel has yet to verify this information. The seizure included 36 x AK variant assault rifles, two DshK heavy machine guns, two RPG-7 rocket launchers and associated ammunition.

On 8 January 2022 official RSF open source media reported a further seizure of 3,995 rounds of small arms ammunition.

The Panel requested further information from Sudan in letters dated 26 September 2021 and 4 February 2022. No response was received.

This transfer of small arms and light weapons from Libya is a violation of paragraph 9 of resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#).

#### Primary sources

1. <https://rsf.gov.sd/news/1467>, 18 September 2021;
2. <https://twitter.com/RSFSudan/status/1439183450691575808?s=20>, 18 September 2021; and
3. <https://english.alaraby.co.uk/news/sudanese-forces-seize-libya-arms-shipment>, 19 September 2021;
4. <https://www.rsf.gov.sd/news/1666>, 8 January 2022;
5. <https://rsf.gov.sd/en/news/1667/RSF-Thwarts-Attempt-of-Smuggling-a-Shipment-of-Ammunition-on-the-Sudanese-Libyan-Borders>, 9 January 2022; and
6. <https://www.libyaobserver.ly/inbrief/sudan-thwarts-ammunition-smuggling-operation-near-libyan-border>, 9 January 2022.

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## Annex 72      Katmerciler *KIRAC* Armoured Personnel Carrier (24 December 2021)

### Katmerciler *KIRAC* Armoured Personnel Carriers (APC) (GNU Ministry of Interior in Tripoli) (25 December 2021)

The Panel has identified from Turkish specialist defence media the presence of Katmerciler *KIRAC* armoured personnel carriers (APC) being used by the GNU in Tripoli. These vehicles are designed and manufactured by the Katmerciler Arac Ustu Ekipman Sanayi ve Ticarit A.S. Merkez (Fabrika) company in Turkey.

The manufacturer's coverage on their website states that this New Generation Criminal Investigation Vehicle has a unique design which can be configured as armoured personnel carrier, command control vehicle and internal security vehicle. If designed for use in the "Command Control" or "Internal Security" roles, the vehicles, depending on the end-user, could fall under the exception for non-lethal humanitarian or protective use provided for in paragraph 9 (a) of resolution 1970 (2011), as amended by paragraphs 9 and 10 of resolution 2095 (2013).

However, these particular vehicles are armoured and are being used in the APC role, hence an exemption request and prior approval by the Committee would have been required under paragraph 8 of resolution 2174 (2014). No such request was made by Libya or Turkey.

The Panel offered Libya and Turkey an opportunity to respond in letters dated 1 February and 31 January 2022 respectively. No response was received.

This transfer of military equipment to Libya undertaken within the scope of the Military Training, Cooperation and Consultancy Agreement between Turkey and the then GNA is a violation of paragraph 9 of resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#) by Turkey.



KIRAC APC in Tripoli. Note the official Libyan Ministry of Interior number plate.



Two KIRAC APC in official convoy in Tripoli. Note the Libyan police car.

#### Primary sources

- <https://www.defenceturk.net/turk-katmerciler-firmasinin-zirhli-araclari-libyada>, 24 December 2021; and
- <http://www.katmerciler.com.tr/L/EN/mid/343/g/343/c/31/id/79/KIRAC-New-Generation-Criminal-Investigation-Vehicle.htm>. Accessed 11 January 2022.

Developed by UN Panel of Experts

## Annex 73 AN/PEQ-15 Advanced Target Pointer Illuminator Aiming Laser (ATPIAL) (31 December 2021)

### AN/PEQ-15 Advanced Target Pointer Illuminator Aiming Laser (ATPIAL) (Misrata) (31 December 2021)

The Panel has identified from GNU official social media the presence of a target pointer illuminator (TPI), virtually identical to the AN/PEQ-15 Advanced Target Pointer Illuminator Aiming Laser (ATPIAL), fitted to an assault rifle in the possession of the Joint Operations Force of the Government of National Unity (GNU-AF) in Misrata on 31 December 2021.

Target Pointer Illuminators (TPI) fall under the auspices of *arms and related materiel of all types* under the arms embargo.

The ATPIAL has high production levels and is globally distributed, which means that without a serial number supply chain tracing is not possible.

The transfer of this military material to Libya is a violation of paragraph 9 of resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#).

#### Primary sources

1. <https://www.facebook.com/GOVLYT/photos/1825880584261887>, 2 January 2022; and
2. <https://www.l3harris.com/all-capabilities/advanced-target-pointer-illuminator-aiming-laser-atpial-an-peq-15>. Accessed 22 January 2022.

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The image shows a side-by-side comparison of two photographs of a binocular. On the left is a photograph taken by a user, showing the binocular mounted on a camera. On the right is a photograph of the same binocular, labeled 'Manufacturer's Image', showing it from a different angle without the camera mount. An arrow points from the manufacturer's image to the user's image.

The transfer of this military material to Libya is a violation of paragraph 9 of resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#).

1. <https://www.facebook.com/قبي-تكنولوجيا-الالكترونيات-166-مجلة-166-قبي-تكنولوجيا-الالكترونيات-166-مجلة-166/photos/3292495174371070>, 8 February 2022;
2. [customer.janes.com](https://customer.janes.com). Accessed 11 February 2022; and
3. <https://www.aselsan.com.tr/en/capabilities/electro-optic-systems/handheld-applications/a100-night-vision-monocular>. Accessed 11 February 2022.

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## Annex 76 M79 Osa 90mm Anti-tank Rockets (23 March 2022)

### M79 Osa 90mm Anti-tank Rockets (Ajdabia) (23 March 2022)

The Panel has identified from GNU official social media the seizure of five M79 Osa 90mm anti-tank rockets by the Security Directorate in Ajdabia on 23 March 2022. This ammunition type has not been seen in Libya before.

The resolution of the imagery was not high enough to confirm the Lot/Batch number, which appeared to be 18-1984. The age and wide distribution of this ammunition type means that a tracing request would be nugatory.

The transfer of this military material to Libya is a violation of paragraph 9 of resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#).



#### Primary sources

1. [https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story\\_fbid=3112507732370942&id=1706796266275436](https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=3112507732370942&id=1706796266275436), 23 March 2022; and
2. [customer.janes.com](#). Subscription. Accessed 23 March 2022.

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## Annex 77 GNA-AF Air Defence training in Turkey (1 February 2021)

### GNA -AF Air Defence systems training (1 February 2021)

On 01 February 2021 imagery was published on social media of the Turkish Armed Forces providing training in Konya, Turkey to the then GNA-AF across a range of air defence systems. It was confirmed by video imagery on the official Turkish Armed Forces website.

The systems included: 1) *Korkut* Twin 35mm Cannon (SSA and KKA); 2) *Kalkan* II Air Defence Radar; 3) iHASAVAR Anti-Drone System; 4) iHATAR Anti-Drone System; and 5) Twin *Oerlikon* 35mm Cannon.

The Panel offered Turkey an opportunity to respond in letters dated 9 February and 5 October 2021. No response was received.

This military training undertaken within the scope of the Military Training, Cooperation and Consultancy Agreement between Turkey and the then GNA is a violation of paragraph 9 of resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#).



#### Primary sources

- [https://twitter.com/COIN\\_V2/status/1356172136629624832](https://twitter.com/COIN_V2/status/1356172136629624832), 1 February 2021;
- <https://twitter.com/Oded121351/status/1356161444769898496>, 1 February 2021;
- <https://www.aselsan.com.tr/en/capabilities/air-and-missile-defense-systems/self-propelled-and-air-burst-munition/korkut-self-propelled-air-defense-gun-system>;
- <https://www.aselsan.com.tr/en/capabilities/radar-systems/air-defense-radars/kalkan-air-defence-radar>; and
- <https://www.ssb.gov.tr/urun katalog/en/412/>.

Developed by UN Panel of Experts



## Annex 78      GNA-AF Military Diving training in Khoms, Libya (6 February 2021)

### GNA -AF Military Diving Training by Turkey (Khoms Naval Base) (6 February 2021)

On 6 February 2021 imagery was published on official social media of the Turkish Armed Forces of military diving training in the Khoms Joint Naval Training Command centre being provided to the then GNA-AF. The Panel has confirmed the imagery by geo-locating the training location to 32°41'30.7"N 14°14'31.8"E.

The Panel offered Turkey an opportunity to respond in letters dated 12 July and 5 October 2021. Their response of 17 March 2022 stated that only training was provided and no diving equipment was supplied.

This military diving training undertaken within the scope of the Military Training, Cooperation and Consultancy Agreement between Turkey and the then GNA is a violation of paragraph 9 of resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#).

#### Primary sources

1. <https://twitter.com/tcsavunma/status/1358031134941212672>, 6 February 2021; and
2. Google Earth Pro.

Developed by UN Panel of Experts



## Annex 79 GNA-AF Officer Cadet training in Tripoli, Libya (7 February 2021)

### GNA-AF Officer Cadet training by Turkey (Tripoli) (7 February 2021)

On 7 February 2021 imagery was published on official social media of the Turkish Armed Forces of Officer Cadet training being provided to the then GNA-AF. The Panel has confirmed the imagery by geo-locating the training location to a military base in Tripoli at 32°50'23.2"N, 13°12'07.3"E.


The Panel offered Turkey an opportunity to respond in letters dated 12 July and 5 October 2021. No response was received.

This military training undertaken within the scope of the Military Training, Cooperation and Consultancy Agreement between Turkey and the then GNA is a violation of paragraph 9 of resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#).

#### Primary sources

1. <https://twitter.com/tcsavunma/status/1358392940591259648>, 4 February 2021;
2. <https://twitter.com/tcsavunma/status/1358392818083848201>, 7 February 2021; and
3. Google Earth Pro.

Developed by UN Panel of Experts



## Annex 80 GNU-AF Unit 444 UAV training in Libya (25 March 2021)

### GNU-AF Unit 444 UAV training (Takbali Training Camp, Tripoli) (25 March 2021)

The official social media account of the GNU-AF Tripoli Military District 444 Unit, showed imagery of training in the use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) at the Takbali Training Camp on 25 March 2021. The Panel has confirmed the imagery by geo-referencing the location to approximately 32°48'53.9"N,13°13'26.7"E.

The Panel has identified the UAV as a Foxtech Baby Shark 260 VTOL, which has dual use military utility as an Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) platform. The imagery shows a vehicle painted in a military sand colour, with air conditioning and a dual antenna array. The Panel considers it almost certain that this vehicle is a command, control and communications (C3) vehicle for the operation of the UAV.

The wide commercial distribution of the Foxtech Baby Shark 260 VTOL, means that a tracing request is unlikely to identify the supply chain unless serial numbers can be identified.

This transfer of the Foxtech Baby Shark 260 VTOL into Libya is a violation of paragraph 9 of resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#).

#### Primary sources

1. <https://www.facebook.com/الوحد-444-ج-115065407070788/photos/pcb.231514245425903/231513142092680>, 25 March 2021;
2. <https://www.foxtechfpv.com/foxtech-baby-shark-vtol.html>. Accessed 18 June 2021; and
3. Google Earth Pro.

Developed by UN Panel of Experts



## Annex 81 GNU-AF training on *Firtina* T-155 SP howitzer in Libya (30 March 2021)

### GNU-AF *Firtina* T155 Training (Joint Land Training Centre, Tajoura) (30 March 2021)

The Panel reported on the transfer of *Firtina* T-155 self propelled howitzers from Turkey to Libya in annexes 28 and 34 to [S/2021/229](#).

The Panel identified from an official social media account of the GNU-AF “Media Centre for Operation Volcano of Anger” a report of the Turkish Armed Forces providing artillery training on the use of the T-155 *Firtina* self-propelled howitzers to the GNU-AF.

The Panel offered Turkey an opportunity to respond in letters dated 15 July and 5 October 2021. No response was received.

This training in the operation of *Firtina* T155 self propelled howitzers undertaken within the scope of the Military Training, Cooperation and Consultancy Agreement between Turkey and the then GNU is a violation of paragraph 9 of resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#).

#### Primary sources

1. <https://twitter.com/BurkanLy/status/1376896912553562117>, 30 March 2021; and
2. [https://customer.janes.com/Janes/Display/JAA\\_1327-JAAD](https://customer.janes.com/Janes/Display/JAA_1327-JAAD), 2 February 2021. (Subscription).

Developed by UN Panel of Experts





## Annex 82 GNU-AF Special Forces Training in Turkey (7 August 2021)

### GNU-AF Special Forces Training (Egirdir, Turkey) (7 August 2021)

On 7 August 2021 imagery was published on official social media of the GNU-AF, and on 15 August 2021 on open-source media, of GNU-AF personnel receiving special forces training at the Turkish Ministry of Defence Counter-Terrorism Training and Exercise Centre near Egirdir, Turkey.

The training location was geo-referenced to 37°52'18.56"N, 30°49'52.14"E by an independent OSINT analyst. The Panel concurs with the location identified (see R).

The Panel offered Turkey an opportunity to respond in a letter dated 7 October 2021. No response was received.

This military special forces training undertaken within the scope of the Military Training, Cooperation and Consultancy Agreement between Turkey and the then GNA is a violation of paragraph 9 of resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#).

#### Primary sources

1. <https://www.facebook.com/Libyabook/posts/1175363809541529>, 7 August 2021;
2. <https://twitter.com/Oded121351/status/1424632216617893891>, 9 August 2021;
3. [https://twitter.com/il\\_kanguru/status/1424637919080419329](https://twitter.com/il_kanguru/status/1424637919080419329), 9 August 2021;
4. <https://twitter.com/Oded121351/status/1426881959876235265>, 15 August 2021; and
5. Google Earth Pro.

Developed by UN Panel of Experts



## Annex 83 HAF 106 brigade return from training in Egypt (8 September 2021)

### HAF 106 brigade training (Egypt) (8 September 2021)

On 8 September 2021 imagery was published on the official social media of the HAF 106 brigade reporting the conclusion of a training event in Egypt.

The Panel has confirmed that the aircraft in the imagery showing the return of HAF 106 brigade personnel was in Libya when the image was taken, and that it is the IL-76 [MSN#33446205] [now 5A-7656] flying in support of HAF.

The Panel offered Egypt an opportunity to respond in a letter dated 29 September 2021. On 21 October 2021 Egypt responded that the official HAF report was false.

This training is a violation of paragraph 9 of resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#) by HAF and the, as yet to be identified, training provider.



#### Primary sources

1. <https://twitter.com/JDTkLYZayYGdbew/status/1435663797679792132/photo/1>, 8 September 2021; and
2. [https://twitter.com/Gerjon\\_/status/1436052461031133190?s=20](https://twitter.com/Gerjon_/status/1436052461031133190?s=20), 9 September 2021.

Developed by UN Panel of Experts



## Annex 84 GNU-AF Sniper Training from Turkish Armed Forces (3 October 2021)

### GNU -AF Sniper Training by Turkey (Western Region, Tripoli) (3 October 2021)

On 3 October 2021 imagery was published on official social media of the Turkish Armed Forces of military sniper training being provided to military personnel of the GNU-AF Western Region.

The Panel offered Turkey an opportunity to respond in a letter dated 7 October 2021. No response was received.

This military sniper training undertaken within the scope of the Military Training, Cooperation and Consultancy Agreement between Turkey and the then GNA is a violation of paragraph 9 of resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#).

#### Primary sources

1. <https://twitter.com/tcsavunma/status/1444632404128378880>, 3 October 2021; and
2. [https://twitter.com/wady\\_dynar/status/1444662262640398341?s=20](https://twitter.com/wady_dynar/status/1444662262640398341?s=20), 3 October 2021.

Developed by UN Panel of Experts



## Annex 85 GNU-AF Mountain Corps Academy Training in Turkey (9 October 2021)

### GNU-AF Mountain Corps Academy Training (Turkey) (9 October 2021)

On 9 October 2021 imagery was published on the official website of the Presidency of the General Staff to the Libyan Army of GNU-AF personnel receiving training at the Mountain Corps Academy in Turkey. Note the Blue Beret worn by a Turkish instructor. The Blue Beret is worn by elite units of the Turkish Armed Forces such as: 1) Land Forces Mountain Commandos; and 2) Gendarmerie Commandos.

The Panel offered Turkey an opportunity to respond in a letter dated 13 December 2021. On 15 February 2022 the Turkish authorities confirmed to the Panel that 34 Libyan students were trained between 2 August to 8 October 2021.

This specialist military training undertaken within the scope of the Military Training, Cooperation and Consultancy Agreement between Turkey and the then GNA is a violation of paragraph 9 of resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#).



#### Primary sources

1. <https://www.facebook.com/The.presidency.of.the.General.Staff.To.Libyan.Army/photos/pcb.250136173721830/250136023721845>; 9 October 2021;
2. <https://twitter.com/Oded121351/status/1447198469953925120>, 10 October 2021;
3. <https://iacmc.forumotion.com/t10559-berets-of-the-turkish-armed-forces-law-enforcement-units>. Accessed 23 November 2021; and
4. Letter from Member State dated 15 February 2022.

## Annex 86 Russian Federation military cargo flights in eastern Libya

1. The Panel has continued to monitor and analyse the quantity of military cargo flights by the Russian Federation on the air line of communication (ALoC) from the Hmeymim military air base<sup>172</sup> in Syria to eastern Libya. These flights meet the profile indicators for flights deemed to be suspicious. The Panel wrote to the Member State (see paragraph 5).

2. The Panel has identified at least 175 flights by specific aircraft registration number,<sup>173</sup> equating to a maximum cargo delivery capacity of 7,922 tonnes from 1 May 2021 to 31 March 2022 (assuming a 48-tonne cargo payload for an IL-76TD). Flights are summarised at tables 86.1 and 86.2 and figures 86.1 and 86.2.<sup>174</sup> The data is not exhaustive as pre-departure flight plans are not usually filed directly with Eurocontrol<sup>175</sup> for entry into European airspace. Entry is usually activated by Cyprus air traffic control (ATC) using a ZZZZ code for departure airfield, or by the destination airfield itself.

Table 86.1

**Summary of RF military cargo flights to Libya (1 January – 31 December 2021)**


| Data set                  | Jan   | Feb   | Mar | Apr | May | Jun   | Jul | Aug | Sep   | Oct | Nov | Dec | Totals |
|---------------------------|-------|-------|-----|-----|-----|-------|-----|-----|-------|-----|-----|-----|--------|
| # Flights <sup>a</sup>    | 25    | 23    | 20  | 19  | 15  | 22    | 16  | 12  | 23    | 12  | 15  | 15  | 217    |
| Max load (t) <sup>b</sup> | 1,168 | 1,072 | 920 | 912 | 682 | 1,016 | 728 | 544 | 1,064 | 576 | 624 | 656 | 9,962  |

<sup>a</sup> Identified by Panel.

<sup>b</sup> Assuming cargo payload of 48 tonnes for IL-76 aircraft. Data is rounded and includes other aircraft types.

Figure 86.1

**Number of RFF military cargo flights to Libya (1 January - 31 December 2021)**



<sup>172</sup> Centred on 35°24'27.07"N, 35°57'8.00"E.

<sup>173</sup> Flight data for flights is based on data received from a combination of: (a) Confidential sources; (b) [www.flightradar24.com](http://www.flightradar24.com); (c) [www.radarbox.com](http://www.radarbox.com); (d) [www.italmilitaradar.com](http://www.italmilitaradar.com); (e) C4ADS analysis; (f) Twitter [@ALandewers](https://twitter.com/ALandewers); [@Gerjon](https://twitter.com/Gerjon) (primarily) and (g) Twitter [@YorukIsik](https://twitter.com/YorukIsik).

<sup>174</sup> The Panel has maintained a database of flight details.

<sup>175</sup> <https://www.eurocontrol.int/>.

Table 86.2


**Summary of RF military cargo flights to Libya (1 January – 31 March 2022)**

| <i>Data set</i>           | <i>Jan</i> | <i>Feb</i> | <i>Mar</i> | <i>Totals</i> |
|---------------------------|------------|------------|------------|---------------|
| # Flights <sup>a</sup>    | 17         | 11         | 17         | 45            |
| Max load (t) <sup>b</sup> | 752        | 464        | 816        | 2,032         |

<sup>a</sup> Identified by Panel.

<sup>b</sup> Assuming cargo payload of 48 tonnes for IL-76 aircraft. Data is rounded and includes other aircraft types.

Figure 86.2

**Number of RF military cargo flights to Libya (1 January - 31 March 2022)**

3. The Panel requested further information from the Member State<sup>176</sup> and in their reply<sup>177</sup> they stated that the cargo comprised of “humanitarian assistance to Libya, including the supply of vaccines against COVID-19”. No further details were provided.

4. UN agencies have neither observed, nor heard of, any large quantity of humanitarian aid from the Russian Federation being supplied to, or distributed in, eastern Libya.<sup>178</sup> No humanitarian aid has been identified from satellite imagery or ground reports in the aircraft unloading areas at Benina (HLLB) and Al Khadim (HL59), and Al Khadim is not known to be a humanitarian hub for any aid agency.<sup>179</sup> A mass and volumetric cargo analysis by the Panel (see table 86.2) shows the cargo capacity of these flights for selected items.

<sup>176</sup> Panel letter of 5 October 2021.

<sup>177</sup> Email to Panel of 26 October 2021.

<sup>178</sup> Senior UN official in the UN Country Team.

<sup>179</sup> Ibid.

Table 86.2

**Volumetric cargo analysis of typical humanitarian aid**

| <i>Item</i>                         | <i>Mass<br/>(tonnes)</i> | <i>Volume<br/>(m<sup>3</sup>)</i> | <i>Density<br/>(tonnes/m<sup>3</sup>)</i> | <i>Flights</i> | <i>Maximum<br/>Payload</i> | <i>Remarks</i>           |
|-------------------------------------|--------------------------|-----------------------------------|-------------------------------------------|----------------|----------------------------|--------------------------|
| IL-76 TD Cargo Capacity             | 48                       | 234                               |                                           |                |                            |                          |
| COVID-19 (5,000 vials) <sup>a</sup> | 1                        | 6                                 | 1.67                                      | 175            | 42,000,000 vials           | 92% of cargo hold volume |
| Wheat                               | 1                        | 0.79                              | 0.79                                      | 175            | 8,400 tonnes               | 26% of cargo hold volume |
| Water                               | 1                        | 1                                 | 1.00                                      | 175            | 8,400,000 litres           | 21% of cargo hold volume |

<sup>a</sup> Assuming packed in Single Use Thermal Type packaging.

5. The Panel also noted that Russian Federation military cargo aircraft are using eastern Libyan airfields for technical stop overs on flights to other destinations in Africa, including the Central African Republic. For example, on 2 October 2021 aircraft tracking websites identified a Russian Federation Air Force Tupolev TU-154M (registered #RA-85042)<sup>180</sup> on the normal route from Latakia (OSLK), Syria to Al Khadim (HL59), Libya. The aircraft tracking websites then showed “no data” for the period from 01:48 hours UTC on 2 October to 15:16 hours UTC on 3 October 2021. A “dark period” of 1 Day, 13 Hours and 26 Minutes. Sentinel-1 satellite imagery for that period did not show a TU-154M aircraft parked at Al Khadim (HL59) in eastern Libya. Figure 86.2 shows the same aircraft at Bangui M’Poko airport (FEFF), Central African Republic on 2 October 2021 between 08:15 to 10:36 hours UTC, based on the ground time for the Air France Boeing 777-228 (F-GSPO) parked in the vicinity and shown on aircraft tracking websites. The Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic established pursuant to resolution [2127 \(2013\)](#) was informed of this flight activity.<sup>181</sup>

Figure 86.2

**TU-154M (RA-85042) at Bangui, CAR (2 October 2021)**



Source: [https://twitter.com/tom\\_bullock/status/1445386123161788421](https://twitter.com/tom_bullock/status/1445386123161788421), 2 October 2021.

<sup>180</sup> This aircraft was also reported in annexes 55 and 77 to [S/2021/229](#) as operating in support of ChVK Wagner.

<sup>181</sup> Reported in the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic report [S/2021/259](#) (annex 3.4).

6. The Panel has identified that flights from Benghazi, Libya (HLLB) to Modibo Keita International Airport, Mali (GABS) took place on 1, 21 and 26 February 2022. The Panel of Experts on Mali established pursuant to resolution [2374 \(2017\)](#) has been informed of this flight activity.

7. The Panel finds that this flight activity by military cargo aircraft is a violation of paragraph 9 of resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#) for the *direct, and indirect, supply of (...) military (...) equipment* and (...) *other assistance* (...) to Libya. As they are military aircraft their routine landing at Libyan airports violates paragraph 9 of resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#) regardless of whether the aircraft are transferring arms or military equipment to Libya.



## Annex 87 Turkish military cargo flights in support of GNU-AF

1. The Panel has continued to monitor and analyse the quantity of military cargo flights by the Turkish Air Force (TuAF) on the air line of communication (ALoC) from Turkey to western Libya by Airbus A400M operated by the 221 *Breeze* Squadron based at Kayseri/Erkilet.<sup>182</sup>

2. The Panel has identified at least 33 flights by specific aircraft registration number,<sup>183</sup> equating to a maximum cargo delivery capacity of 1,221 tonnes from 1 May 2021 to 31 March 2022 (assuming a 37-tonne cargo payload for an Airbus A400M). Flights are summarised at tables 87.1 and 87.2 and figures 87.1 and 87.2.<sup>184</sup> The list may not be exhaustive as the TuAF use an indirect route to avoid certain Flight Information Regions (FIR). This route follows the Istanbul / Nicosia FIR boundary and then the Athens / Cairo FIR boundary until reaching the Tripoli FIR. These flights meet the profile indicators for flights deemed to be suspicious and almost certainly violating the arms embargo.

Table 87.1

**Summary of TuAF cargo flights to Libya (1 January - 31 December 2021)**


| Data set                  | Jan | Feb | Mar | Apr | May | Jun | Jul | Aug | Sep | Oct | Nov | Dec | Totals |
|---------------------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|--------|
| # Flights <sup>a</sup>    | 3   | 4   | 2   | 4   | 2   | 2   | 3   | 2   | 13  | 3   | 2   | 1   | 41     |
| Max load (t) <sup>b</sup> | 111 | 130 | 74  | 148 | 74  | 74  | 111 | 74  | 222 | 37  | 0   | 37  | 1,517  |

<sup>a</sup> Identified by Panel.

<sup>b</sup> Assuming cargo payload of 37 tonnes for Airbus A400M aircraft.

Figure 87.1

**Number of TuAF cargo flights to western Libya (1 January – 31 December 2021)**



<sup>182</sup> LTAU. Joint Airbase. 38°46'13"N, 35°29'43"E.

<sup>183</sup> Flight data for flights is based on data received from a combination of: (a) Confidential sources; (b) [www.flightradar24.com](http://www.flightradar24.com); (c) [www.radarbox.com](http://www.radarbox.com); (d) [www.italmilitaradar.com](http://www.italmilitaradar.com); (e) C4ADS analysis; (f) Twitter [@ALandewers](https://twitter.com/ALandewers); [@Gerjon](https://twitter.com/Gerjon) (primarily); and (g) Twitter [@YorukIsik](https://twitter.com/YorukIsik).

<sup>184</sup> The Panel has maintained a database of flight details.


Table 87.2

**Summary of TuAF military cargo flights to Libya (1 January – 31 March 2022)**

| <i>Data set</i>           | <i>Jan</i> | <i>Feb</i> | <i>Mar</i> | <i>Totals</i> |
|---------------------------|------------|------------|------------|---------------|
| # Flights <sup>a</sup>    | 1          | 2          | 2          | 5             |
| Max load (t) <sup>b</sup> | 37         | 78         | 78         | 193           |

<sup>a</sup> Identified by Panel.<sup>b</sup> Assuming cargo payload of 48 tonnes for IL-76 aircraft.

Figure 87.2

**Number of TuAF military cargo flights to Libya (1 January - 31 March 2022)**

3. On 14 April 2021 one TuAF A400 delivered humanitarian supplies (vaccines) to Tripoli (figure 87.2), but two other aircraft flew to their military operating base at Al Wattiyah.

Figure 87.2

TuAF A400M offloads vaccines at Tripoli (Mitiga) (14 April 2021)



Source: <https://twitter.com/libyaalahrartv/status/1382366609612890112>, 14 April 2021.


4. The Panel finds that this flight activity by military cargo aircraft is a violation of paragraph 9 of resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#) for the *direct, and indirect, supply of (...) military (...) equipment* and (...) *other assistance* (...) to Libya. As they are military aircraft their routine landing at Libyan airports violates paragraph 9 of resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#) regardless of whether the aircraft are transferring arms or military equipment to Libya.

## Annex 88 Cham Wings Airlines flights in support of HAF

1. The flight activity of Cham Wings Airlines<sup>185</sup> (SAW) aircraft continued to be of interest to the Panel during this mandate.<sup>186</sup>
2. On 2 December 2021 the European Union placed restrictive measures<sup>187</sup> on Cham Wings Airlines for an issue unrelated to the UN sanctions measures relating to Libya. This action has impacted on the company's flight operations in regard to Libya as the EU sanctions measures consider access to European controlled airspace as an "economic resource". It is the responsibility of the Member State to refuse access to its own national air space.
3. By international law, a State "has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its territory", which corresponds with the maritime definition of territorial waters as being 12 nautical miles (22.2 km) out from a nation's coastline.<sup>188</sup> Airspace not within any country's territorial limit is considered international, analogous to the "high seas" in maritime law. Operational control of air space over the Mediterranean is split up, under an agreement with the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) into Flight Information Regions (FIR). For the coastal States of the Mediterranean, the FIR consists of the airspace above its land and sea territory plus any international airspace in respect of which ICAO has assigned responsibility to that State.
4. The Panel has identified that shortly after the imposition of EU sanctions on Cham Wings Airlines their flight routes changed to avoid the national air space of Cyprus and Greece. Their aircraft still transit the FIR controlled by these two nations, as well as Malta FIR, but try and fly on the inter-FIR boundaries in order to introduce a level of confusion of responsibility as to which Member State should take action (see figures 88.1 and 88.2). The Panel mentions this as an example of sanctions evasion tactics used by airlines.

Figure 88.1

Cham Wings Airlines flight profile 2021 (pre-EU sanctions)



<sup>185</sup> [www.chamwings.com](http://www.chamwings.com), Fardos Street, Damascus, Syria. +963 11 9211. ([cs@chamwings.com](mailto:cs@chamwings.com)).

<sup>186</sup> In particular Airbus A320-211 (Registered in Syria as YK-BAB).

<sup>187</sup> (a) Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/2124 of 2 December 2021; and (b) Council Implementing Decision (CFSP) 2021/2125 of 2 December 2021. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L:2021:4301:FULL&from=EN>.

<sup>188</sup> Convention on International Civil Aviation. [https://www.icao.int/publications/Documents/7300\\_cons.pdf](https://www.icao.int/publications/Documents/7300_cons.pdf).



(f) No response to Panel enquiries was received from the Member State nor the airline.

Table 88.1

**Summary of Cham Wings Airlines flights to eastern Libya (1 January – 31 December 2021)**

| <i>Data set</i> | <i>Jan</i> | <i>Feb</i> | <i>Mar</i> | <i>Apr</i> | <i>May</i> | <i>Jun</i> | <i>Jul</i> | <i>Aug</i> | <i>Sep</i> | <i>Oct</i> | <i>Nov</i> | <i>Dec</i> | <i>Totals</i> |
|-----------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|---------------|
| # Flights       | 13         | 13         | 18         | 13         | 8          | 20         | 17         | 16         | 9          | 5          | 14         | 12         | 158           |
| Max passengers  | 2,262      | 2,262      | 3,132      | 2,262      | 1,392      | 3,480      | 2,958      | 2,784      | 1,566      | 870        | 2,436      | 2,088      | 27,492        |
| Max load (t)    | 103        | 103        | 142        | 103        | 63         | 158        | 134        | 126        | 71         | 40         | 111        | 95         | 1,249         |

Figure 88.3


**Number of Cham Wings Airlines flights to Libya (1 January - 31 December 2021)**


Table 88.2

**Summary of Cham Wings Airlines flights to eastern Libya (1 January – 31 March 2022)**

| <i>Data set</i> | <i>Jan</i> | <i>Feb</i> | <i>Mar</i> | <i>Totals</i> |
|-----------------|------------|------------|------------|---------------|
| # Flights       | 10         | 8          | 11         | 29            |
| Max passengers  | 1,740      | 1,392      | 1,914      | 5,046         |
| Max load (t)    | 79         | 63         | 87         | 229           |



Figure 88.4  
Number of Cham Wings Airlines flights to Libya (1 January - 31 March 2022)



7. The Panel has further identified that these flights are not always uniquely military in nature, as flights for migrants have also taken place.<sup>193</sup> Since 26 June 2021, a Facebook profile<sup>194</sup> of a representative of the airline has occasionally reported on availability of migrant flights to Libya,<sup>195</sup> stating tickets and security clearances must be obtained through ‘their’ offices.

8. The Panel finds that Cham Wings Airlines have continued to conduct flight operations in violation of paragraph 9 of resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#) for the *direct, and indirect, supply of (...) military (...) equipment and (...) other assistance (...)* to Libya.

<sup>193</sup> Confidential report by IHL CS24. 10 September 2021.

<sup>194</sup> <https://www.facebook.com/MMD.76/>. 26 June 2021.

<sup>195</sup> Flights offered for 29 June, 10 July, 14 July, 30 July, 8 August, 17 August, 3 September 2021. A total of seven flights out of the 34 identified during this period. Panel interviews with Syrian migrants (CS66 to CS68) (13 and 14 January 2022) confirmed that this was now a regular route for the onward transfer of migrants.

## Annex 89 Summary of aviation related violations, non-compliances and 'of interest' air operators

1. The Panel has multiple sources for the entries in tables 89.1 to 89.5, which are shown in the appropriate annexes, and are primarily from a combination of: (a) Member States responses to Panel enquiries; (b) entity responses to Panel enquiries; (c) official social media of national armed forces; (d) social media of armed groups; (e) other social media; (f) specialist aviation databases<sup>196</sup> and web platforms;<sup>197</sup> (g) imagery supported by geo-location; and/or (h) imagery supported by technical analysis.

2. Commercial aviation related violations and non-compliances, or data on airlines of current interest to the Panel, are presented in the annexes listed in tables 89.1 to 89.4 below:

Table 89.1

### Commercial airlines or operators identified as violating the arms embargo in support of GNU-AF

| <i>Airline</i>        | <i>ICAO Code</i> | <i>Air Operator<br/>Certificated<br/>(AOC)<sup>a</sup></i> | <i>Operational<br/>Base<sup>b</sup></i> | <i>Owned aircraft in direct support of<br/>GNU-AF or MoI<sup>c</sup></i> | <i>Annex</i> |
|-----------------------|------------------|------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------|
| Libya Police Aviation | <sup>d</sup>     | <sup>e</sup>                                               | Libya                                   | IL-76TD [MSN#53465956] <sup>f</sup>                                      | 90           |

<sup>a</sup> Member State where the company is registered.

