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# Meeting of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction

26 November 2021

English only

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## 2020 Meeting

Geneva, 22-25 November 2021

Item 6 of the agenda

Consideration of the factual reports of the Meetings of Experts reflecting their deliberations, including possible outcomes

## Non-paper Submitted by the Chairperson of the 2020 Meeting of States Parties and the Chairpersons of the 2020 Meetings of Experts to the Biological Weapons Convention<sup>1</sup>

### I. Introduction

1. This document compiles in a concise and factual manner the proposals made during the 2018, 2019 and 2020 Meetings of Experts and Meetings of States Parties. It also contains the personal reflections of the Chairpersons of the 2020 Meetings of Experts regarding the topics under consideration by the respective Meetings of Experts. The document includes in its annex a thematic listing of all working papers submitted during the 2018-2020 intersessional programme.
2. The document is meant to assist States Parties in the lead-up to the Ninth Review Conference, in order to review the implementation of the Convention and to facilitate its operationalization. It is considered by the Chairpersons as a tool to link the Meetings of Experts and the Meetings of States Parties with the Ninth Review Conference.
3. This document builds upon the document that was submitted by the Chairperson of the 2019 Meeting of States Parties (BWC/MSP/2019/CRP.1).

### II. Reflections by the Chairpersons of the 2020 Meetings of Experts

#### A. Cooperation and Assistance, with a Particular Focus on Strengthening Cooperation and Assistance under Article X

4. Given the high number of proposals related to Article X, further work is required to see which proposals are overlapping, and which are horizontal covering several articles of the Convention (and the mandates of other Meetings of Experts).
5. Co-operation and assistance under Article X can be seen an effective way to implement the BWC as a whole especially in terms of national implementation and capacity-building. Assistance and cooperation can take many forms, financial and others. It has been noted that for the time being, there is no agreed definition for assistance and cooperation

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<sup>1</sup> This document is submitted by the MSP and MX Chairpersons in their personal capacity and without prejudice to their national positions.



under Article X. Access to and availability of the critical data on both needs and assistance delivered remains a key challenge. In order to maintain and develop evidence-based structures for planning and delivering cooperation and assistance under Article X, strengthening and operationalizing the Database will remain as the key objective. The impact of the current COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted not only the role of cooperation and assistance but the vital role of science, technology and innovation in providing the best solutions to mitigate the risks of pandemics and health disasters. The role of the private sector and other stakeholders has also been highlighted. COVID-19 has highlighted the need to transition towards more sustainable and resilient societies. Better prepared national health systems are able to manage outbreaks regardless of their origin. During the last Meeting of Experts many States Parties also highlighted that the full implementation of Article X requires non-discriminatory access to medicines, equipment and other related materials necessary to response to health-related emergencies.

## **B. Review of Developments in the Field of Science and Technology Related to the Convention**

6. During the intersessional programme, the MX2 has seen active discussions among States Parties on some scientific and technological developments of relevance to the Convention, in accordance with the MX2 Agenda. A brief summary of substantive discussions at MX2, as follows, may serve as a reference for States Parties.

7. Regarding Agenda item 4, broad support has been expressed for a systematic and structured science and technology review process in the framework of the Convention to monitor relevant developments and assess their potential implications. The topic has matured within the MX2 through discussions, working papers and proposals. At this point, some key features have garnered convergence of views to some degree and many States Parties have expressed their readiness to engage further on this issue.

8. Regarding Agenda item 5, discussions throughout the intersessional period have seen a number of States Parties emphasize the importance of a systematic approach to examine potential risks and benefits of advances in life sciences with relevance to the Convention. Following discussions, presentations and working papers submitted to the MX2 on biological risk assessment and management, several possibilities remain to be explored by States Parties on the question of assessment methodologies.

9. Regarding Agenda item 6, many States Parties have noted the importance of voluntary codes of conduct. The topic has increasingly matured over time, notably with the “The Tianjin Biosecurity Guidelines for Codes of Conduct for Scientists” presented at the 2020 MX2 and recently endorsed by the InterAcademy Partnership. Many States Parties have expressed their support for the “Tianjin Biosecurity Guidelines” including their endorsement at the Ninth Review Conference while some States Parties expressed their wish to continue discussions on this.

10. Regarding Agenda item 7, it seems that States Parties largely share an understanding of the importance of closer interaction with the scientific and technical communities and the involvement of nongovernmental experts, scientists, professional associations and industry in the work of the Convention.

## **C. Strengthening National Implementation**

11. Measures related to Article IV. As of September 2021, 73% of all States Parties have provided national contact information. Clearly it is a solid indicator for the BWC, but this number should be much higher, given the strengthened visibility of the Convention under current circumstances. States Parties reiterated the importance of implementing national action plans aimed at creating effective national biosecurity regimes, including the development of a biosecurity culture within relevant institutions. The importance of legislative assistance and capacity building; outreach and awareness-raising; and work to promote regional and bilateral cooperation was once again reiterated.

12. Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs). In 2021 we saw the highest number of CBMs ever submitted. Many States Parties the importance of improving and strengthening CBMs, as they are the only formal tool under the BWC for promoting transparency and building confidence. Still 52 States Parties had never submitted CBMs and possible ways to encourage them to submit for the first time should be further explored. Many States Parties recognised the value of awareness-raising activities, workshops and training modules for States Parties needing assistance with CBM submissions. Several concrete proposals were made to enhance the utility of CBMs.

13. Various ways to promote transparency and confidence building. A number of States Parties informed about different voluntary activities or initiatives which they have conducted to improve transparency and build confidence.

14. Role of international cooperation and assistance under Article X, in support of strengthening the implementation of the Convention. Some States Parties informed the Meeting about concrete activities they had undertaken to promote regional cooperation, and to support developing States Parties strengthen their domestic implementation of the Convention. The concept of South-South cooperation was highlighted by many States Parties.

15. Issues related to Article III, including effective measures of export control, in full conformity with all Articles of the Convention, including Article X. Several States Parties referred to the importance of effective export control measures in conformity with the Convention. At the same time some States Parties reiterated that any national export control measures should be in full conformity with obligations under the Convention and conducive to the full, effective and non-discriminatory implementation of all its provisions.

#### **D. Assistance, Response and Preparedness**

16. The Meeting of Experts on Assistance, response and preparedness considers 6 more narrowly defined topics and even though there are number of views on these issues, broad recognition of the need to make progress towards operationalization of article VII is present and efforts to advance the work carried out on some of the proposals should be encouraged.

