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Seventy-eighth session Item 139 of the preliminary list\* Proposed programme budget for 2024

## **Proposed programme budget for 2024**

Part II Political affairs

Section 3 Political affairs

Special political missions

Thematic cluster III: regional offices, offices in support of political processes and other missions

## Summary

The present report contains the proposed resource requirements for 2024 for 11 special political missions grouped under the thematic cluster of regional offices, offices in support of political processes and other missions.

The proposed resource requirements for 2024 for special political missions grouped under this cluster amount to \$427,911,900 (net of staff assessment).







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<sup>\*\*</sup> The part consisting of the proposed programme plan for 2024 is submitted for the consideration of the General Assembly in accordance with the established budgetary procedures and practices reaffirmed in paragraph 7 of Assembly resolution 77/267.

<sup>\*\*\*</sup> In keeping with paragraph 10 of General Assembly resolution 77/267, the part consisting of the post and non-post resource requirements (part III) is submitted through the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions for the consideration of the Assembly.

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## I. Resource overview

1. The proposed resource requirements for 2024 for the 11 special political missions grouped under thematic cluster III amount to \$427,911,900 (net of staff assessment). Tables 1 and 2 provide a comparison between the financial and human resources proposed for 2024 and such resources for 2023 as approved by the General Assembly in its resolution 77/263 A.

#### Table 1 Financial resources

(Thousands of United States dollars)

	202	2	2023	2024	Variance
	Appropriation	Expenditure	Appropriation	Estimate	2024 vs. 2023 Increase/ (decrease)
Mission	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)=(4)-(2)
UNOWAS	14 658.6	14 526.5	14 835.2	15 347.8	512.6
UNSOM	98 507.2	100 000.8	96 571.3	101 275.6	4 704.3
United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia	2 894.2	3 011.1	3 292.7	3 233.2	(59.5)
United Nations support for the Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission	3 525.0	3 686.8	3 781.3	3 821.7	40.4
Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon	9 558.4	10 275.7	10 183.1	11 308.9	1 125.8
UNOCA	8 530.1	8 044.2	9 074.1	8 410.5	(663.6)
UNSMIL	69 262.0	82 340.9	88 046.5	87 903.7	(142.8)
United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia	66 800.6	61 117.6	67 244.3	66 971.7	(272.6)
United Nations Mission to Support the Hudaydah Agreement	42 292.0	29 531.0	36 071.6	34 766.2	(1 305.4)
BINUH	21 841.3	23 017.3	27 902.1	29 975.1	2 073.0
UNITAMS	56 319.6	56 649.0	66 128.0	64,897.5	(1 230.5)
Total	394 189.0	392 200.9	423 130.2	427 911.9	4 781.7

*Abbreviations*: BINUH, United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti; UNITAMS, United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in the Sudan; UNOWAS, United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel; UNSMIL, United Nations Support Mission in Libya; UNSOM, United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia.

### Table 2 Human resources

	Military observer/ advisers	Military contingents	United Nations police	Government- provided personnel	International staff <sup>a</sup>	National staff <sup>b</sup>	United Nations Volunteers <sup>c</sup>	Total
UNOWAS								
Approved 2023	2	_	-	-	44	31	-	77
Proposed 2024	2	_	-	_	44	31	_	77
UNSOM								
Approved 2023	_	625	14	23	187	132	19	1 000
Proposed 2024	_	625	14	23	187	132	19	1 000

	Military observer/ advisers	Military contingents	United Nations police	Government- provided personnel	International staff <sup>a</sup>	National staff <sup>b</sup>	United Nations Volunteers <sup>c</sup>	Total
United Nations Regional Centre for	Preventive Diploma	cy for Centi	ral Asia					
Approved 2023	_	_	_	-	8	22	_	30
Proposed 2024	_	_	_	-	8	22	-	30
United Nations support for the Came	eroon-Nigeria Mixee	d Commissi	on					
Approved 2023	1	_	_	-	9	2	_	12
Proposed 2024	1	_	_	_	9	2	_	12
Office of the United Nations Specia	l Coordinator for Le	banon						
Approved 2023	_	_	_	-	18	65	-	83
Proposed 2024	_	_	_	-	18	65	_	83
UNOCA								
Approved 2023	-	_	-	-	33	16	1	50
Proposed 2024	-	_	_	_	33	16	1	50
UNSMIL								
Approved 2023	-	234	_	7	274	135	6	656
Proposed 2024	_	234	_	7	274	137	6	658
United Nations Verification Mission	in Colombia							
Approved 2023	120	_	_	_	171	182	141	614
Proposed 2024	120	_	_	_	180	189	145	634
United Nations Mission to Support	the Hudaydah Agree	ment						
Approved 2023	75	_	_	5	71	91	_	242
Proposed 2024	75	_	_	5	73	92	_	245
BINUH								
Approved 2023	-	_	21	2	90	58	_	171
Proposed 2024	-	_	21	2	93	58	4	178
UNITAMS								
Approved 2023	28	_	42	_	178	166	12	426
Proposed 2024	28	_	42	_	179	166	12	427
Total								
Approved 2023	226	859	77	37	1 083	900	179	3 361
Proposed 2024	226	859	77	37	1 098	910	187	3 394
Net change	-	_	_	-	15	10	8	33

*Abbreviations*: BINUH, United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti; UNITAMS, United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in the Sudan; UNOWAS, United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel; UNSMIL, United Nations Support Mission in Libya; UNSOM, United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia.

<sup>a</sup> Includes staff in the Professional and higher categories and Field Service and General Service staff.

<sup>b</sup> Includes National Professional Officers and Local level staff.

<sup>c</sup> Includes international and national United Nations Volunteers.

- 2. The proposed vacancy rates applied in the budget take into account the experience to date. The assumptions considered for the proposed vacancy factors include the 12-month average vacancy rate in 2022, and the actual vacancy rate as at 31 March 2023. The lower of the two was used as the budgeted vacancy rate. This is in line with the policy guidance provided by the Field Operations Finance Division of the Department of Management Strategy, Policy and Compliance, to improve the accuracy and consistency of the vacancy factors applied in the proposed budgets for 2024 and to ensure that proposed vacancy rates are based, as much as possible, on actual rates. A vacancy rate of 50 per cent has been applied in the calculation of costs for the proposed establishment of new posts and positions, or posts and positions proposed for reassignment or conversion.
- 3. For the sake of brevity, the present document will include a section on extrabudgetary resources only for those missions that have projected extrabudgetary resources in 2023 or 2024.

## **II.** Cross-cutting information

#### **Gender perspective**

- 4. Special political missions are guided by Security Council resolutions 1325 (2000), 1820 (2008), 1888 (2009), 1889 (2009), 2122 (2013), 2242 (2015), 1960 (2010), 2106 (2013), 2467 (2019), and 2493 (2019), which, together, constitute the women and peace and security agenda and mandate the incorporation of a gender perspective into the political work of the United Nations, including in special political missions. The missions are also guided by General Assembly resolution 75/100 on the comprehensive review of special political missions, in which the Assembly reaffirmed the important role of women in the prevention and resolution of conflicts and in peacebuilding and recognized the importance of the equal and effective participation and the full involvement of women at all levels, at all stages and in all aspects of the peaceful settlement of disputes, conflict prevention and conflict resolution.
- 5. Specific examples of how special political missions integrate a gender perspective into their operational activities, deliverables and results, are given under the individual missions in the present report.