<sup>b</sup> Member State from which airline primarily operates.

<sup>c</sup> Ministry of Interior.

<sup>d</sup> Not registered with the ICAO.

<sup>e</sup> Information not received from the Libyan Civil Aviation Authority after numerous Panel requests.

<sup>f</sup> Previously flew for Sigma Airlines as UP-I7645 and reported in: annex 52 to [S/2019/914](#); and appendix C to annex 55 of Panel report [S/2021/229](#).

Table 89.2

### Commercial airlines or operators identified as violating the arms embargo in support of HAF

| <i>Airline</i>      | <i>ICAO Code</i> | <i>Air Operator<br/>Certificated<br/>(AOC)<sup>a</sup></i> | <i>Operational<br/>Base<sup>b</sup></i> | <i>Owned aircraft in direct support of<br/>HAF</i> | <i>Annex</i> |
|---------------------|------------------|------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------|--------------|
| Alpha Air LLC       |                  |                                                            |                                         | IL-76TD [MSN#0033446325] <sup>c</sup>              | 91           |
| Cham Wings Airlines | SAW              | Syria                                                      | Syria                                   |                                                    | 88           |
| FlySky Airlines LLC | FSQ              | Kyrgyz Republic                                            | UAE                                     |                                                    | 92           |
| FlySky Airlines LLC | FSU              | Ukraine                                                    | UAE                                     |                                                    | 93           |

<sup>196</sup> 1) Aerotransport Database ([www.atdb.org](http://www.atdb.org)). (Subscription); 2) [www.ch-aviation.com](http://www.ch-aviation.com). (Subscription); and 3) <http://www.csgnetwork.com/aviationdatabases.html>.

<sup>197</sup> Flight data for flights is based on data received from a combination of: (a) Confidential sources; (b) [www.flightradar24.com](http://www.flightradar24.com); (c) [www.radarbox.com](http://www.radarbox.com); (d) [www.italmilradar.com](http://www.italmilradar.com); (e) C4ADS analysis; (f) Twitter [@ALandewers](#); [@Gerjon](#) (primarily); and (f) Twitter [@YorukIsik](#).

| <i>Airline</i>       | <i>ICAO Code</i> | <i>Air Operator Certificated (AOC) <sup>a</sup></i> | <i>Operational Base <sup>b</sup></i> | <i>Owned aircraft in direct support of HAF</i>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               | <i>Annex</i> |
|----------------------|------------------|-----------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------|
| Green Flag Aviation  | GNF              | Sudan                                               | Libya                                | IL-76TD [MSN#1013409282] <sup>d</sup>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        | 94           |
| NPP Mir Aviakompania | NPP              | Russian Federation                                  | Russian Federation                   |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              | 95           |
| Sapsan Airlines LLC  | KGB              | Kyrgyz Republic                                     | UAE                                  |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              | 96           |
| Space Cargo Inc FZE  | <sup>e</sup>     | UAE                                                 | Libya                                | AN-12A [MSN#2340806]<br>AN-12BP [MSN#5342908]<br>AN-12BP [MSN#5343005] <sup>f</sup><br>AN-32B [MSN#2009] <sup>g</sup><br>IL-18D [MSN#172001401] <sup>h</sup><br>IL-18D [MSN#187009903] <sup>j</sup><br>IL-76TD [MSN#73479367] <sup>k</sup><br>IL-76TD [MSN#1013405167] <sup>l</sup><br>IL-76TD [MSN#1023411378] <sup>m</sup> | 97           |

<sup>a</sup> Member State where the company is registered.

<sup>b</sup> Member State from which airline primarily operates.

<sup>c</sup> Also see table 55.3 and appendix E to annex 55 of [S/2021/229](#).

<sup>d</sup> Also see appendix K to annex 55 of [S/2021/229](#).

<sup>e</sup> Although Space Cargo Inc FZE owns and operates aircraft the company is not registered with ICAO.

<sup>f</sup> Also see appendix K to annex 55 to [S/2021/229](#).

<sup>g</sup> Also see appendix J to annex 55 to [S/2021/229](#).

<sup>h</sup> Also see appendix F to annex 55 to [S/2021/229](#).

<sup>j</sup> Also see annex 35 to [S/2017/466](#).

<sup>k</sup> Also see appendix F to annex 55 to [S/2021/229](#).

<sup>l</sup> Ibid.

<sup>m</sup> Flying with Sapsan Airline, Kyrgyz Republic since 18 May 2021, with owner changed to BU Shames FZE. Also see appendix F to annex 55 to [S/2021/229](#).

Table 89.3

**Commercial airlines or operators of interest to the Panel regarding potential arms embargo in support of HAF**

| <i>Airline</i>                    | <i>ICAO Code</i> | <i>Air Operator Certificated (AOC) <sup>a</sup></i> | <i>Operational Base <sup>b</sup></i> | <i>Owned aircraft in direct support of HAF</i> | <i>Annex</i> |
|-----------------------------------|------------------|-----------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------|--------------|
| Syrian Arab Airlines <sup>c</sup> | SYR              | Syria                                               | Syria                                |                                                | 98           |

<sup>a</sup> Member State where the company is registered.

<sup>b</sup> Member State from which airline primarily operates.

<sup>c</sup> This is the legal name. Flies as Syria Air.

Table 89.4

**Summary of other aviation related violations and non-compliances**

| <i>Date identified</i>                                         | <i>End User</i> | <i>Type</i>                   | <i>Details of violation or non-compliance</i>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                | <i>Responsible</i> | <i>Remarks</i> |
|----------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------|-------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------|----------------|
| During resolution <a href="#">2509 (2020)</a> reporting period |                 |                               |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              |                    |                |
| 18 Apr 2020                                                    | GNU             | Military aircraft overflights | Squadron of ten F16 multi-role fighter aircraft violated Libyan air space off the coast of Tripoli and Misrata. <sup>a</sup>                                                                                                                                                                 | Turkey             |                |
| 11 Jun 2020                                                    |                 |                               |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              |                    |                |
| During resolution <a href="#">2571 (2021)</a> reporting period |                 |                               |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              |                    |                |
| 29 May 2021                                                    | HAF             | Cargo aircraft                | IL-76 now marked as 5A-??? identified operating in support of HAF, but not 5A-ILA as paint scheme different. <sup>198</sup><br><br>Based on colour scheme, highly probably ex UP-I7651 <sup>b</sup> or ex UP-I7652, <sup>c</sup> both operated by Azee Air LLC and owned by Space Cargo Inc. | HAF                |                |
| 21 Aug 2021                                                    | HAF             | Cargo aircraft                | IL-76 marked as 5A-ILA first identified operating in support of HAF.<br><br>Libyan registration and manufacturers serial number to be confirmed.                                                                                                                                             | HAF                |                |

<sup>a</sup> Source: Member State.<sup>b</sup> [MSN#0073479367]. IAC airworthiness expired on 25 September 2020.<sup>c</sup> [MSN#1013405167]. IAC airworthiness expired on 19 July 2020.

3. Routine commercial air activity is now expanding for Libya, as time moves on from the more recent conflicts. Table 89.5 lists those air operators now routinely operating commercial cargo and passenger flights into Libya on a regular basis. Panel monitoring has identified no suspicious activity during this reporting mandate.

Table 89.5

**Routine commercial cargo and passenger operators for Libya**

| <i>Air Operator</i>              | <i>Primary type</i> | <i>ICAO Code</i> | <i>Air Operator Certificated (AOC) <sup>a</sup></i> | <i>Operational Base <sup>b</sup></i> | <i>Remarks</i>                                                                                                     |
|----------------------------------|---------------------|------------------|-----------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Afriqiyah Airways <sup>c</sup>   | Passenger           | AAW              | Libya                                               | Tripoli                              | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Government owned.</li> <li>Flights mainly to Algeria and Turkey.</li> </ul> |
| Buraq Air Transport <sup>d</sup> | Mixed               | BRQ              | Libya                                               | Tripoli                              | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Flights currently only to Turkey.</li> </ul>                                |
| Express Air Cargo <sup>e</sup>   | Cargo               | XRC              | Tunisia                                             | Tunis                                | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li></li> </ul>                                                                 |
| Libyan Airlines <sup>f</sup>     | Mixed               | LAA              | Libya                                               | Tripoli                              | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Government owned.</li> <li>Flights currently only to Turkey.</li> </ul>     |

<sup>198</sup> ??? means unknown letters. XXX not used as this could be a real number.

| <i>Air Operator</i>                | <i>Primary type</i> | <i>ICAO Code</i> | <i>Air Operator Certified (AOC) <sup>a</sup></i> | <i>Operational Base <sup>b</sup></i> | <i>Remarks</i>       |
|------------------------------------|---------------------|------------------|--------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|----------------------|
| Libyan Wings Airlines <sup>g</sup> | Mixed               | LWA              | Libya                                            | Tripoli                              | ▪                    |
| MNG Airlines <sup>h</sup>          | Cargo               | MNB              | Turkey                                           | Istanbul                             | ▪                    |
| Rada Airlines <sup>i</sup>         | Cargo               | RDA              | Belarus                                          | Minsk                                | ▪ Contracted by WFP. |
| Tunis Air <sup>j</sup>             | Mixed               | TAR              | Tunisia                                          | Tunis                                | ▪                    |
| ULS Airlines Cargo <sup>k</sup>    | Cargo               | ULS              | Turkey                                           | Istanbul                             | ▪                    |

<sup>a</sup> Member State where the company is registered.

<sup>b</sup> Member State from which airline primarily operates.

<sup>c</sup> <https://flyafriqiyahairways.com>.

<sup>d</sup> [www.buraq.aero](http://www.buraq.aero).

<sup>e</sup> <http://express-aircargo.com>.

<sup>f</sup> <https://libyanairlines.aero>.

<sup>g</sup> <https://libyanwings.ly>.

<sup>h</sup> [www.mngairlines.com](http://www.mngairlines.com).

<sup>i</sup> <http://www.rada.aero/>.

<sup>j</sup> [www.tunisair.com](http://www.tunisair.com).

<sup>k</sup> <https://ulsairlines.com>.

## Annex 90      Libya Police Aviation IL-76TD cargo aircraft (5A-POL)

1. The Panel has identified that the IL-76TD cargo aircraft displaying Libyan registration 5A-POL<sup>199</sup> is the IL-76TD (MSN<sup>200</sup> 186009403). The aircraft previously flew for Sigma Airlines under Kazakhstan registration UP-I7645<sup>201</sup> and was reported for violating the arms embargo in: (a) annex 52 to [S/2019/914](#); and (b) appendix C to annex 55 of Panel report [S/2021/229](#). At that time, it was being chartered by Space Cargo Inc.
2. This aircraft is listed on [www.aerotrtransport.org](http://www.aerotrtransport.org) (ATDB), a definitive aviation database, as being operated by 'Libyan Police Aviation' since December 2019, and is the only aircraft listed as operating for them. No ownership is listed on ATDB.
3. The last known owner<sup>202</sup> of the aircraft was Technoline FZC of Sharjah, UAE.<sup>203</sup> The owner has no open-source web presence, but the Panel notes that the email address is hosted by North South Cargo, whose website states that they specialise in cargo flights from UAE to the Russian Federation.<sup>204</sup>
4. The aircraft made 53 return flights from Misrata (HLMS) to Istanbul (LTFM) in 2020 and only one in 2021. The Panel notes that the manufacturer's Certificate of Airworthiness for this aircraft expired on 21 June 2021.<sup>205</sup> Without such a certificate, flights cannot be legally made through EU controlled air space, thus restricting the aircraft to operations within Libya.

Figure 90.1

**IL-76TD (POL) at Minsk (26 September 2020)**



Figure 90.2

**IL-76TD (POL) at Istanbul (6 October 2020)**



Sources: (a) <https://www.airplane-pictures.net/photo/1346627/5a-pol-libya-government-ilyushin-il-76-all-models/>, 26 September 2020; and (b) <https://www.jetphotos.com/photo/9882694>, 6 October 2020

5. The activities and profile of this aircraft meet at least seven of the Panel's air delivery profile indicators that when considered collectively indicate that a vessel or aircraft is almost certainly carrying illicit cargo: (a) lack of an obvious schedule, with flights usually in dark hours for concealment of offloads; (b) the random nature of the flights; (c) AIS is sometimes switched off; (d) tickets are unavailable for public purchase; (e) there is no open-source trace for the air operator; (f) air operator transparency is opaque; and (g) the previous record of this aircraft for sanctions violations.

<sup>199</sup> Initially reported in Reported in table 39.1 of annex 39 to Panel report [S/2021/229](#).

<sup>200</sup> Manufacturer's serial number.

<sup>201</sup> Kazakhstan removed the aircraft from its civil aviation register on 10 September 2019. Certificate #291.

<sup>202</sup> Member State information of 25 December 2019.

<sup>203</sup> Sharjah Airport Free Zone, Sharjah, UAE. +971 6 557 3127, +971 6 557 3128. [technoline@nsc.ae](mailto:technoline@nsc.ae).

<sup>204</sup> Warehouse 2, Street #24, Sharjah, UAE. +971 6 532 5538. [nsc@nsc.ae](mailto:nsc@nsc.ae).

<sup>205</sup> <https://ilyushin.org/en/airworthiness/>.



6. The Panel requested further information from Libya in letters dated 31 March 2020 and 7 January 2022. No response was received.

7. The Panel finds that the IL-76TD (MSN 186009403) cargo aircraft undertook internal and external flight operations to Libya in violation of paragraph 9 of resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#) for the *direct, and indirect, supply of (...) military (...) equipment and (...) other assistance (...)* to Libya.

## Annex 91      Alpha Air LLC owned IL-76TD cargo aircraft (5A-7656)

1. The Panel has identified that the IL-76TD cargo aircraft displaying Libyan registration 5A-7656 is the IL-76TD (MSN<sup>206</sup> 33446325). The aircraft previously flew for Jenis Air LLC under Kazakhstan registration UP-I7656<sup>207</sup> and was reported for violating the arms embargo in appendix E to annex 55 of Panel report [S/2021/229](#). At that time, it was being chartered by Space Cargo Inc.

Figure 91.1

**IL-76TD displaying registration 5A-7656 flying in support of Haftar**

### **Ilyushin IL-76TD cargo aircraft (5A-7656) at Benghazi (29 May 2021)**

The Panel has identified an Ilyushin IL-76 cargo aircraft flying as part of the Libyan National Army 7th Operation Dignity anniversary military parade in Benghazi on 29 May 2021. Flight operations in support of armed groups affiliated to Khalifa Haftar are a violation of paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011) as such operations constitute “*other assistance*”.

The aircraft was displaying the registration number 5A-7656, which is unusual as the correct ICAO format for all Libyan registered aircraft is 5A-XXX (Libyan Civil Aviation Regulations, Aircraft Registration and Markings (LYCAR.47) clause 47.045 (b) refers).



#### **Primary sources**

1. [https://twitter.com/Gerjon\\_/status/1398695363138273288](https://twitter.com/Gerjon_/status/1398695363138273288), 29 May 2021; and
2. Confidential source.

Developed by UN Panel of Experts

2. The documentation submitted to the Kazakhstan civil aviation authorities states that the aircraft is owned by Alpha Air LLC of Ukraine.<sup>208</sup> The aircraft is still registered in Kazakhstan as UP-I7656 and is thus flying under a “fake registration”.

3. The Panel notes that the manufacturer's Certificate of Airworthiness for this aircraft expired on 21 May 2020.<sup>209</sup> Without such a certificate, flights cannot be legally made through EU controlled air space, thus restricting the aircraft to operations within Libya.

<sup>206</sup> Manufacturer's serial number.

<sup>207</sup> Registration Certificate #1180 dated 21 May 2019.

<sup>208</sup> Office 58, House 1A, Dnepropetrovskaya Street, Kiev, Ukraine. +380 67 6123237. [yss67uae@gmail.com](mailto:yss67uae@gmail.com).

<sup>209</sup> <https://ilyushin.org/en/airworthiness/>.

4. The Panel requested further information from Libya in letter dated 8 July 2021. No response was received. The Panel also requested further information from Ukraine on 21 October 2021. No response was received.
5. The Panel finds Alpha Air LLC in violation of paragraph 9 of resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#) for the *direct, and indirect, supply of (...) military (...) equipment* and (...) *other assistance* (...) to Libya.

## Annex 92 FlySky Airlines LLC (FSQ), Kyrgyz Republic flights in support of HAF

1. The flight activity of FlySky Airlines LLC (FSQ)<sup>210</sup> aircraft continued to be of interest to the Panel during this mandate. FlySky Airlines LLC (FSQ) received their Air Operating Certificate (AOC) #53 from the Kyrgyz Republic Civil Aviation Agency on the 28 August 2020 and then operated the aircraft shown in table 92.1 on the Libyan airbridge to HAF.<sup>211</sup>

Table 92.1

### FlySky Airlines LLC (FSQ) aircraft

| Type             | MSN#       | Current<br>Registration # | Previous<br>Registration # | Current Owner                             | Previous Owner |
|------------------|------------|---------------------------|----------------------------|-------------------------------------------|----------------|
| Ilyushin IL-76TD | 1033418596 | EX-76003                  | UP-I7650                   | Aero Business<br>Charter FZE <sup>a</sup> | Azee Air LLC   |

<sup>a</sup> Office C3/17, PO Box 8399, SAIF Zone, Sharjah, UAE. +971 6 557 1440. [Sales@charteraflight.com](mailto:Sales@charteraflight.com). [www.charteraflight.com](http://www.charteraflight.com) is non-operational. The Panel notes that a second address in Fujairah International Airport, UAE was used on documentation from the company.

2. Table 92.2 summarises the recent history of this aircraft as it relates to sanctions violations. Note that it was previously owned and operated by Azee Air LLC (AZL) of Kazakhstan who were reported for violating paragraph 9 of resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#) in Panel report [S/2021/229](#).<sup>212</sup> Azee Air LLC (AZL) had their AOC suspended on 21 April 2020, and the aircraft was transferred to a Kyrgyz Republic registration (EX-76003) on 9 June 2020, before the Azee Air LLC (AZL) AOC was revoked by Kazakhstan on 1 February 2021. The aircraft was sold to Aero Business Charter FZE on 31 July 2020. The Panel considers that this action was taken to protect the aircraft against any legal action from the Kazakhstan authorities.

Table 92.2

### IL-76TD (MSN# 1033418596) sanctions violations related history

| Date        | Activity                                                                                                                                         | Panel Evidence / Remarks <sup>a</sup>                                                               |
|-------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 9 Jul 2018  | Registered by Kazakhstan as UP-I7650.                                                                                                            | ▪ Certificate of Registration No.1145.                                                              |
| 14 Jan 2020 | First identified by the Panel flying on UAE - Libya airbridge operating in support of HAF.                                                       | ▪                                                                                                   |
| 17 Jan 2020 | Flight data blocked from public view on <a href="http://www.flightradar24.com">www.flightradar24.com</a> platform at Azee Air LLC (AZL) request. | ▪ FR24 documentation. <sup>b</sup><br>▪ Intended to disguise clandestine flights into Libya.        |
| 21 Apr 2020 | Azee Air LLC (AZL) Air Operating Certificate suspended for six months.                                                                           | ▪ Until 20 October 2020.                                                                            |
| 4 May 2020  | Dry leased by Azee Air LLC (AZL) to FlySky Airlines (FSQ), Kyrgyz Republic.                                                                      | ▪ Dry Lease No 04/05/20.<br>▪ Prior to issuance of FlySky Airlines (FSQ) air operating certificate. |
| 9 Jun 2020  | Registered by Kyrgyz Republic as EX-76003.                                                                                                       | ▪                                                                                                   |

<sup>210</sup> Office No 6, Ch Aitmatova Avenue 82A, Bishkek 720044, Kyrgyz Republic. +996 312 979300. [office@flysky.kg](mailto:office@flysky.kg).

<sup>211</sup> Identified in para. 83 and annex 55 to [S/2021/229](#).

<sup>212</sup> Annex 55.

| <i>Date</i> | <i>Activity</i>                                                                                                    | <i>Panel Evidence / Remarks <sup>a</sup></i>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   |
|-------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 15 Jun 2020 | Cancellation of aircraft registration by Kazakhstan.                                                               | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Certificate of Cancellation No. 301.</li> </ul>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |
| 31 Jul 2020 | Sold by Azee Air LLC (AZL) to Aero Business Charter FZE, UAE.                                                      | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Sale Agreement #9009-07-2020.</li> <li>▪ The Panel notes that the Acceptance Certificate was signed on 7 May 2020, 11 weeks prior to the Sales Agreement.</li> </ul>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  |
| 28 Aug 2020 | FlySky Airlines LC (FSQ) receive Air Operating Certificate from Kyrgyz Republic CAA.                               | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ AOC Certificate #53.</li> </ul>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |
| 7 Sep 2020  | First flight (FSQ1110) identified as made by IL-76 (EX-76003) on the airbridge leg from UAE to Sidi Barani, Egypt. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ In Panel report <a href="#">S/2021/229</a><sup>c</sup> the Panel found that flights along this airbridge formed part of the wider supply chain to HAF, and were therefore a violation of paragraph 9 of resolution <a href="#">1970 (2011)</a>.</li> <li>▪ Flight documentation showed cargo for the return flight only.<sup>d</sup></li> <li>▪ Suspicious flights made during 2021 are at appendix A.</li> </ul>                                                                     |
| 24 Sep 2020 | IL-76 (EX-76003) made flight (FSQ1110) on the airbridge from UAE to Sidi Barani, Egypt.                            | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ The flight documentation listed the shipper as the Khalifa Foundation of Abu Dhabi.</li> <li>▪ The Khalifa Foundation was previously used in flight documentation by Azee Air LLC (AZL) for flight AZL1538 on 20 January 2020. In Panel report <a href="#">S/2021/229</a> the Panel found very similar documentation to be false.<sup>e</sup></li> <li>▪ After documentary analysis the Panel finds the flight documentation for this flight to be false (see appendix B).</li> </ul> |
| 1 Oct 2020  | Dry leased by Aero Business Charter FZE to FlySky Airlines (FSQ), Kyrgyz Republic.                                 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Unreferenced lease document.</li> </ul>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               |
| 1 Feb 2021  | Azee Air LLC Air Operating Certificate revoked by Kazakhstan                                                       | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Revocation Order #00.47.</li> </ul>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   |
| 6 Feb 2021  | IL-76 (EX-76003) made flight on the airbridge from UAE to Sidi Barani, Egypt.                                      | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ FlySky Airlines LLC (FSQ) only supplied flight documentation for the return flight despite two requests from the Panel.</li> </ul>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    |
| 4 Apr 2021  | IL-76 (EX-76003) made flight from UAE to Mitiga, Tripoli.                                                          | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ The Panel has analysed the flight documentation for this flight and elements of it are suspicious (see appendix C).</li> <li>▪ Imagery shows the aircraft on the ground in Mitiga, Libya, with a brand named vaccine packaging box in the cargo hold.<sup>f</sup></li> <li>▪ The Panel continues to investigate this flight.</li> </ul>                                                                                                                                               |

| <i>Date</i> | <i>Activity</i>                                                            | <i>Panel Evidence / Remarks <sup>a</sup></i>                                                                                                                                                                                       |
|-------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 1 Aug 2021  | IL-76 (EX-76003) made flight on the airbridge from UAE to Mitiga, Tripoli. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ The Panel has analysed the flight documentation for this flight and elements of it are suspicious (see appendix D).</li> <li>▪ The Panel continues to investigate this flight.</li> </ul> |
| 2 Aug 2021  | IL-76 (EX-76003) made flight on the airbridge from UAE to Mitiga, Tripoli. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ The Panel has analysed the flight documentation for this flight and elements suspicious (see appendix D).</li> <li>▪ The Panel continues to investigate this flight.</li> </ul>           |
|             |                                                                            | ▪                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  |

<sup>a</sup> The Panel has evidentiary copies of the documentation listed in this table on file.

<sup>b</sup> Email to Panel of 23 June 2020.

<sup>c</sup> Annex 55.

<sup>d</sup> FlySky Airlines, Ukraine (FSU) also supplied flight documentation for return flights, claiming outbound flights were empty.

<sup>e</sup> Para.13 to annex 55.

<sup>f</sup> [https://twitter.com/Gerjon\\_/status/1378623180458328066](https://twitter.com/Gerjon_/status/1378623180458328066), 4 April 2021.

3. The Panel identified that FlySky Airlines LLC (FSQ) flights in 2020 meet at least eight of the air delivery profile indicators (see annex 25) that when considered collectively indicate that an aircraft is almost certainly carrying illicit cargo. (a) lack of an obvious schedule; (b) flights usually in dark hours for concealment of offloads; (c) the random nature of the flights; (d) ADBS signal on AIS is often switched off; (e) false flight documentation; (f) air operator transparency is opaque; (g) inconsistent use of flight numbers; and (h) the links to Azee Air LLC (AZL).

4. The Panel has examined the documentation for the flights on 4 April, 1 August and 2 August 2021, which reports that the cargo was vaccines and medical supplies. Although the flight documentation is inaccurate and suspicious, the Panel considers it possible that this is because the same shipping agents were used as for the military cargo flights, and thus it was routine for the shipping agents to be inaccurate in completion of such documents. Additionally, the WFP (the logistic coordination agency for the UN presence in Libya) have confirmed that vaccines were delivered during that period, although they have no knowledge of the delivery mechanism. The Panel does not have evidence to the necessary evidential standards that these three flights carried military materiel.

5. The Panel offered FlySky Airlines LLC (FSQ) an opportunity to respond on 26 November 2021. Their response was sent by the Member State on 17 December 2021. This stated that they were aware of the flights by their aircraft into Libya and that “*the airline is also aware of the nature of the cargo being transported, which conforms to the stated requirements, is not prohibited for transport by air and does not constitute military cargo subject to United Nations Security Council sanctions*”. The Panel does not consider that this response addresses any of the indicators (paragraph 3) and documentary evidence (appendices) identified by the Panel.

6. The Panel offered the owner of the aircraft, Aero Business Charter FZE, an opportunity to respond on 25 January 2022. No response has yet being received by the Panel.

7. The Panel finds that FlySky Airlines LLC (FSQ) conducted flight operations on the air bridge from UAE to Egypt during 2020 in violation of paragraph 9 of resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#) for the *direct, and indirect, supply of (...) military (...) equipment and (...) other assistance (...)* to Libya.

7. The Panel also notes that FlySky Airlines, Kyrgyz Republic (FSQ) and FlySky Airlines, Ukraine (FSU) share the same logo, and conducted flights on the Libya airbridge alongside each other in early 2021. The Panel has yet to determine the exact relationship between the two companies.



## Appendix A to Annex 92: FlySky Airlines LLC (FSQ) suspicious flights on Libya airbridge 2020 and 2021

1. Table 92.A.1 shows a consolidated list of flights made by FlySky Airlines LLC, Kyrgyz Republic (FSQ).

Table 92.A.1

### FlySky LLC Airlines (FSQ) suspicious flights on Libya airbridge 2021

| <i>Date</i> | <i>From</i> |                       | <i>To</i> |             | <i>A/C</i> <sup>a</sup> | <i>Flight#</i> | <i>Remarks</i>                                                                                                                              |
|-------------|-------------|-----------------------|-----------|-------------|-------------------------|----------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 7 Sep 2020  | OEJN        | Jeddah                | HE40      | Sidi Barani | EX-76003                | FSQ1110        | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Only return flight documentation to OMDW Al Maktoum supplied to Panel after two requests.</li> </ul> |
| 9 Sep 2020  | OMAH        | Al Dafra <sup>a</sup> | HE40      | Sidi Barani | EX-76003                | FSQ1110        | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Only return flight documentation to Al Dhafra supplied to Panel after two requests.</li> </ul>       |
| 24 Sep 2020 | OMAA        | Abu Dhabi             | HE40      | Sidi Barani | EX-76003                | FSQ1110        | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Suspicious air waybill. See appendix B.</li> </ul>                                                   |
| 14 Nov 2020 | OJAQ        | Aqaba                 |           |             | EX-76003                | FSQ1110        | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>On direct flight track to HE40.</li> <li>AIS disabled.</li> </ul>                                    |
| 30 Nov 2020 | OJAQ        | Aqaba                 |           |             | EX-76003                | FSQ4921        | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>On flight track towards HE40 or Libya.</li> <li>AIS disabled.</li> </ul>                             |
| 17 Jan 2021 | OJAQ        | Aqaba                 | HE40      | Sidi Barani | EX-76003                | FSQ1120        | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>On flight track towards HE40 or Libya.</li> <li>AIS disabled.</li> </ul>                             |
| 18 Jan 2021 |             | UAE                   | HE40      | Sidi Barani | EX-76003                | FSQ1119        | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>AIS disabled.</li> </ul>                                                                             |
| 21 Jan 2021 |             | UAE                   |           |             | EX-76003                | FSQ1119        | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>On direct flight track to HE40.</li> <li>AIS disabled.</li> </ul>                                    |
| 22 Jan 2021 |             | UAE                   |           |             | EX-76003                | FSQ1120        | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>On flight track towards HE40 or Libya.</li> <li>AIS disabled.</li> </ul>                             |

| <i>Date</i> | <i>From</i> |           | <i>To</i> |         | <i>A/C</i> <sup>a</sup> | <i>Flight#</i> | <i>Remarks</i>                                                                                                                                                                     |
|-------------|-------------|-----------|-----------|---------|-------------------------|----------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 7 Feb 2021  | OEJN        | Jeddah    |           |         | EX-76003                | FSQ1119        | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>On direct flight track to HE40.</li> <li>AIS disabled.</li> </ul>                                                                           |
| 3 Apr 2021  | OMAA        | Abu Dhabi | HLLM      | Mitiga  | EX-76003                | FSQ1110        | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Declared cargo of vaccines, but flight documentation highly suspicious.</li> <li>Same flight number as used for flights to HE40.</li> </ul> |
| 9 Apr 2021  | OMAA        | Abu Dhabi | HLLM      | Mitiga  | EX-76003                | FSQ1110        | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Declared cargo of vaccines.</li> <li>Same flight number as used for flights to HE40.</li> </ul>                                             |
| 2 May 2021  | OMAA        | Abu Dhabi | HLLB      | Benina  | EX-76003                | FSQ1112        | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Declared cargo of vaccines.</li> </ul>                                                                                                      |
| 1 Aug 2021  | OMAA        | Abu Dhabi | HLMS      | Misrata | EX-76003                | FSQ1111        | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Declared cargo of vaccines.</li> </ul>                                                                                                      |
| 2 Aug 2021  | OMAA        | Abu Dhabi | HLLM      | Mitiga  | EX-76003                | FSQ1113        | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Declared cargo of vaccines.</li> </ul>                                                                                                      |
| 3 Aug 2021  | OMAA        | Abu Dhabi | HLLM      | Mitiga  | EX-76003                | FSQ1115        | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li></li> </ul>                                                                                                                                 |
| 17 Oct 2021 | OEJN        | Jeddah    | HLLM      | Mitiga  | EX-76003                | FSQ1110        | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li></li> <li></li> <li></li> <li></li> </ul>                                                                                                   |

<sup>a</sup> Aircraft registration #.<sup>b</sup> Al Dafra is a UAE military airbase. 24°14'24"N, 054°32'54"E. This was listed on return flight documentation supplied by airline.

# Appendix B to Annex 92: Panel analysis of Air Waybill for Flight FSQ1110 (24 September 2020)<sup>213</sup>

|                                                                                                                                          |  |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        |  |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--|
| <b>AZE-1600 0244</b>                                                                                                                     |  | <b>AZE-1600 0244</b>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   |  |
| Shipper's Name & Address<br><b>KHALIFA FOUNDATION, ABU DHABI</b>                                                                         |  | Shipper's Account Number                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               |  |
| Consignee's Name & Address<br><b>REPRESENTATIVE OF KHALIFA FOUNDATION, ABU DHABI</b>                                                     |  | Consignee's Account Number                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             |  |
| Issued by<br><b>AZEE AVIATION FZE</b><br>PO BOX 14455, Q1/55-157A, SAIF ZONE<br>Sharjah, UAE, Tel: +971 4 3620003<br>Email: info@azee.ae |  | Date of Issue<br><b>24.09.2020</b>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |  |
| Issued for<br><b>FSQ1110</b>                                                                                                             |  | For carriage SUBJECT TO THE CONDITIONS OF THE REVERSE HEREOF. THE SHIPPER'S ATTENTION IS DRAWN TO THE NOTICE CONCERNING CARRIER'S LIMITATION OF LIABILITY. Shipper may increase their security by declaring a higher value for carriage and paying a supplementary charge if required. |  |
| Issuing Carrier's Agent Name and City<br><b>AZEE AVIATION FZE</b>                                                                        |  | Accounting Information<br><b>AS AGREED</b>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             |  |
| Agent's IATA Code<br><b>0000</b>                                                                                                         |  | Account No.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            |  |
| Airport of departure (Place of First Carrier) and Requested Routing<br><b>ABU DHABI (AUH)</b>                                            |  | Currency<br><b>USD</b>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 |  |
| By First Carrier Routing & Destination<br><b>ABU DHABI (AUH)</b>                                                                         |  | Declared Value for Carriage<br><b>AS AGREED</b>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        |  |
| Declared Value for Customs<br><b>AS AGREED</b>                                                                                           |  | Declared Value for Customs<br><b>AS AGREED</b>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         |  |
| Amount of Insurance<br><b>AS AGREED</b>                                                                                                  |  | Amount of Insurance<br><b>AS AGREED</b>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                |  |
| INFORM CONSIGNEE UPON ARRIVAL                                                                                                            |  | INFORM CONSIGNEE UPON ARRIVAL                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          |  |
| No. of PCS<br>RCP                                                                                                                        |  | Gross Weight<br>kg                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |  |
| 260                                                                                                                                      |  | 27000                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  |  |
| Net Weight<br>kg                                                                                                                         |  | Net Weight<br>kg                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |  |
| 260                                                                                                                                      |  | 27000                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  |  |
| AS AGREED                                                                                                                                |  | AS AGREED                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              |  |
| Weight Charge                                                                                                                            |  | Other Charges                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          |  |
| AS AGREED                                                                                                                                |  | AS AGREED                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              |  |
| Valuation Charge                                                                                                                         |  | Tax                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    |  |
| AS AGREED                                                                                                                                |  | AS AGREED                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              |  |
| Total other charges due amount                                                                                                           |  | Total other charges due carrier                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        |  |
| AS AGREED                                                                                                                                |  | AS AGREED                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              |  |
| Currency conversion rates                                                                                                                |  | Co Charges in dest Currency                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            |  |
| AS AGREED                                                                                                                                |  | AS AGREED                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              |  |
| For carrier's use only at destination                                                                                                    |  | Charges at destination                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 |  |
| AS AGREED                                                                                                                                |  | AS AGREED                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              |  |
| Total Collected charges                                                                                                                  |  | Total Collected charges                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                |  |
| AS AGREED                                                                                                                                |  | AS AGREED                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              |  |

**SHIPPER**  
Known fake Shipper and Consignee, often used for illicit flights in violation of arms embargo.

**SUPPLIER**  
Azee Aviation FZE sold the aircraft on 31 July 2020. The Azee AOC was revoked on 23 September 2021.

**CARGO WEIGHT**  
Highly unlikely to be a "000" number if proper cargo analysis was done.

**FORM**  
This is an Azee Aviation FZE AWB form, not a FlySky Airlines AWB form. So a false carrier has been declared.

**DECLARED VALUE**  
No Customs value is highly unusual.

**GOODS**  
No identified Khalifa Foundation project to provide humanitarian aid to Egypt. Insufficient information provided.

