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Letter dated 9 April 2019 from the Panel of Experts on South Sudan addressed to the President of the Security Council

The members of the Panel of Experts extended pursuant to Security Council resolution [2428 \(2018\)](#) have the honour to transmit herewith the final report, submitted in accordance with paragraph 19 (e) of the resolution.

The report was provided to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution [2206 \(2015\)](#) on 15 March 2019 and was considered by the Committee on 29 March 2019.

The Panel would appreciate it if the present letter and the final report were brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council and issued as a document of the Council.

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Final report of the Panel of Experts on South Sudan submitted pursuant to resolution 2428 (2018)

Summary

On 12 September 2018, Salva Kiir, the President of South Sudan, Riek Machar Teny, the leader of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army in Opposition, and other rebel factions signed the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan. The agreement has reduced fighting in many parts of the country, allowing for some alleviation of the serious humanitarian emergency that still afflicts the majority of the civilian population. It has also facilitated the return of senior opposition figures to Juba, opening new space for the political dialogue and confidence-building that will be necessary for the forthcoming transitional period.

Some armed groups remain outside of the agreement, however, including an alliance led by the National Salvation Front of Thomas Cirillo. A sustained conflict with Government forces has led to renewed fighting in Central and Western Equatoria, displacing an estimated 12,000 civilians since January 2019. They join the more than 2 million civilians who remain displaced by the conflict, most of whom have yet to see tangible improvements in their lives as a result of high-level political negotiations. Many remain vulnerable to growing food insecurity and alarming and persistent levels of sexual violence abetted by impunity.

The implementation of the agreement has also been challenged by delays and occasional obstruction. A state of emergency remains in place; several prominent political detainees are still in detention or unaccounted for; and little substantive progress has been made on the most challenging provisions, notably those pertaining to political boundaries, the devolution of power from the centre to the periphery, and security provisions.

At the heart of those issues is a Government reluctant to share control of key parts of the political, security and economic landscape of South Sudan. This is perhaps most evident in the growing power and influence of the National Security Service, which has emerged as a significant and parallel fighting force able to operate outside the rule of law and the framework for the implementation of the peace agreement. Both the Government and opposition forces also continue to profit from a parallel conflict economy, including through the illicit trade in timber and gold.

Political elites benefiting from a period of relative stability and access to an economy buoyed by increasing oil production and prices have little to gain from the collapse of the agreement. They are, however, increasingly contending with the waning patience of commanders, fighters and civilians, who have yet to see the benefits of the bargains struck by their leaders. Maintaining momentum by supporting the resolution of the most contentious aspects of the agreement is now a key challenge to its sustainability.

The regional context in which the agreement is being implemented has also shifted since the Panel's interim report of November 2018 (S/2018/1049), with domestic instability occupying the Sudan, one of its key guarantors, and other regional disputes having emerged as competing priorities for Uganda.

In adopting resolution 2428 (2018), the Security Council imposed an arms embargo on the entire territory of South Sudan, while detailing exemptions to the ban in paragraph 5. As in its interim report, the Panel has continued to note the presence of foreign military forces in South Sudan. While the Panel has not identified the import of substantial amounts of weaponry or ammunition, it has noted limitations to current efforts to monitor the embargo, including the absence of any inspection reports

produced further to paragraph 8 of resolution [2428 \(2018\)](#). Shortcomings have also been identified in the systems put in place by regional States to implement the asset freeze.

The present final report describes the Panel's findings from its work completed between September 2018 and March 2019.

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Abbreviations

IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
NAS	National Salvation Front
NGO	non-governmental organization
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OHCHR	Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
SPLA	Sudan People's Liberation Army
SPLA-IO	Sudan People's Liberation Army in Opposition
SPLM	Sudan People's Liberation Movement
SPLM-FD	Sudan People's Liberation Movement – Former Detainees
SPLM/A-IO	Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army in Opposition
SPLM-IO	Sudan People's Liberation Movement in Opposition
SSNMC	South Sudan National Movement for Change
SSOA	South Sudan Opposition Alliance
SSPDF	South Sudan People's Defence Forces
UNHCR	Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNMISS	United Nations Mission in South Sudan

I. Background

A. Mandate and travel

1. By its resolution [2206 \(2015\)](#), the Security Council imposed a sanctions regime targeting individuals and entities contributing to the conflict in South Sudan and established a sanctions committee (the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution [2206 \(2015\)](#) concerning South Sudan). The Committee designated six individuals for targeted sanctions on 1 July 2015. In its resolution [2428 \(2018\)](#), the Council renewed the sanctions regime until 31 May 2019 and added two persons to the list of designated individuals. It also decided to impose an arms embargo on the entire territory of South Sudan, detailing exemptions in paragraph 5 of the resolution.

2. The Security Council also decided to extend the mandate of the Panel of Experts on South Sudan until 1 July 2019 so that it might provide information and analysis regarding the implementation of resolution [2428 \(2018\)](#), in support of the work of the Committee, including as relevant to the potential designation of individuals and entities that might be engaging in the activities described in paragraphs 13, 14 and 15 of the resolution.

3. On 22 August 2018, the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Committee, appointed the five members of the Panel (see [S/2018/776](#)): a natural resources expert (Michael Gibb), an arms expert (Dean Gillespie), a finance expert (Andrei Kolmakov), an expert on humanitarian affairs (Renifa Madenga) and an expert on armed groups and regional issues (Emilio Manfredi). Mr. Gibb was designated to serve as the coordinator of the Panel.

4. Since their appointment in August 2018, members of the Panel have travelled to Ethiopia, France, Kenya, South Africa, South Sudan, the Sudan, Uganda, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America.

B. Methodology

5. The present report was prepared on the basis of research conducted by the Panel, as well as a review of documentation made available by the Government of South Sudan, other Member States, regional entities, international organizations and commercial entities. The report also draws on the Panel's earlier work, including previous reports to the Security Council and the Committee, both public and confidential, hundreds of interviews and a large body of other information and evidence provided by a wide range of sources.

6. The Panel follows the standards recommended by the Informal Working Group of the Security Council on General Issues of Sanctions in its report of December 2006 ([S/2006/997](#)), which call for reliance on verified, genuine documents, concrete evidence and on-site observations by experts, including photographs wherever possible. The Panel has corroborated all information contained in the present report using multiple, independent sources to meet the appropriate evidentiary standard.

7. The Panel conducted its work with the greatest transparency possible, while being cognizant of the importance of protecting confidentiality where necessary. A source or document is described as confidential when its disclosure could compromise the safety of the source or ongoing Panel investigations.

C. Cooperation with international organizations and other stakeholders

8. While the Panel operates independently of United Nations agencies and institutions, it wishes to express its gratitude to the leadership and personnel of UNMISS and other United Nations staff in Entebbe, Uganda, Nairobi and New York for their invaluable support.

9. The Panel met with South Sudan's Minister of Defence, Chief of General Staff, Minister of the Interior, Minister of Mining and Minister of Gender and Child and Social Welfare; representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security and the Ministry of Forestry; and a number of officials of SSPDF, including commanders of the 7(b) Brigade and the second, fourth, fifth, eighth and tenth Divisions.

10. During the initial months of its mandate, the Panel consulted extensively with the Member States concerned, international, regional and subregional organizations and UNMISS, further to paragraph 18 of resolution [2428 \(2018\)](#), in which the Council emphasizes the importance of the Panel holding consultations with those entities.

11. The Panel met with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of UNMISS, the Mission's Force Commander and Police Commissioner and representatives of the UNMISS Human Rights, Civil Affairs and Political Affairs Divisions, Women's Protection Unit, Gender Affairs Unit, Child Protection Unit and Rule of Law Section, as well as UNICEF, UNHCR, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the United Nations police and the United Nations Mine Action Service in South Sudan. The Panel also consulted with the Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission, the Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring and Verification Mechanism and the Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan.

II. Conflict dynamics

A. Armed groups and the implementation of the peace agreement

12. At the thirty-third extraordinary summit of Heads of State and Government of IGAD member States, held in Addis Ababa on 12 September 2018, Salva Kiir, the President of South Sudan, signed the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (hereinafter referred to as the revitalized peace agreement) with Riek Machar Teny, leader of SPLM/A-IO and representatives of other opposition factions, namely, SPLM-FD, SSOA, the Umbrella of Political Parties, the National Alliance of Political Parties, the United Sudan African Party, the United Democratic Salvation Front, the United Democratic Party and the African National Congress. The new accord was aimed at ending the hostilities that broke out in July 2016, following the collapse of the 2015 Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan.

13. The Panel discussed the context of the revitalized peace agreement in its interim report ([S/2018/1049](#)), noting the fatigue, resource depletion and military realities that had brought the sides back to the negotiating table, as well as an altered regional dynamic that supplemented the existing IGAD leadership with increased participation from the President of the Sudan, Omer Hassan Al-Bashir, and the President of Uganda, Yoweri Museveni.

14. The revitalized peace agreement can still be viewed as a positive step towards the resolution of the conflict in South Sudan, although this optimism must be

tempered by an understanding of the many challenges that face its implementation. It is an imperfect yet ambitious agreement that will require sustained political support and careful monitoring, including of the management and use of public finances, if it is to deliver on its promise to the population of South Sudan.

15. A permanent ceasefire, agreed under the Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities, Protection of Civilians and Humanitarian Access, signed on 21 December 2017, appears to be holding across the majority of the country.¹ This has reduced the number of conflict incidents recorded, thereby creating some additional space to alleviate the serious humanitarian emergency that still affects the majority of the civilian population.

16. A number of senior opposition leaders have returned to Juba,² demonstrating that some trust has been rebuilt between the parties and facilitating further confidence-building measures and peace celebrations across the country, which have included both Government and opposition forces.³ The presence of senior opposition leaders in Juba has also made it possible for several of the key bodies created under the revitalized peace agreement to meet more regularly, signalling some momentum towards the implementation of the most challenging provisions in the agreement, including the security provisions outlined in chapter 2.

17. At the same time, several opposition forces have refused to sign the agreement, arguing that it leaves the root causes of the conflict unaddressed and calling for its renegotiation.⁴

18. These opposition forces include the South Sudan United Front/Army led by Paul Malong⁵ (SSi.008) and the South Sudan National Democratic Alliance, an alliance of four groups, led by Thomas Cirillo's NAS. The alliance, formed in November 2018, succeeded in gathering a number of armed groups under the centralized leadership of Cirillo.⁶

19. The refusal by the South Sudan National Democratic Alliance to sign the revitalized peace agreement has placed significant pressure on the ceasefire, particularly in Yei River State (Central Equatoria) and Amadi State (Western

¹ The Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities, Protection of Civilians and Humanitarian Access was reaffirmed on 21 June 2018 during the thirty-second extraordinary summit of the IGAD Assembly of Heads of State and Government on South Sudan and again on 12 September 2018 in article 2.1 of the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan.

² Opposition leaders who have returned to Juba include the Deputy Chair of SPLM/A-IO, Henry Odwar; the head of the SPLM/A-IO Security Committee, Angelina Teny; a senior leader of SPLM-FD, Rebecca Nyandeng de Mabior; the (contested) Chair of SSOA, Gabriel Changson Chang; the Chair of the National Democratic Movement, Lam Akol; and the former Secretary-General of the Jieng Council of Elders, Uztas Lewis Anei Madut. Interviews with Angelina Teny and other senior members of SPLM/A-IO, as well as senior members of SSOA, SPLM-FD and SSPDF, in Juba and Khartoum, January–March 2019.

³ Locations included Bentiu, Yambio, Kajo Keji, Wau, Bor and Raja. Interviews with senior SSPDF commanders, senior SPLA-IO representatives, United Nations staff, civil society representatives and journalists, in Juba, January–March 2019.

⁴ Interviews with General Thomas Cirillo, in Addis Ababa, November 2018 and February 2019; interviews with senior South Sudan United Front/Army representatives, in Khartoum, Nairobi and Kampala, December 2018, January and February 2019.

⁵ Interviews with senior South Sudan United Front/Army representatives, in Khartoum, Nairobi and Kampala, December 2018–March 2019.

⁶ The joint SSNDA joint military command now falls under the leadership of General Faiz Ismail Fatur (Chief of Staff), General John Kenyi Lebron, General Khalid Ono Lolu and General Kamilo Otwari (Deputy Chiefs of Staff). Interviews with General Thomas Cirillo and SSNDA senior representatives and military commanders, in Addis Ababa and Kampala, November 2018–March 2019.

Equatoria)⁷ where, since January 2019, SSPDF and NAS forces have been engaged in a protracted military confrontation that has displaced more than 12,000 civilians.⁸ Violent rhetoric has also escalated as a result, with the Government labelling NAS a “terrorist force”, substantially increasing its military presence in these areas and, in occasional partnership with SPLM/A-IO,⁹ pursuing sustained military action against NAS forces.

20. Further to its interim report, the Panel has also corroborated allegations of the presence of the Uganda People’s Defence Forces in the Equatorias, including in areas of ongoing conflict.¹⁰

21. As the Panel noted in its interim report, the fragmentation of signatory groups has also impeded the implementation of the agreement. On 30 November 2018, SSOA held an election in Khartoum for a new Chair. Sanctioned individual Peter Gadet Yak (SSi.006), leader of the South Sudan United Movement, claimed victory, but this was immediately contested by the incumbent Chair, Gabriel Changson Chang, leader of the Federal Democratic Party/South Sudan Armed Forces. This internal power struggle remains unresolved. Changson and those who support his leadership are in Juba, or visit regularly, while Gadet moves between Khartoum and South Kordofan, Sudan, near the South Sudanese border, where his military forces are based. Lam Akol, who has sided with Gadet, visited Juba for three days in February before returning to Khartoum.¹¹

22. Despite the momentum generated by the arrival of senior opposition figures in Juba, procedural issues continue to dominate discussions. As a result, only limited progress has been achieved on the most challenging substantive issues as the end of the critical eight-month pre-transitional period draws closer.¹² This has frustrated most groups, but especially those for whom tangible progress on these fronts, not elite politics in Juba, is a core objective.

23. Both Government and opposition groups have cited limited financial resources as the reason for delays in the implementation of the agreement. Few Government resources have been allocated to the budget of the National Pre-transitional Committee, however, which is also heavily skewed in favour of security sector spending (see annex 3), while considerable opacity around Government revenues persists.

24. The political process is now balancing the gains accrued from the implementation of the agreement to date against the waning patience of the signatories, the guarantors and the civilian population of South Sudan. This was almost the inevitable consequence of an ambitious agreement that was ultimately a

⁷ Created by Establishment Order No. 36/2015.

⁸ Interviews with civil society representatives, journalists, local community and religious leaders, humanitarian personnel, high-ranking SSPDF officers and NAS leadership, in Juba, Addis Ababa and Kampala, February–March 2019.

⁹ Interviews with community and religious leaders and civil society representatives, in Juba and Kampala, January–March 2019.

¹⁰ Interviews with community and religious leaders, civil society representatives, former and current intelligence personnel and diplomats of regional countries, in Juba, Kampala and Addis Ababa, January–March 2019. The presence of the Uganda People’s Defence Forces was also confirmed by Ugandan government officials in a meeting with the Panel in Kampala, March 2019.

¹¹ Interviews with senior SSOA representatives, in Kampala, Khartoum and Juba, December 2018 and January and February 2019.

¹² Interviews with SSPDF, SPLA-IO, SSOA, NAS senior officers, civil society representatives, journalists and community leaders, in Juba, Nairobi, Kampala and Khartoum, January–March 2019.

bargain between elites facing a narrowing range of options.¹³ Faced with growing conflict fatigue across their leaders, commanders and the civilian population, each group found its own reasons to accept an agreement that could move South Sudan out of active conflict and restore access to some financial resources.¹⁴

25. In practical terms, therefore, the revitalized peace agreement did not emerge from exhaustive multilateral negotiations centred on a collective and shared vision, but rather from a series of parallel and bilateral negotiations that found enough common ground to secure an agreement.¹⁵ What was secured, however, was not a comprehensive commitment to reshaping the political process in line with an ambitious text, but rather a renewed framework for the familiar political bargaining process that has shaped politics and resource allocation in South Sudan since its independence.

26. Early progress was therefore secured where there were clear areas of shared interest. Further fighting between signatories has largely been avoided, given that there is little will and few resources to do so, and political space has been created for renewed bargaining and negotiations through the creation of new bodies and positions, filled in part by senior political figures who have returned to Juba. By the same token, no meaningful progress has been made towards transitional justice or accountability for past crimes, as outlined in chapter 5 of the revitalized peace agreement, with signatories largely agreed on resisting such measures.¹⁶ This selective and partial approach has also shaped the implementation of other provisions, including those concerning the management and allocation of public resources (chapter 4), with some being ignored and others being moulded to suit the outcomes of the bargaining process.¹⁷

27. The most significant challenges to the sustainability of the revitalized peace agreement are therefore found in the provisions that one or more parties are unwilling to ignore, but where there is little common ground. The most significant of these is, perhaps, the reluctance of the Government to relinquish control of core components of South Sudan's security and economic landscape.¹⁸

28. The cantonment of armed forces offers a striking illustration of this dynamic. While the Government has agreed to a cantonment plan that enables the SPLM/A-IO leadership to deliver on its promise of food, shelter and medical treatment for its exhausted forces and commanders, the Government has resisted other key provisions.¹⁹ This includes, in practice, the disengagement and separation of forces (2.2.2), their assembly and cantonment (2.2.3.3), the demilitarization of civilian areas (2.2.3.1), the collection of long- and medium-range heavy weapons (2.2.3.2) and the submission of force location, size and weaponry maps (2.2.3.4). The full

¹³ Interviews with civil society representatives, diplomats, South Sudan government officials, SPLA-IO, SSOA and regional security services offices, in Addis Ababa, Nairobi, Kampala and Khartoum, September–December 2018.

¹⁴ Interviews with diplomats, diplomats and security services offices of regional countries, international analysts and journalists, in Addis Ababa, Nairobi, Kampala and Khartoum, September–December 2018.

¹⁵ Interviews with diplomats, SPLM/A-IO, SSOA and NAS senior officers, in Addis Ababa, Nairobi, Kampala and Khartoum, September–December 2018.

¹⁶ Interviews with senior civil servants, SPLM-IO, SPLM-FD, SSOA, community and religious leaders and civil society representatives, in Juba, Nairobi, Kampala, Addis Ababa and Khartoum, September–December 2018 and January–March 2019.

¹⁷ Interviews with SSPDF, SPLM/A-IO, SPLM-FD, SSOA and civil society representatives, in Juba, Kampala and Khartoum, January–March 2019.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Interviews with SSPDF, SSPDF-Military Intelligence, SPLA-IO and SSOA senior representatives, in Juba, Bentiu, Kampala, Khartoum, Addis Ababa and Nairobi, December 2018 and January–March 2019.

implementation of these provisions is an expressed priority of SPLM/A-IO as well as a stated precondition for the return of Riek Machar to Juba at the end of the pre-transitional period in mid-May 2019.²⁰

29. Similarly, the recruitment and training of security forces are prohibited under article 2.1.8 of the revitalized peace agreement. The Panel has, however, corroborated evidence that both SSPDF and the National Security Service have continued recruitment in Warrap State, including in the areas of Gogrial, Tonj and Twic, all of which are ethnic strongholds of President Kiir.²¹ The Panel has also corroborated recruitment, including of children, by an SPLM/A-IO faction allied with the Government and led by First Vice-President Taban Deng Gai, in parts of Unity State.

30. A determination to retain effective security control is perhaps most evident, however, in the continued exclusion of the National Security Service, and its Internal Security Bureau in particular, from the implementation process to date. As detailed in the case study below, the National Security Service has become an increasingly powerful and independent security actor with its own territorial control over Juba and other major cities.²² The Panel has corroborated allegations that the National Security Service has resisted the implementation of the security provisions under chapter 2.²³

31. Article 1.15 of the revitalized peace agreement relates to the contentious issue of political boundaries, but is also linked more broadly to the devolution of powers from the central to the local governments, and to the equitable access to land and resources. These are significant priorities for many opposition groups. The Technical Boundary Committee has, however, faced a number of obstacles and was ultimately unable to effectively complete its work.²⁴ The Independent Boundaries Commission (article 1.15.7) is yet to be constituted, at the time of writing.

32. The Government has also sought to use the pre-transitional period to shore up its control of the political landscape.²⁵ On 30 January 2019, for example, President Kiir formed a committee to accelerate the reunification of three main factions of SPLM: the one led by Kiir himself; the SPLM-IO faction led by First Vice-President Taban Deng Gai; and the SPLM-FD faction led by Deng Alor Kuol. The SPLM-IO faction led by Riek Machar is, however, not included.²⁶ Given the likely significance of the SPLM brand to future elections, this is a potentially divisive initiative at a key moment in the pre-transitional period.²⁷

33. Progress on implementing the above contentious provisions is complicated by a number of competing forces and objectives, including within signatory groups.²⁸

²⁰ Interviews with Riek Machar, in Khartoum, December 2018 and January 2019.

²¹ Interviews with community leaders, humanitarian personnel, UNMISS staff, SSPDF-Military Intelligence, diplomats and confidential sources, in Juba, Nairobi and Kampala, December 2018 and January–March 2019.

²² See case study on the National Security Service, sect. II B below and the report of the Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan of 18 February 2019 (A/HRC/40/69).

²³ Interviews with senior SSPDF commanders, February 2019; Riek Machar, in Khartoum, December 2018 and January 2019; and confidential sources, in undisclosed locations, January–March 2019.

²⁴ Interviews with diplomats and confidential sources, in Juba and Addis Ababa, January–March 2019.

²⁵ Interviews with senior SSPDF commanders, diplomats, UNMISS staff and confidential sources, in Juba, December 2018 and January–March 2019.

²⁶ See annex 5. Interviews with SPLM, SPLM-IO, SPLM/A-IO (Taban Deng Gai) and SPLM-FD senior representatives, civil society representatives and journalist, in Juba, February and March 2019.

²⁷ Interviews with SPLM, SPLM-IO, SPLM-FD, civil society representatives, analysts and diplomats, in Juba, Kampala and Addis Ababa, February and March 2019.

²⁸ Interviews with government officials, SPLM/A-IO, SSOA, SPLM-FD and civil society

34. The political leadership of the signatory groups is looking ahead to a new Revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity and jostling for key positions. Protracted negotiations over security provisions that would be sufficient to guarantee the return of Riek Machar at the end of the pre-transitional period are taking place amidst underlying tensions between President Kiir and First Vice-President Taban Deng Gai over the latter's role in a future Government in which Riek Machar resumes his position as First Vice-President, while other political elites eye the remaining four vice-presidential positions and key ministerial posts.²⁹

35. While the leadership of the signatory groups may be willing to contemplate tactical short-term concessions in pursuit of their longer-term vision, lower-ranking members of these groups have, in interviews with the Panel, stressed the supremacy of their short-term needs for food, shelter and other material benefits, expressing far less interest in long-term visions and political positioning. Within SPLM/A-IO, for example, General Johnson Olony has expressed dissatisfaction at the limited attention given to political borders in Shilluk areas, including in the context of the limitations of the Technical Boundary Committee and the Independent Boundaries Commission. In interviews with senior Equatorian SPLM/A-IO representatives, the Panel also noted their increasing dissatisfaction with the priorities of their leadership in Juba, as well as with the joint military operation between Government forces and the SPLA-IO Nuer mobile force based in Panyume against NAS. Some even raised the possibility of a splinter movement, either to create a new force or to join forces with the South Sudan National Democratic Alliance, which is led by Thomas Cirillo's NAS.³⁰

36. The same holds true for smaller splinter groups which, in interviews with the Panel, were focused only on the optimal pursuit of their short-term interests, with almost no concern for national politics.³¹ One Equatorian splinter group told the Panel "If we can find a sponsor and some money, we will fight the Government. If not, we will go to Juba and sign and work with the Government."³²

37. Further divisions complicate this bargaining at the local level, with significant intra-tribal divisions also emerging.³³ The growing dominance of the ethnic Rek Dinka, who are mostly from Gogrial, Tonj and Twic States,³⁴ within key Government offices and institutions, as well as over other Dinka groups, is allegedly an area of growing concern. The influential Jieng Council of Elders, an informal group of influential Dinka leaders and elders, is exerting pressure on key parties to re-establish a broader Dinka base that could better accommodate other groups as well. This might include efforts to reintegrate sanctioned individual Paul Malong Awan (SSi.008), a move that is being resisted by the Director General of the Internal Security Bureau, Akol Koor Kuc.³⁵

representatives, in Juba, January and February 2019.

²⁹ Interviews with SSPDF, SPLM/A-IO, SPLM-FD, SSOA, community leaders, civil society representatives and UNMISS staff, in Juba and Bentiu, January and February 2019.

³⁰ Interviews with SPLM/A-IO senior representatives and military commanders, in Kampala, Juba and Khartoum, December 2018 and January–March 2019.

³¹ Interviews with SPLM-IO, SPLM-FD, SSOA, SSPDF senior representatives, independent political actors, civil society representatives and community leaders, in Juba, Kampala and Khartoum, January and February 2019.

³² Interviews with an Equatorian splinter group, in Kampala, January and February 2019.

³³ Interviews with community and religious leaders and civil society representatives, in Juba and Bentiu, December 2018 and January and February 2019.

³⁴ Created by Establishment Order No. 36/2015.

³⁵ This has been particularly visible in recent promotions within SSPDF and the National Security Service. In the August 2018 National Security Service promotions, individuals from Gogrial or Tonj States predominate. Interviews with an SSPDF senior commander, a former SPLA-MI representative and confidential sources, in Juba, Nairobi, Addis Ababa, Kampala and Khartoum, January and February 2019.

38. Similar dynamics are shaping intra-Nuer politics, as the possible return of Riek Machar, a Dok Nuer, puts the future political position of the current First Vice-President, Taban Deng Gai, a Jikany Nuer, in doubt. Given that Taban Deng Gai retains significant forces in the volatile Unity State, these tensions could quickly become relevant to the broader conflict dynamic at both the local and national levels. On 30 December 2018, Colonel Dickson Gatluak Jock, a former military spokesperson for SPLM/A-IO (Taban Deng Gai), defected, accusing Taban Deng Gai of submitting to the Government and of integrating his forces into SSPDF and SPLM without consent. Gatluak Jock later formed a new movement called the “Federal Unionists Liberation Front”.³⁶

39. The Equatorias have emerged as one of the most volatile regions in South Sudan in recent years, exemplified in recent months by Thomas Cirillo’s opposition to the agreement and as detailed in a case study in the Panel’s interim report. Cirillo has harnessed long-standing grievances by Equatorians towards the centre, which is perceived to have neglected their interests. Cirillo’s opposition to the agreement has, however, also allowed other Equatorians, such as the incumbent Vice-President, Wani Igga, and the Minister of Cabinet Affairs and Secretary of the National Pre-transitional Committee, Martin Elia Lomuro, to position themselves as allies of the Government in an unstable region where it is actively trying to build support.³⁷

40. The revitalized peace agreement is an ambitious agreement of short deadlines and limited resources, the implementation of which remains hostage to the multiple dynamics described above. Continued nuanced political support, progress towards accountability, and careful monitoring, including of spending and financial arrangements, will be necessary to ensure that the agreement maintains momentum without departing from the agreed provisions in ways that imperil the future stability and security of South Sudan.

B. Case study on the National Security Service³⁸

41. The immediate release of all political prisoners is a key provision of the revitalized peace agreement (article 2.16) and is viewed by many parties as a key indicator of the Government’s commitment to peace.³⁹ A total of 29 political prisoners were released in October 2018, followed, on 2 November 2018, by the release of James Gatdet and South African national William Endley, both prominent SPLM/A-IO detainees who had been sentenced to death in February 2018.⁴⁰

42. Six months after the signing of the revitalized peace agreement, no further political detainees have been released.⁴¹ Among those who remain unaccounted for are other prominent critics of the Government, including Aggrey Idri, a member of SPLM-IO; Dong Samuel Luak, a human rights lawyer; and the youth activist Peter Biar Ajak.

³⁶ Interviews with senior SPLM/A-IO (Taban Deng Gai) representatives, community leaders, journalists and civil society representatives, in Juba, Bentiu and Kampala, December 2018, January and February 2019.

³⁷ Interviews with NAS, SPLM/A-IO, SSOA and Equatoria Non-Allied Forces senior representatives, community leaders, businessmen and civil society representatives, in Juba, Addis Ababa and Kampala, January and February 2019.

³⁸ See annex 2 for further information.

³⁹ Interviews with Riek Machar, SPLM/A-IO, SSOA senior representatives and civil society representatives, in Khartoum, January 2019; interviews with civil society representatives, in Juba and Nairobi, December 2018.

⁴⁰ See Waakhe Simon Wudu, “2 Machar followers freed in South Sudan”, VOA, 2 November 2018.

⁴¹ Interviews with civil society representatives, in Juba, Kampala and Nairobi, November and December 2018.

43. Both Aggrey and Dong fled to Nairobi, where they disappeared on 23 and 24 January 2017, respectively. When the Panel asked the Government of South Sudan about their whereabouts, it was referred to Kenyan authorities. South Sudanese authorities stated that they did not know what had happened to the two men, but that anything that did happen appeared to have taken place outside of South Sudan.

44. The Panel has corroborated evidence strongly suggesting that both Aggrey and Dong were kidnapped in Kenya by the Internal Security Bureau of South Sudan, which is part of the National Security Service. Acting on orders from the Director General of the Internal Security Bureau, Lieutenant General Akol Koor Kuc, the Internal Security Bureau team transported the two men from Kenya to Juba in a commercial plane on 27 January 2017, chartered with the help of the Embassy of South Sudan in Nairobi.

45. Once in the South Sudanese capital, the two men were taken to an Internal Security Bureau detention facility in the compound that serves as the National Security Service headquarters, commonly known as “the Blue House”. According to first-hand testimony, Aggrey was detained in one of several solitary confinement cells known as “*zan zans*” in the upper “political section”, while Dong was detained in solitary in the underground “criminal section” (see annex 8). Both men were observed inside the facility by former detainees of the facility who have spoken to the Panel.

46. On the night of the day they arrived, however, both Aggrey and Dong were, according to the same corroborated evidence, moved from the Blue House facility to another National Security Service detention and training facility in Luri that is part of a sprawling presidential and security service complex about 20 km west of Juba.

47. The Panel has received and reviewed a number of independent reports from multiple, highly credible and well-placed sources. These accounts corroborate each other across a number of key details, leading the Panel to conclude that it is highly probable that Aggrey Idri and Dong Samuel Luak were executed by Internal Security Bureau agents at the Luri facility on 30 January 2017, on orders from the commander of the National Security Service training and detention facilities in Luri, the Commander of the National Security Service Central Division and, ultimately, Lieutenant General Akol Koor Kuc.⁴² Their tragic deaths offer a sobering reflection of the challenges posed to the implementation of the revitalized peace agreement by the violent legacy of South Sudan’s conflicts, while highlighting the increasingly unchecked discretionary power of the National Security Service.

48. Some months later, on 28 July 2018, Peter Biar Ajak was arrested by the National Security Service upon arrival at Juba International Airport. He has since been detained in the political section of the Blue House detention facility, where he has had only intermittent access to lawyers and family.

49. On 7 October 2018, a stand-off between guards and detainees took place at the Blue House following violent protests about detention conditions. The Government alleges that Peter Biar Ajak played a prominent role in the events, an allegation that Biar denies.⁴³ The Government has informed the Panel that criminal charges relating principally to his alleged role in the events of 7 October have now been filed against Peter Biar Ajak, classifying him as a criminal rather than a political detainee. In discussions with the Panel about this case, the Government did not clarify why he had been detained in the first place, nor why he had not been charged within 24 hours of

⁴² Interviews, confidential sources, undisclosed locations, December 2018, January 2019 and February 2019. The Panel received testimony from more than ten well-placed individuals, including individuals with first-hand knowledge of detention facilities. All spoke to the Panel on condition of anonymity.

⁴³ Interview with a Ministry of Foreign Affairs representative, in Juba, February 2019.

detention, as required by South Sudan's Code of Criminal Procedure Act and Constitution.⁴⁴

50. The above cases illustrate the ability of the National Security Service, and the Internal Security Bureau in particular, to act outside the rule of law and official state structures. These powers, and the desire of the National Security Service to retain them beyond the peace agreement, pose a significant threat to the implementation of the agreement and, by extension, to the peace, security and stability of South Sudan.

51. The other facet of the power and autonomy of the National Security Service is its increasing financial independence. The budget of the Service is typically obscured in South Sudan's national budget, usually appearing as a "Security" line under "Office of the President". In the approved budget for 2018/19, the "Security" line within the budget for the Office of the President is allocated 4,681,304,253 South Sudanese pounds (SSP) (around \$3 million). South Sudan's Appropriation Act for 2018/19, however, does explicitly include a line for the "National Security Service" in the exact same amount of SSP 4,681,304,253. The equivalent line in the 2017/18 approved budget is SSP 2,755,945,652. This suggests a year-on-year increase in the budget of the National Security Service of more than 58 per cent.

52. In addition to resources obtained through the national budget, however, the National Security Service has pursued a number of independent commercial revenue streams. These not only increase its financial resources, but also liberate it from financial dependence on Government structures.

53. South Sudan's State-owned oil company, the Nile Petroleum Corporation (Nilepet), receives a significant share of oil revenues through its position as an equity partner in all of the joint venture companies producing oil in South Sudan. Nilepet regularly fails to meet the cash calls through which participating companies pay their share of production costs, and its accounts have never been audited.⁴⁵

54. As previously reported by the Panel, Akol Koor Kuc has held a seat on the Nilepet board since at least 2016 (see [S/2016/70](#)), and the Panel has confirmed that members of its staff are active National Security Service agents.⁴⁶ Nilepet has previously been linked, both by the Panel and third parties, to the off-budget financing of the National Security Service and has been asked to pay costs accrued by SSPDF in oil-producing areas.⁴⁷ The Chairman of the Committee on Finance and Economic Planning of the National Assembly recently noted that it "would seem to the Committee that some powerful institutions within the government are taking it [Nilepet's allocation], while Nilepet is unable to meet the cash calls as part of its operations!"⁴⁸

55. The National Security Service has also placed agents inside other major companies in South Sudan, including the Dar Petroleum Operating Company and the Bank of South Sudan,⁴⁹ and pursued its own commercial ventures.