#### **Disability inclusion**

6. In line with the United Nations Disability Inclusion Strategy, special political missions review the Strategy with a view to further advancing disability inclusion through inclusive messaging, awareness-raising and promoting the Strategy through their work, including in political and peace processes. The missions also support mitigating measures to overcome accessibility challenges, in addition to the efforts by relevant United Nations entities to ensure the accessibility of facilities, platforms, security and other infrastructure to facilitate easy access and use by persons with disabilities.

#### **Evaluation activities**

7. The Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs will support the biennial assessment by the Office of Internal Oversight Services on strengthening the role of evaluation and the application of evaluation findings on programme design, delivery and policy directives. Mission-specific evaluation activities are described, as applicable, under the specific missions in the present report.

#### Impact of the pandemic and lessons learned

- 8. The continuation of the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic into 2022 impacted the implementation of mandates in the special political missions. Specific examples are provided under the individual missions in the present report.
- 9. Reflecting the importance of continuous improvement and responding to the needs and requests of Member States, the proposed programme plans for the special political missions for 2024 continue to incorporate lessons learned and best practices related to the adjustments to and adaptation of the programme owing to the COVID-19 pandemic. At the same time, it is assumed that those operational conditions have improved and allow for mandate implementation through formerly established approaches. Any modifications to planned deliverables would be in pursuance of the objectives, strategies and mandates and would be reported as part of the programme performance information.

## **III.** Special political missions

## 1. United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel

(\$15,347,800)

## Foreword

In 2022, inclusive and peaceful elections brought renewed hope for peace consolidation and democratic governance in parts of the region. However, unconstitutional changes of Government in three countries and an attempted military takeover, together with restrictions on political space and civil liberties in some countries, exposed underlying governance fragilities. More promisingly, through effective regional diplomacy, agreement was reached on transition calendars in Burkina Faso and Guinea. On the security front, violent attacks against civilian and military targets continued, with the situation increasingly impacting coastal countries. In central Sahel, many schools and health centres closed owing to persistent insecurity, which also caused high displacement rates. Expectations are high that regional security initiatives, such as the Accra Initiative, will support ongoing efforts to stem the tide of insecurity in the region.

In 2024, the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel will continue its preventive and peace consolidation engagements. Our good offices and political advocacy efforts will focus on building consensus on political and electoral processes and strengthening democratic governance in support of just, peaceful and inclusive societies. We will place emphasis on strengthening capacities and pursuing coordinated and coherent approaches to address conflict drivers. Partnerships across the region and within the United Nations system will be intensified in pursuit of these objectives, with the hope of restoring legitimacy in democratic traditions and accountable governance in the region.

(Signed) Leonardo Santos Simão Special Representative of the Secretary-General for West Africa and the Sahel Head of the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel

# A. Proposed programme plan for 2024 and programme performance in 2022

## **Overall orientation**

## Mandates and background

- 10. The United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS) is responsible for conflict prevention and ensuring sustainable peace and security in West Africa and the Sahel. The mandate of UNOWAS derives from the exchanges of letters between the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council (S/2016/88 and S/2016/89, S/2016/1128 and S/2016/1129, S/2019/1009 and S/2020/85, S/2023/70 and S/2023/71, the latter of which reflected the Council's extension of the mandate of the mission to 31 January 2026), as well as Security Council resolution 2349 (2017).
- 11. UNOWAS will continue to monitor political developments, identify emerging peace and security threats and conduct good offices activities to prevent conflict, sustain peace and consolidate peacebuilding efforts and political stability in West African and Sahelian countries; enhance regional and subregional partnerships to address cross-border and cross-cutting peace and security threats in West Africa and the Sahel; support, through political advocacy and convening, the implementation of the United Nations integrated strategy for the Sahel; and promote good governance, respect for the rule of law, human rights and the mainstreaming of gender in conflict prevention, management and resolution. In doing so, it will work closely with regional and subregional entities and will enhance its collaboration across the United Nations system.

## **Programme of work**

## Objective

12. The objective, to which this mission contributes, is to achieve peace and security in West Africa and the Sahel.

## Strategy and external factors for 2024

- 13. To contribute to the objective, the mission will:
  - (a) Strengthen its early warning and conflict prevention, resolution and management actions in close partnership with national, subregional and regional partners, with a particular focus on countries undergoing political transitions and scheduled to hold elections in 2024, namely Burkina Faso, Cabo Verde, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Mauritania and Senegal, as well as take steps to anticipate and address threats to social cohesion, de-escalate crises surrounding political, constitutional and reform processes, and address governance-related challenges;
  - (b) Further enhance partnerships with regional institutions to address regional peace and security challenges; with civil society organizations, including traditional and religious leaders, youth and women; and with United Nations entities to address the root causes of instability and insecurity in the region and to reinforce the peace-security-development nexus;
  - (c) Accelerate the implementation of the women and peace and security and youth, peace and security agendas, including by ensuring the promotion of gender and meaningful involvement of women and young people in political and decision-making processes and mediation initiatives; and advance the promotion of good governance and respect for human rights and the rule of law.

- 14. The above-mentioned work is expected to result in:
  - (a) Prevention and mitigation of conflicts, consensual political processes, the consolidation of democracy and political stability; and peaceful and inclusive electoral processes, as well as mechanisms for prevention of conflicts and potential election-related violence;
  - (b) Strengthened subregional cross-border responses to challenges related to climate change, transnational organized crime, illicit trafficking, farmer and herder dynamics, terrorism and violent extremism conducive to terrorism;
  - (c) Coherent, comprehensive and integrated approaches to addressing the root causes of instability, intercommunal violence and conflict in the Sahel;
  - (d) Mainstreaming of gender into conflict prevention, management and resolution activities in West Africa and the Sahel;
  - (e) Improved governance and security structures and mechanisms and enhanced respect for human rights and the rule of law in the region.
- 15. With regard to cooperation with other entities, UNOWAS partners with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Mano River Union, the Lake Chad Basin Commission, the Liptako-Gourma Authority, the Gulf of Guinea Commission, the Group of Five for the Sahel, the Accra Initiative and the African Union to strengthen and harmonize regional capacities for conflict prevention and resolution, peacebuilding and sustaining peace; advance the promotion of good governance and respect for human rights and the rule of law, and the promotion of gender and the active participation of women and young people in political and decision-making processes; and support regional responses to address cross-border threats to peace and security, including transnational organized crime, illicit trafficking, farmer and herder dynamics, terrorism and violent extremism conducive to terrorism as well as piracy and other forms of maritime crime in the Gulf of Guinea. Collaboration with regional and subregional partners will take place through joint highlevel missions, as well as technical assessment and fact-finding missions, based on principles of subsidiarity and complementarity. In addition, UNOWAS will continue to host the secretariat and ensure coordination of the Working Group on Women, Youth, Peace and Security in West Africa and the Sahel.
- 16. With regard to inter-agency coordination and liaison, UNOWAS will promote synergies with the Regional Collaborative Platform, the Development Coordination Office, as well as resident coordinators, humanitarian coordinators, United Nations country teams and other United Nations agencies, funds and programmes to address the multifaceted challenges facing the region. Coordination with United Nations entities, including with the Office of the Special Coordinator for Development in the Sahel, will continue within the United Nations integrated strategy for the Sahel framework and in line with the mission's convening and political advocacy roles. The engagement of UNOWAS will remain consistent with the priorities of the integrated strategy, with a focus on cross-border threats to peace and security and efforts to counter radicalization. UNOWAS will work closely with the resident coordinators in its mission area on the sustaining peace agenda and other priority issues. In that context, it will continue to coordinate with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and with the Peacebuilding Support Office of the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs in relation to any joint interventions. UNOWAS will deepen its engagement with UNOCA on transregional issues affecting both West and Central Africa, including the threats posed by Boko Haram factions, as well as conflicts related to farmer-herder dynamics, piracy and maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea.
- 17. In relation to the external factors, the overall plan for 2024 is based on the following planning assumptions:
  - (a) The demand remains high for the good offices of UNOWAS to facilitate political dialogue and ease political tensions, and to support countries undergoing political transitions and elections;

