

Conference on Disarmament

English

Final record of the one thousand three hundred and fortieth plenary meeting


Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on Tuesday, 24 February 2015, at 10.05 a.m.

President: Mr. Vaanchig Purevdorj.....(Mongolia)

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The President: I call to order the 1340th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

Distinguished colleagues, we have received a request from Bahrain to participate in our work as an observer during the 2015 session. This request is now before you in document CD/WP.583/Add.5, which includes all the requests received by the secretariat until yesterday, 23 February 2015, at 4 p.m. All requests from non-member States received after that date will be presented for your consideration and decision at the next plenary meeting.

Are there any comments on these requests? I see none. May I take it that the Conference decides to invite Bahrain to participate in our work in accordance with the rules of procedure?

It was so decided.

The President: Distinguished colleagues, as you know we decided to devote our meeting today to agenda items 1 and 2, with a special focus on nuclear disarmament. Before I give the floor to the speakers on my list, I wish to express my sincere appreciation to you for accepting our suggestion to hold a focused debate and exchange on the four core issues. I also wish to extend my thanks again to all members for your kind support and cooperation.

As I noted before, advancing the agenda of disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is one of our main priorities, and substantive and focused discussion on this issue would be timely and relevant as we are preparing for the 2015 Review Conference on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Thus, I hope that today's debate will contribute to our collective efforts to move the process forward.

I have on my list of speakers today Pakistan. I now give the floor to the Ambassador of Pakistan.

Mr. Akram (Pakistan): First of all, I would like to congratulate you, Mr. President, on assuming the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament and assure you of my delegation's full support and cooperation.

We welcome the discussions in the Conference on nuclear disarmament, which is not only the highest priority of the international community but also the *raison d'être* of the Conference on Disarmament.

At the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament, held in 1978, the entire United Nations membership agreed by consensus on a comprehensive disarmament strategy. The Final Document of that special session stated that, while the final objective was general and complete disarmament under effective international control, the immediate goal was the time-bound elimination of nuclear weapons. Pakistan is fully committed to achieving this goal in a universal, non-discriminatory and verifiable manner.

The first special session emphasized that, in the adoption of disarmament measures, the right of each State to security should be kept in mind and that, at each stage of the disarmament process, the objective should be undiminished security at the lowest possible level of armaments and military forces.

The first special session also recognized the Conference on Disarmament as the sole multilateral negotiating forum on disarmament.

Mr. President, there has been progressive erosion in the international consensus established by the first special session devoted to disarmament. The declared aspiration for achieving a world free of nuclear weapons does not match practical action on the ground.

The cardinal principle of equal and undiminished security for all States is being ignored, without realizing that absolute security for one State, or a group of States, cannot come at the cost of diminished security for others. This, coupled with the trend of granting waivers and exceptions, has undermined the global non-proliferation regime and complicated regional and global security. We continue to observe blatant application of double standards and discrimination for narrow strategic and commercial considerations, which have proved counterproductive.

The reasons for the inaction on nuclear disarmament and the ongoing stalemate of the United Nations disarmament machinery lie in the lack of political will among significant military States to address the relevant issues on an equitable basis with due regard for the security of all States.

Nuclear-weapon States must announce a renewed commitment to achieve nuclear disarmament within a reasonable time frame. Without this commitment, the so-called grand bargain of the non-proliferation regime will continue to erode. The eventual objective must be the total elimination of nuclear weapons within a re-energized collective security system.

The security of Pakistan was qualitatively challenged by the introduction of nuclear weapons in our region. Pakistan was left with no option but to acquire a credible nuclear deterrent capability. Nevertheless, Pakistan has consistently supported the goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world through the conclusion of a universal, non-discriminatory and verifiable nuclear weapons convention in the Conference on Disarmament. We have never wavered from this objective and reaffirm our commitment to this goal today.

There has been an ongoing debate on the most effective approach to nuclear disarmament. Some States advocate a step-by-step approach leading to the elimination of nuclear weapons at an undefined future date. This piecemeal approach seems to be a subterfuge for diverting attention from nuclear disarmament to those non-proliferation measures which they consider cost-free for their security calculus. This was manifest in the conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and now in the push for a fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT). Moreover, the States advocating the step-by-step approach have not even been able to identify the next step after an FMCT — not to mention a definite time frame for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

Some other States, mostly those relying on extended nuclear deterrence, have advanced the “building blocks” approach, comprising a set of mutually reinforcing unilateral, bilateral, plurilateral and multilateral measures for nuclear disarmament. This is essentially a status quo approach propagating the conduct of business as usual through disparate measures — which has failed to deliver nuclear disarmament thus far.

The difference between the step-by-step and the “building block” approaches is that the former envisages progressive steps with each new step conditional on the fulfilment of the previous one, while the latter foresees parallel and simultaneous measures. In our view, both fall short of providing a definite time frame and both advocate only an FMCT in the foreseeable future.

This is why most States, including non-aligned members of the Conference on Disarmament, prefer a direct and comprehensive approach for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified time frame. A comprehensive nuclear weapons convention would prohibit the possession, development, production, acquisition, testing, stockpiling, transfer, use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, and provide for their destruction. United Nations General Assembly resolution 68/32 on the follow-up to the 2013 high-level meeting on nuclear disarmament embraced this comprehensive approach.

The Final Document of the first special session devoted to disarmament also calls for a comprehensive phased programme with agreed time frames, whenever feasible, for

progressive and balanced reduction of stockpiles of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, leading to their ultimate and complete elimination at the earliest possible time.

The United Nations Secretary-General alluded to either of the two approaches in his 2008 five-point proposal, where he stated that the goal of nuclear disarmament could be pursued by agreement on a framework of separate, mutually reinforcing instruments or by considering negotiating a nuclear weapons convention, backed by a strong system of verification.

While Pakistan favours a comprehensive approach to nuclear disarmament, we are, for the sake of facilitating progress, open to considering all options as long as we are in agreement that the end goal is complete nuclear disarmament within a specified time frame, with equal and undiminished security for all States. What we cannot accept is that this ultimate goal of nuclear disarmament is derailed by the pursuit of discriminatory and deceptive interim agreements.

