

Conference on Disarmament

14 January 2020

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Note verbale dated 13 September 2019 from the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Kazakhstan addressed to the Secretariat of the Conference on Disarmament and conveying the Chair's summary of the Seminar on Fostering Cooperation and Enhancing Consultation Mechanisms Among the Existing Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zones, which was held on August 28-29, 2019 in Nur-Sultan, Kazakhstan.

The Permanent Mission of the Republic of Kazakhstan to the United Nations Office and other International Organizations in Geneva presents its compliments to the Secretariat of the Conference on Disarmament and has the honour to convey the Chair's summary of the Seminar on Fostering Cooperation and Enhancing Consultation Mechanisms Among the Existing Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zones, which was held on August 28-29, 2019 in Nur-Sultan, Kazakhstan.

In this regard the Permanent Mission has the further honour to request to register the Chair's summary as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament and circulate it among delegations of the Conference on Disarmament.

Feedback and comments can be sent to the following e-mail address:
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The Permanent Mission avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Secretariat of the Conference on Disarmament the assurances of its highest consideration.



Annex

Chair's summary at the conclusion of the Seminar on Fostering Cooperation and Enhancing Consultation Mechanisms Among the Existing Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones

Nur-Sultan, 29 August 2019

On the occasion of the 10th anniversary of the International Day Against Nuclear Tests the points of contact and representatives of States Parties and Signatories to the Treaties establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones in Latin America and the Caribbean (Tlatelolco Treaty), the South Pacific (Rarotonga Treaty), South East Asia (Bangkok Treaty), Central Asia (Semipalatinsk Treaty) and Mongolia met on 28-29 August 2019 in Nur-Sultan, Republic of Kazakhstan, for the purpose of contributing to the achievement of a world free of nuclear weapons by strengthening cooperation between nuclear-weapon-free zones. The meeting was also attended by experts from the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO), the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) and the Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation (VCDNP).

The inter-zonal meeting was also convened in alignment with such initiative of the First President of Kazakhstan, Mr. Nursultan Nazarbayev, originally presented at the inauguration ceremony of the IAEA Low Enriched Uranium Bank Facility on 29 August 2017.

Participants discussed the implementation of the existing nuclear-weapon-free zone Treaties as well as preparations for the Fourth Conference of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones and Mongolia (24 April 2020, New York).

In order to continue the pursuit of international efforts to achieve a nuclear-weapon-free world, foster cooperation among the nuclear-weapon-free zones to fully implement the principles and objectives of the treaties, to exchange relevant ideas and best practices in areas of mutual interest the **following recommendations** are made by the Republic of Kazakhstan in its national capacity as the Chair of the Seminar and reflects to the best of its knowledge what transpired at the Seminar with regard to the matters discussed:

1. Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone States Parties and Signatories should resume the tradition of holding and further institutionalizing the meetings of “points of contacts” for the zones, either annually — on the margins of the General Assembly or NPT Preparatory Committee sessions — in the interim years when no conference of States Parties will take place.
2. Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone States Parties and Signatories should consider tabling a joint annual resolution at the UN General Assembly. This could be in lieu of individual resolutions. Furthermore, this initiative could assist coordination and present a common front in the strengthening of the regime established by the Treaties and the very concept of such zones. It could also contribute to the establishment of future nuclear-weapon-free zones. The resolution could also contain a request for the preparation of a comprehensive second study on Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones in all their aspects, taking into account that first such study was undertaken by the United Nations General Assembly in the 1970s, before most of the current zones came into existence.
3. Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone States Parties and Signatories should undertake activities aimed at further institutionalizing nuclear-weapon-free zones Treaties by establishing dedicated working bodies or relevant regional organizations, where practical, following the successful example of the Agency on the Prohibition of Nuclear

Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL) and the African Commission on Nuclear Energy (AFCONE).

4. A consultative group of representatives from NWFZ States Parties and Signatories should be established with the aim of regularly exchanging information on zonal activities and, where possible, coordinating positions. Such a group could be represented by delegates of Permanent Missions to the United Nations either in New York (or in any other mutually agreed suitable format and location). This would contribute to strengthening the preparatory process on the organization of Conferences of States Parties and Signatories to the Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaties.
5. A global Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone website/portal serving as a means of communication among the zones and providing information about the zones, the NWFZ Conferences and other joint activities should be established with aim of systematizing and strengthening inter-zonal cooperation.
6. Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone States Parties and Signatories should maintain the practice of inviting representatives from other Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones to each of the Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaties' regional meetings, following the successful example of cooperation between OPANAL and AFCONE.
7. Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone States Parties and Signatories should maintain diplomatic efforts, jointly where necessary, aimed at securing signatures and ratifications of States listed or mentioned in the relevant Protocols to the treaties establishing Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones that have not yet signed or ratified those Protocols to do so as soon as possible.
8. Further efforts should be undertaken to promote the accession of all States to their respective Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaties.
9. Further efforts should be undertaken to promote the entry-into-force and the universalization of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), as a contribution to the elimination of nuclear weapons.
10. Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone States Parties and Signatories should organize a preparatory meeting for the Fourth Conference of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones and Mongolia (2020) in the margins of the 74th session of United Nations General Assembly First Committee and any other preparatory meetings thereafter as necessary to achieve a successful outcome at the Fourth Conference of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones and Mongolia.
11. In order to facilitate preparations for the Fourth Conference of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones and Mongolia, Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone States Parties and Signatories should make every effort to designate a President for the Conference at the earliest possible date.
12. In order to ensure the successful convening of the Fourth Conference of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones and Mongolia, Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone States Parties and Signatories should fulfil their financial commitments in relation to the Conference as agreed at the 73rd session of the United Nations General Assembly.
13. Further outreach efforts should be undertaken by the Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone States Parties and Signatories to promote disarmament education, particularly amongst the youth. Research and analysis on important elements of nuclear-weapon-free zones should also be encouraged, for instance, on negative security assurances and on interpretive Protocol declarations in this regard.