- (b) The Heads of State and Government of West Africa, ECOWAS, the Lake Chad Basin Commission, Mano River Union, the African Union, the Group of Five for the Sahel, the Gulf of Guinea Commission and the Accra Initiative demonstrate commitment to mobilizing resources to address challenges to peace and stability and the political will to sustain regional peace and security mechanisms. The ECOWAS early warning and response mechanism and other regional conflict prevention instruments, including the good governance protocol, are fully operationalized at the regional, national and local levels, in close collaboration with civil society;
- (c) The international community remains committed to supporting the countries of the region and regional and subregional organizations in addressing governance and security challenges. Peacebuilding and peace consolidation efforts by regional and subregional organizations and other partners, including in post-electoral contexts, continue;
- (d) There is strong political commitment on the part of Member States, regional organizations and civil society organizations to work with the United Nations in the context of the United Nations integrated strategy for the Sahel. Political and technical level engagements with the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) on regional peace and security issues and with UNOCA in support of the Gulf of Guinea Commission and the Interregional Coordination Centre for Maritime Safety and Security in the Gulf of Guinea continue.
- 18. The mission integrates gender and youth perspectives in its operational activities, deliverables and results, as appropriate. The good offices role of the Special Representative includes consultations with women's groups and young people, and UNOWAS will continue to advocate for the implementation of Security Council resolutions 1325 (2000) and 2250 (2015), and subsequent resolutions on women and peace and security and on youth, peace and security through the formulation and implementation of national and regional action plans.

### Impact of the pandemic and lessons learned

- 19. The continuation of the COVID-19 pandemic into 2022 had minimal impact on mandate implementation, as most of the restrictive measures enacted to respond to COVID-19 were lifted. As a result, UNOWAS deployments across the region and beyond, as well as in-person activities, resumed to near pre-pandemic levels.
- 20. The mission continues to mainstream lessons learned and best practices related to the adjustments to and adaptation of the programme owing to the COVID-19 pandemic including by conducting hybrid activities, encouraging virtual participation at external partner events and enabling flexible working arrangements, where such approaches do not adversely impact on mandate implementation.

### **Programme performance in 2022**

#### Reduction in electoral-related tensions throughout West Africa and the Sahel


21. In 2022, the Special Representative for West Africa and the Sahel and his Deputy Special Representative conducted 22 good offices and mediation missions throughout the region, including those conducted jointly with ECOWAS, to facilitate the rapid restoration of constitutional order in Burkina Faso and Guinea, support peaceful elections in the Gambia, Benin and Nigeria, and foster inclusive political reform and dialogue processes across the region. The Special Representative intensified his preventive diplomacy engagements in connection with Burkina Faso to secure the commitment of the transitional authorities to respect agreed transition timetables and to establish a transition monitoring and evaluation mechanism. In support of ECOWAS-led mediation efforts, the Special Representative engaged with Guinean political stakeholders and external partners to facilitate constructive dialogue and ensure an inclusive political transition. In election settings, UNOWAS undertook good offices missions, as well as technical assessments to support peaceful

and inclusive elections in the Gambia in 2022 and a transparent electoral process in the lead-up to elections in Benin scheduled for 2023. In addition, in anticipation of the general elections in Nigeria scheduled for 2023, the Special Representative and his Deputy conducted pre-electoral good offices missions to meet with the presidential candidates, as well as national and international partners, the resident coordinator and representatives of United Nations entities in the country.

- 22. The above-mentioned work contributed to an overall reduction in violence and increased political stability in countries conducting electoral processes in West Africa and the Sahel.
- 23. Progress towards the objective is presented in the performance measure below (see figure I).

#### Figure I

## Performance measure: number of high-level good offices and mediation missions carried out to prevent election-related tensions and consolidate political stability



## Planned results for 2024

## Result 1: reduced tensions related to electoral processes and political reforms throughout West Africa and the Sahel

#### Programme performance in 2022 and target for 2024

- 24. The mission's work contributed to a reduction in violence and increase in political stability in countries conducting electoral processes, undergoing political reforms and experiencing unconstitutional changes of government. This met the planned target of enhanced good offices and mediation efforts to address election-related tensions throughout West Africa and the Sahel.
- 25. In 2022, the high-level political engagement and good offices deployments of the Special Representative in the transition context of Burkina Faso resulted in an agreement by the transition authorities to commit to previously agreed transition timetables and to the establishment of a transition monitoring committee.
- 26. Also in 2022, in collaboration with United Nations partners, UNOWAS supported authorities of different states in Nigeria in preparing and organizing national stakeholders' forums as a demonstration of their collective resolve to enhance sustainable peace, security and development in Nigeria in the context of the 2023 general elections. The beneficiaries present, which included traditional and religious leaders, the National Peace Committee, security forces, and women and youth groups, considered that the forums contributed positively to the creation of conducive conditions for peaceful and credible elections.
- 27. In 2024, a series of presidential or legislative elections are scheduled to be held in Burkina Faso, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Mauritania and Senegal in accordance with constitutional and legal time frames and in keeping with agreed transitional calendars. The mission will conduct high-level good offices and mediation missions to contribute to the peaceful holding of credible elections in

those countries. It will also deploy technical assessment missions to work closely with the resident coordinators and United Nations country teams, which will focus on identifying and defusing emerging peace and security threats or pre-electoral tensions.

28. Progress towards the objective and target for 2024 are presented in the performance measure below (see table 3).

## Table 3Performance measure

2020 (actual)	2021 (actual)	2022 (actual)	2023 (planned)	2024 (planned)
The conduct of generally peaceful, inclusive and credible elections in five countries in West Africa	Increased good offices and mediation efforts to address election related tensions/ disagreements throughout West Africa and the Sahel	Enhanced good offices and mediation efforts to address election related tensions/ disagreements throughout West Africa and the Sahel	Increased good offices and mediation efforts to address election related tensions/ disagreements throughout West Africa and the Sahel	Peaceful electoral processes and political reforms throughout West Africa and the Sahel

## Result 2: strengthened regional partnership and leadership role in support of the implementation of the United Nations integrated strategy for the Sahel

#### Programme performance in 2022 and target for 2024

- 29. The Special Representative leveraged his political leadership and strategic guidance to intensify implementation of the United Nations integrated strategy for the Sahel. He chaired the thirteenth meeting of the steering committee, held in May 2022 in Chad, and facilitated the activities of the strategy's security pillar. Twelve of his good offices' missions undertaken in 2022 were to Sahel countries in response to the rapidly deteriorating political, security and humanitarian situation in the area. The mission worked closely with the Office of the Special Coordinator for Development in the Sahel, ensuring an integrated and joint approach to implementation of the United Nations integrated strategy for the Sahel. A study on the impact of geopolitics on peace and prosperity in the Sahel was conducted in 2022 and will be finalized in 2023. The mission also worked closely with the Independent High-Level Panel on Security and Development in the Sahel, led by the former President of the Niger, Mahamadou Issoufou, launched in September 2022.
- 30. For 2024, the mission will continue to strengthen partnerships with regional organizations and other stakeholders on the basis of its comparative advantages in pursuit of peace and security objectives. It will also continue to harness its leadership role to drive implementation of the United Nations integrated strategy for the Sahel, through political advocacy and convening, in line with its mandate.