⁴⁴ Ibid. See also South Sudan, Code of Criminal Procedure Act (2018), art. 64.)

⁴⁵ Interviews with confidential government sources, February and March 2019. See also Global Witness, *Capture on the Nile* (2018); article 4.8.1.14.14 of the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan calls for the review and transformation of Nilepet, while article 4.8.1.14.4 calls for strict adherence to the Petroleum Act, 2012.

⁴⁶ Interviews, with confidential sources, in undisclosed locations, January and February 2019.

⁴⁷ See [S/2016/793](#). See also Global Witness, *Capture on the Nile; The Sentry*, "Fuelling atrocities: oil and war in South Sudan", March 2018.

⁴⁸ Transitional National Legislature of the Republic of South Sudan, "Report on the second reading of the budget for the financial year 2018–2019", sect. 3.1.a.5, presented by the Chairman of the Committee on Finance and Economic Planning, David Nailo Mayo, 13 August 2018. Nilepet's failure to meet cash calls has been corroborated by one confidential source.

⁴⁹ Interviews with confidential sources, in undisclosed locations, December 2018 and January–March 2019.

56. The Panel has identified three companies explicitly identified as “owned by” or “the property of” the National Security Service in corporate registration documents. These are Sudd (Suud) Security Services Co. Ltd, Sudd Security Services and Property Co. Ltd and National Oil and Gas Co. Ltd. Sudd (Suud) Security Services has, in turn, formed a number of joint venture partnerships with private aviation and security companies.

57. The National Security Service has also taken the lead in monitoring and restricting the activities of those who are critical of the Government, including journalists and civil society representatives. Through an office under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Deng Tong Kenjok, an active member of the National Security Service officially assigned to the South Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Commission, the Service embeds personnel within key offices and civil society organizations and approves all meetings, workshops and conferences.⁵⁰

58. The extensive and parallel detention programme of the National Security Service also allows it detain individuals outside the normal judicial process. The Blue House is just one of several formal and informal detention facilities across South Sudan that are controlled by the Internal Security Bureau. According to testimony from former detainees, the Blue House facilities, and its “criminal” section in particular, are overcrowded, with prisoners being extorted and deprived of food and medical attention (see annex 8). The Panel heard multiple accounts of interrogations that included beatings and torture, such as the use of electric shocks.⁵¹

59. In Juba, the Panel also confirmed the existence of a second notorious detention and torture site located on the Nile river between the immigration and police facilities, known as “Riverside”.⁵²

60. The National Security Service has also allegedly conducted a number of extrajudicial killings through two small killing squads known as “Inside Tiger” and “Outside Tiger”, both of which are under the command of Lieutenant General Akol Koor Kuc. These “unknown gunmen” are alleged to have carried out a number of targeted killings in recent years, including of journalists and civil society activists in South Sudan and perceived critics or political opponents seeking refuge in neighbouring countries, including in refugee camps.⁵³

61. Viewing them as a threat to its independence, the National Security Service has resisted the imposition of many of the provisions of the revitalized peace agreement.⁵⁴ As such, it is emerging as one of the most significant obstacles to the implementation of the agreement and to the trust the agreement seeks to build between the signatories.

62. Contrary to the provisions of the revitalized peace agreement (article 2.1.8), for example, the Panel has confirmed the recent recruitment by the National Security Service of at least 3,000 new forces in Tonj and Gogrial, the respective homes of Akol Koor Kuc and President Kiir, with ethnic and tribal affiliation becoming an increasingly greater focus of the most senior government officials.⁵⁵

63. New National Security Service recruits are reportedly receiving training at a facility located in Ananatak. The training is allegedly supported by an international company that may be operating locally as “Marchant – Mighty Warriors Tactical Training”. Any such training would fall under the provisions of the arms embargo

⁵⁰ Interviews with confidential sources, in undisclosed locations, January and February 2019.

⁵¹ Interviews with confidential sources, in undisclosed locations, January–March 2019.

⁵² Interview with confidential source, in undisclosed location, February 2019.

⁵³ Interviews with confidential sources, in undisclosed locations, January and February 2019.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ Interviews with confidential sources, in undisclosed locations, January–March 2019. See also annex 6.

imposed on the entire territory of South Sudan by the Security Council in its resolution [2428 \(2018\)](#).

64. The Panel has also noted attempts by the National Security Service to place itself outside of the security provisions of the revitalized peace agreement. The Director General of the Internal Security Bureau has reportedly stressed repeatedly that the National Security Service does not consider itself subject to the cantonment provisions of article 2.2.2 and does not intend to vacate civilian areas, as provided for in article 2.2.3.1.⁵⁶

65. This resistance to the implementation of the revitalized peace agreement is well exemplified by a serious incident that took place at the National Security Service training and detention facilities in Luri. On 18 December 2018, a Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring and Verification Mechanism team consisting of three international observers and a local driver travelled to the training centre to conduct an investigation into an alleged violation of the Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities, Protection of Civilians and Humanitarian Access. After being denied access to the training centre, the team was detained for more than four hours by National Security Service forces. Members of the monitoring team were harassed, seriously assaulted and robbed. A female member of the team was stripped naked during the assault.⁵⁷ This constitutes a significant violation of articles 2.1.10.5 and 2.1.10.6 of the revitalized peace agreement and of paragraph 14 (g) of resolution [2428 \(2018\)](#).

66. The Panel has established that the detention and assault were ordered by Brigadier General Malual Dhal Muorwel, who was the National Security Service commander in charge of the Luri facilities at the time, with the knowledge of Major General Aciec Kuot, the Deputy Operations Commander for the National Security Service in Juba, both of whom are close to the Director General of the Internal Security Bureau (Akol Koor Kuc), who was also aware of the incident.⁵⁸

C. Regional developments and context

67. In its interim report, the Panel described how the revitalized peace agreement was negotiated and signed against the backdrop of a growing regional détente in the Horn of Africa region. This engaged a broader range of regional stakeholders in the leadership of the South Sudan peace process, with the Sudan and Uganda emerging as a complement to the leadership of Ethiopia within the regional mechanism, IGAD.

68. This raised expectations that the revitalized peace agreement would be implemented in a more conducive regional context than its 2015 predecessor, the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan, which lacked the equivalent political and security backing from the region. The Panel also noted, however, that this backing would have to become sufficiently institutionalized to endure beyond the short term in order to be effective.

69. In the months since the Panel's interim report, a number of regional developments have strained the détente, raised questions over which regional leadership will be sustained, and shaped a different regional context for the remaining months of the pre-transitional period and subsequent transitional period.

⁵⁶ Interviews with confidential sources, in undisclosed locations, December 2018 and January and February 2019.

⁵⁷ See annexes 9 and 10.

⁵⁸ Interviews with confidential sources, in undisclosed locations, December 2018 and January and February 2019.

70. From the outset, Panel interviews suggest there has been only limited communication and coordination between the key regional backers of the revitalized peace agreement and between Khartoum and Kampala in particular.⁵⁹

71. Domestic developments in the Sudan have also impacted its engagement in the South Sudanese peace process. On 19 December, Sudanese citizens took to the streets of cities across their country, including in the capital. While an increase in the price of basic goods and fuel shortages appear to have sparked the protests, they soon took on a broader agenda critical of the Government and demanded the resignation of President Omer Al-Bashir. Unarmed protesters, supported by opposition parties and professional associations, were fired at with tear gas and live ammunition. The demonstrations continued and, on 22 February 2019, President Al-Bashir dissolved the Cabinet and all local governments and declared a state of emergency.⁶⁰ On 23 February, President Al-Bashir appointed the Defence Minister, General Awad Ibnoufas, as his Vice-President, and the Governor of eastern Gezira State, Mohamed Tahir Ayala, as Prime Minister. In parallel, President Al-Bashir replaced all state governors with military officials.⁶¹

72. The above changes and the consequent instability in the Sudan will likely impact the implementation of the revitalized peace agreement in South Sudan. Authorities in Khartoum, and President Al-Bashir in particular, are among the key guarantors of the revitalized peace agreement, including with respect to guaranteeing the security of Riek Machar.⁶² The Sudan's renewed cooperation with South Sudan to resume oil production in the Unity State oilfields, in addition to South Sudan's dependence on Sudanese pipelines and ports for all oil exports, also make this relationship critical to both economies.

73. Ongoing political, military and financial investment in the implementation of the revitalized peace agreement by Uganda has also grown less certain. Other regional political disputes, including with Rwanda, have affected political priorities.⁶³ The continued presence of armed Uganda People's Defence Forces in Central and Western Equatoria, in violation of the arms embargo established by the Security Council in its resolution 2428 (2018), and as reported in the Panel's interim report, has also raised questions about Uganda's role as an impartial participant in the process.⁶⁴

74. On 5 March 2019, the Prime Minister of Ethiopia, Abiy Ahmed Ali, and the President of Eritrea, Isaias Afwerki, both visited Juba and met with President Kiir. The meeting took place soon after the forty-sixth ordinary session of the IGAD Council of Ministers, held in Djibouti on 27 February, at which the need for enhanced policies on the greater Horn of Africa was discussed.⁶⁵ This joint Ethiopian and

⁵⁹ Interviews with diplomats and security service personnel of regional countries, diplomats and confidential sources, in Kampala, Addis Ababa, Khartoum, Nairobi and Juba, December 2018 and January–March 2019.

⁶⁰ See Al Jazeera English, "Sudan's Bashir declares year-long state of emergency", 23 February 2019. The one-year state of emergency was later reduced to six months.

⁶¹ See Al Jazeera, "Sudan's Bashir reshuffles top team amid state of emergency", 23 February 2019.

⁶² Interviews with Sudanese civil society representatives, journalists and academics, Sudanese senior civil servants, Sudanese and regional countries' intelligence personnel, diplomats and confidential sources, in Khartoum, Addis Ababa, Juba, Kampala and Nairobi, January–March 2019.

⁶³ Interviews, including by telephone, with senior Ugandan civilian, military and intelligence personnel, diplomats, international analysts and confidential sources, in Kampala, Addis Ababa and Nairobi, January–March 2019.

⁶⁴ Interviews with civil society representatives, community and religious leaders, internally displaced persons, journalists and staff of an international non-governmental organization (NGO), in Addis Ababa, Juba, Kampala and Nairobi, January–March 2019

⁶⁵ See annex 11.

Eritrean mission to Juba may signal a change in internal IGAD dynamics and a renewed interest on the part of Ethiopia and Eritrea in the South Sudan peace process.⁶⁶ In recent months, the IGAD Special Envoy to South Sudan, Ambassador Ismail Wais, has pushed non-signatory groups to sign the revitalized peace agreement,⁶⁷ with IGAD also playing a central role in the consensus selection of a permanent Chairperson for the critical monitoring and evaluation body, the Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission.⁶⁸

III. Violations of international humanitarian and human rights law

75. The humanitarian situation in South Sudan remains precarious, despite the hopes attached to the revitalized peace agreement by the civilian population. More than 2 million civilians remain displaced. Most are facing serious food shortages, with those sheltering in protection of civilian sites, and women and children in particular, remaining vulnerable. Many feel unable to return to their homes, given that they have either been occupied or destroyed.⁶⁹

A. Humanitarian access

76. The security situation has improved in many parts of South Sudan and has gone some way towards alleviating the humanitarian crisis. The number of humanitarian access incidents reported has decreased steadily since July 2018, when 80 incidents were reported across South Sudan.⁷⁰ The first month of 2019 saw a total of 35 incidents reported, 23 per cent of which involved violence against humanitarian personnel and assets, compared with a monthly average of 52 per cent in 2018.

77. The Panel notes nevertheless that while the security situation is improving in many parts of the country, bureaucratic impediments to humanitarian access are increasing, contrary to the 2017 Republican Order for free and unhindered movement of humanitarian assistance convoys and the provisions of article 2.1.2 of the revitalized peace agreement.

78. The percentage of such bureaucratic incidents reported rose from a monthly average of 12 per cent in 2018 to 31 per cent in January 2019, with significant delays and blockages linked to importation challenges, fees at checkpoints and the taxation of staff.⁷¹ Other impediments include cumbersome accreditation processes and high fees to access certain areas.⁷²

79. In January 2019, humanitarian supplies were unable to reach some 23,000 people around Yei, with supplies blocked at the border entry point further to

⁶⁶ Interviews with diplomats, international analysts, journalists and confidential sources, in Addis Ababa and Kampala, February and March 2019.

⁶⁷ See annex 13.

⁶⁸ See Harriett Baldwin, Minister of State for Africa at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, “Troika statement on escalating conflict in South Sudan”, 20 February 2019.

⁶⁹ Interviews with civilians, United Nations staff and civil society representatives, in Bentiu and Juba, October 2018–February 2019.

⁷⁰ United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, South Sudan: Annual Humanitarian Access Review (January–December 2018), 25 February 2019.

⁷¹ United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, South Sudan: Humanitarian Access Snapshot (January 2019), 15 February 2019.

⁷² United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, South Sudan: Humanitarian Access Review (January–June 2018), 15 August 2018.

the December 2018 Republican Order on import duties and an unclear definition of what constitutes “humanitarian goods”.⁷³

80. In addition, an increase in the number of checkpoints and fees demanded along the Juba-Bentiu corridor has been reported, with an average of \$4,500 per truck paid across an estimated 57 checkpoints. Demands for fees and the confiscation of cargo were also reported to have interfered with humanitarian flights in Rubkona in September 2018,⁷⁴ with illegal checkpoints and taxation also becoming an ongoing problem in Central Equatoria.⁷⁵

81. The Panel has noted the bureaucratic impediments to humanitarian assistance in previous reports and continues to find that there is a lack of clarity and consistency in the application of government policies with respect to humanitarian access (see [S/2017/979](#)). Interviews with humanitarian staff suggest that these policies are, on occasion, being used to obstruct humanitarian access to communities perceived to support the opposition and to redirect aid towards preferred communities.⁷⁶

B. Food insecurity

82. Food insecurity remains a serious concern in many parts of the country. The key drivers for this, as assessed by the Integrated Food Security Phase classification,⁷⁷ are conflict-driven displacement, low crop yields, the broader economic crisis, climatic shocks and humanitarian access challenges. The States particularly affected include Unity, Jonglei and Northern Bahr el-Ghazal, as well as Lakes, Eastern Equatoria and Upper Nile.

83. The food security outlook has in fact deteriorated since late 2018, with 5.2 million people assessed to be severely food insecure for the period from January to March 2019,⁷⁸ including 36,000 people classified in famine-like conditions. This compares with a total of 4.4 million people for the period from October to December 2018. Areas still classified as facing “catastrophe” levels of food insecurity include Leer and Mayendit Counties in Unity State, the greater Baggari area, and Wau County in Western Bahr el-Ghazal.⁷⁹ This situation risks further deteriorating in the coming months, which are often identified as “the lean season” across many communities in South Sudan.⁸⁰

84. In Yei, a group of 25 displaced women and girls told the Panel that many people could not work their fields because of insecurity and that, as a result, they were facing severe food shortages. A man from the area now seeking refuge in Uganda noted that

⁷³ United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, South Sudan: Humanitarian Access Snapshot (January 2019).

⁷⁴ United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, South Sudan: Humanitarian Access Snapshot (September 2018), 10 October 2018.

⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁶ Interviews with humanitarian civil society organizations, in Yei and Yambio, November 2018–February 2019.

⁷⁷ United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, South Sudan: Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) Snapshot (January–July 2019), 22 February 2019.

⁷⁸ Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs’ humanitarian snapshot for January 2019 reflects a different figure (5.2 million) from IPC’s predictions for January–July 2019 (6.17 million). The number presented in the snapshot is provided here, to be consistent with the numbers taken from humanitarian snapshots for 2018.

⁷⁹ Integrated Food Security Phase Classification, The Republic of South Sudan, “Key IPC findings: September 2018–March 2019”, 28 September 2018.

⁸⁰ World Food Programme, “Increasing number of people face severe food shortages in South Sudan”, 22 February 2019.

many civilians in Lainya had been displaced before they had the opportunity to harvest their crops.⁸¹

85. One female witness explained how fighting had also led to an increase in looting in the area, as soldiers often were not paid. “Here in Yei we are really disturbed by soldiers, the very people who should protect civilians. We have seen an increase of cases of looting, even when people are raped, they are also robbed of money and food. We understand that the soldiers are looting because they have not been paid for months. What does the Government expect if they give their unpaid servants guns?”⁸²

C. Use and recruitment of children

86. Further to resolution [2428 \(2018\)](#), the Panel investigated violations related to the use and recruitment of children in conflict. Although the recruitment and use of children has been declining in South Sudan since the signing of the revitalized peace agreement,⁸³ the Panel received reports of the use of children in Yambio and Bentiu.⁸⁴

87. The Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict also noted the use and recruitment of children during the reporting period. Because this is a violation of applicable international law, the Working Group urged all parties to the armed conflict to immediately and without preconditions release all children within their ranks and called upon parties to the armed conflict that have not done so to grant the United Nations unhindered access for verification and release of children associated with all parties.⁸⁵

88. The Panel received multiple allegations of ongoing child recruitment in Unity State.⁸⁶ Multiple witnesses alleged that SSPDF and SPLM/A-IO (Taban Deng Gai) forces were recruiting fighters in the area and in the reports, it is stated that some of the persons being recruited were children.⁸⁷

89. During its recent visit to Yambio, the Panel was informed that a total of 106 children (79 boys and 27 girls) had recently been released, including 13 boys and 6 girls by SPLM/A-IO (Riek Machar) forces and 66 boys and 21 girls by South Sudan National Liberation Movement forces.⁸⁸

D. Sexual and gender-based violence

90. In its previous reports, the Panel noted how sexual violence and rape in particular, had been used as a deliberate military strategy in the conflict in South Sudan (see [S/2018/292](#)). Despite the provisions of the revitalized peace agreement that call for the cessation of all forms of sexual and gender-based violence,

⁸¹ Interview with a displaced person, in Uganda, January 2019.

⁸² Interview with a civilian, in Central Equatoria, November 2018.

⁸³ Interviews with United Nations agencies, in Juba, Bentiu and Yambio, October 2018–February 2019.

⁸⁴ Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission, Progress report No. 4: on the status of implementation of the R-ARCSS 2018, 10 December 2018; Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring and Verification Mechanism, “Technical Committee meeting minutes No. 7”, 16–19 January 2019.

⁸⁵ United Nations, Security Council, “Public statement by Chair of Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict”, press release, 18 December 2018.

⁸⁶ Interview with former detainee working with children, in Bentiu, February 2019.

⁸⁷ Interviews with confidential sources, in Bentiu, February 2019. See also annex 1.

⁸⁸ Interviews with United Nations agencies and civil society organizations, February 2018.

widespread incidents of conflict-related sexual violence have been reported to the Panel, including in Unity State and Central Equatoria.⁸⁹

91. The Panel focused its work on Unity State, where numerous reports have highlighted significant levels of sexual violence.⁹⁰ Despite the recent attention that these reports have received, women interviewed by the Panel in the area stressed that the problem dated back to at least 2014.⁹¹

92. The Panel remains mindful of the importance of avoiding duplication of the work of other United Nations agencies and bodies, including the UNMISS Human Rights Division and the Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan, as established by the Human Rights Council, as well as the work of the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict and the Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring and Verification Mechanism. In particular, the Panel considers that it is important to avoid subjecting victims and witnesses to multiple interviews about the same traumatic events.⁹² The Panel stresses, however, that its own independent investigations have also revealed a pervasive pattern of sexual violence, perpetrated by armed groups against civilians, in the Unity area.

93. In Bentiu, the Panel heard multiple accounts of attacks on civilians seeking refuge in the protection of civilian sites as a consequence of the military offensives in Unity State in April and May 2018.⁹³ (See annex 1 for a case study on armed groups in Unity State.)

94. “When we arrived here we thought we were safe. Women go out to fetch water or fire wood they are raped. Recently, in late January, a 30-year-old and a 13-year-old left the POC and just outside they were both raped. You can talk to both survivors – they are in this camp. We are humiliated and we have scars and mine has not healed since that time, a reminder that we are hunted like animals to be humiliated.”⁹⁴

95. The Panel also heard testimony describing the rape of a resident of a protection of civilians site by two armed men at the end of December 2018;⁹⁵ the rape of an elderly woman around the age of 70 in October 2018;⁹⁶ the gang rape of a 10-year old girl at “Nyajui” in Nhialdiu in January 2018;⁹⁷ and the rape of a 12-year-old girl not far from the Bentiu protection of civilians site in September or October 2018 (see annex 14).⁹⁸

96. Survivors and witnesses told the Panel that the alleged rapes were perpetrated by armed youths, “soldiers” and armed persons wearing masks, “either balaclavas or socks with holes for the eyes and the mouth”.⁹⁹ The Panel has not been able to conclusively determine the identity or affiliation of these perpetrators.

⁸⁹ See also annex 14 for further testimony.

⁹⁰ Interviews with civilians, internally displaced persons and human rights defenders, in Bentiu, February 2019.

⁹¹ Interviews with United Nations staff, community leaders and an interfaith representative, and group meeting with 25 South Sudanese civilians, in Bentiu, February 2019.

⁹² In Bentiu, following the report by Médecins sans frontières on the November 2018 rape incidents, there was an influx of humanitarian and other actors carrying out investigations into the report. As a result, some victims expressed exhaustion from the multiple interviews by different actors.

⁹³ Many interviewees requested anonymity for fear of reprisals.

⁹⁴ Interviews with confidential sources, in Bentiu, February 2019.

⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁹⁹ Interview with community leader, in Bentiu, December 2018.

97. By its resolution 2428 (2018), paragraph 14 (e), the Security Council introduced a specific designation criterion for “planning, directing or committing acts involving sexual and gender-based violence in South Sudan”.

98. Subsequent to its focus on Central Equatoria in the interim report, the Panel has sought to further support the work done by other agencies and bodies to document sexual violence in this area by investigating and detailing the presence and command structure of armed groups in Unity (see annex 1). The Panel hopes that this information, together with the United Nations reporting already in its possession, will aid members of the Committee in determining whether any of the named individuals meet the designation criteria outlined in resolution 2428 (2018), without repeating the work of other agencies.

E. Accountability

99. There appears to be limited political will to hold accountable those who bear responsibility for violations documented during the protracted conflict in South Sudan. In multiple interviews and discussions, survivors, their families, community leaders and civil society representatives have expressed frustration and anger at the delays in establishing the hybrid court in accordance with chapter 5 of the revitalized peace agreement, as well as the delays in addressing the many documented gross abuses committed during the conflict, including the deliberate targeting of civilians, abductions, rape and other sexual violence, looting and the destruction of civilian property. A recent study estimated excess deaths resulting from the conflict in the country to be close to 400,000, with almost half of those lost lives directly attributable to violence.¹⁰⁰

100. In signing the revitalized peace agreement, South Sudanese officials recommitted themselves to fully cooperating with the African Union to establish a hybrid court for South Sudan (articles 5.1.5 and 5.3.1). The Security Council, most recently in December 2018, called on South Sudan’s leaders “to take all necessary steps for the establishment of the hybrid court for South Sudan and the Commission for Truth, Reconciliation and Healing”.¹⁰¹ Chapter 5 of the revitalized peace agreement provides a sound basis for the delivery of justice, the promotion of reconciliation and the provision of reparations for victims, including by harnessing and adapting South Sudan’s rich customary institutions.

101. “Under the draft statute of the hybrid court, individuals, both civilian and military, regardless of rank and affiliation, may be held criminally responsible.” Individual criminal responsibility under the statute covers those who “planned, instigated, ordered, committed, aided and abetted, conspired or participated in a joint criminal enterprise in the planning, preparation or execution of a crime” under the statute.¹⁰²

¹⁰⁰ Francesco Checchi, and others, “Estimates of crisis-attributable mortality in South Sudan, December 2013–April 2018”, September 2018.

¹⁰¹ United Nations, Security Council, “Security Council press statement on sexual violence in South Sudan”, press release, 7 December 2018. See also the African Union Peace and Security Council communiqué of its 547th meeting, 26 September 2015, in which the Council reaffirmed its commitment to combating impunity, reiterated its condemnation of the violence and abuses committed by armed actors in South Sudan and agreed to the establishment of an independent hybrid court pursuant to the 2015 peace agreement.

¹⁰² Draft statute of the hybrid court for South Sudan, article 8 (1).

IV. Arms and implementation of the arms embargo

102. Further to paragraph 19 of resolution 2428 (2018), which includes monitoring the enforcement of the arms embargo established on the entire territory of South Sudan by paragraphs 4 to 6 of the same resolution, the Panel has sought to gather, examine and analyse information regarding the supply, sale or transfer of arms and related material into South Sudan, as well as the provision of training and other forms of military assistance covered by the embargo.

103. Since its establishment by resolution 2206 (2015), and further to paragraph 18 (c) thereof, the Panel has included an arms expert among its members to report on the supply, sale or transfer of arms and related materiel and related military or other assistance, including through illicit trafficking networks, to individuals and entities undermining the peace process or participating in acts that violate international human rights law or international humanitarian law, which has informed the Panel's investigations under the current mandate.

104. As this is the first mandate to monitor the implementation of the arms embargo, the Panel travelled extensively in South Sudan in an attempt to establish a baseline understanding of the arms and ammunition stocks already present in the country prior to the implementation of the embargo. Observations of new material not included in the baseline may then guide investigations into possible violations, although the possibility remains that old stock will be imported.

105. The Panel notes that decades of conflict and instability have led to the accumulation of large stockpiles of weapons and ammunition across Government forces, armed opposition groups and civilians. This includes rocket-launched projectiles, anti-aircraft systems, mortars, heavy machine guns, light machine guns, assault rifles (mostly standard AK-47s, AK 56-1 and 56-2 variants and smaller numbers of two additional and identifiable newer-generation assault rifles), pistols, ammunition and, more recently, the purchase of a ground support attack jet aircraft (L-39), helicopters (Mi-24 and Mi-17) and tanks (T-72 type and variants), as well as many models of artillery, multi-barrelled rocket systems and sophisticated anti-tank missiles.

106. The most prolific weapon in use by all sides to the conflict is the ubiquitous 1951 model of the AK-47 assault rifle (identified by machine-milled receiver) and later variants (identified by machine-stamped receiver),¹⁰³ followed by the AK-56-1 and 56-2 variants. The latter two models were imported largely in 2014.¹⁰⁴ The AKM belt-fed 7.62 general purpose machine gun¹⁰⁵ was also observed to be widespread.

107. Most of the ammunition rounds examined by the Panel were 7.62 x 39 mm bearing the head stamp 811-13, reportedly originating in a consignment of 27 million rounds delivered in 2014.¹⁰⁶ These rounds were observed in Bentiu, Bor, Malakal, Wau and locations in Western Equatoria, indicating that all parties to the conflict have possession of this particular batch of cartridge.¹⁰⁷ This suggests not only that large shipments of ammunition can have a significant impact on the conflict beyond the short term, but also that continued reliance on this stock subsequent to several periods of conflict likely means that Government forces are using reserve stocks and prioritizing resupply of ammunition.

¹⁰³ See annex 15.

¹⁰⁴ Interview with a former SPLA general. See also Conflict Armament Research, *Weapons Supplies into South Sudan's Civil War* (London, 2018).

¹⁰⁵ See annex 15.

¹⁰⁶ See Conflict Armament Research, *Weapons Supplies into South Sudan's Civil War*, p. 11.

¹⁰⁷ See annex 15.

108. Armoured personnel carriers were observed in Juba, Yei and Unity, but no heavy armoured mechanized weapons systems were observed, except in Bentiu, where one SSPDF T-72M1 battle tank was observed.¹⁰⁸ At the eighth and tenth Divisions in Bor, it was observed that the Mechanized Tank Division was reasonably well supplied.¹⁰⁹

109. A Diamond DA42 surveillance aircraft was observed by the Panel at the SSPDF airwing facility at Juba International Airport in February 2019, and five Mi-24V attack helicopters were observed several times at Juba International Airport in February 2019. Four Mi-24 attack helicopters were observed at Bilpham general headquarters in Juba in February 2019, and one Mi-24 was observed stationed at Luri in February 2019. The total number of operational Mi-24 helicopters is not known, as the Panel believes that several of the Mi-24s are currently non-operational and are being stored at Bilpham barracks near Juba. Satellite imagery confirms that these Mi-24s are unlikely to have been moved since the start of the current mandate period.

110. The Panel observed considerable variance in the resources available to various SSPDF divisions, with urban-based units clearly better equipped than outlying units, such as those in Yambio in Western Equatoria and Abienmom in northern Unity.¹¹⁰

111. Opposition forces with whom the Panel spoke, including representatives of SPLM/A-IO and NAS, identified their main source of weapons and ammunition as having been looted from Government forces, mostly following ambushes.¹¹¹ As a result, their more limited stocks of weapons closely resemble those of SSPDF, with AK-47s and AKM general-purpose machine guns being especially common. As noted in the Panel's interim report, their supplies of ammunition and uniforms appear to be limited.

112. In its interim report, the Panel noted a number of likely violations of the arms embargo, which also covers the provision of military assistance and training. Further to paragraph 5 (f) of resolution 2428 (2018), any such military assistance and training require an exemption.

113. Also in its interim report, the Panel noted the presence of armed Uganda People's Defence Forces in the Equatorias. Soldiers from these Forces continued to be present in Yei River State in subsequent months, including in Yei town and along its connecting roads between 18 and 21 January 2019.¹¹² Reports suggest the presence of a significant number of troops (40-50) as well as around six military vehicles. The Panel is not aware of any exemption having been sought for this deployment, as required by paragraph 5 of resolution 2428 (2018).

114. In a meeting with the Panel, representatives of the Uganda People's Defence Forces confirmed the presence of these forces in Yei, noting that they were providing protection to Ugandan engineers who were surveying the road between Yei and Uganda.¹¹³ The Panel also discussed this deployment with the Minister of Defence of South Sudan, who reiterated that the Uganda People's Defence Forces were there for the purpose of protecting engineers.¹¹⁴

115. Further to reports that a number of the five Mi-24V attack helicopters of the SSPDF airwing were not operational, with at least one having sustained damage from

¹⁰⁸ Panel observations in Juba, Unity and Yei, January and February 2019.

¹⁰⁹ Panel observations in Bor, January 2019.

¹¹⁰ Panel observations, including in Yambio and Abienmom, January and February 2019.

¹¹¹ Interviews with the military, the police and civil society representatives, in Bentiu, Bor, Juba, Yambio, Kampala and Uganda, September 2018–March 2019.

¹¹² Interviews with community leaders, civil society representatives, journalists and international staff, in Kampala and Nairobi, January 2019.

¹¹³ Meeting with Ugandan officials, in Kampala, March 2019.

¹¹⁴ Panel meeting with the Minister of Defence of South Sudan, in Juba, January 2019.

ground fire, the Panel observed a period of apparent maintenance and servicing of five helicopters at Juba International Airport during February 2019. The Panel has not been able to identify whether any foreign companies assisted with repairs or maintenance, but notes that South Sudan has, in the past, been heavily reliant on foreign support for the use and maintenance of these helicopters.

116. The Panel also notes the ongoing arrival of cargo aircraft at Juba International Airport at night, of which there is no meaningful monitoring, and which likely includes foreign-registered aircraft and aviation companies and flights originating outside of South Sudan.

117. The Panel also notes, further to paragraph 8 of resolution [2428 \(2018\)](#), that no inspection reports were provided to the Committee by the customs agencies of neighbouring States during the mandate period. The Panel believes that the implementation of the arms embargo would benefit, in particular, from inspections of cargo aircraft destined for Juba International Airport or airports in South Sudan where there is a military presence and of trucks crossing the Nimule border post on the border with Uganda, which is equipped with sophisticated scanning technology.

V. Finance and natural resources

118. The natural resources of South Sudan, including oil, minerals and tropical hardwood, are the dominant source of Government revenues and foreign exchange, as well as financing for armed opposition groups. With oil production and prices both gradually recovering and the potential of the gold-mining sector slowly emerging, South Sudan's natural resources could play an important role in the implementation of the revitalized peace agreement and the ambitions of a Revitalized Government of National Unity and provide much-needed development spending.

119. Under paragraph 14 (j) of resolution [2428 \(2018\)](#), the Panel is mandated to investigate the engagement of armed groups or criminal networks in the illicit exploitation or trade of natural resources. In paragraph 15, the Security Council expresses concerns at the risk that the misappropriation and diversion of public resources may pose to the peace, security and stability of South Sudan, while underscoring that "individuals engaged in actions or policies that have the purpose or effect of expanding the conflict in South Sudan may be listed for travel and financial measures".

120. The dangers posed by the mismanagement, diversion and misappropriation of the natural resource revenues of South Sudan are also acknowledged in the revitalized peace agreement. Chapter 4 is devoted to reforms and measures designed to promote greater accountability and transparency in the use and management of public resources, with an emphasis on oil revenues. These measures are, in turn, largely based on South Sudan's national laws, notably the Petroleum Act, 2012 and the Petroleum Revenue Management Act, 2012.

121. The implementation of chapter 4 of the revitalized peace agreement will be critical to safeguarding the achievements of the agreement, including by securing a viable financial basis for its further implementation, while also building the reciprocal trust and confidence necessary to a functioning unity Government.