17. Under the agenda item on Practical challenges facing the implementation of Article VII, and possible solutions, the necessity to operationalize the provision of Article VII is reaffirmed, with attention drawn to the need to have in place response capabilities and plans before an event occurred. Discussions about the role of the Security Council in making a decision pursuant to Article VII, the potential coordination role of the United Nations in providing international assistance, the United Nations Secretary-General's Mechanism (SGM) to investigate alleged use of biological weapons and lessons drawn from the COVID-19 pandemic are not exhausted. Majority of concerns refer to the risk of not having timely response, and the potential challenge of distinguishing between a natural and deliberate disease outbreak and the fact that there are no agreed procedures for investigating the claim of a requesting State Party under Article VII. Even though there are examples of how international assistance had enhanced response to the COVID-19 pandemic a number of State Parties noted that certain national measures have negatively impacted the options for prompt, effective, and coordinated response to disease outbreaks, whether of natural or deliberate origin.

18. The need to establish a set of guidelines and formats to assist a State Party, if required, when submitting an application for assistance in the framework of Article VII remains of high importance and further work on the papers circulated by a State Party at the 2018 Meeting of Experts is needed before the Ninth Review Conference.

19. The joint proposal of two States Parties for the establishment of a database for assistance under Article VII receives support from number of States and work towards improvement of the proposal should continue before the Ninth Review Conference. Outstanding issues for consideration could relate to the financial implications, potential duplication with the Article X database, concerns about potential voluntary trust

establishment, rights of access, possible elements of procedures for the provision of assistance under Article VII fund and development and other.

20. A lot of concerns remain to be resolved for the possibility of operationalising mobile biomedical units under the BWC, with the emphasis these units could serve to implement Article VII, as well as Article VI and Article X of the Convention. These refer to the possibility to establish a roster of such units under national authority, financial and institutional implications, intellectual property rights of the collected samples, and the challenges of potential dual role of such units.

21. The discussion on exploration of approaches by which States Parties, individually or collectively, might contribute to the strengthening of international response capabilities for infectious disease outbreaks, whether natural or deliberate in origin should be continued by analysing individual national, regional and international projects and exercises and lessons learned from them.

22. The importance of the agenda item dedicated to the exploration of means to prepare for, respond to and render assistance in case of the possible hostile use of biological agents and toxins against agriculture, livestock as well as the natural environment remains of relevance, especially since issues concerning strengthening national capacities, international cooperation and cooperation between BWC and other international organizations should be further discussed.

## **E. Institutional Strengthening of the Convention**

23. The MX5 considered the full range of approaches and options to further strengthen the BWC and its functioning through possible additional legal measures or other measures in the framework of the Convention. Over the past years, the MX5 saw very active and constructive conversations, including the enriching and in-depth exchange of views on the various proposals to be considered.

24. These proposals referred to a wide range of topics, including but not limited to universalization efforts, the establishment of a science and technology (S&T) review mechanism, a global guidelines for code of conduct, verification protocol, confidence-building measures (CBMs), enhancement of the BWC Implementation Support Unit (ISU), peer review exercises, voluntary visits, arrangements under Article V, Article VI and the UN Secretary-General's mechanism for investigating alleged use of chemical and biological weapons, guidelines concerning a request for assistance under Article VII, the establishment of an assistance database and the use of mobile biomedical units, the establishment of an Article X cooperation committee, the elaboration of an Article X action plan the intersessional programme (ISP), the establishment of an International Agency for Biological Safety, the enhancement of gender equality and women's empowerment under the BWC, financial matters, among others.

25. Overall, States Parties underlined the importance of the BWC and stressed the need to further strengthen it institutionally. Notwithstanding, there are different approaches on the way and means to translate this aspiration into reality.

26. Many States Parties underscored that it is critical to deal with all of the issues interrelated to the BWC in a balanced and comprehensive manner and emphasized the urgency of resuming multilateral negotiations on a legally-binding instrument, including verification measures, which in their view represents the only sustainable method to strengthen the Convention.

27. Other States Parties supported an incremental approach by adopting individual measures to strengthen the BWC's existing provisions. They stressed that the absence of a formal verification and enforcement system ought not hinder efforts to strengthen the Convention and called for a pragmatic approach to explore both legal and voluntary measures in greater depth.

### III. Proposals submitted by States Parties during the 2018-2020 intersessional programme

28. This section compiles in a concise and factual manner the proposals made during the 2018-2020 intersessional programme. It reflects the full range of views expressed during the meetings but does not purport to be exhaustive and it does not imply in any way agreement on any individual option. No attempt was made to narrow the range or edit the content of proposals, which are not set in any specific order of importance. Each proposal is classified in accordance with the structure of the intersessional programme and relates to one or several of the articles of the Convention.

#### A. Cooperation and Assistance, with a Particular Focus on Strengthening Cooperation and Assistance under Article X

- Creating an institutional mechanism, through negotiation in an open-ended working group, to ensure the full, effective and non-discriminatory implementation of article X, including with an article X compliance and dispute-settlement standing body and a cooperation committee, which would monitor cooperation and assistance activities and coordinate the operationalization of offers and supplies proposed and/or requested by States Parties. – **article X**
- Pending the establishment of such a mechanism, develop an action plan for full, effective, and non-discriminatory implementation of Article X and establish a multilaterally negotiated procedure to settle disputes if a State Party is restricted and/or denied access to drugs, medicines, vaccines, diagnostics and related equipment and materials for peaceful purposes as result of policies or unilateral coercive measures inconsistent with article X. – **article X**
- Undertaking not to impose, under any circumstances, restrictions, limitations and unilateral coercive measures on trade in such areas as drugs, medicines, vaccines, diagnostics, biological agents, equipment and materials for peaceful purposes in particular for treatment of patients. – **article X**
- Urging the immediate lifting of all such measures to ensure full, effective and non-discriminatory implementation of Article X. – **article X**
- Establishing a non-proliferation export control and international cooperation regime to promote non-proliferation and the peaceful use of biotechnology. – **article III and article X**
- Strengthening the operationalization of the cooperation database, which was established by the Seventh Review Conference by enhancing its functionality, visibility and effectiveness and considering the ways to improve reporting, notably of informal requests and provisions of the assistance requested in the database. – **article X**
- Including offers for cooperation and assistance from intergovernmental organizations and non-governmental actors in the cooperation database. – **article X**
- Setting up a voluntary trust fund or hiring a Cooperation and Assistance Officer within the ISU in order to improve the effective implementation of Article X. – **article X**
- Enacting necessary legislations and/or regulations to ensure the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and technologies for peaceful purposes. – **article X**
- Reviewing periodically, and amending or adopting as necessary, national regulations governing international exchanges and transfers of microbial and other biological agents and toxins, and equipment, materials and scientific and technological information to ensure their consistency with the objectives and relevant provisions of the Convention. – **article IV and X**
- Reflecting on concrete manners to encourage submission of national article X reports, including through clarifying content, format, structure and adding, if appropriate, deadlines. – **article X**