Nuclear disarmament is being delayed by diverting the Conference on Disarmament's focus to partial non-proliferation measures like the FMCT. An FMCT that does not address the existing stockpiles of fissile materials would make no contribution towards nuclear disarmament.

We hope that the discussions that we are undertaking today will facilitate the start of negotiations on nuclear disarmament in the Conference. As a first step, we should examine the various existing proposals on nuclear disarmament to identify the common elements that could provide the initial basis for our work. We should also explore new ideas in order to arrive at a common approach. Pakistan remains ready to enter into this exercise in a sincere and earnest manner.

The President: I thank the Ambassador of Pakistan for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair.

The next speaker on my list is the representative of the United Kingdom. You have the floor, Madam.

Ms. Saggese (United Kingdom): I am speaking on behalf of China, France, Russia, the United States and the United Kingdom.

The five Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty nuclear-weapon States (P5) met in London on 4 and 5 February 2015 for their sixth conference to review progress towards fulfilling the commitments made at the 2010 Review Conference and to discuss the next steps for the P5 process. In particular, the five States considered the implementation of the 2010 action plan adopted by consensus as a road map for long-term action. They also considered a wide array of issues related to and steps towards making progress on all three pillars of the Treaty: disarmament, non-proliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In addition, they had constructive and productive discussions with a number of non-nuclear-weapon States and civil society representatives.

In reaffirming their commitment towards achieving a world without nuclear weapons in accordance with the goals of the Treaty, the five States reflected on the contribution that the P5 process had made in developing the mutual confidence and transparency among them that is essential to make progress towards multilateral nuclear disarmament. At the start of the second cycle of the process, all five States noted the value of having an established dialogue, with each of them having now hosted a conference at least once. They welcomed how each conference had built on the success of the last and the increasing amount of intersessional work on issues such as the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, the achievement of consensus among the five States on a common reporting framework and the glossary of key nuclear terms, which have all contributed towards the implementation of the 2010 action plan.

At their 2015 conference, the five States restated their belief that the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty remains the essential cornerstone for the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament, and is an essential contribution to international security and stability. They reviewed the Preparatory Committee process over the course of this review cycle and considered the upcoming 2015 Review Conference, where the five States intend to make a joint statement. They looked forward to working with all States parties to the Treaty to ensure a positive outcome to the Review Conference that is balanced across the three mutually reinforcing pillars.

The five States reaffirmed that a step-by-step approach to nuclear disarmament that promotes international stability, peace and undiminished and increased security for all remains the only realistic and practical route to achieving a world without nuclear weapons. To this end, they discussed issues related to international security and strategic stability and their nuclear doctrines in order to enhance mutual understanding in these areas. This included updates on New START Treaty implementation and the verification experiences of both the Russian Federation and the United States in relation to the New START Treaty. It was noted that, since the entry into force of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the step-by-step approach has already dramatically reduced the number of nuclear weapons held by the nuclear-weapon States from their cold war peak. All five States reaffirmed the importance of full compliance with existing, legally binding arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament agreements and obligations as an essential element of international peace and security.

The five States stressed that addressing further prospects for nuclear disarmament would require taking into account all factors that could affect global strategic stability. In doing so, they stressed the importance of engaging in frank and constructive dialogue to that end.

The President: I thank the representative of the United Kingdom for her statement. I now give the floor to the representative of South Africa.

Ms. Mancotywa-Kumsha (South Africa): At the outset, my delegation would like to congratulate you, Mr. President, on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament and would also like to assure you of the full cooperation and support of South Africa during your tenure.

South Africa is concerned by the continuing stalemate in the Conference despite recent intensive efforts to get it back to work. As the world's single multilateral negotiating forum, the prolonged impasse in the Conference not only undermines its credibility but also raises questions about its continued relevance. It is therefore crucial that the work of the Conference be revitalized so that it can again fulfil its mandate through the resumption of substantive work.

As you are aware, nuclear disarmament remains the highest priority of South Africa. South Africa equally remains concerned about the lack of progress on this important issue. We believe that nuclear disarmament is an international obligation and a moral imperative. For South Africa, it is a shared responsibility of all States to prevent a nuclear weapon detonation, to curb the proliferation of nuclear weapons, to pursue nuclear disarmament and to achieve a world free of nuclear weapons.

As long as nuclear weapons exist, vertical and horizontal proliferation will persist and the threat to humanity will remain. The continued retention of nuclear weapons on the basis of the perceived security interests of some States comes at the expense of the rest of humanity. It is simply not sustainable for some States to argue that nuclear weapons are central to their own security while expecting others not to argue the same. The development of new categories of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems provides a clear indication that some nuclear-weapon States continue to harbour aspirations for the indefinite retention

of these instruments of mass destruction. It is regrettable that vast public resources are diverted towards the modernization of nuclear weapons, while basic human needs cannot be met. Much-needed resources should be redirected towards the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals and the post-2015 global development agenda that will carry forward the unmet targets of the Millennium Development Goals.

Nuclear weapons are inhumane weapons and it is inconceivable that their use could ever, under any circumstances, be consistent with international law, particularly international humanitarian law. South Africa has always emphasized the humanitarian imperatives that underpin our search for a world without the threat posed by the possession, use and proliferation of nuclear weapons. These considerations are today a fundamental and global concern that must be at the core of all deliberations, actions and discussions on nuclear weapons. My delegation therefore welcomes the outcomes of the Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons; in particular, we welcome the spirit of the Austrian Pledge and subsequent pledges which call for member States to identify and pursue effective measures to fill the existing legal gap for the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons. As South Africa, we trust that these matters will be adequately reflected in the outcome document and decisions of the 2015 Review Conference on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

In conclusion, my delegation is of the view that measurable progress on nuclear disarmament is a major determinant in achieving and in sustaining international peace and security. Indeed, nuclear weapons have no place in today's world. As the world this year marks the seventieth anniversary of the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, we believe that it is high time that all Conference on Disarmament members ensure that this body discharges its negotiating mandate.