#### Lessons learned and planned change

31. A lesson learned for the mission was that, increasingly, the region is taking a lead role on peace and security matters, pursuing homegrown and regional initiatives to mediate political crises and tackle governance deficits and security challenges that draw on lessons learned from various past interventions in the region. In applying the lesson, the mission will continue to strengthen partnerships with regional organizations and other stakeholders on the basis of its comparative advantages in pursuit of peace and security objectives. Emphasis will be placed on strengthened collaboration across the United Nations system and coherent regional and international approaches to avoid overlap and maximize synergies to more effectively address root causes as well as develop responses that are locally driven and people-centred.

32. Expected progress towards the objective is presented in the performance measure below (see figure II).

#### Figure II

Performance measure: number of briefings, high level meetings and advocacy engagements between leadership of the mission and regional partners in the Sahel



## Deliverables

33. Table 4 lists all deliverables of the mission.

#### Table 4

### Deliverables for the period 2022-2024, by category and subcategory

Cat	tegory and subcategory	2022 planned	2022 actual	2023 planned	2024 planned
A.	Facilitation of the intergovernmental process and expert bodies				
	Parliamentary documentation (number of documents)	2	2	2	2
	1. Reports of the Secretary-General to the Security Council	2	2	2	2
	Substantive services for meetings (number of three-hour meetings)	2	2	2	2
	2. Meetings of the Security Council	2	2	2	2
B.	Generation and transfer of knowledge				
	Seminars, workshops and training events (number of days)	9	9	15	15
	3. Workshops on peace and security, including terrorism, violent extremism conducive to terrorism, transnational organized crime, human rights and the implementation of Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) and subsequent resolutions on women's rights	9	9	15	15
	Technical materials (number of materials)	4	4	4	4
	4. Issue papers on peace and security, human rights, gender and young people	4	4	4	4
	Fact-finding, monitoring and investigation missions (number of missions)	15	15	15	15
	5. Advocacy and support for integrated subregional and cross-border responses on cross-cutting threats to peace and security, in particular election-related instability and challenges related to governance deficits, security sector reform, transnational organized crime, illicit trafficking, terrorism and violent extremism conducive to terrorism; consultations on human rights during political and electoral processes; and advocacy for the effective implementation of the United Nations integrated strategy for the Sahel and advocacy for enhanced strategic cooperation and coordination in the Sahel in fulfilment of the objectives of the integrated strategy	15	15	15	15

	2022	2022	2023	2024
Category and subcategory	planned	actual	planned	planned

#### C. Substantive deliverables

**Good offices**: provision of good offices, including jointly with ECOWAS and the African Union, on conflict prevention across countries of West Africa and the Sahel in consideration of human rights and gender aspects.

**Consultation, advice and advocacy**: monitoring missions to countries of West Africa and the Sahel to analyze developments and emerging threats and identify entry points for early warning and conflict prevention activities; monitoring missions to Burkina Faso and the Gambia to support United Nations initiatives to sustain peace; and pre- and post-electoral missions to countries conducting elections in West Africa and the Sahel to monitor tensions related to the electoral process.

#### **D.** Communication deliverables

**Outreach programmes, special events and information materials**: digital and print (quarterly), information campaigns, brochures, flyers, information notes to promote the good offices and the mission's activities while enhancing the visibility of the mission.

External and media relations: media encounters, briefings, press conferences, press releases, statements and op-eds.

**Digital platforms and multimedia content**: dissemination of information and promotion of the good offices and the activities of the mission through its website and social media.

## B. Proposed post and non-post resource requirements for 2024

#### **Resource requirements (regular budget)**

## Table 5

Financial resources

(Thousands of United States dollars)

	202	2	2023	2024	Variance
	Appropriation	Expenditure	Appropriation	Requirements	2024 vs. 2023 Increase/(decrease)
Category of expenditure	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)=(4)-(3)
Military and police personnel costs	146.6	87.2	113.5	113.5	_
Civilian personnel costs	9 371.8	9 497.7	9 292.6	9 755.1	462.5
Operational costs	5 140.2	4 941.6	5 429.1	5 479.2	50.1
Total (net of staff assessment)	14 658.6	14 526.5	14 835.2	15 347.8	512.6

#### Table 6 Human resources

		International staff							National staff			United Nations Volunteers						
	USG	ASG	D-2	D-1	P-5	P-4	P-3	P-2	FS	GS	Subtotal	NPO	LL S	Subtotal	International N	ational S	ubtotal	Total
Approved 2023	1	1	_	2	9	14	10	1	6	_	44	9	22 <i>ª</i>	31	_	_	_	75
Proposed 2024	1	1	_	2	9	14	10	1	6	_	44	9	22 <sup><i>a</i></sup>	31	_	_	_	75
Change	_	_	_	_	_	_	_	_	_	_	_	_	_	_	_	_	_	_

<sup>*a*</sup> Includes one general temporary assistance position.

The following abbreviations are used in the tables: ASG, Assistant Secretary-General; FS, Field Service; GS, General Service; NPO, National Professional Officer; USG; Under-Secretary-General.

- 34. The proposed resource requirements for 2024 for UNOWAS amount to \$15,347,800 (net of staff assessment) and would provide for the deployment of one military adviser and one police adviser (\$113,500), salaries and common staff costs (\$9,755,100) for 44 international positions (1 Under-Secretary-General, 1 Assistant Secretary-General, 2 D-1, 9 P-5, 14 P-4, 10 P-3, 1 P-2 and 6 Field Service) and 31 national positions (9 National Professional Officer and 22 Local level), as well as operational costs (\$5,479,200), comprising the costs for consultants and consulting services (\$172,600), official travel (\$789,300), facilities and infrastructure (\$249,700), ground transportation (\$70,600), air operations (\$2,608,300), communications and information technology (\$710,300), and other supplies, services and equipment (\$878,400).
- 35. In 2024, no change is proposed to the number and levels of the positions.
- 36. The mission's approved 2023 staffing table includes one general temporary assistance position. It is proposed that this position, Finance and Budget Assistant (Local level), be continued in 2024, to support and maintain internal control over the financial transactions of the mission.
- 37. A vacancy rate of 11.4 per cent has been applied to the estimates for international positions based on the actual vacancy rate in March 2023. A vacancy rate of zero per cent has been applied to the estimates for National Professional Officer positions, and 4.5 per cent for Local level positions, based on the actual vacancy rates in March 2023. A vacancy rate of zero per cent has been applied to the estimates for military and police advisers are based on actual vacancy rate in March 2023.
- 38. The increase in requirements for 2024 compared with the appropriation for 2023 is attributable to the following: (a) an increased requirement for international staff, resulting mainly from the application of the latest salary scales and the lower vacancy rate of 11.4 per cent applied compared with 16 per cent approved in 2023, offset in part by the decrease in national staff costs (National Professional Officer and Local level) resulting from the application of the latest salary scales and common staff costs; (b) additional requirements under consultants and consulting services owing to consultancy work to elaborate an integrated planning and resource mobilization strategy; (c) official travel attributable to public information activities to promote the mandate and activities of UNOWAS and to support the Special Representative's good offices and election-related activities in the subregion; (d) communications and information technology for the acquisition of software, licences and fees; and (e) other supplies, services and equipment for individual contractor to cover the car-log system. The increase is partially offset by decreased requirements under facilities and infrastructure owing to lower costs for utilities, maintenance and security services in the new United Nations House in Dakar based on latest estimates, and decreased requirements under air operations due to lower fuel cost for aircraft and lower aircrew subsistence.