**UNSIGNED**

<sup>213</sup> The Panel has higher quality imagery available on request. The imagery resolution is poor in some of the remaining appendices due to the infographics being compressed to make the overall document a more manageable size.

[illegible]

The Panel notes that "Thanos" is not a typical arabic name.

It is NOT the number for the Libyan Ministry of Health as declared on the air waybill.

The second AWB for this flight only declares a cargo of 565kg.

## Appendix D to Annex 92: Panel analysis of Air Waybill for Flight FSQ1110 (1 August 2021)

### 'Suspicious' Air Waybill

Fly Sky Airlines (FSQ), Kyrgyz Republic, Flight# FSQ1111, Declared UAE to Misrata  
(1 August 2021)

The image shows a scanned air waybill for flight FSQ1111. Three red boxes highlight key information: the Air Carrier (Fly Sky Airlines), the Consignee (Ministry of Health for Libya in Mitiga), and the Gross Weight (12,646 kg). Red arrows point from these boxes to explanatory text on the right.

#### Consignor Contact Number +971 5066 22961

Same contact number for air waybills for Maximus Air flights on 12, 14, 18 and 19 January 2020. See appendix G to annex 55 to [S/2021/229](#) for the reported violations of the arms embargo for these flights.

The number linked to Mubarak Al Ameri the contact for the GHQ of United Arab Emirates Armed Forces. a.k.a Mubarak Al Amri or Mubarak Al Ansari. The number is also linked to a security incident of 20 October 2021, which was reported separately to the Committee.

On 11 Oct 2021 the listed UAE contact number claimed to be "Fast Food" shop in Gaza, then "Fast Food" shop in Abu Dhabi. Same claim to a 12 Oct 2021 OTR.

#### Consignee Contact Number NONE

No proper address for the Ministry of Health for Libya in Mitiga.

#### Volumetric Cargo Analysis

The declared 12,646kg for the cargo would equate to 89,500 vaccines if packed similarly to the standard WFP Single Use Thermal packaging. This equates to 26% of the maximum cargo load mass for the aircraft, and 27% of the maximum cargo area volume for the aircraft.

Flight FSQ1115 on 2 August 2021, made by the same aircraft had a declared cargo of 17,886kg of "relief goods". This equates to 37% of the maximum cargo load mass for the aircraft. The use of two flights is inefficient, expensive and unlikely if the cargo was as declared.

**Fly Sky Airlines (FSQ), Kyrgyz Republic, Flight# FSQ1115, Declared UAE to Mitiga (2 August 2021)**

[illegible]

Same contact number for air waybills for Maximus Air flights on 12, 14, 18 and 19 January 2020. See appendix G to annex 55 to [S/2021/229](#) for the reported violations of the arms embargo for these flights.

The number linked to Mubarak Al Ameri the contact for the GHQ of United Arab Emirates Armed Forces, a.k.a Mubarak Al Amri or Mubarak Al Ansari. The number is also linked to a security incident of 20 October 2021, which was reported separately to the Committee.

On 11 Oct 2021 the listed UAE contact number claimed to be "Fast Food" shop in Gaza, then "Fast Food" shop in Abu Dhabi. Same claim to a 12 Oct 2021 OTR.

Contact number does not belong to the Ministry of Health for Libya in Mitiga.

The packed 17,886kg for the cargo would equate to 89,500 vials if declared similarly to the standard WFP Single Use Thermal packaging. This equates to 37% of the maximum cargo load mass for the aircraft, and 33% of the maximum cargo area volume for the aircraft.

Flight FSQ1111 on 1 August 2021, made by the same aircraft had a declared cargo of 12,646kg of "relief goods". This equates to 26% of the maximum cargo load mass for the aircraft. The use of two flights is inefficient, expensive and unlikely if all the cargo was as declared.



## Annex 93 FlySky Airlines LLC (FSU) Ukraine flights in support of HAF

1. FlySky Airlines LLC (FSU)<sup>214</sup> received their Air Operating Certificate (AOC) #UK058 from the Ukraine State Aviation Administration on the 28 October 2020 and operated the aircraft shown in table 93.1 on the Libyan airbridge to HAF route.<sup>215</sup> The company's AOC was suspended by the Ukraine State Aviation Administration on 11 June 2021<sup>216</sup> for non-compliance with aviation standards. The AOC was reinstated on 19 July 2021.<sup>217</sup>

Table 93.1

### FlySky Airlines LLC (FSQ) aircraft of interest

| Type             | MSN#       | Registration #<br>on violation | Previous<br>Registration # | Current Owner                               | Previous Operator       |
|------------------|------------|--------------------------------|----------------------------|---------------------------------------------|-------------------------|
| Ilyushin IL-76TD | 93498974   | UR-FSA                         | UR-COE                     | Aganya Holdings Limited, UAE <sup>a b</sup> | Europe Air LLC, Ukraine |
| Ilyushin IL-76TD | 1023412399 | UR-FSC                         | UR-CRN                     | Aganya Holdings Limited, UAE                | Europe Air LLC, Ukraine |
| Ilyushin IL-76TD | 1003403075 | UR-FSE                         | UR-EAB                     | Aganya Holdings Limited, UAE                | Europe Air LLC, Ukraine |

<sup>a</sup> Operated from RAK Offshore, PO Box 48904, Al Khaimah UAE. Documentation from the company claims that it is incorporated in the British Virgin Islands, (BVI) but the BVI authorities confirmed to the Panel on 28 April 2020 that the company was not registered in the BVI.

<sup>b</sup> Second address used for aircraft registration: PO Box 128666, 24 Al Sila Tower, Abu Dhabi Global Market Square, Al Maryah Island, Abu Dhabi, UAE.

2. The previous owner of the FlySky LLC (FSU) aircraft above was Europe Air LLC of Ukraine, who were reported for violating paragraph 9 of resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#) in Panel report [S/2019/914](#).<sup>218</sup> The Europe Air LLC AOC suspended by the State Aviation Administration of Ukraine on 27 July 2019 and the company ceased trading on 9 August 2019. At that time their aircraft were leased from Infinite Seal Inc of the BVI, whose listed beneficial owner works for the Department of Civil Aviation of Fujairah, UAE, but were subsequently transferred to Aganya Limited, UAE. The Panel has not been able to refine the date of transfer of the aircraft from Infinite Seal Inc ownership to Aganya Limited beyond mid-2020.<sup>219</sup> The Panel considers that this ownership transfer was taken to protect the aircraft against any legal action from the appropriate authorities.

3. Tables 93.2 to 93.4 summarise the recent history of the aircraft at table 93.1 as relating to sanctions violations regarding Libya.

<sup>214</sup> Office 16, 1 Pidlisna Street, Kiev 03164, Ukraine .+380 44 353 1083. [office@flysky.co](mailto:office@flysky.co).

<sup>215</sup> Identified in para. 83 and annex 55 to [S/2021/229](#).

<sup>216</sup> Order of the State Aviation Administration of Ukraine # 902 dated 10 June 2021.

<sup>217</sup> Order of the State Aviation Administration of Ukraine # 1134 dated 19 July 2021.

<sup>218</sup> Annex 52.

<sup>219</sup> In 2020 Aganya Limited also sold other aircraft to Space Cargo Inc (Appendix E to annex 55 to [S/2021/229](#)). It appears to the Panel as if aircraft ownership are transferred between the three companies to disguise beneficial ownership and to protect the aircraft against legal action by appropriate authorities.

Table 93.2

**FlySky Airlines LLC (FSU) aircraft sanctions violations related history**

| <i>Date</i> | <i>Activity</i>                                                                                                     | <i>Panel Evidence / Remarks <sup>a</sup></i>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          |
|-------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 21 Apr 2020 | Air Operating Certificate of Azee Air LLC (AZL) suspended by Civil Aviation Authority of Kazakhstan for six months. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>See later for link to Deek Aviation FZE, UAE contract and previous arms embargo violations.</li> </ul>                                                                                                                                                                                                                         |
| 28 Oct 2020 | Air Operating Certificate issued to FlySky (FSU) by State Aviation Administration of Ukraine                        | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Certificate #UK 058.</li> </ul>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                |
| 3 Nov 2020  | IL-76TD (MSN#93498974) registered by Ukraine as UR-FSA.                                                             | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Certificate of Registration #4283/2</li> </ul>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 |
| 3 Nov 2020  | IL-76TD (MSN#1023412399) registered by Ukraine as UR-FSC.                                                           | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Certificate of Registration #4569/2</li> </ul>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 |
| 10 Nov 2020 | General Contract for Freight Transportation signed between FlySky (FSU) and Deek Aviation, UAE.                     | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Contract #10112020.</li> <li>See paragraph 4.</li> </ul>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |
| 1 Jan 2021  | IL-76TD (MSN#1003403075) registered by Ukraine as UR-FSE.                                                           | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Certificate of Registration #4434/1</li> </ul>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 |
| 19 Jan 2021 | First flight (FSU4812) identified as made by IL-76 (UR-FSA) on the airbridge from UAE to Sidi Barani, Egypt.        | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>In Panel report <a href="#">S/2021/229</a><sup>c</sup> the Panel found that cargo flights on this air bridge formed part of the wider supply chain to HAF, and were therefore a violation of paragraph 9 of resolution <a href="#">1970 (2011)</a>.</li> <li>Suspicious flights made during 2021 are at appendix A.</li> </ul> |
| 1 Feb 2021  | Air Operating Certificate of Azee LLC (AZL) formally revoked by Civil Aviation Administration of Kazakhstan.        | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Order #00.47.</li> </ul>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |
| 8 Feb 2021  | Last flight (FSU4814) identified as made by IL-76 (UR-FSA) on the airbridge from UAE to Sidi Barani, Egypt.         | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li></li> </ul>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    |
| 11 Jun 2021 | Air Operating Certificate of FlySky Airlines LLC (FSU) suspended by State Aviation Administration of Ukraine.       | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Order 902 of State Aviation Administration of Ukraine.</li> </ul>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              |
| 19 Jul 2021 | Air Operating Certificate of FlySky Airlines LLC (FSU) reinstated by State Aviation Administration of Ukraine.      | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Order 1134 of State Aviation Administration of Ukraine.</li> </ul>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             |

<sup>a</sup> The Panel has evidentiary copies of the documentation listed in the tables in this appendix. The documentation is not included in the report as the final report would become even more voluminous.

3. The Panel identified the FlySky Airlines LLC (FSU) flights meet at least seven of the air delivery profile indicators (see annex 25) that when considered collectively indicate that an aircraft is almost certainly carrying illicit cargo. (a) lack of an obvious schedule; (b) flights usually in dark hours for concealment of offloads; (c) the random nature of the flights; (d) ADBS signal on AIS is often switched off; (e) false flight documentation; (f) air operator transparency is opaque; and (g) the links to other Libyan arms embargo violators such as Deek Aviation FZE.

4. The Panel notes that the airline is contracted under a General Sales Agreement to fly cargo on the Libya airbridge by Deek Aviation FZE;<sup>220</sup> a company with a history of arms embargo violations:

(a) Deek Aviation FZE was reported in Panel report [S/2019/914](#)<sup>221</sup> for violating paragraph 9 of resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#) for contracting Europe Air LLC to fly military materiel into Libya.

(b) Deek Aviation was further reported in Panel report [S/2021/229](#)<sup>222</sup> in connection to a violation of paragraph 9 of resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#) by Azee Air LLC, with whom they had a General Sales Agreement.

5. Due diligence by FlySky Airlines LLC (FSU) should have identified the involvement of Deek Aviation FZE in sanctions violations activities in Libya. The Panel considers that FlySky Airlines LLC (FSU) have in effect partly taken on the logistic support role to HAF previously undertaken by Azee Air LLC until their AOC was suspended. The remainder of that role being taken on by FlySky Airlines LLC (FSQ) (see annex 92).

6. The Panel finds that FlySky Airlines LLC (FSU) have conducted flight operations on the air bridge from UAE to Egypt in violation of paragraph 9 of resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#) for the *direct, and indirect, supply of (...) military (...) equipment and (...) other assistance (...)* to Libya.

7. The Panel notes that FlySky Airlines, Ukraine (FSU) and FlySky Airlines, Kyrgyz Republic (FSQ) share the same logo, and conducted flights on the Libya airbridge alongside each other in early 2021.

<sup>220</sup> [www.deek.aero](http://www.deek.aero).

<sup>221</sup> Annexes 28 and 52. The two aircraft destroyed at Al Jufra on 26 July 2019 (UR-CMP and UR-CRC) were both operated by Europe Air LLC, the previous operator of the aircraft now operated by FlySky LLC (FSU).

<sup>222</sup> Para. 8 of annex 55.

## Appendix A to Annex 93: FlySky Airlines LLC (FSU) suspicious flights on Libya airbridge in 2021

1. Table 93.A.1 shows a consolidated list of flights made by FlySky Airlines LLC, Ukraine (FSU).

Table 93.A.1

### FlySky LLC Airlines (FSU) suspicious flights on Libya airbridge 2021

| <i>Date</i> | <i>From</i>   | <i>To</i>        | <i>A/C</i> <sup>a</sup> | <i>Flight#</i> | <i>Remarks</i>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              |
|-------------|---------------|------------------|-------------------------|----------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 19 Jan 2021 | OMDW Dubai    |                  | UR-FSA                  | FSU4812        | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>On direct flight track to HE40.</li> <li>AIS disabled.</li> </ul>                                                                                                                                                                    |
| 19 Jan 2021 | OMFJ Fujairah |                  | UR-FSC                  | FSU4814        | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>On direct flight track to HE40.</li> <li>AIS disabled.</li> </ul>                                                                                                                                                                    |
| 21 Jan 2021 | OMDW Dubai    |                  |                         | FSU4814        | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>On direct flight track to HE40.</li> <li>AIS disabled.</li> </ul>                                                                                                                                                                    |
| 22 Jan 2021 | OMDW Dubai    |                  |                         | FSU4812        | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>On direct flight track to HE40.</li> <li>AIS disabled.</li> </ul>                                                                                                                                                                    |
| 24 Jan 2021 |               | UAE              |                         | FSU4814        | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>On direct flight track to HE40.</li> <li>AIS disabled.</li> </ul>                                                                                                                                                                    |
| 6 Feb 2021  | OJAQ Aqaba    | HE40 Sidi Barani | UR-FSA                  | FSU4814        | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>AIS disabled.</li> <li>Flight documentation shows zero payload for the flight from OJAQ to HE40.</li> <li>The Panel has analysed the flight documentation for the return flight and finds it suspicious (see appendix B).</li> </ul> |
| 7 Feb 2021  | OEJN Jeddah   | HE40 Sidi Barani | UR-FSC                  | FSU4817        | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>AIS disabled.</li> <li>Flight documentation shows zero payload for the flight from OMSJ (Sharjah) to OEJN (Jeddah) and then zero payload from OEJN to HE40.</li> </ul>                                                               |

| <i>Date</i> | <i>From</i> |        | <i>To</i> | <i>A/C</i> <sup>a</sup> |        | <i>Flight#</i> | <i>Remarks</i>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           |
|-------------|-------------|--------|-----------|-------------------------|--------|----------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 7 Feb 2020  | OEJN        | Jeddah | HE40      | Sidi Barani             | UR-FSE | FSU4812        | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ AIS disabled.</li> <li>▪ Flight documentation shows zero payload for the flight from OMDW (Al Maktoum) to OEJN and then zero payload from OEJN to HE40. Supplied copies of Cargo Manifest showing "EMPTY", which is highly unusual.</li> </ul>  |
| 8 Feb 2021  | OEJN        | Jeddah | HE40      | Sidi Barani             | UR-FSA | FSU4814        | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ AIS disabled.</li> <li>▪ Flight documentation shows zero payload for the flight from OMDW (Al Maktoum) to OEJN and then zero payload from OEJN to HE40.</li> <li>▪ Subsequent flights made by FlySky Airlines LLC (FSQ).</li> <li>▪ </li> </ul> |

<sup>a</sup> Aircraft registration #.

## Appendix B to Annex 93:

Panel analysis of Air Waybill for Flight FSU4814 (Return from HE40) <sup>223</sup>

## SHIPPER / CONSIGNEE

There is no listing for a company called "Powerex Eastpac LLC" in any UAE business directory, nor a presence on social media.

A company called "Eastpac International" was identified, but their representative informed the Panel that the company had never conducted business in Egypt.

## DECLARED VALUE

No Customs value is unusual.

|                                                                                                   |                 |                                                  |                         |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------|--------------------------------------------------|-------------------------|
| <b>FSU-0001 0205</b>                                                                              |                 | <b>FSU-0001 0205</b>                             |                         |
| Shipper's Name & Address<br><b>REP OF POWEREX EASTPAC LLC,<br/>SIDI BARRANI,<br/>EGYPT.</b>       |                 | Shipper's Account Number<br>Not negotiable       |                         |
| Consignee's name & address<br><b>POWEREX EASTPAC LLC,<br/>ASU DHABI<br/>UNITED ARAB EMIRATES.</b> |                 | Consignee's account Number                       |                         |
| Issuing Carrier's Agent Name and City<br><b>FLYSKY AIRLINES LLC</b>                               |                 | Accounting Information<br><b>FREIGHT PREPAID</b> |                         |
| Agent's IATA Code<br><b>SQK</b>                                                                   |                 | Amount of Insurance<br><b>XXX</b>                |                         |
| Airport of departure(Addr. Of First Carrier) and Requested Routing<br><b>SQK<br/>DWC</b>          |                 | Declared Value for carriage<br><b>NVD</b>        |                         |
| By First Carrier Routing & Destination<br><b>SQK-DWC</b>                                          |                 | Declared value for Customs<br><b>NCV</b>         |                         |
| Arrival of Destination<br><b>DWC AL MAKTUM INTL AIRPORT</b>                                       |                 | Amount of Insurance<br><b>XXX</b>                |                         |
| Handling Information<br><b>FSU-4814 / 9/19/2021</b>                                               |                 | Amount of Insurance<br><b>XXX</b>                |                         |
| No. of PCD<br>(RCD)                                                                               | Gross<br>Weight | Kg                                               | Rate Class<br>Commodity |
| 1                                                                                                 | 8506            |                                                  |                         |
| 1                                                                                                 | 3006            |                                                  |                         |
| 1                                                                                                 | 2506            |                                                  |                         |
| 1                                                                                                 | 3006            |                                                  |                         |
| 1                                                                                                 | 2702            |                                                  |                         |
| Prepaid                                                                                           |                 | Weight Charge                                    |                         |
| Valuation Charge                                                                                  |                 | Collect                                          |                         |
| Tax                                                                                               |                 | Other Charges                                    |                         |
| Total other charges due amount                                                                    |                 | AS AGREED                                        |                         |
| Total other charges due carrier                                                                   |                 | AS AGREED                                        |                         |
| AS AGREED                                                                                         |                 | Total Collect                                    |                         |
| Currency conversion rates                                                                         |                 | Date                                             |                         |
| For carrier's use only<br>at destination                                                          |                 | Charges at destinations                          |                         |
| Total Collect charges                                                                             |                 | 9-Feb-21                                         |                         |
| Signature of Shipper or its Agent                                                                 |                 | Signature of Issuing Carrier or its Agent        |                         |
| Signature of Shipper or its Agent                                                                 |                 | Signature of Issuing Carrier or its Agent        |                         |

<sup>223</sup> The Panel has higher quality imagery available on request. The imagery resolution is poor in some of the remaining appendices due to the infographics being compressed to make the overall document a more manageable size.



## Annex 94      Green Flag Aviation, Sudan aircraft in support of HAF

1. The Panel has identified that the Ilyushin IL-76TD cargo aircraft displaying Libyan registration 5A-EWX<sup>224</sup> is the Ilyushin IL-76TD (MSN<sup>225</sup> 1013409282). Closer inspection of the number by the Panel has identified that the number has been adapted from a Sudan Civil Aviation Authority registration ST-EWX, in that the “5” uses the bottom half of the original “S” and the “A” uses the top of the “T” from the previous registration number.

Figure 94.1

Change of registration from ST-EWX to 5A-EWX



<sup>224</sup> New registration first identified when the aircraft was participating in the Libyan National Army 7<sup>th</sup> Operation Dignity anniversary military parade in Benghazi on 29 May 2021.

<sup>225</sup> Manufacturer's serial number.

2. The aircraft previously flew for Green Flag Aviation (GNF)<sup>226</sup> under Sudanese registration ST-EWX<sup>227</sup> and was reported for violating the arms embargo in appendix K to annex 55 of Panel report [S/2021/229](#).<sup>228</sup> This aircraft is listed on [www.aerotrtransport.org](http://www.aerotrtransport.org) (ATDB), a definitive aviation database, as being owned by Green Flag Aviation (GNF) since July 2011. No ownership transfer to HAF is listed on ATDB.
3. The Panel notes that the manufacturer's Certificate of Airworthiness for this aircraft expired on 24 February 2017.<sup>229</sup> Without such a certificate, flights cannot be legally made through EU controlled air space, thus restricting the aircraft to operations within Libya.
4. The Panel requested further information from Libya in letter dated 8 July 2021. No response was received.
5. The Panel finds that Green Flag Aviation have supported flight operations within Libya in violation of paragraph 9 of resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#) for the *direct, and indirect, supply of (...) military (...) equipment and (...) other assistance (...)* to Libya.

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<sup>226</sup> <http://www.greenflag-sdn.com>. Website inactive.

<sup>227</sup> The Member State confirmed to the Panel on 21 September 2021 that the aircraft was no longer registered in Sudan.

<sup>228</sup> Sources: (a) [https://twitter.com/Gerjon\\_/status/1268467153340174336](https://twitter.com/Gerjon_/status/1268467153340174336); and (b) <https://twitter.com/HasairiOuais/status/1268466092265127937>, 4 June 2020.

<sup>229</sup> <https://ilyushin.org/en/airworthiness/>.

## Annex 95 NPP Mir Aviakompania (NPP), Russian Federation in support of HAF

### Converted *Ilyushin* IL-18D cargo aircraft at Al Khadim (HL59) (31°59'48.04"N, 21°12'7.03"E) (3 October to 2 November 2021)

The Panel has identified from satellite imagery the presence of an *Ilyushin* IL-18D cargo aircraft at Al Khadim airbase (HL59) on 3, 17, 26 and 28 October 2021, and 1 and 2 November 2021. The aircraft has been converted from an IL-38 maritime patrol aircraft at some time, as evidenced by the presence of a sensor tail boom.

The aircraft is almost certainly IL-18TD (MSN 186009403). This aircraft is listed on [www.aerotrtransport.org](http://www.aerotrtransport.org) (ATDB), a definitive database, as being operated by NPP MIR Aviakompania of Saint Petersburg, Russian Federation at that time.

The Panel requested further information from the Russian Federation in a letter dated 22 December 2021. On 28 January 2022 they responded that the aircraft was deregistered from #RA-75713 on 24 February 2004. The Russian Federation did not provide the requested information regarding the air operator. ATDB now show the aircraft as registered by the Central African Republic as TL-ARN in October 2021 and operated by an unknown user.

The use of this aircraft in support of HAF is a violation of paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011).

#### Primary sources

1. Satellite imagery and Google Earth Pro;
2. Confidential source; and
3. [www.jetphotos.com/photo/8722017](http://www.jetphotos.com/photo/8722017), 9 October 2017.

Developed by UN Panel of Experts



## Annex 96 Sapsan Airline LLC (KGB), Kyrgyz Republic flights in support of HAF

1. The flight activity of Sapsan Airline LLC (KGB)<sup>230</sup> aircraft became of interest to the Panel during this mandate. Sapsan Airline LLC (KGB) received their Air Operating Certificate (AOC) #54 from the Kyrgyz Republic Civil Aviation Agency on the 27 January 2021 and then operated at least one of the aircraft shown in table 96.1 on the Libyan airbridge to HAF.<sup>231</sup>

Table 96.1

### FlySky Airlines LLC (FSQ) aircraft

| Type             | MSN#        | Current Registration # | Previous Registration # | Current Owner                    | Previous Owner        |
|------------------|-------------|------------------------|-------------------------|----------------------------------|-----------------------|
| Antonov AN-74D   | 36547098943 | EX-74001               | RA-74048                | Sapsan Airline                   | ▪ Uktus Air Company   |
| Ilyushin IL-76TD | 63471147    | EX-76005               | UR-CIV                  | Technoline FZC, UAE <sup>a</sup> | ▪ Technoline FZC, UAE |
| Ilyushin IL-76TD | 1033416515  | EX-76008               | UR-CIG                  | BU Shames FZE <sup>b</sup>       | ▪ Technoline FZC, UAE |

<sup>a</sup> No corporate web presence. Suite Y-2-215, PO Box 8953, Sharjah Airport Free Zone, Sharjah, UAE. +971 65 578170. +971 65 573127. ([technoline@nsc.ae](mailto:technoline@nsc.ae)).

<sup>b</sup> No corporate web presence. A4-08, PO Box 7812, SAIF, Sharjah, UAE.

2. Table 96.2 summarises the recent history of Ilyushin IL-76TD (EX-76008) as it relates to sanctions violations. This aircraft was previously registered by the Aviation Administration of Ukraine as UR-CIG where it was operated by ZetAvia LLC (ICAO Code: ZAV). In appendix J to annex 55 of Panel report [S/2021/229](#) the Panel found that flight activity by ZetAvia using this aircraft was a violation of paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011) for the *direct supply of (...) military (...) equipment and (...) other assistance (...)* to Libya. ZetAvia LLC also delivered the aircraft in support of Operation OPUS in 2019 (annex 76 of Panel report [S/2021/229](#) refers).

Table 96.2

### IL-76TD (MSN# 1033416515) sanctions violations related history

| Date        | Activity                                                                                                  | Panel Evidence / Remarks <sup>a</sup> |
|-------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|
| 1 Jul 2018  | ZetAvia LLC receive Air Operating Certificate from the State Aviation Administration of Ukraine.          | ▪ AOC Certificate #UK009              |
| 30 Jul 2019 | State Aviation Administration of Ukraine prohibited flights of Ukrainian registered aircraft to Libya.    | ▪                                     |
| 7 Mar 2020  | Aircraft first identified leaving Sweihan military base <sup>b</sup> on the UAE to Libya airbridge route. | ▪                                     |

<sup>230</sup> 132 A/1 Bakaeva Street, Bishkek 720032, Kyrgyz Republic. +996 552 962888. [sapsan.aircargo@mail.ru](mailto:sapsan.aircargo@mail.ru).

<sup>231</sup> Identified in para. 83 and annex 55 to [S/2021/229](#).

| <i>Date</i> | <i>Activity</i>                                                                                        | <i>Panel Evidence / Remarks <sup>a</sup></i> |
|-------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------|
| 30 Apr 2020 | Last flight identified of the aircraft on the UAE to Libya airbridge route.                            | ▪                                            |
| 11 Jan 2021 | ATDB reports sale of aircraft from Technoline FZE, UAE to BU Shames FZE.                               | ▪                                            |
| 21 May 2021 | Aircraft transferred from ZetAvia LLC to Sapsan Airline LLC as air operator.                           | ▪                                            |
| 4 Jan 2022  | Aircraft first identified as operating on the UAE to Libya airbridge route using new callsign KGB4961. | ▪                                            |
| 10 Jan 2022 | Aircraft operated on the UAE to Libya airbridge route using callsign KGB4961.                          | ▪ Returned to Sweihan military base in UAE.  |
| 11 Jan 2022 | Aircraft operated on the UAE to Libya airbridge route using callsign KGB4961.                          | ▪ Returned to Sweihan military base in UAE.  |
|             |                                                                                                        | ▪                                            |

<sup>a</sup> The Panel has evidentiary copies of the documentation listed in this table on file.

<sup>b</sup> OMAW. Military Airbase. 24°31'38"N, 54°58'27"E.

3. The activities and profile of this aircraft meet at least six of the Panel's air delivery profile indicators that when considered collectively indicate that a vessel or aircraft is almost certainly carrying illicit cargo: (a) lack of an obvious schedule; (b) flights usually in dark hours for concealment of offloads; (c) use of military airbases; (d) AIS dark activity; (e) air operator transparency is opaque (no online presence); and (f) corporate links to previous sanctions violators.

4. The Panel requested further information from the Kyrgyz Republic in a letter dated 25 January 2022. In their response of 9 February 2022, they provided flight documentation showing that Ilyushin IL-76TD (EX-76008) had flown to Chanda, Pakistan on 4 January 2022. This is contrary to the ADBS<sup>232</sup> data shown on open-source flight tracking platforms. The Panel accepts the veracity of the flight data provided by the Member State regarding the air operations of Ilyushin IL-76TD (EX-76008) on that day. Nevertheless, an aircraft transmitting the hex code of that aircraft certainly made a flight on the UAE to Libya airbridge route that day. Independent aviation OSINT analysts have identified that Sapsan Airline operated aircraft have exchanged ADBS Hex "squawk" codes for other flights.<sup>233</sup> This exchange of ADBS Hex "squawk" codes is not accidental and is designed to disguise the activities of specific aircraft. It is also contrary to ICAO regulations.

5. The Panel finds that the Sapsan Airline LLC cargo aircraft flight operations to Libya were in violation of paragraph 9 of resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#) for the *direct, and indirect, supply of (...) military (...) equipment and (...) other assistance (...)* to Libya.

<sup>232</sup> Automatic Dependent Surveillance–Broadcast.

<sup>233</sup> [https://twitter.com/Gerjon\\_/status/1487392355028283400?s=20](https://twitter.com/Gerjon_/status/1487392355028283400?s=20), 29 January 2022; [https://twitter.com/Gerjon\\_/status/1487392355028283400?s=20](https://twitter.com/Gerjon_/status/1487392355028283400?s=20), 29 January 2022; and [https://twitter.com/Gerjon\\_/status/1487393905809281035](https://twitter.com/Gerjon_/status/1487393905809281035), 29 January 2022.

## Annex 97 Space Cargo Inc (UAE) activities in 2021

1. The Panel has previously reported on Space Cargo Inc (United Arab Emirates)<sup>234</sup> owned or operated aircraft in [S/2019/914](#)<sup>235</sup> and [S/2021/229](#).<sup>236</sup> Space Cargo Inc remains a common denominator in many of the illicit aviation activities relating to eastern Libya and airports under the control of HAF. The Panel found that the company has a major coordination and operational role for the United Arab Emirates airbridge to eastern Libya, and the delivery of military materiel to HAF. The company has also operated as a PMC in Libya during this period.

2. During the investigations covered in Panel report [S/2021/229](#) the Panel identified that Space Cargo Inc supplied false and misleading information in response to Panel enquiries. The company continued to do so during this mandate (see paras. 10, 20 and 24).

### A. Aviation logistic support to HAF

3. The Panel has documentation or evidence showing that Space Cargo owns or operates other aircraft previously reported as operating in Libya in support of United Arab Emirates and has developed the consolidated list at table 97.1 for reference. The Panel notes that many aircraft are not flying in accordance with ICAO regulations<sup>237</sup> as the aircraft do not have a valid airworthiness certificate. Only details of newly identified aircraft (shown below in *italic*) are included later in this annex.

Table 97.1

#### Summary of Space Cargo Inc related aircraft supporting HAF operations in Libya

| <i>Date</i> <sup>a</sup> | <i>Aircraft type</i> | <i>MSN#</i> <sup>b</sup> | <i>Registration #</i> <sup>c</sup> | <i>Status</i> | <i>Remarks</i>                                                                                                      |
|--------------------------|----------------------|--------------------------|------------------------------------|---------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 22 Jun 2015              | AN-26                | 503                      | UP-AN601                           | Owned         | ▪                                                                                                                   |
| 4 Mar 2019               | IL-76TD              | 1013409295               | UP-I7601 <sup>d</sup>              | Chartered     | ▪ Previously operated by Sigma Airlines.<br>▪ Went to ZetAvia (UR-CTO) on 15 June 2020 and not seen in Libya since. |
| 24 Nov 2019              | IL-76TD              | 1003405167               | UP-I7652 <sup>e</sup>              | Owned         | ▪ Previously operated by Jenis Air. <sup>f</sup><br>▪ Now HAF.                                                      |
| 20 Dec 2019              | IL-18D               | 172011401                | UP-I1805                           | Owned         | ▪ Previously operated by Jenis Air. <sup>g</sup><br>▪ Now HAF.                                                      |

<sup>234</sup> A4-73, Block A4 Street, G Floor, Sharjah International Airport, Al Ruqa Al Hamra, 61487 Sharjah, UAE or SaifZone 125 M2, Warehouse A4-73, P.O. Box 7812, Sharjah, UAE. [www.spacecargoinc.com](http://www.spacecargoinc.com). The website was live and was then removed after Panel enquiries to the Company in September 2020.

<sup>235</sup> Table 8 and annexes 28 and 52.

<sup>236</sup> Annex 55 and appendix F to annex 55.