The President: I thank the representative of South Africa for her statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair. The next speaker on my list is the representative of the Russian Federation. You have the floor, Sir.

Mr. Deyneko (Russian Federation) (*spoke in Russian*): Mr. President, we had the impression we would be making our statement a little later on but we are prepared to do so now. If you have given us the floor now, we shall do so.

The Russian delegation fully endorses the statement made by the representative of the United Kingdom on behalf of the five permanent members of the Security Council. Russia meets all its international obligations on nuclear disarmament. The Russian Federation, like the Soviet Union before it, has signed a number of treaties and agreements that have laid the foundation for policy on nuclear disarmament and the strengthening of strategic stability.

The first step towards real nuclear disarmament was the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, signed on 8 December 1987. The treaty allowed us to eliminate — I stress, to eliminate — an entire class of nuclear missiles. Pursuant to its provisions, 1,846 medium-range (from 1,000 km to 5,500 km) and short-range (from 500 km to 1,000 km) ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles and 825 launchers for them were completely destroyed. In total, more than 3,000 tons of nuclear warheads with a combined yield of 5,000 kilotons were deactivated. The Treaty is still in operation today.

The signing of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (the New START Treaty) in Prague on 8 April 2010 was an exceptionally significant event for nuclear disarmament. The New START Treaty requires both parties to reduce and limit their strategic offensive weapons within seven years to no more than 700 deployed

intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles and bombers and 1,550 warheads for them.

Thus, from the very beginning — that is, 1987 — to the present day, Russia has reduced by several times the capabilities of its nuclear deterrent from their extent at the height of the cold war and has fully met its obligations to end the nuclear arms race, as provided for under article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

As to further steps, we are, as President Vladimir Putin announced at the Valdai Discussion Club in Sochi, ready for a serious and substantive discussion on nuclear disarmament. What do we envisage? A serious and substantive discussion can be held only if the principle of equal and indivisible security for all is respected and all factors affecting global stability are considered.

Note that many other countries also recognize this necessity. You recently had the opportunity to read the statement issued on behalf of the permanent members of the Security Council at the Conference held in London, and it reflects the same position. Let me quote one passage for you: “Addressing further prospects for nuclear disarmament would require taking into account all factors that could affect global strategic stability.” I will not bore you with a detailed list of all these factors, but will focus on only the three most significant ones.

Firstly, today, many types of precision-guided munition already possess capabilities similar to those of weapons of mass destruction. States that reject nuclear weapons or critically reduce the size of their nuclear arsenal would face a significant military disadvantage against States that possess superiority in the creation and production of precision-guided munition systems. The temptation would arise of a so-called global disarming first strike.

Secondly, there are the global missile defence plans developed by the United States of America and its allies. The problem is so significant that, with your permission, Mr. President, we have decided to make a separate statement on the matter. For now, let me note only that an increasing number of Member States of the United Nations share our main concerns regarding the destabilizing effect of global missile defence.

Thirdly, uncertainty regarding the placement of weapons in outer space remains a serious threat to global stability. The aim of the Russian-Chinese draft treaty, an updated version of which was offered for your consideration last year, was to neutralize this threat. The adoption of legally binding international safeguards prohibiting the placement of weapons in space would be an organic addition to the cause of nuclear disarmament, since it would increase the predictability of behaviour and trust in the military sphere, strengthen global security and thereby pave the way for further advances, and it would do so in the interests of all States, not at the expense of some and to the benefit of others.

The scale of the problems before us makes it necessary for us to come together to find suitable collective solutions. And, as the single multilateral negotiating forum, the Conference on Disarmament can and must contribute to this process. As we said earlier, the Russian delegation is prepared to engage in a substantive and comprehensive dialogue, both in discussions and negotiations.

The President: I thank the representative of the Russian Federation for his statement. The next speaker on my list is the Ambassador of Bulgaria. Ambassador, you have the floor.

Mr. Piperkov (Bulgaria): Mr. President, let me start by wishing you a successful tenure as President of the Conference on Disarmament. My delegation will support every effort to bring the Conference back on a track that will result in action. In this regard, I join others who spoke in favour of re-establishing the mandate of the informal working group

on a programme of work. We also agree with the assessment that last year's schedule of activities steered substantial discussion on all the agenda items of the Conference; we can support a follow-on to this positive experience. We understand that you are seeking a way to continue work on the proposals introduced by the Mexican presidency.

It is timely and relevant — as was already said today — to continue the discussion on the issue of nuclear disarmament. Bulgaria is strongly committed to the objective of achieving a world free of nuclear weapons. As the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) provides the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament and is recognized as a cornerstone for nuclear non-proliferation, we need to work towards further strengthening of its regime.

The NPT is an irreplaceable framework for maintaining international peace and security. Therefore, we need to unite efforts to secure a positive outcome to the forthcoming NPT Review Conference that will lay the groundwork for further progress in this area. The successful implementation of the commitments undertaken in the 2010 NPT Review Conference action plan, across the three pillars, is of key importance for implementing the goals of the Treaty. We welcome the achievements so far, in particular the concrete steps implemented in nuclear disarmament.

Advancing nuclear disarmament is a collective responsibility. A common understanding on the concrete and practical steps needed can be built through an inclusive and comprehensive discussion, with substantive participation of the nuclear-weapon States. Bringing different perspectives to the debate on nuclear disarmament should not divide us; rather, this is the way to establish common ground for effective progress in this area.

Nuclear disarmament is a complex process that is not occurring in a vacuum. The strategic context cannot be neglected. Creating conditions for a world without nuclear weapons and achieving success in nuclear disarmament and, in the future, their total elimination requires that both humanitarian and security considerations are taken into account.

We share the concern about the catastrophic humanitarian consequences that could occur as a result of the possible use of nuclear weapons, whether deliberate or accidental. The awareness and understanding of these consequences underpin the efforts to achieve real progress in nuclear disarmament and create a safer and secure world.