A. Oil revenues

122. Government documents make it clear that in South Sudan, “public resources” are almost synonymous with oil revenues.

123. The approved national budget for the financial year 2018/19 estimates net oil revenues of SSP 71.86 billion (\$463,612,903).¹¹⁵ Non-oil revenues, by contrast, are estimated at SSP 25.056 billion (\$161,651,613), resulting in total available revenues of SSP 81.59 billion (\$526,387,097). Oil revenues are thus projected to account for just over 74 per cent of total Government revenues and over 88 per cent of the public resources available to the budget.

124. It is, however, difficult to reconcile South Sudan’s budget estimates with actual economic activity. In article 4.8.1.1 of the revitalized peace agreement, the parties call for the full implementation of the Petroleum Revenue Management Act, 2012, within three months of the transitional period. In article IX.35.1 of the Act, it is stated that “licensees, contractors and sub-contractors shall annually disclose information on all payment, monetary or in kind, made to Government agencies in connection with Petroleum Activities” and that “the Government shall disclose the revenues received in connection with Petroleum Activities without regard to provisions of confidentiality”.¹¹⁶ Neither companies, nor the Government, are providing such information, significantly reducing visibility on the actual revenues generated.¹¹⁷

125. The oil production in South Sudan in recent years has been concentrated in the Upper Nile fields, with the revitalized peace agreement slowly paving the way for resumed production in fields in Unity State, which were badly damaged by conflict and ceased production around December 2013. While estimates vary, recent production in Upper Nile has likely been around 130,000 barrels per day,¹¹⁸ which is equivalent to about 120,000 barrels per day of marketable oil once residual water content has been removed.

126. As noted in the interim report, the Khartoum Declaration of Agreement between Parties of the Conflict of South Sudan, of June 2018, and the revitalized peace agreement, of September 2018, have provided a basis for unprecedented cooperation between the Governments of South Sudan and the Sudan to restart production also in the oilfields in Unity State (blocks 1, 2, 4 and 5A).

127. In August 2018, production reportedly resumed in the Toma South field, on the border with the Sudan. On 21 January 2019, the Minister for Petroleum of South Sudan, Ezekiel Lul Gatkuoth, and the Minister for Petroleum of the Sudan, Azhari Abdel Qader, attended a ceremony that marked the formal reopening of the Unity oilfield, just north of Bentiu town.¹¹⁹

¹¹⁵ South Sudan, Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, *Approved National Budget for 2018/2019*, document on file with the Panel.

¹¹⁶ Article 4.8.1.14.11 of the revitalized peace agreement also calls for the “expedition” of South Sudan’s efforts to join the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative. In principle 11 of the Transparency Initiative, it is stated: “We believe that payments’ disclosure in a given country should involve all extractive industry companies operating in that country.” The principles are available at <https://eiti.org/document/eiti-principles>.

¹¹⁷ The Panel is not aware of any marketing reports having been published by the Ministry of Petroleum since 2015.

¹¹⁸ The figure is included in a presentation by the Minister of Petroleum of South Sudan to the 2018 Africa Oil and Power State of the Industry Conference, held from 5 to 7 September 2018. The budget speech for the year 2018–2019, presented to South Sudan’s Transitional National Legislature by Salvatore Garang Mabiordit, Minister of Finance and Economic Planning, on 12 July 2018, cites a production figure of 127,000 barrels per day.

¹¹⁹ See, for example, Katherine Hourel and Denis Dumo, “South Sudan starts repairs, pumping oil

128. At the heart of this cooperation are economic imperatives facing two economies in need of revenues and foreign currency, with the Sudan currently receiving 28,000 barrels of oil per day from South Sudan,¹²⁰ and Sudanese companies, including the State-owned 2B Operating Petroleum Company, which operates in Sudanese oil blocks, playing a prominent role in rehabilitating the Unity fields in South Sudan.¹²¹

129. There is, however, considerable uncertainty around the actual production figures in the Unity fields. The Minister for Petroleum of South Sudan announced that the reopened fields in Unity would contribute an additional 12,000 to 15,000 barrels per day, setting a still more ambitious production target of 70,000 barrels per day by the end of 2019.¹²² These figures appear to refer to capacity, however, rather than actual production levels. The Panel confirmed that between 600,000 and 1.2 million barrels of the “Nile blend” produced in Unity State were traded in December 2018.¹²³

130. In addition to generating additional revenues and forging renewed cooperation between South Sudan and the Sudan, resumed production in Unity State has also added an economic dimension to long-standing disputes in this historically unstable part of South Sudan.

131. In chapter VIII of the Petroleum Revenue Management Act, 2012, the full implementation of which is called for by article 4.8.1.1 of the revitalized peace agreement, it is stated in article 29.1.a that “petroleum producing States shall receive 2% of the Net Petroleum Revenue”. In article 29.1.b, it is stated that “petroleum producing communities in the petroleum producing states shall receive 3% of the Net Petroleum Revenue”, and in article 29.1.c, it is stipulated that 55 per cent of that should go to the petroleum-producing counties in the State and 45 per cent to the non-producing counties in the State.

132. The redrawing of state and county boundaries as a result of the creation of additional states by presidential decree in 2015 and 2016 will therefore have significant economic consequences in Unity State. The new Ruweng State,¹²⁴ achieved by annexing a triangle of land from Rubkona County, which previously separated Pariang and Abeimon Counties, is now inhabited primarily by Padang Dinka and contains most of Unity State’s oilfields. This has not only aggrieved the State’s Nuer population, now cut off from state and county revenues derived from oil production, but has also intensified competition for the county and state political offices that control these revenues.

133. The oversight of oil revenues is also limited by the opacity that surrounds the trading process. With a few minor exceptions, all of South Sudan’s oil is exported. Of the oil produced, the oil companies are entitled to subtract a maximum of 45 per cent as “cost oil”, to cover production costs. The remaining “profit oil” is then split between the Government (78 per cent) and its joint venture partners (see annex 16).

134. Government revenues therefore vary with production levels, the international oil price and the terms of the various agreements through which it is sold. Based on the information available to it, however, the Panel considers it reasonable to estimate

from wells damaged in the civil war: minister”, Reuters, 21 January 2019.

¹²⁰ South Sudan, Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, “Approved national budget and context for FY 2018/2019”, document on file with the Panel; “Draft expenditure report for Q1 2018/2019”. Interview with Sudanese government official, October 2018.

¹²¹ Interviews with United Nations staff and international diplomats, in Juba, February 2019.

¹²² Widely reported in the press. See, for example, Hourel and Dumo, “South Sudan starts repairs, pumping oil from wells damaged in the civil war”.

¹²³ Interviews with commodity traders, industry experts and diplomats, in Juba and London and by telephone, January–March 2019.

¹²⁴ Created by Establishment Order No. 36/2015.

monthly Government revenues from crude oil to be between \$50 million and \$60 million.¹²⁵

135. The Government of South Sudan, however, pre-sells almost all of its oil, meaning that it takes advance payment for oil that it will deliver in the future, usually within a number of months.¹²⁶ Companies receive a discount in exchange for making an advance payment and charge significant interest on the amount they have prepaid. Given that the number and terms of these pre-purchase agreements are not disclosed and revenues can be generated well in advance of actual production, the oversight of revenue flows is impeded. Agreements of this kind also have the effect of saddling future Governments with debts and obligations, including the Revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity scheduled for appointment in May 2019. The Panel has identified several commitments that have been made beyond May 2019.¹²⁷

136. The market for South Sudan's crude oil has become more competitive, with a number of buyers having won cargoes in the past years. International trading companies that have purchased or prepaid for cargoes of crude oil include BB Energy, Sahara Energy and, until recently, Trafigura.¹²⁸ Glencore has also recently purchased several cargoes through the South Sudanese company Trinity Energy, which is mainly a downstream fuel supplier with interest and expertise in mobile payment systems.¹²⁹ Three of those cargoes are linked to a loan agreement reached among the Government of South Sudan, Trinity Energy and the African Export-Import Bank, which is secured against crude oil ultimately being lifted by Glencore (see annex 17).

137. The Panel confirmed that the Government of South Sudan had received prepayments totalling just under \$400 million across these commodity traders in 2017 and 2018.¹³⁰ South Sudan has also, according to Government documents, secured short-term loans by forward selling oil to its joint venture production partners. The Ministry of Finance noted oil advances of \$1 billion, of which \$154 million is outstanding, from China National Petroleum Corporation and Petronas as at the first quarter of the 2018/19 financial year.¹³¹

138. The management of South Sudan's oil revenues and public resources is characterized by a degree of informality that limits meaningful controls and oversight. Government officials have described key institutions to the Panel, including the Treasury and the Ministry of Finance, as being effectively "privatized".¹³²

¹²⁵ This assumes a total production of between 155,000 and 135,000 bbd; cost oil deductions of 45 per cent; discounts of \$7–\$10/bbl; and an oil price of around \$65/bbl. Crucially, this estimate assumes that South Sudan's transfer of 28,000 barrels a day to the Sudan covers both agreed transit fees and payments towards the transitional financial arrangement. If it does not, actual Government revenues may be significantly lower.

¹²⁶ Interviews with government officials, commodity trading companies active in South Sudan and commodity trading companies attempting to enter the South Sudanese market, in Dubai, Juba and London, October 2018–February 2019; and documents on file with the Panel.

¹²⁷ Interviews and correspondence with commodity trading companies active in South Sudan, in Dubai, Juba and London, October 2018–February 2019.

¹²⁸ Trafigura had retained a company, "L.I.O. Ziv Ltd", to provide local assistance in managing crude oil trades between Trafigura and the Government of South Sudan. This arrangement was brought to an end in May 2017. Trafigura notes that this was an entirely separate commercial arrangement and was unconnected with any other activities of Israel Ziv and related companies in South Sudan.

¹²⁹ Correspondence with Glencore and documents on file with Panel.

¹³⁰ Interviews and correspondence with commodity trading companies active in South Sudan, in Dubai, Juba and London, October 2018–February 2019; and documents on file with the Panel.

¹³¹ South Sudan, Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, "Draft expenditure report Q1 2018/19". See also, Bank of South Sudan, "Third quarter report".

¹³² Interviews with confidential sources employed or previously employed by the Government of South Sudan. In Juba, October 2018–February 2019. See also annex 3.

139. There is also evidence to suggest that reported spending does not match the actual use of public resources. For example, the bulk of reported Government spending is on salaries.¹³³ It is clear, however, that many Government salaries are not being paid in practice. The Bank of South Sudan has confirmed that civil service salaries are not being paid regularly,¹³⁴ and the Panel has confirmed that SSPDF salaries are not being paid regularly.¹³⁵ Documents from the Ministry of Finance make it clear that a significant amount of spending in 2018/19 has gone towards clearing salary arrears for the previous financial year, with arrears of 3 to 11 months still remaining across various Government departments.¹³⁶ The Bank of South Sudan has identified “the cleansing of the government payroll using biometric verification data”¹³⁷ as one important means of increasing available public resources, implying that the misappropriation of salaries is a drain on public accounts. In January 2019, President Kiir himself accused senior officers of diverting food and resources, meant for soldiers, for personal gain.¹³⁸

140. The Panel has also obtained evidence of specific instances of diversion or misappropriation that give some insight into the role such diversions play in the political bargaining process central to the peace, security and stability of South Sudan.

141. In January 2019, just over \$135,000 was allocated from the budget of the National Pre-transitional Committee for the renovation of houses belonging to two senior political figures.¹³⁹

142. On 4 January 2019, a withdrawal of \$100,000 was authorized by the National Pre-transitional Committee “for the house of the Vice President, H.E. Gen Taban Deng Gai”. As the First Vice-President of the incumbent Government, Taban Deng Gai is already the recipient of a Government salary and accompanying allowances. As noted in annex 1, forces loyal to Taban Deng Gai in Unity State have demonstrated their ability to inflict human suffering and destabilize the area at times that coincide with concerns over how he will be accommodated in a Government that also includes Riek Machar.

143. On 9 January 2019, a further withdrawal of SSP 8.79 million, just over \$35,000, was also authorized by the National Pre-transitional Committee “for the renovation of the house of Dr. John Garang”. The entire amount was paid in advance. Rebecca Nyandeng De Mabior, the widow of John Garang, who is widely regarded as the founding father of South Sudan, has recently made a high-profile return to Juba as part of the implementation of the revitalized peace agreement. She may be in line to assume one of its four vice-presidencies. Her return has put significant pressure on other “Former Detainees” to engage in the peace process and may also factor into President Kiir’s ambition to reunite and control the critical SPLM brand, as noted above. According to a press report, the authors of which independently obtained access to the same documents, the two amounts allocated, when combined, comprise around a third of the total amount deposited in the accounts of the National Pre-transitional Committee at the time.¹⁴⁰

¹³³ South Sudan, Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, “Approved national budget and context for 2018/2019”; Bank of South Sudan, “Third quarter report”.

¹³⁴ Bank of South Sudan, “Third quarter report”, September 2018.

¹³⁵ Interviews, in Bentiu and Juba, October 2018–February 2019.

¹³⁶ Ministry of Finance document on file with the Panel.

¹³⁷ Bank of South Sudan, “Third quarter report”.

¹³⁸ See, for example, Denis Dumo, “South Sudan soldiers ‘unhealthy’ due to food theft: Kiir”, Reuters, 24 January 2019.

¹³⁹ Confidential documents on file with the Panel.

¹⁴⁰ Sam Mednick, “South Sudan peace deal funds spent on renovating politicians’ homes”, *The Guardian*, 13 February 2019.

144. Other documents reviewed by the Panel suggest that there is insufficient control over withdrawals from the Central Bank, particularly in the context of procurement contracts.¹⁴¹

145. Between June and October 2018, around \$20.57 million and SSP 40 million (\$250,000) were withdrawn in instalments from the Bank of South Sudan and transferred to an individual named Kur Ajing Ater.¹⁴² A further \$1.5 million and SSP 213 million (\$1.37 million) were transferred to a company named “Lou Trading”. The Panel has established that this company is 40 per cent owned by Kur Ajing Ater, with all the other owners residing at the same address as he does.¹⁴³ The majority of these amounts were released, without any purpose being specified. Only one amount, of \$570,000, is described as a payment for “vehicles”, with another two payments of \$2 million and SSP 40 million described as payments for “SPLA food”.

146. In August 2018, a “Lou for Trading” was awarded a contract by the Ministry of Defence worth SSP 11,357,038,000 (\$73 million) for vehicles and communications equipment for SSPDF.¹⁴⁴ This contract alone exceeds the total amount budgeted for SSPDF goods and services for the year (SSP 1,275,013,084) by a factor of almost 10.¹⁴⁵ In a separate document dated June 2018, the Ministry of Finance expressed concerns about this award, noting that it exceeded approved spending and available resources, but also that the proper procurement process had not been followed, as no competitive tender had been issued, and that there was no justification for the use of a single source for the award and issue of the contract.¹⁴⁶

147. The Panel has received confirmation that new SSPDF and National Security Service vehicles have been observed in Juba in recent months.¹⁴⁷ The import of such vehicles, if for the use of South Sudan’s armed forces, would require notification under the terms of paragraphs 4 and 5 of resolution [2428 \(2018\)](#).

148. In November 2016, “Lou for Trading” was awarded a separate contract of \$539,455,142 (equivalent to SSP 1,704,682,470, according to the contract) for the supply of food to SSPDF.¹⁴⁸ This contract, which appears to have been extended a number of times, exceeds the entire budget for goods and services for the entire security sector for the 2017/18 financial year (SSP 1,408,176,171).¹⁴⁹

149. The closed nature of this procurement process makes it difficult to verify the competitiveness of the prices quoted. The size of the contracts also makes it almost impossible to verify actual delivery of the agreed quantities, as these agreed quantities, and the payment for them, are inevitably broken up and delivered in various informal tranches, while giving the award-holders an effectively open-ended and unlimited right to draw on public resources.

¹⁴¹ In February 2019, it was announced that the new Director of Procurement of SSPDF is Major General Gregory Vasili Dimitry. Document on file with the Panel.

¹⁴² Documents seen by the Panel. The Panel made several attempts to contact Kur Ajing Ater, but was not able to reach him for comment.

¹⁴³ According to 2015 records from the Ministry of Justice, and documents seen by the Panel.

¹⁴⁴ Documents seen by the Panel.

¹⁴⁵ Documents seen by the Panel; and South Sudan, Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, “Approved national budget and context for FY 2018/2019”.

¹⁴⁶ Document seen by the Panel.

¹⁴⁷ Panel observations and interviews with UNMISS and the international diplomatic community, in Juba, February 2019.

¹⁴⁸ Documents seen by the Panel.

¹⁴⁹ Documents seen by the Panel; and South Sudan, Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, “Approved national budget and context for FY 2018/2019”.

150. According to Panel interviews, Kur Ajing Ater is a businessman with close commercial ties to President Kiir.¹⁵⁰

151. A different and separate challenge to the management of South Sudan's public resources is the Government practice of moving oil revenues off budget. This may reduce oversight in respect of how public resources are spent and allocated.

152. In January 2016, the Ministry of Finance of South Sudan allocated \$45 million to an agricultural project called "Green Horizon".¹⁵¹ The allocation was taken from a payment of \$75 million made by the international commodity trader Trafigura to the Government of South Sudan as a prepayment for crude oil.¹⁵² Trafigura has confirmed that the payment was made directly to the revenue account of the Government of South Sudan, in accordance with applicable rules and regulations, which is also corroborated by documents reviewed by the Panel. Trafigura has also made it clear to the Panel that, while the company was aware that a portion of the prepayment was to be allocated to the Green Horizon project and was supportive of the Government's allocation of crude oil payments to development spending, Trafigura was not a partner in the project.¹⁵³

153. The Green Horizon project in South Sudan is operated by the Israel-based "Global Group" which is, in turn, owned and operated by Israel Ziv. According to Global Group, the purpose of the advance payment of \$45 million made by the Government of South Sudan to the Global Group was to fund a five-year budget for the project, which started in 2016.¹⁵⁴

154. The Panel visited one of the farms established by the Green Horizon project near Juba¹⁵⁵ and observed that it was engaged in agricultural activity, including the production of fruit and vegetables (see annex 18). Global Group told the Panel that it was a "life-saving" project that was "fighting hunger" and that it "provides food to tens of thousands of people in South Sudan" and should be seen as "an example of positive activities in developing countries" that is "strengthening food security".¹⁵⁶

155. The Panel notes, however, that the \$45 million in oil revenues allocated to the project appears to have been moved outside the national budget of South Sudan, although Global Group told the Panel that the project was "supervised by the Ministry of Finance" on a monthly basis.¹⁵⁷ South Sudan's expenditure reports for the period from 2015 to 2018 put total Government spending on all budget lines in the area of "Agriculture and Forestry" at less than \$10 million, with the majority of this spending going towards Government salaries.¹⁵⁸ According to Global Group, around two thirds

¹⁵⁰ Interviews with South Sudanese officials, former officials, opposition members and independent businessmen, by telephone and in person in undisclosed locations in order to protect source, January and February 2019.

¹⁵¹ Documents on file with the Panel.

¹⁵² The Panel is grateful for the cooperation of Trafigura, which has met with the Panel. Additional documents on file with the Panel.

¹⁵³ Meetings with Trafigura. This information is also corroborated by documentary evidence reviewed by the Panel.

¹⁵⁴ Interviews with Green Horizon and Global Group staff, in Juba, February 2019; and documents on file with the Panel. The Panel is grateful for the cooperation of Israel Ziv, the staff of Global Group and its Green Horizon and Smart City projects in Juba.

¹⁵⁵ The Panel visited the Green Horizon farm near Juba in February 2019.

¹⁵⁶ Correspondence with the Panel.

¹⁵⁷ Correspondence with the Panel.

¹⁵⁸ Expenditure reports published by the Ministry of Finance list spending as follows: 2015–2016, on "agriculture and forestry" of 35,268,706 SSP, at an average exchange rate of 16.73 SSP to the dollar; 2016–2017, on all "natural resources and rural development" of 599 million SSP, at an average exchange rate of 70 SSP to the dollar; 2017–2018 Q1 to Q3 of 50,367,718 SSP, at an average exchange rate of 120.97 SSP to the dollar.

of the allocated \$45 million has been spent to date. This suggests that the project is managed outside of the Government's ordinary budget process, reducing oversight and accountability over how the funds are managed and spent.¹⁵⁹ Also according to Global Group, a planned "second phase" of the Green Horizon project has been approved by the National Assembly of South Sudan, but no funds have been transferred to Global Group to date.¹⁶⁰ The Budget Committee of the National Assembly notes, in its report on the approved budget for 2018/19, a budget item of \$89.75 million for the "projected costs" of Green Horizon phase II.¹⁶¹

156. Global Group has also worked with the Ministry of Defence of South Sudan since at least 2016. It denies any formal partnership with the Ministry of Defence or SSPDF, informing the Panel that cooperation is limited to the provision of some training to civilian demobilized SSPDF veterans and the use of some SSPDF land for a Green Horizon farm next to the SSPDF Bilpham barracks in Juba for "sole and exclusive agricultural usage".¹⁶²

157. Global Group has worked separately with the Ministry of the Interior and the South Sudan National Police Service. This work appears to have been independent of the Green Horizon project and to have been financed through a separate allocation of public funds.

158. In its second reading of the 2018/19 budget, the Committee on Finance and Economic Planning of the National Assembly noted the approval of a \$4,002,716 budget line for the "implementation and operationalisation of Smart City in Juba".¹⁶³ Global Group has confirmed that this amount covers ongoing running costs and comes in addition to earlier payments made to establish the project. Global Group also notes, however, that only a portion of the allocated funds has been disbursed to date.¹⁶⁴

159. Smart City was formally launched by President Salva Kiir in December 2017. It is an ambitious surveillance programme aimed at deploying a large number of surveillance cameras in Juba. At its launch, President Kiir framed the initiative as a crime-fighting measure.¹⁶⁵

160. Global Group has provided the Panel with access to the Smart City programme, which it also describes as a crime-fighting initiative implemented with the South Sudan National Police Service, with the knowledge of the United Nations agencies in South Sudan.¹⁶⁶ The Panel was informed that there are currently 11 camera sites in Juba, each equipped with multiple high-resolution cameras capable of zooming in to record considerable detail. According to the Smart City operators, one month's worth of footage is stored on the company's servers. The Panel notes that the project has a

¹⁵⁹ In December 2018, the United States Department of the Treasury imposed sanctions on Israel Ziv and three companies that form part of Global Group. See United States Department of the Treasury, "Treasury sanctions three individuals for their roles in the conflict in South Sudan", press release, 14 December 2018. Israel Ziv and Global Group have issued a "strong" and "categorical denial" of all these allegations, both publicly and to the Panel. See annex 21.

¹⁶⁰ Correspondence with the Panel.

¹⁶¹ Transitional National Legislature of the Republic of South Sudan, "Report on the second reading of the budget for the financial year 2018/19".

¹⁶² Interviews with Green Horizon and Global Group staff, in Juba, February 2019; and documents on file with the Panel.

¹⁶³ Transitional National Legislature of South Sudan, "Report on the second reading of the budget for the financial year 2018/19", sects. 2.1.a.4 and 2.1.b.6.

¹⁶⁴ Correspondence with the Panel.

¹⁶⁵ See, for example, Sudan Tribune, "S. Sudan president launches surveillance drones, CCTV cameras", 5 December 2017; Radio Tamazuj, "Kiir launches surveillance drones, CCTV cameras in Juba", 4 December 2017. Available at <https://radiotamazuj.org/en/v1/news/article/kiir-launches-surveillance-drones-cctv-cameras-in-juba>.

¹⁶⁶ The Panel visited the Smart City project in Juba in February 2019.

clear public safety application, but remains concerned about the risks of abuse if access to footage is not strictly controlled, given the broad powers of agencies such as the National Security Service. Global Group told the Panel that it does not control the materials recorded by the Smart City project, with decisions about their use being made solely by the South Sudan National Police Service.

B. Gold

161. South Sudan has significant alluvial gold deposits. These are concentrated mainly in Central and Eastern Equatoria, although there is also gold-mining activity in Western Bahr el-Ghazal, Western Equatoria and Upper Nile (see annex 19). Unlike oil, alluvial gold deposits are relatively easy to exploit, with almost no capital or specialist equipment required. Gold has become more significant to the conflict economy in recent years. It could, however, also become an important source of public resources and local livelihoods.

162. Gold-mining in South Sudan is regulated by the Mining Act, 2012, which provides for a number of licence categories, from prospecting to production, at various scales. According to the Ministry of Mining, however, only exploration licences have been issued to date; these licences give the holder the right to explore within the allocated concession area, but do not permit gold production. According to the Ministry, around 57 exploration licences have been issued to date, although only a handful of companies are actively exploring their concessions owing to conflict and instability.¹⁶⁷ The licences are valid for five years and include an annual rental fee of \$1.43 per cadastral unit.¹⁶⁸ Informal artisanal mining down to a depth of 10 metres is also permitted under the Mining Act, 2012, but requires a mining licence to be issued by local state authorities. No such licences are being issued at present, largely because there is no capacity to do so at the state level.¹⁶⁹

163. According to the Ministry of Mining, therefore, all gold produced in South Sudan is in effect produced illegally. In many cases, however, this illegality is a consequence of limited state capacity and reach, rather than criminality, with artisanal gold-mining offering an important source of income to individuals and families with few alternatives available to them.

164. Most gold production in South Sudan is artisanal, meaning that relatively shallow alluvial deposits are mined using only rudimentary equipment. For many such miners, gold-mining is one part of a broader livelihood strategy and is not a full-time occupation. Artisanal mining is also seasonal in South Sudan, peaking, in most areas, during the rainy season when the necessary water is more easily available.¹⁷⁰ It is therefore difficult to estimate a total number of artisanal miners with any degree of accuracy, although a number in the tens of thousands during peak times is considered plausible.¹⁷¹

¹⁶⁷ Interview with a Ministry of Mining representative, in Juba, February 2019. See also South Sudan's Mining Cadastre portal for further details about existing licence holders, available at <http://portals.flexicadastre.com/southsudan/>.

¹⁶⁸ Interview with the Ministry of Mines, in Juba, February 2019.

¹⁶⁹ Ibid.

¹⁷⁰ Interviews, including by telephone, with the Ministry of Mining, members of SPLA/M-IO and NAS who had engaged in gold mining, and civil society representatives, in Juba and Kampala, September 2018–February 2019.

¹⁷¹ The most prominent estimate of 60,000 artisanal miners originates from Cordaid's report, *Mining in South Sudan: Opportunities and Risks for Local Communities* (2016). While still considered plausible, this estimate is now likely on the high end of the reasonable estimate as a consequence of further civilian displacement in Central Equatoria and the growth in more organized industrial mining in Eastern Equatoria.

165. Meaningful production estimates are equally difficult to establish, as artisanal production varies with location, season and the time devoted to mining. The most common artisanal production estimates given to the Panel were in the range of three to four grams per week, with some slightly higher estimates for areas in Eastern Equatoria.¹⁷²

166. While prices vary according to a number of factors, alluvial deposits in the Equatorias appear to have 90 to 92 per cent purity, with gold trading locally at, very roughly, SSP 8,000 per gram (\$29) close to the mine and at higher prices in urban and regional gold-trading centres.¹⁷³

167. The Panel was able to confirm intermittent artisanal gold-mining activity in Central Equatoria, in Gorom and the Luri River basin west of Juba, around Lobonok, around Morobo, around Wonduruba and in various rivers and seasonal streams around Kajo Kaji; in Western Equatoria, along the border with the Democratic Republic of the Congo; and in Eastern Equatoria, in the various river systems around and south of Kapoeta, and the area along the Ugandan border south-east of Chukudum.¹⁷⁴

168. Several of these areas are controlled by armed opposition groups, most notably SPLM/A-IO and NAS. Representatives of both groups confirmed to the Panel that they engaged in occasional artisanal gold-mining themselves and taxed civilians who mined gold in areas they controlled. The taxation schemes appear to be informal and sporadic, but were typically cited as being in the region of one gram per three grams produced.¹⁷⁵

169. SPLM/A-IO has engaged in gold-mining around Kajo Kaji. Both SPLM/A-IO and NAS forces have also mined gold and taxed civilian gold miners around Lobonok, around Wonduruba and along the Luri River.¹⁷⁶

170. Based on a number of interviews, the gold-mining knowledge of armed groups and their ability to exploit this resource appear fairly limited. Opposition fighters describe fairly small and ad hoc mining operations that mostly prey on civilian miners, although fighters themselves are also engaged when gold is found. Where more sophisticated equipment is available through looting or seizure, individuals with whom the Panel spoke professed an inability to put it to use.

171. While armed groups make use of gold to finance their activities, there are few indications of ongoing violence directly linked to efforts to control gold-producing areas. One possible exception took place in the Gorom area, Central Equatoria, on around 3 January 2019. The Panel received multiple reports that clashes resulted in at least 15 civilian deaths and more than 20 injuries as armed men attacked a gold-mining site in Kisaru, near Gorom. The site is near the SSPDF Luri barracks, but has also seen a sporadic NAS presence. The Government and NAS have traded allegations

¹⁷² Interviews, including by telephone, with the Ministry of Mining, members of SPLA/M-IO and NAS who had engaged in gold mining, and civil society representatives, in Juba and Kampala, September 2018–February 2019. Cordaid's report estimated an average of 1–2 grams per miner per week.

¹⁷³ Interviews, including by telephone, with members of SPLA/M-IO and NAS who had engaged in gold mining, and civil society representatives, in Juba and Kampala, September 2018–February 2019.

¹⁷⁴ Interviews, including by telephone, with the Ministry of Mining, members of SPLA/M-IO and NAS who had engaged in gold mining, and civil society representatives, in Juba and Kampala, September 2018–February 2019.

¹⁷⁵ Interviews, including by telephone, with members of SPLA/M-IO and NAS who had engaged in gold mining, and civil society representatives, in Juba and Kampala, September 2018–February 2019.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid.

over the responsibility for these killings, in line with the pattern described above.¹⁷⁷ The Panel has not been able to definitively attribute responsibility to either party.

172. Although there are no valid production licences in South Sudan at present, evidence suggests that more organized production is growing quickly in areas under Government control, notably in concessions around Kapoeta, but also in Luri, Central Equatoria and Boma State¹⁷⁸ in Upper Nile.¹⁷⁹ A small number of international companies are active in all of these areas and appear to be supplementing their permitted exploration activities with gold production. The Panel has seen photographic and video evidence of gold-producing equipment in Eastern Equatoria, capable of processing up to 20 to 30 tons of earth an hour and likely producing between one and five grams an hour, depending on the location and the availability of water and fuel.¹⁸⁰

173. In these areas, there is a significant degree of Government involvement in the production, with organized gold-mining in Luri being provided security by SSPDF soldiers in exchange for payment.¹⁸¹ State-level officials were described as the most active participants in gold-mining activity, using a provision of the Mining Act, 2012, that devolves the regulation of artisanal mining to the states to justify direct engagement with international companies.¹⁸²

174. The trade in gold in South Sudan is almost entirely unregulated and there is no effective legal framework to regulate the export of South Sudanese gold. Few export certificates have been issued and no gold exports are recorded. While also partly the consequence of limited state capacity, all of South Sudan's gold exports are therefore, in principle, illegal.

175. In 2017, the Government, through the Central Bank, attempted a pilot centralized buying scheme in Kapoeta. According to government officials, however, their use of the official exchange rate to calculate the gold price and their location in the town centre rather than at the mine site meant that they were unable to compete with the large number of mobile and informal gold traders in gold-producing areas. As a result, the scheme purchased less than 1 kg of gold before being abandoned.¹⁸³

176. A significant number of these traders are foreign nationals, with the majority of gold "smuggled" across the border into Uganda where it is sold in border towns such as Arua and Koboko, but also in Entebbe and Kampala. Members of both SPLM/A-IO and NAS confirmed to the Panel that they had sold gold mined in South Sudan in Uganda. Some smaller volumes are also traded directly to Dubai via Juba International Airport.¹⁸⁴ As is common in the region, most gold is hand-carried and transported by road or on civilian flights.

¹⁷⁷ Interviews, including by telephone, with NAS (Thomas Cirillo), SPLA/M-IO, SSPDF, SSOA and South Sudan United Front/Army senior officers, civil society representatives, community leaders, elders and journalists, in Kampala and Nairobi, January 2019.

¹⁷⁸ Created by Establishment Order No. 36/2015.

¹⁷⁹ Interviews, including by telephone, with a confidential source, tribal chiefs from the Equatorias, journalists, civil society, SPLM/A-IO and NAS representatives, and businessmen, in Juba and Kampala, September 2018–February 2019.

¹⁸⁰ Confidential documents on file with the Panel, verified by gold mining experts with experience of mining in the region.

¹⁸¹ Interviews with confidential sources from the mining and business community, and civil society organizations, September 2018–February 2019.

¹⁸² Ibid.

¹⁸³ Interviews with the Ministry of Mining, in Juba, February 2019, corroborated by civil society representatives in the region.

¹⁸⁴ Interviews with gold traders and gold experts, including in Dubai; interviews, including by telephone, with businessmen, civil society representatives, journalists and opposition representatives, in Nairobi and Kampala, September–November 2018.

177. South Sudan does not produce certificates of origin. The Ministry of Mining of South Sudan confirmed that it had seen South Sudanese certificates of origin circulating in Uganda, but noted that all such certificates were inevitably fraudulent. The majority of South Sudanese gold sold in Uganda is therefore likely misrepresented as being of Ugandan origin or traded without a request for a certificate of origin. As Ugandan gold exports continue to rise, the Panel considers it important to establish a clear estimate for Ugandan production levels. No such estimate was available from the Ugandan authorities when requested by the Panel.¹⁸⁵

178. Further to its recommendation in the 2018 interim report (S/2018/1049, para. 95), the Panel's investigations have further confirmed the ease with which gold continues to move across international borders and the very limited scrutiny gold transactions are subject to in major gold-trading centres, including Uganda and the United Arab Emirates. Greater scrutiny and due diligence could limit market access for smuggled and otherwise illicit gold. At the Dubai Gold Souk, multiple traders professed to the Panel that they did not enquire about the origin of the gold they purchased and were thus unable to determine whether they were trading in gold from South Sudan.¹⁸⁶ Other traders appeared to conflate the countries of South Sudan and Sudan.