#### **Extrabudgetary resources**

- 39. In 2023, extrabudgetary resources in the amount of \$690,000 are estimated, comprising the following:
  - (a) Voluntary contributions of \$515,000 are projected to be utilized to support activities aimed at building the capacity of women in politics; promoting gender equality and women empowerment in the security sector; fighting hate speech and divisive discourse in the Mano River Basin; convening a regional forum of Peace and Development Advisers of West Africa and the Sahel; strengthening conflict prevention, regional analysis and coordination in the Sahel; addressing various threats to peace and security in the region including climate change, extremism and impunity; and promoting social inclusion and cohesion in West Africa and the Sahel;
  - (b) Cost recovery resources of \$175,000 projected to be utilized would provide for support to the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization in Dakar for utilities and maintenance services, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime for office-sharing with the UNOWAS Liaison Cell Office in Mauritania for rental and utilities services, MINUSMA for air transportation and office accommodation in Senegal, and the UNOWAS Liaison Cell Office in Abuja.

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40. In 2024, extrabudgetary resources in the amount of \$690,000 (comprising \$515,000 in voluntary contributions and \$175,000 in cost recovery resources) are projected to be utilized, to continue the above-mentioned supporting activities aimed at achieving peace and security in West Africa and the Sahel, as well as activities funded from cost recovery.

## 2. United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia

(\$101,275,600)

## Foreword

The year 2024 offers an opportunity for the Federal Government of Somalia to advance progress on its key national priorities, with a focus on the constitutional review process, deepening federalism and inclusive politics. Continued efforts to strengthen security, stabilize areas recovered from Al-Shabaab, and advance priority legislation are further expected to be key focus areas. The government is also anticipated to maintain its dialogue with federal member states towards progress on the country's national priorities and the resolution of some contentious issues regarding federalization.

Continued efforts to strengthen federal and state-level institutions in Somalia will also need to extend to local governance structures, particularly in newly recovered areas, and related stabilization support. Several subnational electoral processes are scheduled to take place in 2024, while preparations for national parliamentary and presidential elections planned for 2026 are expected to be advanced. The ongoing security transition will remain a priority for 2024, with the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) continuing a planned drawdown and Somali security forces and institutions assuming the lead security responsibility by the end of 2024. Al-Shabaab will likely remain a significant threat to security in the country.

Somalia will continue to face recurring and protracted humanitarian challenges, including climatic shocks, insecurity and displacement. The United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia and the United Nations family overall will maintain their commitment to Somalia and its people, ensuring coherence in their support to peace and reconciliation efforts, as well as humanitarian and development assistance.

(Signed) Anita Kiki **Gbeho** Officer-in-Charge United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia

# A. Proposed programme plan for 2024 and programme performance in 2022

## **Overall orientation**

## Mandates and background

- 41. The United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) is responsible for providing: (a) good offices to support the advancement of Somali Government-led inclusive political processes and reconciliation; (b) technical, operational and logistical support for inclusive universal elections with the representation and participation of women; (c) assistance in security sector reform and improvements in rule of law institutions, as well as support for the comprehensive approach to security and implementation of the Somalia Transition Plan; and (d) promotion and protection of human rights and system-wide support for the implementation of the human rights due diligence policy. The Mission also provides strategic advice and support to bolster the Government's ability to deliver services, attract investment and advance the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, in close collaboration with the United Nations country team and international financial institutions. The mandate is defined in Security Council resolutions 2102 (2013), which established the Mission, and renewed in subsequent resolutions 2158 (2014), 2221 (2015), 2232 (2015), 2275 (2016), 2358 (2017), 2408 (2018), 2461 (2019), 2516 (2020), 2540 (2020), 2592 (2021), 2632 (2022) and 2657 (2022), the latter of which reflected the Council's extension of the Mission's mandate until 31 October 2023.
- 42. In its resolution 2657 (2022), the Security Council welcomed the strategic review of UNSOM and endorsed the benchmarks and recommendations outlined therein. The Council also encouraged UNSOM to support Somalia in accelerating implementation of the national stabilization strategy and State-level stabilization plans, and in ensuring timely and balanced support to areas newly or recently recovered from Al-Shabaab. Furthermore, the Council requested the Mission to maintain and strengthen its presence across Somalia, and to continue to strengthen its cooperation with Somalia and the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS).

## **Programme of work**

## Objective

43. The objective, to which this Mission contributes, is to achieve peace, security, political stability, and national reconciliation in Somalia through the delivery of the mandate established by the Security Council and in line with the priorities of the Federal Government of Somalia.

## Strategy and external factors for 2024

- 44. To contribute to the objective, the Mission will:
  - (a) Support the Federal Government of Somalia in advancing its national priorities, through outreach, good offices and strategic advice, in coordination with partners, towards the completion of the constitutional review process, and deepening federalism and inclusive politics;
  - (b) Support the Government and its relevant electoral management bodies, at the federal and state level, with strategic advice, technical assistance and the coordination of international technical support to prepare for and implement electoral processes at the subnational and national levels;
  - (c) Provide strategic and technical advice to women leaders, civil society and the Federal Government, as well as federal member states to ensure women's enhanced participation and

representation in government national and subnational electoral processes, reconciliation and mediation processes, public spheres, leadership and decision-making;

- (d) Support the Federal Government of Somalia in the further development of the security sector and implementation of the Somalia Transition Plan, in coordination with ATMIS and partners; and in further enhancing the ability of Somali authorities to mitigate the threat from explosive ordnance, including improvised explosive devices, and effectively managing weapons and ammunition;
- (e) Support the Federal Government of Somalia in accelerating implementation of the national stabilization strategy, state-level stabilization plans and local reconciliation initiatives through good offices, strategic advice and technical assistance;
- (f) Provide good offices, strategic advice and technical assistance for the development of a federated justice system, judicial structures and enhanced access to justice, especially in newly or recently recovered areas, including through community dialogue; and support efforts to enhance cooperation and coordination across the justice chain, at different levels of government;
- (g) Provide technical support to the Federal Government of Somalia to deliver on its commitments made during the universal periodic review process;
- (h) Continue to support the Federal Government of Somalia in coordinating international partners around the national priorities of Somalia, building consensus and advocating around joint messaging and programmatic approaches. The Mission will integrate cross-cutting themes, such as human rights, gender, youth, inclusivity, climate change and resilience, into its activities;
- Advance its transition planning efforts, in close coordination with the Federal Government of Somalia, ATMIS, the United Nations Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS) and United Nations agencies, funds and programmes.
- 45. The above-mentioned work is expected to result in:
  - (a) Meeting the Mission's commitments set out in the United Nations Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework for the period 2021–2025, aligned with the national priorities on inclusive politics, security, rule of law, development and economic growth;
  - (b) Support for the Federal Government of Somalia in the implementation of the national development plan (2020–2024); and work towards the priorities reflected in the National Consultative Council communiqué of June 2022;
  - (c) Support for the Federal Government of Somalia in advancing the security transition, in close coordination with ATMIS.
- 46. With regard to cooperation with other entities, UNSOM will continue to work closely with ATMIS in alignment with strategic and operational priorities, including through the senior leadership coordination forum comprising the Heads of ATMIS, UNSOM, UNSOS and other coordination mechanisms. Human rights due diligence policy coordination and cooperation will also continue to ensure compliance, the promotion of accountability and the implementation of mitigation measures identified in risk assessments. This cooperation will be particularly important in the context of a progressive transfer of security responsibilities to Somali security forces.
- 47. With regard to inter-agency coordination and liaison, building upon its current integration pilot initiative, UNSOM will continue to further integrate and cooperate with United Nations agencies, funds and programmes, and to advance the priorities outlined in the United Nations Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework (2021–2025) in support of the Government's priorities.