With this in mind, we will encourage and support a constructive and realistic, gradual approach that requires, inter alia, agreeing on practical and implementable measures: building blocks that will strengthen the international disarmament and non-proliferation regime. The Conference on Disarmament, as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, is positioned to play a significant role in this regard. We need to demonstrate mature political will and overcome the long-lasting impasse. Starting negotiations in the Conference on a fissile material cut-off treaty on the basis of the mandate contained in document CD/1299 remains a priority for us. This is the next logical step in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Bringing into force the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty will also be a serious practical contribution to strengthening control over nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Effective nuclear disarmament requires simultaneous multilateral, bilateral and unilateral measures and a framework of mutually reinforcing, legally binding documents. For this purpose, we have to make the Conference again instrumental.

All these steps that we need to embark upon should be perceived as strengthening the NPT in line with the obligations of article VI and contributing towards achieving the Treaty's final goal: a world without nuclear weapons. There is no alternative path or shortcut. We need to act in a sustainable, realistic and responsible manner.

The President: I thank the representative of Bulgaria for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair. The next speaker on my list is the Ambassador of India. Ambassador Varma, you have the floor.

Mr. Varma (India): Mr. President, we would like to join other delegations in thanking you for the initiative that you have taken to organize plenary discussions on nuclear disarmament and other items on the agenda during the next few plenaries.

With reference to your opening remarks on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), we recognize and we fully respect that a vast majority of the delegations here will be participating in the NPT Review Conference in May, for which we wish them well and we wish the Conference success. Having said that, we think that the Conference on Disarmament is an independent body and we would not like this Conference to be limited by limitations of a treaty outside this body.

India has been unwavering in its commitment to universal, non-discriminatory, verifiable nuclear disarmament. In our view, nuclear disarmament can be achieved through a step-by-step process underwritten by a universal commitment in an agreed global and non-discriminatory multilateral framework. But we have called for a meaningful dialogue among all States possessing nuclear weapons to build trust and confidence and for reducing the salience of nuclear weapons in international affairs and security doctrines. We believe that increasing the restraints and use of nuclear weapons would reduce the probability of their use, whether deliberate, unintentional or accidental, and this process could contribute to the progressive delegitimization of nuclear weapons, an essential step for their eventual elimination, as has been the experience for chemical and biological weapons.

The resolutions sponsored by India in the First Committee and the General Assembly last year, on measures to reduce nuclear dangers arising from accidental, unauthorized use of nuclear weapons, adopted as resolution 69/40, and the call on the Conference on Disarmament to commence negotiations on a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, adopted as General Assembly resolution 69/69, received support from a large number of Member States. Pursuant to General Assembly resolution 68/32, supported by the Non-Aligned Movement, India has supported the commencement of negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear weapons convention in the Conference on Disarmament on the basis of document CD/1999, which was submitted by the Group of 21 last year.

India participated in the Vienna meeting on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons as it did in the Oslo and Nayarit meetings before, in the hope that renewed attention to the most serious threat to the survival of mankind posed by the use of nuclear weapons would help generate momentum for increased restraints on use of such weapons, and thus correct an imbalance in the international discourse that has focused almost exclusively on restraints on possession.

The credibility gap arising from the positions of some member States, and of some NGOs, who are quick to embrace the humanitarian discourse but, strangely enough, oppose restraints on use of nuclear weapons, does not help, in our view, in building a genuine global movement in favour of nuclear disarmament. It is the view of India that, for these discussions to be meaningful, it is important that they be inclusive, with the participation of all the nuclear Powers. In terms of substance, they should do no harm to the non-proliferation regime or impede genuine progress towards the goal of nuclear disarmament. In terms of process, they should do no harm to the established disarmament machinery.

Without prejudice to the priority that we attach to nuclear disarmament, India supports the negotiation in the Conference on Disarmament of a fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT) that meets its national security interests. We hope that the Group of Governmental Experts on an FMCT established under United Nations General Assembly

resolution 67/53 will strengthen international resolve for the early commencement of treaty negotiations in the Conference on the basis of the agreed mandate contained in document CD/1299, and we will of course have an opportunity in the next plenary to say a little more on this topic.

India is committed to working with the international community to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, including through strong national export controls, and early membership of the multilateral export control regimes.

India considers the Conference on Disarmament as the appropriate forum for the commencement of negotiations on nuclear disarmament through the establishment of a subsidiary body with a mandate agreed by consensus as part of a comprehensive and balanced programme of work.

The President: I thank the Ambassador of India for his statement. I have the Ambassador of Indonesia as the next speaker on my list. Ambassador Wibowo, you have the floor.

Mr. Wibowo (Indonesia): Let me begin by congratulating you, Ambassador Purevdorj, on the assumption of your role as the second President of the Conference on Disarmament at its 2015 session. I am confident that, with your competent leadership, you will be able to guide us in conducting the work of the Conference, and Indonesia stands ready to support and cooperate with you during your presidency.

Indonesia appreciates your plans to re-establish an informal working group with a mandate to produce a programme of work and to work on the draft schedule of activities for the Conference's current 2015 session. My delegation also supports any effort to produce a workable programme of work. Indonesia appreciates as well the initiative of Mongolia to convene the formal plenary meetings for focused debate and exchanges of views on the four core issues related to the programme of work.

This plenary is devoted to discussing nuclear disarmament. As demonstrated during the high-level meeting of the General Assembly on nuclear disarmament held in New York on 26 September 2013, the issue of nuclear disarmament remains a major international priority. That meeting provided an opportunity for Heads of State and Government, foreign ministers and other high-level officials to outline their policies for nuclear disarmament. The meeting underlined the strong support of the international community for taking urgent and effective measures to achieve the total elimination of all nuclear weapons.