C. Timber

179. South Sudan, and the Equatorias in particular, have some of the largest and oldest teak forests in Africa.¹⁸⁷ Teak traders active in South Sudan are, in most cases, foreign nationals working without formal concessions or permissions from the Government of South Sudan. Instead, these traders negotiate directly with the de facto authorities of their area of activity, including local government officials, local SSPDF commanders and local SPLM/A-IO commanders or officials in areas under opposition control. In exchange for permission to harvest teak, they pay various fees, including for protection and transit.

180. Panel interviews suggest that the majority of illicitly harvested teak is logged by local civilians, with traders providing or financing logging equipment. In some cases, traders also appear to have established informal timber mills near teak plantations. Teak logs are then transported out of South Sudan through the border with the Democratic Republic of the Congo or Uganda and may be subject to further illicit taxation during transport.¹⁸⁸

181. In Western Equatoria, SPLM/A-IO groups have profited from teak, with various levels of activity, since at least early 2018 and up until February 2019, with more sporadic activity alleged in the period since September 2018 as a result of renewed instability in the region.

182. The Panel has received credible information indicating that SPLM/A-IO Division 9A Commander Major General John Mohammedo Sabadari and SPLM/A-IO Division 9B Commander Major General James Marko Nando¹⁸⁹ have both been directly involved in the taxation of timber illegally harvested in areas under their control and in the transit of this timber to the Democratic Republic of the Congo and

¹⁸⁵ The Panel made this request in several meetings with Ugandan authorities in Kampala, November 2018 and February 2019.

¹⁸⁶ Interviews with gold traders, in Dubai, October 2018.

¹⁸⁷ Cristian Nasulea and others, "All roads lead to Juba: an inquiry into the economic viability of South Sudan", *Revista Economica*, vol. 68, No. 6.

¹⁸⁸ Interviews with teak experts, SPLM/A-IO representatives and confidential sources, in Yei and Kampala, December 2018 and January 2019.

¹⁸⁹ The Panel has sought comment via written correspondence, but is yet to receive a reply.

Uganda. The Panel has been able to establish the illicit harvest of teak in Lirangu (Yambio County), Tambura (Tambura County), and Morongo and Diabio (both in Ezo County). SPLM/A-IO has also established a number of illegal checkpoints along transit routes in these areas.¹⁹⁰

183. The taxes and payments negotiated by armed groups appear to have varied considerably. Protection payments during periods when teak is harvested are reported to have been roughly in the range of \$400 to \$500. Transportation fees are reportedly in the region of \$1,000 per truck, although the fees vary depending on the size of the trucks and the quality and quantity of timber loaded. This trade reportedly results in significant profits, with South Sudanese teak logs trading for as much as \$350 to \$470 per cubic meter in Uganda.¹⁹¹ Parts of the revenue are reportedly collected by SPLM/A-IO representatives based in neighbouring countries, including Uganda, with part of the profits going towards small batches of ammunition and medical supplies through the informal cross-border trade with the Democratic Republic of the Congo.¹⁹²

184. In November 2018, Major General John Mohammedo Sabadari also took part in negotiations with the government of Gbudwe State¹⁹³ over control of teak plantations in the Lirangu area. The negotiations reportedly failed, as Major General Sabadari was reluctant to accept joint control, fearing that it might undermine his relationships with teak traders. In this regard, it is also worth noting that proposed cantonment sites for the forces of John Sabadari and James Nando correspond to teak plantations in the Rirangu area.¹⁹⁴

185. The importance of teak revenues to the local government of Western Equatoria can also be seen in Maridi State.¹⁹⁵ In September 2018, further to limited financing from Juba for the operation of local governmental structures and law enforcement, the local government sold \$400,000 in teak from Zaria plantations to various traders. These revenues reportedly went, in part, towards purchasing uniforms for the graduates of the Maridi Training and Research Centre of the South Sudan National Police Service and to pay salaries to police and SSPDF units, which had been unpaid for six to seven months.¹⁹⁶

186. Central Equatoria is home to the largest remaining teak plantations in South Sudan, including the Loka plantation, which covers some 1,751 hectares. The total value of this teak may be in the region of \$50 million to \$70 million.¹⁹⁷

187. SPLM/A-IO has also profited from teak in Central Equatoria. In September 2018, SPLM/A-IO opened an investigation into the then SPLM/A-IO Governor of Yei River State, further to allegations that he was involved in the illegal teak trade for personal gain. He was suspended from his position, with the results of the internal investigations reportedly due in May 2019.¹⁹⁸ According to information received by

¹⁹⁰ Interview, including by telephone, with an independent researcher, UNMISS staff and civil society representatives, in Yambio, December 2018–February 2019.

¹⁹¹ Interviews and correspondence with teak industry experts and civil society representatives, December 2018–February 2019. See also www.itto.int/market_information_service/.

¹⁹² Interviews with SPLM/A-IO representatives and civil society representatives, in Kampala and Nairobi, December 2018–February 2019.

¹⁹³ Created by Establishment Order No. 36/2015.

¹⁹⁴ Interviews with UNMISS staff and independent researcher, and civil society representatives, December 2018 and January 2019.

¹⁹⁵ Created by Establishment Order No. 36/2015.

¹⁹⁶ Interviews with UNMISS staff, teak industry expert, SPLM/A-IO and civil society representatives, in Yambio and Kampala, December 2018–February 2019.

¹⁹⁷ Interviews with teak industry experts and teak trader, in Kampala, September 2018–January 2019.

¹⁹⁸ Letter of Chairman and Coordinator-in-Chief, SPLM/SPLA-IO, 21 October 2018; interview with

the Panel, the main logging sites for SPLM/A-IO in Central Equatoria were Kegulu, Kajioko South, Kajioko North, Loka West and Pacula. The majority of this teak was then transported to the Ugandan border along roads linking Morobo and Lujulu, and Panjume East and Pabunga.

188. The Panel has received information suggesting that the Government also benefits from the trade in teak at the county level, including in Morobo, Kajo Kaji and Yei.¹⁹⁹ County security committees, headed by the county commissioner, reportedly have entered into deals with teak traders. Traders are then given SSPDF protection during harvesting and transport, including to the border with Uganda along the Juba – Nimule road. Payments can reportedly be in the range of \$900 to \$1,000 per truck.²⁰⁰

189. In Eastern Equatoria, SSPDF is the most active participant in the timber trade, particularly in Pageri County, which is situated close to the border with Uganda and the Nyolo River along the Juba-Nimule road. In Kerepi Payam, timber traders are reportedly logging mahogany trees through hired local loggers, with protection from SSPDF soldiers stationed in Kerepi and the transportation along the Kerepi-Pageri road also reportedly being controlled by low-ranking SSPDF soldiers. As well as participating in the trade, soldiers also reportedly produce and sell charcoal from discarded branches cut during the harvesting process. The Panel received similar reports of SSPDF protection for loggers in Southern Umo, next to Lobonok County, where armed protection is provided by the SSPDF artillery unit stationed in the village of Tokuro.²⁰¹

D. Charcoal

190. Charcoal has been identified as a source of conflict financing in many regional conflicts.²⁰² The Panel has determined that this revenue source may also play a role in the conflict in South Sudan.

191. South Sudan has a relatively high demand for charcoal, which has contributed to significant deforestation, including in Central Equatoria. Charcoal serves as a source of cheap fuel for a large number of South Sudanese households. According to “South Sudan: First State of Environment and Outlook Report 2018”, fuelwood and charcoal account for over 80 per cent of all wood used in South Sudan.²⁰³

192. The production and sale of charcoal, especially along major roads, is an important source of livelihood incomes in many communities. In addition, both sides of the conflict in South Sudan appear to participate in the trade, including through production, transportation and sales. In more rural areas, it appears to provide an important source of basic income for soldiers, who are infrequently paid by the Government.²⁰⁴ Allowing soldiers to participate in the charcoal trade may therefore

a confidential source, October 2018; interviews with SPLM/A-IO representatives, in Kampala, December 2018 and January 2019.

¹⁹⁹ Interview, including by telephone, with civil society and SPLM/A-IO representatives, in Juba, Yei and Kampala, December 2018–February 2019.

²⁰⁰ Ibid.

²⁰¹ Interviews with civilians from Eastern Equatoria, members of the SPLM/A-IO Economic Committee, February 2019; and correspondence with SPLM/A-IO members, March 2019. See also, “Report of Ma’di community on illegal logging for July 2018–January 2019”, on file with the Panel.

²⁰² See S/2017/924. See also, Amy Yee, “In Africa’s oldest park, seeking solutions to a destructive charcoal trade”, *Yale Environment* 360, 14 September 2017.

²⁰³ United Nations Environment Programme, “South Sudan cracks down on charcoal trade”, 2 August 2018.

²⁰⁴ Interviews and correspondence with South Sudanese internally displaced persons and refugees,

be an important means of avoiding defections and maintaining some chain of command for local officers.

193. SSPDF also appears to be involved in the transportation of charcoal. Several witnesses who have spoken to the Panel described SSPDF trucks transporting significant quantities of charcoal to the Konyo Konyo market in Juba in October 2018. Elsewhere in Central Equatoria, SSPDF trucks carrying charcoal were observed in Lobonok and Kansuk, again close to local markets. On 23 January 2018, an SSPDF truck was reportedly stopped at a checkpoint carrying 16 bags of charcoal (see annex 20).²⁰⁵

194. SSPDF soldiers can also be observed selling charcoal along major roads,²⁰⁶ including in Juba, along the Yambio-Nzara and Yambio-Maridi roads near the Nzara airport and near Chukudum in Eastern Equatoria. One person who spoke to the Panel explained that the “army has nothing to live on as they are unpaid”.²⁰⁷

195. In Western Equatoria and in Tambura and Lirangu in particular, the Panel has been informed that SPLM/A-IO and other armed groups have taxed individuals logging trees to produce charcoal.²⁰⁸

196. Some of the most prominent sources of charcoal production in South Sudan are Mangola, Magwe, Jemesa, Digal, Garsi, Lainya and Yei, as well as the Chukudum and Budi areas, villages along the Bor-Juba road, and Jonglei. Charcoal is transported to Juba mainly along the following roads: Terekeka-Maridi-Juba; Yei-Juba; Bor-Juba; Torit-Nesitu-Juba; Kajo Kaji-Juba; and Lainya-Juba.²⁰⁹ In Juba, charcoal is sold mainly in the Jebel, Gudele, Gumbo, Munuki and Konyo Konyo markets.

197. According to Panel interviews, charcoal prices in Juba for early March 2019 were around SSP 2,300 to SSP 2,500 for a bag of 30 kilos.²¹⁰ In Western Equatoria (Yambio), prices were around SSP 800 to SSP 1,200 for a bag of 10 kilos, while in Wau (Western Bahr El-Ghazal) and Chukudum (Eastern Equatoria), a small bag cost around SSP 400 and a medium-sized bag cost SSP 850 to SSP 1,200 in January and February 2019.²¹¹ According to a 2015 study by the United Nations Environment Programme, some 2.5 million bags of charcoal were used by households in Juba in 2014, with South Sudanese charcoal reportedly bought by both traders and households.²¹² The Panel has been unable to identify more recent estimates, but considers the trade in charcoal to still be significant in South Sudan, particularly in urban areas where firewood is less available.

charcoal experts and United Nations staff, in Juba and Nairobi, December 2018–February 2019.

- ²⁰⁵ Interviews and correspondence with UNMISS staff, civil society representatives and displaced persons, in Juba and Yei, November 2018–January 2019. Photos also on file with the Panel.
- ²⁰⁶ Interviews and correspondence with SPLM/A-IO and civil society representatives and UNMISS staff, in Yei, November 2018–January 2019.
- ²⁰⁷ Personal observations by the Panel in November 2018–February 2019; correspondence with refugees, December 2018; interviews with UNMISS staff and civil society activists, in Yambio, January 2019.
- ²⁰⁸ Interviews with former South Sudanese government officials, in Nairobi, November 2018; interview with an SSNPS officer, in Yambio, December 2018; interviews with charcoal experts, in Juba, January and February 2019.
- ²⁰⁹ Interviews and correspondence with charcoal experts, SPLM/A-IO representatives and displaced persons, in Juba, December 2018–February 2019.
- ²¹⁰ Interviews and correspondence with civilians in Juba, and SPLM/A-IO representatives in Uganda, March 2019.
- ²¹¹ Interviews and correspondence with displaced persons and charcoal experts, in Juba and Yambio, January and February 2019.
- ²¹² USAID South Sudan, “Charcoal production and use in South Sudan: a Wildlife Conservation Society South Sudan action plan for mitigating environmental impacts”, March 2018.

VI. Implementation of the travel ban and asset freeze

A. Travel ban

198. The Panel continued to monitor the implementation of the travel ban, which was renewed by the Security Council in its resolution 2428 (2018), with two additional designated individuals listed in the annex thereto. In its interim report, the Panel noted a number of violations of the travel ban, in particular by Gabriel Jok Riak (SSi.001).

199. Overall, however, the Panel has noted significant progress towards the use of the exemption process outlined in paragraph 11 of resolution 2206 (2015) and renewed in paragraph 12 of resolution 2428 (2018). Three exemption requests were submitted to the Committee for approval in the subsequent months, with two approved, although limited notice was provided in advance of the travel. The State receiving the designated person also provided only limited reporting following the return of the designated individual to South Sudan, as required under section 10 of the Committee guidelines. The exemption requests also made it possible to update the sanctions list, adding additional detail. Limited detail in the listings has been cited by some Member States as one challenge to the effective enforcement of the travel ban.

200. The Panel noted, however, one additional violation of the travel ban by Malek Reuben Riak Rengu (SSi.007) in November 2018, with no exemption request having been received. He travelled to Khartoum at the time of a meeting of the Strategic Defence and Security Review Board on 29 November 2018.

B. Asset freeze

201. Further to paragraphs 12 and 13 of resolution 2428 (2018) reaffirming the financial measures imposed by paragraph 12 of resolution 2206 (2015), the Panel has continued its work to monitor and support the implementation of the asset freeze, including by engaging extensively with States neighbouring South Sudan and their commercial banking sectors.

202. Despite the limited public availability of corporate ownership information, particularly in South Sudan, the Panel has documented a number of corporate networks linked to designated individuals through both direct ownership and family members. These companies cover a variety of sectors and highlight the importance of mapping and monitoring corporate entities when implementing the asset freeze, as well as family members and other individuals who may be acting on behalf of designated individuals, further to paragraph 14 (i) of resolution 2428 (2018).

203. Based on company records from 2015, the Panel has identified 16 entities linked to Paul Malong Awan (SSi.008) or his immediate relatives. Six of these companies are linked to his wife, Ajok Wol Atak Deng,²¹³ with another nine companies linked to his children. The Panel has confirmed that one of these companies, Golden Star Holdings Clearance Agency Ltd, had its South Sudanese accounts frozen with a balance of SSP 1,651,985,52 as at June 2018, before Malong was sanctioned by the Security Council through the adoption of resolution 2428 (2018). The Panel has also confirmed that Ajok Wol Atak Deng owns property in Nairobi.

204. Company records from 2015 also link Malek Riak Reuben Rengu (SSi.007) to a broad commercial network of at least 23 companies, including in the engineering and energy sectors. In addition to direct ownership, a number of these companies are owned by his children, with several children also appearing as directors of companies

²¹³ Documents on file with the Panel.

he owns. Most prominent are six companies partially owned by his daughter, Christine Malek Reuben Riak.

205. The Panel has confirmed that Malek Riak Reuben Rengu (SSi.007) benefits from “ABC Progressive Private School Co. Ltd” with his daughter, Diana Malek Reuben, also owning 15 per cent and serving as Director General of the company. “ABC Progressive Private School Co. Ltd” is a private school located in Juba, with fees of around \$450 per semester.²¹⁴

206. The Panel’s work to monitor and support the implementation of the asset freeze has also indicated broader limitations to its effective enforcement in the region.

207. There are currently eight individuals designated for targeted financial measures by the Committee. Six have been designated for over three years, with another two designated for over eight months. The Panel has communicated detailed information about their suspected commercial holdings, as well as the commercial holdings of confirmed family members, to regional Governments and, through them, to commercial banks operating in the region.

208. While there were some clear cases of constructive engagement with the Panel and a willingness of both Governments and commercial entities to cooperate, most responses signalled significant structural limitations that impede the effective implementation of these targeted financial measures.

209. The majority of the Panel’s correspondence on the implementation of the asset freeze has been unanswered, even where the Panel provided extensive details to inform the requested searches. The responses that were received generally lamented the time given by the Panel for the receipt of the responses, given that regional commercial banks are largely unfamiliar with the existence and requirements of the asset freeze. The Panel was largely identified as the party responsible for educating commercial banks about such obligations as well as generating the financial intelligence necessary to implement the measures, although it was also discouraged from engaging directly with commercial banks.

210. The effective implementation of targeted financial measures requires effective communication of information and intelligence to commercial banks and for these banks, in turn, to effectively and reliably check their accounts and transactions against the information. In the view of the Panel, the asset freeze cannot be meaningfully implemented unless relevant State structures and commercial banks are able to effectively process, share and communicate relatively large quantities of information, including account and transaction data.

211. The Panel remains mindful of the capacity and resource constraints that make it challenging for Member States to implement targeted measures. The Panel also notes, however, that many of the structural measures that could aid the efficient implementation of targeted financial measures are likely familiar to the relevant institutions and national commercial banks through other related instruments, such as efforts to disrupt terrorist financing and money-laundering through the recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force, as promoted by the Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group.²¹⁵ These recommendations also note the value of national coordination through a designated body to aid the exchange of information; comprehensive due diligence on customers, including knowledge of the ultimate beneficial owners of corporate entities and additional care when dealing with

²¹⁴ Interviews and correspondence with civil society representatives, a confidential government source and South Sudanese diaspora, in Juba, January and February 2019.

²¹⁵ See www.fatf-gafi.org/pages/easternandsouthernafricaanti-moneylaunderinggroupesaamlg.html.

“politically exposed persons”; and making use of a risk-based approach to ensure the efficient allocation of limited resources.²¹⁶

VII. Conclusion

212. The revitalized peace agreement represents a significant milestone in efforts to bring an end to the conflict in South Sudan. The outcome of the agreement, however, remains uncertain, as challenges continue to face its implementation, particularly with regard to accountability, security provisions, financial transparency and the devolution of centralized power. Careful monitoring of the implementation process will therefore be essential to providing effective and meaningful support to the accord.

213. Efforts to ensure that the dividends of peace outweigh the drivers of the conflict economy in South Sudan will also be critical, including by reforming the use and management of public resources in South Sudan through the implementation of existing laws and the provisions detailed in chapter 4 of the revitalized peace agreement, in order to ensure that excessive resources are not diverted towards security sector spending or misappropriated by entrenched patronage networks. The robust implementation of the individual sanctions and the arms embargo imposed by the Security Council in its resolution 2428 (2018) will provide further critical support, but will require additional efforts, particularly from States neighbouring South Sudan.

214. Most importantly, however, the momentum behind the implementation of the revitalized peace agreement must be maintained by ensuring that the high-level accord translates into tangible improvements in the lives of civilians across the country, who continue to suffer sexual and gender-based violence and a desperate humanitarian situation that includes severe food shortages.

VIII. Recommendations

215. The Panel makes the following recommendations:

(a) That, to ensure the effective implementation of the arms embargo, the Security Council call on regional and neighbouring Member States to report to the Committee on the steps they have taken to implement effectively paragraphs 4 to 6 and 8 to 10 of resolution 2428 (2018), and that the Committee, on a semi-annual basis, request countries neighbouring South Sudan to submit inspection reports pursuant to paragraph 10 of resolution 2428 (2018), with the Committee making available on its website a template for such inspection reports;

(b) That, to support the implementation of the revitalized peace agreement and accountability for serious crimes committed in the context of the conflict in South Sudan, the Security Council encourage the Government of South Sudan to implement its stated commitment to signing the memorandum of understanding on the hybrid court with the African Union as a meaningful step towards the establishment of that court;

(c) That, to aid in the identification of, and to discourage the misappropriation and diversion of, public resources that pose a risk to the peace, security and stability of South Sudan, as outlined in paragraph 15 of resolution 2428 (2018), the Security Council encourage Member States to contact relevant companies active or registered in their jurisdictions and urge them to disclose all oil-related payments and

²¹⁶ The full Financial Action Task Force recommendations are available at www.fatf-gafi.org/publications/fatfrecommendations/documents/fatf-recommendations.html.

prepayments made to the Government of South Sudan, in accordance with the principles of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, and in support of article 4.8.1.14.11 of the revitalized peace agreement, which provides for South Sudan to “expedite” its efforts to join this initiative, and to ensure that all such payments are made in accordance with the provisions of chapter 4 of the revitalized peace agreement and the domestic laws of South Sudan, including the Petroleum Revenue Management Act, 2012;

(d) That, to ensure the effective implementation of the arms embargo introduced in resolution 2428 (2018) and to encourage the training of national and other relevant customs agencies, the Committee develop and make available on its website an Implementation Assistance Notice to Member States to aid them in carrying out the arms embargo, with particular attention to the provision of training, the inspection advice detailed in paragraphs 7 to 10 of resolution 2428 (2018), the process by which exemptions may be sought, as detailed in paragraphs 5 and 6 of the resolution, and the deployment of military personnel or equipment within the territory of South Sudan;

(e) That, to ensure the effective implementation of the arms embargo, the Committee encourage Member States to engage formally with air cargo companies and regional aviation authorities, informing them about the provisions of the arms embargo established by resolution 2428 (2018), and encouraging them to cooperate with the inspections mandated by paragraph 10 of that resolution;

(f) That, to support independent reporting on the implementation of the arms embargo, all approved arms embargo exemption requests be posted on the website of the Committee, along the lines of approved travel ban exemptions;²¹⁷

(g) That, to ensure the effective implementation of the asset freeze, the Committee address letters to the authorities of Ethiopia, Kenya, the Sudan and Uganda, encouraging these regional States to submit to their government agencies, including but not limited to central banks, national revenue agencies and financial monitoring bodies, copies of the Committee’s sanctions list of eight South Sudanese individuals, and to seek further information on the steps taken to implement asset freeze measures;

(h) That, to ensure effective cooperation and coordination between the Panel of Experts and other United Nations agencies and bodies, further to paragraphs 21 and 24 of resolution 2428 (2018), the Committee request that the United Nations Mission in South Sudan, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict and the Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan establish a protocol for the sharing of information on acts that potentially threaten the peace, stability and security of South Sudan, including violations of international humanitarian law and international human rights law and obstructions of humanitarian assistance;

(i) That, to prevent the illegal exploitation and trade of timber from funding armed groups in South Sudan, the Committee encourage regional and national revenue authorities and the Government of South Sudan to take measures to prevent

²¹⁷ By paragraph 10 (k) of the guidelines for the conduct of its work of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2206 (2015) concerning South Sudan, “unless the Committee otherwise decides, all requests for exemptions and extensions thereto which have been approved by the Committee in accordance with the above procedures, shall be posted in the ‘Exemptions’ section of the Committee’s website until expiry of the exemption”, see www.un.org/securitycouncil/sites/www.un.org.securitycouncil/files/2206_guidelines_en_0.pdf.

individuals and companies without official licences from the Ministry of Environment and Forestry of South Sudan from transporting and trading teak in their jurisdictions;

(j) That, to prevent the illicit exploitation of or trade in mineral resources in ways that may destabilize South Sudan, as described in paragraph 14 (j) of resolution [2428 \(2018\)](#), paying particular attention to gold that may have originated in South Sudan, the Committee encourage Uganda and other members of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region to reiterate and enforce requirements that companies publicly report on their due diligence practices, including efforts to mitigate the risks of trading in South Sudanese gold that has been mislabelled, in accordance with OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas, and as endorsed by the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, including by passing domestic legislation that is consistent with this standard and requires the certification of gold exports, and as previously committed to in the context of the Regional Initiative against the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region;²¹⁸

(k) That, to aid in the identification of and to discourage the misappropriation and diversion of public resources that pose a risk to the peace, security and stability of South Sudan, as outlined in paragraph 15 of resolution [2428 \(2018\)](#), the Security Council encourage Member States making financial or in-kind contributions to the national budget of South Sudan or the supplementary budget of the National Pre-transitional Council to make such contributions conditional on the meaningful and timely implementation of auditing, including by the National Audit Chamber of South Sudan, and other revenue management provisions contained within chapter 4 of the revitalized peace agreement.

²¹⁸ Lusaka Declaration of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region Special Summit to Fight Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources in the Great Lakes Region, 15 December 2010; and OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas.

Annex 1

Case study on armed groups in Unity State

A large number of armed groups are present in the area that makes up the former Unity State. These include regular SSPDF forces; SPLA-IO Taban Deng Gai (TDG) forces that have been officially integrated into the SSPDF; SPLA-IO Riek Machar (RM) forces; as well as various other armed militias. Their competing presence in a strategically, economically, and politically significant area has resulted in a fragile security balance that has been tested throughout 2018, including after the September 2018 signing of the R-ARCSS. The frequent armed confrontations that have resulted are one of the principal drivers of violence, including widespread sexual violence, against civilians in the area.

Unity has witnessed a great deal of violence since the start of the conflict in South Sudan. Multiple government offensives sought to retake SPLM/A-IO strongholds in the area between 2013 and 2015.²¹⁹ These operations were characterised by acts of extensive violence against civilians.

After renewed fighting broke out in Juba in July 2016, SPLM/A-IO Chairman Riek Machar escaped to the Democratic Republic of Congo and the SPLM/A sought to consolidate its territorial and political control.

President Salva Kiir replaced Riek Machar, who had been serving as First Vice-President in a Government of National Unity, with General Taban Deng Gai, a senior member of the SPLM/A-IO.²²⁰ This split the SPLM/A-IO into two factions: one remaining loyal to Machar (SPLM/A-IO (RM)) and the other to Taban Deng Gai (SPLM/A-IO (TDG)).²²¹ Both men are ethnic Nuer and from Unity State. Machar is Dok Nuer from Leer, whilst Deng Gai is Nuer Jikani from Guit.²²² Their renewed rivalry quickly exacerbated existing intra-Nuer tensions in the area. Nuer militias and youth groups fragmented, dispersing and disrupting established chains of commands across Unity State.²²³

Officially, government SSPDF forces controlled the area through its Division 4 during the second half of 2016, but, in reality, its reach did not extend beyond Bentiu and a few other cities.

The main armed forces in the area remained under the control of SPLA-IO (RM) and SPLA-IO (TDG).²²⁴ In addition, the South Sudan Liberation Army (SSLA) – a mostly Bul Nuer force of around 3,000-5,000 fighters – also remained a potent and active force in the Mayom area, under the command of General Matthew Puljang. This independent

²¹⁹ Among the most significant military campaigns are those of January 2014 and April 2015. See Joshua Craze, Jerome Tubiana, Claudio Gramizzi, “A state of Disunity: Conflict Dynamics in Unity State, South Sudan, 2013–2015,” Small Arms Survey, 2016: <http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/working-papers/HSBA-WP42-Unity-Dec-2016.pdf>.

²²⁰ Taban Deng Gai was also the Governor of Unity State from 2005 to 2013. Interviews, community leaders, elders, businessmen, and former Unity state officials: Bentiu and by phone; December 2018.

²²¹ See: “Legitimacy, exclusion, and power. Taban Deng Gai and the South Sudan peace process,” HSBA N. 25, Small Arms Survey, December 2016: <http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/issue-briefs/HSBA-IB25-Taban-Deng-Gai-Dec-2016.pdf>.

²²² Interviews, community and religious leaders, elders, and youths; Bentiu, December 2018.

²²³ See: Wal Duany, “Neither palaces nor prisons: the constitution of order among the Nuer”, Indiana University PhD dissertation, 1992. Interviews, community and religious leaders, elders, state officials, youths, and businessmen; Bentiu and by phone; December 2018.

²²⁴ Interviews, community leaders and elders, Bentiu, December 2018.

fighting force was aligned with SSPDF Government forces and enjoyed a unique arrangement by which it reported directly to SSPDF headquarters in Juba (Bilpham).²²⁵

Taban Deng Gai emerged as a key ally of President Kiir after the summer of 2016, and since early 2017, has sought to reassert his political and economic influence in Unity State. Taban Deng's local commanders resumed recruitment in the area, some incentivised with pay or supplies, but also through the abduction of youths. At the same time, Taban Deng Gai sought to integrate his forces in the area with local SSPDF Division 4 forces, which are headquartered in Bentiu.

This integration ultimately failed at first, reportedly because General Stephen Buay Rolnyang, a Bul Nuer from Mayom and then Commander of SSPDF Division 4, considered Taban Deng Gai's forces poorly trained and difficult to manage, while also fearing the growing personal power of Taban Deng Gai.²²⁶

By the end of 2017, the SSPDF had recognised its inability to seize Unity decisively from SPLA-IO (RM) forces, with Division 4 Commander General Buay also reportedly resistant to further military campaigns that were inflicting a heavy toll on the civilian population.²²⁷

At this point, the Government decided to effectively hand control of Unity's military campaign to Taban Deng Gai, which also offered an opportunity to test the loyalty of their new ally. Taban Deng quickly seized the opportunity to move decisively against the SPLA-IO (RM) in their own communities, and continued the recruitment and mobilization of Nuer youths, especially in his home constituencies, swelling the ranks of his forces. Some of these new recruits were integrated into SPLA-IO (TDG) forces, while others were mobilized more occasionally and informally.

As a consequence, the chain of command remained highly dispersed. Forces were mostly unpaid, encouraging local commanders to conduct periodic offensives aimed first and foremost at generating resources and payment. Commanders reportedly told fighters that anything could be looted during attacks. In one case, a commander is said to have told youths: "For those of you who are yet to get married, it is your chance now to find a nice woman."²²⁸

In April 2018, a fresh military offensive was launched in Unity state, targeting the few remaining SPLA-IO (RM) forces, with the aim of "clearing opposition-held areas" and "forcefully displacing civilians."²²⁹ This operation continued into May, June, and July 2018.²³⁰ SPLA-IO (TDG) forces, supported by the more informal youth militias, moved into Leer and Mayendit Counties in Southern Liech State.²³¹

The Panel has established that SPLA-IO (TDG) units, commanded by Lieutenant General Peter Dor Manjur Gatluak, were at the forefront of these offensives, alongside

²²⁵ Interviews, SSPDF and SPLM/A-IO senior officers, senior politicians, community leaders, and journalists; Juba and Bentiu; December 2018; Kampala and Nairobi; January 2019.

²²⁶ Interviews, community and religious leaders, elders, SSPDF Division 4 senior officers, and journalists; Bentiu and Juba; December 2018.

²²⁷ Interviews, community and religious leaders, elders, youths, political analysts, and state officials; Bentiu, Juba, and by phone; December 2018

²²⁸ Interviews, community and religious leaders, elders, youths, UN personnel, businessmen, and state officials; Bentiu, December 2018.

²²⁹ Interviews, SSPDF high-ranking commanders, community and religious leaders, elders, youths, international political analysts and human rights researchers, and state officials; Bentiu, Juba, and by phone; December 2018. See also, Amnesty International, "Anything that was breathing was killed – War crimes in Leer and Mayendit, South Sudan," September 2018: <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/afr65/8801/2018/en/>

²³⁰ Interviews, community and religious leaders, elders, and youths; Bentiu, December 2018.

²³¹ Recruitment was, allegedly, mostly from Guit, Rubkona and Koch. Southern Liech State was created by Establishment Order No. 36/2015.

a youth militia controlled by then Gany County Commissioner, Gordon Koang Biel (Nuer Jagei).²³² The Panel also gathered evidence that suggests these operations were supported by the SSPDF Division 4 Commander, Major General Samson Mabior Lual, including with men, trucks, and ammunition.²³³

During these attacks, civilians in opposition-held areas were killed, while widespread looting and destruction targeted crops, food, medical supplies, health facilities, and entire villages. Acts of SGBV, including rape, gang-rape and the abduction and enslavement of women and girls, took place on a significant scale.²³⁴

In May 2018, in the midst of this Unity offensive, Taban Deng Gai announced his decision to dissolve his SPLA-IO (TDG) forces, and again asked the SSPDF Chief of Staff, sanctioned individual General Gabriel Jok Riak (SSi.001), to expedite the integration of SPLA-IO forces into the regular SSPDF.²³⁵

Further to this announcement, and following the signature of R-ARCSS in September 2018, a number of meetings took place between SSPDF Division 4 and SPLA-IO (TDG) commanders to discuss this proposed integration. At the same time, the forced recruitment of adults, women and children across Guit county continued, in an effort to boost numbers ahead of integration.²³⁶

Two challenges to meaningful integration quickly emerged. SPLA-IO (TDG) commanders had higher military ranks than their Division 4 counterparts, but had a comparatively low number of fighting troops under their command. Despite a significant number of officers, and multiple rounds of recruitment, SPLA-IO (TDG) forces appear, today, to comprise only around 3,000 fighters. At one integration exercise, only around 1,000 fighters were presented by SPLA-IO (TDG) for integration.^{237 238}

However, other commanders such as the current commander of SPLA-IO (TDG)'s Kuergueni headquarters, Maj General William Riek Riek, have not been integrated.

SPLA-IO (TDG) forces have also continued to act independently of, though at times in cooperation with, the SSPDF.²³⁹ A senior SSPDF Division 4 Military Intelligence commander told the Panel that SPLA-IO (TDG) forces “are not trained; these are not soldiers, they are at best militiamen. To turn them into soldiers we will need to start from scratch. And they do not know what a military chain of command is, they do not respect

²³² Interviews, community and religious leaders, elders, civil society, and local politicians; Bentiu, Juba, Kampala; December 2018-January 2019.