- Promoting among states parties understanding on specific measures for the transfer and exchange of information, materials and equipment including: mobilizing adequate resources; enabling capacity building in States in need; ensuring technical cooperation in the development and production of vaccines and drugs; facilitating the flow of information in the field of biotechnology; genetic engineering; microbiology; exchanging scientists and providing training opportunities; and better defining specific roles for the UN and the private sector; establishing a world data bank under UN supervision to facilitate the flow of information in the field of genetic engineering and biotechnology. – **article X**
- Creating environments in which private biotechnological and health industries can thrive, i.a. through sound intellectual property rights based in law, skilled workforce, investment in educational infrastructure, support for research, laws and policies on commercial activities and competition that are robust, transparent, and encourage foreign investment; and regulatory infrastructure and frameworks that promote trade and foreign direct investment. – **article X**
- Establishing an online international, interactive and ad-hoc platform dedicated to biosafety and biosecurity to be used by practitioners and institutions. – **article X**
- Further encouraging the promotion of regional networks of young scientists, especially in the Global South, fostering assistance and cooperation among them, facilitating capacity building programmes for developing countries in biosafety and biosecurity, and engaging global networks of biosecurity professionals. – **article X**
- Continuing to build health system capacity and resilience through workforce development better prepare national health systems to manage outbreaks regardless of their origin. – **article VII and X**

## **B. Review of Developments in the Field of Science and Technology Related to the Convention**

- Establishing a dedicated science and technology advisory process within the BWC to analyze benefits and risks of new S&T developments, potentially including enhanced ISU support to the process. – **article XII**
- Achieving the utmost advantage out of the current process for reviewing developments in biological science and technology and considering ideas and ways and means for how the current format can be improved over time. – **article XII**
- Exploring possible practical steps that might be taken as part of or in addition to the intersessional process to further share and harmonize national governance approaches to managing the risks and protecting the benefits from advances in biological science and technology. – **article IV and XII**
- Encouraging laboratories to follow and/or harmonize with international guidelines for biosafety procedures and to exchange best practices and lessons learned. – **article IV and XII**
- Encouraging States Parties to provide assistance, where appropriate, for the implementation of biorisk management standards in life science institutions in accordance with Article X. – **article IV and X**
- Developing a voluntary model code of conduct for biological scientists and all relevant personnel, and biosecurity education, adaptable to national requirements, in order to preventing the misuse of dual-use research while ensuring that research for peaceful purpose is not hampered. – **article IV and XII**
- Endorsing the “Tianjin Biosecurity Guidelines for Codes of Conduct for Scientists” and encouraging all stakeholders to voluntarily incorporate elements from the Guidelines in their practices, protocols, and regulations, and to disseminate the Guidelines, as appropriate. – **article IV and XII**

- Tasking a potential future intersessional process to exchange information, experiences and good practices about the dissemination of the “Tianjin Biosecurity Guidelines for Codes of Conduct for Scientists” and report the outcomes to the Tenth Review Conference. - **article IV and XII**
- Considering the applicability of already available frameworks and principles to the BWC context, including by tapping into academic material when relevant. – **article XII**

### C. Strengthening National Implementation

- Establishing a non-proliferation export control and international cooperation regime to promote non-proliferation and the peaceful use of biotechnology. – **article III and article X**
- Developing a user-friendly, comprehensive and accessible online platform containing organized, searchable and publicly available information about national implementation measures taken by States Parties. – **article IV**
- Agreeing on a set of elements and principles for effective national export control, which could be established at the national level and could include: appropriate provisions to regulate transfers; a list of items requiring authorization prior to export; a national licensing system containing relevant factors for evaluating export applications and making licensing decisions; export control guidelines that are comprehensive and include criteria for transfers to limit the risks of proliferation of biological weapons by States or non-State actors; and regular outreach to all stakeholders including industry and academia. – **article III**
- Encouraging States Parties to consult and exchange further information amongst themselves to enhance clarity and confidence that implementation of Article III would ensure that the cooperation envisaged under Article X is taken forward in mutual confidence and that the Convention as a whole is implemented in a balanced manner. – **article III and X**
- Establishing a voluntary fund to provide assistance to State Parties in the implementation of Article III, coordinated through the ISU. – **article III**
- Establishing a reassurance mechanism aimed at institutionalizing procedures to monitor transfers of materials and equipment with a view to increasing transparency on trade activities, including through reporting, and end-use assurances. – **article III and IV**
- Submitting more regular, timely and comprehensive confidence-building measures (CBMs) to the ISU, making the best use of the electronic CBM submission platform. – **article IV and V**
- Addressing a potential reporting gap in the declaration of vaccine production facilities under CBM Form G and supplementing Form G’s information on human vaccine production facilities with similar data on animal vaccine production facilities. – **article V**
- Including information on military biological facilities located on the territory of other States in the CBM forms. – **article V**
- Amending Form E to include information on the export control of genetically-modified organisms and specific genetic elements linked to export-controlled microorganisms and toxins. – **article V**
- Requesting information on BSL4 laboratory oversight in the CBM forms. – **article V**
- Encouraging a step-by-step approach to CBM submission for States Parties that have either never submitted a CBM report or have experienced difficulties in regularly doing so. – **article V**
- Encouraging regional workshops to support States Parties in need of assistance to fill in their CBM forms and explaining the roles and responsibilities of BWC national focal points. – **article IV and V**