Subsequent to the high-level meeting on nuclear disarmament, the General Assembly last year adopted resolution 69/58, entitled "Follow-up to the 2013 high-level meeting of the General Assembly on nuclear disarmament". The resolution called for the urgent commencement of negotiations in the Conference for the early conclusion of a comprehensive convention on nuclear weapons to prohibit their possession, development, production, acquisitions, testing, stockpiling, transfer, use or threat of use and to provide for their destruction. In the resolution, the Assembly also decided to convene, no later than 2018, a United Nations high-level international conference on nuclear disarmament to review the progress made in this regard, and it welcomed the commemoration of 26 September as the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons.

To this end, we emphasize the need to start negotiations on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, including a nuclear weapons convention to prohibit their development, production, acquisition, testing, stockpiling, transfer, use or threat of use and to provide for their destruction without further delay. Establishing an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament as soon as possible is also of the highest priority.

It is dismaying, therefore, that the Conference has continued in a stalemate for the past 19 years. The continuing deadlock of the Conference reflects a lack of serious

commitment to the goal of complete elimination of nuclear weapons, as well as other core issues before the Conference. Multilateral disarmament negotiations can only take place if member States of the Conference demonstrate flexibility and political will to agree on a balanced and comprehensive programme of work.

Finally, Indonesia is fully mindful of making tangible progress on international security and disarmament affairs. In this regard, Indonesia would like to reiterate once again the need to attain the goal of complete nuclear disarmament leading to the total elimination of nuclear weapons as the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Achieving a world without nuclear weapons should remain our ultimate goal.

The President: I thank the Ambassador of Indonesia for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair.

I have as the next speaker on my list the Ambassador of Japan. Ambassador Sano, you have the floor.

Mr. Sano (Japan): Since this is the first time that I am taking the floor under your presidency, allow me to congratulate you, Mr. President, on your assumption of this high post. I appreciate your efforts to organize these substantive discussions on the core issues, and I assure you of my delegation's full support as you lead the Conference on Disarmament.

The overall objective of nuclear disarmament is to achieve a safer world without nuclear weapons, and for that purpose it is important to take realistic and practical steps in a progressive manner.

The Japanese Foreign Minister Mr. Kishida has proposed that we should work towards "three reductions" in nuclear disarmament and "three preventions" in nuclear non-proliferation, namely a reduction in the number of nuclear weapons, in the role they play and in the incentive to possess them, and prevention of the emergence of new nuclear-weapon States, of the proliferation of nuclear weapon-related materials and of technologies and nuclear terrorism.

We are determined to make further efforts to accumulate "building blocks" towards a world without nuclear weapons, while keeping in mind the three reductions and preventions.

States may differ on the means or sequencing for achieving a secure world free of nuclear weapons. However, the international community should focus not on differences but on common ground by identifying concrete and practical measures, including the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the universalization of the International Atomic Energy Agency Additional Protocol. We recognize that there is steady progress on these issues, and here in Geneva the immediate commencement of negotiation of a fissile material cut-off treaty is our highest priority. There are no shortcuts to achieve effective, verifiable and irreversible nuclear disarmament, taking into account the severity of the prevailing international security environment.

Mr. President, our journey towards a secure world free of nuclear weapons requires enduring will and enormous energy from the people on a global scale. Therefore, it is all the more crucial to foster a broad and deep understanding of the importance of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation in the minds and hearts of the people. In this regard, Japan places great emphasis on the significance of education, i.e., spreading awareness of the catastrophic humanitarian consequences across national borders and generations.

Japan has participated in three conferences on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons and believes that this important issue should be inclusive and universal, as well as

a catalyst, instead of a dividing factor, for united global action towards the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons. It fundamentally underpins all nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation work, including progressive approaches, in pursuit of a more secure world, particularly through the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). It is vital to avoid mutual distrust, lack of confidence and fragmentation of the international community which would be counter to sincere, effective disarmament and non-proliferation efforts and delay the entire process of nuclear disarmament.

Mr. President, 70 years have passed since the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and in a few months the NPT Review Conference will take place. It is crucial that all States fulfil their disarmament commitments urgently and with greater resolve and work together towards a world without nuclear weapons. Japan is fully committed to achieving the total elimination of nuclear weapons, and we intend to continue to steadily promote practical steps and effective measures to that end.

The President: I thank the Ambassador of Japan for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair. The next speaker on my list is the representative of France. You have the floor, Sir.

Mr. Riquet (France) (*spoke in French*): Mr. President, since this is the first time that I am taking the floor under your presidency, allow me to congratulate you on your assumption of this post and assure you of the full support of France in the discharge of your responsibilities.

France associates itself fully with the statement made by the United Kingdom on behalf of the five nuclear-weapon States that are parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).

My delegation would like to see today's meeting on nuclear disarmament reflect the importance of the Non-Proliferation Treaty as the cornerstone of the international non-proliferation regime and the basis of our disarmament efforts. With only a few weeks to go before the ninth NPT Review Conference, our priority must be the consolidation of the Treaty. For France, that means that we must continue to implement fully the road map established under the action plan that was adopted by consensus in 2010. As we have stated on numerous occasions, this is an ambitious, long-term plan. This balanced approach among the three pillars, which calls on States to take concrete and progressive action, will allow us to make progress in creating the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons — in accordance with the objectives of the Treaty — in a way that promotes international stability and based on the principle of undiminished and increased security for all.

That is the only realistic and effective approach to multilateral disarmament. Nuclear disarmament only makes sense if it does not lead to an arms race in other areas. Hence, it needs to be part of general and complete disarmament, in accordance with article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Nuclear disarmament can only be achieved step by step through a series of concrete and progressive measures. This is the only effective approach. Pursuing any other avenue — which would be to ignore the actual strategic context and stray from the course charted by the action plan — would only undermine the integrity of the Treaty and weaken the essential and irreplaceable contribution that it makes to international peace and security.

