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# Conference on Disarmament

English

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## Final record of the one thousand three hundred and thirty-third plenary meeting

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on Wednesday, 28 January 2015, at 3.05 p.m.

*President:* Mr. Jorge Lomónaco ..... (Mexico)

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**The President:** I call to order the 1333rd plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament. As agreed earlier this afternoon, we will continue with our interactive debate devoted to specific topics on the agenda of the Conference. At this time, I would like to turn to Ambassador Biontino of Germany to take the floor.

**Mr. Biontino (Germany):** Mr. President, I will try to be helpful with my statement in the sense that you indicated you want to address the specific items on the agenda. However, I would like to see these items in a certain balance, so I will address four of the core items because we believe that there needs to be a balance between the four of them: just concentrating on one would not really fully reflect our position.

But first of all, Mr. President, I would like to thank you for the preparation of these meetings and the input of new ideas. We need a dynamic approach in order to solve long-existing problems of the Conference on Disarmament. Improved communication and the exchange of ideas among its members are of utmost importance to overcome the often deplored standstill in the Conference.

Therefore, we believe that a transparent, inclusive and consensus-oriented approach has the greatest potential for success. As I have stated before, the Conference on Disarmament, being the only universally acknowledged forum for disarmament negotiations, deserves every conceivable support. We cannot hide behind procedural regulations and formal or rhetorical repetitions; existing political will must be focused on advancing our work on the core items on our agenda.

With regard to opposing ideas and approaches for achieving “Global Zero”, Germany suggests focusing on existing commonalities by identifying concrete and practical “building blocks” for further nuclear disarmament and the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons and, at the same time, the risk of catastrophic humanitarian consequences from their use. Here, progress should be envisaged through practical, effective and confidence-building measures, particularly by those States that possess nuclear weapons.

Let me point out in this context that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) owes its very existence to the understanding that a nuclear war must never be fought. At the same time, it is important to stress that this process should be an inclusive one if it is to lead to tangible results and intended to strengthen the NPT. We work on the basis of the Final Document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference, which reaffirms the unequivocal undertaking of the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament, to which all States parties are committed under article VI. Action 5 of the action plan spells out that the nuclear-weapon States commit to accelerate concrete progress on the steps leading to nuclear disarmament, contained in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference. The preparation of the 2015 NPT Review Conference in New York is of utmost importance in order to strengthen this process.

We stress the need for systematic and continued reduction of all types of nuclear weapons, including non-strategic and non-deployed weapons, by all States possessing nuclear weapons, in a pragmatic and step-by-step or building-block approach aiming at their total elimination. So far, the focus has been on bilateral agreements between the Russian Federation and the United States of America to work on bilateral nuclear disarmament efforts. The United States and Russia significantly reduced their nuclear arsenals after the cold war. Nevertheless, there is much to be done. We urge the United States and Russia to advance further in line with the principles of irreversibility, verifiability and transparency. President Obama’s offer made on 19 June 2013 in Berlin to seek negotiated cuts with Russia and to further reduce deployed strategic nuclear weapons by up to a third provides a much needed perspective in this context.

We believe that nuclear disarmament in the context of the NPT process needs additional impetus. Germany urges all nuclear States and other States possessing nuclear weapons to take further steps to reduce their arsenals, regardless of their size, type or location, and to declare a moratorium on developing new warheads, new types of nuclear weapons, and on upgrading existing nuclear weapons or developing new missions for nuclear weapons. All nuclear-weapons States must intensify this process, which could pave the way for future multilateral disarmament negotiations.

It must also be taken into consideration that nuclear weapons still have a role to play in security doctrines — whether we like it or not. Germany believes that this role should and could be gradually reduced as we get closer to “zero”. But this process does not take place in a vacuum. In order to reduce the risk of a nuclear detonation, we should thus focus on pragmatic steps and work with the nuclear-weapon States and States possessing nuclear weapons.