- Having informal discussions open to all States Parties to discuss the increase of participation/submission, challenges, and possible modifications to the CBM forms. – **article V**
- Establishing, at the national level, a list of all relevant government agencies and organizing meetings with BWC focal points from other ministries, bio-safety associations, and the private sector to exchange views and enhance cooperation on CBM implementation. – **article IV**
- Encouraging States Parties to organize online and in-person training courses for National Contact Points on issues relating to the BWC, or to provide support to the ISU to enable it to organize such courses. – **article IV**
- Conducting or participating in peer-review initiatives and voluntary visits to relevant facilities. – **article IV**
- Creating an exchange platform for voluntary transparency exercises to strengthen the implementation of the BWC and support national implementation efforts; Discuss and exchange information and best practices on voluntary transparency exercises conducted by States Parties; Create a compendium of all voluntary transparency exercises, as well as related best practices, conducted by States Parties and lessons learned from exchanges within the Platform; and Identify potential needs for assistance and cooperation for national implementation of the Convention, including Article X. – **article IV and X**

#### **D. Assistance, Response and Preparedness**

- Setting up mobile biomedical units either nationally based or under the BWC to advance international cooperation for the prevention of infectious disease pursuant to Article X, provide assistance and delivery of protection against biological weapons pursuant to Article VII and investigate alleged use of biological weapons pursuant to Article VI;. – **article VII**
- Developing a set of agreed guidelines for States Parties when submitting an application for assistance in the framework of Article VII. – **article VII**
- Developing a set of procedures or guidelines to inform the Security Council’s decision-making upon receipt of a request for assistance under Article VII. – **article VII**
- Recommending that the Secretary-General of the United Nations prepares a generic plan to ensure a coordinated response to a deliberate release of a biological agent or toxin, including through the appointment of a special representative to work with BWC States Parties, the ISU, WHO, OIE or FAO. – **article VII**
- Establishing a database containing States Parties’ offers and needs for assistance (expertise, information, protection, detection, decontamination, prophylactic and medical and other equipment). – **article VII**
- Encouraging regular exercises to ensure readiness and test the operationalisation of capabilities of States Parties to deliver protection to States Parties that many have been affected by the use of biological weapons. – **article VII**
- Establishing a voluntary trust fund for assistance under Article VII. – **article VII**
- Addressing challenges and gaps in the current international response system and prepare States Parties, international organizations and NGOs to respond effectively to a deliberate use event (including establishment of a multilateral response framework and templates for national preparedness and response plans). – **article VII**
- Increasing cooperation and information-sharing, at the local, national, and international levels to prepare for and respond to naturally occurring and intentional threats to agriculture, livestock, or the environment. – **article VII**
- Strengthening collaboration between the BWC and international organizations such as the WHO, OIE and FAO. – **article VII**

- Identifying the linkages and synergies with Article X, recognizing that strengthening surveillance, detection and response capabilities of national health systems, including through the establishment of a voluntary fund for assistance and capacity-building, would help to tackle both infectious disease outbreaks of a natural origin and also enhance preparedness to mitigate the consequences of deliberate bio-events. – **article VII and X**

## **E. Institutional Strengthening of the Convention**

- Strengthening the Convention through the resumption of the multilateral negotiations for a legally-binding Protocol dealing with all Articles of the Convention, in a balanced and comprehensive manner, including through verification measures. – **article XI**
- Establishing an open-ended working group open to all States Parties sharing its objective to elaborate, on the basis of consensus, appropriate measures and draft proposals to strengthen the Convention to be included, as appropriate, in a legally-binding instrument to be submitted for the consideration of the States Parties – **article XI**
- Establishing an International Agency for Biological Safety accountable to the United Nations Security Council with its activities guided by the BWC. – **article XI**
- Enhancing the effectiveness of the consultative procedures, through reinforcement of arrangements adopted by previous Review Conferences and/or by further operationalizing the procedures for bilateral and multilateral consultations. – **article V**
- Enhancing capacities to investigate the alleged use of biological weapons by strengthening the capabilities of the UN Secretary-General’s Mechanism for investigation of alleged use of biological and chemical weapons, including in response to a complaint lodged by a State Party, or by considering an investigative mechanism under the Convention. – **article VI**
- Establishing a group of governmental experts to elaborate modalities of a specific mechanism with technical guidelines and procedures for investigating alleged use of biological and toxin weapons consistent with Article VI of the Convention – **article VI**
- Strengthening the authority and functions of the annual Meetings of States Parties by endowing them with the authority to decide on specific actions needed to strengthen the Convention when required. – **article XII**
- Enhancing the role of the ISU and increasing its staffing to support additional mandates in relation to science and technology, national implementation, Article VII and Article X and the intersessional work programmes. – **article XII**
- Settling BWC debts for States Parties in arrears and urging all States Parties to make their financial contributions on time. – **article XII**
- Funding the BWC Working Capital Fund from assessed contributions rather than from voluntary contributions. – **article XII**
- Intensifying of outreach and universalisation activities. – **article XIV**
- Ensuring the widest possible representation in meetings of the BWC, including with regard to gender balance and equitable geographical representation. – **article XII**
- Agreeing to a number of proposals to enhance gender equality, as well as full and meaningful participation of men and women in all BWC-related activities, for example by adopting a new mandate to mainstream a gender perspective in the ISU, the intersessional meetings, the Review Conferences and in any future subsidiary bodies. – **article XII**