France remains fully committed and ready to take action towards disarmament. The President of France, Mr. François Hollande, recently reiterated this in an important address he delivered on nuclear deterrence last Thursday, 19 February. The text of that address is available, in English and French, on the website of the Permanent Mission of France to the Conference on Disarmament. In his speech, the President clearly indicated that, while it is prepared to defend itself, France does not wish to give up the goal of disarmament,

including nuclear disarmament. France therefore supports the long-term goal of total elimination of nuclear weapons as soon as the strategic context is ripe. France will continue to work tirelessly towards this end. It will do so with consistency, transparency, truth and wisdom.

President Hollande further stated that it is not enough to simply declare immediate and total nuclear disarmament. Our words must be reflected in our deeds. Nuclear disarmament will not come about as if by magic or by merely making calls for action. It must be demonstrated in practice, above all by the States that call for it.

France has been exemplary in this regard through its adherence to the principle of strict sufficiency. It has thus reduced the total number of its weapons by half in recent years. France has also been exemplary in terms of irreversibility. It has not contented itself with just ceasing its nuclear tests: it has also stopped uranium and plutonium production for nuclear weapons and has completely dismantled the corresponding facilities. France has also been exemplary in terms of transparency about its nuclear arsenals and its concrete disarmament efforts. France will shortly propose visiting new sites that no longer have nuclear weapons, such as at Plateau d'Albion and the Luxeuil air base. Furthermore, also with regard to transparency, the President did not hesitate to disclose the composition of the French arsenal and urged all other States to do the same for all categories of weapons.

In his address, President Hollande took the opportunity to reaffirm the priorities of France in the area of nuclear disarmament. Our first priority remains the earliest possible entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. Our second priority is to end the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons definitively. The President of France called on all nuclear-weapon States to engage without delay in a discussion on the complete cessation of the production of fissile material, and France will propose in the coming weeks an ambitious, realistic and verifiable draft treaty on these issues. My delegation will be taking the floor again on these points in the not-too-distant future.

The President: I thank the representative of France for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair.

I now give the floor to the Ambassador of Algeria.

Mr. Khelif (Algeria) (*spoke in French*): Mr. President, the Algerian delegation would like to congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency and assures you of its full support as you lead our work towards the adoption of a programme of work, which continues to be our main challenge.

The Algerian delegation does not have a prepared statement for this plenary meeting, because we did not want to repeat the same speech as in years gone by. The Algerian position is well known, as are those of the other delegations. Every year we embark on a discussion of the various issues on the agenda, but this exercise has now morphed into a sort of monologue that we repeat every year without ever achieving any positive outcome.

I cannot help but note that the blinds here in the Council Chamber are drawn, depriving us of sunlight in this winter season just as we are deprived of a positive contribution from the international community to revitalize the work of the Conference on Disarmament. Unfortunately, the Conference seems to be sinking into a state of lethargy and complete autism. This situation serves only to exacerbate the concern expressed by the international community. I fully agree with our colleague from South Africa and her concern about the deadlock, which, regrettably, is holding not only the Conference hostage but also nuclear disarmament. This situation is not unique to the work of the Conference: the sad truth is that the entire machinery — all multilateral nuclear disarmament mechanisms — is affected and is unable to function, for reasons we are all well familiar with.

Please indulge me as I try to step back a bit from our usual rhetoric and reciting of official positions. As stated in the Conference's 10-point agenda (the "Decalogue") back in 1978, nuclear weapons are the weapons that pose the biggest threat, not only to international security, but to the very existence of humankind. This fact was acknowledged in 1978. Prior to that, in 1961, the General Assembly had indicated in a resolution that the use of nuclear weapons could constitute a crime against humanity. The Decalogue itself mentions that the use of nuclear weapons is contrary to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations. This is no less true today. The danger of nuclear weapons and the awareness of this threat are not new: at the time of the cold war, many theories and policies were developed in an effort to contain this danger. Those policies were based on two main elements. The first was that such weapons should not be used against the nuclear Powers of the time, essentially the East and the West; this restraint was based on the doctrine of mutual assured destruction, or MAD.

(spoke in English)

It is interesting that the acronym was MAD, as it was truly a mad policy since any failure of such a policy would lead to the destruction of humanity.

(spoke in French)

The second element to contain and avoid the danger of nuclear weapons at the time was the establishment of a standard on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, which led to the conclusion of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) that we are discussing today. In a few weeks, we will be gathering at the Review Conference on the Treaty in the hope that it will lead to positive results.

The rule of non-proliferation was in turn conditional on three things that we must not lose sight of. The first was the commitment made by the nuclear-weapon States to persevere towards eliminating their nuclear arsenals. The second was to provide non-nuclear-weapon States with credible assurances against the use of such weapons. The third was to guarantee non-nuclear-weapon States access to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. It has now been many years since the NPT was adopted, and all the delegations present here can make their own assessment based on the progress made under the three areas that I have just mentioned.

The doctrine of nuclear deterrence, which was closely linked to the context of the cold war, appears unfortunately to persist today. It seems to us that the doctrine is redundant in today's globalized, interconnected world where the security of States is seen as interlinked. In our opinion, it is important to emphasize that the security of a State or group of States cannot be seen in isolation. It must be viewed holistically if we are to keep humankind safe from the dangers posed, in particular by nuclear weapons.

We have taken note of the statement made by our colleague from the United Kingdom concerning the discussion among the five NPT nuclear-weapon States, their position and their assessment with respect to the upcoming Review Conference. We welcome the fact that they remain committed to achieving the goal of nuclear disarmament. We also listened with interest to what was said by our colleague from India, and we have great respect both for him and for his country's commitment to nuclear disarmament. What most caught our attention was the call made by his country for greater dialogue among nuclear-weapon States in an effort to build confidence. While that is no doubt an essential step, we believe that, in the current context, those who are most in need of confidence-building are the non-nuclear-weapon States, given the thousands of nuclear weapons in stockpiles and the associated dangerous doctrines of deterrence. In such a setting, responsibility for nuclear disarmament lies with us all, even if the nuclear-weapon States have a special responsibility, i.e., that of beginning to phase out the manufacture of nuclear weapons with a view to eliminating them. These States also have a responsibility to reduce

the danger of nuclear war. Lastly, they also have a responsibility to report on the action they are taking. I hope that at the Review Conference we will hear good news about headway made under the 2010 action plan.