In addition, Germany calls for a full commitment to non-proliferation. While some progress has been achieved in this respect, much more needs to be done. Germany believes that the additional protocol of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), while voluntary, should become the universal verification norm. It is the only tool to allow IAEA to ascertain that no undeclared activities are taking place.

“Building blocks” are a pragmatic approach for nuclear disarmament allowing for parallel and simultaneous steps on a multilateral, plurilateral, bilateral or unilateral basis. In the past, bilateral and unilateral building blocks have significantly reduced the global nuclear weapon stockpile from its peak in the 1980s, and crucial multilateral building blocks already exist, for example the IAEA safeguards system, the Partial Test Ban Treaty, the Outer Space Treaty, the NPT, the Sea-bed Arms Control Treaty, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, as well as the multilateral disarmament machinery.

However, further multilateral building blocks are needed. Therefore, framed by its ongoing commitment to the implementation of the 2010 NPT action plan, Germany again suggests the following practical actions in support of a world without nuclear weapons.

First of all, a fissile material cut-off treaty: negotiations on a verifiable and non-discriminatory treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices are of great importance and should commence as soon as possible. It should deal with all relevant questions for the achievement of its purpose; pending negotiation and entry into force of such a treaty, maintenance or declaration by all States possessing nuclear weapons of moratoriums on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons purposes; designating fissile material no longer required for military purposes; and the development of legally binding verification arrangements, within the context of IAEA, to ensure the irreversible removal of such fissile material.

The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty: entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty; pending the entry into force of the Treaty, maintenance or declaration by all States possessing nuclear weapons of moratoriums on nuclear weapons tests, as well as refraining from the use of new nuclear weapons technologies and from any action that would defeat the object and purpose of that Treaty. In the twenty-first century, there is no place for nuclear tests. Germany calls upon all States which have not yet done so to ratify the Treaty. It is hard to see why States that are in a position to ratify it should wait for other States to take the lead.

Negative security assurances: continued commitment by all States possessing nuclear weapons to fully respect their binding commitments with regard to security assurances or to extend such assurances if they have not yet done so. In our view, it would

make sense if such assurances were being reiterated in an unequivocal fashion at regular intervals.

Zones free of weapons of mass destruction should be established on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned. They constitute an important intermediate step towards the ultimate goal, namely complete disarmament. Given the seriousness and urgency of the situation, we are of the view that the Middle East continues to be a priority region for the establishment of such a zone. But progress is only possible if the States of the region are willing to engage in dialogue and if the interests of all States are taken into consideration.

The preservation of a safe and secure space environment and peaceful uses of outer space on an equitable and mutually acceptable basis is another important task we are facing. It is in the common interest of all nations and peoples to strengthen the safety, security and long-term stability of activities in outer space, which contributes to the development and security of all of us. Therefore, transparency and confidence-building measures, including an international code of conduct for outer space activities, deserve further promotion.

The debate on the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapon detonations is of special importance, also with a view to the exchange of views with civil society. The conference held in Vienna gave some important insight into this topic.

As we underlined in Vienna: we understand the growing impatience and frustration about the perceived standstill with regard to nuclear disarmament. But are there any realistic alternatives to the difficult path of further negotiations? Are there shortcuts to Global Zero? Theoretically: yes. Practically and politically: no. There are question marks, if not concerns, about whether attempts at outlawing or delegitimizing nuclear weapons without States, including the States possessing them, will really get us closer to the ultimate goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world. This is the core of our argument for concrete and practical actions in support of a world without nuclear weapons.

**The President:** I thank the Ambassador of Germany for his presentation. As this is an interactive debate, I would now like to open the floor to any member or observer who wishes to make comments or pose questions on the German presentation. I see no requests for the floor. Let us then move to the next speaker, Mr. O'Reilly of Ireland. You have the floor, Sir.