## Annex

### Working Papers submitted during the 2018-2020 intersessional programme

#### A. Cooperation and Assistance, with a Particular Focus on Strengthening Cooperation and Assistance under Article X

##### 2018

- BWC/MSP/2018/MX.1/WP.1 - Australia's Article X report for 2016 and 2017 – Submitted by Australia
- BWC/MSP/2018/MX.1/WP.2 - Promotion of Capacity Building: Sustainable Laboratories for High Consequence Pathogens - Submitted by Canada and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
- BWC/MSP/2018/MX.1/WP.3 - Report on BWC Implementation Workshop Rabat, Morocco, 10-11 May 2018 - Submitted by the United States of America
- BWC/MSP/2018/MX.1/WP.4 - Outcome of the International Workshop on Cooperation and Assistance under Article X – Submitted by Norway
- BWC/MSP/2018/MX.1/WP.5 - Institutional Mechanism for International Cooperation and Compliance with Article X - Submitted by the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela on behalf of the Group of the Non-Aligned Movement and Other States Parties to the BWC
- BWC/MSP/2018/MX.1/WP.6 - Cooperation and Assistance, with a particular focus on Strengthening Cooperation and Assistance under Article X - Submitted by the Islamic Republic of Iran
- BWC/MSP/2018/MX.1/WP.7 - Report on Implementation of Article X of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention - Submitted by the United States of America
- BWC/MSP/2018/MX.1/WP.8 - Comparative review of biological threats needs assessment and national action plans implemented under BTWC, EU CBRN Centres of Excellence, WHO (IHR-JEE), and 1540 UNSCR, African Regional Conference, 25-26 October 2017, Rabat, Morocco - Submitted by the European Union
- BWC/MSP/2018/MX.1/WP.9 - Improving the Utility and Functioning of the BWC Assistance and Cooperation Database - Submitted by the United States of America
- BWC/MSP/2018/MX.1/WP.10 - Participation of the Russian Federation in implementation of the Article X of the BTWC - Submitted by the Russian Federation
- BWC/MSP/2018/MX.1/WP.11 - Implementación del Artículo X de la Convención de Armas Biológicas (CAB) – Submitted by Cuba (Spanish only)
- BWC/MSP/2018/MX.1/WP.12 - Cooperation and Assistance, with a particular Focus on Strengthening Cooperation and Assistance under Article X - Submitted by the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement and other States Parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention
- BWC/MSP/2018/WP.2 - Article X reports: Australia's approach to structure and content - Submitted by Australia
- BWC/MSP/2018/WP.3 - Dificultades y obstáculos que enfrenta Cuba para la plena aplicación del Artículo X de la Convención sobre Armas Biológicas - Submitted by Cuba (unofficial English translation contained in the annex)

- BWC/MSP/2018/WP.9 - International Activities of Global Partnership Member Countries related to Article X of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention - Submitted by Canada, Denmark, European Union, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, and United States

### 2019

- BWC/MSP/2019/MX.1/WP.1 - Facilitating the fullest possible exchange of science and technology under Article X - Submitted by the United States of America
- BWC/MSP/2019/MX.1/WP.2 - Capacity Building through International Cooperation: The British Medical Journal's Clinical Decision Support Training Initiative - Submitted by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
- BWC/MSP/2019/MX.1/WP.3 - Institutional Mechanism for International Cooperation and Compliance with Article X - Submitted by the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela on behalf of the Group of the Non-Aligned Movement and Other States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention
- BWC/MSP/2019/MX.1/WP.4 - Cooperation and Assistance, with a particular focus on Strengthening Cooperation and Assistance under Article X - Submitted by the Islamic Republic of Iran
- BWC/MSP/2019/MX.1/WP.5 - Report on implementation of Article X of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention - Submitted by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
- BWC/MSP/2019/MX.1/WP.6 - Cooperation and Assistance, with a particular Focus on Strengthening Cooperation and Assistance under Article X - Submitted by the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement and other States Parties to the BWC
- BWC/MSP/2019/WP.1 - Dificultades y obstáculos que enfrenta Cuba para la plena aplicación del Artículo X de la Convención sobre Armas Biológicas - Presentado por Cuba [Unofficial English translation - Difficulties and obstacles faced by Cuba for the full implementation of Article X of the Biological Weapons Convention]
- BWC/MSP/2019/WP.3 - Report on Germany's Implementation of Article X with a special focus on the "German Biosecurity Programme" - Submitted by Germany
- BWC/MSP/2019/WP.5 - Implementation of Articles IV and X of the Biological Weapons Convention - Submitted by the Republic of Korea

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- BWC/MSP/2020/MX.1/WP.1 - Report on Implementation of Article X of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention - Submitted by the United States of America
- BWC/MSP/2020/MX.1/WP.2 - What constitutes assistance and cooperation under Article X? -Submitted by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
- BWC/MSP/2020/MX.1/WP.3 - Proposal for establishment of an international platform dedicated to biosecurity and biosafety: SecBio - Submitted by France
- BWC/MSP/2020/MX.1/WP.4 - Contributions to the global response to the COVID-19 pandemic - Submitted by the United States
- BWC/MSP/2020/MX.1/WP.5 - Pandemia as catalyst to enhance cooperation and assistance? Germany's continued implementation of Article X under the special circumstances of COVID-19 - Submitted by Germany
- BWC/MSP/2020/MX.1/WP.6 - Challenges and obstacles to international cooperation, assistance and exchange in the biological sciences and technology under Article X - Submitted by the Islamic Republic of Iran

- BWC/MSP/2020/MX.1/WP.7 - Difficulties and obstacles faced by Cuba for the full implementation of Article X of the Biological Weapons Convention - Submitted by Cuba
- BWC/MSP/2020/WP.5 - Proposal for establishment of an international platform dedicated to biosecurity and biosafety: SecBio - Submitted by France
- BWC/MSP/2020/WP.8 - Implementation of Articles IV and X of the Biological Weapons Convention - Submitted by the Republic of Korea
- BWC/MSP/2020/WP.9 - Report on Implementation of Article X of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction - Submitted by the Russian Federation
- BWC/MSP/2020/WP.10 - Difficulties and obstacles faced by Cuba for the full implementation of Article X of the Biological Weapons Convention - Submitted by Cuba
- BWC/MSP/2020/WP.11 - Article X Cooperation and Laboratory Support: The Example of the Biological Threat Reduction Program - Submitted by the United States of the America

## **B. Review of Developments in the Field of Science and Technology Related to the Convention**

### 2018

- BWC/MSP/2018/MX.2/WP.1 - Germany's best practice in handling (bio)security-relevant research: Self-governance organized by the German National Academy of Sciences Leopoldina and the German Research Foundation (DFG) - Submitted by Germany
- BWC/MSP/2018/MX.2/WP.2 - Technical Working Paper on Genome Editing and Other Scientific and Technological Developments of Relevance to the Convention - Submitted by Switzerland
- BWC/MSP/2018/MX.2/WP.3 - Review of Developments in the Field of Science and Technology Related to the Convention - Genome editing – Submitted by Australia
- BWC/MSP/2018/MX.2/WP.4 - Genome editing: addressing implications for the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention - Submitted by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
- BWC/MSP/2018/MX.2/WP.5 - Recent Advances in Gene Editing and Synthesis Technologies and their Implications - Submitted by the United States of America
- BWC/MSP/2018/MX.2/WP.6 - Review of Developments in the Field of Science and Technology Related to the Convention - Genome Editing - Submitted by the Islamic Republic of Iran
- BWC/MSP/2018/MX.2/WP.7 - Report of the Scientific Advisory Board of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons on Developments in Science and Technology for the Fourth Special Session of the Conference of the States Parties to Review the Operation of the Chemical Weapons Convention - Note by the Implementation Support Unit
- BWC/MSP/2018/MX.2/WP.8 – Response by the Director-General of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons on the Report of the Scientific Advisory Board of the on Developments in Science and Technology for the Fourth Special Session of the Conference of the States Parties to Review the Operation of the Chemical Weapons Convention - Note by the Implementation Support Unit