<sup>237</sup> See annex 8 at <https://aviation-is.better-than.tv/icaodocs/Annex%208%20-%20Airworthiness%20of%20Aircraft/Annex%2008,%2010%20edition.pdf>.



| <i>Date</i> <sup>a</sup> | <i>Aircraft type</i> | <i>MSN#</i> <sup>b</sup> | <i>Registration #</i> <sup>c</sup>           | <i>Status</i> | <i>Remarks</i>                                                                                                                                                                                                                   |
|--------------------------|----------------------|--------------------------|----------------------------------------------|---------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 1 Feb 2020               | IL-76TD              | 1023411378               | UP-I7646 <sup>h</sup><br>5A-7656<br>EX-76007 | Owned         | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Previously operated by Azee Air<sup>i</sup> and then Jenis Air.</li> <li>Then HAF.</li> <li>Went to Sapsan Airlines LLC (EX-76007) on 18 May 2021 and not seen in Libya since.</li> </ul> |
| 19 Mar 2020              | IL-76TD              | 73479367                 | UP-I7651 <sup>j</sup>                        | Owned         | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Previously operated by Azee Air.<sup>k</sup></li> <li>Now HAF.</li> </ul>                                                                                                                 |
| 12 Apr 2020              | AN-32B               | 2009                     | EY-332                                       | Owned         |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  |
| 30 Jan 2021              | AN-12A               | 2340806                  | UP-AN220<br>9U-BBD                           | Owned         | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Flying under fake Burundi markings.</li> </ul>                                                                                                                                            |
| 30 May 2021              | AN-12BP              | 5342908                  | UP-AN218                                     | Owned         | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li></li> </ul>                                                                                                                                                                               |
| 2 Oct 2021               | IL-18D               | 187009903                | ER-ICS <sup>l</sup>                          | Owned         | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Now flying as 5A-AND.</li> </ul>                                                                                                                                                          |
| 12 Oct 2021              | AN-12BP              | 5343005                  | EY-407 <sup>m</sup>                          | Owned         |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  |

<sup>a</sup> Date purchased, first identified operating in Libya or identified by the Panel as owned by Space Cargo Inc.

<sup>b</sup> Manufacturers serial number.

<sup>c</sup> Includes all registrations legitimately used or illicitly displayed by the aircraft during Libya operations.

<sup>d</sup> No Ilyushin Aviation Complex airworthiness listed.

<sup>e</sup> Ilyushin Aviation Complex airworthiness expired 19 July 2020. May now be flying displaying a Libyan 5A series registration.

<sup>f</sup> Reported in annex 55 and appendix E to annex 55 of [S/2021/229](#). Jenis Air LLC had its air operating certificate suspended by the Kazakhstan civil aviation authorities on 3 July 2020. It was not renewed by the company.

<sup>g</sup> Reported in appendix F to annex 55 to [S/2021/219](#).

<sup>h</sup> Ilyushin Aviation Complex airworthiness expires on 24 June 2022.

<sup>i</sup> Also see appendix F to annex 55 to [S/2021/219](#).

Operating outside Libya since at least 17 July 2021 with Sapsan Airlines (KGB) of Kyrgyz Republic.

<sup>j</sup> Ilyushin Aviation Complex airworthiness expired on 25 September 2020. May now be flying displaying a Libyan 5A series registration.

<sup>k</sup> Reported in annex 55 and appendix D to annex 55 of [S/2021/229](#). Azee Air LLC had its air operating certificate revoked by the Kazakhstan civil aviation authorities on 20 September 2020.

<sup>l</sup> First reported in annex 35 of [S/2017/406](#).

<sup>m</sup> First reported as operating in support of HAF in appendix K to annex 55 to [S/2021/219](#). A 31 October 2021 response to the Panel by Space Cargo contained inconsistencies and used a previously discredited purchase type explanation, used in previous cases where the Panel found Space Cargo's claims as not credible.

# **1. Antonov AN-12A cargo aircraft (MSN#2340806) (ex UP-AN220)**

4. At 13:00 hours on 28 January 2021 the Antonov AN-12A cargo aircraft (MSN#2340806) departed Amman (Marka) airport, Jordan (ICAO: OJAM) bound for Benghazi (Benina) airport, Libya (ICAO: HLLB). On board were three technicians recruited under a Space Cargo Inc contract to repair the three AS332L Super Puma helicopters reported in annex 76 to [S/2021/229](#) (see later for details of this PMC activity). The aircraft encountered technical issues with its transponders forcing a return to OJAM.<sup>238</sup>

<sup>238</sup> Confidential source.

5. The aircraft was clearly marked with a Kazakhstan registration UP-AN220 at this time (see appendix A). This is contrary to a statement made by the then operator, Jupiter Jet LLC<sup>239</sup> to the Aviation Authority of Kazakhstan that the Kazakhstan markings had been overpainted on 25 January 2021 (see imagery at appendix A).<sup>240</sup> The General Manager of Jupiter Jet LLC, Erikzhan Satenovich Kozbagarov, informed the Aviation Authority of Kazakhstan that the aircraft owner, Space Cargo Inc, had terminated their lease of the aircraft on 25 January 2021 and that the owner had requested that the aircraft be delivered to Amman, Jordan on termination of the lease. The Panel notes that the aircraft had landed at Amman, Jordan on 23 January 2021, two days prior to the declared termination of the lease.

6. After resolving the transponder technical issue, the aircraft departed Amman (OJAM) at 14:45 hours on 31 January 2021 with the same crew, and successfully delivered the three Space Cargo Inc technicians to Benghazi (HLLB). The Panel obtained imagery of the aircraft at HLLB on 5 February 2021, which was then displaying a Burundi registration (see appendix A). The Panel has confirmed with the Burundi authorities that this is a fake registration, and that no AN-12 type aircraft are registered with Burundi.<sup>241</sup>

7. This aircraft was registered with the Aviation Administration of Kazakhstan as UP-AN220 until the registration was officially cancelled on 12 February 2021. It is now unregistered.

8. The timeline of events regarding this aircraft is summarised at table 97.2.

Table 97.2

**Timeline of main events for AN-12A cargo aircraft (#2340806) (ex UP-AN220)**

| <i>Date</i> | <i>Event</i>                                                                                                                            | <i>Remarks</i>                                                                                                                                                                                                             |
|-------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 20 Mar 2020 | Ukraine registration (UR-CSI) for aircraft cancelled.                                                                                   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Cancellation No. PB1319.</li> <li>▪ Then owned by Aeronet FZE.<sup>242</sup></li> <li>▪ Aircraft operating unregistered for nine months.</li> </ul>                               |
| 2 Sep 2020  | Aircraft leased by Space Cargo Inc to Jupiter Jet LLC                                                                                   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Contract No.02/09/2020.</li> </ul>                                                                                                                                                |
| 22 Dec 2020 | Aircraft registered by Aviation Authority of Kazakhstan as UP-AN220.                                                                    | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Certificate No.1230.</li> </ul>                                                                                                                                                   |
| 23 Jan 2021 | Aircraft arrives at Amman (Marka) (OJAM) from Sudan (HSSS).                                                                             | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ At Space Cargo Inc request.</li> <li>▪ Departed Sudan (HSSS) on 22 Jan 2021. Ferry flight documentation with Panel.</li> <li>▪ Pilot was Nikolay DENISOV (Kazakhstan).</li> </ul> |
| 25 Jan 2021 | Lease agreement <sup>243</sup> with Jupiter Jet LLC, Kazakhstan for aircraft cancelled by owner, Space Cargo Inc, UAE.                  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Space Cargo Inc had requested aircraft be taken to Aqaba, Jordan, but it was already in Amman, Jordan.</li> </ul>                                                                 |
| 25 Jan 2021 | Kazakhstan registration on aircraft declared by Jupiter Jet LLC to the Kazakhstan aviation authorities as having been overpainted blue. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Fake report as identified with Kazakhstan registration was still displayed on the aircraft on 28 Jan 2021.</li> </ul>                                                             |

<sup>239</sup> [www.jupiterjet.aero](http://www.jupiterjet.aero). Last accessed 6 August 2021.

<sup>240</sup> Letter from Member State of 2 June 2021.

<sup>241</sup> Letter from Member State of 30 June 2021.

<sup>242</sup> PO Box 7902, Sharjah, UAE.

<sup>243</sup> Contract No 02/09/220 dated 02 September 2020 between Space Cargo Inc, UAE and Jupiter Jet LLC, Kazakhstan.

| <i>Date</i> | <i>Event</i>                                                                                                                                      | <i>Remarks</i>                                                                                                                                                                                                                            |
|-------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 28 Jan 2021 | 13:00 hours. Aircraft (marked as UP-AN220) departs from Amman (OJAM) for Benghazi (HLLB) but returns after 90 minutes due to a transponder fault. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Three Space Cargo Inc technicians as passengers. ('Team A' – see Part B).</li> </ul>                                                                                                               |
| 31 Jan 2021 | 14:45 hours. Aircraft departs Amman (OJAM) for Benghazi (HLLB).                                                                                   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Three Space Cargo Inc technicians as passengers. ('Team A' – see Part B).</li> </ul>                                                                                                               |
| 5 Feb 2021  | Aircraft identified in Benghazi airport (HLLB) now displaying Burundi registration 9U-BBD or 9U-BBO.                                              | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Burundi has confirmed that this is a fake registration number.<sup>244</sup></li> </ul>                                                                                                            |
| 12 Feb 2021 | UP-AN220 registration cancelled by Aviation Authority of Kazakhstan. <sup>245</sup>                                                               | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Cancellation No.332.</li> <li>At the request of the operator.</li> </ul>                                                                                                                           |
| 10 Apr 2021 | Aircraft identified in Benghazi airport (HLLB) by satellite imagery.                                                                              | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Identified by unique blue and red colour scheme.</li> <li>Aircraft parking position and orientation different to that of 5 February 2021 indicating flight operations have taken place.</li> </ul> |

9. The Panel notes: (a) that the aircraft was moved to Jordan (OJAM) prior to the cancellation of the contract; (b) the contract was extant for only four months: aircraft leases are usually much longer; and (c) the operator provided the Kazakhstan aviation authorities with false information regarding the markings on the aircraft. The Panel considers that these activities were deliberately designed to protect Jupiter Jet LLC from any allegations of arms embargo violations. The aircraft was still technically operated by Jupiter Jet LLC for its flight to Libya, as the aircraft registration was not cancelled until two weeks after the flight.

10. The Panel offered Space Cargo an opportunity to reply on 15 July 2021. Their response on 10 August 2021 claimed that they had sold the aircraft to a South Sudanese company<sup>246</sup> on 20 January 2020. This is the same response they made in their proven false claim when questioned about their ownership of the Ilyushin IL-76TD cargo aircraft (MSN#0073479367) on 15 November 2020. On 10 August 2021 the South Sudanese company again refuted all claims made by Space Cargo Inc and denied any business relationship with them.<sup>247</sup> The Panel considers the documentation provided by Space Cargo Inc to the Panel on 10 August 2021 (see appendix A) as nothing more than a virtual "cut and paste" of the fake documentation supplied to the Panel on 15 November 2020 for the Ilyushin IL-76TD cargo aircraft (MSN#0073479367). The extensive and detailed evidence in this annex serves to refute all claims made by Space Cargo in their letters of 10 August and 9 September 2021. Mr Maher Nayef Alismail, General Manager of Space Cargo Inc., has again provided the Panel with false documentation and a narrative of falsehoods, and continues to violate the UN arms embargo with complete impunity.

11. The provision of this aircraft for "*other assistance .... relating to military activities*" is a further violation of paragraph 9 of resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#) by Space Cargo Inc, and Mr. Maher Nayef Alismail. Jupiter Jet LLC remains under investigation for its involvement in this violation.

<sup>244</sup> Letter to Panel of 30 June 2021.

<sup>245</sup> Letter to Panel of 2 June 2021. Cancellation No 322.

<sup>246</sup> The Panel is aware of the identity of the company but considers it is not necessary to report the identity of the company at this stage and expose the company to any reputational risk resulting from its cooperation with the Panel and being named in a UN report on sanctions violations. The Panel has copies of all correspondence from the South Sudanese company that refutes the Space Cargo Inc claim.

<sup>247</sup> Email to Panel of 10 August 2021. The address used by Space Cargo Inc in their documentation was last occupied by the South Sudanese company in 2015.

## 2. Antonov AN-12BP cargo aircraft (MSN#5342908) (ex UP-AN218)

12. The Panel has now confirmed that this aircraft is owned by Space Cargo Inc and is operating in Libya in support of HAF.

13. The timeline of events regarding this aircraft is summarised at table 97.3.

Table 97.3

### Timeline of main events for AN-12BP cargo aircraft (MSN#5342908)<sup>248</sup>

| Date        | Event                                                                                                                             | Remarks                                                                              |
|-------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 12 May 2019 | Leased by Roland Aviation FZE, UAE to Jupiter Jet LLC (JPJ), Kazakhstan.                                                          | ▪ Lease unreferenced.                                                                |
| 24 Sep 2019 | Registered in Kazakhstan as UP-AN218.                                                                                             | ▪ Registration certificate #1191.<br>▪ Previously registered as EY-414 by Lithuania. |
| 17 Jul 2020 | Termination of lease between Roland Aviation FZE, UAE and Jupiter Jet LLC (JPJ), Kazakhstan.                                      | ▪                                                                                    |
| 26 Aug 2020 | Deregistered by Kazakhstan.                                                                                                       | ▪ Cancellation certificate #314.                                                     |
| 9 Sep 2020  | Panel identified from a confidential source <sup>249</sup> that Roland Aviation FZE had sold the aircraft to Space Cargo Inc FZE. | ▪                                                                                    |
| 29 May 2021 | Identified as flying on HAF parade in Benina, Benghazi. <sup>a</sup>                                                              | ▪ The aircraft has a distinctive blue and white colour scheme (figure 97.1)<br>▪     |

<sup>a</sup> [https://twitter.com/gerjon\\_/status/1401616972589248516](https://twitter.com/gerjon_/status/1401616972589248516), 31 May 2021.

Figure 97.1

### Comparative imagery of AN-12BP cargo aircraft (MSN#5342908)



11 August 2020: Image supplied by Jupiter Jet LLC to Kazakhstan CAA



29 May 2021: HAF Benghazi Parade.



29 May 2021: Enhancement of HAF Benghazi Parade imagery.

<sup>248</sup> The Panel has copies of all the documentation referred to in this table.

<sup>249</sup> A senior commercial airline official in Kazakhstan in taped interview with Kazakhstan CAA.

14. The Panel offered Space Cargo an opportunity to reply on 23 December 2021. Their response on 20 January 2022 (extract in appendix A) claimed that they were going to act as a broker for the sale of this aircraft, but that the then owner, Roland Aviation FZE, sold the aircraft directly to the same above-mentioned South Sudanese company<sup>250</sup> on, or about, 28 December 2020. On 23 January 2022 the South Sudanese company again refuted all claims made by Space Cargo Inc, denied any business relationship with Space Cargo Inc.<sup>251</sup> The company also denied that it had purchased any aircraft from Roland Aviation FZE. The Panel requested information as to the ownership trail for this aircraft from Roland Aviation FZE on 15 July 2021 and 14 February 2022. No response was received.

15. The detailed evidence in possession of the Panel serves to refute all claims made by Space Cargo in their letter of 20 January 2022. Mr Maher Nayef Alismail has again provided the Panel with a narrative of falsehoods and continues to violate the UN arms embargo with complete impunity.

16. The provision of this aircraft for “*other assistance .... relating to military activities*” is a further violation of paragraph 9 of resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#) by Space Cargo Inc and Mr. Maher Nayef Alismail.

### 3. Ilyushin IL-18D cargo aircraft (MSN# 187009903) (ex ER-ICS)

17. This aircraft has been reported on in [S/2017/466](#),<sup>252</sup> [S/2019/914](#)<sup>253</sup> and [S/2021/229](#),<sup>254</sup> where it identified as being the aircraft previously registered as ER-ICS. A Member State has confirmed that this aircraft was sold to Space Cargo Inc sometime after 8 July 2015.<sup>255</sup>

18. The timeline of events regarding this aircraft is summarised at table 97.4.

Table 97.4

**Timeline of main events for IL-12D cargo aircraft (MSN#187009903)<sup>256</sup>**

| <i>Date</i> | <i>Event</i>                                                          | <i>Remarks</i>                                                                                                  |
|-------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 14 Dec 2013 | Registered in Moldova to Sky Prim Air S.R.L as ER-ICS.                | ▪ Certificate 0418.                                                                                             |
| 29 May 2015 | Export Certificate of Airworthiness listed Chad as country of export. | ▪ Chad confirmed to Panel that this aircraft had never being listed under their aviation registry. <sup>a</sup> |
| 8 Jul 2015  | Cancellation of Moldovan registration ER-ICS.                         | ▪ De-registration Certificate 0418.<br>▪ Member State confirm sold to Space Cargo Inc.                          |
| 15 Sep 2016 | IL-18D (ER-ICS) identified in Zintan.                                 | ▪ Paint scheme identical to that seen later on for positive identification.                                     |
| 25 Nov 2016 | IL-18D (ER-ICS) identified in Benina.                                 | ▪ Paint scheme identical to that seen later on for positive identification.                                     |

<sup>250</sup> The Panel is aware of the identity of the company but considers it is not necessary to report the identity of the company at this stage and expose the company to any reputational risk resulting from its cooperation with the Panel and being named in a UN report on sanctions violations. The Panel has copies of all correspondence from the South Sudanese company that refutes the Space Cargo Inc claim.

<sup>251</sup> Email to Panel of 23 January 2022. The address used by Space Cargo Inc in their documentation was last occupied by the South Sudanese company in 2015.

<sup>252</sup> Annex 35.

<sup>253</sup> Annex 52.

<sup>254</sup> Annex 55 and appendix F to annex 55.

<sup>255</sup> Letter to Panel dated 15 September 2021.

<sup>256</sup> The Panel has copies of all the documentation referred to in this table.

| Date        | Event                                                                                   | Remarks                                                                                                                |
|-------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 27 Jul 2020 | IL-18D re-confirmed as ex ER-ICS                                                        | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Identified by independent OSINT analyst.<sup>c</sup> See appendix B.</li> </ul> |
| 2 Oct 2021  | Aircraft identified as now flying under Libyan registration number 5A-AND. <sup>d</sup> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Legitimacy of Libyan registration unconfirmed.</li> </ul>                       |

<sup>a</sup> Letter to Panel dated 8 November 2021.

<sup>b</sup> Letter from Member State dated 1 April 2022.

<sup>c</sup> [https://twitter.com/Gerjon\\_/status/1288061918364794889](https://twitter.com/Gerjon_/status/1288061918364794889), 27 July 2020.

<sup>d</sup> [https://twitter.com/Gerjon\\_/status/1444324396349411332?s=20](https://twitter.com/Gerjon_/status/1444324396349411332?s=20), 2 October 2021

19. The Panel wrote to Libya on 7 October 2021 requesting confirmation, or otherwise, of the legitimacy of the displayed Libyan registration. No response has been received.

20. The Panel offered Space Cargo Inc an opportunity to reply on 7 October 2019 regarding their ownership of this aircraft. Their response of 21 February 2021 denied that their company had purchased the aircraft, which is contrary to the information provided, and subsequently confirmed, by a Member State.

21. The provision of this aircraft for “*other assistance .... relating to military activities*” is a further violation of paragraph 9 of resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#) by Space Cargo Inc and Mr. Maher Nayef Alismail.

#### 4. Antonov AN-12BP cargo aircraft (MSN#5343005) (ex-EY-409)

22. This aircraft was reported on in [S/2021/229](#),<sup>257</sup> where it identified as being the aircraft previously registered as EY-409. The Panel has now confirmed that this aircraft is owned by Space Cargo Inc.

23. The timeline of events regarding this aircraft is summarised at table 97.5.

Table 97.5

#### Timeline of main events for AN-12BP cargo aircraft (MSN#5343005)<sup>258</sup>

| Date        | Event                                                                                                                        | Remarks                                                                                                                                                    |
|-------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 9 Jul 2014  | Acquired by ALA International FZE, UAE                                                                                       | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><a href="http://www.aerotransport.org">www.aerotransport.org</a>.</li> </ul>                                        |
| 1 Apr 2015  | Leased by Allied Services Limited, South Sudan ( <a href="http://www.alliedservicesltd.com">www.alliedservicesltd.com</a> ). | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Lease Agreement No 15/03 dated 1 April 2015.<sup>a</sup></li> </ul>                                                 |
| 4 Nov 2015  | Aircraft returned to owners by Allied Services Limited, South Sudan, but stayed in storage in Juba.                          | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No longer required as South Sudan CAA had banned use of AN-12 cargo aircraft in South Sudan.<sup>b</sup></li> </ul> |
| 9 Nov 2015  | ALA International renamed as Meridien FZE.                                                                                   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Addendum to Memorandum and Articles of Understanding.<sup>c</sup></li> </ul>                                        |
| 11 Dec 2015 | Deregistered by Tajikistan                                                                                                   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>De-registration Certificate dated 11 December 2015.</li> </ul>                                                      |

<sup>257</sup> Annex 55 and appendix K to annex 55.

<sup>258</sup> The Panel has copies of all the documentation referred to in this table.



| <i>Date</i> | <i>Event</i>                                                                              | <i>Remarks</i>                                                            |
|-------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 1 Apr 2016  | Formal expiration of lease between Allied Services Limited, South Sudan and Meridien FZE. | ▪                                                                         |
| 20 Aug 2019 | Sold to Space Cargo Inc by Meridien FZE.                                                  | ▪ Aircraft Purchase and Sale Agreement dated 20 August 2019. <sup>d</sup> |
| 26 Oct 2019 | Aircraft departed Juba, South Sudan flown by AsiaAirways LLC of Tajikistan.               | ▪ South Sudan CAA Pre-Flight Inspection Report.                           |
| 4 Nov 2019  | AN-12BP identified delivering HAF commanders to Al-Muzaq.                                 | ▪ Subsequently confirmed as AN-12 BP (MSN#5343005). <sup>e</sup>          |
| 22 Aug 2020 | Identified as AN-12 BP (MSN#5343005) in Al Jufra, Libya flying in support of HAF.         | ▪ Identified by independent OSINT analyst. <sup>f</sup>                   |

<sup>a</sup> Email to Panel from Meridien FZE of 12 October 2021.

<sup>b</sup> Letter/Email to Panel from Allied Services Limited of 29 October 2021.

<sup>c</sup> Supplied by Meridien FZE on 12 October 2021.

<sup>d</sup> Supplied by Meridien FZE on 12 October 2021.

<sup>e</sup> <https://twitter.com/Oded121351/status/1191436452716056577>, 4 November 2019.

<sup>f</sup> [https://twitter.com/Gerjon\\_/status/1297157977816915969?s=20](https://twitter.com/Gerjon_/status/1297157977816915969?s=20), 22 August 2020.

24. The Panel offered Space Cargo Inc an opportunity to reply on 19 October 2019 regarding their ownership of this aircraft. Their response to the Panel on 31 October 2021 contained inconsistencies and used a previously discredited purchase type explanation, used in previous cases, where the Panel found Space Cargo's claims as not credible. In this case Space Cargo Inc claimed to have used an offset credit agreement to sell the aircraft to a company called Mars Avia Tech LLC in Belarus. The Panel found this claim as not credible as:

- (a) The alleged sale took place two days after they purchased the aircraft from Meridien. This would not allow time for the normal due diligence for aircraft purchases to take place.
- (b) Mars Tech Avia LLC is not registered as a company in Belarus,<sup>259</sup> and there is no trace of the company in open source information in either English or Russian.
- (c) The contract with Meridien FZE stated that the Buyer, Space Cargo LLC, should provide the crew at Juba, South Sudan. The aircraft was flown out of South Sudan by a crew from Asia Airways LLC, who were listed on the flight operations manual provided by Meridien to the original lessee.
- (d) Allied Services Limited, South Sudan handed the aircraft back to Meridien FZE and not the alleged new owners, Mars Avia Tech LLC as stated in the alleged contract between Space Cargo LLC and Mars Avia Tech LLC.
- (e) The contract with Space Cargo LLC stated that the alleged Buyer, Mars Avia Tech LLC, should settle the contract based on 100% pre-payment of US\$ 553,446. No mention of an offset credit agreement, which was submitted unreferenced to the Panel, and in a very different format to the fake one supplied for the sale of the Antonov AN-12A cargo aircraft (MSN#2340806) (see paragraph 10).

<sup>259</sup> Confirmed by Member State in letter to Panel of 13 December 2021.

25. The extensive and detailed evidence in this annex serves to refute all claims made by Space Cargo in their letters of 10 August and 9 September 2021. Mr Maher Nayef Alismail has again provided the Panel with a narrative of falsehoods and forged documentation. He continues to violate the UN arms embargo with complete impunity.

26. The provision of this aircraft for “*other assistance .... relating to military activities*” is a further violation of paragraph 9 of resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#) by Space Cargo Inc and Mr. Maher Nayef Alismail.

#### **B. PMC maintenance support for three AS332L Super Puma helicopters**

27. The Panel has established that Space Cargo Inc contracted the provision of helicopter engineers and aircrew from a South African company to make the three AS332L Super Puma helicopters transferred into Libya during July 2019 by Project Opus<sup>260</sup> airworthy. In doing so it became a private military company for under the auspices of “*other assistance .... relating to military activities*”. Supporting imagery and evidence is at appendix C.

28. On 10 December 2020 a South African helicopter maintenance company<sup>261</sup> was contracted by Space Cargo Inc to provide qualified individuals capable of making the above-mentioned helicopters airworthy. The individual in Space Cargo Inc responsible for coordinating this programme with the South African company was Aleksandra Isamova, the “Auditor” of Space Cargo Inc, (see figure 97.2, the remaining Email evidence is at appendix C). The Panel offered Aleksandra Isamova an opportunity to respond on behalf of the company on 7 August 2021, which she declined.<sup>262</sup>


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<sup>260</sup> See annex 76 to Panel report [S/2021/229](#).

<sup>261</sup> The Panel is aware of the identity of the company but considers that: (a) as the company was unaware that the work would be a technical non-compliance with the arms embargo; and (b) has fully cooperated with the Panel, it is not necessary to report the identity of the company at this stage and expose the company to any reputational risk resulting from its participation. Similarly, the Panel is aware of the identities of all the individuals employed by the company that deployed to Libya.

<sup>262</sup> WhatsApp message. 7 August 2021, which the company has confirmed receiving (Email of 20 January 2022). Three separate numbers were also used to call and there was no reply, but the Panel acknowledges that unless the subscriber is using a virtual private network (VPN) calls are blocked on WhatsApp in the UAE.

Figure 97.2

**E Mail to company from Space Cargo Inc**

29. The Panel has established that the first technician deployed to Jordan on 19 December 2020 on flight EK903 from Dubai, where he was met by a representative from SkyWings Aviation<sup>263</sup> and accommodated in the Hotel Corp, Amman, Jordan.<sup>264</sup> He then soon flew into Libya on a Space Cargo Inc charter flight.

30. A team of three further technicians ('Team A') then deployed to Jordan on 1 January 2021 on Egypt Air flights MS840 and MS871. They were also met by a representative from SkyWings Aviation and accommodated in the Hotel Corp, Amman, Jordan.

31. 'Team A' was delayed in Jordan until the first attempt was made on 28 January 2021 to fly them to Libya on the Space Cargo Inc owned Antonov AN-12 (#2340806) (see Part A above). This flight had to return to Jordan due to transponder issues, and 'Team A' eventually deployed to Libya on 31 January 2021 on the Antonov AN-12 (#2340806). 'Team A' remained in Libya working on the helicopters until returning to Johannesburg on 17 February 2021.

32. The Panel has copies of the return flight tickets for Team 'A', which were paid for by a credit card in the name of Maher ALISMAIL, the same name as the Managing Director of Space Cargo Inc (see figure 97.3).

<sup>263</sup> <http://www.skywingsjordan.com>. Accessed 18 June 2021. Contact person details +96277900077. Elie NJEIM. [ops@skywingsjordan.com](mailto:ops@skywingsjordan.com).

<sup>264</sup> <https://www.hmhhotelgroup.com/en/jor/amman/corp-amman>. Accessed 18 June 2021.

Figure 97.3

**Payment information for Team A return flights to South Africa (17 February 2021)**

|                                                                                                  |                               |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| Payment reference 50160547                                                                       | Administration fee EGP 189.72 |
| Booked on 17 February 2021                                                                       | Booking total EGP 6,513.72    |
| Card number: *****7800                                                                           | AED 1,557.64                  |
| Maher Alismail 17 February 2021                                                                  | Equivalent to EGP 6,513.72    |
| Please note, that the credit/debit card used to make the payment will be checked at the airport. |                               |

**Source:** Confidential.

33. The agreed contract price for the provision of ‘Team A’ was \$195,000, which was invoiced to Space Cargo Inc.<sup>265</sup>

34. On 27 April 2021 a second team (‘Team B’) consisting of one pilot and four technicians deployed to Benghazi, Libya directly from Johannesburg (Lanseria) airport (FALA) on board a Dassault Falcon 900DX business jet (see at appendix C).<sup>266</sup> The Panel also independently obtained a copy of the aircraft flight plan from another source, which confirms this flight. The aircraft charter flight was booked by Shamil Travel Services Company of Benghazi, whom the Panel could not contact for their comment. The charter cost was LYD 135,000 (US\$ 29,800), which was paid in cash.

35. After ‘Team B’ maintenance work, two of the AS332L Super Puma helicopters were seen flying as part of the HAF Libyan National Army 7<sup>th</sup> Operation Dignity anniversary military parade in Benghazi on 29 May 2021 (see figure 97.4).

<sup>265</sup> Confidential source.

<sup>266</sup> The Panel is aware of the owner and operator of the private jet but considers that as the company was unaware that the flight would be a technical non-compliance with the arms embargo, and cooperated fully with the Panel, it is not necessary to expose them to the reputational risk resulting from the company being identified.

Figure 97.4  
AS332L Super Pumas flying in Haftar parade (29 May 2021)



Source: [https://twitter.com/Libya\\_OSINT/status/1398654492980166658](https://twitter.com/Libya_OSINT/status/1398654492980166658), 29 May 2021

36. The agreed contract price for the provision of 'Team B' was \$375,000, which Space Cargo Inc requested to be invoiced to BU Shames FZE.<sup>267</sup> The Panel has identified that a Mr. Abdullah Mohamed Alismail<sup>268</sup> is listed as the owner of BU Shames FZE.<sup>269</sup> In figure 97.2 there is a copy email address for [abdullah.ismail@spacecargoinc.com](mailto:abdullah.ismail@spacecargoinc.com), and the Panel has confirmed that Abdullah Mohamed Alismail also uses [abdullahgm@bushamesfze.com](mailto:abdullahgm@bushamesfze.com). The Panel has identified that Aleksandra Isamova,<sup>270</sup> Auditor of Space Cargo Inc, is also listed as working in the finance department of BU Shames FZE. Although the Panel has yet to confirm the exact family relationship between Maher Nayef Alismail, the General Manager of Space Cargo Inc, and Abdullah Mohamed Alismail, the owner of BU Shames FZE, the Panel considers that the two companies are in effect operated as a single business entity.

37. During the maintenance periods for both Space Cargo Inc 'Team A' and 'Team B', their local HAF air force counterparts requested information as to the types of weapons that could be mounted to the aircraft, and what sort of weapons mounts were required.<sup>271</sup> The Panel also identified from confidential imagery that the three Gazelle helicopters delivered in July 2019 as part of Project Opus had been repainted in military sand colour with Libyan armed forces markings (see figure 97.5).

<sup>267</sup> Registered as company #11617945 on 3 March 2020. 600 M2 Warehouse A4-08, Sharjah, UAE. The invoice was paid from account number IBAN AE080260001015771385401, Emirates NBD Bank, Deira Branch, Dubai, UAE.

<sup>268</sup> a.k.a. Abdullah Mohamed ALISMAEL, Abdullah Mohamed AL ISMAIL, Abdullah Mohamed AL ISMAEL.

<sup>269</sup> <https://are.databasesets.com/en/company-all/company/27180>. Accessed 6 August 2021.

<sup>270</sup> Uses [sasha@bushamesfze.com](mailto:sasha@bushamesfze.com) and [auditor@spacecargoinc.com](mailto:auditor@spacecargoinc.com). Same telephone number as Space Cargo Inc +971 58 206 4133.

<sup>271</sup> Confidential source.

Figure 97.5

**Project Opus Gazelle helicopters in military livery (2021)**

**Source:** Confidential

38. The Panel has identified that one or more of the Super Puma aircraft has rotor gearbox faults necessitating the delivery of spare parts. These are only legitimately available from Airbus Helicopters<sup>272</sup> or companies that have passed the Airbus Helicopters' due diligence and compliance processes. Airbus Helicopters informed the Panel<sup>273</sup> that the three helicopters were removed from the Airbus Helicopters database on 10 March 2020 after a self-declaration from the previous legitimate owner Starlite Aviation<sup>274</sup> on 28 August 2019. This was over nine months after Starlite sold the helicopters to L6-FZE of Project Opus. It is thus highly unlikely that Space Cargo Inc or HAF will ever be able to legitimately access the spare parts necessary to maintain any airworthiness for these aircraft. Sources have informed the Panel that illegitimate sources for such parts are rare.

39. The timeline of events regarding this support by Space Cargo Inc is summarised at table 97.6.

<sup>272</sup> <https://www.airbus.com/helicopters.html>. Accessed 6 August 2021.

<sup>273</sup> Letter of 2 August 2021 and Email of 1 September 2021.

<sup>274</sup> <https://www.starliteaviation.com>. Accessed 6 August 2021.