**Mr. O'Reilly (Ireland):** Mr. President, as this is the first occasion that my delegation takes the floor, allow me to congratulate you, a fellow member of the New Agenda Coalition, on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament and to assure you of our cooperation and support. My delegation would also like to express its appreciation to Ambassador Muhammad of Malaysia for skilfully guiding the drafting of the 2014 report of the Conference and the resolution thereon at the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly. My delegation aligns itself with the statement delivered on behalf of the European Union at the first plenary meeting of 2015. I would also like to bid farewell to Ambassador Golberg of Canada and to thank her for her significant contribution, not only in the field of disarmament but in all areas of her work in Geneva.

Many delegations have already spoken about significant achievements in the field of disarmament and arms control in 2014 — the entry into force of the Arms Trade Treaty, the Maputo Review Conference of the Anti-Personnel Mine Convention, the resolute and cooperative work of the international community to destroy the chemical weapon stockpile of Syria and the accession of Syria to the Chemical Weapons Convention. These developments have shown two things: what is possible when the international community takes action together but also that the international community seems unable to take such action together in this forum. As the United Nations Secretary-General noted in his

message to the Conference last week, governments and civil society are increasingly looking outside the Conference to make progress on disarmament.

The agenda which this Conference adopted last week is a long-standing one. The first two items are “Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament” and “Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters”. For my delegation, it is abundantly clear why these two items are on the Conference’s agenda. It has been abundantly clear since the very first resolution of the United Nations called for the elimination of all nuclear weapons and all weapons adaptable to mass destruction.

In order to avert the danger of a nuclear war, the framers of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) included an obligation, in article VI, on all States party to the Treaty to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. Some 45 years after the Treaty entered into force, these effective measures are not in place. In fact, negotiations on these effective measures have not even commenced.

As the New Agenda Coalition Coordinator at the time, Ireland presented to the third session of the Preparatory Committee for the NPT Review Conference a paper on article VI on behalf of the Coalition. We also presented that paper to this Conference during the discussions on nuclear disarmament coordinated by Ambassador Abdelnasser of Egypt; the paper was subsequently circulated as an official document of the Conference (CD/1986).

There were a number of reasons for drafting the paper for last year’s session of the NPT Preparatory Committee. Apart from the stalemate in the Conference on Disarmament and the failure to engage in serious efforts to circumvent this, there seemed to be a fixed status quo as regards nuclear weapons which stood little likelihood of changing. At the same time, initial research findings into the area of risk and near misses were beginning to appear in the United Kingdom and in the United States on the basis of declassified information. At the same time, the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research was carrying out an investigation into international response capacity in the event of a nuclear weapons detonation.

In the normal run of events, risks can be managed, just as gaps in response capacity can be filled — but these weapons are not normal. The consequences of a detonation, coupled with the risks of one happening and the now proven limitations on our ability to respond, seemed to us to point to a duty of care on the part of all Governments towards our citizens’ well-being and health. It was this troubling combination of factors that gave rise to the impetus for a paper that seeks to bring about discussions on effective measures that are required by article VI.

The working paper that was presented outlines the history of failed attempts to secure negotiations on a framework for multilateral nuclear disarmament: from the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, through the “13 practical steps” for systematic efforts to implement article VI, to the 2010 action plan.

The paper outlines the development of the humanitarian initiative since the 2010 Review Conference for achieving and maintaining a world without nuclear weapons and concludes that there is a need for a legally binding multilateral commitment to achieving it. The paper then sets out the elements essential to any such instrument creating effective measures.

In summary, the purpose of the New Agenda Coalition’s working paper was to bring into the NPT review cycle a serious discussion of the essential constituent elements necessary for the fulfilment of article VI. Having set these out, the next stage in the paper was to test the elements against four different options that have been forwarded as possible

instruments: a comprehensive nuclear weapons convention, as set out this morning by Costa Rica, a nuclear weapons ban treaty, a framework arrangement and a hybrid.

It is important to emphasize that the paper does not prescribe any forum for the inclusive discussion it seeks, nor does it try to predetermine any outcome.