- BWC/MSP/2018/MX.2/WP.9 - Proposal for the development of a model code of conduct for biological scientists under the Biological Weapons Convention - Submitted by China and Pakistan
- BWC/MSP/2018/MX.2/WP.10 - Códigos de Conducta en el Marco de la Convención de Armas Biológicas – Submitted by Cuba
- BWC/MSP/2018/MX.2/WP.11 - Nuevos adelantos de la Ciencia y la Tecnología en la Esfera de la Biología, en particular la Edición de Genes y la Biología Sintética – Submitted by Cuba
- BWC/MSP/2018/MX.2/WP.12 - Review of Developments in the field of Science and Technology related to the Convention - Submitted by the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement and other States Parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention

### 2019

- BWC/MSP/2019/MX.2/WP.1 - Rethinking the BTWC science and technology review: A renewed case for a BTWC Scientific and Technological Experts Advisory Forum (STEAF) - Submitted by Germany, co-sponsored by the Netherlands and Sweden
- BWC/MSP/2019/MX.2/WP.1/Corr.1 - Rethinking the BTWC science and technology review: A renewed case for a BTWC Scientific and Technological Experts Advisory Forum (STEAF) - Submitted by Germany, co-sponsored by Chile, the Netherlands and Sweden
- BWC/MSP/2019/MX.2/WP.2 - Scientific and Technological Developments of Relevance to the Convention and the Assessment of Benefits and Risks - Submitted by Switzerland
- BWC/MSP/2019/MX.2/WP.3 - Approaches to Risk and Benefit Assessment for Advances in the Life Sciences - Submitted by the United States of America
- BWC/MSP/2019/MX.2/WP.4 - Review of Developments in the Field of Science and Technology Related to the Convention – Synthetic biology - Submitted by Australia
- BWC/MSP/2019/MX.2/WP.5 - Scientific and Technological Developments of Relevance to the Convention - Submitted by the Islamic Republic of Iran
- BWC/MSP/2019/MX.2/WP.6 - Biological risk assessment and management: some further considerations - Submitted by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
- BWC/MSP/2019/MX.2/WP.7 - Review of Developments in the Field of Science and Technology Related to the Convention - Submitted by the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela on behalf of the Group of the Non-Aligned Movement and Other States Parties to the BWC

### 2020

- BWC/MSP/2020/MX.2/WP.1 - Approaches to Governance for Scientific and Technological Advances in the Life Sciences Relevant to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention - Submitted by the United States of America
- BWC/MSP/2020/MX.2/WP.2 - Biorisk management standards and their role in BTWC implementation - Submitted by Austria, Belgium, Chile, France, Germany, Iraq, Ireland, Netherlands, Spain and Thailand
- BWC/MSP/2020/MX.2/WP.3 - Biological risk assessment and management: a need for guiding principles and frameworks-Submitted by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

- BWC/MSP/2020/MX.2/WP.4 - Strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention Proposal for the establishment of a Scientific Advisory Committee - Submitted by the Russian Federation
- BWC/MSP/2020/MX.2/WP.5\* - Exploring Science and Technology Review Mechanisms under the Biological Weapons Convention - Submitted by Germany
- BWC/MSP/2020/MX.2/WP.6 - The Tianjin Biosecurity Guidelines for Codes of Conduct for Scientists - Submitted by China and Pakistan
- BWC/MSP/2020/MX.2/WP.6/Corr.1 - The Tianjin Biosecurity Guidelines for Codes of Conduct for Scientists - Submitted by China and Pakistan, co-sponsored by Brazil
- BWC/MSP/2020/MX.2/WP.7 - A Scientific and Technological Advisory Process for the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention - Submitted by the United States
- BWC/MSP/2020/MX.2/WP.8 - Summary of October 2020 Experts' Meeting on Strengthening Laboratory Biorisk Management - Submitted by the United States
- BWC/MSP/2020/MX.2/WP.9 - Benefits of science and technology developments for the global COVID-19 response - Submitted by the United States
- BWC/MSP/2020/MX.2/WP.10 - Managing Biosafety and Biosecurity Risks: The Importance of Codes of Conduct and a BTWC Science and Technology Advisory Process - Submitted by Switzerland
- BWC/MSP/2020/MX.2/WP.11 - Review Process of Science and Technology Developments relevant to the BWC: Some Considerations - Submitted by the Islamic Republic of Iran
- BWC/MSP/2020/MX.2/WP.12 - Examen de los adelantos en la esfera de la ciencia y la tecnología relacionados con la Convención - Presentado por Cuba
- BWC/MSP/2020/WP.7 - The Tianjin Biosecurity Guidelines for Codes of Conduct for Scientists - Submitted by China and Pakistan, Co-sponsored by Brazil
- BWC/MSP/2020/WP.12 - Current Trends and their Implications to the Biological Weapons Convention - Submitted by the United States of the America

### **C. Strengthening National Implementation**

#### **2018**

- BWC/MSP/2018/MX.3/WP.1/Rev.1 - El transporte de agentes biológicos debe protegerse con medidas de Biocustodia - Submitted by Chile, Colombia, Panama and Spain (unofficial English translation in the annex)
- BWC/MSP/2018/MX.3/WP.2 - Building Confidence in Compliance: Peer Review Transparency Exercise at the Richard Lugar Center for Public Health Research (CPHR) of the National Center for Disease Control and Public Health (NCDC) in Tbilisi, Georgia - Submitted by Georgia, co-sponsored by Germany
- BWC/MSP/2018/MX.3/WP.3 - Improving the Quality of CBM Information: A Review of Recent Proposals and Some Suggestions for Future Work - Submitted by the United States of America
- BWC/MSP/2018/MX.3/WP.4 - Strengthening national implementation: The UK Biological Security Strategy 2018 - Submitted by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
- BWC/MSP/2018/MX.3/WP.5 - Séminaire sur la mise en œuvre de la Convention sur l'Interdiction des Armes Biologiques et à Toxines (Rabat, 10 et 11 Mai 2018) - Submitted by Morocco

