

**Formal Consultative Meeting of the States Parties
to the Convention on the Prohibition of the
Development, Production and Stockpiling
of Bacteriological (Biological) and
Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction**

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2022 Meeting

Geneva, 26 August and 5-9 September 2022

Item 6 of the agenda


**Respective outstanding questions by the Russian Federation
to the United States and to Ukraine concerning the fulfilment
of their respective obligations under the Convention in the context
of the operation of biological laboratories in Ukraine**

**Questions to Ukraine regarding the compliance with
obligations under Article IV of the Convention on the
Prohibition of the Development, Production and
Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin
Weapons and on their Destruction (BWC) in the
context of activities of biological laboratories in
Ukrainian territory**

Submitted by the Russian Federation





Science and technology centre in Ukraine




The Science and Technology Center in Ukraine is an international intergovernmental organization established "for the purpose of preventing the spread of knowledge and expertise related to weapons of mass destruction", acting on the basis of the Agreement of 25.10.1993, concluded between the governments of Ukraine, Canada, USA and Sweden.

The STCU brings together former defense industry personnel, scientists and researchers who have worked on nuclear, chemical, biological or other weapons of mass destruction in the nuclear and chemical industries, and employees of closed science centers, institutions and laboratories of the former Soviet Union.



Example of ongoing projects with dual-use potential



Document of the STCU on possible risks involved with the activity of Ukrainian specialists on WMD

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Reducing the Threat of Ukrainian Expertise Proliferating to U.S. Adversaries

Draft dated Mar. 11, 2022

Proliferation Challenge:

The Russian invasion of Ukraine has resulted in millions evacuating Ukraine, including the exodus of highly capable technical experts from Ukrainian facilities that produce missile components and advanced conventional weapons (ACW), as well as those with expertise that could be redirected and exploited by others for a chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) weapon. **The most senior and experienced of these dual-use scientists, technicians, and engineers (STEs)**, estimated at 1,000-4,000 total (see Attachment), will find themselves in conditions of financial and professional hardship that render them vulnerable to exploitation by proliferator states or others to advance illicit WMD, missile, and ACW programs.

Proposed Solution:

This non-paper proposes that U.S. Party and USG Partner organizations including ISN (CTR, NDF, WMDT, ECC), NNSA, DTRA, NAS, and others should fund and implement a new effort through the Science and Technology Center in Ukraine (STCU) to engage a Ukraine's most at-risk STE with proliferation-sensitive expertise under the three lines of effort outlined below. For nearly three decades, the STCU has successfully facilitated and implemented just over \$350 million dollars' worth of peaceful scientific and commercial collaboration between Ukrainian STEs with dual-use expertise and international partners from both the public and private sectors in the U.S., the European Union, and beyond. As an intergovernmental organization with diplomatic status designed to facilitate scientific cooperation to mitigate the threat of dual-use expertise proliferation from the former Soviet Union, the STCU's unique pedigree, credibility, networks, and experience render it uniquely qualified to mitigate this new proliferation threat.

Potential Lines of Effort:

1. **Professional Matchmaking for Ukrainian Dual-Use Experts:** This line of effort leverages STCU's deep networks across the Ukrainian, U.S., and EU scientific community to provide a clearinghouse, central repository of available expertise, and expert facilitation for Ukrainian dual-use experts seeking grant opportunities, scientific collaboration, and/or employment for peaceful civilian work with international partners. Anticipated activities include searchable database development and maintenance, in-person and virtual symposia and conferences that permit Ukrainian experts to showcase their talents, travel grants for Ukrainian experts to participate and present in international events for targeted networking and meet with potential employers and collaborators, and peer-review of non-sensitive publications that highlight their abilities for employment purposes.
2. **Personal and Professional Security Training for Ukraine's Dual-Use Experts:** This line of effort builds upon prior STCU experience providing sustainability support to dual-use scientists by developing skills needed by scientists but sometimes lacking such as responsible science, scientific ethics, and protection of sensitive dual-use information, cybersecurity and cyber

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«... There has been an outflow of highly qualified scientific experts in the development of missile technology, delivery systems, and advanced weaponry who have worked for Ukrainian institutions, as well as experts in the development of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons. The most experienced specialists with dual-use knowledge (there are 1,000-4,000 of them) found themselves in unfavorable professional and financial circumstances. This makes them vulnerable to defection to other states to participate in programs to develop WMD, delivery systems, and other weapons.»

2022–2024 amount of financing
\$ 31 000 000

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hygiene for scientists, risk assessment, mitigation, and vetting of potential partners and opportunities; intellectual property rights and protection.

3. **Intensive Collaboration and Partnership Grants for Ukrainian Dual-Use Experts:** This line of effort leverages decades of STCU experience in grant administration to provide one-time, limited-term research and development grants on a peer-reviewed, competitive basis for meritorious civilian research proposals from Ukrainian experts with especially sensitive WMD-applicable expertise. Grants may support labor, approved travel, research materials such as reagents and personal protective equipment, equipment such as laptop computers, and limited-term subscriptions to scientific publications and databases. Grants will be administered by the STCU leveraging the organization's performance monitoring and auditing infrastructure. A unique element of this program is STCU support in locating suitable research facilities for displaced scientists to conduct their work.

Priority Community for Engagement:

This programming is focused only on the subset of the Ukrainian technical community most vulnerable to exploitation by a proliferator state that have significant experience in fields applicable to the development of CBRN weapons, ACW and missiles, and who left Ukraine in 2022.