Ireland has long believed that the dialogue and deliberations on nuclear disarmament have been dominated by narrow conceptions of State-centric security rather than focusing on the broader implications for humanity of the failure to make sufficient efforts to rid the world of nuclear weapons. The three international conferences on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons have sought to address broader questions, and we warmly congratulate the Governments of Norway, Mexico and Austria for organizing these conferences.

It has been particularly useful to hear from Director Kmentt this morning about the highly significant and successful conference held in Vienna last month. The fact that almost 160 States, an overwhelming majority of the world's governments, were represented there and the very compelling evidence that was presented there by survivors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and of nuclear testing shows that the very real and devastating impact of nuclear weapons is far worse than we had previously believed, but also that the risk of a nuclear weapon detonation is greater than we had previously thought. The evidence so cogently presented in Vienna will certainly serve to inspire my delegation as it works with others both in this forum and others, and we are also fully confident that it will serve to bolster the NPT as we seek to achieve its promise of the safety and security of a world without nuclear weapons.

**The President:** I thank the representative of Ireland for his presentation on effective implementation of article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Now, even if the Conference on Disarmament is not a subsidiary body of the NPT, as the Ambassador of India rightly said this morning, the obligations contained in article VI are part and parcel of the Conference's mandate. Again, I would like now to open the floor for comments or questions on the Irish presentation. I see none. Let us move on, then, to the last speaker in the interactive dialogue section of today's session, and that is Mr. Malov of the Russian Federation. You have the floor, Sir.

**Mr. Malov** (Russian Federation) (*spoke in Russian*): Mr. President, the position of the Russian delegation is that we must maintain the Conference on Disarmament as the sole multilateral negotiating mechanism in the field of disarmament as it has a solid history of service and unique expert potential. Of course, for our delegation as for many others, the lasting stalemate in this forum's negotiation work does not sit well. In this unsatisfactory situation, we consider that the idea of withdrawing items from the Conference's agenda and taking them up in alternative venues does a terrible disservice. Experience has shown that such approaches can be agreed upon only by a select club infused with partiality and unable to advance any claim of universality. We will continue to base our position on the idea that global agreements are possible only on the basis of consensus and the common denominator of the vital national security interests of all States. We see the criticism often levelled against the Conference, and thus against you and us as well, as a call to action.

We are confident that consensus is not only possible, but actually achievable, if we all show sufficient political will and consistently work to overcome the disagreements resulting from differences in the priorities of our States. Naturally, our first and foremost task should be to agree on a programme of work for the Conference. We hope that your suggestions, Mr. President, will help to find a compromise.

Our interest lies in commencing substantive work as soon as possible and beginning the negotiation stage. We believe that concrete and substantive work under agenda item 3 — the prevention of an arms race in outer space — provides a good foundation. In concrete

terms, this relates to the Russian-Chinese draft Treaty on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, as updated with the proposals and comments of a significant number of States.

In our view, the Russian-Chinese initiative has the advantage of being about preventive disarmament, or the prevention of the emergence of yet another potential arena for armed confrontation. Furthermore, we believe that international legal guarantees against the deployment of weapons in outer space will strengthen strategic stability and help create the conditions required for further steps towards the genuine nuclear disarmament that we have today spent so much time discussing. Such a step also corresponds fully with the requirements of article VI of the NPT Treaty, which are organically linked with the overall context of “general and complete disarmament” addressed by that article.