- 48. With regard to the external factors, the overall plan for 2024 is based on the following planning assumptions:
  - (a) Political dialogue between the Federal Government of Somalia and federal member states continues, with a focus on advancing national priorities;
  - (b) Progress on the constitutional review process continues, with some contentious issues still requiring attention; and the parliamentary joint oversight committee and the Independent Constitutional Review and Implementation Commission are operational;
  - (c) Priority legislation is passed, further advancing state-building;
  - (d) Federal member state elections take place in accordance with a schedule and electoral model agreed to with the Federal Government ahead of planned national elections in 2026. Electoral management bodies are established at the federal member state level and electoral legislation is enacted to conduct local council elections;
  - (e) Somalia will progressively assume responsibility for security matters, with the Federal Government and federal member states making progress towards building security institutions as outlined in the national security architecture and the Somalia Transition Plan;
  - (f) Somali security forces are able to effectively hold territory, rendering ongoing stabilization efforts more sustainable;
  - (g) The Security Council, the African Union Peace and Security Council and the wider international community will continue to support the security transition in Somalia;
  - (h) Efforts to advance the development of the justice system will continue;
  - (i) Human rights violations by parties to the conflict will remain of concern;
  - (j) Al-Shabaab will likely remain the greatest threat to security and stability in Somalia, followed by clan violence and localized disputes;
  - (k) Somali young people will remain vulnerable to radicalization and recruitment by extremist groups, in particular Al-Shabaab;
  - (1) Women and girls will continue to be disproportionately affected by inequality and by violations of international humanitarian law and violations and abuses of human rights;
  - (m) The country will face recurring climate-related shocks, including drought and flooding.
- 49. The Mission continues to integrate gender perspectives in its activities, deliverables and results, as appropriate, including support for the increased participation and representation of women in the political sphere, economic life and reconciliation and peacebuilding efforts.
- 50. In line with the United Nations Disability Inclusion Strategy, UNSOM, in partnership with UNSOS, developed a two-year joint action plan (2021–2022), which is due for review and updating in 2023, based on an accessibility audit exercise conducted in 2022.

#### Impact of the pandemic and lessons learned

- 51. The continuation of the COVID-19 pandemic into 2022 had a limited impact on the implementation of mandates, including on the Mission's ability to engage with government and civil society counterparts due to their limited access to internet connectivity and conference call technology, especially at the subnational level.
- 52. The Mission continues to mainstream lessons learned and best practices related to the adjustments to and adaptation of the programme owing to the COVID-19 pandemic. Many meetings, trainings and workshops continue to be conducted online, where conducive, thereby reducing travel costs and related staff time. In addition, monitoring and tracking mechanisms established at the onset of the

pandemic remain in place for continued and potential future use, together with mitigation measures as and when required.

#### **Programme performance in 2022**

#### Institutional empowerment for disability rights and inclusion

- 53. The continued use of improvised explosive devices by Al-Shabaab constitutes the single largest non-environmental threat to Somalis. In 2022, UNSOM brought together a broad coalition of United Nations agencies and partnered with Trinity College Dublin to provide technical and advocacy support to the national disability agency, resulting in a nationwide disability survey the first of its kind in Somalia. The survey helped to obtain accurate quantitative and qualitative data regarding persons with disabilities, including those caused by improvised explosive devices, to enable the Federal Government of Somalia to protect their rights and understand their needs. The Mission also supported the national disability agency's successful application for funding, to renovate its existing offices ensuring accessibility, creating a space where persons with disabilities can engage with their dedicated national institution. These efforts have raised the profile of persons with disabilities and a recognition by the political leadership of their needs. On 4 December 2022 at a celebration of the International Day of Persons with Disabilities, the Prime Minister of Somalia committed to increasing the budget of the national disability agency.
- 54. Progress towards the objective is presented in the performance measure below (see table 7).

## Table 7Performance measure

2020 (actual)	2021 (actual)	2022 (actual)
A disability roadmap was developed by the Ministry of Women and Human Rights Development Partnerships on disability between ministries were strengthened and expanded, resulting for instance in the adoption of a victim assistance strategy by the Ministry of Internal Security and the Ministry of Women and Human Rights	The national disability agency was launched in July 2021 Country-wide mapping of organizations of persons with disabilities and civil society organizations working on disability	The national disability agency conducted the first nationwide disability survey Funding for the national disability agency was obtained. The Federal Government of Somalia committed to increasing the budget of the national disability agency

### **Evaluation activities**

55. An internal evaluation on digital transformation, in line with the vision of the Secretary-General for a "United Nations 2.0", and an internal evaluation on the effectiveness of UNSOM strategic communications in support of mandate implementation, are planned for 2023.

## Planned results for 2024

## Result 1: engendering public confidence in security and justice institutions during and post-security transition

#### Programme performance in 2022 and target for 2024

- 56. In 2022, the Mission supported national rule of law and security priorities through expert advice and coordination support on security transition and related benchmarking. It continued its regular strategic engagement with Somali and international counterparts on the review and the implementation of the national security architecture towards the greater federalization of security. Regarding the rule of law, UNSOM supported progress on the justice and corrections model, enhancing the independence and impartiality of the justice system, and further advancing implementation of the new policing model.
- 57. In 2024, UNSOM will further enhance its coordination with national and international stakeholders to support the security transition from ATMIS to Somali security forces, scheduled for completion by December 2024, the federalization of security, implementation of the national security architecture, and the development of a federated justice system. Related security initiatives will include: strengthening national weapons and ammunition management and counter-improvised explosive device frameworks; addressing the integration and reintegration of regional forces and other local groups supporting Somali security forces' operations; and efforts to prevent and counter terrorism and violent extremism conducive to terrorism. On rule of law, justice and corrections support will contribute to strengthening good governance. Additional police acts at the federal and state levels are expected to be enacted, contributing to the further development of the legal framework for a federated policing system in Somalia.
- 58. Progress towards the objective and the target for 2024 are presented in the performance measure below (see table 8).