Table 97.6

**Timeline of main events for Space Cargo Inc support to HAF (2021)**

| <i>Date</i> | <i>Event</i>                                                                                                                                         | <i>Remarks</i>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 |
|-------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 10 Dec 2020 | South African maintenance company contacted by Space Cargo Inc (UAE) <sup>275</sup> for recruitment of Super Puma engineers for a contract in Libya. | ▪                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              |
| 19 Dec 2020 | Team Leader for the Space Cargo Inc contract deploys to Jordan from South Africa.                                                                    | ▪ Arrives Amman on flight EK903 from Dubai.<br>▪ Met by Skywings Aviation and accommodated at Corp Amman Hotel, Amman.                                                                                                                                         |
| 1 Jan 2021  | Repair Team A (3 persons) deploy from Johannesburg, RSA via Cairo to Amman, Jordan.                                                                  | ▪ Egypt Air flights MS840 and MS871.<br>▪ Flights booked by <a href="mailto:info@spacecargoinc.com">info@spacecargoinc.com</a> .<br>▪ Payment card ending in 7800 (Maher Alismail).<br>▪ Met by Skywings Aviation and accommodated at Corp Amman Hotel, Amman. |
| 23 Jan 2021 | Aircraft AN-12A (#2340806) arrives at Amman (Marka) airport (OJAM) from Sudan (HSSS) .                                                               | ▪ At Space Cargo request.<br>▪ Departed Sudan (HSSS) on 22 Jan 2021.<br>▪ Pilot was Nikolay DENISOV (Kazakhstan).                                                                                                                                              |
| 24 Jan 2021 | Repair Team A members identified by Panel.                                                                                                           | ▪                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              |
| 28 Jan 2021 | 13:00 hours. Repair Team A departs from Amman (OJAM) for Benghazi (HLLB) on aircraft AN-12A (#2340806) (marked UP-AN220).                            | ▪                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              |
| 28 Jan 2021 | 14:30 hours. Aircraft AN-12A (#2340806) (marked UP-AN220) returns to Amman (OJAM), Jordan due to technical fault.                                    | ▪                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              |
| 31 Jan 2021 | 14:45 hours. aircraft AN-12A (#2340806) departs Amman (OJAM) for Benghazi (HLLB)                                                                     | ▪ Repair 'Team A' now deployed.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                |
| 7 Feb 2021  | Repair 'Team A' identified working on third Super Puma.                                                                                              | ▪ 32° 5'36.44"N, 20°15'38.67"E.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                |
| 8 Feb 2021  | Panel identify Repair 'Team A' accommodation location.                                                                                               | ▪ 32° 5'18.16"N, 20°15'37.66".                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 |

<sup>275</sup> [auditor@spacecargoinc.com](mailto:auditor@spacecargoinc.com). Aleksandra. +971 6 55 70 388. Fax: +971 6 57 24 019. Mobile: +971 58 206 4133. SAIF Zone | A4-073 | P.O.Box 7812 | Sharjah | UAE.

| <i>Date</i> | <i>Event</i>                                                                                                                                                                                                                         | <i>Remarks</i>                                                                             |
|-------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 10 Feb 2021 | General Haftar's representative visited Benina Hanger and observed ground tests on all three Super Puma.<br>Looking to recruit pilots from RSA as no Libyan pilots qualified. RSA company to recruit and pilots for Space Cargo Inc. | ▪ Confidential source.                                                                     |
| 17 Feb 2021 | Repair 'Team A' departs Benghazi for Johannesburg                                                                                                                                                                                    | ▪ Route HLLB > Alexandria (HEBA) > Dubai (OMDB) > Addis Adaba (HAAB) > Johannesburg (FAOR) |
| 26 Apr 2021 | Private jet flight from Benghazi (HLLB) via Entebbe (HUEN) to Johannesburg (FAOR) to collect Repair 'Team B'.                                                                                                                        | ▪ Dassault Aviation Falcon 900EX registered 9A-XXX.                                        |
| 27 Apr 2021 | Repair 'Team B' fly on private jet flight from Johannesburg (FAOR) via Entebbe (HUEN) to Benghazi (HLLB)                                                                                                                             | ▪ 'Team B' accommodation located 14.5km from airport at 31°59'36.75"N, 20°9'45.23"E.       |
| 29 May 2021 | Two Super Puma helicopters fly in the HAF 7th Anniversary of Operation DIGNITY parade. <sup>276</sup>                                                                                                                                | ▪                                                                                          |
| 20 Jul 2021 | Repair "Team B" returns to South Africa.                                                                                                                                                                                             | ▪                                                                                          |

40. The Panel offered Space Cargo an opportunity to reply on 23 December 2021. Space Cargo Inc responded on 22 January 2022 and requested a three-week delay for them to respond so that they could consolidate the necessary documentation. The Panel agreed, but no response was received by the agreed 12 February 2022 deadline.

41. On 7 January 2022 the Panel wrote to Holman Fenwick Willan MEA LLP (HFW), the legal representative of the last known owners of the aircraft to request an update on the aircraft ownership, or any sales or transfers that may have taken place. HFW have yet to respond to the Panel's request.

42. The provision of maintenance technicians for these particular aircraft that were supplied for military use and are operated now by HAF falls under the auspices of "*other assistance .... relating to military activities*". This is a further violation of paragraph 9 of resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#) by Space Cargo Inc and Maher Nayef ALISMAIL.

### C. Space Cargo Inc violations of other arms embargoes

43. The Panel notes that in paragraph 75 of [S/2021/569](#) the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic also named Space Cargo Inc as the owner of two IL-76TD cargo aircraft (MSN# 33446325 and 1013405167) operated by Jenis Air LLC, Kazakhstan, who used the aircraft on 19 December 2020 for the transfer of military materiel into the Central African Republic.

<sup>276</sup> <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mbIDXxITPa0>, 31 May 2021. (@35 min 05 sec).

**D. Space Cargo Inc business licences**

44. The United Arab Emirates informed the Panel on 24 March 2022 that the company's business licence (#20155) was not renewed after expiry on 26 October 2021. The United Arab Emirates provided no information on the company's other business licences (#00607) and (#14987).

## Appendix A to Annex 97: Supporting imagery and documentation relating to Space Cargo Inc aviation support

Figure 97.A.1

AN-12A cargo aircraft (#2340806) at Jordan Marka airport (OJAM) (28 January 2021)



Sources: Confidential source and Panel analysis

Figure 97.A.2

Faked imagery of AN-12A cargo aircraft (#2340806) claiming markings overpaint on 25 January 2021



<sup>a</sup> Geo-referenced to 31°58'22"N, 35°59'54"E (OJAM).

<sup>b</sup> Note UP-AN220 still on aircraft on image in figure 97.A.1, taken 3 days after the claimed date the above images were taken.

Sources: Member State and Panel analysis.

Figure 97.A.3

AN-12A cargo aircraft (#2340806) in Benghazi with faked Burundi registration (5 February 2021)

### AN-12A Cargo Aircraft (#2340806) in Benghazi (5 February to 10 April 2021)



Image extracted from confidential source video imagery of 5 February 2021. Note the changed registration number to a Burundi registration 9U-BBD or 9U-BBO. The paint work is of poor quality.



5 February 2021.  
Benghazi Airport  
32°05'34.47"N,  
20°15'39.92"E



10 April 2021.  
Benghazi Airport  
32°05'33.16"N,  
20°15'40.58"E

Sources: Confidential source and Panel analysis

Figure 97.A.4

Space Cargo Inc OTR false response (10 August 2021)

|   |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  |            |    |
|---|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------|----|
| 6 | Sale Purchase Contract of aircraft (ANTONOV AN-12) Serial No (2340806) holding registration mark (UP-AN220) with [REDACTED]<br>[REDACTED]<br>[REDACTED] along with the full material and financial possession. The capacity of our company in the capacity of the owner/medium/broker without any control or actual possession to the airport. Our documentary possession of the aircraft by one day is 10/3/2020 (only one day) | 2020/03/10 | .2 |
|---|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------|----|



Figure 97.A.5

**Extract from Space Cargo Inc fake sales agreement (20 January 2021) supplied to Panel (10 August 2021)**

**SALE AND PURCHASE AGREEMENT**  
No: 2001/2021  
DATE: 20<sup>th</sup> January 2021  
Correspondence by Email:

Space Cargo Inc., hereinafter referred to as "SELLER" represented by Mr. Abdulrazzak Al Hamid, Director, acting in accordance with the power of attorney dated by 01<sup>st</sup> January 2021 of the Company and the [REDACTED] to as a "Buyer", represented by its [REDACTED] have concluded this Agreement as follows:

SELLER hereby agrees to sell to Buyer 1 (one) Civil Aircraft Antonov (AN) 12A (2340806), and BUYER agrees to purchase this aircraft from SELLER in accordance with the terms and conditions set out in this Agreement.

**Clause 1.**  
**Definitions and Interpretations**

For the purpose of this Agreement the following expressions shall have the meaning assigned to them below unless the context otherwise requires:

Aircraft: AN-12A (S/N: 2340806) type of civil aircraft.  
Tools: Tools for aircraft, engines and system maintenance;  
Flight Crew: AN-12A of civil aircraft crew;  
Technical Acceptance: Acceptance of the aircraft envisaged by Clause 4 of this agreement, implemented by Buyer's team through operational inspection of the aircraft's systems and its equipment thereof on ground in the volume of pre-flight procedures stipulated by Maintenance Schedule and perform a test flight (after ground inspection the aircraft familiarization flight can be combined with the ferry flight, if agreed by the parties). Technical acceptance shall be carried out by Buyer's representatives in the presence of representatives of Seller.  
Aircraft Delivery: Ferry flight of aircraft as it is envisaged in Clause 3 of this Agreement.  
"The Buyer's base": Khartoum International Airport  
"The Seller's base": Khartoum International Airport  
"Bill of Sale": Certificate of sale and transfer of property rights

Life Expenditure: Aircraft operating hours on ground and in flight recorded in the aircraft's Log Books.  
Defect: Each separate product discrepancy between prescribed requirements.  
Technical Service Life: Aircraft's operating hours from the beginning of operation till discarding.  
Warranty: Obligations stipulated by Clause 5 of this Agreement.  
Delivery Date: The date of fulfilling obligations envisaged by Clause 4.4 of this Agreement.  
Reclamation Report: claims to quality of the AN-12A type aircraft and equipment supplied according to this Contract coming within the scope of the definition of Clause 5.

**Clause 2.**  
**Subject of Contract and Contract Price**

2.1. SELLER shall sell and BUYER shall buy 1 (one) AN-12A civil aircraft serial number №: 2340806 together with components, devices, systems and technical publications.  
Service lives of vendor items are indicated in their Log Books and Certificates.  
2.2. The price of Aircraft under this Agreement is set forth in Annex No.3 to this Agreement.

**Clause 3.**  
**Terms of Delivery**

3.1. Hand-over of the aircraft to BUYER shall be done after the requirements to Buyer to this Agreement have been met.  
SELLER provides BUYER with all necessary data and documents of delivered aircraft to receive licenses/documents which are needed.

Figure 97.A.6

Space Cargo Inc fake credit note to South Sudanese company (20 January 2021) supplied to Panel (10 August 2021)

| <b><u>CREDIT NOTE</u></b>                                                                                                          |          |                                                                                                                                              |            |                              |              |  |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------|------------------------------|--------------|--|
| <b>No: SCI/CN/3</b>                                                                                                                |          |                                                                                                                                              |            | <b>Date: 20-01-2021/8888</b> |              |  |
| <div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px;">           Credit to: SPACE CARGO INC<br/>           Reference:         </div> |          |                                                                                                                                              |            |                              |              |  |
| Outstanding Balance for Services Provided in Sudan and Ethiopia /Fueling, Handling and Landing Permits for Aug 2020 to Dec 2020    |          |                                                                                                                                              |            |                              |              |  |
| S.N.                                                                                                                               | GL Acct. | Description                                                                                                                                  | Cur.       | Amount                       | Amount AED   |  |
| 1                                                                                                                                  | Dr 11000 | Accounts receivable: Outstanding Balance for Services Provided in Sudan and Ethiopia /Fueling for Aug 2020 to Dec 2020                       | USD        | 393,652.00                   | 1,446,671.10 |  |
|                                                                                                                                    | Cr 20000 | Accounts payable                                                                                                                             | USD        | 393,652.00                   | 1,446,671.10 |  |
| 2                                                                                                                                  | Dr 11000 | Accounts receivable: Outstanding Balance for Services Provided in Sudan and Ethiopia / Handling and Landing Permits for Aug 2020 to Dec 2020 | USD        | 174,371.00                   | 640,813.43   |  |
|                                                                                                                                    | Cr 20000 | Accounts payable                                                                                                                             | USD        | 174,371.00                   | 640,813.43   |  |
| <b>TOTAL:</b>                                                                                                                      |          |                                                                                                                                              | <b>USD</b> | <b>568,023.00</b>            | <b>0.00</b>  |  |
| Amount in words: <u>Five Hundred Sixty Eight Thousand Twenty Three Dollars Only</u>                                                |          |                                                                                                                                              |            |                              |              |  |
| Prepared by _____ Accounts Manager _____ General Manager _____                                                                     |          |                                                                                                                                              |            |                              |              |  |
| Received by _____                                                                                                                  |          |                                                                                                                                              |            |                              |              |  |

Figures 97.A.7 and 97.A.8

**One of the South Sudanese company's responses to Panel enquiry (10 August 2021)**

The Panel holds copies of all the other rebuttals from this company, and this one is included for an illustration of that company's responses.






Figure 97.A.9


Extract from Space Cargo Inc OTR inaccurate response (20 January 2022)

|                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <p>1. Regarding the aircraft (Antonov AN-12A) with the serial number (5342908), and <u>since among the activities of our company is the activity of importing and exporting aircraft and their spare parts under License No. (0067) issued in 1999 by the Sharjah Airport International Free Zone Authority:</u></p> <p>a. On (December 28, 2020), our company requested (reservation in return for purchase) as an intermediary/ broker in dealing with the purchase of the aircraft described in our response above from the seller (Roland Aviation FZE) with the intention of reselling it to others.</p> <p>b. The selling company (Roland Aviation FZE) issued an invoice in the name of our company, and the amount (the down payment) was settled with the intention of completing the mediation and completing the sale.</p> <p>c. Immediately and on the same date on (28/12/2020) and before making any change in the registration or any flight or operation of the aircraft, the selling company executed the sales contract directly with the buyer (other than our company).</p> <p>2. Our company has not entered with the selling company (Roland Aviation FZE) into any sale and purchase contract and has not concluded any lease contract, because the oral agreement is that the amount paid by our company as a deposit is a refundable / redeemable advance to prove the seriousness of the deal and to book the aircraft, provided that the transaction is direct sale and purchase contract between Seller and Buyer.</p> | <p>3. Our company is not concerned with the name of the air operator / company that currently operates the aircraft described in our response and is not concerned with its technical condition or the scope of its operations and operation, nor is it aware of any of the foregoing.</p> <p>4. Our company is not concerned with the civil registration number of the aircraft described in our answer, nor its registration certificate, nor is it aware of any of the foregoing.</p> <p>5. Our company is not concerned with the airworthiness certificate of the aircraft described in our answer, nor is it aware of any of the foregoing</p> <p>6. Our company is not concerned with operating the aircraft described in our answer, nor is it aware of any of the foregoing</p> <p>7. Our company is not concerned with any means of payment regarding the implementation of the operation of the aircraft described in our answer and is not aware of any of the foregoing.</p> <p>8. To the best of our knowledge, the selling company has executed the sale contract for the aircraft described in our answer directly with the buyer ((Eagle Enterprise Company Limited), Address: Eastern Pearl, Juba, South Sudan, Tel: 00211955921703 and our company has not obtained any copy of any contract between the two parties (the seller and the buyer) in the same matter</p> |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

## Appendix B to Annex 97: Supporting imagery and documentation relating to IL-18D (MSN#187009903)

Figures 97.B.1

Independent OSINT analyst identification of the IL-18D.<sup>a</sup>





<sup>a</sup> Source: [https://twitter.com/Gerjon\\_/status/1287815982350766085](https://twitter.com/Gerjon_/status/1287815982350766085), 27 July 2020.

## Appendix C to Annex 97: Supporting imagery and documentation relating to Space Cargo Inc PMC support

Figures 97.C.1

Space Cargo Inc emails regarding initial deployment<sup>277</sup>



<sup>277</sup> The resolution of some of this evidence has been reduced as a result of the means of transfer to the Panel via secure social messaging platform, then data erasure to protect sources and finally file compression when adding to this document. Higher resolution imagery is available on request.



**From:** Accounts Department <auditor@spacecargoinc.com>  
**Sent:** Saturday, December 12, 2020 2:08 PM  
**To:** [REDACTED]  
**Cc:** abdullah.ismail@spacecargoinc.com; ermolchev.s.  
**Subject:** HA: ASSEMBLY AND MAINTENANCE OF HELI

Dear [REDACTED]  
 Please let M [REDACTED] go for COVID test immediately.  
 Once test will be ready, please let me know we will purchase for him regular flight from Cape Town to Amman (Jordan), and from Jordan we will arrange flight to point of work.

Regards, Sasha

Thank you & best regards,

Aleksandra  
 Finance Department  
 "SPACE CARGO INC."

T/F: +971 6 55 70 388/+971 6 57 24 019 | Mobile: +971 58 206 4133 |  
 Email: auditor@spacecargoinc.com ; accounts@spacecargoinc.com  
 SAIF Zone | A4-073 | P.O.Box 7812 | Sharjah | United Arab Emirates

**From:** Accounts Department <auditor@spacecargoinc.com>  
**Sent:** 16 December 2020 09:04  
**To:** [REDACTED]  
**Cc:** s.ermolchev@spacecargoinc.com; maher\_nafaa@yahoo.com; 'Abdullah ismail' <abdullah.ismail@spacecargoinc.com>; jyotsna@spacecargoinc.com  
**Subject:** regulations for M [REDACTED] for his trip to Amman, Jordan

Dear [REDACTED]  
 Please note below and handover to M [REDACTED] information as follows:

1. <https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=jo.gov.moh.aman> – this application he has to download on his mobile device;
2. Above application is for QR code tracking – QR code required at Cape Town and Dubai airports;
3. He has to pay around – USD 60-70 for visa stamping on arrival;
4. CORP HOTEL in Amman & Meeting Company is Skywings Aviation - +962779200077 contact number of Skywings Aviation representative – this information required by Immigration in Amman, Jordan;

Confirm the receipt of email

Thank you & best regards,

Aleksandra  
 Finance Department  
 "SPACE CARGO INC."

T/F: +971 6 55 70 388/+971 6 57 24 019 | Mobile: +971 58 206 4133 |  
 Email: auditor@spacecargoinc.com ; accounts@spacecargoinc.com  
 SAIF Zone | A4-073 | P.O.Box 7812 | Sharjah | United Arab Emirates

On 18 Dec 2020, at 3:10 PM, [s.ermolchev@spacecargoinc.com](mailto:s.ermolchev@spacecargoinc.com) wrote:

Dear colleagues,

Good afternoon!

Kindly arrange transportation and HOTAC (1 single room) for [REDACTED] arriving in Queen Alia International Airport on 19<sup>th</sup> of December 2020 at 15.55 local Jordanian time by flight #EK903 (EMIRATES AIRLINES) from Dubai.

Thank you in advance!

Best Regards,

Sergey Ermolchev  
Operations Manager

T/F: +971 6 544 4159 | [Mobile: +971 52 7888 309](mailto:s.ermolchev@spacecargoinc.com) | E-mail: [s.ermolchev@spacecargoinc.com](mailto:s.ermolchev@spacecargoinc.com)  
SAIF Zone | A4-073 | P.O.Box 7812 | Sharjah | United Arab Emirates

On 18 Dec 2020, at 3:10 PM, [s.ermolchev@spacecargoinc.com](mailto:s.ermolchev@spacecargoinc.com) wrote:

Dear colleagues,

Good afternoon!

Kindly arrange transportation and HOTAC (1 single room) for [REDACTED] arriving in Queen Alia International Airport on 19<sup>th</sup> of December 2020 at 15.55 local Jordanian time by flight #EK903 (EMIRATES AIRLINES) from Dubai.

Thank you in advance!

Best Regards,

Sergey Ermolchev  
Operations Manager

T/F: +971 6 544 4159 | [Mobile: +971 52 7888 309](mailto:s.ermolchev@spacecargoinc.com) | E-mail: [s.ermolchev@spacecargoinc.com](mailto:s.ermolchev@spacecargoinc.com)  
SAIF Zone | A4-073 | P.O.Box 7812 | Sharjah | United Arab Emirates

From: [auditor@spacecargoinc.com](mailto:auditor@spacecargoinc.com) <[auditor@spacecargoinc.com](mailto:auditor@spacecargoinc.com)>  
Sent: Friday, December 18, 2020 6:53 PM  
To: [REDACTED]  
Cc: Abdullah Ismail; S Ermolchev  
Subject: Fwd: FW: HOTAC & TRANSPORTATION REQUEST/19 DEC 2020

Dear [REDACTED]  
Hope all is well at your side .  
Kindly accept below confirmation for transportation and Hotel Accommodation for [REDACTED] contact details are below.  
Regards, Sasha

--  
Отправлено из Outlook Email App для Android

----- Пересланное письмо -----  
От: [s.ermolchev@spacecargoinc.com](mailto:s.ermolchev@spacecargoinc.com)  
Кому: Auditor SCI [auditor@spacecargoinc.com](mailto:auditor@spacecargoinc.com)  
Дата: пятница, 18 декабря 2020г., 18:44 +04:00  
Тема: FW: HOTAC & TRANSPORTATION REQUEST/19 DEC 2020

---

From: Ops <[ops@skywingsjordan.com](mailto:ops@skywingsjordan.com)>  
Sent: Friday, December 18, 2020 6:11 PM  
To: [s.ermolchev@spacecargoinc.com](mailto:s.ermolchev@spacecargoinc.com)  
Cc: Mike <[ops@skywingsjordan.com](mailto:ops@skywingsjordan.com)>; suha <[suha@skywingsjordan.com](mailto:suha@skywingsjordan.com)>  
Subject: Re: HOTAC & TRANSPORTATION REQUEST/19 DEC 2020

Dear Sergey  
Good evening  
Ref below well action and confirm  
Kind regards  
Elie Njeim  
OCC/SWA  
Mob:+962779200077  
24/7:+962777818444  
[www.skywingsjordan.com](http://www.skywingsjordan.com)  
Amman-Jordan

Source: Confidential

Figure 97.C.2

Imagery of AS332L Super Puma helicopter repairs in Libya (February to May 2021)<sup>278</sup>



Source: Confidential

<sup>278</sup> The resolution of some of this evidence has been reduced as a result of the means of transfer to the Panel via secure social messaging platform, then data erasure to protect sources and finally file compression when adding to this document. Higher resolution imagery is available on request.


Figures 97.C.3 and 97.C.4

**Infographic for 'Team B' private jet transfer from South Africa to Libya (27 April 2021)**

**PMC 'Team B' deployment on P4-XXX  
(27 April 2021) Departure from Johannesburg  
(25°56'7.13"S 27°55'38.19"E)**

A confidential source provided an image taken of the Dassault Falcon 900DX business jet (registered P4-XXX) prior to departure from Johannesburg (Lanseria) airport. The aircraft was used to deploy Space Cargo Inc 'Team B' to support HAF air operations.


The PMC was contracted to provide the necessary maintenance personnel to get the 3 x Super Puma delivered in July 2019 ready for operational flight.



**Primary sources**

1. Confidential source.
2. Google Earth Pro
3. Geo-reference by Panel.

Developed by UN Panel of Experts.



**PMC 'Team B' deployment on P4-XXX  
(27 April 2021) Arrival at Benghazi  
(32°05'38.30"N, 20°15'45.84"E)**

A confidential source provided an image taken from the cockpit of the Dassault Falcon 900DX business jet (registered P4-XXX) during taxiing in Benghazi (Benina) airport. The aircraft was used to deploy the Space Cargo Inc 'Team B' to support HAF air operations.

Space Cargo Inc was contracted to provide the necessary maintenance to get the 3 x Super Puma delivered in July 2019 ready for operational flight.



**Primary sources**

1. Confidential source.
2. Google Earth Pro
3. Geo-reference support from "Il-Kangurur".

Developed by UN Panel of Experts.



Figure 97.C.5

## Private jet transfer booking request (10 April 2021)



التاريخ 10 أبريل 2021

نتقدم شركة الشامل للخدمات السياحية بطلبها هذا بسؤالكم عن إمكانية ترتيب رحلة بطائرة خاصة من جوهانسبرغ (جنوب أفريقيا) إلى بنغازي (ليبيا) لعدد 5 اشخاص وذلك حسب خط السير ادناه

| تاريخ الرحلة | خط السير                             | عدد الركاب |
|--------------|--------------------------------------|------------|
| 27/04/2021   | Johannesburg (JNB)<br>Benghazi (BEN) | 5          |

على ان يكون الإقلاع من مدينة جوهانسبرغ على تمام الساعة 10:00 صباحا بتوقيت جنوب أفريقيا

نرجو من حضراتكم التكرم بالرد بالإمكانية لتوفير هذه الرحلة واعلامنا بتكلفة الرحلة بالدينار الليبي وطرق الدفع وشكرا

تجدون طبيته قائمة بأسماء الركاب ونسخة من صور الجوازات

تقبلوه بقاتق الاحترام  
مدير قسم الحجوزات  
شركة الشامل للخدمات السياحية



---

العنوان : السلماني الشرقي مقابل البريد الرئيسي  
هاتف : 0619091531-0619091530

Source: Confidential

OFFICIAL UN TRANSLATION 2107704E

*Translated from Arabic*

Date: 10 April 2021

Falcon Jet

Sirs,

Greetings

The Shamil Travel Services Company would like to inquire as to the possibility of arranging a private aeroplane flight from Johannesburg, South Africa, to Benghazi, Libya, for five people, with the following itinerary:

| <i>Date of flight</i> | <i>Route</i>                         | <i>Number of passengers</i> |
|-----------------------|--------------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| 27 April 2021         | Johannesburg (JNB)<br>Benghazi (BEN) | 5                           |

Take-off time from Johannesburg should be 1000 hours South African time

We ask you to kindly respond about the possibility of providing such a flight and let us know the cost in Libyan dinars and the preferred method of payment. Thank you.

Please find attached a list of the passengers' names and a copy of the passport photos.

Accept, Sir, the assurances of my highest consideration.

(*Signature*) Director of the Reservations Division  
Shamil Travel Services Company

---

Address: Eastern Salmani opposite the Main Post Office    Tel: 0619091531-0619091530

Figure 97.C.6 and 97.C.7

## BU Shames FZE Business Licenses

| SAIF ZONE<br>شركة المنطقة الحرة                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             | حكومة الشارقة<br>Government of Sharjah                                                                                                    |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <b>شهادة ترخيص<br/>License Certificate</b>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             |                                                                                                                                           |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               |
| LICENSE NO.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              | 21315                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       | رقم الرخصة                                                                                                                                | ٢١٣١٥                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         |
| NAME                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     | BU SHAMES (FZE)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             | الاسم                                                                                                                                     | بو شامس (م.ح)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 |
| LEGAL STATUS                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             | Free Zone Est. with Limited Liability                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       | الشكل القانوني                                                                                                                            | مؤسسة منطقة حرة ذات مسؤولية محدودة                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            |
| TYPE OF LICENSE                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          | Commercial                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  | نوع الرخصة                                                                                                                                | تجارية                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        |
| ACTIVITY(S)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              | Trading in Civil Aircrafts & Spare Parts                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    | النشاط                                                                                                                                    | تجارة الطائرات المدنية وقطع غيارها (يشترط الحصول على موافقة الجهات المختصة في دولة الإمارات العربية المتحدة)                                                                                                                                                                                  |
| OWNER(S)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 | ABDULLAH MOHAMMED ALISMAEL                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  | المالك                                                                                                                                    | عبدالله محمد الاسماعيل                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        |
| MANAGER                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  | ABDULLAH MOHAMED ALISMAEL                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   | المدير المسؤول                                                                                                                            | عبدالله محمد الاسماعيل                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        |
| SAIF-ZONE ADDRESS                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        | 600 M2 Warehouse A4-08<br>Sharjah - U.A.E                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   | العنوان في المنطقة الحرة                                                                                                                  | مستودع ٢٦٠٠٠ ايه-٨ - الشارقة - أ.ع.م                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          |
| INCORPORATION DATE                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       | 08 March 2020                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               | تاريخ عقد التأسيس                                                                                                                         | ٠٨ مارس ٢٠٢٠                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  |
| ISSUE DATE                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               | 08 March 2021                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               | تاريخ الاصدار                                                                                                                             | ٠٨ مارس ٢٠٢١                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  |
| EXPIRY DATE                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              | 07 March 2022                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               | تاريخ الانتهاء                                                                                                                            | ٠٧ مارس ٢٠٢٢                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  |
| REMARKS                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  | THIS LICENSE IS ISSUED AND BASED UPON EMIRI DECREE NO. 2 OF 1995 ISSUED IN SHARJAH ON MAY 8, 1995.<br><br>THIS LICENSE IS GRANTED TO THE LICENSEE ONLY AND SHALL NOT BE LEASED OR TRANSFERRED WITHOUT PRIOR APPROVAL OF THE SAIF ZONE.<br><br>SALES IN U.A.E SHALL BE CAIRED OUT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE VALID LAWS AND REGULATIONS THEREOF. | ملاحظات                                                                                                                                   | هذه الرخصة صادرة استنادا الى لمرسوم الاميري رقم ٢ لسنة ١٩٩٥ الصادر في الشارقة بتاريخ ٨ مايو ١٩٩٥.<br><br>هذه الرخصة مخصصة للمرخص له فقط ولا يجوز تأجيرها او تحويلها الا بموافقة هيئة المنطقة الحرة لمطار الشارقة لتتولى<br><br>تم اعتناى البيع داخل الدولة وفقا للنظم والقوانين السارية فيها. |
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| 1- Send an SMS to 2514 with License number.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             | 1- رسالة نصية قصيرة (SMS) إلى الرقم 2514 مع رقم الرخصة.                                                                                   |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               |
| 2- Scan the QR code.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             | 2- مسح رمز الاستجابة السريع (QR Code)                                                                                                     |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               |
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| <p>هذه الوثيقة رسمية ولا تحتاج لخطم أو توقيع وللتأكد من صحة البيانات يرجى زيارة الموقع <a href="http://www.saif-zone.com">www.saif-zone.com</a></p> <p>This document is official and it does not need to be stamped or signed. To view license detail visit <a href="http://www.saif-zone.com">www.saif-zone.com</a></p> |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             |                                                                                                                                           |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               |





حكومة الشارقة  
Government of Sharjah

## شهادة ترخيص

### License Certificate

|                    |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               |                          |
|--------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------|
| LICENSE NO.        | 22237                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     | ٢٢٢٣٧                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         | رقم الرخصة               |
| NAME               | BU SHAMES (FZE)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           | بو شامس (م.م.ح)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               | الاسم                    |
| LEGAL STATUS       | Free Zone Est. with Limited Liability                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     | مؤسسة منطقة حرة ذات مسؤولية محدودة                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            | الشكل القانوني           |
| TYPE OF LICENSE    | Services                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  | خدمية                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         | نوع الرخصة               |
| ACTIVITY(S)        | Chartering & Leasing of Civil Aircraft                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    | تأجير واستئجار الطائرات المدنية (بشرط الحصول على موافقة الجهات المختصة في دولة الإمارات العربية المتحدة)                                                                                                                                                                                      | النشاط                   |
| OWNER(S)           | ABDULLAH MOHAMED ALISMAEL                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 | عبدالله محمد الاسماعيل                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        | المالك                   |
| MANAGER            | ABDULLAH MOHAMED ALISMAEL                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 | عبدالله محمد الاسماعيل                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        | المدير المسؤول           |
| SAIF-ZONE ADDRESS  | 600 M2 Warehouse A4-08<br>Sharjah - U.A.E                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 | مستودع ٢٦٠٠ ٨-٤-٨<br>الشارقة - ا.ع.م                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          | العنوان في المنطقة الحرة |
| INCORPORATION DATE | 08 March 2020                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             | ٠٨ مارس ٢٠٢٠                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  | تاريخ عقد التأسيس        |
| ISSUE DATE         | 17 March 2021                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             | ١٧ مارس ٢٠٢١                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  | تاريخ الاصدار            |
| EXPIRY DATE        | 07 March 2022                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             | ٠٧ مارس ٢٠٢٢                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  | تاريخ الإنتهاء           |
| REMARKS            | THIS LICENSE IS ISSUED AND BASED UPON EMIRI DECREE NO. 2 OF 1995 ISSUED IN SHARJAH ON MAY 8, 1995<br><br>THIS LICENSE IS GRANTED TO THE LICENSEE ONLY AND SHALL NOT BE LEASED OR TRANSFERRED WITHOUT PRIOR APPROVAL OF THE SAIF ZONE<br><br>SALES IN U.A.E SHALL BE CARRIED OUT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE VALID LAWS AND REGULATIONS THEREOF | هذه الرخصة صادرة استنادا الى المرسوم الأميري رقم ٢ لسنة ١٩٩٥ الصادر في الشارقة بتاريخ ٨ مايو ١٩٩٥<br><br>هذه الرخصة ممنوحة للمرخص له فقط ولا يجوز تأجيرها أو تحويلها إلا بموافقة هيئة المنطقة الحرة لمطار الشارقة الدولي<br><br>تتم أعمال البيع داخل الدولة وفقا للنظم والقوانين السارية فيها | ملاحظات                  |

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- 2- مسح رمز الاستجابة السريع (QR Code)
- 3- زيارة الموقع الإلكتروني:  
<https://portal.saif-zone.com/LicenseDetail.aspx>

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This document is official and it does not need to be stamped or signed

Date : 17/03/2021  
\*RM\*

التاريخ: ٢٠٢١/٠٣/١٧

Figure 97.C.8

**Repair Team 'A' accommodation in Benghazi airport****PMC 'Team A' Accommodation  
(02 February 2021)  
(32° 5'18"N, 20°15'38"E)**

A confidential source provided imagery of the accommodation for the Space Cargo Inc 'Team A' that deployed to Libya on 31 January 2021.

The location was identified from geo-referencing.

**Primary sources**

1. Confidential sources.
2. Google Earth Pro
3. Geo-reference support from "Il-Kanguru".

Developed by UN Panel of Experts.



Figure 97.C.9

**Repair Team 'B' accommodation in Benghazi****PMC 'Team B' Accommodation  
(April/May 2021)  
(31°59'36.75"N, 20° 9'45.23"E)**

A confidential source provided imagery of the accommodation for the Space Cargo Inc 'Team B' that deployed to Libya on 27 April 2021.

The location was identified from geo-referencing.

**Primary sources**

1. Confidential sources.
2. Google Earth Pro
3. Geo-reference support from "Il-Kanguru".

Developed by UN Panel of Experts.





## Annex 98 Syrian Arab Airlines (SYR) operating in Libya

1. The Panel has identified that the Syrian Arab Airlines<sup>279</sup> operated IL-76T cargo aircraft displaying Syrian registration YK-ATA (MSN<sup>280</sup> 93421613) made an initial flight from Damascus to Benghazi or Tobruk on 20 August 2021. The aircraft was identified as making five flights from Benghazi to Tobruk in December 2022 and six flights in February 2022.
2. The activities and profile of this aircraft meet five of the Panel's air delivery profile indicators that when considered collectively indicate that an aircraft is carrying illicit cargo: (a) lack of an obvious schedule; (b) the random nature of the flights; (c) the indirect route; (d) AIS is often switched off; (d) air operator transparency is opaque; and (e) the aircraft flew a similar track to that used for the "Libya Airbridge" reported in UN document [S/2021/229](#) (paragraphs 81 to 83 and annexes 39 and 55).
3. The Panel requested further information from the airline in letters dated 24 September 2021 and 14 March 2022. No response has yet been received.
4. The Panel will continue to monitor the activities of Syrian Arab Airlines (SYR).

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<sup>279</sup> Office 3N, 35 Starinovskaya Street, 220056 Minsk, Belarus. +375 (17) 3507253. [www.rada.aero](http://www.rada.aero).

<sup>280</sup> Manufacturer's serial number.