We believe that the topical nature of the prevention of an arms race in outer space is becoming stronger every day and cannot be denied. The advent of a completely new class of weapons — in this case, space weapons — could seriously undermine the global security system, if not completely destroy it. We see not only a shared interest in avoiding such an ominous scenario but also, to some extent, a duty on the part of all participants in this Conference. Otherwise we must prepare ourselves to confront, now in space as well, problems of the same complexity as those we have encountered in reducing and limiting nuclear weapons. This year we will mark the seventieth anniversary of the tragic use by the United States of nuclear weapons against the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

Neither we, nor we should think our Chinese partners, as co-sponsors of the draft Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space and of the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects, claim that our joint draft is an absolute truth. We see it as a living document, open for improvement and constructive inputs from other delegations. We believe the time has come to move from general commentary to concrete proposals, from disjointed critical comments to substantive work on the text. At the same time, as realists, we understand that achieving a legally binding ban on the placement of weapons in outer space naturally will take time. We think a political commitment not to be the first to deploy weapons in outer space can fill the legal void during this period. The universalization and globalization of such a commitment would create a reliable safety net and would facilitate the maintenance of space as a place free from conflict.

In this connection, we should like to take note of the comments made by the United Nations Secretary-General, Mr. Ban Ki-moon, regarding consideration of this initiative of no first deployment of weapons in outer space by the General Assembly, which is in fact outside the framework of our Conference. In essence, the Secretary-General confirmed what we have said in the past, which is that the Conference is the appropriate place to discuss this disarmament initiative. We should say that it is not our intention to confine ourselves solely to the topic of the prevention of an arms race in outer space, even though we consider the draft treaty to be fully ready for negotiation.

We are also prepared to take part in negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty and are willing to participate in the drafting of a legally binding instrument on negative security assurances.

Mr. President, you have been given the high responsibility of setting the tone for the 2015 session. Permit me once again to assure you of our genuine will to engage in constructive cooperation. We sincerely hope that during the session now commencing, we will all be encouraged by a successful renewal of the substantive work of the Conference, aimed at a genuine strengthening of international peace and security.

**The President:** I thank the representative of the Russian Federation for his presentation, and now would like to open the floor for comments or questions on the Russian presentation. I recognize the representative of China.

**Mr. Shen Jian** (China) (*spoke in Chinese*): Thank you, Mr. President, and I also thank the representative of the Russian Federation for his intervention. Preventing an arms race in outer space has always been one of the top priorities of the Chinese delegation at the Conference on Disarmament. I would like to take this opportunity to briefly discuss a few points on this subject.

Ensuring the peaceful use of outer space and preventing the weaponization of outer space and an arms race in outer space is in the common interest of all States. The United Nations General Assembly has for over 30 years running adopted resolutions by an overwhelming majority calling for the prevention of an arms race in outer space and requesting the Conference to negotiate an arms control treaty for outer space. This is a clear reflection of the international community's opposition to the weaponization of outer space and its consensus around the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

China is working actively to maintain peace and security in outer space. Last June, in the light of developments in the space security situation and the comments and proposals received from various parties, China and the Russian Federation circulated an update to the draft Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space that they had jointly put forward in 2008. This new draft is still open for discussion, and we welcome further suggestions that will allow us, together, to improve it. We hope that the Conference will start negotiations on a treaty as soon as possible on this basis. We commend the President for taking the relevant proposals on board in the draft programme of work distributed yesterday.

Lastly, China supports efforts to achieve a comprehensive and balanced programme of work acceptable to all members and the initiation of substantive work on issues such as nuclear disarmament, security assurances for non-nuclear States, the prevention of an arms race in outer space and a fissile material cut-off treaty.

**The President:** I thank the Chinese representative. Now I give the floor to Belarus.

**Mr. Grinevich** (Belarus): Mr. President, I am sorry for being a bit talkative today but, following your advice, I am trying to support interactivity within our forum. I would now like to switch into Russian.

(*spoke in Russian*)

Mr. President, yesterday, as you put forward your draft programme of work, you pronounced some words of wisdom, stating that the degree of readiness of an issue could be contested only during the negotiations themselves, at the end of the negotiating process. On this point, our delegation considers that a treaty on the prevention of the placement of weapons in outer space is in a very good position and is among the subjects less likely to raise problems than the discussion of a fissile material cut-off treaty.