- BWC/MSP/2018/MX.3/WP.6 - Step-by-Step Approach to CBM Participation Submitted by Japan, Co-sponsored by Australia, Germany, Malaysia, and Switzerland
- BWC/MSP/2018/MX.3/WP.6/Corr.1 - Step-by-Step Approach to CBM Participation Submitted by Japan, Co-sponsored by Australia, Germany, Malaysia, Republic of Korea and Switzerland
- BWC/MSP/2018/MX.3/WP.7 - National Implementation under Article IV - Submitted by the Islamic Republic of Iran
- BWC/MSP/2018/MX.3/WP.8 - Cumplimiento de las Disposiciones de la Convención de Armas Biológicas (CAB) – Submitted by Cuba
- BWC/MSP/2018/MX.3/WP.9 - Strengthening National Implementation - Submitted by the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement and other States Parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention
- BWC/MSP/2018/WP.1 - Strengthening implementation of Article III of the BTWC - Submitted by India and the United States of America
- BWC/MSP/2018/WP.5 - Building Confidence through Transparency: Peer Review Transparency Visit at the Richard Lugar Center for Public Health Research of the National Center for Disease Control and Public Health in Tbilisi, Georgia - Submitted by Georgia and Germany, co-sponsored by Austria, Belgium, Columbia, Iraq, Hungary, Malaysia, Mali, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America
- BWC/MSP/2018/WP.5/Corr.1 - Submitted by Georgia and Germany, co-sponsored by Austria, Belgium, Chile, Colombia, Hungary, Iraq, Malaysia, Mali, Montenegro, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America
- BWC/MSP/2018/WP.8 - Report of the Regional Workshop for Central Asian States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention on scientific and practical implementation issues (Almaty, Kazakhstan, 23-24 October 2018) - Submitted by Kazakhstan, co-sponsored by Germany
- BWC/MSP/2018/WP.10 - A new initiative to promote voluntary transparency and confidence building measures - Submitted by France
- BWC/MSP/2018/WP.11-Transparency visit to the Lugar Center, Georgia: An Independent Report – Submitted by Georgia

## 2019

- BWC/MSP/2019/MX.3/WP.1 - Strengthening National Implementation: The United States National Biodefense Strategy - Submitted by the United States of America
- BWC/MSP/2019/MX.3/WP.2/Rev.1 - Proposals to Enhance Confidence-Building Measures Participation - Submitted by Japan, co-sponsored by Australia, Germany, Malaysia and Republic of Korea
- BWC/MSP/2019/MX.3/WP.3 - National Implementation under Article IV - Submitted by the Islamic Republic of Iran
- BWC/MSP/2019/MX.3/WP.4 - Confidence Building Measure G - Declaration of Vaccine Production Facilities: identifying additional relevant facilities - Submitted by Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
- BWC/MSP/2019/MX.3/WP.5 - An Exchange Platform for Voluntary Transparency Exercises - Submitted by France

- BWC/MSP/2019/MX.3/WP.6 - Strengthening National Implementation - Submitted by the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement and other States Parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention
- BWC/MSP/2019/WP.5 - Implementation of Articles IV and X of the Biological Weapons Convention - Submitted by the Republic of Korea

### **2020**

- BWC/MSP/2020/MX.3/WP.1 - Online training course for Biological Weapons Convention National Contact Points in Southeast Asia: a model approach for other regions - Submitted by Japan
- BWC/MSP/2020/MX.3/WP.2 - U.S. Project to Strengthen BWC National Implementation: An Offer of Assistance - Submitted by the United States
- BWC/MSP/2020/MX.3/WP.3 - Strengthening National Implementation: The National Biorisk Management Committee in Iraq (Overview) - Submitted by the Republic of Iraq
- BWC/MSP/2020/MX.3/WP.4 - An exchange Platform for voluntary transparency exercises: Terms of reference - Submitted by Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, France, Georgia, Germany, Luxembourg, Netherlands and Spain
- BWC/MSP/2020/MX.3/WP.5 - Fortalecimiento de la Implementación Nacional - Presentado por Cuba
- BWC/MSP/2020/WP.1 - Proposal to enhance the format of confidence-building measures under the Biological Weapons Convention - Submitted by the Russian Federation
- BWC/MSP/2020/WP.4 - An exchange Platform for voluntary transparency exercises: terms of reference - Submitted by Belgium, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, France, Georgia, Germany, Luxembourg, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands and Spain
- BWC/MSP/2020/WP.8 - Implementation of Articles IV and X of the Biological Weapons Convention - Submitted by the Republic of Korea

## **D. Assistance, Response and Preparedness**

### **2018**

- BWC/MSP/2018/MX.4/WP.1 - Assistance and protection from biological weapons in the context of Article VII of the Biological Weapons Convention - Submitted by the Russian Federation (unofficial English translation in the annex)
- BWC/MSP/2018/MX.4/WP.2 - The United Kingdom public health rapid support team concept - Submitted by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
- BWC/MSP/2018/MX.4/WP.3 - Implementation of Article VII - Submitted by South Africa
- BWC/MSP/2018/MX.4/WP.4 - Provision of assistance to a State Party that has been exposed as a result of a violation of the Convention - Submitted by South Africa
- BWC/MSP/2018/MX.4/WP.5 - Recent International Developments Relevant to Article VII - Submitted by the United States of America
- BWC/MSP/2018/MX.4/WP.6 - Australia's Health Security Initiative: Strengthening regional response capabilities for infectious disease outbreaks - Submitted by Australia
- BWC/MSP/2018/MX.4/WP.7 - Strengthening Cooperation among States Parties and Relevant International Organizations in Response to Deliberate Spread of

Infectious Diseases - Submitted by Japan, co-sponsored by the Netherlands and the United Kingdom

- BWC/MSP/2018/MX.4/WP.8 - A contribution to the discussions on the practical challenges facing the implementation of Article VII, and possible solutions - Submitted by Canada
- BWC/MSP/2018/MX.4/WP.9 - Strengthening Article VII: International Cooperation and Assistance in Preparing for and Responding to Biological Incidents - Submitted by the United States of America
- BWC/MSP/2018/MX.4/WP.10 - Investigations of Alleged Biological Weapons Use: Overlap with Public Health Assistance under Article VII of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention - Submitted by the United States of America
- BWC/MSP/2018/MX.4/WP.11 - Assistance, response and preparedness - Submitted by the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement and other States Parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention
- BWC/MSP/2018/WP.4 - Approach to Strengthening Measures for Emerging Infectious Diseases based on Lessons Learned from the Ebola Outbreak - Submitted by Japan
- BWC/MSP/2018/WP.6 - Core Elements for an Effective Article VII Response - Submitted by the Russian Federation and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (unofficial Russian translation contained in the annex)
- BWC/MSP/2018/WP.7 - Proposal for establishment of a database for assistance in the framework of Article VII of the Biological Weapons Convention - Submitted by France and India