As our French colleague said, the States that possess nuclear weapons need to lead the way on nuclear disarmament. We look forward to hearing about what has been done vis-à-vis the commitments made in 2010 within the framework of the NPT action plan, especially with regard to the issue of nuclear weapons. And we hope to hear about progress made on the ground, not diplomatic progress in the form of documents. The commitments made in 2010 are in fact the same commitments we assumed at the earlier Review Conference in 2000 and on which, unfortunately, no action has been taken to date.

As for what we will do in the Conference on Disarmament, since the nuclear-weapon States are still bound by their nuclear disarmament obligation, the Algerian delegation does not wish to make a formal proposal but would simply like to share an idea with our colleagues; this is, in a way, an idea that we already presented to the Conference in the 1990s. Since the nuclear-weapon States are willing to engage in a process of nuclear disarmament, and they are truly committed to this, we suggest that the Conference on Disarmament — provided, of course, that the nuclear-weapon States agree — should codify the commitment that these States assumed at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference to eliminate their nuclear weapons. If such a solution could be adopted at the Conference, and if that commitment could be codified in the Conference, we could easily establish a working group within the Conference to consider the measures required to achieve this goal.

I would like to conclude, Mr. President, by touching on your plans for the coming period. Through the Coordinator of the Group of 21, the delegation of Egypt, who has duly reported back to us, we have taken note of what this session's six Presidents discussed yesterday. We note that you intend to undertake consultations on the re-establishment of the informal working group to produce a programme of work, the establishment of a schedule of activities and the establishment of a working group to examine the working methods of the Conference on Disarmament. We look forward to receiving these proposals and the background documents. However, without wishing to question your intentions, Mr. President, which we know are in good faith and intended solely to help us move forward, we would like to reiterate a few points that we have already expressed in the past in relation to the current situation.

The first problem to which we must find a solution is the question of the programme of work. It is your responsibility, Mr. President, and we support you in this, to continue our consultations on the basis of previous proposals to reconcile the delegations' positions on a programme of work. With regard to the proposal that we have already tried for two years, which is to re-establish the informal working group on the programme of work, we are not certain — without wishing to prejudge what will happen if this proposal is taken up — that this will enable us to move forward. We already have last year's report of the working group, so the issues are known. The Algerian delegation is thus tentatively of the opinion that, as the proposal that was put before us at the beginning of the session by your predecessor, the Ambassador of Mexico, was very interesting, we could continue along this path in order to try to find common ground for moving forward.

We are concerned that establishing a working group on working methods and a working group on the programme of work might give the outside world, that is, the international community, the wrong impression — or false hope — that we are doing something, whereas, in our view, this is an initiative whose outcome we already know. Without wishing to jump to conclusions with regard to the programme of work, the outcome is already known and we do not believe that this will help us move forward.

In the event that these proposals do not allow us to move forward, it might be more useful to build on what we have done in recent years under the schedule of activities. The schedule of activities could serve as a genuine platform for discussions that would result in a report that shows the international community and the General Assembly the realities faced when it comes to the various issues on the negotiating table at the Conference on Disarmament.

The President: I thank the representative of Algeria for his statement. Would any other delegation like to take the floor? I recognize the representative of the Russian Federation.

Mr. Davydov (Russian Federation) (*spoke in Russian*): Mr. President, the Russian delegation must apologize for taking the floor for a second time today, but, as we said earlier, we would like to make some more detailed comments regarding the matter of missile defence.

We consider the intention of the United States of America and its allies to build a global missile defence system and regional segments without taking account of the interests and concerns of other States to be one of the major factors negatively influencing international security and stability. This negative influence increases as the number of American missile defence installations across the world increases. In Europe, the Asia-Pacific region, the Middle East and indeed throughout the world, the dividing lines between States are growing, as is distrust. Washington's plan to increase the quantity and quality of missile defence units capable of intercepting intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles presents a direct threat to the existing strategic parity.

The United States began this process in 2002 by withdrawing from the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, which had formed the basis of strategic stability for more than three decades. Washington's withdrawal from the Treaty was connected with its plan to build in Europe a so-called third interceptor site of the United States strategic missile defence system, parts of which were to be installed in Poland and the Czech Republic. Their position so close to Russian borders would have required retaliatory measures on our part to neutralize the threat that they would have posed to Russian nuclear deterrent forces. We were explicit in our warnings about this both to the United States and to those of its allies that had expressed a willingness to host American missile defence bases.

We interpreted President Obama's cancellation of the third interceptor site as a step in the right direction and a timely call for a de-escalation of the situation and the conclusion of the New START Treaty. However, the new phased and adaptive approach to missile defence announced by President Obama was to a large extent a continuation of the line taken by the United States from the moment of its unilateral withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. As missile defence technologies develop and new missile defence capabilities are installed in Romania, Poland and coastal areas of the European region, these installations become ever more dangerous, directly affecting Russian interests.

The destabilizing impact of American missile defence is spreading to other regions. Having originally begun in Europe, the United States is now looking to enlist other participants in the creation of regional segments of its global missile defence system. In the Asia-Pacific region, Washington has already enlisted Japan and Australia to this end. The States of the Persian Gulf have been supplied with new missile defence weapons. At the same time, the United States has increased the number of strategic missile defence ground-based interceptors on its continental territory. By 2017, there will be 44 interceptors. Plans are being prepared for further expansion, including a possible expansion to the east of the country. Information systems, including space-based systems, are being improved, and

missile defence firepower is being tested. The naval group of the missile defence system comprises approximately 40 warships and hundreds of interceptors.

These colossal efforts demonstrate that Washington's officially declared intentions are far from the reality. As Sergei Lavrov, Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation, said in Munich, the missile defence situation is a striking example of the powerfully destructive influence of unilateral steps towards military build-up that run counter to the legitimate interests of other States.