²³³ Interviews, community and religious leaders, elders, youths, villagers, UNMISS and other UN personnel, CTSAMVM, and international NGO personnel; Bentiu, Juba, and by phone; December 2018.

²³⁴ Ibid.

²³⁵ “Taban asks new army chief to expedite integration of his forces into army,” Radio Tamazuj, 7 May 2018: <https://radiotamazuj.org/en/news/article/taban-asks-new-army-chief-to-expedite-integration-of-his-forces-into-army>

²³⁶ Interviews, SSPDF Division 4 high ranking officers, Northern Liech State authorities, and civil society; Bentiu, December 2018; Kampala, Nairobi; January 2019.

²³⁷ Interview, SSPDF Division 4 high-ranking officer; Bentiu; December 2018.

²³⁸ A number of senior SPLA-IO (TDG) officers have formally integrated into SSPDF. These include: Lt General Peter Dor Manjur Gatluak, (Riverine Forces in Upper Nile); Lt General Wang Chok Korkom, (SSPDF Deputy Chief of Staff for Organization); Maj General Karlo Kual, (Deputy Commander of SSPDF Division 4); Maj General Mayel Thay, (SSPDF Division 4); and Maj General Makal Kual, (SSPDF Division 4).

²³⁹ Interviews, SSPDF Division 4 high-ranking commanders and Unity state officials, Bentiu, December 2018.

orders.” The Panel was told that “no more than 10 percent of their forces are integrated.”²⁴⁰

SPLA-IO (TDG) forces have continued to aggressively assert themselves in different parts of Unity State, particularly in Guit County, Rubkona County, and Koch County (all in Northern Liech State under the contested 32-state division). In November 2018, reports of ongoing harassment and abuses of civilians, rapes at checkpoints near the Bentiu Protection of Civilian site, and rape and gang rape in Nimni and Nhialdiu areas in Rubkona County, were largely attributed to forces connected to SPLA-IO (TDG).²⁴¹

The Panel also corroborated information that, on 5 December 2018, SPLA-IO (TDG) forces attacked one of the few remaining SPLA-IO (RM) positions in Guit County, Biil, with fighting lasting for three days.²⁴²

The signing of the R-ARCSS in September 2018 secured the return of Riek Machar to the national political scene. This has raised questions about the future role of South Sudan’s current First Vice-President, Taban Deng Gai, in a Revitalised Government of National Unity.²⁴³

In parallel, both the local political dynamics of Unity State and intra-Nuer tribal politics are changing in ways that risk further marginalising Taban Deng Gai. Peace celebrations that took place in Bentiu at the end of December 2018 were attended by the Governor of Northern Liech State, Joseph Monytil (Bul Nuer), and representatives of the SPLM/A-IO (RM). The return to Juba of Angelina Teny, the wife of Riek Machar, senior member of the SPLM/A-IO (RM) and a Jikani Nuer from Guit, where she still exerts significant political influence, could also imperil Taban Deng Gai’s standing in his traditional strongholds.²⁴⁴

The Panel has been told by multiple sources that Taban Deng Gai therefore remains committed to attacking SPLA-IO (RM) military positions in Unity, still seeing this as an opportunity to demonstrate his continued relevance, and in so doing, disrupt the peace process, if necessary, and alter the military and political dynamics in Unity state and the country at large.²⁴⁵

From this complex landscape, the Panel has identified a number of significant fighting forces in the Unity area:

SSPDF Division 4, headquartered in Northern Liech State’s capital, Bentiu, is commanded by Major General Samson Mabior Lual, with Major General Karlo Kual serving as his Deputy. They control major towns, including Bentiu, Leer, Yiol, and have the capacity to move into the rural areas surrounding these towns if needed. Despite better organization, equipment, and training, these SSPDF forces often lack fuel for patrols, and the force has gone unpaid for over six months, with the food available to the force also limited.

²⁴⁰ Interview, SSPDF Division 4 high-ranking officer, Bentiu, December 2018.

²⁴¹ Interviews, international NGO staff, civil society, religious leaders, SSPDF commanders, Northern Liech State authorities, and UN personnel; Bentiu and Juba; December 2018.

²⁴² This was the second such incident in Biil in one month, and the third since August, and seemed connected to an attempt by SPLA-IO (TDG) forces to remove SPLA-IO (RM) forces out of one of their few strongholds in Guit County, most probably for fear that the implementation of the R-ARCSS would allow SPLA-IO (RM) forces to gain ground and support from the population. Interviews, civil society, senior politicians, local and international observers, Bentiu, December 2018; Kampala, Khartoum and Nairobi; January 2019.

²⁴³ Interviews, senior politicians, civil society, journalists and analysts; Juba, Bentiu, December 2018; Addis Ababa, Kampala, Khartoum and Nairobi; January 2019.

²⁴⁴ Ibid.

²⁴⁵ Interviews, civil society, journalists, senior politicians, community and religious leaders; Bentiu and Juba, December 2018; Kampala, Khartoum and Nairobi; January 2019.

SPLA-IO (TDG) forces, while officially integrated, largely retain separate barracks. They are headquartered in Kergueini, which is under the command of Major General William Riek Riek, although Lt General Peter Dor Manjur Gatluak retains significant influence over their actions and is often seen in Guit County and in the headquarters itself. Other SPLA-IO (TDG) units are present in:

- Koch (Koch County), under the command of Major General Mayel Thay;
- Tong (Rubkona County);
- Tumor (Mayom County), under the command of Major General Makal Kual;
- Rubkway (Rubkway County, Southern Liech State), under the command of Major General James Gadit; Pariang (the capital of Ruweng State), where a limited SPLA-IO (TDG) force responds to orders from local Governor, Tem Machar.

SPLA-IO (RM) forces retain control of:

- Ganyiel County, Nyal County, Paynjiir County and Mayendit County, all under the command of Brigadier General Dok Wanjang and Brigadier General John Tap Puot;
- Biil, in Guit County, under the command of General Michael Mawich;
- While under increasing pressure in Northern Liech and Ruweng States, SPLA-IO (RM) elements also still control a few areas between Wicok, Buaw, Ngop and Bentiu, as well as Wunkur, all under the command of Brigadier Tito Biel Wich.

The South Sudan Liberation Army (SSLA), led by General Matthew Puljang, is a mostly Bul Nuer force, and still has around 2,000 fighters who are mostly deployed in Mayom County. General Puljang remains allied to Government forces, and still responds directly to SSPDF headquarters in Juba (Bilpham), rather than local SSPDF command.

There is also a force of at least 1,000 **youths**, mostly Nuer Jagei, from Koch County, formed and led by then Gany County Commissioner, Gordon Koang Biel, until at least July 2018. Biel was then sacked from his role of County Commissioner and placed under house arrest in Bentiu. Upon release, by September 2018, he was integrated into the SSPDF with the rank of General. In recent months, General Biel's force has operated in collaboration with SPLA-IO (TDG) commanders, and is now often referred to as a "proxy force" in the hands of SPLA-IO (TDG).

The abuse of civilians, including endemic levels of SGBV and rape, is a widespread and persistent problem in Unity.²⁴⁶ The complex military and political landscape in Unity is crucial to understanding this trend, but also to the attribution of responsibility. While official territorial control is claimed by SSPDF Division 4, it is clear that their effective control over much of this territory is limited. Most SSPDF units are confined to barracks, with only sporadic capacity for patrol and operations.

In the view of the Panel, SPLA-IO (TDG) forces pose a particular threat to civilians in the Unity area. The perceived vulnerability of its political leadership, including Taban Deng Gai himself, may drive a determination to assert their continued significance. At the same time, a predatory relationship to the civilian population and territory has been intrinsic to the very core of these forces since their inception, with a rank and file that remains largely untrained and unpaid. One SSPDF commander, familiar with SPLA-IO (TDG) operations in Unity, told the Panel that he heard a commander telling his forces before a military operation in 2018: "Go get what you can. Food, a chicken, a goat, a cow, a woman, whatever you find is for you."

²⁴⁶ Interviews, community and religious leaders and elders, women in Bentiu PoC, and civil society; Bentiu, December 2018.

Annex 2

Further information on the evolution and command structures of the National Security Service

The NSS is regulated by the National Security Service Act of 2014, which gives the NSS broad powers and provides few safeguards against their abuse. Its core mandate is to “safeguard the national interest”²⁴⁷ in accordance with the “authority of the Constitution and the law”, while respecting “the will of the people, the rule of law, democracy, human rights and fundamental freedoms” while being “professional with the mandate to focus on information gathering, analysis and advice to the relevant authorities.”²⁴⁸

Under Lt. General Akol Koor Kuc, recent years have seen the NSS pursue an ever-broader interpretation of these powers, eventually emerging as a parallel and independent security force with activities ranging from intelligence gathering to military operations, many of which are well beyond its stated mandate.

The origins of the NSS’ rise can be traced to President Kiir’s growing mistrust of the SPLA’s former Chief of Defence Staff, General Paul Malong Awan (SSi.008). Reportedly fearing an SPLA coup led by Malong, President Kiir encouraged and allowed the NSS to grow from an intelligence-gathering agency into an increasingly powerful and autonomous fighting force capable of influencing South Sudan’s politics, society, and economy.²⁴⁹ What may have been developed as a counterweight to Malong’s power and influence over key parts of the SPLA (now SSPDF) quickly became the dominant actor in South Sudan’s security sector when Malong fled to Kenya in 2018. With the assent of the influential Jieng Council of Elders – an informal group of influential Dinka leaders and elders – Lt. General Akol Koor Kuc emerged as its increasingly influential leader.

The influence of the NSS has grown, in part, from the increase in the size of its fighting force, well beyond what is required by its official mandate, and which now numbers around 10,000. Most fall under the Operations Division’s Batch 4 and 5, formally led by Major General Gabriel Ayor, but in reality commanded by Major General Aciec Kuot who, like Lt. General Akol Koor Kuc, is from Tonj.²⁵⁰ An additional force of around 5,000 makes up the Protection Division (Batch 3), commanded by Major General Deng Akol Wek Ateny, which is assigned to the protection of the President and key institutions.²⁵¹ In recent years, these NSS forces have exerted increasing control over Juba, as well as towns such as Yei and Wau.

These NSS forces are also better equipped and trained than ordinary SSPDF forces, with the NSS having established its own procurement and supply systems. Unlike their SSPDF counterparts, most of whom have gone unpaid for months at a time in recent years, NSS personnel are regularly paid and fed.²⁵²

One person well-acquainted with the system told the Panel that the “NSS is a parallel force to the army, and a parallel structure to Government institutions. The model Akol Koor Kuc put in place is entirely anti-democratic; borrowed from the NISS in Khartoum.”²⁵³

²⁴⁷ National Security Act, Chapter III.13.1, October 2014.

²⁴⁸ National Security Act, Chapter I.6.a/b/c, October 2014

²⁴⁹ Interviews, SSPDF, SSPDF-MI, former SPLA-MI, NSS senior officers, SPLM, SPLM-IO senior representatives, civil society, journalists, Juba, Nairobi, Khartoum, Addis Ababa, Kampala, by phone, September–December 2018, January–March 2019.

²⁵⁰ Interviews, confidential sources, undisclosed locations, November 2018, January–February 2019.

²⁵¹ Ibid

²⁵² Ibid

²⁵³ Interview, confidential source, undisclosed location, February 2019.

The Panel has been able to establish the following chains of command for key components of the NSS/ISB:

Lt. Colonel Jackson Deng Goch commands the NSS ‘Blue House’ detention facility.²⁵⁴

The ‘Riverside’ facility is under the control of:²⁵⁵

- Maj. General Achiech Kuot Kuot;
- His deputy Brig. General Niew Niew;
- Col. Kaka Roric Jur, who is commander of ‘Riverside Special Operations’; and
- Major Wol Deng Mading, the Head of the detention facility itself.

²⁵⁴ Interviews, confidential sources, undisclosed locations, October 2018, December 2018, January–February 2019.

²⁵⁵ Interviews, confidential sources, undisclosed locations, January–February 2019.

Annex 3

Diversion of public funds to security spending

Public documents indicate that, despite the ongoing implementation of the R-ARCSS, significant percentages of South Sudan's public finances continue to be diverted to the security sector.

In the Approved Budget for the Financial Year 2018/19, it is noted that "expenditures are largely skewed towards defence at the expense of poverty reduction. Security and accountability/public administration and rule of law spending have accounted for over 70 per cent of the total budget over the past three fiscal years."²⁵⁶ The Chairman of the National Assembly's Budget Committee noted, in his review of the budget, that the precipitous decline in South Sudan's GDP is, in part, "due to the on-going war that continues to divert resources away from investments into security sector."²⁵⁷ He also warns that, "as peace will bring more prosperity, we are forewarned of the propensities by [un]scrupulous individuals to rob the nation of the oil wealth."

Security sector spending is budgeted to be 15,455,430,392 SSP (US\$99,712,454). To this, spending on Police and Prison services might reasonably be added for a total of around a quarter (23 per cent) of total budgeted spending.

There are, however, few effective mechanisms in place to ensure spending matches the approved budget, with significant spending routinely diverting from the approved budget. A draft Ministry of Finance spending report for the first quarter of the 2018/19 financial year notes that the security sector had, by the end of the first quarter, already spent 118 per cent of its entire allocated budget on goods and services for the year. The Office of the President, under which the budget for the NSS sits, has also routinely overspent against its allocated budget.²⁵⁸

There is also evidence to suggest that reported spending does not match the actual use of public resources. The bulk of reported Government spending is, for example, on salaries.²⁵⁹ At the same time, however, it is clear that many Government salaries are not being paid in practice. The Bank of South Sudan has confirmed that civil service salaries are not being paid regularly;²⁶⁰ the Panel has confirmed that SSPDF salaries are not being paid regularly;²⁶¹ and documents from the Ministry of Finance make it clear that a significant amount of spending in 2018/19 has gone towards clearing salary arrears for the previous financial year, with arrears of three to eleven months still remaining across various Government departments.²⁶² The Bank of South Sudan has identified "the cleansing of the government payroll using biometric verification data"²⁶³ as one important means of increasing available public resources, implying that the misappropriation of salaries is a drain on public accounts. In January 2019, President

²⁵⁶ Government of South Sudan, Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, Approved National Budget and context for FY 2018 / 2019, document on file with Panel.

²⁵⁷ Transitional National Legislature of the Republic of South Sudan, Report on the Second Reading of the Budget for the Financial Year 2018/19, presented by the Chairman of the Committee on Finance and Economic Planning, 13 August 2018, section 1.2.

²⁵⁸ See, for example, Ministry of Finance, 2015/16 Full Year Macro-Fiscal Report, October 2016

²⁵⁹ Government of South Sudan, Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, Approved National Budget and context for 2018/2019, document on file with Panel and Central Bank of South Sudan, Third Quarter Report, September 2018

²⁶⁰ Central Bank of South Sudan, Third Quarter Report, September 2018

²⁶¹ Panel interviews, Bentiu and Juba, October 2018-February 2019.

²⁶² Ministry of Finance document on file with Panel.

²⁶³ Central Bank of South Sudan, Third Quarter Report, September 2018

Kiir himself accused senior officers of diverting food and resources, meant for soldiers, for personal gain.²⁶⁴

As part of the implementation of the R-ARCSS, a supplementary budget was also developed by the National Pre-Transitional Committee and approved by the Government's Council of Minister in February 2019 in order to finance its work for the remaining four months of the NPTC's mandate.²⁶⁵ This budget is to be funded mainly from the Government's public resources, including oil revenues.

The total supplementary budget proposed is US\$285,085,509. Of this total, US\$245,252,855 – around 86 per cent – is devoted to “Security Mechanisms”. Of this amount, US\$143,496,907, around 58 per cent, is budgeted for the Joint Military Ceasefire Commission (JMCC), which will oversee the cantonment of forces, with US\$95,278,903, around 38 per cent, going to Joint Transitional Security Committee (JTSC). By contrast, US\$29,617,730 of the total budget is allocated for the establishment of the National Pre-Transitional Committee and US\$2,270,100, less than 1 per cent, is allocated to “reconciliation and healing.”

²⁶⁴ See, for example, Reuters, South Sudan soldiers 'unhealthy' due to food theft: Kiir, January 2019: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-southsudan-unrest/south-sudan-soldiers-unhealthy-due-to-food-theft-kiir-idUSKCN1PI2T8>.

²⁶⁵ Documents on file with Panel.

**Annex 4
Joint Defence Board Cantonment Areas and Barracks Agreement of 3 February 2019**

CANTONMENT AREAS AND BARRACKS

Phase One (1)

3rd February 2019
Palm Africa Hotel, Juba – South Sudan

Resolutions:

Pursuant to Article 2.2.3.3, of the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan, (R-ARCSS 2018) all forces shall be cantoned under supervision of the current monitoring bodies at their present barracks and cantonment sites. Cantoned forces shall be assembled in accessible areas and in a size of not less than a battalion.

The parties agreed to immediately commence cantonment of opposition forces in twenty-five (25) cantonment sites, whereas, the SSPDF will be cantoned in ten (10) main barracks for Phase One, as indicate in the table below:

S/NO.	STATE/REGION	AREAS OF CANTONMENT (SPLA-IO & SSOA forces)	BARRACKS (SSPDF)	BARRACKS (NSS & ORGANISED FORCES)	NO. FORCES TO BE TRAINED	TRAINING CENTRES
1.	UNITY	1. Mirmir 2. Pakur (Rubkona) 3. Bong	1. Bentiu, 2. Leer 3. Mayendit, 4. Mayom			
2.	WESTERN EQUATORIA	1. Rirangu Sue	1. Yambio,			

JKL GJR

M. J. J.
SSOA CO
1 Charr

		(Yambio) 2. Ngiri (Mundri)	2. Tombura 3. Mundri, 4. <u>Maridi</u>			
3.	CENTRAL EQUATORIA	1. Panyume 2. Wunaleit 3. Lobojo (Lobonok)	1. <u>Juba</u> , 2. <u>Yei</u> , 3. Kajokeji, 4. Terkeka, 5. Mogerri, 6. Kaya 7. Thertanya			
4.	EASTERN EQUATORIA	1. Ashwa (Pageri) 2. Lorere/Nyara 3. Nawokitbong (Kapoeta)	1. <u>Torit</u> , 2. <u>Kapoeta</u> , 3. Magwi 4. Nimule, 5. Ikotos, 6. Narus, 7. New site, 8. New Kush			

JCC

WJ

Scott
Co-Chair

5.	JONGLEI (Bieh/Akobo/Phow/Jonglei)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> Pulturuk Pieri Ker (Ayod) Dor (Fangak) (Weibuony in Geni) 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <u>Malual Choat,</u> Pibor Likwangoli, Gumruk, Nanam, Buma, Marroa, Kethngor, Pochalla, Duk, Ayod, Waat, Yual, Pajut, Gadiang. 			
6.	UPPER NILE (Nasir/Sobat/Fashoda/Adar)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> Torpuot Turow Wichpanyikang Thuorgwang Lieng (Khor Yabus) 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <u>Malakal,</u> Doleb, Nasir, Galacel, Pagak, <u>Renk,</u> Lelo, Kodok, Kaka, Wudokona, Maban, Poch, Gopa, Chatha, 			

JKC GJR

3 *[Signature]*
SSDA Co-Chair

			<ol style="list-style-type: none"> Jamam, Molbuok, Atam, Dukduk, Chumudi, Halga, Kuek, Gabat, Uwaci, 			
7.	WESTERN BAHR GHAZAL	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> Dulu Busheri 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <u>Wau,</u> Raja, Kitkit, Timza, Bor Madina, 			
8.	NORTHERN BAHR-EL-GAZAL/WARRAP	1. Malek Gumel	<u>1. Awell,</u> (Wunyik)			
	TOTAL	25 CANTONMENT SITES	68 BARRACKS (10 MAIN, 58 SUB-BARRACKS)			


Signed *[Signature]*
3rd. Feb. 2015
General Gabriel Jok Riak
SSPDF Chief of Defense Force and
Chairperson of JDB

GJR

[Signature]
SSDA
Co-Chair

Signed 


Lt. General James Koang Chuol
SPLM/A-IO DCoGs for Administration and Finance
Co-Chair of JDB

Signed 

Maj. General Charles Machieng Kuol
SSOA
Co-Chair of JDB.



Annex 5
SPLM national secretariat: Report on the modalities for the reunification of SPLM, 21 February 2019





After thorough discussions and analysis of issues from different perspectives for over three days, the committee recommends to the Chairman of the SPLM, the following steps and actions for the immediate reunification of the Party:

1. To operationalize his previous Order for the reinstatement of members of PB and NLC who were dismissed from party membership and leadership positions to their previous positions in the Party;
2. All seats that fell vacant in the PB and NLC shall be filled by the reunified PB from the respective groups within 30 days;
3. To convene a meeting of the reunified PB as it stood in December 2013, at the earliest possible time, to deliberate on the allocation of the 16 additional seats in accordance with the provisions of the Arusha Agreement and the SPLM Constitution; and
4. The reunified PB shall restructure the SPLM National Secretariat as per Arusha Agreement.

Signed in the SPLM House in Juba on this 21st Day of the month of February, 2019 A.D.


Cde. Daniel Awet Akot,
For the SPLM


Cde Ezekiel Lol Gatkuoth
For SPLM – IO


Cde John Luk Jok
For SPLM - FDs

**Annex 6
National Security Service promotions, August 2018**

National Security Service GHQs
Email: isbghqs@gmail.com
JUBA, SOUTH SUDAN



OFFICE OF THE MINISTER
Minister, Office of the President
for National Security Service
Tel: +211 956891339

REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN

Please quote our reference when replying

Out Ref: **RSS/MNSS/OM/J/12/6/18**

Date: **4th AUGUST 2018**

To:

Lt Gen. Thomas Duoth Guet ✓
Director General,
General Intelligence Bureau - GIB

Repeat:

Lt Gen. Akol Koor Kuc
Director General,
Internal Security Bureau - ISB

Subject: Absorption into the System of the Newly Promoted Officers into their New National Security Service Ranks

Reference to the Republican Decree **No: 100/2018, A.D** for the **promotion of Officers into the National Security Service (NSS), 2018 A.D**, you are hereby directed to immediately absorb the newly promoted officers into their respective ranks as of the National Security Service system.

This is for your immediate consideration



Hon. Obuto Mamur Mete
Minister,
Ministry of National Security Service
Office of the President

*Ref. to Dec for Amendment
- Requests -*



Republic of South Sudan (RSS)
The President

RSS/RD/J/100/2018

2nd August 2018
Date

THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN (RSS)


Republican Decree NO: 100/2018 for the **Promotion of Officers in National Security Service**, 2018 A.D

1. TITLE AND COMMENCEMENT:

The Decree shall be cited as "The Republican Decree NO: 100/2018, A.D for the **Promotion of Officers into the National Security Service**, 2018 A.D." and shall come into force on the date of its signature by the President of the Republic.


2. THE DECREE

In exercise of powers conferred upon me under section 46(1) of the National Security Service Act, 2014, I, Salva Kiir Mayardit, President of the Republic of South Sudan and the Supreme Commander of all Regular Forces, do hereby issue this Republican Decree for **Promotion of Officers into the National Security Service** with effect from 1st January 2018 as hereunder:



OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Name of Office: _____

Issued under my Hand and seal of the Republic of South Sudan in Juba,
this Third Day of the Month of August in the Year 2018 A.D.



Salva Kiir Mayardit,
President,
Supreme Commander of All Regular Forces,
Republic of South Sudan,
Juba

A. COLONELS

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OF ORIGINAL DOCUMENT

Name of Officer in Charge

Date

S/NO	RANK	NAME IN FULL	LAST DATE OF PROMOTION	DUE FOR PROMOTION TO	REMARKS
1.	COL.	HAKIM MUORWEL MARIAL	01/01/2007	BRIGADIER GENERAL	ISB
2.	COL.	JULIUS WILLIAM WARE	01/01/2010	BRIGADIER GENERAL	GIB
3.	COL.	STEPHEN ONAK PAWANG	01/01/2010	BRIGADIER GENERAL	ISB
4.	COL.	JOHN MANUT WOL	01/01/2010	BRIGADIER GENERAL	ISB
5.	COL.	PETER CAFENOL URIEMO	01/01/2011	BRIGADIER GENERAL	GIB
6.	COL.	KUAI MALET KUOL	01/01/2011	BRIGADIER GENERAL	ISB
7.	COL.	LOUIS MAYAR BILKUEI	01/01/2011	BRIGADIER GENERAL	ISB
8.	COL.	SIMON TOR KONDOK	01/01/2011	BRIGADIER GENERAL	GIB
9.	COL.	KULANG MAKENY AROK	01/01/2011	BRIGADIER GENERAL	ISB
10.	COL.	MARTIN LUAL LIU	01/01/2011	BRIGADIER GENERAL	GIB
11.	COL.	OKOMI LA AKOL	01/01/2011	BRIGADIER GENERAL	ISB
12.	COL.	MATHEW THOKRIEL LUETH	01/01/2011	BRIGADIER GENERAL	GIB
13.	COL.	GUM AGOK DEK	01/01/2011	BRIGADIER GENERAL	ISB
14.	COL.	LINO DENG WEK	01/01/2011	BRIGADIER GENERAL	GIB
15.	COL.	DAVID PANCHOL ADUONG	01/01/2011	BRIGADIER GENERAL	GIB
16.	COL.	RIAK KIIR DENG	01/01/2011	BRIGADIER GENERAL	GIB
17.	COL.	BENJAMIN KUC AGOOK	01/01/2011	BRIGADIER GENERAL	ISB
18.	COL.	THOMAS GATOT CHIOK	01/01/2011	BRIGADIER GENERAL	ISB
19.	COL.	ISAAC DAKBAI DAU	16/05/2014	BRIGADIER GENERAL	GIB
20.	COL.	MAJIER ABDALLA MABIOR	16/05/2014	BRIGADIER GENERAL	GIB
21.	COL.	ALBINO MAWICH KUOL	16/05/2014	BRIGADIER GENERAL	ISB
22.	COL.	MANAS MACHAR BOL	16/05/2014	BRIGADIER GENERAL	ISB
23.	COL.	CIENGKUEU MADING ROC	16/05/2014	BRIGADIER GENERAL	GIB
24.	COL.	KUOL MAJAK AKOT	16/05/2014	BRIGADIER GENERAL	GIB
25.	COL.	RIAK MAJOK RING	16/05/2014	BRIGADIER GENERAL	GIB
26.	COL.	AKOT LUAL ARECH	16/05/2014	BRIGADIER GENERAL	ISB
27.	COL.	OHIYOK DAVID ODUHO	14/03/2014	BRIGADIER GENERAL	GIB
28.	COL.	ANDREA RAY ALLAM	14/03/2014	BRIGADIER GENERAL	GIB
29.	COL.	GUK RIK POUT	16/05/2014	BRIGADIER GENERAL	ISB
30.	COL.	TER TONGYIK MAJOK	16/05/2014	BRIGADIER GENERAL	GIB
31.	COL.	DENG AYIENY ALEU	16/05/2014	BRIGADIER GENERAL	ISB
32.	COL.	WOL LUAL WOL	16/05/2014	BRIGADIER GENERAL	GIB
33.	COL.	SALVA CHOL MAJOK	16/05/2014	BRIGADIER GENERAL	ISB
34.	COL.	KUAC ATUER WIEU	16/05/2014	BRIGADIER GENERAL	ISB
35.	COL.	SAMUEL NIEWNIEW AKUECTOC	16/05/2014	BRIGADIER GENERAL	ISB
36.	COL.	DOMINIC DENG KUOC MALEK	16/05/2014	BRIGADIER GENERAL	ISB
37.	COL.	LUAL CHOL KUR	16/05/2014	BRIGADIER GENERAL	GIB

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38.	COL.	JUBEK JOHN NOEL	16/05/2014	BRIGADIER GENERAL	GIB
39.	COL.	NAPOLEON ADOK GAI	16/05/2014	BRIGADIER GENERAL	ISB
40.	COL.	PAULINO PIOL MALEK	16/05/2014	BRIGADIER GENERAL	ISB
41.	COL.	BONA GONG NGENY	16/05/2014	BRIGADIER GENERAL	ISB
42.	COL.	CHOL AGOTH DENG	16/05/2014	BRIGADIER GENERAL	ISB
43.	COL.	PETER PAKAK PAKAK	16/07/2017	BRIGADIER GENERAL	ISB
44.	LT.COL.	ABE KHAMIS KAMBAMBA	01/01/2008	BRIGADIER GENERAL	GIB
45.	LT.COL.	ARIA LORO LOTHENUM	01/01/2008	BRIGADIER GENERAL	ISB
46.	LT.COL.	SOLOMON DENG KURENG	01/01/2008	BRIGADIER GENERAL	GIB
47.	LT.COL.	JALPAN OBYEC NYAWELO	01/12/2009	BRIGADIER GENERAL	ISB
48.	LT.COL.	MANYANG MANHOM AWAN	16/05/2014	BRIGADIER GENERAL	ISB
49.	LT.COL.	WILLIAM OYET OMORO	16/05/2014	BRIGADIER GENERAL	ISB
50.	LT.COL.	STEPHEN KUETH GAC	16/05/2014	BRIGADIER GENERAL	ISB
51.	LT.COL.	DENG KUAC DENG	16/05/2014	BRIGADIER GENERAL	ISB
52.	LT.COL.	AYUEL KUR LUAL	16/05/2014	BRIGADIER GENERAL	ISB
53.	LT.COL.	MALANG KERUBINO KUANYIN	16/05/2014	BRIGADIER GENERAL	GIB
54.	LT.COL.	MALUAL DHAL MUORWEL	01/01/2007	BRIGADIER GENERAL	ISB
55.	LT.COL.	WOL TONG AKOL	01/01/2008	BRIGADIER GENERAL	ISB

B. LIEUTENANT COLONELS

S/NO	RANK	NAME IN FULL	LAST DATE OF PROMOTION	DUE FOR PROMOTION TO	REMARKS
1.	LT.COL.	KUOL MUOR MUOR KUOL	01/01/2008	COLONEL	ISB
2.	LT.COL.	WILLIAM AJANG CHAN	01/01/2008	COLONEL	GIB
3.	LT.COL.	MAYEN TAP MAYEN	01/01/2008	COLONEL	ISB
4.	LT.COL.	NATALI OMET TIPO	01/01/2008	COLONEL	GIB
5.	LT.COL.	KONG BIEL THANYPINY	01/01/2008	COLONEL	ISB
6.	LT.COL.	DUT AGANY DUT	01/01/2008	COLONEL	GIB
7.	LT.COL.	ARKANGELO OSWAHA LWANI	01/01/2008	COLONEL	GIB
8.	LT.COL.	ASSUOD PAULO AWEDIT	01/01/2008	COLONEL	ISB
9.	LT.COL.	DHIEU PAUL CHABIET	16/05/2014	COLONEL	GIB
10.	LT.COL.	PETER LUL NYAK	16/05/2014	COLONEL	ISB
11.	LT.COL.	PETER GABRIEL JUR	16/05/2014	COLONEL	ISB
12.	LT.COL.	FRED LAKO RAIMOND	16/05/2014	COLONEL	GIB
13.	LT.COL.	MUORWEL ANDREW ANYUONIC	16/05/2014	COLONEL	ISB
14.	LT.COL.	JOHN OKECH OKELLO	16/05/2014	COLONEL	GIB
15.	LT.COL.	LODULE LUWALA ALHAJ	16/05/2014	COLONEL	GIB
16.	LT.COL.	SIMON SEBIT MICHAEL	16/05/2014	COLONEL	ISB
17.	LT.COL.	KUOT BAK DENG BAK	16/05/2014	COLONEL	ISB
18.	LT.COL.	AKOL THEM AROP	16/05/2014	COLONEL	ISB
19.	LT.COL.	MARIAL MOSES MAJOK	16/05/2014	COLONEL	ISB
20.	LT.COL.	KUEK CHANUONG KUEK	16/05/2014	COLONEL	ISB