Our position in respect of the draft proposed by the Russian Federation and China to prevent an arms race in outer space is well known. We support the updated text and believe that the draft Treaty is a good basis for negotiations. In our view, if we are able to begin such negotiations in the framework of the Conference, then the agreement process will no doubt move ahead much more quickly than it would on other topics. However, this mainly will depend on the political will of the other States.

We should also like to state once again that we have supported the draft resolution for a moratorium on the first placement of weapons in outer space.

**The President:** I thank the representative of Belarus and stress that there is no need to apologize. On the contrary, your participation today has been a major contribution to an interactive dialogue. I recognize the representative of Kazakhstan. Sir, you have the floor.



**Mr. Omarov** (Kazakhstan) (*spoke in Russian*): This is my first time speaking not only at this session but also in general at the Conference on Disarmament. As a new arrival, I would like to say that, if tomorrow we adopt the programme of work, as is our hope and that of our capital, I believe we already have a draft prepared for agenda item 3. The delegations of the Russian Federation and China have drawn up a draft Treaty, and we could immediately begin not only discussions but indeed negotiations on that treaty. Also, the draft model treaty on nuclear weapons submitted by the delegation of Costa Rica, too, can be taken as a draft, for agenda items 1 and 2.

We have, or rather by the end of March will have, the conclusions of the Group of Governmental Experts on a fissile material cut-off treaty, which may be, or indeed will be, taken as a basis for negotiations on the question of fissile materials. Therefore, we — and, as far as I can tell, a number of other delegations — see no obstacle to the adoption tomorrow of the programme of work and the circulation of existing documents prepared by a number of delegations.

**The President:** I thank the representative of Kazakhstan and welcome him as a regular speaker to the Conference. Are there any more requests for the floor? I recognize the Ambassador of Brazil.

**Mr. Motta Pinto Coelho** (Brazil): I take the lead from Belarus in saying that I am perhaps talking too much, but I think that is the idea a little bit today so we can indulge in a less contemplative and more active kind of debate. In that sense, I would like to refer back — in considering the proposal by Russia and China, which we support, by the way, and fully endorse — to the question of logic that we discussed this morning concerning the fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT). We can accept the idea that in the case of the FMCT there are two logics: one logic is that it should precede the natural evolution of disarmament discussions on a comprehensive convention or treaty on nuclear disarmament; and the other one — and that goes perhaps for tomorrow's discussion on the question of the programme of work — we could also understand the FMCT as a subsequent, not a preceding, logical step to the adoption or the negotiation of a fully fledged convention on nuclear disarmament, given the fact that it is one of the elements that should necessarily be included whenever we have a negotiation on a comprehensive convention. The logic is that, if we look at the FMCT as such, we can see that it is an empty ensemble — there is no substance to it in the sense that the nuclear-weapon States already have the material and the non-nuclear-weapon States do not have it. So, what is the purpose of this treaty?

We can understand the treaty as a consequence of a fully fledged negotiation on a convention on nuclear disarmament as an item. So, tomorrow I will come back to that suggestion. At the same time, however, if we look at outer space, we see that the same logic applies. We can negotiate right now. There is maturity in the Conference on Disarmament to face a proposal and negotiate, examine positively and negotiate, a convention or a treaty or an instrument that deals with the prevention of an arms race in outer space in the sense that has been proposed here by Russia and China. We do not see why this could not happen straight away. In that sense, we have suggested to you — and we are going to insist on this — that whenever we adopt the programme of work, we could discuss the eventuality of having two subsidiary bodies: one to address the prevention of an arms race in outer space and eventual proposals such as this one, and the other one for nuclear disarmament, which of necessity would encompass the whole issue of FMCT.

**The President:** I thank the Ambassador of Brazil for his comments. As I said yesterday, the Chinese-Russian proposal on outer space should be considered as one of the bases for any negotiation, as should any past, present or future proposal, if we adopt, tomorrow, the programme of work. However, I am fully aware that this is a major input, and we, in our national capacity, fully appreciate the importance of it.