## Annex 99 Update on Project Opus

### Aircraft

1. The Panel has identified further information on the design, deployment routing and current whereabouts of the LASA T-Bird (YU-TSH) light attack aircraft reported in [S/2021/229](#).<sup>281</sup>
2. The aircraft<sup>282</sup> deployed from GAS Aviation in Rudine, Serbia on 18 June 2019 and flew to Wiener Neustadt airport, Austria (LOAN). Wiener Neustadt airport is the base of Airborne Technologies,<sup>283</sup> the company that designed and modified the aircraft.<sup>284</sup> It remained there for six days before deploying to Amman, Jordan (OJAM) on 24 June 2019 making technical stops at Sofia, Bulgaria (LBSF) and Heraklion, Greece (LGIR). The pilot was Shawn Matthews, the Head of Airborne Technologies Flight Test department.<sup>285</sup>
3. The Panel can now confirm that the aircraft left Amman, Jordan on 18 July 2019 for Larnaca, Cyprus (LCLK) and not on 22 July 2019 as initially reported. On 30 July 2019 the aircraft was moved to Paphos, Cyprus (LCPH) where it is now in storage with EDT Hangar Services Limited (see figures 99.1 and 99.2).<sup>286</sup> The pilot was Matthew Coughlin, one of the PMC operatives that evacuated from Libya to Malta on the rigid hulled inflatable boat (RHIB) 'Manta-1' on 29 June 2019.<sup>287</sup> An updated infographic for the aircraft is at appendix A.<sup>288</sup>

Figure 99.1

**LASA T-Bird condition in Serbia on 16 June 2019**



Figure 99.2

**LASA T-Bird at Larnaca (19 July 2019)**



**Sources:** See figure 99.3

4. The Panel noted that at some time between leaving Serbia on 18 June 2019 and arriving at Larnaca on 19 July 2019 the overall body colour of the aircraft had changed from white to a 'military grey'. The position and font of the registration

<sup>281</sup> See paras. 39 to 41 and annex 76 of [S/2021/229](#).

<sup>282</sup> Using Mode-S Hex Code 4C4E47.

<sup>283</sup> <https://www.airbornetechnologies.at>.

<sup>284</sup> At that time (2013 to 2017) Erik PRINCE was an indirect partner in the Company, controlling 25%. <https://www.profil.at/wirtschaft/neue-ermittlungen-gegen-firma-airborne-technologies-aus-noe/401724246>, 4 September 2021; and <https://theintercept.com/2016/04/11/blackwater-founder-erik-prince-drive-to-build-private-air-force/>, 11 April 2016. See later for example of disguised ownership.

<sup>285</sup> Confidential source.

<sup>286</sup> <http://www.edthangarservices.com/>.


<sup>287</sup> See appendix R to annex 76 of [S/2021/229](#).

<sup>288</sup> This no longer includes the transfer to Aircraft and More GmbH, as the company was purely used as a sales agent. Information from Cerha Hempel Rechtsanwälte GmbH dated 16 November 2021.

markings had also changed (see figure 99.3). The Panel notes that 'Global Geo Survey' markings were applied to the aircraft in Paphos. The company does not exist, and the company name was last seen on the sister aircraft H80-156DC on 12 November 2014 in Malta. This sister aircraft was last seen in Nakasongola air force base in Uganda in May 2019.

Figure 99.3

**Comparison of overall body colour and registration markings**



5. The aircraft no longer holds a valid certificate of airworthiness, which expired on 4 June 2020,<sup>289</sup> and the Serbian authorities revoked the aircraft registration certificate on 8 October 2021. At this time, the aircraft can no longer legally fly until re-registered with a Member State and a certificate of airworthiness issued.

6. The aircraft were inspected by the Cypriot authorities, in the presence of a Member State law enforcement agency on 11 October 2021. The Panel is awaiting the official release of this report to the Panel.

**Disguised company ownership**

7. In [S/2021/229](#) the Panel made a statement regarding the assistance provided by Erik Prince for the rapid transfer of aviation assets from companies that he controlled. What the Panel did not report at that time, due to it being single source, was an interview with Gregg Smith who, as the Chief Executive Officer of Frontier Services Group (FSG) from 2014 to 1

<sup>289</sup> Data from Serbian CAA civil aircraft registry. <http://cad.gov.rs/en/strana/20841/aircraft-registry#app>.

May 2016,<sup>290</sup> worked closely with Erik Prince, then the Chairman of FSG. Gregg Smith stated to the Panel<sup>291</sup> that the cover story for Operation Opus would be “oil and gas security” or “oil and gas survey” as that was what Erik Prince had always used. Gregg Smith repeated this publicly in an interview with [www.narativ.org](http://www.narativ.org) on 17 September 2020.<sup>292</sup>

8. Gregg Smith also claimed that it was implausible that Erik Prince did not control Lancaster6, the company that launched the operation. Gregg Smith went on to explain that, in his experience, Erik Prince protected himself from litigation by not owning companies, and by controlling them through debt ownership or security pledges he would receive material or financial benefits in other ways. The Panel now has evidence<sup>293</sup> of this technique being used by Erik Prince regarding PBM Limited (Malta #C74485), which was 50% owned by Unified Global Services Group Limited (Malta C66387) a company controlled by James Fenech, coincidentally the supplier of the RHIBs to Operation Opus. On 1 June 2017 Unified Global Services Group Limited pledged 100% of their shareholding in PBM Limited (Malta) to a US registered company Phalanx Holding Company LLC (Delaware# 4901076), which was controlled by Erik Prince, hence making Erik Prince in effect the beneficial owner of PBM Limited (Malta). After the investigation and arrest of James Fenech in late April 2020, and the freezing of Fenech’s assets on 24 April 2020 by the Maltese court, Erik Prince made efforts to divest himself of his interest in PBM Limited (Malta) and sever business links with James Fenech. The Panel believes this to be part of a wider cover up operation. At this point Erik Prince revealed his interest in Phalanx Holding Company LLC by personally signing the termination of pledge documentation, in effect returning control and ownership of the company back to Nicola Bandini and Unified Global Services Group Limited (Malta) on 21 July 2020. This was an uncharacteristic error of Erik Prince whose signature has not previously been identified by the Panel on open-source corporate documentation. Documentary evidence is at appendix B to this annex.


<sup>290</sup> <https://www.marketscreener.com/quote/stock/Frontier-Services-Group-L-6165919/news/Frontier-Services-1-RESIGNATION-OF-AN-EXECUTIVE-DIRECTOR-2-GRANT-OF-SHARE-OPTIONS-3-RESIGNAT-22268951/>, 29 April 2016.

<sup>291</sup> Panel interview of 30 March 2020.

<sup>292</sup> Smith, Gregg interviewed by Shalev, Zev, “Prince of Proxy: Libya”, *Narativ live with Zev Shalev*, Narativ.org, 12:30 to 13:35. 17 September 2020. <https://www.podbean.com/ew/pb-zzcef-ebc21a>.

<sup>293</sup> Initially identified by @bugdavem (Twitter), 18 April 2019.

# Appendix A to Annex 99: LASA T-Bird (YU-TSH) infographic



## Appendix B to Annex 99: Documentation illustrating disguised ownership technique used by Erik PRINCE

1. Documentation for figures 99.B.1 to 99.B.3 within this annex is from the Malta Business Registry.<sup>294</sup>
2. PBM Limited was registered on 2 December 2016 with 1,200 authorized shares. Nicola Bandini held 600 shares and Unified Global Services Group Limited (Malta C66387) the remaining 600 shares. Unified Global Services Group Limited (Malta C66387) is owned by James Fenech, the individual who supplied the RHIBs to Opus through a separate subsidiary of Unified Global Services Group Limited called Sovereign Charterers (Malta) Limited.

Figure 99.B.1

### Authorised Share Capital of 1000 shares

| <div> <div>MBR</div> <div>MALTA BUSINESS REGISTRY</div> </div>                                                                                     |          |                                |               |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------|--------------------------------|---------------|
| Company Share Capital                                                                                                                              |          |                                |               |
| <div> <div>Company Details</div> <div>Authorised Shares</div> <div>Involved Parties</div> <div>Beneficial Owners</div> <div>Documents</div> </div> |          |                                |               |
| Company Registration Number C 78445 - PBM LIMITED                                                                                                  |          |                                |               |
| <div> <div>Company Registration Number</div> <div>C 78445</div> </div>                                                                             |          |                                |               |
| <div> <div>Total No. of Authorised Shares</div> <div>1,200 (EUR 1200.00)</div> </div>                                                              |          |                                |               |
| <div> <div>Total No. of Issued Shares</div> <div>1,200 (EUR 1200.00)</div> </div>                                                                  |          |                                |               |
| Authorised Share Capital                                                                                                                           | Type     | Nominal Value Per Share in EUR | Issued Shares |
| 1,200                                                                                                                                              | Ordinary | 1.000000                       | 1,200         |

<sup>294</sup> <https://registry.mbr.mt>.



Figure 99.B.2

Pledge of shares to Phalanx Holding Company LLC (USA)<sup>295</sup> (1 June 2017)

Form T (2)

No. of Company C78445

**REGISTRY**

**RECEIVED**

- 6 JUN 2017

**OF COMPANIES**

Name of Company

**COMPANIES ACT, 1995**

**Notice of a pledge of securities**

**Pursuant to Section 122 (2)**

**PBM LIMITED**

**BG**

**09 JUN 2017**

Given by **MamoTCV Advocates – Dr. Nicholas Valenzia**

To the *Registrar of Companies*:

I hereby give notice in accordance with Section 122 (2) of the Companies Act, 1995 that with effect from 28<sup>th</sup> May, 2017 the undermentioned securities have been pledged.

| Pledgor<br>(Name and Address)                                                                                                      | Pledgee<br>(Name and Address)                                                                                                                     | Securities |          |       |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------|----------|-------|
|                                                                                                                                    |                                                                                                                                                   | Number     | Kind     | Value |
| <b>UNIFIED GLOBAL SERVICES GROUP LIMITED</b><br>Co. Reg. № 66837<br>/22, Parish Square,<br>Abu Dhabi,<br>UAE.                      | <b>PHALANX HOLDING COMPANY, LLC</b><br>Co. Reg. № 4901076<br>1209, Orange Street,<br>Wilmington,<br>New Castle County,<br>Delaware 19801,<br>USA. | 600        | Ordinary | €1.00 |
| <b>NICOLA BANDINI</b><br>Italian Passport №<br>A1301870<br>P.O. BOX 77798,<br>Khalifa Park,<br>Abu Dhabi,<br>United Arab Emirates. | <b>PHALANX HOLDING COMPANY, LLC</b><br>Co. Reg. № 4901076<br>1209, Orange Street,<br>Wilmington,<br>New Castle County,<br>Delaware 19801,<br>USA. | 600        | Ordinary | €1.0  |

Signature.....  
**Nicholas Valenzia**  
As duly authorized  
for and on behalf of the Pledgee

Dated this.....1<sup>ST</sup>.....day of June.....of the year 2017.

<sup>295</sup> Owned by Erik Prince. See figures 99.B.3 and .B.4.

Figure 99.B.3

Termination of pledge of shares to Phalanx Holding Company LLC (USA) signed by Erik Prince (21 July 2020)

Delivered by **Nicola Bandini**

To the Registrar of Companies:

I hereby give notice in accordance with Section 122 (15) of the Companies Act, 1995 that with effect from 21/07/2020 2020 the pledge of the undermentioned securities has been terminated.

| Pledgor (Name & Address)                                                                    | Pledgee (Name & Address)                                                                                  | Securities |                 |               |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------|-----------------|---------------|
|                                                                                             |                                                                                                           | Number     | Type            | Nominal Value |
| Unified Global Services Group Ltd.<br>22, Parish<br>St. John's, Malta<br>Co. Reg. No. 66837 | Phalanx Holding Company, LLC<br>Co. Reg. No. 001076<br>Wilmington, New Castle County, Delaware 19801, USA | 600        | Ordinary shares | €1            |
| Nicola Bandini<br>Via Casalone Di Val<br>53034 Italy<br>Italian Passport Number YA1301870   | Phalanx Holding Company, LLC<br>Co. Reg. No. 001076<br>Wilmington, New Castle County, Delaware 19801, USA | 600        | Ordinary Shares | €1            |

Signature .....  .....  
Erik Prince  
For and on behalf of  
Phalanx Holding Company,  
LLC

Dated this 21 day of July of the year 2020

*This form must be completed in typed form.*

4. Further research establishes that Phalanx Holding Company LLR is registered to Erik Prince's home address in Virginia.

Figure 99.B.4

Identification of the use of Erik Prince's home address for registration of Phalanx Holding Company LLC (Virginia, USA)

**opencorporates**  
The Open Database Of The Corporate World

Company name or number  **SEARCH**

[Companies](#) [Officers](#) [Log in/Sign up](#)

## PHALANX HOLDING COMPANY LLC

**BRANCH**

**Company Number** T0464935  
**Status** Active  
**Incorporation Date** 9 May 2011 (almost 10 years ago)  
**Company Type** Foreign Limited Liability Company  
**Jurisdiction** [Virginia \(US\)](#)  
**Branch** Branch of PHALANX HOLDING COMPANY, LLC (Delaware (US))

**Registered Address** 23118 FOXCROFT  
MIDDLEBURG  
20118-0000  
Virginia  
United States

**Business Classification Text** GENERAL  
**Agent Name** C T CORPORATION SYSTEM  
**Agent Address** 4701 Cox Rd Ste 285, Glen Allen, Virginia, 23060-6808  
**Directors / Officers** [C T CORPORATION SYSTEM, agent](#)

**Company network**  
Not yet available for this company. [Click to find out more](#)

**Latest Events**

- 2011-05-09 Incorporated
- 2011-05-09 - 2019-11-12 Addition of officer C T CORPORATION SYSTEM, agent
- 2019-12-03 - 2020-12-05 Change of name from 'PHALANX HOLDING COMPANY, LLC' to 'PHALANX HOLDING COMPANY LLC'

[See all events](#)

**Corporate Grouping** [USER CONTRIBUTED](#)  
None known. [Add one now?](#)  
[See all corporate groupings](#)

**Similarly named companies**

[PHALANX HOLDING COMPANY, LLC](#) (Delaware (US), 19 Nov 2010- )

Source Commonwealth of Virginia State Corporation Commission, <https://cis.scc.virginia.gov/>, 28 Feb 2021

## Annex 100 Update on ChVK Wagner and Russian PMC operations and logistics<sup>296</sup>

### General

1. The Panel has obtained further information and records relating to ChVK Wagner operations and logistics additional to that reported in Panel report [S/2021/229](#).<sup>297</sup>

2. In early 2021 the BBC gained exclusive access to a Samsung electronic tablet left behind on a Libyan battlefield by a ChVK Wagner mercenary.<sup>298</sup> Their investigation was published on 10 and 11 August 2021.<sup>299</sup> The Panel has spoken to the BBC investigative team regarding the circumstances of the find and is assured of the chain of custody and continuity of evidence for the electronic tablet. Furthermore, although a single technical source, the electronic device contains tangible documentary and imagery evidence that makes it highly likely that the contents are authentic. Some of the information contained in the tablet has been corroborated by other sources (see below). Two confidential Panel sources with extensive knowledge of the ChVK Wagner organization, independent from the BBC, also considered the find of the electronic tablet and its contents as authentic.

3. The Samsung electronic tablet contained:

- (a) Over 42 military diagrammatic images for Russian designed fuzes, mines and booby-traps (see examples at appendix A);
- (b) Over twenty pages of Russian military low level tactical information on, for example, range finding through weapons sights, published by the Senior Service College of the Far East Department of Weapons and Marksmanship (author S.P. Proshchenkov) (see examples appendix B);<sup>300</sup> and
- (c) A mapping application software “All in One Offline Maps Plus”,<sup>301</sup> which had at least 35 locations of mines and booby traps displayed, as well as code names of fighters and fighting positions in the Ain Zara area of South Tripoli.



<sup>296</sup> There were a number of Russian PMC operating in Libya between 2019 and 2020. The Panel will only attribute an incident or activity to a named Russian PMC where evidential standards for attribution have been met. Otherwise, the term “Russian PMC” will be used.

<sup>297</sup> Primarily in p.32 and annex 77.

<sup>298</sup> The term “private military operative” was previously used in Panel reporting as evidential standards of ‘*direct participation in hostilities*’ by specifically ChVK Wagner personnel had not been met to allow the Panel to use the term ‘mercenary’ when referring to ChVK Wagner personnel. The term ‘mercenary’ when used in this document refers to ‘armed mercenary personnel’ as referenced in paragraph 9 of resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#). The information contained in this update provides evidence of ‘*direct participation in hostilities*’ by ChVK Wagner individuals thus allowing the Panel to make a definitive finding as to the “armed mercenary personnel” status of the individuals identified in Libya as operating for ChVK Wagner.

<sup>299</sup> <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-58009514>; and <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/extra/8iaz6xit26/the-lost-tablet-and-the-secret-documents>.

<sup>300</sup> Official UN translation 2108754E.

<sup>301</sup> [https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=net.psyberia.offlinemaps&hl=en\\_GB&gl=US](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=net.psyberia.offlinemaps&hl=en_GB&gl=US).

### Imagery of anti-personnel mines

4. The imagery included schematic diagrams of the Russian designed MON-50, POM-2 and PMN-2 anti-personnel mines (APM). The POM-2 and PMN-2 APM were reported as being first seen in Libya in Panel report [S/2021/229](#),<sup>302</sup> and were found to be violations of paragraph 9 of resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#) by a Russian PMC. Also see paragraphs 7 to 9 below for other equipment, weapons and ammunition requested in the logistic resupply documentation found on the electronic tablet, that were first seen in Libya during 2020.

### Mapping application - location of anti-personnel mines

5. The locations of thirty-five APM were indicated within the mapping application as shown in table 100.1 and in figure 100.1. The Panel has geo-referenced the locations shown to confirm the accuracy of the mapping application software. The Panel also confirmed that the area within which the mined locations are indicated on the mapping software was under the control of HAF, including his ChVK Wagner support, from the end of February 2020 until the HAF withdrawal in late May 2020. It was their frontline at that time, which explains the deployment of defensive command initiated anti-personnel mines such as the MON-50, 90 and 200 series. The Panel has further confirmed<sup>303</sup> that explosive hazards were removed from these specific locations by a combination of Libyan Ministry of Interior, military and NGO explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) teams as part of ongoing battlefield area clearance (BAC) operations in mid 2020. Examples of screenshots from the electronic tablet are at appendix C.

Table 100.1

#### Indicated locations of APM

| #  | ChVK # | Type       | Location (Longitude and Latitude) |               | Remarks                               |
|----|--------|------------|-----------------------------------|---------------|---------------------------------------|
| 1  |        |            | 32°46'36.33"N                     | 13°17'02.69"N |                                       |
| 2  |        |            | 32°46'40.36"N                     | 13°16'56.46"N |                                       |
| 3  |        |            | 32°46'21.96"N                     | 13°16'51.43"N |                                       |
| 4  |        |            | 32°45'54.59"N                     | 13°16'50.97"N |                                       |
| 5  |        | Booby Trap | 32°46'24.01"N                     | 13°16'21.85"N | ▪ Booby trapped F1 Grenade.           |
| 6  |        | Command    | 32°46'23.52"N                     | 13°16'21.33"N | ▪ Possible remote controlled OZM APM. |
| 7  |        | Booby Trap | 32°46'24.28"N                     | 13°16'20.24"N | ▪ Booby trapped F1 Grenade.           |
| 8  |        |            | 32°46'08.80"N                     | 13°16'20.64"N |                                       |
| 9  | A1     |            | 32°45'38.24"N                     | 13°16'41.90"N |                                       |
| 10 | A1     |            | 32°46'33.28"N                     | 13°16'23.97"N | ▪ Second A1 code location referenced. |
| 11 | A2     |            | 32°45'41.13"N                     | 13°16'48.19"N |                                       |
| 12 | A2     |            | 32°46'32.27"N                     | 13°16'31.89"N | ▪ Second A2 code location referenced. |
| 13 | A3     |            | 32°45'42.48"N                     | 13°16'54.73"N |                                       |
| 14 | A3     |            | 32°46'31.72"N                     | 13°16'26.77"N | ▪ Second A3 code location referenced. |
| 15 | A4     |            | 32°45'42.65"N                     | 13°16'55.88"N |                                       |
| 16 | A5     |            | 32°45'44.47"N                     | 13°16'55.43"N |                                       |

<sup>302</sup> PMN-2 in table 6 and annex 67. POM-2R in table 6 and annex 70.

<sup>303</sup> Source: An operational demining organization in Libya.


| #  | ChVK # | Type    | Location (Longitude and Latitude) |               | Remarks                                                                                                                                                                               |
|----|--------|---------|-----------------------------------|---------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 17 | A5     |         | 32°46'29.50"N                     | 13°16'23.78"N | ▪ Second A3 code location referenced.                                                                                                                                                 |
| 18 | A6     |         | 32°45'45.14"N                     | 13°17'10.12"N |                                                                                                                                                                                       |
| 19 | A6     |         | 32°46'27.40"N                     | 13°16'23.81"N | ▪ Second A6 code location referenced.                                                                                                                                                 |
| 20 | A7     |         | 32°45'50.90"N                     | 13°17'09.53"N |                                                                                                                                                                                       |
| 21 | A7     |         | 32°46'37.36"N                     | 13°16'18.79"N | ▪ Second A7 code location referenced.<br>▪ Two F3 EOD operators killed at 32° 46' 37.46"N, 13°16'19.10"E by an OZM-72 on 5 July 2020. (8.5m between reported locations). <sup>a</sup> |
| 22 | A8     |         | 32°45'46.25"N                     | 13°16'48.46"N |                                                                                                                                                                                       |
| 23 | A9     |         | 32°45'30.35"N                     | 13°16'35.27"N |                                                                                                                                                                                       |
| 24 | A10    |         | 32°45'41.26"N                     | 13°16'42.17"N |                                                                                                                                                                                       |
| 25 | A11    |         | 32°45'39.13"N                     | 13°16'43.20"N |                                                                                                                                                                                       |
| 26 | T2     |         | 32°46'12.35"N                     | 13°16'44.75"N |                                                                                                                                                                                       |
| 27 |        | MON-50  | 32°46'21.88"N                     | 13°16'41.41"N |                                                                                                                                                                                       |
| 28 |        | MON-50  | 32°46'18.27"N                     | 13°16'30.64"N | ▪ Possibly remote initiated.                                                                                                                                                          |
| 29 |        | MON-50  | 32°46'19.33"N                     | 13°16'28.80"N |                                                                                                                                                                                       |
| 30 |        | MON-50  | 32°46'21.46"N                     | 13°16'21.21"N |                                                                                                                                                                                       |
| 31 |        | MON-50  | 32°46'21.20"N                     | 13°16'27.13"N |                                                                                                                                                                                       |
| 32 |        | MON-50  | 32°46'23.08"N                     | 13°16'25.52"N |                                                                                                                                                                                       |
| 33 |        | MON-90  | 32°46'24.75"N                     | 13°16'31.35"N |                                                                                                                                                                                       |
| 34 |        | MON-90  | 32°46'24.45"N                     | 13°16'31.98"N |                                                                                                                                                                                       |
| 35 |        | MON-200 | 32°46'22.64"N                     | 13°16'32.18"N |                                                                                                                                                                                       |

<sup>a</sup> **Source:** Accident report by an operational demining organization in Libya.

6. The locations at table 100.1 also includes some information as to the type of mine deployed. These include MON-50, MON-90, MON-200 and OZM-72, none of which have been reported as being in Libya before. The transfer of these mines to Libya is therefore a violation of paragraph 9 of resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#). Imagery of three of these mine types recovered by GNU-AF and Libyan NGO EOD teams in the Tripoli area is at appendix D.



Figure 100.1  
Indicated locations of APM from mapping software



5. The Panel also received information<sup>304</sup> regarding the recovery during Summer 2020 of booby-trapped TM-62M anti-tank mines from positions previously occupied by, primarily, ChVK Wagner operatives in Southern Tripoli (see figure 100.2).<sup>305</sup>

Figure 100.2

**TM-62M mine with booby trap**



#### **IHL and indiscriminate use of explosive ordnance**

6. When employing explosive weapons in their military operations, Russian PMC operatives were obliged under IHL to respect the prohibition of indiscriminate attacks and to take all feasible precautionary measures to protect civilians from the indiscriminate effects of those weapons.<sup>306</sup> These measures should include: (a) the visible marking of mines and other explosive devices; (b) issuing effective warnings on the emplacement of these devices to the local civilian population; and (c) removing or facilitating their removal upon the end of active hostilities.

7. The Panel found that ChVK Wagner operatives did not take the required precautions when they laid the thirty-five APMs (table 100.1 above) in urban locations of the Ain Zara municipality that were likely to be used by civilians after their withdrawal. This failure to avoid, or at least to minimize, incidental effects of the deployed ordnance on the civilian population and civilian objects rendered their method of warfare unlawful under IHL.<sup>307</sup>

8. In at least one case on 5 July 2020, shortly after the withdrawal of the ChVK Wagner operatives from their positions in Ain Zara, a booby-trapped mine (serial 21 in table 100.1 above) unexpectedly detonated during an EOD clearance operation. This resulted in the indiscriminate death of two civilian EOD operators.<sup>308</sup> The device was unmarked and attached to a harmless object inside a civilian house (see appendix F). The two victims, who did not take a direct part in the hostilities, were staff members of a mine action non-governmental organisation deployed to remove mines, booby-traps and other explosive devices from the populated area of Ain Zara.

<sup>304</sup> Confidential source in the mine action community (19 January 2022).

<sup>305</sup> The use of ML-8 anti lift initiators was reported in S/2019/229.

<sup>306</sup> Customary International Humanitarian Law [CIHL] rules 1, 11-12, and 15.

<sup>307</sup> CIHL rules 80-83. *See also* CIHL rule 15.

<sup>308</sup> Confidential sources within mine action organizations operational in Libya. The Panel has copies of the death certificates.

9. The Panel further found that Russian PMC operatives did not take the required precautions when they laid the TM-62M booby trapped anti-tank mines (figure 100.2 above) in an urban location along the civilian road in Southern Tripoli, which was expected to be used by civilians after the withdrawal of the PMC operatives.<sup>309</sup> This failure to avoid, or at least to minimize, incidental effects of the deployed ordnance on the civilian population and civilian objects rendered their method of warfare unlawful under IHL.<sup>310</sup>

10. The method in which ChVK Wagner operatives emplaced the thirty-five APMs and the Russian PMC operatives the TM-62M booby trapped anti-tank mines, without any feasible precautionary measures, also heavily undermined the safe return of the displaced civilians to their homes as well as the protection of those civilian organizations mandated to carry out mine clearance as a specific measure to facilitate the right of the displaced civilians to voluntary return in safety to their homes or places of habitual residence as soon as the reasons for their displacement ceased to exist.<sup>311</sup>

### Mapping application - tactical information

11. The mapping application software data also contained tactical information such as names and unit identifiers. These are at table 100.2 for reference.

Table 100.2

#### Tactical information

| #  | Data           | Panel analysis              | Remarks                                                                                                                                               |
|----|----------------|-----------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 1  | Red Dot        | ChVK Wagner location        |                                                                                                                                                       |
| 2  | Blue Dot       | Enemy / GNU-AF              |                                                                                                                                                       |
| 3  | Yellow Dot     | LNA / HAF                   |                                                                                                                                                       |
| 4  | Purple Dot     | Not confirmed               | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Possibly 'Protective Fire' (PF)<sup>a</sup> or 'Final Protective Fire' (FPF)<sup>b</sup> locations.</li> </ul> |
| 5  | Black Dot      | Mines, booby traps or IEDs. |                                                                                                                                                       |
| 6  | Light Blue Dot | Not confirmed               |                                                                                                                                                       |
| 7  | "Diver"        | Unknown                     | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Possible code name of fighter.</li> </ul>                                                                      |
| 8  | "German"       | Code name of fighter        | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Three Wagner operatives are known to use this nickname.<sup>c</sup></li> </ul>                                 |
| 9  | "Himmler"      | Code name of fighter        |                                                                                                                                                       |
| 10 | "Metla"        | Fedor Andreevich METELKIN   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Wagner # M-1913.<sup>d</sup></li> </ul>                                                                        |
| 11 | "Spirits"      | Enemy                       | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>"Spirits" is ChVK Wagner nickname for ISIS in Syria, so could mean similar here.</li> </ul>                    |

<sup>309</sup> Civilian casualties due to UXO were reported in this area during the summer of 2020. Confidential source in the mine action community (19 January 2022).

<sup>310</sup> CIHL rules 80-83.

<sup>311</sup> CIHL rule 132.

<sup>a</sup> ‘Protective fire’ refers to a tactical fire plan for a military unit, pre-set up to protect itself against overwhelming attack. It involves the pre-laying and concentration of all support weapons fire (heavy machine gun, artillery, mortar and air support) directly in front of the unit to impede enemy movement.

<sup>b</sup> As the “final” in the name implies, this is the last resort in defensive plans, involving weapons fire directed dangerously close to friendly defensive positions that are at risk of being overrun by the enemy. An FPF request has absolute priority over any other kind of fire support request.

<sup>c</sup> 1) Makarov (DOB 6 Jan 1994); 2) Ivanovich Apes (Wagner # M2206); and 3) Alexander Alexandrovich (Wagner # M-0176).

<sup>d</sup> <https://myrotvorets.center/criminal/metelkin-fedor-andreevich/>.

## Logistic resupply documentation

12. The electronic tablet also stored a ten-page document dated 19 January 2020, which included a list of the weapons and equipment required for various sub-units within ChVK Wagner in Libya. The document is at appendix E together with an official UN translation.<sup>312</sup> Within this document are code names or nick names of senior ChVK Wagner staff who are mentioned within, or contributed to, the document. These are at table 100.3. A summary of the equipment requested is at appendix G.

Table 100.3

### Identification of report name mentions and contributors

| Page # | Codename         | Panel identification              | Remarks                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               |
|--------|------------------|-----------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 1      | Director General | Highly probably Yevgeny PRIGOZHIN |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |
| 1      | Lipetsk          | Libya                             |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |
| 1      | Zurab            |                                   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Senior Signals Officer.</li> <li>New in position as Head of Communications.</li> </ul>                                                                                                                                                                                                         |
| 1      | The Nineth       | Dimitry UTKIN                     | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Utkin is known as “the nineth”. This is based on his Wagner number M-0209. The Panel assesses that the hand written word “DA” in Cyrillic appears in the document next to the typed “nineth”, meaning “Yes” has been written as a personal approval for the transfer.<sup>313</sup></li> </ul> |
| 2      | Bonya            |                                   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Senior Intelligence Officer.</li> <li>Probably a former district police officer from the Asiatic regions.</li> <li>Been with Wagner since 2014 but still unidentified.</li> </ul>                                                                                                              |
| 5      | Chukcha          | Kirill Vladimirovich TIKHONOVIC   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>M-0379</li> <li>Commander, Assault Team 6.</li> <li>DoB 16 March 1984</li> </ul>                                                                                                                                                                                                               |

<sup>312</sup> 2107434E.

<sup>313</sup> This assessment is agreed by two confidential sources with extensive knowledge of the ChVK Wagner Organization. The Panel has seen other documents authenticated as genuine ChVK Wagner documents where both the Cyrillic initials “DU” and “DA” appear in the same handwriting as approval signatures.

| Page # | Codename           | Panel identification                      | Remarks                                                                                                                                                  |
|--------|--------------------|-------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 7      | '1374'             |                                           | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Commander, Assault Team 1.</li> <li>M-1374 personal number is assigned to Leonardovich Vasiliy PIVNEV.</li> </ul> |
| 9      | Lotus              | Possibly Alexander Antolievich TISHCHENKO | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Commander, Assault Team 7.</li> </ul>                                                                             |
| 12     | Cap <sup>314</sup> | Probably Alexey Vasilievich KLOKOV        | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Commander, Assault Team 2.</li> <li>DoB 14 October 1973</li> </ul>                                                |

13. The Panel notes that the equipment list contains equipment, weapons and ammunition not previously seen in Libya before 2020, and reported for the first time in Panel report [S/2021/229](#): (a) MIC VPL *Tigr*-M armoured vehicles;<sup>315</sup> (b) KBP RPO-A *Schmel* Thermobaric Munitions;<sup>316</sup> (c) VOG-17M 30mm Grenades; and (d) VOG-25 40mm Grenades.<sup>317</sup> These were all found by the Panel to be violations of paragraph 9 of resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#) by a Russian PMC.

14. Other weapons on the equipment list have been identified by the Panel as being newly present in Libya during 2021, and are reported on elsewhere in the report: (a) AK-103 Assault Rifles manufactured in 2020 (annex 52); and (b) *Steyr* SSG 08 anti-materiel rifle (annex 65).

15. The Panel noted that some military materiel requested in the equipment list are technologically advanced systems that have only very recently been made available for operational use. The systems include: (a) the *Ironiya* electro-optical system (serial 17 to table 100.E.1), which was first seen publicly in April 2019;<sup>318</sup> (b) the 1L277 *Sobolyatnik* battlefield surveillance radar (see serial 11 to table 100.E.1), which have only been seen operationally deployed since 2018.<sup>319</sup>

16. The Panel is currently investigating how much of the requested equipment was physically supplied, if any, to ChVK Wagner in Libya.

#### Media response to BBC coverage in Russia

17. Media outlets closely linked to, or controlled by, Yevgeny Prigozhin<sup>320</sup> have heavily criticised the initial BBC report.<sup>321</sup> RIAFAN (a.k.a the Federal News Agency)<sup>322</sup> stated the BBC report was “...an assortment of inventions, rumours, falsified materials and fakes which have been disproved many times”.

<sup>314</sup> Another Wagner mercenary with this nickname, Alexander Viktorovich UMANSKY (M-1181), was previously killed in operations elsewhere.

<sup>315</sup> Annex 63.

<sup>316</sup> Annex 60.

<sup>317</sup> Annex 77. VOG-17 and VOG-25.

<sup>318</sup> <https://avia-pro.net/news/rossiyskiy-optiko-elektronnyy-kompleks-ironiya-vpervye-pokazali-publike>.

<sup>319</sup> [https://www.armyrecognition.com/june\\_2020\\_news\\_defense\\_global\\_security\\_army\\_industry/russian\\_airborne\\_forces\\_receive\\_sobolyatnik\\_portable\\_radar.html](https://www.armyrecognition.com/june_2020_news_defense_global_security_army_industry/russian_airborne_forces_receive_sobolyatnik_portable_radar.html), 23 June 2020.

<sup>320</sup> Mentioned as connected with ChVK Wagner in Panel report [S/2021/229](#) (annex 77 and appendix A to annex 77).

<sup>321</sup> <https://monitoring.bbc.co.uk/country/LBY?preview=true>. Subscription.

<sup>322</sup> <https://riafan.ru/1502678-professionalizm-lzhi-vasserman-obyasnil-cel-filma-vvs-o-rossiyanakh-v-livii>. This is also commonly referred to as the “Troll Factory”.

18. The RIAFAN response was reprised in other media outlets<sup>323</sup> within the Prigozhin controlled Patriot Media group.<sup>324</sup> RIAFAN questioned the chain of custody of the electronic tablet and the continuity of the evidence contained within it.