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21.	LT.COL.	SIMON CHUOL JOP	16/05/2014	COLONEL	GIB
22.	LT.COL.	GUEM DAVID MANYOK	16/05/2014	COLONEL	GIB
23.	LT.COL.	PETER RUEI PUOT	16/05/2014	COLONEL	ISB
24.	LT.COL.	JAMES DENG MALIM	16/05/2014	COLONEL	ISB
25.	LT.COL.	SIMON ABUJA ATEM	16/05/2014	COLONEL	ISB
26.	LT.COL.	JOSEPH ANYAK LUAL	01/12/2015	COLONEL	GIB
27.	MAJOR	MANYTOJ KUEL ADOR	01/07/2009	COLONEL	GIB
28.	MAJOR	OBOYA OMAN ABOLLA	01/07/2009	COLONEL	ISB
29.	MAJOR	AROP OTOWNG AWIJAK	01/07/2009	COLONEL	ISB
30.	MAJOR	MACHIEK MADING MABENY	01/11/2009	COLONEL	ISB
31.	MAJOR	LUAL ALINY LUAL	01/07/2010	COLONEL	ISB
32.	MAJOR	GEORGE RUBEN FEDERICO	01/07/2010	COLONEL	GIB
33.	MAJOR	MALUIL AKOL KUOT	02/07/2011	COLONEL	GIB
34.	MAJOR	CIRILO ROBA BRINJI	02/07/2011	COLONEL	GIB
35.	MAJOR	STEPHEN TABAN MALESH	02/07/2011	COLONEL	ISB
36.	MAJOR	GIFT ELIABA HALAWA	02/07/2011	COLONEL	ISB
37.	MAJOR	MAGOK GONG MAGOK	02/07/2011	COLONEL	GIB
38.	MAJOR	TARTISIO BADI NOAH	02/07/2011	COLONEL	GIB
39.	MAJOR	DUT ABRAHAM GUM	02/07/2011	COLONEL	ISB
40.	MAJOR	PETER LADU PITIA	02/07/2011	COLONEL	ISB
41.	MAJOR	MADUT YOM MADUT	02/07/2011	COLONEL	ISB
42.	MAJOR	MARIER AROK DHAL	06/05/2014	COLONEL	ISB
43.	MAJOR	CHAW KUOL MANYANG	06/05/2014	COLONEL	GIB
44.	MAJOR	CHOL AMOS AGOK	06/05/2014	COLONEL	ISB
45.	MAJOR	HENRY AKOCH ISAIAH	06/05/2014	COLONEL	ISB
46.	MAJOR	WILLIAM GAI WICHYEAH	06/05/2014	COLONEL	ISB
47.	MAJOR	OFENI NGOTA AMITAI	06/05/2014	COLONEL	ISB
48.	MAJOR	GABRIEL LUBANG MODI	06/05/2014	COLONEL	ISB
49.	MAJOR	JAMES LADO MODI	06/05/2014	COLONEL	ISB
50.	MAJOR	ALOR AGUEK AROP	06/05/2014	COLONEL	ISB
51.	MAJOR	AKOT AGUER MOU	06/05/2014	COLONEL	ISB
52.	MAJOR	ZACHARIA RIEK KEAH	06/05/2014	COLONEL	ISB
53.	MAJOR	ATAK DENG AKOL	06/05/2014	COLONEL	ISB
54.	MAJOR	GAI ATEM KUOL	06/05/2014	COLONEL	ISB
55.	MAJOR	JOHN LUIS SIJIN	06/05/2014	COLONEL	ISB
56.	MAJOR	GABRIEL WIETHIANG PAULINO	06/05/2014	COLONEL	ISB
57.	MAJOR	EMMANUEL DAVID DUAL	06/05/2014	COLONEL	ISB
58.	MAJOR	JUAC BIAR CHOL DENG	06/05/2014	COLONEL	ISB
59.	MAJOR	PASQUALE KARLO AWIN	06/05/2014	COLONEL	ISB
60.	MAJOR	PHILLIP PIOL AYUEL	06/05/2014	COLONEL	ISB
61.	MAJOR	MAJOK MAKOM MAJOK	21/07/2015	COLONEL	ISB
62.	CAPT.	VINCENT MARK WANGA	05/11/2012	COLONEL	ISB

SKM

C. MAJORS

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Name of Officer in Charge

Date

S/NO	RANK	NAME IN FULL	LAST DATE OF PROMOTION	DUE FOR PROMOTION TO	REMARKS
1.	MAJ.	AYUAL NYOC AYUAL	01/01/2004	LT. COLONEL	ISB
2.	MAJ.	MANYIEL MALOU BEK MALANG	01/07/2009	LT. COLONEL	ISB
3.	MAJ.	ANTHONY EDWARD PETER	01/07/2010	LT. COLONEL	ISB
4.	MAJ.	ALI TABAN LO'KAKU	02/07/2011	LT. COLONEL	ISB
5.	MAJ.	ABUOCH AYUEL ABUOCH	06/05/2014	LT. COLONEL	GIB
6.	MAJ.	MAKUR MAGAK AMANG	06/05/2014	LT. COLONEL	ISB
7.	MAJ.	ABUK KON ANOK	06/05/2014	LT. COLONEL	GIB
8.	MAJ.	JAMES THEM DUOT	06/05/2014	LT. COLONEL	GIB
9.	MAJ.	SIMON BUONY GATNOR	06/05/2014	LT. COLONEL	GIB
10.	MAJ.	DIING AKOT KUOL	06/05/2014	LT. COLONEL	GIB
11.	MAJ.	KAVA WINSTON MICHAEL	06/05/2014	LT. COLONEL	GIB
12.	MAJ.	AKUR CHOL MALUAL DENG	06/05/2014	LT. COLONEL	ISB
13.	MAJ.	JOSEPH AYOK NHIAL	06/05/2014	LT. COLONEL	ISB
14.	MAJ.	CHARLES ANDREW CHURKALI	06/05/2014	LT. COLONEL	GIB
15.	MAJ.	CHOL RING AJAK	06/05/2014	LT. COLONEL	ISB
16.	MAJ.	AYUEL MALUAL AYUEL	06/05/2014	LT. COLONEL	GIB
17.	MAJ.	BENJAMIN BOL MADUT	06/05/2014	LT. COLONEL	GIB
18.	MAJ.	MAYAR BARJOK MAKUEI	06/05/2014	LT. COLONEL	ISB
19.	MAJ.	JAMES ALOR MAJOK DENG	06/05/2014	LT. COLONEL	ISB
20.	MAJ.	GEORGE GUM THUC MUORWEL	01/01/2007	LT. COLONEL	GIB
21.	MAJ.	OLWAK CHOL AYOK	06/05/2014	LT. COLONEL	GIB
22.	MAJ.	JOHNSON RUACH BIEL	06/05/2014	LT. COLONEL	GIB
23.	MAJ.	AGUTI ADUT AGUTI	06/05/2014	LT. COLONEL	ISB
24.	MAJ.	WANJANG TUT CHAR	06/05/2014	LT. COLONEL	ISB
25.	MAJ.	VICTOR DENG AKEEN	01/01/2008	LT. COLONEL	GIB
26.	MAJ.	BANG WIEU KOOR	21/07/2015	LT. COLONEL	ISB
27.	MAJ.	OHISA MOSES BEDA	21/07/2015	LT. COLONEL	ISB
28.	MAJ.	ANTHONY SANDE JUMA ALI	15/01/2016	LT. COLONEL	ISB
29.	MAJ.	JUSTIN KULANG HENRY	15/01/2016	LT. COLONEL	ISB
30.	CAPT.	ANEI RING CHEIR	02/07/2007	LT. COLONEL	GIB
31.	CAPT.	HENRY MARCELLO MOSES	01/12/2008	LT. COLONEL	ISB
32.	CAPT.	GARANG KUOT KUOT	01/07/2009	LT. COLONEL	ISB
33.	CAPT.	NGOR YUSIF NGOR	01/07/2009	LT. COLONEL	GIB
34.	CAPT.	ACWIL ODHONG AYUL	01/07/2009	LT. COLONEL	GIB
35.	CAPT.	GENG GENG REEC	01/07/2009	LT. COLONEL	ISB
36.	CAPT.	SEBIT JUMA MORGAN	01/07/2009	LT. COLONEL	GIB
37.	CAPT.	KIIR MONYTOCH MONYCHOL	01/07/2009	LT. COLONEL	GIB
38.	CAPT.	AJUONG DENG JEPUR	01/07/2009	LT. COLONEL	ISB
39.	CAPT.	GILO OPIO GILO	01/07/2009	LT. COLONEL	GIB
40.	CAPT.	GARANG MANYUOL AKOT	01/07/2009	LT. COLONEL	GIB
41.	CAPT.	SILVANO SEBIT DUKU	01/07/2011	LT. COLONEL	ISB

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42.	CAPT.	CHIENGJUK DANIEL TIPO	01/07/2010	LT. COLONEL	ISB
43.	CAPT.	ANN ACHAN MARK	01/07/2010	LT. COLONEL	GIB
44.	CAPT.	ABRAHAM AYUEL ALEER	05/11/2012	LT. COLONEL	GIB
45.	CAPT.	DAMBOK RING KUOL	05/11/2012	LT. COLONEL	ISB
46.	CAPT.	AJAK MAJOK AJAK	05/11/2012	LT. COLONEL	GIB
47.	CAPT.	JIBENI YOUNES AMUM	05/11/2012	LT. COLONEL	GIB
48.	CAPT.	WOL DHIEU AKUCJANG	05/11/2012	LT. COLONEL	GIB
49.	CAPT.	VETO SAMUEL OYATH	01/03/2013	LT. COLONEL	GIB
50.	CAPT.	DENG SANTINO DENG	16/05/2014	LT. COLONEL	ISB
51.	CAPT.	WILLIAM DENG PAL	16/05/2014	LT. COLONEL	ISB
52.	CAPT.	ADAM ADUPO LORIKO	16/05/2014	LT. COLONEL	GIB
53.	CAPT.	BOL CHOL WIEU	16/05/2014	LT. COLONEL	GIB
54.	CAPT.	GEORGE LUATE ALFRED	16/05/2014	LT. COLONEL	ISB
55.	CAPT.	VICTORIA KETTY STEPHEN	16/05/2014	LT. COLONEL	GIB
56.	CAPT.	JOHN SEBIT MAKUAC	16/05/2014	LT. COLONEL	ISB
57.	CAPT.	ANTHONY TIKO ALLAN	16/05/2014	LT. COLONEL	ISB
58.	CAPT.	MICHAEL MAPER MAJAK	16/05/2014	LT. COLONEL	GIB
59.	CAPT.	ANDREW AYODI CHOL	16/05/2014	LT. COLONEL	ISB
60.	CAPT.	CHARLES WANI PAUL	16/05/2014	LT. COLONEL	ISB
61.	CAPT.	RIAK AGANY AGUTO	16/05/2014	LT. COLONEL	GIB
62.	CAPT.	GIETH KON MATHIANG	16/05/2014	LT. COLONEL	ISB
63.	CAPT.	TONG GOP TONG	16/05/2014	LT. COLONEL	ISB
64.	CAPT.	TAKPINY PETER GATKUOTH	16/05/2014	LT. COLONEL	ISB
65.	CAPT.	JACKSON GARANG AJOU	16/05/2014	LT. COLONEL	ISB
66.	CAPT.	MANOAH STEPHEN BABANEN	16/05/2014	LT. COLONEL	GIB
67.	CAPT.	KUOL MAJOK MABIOR	16/05/2014	LT. COLONEL	ISB
68.	CAPT.	JOSEPH KON UKECH	16/05/2014	LT. COLONEL	ISB
69.	CAPT.	NUER STEPHEN RET	16/05/2014	LT. COLONEL	GIB
70.	CAPT.	DUOP ULUAK KEAT	16/05/2014	LT. COLONEL	ISB
71.	CAPT.	JOSEPH LAGU MARTIN	16/05/2014	LT. COLONEL	ISB
72.	CAPT.	KIIR MAJAK DENG	16/05/2014	LT. COLONEL	ISB
73.	CAPT.	GABRIEL THALOKA TOP	16/05/2014	LT. COLONEL	ISB
74.	CAPT.	SANTINO DUT ULIR	16/05/2014	LT. COLONEL	ISB
75.	CAPT.	DOMINIC WOL DENG	16/05/2014	LT. COLONEL	ISB
76.	CAPT.	MAKOI GAK TOKMAC	16/05/2014	LT. COLONEL	ISB
77.	CAPT.	GUEK WANG KORYOM	16/05/2014	LT. COLONEL	ISB
78.	CAPT.	ALUEL ATEM RING	16/05/2014	LT. COLONEL	ISB
79.	CAPT.	AKOI TEENG AKOI	16/05/2014	LT. COLONEL	GIB
80.	CAPT.	GATOT SAMUEL GAI CHUOL	16/05/2014	LT. COLONEL	ISB
81.	CAPT.	AKOL MAKER GALUAK	16/05/2014	LT. COLONEL	ISB
82.	CAPT.	WILSON BOL LAT	16/05/2014	LT. COLONEL	GIB
83.	CAPT.	KUOL KUOL BULO	16/05/2014	LT. COLONEL	ISB
84.	CAPT.	KUOT GARANG KUOT	16/05/2014	LT. COLONEL	ISB
85.	CAPT.	GABRIEL WOL WOL JONG	16/05/2014	LT. COLONEL	ISB
86.	CAPT.	LUKA LOK MATHIANG	01/01/2010	LT. COLONEL	ISB
87.	CAPT.	EMMANUEL SEBIT MAJAKA	15/01/2016	LT. COLONEL	ISB

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88.	1 ST LT.	DENG TONG KENJOK	16/05/2014	LT. COLONEL	ISB
89.	1 ST LT.	LODAE SIMON PETER	05/11/2012	LT. COLONEL	ISB

D. CAPTAINS

S/NO	RANK	NAME IN FULL	LAST DATE OF PROMOTION	DUE FOR PROMOTION TO	REMARKS
1.	CAPT.	ALAAK DENG ALAAK	01/07/2008	MAJOR	ISB
2.	CAPT.	NIMERI OMAR AMUOT	01/07/2009	MAJOR	ISB
3.	CAPT.	DAVID THIEP AKOON	01/07/2009	MAJOR	ISB
4.	CAPT.	CHARLES DENG MAWUT	01/07/2009	MAJOR	GIB
5.	CAPT.	JOHN LAGU MARCELLO	01/07/2010	MAJOR	ISB
6.	CAPT.	KEAK JOK MUON	01/07/2010	MAJOR	ISB
	CAPT.	MICHAEL MAJOK KUCH	05/11/2012	MAJOR	ISB
7.	CAPT.	NATALE TONG TONG DHEL	05/11/2012	MAJOR	ISB
8.	CAPT.	MUSA JAL PAUL KOORYOM	05/11/2012	MAJOR	ISB
9.	CAPT.	SANTINO KUOT MALUIL	05/11/2012	MAJOR	ISB
10.	CAPT.	AKRAM GABRIEL NYOK	05/11/2012	MAJOR	ISB
11.	CAPT.	AJING AJING DUT	05/11/2012	MAJOR	ISB
12.	CAPT.	SATURLINO MODI FRANCIS	05/11/2012	MAJOR	GIB
13.	CAPT.	PAUL AYII LAWRENCE ALEU	05/11/2012	MAJOR	ISB
14.	CAPT.	CHOL AKIC AJAK	05/11/2012	MAJOR	ISB
15.	CAPT.	EMMANUEL MONYCHOL AKOP	05/11/2012	MAJOR	ISB
16.	CAPT.	GARANG ARIATH BAAK	16/05/2014	MAJOR	ISB
17.	CAPT.	KOTH CHOL KOOR	16/05/2014	MAJOR	GIB
18.	CAPT.	PETER LUAL AJOK	16/05/2014	MAJOR	GIB
19.	CAPT.	AKIYOY MOU PAJOK	16/05/2014	MAJOR	ISB
20.	CAPT.	IRENE NOVELLO NYILLOCK	16/05/2014	MAJOR	ISB
21.	CAPT.	BOL CHOL WIEU	16/05/2014	MAJOR	GIB
22.	CAPT.	BILAL KHEIR MANOFEE	16/05/2014	MAJOR	ISB
23.	CAPT.	ALEER LEEK DENG	16/05/2014	MAJOR	ISB
24.	CAPT.	ATEM DE MAIWAK ABUOI	16/05/2014	MAJOR	ISB
25.	CAPT.	MAYOR ABDUN NGONG	16/05/2014	MAJOR	ISB
26.	CAPT.	ANGELO ANYAK DENG	16/05/2014	MAJOR	ISB
27.	CAPT.	ISAAC ATER JOHNSON	16/05/2014	MAJOR	ISB
28.	CAPT.	ANTHONY BATISTA MONIAOR	16/05/2014	MAJOR	ISB
29.	CAPT.	BAK BARNABA CHOL	16/05/2014	MAJOR	GIB
30.	CAPT.	ATEM AWAN GAK	16/05/2014	MAJOR	ISB
31.	CAPT.	ABRAHAM AJAK GARANG	16/05/2014	MAJOR	ISB
32.	CAPT.	CHOL ARKANGELO NYUOL	16/05/2014	MAJOR	ISB
33.	CAPT.	MARTIN YAI ALEU	16/05/2014	MAJOR	GIB
34.	CAPT.	GARANG BOL AREECH	16/05/2014	MAJOR	GIB
35.	CAPT.	JOHN SAMUEL BROWN	16/05/2014	MAJOR	GIB
36.	CAPT.	JANE ALAWIYA LOUIS	16/05/2014	MAJOR	ISB
37.	CAPT.	WOL DENG MADING	16/05/2014	MAJOR	ISB

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38.	CAPT.	BOL WEK AGOTH	16/05/2014	MAJOR	ISB
39.	CAPT.	NHIAL AJITH NHIAL	16/05/2014	MAJOR	ISB
40.	CAPT.	EMMANUEL JOHN BOI	16/05/2014	MAJOR	ISB
41.	CAPT.	AJALWANG MATHEW GOWING	16/05/2014	MAJOR	ISB
42.	CAPT.	THIHK THIHK MAYARDIT	16/05/2014	MAJOR	ISB
43.	CAPT.	MARTIN MANUT MALITH	16/05/2014	MAJOR	ISB
44.	CAPT.	DAVID MAJUR MAKENY	16/05/2014	MAJOR	ISB
45.	CAPT.	SAMUEL MAKUR MAJOK	16/05/2014	MAJOR	ISB
46.	CAPT.	SABRINO GARANG BARJOK	16/05/2014	MAJOR	ISB
47.	CAPT.	MANUT ACUIL LUAL	16/05/2014	MAJOR	ISB
48.	CAPT.	JOK DENG BOL MALEK	16/05/2014	MAJOR	ISB
49.	CAPT.	JOSEPH ABIEM KUOL	16/05/2014	MAJOR	ISB
50.	CAPT.	MARTIN AKUEIN DENG ANGOK	16/05/2014	MAJOR	ISB
51.	CAPT.	SAMUEL LUETH MOU	16/05/2014	MAJOR	ISB
52.	CAPT.	MADUT AYAI DENG	16/05/2014	MAJOR	ISB
53.	CAPT.	ITWARA SONIA OBUTO MAMUR	16/05/2014	MAJOR	GIB
54.	CAPT.	MARIAL PETER MAJOK	15/01/2016	MAJOR	ISB
55.	CAPT.	JAMES VITO MUNGASH	15/01/2016	MAJOR	ISB
56.	CAPT.	AJIECH MONYICIRIN AJIECH	15/01/2016	MAJOR	ISB
57.	1 ST LT.	ARANI PHILLIP TABALANG	01/01/2010	MAJOR	ISB
58.	1 ST LT.	DAVID MAYEN GATKUOTH	01/01/2010	MAJOR	GIB
59.	1 ST LT.	LAM JOHN BEDIET	01/07/2011	MAJOR	GIB
60.	1 ST LT.	CHOL JOHN OLAMIN	01/07/2011	MAJOR	GIB
61.	1 ST LT.	ALBINO OKUOCH JOHN	01/07/2011	MAJOR	GIB
62.	1 ST LT.	AMIN HENRY JADA	01/07/2011	MAJOR	GIB
63.	1 ST LT.	ASHUNG WILLIAM AROP	01/07/2011	MAJOR	GIB
64.	1 ST LT.	JIMMY JOSEPH BENJAMIN	01/07/2011	MAJOR	ISB
65.	1 ST LT.	THIHK AKOL THIHK	01/07/2011	MAJOR	GIB
66.	1 ST LT.	AROP AKUEI NANA	01/07/2011	MAJOR	GIB
67.	1 ST LT.	SEBIT CHARLES NATANIEL	01/07/2011	MAJOR	GIB
68.	1 ST LT.	PAUL UMAN LAWRENCE WOL	01/07/2011	MAJOR	ISB
69.	1 ST LT.	ANDREA AKOT AKOL	01/07/2011	MAJOR	GIB
70.	1 ST LT.	DUT COSTA MARIAL	01/07/2011	MAJOR	GIB
71.	1 ST LT.	PETER KEK GATLUAK GENG	01/07/2011	MAJOR	ISB
72.	1 ST LT.	STEPHEN ELIA TRANQUILO	01/07/2011	MAJOR	GIB
73.	1 ST LT.	AROP DENG NYIGEW	01/07/2011	MAJOR	GIB
74.	1 ST LT.	LEXSON FRANCIS TABAN	01/07/2011	MAJOR	GIB
75.	1 ST LT.	JAMES TABAN LADO	01/07/2011	MAJOR	GIB
76.	1 ST LT.	PHILLIP DAVID DAUDY	01/07/2011	MAJOR	ISB
77.	1 ST LT.	SANTINO GABRIEL CHOL	01/07/2011	MAJOR	GIB
78.	1 ST LT.	MARKO KER MALUAL	01/07/2011	MAJOR	GIB
79.	1 ST LT.	VICTOR LADU DONATO	01/07/2011	MAJOR	GIB
80.	1 ST LT.	JIMMY PETER WANI	01/07/2011	MAJOR	ISB
81.	1 ST LT.	WOL SIMON TUT	01/07/2011	MAJOR	ISB
82.	1 ST LT.	MOSES PETER AKEC	01/07/2011	MAJOR	ISB
83.	1 ST LT.	JOHN MADING THON BOL	01/07/2011	MAJOR	ISB

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84.	1 ST LT.	CHRISTINA NYANKIIR KUOL	01/07/2011	MAJOR	GIB
85.	1 ST LT.	WILSON YAIRO MIGIDO	05/11/2012	MAJOR	ISB
86.	1 ST LT.	ATHIAN DENG AKEN	05/11/2012	MAJOR	ISB
87.	1 ST LT.	GENGE MICHAEL DOMINIC	05/11/2012	MAJOR	ISB
88.	1 ST LT.	MAW ADOL KUOL	05/11/2012	MAJOR	ISB
89.	1 ST LT.	YOANES GABRIEL FEEDIL AMUM	05/11/2012	MAJOR	GIB
90.	1 ST LT.	ZAMOI CEASAR LOUIS	05/11/2012	MAJOR	GIB
91.	1 ST LT.	BENJAMIN MATHEW MATHIANG	05/11/2012	MAJOR	GIB
92.	1 ST LT.	YIEN MONYKUANY BUOP GUELGAK	05/11/2012	MAJOR	GIB
93.	1 ST LT.	NAAMA ABSAI KOMBOSAYO	05/11/2012	MAJOR	ISB
94.	1 ST LT.	FRANCO YUSIF DOBU	05/11/2012	MAJOR	ISB
95.	1 ST LT.	WILLIAM ANIMBUE DANIEL	05/11/2012	MAJOR	GIB
96.	1 ST LT.	DENNIS AYOUB PHILLIP GAZA	05/11/2012	MAJOR	ISB
97.	1 ST LT.	ROBERT ZACHARIA MALOK	05/11/2012	MAJOR	GIB
98.	1 ST LT.	SAMUEL MAYEN DENG	05/11/2012	MAJOR	GIB
99.	1 ST LT.	DUOT AKOL AYEI KACH	05/11/2012	MAJOR	GIB
100.	1 ST LT.	TANG KUEI RUACH	05/11/2012	MAJOR	GIB
101.	1 ST LT.	MUNDIT JOCK MUNDIT	05/11/2012	MAJOR	GIB
102.	1 ST LT.	OKUCH GILO BOYA	05/11/2012	MAJOR	GIB
103.	1 ST LT.	GALIO JAMES BOI	05/11/2012	MAJOR	ISB
104.	1 ST LT.	TABAN RUDOLF GETTANO	05/11/2012	MAJOR	ISB
105.	1 ST LT.	DAVID NYANG GACH	05/11/2012	MAJOR	ISB
106.	1 ST LT.	DANIEL PETER ONORIO	05/11/2012	MAJOR	GIB
107.	1 ST LT.	MONYKUCH PETER MAYOM	05/11/2012	MAJOR	GIB
108.	1 ST LT.	DOMINIC OYOM AGAPITO	05/11/2012	MAJOR	ISB
109.	1 ST LT.	NICHOLA LOMURU KENYI	05/11/2012	MAJOR	ISB
110.	1 ST LT.	GARANG NGONG KUAC	05/11/2012	MAJOR	ISB
111.	1 ST LT.	KHAPEAL JUANG TOCH	05/11/2012	MAJOR	GIB
112.	1 ST LT.	BADHIEL CHUOL KAI	05/11/2012	MAJOR	GIB
113.	1 ST LT.	SUZI ISAAC SAMUEL	05/11/2012	MAJOR	ISB
114.	1 ST LT.	MAYAR GEORGE APAI	05/11/2012	MAJOR	GIB
115.	1 ST LT.	PETER BENJAMIN AJONGO	05/11/2012	MAJOR	ISB
116.	1 ST LT.	KHAMISA NADI KUTILE OLE	05/11/2012	MAJOR	ISB
117.	1 ST LT.	AKOT PETER NGONG	05/11/2012	MAJOR	ISB
118.	1 ST LT.	ELIZABETH APAI PAUL	05/11/2012	MAJOR	ISB
119.	1 ST LT.	CHOL DAU LUETH	05/11/2012	MAJOR	ISB
120.	1 ST LT.	AKOK GABRIEL AKOL	05/11/2012	MAJOR	ISB
121.	1 ST LT.	NIEN CHANY BOL	05/11/2012	MAJOR	GIB
122.	1 ST LT.	GABRIEL KIIR KUR	05/11/2012	MAJOR	ISB
123.	1 ST LT.	JOHN PAUL UBAR	05/11/2012	MAJOR	ISB
124.	1 ST LT.	LAM ISAAC JUER	05/11/2012	MAJOR	GIB
125.	1 ST LT.	CHANGKUOTH KOAT RUOT	05/11/2012	MAJOR	GIB
126.	1 ST LT.	ISAAC MARTIN NYANG	24/07/2012	MAJOR	GIB
127.	1 ST LT.	CHRISTOPHER RUAI PETER	01/03/2013	MAJOR	GIB

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128.	1 ST LT.	METE OBUTO MAMUR	07/10/2013	MAJOR	ISB
129.	1 ST LT.	ALBINO BUOCH DIING	16/05/2014	MAJOR	ISB
130.	1 ST LT.	BOL KUN GATDET	16/05/2014	MAJOR	ISB
131.	1 ST LT.	LUAL GATWECH LUAL	16/05/2014	MAJOR	GIB
132.	1 ST LT.	JUAC AMOS AGOK	16/05/2014	MAJOR	GIB
133.	1 ST LT.	MALITH DENG AYUEL	16/05/2014	MAJOR	ISB
134.	1 ST LT.	JOSEPH AGUEK MILO	16/05/2014	MAJOR	ISB
135.	1 ST LT.	JOHN WIYUAL WAL	16/05/2014	MAJOR	GIB
136.	1 ST LT.	MARY THINYIN RUEA	16/05/2014	MAJOR	ISB
137.	1 ST LT.	WILLIAM MAYOR MAKER	16/05/2014	MAJOR	ISB
138.	1 ST LT.	ADING DENG ADING	16/05/2014	MAJOR	GIB
139.	1 ST LT.	JAMES GATLUAK DAK	16/05/2014	MAJOR	ISB
140.	1 ST LT.	LOKULI LADO LOLIK	16/05/2014	MAJOR	ISB
141.	1 ST LT.	JOSEPH KHAMIS MARIO	16/05/2014	MAJOR	ISB
142.	1 ST LT.	KERBINO DAK MATHEW	20/11/2014	MAJOR	ISB
143.	1 ST LT.	MATHOR RUOT BIDIO	20/11/2014	MAJOR	GIB
144.	1 ST LT.	WOL DHAL TONG	24/02/2016	MAJOR	ISB
145.	1 ST LT.	AMET ALBINO AJEK	01/07/2007	MAJOR	ISB
146.	1 ST LT.	LUAL AKEEN AKEC	01/07/2007	MAJOR	GIB

E. FIRST LIEUTENANTS (1ST LT.)

S/NO	RANK	NAME IN FULL	LAST DATE OF PROMOTION	DUE FOR PROMOTION TO	REMARKS
1.	1 ST LT.	WANI JOHN LADO	01/01/2002	CAPTAIN	ISB
2.	1 ST LT.	BIONG MAWIEN MARIAL	01/01/2007	CAPTAIN	ISB
3.	1 ST LT.	GARKEK RIAK GARKEK	01/01/2010	CAPTAIN	ISB
4.	1 ST LT.	JAGO NGOR AWIJOK	01/01/2010	CAPTAIN	GIB
5.	1 ST LT.	SATURLINO SILVESTRO LOMOLO	01/01/2010	CAPTAIN	ISB
6.	1 ST LT.	MARTIN MOSES LADU	01/07/2011	CAPTAIN	ISB
7.	1 ST LT.	THOMAS PETER AGUEM	01/07/2011	CAPTAIN	ISB
8.	1 ST LT.	LAM KUANY CHIENGJIEK	01/07/2011	CAPTAIN	ISB
9.	1 ST LT.	LADU PAULO MODI MATIYA	01/07/2011	CAPTAIN	ISB
10.	1 ST LT.	WILLIAM JOSEPH DENG DENG	01/07/2011	CAPTAIN	ISB
11.	1 ST LT.	ATHIAN ATHIAN BAAK MADUT	01/07/2011	CAPTAIN	ISB
12.	1 ST LT.	JAMES PAGAN MAJOK AYEK	01/07/2011	CAPTAIN	ISB
13.	1 ST LT.	MARIO AKILO EDWARD	01/07/2011	CAPTAIN	ISB
14.	1 ST LT.	CHAN AMOS AGOK	01/07/2011	CAPTAIN	ISB
15.	1 ST LT.	MAJOK MAKUR AKEC	01/07/2011	CAPTAIN	ISB
16.	1 ST LT.	MALITH MAJOK PARAMINA	01/07/2011	CAPTAIN	ISB
17.	1 ST LT.	MALUAL JOHN KONG	01/07/2011	CAPTAIN	ISB
18.	1 ST LT.	JOSEPH JAMES OKUOTH	01/07/2011	CAPTAIN	ISB
19.	1 ST LT.	LOMORO COSMOS MORRIS	01/07/2011	CAPTAIN	ISB
20.	1 ST LT.	EMMANUEL PETER SUKOLE	01/07/2011	CAPTAIN	ISB
21.	1 ST LT.	LADU SIMON LAKI SUSU	01/07/2011	CAPTAIN	GIB

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22.	1 ST LT.	GEORGE MAKUAC BOL	01/07/2011	CAPTAIN	ISB
23.	1 ST LT.	KUOL AJAK DENG AJAK	01/07/2011	CAPTAIN	ISB
24.	1 ST LT.	GODWIL CHARLES BROWN	01/07/2011	CAPTAIN	ISB
25.	1 ST LT.	JOSEPH MAYIUK MAJOK DENG	01/07/2011	CAPTAIN	ISB
26.	1 ST LT.	SAMUEL LAM ZACHIO ZAYAK	01/07/2011	CAPTAIN	ISB
27.	1 ST LT.	BIAR MAJOK MAYEN	01/07/2011	CAPTAIN	ISB
28.	1 ST LT.	JIMMY PETER TABAN	01/07/2011	CAPTAIN	ISB
29.	1 ST LT.	WOL AGOK WOL ATEM	01/07/2011	CAPTAIN	ISB
30.	1 ST LT.	GEORGE GABRIEL JONGO	01/07/2011	CAPTAIN	ISB
31.	1 ST LT.	WOL ABDOUN AKEC MAJOK	01/07/2011	CAPTAIN	ISB
32.	1 ST LT.	DAVID ALHAJ TABAN LOTIO	01/07/2011	CAPTAIN	ISB
33.	1 ST LT.	SANTINO CHOL ATER BIOR	01/07/2011	CAPTAIN	ISB
34.	1 ST LT.	DENG MAWIEN UTOR GOUT	01/07/2011	CAPTAIN	ISB
35.	1 ST LT.	JAMES GARANG MAYEN	01/07/2011	CAPTAIN	ISB
36.	1 ST LT.	GUM ACHUAL KUOL DENG	01/07/2011	CAPTAIN	ISB
37.	1 ST LT.	MARKO ADAM MALEK PIOK	01/07/2011	CAPTAIN	ISB
38.	1 ST LT.	STEPHEN WANI CORNELIO	01/07/2011	CAPTAIN	ISB
39.	1 ST LT.	EMMANUEL COSSI WANI	01/07/2011	CAPTAIN	GIB
40.	1 ST LT.	JOHN LUKAK RUEBEN GORE	01/07/2011	CAPTAIN	ISB
41.	1 ST LT.	STEPHEN JADA ALFRED	01/07/2011	CAPTAIN	ISB
42.	1 ST LT.	MATHEW LOFUL SILVESTO	01/07/2011	CAPTAIN	ISB
43.	1 ST LT.	DAVID LADU JOHN TONGUN	01/07/2011	CAPTAIN	ISB
44.	1 ST LT.	YOHANNA TOMBE MATADIO	01/07/2011	CAPTAIN	ISB
45.	1 ST LT.	GERMANIA PETER YOANIS	01/07/2011	CAPTAIN	ISB
46.	1 ST LT.	MABIOR ATEM MABIOR	05/11/2012	CAPTAIN	GIB
47.	1 ST LT.	BENJAMIN MUORWEL MANIN	05/11/2012	CAPTAIN	ISB
48.	1 ST LT.	MARTIN MANASE MIKAYA	05/11/2012	CAPTAIN	ISB
49.	1 ST LT.	QUIRKO LEKOI COSMOS	05/11/2012	CAPTAIN	ISB
50.	1 ST LT.	MOGGA KENYI DAVID	05/11/2012	CAPTAIN	ISB
51.	1 ST LT.	DENG MAWUT SIMON	05/11/2012	CAPTAIN	ISB
52.	1 ST LT.	AMAL MADOL ATHIEU	05/11/2012	CAPTAIN	GIB
53.	1 ST LT.	JUSTIN MOSES KULANG	05/11/2012	CAPTAIN	ISB
54.	1 ST LT.	LEEK ALEER DENG	05/11/2012	CAPTAIN	ISB
55.	1 ST LT.	DENG DANIEL MARUAI	05/11/2012	CAPTAIN	ISB
56.	1 ST LT.	DUSUMAN PONI CEJERINE	05/11/2012	CAPTAIN	ISB
57.	1 ST LT.	JOHN KULANG MOSES	05/11/2012	CAPTAIN	ISB
58.	1 ST LT.	SIDONIA AKUOT MARTIN	05/11/2012	CAPTAIN	GIB
59.	1 ST LT.	ANGELO GEORGE LOBEYA	05/11/2012	CAPTAIN	ISB
60.	1 ST LT.	LOANG PETER NGUTH	05/11/2012	CAPTAIN	ISB
61.	1 ST LT.	MUSA MARCELLO LAGU	05/11/2012	CAPTAIN	ISB
62.	1 ST LT.	AKOL ANEI THEM AROP	05/11/2012	CAPTAIN	ISB
63.	1 ST LT.	DOOR FRANCO MALEK	05/11/2012	CAPTAIN	GIB
64.	1 ST LT.	FRANCIS LOKUDU ONESIMOS	05/11/2012	CAPTAIN	ISB
65.	1 ST LT.	AKOT MADUOK MAJOK	05/11/2012	CAPTAIN	ISB
66.	1 ST LT.	ONGEE ALEX GILTON	05/11/2012	CAPTAIN	ISB
67.	1 ST LT.	MATUR ROKBENY ACIEK	05/11/2012	CAPTAIN	ISB