Our offers of collaboration on missile defence were rejected. We were instead advised to join in the creation of the American global missile defence system strictly according to Washington's plan, which, as we have repeatedly stressed and explained with the support of evidence, entails real risks for Russian nuclear deterrent forces.

Any action undermining strategic stability inevitably entails retaliatory measures. It also causes long-term damage to the system of international treaties on arms control, the viability of which depends directly on ballistic missile defence.

The President: I thank the representative of the Russian Federation for his statement. I now give the floor to the Ambassador of the United States of America.

Mr. Wood (United States of America): I apologize for taking the floor, Mr. President, but I need to say a few words in response to the presentation that was just made by our colleague from the Russian Federation.

We have had countless bilateral discussions with the Russian Federation on a range of issues, one of which, which was mentioned, was ballistic missile defence. We have always been open to having those discussions. We have said that the Russian Federation has nothing to fear by the work we have been doing on ballistic missile defence. We certainly welcome discussions with them. Our ballistic missile defence capabilities and systems that we are working on with allies have basically been developed to protect us from new threats that have emerged. That is certainly well known by our colleagues from Russia. Again, we are willing to talk about these issues with the Russian Federation, issues with regard to strategic stability, and of course further nuclear reductions. In fact, as I think everyone in this room knows, President Obama in 2013 put down a proposal to reduce our stockpiles by an additional one third from the New START Treaty levels. We certainly remain willing to do that but, in order to do so, we need a willing partner and obviously a climate that is much more conducive to further disarmament discussions. I just wanted to make those points clear.

The President: I thank the Ambassador of the United States for his statement. Would any other delegation like to take the floor? That does not seem to be the case. As we have exhausted the list of the speakers, before we adjourn this plenary session I wish to inform the Conference of the following.

As I said in my opening remarks during the last plenary meeting, I have been undertaking consultations on three issues among this session's six Presidents, namely on the re-establishment of an informal working group on the programme of work, on a schedule of activities for the 2015 session of the Conference and on the establishment of an informal working group on the methods of work. We are closely consulting with the other Presidents; once consultations are concluded, then the draft documents will be more or less finalized. In my capacity as the President, I will share with the Conference draft proposals on these three documents through the coordinators of the regional groups for further consultation.

Would any other delegation like to take the floor on this issue? I recognize the representative of Iraq.

Mr. Al Neiami (Iraq): Allow me first to congratulate you, Mr. President, on the assumption of your work as the President of the Conference. We are sure that your work will add to the work of the Conference this year.

You described to us what you are planning to do. My question is if the draft proposals will be circulated through our coordinators this week or after the high-level segment next week?

The President: I thank the representative of Iraq for his comments and question. In terms of time, we aim to do this within this week, that is to say, finalize and distribute to the regional group coordinators; if not, then by the beginning of next week.

I now recognize the representative of Algeria.

Mr. Khelif (Algeria) (*spoke in French*): I am sorry to take the floor again on an issue to which I already referred in my earlier statement. It is simply about the proposals you intend to present, Mr. President, on the three issues you mentioned.

We do not know what status these proposals will have, but we hope that these documents will be presented in an appropriate framework so as to ensure that the consultations can continue.

Secondly, with regard to the key issue of the programme of work, I do not know what you have in mind, Mr. President, but the Algerian delegation strongly encourages you to continue consultations on this issue, because it is the problem on which we are stuck. We therefore encourage you to continue, taking into account the proposals on the table, with which we are all familiar, in the hope that we can find common ground on this issue.

The President: I thank the representative of Algeria for his comments and for sharing his views. I recognize the Ambassador of the Netherlands.

Mr. Van der Kwast (Netherlands): I have a question with regard to next week, Mr. President. May I ask the secretariat, through you, if we have any indication already about the speakers for the high-level panel, and what sort of list there is. It could be of interest to several delegations, including my own, to see what speakers there are.

The President: I thank the Ambassador of the Netherlands for his comments and questions. I now give the floor to the Secretary of the Conference.

Mr. Fung (Secretary of the Conference): Mr. President, the secretariat is in the process of finalizing the list. We should have done so earlier, but various delegations have changed either their time or their date, thus making it difficult for the secretariat to finalize its work at this stage. We intend to do so by early next week. The information will be posted on the website for everyone to see the plan for the speakers and their time slots. I can tell you now that we have registered 24 dignitaries so far, including close to 17 Ministers, who will be addressing the Conference.

I wish to take this opportunity to call on the delegations that have not yet finalized or confirmed to do so, so that the secretariat can conclude its work. We are aware that it is not in your hands to quickly come to us and provide confirmation, but this is where we are. We will be closing the process by early next week, with everything to be posted online.

The President: I thank the Secretary of the Conference for the response provided and clarifications made. I now recognize the Ambassador of the Netherlands.

Mr. Van der Kwast (Netherlands): I apologize for coming back, but I think that is rather late. I know that some Ministers, including my own, will speak on Monday, so it might be good if we could have an indicative list. I fully appreciate that it is not possible to give a full list but, for planning and that sort of thing, for all of us it would be good to have

already an indication as to what sort of high-level speakers we might have next week from Monday on.

The President: I thank the Ambassador of the Netherlands and now give the floor to the Secretary of the Conference.

Mr. Fung (Secretary of the Conference): We have been working with individual delegations and, for the other delegations, we have put down the time slot that they have requested. I agree that it is getting very late for concluding this. In the past, we usually only put up the timetable for the high-level segment once it was confirmed; but we are open, and many of you have been coming to us for confirmation. We will continue to provide information to all delegations, and we will make additional efforts so that it can be posted well in time. We have three or four delegations that have not yet confirmed: they have told us that they would do so as soon as they hear from their capitals. We really hope that this will be done in the next day or so.

The President: I thank the Secretary of the Conference. Would any other delegation like to take the floor? That does not seem to be the case.

That concludes our business for today. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will take place on Thursday, 26 February, at 10 a.m.

The next plenary meeting will be devoted to agenda items 1 and 2 with a special focus on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices.

The meeting rose at 11.40 a.m.