19. Key to the RIAFAN response was that some of the locations within the mapping application were under the control of the GNU-AF and “Tripoli gangs” in 2019. This is true, but irrelevant as they later came under control of HAF and ChVK Wagner (see paragraph 4).

20. RIAFAN also reported that they had interviewed an individual mentioned in the report, Fedor METELKIN (“Metla”), who denied being in Libya and that he worked on a construction site.

#### Communications liaison between ChVK Wagner and HAF

21. The Panel obtained a copy of a separate handwritten document<sup>325</sup> that contained receipts from HAF officers for the delivery of BauFeng UV-5R series hand-held radios.<sup>326</sup> Two independent confidential Panel sources with extensive knowledge of the ChVK Wagner organization considered the document as credible and authentic. The Panel has also confirmed that the names of the HAF officials accurately reflect the command appointments reflected in the document. A copy of the original documentation and official UN translation is at appendix H, and summarised in table 100.4 below:

Table 100.4

Summary of communication receipts

| <i>Receipt #</i> | <i>ChVK Wagner name</i> | <i>HAF Official in receipt</i>                                                   | <i>Communication device</i> | <i>Quantity</i> |
|------------------|-------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------|
| 2                | Zurab <sup>a</sup>      | lieutenant colonel<br>Omar Mraji‘i Hasan<br>commander, Tareq Bin Ziyad battalion | BauFeng UV-5R               | 20              |
| 3                | Zurab                   | major general<br>Salih Abbudah<br>battlefield commander                          | BauFeng UV-5R               | 10              |
| 4                | Zurab                   | major general<br>Ahmad Salim<br>commander, second division                       | BauFeng 5R                  | 10              |
| 5                | Zurab                   | major general<br>Ahmad Salim<br>commander, second division                       | BauFeng UV-5R               | 15              |

<sup>323</sup> Economics Today (<https://rueconomics.ru/537270-tehnologiya-voiny-obmana-fedorov-ocenil-psevdorassledovanie-vbs-o-rossiyanah-v-livii>), <https://rueconomics.ru/537265-fan-ukazal-na-somnitelnye-istochniki-v-rassledovanii-bbc-o-livii>, <https://rueconomics.ru/537186-fan-anonsiroval-razoblachenie-rassledovaniya-bbc-o-livii>; <https://rueconomics.ru/537256-zvenya-zapadnoi-propagandy-manukyan-obyasnil-chto-stoit-za-rassledovaniem-bbc-o-livii>; Info Reactor (<https://info reactor.ru/385841-v-afrike-nikogda-ne-byl-figurant-rassledovaniya-o-rossiyanah-otvetil-na-publikaciyu-bbc>; <https://info reactor.ru/385834-peredacha-plansheta-v-ruki-zhurnalistov-sdelala-bespoleznoi-glavnuyu-uliku-rassledovaniya-vvs>); PolitRos (<https://politros.com/217387-bbc-pytalos-vydat-fail-iz-word-office-za-dokazatelstvo-prisutstviya-rossiyan-v-livii>); and PolitExpert (<https://poliexpert.net/256930-fan-zametil-faktycheskie-oshibki-v-rassledovanii-bbc-o-liviiskom-konflikte>).

<sup>324</sup> <https://mediapatriot.ru/o-mediagruppe/>.

<sup>325</sup> Confidential source.

<sup>326</sup> <https://baofengtech.com/product/uv-5r/>.



| <i>Receipt #</i> | <i>ChVK Wagner name</i> | <i>HAF Official in receipt</i>                                                                                       | <i>Communication device</i> | <i>Quantity</i> |
|------------------|-------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------|
| 6                | Zurab                   | major general<br>Ahmad Salim<br>commander, second division                                                           | BauFeng UV-5R               | 50              |
| 7                | Zurab                   | lieutenant colonel<br>Omar Mraji'i<br>commander, Tareq Bin Ziyad battalion                                           | BauFeng 5R                  | 5               |
| 8                | Zurab                   | major general<br>Ahmad Salim<br>commander, second division                                                           | BauFeng 5R                  | 5               |
| 9                | Zurab                   | major general<br>Ahmad Salim<br>commander, second division                                                           | BauFeng UV-5R               | 10              |
| 11               | Zurab                   | Ali al-Ghazwi <sup>b</sup><br>western region operations room                                                         | BauFeng UV-5R               | 2               |
| 12               | Zurab                   | Ali al-Ghazwi<br>western region operations room                                                                      | BauFeng UV-5R               | 10              |
| ?                | Zurab                   | major general<br>Salih Abbudah<br>battlefield commander<br>forward operations room<br>western region operations room | BauFeng UV-5R               | 50              |

<sup>a</sup> See table 27.3.

<sup>b</sup> a.k.a Mabrouk Al Ghazwi.

22. The Panel assesses that the radios were supplied to ensure deconfliction between the armed groups during low-level tactical operations within a 5km area. The radios are readily available consumer items, insecure and obsolescent. Nevertheless, they are cheap, simple to operate, can be pre-programmed to operate on specific frequencies and are expendable.

#### Verified open-source information

23. A social media page for the mercenary community,<sup>327</sup> known as Reverse Side of the Medal (RSOTM), has recently begun to display imagery of ChVK Wagner in Libya that was verified by geo-location or from other sources.<sup>328</sup>

<sup>327</sup> <https://twitter.com/RSOTM>.

<sup>328</sup> For example:

<https://twitter.com/RSOTM/status/1403061848665112588>, 10 June 2021 (@0.31 minutes) (geo-located ;  
<https://twitter.com/RSOTM/status/1420379513712746499>, 28 July 2021;  
<https://twitter.com/RSOTM/status/1431663037866446851>, 28 August 2021 (by geo-location); and  
<https://twitter.com/RSOTM/status/1431657243603259401>, 28 August 2021 (by geo-location).

24. Other social media video imagery<sup>329</sup> contains evidence of ChVK Wagner in Libya. This video, geo-located by the Panel, shows a mixed ChVK Wagner and HAF 106 brigade convoy entering Bani Walid in late May 2020. The image at figure 100.2 provides evidence of ChVK Wagner / HAF interoperability as the vehicle is painted in the distinctive “Africa” camouflage used exclusively by HAF 106 brigade.


Figure 100.2

**HAF 106 brigade ‘Africa’ camouflage**



<sup>329</sup> <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tt2ne2So5sQ>, 26 May 2020.

## Appendix A to Annex 100: Low level tactical publications (example)



13

2106754E.docx

6. Determining the range using the 1PZ-2 reticle




Figure 11. Field of view of a 1PZ-2

Exercise 16. The length of the BZO warhead (No. 17a) is equal to 1.5 divisions of the 1PZ-2 reticle (Figure 11).

**Solution:**

$L$  = Length of the warhead = 2.5 m

$Y$  = Division value = 0.02

The range is calculated as follows:

$$R = \frac{L}{Y} \times 1000 = \frac{2,5}{1,5 \times 2} \times 1000 = 800 \text{ m}$$

Exercise 17. The height of the armoured personnel carrier (No. 13) is equal to half of one small reticle line (Figure 11).

**Solution:**

$H$  = Height of the armoured personnel carrier = 1.8 m

$Y$  = Height of the reticle line = 0.04

The range is calculated as follows:

$$R = \frac{H}{Y} \times 1000 = \frac{1,5}{0,5 \times 4} \times 1000 = 900 \text{ m}$$

Exercise 18. A shooter 1.5 m tall is visible at 0.06 mrad (Figure 11).

The range to target is calculated as follows:

$$R = \frac{B}{Y} \times 1000 = \frac{1,5}{6} \times 1000 = 250 \text{ m}$$

Senior Service College of the Far East Department of Weapons and Marksmanship

S.P. Froshchenkov

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## Appendix B to Annex 100: Diagrams of fuzes, mines and booby traps (example)





## ВЗРЫВНЫЕ УСТРОЙСТВА

### ВЗРЫВЧАТЫЕ ВЕЩЕСТВА

Взрывчатые вещества (ВВ) называются соединениями, способными к самопроизвольному или инициированному взрыву. В зависимости от назначения ВВ делятся на взрывчатые вещества для подрывных работ и взрывчатые вещества для пиротехники.

| Вид ВВ       | Плотность, г/см³ | Взрывчатость, % | Скорость детонации, м/с |
|--------------|------------------|-----------------|-------------------------|
| Триггер      | 1,58             | 4000            | 4000                    |
| Триггер      | 1,79             | 4000            | 4000                    |
| Триггер      | 1,77             | 3000            | 3000                    |
| Взрывчатка   | 1,80             | 5000            | 5000                    |
| Взрывчатка   | 1,40             | 4000            | 4000                    |
| Взрывчатка   | 1,3-1,8          | 3000-5000       | 3000-5000               |
| Взрывчатка   | 1,3-1,7          | 3000-5000       | 3000-5000               |
| Сенсорный ВВ | 4,4              | 1740            | 1740                    |
| АМВ (ВВ)     | 4,3              | 1050            | 1050                    |
| ВВС          | 5,30             | 840             | 840                     |

### ВЗРЫВООПАСНЫЕ ВЕЩЕСТВА

Взрывоопасные вещества (ВОВ) называются веществами, способными к самопроизвольному или инициированному взрыву. В зависимости от назначения ВОВ делятся на взрывоопасные вещества для подрывных работ и взрывоопасные вещества для пиротехники.

| Вид ВОВ    | Плотность, г/см³ | Взрывчатость, % | Скорость детонации, м/с |
|------------|------------------|-----------------|-------------------------|
| Взрывчатка | 1,36-1,84        | 3000-5000       | 3000-5000               |
| Взрывчатка | 1,4-1,80         | 4000-5000       | 4000-5000               |
| Взрывчатка | 1,3-1,80         | 4000-5000       | 4000-5000               |
| Взрывчатка | 1,32-1,80        | 1900-2500       | 1900-2500               |
| Взрывчатка | 1,32-1,80        | 1900            | 1900                    |

### СХЕМЫ ВЗРЫВНЫХ УСТРОЙСТВ

Взрывные устройства (ВУ) представляют собой соединения взрывчатых веществ, предназначенные для взрыва. В зависимости от назначения ВУ делятся на взрывные устройства для подрывных работ и взрывные устройства для пиротехники.

### ВЗРЫВНЫЕ УСТРОЙСТВА ЗАВОДСКОГО ИЗГОТОВЛЕНИЯ

ВУ заводского изготовления выпускаются в соответствии с требованиями ГОСТ 12.1.008-78. В зависимости от назначения ВУ делятся на взрывные устройства для подрывных работ и взрывные устройства для пиротехники.

### САМОДЕЛЬНЫЕ ВЗРЫВНЫЕ УСТРОЙСТВА

Самодельные ВУ представляют собой соединения взрывчатых веществ, предназначенные для взрыва. В зависимости от назначения ВУ делятся на взрывные устройства для подрывных работ и взрывные устройства для пиротехники.

### ВЗРЫВАТЕЛИ

Взрыватели (ВЗ) представляют собой устройства, предназначенные для взрыва ВВ. В зависимости от назначения ВЗ делятся на взрыватели для подрывных работ и взрыватели для пиротехники.

### ТЕЛЕВИЗОРНЫЕ СРЕДСТВА ПОИСКА ВУ

Телевизорные средства поиска ВУ (ТСПВУ) представляют собой устройства, предназначенные для поиска ВУ. В зависимости от назначения ТСПВУ делятся на ТСПВУ для подрывных работ и ТСПВУ для пиротехники.

### МЕРЫ БЕЗОПАСНОСТИ ПРИ ОБНАРУЖЕНИИ ВУ

Меры безопасности при обнаружении ВУ (МБПВУ) представляют собой правила, предназначенные для обеспечения безопасности при обнаружении ВУ. В зависимости от назначения МБПВУ делятся на МБПВУ для подрывных работ и МБПВУ для пиротехники.

## РУЧНЫЕ ОСКОЛОЧНЫЕ ГРАНАТЫ

### РГД-5

### Ф-1

### ОСНОВНЫЕ ЧАСТИ

1 - ручка (рукоятка)  
2 - корпус (тело)  
3 - хвостовое оперение (хвостовое оперение)  
4 - запал (зажигатель)  
5 - предохранительная скоба (предохранительная скоба)

### ОСНОВНЫЕ ВОЕНЫЕ СВОЙСТВА РУЧНЫХ ОСКОЛОЧНЫХ ГРАНАТ

| Вид гранаты | Плотность, г/см³ | Взрывчатость, % | Скорость детонации, м/с |
|-------------|------------------|-----------------|-------------------------|
| РГД-5       | 1,58             | 4000            | 4000                    |
| Ф-1         | 1,79             | 4000            | 4000                    |
| РГН         | 1,77             | 3000            | 3000                    |
| РГО         | 1,80             | 5000            | 5000                    |

### РГН

### РГО

### ОСНОВНЫЕ ЧАСТИ


1 - ручка (рукоятка)  
2 - корпус (тело)  
3 - хвостовое оперение (хвостовое оперение)  
4 - запал (зажигатель)  
5 - предохранительная скоба (предохранительная скоба)

### УЛУЧШЕННЫЙ ЗАПАЛ РУЧНОЙ ГРАНАТЫ МОДЕРНИЗИРОВАННЫЙ УЗРГМ

### ОБЩЕЕ УСТРОЙСТВО

### УДАЛЬНО-ДИСТАНЦИОННЫЙ ЗАПАЛ УДЗ

# Appendix C to Annex 100: Mapping software mine and booby trap locations (examples)





## Appendix D to Annex 100: Imagery of explosive ordnance recovered from old ChVK Wagner locations

MON-50 APM



MON-90 APM



OZM-72 APM



### Primary sources

1. @lpc.ly Twitter, 3 September 2021.
2. www.napd.com, 3 September 2021.
3. <https://twitter.com/Oded121351/status/1434439691340759043>, 5 September 2021.
4. customer.janes.com. (Subscription). 7 September 2021.
5. CAR-UXO. 7 September 2021.

Developed by UN Panel of Experts.



# Appendix E to Annex 100: ChVK logistic resupply documentation (original: left; translation: right)<sup>330</sup>

Генеральному директору

Заявка

В целях обеспечения выполнения боевой задачи на направлении «Липецк» прошу Вас о закупке средств связи:

1. Радиостанции для установки на автомобили и бронеемкости Motorola DM 4600 – 70 шт.
2. Антенна AW-6 UHF – 70 шт.
3. Кабельная сборка – 70 комплектов (кабель питания для подключения радиостанции к АКБ, кабельная сборка для подключения радиостанции к антенне с креплением, переходник антенный BU-312).
4. Радиостанция носимая Motorola DP 4400 (комплект 2АКБ, зарядное устройство) – 190 комплектов.(замена радиостанций старого парка Моторола DP-1400, Вертекс)
5. Рюкзак носимый с радиостанцией Motorola DM 4600 с АКБ Li-Po 2 шт., с карманом под радиостанцию и с карманом под АКБ, зарядным устройством, антенная сборка для подключения радиостанции к антенне-8 метров с креплением, кабельная сборка антенной AW-6 UHF – 20 комплектов.
6. Квадрокоптер DJI Mavic 2 Pro с ночной камерой 20 комплектов.
7. Смартфон с SD картой 64 Gb для установки программы All-In-One Offline Maps-30 штук.
8. Ларингофонная гарнитура для радиостанции Motorola DP 4400-4600-500 штук.

Начальник связи  «Зураб»

«19» января 2020г.

Согласовано:

Командир БрГ  «Девятый»

UN Translation 2107434E  
Translated from Russian

Attn: Director General

## Requisition note

I hereby request the purchase of the following communication equipment to ensure the success of the Lipetsk [LIBYA] combat mission:

1. Motorola DM4600 radio to be installed in vehicles and armoured vehicles, 70 units.
2. AW-6 UHF antenna, 70 units.
3. Set of cables, 70 sets (a power cable to connect the radio to the battery, a set of cables and mount for connecting the radio to the antenna and a BU-312 antenna adapter).
4. Motorola DP4400 wearable radio (in a set with two batteries and charging device), 190 sets (replacements for the old Motorola DP1400, Vertex, radios).
5. A backpack for carrying a Motorola DM4600 radio with two lithium polymer batteries, with a pocket for the radio and another for the battery, charging device, antenna assembly with mount for connecting the radio to an eight-meter antenna, and a cable assembly for the AW-6 UHF antenna, 20 sets.
6. DJI Mavic 2 Pro quadcopter with night vision camera, 20 sets.
7. Smartphone with a 64 GB SD card for installing the All-in-One Offline Maps application, 30 units.
8. Throat microphone for Motorola DP4400 and DP4600 radios, 500 units.

[Signed] “Zurab”

Senior signals officer

19 January 2020

Approved by: [Signed] “The Ninth”, Brigade commander

<sup>330</sup> Only two pages of the ten have been included due to document size limitations.

Командиру бригады

**Заявка**

Для выполнения боевых задач на направлении «Липецк», СШГ «Трак» требуется следующая техника, вооружение, оптические приборы и средства связи:

**I. Бронетехника**

1. БТР-82 – 2 ед.
2. БМП-2 – 1 ед.
3. Т-72Б – 1 ед.
4. Пикап LandCruzer 70 с ЗУ-23 – 4 ед.
5. Пикап LandCruzer 70 (бронированный) – 5 ед.

**II. Вооружение**

1. Комплекс ПЗРК «Верба» 9К333 с РЛС-1Л122 модификация 2Е – 2 ед.
2. 120мм миномет 2Б11 (1ШО и ШГ «Легион») – 6 ед.
3. ПТУР «КОРНЕТ» – 3 ед.
4. 7,62мм ПКН – 8 ед.
5. АС «БП30» ВАЛ – 3 ед.
6. 9мм АПС – 40 ед.
7. 9мм ПБ «БП9» – 6 ед.
8. 7,62 мм ПБС – 20 шт.
9. Полуавтоматическое ружьё 12кал. – 16 шт.

**III. Боеприпасы**

1. ПГ-7 (осколочный) – 50 шт.
2. 7,62x39 УС – 28000 шт.
3. 9x56мм ПАБ-9 – 5000 шт.
4. МРО-А – 100 шт.
5. РПО – 50 шт.
6. Патрон 12 кал.(картечь) – 2000 шт.
7. Патрон 12 кал. (пуля) – 2000 шт.
8. Ракеты для ПТУР «Корнет» – 60 шт.

**IV. Оптические приборы**

1. ППН93-3 (ПКН) – 10 шт.
2. ППН93-1АС – 6 шт.
3. ЛЦУ с возможностью крепления на планку «Тикатинни» на АК – 10 шт.

**V. Средства связи**

1. Гарнитура для радиостанции Motorola DP – 60 шт.
2. Квадрокоптер с возможностью ночной съемки и зумом – 4 шт.
3. Активные наушники – 60 шт.

19.01.2020г. Командир 1ШО \_\_\_\_\_ «1374»

*Липецк  
Гарнитура 100 шт.  
DP-4000 - 13 шт.  
DP-4000 - 60 шт.*

Attn: Brigade commander

**Requisition note**

The following equipment, munitions, optical devices and communications equipment are required to carry out the Lipetsk and [unknown abbreviation:] SShG Trak combat missions:

**I. Armoured vehicles**

1. BTR-82 armoured personnel carrier, two units.
2. BMP-2 armoured personnel carrier, one unit.
3. T-72B tank, one unit.
4. Land Cruiser Pickup 70 with ZU-23 gun, four units.
5. Land Cruise Pickup 70 (armoured), five units.

**II. Munitions**

1. 9k333 Verba shoulder-fired air-defence missile system with 1L122-2E radar, two units.
2. 120-mm 2B11 mortar (for Assault Team 1 and the Legion assault group), six units.
3. Kornet anti-tank guided missile system, three units.
4. 7.62-mm PKN night-vision Kalashnikov machine gun, eight units.
5. AS Val assault rifle (GRAU designation 6P30), three units.
6. 9-mm Stechkin automatic pistol, 40 units.
7. 9-mm PB silent pistol (Russian armed forces (GRAU) index 6P9), six units.
8. 7.62-mm PBS silencer, 20 units.
9. 12-gauge semi-automatic shotgun, 16 units.

**III. Ammunition**

1. PG-7 (fragmentation) rocket, 50 units.
2. Subsonic 7.62 x 39 ammunition, 28,000 rounds.
3. 9 x 56 mm PAB-9 ammunition, 5,000 rounds.
4. MRO-A sighting device, 100 units.
5. RPO rocket, 50 units.
6. 12-gauge cartridge (buckshot), 2,000 rounds.
7. 12-gauge cartridge (bullet), 2,000 rounds.
8. Rockets for the Kornet anti-tank guided missile system, 60 units.

|                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   |  |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--|
| <p>IV. Optical devices</p> <p>1. 1PN93-3 night sight (for night-vision Kalashnikov machine gun), 10 units.</p> <p>2. 1PN93-1 night sight for assault rifle, six units.</p> <p>3. Laser designator with Picatinny rail mount for Kalashnikov assault rifle, 10 units.</p> <p>V. Communications equipment</p> <p>1. Motorola DP radio headset, 60 units.</p> <p>2. Quadcopter with night vision and zoom, four units.</p> <p>3. Noise-cancelling headphones, 60 units.</p> <p>[Handwritten note:]</p> <p>Throat microphone, 100 units</p> <p>DM4600 [illegible]</p> <p>DP4400 [illegible]</p> <p>19 January 2020</p> <p>“1374”</p> <p>Commander, Assault Team 1</p> |  |
| <p>Engineer operations</p> <p>UR-83 mine clearing system, three units</p> <p>ZTP-50, 150 and 300 fuses</p> <p>Portable manual mine clearance kits, 20 units</p> <p>PM-4 blasting machine, 10 units</p> <p>Green camouflage netting (3.5 x 6), 30 units</p> <p>Metal detectors, five units</p> <p>Understaffing of 60 persons (maximum age: 40; maximum weight: 100 kg)</p> <p>19 January 2020</p> <p>“Cap”</p> <p>Commander, Assault Team 2</p>                                                                                                                                                                                                                   |  |

## Appendix F to Annex 100: Imagery from the 5 July 2020 explosion site

Figure 100.F.1

Overview of incident site (5 July 2020)



Figure 100.F.2

Location of victims (5 July 2020)



Source: Confidential source.

## Appendix G to Annex 100: Summary of major equipment requested by ChVK Wagner in Libya

Table 100.G.1

### Major equipment requested by ChVK Wagner in Libya

| #  | Generic Type       | Equipment <sup>a</sup>                            | Signals | Intelligence | Assault Team 1     | Assault Team 2 | Assault Team 6 | Assault Team 7 | Totals | Remarks                                     |
|----|--------------------|---------------------------------------------------|---------|--------------|--------------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|--------|---------------------------------------------|
| 1  | Communications     | Antenna AW-6 UHF                                  | 70      |              |                    |                |                |                | 70     |                                             |
| 2  |                    | Antenna AW-6 UHF Cable Assembly                   | 20      |              |                    |                |                |                | 20     |                                             |
| 3  |                    | Motorola DM 4400 Radio                            | 190     |              | UID                | 21             | 46             | UID            | 257+   |                                             |
| 4  |                    | Motorola DM 4600 Radio                            | 70      |              | UID <sup>331</sup> | 25             | 63             | UID            | 155+   |                                             |
| 5  |                    | Throat Microphones                                | 500     |              |                    |                |                |                | 500    |                                             |
| 6  |                    | 64GB SD Card Smartphone                           | 30      |              |                    |                |                |                | 30     |                                             |
| 7  | UAV <sup>332</sup> | DJI Mavic Pro 2 (Night Vision Version) or similar | 20      |              | 4                  | 10             | 5              | 4              | 43     |                                             |
| 8  |                    | Orlan 30 UAV                                      |         | UID          |                    |                |                |                | UID    | For guiding 152mm Laser Guided Projectiles. |
| 9  |                    | <b>Orlan 10 UAV</b>                               |         | 4            |                    |                |                |                | 4      |                                             |
| 10 | Electro Optics     | 1L-122-2E Radar                                   |         |              | 1                  |                |                |                | 1      |                                             |
| 11 |                    | 1L227 Sobolyatnik Radar                           |         | 15           |                    |                |                |                | 15     | Entered operational service in 2018.        |
| 12 |                    | 1PN93-1 NVS <sup>333</sup>                        |         |              | 6                  |                | 270            |                | 276    |                                             |
| 13 |                    | 1PN93-3 NVS                                       |         |              | 10                 |                | 12             | 11             | 33     |                                             |
| 14 |                    | DEDAL 370 NVS                                     |         |              |                    |                |                | 12             | 12     |                                             |
| 15 |                    | DEDAL DVS-8 NVS                                   |         |              |                    | 15             |                | 18             | 33     |                                             |
| 16 |                    | Fortuna 40L6 Thermal Sight                        |         |              |                    |                | 24             | 9              | 33     |                                             |

<sup>331</sup> Requested but quantity unidentified.

<sup>332</sup> Unmanned Aerial Vehicles.

<sup>333</sup> Night Vision Sight.



| #  | Generic Type              | Equipment <sup>a</sup>             | Signals | Intelligence | Assault Team 1 | Assault Team 2 | Assault Team 6 | Assault Team 7 | Totals | Remarks                          |
|----|---------------------------|------------------------------------|---------|--------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|--------|----------------------------------|
| 17 |                           | Ironiya Electro-Optical            |         | 9            |                | UID            |                | 1              | 10+    | First seen operationally in 2019 |
| 18 |                           | LPR-1 Laser Range Finder           |         |              |                |                |                | 2              | 2      |                                  |
| 19 |                           | LPR-3 Laser Range Finder           |         |              |                |                |                | 4              | 4      |                                  |
| 20 |                           | Quaker Night Vision Goggles        |         |              |                |                | 72             |                | 72     |                                  |
| 21 | Electronic Warfare        | Silok EWS <sup>334</sup>           |         | 6            |                |                |                |                | 6      |                                  |
| 22 | AFV / AIFV <sup>335</sup> | T-72 Main Battle Tank              |         |              | 2              |                | 4              |                | 6      |                                  |
| 23 |                           | BMP-2                              |         |              | 2              | 3              | 6              | 1              | 12     |                                  |
| 24 |                           | BTR-82 APC                         |         |              | 2              | 3              |                |                | 5      |                                  |
| 25 |                           | Gorets APC <sup>336</sup>          |         |              |                |                | 4              |                | 4      |                                  |
| 26 |                           | Tigyr                              |         |              |                |                | 6              | 8              | 14     |                                  |
| 27 | Vehicles                  | Toyota Land Cruiser                |         |              | 9              | 18             | 44             |                | 71     |                                  |
| 28 | Weapons                   | Anti-Materiel Rifle                |         |              |                |                | 4              |                | 4      |                                  |
| 29 |                           | AK-103 Assault Rifle               |         |              |                |                | 270            |                | 270    |                                  |
| 30 |                           | AS VAL Assault Rifle               |         |              | 3              | 9              | 8              |                | 20     |                                  |
| 31 |                           | AS VSS Sniper Rifle                |         |              |                | 3              |                |                | 3      |                                  |
| 32 |                           | ASVK Kord Sniper Rifle             |         |              |                | 6              |                |                | 6      |                                  |
| 33 |                           | GP-25 Grenade Launcher             |         |              |                |                | 28             |                | 28     |                                  |
| 34 |                           | GP-30 Grenade Launcher             |         |              |                | 22             |                |                | 22     |                                  |
| 35 |                           | <b>Kornet ATGW</b> <sup>337</sup>  |         |              | 3              | 3              | 4              |                | 10     |                                  |
| 36 |                           | Makarov 9mm Pistol                 |         |              |                | 20             |                | 15             | 35     |                                  |
| 37 |                           | NSVS Utes 12.7mm Heavy Machine Gun |         |              |                | 4              |                |                | 4      |                                  |
| 38 |                           | PB 6P9 9mm Silent Pistol           |         |              | 6              |                |                |                | 6      |                                  |
| 39 |                           | PKM Light Machine Gun              |         |              |                | 12             | 16             | 11             | 39     |                                  |
| 40 |                           | RG6 40mm Grenade Launcher          |         |              |                | 10             |                |                | 10     |                                  |

<sup>334</sup> Electronic Warfare System.

<sup>335</sup> Armoured Fighting Vehicles / Armoured Infantry Fighting Vehicles.

<sup>336</sup> Armoured Personnel Carrier.

<sup>337</sup> Anti-Tank Guided Weapon.


| #  | Generic Type | Equipment <sup>a</sup>             | Signals | Intelligence | Assault Team 1 | Assault Team 2 | Assault Team 6 | Assault Team 7 | Totals | Remarks |
|----|--------------|------------------------------------|---------|--------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|--------|---------|
| 41 |              | Shotgun 12 Gauge                   |         |              | 16             |                |                | 12             | 28     |         |
| 42 |              | Stechkin 9mm Pistol                |         |              | 40             | 20             | 24             | 28             | 112    |         |
| 43 |              | SVD 7.62mm Sniper Rifle            |         |              |                |                |                | 7              | 7      |         |
| 44 |              | Verba 9K333 MANPADS <sup>338</sup> |         |              | 2              | UID            |                |                | 2+     |         |
| 45 |              | <b>ZSU-23-2 Cannon</b>             |         |              | 2              | 10             | 6              |                | 18     |         |
| 46 |              | ZPU 57mm Cannon                    |         |              |                | 7              |                |                | 7      |         |
| 47 |              | 2B11 120mm Mortar                  |         |              | 6              |                |                | 3              | 9      |         |
| 48 | Ammunition   | MRO-A Rockets                      |         |              |                |                | UID            |                | UID    |         |
| 49 |              | OG-7 Rockets                       |         |              |                | UID            |                |                | UID    |         |
| 50 |              | PG-7 Rockets                       |         |              | 50             |                |                |                | 50     |         |
| 51 |              | RDG-5 Hand Grenades                |         |              |                | UID            |                |                | UID    |         |
| 52 |              | RPG-26                             |         |              |                | UID            | UID            |                | UID    |         |
| 53 |              | RPO-A                              |         |              | 50             |                | UID            |                | 50+    |         |
| 54 |              | Stun Grenades                      |         |              |                | UID            |                |                | UID    |         |
| 55 |              | TBG-7B Thermobaric Rockets         |         |              |                | UID            |                |                | UID    |         |
| 56 |              | UR-83 Mine Clearance System        |         |              |                | 3              |                |                | 3      |         |
| 57 |              | <b>VOG-17 Grenades</b>             |         |              |                |                | UID            | 450            | 450+   |         |
| 58 |              | <b>VOG-25 Grenades</b>             |         |              |                |                | UID            |                | UID    |         |
| 59 |              | ZTP-50 Fuze Firing Device          |         |              |                | UID            |                |                | UID    |         |
| 60 |              | ZTP-150 Fuze Firing Device         |         |              |                | UID            |                |                | UID    |         |
| 61 |              | ZTP-300 Fuze Firing Device         |         |              |                | UID            |                |                | UID    |         |
| 62 |              | <b>9M133 Kornet ATGM</b>           |         |              | 60             |                |                |                | 60     |         |
| 63 |              | <b>7.62 x 39mm Rounds Ball</b>     |         |              | 28,000         |                |                |                | 28,000 |         |
| 64 |              | <b>7.62 x 39mm Rounds Link</b>     |         |              |                |                |                | 10,000         | 10,000 |         |
| 65 |              | 9 x 56mm PAB-9 Rounds              |         |              | 5,000          |                |                |                | 5,000  |         |
| 66 |              | <b>12.7mm Rounds Link</b>          |         |              |                |                |                | 5,000          | 5,000  |         |
| 67 |              | 12 Gauge Pellet                    |         |              | 2,000          |                |                | 1,200          | 3,200  |         |
| 68 |              | 12 Gauge Solid Shot                |         |              | 2,000          |                |                |                | 2,000  |         |
| 69 |              | 23mm Rounds                        |         |              |                |                |                | UID            | UID    |         |

<sup>338</sup> Man Portable Air Defence System.

| # | Generic Type | Equipment <sup>a</sup> | Signals | Intelligence | Assault<br>Team 1 | Assault<br>Team 2 | Assault<br>Team 6 | Assault<br>Team 7 | Totals | Remarks |
|---|--------------|------------------------|---------|--------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|--------|---------|
|   |              |                        |         |              |                   |                   |                   |                   |        |         |

<sup>a</sup> The equipment in **bold** has been identified as being in Libya in violation of the arms embargo.

# Appendix H to Annex 100: HAF receipts for communications equipment from ChVK Wagner<sup>339</sup>



<sup>339</sup> Only one of the six documents has been included due to document size limitations.