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		Name of Off. in Charge			
68.	1 ST LT.	ARKANGELO KUEC GUR	05/11/2012	CAPTAIN	ISB
69.	1 ST LT.	KUYU JOHN ALFRED	05/11/2012	CAPTAIN	ISB
70.	1 ST LT.	KEN DUT YEL	05/11/2012	CAPTAIN	ISB
71.	1 ST LT.	BEC LUETH KOL	05/11/2012	CAPTAIN	ISB
72.	1 ST LT.	BOSCO OTIM OBWOYA	05/11/2012	CAPTAIN	ISB
73.	1 ST LT.	EDDY OKWARO PRIMO	05/11/2012	CAPTAIN	ISB
74.	1 ST LT.	AWER BONA BOL	05/11/2012	CAPTAIN	ISB
75.	1 ST LT.	ANGELO BODO PETER	05/11/2012	CAPTAIN	GIB
76.	1 ST LT.	YAPO JOHN ULAK	05/11/2012	CAPTAIN	ISB
77.	1 ST LT.	JOHN TONGUN SEKONDO	05/11/2012	CAPTAIN	ISB
78.	1 ST LT.	MOTER MATHEW RING	05/11/2012	CAPTAIN	ISB
79.	1 ST LT.	ADHAR MAYOM DENG	05/11/2012	CAPTAIN	ISB
80.	1 ST LT.	DUT LUAL ROU	05/11/2012	CAPTAIN	ISB
81.	1 ST LT.	MONYLUAK MATHOK TONG	05/11/2012	CAPTAIN	ISB
82.	1 ST LT.	JAMES ALEU BOL JOK	05/11/2012	CAPTAIN	ISB
83.	1 ST LT.	CHARLES AKAYA ONURATO	05/11/2012	CAPTAIN	ISB
84.	1 ST LT.	GATKUOTH JUET JOCK	05/11/2012	CAPTAIN	ISB
85.	1 ST LT.	DENG MAKUACH KON	05/11/2012	CAPTAIN	ISB
86.	1 ST LT.	DENG PHILLIP THON	05/11/2012	CAPTAIN	ISB
87.	1 ST LT.	JAMES MAKUACH MATHIANG	05/11/2012	CAPTAIN	ISB
88.	1 ST LT.	MABIEI ATONG JOK	05/11/2012	CAPTAIN	ISB
89.	1 ST LT.	AKECH AYAK MAJAK	05/11/2012	CAPTAIN	ISB
90.	1 ST LT.	KUOL AYUEN MABIOR	05/11/2012	CAPTAIN	ISB
91.	1 ST LT.	JUSTIN IRENEO AGANY	05/11/2012	CAPTAIN	GIB
92.	1 ST LT.	PETER AGUER DUT AKOT	05/11/2012	CAPTAIN	ISB
93.	1 ST LT.	JOHN CHUOL BADENG	05/11/2012	CAPTAIN	ISB
94.	1 ST LT.	DENG WOL DIING TONG	05/11/2012	CAPTAIN	ISB
95.	1 ST LT.	SAMUEL LOBERIO LAKO	05/11/2012	CAPTAIN	ISB
96.	1 ST LT.	TITO OKELLO KARLO	05/11/2012	CAPTAIN	GIB
97.	1 ST LT.	DENG MAYIEK ANGAU AYUAL	05/11/2012	CAPTAIN	ISB
98.	1 ST LT.	NELSON LOKOSANG MANASE	05/11/2012	CAPTAIN	ISB
99.	1 ST LT.	GARANG CHOL WOL	05/11/2012	CAPTAIN	ISB
100.	1 ST LT.	AYANG PETER JURWIIR	05/11/2012	CAPTAIN	ISB
101.	1 ST LT.	FRANCIS GARANG DIING	05/11/2012	CAPTAIN	ISB
102.	1 ST LT.	ELSANOUS ADAM HUSSEIN	05/11/2012	CAPTAIN	ISB
103.	1 ST LT.	LARBANG GAI RIEK	05/11/2012	CAPTAIN	ISB
104.	1 ST LT.	AROP DUT DAU	05/11/2012	CAPTAIN	ISB
105.	1 ST LT.	PETER KONG PUOT	05/11/2012	CAPTAIN	ISB
106.	1 ST LT.	KUEL MACHOK KIIR KUEL	05/11/2012	CAPTAIN	ISB
107.	1 ST LT.	ALBERT MBIKO CLEMENT	05/11/2012	CAPTAIN	ISB
108.	1 ST LT.	CHIEK MADIT LEPIER	05/11/2012	CAPTAIN	ISB
109.	1 ST LT.	BULABEK ALOR MONYDHANG	05/11/2012	CAPTAIN	GIB
110.	1 ST LT.	PETER AYUEL DENG	05/11/2012	CAPTAIN	ISB
111.	1 ST LT.	GATKUOTH GIDEON CHUOL	05/11/2012	CAPTAIN	ISB
112.	1 ST LT.	TONG LUAL ATAK	05/11/2012	CAPTAIN	ISB
113.	1 ST LT.	PETER ELANGI CEASAR	05/11/2012	CAPTAIN	ISB

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114.	1 ST LT.	FRANCIS KASSIANO MUHURU	05/11/2012	CAPTAIN	ISB
115.	1 ST LT.	MAJOK AYII MUORWEL	05/11/2012	CAPTAIN	ISB
116.	1 ST LT.	THEMBENY DENG THEMBENY	05/11/2012	CAPTAIN	ISB
117.	1 ST LT.	AJIENG MANYIEL ANYUON	05/11/2012	CAPTAIN	ISB
118.	1 ST LT.	AJANG ABAN AJANG	05/11/2012	CAPTAIN	ISB
119.	1 ST LT.	NYAOPUN ABAN ABAN	05/11/2012	CAPTAIN	ISB
120.	1 ST LT.	NICKSON NGONG ACHUIL	05/11/2012	CAPTAIN	ISB
121.	1 ST LT.	JOHN ANYIETH NATHANIEL	05/11/2012	CAPTAIN	ISB
122.	1 ST LT.	DANIEL THON MONYJOK	05/11/2012	CAPTAIN	ISB
123.	1 ST LT.	GEORGE MAWIEN KUOL	05/11/2012	CAPTAIN	ISB
124.	1 ST LT.	JAMES DENG MATIOR DENG	05/11/2012	CAPTAIN	ISB
125.	1 ST LT.	MARGRET GABRIEL DAU ATER	05/11/2012	CAPTAIN	ISB
126.	1 ST LT.	ANGOK AGOTH ATEM	05/11/2012	CAPTAIN	ISB
127.	1 ST LT.	ALAK JACOB GAI	05/11/2012	CAPTAIN	ISB
128.	1 ST LT.	CHOL SANTINO PUORIC	05/11/2012	CAPTAIN	ISB
129.	1 ST LT.	DENG KUOT NYUOL	05/11/2012	CAPTAIN	ISB
130.	1 ST LT.	ANDREW MAYOM CHOL	05/11/2012	CAPTAIN	ISB
131.	1 ST LT.	ALEXANDER MONGU KAMIN	05/11/2012	CAPTAIN	ISB
132.	1 ST LT.	THEODAZ THONY AGIEM	05/11/2012	CAPTAIN	ISB
133.	1 ST LT.	AYII ALENG AYII	05/11/2012	CAPTAIN	ISB
134.	1 ST LT.	PHILLIP PANEK BIAR	05/11/2012	CAPTAIN	GIB
135.	1 ST LT.	DENG MALUETH BAP	05/11/2012	CAPTAIN	ISB
136.	1 ST LT.	DUT MAJOK ISAIAH	05/11/2012	CAPTAIN	ISB
137.	1 ST LT.	KIIR BULABEK MANYANG	05/11/2012	CAPTAIN	ISB
138.	1 ST LT.	NYANG MAPUOL ARUOP	05/11/2012	CAPTAIN	ISB
139.	1 ST LT.	ABRAHAM JOSEPH CHUOR	05/11/2012	CAPTAIN	ISB
140.	1 ST LT.	CHOL AUGUSTINO DENG	05/11/2012	CAPTAIN	ISB
141.	1 ST LT.	MIYOR JUSTIN DENG AGUER	05/11/2012	CAPTAIN	ISB
142.	1 ST LT.	MALONG RING MALUAL	05/11/2012	CAPTAIN	ISB
143.	1 ST LT.	HAFIS RAJAB IBRAHIM	05/11/2012	CAPTAIN	ISB
144.	1 ST LT.	AKUEI CHUOR DENG	05/11/2012	CAPTAIN	ISB
145.	1 ST LT.	DAVID BILLY EPHANETUS	05/11/2012	CAPTAIN	ISB
146.	1 ST LT.	AJAK ABRAHAM GORDON	24/07/2012	CAPTAIN	GIB
147.	1 ST LT.	CHRISTOPHER RUAI PETER	01/03/2013	CAPTAIN	GIB
148.	1 ST LT.	JIPER KHALIFA HAIDER	01/03/2013	CAPTAIN	ISB
149.	1 ST LT.	EL NUR TOM EL NUR	01/03/2013	CAPTAIN	ISB
150.	1 ST LT.	MALAL KUOL DENG	16/05/2014	CAPTAIN	ISB
151.	1 ST LT.	SIMON SWAKA ALISON	16/05/2014	CAPTAIN	ISB
152.	1 ST LT.	BAK MARTIN YAK	16/05/2014	CAPTAIN	GIB
153.	1 ST LT.	ROBERT KIIR DENG	16/05/2014	CAPTAIN	ISB
154.	1 ST LT.	RING BIAR ATEM	16/05/2014	CAPTAIN	ISB
155.	1 ST LT.	ATER JACOB MABOR	16/05/2014	CAPTAIN	ISB
156.	1 ST LT.	MAMER ALEU YAI	16/05/2014	CAPTAIN	GIB
157.	1 ST LT.	ANYANG MAYAK KOK	16/05/2014	CAPTAIN	ISB
158.	1 ST LT.	TERESA AGUEK MAPER	16/05/2014	CAPTAIN	GIB
159.	1 ST LT.	MANSON AGOTH ATAK	16/05/2014	CAPTAIN	GIB

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160.	1 ST LT.	DHIEU MANASSEH ADOR	16/05/2014...	CAPTAIN	ISB
161.	1 ST LT.	DIING ATAK DENG	16/05/2014	CAPTAIN	ISB
162.	1 ST LT.	BAK KUANYANG ATER	16/05/2014	CAPTAIN	GIB
163.	1 ST LT.	VICTORIA JACOB MABOR	16/05/2014	CAPTAIN	GIB
164.	1 ST LT.	AMUNA MANGAR MALUAL	16/05/2014	CAPTAIN	GIB
165.	1 ST LT.	SAMUEL AYUEL WARABEK	16/05/2014	CAPTAIN	ISB
166.	1 ST LT.	KERBINO WOL AGOK	16/05/2014	CAPTAIN	ISB
167.	1 ST LT.	AGUM DUT DOMKOC	16/05/2014	CAPTAIN	GIB
168.	1 ST LT.	KUOT KUOL MALITH	16/05/2014	CAPTAIN	ISB
169.	1 ST LT.	YAGOUB MAJOK DENG	16/05/2014	CAPTAIN	ISB
170.	1 ST LT.	LOUIS AGUEK MAKUAC WIEU	16/05/2014	CAPTAIN	ISB
171.	1 ST LT.	SIMON MADING MARIEU	16/05/2014	CAPTAIN	ISB
172.	1 ST LT.	EMMANUEL WASUN CLEMENT	16/05/2014	CAPTAIN	ISB
173.	1 ST LT.	MATHON MARIEU AJAK	16/05/2014	CAPTAIN	ISB
174.	1 ST LT.	THOMAS TARTISIO UKU	16/05/2014	CAPTAIN	ISB
175.	1 ST LT.	KUOL DENG KUOL	16/05/2014	CAPTAIN	ISB
176.	1 ST LT.	ISAAC MAWA LUKA	16/05/2014	CAPTAIN	ISB
177.	1 ST LT.	WALTER GABRIEL NYOK	16/05/2014	CAPTAIN	ISB
178.	1 ST LT.	AJAK AKOT AJAK	16/05/2014	CAPTAIN	ISB
179.	1 ST LT.	FRANCIS OKERUK SOLOMON	16/05/2014	CAPTAIN	ISB
180.	1 ST LT.	PHILLIP KHAMIS PAULINO	16/05/2014	CAPTAIN	ISB
181.	1 ST LT.	STELLA JAMES YATTA	16/05/2014	CAPTAIN	ISB
182.	1 ST LT.	PETER MAKUEI WOL	16/05/2014	CAPTAIN	ISB
183.	1 ST LT.	WILSON ALISON TABAN	16/05/2014	CAPTAIN	ISB
184.	1 ST LT.	JACKSON DENG GOCH	16/05/2014	CAPTAIN	ISB
185.	1 ST LT.	AKOT MATHIANG ARUOP	16/05/2014	CAPTAIN	ISB
186.	1 ST LT.	SIMON LAKU KULANG	16/05/2014	CAPTAIN	ISB
187.	1 ST LT.	LOUIS LUAL TEK	16/05/2014	CAPTAIN	ISB
188.	1 ST LT.	LINO CHIRONG MAKUAU	16/05/2014	CAPTAIN	ISB
189.	1 ST LT.	SIMON MANUT GARANG	16/05/2014	CAPTAIN	ISB
190.	1 ST LT.	PHILLIP KIIR AKOK	28/05/2014	CAPTAIN	ISB
191.	1 ST LT.	NAWAL RATIB ABDUL KARIM	28/05/2014	CAPTAIN	GIB
192.	1 ST LT.	LUKA LUAL AKOK	28/05/2014	CAPTAIN	ISB
193.	1 ST LT.	AKOT CHOL MARIO	28/05/2014	CAPTAIN	ISB
194.	1 ST LT.	JAMES JILANG PUR	20/11/2014	CAPTAIN	ISB
195.	1 ST LT.	SAMHAN DANIEL BANGOUT	20/11/2014	CAPTAIN	ISB
196.	1 ST LT.	YAK GARANG YAK	01/12/2015	CAPTAIN	ISB
197.	1 ST LT.	JAMES MAZEE NGOREN	01/12/2015	CAPTAIN	ISB
198.	1 ST LT.	MAKER MAJUP KAMIC	01/12/2015	CAPTAIN	ISB
199.	1 ST LT.	CHOL RIAK DENG	01/12/2015	CAPTAIN	ISB
200.	1 ST LT.	ACHUIL MAJOK DENG	15/01/2016	CAPTAIN	ISB
201.	1 ST LT.	ABRAHAM BECH JUMA	15/01/2016	CAPTAIN	ISB
202.	1 ST LT.	MOSES MALOU ALI MALOU	15/01/2016	CAPTAIN	ISB
203.	1 ST LT.	JOSEPH LEEK APOI	15/01/2016	CAPTAIN	ISB
204.	1 ST LT.	AGIDEK PETER AJAK	01/02/2016	CAPTAIN	ISB
205.	2 ND LT.	MARY NAJUA SAMUEL	01/07/2007	CAPTAIN	ISB

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206.	2 ND LT.	LUAL ABRAHAM AJAK	21/07/2012	CAPTAIN	GIB
207.	2 ND LT.	ISABELLA RUDOLF KUOT	05/11/2012	CAPTAIN	GIB
208.	2 ND LT.	MARTHA GABRIEL CHIGACH	05/11/2012	CAPTAIN	GIB
209.	2 ND LT.	WILLIAM KEAH CHUONG	05/11/2012	CAPTAIN	GIB
210.	2 ND LT.	AREET REBECCA RUEBEN	05/11/2012	CAPTAIN	ISB
211.	2 ND LT.	CLEMENT WACHI MARIO	05/11/2012	CAPTAIN	ISB
212.	2 ND LT.	PAUL KAT KOK	05/11/2012	CAPTAIN	ISB
213.	2 ND LT.	TITO UBUR AJULA	05/11/2012	CAPTAIN	GIB
214.	2 ND LT.	LIEP JOSEPH NHIAL HOTH	05/11/2012	CAPTAIN	GIB
215.	2 ND LT.	MARKO AWAN MONYBUNY	05/11/2012	CAPTAIN	ISB
216.	2 ND LT.	MABIL PETER KOT	05/11/2012	CAPTAIN	ISB
217.	2 ND LT.	MUT KUOL RIEK	05/11/2012	CAPTAIN	GIB
218.	2 ND LT.	GARANG THIIK MAYAR	05/11/2012	CAPTAIN	ISB
219.	2 ND LT.	PIOL GIET YAI	05/11/2012	CAPTAIN	ISB
220.	2 ND LT.	BULIS JAMES MAHDI	05/11/2012	CAPTAIN	ISB
221.	2 ND LT.	ABOUD LUKA KIIR	05/11/2012	CAPTAIN	ISB
222.	2 ND LT.	GLEN AMARU OWIRO	05/11/2012	CAPTAIN	ISB
223.	2 ND LT.	DANIEL AKOL CHOL	05/11/2012	CAPTAIN	ISB
224.	2 ND LT.	PHILLIP DIU GATDET	05/11/2012	CAPTAIN	ISB
225.	2 ND LT.	MICHAEL MANGUAT DENG	05/11/2012	CAPTAIN	GIB
226.	2 ND LT.	ROBERT KOROK KUJU	05/11/2012	CAPTAIN	ISB
227.	2 ND LT.	JAMES LONY KANG	05/11/2012	CAPTAIN	GIB
228.	2 ND LT.	PETER KAI KUOL	20/11/2014	CAPTAIN	ISB
229.	2 ND LT.	ALUONG OTOR ALUONG	01/03/2013	CAPTAIN	GIB
230.	2 ND LT.	KHOR KUN PUOCH	01/03/2013	CAPTAIN	GIB

F. SECOND LIEUTENANTS (2ND LT.)

S/NO	RANK	NAME IN FULL	LAST DATE OF PROMOTION	DUE FOR PROMOTION TO	REMARKS
1.	2 ND LT.	GARANG ADOOR RECH	01/07/2007	1 ST LIEUTENANT	ISB
2.	2 ND LT.	ZACHARIA PUOT YAK	01/07/2007	1 ST LIEUTENANT	ISB
3.	2 ND LT.	KERBINO MALOU JOHN	01/07/2007	1 ST LIEUTENANT	ISB
4.	2 ND LT.	GABRIEL MAYEN MARIAL	01/07/2007	1 ST LIEUTENANT	ISB
5.	2 ND LT.	JOHN AJUECHBUK MAKOI	01/07/2012	1 ST LIEUTENANT	ISB
6.	2 ND LT.	MAGOK PHILLIP MAJOK	01/07/2012	1 ST LIEUTENANT	ISB
7.	2 ND LT.	SULE SWAKA LAKU	11/03/2009	1 ST LIEUTENANT	GIB
8.	2 ND LT.	RING AKUEIN CHOL	11/03/2009	1 ST LIEUTENANT	GIB
9.	2 ND LT.	JOSEPHINE ACHOL ABUOC	05/11/2012	1 ST LIEUTENANT	ISB
10.	2 ND LT.	ANGELO NGONG KIIR	05/11/2012	1 ST LIEUTENANT	ISB
11.	2 ND LT.	SUZAN NYANG CHUOL	05/11/2012	1 ST LIEUTENANT	GIB
12.	2 ND LT.	ANGELO MADHEL MAYOT	05/11/2012	1 ST LIEUTENANT	GIB
13.	2 ND LT.	JULE ANDREW DIMA	05/11/2012	1 ST LIEUTENANT	ISB
14.	2 ND LT.	PAUL CLEMENT WANI	05/11/2012	1 ST LIEUTENANT	GIB
15.	2 ND LT.	ABUK LOTH ADIJA	05/11/2012	1 ST LIEUTENANT	GIB

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16.	2 ND LT.	MAKOM MAWAL AKUECHBENY	05/11/2012	1 ST LIEUTENANT	ISB
17.	2 ND LT.	ATEM BENJAMIN KUC	05/11/2012	1 ST LIEUTENANT	GIB
18.	2 ND LT.	KONGKONG PAULINO MATIP	05/11/2012	1 ST LIEUTENANT	ISB
19.	2 ND LT.	MAWIEN MADUT WOL	05/11/2012	1 ST LIEUTENANT	ISB
20.	2 ND LT.	ZACHARIA CHOL WELKANG	05/11/2012	1 ST LIEUTENANT	ISB
21.	2 ND LT.	LINO JOSEPH KAINO	05/11/2012	1 ST LIEUTENANT	GIB
22.	2 ND LT.	ANGOK THUC MALUAL	05/11/2012	1 ST LIEUTENANT	GIB
23.	2 ND LT.	BOYI JAMES JACKSON	05/11/2012	1 ST LIEUTENANT	GIB
24.	2 ND LT.	ANEI MAJOK RING GUM	05/11/2012	1 ST LIEUTENANT	GIB
25.	2 ND LT.	JOK MAJOK DANIEL	05/11/2012	1 ST LIEUTENANT	ISB
26.	2 ND LT.	ATHIAN KUOL BULO	05/11/2012	1 ST LIEUTENANT	GIB
27.	2 ND LT.	ATEM LIAI AKECH ATEM	05/11/2012	1 ST LIEUTENANT	ISB
28.	2 ND LT.	MALEK MALUAL DING	05/11/2012	1 ST LIEUTENANT	ISB
29.	2 ND LT.	AYUEN PETER ABUOI	05/11/2012	1 ST LIEUTENANT	GIB
30.	2 ND LT.	JAMES LOKIO MORRIS	05/11/2012	1 ST LIEUTENANT	ISB
31.	2 ND LT.	REMO ISAAC NELSON	05/11/2012	1 ST LIEUTENANT	GIB
32.	2 ND LT.	JOSEPH GARANG ARIECHDIT	05/11/2012	1 ST LIEUTENANT	ISB
33.	2 ND LT.	EMMANUEL PATTA REPENT	05/11/2012	1 ST LIEUTENANT	ISB
34.	2 ND LT.	DENG KUR ANGOK	05/11/2012	1 ST LIEUTENANT	ISB
35.	2 ND LT.	JAMES ACUOTH KENJOK	05/11/2012	1 ST LIEUTENANT	ISB
36.	2 ND LT.	JACOB CHOL NYOK	05/11/2012	1 ST LIEUTENANT	ISB
37.	2 ND LT.	BATH MAYEN MANYIEL	05/11/2012	1 ST LIEUTENANT	ISB
38.	2 ND LT.	DENIS MARIAL MUORWEL	05/11/2012	1 ST LIEUTENANT	ISB
39.	2 ND LT.	VERONICA CLEMENT JUL	05/11/2012	1 ST LIEUTENANT	GIB
40.	2 ND LT.	AJAK RING DAU	05/11/2012	1 ST LIEUTENANT	ISB
41.	2 ND LT.	MOSES BIDA ELIASON	05/11/2012	1 ST LIEUTENANT	GIB
42.	2 ND LT.	PETER MANUT AGUEK BADOR	05/11/2012	1 ST LIEUTENANT	GIB
43.	2 ND LT.	JOSEPH ADELINO UKEL	05/11/2012	1 ST LIEUTENANT	ISB
44.	2 ND LT.	LOPUTO SAMUEL WILSON	05/11/2012	1 ST LIEUTENANT	GIB
45.	2 ND LT.	MAYOM MAYOM AKEN	05/11/2012	1 ST LIEUTENANT	ISB
46.	2 ND LT.	AJITH DENG ALUK	05/11/2012	1 ST LIEUTENANT	ISB
47.	2 ND LT.	ATEM PETER ABUOI ATEM	05/11/2012	1 ST LIEUTENANT	ISB
48.	2 ND LT.	MARIAL MARK AWUOK TIL	05/11/2012	1 ST LIEUTENANT	ISB
49.	2 ND LT.	SANTINO ABUOCH AYUEL	05/11/2012	1 ST LIEUTENANT	ISB
50.	2 ND LT.	ABRAHAM PAGOL BOL YUOT	05/11/2012	1 ST LIEUTENANT	ISB
51.	2 ND LT.	AJAK RING CHOL	05/11/2012	1 ST LIEUTENANT	ISB
52.	2 ND LT.	JEREMIAH WUOR KUEK	05/11/2012	1 ST LIEUTENANT	ISB
53.	2 ND LT.	STEPHEN MALITH AKOK	05/11/2012	1 ST LIEUTENANT	ISB
54.	2 ND LT.	SAMUEL JING CHANGATH	05/11/2012	1 ST LIEUTENANT	ISB
55.	2 ND LT.	ATEM CHIMAN GARANG	05/11/2012	1 ST LIEUTENANT	ISB
56.	2 ND LT.	MAMUR LIWA AGILI NANDA	05/11/2012	1 ST LIEUTENANT	ISB
57.	2 ND LT.	MARUAL MAJOK DENG	05/11/2012	1 ST LIEUTENANT	ISB
58.	2 ND LT.	DENG MAYAR ARIECH	05/11/2012	1 ST LIEUTENANT	ISB
59.	2 ND LT.	ABRAHAM MAYOM MOU	05/11/2012	1 ST LIEUTENANT	ISB
60.	2 ND LT.	ROIKA JOSHUA HENRY	05/11/2012	1 ST LIEUTENANT	ISB
61.	2 ND LT.	LONGAR MADUT AYUEL	05/11/2012	1 ST LIEUTENANT	ISB

62.	2 ND LT.	GARANG KUR DUT	05/11/2012	1 ST LIEUTENANT	ISB
63.	2 ND LT.	PETER AKUIEN WOL MALUAL	05/11/2012	1 ST LIEUTENANT	ISB
64.	2 ND LT.	BAK JIEL YUOT	05/11/2012	1 ST LIEUTENANT	ISB
65.	2 ND LT.	DAVID ANTHONY KHAMIS	05/11/2012	1 ST LIEUTENANT	ISB
66.	2 ND LT.	MARKO ROU MANUT	05/11/2012	1 ST LIEUTENANT	ISB
67.	2 ND LT.	EMMANUEL MAYEN MANYANG	05/11/2012	1 ST LIEUTENANT	ISB
68.	2 ND LT.	ALEU PETER MALEK	05/11/2012	1 ST LIEUTENANT	ISB
69.	2 ND LT.	LUCY APUK MACHAR MAYUOL	05/11/2012	1 ST LIEUTENANT	GIB
70.	2 ND LT.	GEORGE AJING DENG	05/11/2012	1 ST LIEUTENANT	ISB
71.	2 ND LT.	JONG GARANG JONG	05/11/2012	1 ST LIEUTENANT	ISB
72.	2 ND LT.	STEPHEN KENYI SAMUEL	05/11/2012	1 ST LIEUTENANT	ISB
73.	2 ND LT.	BAK BAK LUAL	05/11/2012	1 ST LIEUTENANT	ISB
74.	2 ND LT.	BANY BANY DENG	05/11/2012	1 ST LIEUTENANT	ISB
75.	2 ND LT.	RING AKUEI AKUEI	05/11/2012	1 ST LIEUTENANT	ISB
76.	2 ND LT.	MALITH BARNAA DHIATH	05/11/2012	1 ST LIEUTENANT	ISB
77.	2 ND LT.	MABEK LUETH AGIEU	05/11/2012	1 ST LIEUTENANT	ISB
78.	2 ND LT.	ABDURAHMAN ABBAS TONG	05/11/2012	1 ST LIEUTENANT	GIB
79.	2 ND LT.	MABUT ABRAHAM MAKOI	05/11/2012	1 ST LIEUTENANT	GIB
80.	2 ND LT.	DENG GENG MAYEN	05/11/2012	1 ST LIEUTENANT	ISB
81.	2 ND LT.	DUT JOK CHALIC	05/11/2012	1 ST LIEUTENANT	ISB
82.	2 ND LT.	GARANG NYOL WOL	05/11/2012	1 ST LIEUTENANT	ISB
83.	2 ND LT.	MADHIEU MATHUC MOU	05/11/2012	1 ST LIEUTENANT	ISB
84.	2 ND LT.	JAMES AKOK PAP	05/11/2012	1 ST LIEUTENANT	ISB
85.	2 ND LT.	MICHAEL BIDAL JONATHAN	05/11/2012	1 ST LIEUTENANT	ISB
86.	2 ND LT.	KOAT PAUL DENG	01/03/2013	1 ST LIEUTENANT	GIB
87.	2 ND LT.	FRANCIS OHISA GILDO	20/11/2014	1 ST LIEUTENANT	ISB
88.	2 ND LT.	JAMES LESUK GABRIEL	20/11/2014	1 ST LIEUTENANT	ISB
89.	2 ND LT.	PETER PITIA MABOR	15/01/2016	1 ST LIEUTENANT	ISB

SKM
 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
 OF CRIMINAL DEFENSE

Name of Offender: _____

Date: _____

Signature: _____

Annex 7 South Sudan Alliance Federal Army: Statement of 8 March 2019



SOUTH SUDAN ALLIANCE FEDERAL ARMY



جيش التحالف الفيدرالي بجنوب السودان

Khartoum, Sudan
Sub: The Coalition of two Political Movements' armies
Date: 08th March 2019

1. Democratic Republican Alliance Party of South Sudan (**DRA PARTY**)
2. Federal Unionist Liberation Front of South Sudan (**FULF**)

These two political movements are united into one army and named "**South Sudan Alliance Federal Army**" (**SSAFA**). This especial force (army) is designed as a tool of protection of South Sudanese in order to overthrow the corrupt regime of SPLM/A that rules the Republic of South Sudan with dictatorship and lawlessness. We are the national political forces that fight for the freedom of the civilians' society in the South Sudan who faced the deprived challenges as result of war caused by the botched leadership of SPLM/A. The current war is not tribal. It is a conflict of SPLM/A political party members who are politically divided into many states due to their failure to address the logical problems that has killed the unity of people of South Sudan with brutal leadership. This disability of the SPLM Party does not allow them to correctly govern the country's disease that spread to all tribes, especially between the Nuer and Dinka.

Therefore, innocents South Sudan citizens are always dying on wars, hungers, diseases etc. because of SPM/A failed leadership that must be blamed specifically on the President Salva Kiir Mayardit and his former Vice President Dr. Riek Machar Teny.

The concept of coalition between these two political parties produced a military title known as **SOUTH SUDAN ALLIANCE FEDERAL ARMY (SSAFA)**

- 1) D: stand for "**Democratic**" that stand for justice in order to transform the nature of army into lawful manner.
- 2) R: stand for "**Republican**" that represents the word people of the Republic that marks the country.
- 3) A: stand for "**Alliance**" that means coalition or united army that represents two to three factions.
- 4) "**Federal Army**" remark the federation of the states that should work by the law of democracy.

The Temporary High Commands Council.

1. 1st Lt. Gen. Dr. Simon Thor Kuon Yuot: Chairman and Commander in Chief for **SSA Federal Army** for South Sudan.
2. M. Gen. Dickson Gatluak Jock Nyuot: Deputy Chairman and Commander in Chief for **FULF** and Deputy Chairman and Commander in Chief for "**DRA Federal Army**" for the South Sudan.
3. 1st Lt. Gen. Raphael Aban Jwok Political and Security Advisor for **SSAFA**.
4. 2nd Lt Gen. Simon Yul Ruel: General Chief of Staffs for **SSAFA**.
5. M.Gen. Sebit Kong Kuon: Chief of National Security Intelligent Service for **SSAFA**.
6. M.Gen. Mubarak Tung Nyuot: Military Intelligent for **SSAFA**.

The high commands council as the coalition of army is leave an open for every organize political military movement that would agree with the idea of federalism, created by those political movements which joint their forces into **South Sudan Alliance Federal Army (SSAFA)** that shall work as the city-wall of protection against the lawlessness of South Sudan. If you are willing to bring people of our Republic together, you are highly welcome to this unity of Army





Khartoum - Sudan Tel: +249961173841
السودان الخرطوم - هاتف: 00249961173841





SOUTH SUDAN ALLIANCE FEDERAL ARMY
جيش التحالف الفيدرالي بجنوب السودان



for South Sudan. For example, your political Party is free to work as independent as you like. But only military forces are allied to fight the common enemy. You are the light to the suffering community and joy to the world for the South Sudan. For instance, truth is a freedom, love is unity, and law is the core and central beams of the government to rule the human society. Therefore, the book had said "Unity is power". So the obedience of law acts like the wall of protection. Leaders should respect law and use the law for their leadership to be followed."