## 2019

- BWC/MSP/2019/MX.4/WP.1 – An integrated approach to preparedness, detection, and response to agricultural threats: The experience of the United States - Submitted by the United States of America
- BWC/MSP/2019/MX.4/WP.2 - Update on Australia’s Health Security Initiative for the Indo-Pacific region: Strengthening regional response capabilities for infectious disease outbreaks – Submitted by Australia
- BWC/MSP/2019/MX.4/WP.3 - Approach to Strengthening Measures for Emerging Infectious Diseases based on Lessons Learned from the Ebola Outbreak – Submitted by Japan
- BWC/MSP/2019/MX.4/WP.4 - Strengthening National, Sub-Regional and International Capacities to Prepare for and Respond to the Deliberate Use of Biological Weapons: Project update – Submitted by Japan
- BWC/MSP/2019/MX.4/WP.5 - Possible hostile use of biological agents and toxins against livestock: Existing support mechanisms by relevant international organizations and capacity building efforts by Canada through the G7-Led Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction - Submitted by Canada
- BWC/MSP/2019/MX.4/WP.6 - Core Elements for an Effective Article VII Response: the need for an international coordinating body - Submitted by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
- BWC/MSP/2019/MX.4/WP.7 - Assistance, response and preparedness - Submitted by the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement and other States Parties to the BWC
- BWC/MSP/2019/WP.4 - Investigating alleged use of biological agents against agriculture, livestock and the natural environment: A practical approach - Submitted by Portugal

**2020**

- BWC/MSP/2020/MX.4/WP.1 - Strengthening National, Sub-Regional and International Capacities to Prepare for and Respond to the Deliberate Use of Biological Weapons”: Project update - Submitted by Japan
- BWC/MSP/2020/MX.4/WP.2 - Strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention Operationalising mobile biomedical units to deliver protection against biological weapons, investigate their alleged use, and to suppress epidemics of various etiology - Submitted by the Russian Federation
- BWC/MSP/2020/MX.4/WP.3 - Proposal for the establishment of a database for assistance under Article VII of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention: specific pending issues and way forward for the operationalization of the proposal - Submitted by India and France
- BWC/MSP/2020/MX.4/WP.3/Corr.1 - Proposal for the establishment of a database for assistance under Article VII of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention: specific pending issues and way forward for the operationalization of the proposal - Submitted by India and France
- BWC/MSP/2020/MX.4/WP.4\* - Lessons Learned in International Cooperation and Assistance from an Agricultural Incident - Submitted by the United States
- BWC/MSP/2020/MX.4/WP.5 - Strengthening Capacities in Responding to and Preparing for the Deliberate Use of Biological Weapons: Lessons Learned from UNSGM Table Top Exercise 2020 and Outlook to the Capstone Field Exercise - Submitted by Germany
- BWC/MSP/2020/WP.3 - Proposal for the establishment of a database for assistance under Article VII of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention - Submitted by France and India

**E. Institutional Strengthening of the Convention****2018**

- BWC/MSP/2018/MX.5/WP.1 - Investigation framework to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention - Submitted by Japan
- BWC/MSP/2018/MX.5/WP.2 - Further strengthen the Convention and its functioning - Submitted by Cuba
- BWC/MSP/2018/MX.5/WP.3 - Institutional Strengthening of the BWC - Submitted by the United States of America
- BWC/MSP/2018/MX.5/WP.4 - Institutional Strengthening of the Convention - Submitted by the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement and other States Parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention

**2019**

- BWC/MSP/2019/MX.5/WP.1 - Institutional strengthening of the Convention: Reflections on the 2001 Protocol and the verification challenge - Submitted by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
- BWC/MSP/2019/MX.5/WP.2 - Utilizing the Convention’s Tools to Strengthen its Institutional Functions - Submitted by the United States of America
- BWC/MSP/2019/MX.5/WP.3 - International conference “Global biosecurity challenges. Problems and solutions”, Sochi, 20-21 June 2019 – Submitted by the Russian Federation [unofficial English translation in annex]

- BWC/MSP/2019/MX.5/WP.4 - Institutional Strengthening of the Convention - Submitted by the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement and other States Parties to the BWC
- BWC/MSP/2019/WP.2 - Fortalecimiento Institucional de la Convención de Armas Biológicas - Presentado por Cuba [Unofficial English translation - Institutional Strengthening of the Biological Weapons Convention]

### **2020**

- BWC/MSP/2020/MX.5/WP.1 - Review conferences, decision making and future institutional strengthening of the Convention-Submitted by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
  - BWC/MSP/2020/MX.5/WP.2 - Strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) Proposal for the BWC Article VI Implementation - Submitted by the Russian Federation
  - BWC/MSP/2020/MX.5/WP.3 - Proposal for inclusion in the final document of the Ninth Review Conference of the Biological Weapons Convention - Submitted by the Russian Federation
  - BWC/MSP/2020/MX.5/WP.4 - Concept note on the creation of an International Agency for Biological Safety (IABS) - Submitted by Kazakhstan
  - BWC/MSP/2020/MX.5/WP.5 - III International research and practical Conference "Global Biosecurity Challenges. Problems and Solutions" (Sochi, 24-25 June 2021) - Submitted by the Russian Federation
  - BWC/MSP/2020/MX.5/WP.5/Corr.1 - III International research and practical Conference "Global Biosecurity Challenges. Problems and Solutions" (Sochi, 24-25 June 2021) - Submitted by the Russian Federation
  - BWC/MSP/2020/MX.5/WP.6 - Enhancing Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment as an Integral Part of the Institutional Strengthening of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) - Submitted by Panama
  - BWC/MSP/2020/WP.2 - Strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). Proposal for the BWC Article VI Implementation - Submitted by the Russian Federation
  - BWC/MSP/2020/WP.6 - Enhancing Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment as an Integral Part of the Institutional Strengthening of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) - Submitted by Panama
-