**Official UN Translation****2111841E***Translated from Arabic*

## Document No. 2

Delivery and receipt of wireless devices

Twenty black Chinese-made Turbo Sky wireless devices (Baufeng UV-5R) were delivered to the Libyan Arab Armed Forces.

|                                                 |                                                                                                                                             |
|-------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Deliverer:<br>On behalf of the company<br>Zurab | Recipient:<br>On behalf of the Libyan Arab Armed Forces<br>Lieutenant Colonel<br>Omar Mraji'I Hasan<br>Commander, Tareq Bin Ziyad Battalion |
|-------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

## Document No. 3

Delivery and receipt of wireless devices

Ten black Chinese-made Turbo Sky wireless devices (Baufeng UV-5R) were delivered to the Libyan Arab Armed Forces.

|                                                 |                                                                                                                    |
|-------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Deliverer:<br>On behalf of the company<br>Zurab | Recipient:<br>On behalf of the Libyan Arab Armed Forces<br>Major General<br>Salih Abbudah<br>Battlefield Commander |
|-------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

## Document No. 4

Delivery and receipt of wireless devices

Ten black Chinese-made Turbo Sky wireless devices (Baufeng UV-5R) were delivered to the Libyan Arab Armed Forces.

|                                                 |                                                                                                                       |
|-------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Deliverer:<br>On behalf of the company<br>Zurab | Recipient:<br>On behalf of the Libyan Arab Armed Forces<br>Major General<br>Ahmad Salim<br>Commander, Second Division |
|-------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

## Document No. 5

Delivery and receipt of wireless devices

Fifteen black Chinese-made Turbo Sky wireless devices (Baufeng UV-5R) were delivered to the Libyan Arab Armed Forces.

|                                                 |                                                                                                                       |
|-------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Deliverer:<br>On behalf of the company<br>Zurab | Recipient:<br>On behalf of the Libyan Arab Armed Forces<br>Major General<br>Ahmad Salim<br>Commander, Second Division |
|-------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

## Document No. 6

## Delivery and receipt of wireless devices

Fifty black Chinese-made Turbo Sky wireless devices (Baufeng UV-5R) were delivered to the Libyan Arab Armed Forces.

|                                                 |                                                                                                                       |
|-------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Deliverer:<br>On behalf of the company<br>Zurab | Recipient:<br>On behalf of the Libyan Arab Armed Forces<br>Major General<br>Ahmad Salim<br>Commander, Second Division |
|-------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

## Document No. 7

## Delivery and receipt of wireless devices

Five black Chinese-made Turbo Sky wireless devices (Baufeng 5R) were delivered to the Libyan Arab Armed Forces.

|                                                 |                                                                                                                                       |
|-------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Deliverer:<br>On behalf of the company<br>Zurab | Recipient:<br>On behalf of the Libyan Arab Armed Forces<br>Lieutenant Colonel<br>Omar Mraji'i<br>Commander, Tareq Bin Ziyad Battalion |
|-------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

## Document No. 8

## Delivery and receipt of wireless devices

Seven black Chinese-made Turbo Sky wireless devices (Baufeng UV-5R) were delivered to the Libyan Arab Armed Forces.

|                                                 |                                                                                                                       |
|-------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Deliverer:<br>On behalf of the company<br>Zurab | Recipient:<br>On behalf of the Libyan Arab Armed Forces<br>Major General<br>Ahmad Salim<br>Commander, Second Division |
|-------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

## Document No. 9

## Delivery and receipt of wireless devices

Ten black Chinese-made Turbo Sky wireless devices (Baufeng UV-5R) were delivered to the Libyan Arab Armed Forces.

|                                                 |                                                                                                                       |
|-------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Deliverer:<br>On behalf of the company<br>Zurab | Recipient:<br>On behalf of the Libyan Arab Armed Forces<br>Major General<br>Ahmad Salim<br>Commander, Second Division |
|-------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|



## Document No. 11

## Delivery and receipt of wireless devices

Two black Chinese-made Turbo Sky wireless devices (Baufeng 5R) were delivered to the Libyan Arab Armed Forces.

|                                                        |                                                                                                    |
|--------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <b>Deliverer:</b><br>On behalf of the company<br>Zurab | <b>Recipient:</b><br>On behalf of the Libyan Arab Armed Forces<br>Operations Room<br>Ali al-Ghazwi |
|--------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

## Document No. 12

## Delivery and receipt of wireless devices

Ten black Chinese-made Turbo Sky wireless devices (Baufeng UV5R) were delivered to the Libyan Arab Armed Forces.

|                                                        |                                                                                              |
|--------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <b>Deliverer:</b><br>On behalf of the company<br>Zurab | <b>Recipient:</b><br>On behalf of the Western Region Operations<br>Room<br><br>Ali al-Ghazwi |
|--------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

## Document ?

## Delivery and receipt of wireless devices

Fifty black Chinese-made Turbo Sky wireless devices (Baufeng UV-5R) were delivered to the Libyan Arab Armed Forces.


|                                                        |                                                                                                                                                                                        |
|--------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <b>Deliverer:</b><br>On behalf of the company<br>Zurab | <b>Recipient:</b><br>On behalf of the Libyan Arab Armed Forces<br>Major General<br>Salih Abbudah<br>Battlefield Commander<br>Forward Operations Room<br>Western Region Operations Room |
|--------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

## Annex 101 End user certificates for communication surveillance systems

1. Figures 101.1 to 101.3 are the EUC submitted by AR Global FZE to the supplier. The signatory, Ahmed Al Alwerfly, is not one of the only two individuals authorised to sign on behalf of Libya, as notified to the Committee in accordance with Implementation Notice (IAN) Number 2.<sup>340</sup>

Figure 101.1

EUC for Sigma Thuraya (3 December 2020)

|                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   |                                                                                   |                                                                       |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <b>LIBYAN GOVERNMENT</b><br><b>GENERAL AUTHORITY FOR</b><br><b>COMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATICS</b>                                                                                                                                                                                                                 |  | <b>الحكومة الليبية</b><br><b>الهيئة العامة للاتصالات والمعلوماتية</b> |
| التاريخ: 03 / 12 / 2020<br>الرقم: الإشاري:                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        |                                                                                   |                                                                       |
| <b>END-USER CERTIFICATE</b><br>No. 51970/4 dated 09/12/2020                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |                                                                                   |                                                                       |
| Reference: Contract No. 51970 dated 27 <sup>th</sup> September 2020                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               |                                                                                   |                                                                       |
| 1. User's full name and address:<br><b>Libyan Ministry of Communication and Information Technology</b>                                                                                                                                                                                                            |                                                                                   |                                                                       |
| 2. Agent's full name and address:<br><div style="background-color: black; height: 20px; width: 100%;"></div>                                                                                                                                                                                                      |                                                                                   |                                                                       |
| 3. Importer's full name and address:<br><b>Libyan Ministry of Communication and Information Technology</b>                                                                                                                                                                                                        |                                                                                   |                                                                       |
| 4. Exporter's full name and address:<br><div style="background-color: black; height: 20px; width: 100%;"></div>                                                                                                                                                                                                   |                                                                                   |                                                                       |
| 5. Description and quantity of the goods:<br><b>1 Unit, Thuraya monitoring solution.</b>                                                                                                                                                                                                                          |                                                                                   |                                                                       |
| 6. Place of installation (use) of the goods:<br><b>East Libya, Benghazi</b>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |                                                                                   |                                                                       |
| 7. The purpose of end-use of the goods:<br>These goods will be plugged in the End-User's equipment with the purpose of<br><b>Monitoring and collecting statistics of subscribers, which use Thuraya services.</b>                                                                                                 |                                                                                   |                                                                       |
| 8. The user of the goods warrants by this, that the goods stated in item 5, will not be used other, than for needs of Libyan Ministry of Communication and Information Technology and will not be transferred to any one or re-exported without a permission of the State Service on Export Control of Lithuania. |                                                                                   |                                                                       |
| 9. The user of the goods shall provide written verification of receipt of stores certifying that consignee against present End-User Certificate has received the stores under the referenced Contract.                                                                                                            |                                                                                   |                                                                       |
| Signature: <br>Name: <b>Ahmed M. Alwerfly</b><br>Position: <b>Manager of EUC Libya</b><br>Seal:                                             |                                                                                   |                                                                       |
| ميني بريد السلمان / بنغازي - ليبيا   +218 61 479 9494   info@gacily.com   www.gacily.com                                                                                                                                                                                                                          |                                                                                   |                                                                       |

<sup>340</sup> As provided in letter from the Permanent Representative of the State of Libya to the United Nations on 12 December 2018.

Figure 101.2  
EUC for Alpha Max surveillance system (3 December 2020)

| LIBYAN GOVERNMENT<br>GENERAL AUTHORITY FOR<br>COMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATICS                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        |  |  الحكومة الليبية<br>الهيئة العامة للاتصالات والمعلوماتية |  |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--|
| التاريخ: 03 / 12 / 2020<br>الرقم الإشاري: /                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         |  |                                                                                                                                           |  |
| <b>END-USER CERTIFICATE</b>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         |  |                                                                                                                                           |  |
| <b>A. Parties</b>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   |  |                                                                                                                                           |  |
| 1. Exporter                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         |  | 4. Country of final destination.                                                                                                          |  |
| [Redacted]                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          |  | Libya                                                                                                                                     |  |
| 2. Consignee                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        |  |                                                                                                                                           |  |
| Libyan Ministry of Communication and Information Technology<br>East Libya, Benghazi                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 |  |                                                                                                                                           |  |
| 3. End-user                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         |  |                                                                                                                                           |  |
| Libyan Ministry of Communication and Information Technology<br>East Libya, Benghazi                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 |  |                                                                                                                                           |  |
| 5. Contract N°: 51970                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               |  | 6. Date of signature of contract: 22/11/2020                                                                                              |  |
| <b>B. Goods</b>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |  |                                                                                                                                           |  |
| 1. Items                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            |  |                                                                                                                                           |  |
| Alpha-MAX tactical cellular interception system.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    |  |                                                                                                                                           |  |
| 2. Quantity (Units) / weight:                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |  |                                                                                                                                           |  |
| 1 qty                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               |  |                                                                                                                                           |  |
| 3. End-use                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          |  |                                                                                                                                           |  |
| This is a software and hardware solution for intelligence purposes and tactical interception of cellular communications. This product is sold only to qualified government intelligence agencies.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   |  |                                                                                                                                           |  |
| 4. Specification of end-use location of the items                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   |  |                                                                                                                                           |  |
| Anti-terrorism and organized crime<br>Libyan Ministry of Communication and Information Technology<br>East Libya, Benghazi                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           |  |                                                                                                                                           |  |
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|                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   |                                                                                   |                                                                                      |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <b>LIBYAN GOVERNMENT</b><br><b>GENERAL AUTHORITY FOR</b><br><b>COMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATICS</b>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 |  | <b>الحكومة الليبية</b><br><b>الهيئة العامة للاتصالات والمعلوماتية</b>                |
| التاريخ: 03/12/2020<br>الرقم الإشاري: /                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           |                                                                                   |                                                                                      |
| <b>C. Commitment</b><br>We certify that the items described in section B1 :                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |                                                                                   |                                                                                      |
| 1. will only be used for the purposes described in section B.3 and that the items are intended for final use in the country named in section A.4.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 |                                                                                   |                                                                                      |
| 2. that the items will not be used in any nuclear explosive activity or unsafeguarded nuclear fuel cycle activity.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                |                                                                                   |                                                                                      |
| 3. that the items will not be used for any purpose connected with any chemical or biological or nuclear weapons, or missiles capable of delivering such weapons.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  |                                                                                   |                                                                                      |
| 4. that the items will only be used for civil end uses. (Tick if applicable)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      |                                                                                   |                                                                                      |
| 5. as far as technology is concerned, we certify that we treat the technology strictly confidential and neither pass the technology on to other companies nor shall we make knowledge available to third parties. In case of goods produced by the help of transferred technology, these goods will only be delivered to a third person/company in condition that this person/company accepts the commitments of the above declaration as binding for itself and on condition that this third person/company is known to be trustworthy and reliable in the observance or such commitments.                       |                                                                                   |                                                                                      |
| 6. we further certify that we will not re-export the items to a third country without the consent of the UAE authorities.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         |                                                                                   |                                                                                      |
| I undersigned <span style="float: right;">NAME - RANK/ROLE</span> <b>AHMED M. ALWERFLY</b>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        |                                                                                   |                                                                                      |
| certify that the information given in this document is true and accurate.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         |                                                                                   |                                                                                      |
| <br>(Signature)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                | 03/12/2020-Libya<br>(Place, Date)                                                 |  |
| <div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between; align-items: center;"> <div>  مبنی بريد السلماني / بنغازي - ليبيا         </div> <div>  +218 61 479 9494         </div> <div>  info@gacily.com         </div> <div>  www.gacily.com         </div> </div> |                                                                                   |                                                                                      |

Figure 101.3  
EUC Alpha interception system (3 December 2020)

| LIBYAN GOVERNMENT<br>GENERAL AUTHORITY FOR<br>COMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATICS                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        |  |  الحكومة الليبية<br>الهيئة العامة للاتصالات والمعلوماتية |  |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--|
| التاريخ: ٥٣... / ١٢... / ٢٠٢٠<br>الرقم الإشاري:                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |  |                                                                                                                                           |  |
| <b>END-USER CERTIFICATE</b>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         |  |                                                                                                                                           |  |
| <b>A. Parties</b>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   |  |                                                                                                                                           |  |
| 1. Exporter                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         |  | 4: Country of final destination.                                                                                                          |  |
|                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    |  | Libya                                                                                                                                     |  |
| 2. Consignee                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        |  |                                                                                                                                           |  |
| Libyan Ministry of Communication and Information Technology<br>East Libya, Benghazi                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 |  |                                                                                                                                           |  |
| 3. End-user                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         |  |                                                                                                                                           |  |
| Libyan Ministry of Communication and Information Technology<br>East Libya, Benghazi                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 |  |                                                                                                                                           |  |
| 5. Contract N°: <b>CONTRACT NO</b>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  |  | 6. Date of signature of contract: <b>DATE</b>                                                                                             |  |
| <b>B. Goods</b>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |  |                                                                                                                                           |  |
| 1. Items                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            |  |                                                                                                                                           |  |
| Alpha-AC-V tactical cellular interception system.<br>Alpha-DET tactical cellular interception detection system.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |  |                                                                                                                                           |  |
| 2. Quantity (Units) / weight:                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |  |                                                                                                                                           |  |
| 1 qty                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               |  |                                                                                                                                           |  |
| 3. End-use                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          |  |                                                                                                                                           |  |
| This is a software and hardware solution for intelligence purposes and tactical interception of cellular communications. This product is sold only to qualified government intelligence agencies.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   |  |                                                                                                                                           |  |
| 4. Specification of end-use location of the items                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   |  |                                                                                                                                           |  |
| Anti-terrorism and organized crime                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  |  |                                                                                                                                           |  |
| Libyan Ministry of Communication and Information Technology<br>East Libya, Benghazi                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 |  |                                                                                                                                           |  |
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**LIBYAN GOVERNMENT**  
GENERAL AUTHORITY FOR  
COMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATICS



الحكومة الليبية  
الهيئة العامة للاتصالات والمعلوماتية

التاريخ: ...../...../.....  
الرقم الإشاري: .....

**C. Commitment**

We certify that the items described in section B1 :

1. will only be used for the purposes described in section B.3 and that the items are intended for final use in the country named in section A.4.
2. that the items will not be used in any nuclear explosive activity or unsafeguarded nuclear fuel cycle activity.
3. that the items will not be used for any purpose connected with any chemical or biological or nuclear weapons, or missiles capable of delivering such weapons.
4. that the items will only be used for civil end uses. (Tick if applicable)
5. as far as technology is concerned, we certify that we treat the technology strictly confidential and neither pass the technology on to other companies nor shall we make knowledge available to third parties. In case of goods produced by the help of transferred technology, these goods will only be delivered to a third person/company in condition that this person/company accepts the commitments of the above declaration as binding for itself and on condition that this third person/company is known to be trustworthy and reliable in the observance or such commitments.
6. we further certify that we will not re-export the items to a third country without the consent of the UAE authorities.

I undersigned

NAME – RANK/ROLE

AHMED.M.ALWRFLY

certify that the information given in this document is true and accurate.

  
(Signature)

03/12/2020 - Lib/a  
(Place, Date)

(Company Stamp / Official seal)



مبنى بريد السلماني / بنغازي - ليبيا



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## Annex 102 Member States and regional organizations responses to arms embargo violations

1. In [S/2021/229](#)<sup>341</sup> the Panel provided information on unilateral action taken by Member States and regional organizations during 2020 to violations of the arms embargo. Table 102.1<sup>342</sup> summarises unilateral responses taken from 1 January 2021 to 31 March 2022, and for those unreported in [S/2021/229](#).

Table 102.1

### Member State responses

| <i>Date</i> | <i>Perpetrator</i>                 | <i>Equipment / Entity</i>                                    | <i>Member State location</i> | <i>Response</i>                                                                                                                          |
|-------------|------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 7 Jul 2020  | Kapor Trade LP <sup>a</sup>        | Engines and spare parts for vehicle type used by Russian PMC | Malta                        | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Consignment seized pending decision. <sup>b</sup> disposal</li> </ul>                             |
| 1 Feb 2021  | Azee Air LLC (AZL) <sup>c</sup>    | Airline                                                      | Kazakhstan                   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Revocation of air operating certificate. <sup>d</sup></li> </ul>                                  |
| 1 Feb 2021  | Jenis Air LLC (JEN) <sup>e</sup>   | Airline                                                      | Kazakhstan                   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Revocation of air operating certificate. <sup>f</sup></li> </ul>                                  |
| 18 May 2021 | Company <sup>g</sup>               | Communications surveillance equipment.                       | Lithuania                    | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Denial of export licence.</li> <li>Reference (24.38-72E)-3.</li> </ul>                            |
| 11 Jun 2021 | FlySky Airlines (FSU) <sup>h</sup> | Airline                                                      | Ukraine                      | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Revocation of air operating certificate. <sup>i</sup></li> </ul>                                  |
| 8 Oct 2021  | L6-FZE <sup>j</sup>                | LASA T-Bird (#YU-TSH)                                        | Serbia                       | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Revocation of civil aircraft registration. <sup>k</sup></li> </ul>                                |
| 13 Dec 2021 | Individual <sup>l</sup>            | Member of ChVK Wagner                                        | EU                           | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Placed under restrictive measures. <sup>m</sup></li> </ul>                                        |
| 13 Jan 2022 | Add Helium <sup>n</sup>            | Rebreathing diving equipment                                 | USA                          | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Supply prohibited.</li> <li>Owner and manager from the company convicted. <sup>o</sup></li> </ul> |
|             |                                    |                                                              |                              | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li></li> </ul>                                                                                       |

<sup>a</sup> Kapor Trade LP, Office 29, Clifton House, Fitzwilliam Street Lower, Dublin, D02 XT91.

<sup>b</sup> Member State.

<sup>c</sup> Appendix D to Annex 55 to [S/2021/229](#).

<sup>d</sup> Revocation Order: 00.47.

<sup>e</sup> Appendix E to Annex 55 to [S/2021/229](#).

<sup>f</sup> Revocation Order: 00.46.

<sup>341</sup> Annex 78.

<sup>342</sup> This table does not include national or regional organization designation listings made in response to a UN designation.

<sup>g</sup> The company cooperated fully with the Panel and the contract was immediately cancelled by the company once they were aware that the system would be a breach of a UN arms embargo. This occurred before the Panel made contact with the company. The Panel considers that it is not necessary to expose them to the reputational risk resulting from the company being identified in a Panel report.

<sup>h</sup> Annex 75 to [S/2021/229](#).

<sup>i</sup> Revocation No: UK 058.

<sup>j</sup> Annex 76 to [S/2021/229](#).

<sup>k</sup> De-registration Certificate No-01-0022/2021-0008.

<sup>l</sup> Annex 77 to [S/2021/229](#).

<sup>m</sup> (a) Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/2192 of 13 December 2021; and (b) Council Implementing Decision (CFSP) 2021/2198 of 13 December 2021.

<sup>n</sup> <https://addhelium.com>. Accessed 14 January 2022.

<sup>o</sup> <https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/south-florida-residents-sentenced-illegally-exporting-controlled-items-libya>, 13 January 2022.

## Annex 103 HAF tactical ballistic missile test launches

### 1. Background

1. On 7 March 2022 the 1st missile battalion of the LAAF launched at least three tactical ballistic missiles (TBM) in eastern Libya.<sup>343</sup> HAF claimed that two single missiles and a double missile launch took place, but available open-source imagery can only confirm a single and a double launch.<sup>344</sup> This was an unexpected event that surprised much of the international community. Unannounced launches of any form of ballistic missile type may act as deterrence but they are also equally likely to be regarded as threatening, particularly when launched by a non-state actor with the recent history HAF has for initiating armed conflict.<sup>345</sup>

2. HAF displayed ballistic missiles with a profile virtually identical to the R-17/SCUD-B TBM<sup>346</sup> at the 29 May 2021 "7th Anniversary of Operation Dignity" parade in Benina.<sup>347</sup> Four transport erector launchers (TEL)<sup>348</sup> (figure 103.1) and four missile transport vehicles (figure 103.2) were paraded.<sup>349</sup>

Figure 103.1

TBM on 9P117 *Uragan* TEL vehicles



Figure 103.2

TBM on transport vehicles



### 2. Identification of missile type

3. The imagery resolution and positioning of the missiles on the vehicles was not sufficient to be able to confirm the exact type of missile or whether they were practicable TBM or not. The number and positioning of fuel and oxidiser filling and drainage valves is a key visual indicator as to type and figure 103.3, as an example, shows the key components for a SCUD-B.

<sup>343</sup> Official HAF social media <https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=496270341902499>, 7 March 2022; and [https://twitter.com/aleasima\\_17/status/1500962189754122244?s=20&t=60EpJCaRRCelikjg6V3Nyg](https://twitter.com/aleasima_17/status/1500962189754122244?s=20&t=60EpJCaRRCelikjg6V3Nyg), 7 March 2022.

<sup>344</sup> [https://twitter.com/soldier\\_libyan3/status/1501559395146252292](https://twitter.com/soldier_libyan3/status/1501559395146252292), 9 March 2022.

<sup>345</sup> 4 April 2019 "Operation Flood of Dignity" offensive against Tripoli.


<sup>346</sup> SCUD-B can also be classified as a Short-Range Ballistic Missile (SRBM), which has a range classification of up to 1,000km. The Panel will use the term TBM to desensitise the issue. Some Member States also classify it as an Operational-Tactical missile.

<sup>347</sup> HAF 7th Anniversary Operation Dignity parade in Benina, 29 May 2021. <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mbIDXxITPa0>, 31 May 2021.

<sup>348</sup> 9P117 *Uragan* 8x8 MAZ-453 wheeled vehicles.

<sup>349</sup> One missile was displayed on the LNA "Alkarama parade" on 7 May 2018. <https://mobile.twitter.com/mahmouedgamal44/status/993809662163243008>, 8 May 2018.

Figure 103.3  
**Schematic of SCUD-B design**<sup>350</sup>



4. Although virtually identical to the R17/SCUD TBM it is also possible that the missiles are Hwasong-6 TBM. Libya reportedly acquired a few from the Democratic People's Republic of North Korea in 1993.<sup>351</sup> The Hwasong-6 is a variant of the SCUD-C design. The only major external difference from the SCUD-B being the missile length (see table 103.1). Imagery resolution was insufficient to enable the use of photogrammetry as the differential in length of 0.31m is only 2.8% of the total length, which is within the error margin for photogrammetry at this resolution.

Table 103.1  
**Comparison of SCUD-B and Hwasong-6**<sup>352</sup>

| Missile   | Diameter | Length | Warhead Mass         | Range | Accuracy (CEP) <sup>353</sup> |
|-----------|----------|--------|----------------------|-------|-------------------------------|
| SCUD-B    | 0.88m    | 11.25m | 545kg <sup>354</sup> | 300km | 450m                          |
| Hwasong-6 | 0.88m    | 10.94m | 770kg                | 500km | 1,000                         |

## 2. Launch operations

5. Confidential satellite imagery identified the launch area as being at 31°51'08"N, 20°24'02"E (figure 103.4). Four TEL vehicles, five military trucks and two unidentified light utility vehicles were observed on the access road to the training area where the launch positions were located. HAF misinformation placed the launch area as south of Suluq (see figure 103.5).

6. Open-source media reported that the missiles were launched "towards hypothetical targets 300km south of Tobruk",<sup>355</sup> (see figure 103.5) but the HAF released imagery of the target area only showed explosions and could not be geo-

<sup>350</sup> From UN Panel of Experts on Yemen report [S/2018/594](#). Not scaled but proportional. Valves are shown larger proportionally than on real missile to assist in identification. FFV is Fuel Filling Valve, FDV is Fuel Drainage Valve, OFV is Oxidiser Filling Valve and ODV is Oxidiser Drainage Valve.

<sup>351</sup> <https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/hwasong-6/>.

<sup>352</sup> Data varies dependent on source, so worse case options used in this table, which was compiled primarily from [customer.janes.com](https://customer.janes.com).

<sup>353</sup> Circular Error Probability. The CEP is a measure of a weapon system's precision. It is defined as the radius of a circle, centred on the mean, whose boundary is expected to include the landing points of 50% of the missiles fired.


<sup>354</sup> From confidential "SCUD data pack".

<sup>355</sup> <https://twitter.com/ObservatoryLY/status/1500962768064757765?s=20&t=60EpJCaRRCelikjg6V3Nyg>, & March 2022.

referenced, so the range of the missile, and effectiveness of the warhead cannot yet be independently verified. Official HAF imagery of the firings was released (see figures 103.6 to 103.8).<sup>356</sup>

Figure 103.4

**Location of missile launch area**



**Source:** Google Earth

<sup>356</sup> [https://twitter.com/soldier\\_libyan3/status/1501559395146252292](https://twitter.com/soldier_libyan3/status/1501559395146252292), 9 March 2022.

Figure 103.5


**Map of missile launch location and possible target area**



Figure 103.6

**TBM on TEL in launch position**

7. Note the red flag at the front left-hand side of the TEL vehicle. This almost certainly indicates that the missiles are being fired from pre-surveyed positions. Pre-surveyed positions are used to assist in the accuracy of the missile system. They are an indicator that this was the launch of a fully capable missile.

8. Also note that in the HAF video that the crew are wearing full personal protective equipment, indicating that live fuelling operations took place on site. The missile can only be safely filled with the liquid bipropellant when it is in the erected launch position. The missile should not be pre-fuelled when in the transport position as the missile propellant tanks and joints are not strong enough to support the weight of the fuel and oxidiser when being moved the 90° from the transport to launch position. There is also the risk of internal valve leakage due to movement-induced internal pressure on seals. Either event could result in immediate spontaneous combustion of the bipropellant if the fuel and oxidiser met the ignition fuel (usually “Samin”).

Figure 103.7

**TBM on TEL in launch position**



9. The Libyan flag and the Arabic text “Al Karama” are indicators that this is real imagery of the launch area.

Figure 103.8

**Simultaneous launch of two TBM**


10. The orange-brown smoke on launch is typical for the combustion of the fuel (kerosene or unsymmetrical dimethyl hydrazine (UDMH)) and the oxidiser (inhibited red fuming nitric acid (IRFNA)). These chemicals also have commercial applications and are available in Libya. Stocks of the bipropellant have been reported as been stored near Tobruk.<sup>357</sup>

11. Analysis of imagery from the launch (figure 103.9) shows indicators that live warheads were fitted to the missiles, but no evidence as to if the full explosive yield of 545kg was present.<sup>358</sup>

<sup>357</sup> Confidential source.

<sup>358</sup> Two of the three ballistic missiles show a constant diameter from the base until the guidance and control section, but one appears to have a guidance and control section with a smaller diameter and a small conic section below the guidance and control section, and also between the oxidiser tank and the tail unit (see the missile at the top in figure 103.9 versus the one at the bottom). This is probably an optical illusion, because the cable ducts make the diameter look a bit larger; investigations of this continue.

Figure 103.9  
**Missile analysis of launch missiles**



12. Comparison against one of the few known images of a Libyan SCUD-B (figure 103.10) clearly shows that the black line markings for safe lift points and internal separation points are in the identical positions of those launched (figure 103.9).



Figure 103.10  
**Libyan confirmed SCUD-B TRM**



Source: <http://www.b14643.de/Spacerockets/Specials/Scud/>.

### 3. Availability

13. The availability of SCUD-B TBM in Libya is, yet, undetermined. In February 2005 Muammar Qadhafi attempted to sell the entire Libyan stockpile of 417 SCUD missiles to the United States of America for USD 834 million, but the United States only acquired ten for testing. More recent estimates state that only 80 SCUD-B missiles remained at the time of the 2011 uprising.<sup>359</sup>

14. During the 2011 uprising Qadhafi launched a SCUD-B TBM against rebel forces, which had no military effect.<sup>360</sup> At that time experts doubted the utility of Libya's SCUD-B TBM arsenal due to poor maintenance and operability, and a history of suboptimal test flight and combat performance.<sup>361</sup>

15. Technical sources who have operated within Libya over the past ten years have yet to report seeing any examples of the SCUD-B TBM, which have remained "hidden" from the international community. Reports have stated that although missile main assemblies may have existed, the specialist missile fuelling and air pressure systems had been lost or were inoperable. The launch on 7 March 2022 clearly indicates that HAF have resolved this issue.

<sup>359</sup> [https://www.nti.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/libya\\_missile.pdf](https://www.nti.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/libya_missile.pdf).

<sup>360</sup> <https://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/libya-missile/>.

<sup>361</sup> James Hackett, "Whatever happened to Libya's Scud-Bs?" *IJSS Voices*, 23 March 2011, [www.ijss.org](http://www.ijss.org); and General Carter Ham, "DOD News Briefing with Gen. Ham via Teleconference from Germany," 21 March 2011.

#### 4. Threat analysis

16. The low number of SCUD-B available to HAF are of minimal military utility. They can only deliver an explosive warhead, no bigger than an average terrorist vehicle-borne IED (VBIED), to an accuracy of within 450m of the target under ideal conditions.

17. Nevertheless, the launch demonstrates that HAF has access to capable missile engineers and technicians, highly probably with cross-transferable skills allowing them to maintain the remainder of his arsenal. This being another indicator of their movement from undisciplined light infantry towards a capable all arms combat force. Khalifa Haftar personally attended the launch and regarded it as a success, and then immediately promoted all the personnel of 1<sup>st</sup> missile battalion.

18. The possession of a capability to launch ballistic missiles, even at the tactical level, is highly symbolic and goes well beyond the actual combat effectiveness of the system. They are regarded as "prestige" weapon systems despite their limited military utility. Only two non-state actors are confirmed as possessing a launch capability for TBM: (a) the Houthi in Yemen;<sup>362</sup> and now (b) HAF.

19. The possession of TBM by non-states actors provides them with a long-range strike capability to attack symbolic area targets such as international airports or critical national infrastructure. Although damage will be limited there is a strategic impact as: (a) it demonstrates a defensive weakness if the target party does not have an effective air defence system;<sup>363</sup> (b) it compels the target party to deploy a disproportionate air defence capability to reassure the civilian population; (c) it demonstrates the vulnerability of the civilian population to surprise attacks by TBM; and (d) results in an immediate increase in military tension.

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<sup>362</sup> Annexes 35 and 36 to [S/2018/594](#).

<sup>363</sup> MIM-104 Patriot air defence systems did not stop Houthi SRBM attacks against Riyadh. See footnote 98 to para.82 of [S/2018/594](#).



## **Annex 104 Central Bank of Libya (CBL) reunification process from report of external consultant to the CBL**

### **1. Pillars and challenges resulting from the institutional split**

- (a) Currency stability;
- (b) Reserves management;
- (c) Monetary policy;
- (d) Foreign exchange regulation;
- (e) Financial system stability; and
- (f) Banking regulation.


### **2. Recommendations**

- (a) Strengthen financial accountability and transparency;
- (b) Reconcile the two branches' Balance Sheets;
- (c) Unifying the ledger system of the two branches;
- (d) Assessment of letters of Credit system/process;
- (e) Review foreign currency sales distribution to ensure fair distribution;
- (f) Review the composition of asset backing for Currency in Circulation issued by the two branches;
- (g) Adoption of widely accepted IFRS standards for financial reporting;
- (h) Periodic physical count of gold, currencies and verification of value of other tangible assets;
- (i) Establish third party confirmation process;
- (j) Resolve potential conflicts of interest on account of holding investments;
- (k) Assessment of impact of devaluation of LYD;
- (l) Unified organization structure, operations, resource needs and plans;
- (m) Establishment of effective governance and internal controls;
- (n) Comprehensive governance framework for transactions with the Public Treasury; and
- (o) Ensure data proposed to be published reconciles with the trial balances.

## Annex 105 Ernst and Young Global Limited progress status of LIA as of 18 February 2022

Figure 105.1

### Assessment of progress status of LIA by Ernst and Young Global Limited



**Source:** Ernst and Young Global Limited.

**Annex 106 Press release by GNU on the release of Saadi Qadhafi (LYi.15) (6 September 2021)**



## بيان صحفي

تنفيذا لأحكام القضاء النافذة، أفرج اليوم عن الموقوف الساعدي معمر القذافي بعد عامين من قرار الإفراج عليه بالتعاون مع مكتب النائب العام وجهاز الردع لمكافحة الإرهاب والجريمة المنظمة. وقد تسلمته عائلته وفقا للإجراءات القانونية.

وإذ تؤكد حكومة الوحدة الوطنية التزامها بما تعهدت به بالعمل على الإفراج على جميع المساجين ممن تقضي أوضاعه القانونية ذلك دون استثناء، فإنها تأمل بأن تكون مثل هذه الجهود تصب في مسار المصالحة الوطنية الشاملة، والتي أساسها انفاذ القانون واحترامه.

حكومة الوحدة الوطنية

2021 / 09 / 06م

**Official UN Translation**

2115622E

*Translated from Arabic*

**Government of National Unity**

**Press release**

In accordance with binding court rulings, the detainee Saadi Muammar Qadhafi was released today, two years after the decision to release him was issued. The release was executed in cooperation with the Office of the Public Prosecutor and the Deterrent Agency for Combating Organized Crime and Terrorism. He was received by his family in accordance with the relevant legal procedures.

The Government of National Unity reaffirms that it is committed to its undertaking to release all prisoners, without exception, whose legal situation warrants doing so, and it hopes that such efforts will promote comprehensive national reconciliation, the basis of which is enforcement of and respect for the law.

**Government of National Unity**

6 September 2021

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## Annex 107 Certificate of death for Abu Zayd Umar Dorda (LYi.006)

جمهورية مصر العربية  
وزارة الداخلية  
قطاع الأحوال المدنية

صورة قيد الوفاة

الرقم القومي

بيانات (السنوي)

الاسم: البوريد عمير احمد ٥ ورده  
النوع: ذكر  
الجنسية: ليبيا  
اسم الام:   
الحالة الاجتماعية: متزوج  
تاريخ الوفاة: ثمانية وعشرون من فبراير  
مكان الوفاة: القاهرة  
العمر عند الوفاة: ٧٨ سنة ١ شهر ٢٧ يوم  
مكان الميلاد:   
م: صحة: زيتهم  
بر. مدني: السيد. رينج  
بر. اصدار: م. نموذجي القطع P ت. اصدار: ٢٠٢٢/٢/٢٤  
١٤٩٥٥٥٨٢٠ رقم مسلسل

تأكد من وجود العلامة المائية ونشر شعار الجمهورية - وثيقة أحوال مدنية

وزارة الداخلية  
قطاع الأحوال المدنية

اسم طالب الخدمة

طلب استخراج صورة قيد وفاة  
خدمة خاصة مميزة

التاريخ

(نموذج ٢/٤٠)

**Source:** Member State.

*Official UN translation  
Translated from Arabic*

Arab Republic of Egypt  
Ministry of the Interior  
Civil Status Division

**Copy of death registration**

National ID:

*Particulars of the deceased*

Name: Abu Zayd Umar Ahmid Durdah

Gender: Male

Religion: Muslim

Nationality: Libya

Mother's name:

Social status: Married

Date of death: 28 February 2022

Place of death: Cairo

Age at death: 78 years, 1 month, 27 days

Place of birth:

Health office: Zaynhum

Record No.: 1155

Civil registration office: Sayyidah Zaynab Date of record: 28 February 2022

Issuing registry: Division forms office Date of issue: 24 March 2022

Serial number: 149555820

*Check for watermark and eagle emblem of the Republic - Civil status document*

|                                    |                                              |             |
|------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------|-------------|
| Ministry of the Interior           | Request to obtain copy of death registration | (Form 40/3) |
| Civil Status Division              | Special service                              |             |
| Name of person requesting service: |                                              | Date:       |