Preliminary Estimate of USG Resources Needed and Not Yet Identified

FY22: Program Development and Implementation: \$12M

FY23: Program Implementation: \$10M

FY24: Program Conclusion and Sunset: \$9M

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Drafted by: Laura Deninger (ISN/CTR, Deninger.L@state.gov, 1-202-340-4216)

Reviewed by: ISN/CTR: RTaughter/MScheland/BHill

ISN/NDF: JConlon

ISN/ECC: MBoudin

ISN/WMDT: KLoew

ISN/PC: CRussell

EUR/PRA: KODriscoll

EUR/RE: JPotter

EUR/ACE: EDemi


NNSA: RCarter

DTRA: RLong

NAS: GSchweitzer

Document of the SCU regarding risks and confirming biological activities of the U.S. in Ukraine

Report of the SCU on ensuring biological security in microbiological institutions




...the demands of the American side to create a single storage facility for pathogens contradict the principles of the existing veterinary control system in Ukraine, which provides for permanent work with pathogens in the field...


...individual steps by foreign representatives can be regarded as actions to undermine the relevant scientific and technical potential... The implementation of these proposals poses a risk to the relevant research potential...

...The above initiatives of the American side have a negative impact on the implementation of the Agreement and are unacceptable for Ukraine in the context of its own vision of building an effective system of epidemiological and epizootological surveillance, adopted on 01.04.2013 by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine № 620 "About approval of state target program biosafety 2015-2020"....

Report of the SCU on military and biological activities of the United States in Ukraine



Report of the Kherson division of the SCU




DTRA programs, implemented through "Black & Veatch", are aimed at establishing control over the functioning of microbiological laboratories in Ukraine

The ongoing work on pathogens could be used to create or modernize biological weapons

The subordination of projects to the military department of a foreign country creates the preconditions for foreign specialists to penetrate into laboratories and become familiar with strategic developments

request for the organization of interaction between the AFU and the U.S. in the field of biological cooperation

Correspondence of the Armed forces of Ukraine on the issue of military and biological cooperation



Documents related to safety violations contributing to uncontrolled access and leakage of pathogens from biolaboratories

ДОВІДКА
про результати роботи робочої групи Міністерства охорони здоров'я України з перевірки зберігання колекції штамів мікроорганізмів, що становить національне надбання в Державній установі «Український науково-дослідний протичумний інститут ім. І.І. Мечникова Міністерства охорони здоров'я України»

27-28.12.2018

м. Одеса

Членами робочої групи в складі: Ганжя І.М., головного спеціаліста експертної групи з біобезпеки та реформування служби крові Директорату громадського здоров'я МОЗ України; Кузін І.В., заступника генерального директора ДУ «Центр громадського здоров'я МОЗ України»; Родина Р.А., заступника генерального директора ДУ «Центр громадського здоров'я МОЗ України»; Дещишної І.В., завідувача вірусологічної референс-лабораторії ДУ «Центр громадського здоров'я МОЗ України»; Видішко Н.Б., завідувача референс-лабораторією з дослідження особливо небезпечних патогенів ДУ «Центр громадського здоров'я МОЗ України»; Бондаренка Д.А., голови комісії з проведення заходів, пов'язаних з реорганізацією ДУ «Український науково-дослідний протичумний інститут ім. І.І. Мечникова Міністерства охорони здоров'я України» в присутності Ковбасюк О.В. – завідувача лабораторії індикації збудників бактеріальних особливо небезпечних інфекцій, Самоїленко В.О. – бактеріолога вищої категорії лабораторії індикації збудників бактеріальних особливо небезпечних інфекцій та Шитівкової Л.І. – завідувача лабораторії індикації особливо небезпечних біологічних патогенних агентів, у відповідності до наказу Міністерства охорони здоров'я України від 07.12.2018 № 127-Адм. проведено перевірку умов зберігання колекції штамів мікроорганізмів, що становить національне надбання в Державній установі «Український науково-дослідний протичумний інститут ім. І.І. Мечникова Міністерства охорони здоров'я України» (далі – Інститут).

Перевіркою встановлено:

Інститут на момент перевірки перебуває в стадії реорганізації шляхом приєднання до ДУ «Центр громадського здоров'я МОЗ України» згідно наказу МОЗ від 18.09.2015 № 604 «Про утворення Державної установи «Центр громадського здоров'я МОЗ України».

В структурі інституту є наступні підрозділи: науковий, спеціалізована поліклініка, протичумна станиця. Станом на грудень 2018 р. на базі протичумної станиці (ПЧС) інституту функціонує дві лабораторії мікробіологічного профілю – лабораторія індикації особливо небезпечних біологічних патогенних агентів

Inoperative system for controlling access to pathogen collections

Violation of the rules for storing biological material

Confirmed facts of biological accidents involving the contamination of employees

Insufficient level of ensuring biological security requirements

Conditions have been created for unauthorized access to pathogenic biomaterials in the course of their accumulation activities

Risks of stealing biomaterial and its subsequent use

DTRA's report in the Cooperative Biological Engagement Program Assessment of health and veterinary systems, biosafety, related processes, and deficiencies



Gross violations, restrictions on access to the territory of biohazardous facilities are characteristic of most institutions.

There is no legislation regarding the control of highly dangerous pathogens, there are significant deficiencies in biosafety