You have touched on another question, which is a broader one, because what we have heard today, through the day, and again because this is something we have been hearing for many years, is that different members have different priorities, clearly. Some have stated specifically one or another priority; some insisted on a certain sequencing. In the end, however, what you have been conveying through the day is that some of you have some priorities, some have a different priority.

The draft programme of work submitted yesterday, in this context, has been designed as the ultimate compromise, which is that you agree to engage in negotiations on one agenda item that is not a priority for you in exchange for engaging in negotiations on an agenda item that is a priority for you. That is the ultimate give and take. That is diplomacy. You engage in one that you are not particularly keen on, that is not your priority, that should not go as the first one, in exchange for being able to negotiate the one that you are particularly interested in. It is, thus, an alternative to what we have been doing for many years, which is to prevent any negotiation because our agenda item is not at the top of someone else's agenda. So, it is the opposite approach. But that is something we should discuss tomorrow when we take up the draft programme of work.

Does any other member or observer wish to take the floor? I see none. With that, we have finished our interactive dialogue portion of today's plenary. I want to thank all the presenters and everyone who intervened, particularly those who took the floor more than once. It has been a very interesting interactive dialogue that has allowed us to exchange views on record — because this is a plenary — on issues that might contribute to the beginning of negotiations on any of the substantive items on the agenda of the Conference. Because, for negotiations to take place, dialogue — and not a succession of monologues — is essential, and this is what has taken place today, and I am extremely grateful to you for that.

Now, as we move away from the dialogue, the delegation of Finland has requested to take the floor to make a general statement. You have the floor, Sir.

**Mr. Järviaho** (Finland): I am sorry for keeping everybody for a few minutes longer. First of all, let me congratulate you, Mr. Ambassador, on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament and the way you are conducting our business here. You will have the full support, of course, of my delegation.

Finland fully aligns itself with the statement made by the European Union earlier here. Last week, we heard once again the message of Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, urging us to act on our mandate to negotiate treaties. Indeed, it is our responsibility, not only to ourselves but for the whole international community. Our aim is enhanced security for all. Therefore, we should search every avenue that could lead to substantive work here in the Conference. Having served us in the past, we believe the Conference can serve us in the future as well. We should renovate the Conference to make it a modern negotiating forum, responsive to the needs we have today. We should look at possible amendments in the rules of procedure, enlargement of the Conference, the agenda and enhancing the role of civil society and academia in our work.

We thank the Acting Secretary-General of the Conference, Mr. Møller, for all his efforts, and especially regarding the Conference on Disarmament/civil society forum. It is high time to enhance the Conference through civil society and academia.

Mr. President, we thank you for your innovative and bold proposal for a programme of work in the Conference. We are in the process of studying it carefully. A programme of work with a negotiating mandate on a fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT) has been our priority. We note with satisfaction that this has been taken into account in your proposal. We have been very happy to contribute, by way of an expert, to the work of the Group of Governmental Experts on an FMCT. We believe the Group's work has progressed well and

will, in due course, contribute to our work here in the Conference. We owe a big thank you to Ambassador Golberg for her leadership in this regard. If helpful, we will be ready to consider further discussions in different formats, such as through an informal working group or schedule of activities. However, discussions, fruitful as they can be, cannot substitute our true mandate for negotiations.

We would like to commend Austria for a well-prepared and hosted conference in December. We thank Ambassador Kmentt for his report today. For us, the conference was a useful and informative exchange on the catastrophic consequences of nuclear weapons and a productive continuation of the preceding conferences in Oslo and Nayarit. We were also happy to note that colleagues from the United States and the United Kingdom participated in this conference. We are hopeful that the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference will take these findings into account.

Mr. President, we stand ready to support your efforts in finding a way forward for the Conference on Disarmament.

**The President:** I thank the representative of Finland for his statement. This concludes our business for today. As previously announced, the next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held tomorrow, 29 January 2015, at 10 a.m., when I intend to take action on the draft programme of work submitted yesterday.

*The meeting rose at 4 p.m.*