2020 (actual)	2021 (actual)	2022 (actual)	2023 (planned)	2024 (planned)
Revision of the Somalia Transition Plan Community dialogue on justice, security and land issues launched in each federal member state capital Capacity-building and institutional development plan in support of the executive and legislative structures of the Federal Government and federal member	Somalia Transition Plan revised and issued, and technical coordination achieved through comprehensive approach to security structures Joint rule of law and security governance programmes ensured that the executive and legislative structures of the Federal Government and federal member states support Somalia Transition Plan implementation	Capacities of accountable, affordable and able Somali security forces protecting the civilian population strengthened Progress made on legislation to improve external civilian oversight over security forces Strategic coordination between national and international stakeholders in the security sector strengthened Hirshabelle State Police Act enacted,	Additional prioritized locations and tasks are handed over to the Somali security forces and institutions by ATMIS Ammunition stockpiles control mechanisms at the federal and state levels are strengthened, in accordance with the national weapons and ammunition management strategy Increased coordination among	Phased ATMIS drawdown advanced, based on agreed drawdown plan and degrading of Al- Shabaab Ammunition stockpiles control mechanisms at the federal and state levels strengthened, in line with the national weapons and ammunition management strategy A counter- improvised explosive device baseline assessment is conducted for the

## Table 8Performance measure

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2020 (actual)	2021 (actual)	2022 (actual)	2023 (planned)	2024 (planned)
states to improve civilian oversight of the security sector Development of Somalia's maritime governance structures and women's engagement in the maritime sector to support wider blue economy efforts	Somalia's weapons and ammunition management structures ensured reporting compliance with the Security Council Committee pursuant to 751 (1992) concerning Somalia Somalia's maritime governance institutions established domestic regulatory frameworks, and Federal Government and federal member states agree on the women in the maritime sector strategy	and four police bills developed and consulted (one at the federal and three at the state-level) Progress made in the development of a new justice and corrections model Coordination strengthened in support of maritime law enforcement Endorsement of national weapons and ammunition management strategy and enactment of national arms control legislation remained pending due to protracted electoral process	stakeholders in the implementation of the National Programme for the Treatment and Handling of Disengaged Combatants in Somalia Community dialogue on justice ongoing in all federal member state capitals	establishment of a national framework Legal framework for a federated policing system in Somalia is further developed Inclusive dialogue on a legitimate and effective justice system includes stakeholders from all federal member states, taking into account priorities voiced in communities

Result 2: effective and coordinated stabilization and complementary strategies and action plans, including alternative dispute resolution and inclusive community dialogue initiatives, on preventing and countering terrorism and violent extremism conducive to terrorism

#### Programme performance in 2022 and target for 2024

- 59. The Mission redoubled its engagement with key ministries and institutions, supporting coordination on stabilization and preventing and countering violent extremism and related matters throughout 2022. Following the onset of military operations against Al-Shabaab led by the Federal Government in Galmudug and Hirshabelle in August 2022, the Government has increased its efforts to link military and counter-terrorism with stabilization initiatives, including justice and reconciliation elements, especially in the newly liberated areas. During this time, the Federal Government finalized the national stabilization strategy, supported by UNSOM with strategic advice and technical assistance, and promulgated a new counter-terrorism strategy focusing on high-level defectors from Al-Shabaab. UNSOM also supported the Federal Government in reviewing and recalibrating the national defector rehabilitation programme, in close coordination with donors.
- 60. In 2024, the Mission will further strengthen its support to the Federal Government through the provision of strategic advice and technical assistance for the effective implementation of the national stabilization strategy and action plans, preventing and countering violent extremism, and the recalibrated national defector rehabilitation programme. As military and stabilization operations are likely to be extended to other areas of Somalia, the need for increased coordination support is anticipated, to ensure greater unity of effort. As part of strengthening overall coordination, the Mission will also advocate for enhanced cooperation between the Federal Government and federal member states, including in the areas of justice and policing.
- 61. Progress towards the objective and the target for 2024 are presented in the performance measure below (see table 9).

## Table 9Performance measure

2020 (actual)	2021 (actual)	2022 (actual)	2023 (planned)	2024 (planned)
Government led a whole-of-government approach to stabilization and preventing and countering violent extremism	Information-sharing and joint planning are established for areas to be recovered under the transition plan, and the national strategy on preventing and countering violent extremism and the plan for implementing the strategy are both revised, ensuring a good combination of military response and a soft power approach	Strategic advice and coordination support provided towards the revision and finalization of the national stabilization strategy, the review and recalibration of the national defector rehabilitation programme, and the finalization of the counter-terrorism strategy, ensuring a coherent approach between security and peacebuilding priorities in alignment with the Somalia Transition Plan	Somali stakeholders are actively engaged in implementing the revised national preventing and countering violent extremism strategy and the recalibrated defectors rehabilitation programme Alternative dispute resolution initiatives are launched in additional locations	Coordination efforts are increased to advance implementation of the national stabilization strategy and action plans, the recalibrated national defector rehabilitation programme, as well as the new approach to preventing and countering violent extremism

# Result 3: resolution of outstanding issues of federalization through Federal Government and federal member state dialogue, enabling progress on the constitutional review and other state-building objectives

### Programme plan for 2024

62. The Mission supported, through its good offices, the convening of five National Consultative Council meetings, which were instrumental in completing the electoral process and reaching an agreement on national priorities after the new President took office.

#### Lessons learned and planned change

- 63. The lesson learned for the Mission was the importance of continued dialogue between the Federal Government and federal member states, as several contentious issues between the Federal Government and federal member states continue to hamper progress on federalization and state-building objectives. In applying the lesson, the Mission will support the Federal Government to regularly convene meetings of the National Consultative Council, or an equivalent mechanism, using its good offices to maximize participation in, and engagement with, the platform. In addition, the Mission will encourage enhanced inclusivity at the technical level to advance progress between meetings.
- 64. Simultaneously, the Mission will support the Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs, the Joint Oversight Committee of the Federal Parliament, and the Independent Constitutional Review and Implementation Commission to conduct public outreach and translate the agreements reached by the National Consultative Council into proposed constitutional amendments for consideration by parliament, through the provision of good offices, strategic advice and technical assistance.

- 65. At the federal member states level, the Mission will liaise with state authorities to identify emerging concerns related to strengthening federalism and state-building, and through its good offices, promote constructive engagement between the states and the Federal Government.
- 66. Expected progress towards the objective is presented in the performance measure below (see table 10).

#### Table 10 **Performance measure**

2020 (actual)	2021 (actual)	2022 (actual)	2023 (planned)	2024 (planned)
			The Federal Government of Somalia convenes the National Consultative Council to hold meetings based on a defined agenda Technical work between the Federal Government of Somalia and federal member states emanating from or in preparation for meetings of the National Consultative Council (or an equivalent platform) progresses	Federal and state level leaders continue to use the National Consultative Council, or an equivalent platform, as a forum for dialogue; and federalization and state building objectives are further advanced National Consultative Council meetings are conducted, based on a defined agenda Preparations for and follow-up after National Consultative Council meetings are supported at the technical level to advance progress between meetings; and enhanced inclusivity at the technical level is encouraged Contentious issues related to federalization and state-building at the federal member state level are identified and resolution is sought at the technical level committee of the National Consultative