Name:

Signed by:

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLICAN ALLIANCE PARTY OF SOUTH SUDAN. (DRA PARTY)	FEDERAL UNIONIST LIBERATION FRONT OF SOUTH SUDAN (FULF)
1. 1 st Lt. Gen. Dr. Simon Thor Kuon Yuot: Chairman and C & C for DRA Party/SPLA-IV. Mob: +249 961173841 SIGN: <i>[Signature]</i> DATE: <i>8 March 2019</i>	1. M. Gen. Dickson Gatluak Joek Nyuot: Chairman and Commander in Chief of Federal Unionist Liberation Front Mob: +251 929484417 SIGN: <i>[Signature]</i> DATE: <i>8 March 2019</i> <i>on behalf of Chairman</i>
2. 1 st Lt. Gen. Raphael Aban Jwok Political and Security Advisor of DRA/SPLA-IV. Mob: +249 915264840 SIGN: <i>[Signature]</i> DATE: <i>8 March 2019</i>	2. M.Gen. Sebit Kong Kuon: Chief security for Federal Unionist Liberation Front. Mob: +249 901191143 SIGN: <i>[Signature]</i> DATE: <i>8 March 2019</i>
3. 2 nd Lt. Gen. Simon Yul Ruei General Chief of Staffs of DRA/SPLA-IV Mob: +249 900210999 SIGN: <i>[Signature]</i> DATE: <i>8 March 2019</i>	
4. Mabarak Tung Nyuot M.Gen. Military Intelligent- DRA/SPLA-IV Mob: +249 963856336 SIGN: <i>[Signature]</i> DATE: <i>8 March 2019</i>	



Dr. Simon Thor Kuon Yuot
1st Lt. Gen. Chairman and C.C.
High Commands Council
SPLA-IV/DRA Party for South Sudan



Khartoum - Sudan Tel: +249961173841
 00249961173841 - هاتفنا: السودان الخرطوم



Annex 8
Internal Security Bureau “Blue House” detention facility



‘Blue House,’ Juba, South Sudan



Downstairs

			bathroom			office	store	office
"zan zans"		cells		"vip" cell				entrance
		cells		exercise area				
bathroom					offices			
bathroom								

Upstairs

			bathroom		bathroom	offices		"vip" or "senior" cell
"zan zans"		cells		"vip" cell				
bathroom						doctor		

Rough layout of ISB 'Blue House' detention facility, based on sketch by a former detainee, provided to Panel.
Not to scale.

Annex 9 Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring and Verification Mechanism flash report, 18 December 2018



20181218 Flash Report Sector I

**RESTRICTED**

Flash Report **(Harassment and Intimidation against MVT** **Juba by SSPDF forces)**

SECTOR 1: MVT Juba

1. **Date and time of the incident:** 18 Dec 2018. From around 1000 hrs to 1500 hrs.
2. **Place of the incident:** SSPDF Luri Training Center.
3. **Type of incident:** Violation of Article 12 in ACOH of 21 Dec 17.
 - A. Attacks, harassment, intimidation, arrest and detention of CTSAMVM personnel;
 - B. Obstruction or interference with movement and work of CTSAMVM;
4. **Involved sides:** SSPDF
5. **Involved units and commanders:** Luri Training Center, approximately 17 km west of Juba. Unidentified NSS Brigadier General.

Impact /damages to persons and property:

- A. MVT Juba conducted a SDP to Luri training center for task investigation of alleged violation of Article 3 Sec 2) (e) ACOH of 21 Dec 17, recruiting and recruit training by SSPDF Luri Training Center on 18 Dec 2018.
- B. MVT Juba team members including Col Muhammad Fadul (TL), Col Adina(IO), Maj Chemjor (IO) and Leju Michael (the Driver) were Restricted from accessing the Camp and then detained at one building before the training center for over five(05) hours. They were initially detained, blind folded, had their hands tied and removed to a jail. Team members were subjected to inhuman treatment such as blindfolding, kicks, handcuffing, stripping completely naked down to underpants with the female MVT member undressing entirely. The team were robbed of their money and Marital Silver ring. The driver was threatened to be killed for having taken the observers at the training facility and his 100 USD, 1730 SSP currencies were taken by the soldiers and never returned.

Impact /damages to persons and property:

- A. MVT Juba conducted a SDP to Luri training center for task investigation of alleged violation of Article 3 Sec 2) (e) ACOH of 21 Dec 17, recruiting and recruit training by SSPDF Luri Training Center on 18 Dec 2018.
- B. MVT Juba team members including Col Muhammad Fadul (TL), Col Adina(IO), Maj Chemjor (IO) and Leju Michael (the Driver) were Restricted from accessing the Camp and then detained at one building before the training center for over five(05) hours. They were initially detained, blind folded, had their hands tied and removed to a jail. Team members were subjected to inhuman treatment such as blindfolding, kicks, handcuffing, stripping completely naked down to underpants with the female MVT member undressing entirely. The team were robbed of their money and Marital Silver ring. The driver was threatened to be killed for having taken the observers at the training facility and his 100 USD, 1730 SSP currencies were taken by the soldiers and never returned.
- C. One Brigadier General identified himself as National Security Service, stated that this area belongs to NSS. He also said that since Dr Riak Machar was training his Forces, why shouldn't SSPDF train its Forces too.

7. SECTOR 1 Assessment/Comment:

- A. The checkpoint soldiers seem to be in compliance with the blanket authorization allow the MVT to continue inside the training area. The later misconduct, described above, occurred inside the camp by higher ranking personnel.
- B. This is an unfortunate and regrettable incident and is a grave violation of ACOH and R-ARCSS.
- C. CTSAMVM should issue immediate press release to condemn this incident by strongest terms.
- D. CTSAMVM should discuss this matter in the ongoing CTC Meeting as this is the biggest misconduct against CTSAMVM personnel.
- E. The officers and soldiers who committed this act should be held accountable immediately.

Annex 10

Joint Defence Board: Joint communiqué on the Luri incident, 20 December 2018



**Republic of South Sudan
Joint Defence Board (JDB)**

Joint Communiqué on the Luri Incident

20th December 2018

The Board was informed of an incident indicating that some of the CTSAMVM members were harassed by some members of Government forces (NSS) at Luri, and that CTSAMVM reported the incident to the international community before informing the Government. This matter is under investigation and appropriate measures will be taken against the suspects.

The Board strongly condemns the act of harassment and promises to bring the culprits into the full force of the law. It also conveys its sincere apologies to the victims.

To avoid such incidents from occurring in the future, the Board urges CTSAMVM on the need to work in coordination with the concern authorities.
The Board sees the incident as an isolated case that doesn't interfere with the implementation of the Peace Agreement.

Signed

.....
Gen. Gabriel Jok Riak Makol, Chairperson, Joint Defence Board

.....
Cdr. (Psc) Dr. Sallam Alhag A. Baballa
Co-Chairperson, Joint Defence Board

.....
Lt. Gen. (ndc) James Koang Chuol
Co-Chairperson, Joint Defence B

Annex 11 Communiqué of the forty-sixth ordinary session of the IGAD Council of Ministers, Djibouti, 27 February 2019



COMMUNIQUÉ OF THE 46TH ORDINARY SESSION OF IGAD COUNCIL OF MINISTERS

27TH FEBRUARY 2019
DJIBOUTI, REPUBLIC OF DJIBOUTI

The IGAD Council of Ministers held its 46th Ordinary Session on 27th February 2019 under the chairmanship of **H.E. Dr Workneh Gebeyehu**, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and Chairperson of the IGAD Council.

The session was attended by **H.E. Mahmoud Ali Youssouf**, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Djibouti; **H.E. Ahmed Isse Awad**, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Somalia; **H.E. Dr Al-Dirdiery Mohamed Ahmed**, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of the Sudan; **H.E. Hirut Zemene**, State Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and **H.E. Mohamed Ali Hassan**, Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Djibouti.

H.E. Mahboub Maalim, IGAD Executive Secretary; **H.E. Hadiza Mustapha**, Special Advisor to the Chairperson of the African Union Commission, **H.E. Dr Ismael Wais**, IGAD Special Envoy for South Sudan and **H.E. Dr Mohamed Ali Guyo**, IGAD Special Envoy for Somalia were also in attendance.

Representatives of the European Union, China, Egypt, France, Japan, Russia, Turkey and USA made statements during the open session.

After extensive deliberations on the geopolitical and security dynamics of the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, the Council:

1. **Pays** a glowing tribute to the Late Amb. Dr. Attalla Hamad Bashir, the former Executive Secretary of IGAD and recognizes his invaluable contribution to the organization;
2. **Expresses** gratitude to the People and Government of the Republic of Djibouti for their warm hospitality extended to the delegations;
3. **Recalls** the Communiqué of the 45th Ordinary Session of the IGAD Council of Ministers held on 11th July 2012 in Addis Ababa, the Report of the 31st Session of IGAD Committee of Ambassadors held on 21st January 2017 in Addis Ababa and the Communiqué of the 66th Extra-ordinary session of IGAD Council of Ministers on Somalia and South Sudan held in Addis Ababa on 16th November 2018;

4. **Underlines** the importance of expediting the endorsement of the proposed treaty and structure to reform IGAD; and decided that there is need for enriched and continued discussion on the organizational structure and treaty of IGAD until the next ordinary sessions of the policy organs;
5. **Notes with appreciation** the presentation made by the IGAD Special Envoy for Somalia on the geopolitical and security dynamics of the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden and **adopts** the recommendations therein;
6. **Acknowledges** the threats, risks and challenges of geopolitical dynamics of the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden to the Greater Horn of Africa;
7. **Appreciates** the enormous opportunities of the geographic positioning of the region;
8. **Further appreciates** the strategic interests of littoral and non-littoral IGAD Member States and the need to formulate shared norms, common goals and strategic coordination in this endeavor;
9. **Recognizes** the need for IGAD to take a leading role on the issue of the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden;
10. **Adopts** a collective approach to challenges in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden by strengthening regional cooperation, and establish a regional platform for IGAD Member States with a view to promote dialogue with other stakeholders including the AU and other international partners;
11. **Agrees** to harmonize and develop a common position to protect the security and economic interests of the region including maritime security, migration, fight against terrorism, prevention of Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing; pollution and dumping of the toxic waste in some parts of the waters of the IGAD region;
12. **Further agrees** to develop a multi-disciplinary policy oriented research and analysis on the matter;
13. **Directs** the IGAD Secretariat to establish a special taskforce of experts to study, review, and advice on the conclusions and recommendations made in the presentation and to urgently chart out a regional plan of action with a clear timeline;
14. **Further directs** the expansion of the responsibilities of the IGAD Special Envoy for Somalia to include the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, in coordination with the AU as may be appropriate; and
15. **Decides** to remain seized of the matters.

**Done on the 27th day of February 2019 in
Djibouti, Republic of Djibouti**

Annex 12

Joint statement on the visit of H.E. President Isaias Afeworki of the State of Eritrea and H.E. Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia to the Republic of South Sudan, Juba, 4 March 2019



Republic of South Sudan *The President*

Joint Statement on the Visit of H.E. President Isias Afeworki of the State of Eritrea and H.E. Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia to the Republic of South Sudan Juba on 4th March 2019

1. H.E. President Isias Afeworki, President of the State of Eritrea and H.E. Dr. Abiy Ahmed, Prime Minister of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, paid a one-day working visit to the Republic of South Sudan in the course of which the two leaders and their host President Salva Kiir Mayardit, held extensive discussions on a broad range of issues.
2. The three leaders emphasized the need to continue working together to consolidate peace in the Republic of South Sudan in all ways possible and to seek to coordinate the positions of the three countries on both Regional and Global issues.
3. In the course of the discussions the three leaders focused on the need to advance the cause of regional integration and to that end agreed to task their foreign Ministers and other relevant government agencies in the three countries to work out the common projects that will facilitate the attainment of the goal of Regional Economic integration and shared prosperity.
4. At the end of their visit H.E. Isias Afeworki, President of the State of Eritrea and H.E. Dr, Abiy Ahmed, Prime Minister of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia thanked their host President Salva Kiir Mayardit and through him the people of South Sudan, for the warm reception and hospitality accorded to them and their delegations during their visit to South Sudan

Annex 13
IGAD invitation to General Thomas Cirillo Swaka to a meeting in Addis Ababa, 1 March 2019

INTERGOVERNMENTAL
SUDAN OFFICE
AUTHORITY ON
(ISSO)
DEVELOPMENT (IGAD)



IGAD SOUTH

REF: IGAD-SSO/047/2018

1st March 2019

Gen. Thomas Cirillo Swaka
Chairman of the National Salvation Front (NAS)
Addis Ababa

Dear General,

Re: Invitation to a meeting in Addis Ababa

1. It will be recalled that the IGAD Council of Ministers at its 66th Extraordinary Session in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, directed me as the IGAD Special Envoy for South Sudan "to reach out to the South Sudanese stakeholders and any warring groups who are not signatories to the R-ARCSS to join in its implementation; otherwise, they shall be labelled spoilers of the peace process".
2. Pursuant to the above-mentioned directive of the IGAD Council of Ministers, I held the first and second urgent informal consultative meetings with you in Addis Ababa on 11th December 2018, and 25th February 2019 as one of the leaders of the non-signatory groups.
3. As agreed in our meeting of 25th February 2019, I am hereby writing to kindly invite you and your team to a meeting in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on 8th March 2019. The purpose of the meeting is to discuss substantive issues regarding the possibility and modalities of you rejoining the R-ARCSS and the peace process. Please take note of the following principles that will guide the framework of our discussions.

- a. No renegotiation or reopening of the R-ARCSS;
 - b. IGAD recognize the old groups/parties as at the HLRF. Any new group/formation will not be admitted into R-ARCSS, except through the R-ARCSS framework;
 - c. The R-ARCSS 2018 and its PCTSA has subsumed the CoHA 2017 and therefore, no party can claim adherence to CoHA without being bound by R-ARCSS 2018;
 - d. A non-signatory to the R-ARCSS cannot claim adherence or protection by CoHA, in as far as the actions are inconsistent with PCTSA under R-ARCSS;
 - e. Any group unwilling to join R-ARCSS and whose activities impede its full implementation shall be considered as a spoiler and held accountable; and
 - f. Any activity attributable to forces allied to a non-signatory group shall be deemed duly authorised by the leadership of that group.
4. I would like to urge you to declare a unilateral ceasefire as a demonstration of your commitment to the upcoming deliberations as well as to prevent further suffering of affected populations.
5. In light of the above, I would like to invite you and your team to a meeting on 8th March 2019 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.
6. I would be much obliged if you could confirm your availability latest by 5th March 2019.

Sincerely,



Amb. Ismail Wais
IGAD Special Envoy to South Sudan

Annex 14

Further testimony from victims of sexual violence in Unity State

Despite the Signing of the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the women and girls have continued to suffer sexual.²⁶⁶ Women in the Bentiu Protection of Civilian (PoC) site told the Panel of serious sexual violence perpetrated against women when they leave the camp in search of firewood, but also inside the POC site.²⁶⁷

One woman told the Panel that such violence is “continuation of the war, the war is now on our bodies, whether young or old, the sexual violence is not a new thing to us, its familiar and related to what we have been going through since this war started. We are now weary, it has been happening for a long time.”²⁶⁸

One woman, 24 years old from Leer County, told the Panel that she witnessed a group of 15 women being raped as they fled to Bentiu around May 2018, by uniformed men. When they reached the Bentiu POC site, they hoped to be safe.

“When we arrived here we thought we were safe. Women go out to fetch water or fire wood and they are raped. Recently, in late January, a 30-year-old and a 13-year-old left the POC and just outside they were both raped. You can talk to both survivors – they are in this camp. We are humiliated and we have scars and some of them you will never see, we are hurting inside our souls. At the end last year, outside the POC, I was approached by armed men who attempted to rape me but as they fell me down they saw young women and pursued her, that is how I escaped. You can see the scar on my leg has not even healed. We have scars, some old and some new, a reminder that we are hunted like animals to be humiliated.”²⁶⁹



(Panel photo, Bentiu February 2019)

Another woman told the Panel that she has witnessed rapes and suffered rapes before she came to Bentiu from Mayendit. Around October 2018 she was raped by two men, both were armed.

²⁶⁶ Interviews Yei, November 2018, POC 3 (Juba) October 2018; November 2018; Meetings in Bentiu with Community Leaders, Inter Faith Representatives, Focused Group discussions, survivors and witnesses (February 2019)

²⁶⁷ POC 3 Juba (October 2018, November 2018; POC Bentiu (February 2019)

²⁶⁸ Participant During a Focused Group Meetings in Bentiu February 2019.

²⁶⁹ Interview, Bentiu, February 2019.

“I was raped as we fled the violence in Mayendit, I also saw women being brutally raped by a group of soldiers and I reflect and say it was in the middle of war. What I want to tell you is that here, in the POC women have been raped as they go out to collect fire wood, or as they go out to get food. Even me, I am a victim of rapes I am talking about. I was raped inside the POC around October and had just retired to bed when they came in. I am still sick, there is no place which is safe.”²⁷⁰

The woman told the Panel that sometime at the end of December 2018, two men approached her whilst she was sleeping, and took turns to rape her.

“The fact that someone can be followed and raped inside the POC and the perpetrators can just disappear makes me think that these rapes are targeted at the survivors who fled from violence so that they go back to the villages and be killed. The two men were disguised but still I managed to identify one from the clothes he was wearing. We are targeted and we are afraid of what will happen to us if the Mongolians leave? [referring to a Mangolian Battalion guarding the POC].”²⁷¹

Another woman told the Panel that she witnessed many atrocities in Mayendit including the rape of a 70-year-old outside the POC sometime in October 2018.

“After the rape the old woman never fully recovered, she later died. She died a month before my 13-year-old son was crashed by an army vehicle and died instantly here at the POC. My child was killed in January 2019 and the old woman died before my child was killed. You should pass through the cemetery to see the area she was buried, this just opposite the area where my 13-year-old was put to rest.”²⁷²



(Panel Photos of the cemetery where the 70 year-old woman was buried near Bentiu POC site)

²⁷⁰ Interview, Bentiu February 2019.

²⁷¹ Panel Meeting, Bentiu February 2019.

²⁷² Meeting with Panel February 2019, Bentiu

Another woman described the gang-rape of a ten-year old girl at ‘Nyajui’ in Nhialdiu in January 2018.²⁷³ A group of uniform and armed men allegedly stopped ten girls who were fleeing the violence. All the ten girls were lined up, and each waited for her turn to be gang raped. Whilst raping the girls, the soldiers stopped a 9-year-old boy and a very old man, and ordered them to sit under a tree as they raped the girls. From where the witness was hiding, she observed all the young girls being raped one by one. They were also searched and robbed of their few possessions.

“After witnessing this you think now that is the end of the war we are in a safe zone. I then witnessed the rape of a 12-year-old girl not far from the Bentiu protection of civilian site in September or October 2018 as we came from collecting food. It is scary, you do not stop to think, it is frightening to see the attackers are targeting us. All of them wore masks and were armed.”²⁷⁴

A 26-year-old woman told the Panel that she is very concerned that this conflict continues to target women and girls:

“I came from Koch and since the war broke out in our village I have seen horrible things with my own eyes. In 2015, around May and June, as I fled my village, I personally saw a group of women, around 20 of them, being forced into a Tukul by soldiers and being brutally raped. That is why I fled and came all the way to the POC. I thought the problem would end. It did not. Sometime last year, in the company of other women we went out to collect food, on our way back, five men, armed and wearing masks, raped women. I particularly noticed that among the women was a girl who was around 10 years old. I saw, at one stage, the five men all taking turns to rape the girl. They also looted the food before they left. I came out of hiding and helped the girl to walk back to the POC. The other women who were raped came straight here, but the girl had to go to the clinic; she needed medical intervention. That was last year. Early this year, 2019, we began to note that those women who had no protection who walked out of the perimeters were targeted and raped. This year we also saw another strange development, incidents of fire, arson and these have resulted in a child and a woman dying as a result of the fire. The same people who rape are the same people who come and loot and burn our shelters.”²⁷⁵

A widow from Mayendit told the Panel “I personally witnessed civilians, old men and women, being killed by soldiers in May 2018. When they then killed my father and husband, I blamed myself. During the ordeal I witnessed horrific things and as a widow I must go and collect food and fire-wood. I went with my 12-year-old daughter, we were both raped by two men on our way from collecting food, it was last year around October.”

Another woman told the Panel how, after two women were raped in January 2018, they still went out to gather food:

“Hunger is killing us. After the rape we still go and look for food, we still must feed the children and we have very few options. Life here is difficult. If we do not go and collect firewood and food children die. You should go to the cemetery and see the children we have buried this year because of disease. We must look after the children we must go out and find food and firewood. The truth is many people were being targeted and raped and it had become normal and there was no need to report it. In January, we were so happy to see people tried for some of their criminal activities and someone was even jailed for many years for raping a woman here at the POC.”²⁷⁶

²⁷³ Interview Bentiu February 2019.

²⁷⁴ Interview Bentiu February 2019.

²⁷⁵ Interview Bentiu February 2019.

²⁷⁶ Interview Bentiu February 2019.

The Panel was told that the introduction of the Bentiu Mobile Courts, which started in January 2019, are trying to address sexual violence. UN official confirmed a 12-year sentence had been issued to a man convicted of rape in January 2019.²⁷⁷

²⁷⁷ Interview Juba February 2019.

Annex 15
Arms and ammunition observed by the Panel in South Sudan



Cartridges gathered by Panel in multiple locations in South Sudan, many bearing head-stamp 811-13



AK-47, with 7,62x 39mm, confiscated at Bentiu Protection of Civilian Site



7.62 AKM, belt-fed general-purpose machinegun, used by all parties to the conflict, photo taken in Yambio by Panel

Annex 16

Revenue-sharing agreements for South Sudan's joint venture oil production companies

Greater Pioneer Operating Company (GPOC)		
Development Blocks 1b and 2b		
Operating Costs	Recovered in year incurred	
Capital Costs	Recovered over four years	
Cost Oil Maximum	40%	
Excess Cost Oil	RSS 100%	
Profit Oil	60%	
Profit Oil Sharing	RSS	Contractor
< 25,000 bbls / day	61.5%	38.5%
> 25,000 bbls / day; < 50,000 bbls / day	71.0%	29.0%
> 50,000 bbls / day	80.0%	20.0%
Exploration Blocks 1a, 2a and 4		
Operating Costs	Recovered in year incurred	
Capital Costs	Recovered over four years	
Cost Oil Maximum	45%	
Excess Cost Oil	RSS 100%	
Profit Oil	55%	
Profit Oil Sharing	RSS	Contractor
< 25,000 bbls / day	60%	40%
> 25,000 bbls / day; < 50,000 bbls / day	70%	30%
> 50,000 bbls / day	80%	20%


SUDD Petroleum Operating Company Limited (SPOC)		
Block 5A		
Operating Expenses	Recovered in year incurred	
Exploration Expenses	20% per financial year	
Development Expenses	20% per financial year	
Cost Oil Maximum	40%	
Excess Cost Oil	Shared as per Profit Oil	
Profit Oil	60%	
Profit Oil Sharing	RSS	Contractor
< 25,000 bbls / day	71.5%	28.5%
> 25,000 bbls / day; < 50,000 bbls / day	72.5%	27.5%
> 50,000 bbls / day; < 100,000 bbls/day	76.25%	23.75%
> 100,000 bbls / day	81.25%	18.75%

Dar Petroleum Operating Company (DPOC)		
Development Block 3D		
Operating Expenses	Recovered in year incurred	
Exploration Expenditures	25% per financial year	
Development Expenditures	25% per financial year	
Cost Oil Maximum	50%	
Excess Cost Oil	Shared as per Profit Oil	
Profit Oil	50%	
Profit Oil Sharing	RSS	Contractor
< 10,000 bbls / day	64%	36%
> 10,000 bbls / day; < 15,000 bbls / day	67%	33%
> 15,000 bbls / day; < 20,000 bbls / day	77%	23%
> 20,000 bbls / day	80%	20%
Exploration Blocks 3E		
Operating Expenses	Recovered in year incurred	
Exploration Expenditures	25% per financial year	
Development Expenditures	25% per financial year	
Cost Oil Maximum	45%	
Excess Cost Oil	Shared as per Profit Oil	
Profit Oil	55%	
Profit Oil Sharing	RSS	Contractor
< 25,000 bbls / day	70%	30%
> 25,000 bbls / day; < 50,000 bbls / day	73%	27%
> 50,000 bbls / day; < 75,000 bbls / day	75%	25%
> 75,000 bbls / day	80%	20%
Exploration Blocks 7E		
Operating Expenses	Recovered in year incurred	
Exploration Expenditures	25% per financial year	
Development Expenditures	25% per financial year	
Cost Oil Maximum	45%	
Excess Cost Oil	Shared as per Profit Oil	
Profit Oil	55%	
Profit Oil Sharing	RSS	Contractor
< 25,000 bbls / day	70%	30%
> 25,000 bbls / day; < 50,000 bbls / day	72%	28%
> 50,000 bbls / day; < 75,000 bbls / day	74%	26%
> 75,000 bbls / day	80%	20%

Source: Ministry of Mining and Petroleum for the Republic of South Sudan, Marketing Reports for 2012/13; 2013/14; and 2014/15

Annex 17

Loan agreement and letter of credit facility with Trinity Energy and the African Export-Import Bank (Afreximbank)



Yours Sincerely,



Hon. Salvatore Garang Mabiordit
Minister,
Ministry of Finance & Planning,
RSS/Juba

- Cc:**
- Hon. Goc Makuac Mayol, Deputy Minister, Ministry of Finance & Planning;
 - Hon. Biel Jock, 1st Undersecretary, Ministry of Finance & Planning;
 - Hon. Mayen Wol Jong, Undersecretary Ministry of Petroleum;
 - File


Annex 18
Green Horizon project



Green Horizon project, Billpham, Juba, photos taken by Panel February 2019



Annex 19
Official mining exploration licences for the Republic of South Sudan



Source: Mining Cadastre of the Ministry of Mining of the Republic of South Sudan, recorded March 2019

Annex 20
SSPDF vehicle carrying charcoal sacks



Annex 21

Response and signed affidavit from Israel Ziv

Affidavit

I, the undersigned, Israel Ziv, bearer of I.D. no. 054905377, after been cautioned to state the truth and that failing to do so I will be liable for the penalties prescribed by law, do hereby state in writing as follows:

1. I make this affidavit in the context of my request to be questioned by the Defense Export Controls Agency at the Ministry of Defense ("DECA") on my behalf and on behalf of Global NTM Ltd., Global Law Enforcement and Security Ltd. and Global IZ Group Ltd, all companies owned by me.
2. All of the factual claims made in this affidavit are known to me personally.
3. On December 14, 2018, the OFAC authority of the U.S. Department of the Treasury released an action regarding the addition of myself and companies owned by me to the SDN list, and the imposition of the sanctions entailed thereby (the "Release" and the "Sanctions" respectively).
4. Already at the outset I shall emphasize that prior to the Release, I was neither investigated nor questioned by any authority or function, either in the U.S.A. or in any other country. The Release came to me out of the blue, and from that date forth I have been forced to deal with the serious implications of the said Release, in order to protect my reputation and business.
5. Immediately upon learning of the Release, I asked, **of my own initiative**, that DECA, as the agency in charge of defense control out of Israel, investigate the matter, in order to clear my name.
6. In this affidavit, I shall address the accusations made against me in the Release, and shall argue that there is not a shred of truth to the Release.
7. In addition, I shall be happy to fully cooperate with any action requested by DECA.
8. **The claims against me (that are denied), as stated in the Release**
In the Release, several actions which I allegedly carried out in South Sudan are attributed to me and to companies under my ownership. Following are the actions ascribed in the Release:
 - a. **The supply of weapons and ammunition to both the Government of South Sudan and the opposition.**
 - b. **The use of an agricultural company in South Sudan as a cover to conceal weapons deals in the astronomical sum of approximately \$150 million.**
 - c. **The planning and organization of attacks by mercenaries on South Sudanese oil fields and infrastructure, in an effort to create a conflict that only I could solve.**
 - d. **Bribery of Government of South Sudan officials.**
9. I shall now address the claims made against me in the Release, one by one.

a. **Contrary to the Release – I never supplied weapons or ammunition in South Sudan – neither to the Government nor to the Opposition and never brokered or facilitated any such transactions**

- (1) I hereby declare that I have never supplied weapons or ammunition in South Sudan, either to the Government or to the opposition, or to any other party, either directly or indirectly, either personally or through the companies which I own.
- (2) I hereby declare also that neither me nor the companies owned by me have brokered or facilitated any such transactions.
- (3) In this context I note that I have approached the Minister of Defense of South Sudan who confirmed, in a letter signed by him, that according to an investigation carried out by his office, no basis has been found for the said accusations against me.

*** The letter of the Minister of Defense is attached hereto as **Annex A**.

- (4) It is worth mentioning, that the Release mentions a transaction of US\$ 150 million!!! This amount cannot be hidden. Obviously, it is not possible to carry out such a transaction without alerting the global banking system or any authority.

b. **Contrary to the Release – my activity and that of the companies owned by me in South Sudan in the agricultural sector is genuine and extensive activity in agriculture only, and is not a “cover” for concealing arms dealing**

- (1) In recent years, I have engaged in civil projects in a range of areas, in which context I have been involved in extensive agricultural projects in South Sudan, **that provide food security to dozens of thousands of residents** in this wretched and conflicted country, in the project known as Green Horizon (the “Project”). The Project is genuine and is not a cover for other activity.
- (2) The Project is carried out by me and by companies under my ownership, according to agreements signed between us and the Government of South Sudan.
- (3) The Project is carried out nationwide in South Sudan, over 8 regions (States).
- (4) The size of the Project’s farming areas amounts to dozens of thousands of acres, and is a complete system of sorts for the agricultural sector in South Sudan, from the level of the seed to the sale to end customers.
- (5) During the course of its activity, the Project has become a large food producer in South Sudan, and it supplies food to dozens of thousands of the country’s residents.

- (6) The Project operates, *inter alia*, 4 agricultural farms for the growing of corn and rice, vegetables and fruits.
- (7) In addition to the agricultural farms, the Project holds activity in the Gum Arabic sector, and maintains cooperation with hundreds of small farmers in a few centers around the country.
- (8) For the first time in the history of the said country, use is made in the agricultural sector, as part of the Project, of the most innovative technologies in the industry, including irrigation systems, agricultural crops in buildings, the implementation of special strains that increase soil productivity, etc.
- (9) Amongst other things, the advanced technologies I implement enable the supply of food to the country's residents also during the dry season, which is not at all to be taken for granted in this country.
- (10) Alongside payments to Israeli experts who travel from Israel for the Project, the Project provides a livelihood to thousands of local residents. The Project provides local workers with various training. *Inter alia*, practical agronomic know-how and experience is relayed in the Project by the top agricultural experts from Israel, as well as teaching and training in the operation of tractors and heavy equipment, agronomic training for locals, etc.
- (11) The Project supports, *inter alia*, entire communities in the country, which suffer hunger in arid years and are forced to migrate and appeal to aid organizations to supply their most basic needs.

*** A letter from the Minister of Agriculture of South Sudan, addressed to the Ambassador of Israel in South Sudan, in support of the aforesaid, is attached hereto as Annex B.
- (12) In his letter, the Minister of Agriculture points out the importance of the Project to the economy and people of South Sudan, and the severe consequences of termination of the Project.

*** A letter from our attorney in South Sudan, describing the business, legal and social aspects of the Project is attached hereto as Annex C.
- (13) All the proceeds from the Project were transferred to bank accounts in Israel and were duly reported to Israeli tax authorities.

c. Contrary to the Release, I never planned attacks on oil fields or infrastructure sites, either by mercenaries or otherwise

- (1) The Release ascribes to me and to companies under my ownership the planning of "attacks on South Sudanese oil fields and infrastructure", supposedly in an effort to create a situation that only we could solve.
- (2) I have never initiated and/or planned and/or been in any way involved in the planning and/or execution of any attack in South Sudan, and specifically any attack on oil fields or infrastructure in the country.

d. **Contrary to the Release, I never bribed any Government of South Sudan official**

- (1) In the Release, I and companies under my ownership are ascribed serious offenses of bribery, and it is claimed that I bribed Government of South Sudan officials.
- (2) **There is not a shred of truth to this claims, and I was not involved in any offense of bribery.**
- (3) It is for good reason that the U.S. Department of the Treasury does not state details about government officials who had supposedly been bribed by me, and had there been any, clearly their name too would have been listed in the Release and Sanctions would have been imposed on them too.

10. **I have no acquaintance or relationship with the other persons named in the Release**

- 10.1. The Release names two other persons – Mr. Gregory Vasili (“**Mr. Vasili**”) and Mr. Obac William Olawo (“**Mr. Olawo**”).
- 10.2. I have no relationship or connection with Mr. Vasili or Mr. Olawo, and I do not know why I am mentioned alongside them.


11. **Conclusion**

- 11.1. As specified in this affidavit, I declare that I do not have and never have had any connection to arms dealing and the other accusations made against me by the U.S. Department of the Treasury.
- 11.2. Anything set forth above about myself applies also to the companies owned by me.
- 11.3. Unfortunately, I find myself in a Kafkaesque situation in which I cannot respond to concrete and specific claims or evidence, which were never presented to me, and against which I have never been afforded the opportunity to defend myself.
- 11.4. The danger that the Project may be canceled, led the President of South Sudan, Mr. Salva Kiir Mayardit, to write the Prime Minister of Israel, Mr. Benjamin Netanyahu, and ask for his help to sustain the Project.

*** A copy of the President’s letter is attached hereto as **Annex D.**
- 11.5. I therefore repeat my request that a comprehensive and thorough investigation be carried out by DECA, in which I am certain that it will soon transpire to you that there is not a shred of truth to the general claims vaguely asserted by the U.S. Ministry of the Treasury.

This is my name, this is my signature and the content of my affidavit is the truth.

Israel Ziv



Certification

I hereby certify that on 10.3.19 appeared before me, Adv. Moshe Kahn, Mr. Israel Ziv who is known to me personally, and after I cautioned him to state the truth, and that if he fails to do so he would be liable for the penalties prescribed by law, he confirmed the veracity of his statement and signed it at my presence.



Moshe Kahn, Adv.

מוֹשֶׁה קַהַן, אֲדֹוָע
MOSE KAHN, ADV.