## Deliverables

67. Table 11 lists all deliverables of the Mission.

#### Table 11

#### Deliverables for the period 2022–2024, by category and subcategory

Catego	ory and subcategory	2022 planned	2022 actual	2023 planned	2024 planned
A. F	acilitation of the intergovernmental process and expert bodies				
Р	arliamentary documentation (number of documents)	4	3	4	3
1.	Reports of the Secretary-General for the Security Council	4	3	4	3
S	ubstantive servicing of meetings (number of documents)	4	3	4	3
2.	Meetings of the Security Council	4	3	4	3
B. G	eneration and transfer of knowledge				
F	ield and technical cooperation projects (number of projects)	2	2	2	_
3.	Joint projects on a United Nations anti-corruption programme, support for universal suffrage elections and women's political empowerment, as well as a stabilization project	2	2	2	0
S	eminars, workshops and training events (number of days)	258	258	297	264
4.		3	4	12	
5.		4	_	4	4
6.		2	_	2	2
7.		5	5	8	8
8.	Workshops, seminars, training events on capacity-building of human rights institutions	6	3	6	6
9.	Thematic workshops on human rights issues with civil society, such as those dealing with minorities, people with disabilities, women and children, civil society engagement and basic human rights obligations, and on monitoring and reporting on the human rights performance of Somali security forces and their ability to foster trust and confidence in communities	14	14	14	14
10	<ol> <li>Workshops for the country task force on monitoring and reporting on violations against children, including children and armed conflict</li> </ol>	4	4	12	12
11	1. Workshops to enhance the capacity and harmonize the implementation of the national defector rehabilitation programme	2	_	2	2
12	2. Workshops on advocating and capacity-building to establish an affordable justice system and the roll-out of the federated justice and corrections model	6	9	20	16
13	3. Workshops for the custodial corps on prison management	20	24	20	16
14	4. Workshops on civilian oversight of security institutions	8	5	8	5
15	5. Workshops on implementation of maritime priorities in accordance with the Somali maritime resource and security strategy and strengthening legislation and mainstreaming gender equity into the maritime law enforcement agencies	8	8	5	5
10	6. Workshops to support institutional capacity-building towards the implementation of the national security architecture and the Somalia Transition Plan	6	4	6	6
17	<ol> <li>Workshops on integrity system to enhance anti-corruption capacities of national authorities, local authorities, and civil society organizations</li> </ol>	1	1	1	2
18	8. Workshops, training and capacity-building on comprehensive approach to security stabilization to review implementation of and update the national stabilization strategy and to review, develop and update state stabilization plans	7	4	7	7

egory	and subcategory	2022 planned	2022 actual	2023 planned	202 planne
19.	Workshops at federal and state levels on preventing violent extremism conducive to terrorism, including with international partners	6	_	6	
20.	National youth seminar, held in partnership with the Federal Government of Somalia/federal member states' ministries of youth and sports, on youth priorities for Somalia	7	_	7	
21.	Workshops, assessments, consultations and/or training to support Federal and federal member state-level institutions with advice on weapons and ammunition management to reduce risk to the civilian population	40	42	40	2
22.	Training on protection of civilians	12	12	12	
	Workshops/seminars/training activities for the National Independent Electoral Commission and electoral management bodies at the state level on jointly identified thematic areas	20	42	20	,
24.	Workshops on prevention of and response to electoral violence against women leaders	2	2	2	
25.	Workshops/seminars/training activities for the National Independent Electoral Commission and electoral management bodies at the state level on legal frameworks and inclusive dialogue with stakeholders	10	15	10	
26.	Workshops/seminars/training activities in journalism, social media and coverage of election campaign	16	28	16	
27.	Miscellaneous workshop/seminars/training activities by Rule of Law and Security Institutions Group of UNSOM on implementation of Somalia Transition Plan/new policing model/comprehensive approach to security	6	1	16	
28.	Workshops, seminars or capacity building/training events in support of relevant government institutions at the federal and state level on inclusive politics	6	_	6	
29.	Workshops, seminars or capacity building/training events on peacebuilding, mediation and conflict resolution	5	3	5	
30.	Workshops seminars or capacity building/training events on the constitutional review process	5	4	5	
31.	Technical workshops to assist the Somali National Youth Council/Youth Advisory Board	6	_	6	
32.	Workshops to build the capacity of civil society for monitoring and reporting on the human rights performance of Somali security forces and their ability to foster trust and confidence in communities, including with regard to conflict - related sexual violence	6	6	4	
33.	Consultations with and workshops/working sessions on mediation, reconciliation, negotiation and policy dialogues for women civil society		10		
D L	leaders and women members of Parliament and senators	15 <b>45</b>	18 50	15	
	<b>lications</b> (number of publications) Human Rights and Protection Group reports on freedom of expression and/or protection of civilians in Somalia and human rights in Somalia's			46	
25	electoral process Fragility index and maturity model national summary and district -level reports	2 32	1 35	2 34	
	Reports on analysis, procedures, processes and best practices on mitigating the threat from improvised explosive devices	8	14	8	
37.	Factsheets on disarmament, demobilization and reintegration -related interventions in Somalia	8		8	
38.	Study report on Somali women's experience and aspiration in peace and politics in the country	1	_	1	
Fac	t-finding, monitoring and investigation missions (number of missions)	_	8	_	
	Human rights monitoring, reporting and investigations, including conflict- related sexual violence and child protection, monitoring of and follow-up on incidents involving security forces supported by the United Nations, through the human rights due diligence policy	_	8	_	

Category and subcategory	2022	2022	2023	2024
	planned	actual	planned	planned

#### C. Substantive deliverables

**Good offices**: provide support to the Federal Government, the federal member states and other stakeholders in advancing the national priorities, in line with the National Consultative Council communiqué of June 2022, including the constitutional review process and implementation of the national security architecture; and provide support to Somali stakeholders in addressing clan and localized conflicts, including in recently recovered areas.

Consultation, advice and advocacy: consultations with civil society on federalization, constitutional review process, local conflict management and resolution, and the national reconciliation process; advice on drafting the revised Constitution; strategic and technical advice to electoral management bodies at the federal and subnational levels, Parliament and other stakeholders on revisions to the electoral legal framework and on electoral processes; advocacy with federal and state authorities, the Somali National Consultative Council and other stakeholders, including clan elders, electoral committees, politicians and the council of presidential candidates for women's enhanced participation and representation in leadership and decision-making political processes in general, in electoral processes, and participation in political leadership roles in governance institutions; advice to the Government on the compliance of national legislation with international human rights law, including policies addressing sexual violence in conflict and children in armed conflict; advice to and advocacy with ministries of women and human rights development, women leaders, human rights defenders, civil society actors, legislators and parliamentary committees to strengthen the national protection framework and institutionalize accountability mechanisms, including through human rights due diligence policy mechanisms, on the implementation of human rights commitments, on recommendations emerging from the human rights universal periodic review process, on human rights due diligence assessments, and on addressing violations committed by international, national and government affiliated forces; advice to Parliament, the Federal Government of Somalia and federal member states on security sector legislation, reforms and budgetary measures, including the sustainable financial management of the security sector; consultations with the Federal Gov ernment and federal member states' security institution stakeholders on the legal framework to implement national security architecture, including a recalibrated disarmament, demobilization and reintegration-related programme; coordination mechanisms and the sustainability of stabilizations activities and advocacy joint planning between security forces and stabilization actors in recovered areas; consultations, planning and advocacy with the Federal Government and federal member states justice stakeholders for the establishment of functioning, independent and accountable rule of law institutions, as part of wider reform efforts; advice to the Ministry of Ports and Marine Transport on the maritime economy, enhancement of Somali maritime administration and women in the maritime sector; and policy and technical advice to Federal Government and federal member states counterparts on explosive hazard threat mitigation, and on weapons and ammunitions management, along with weapons and ammunitions management initiatives.

#### **D.** Communication deliverables

**Outreach**: four long-term strategic messaging campaigns targeting Somali audiences communicating on the work of the United Nations in Somalia, including on thematic issues, and through chairing the United Nations Communications Group – Somalia, which involves harmonizing communications and taking the lead or main support role in joint messaging campaigns; collaborate with civil society (e.g., media associations and youth groups) for events to mark official United Nations observances relevant to the Somali context, and amplify United Nations messaging goals; communications support and multimedia coverage on visits of high-level United Nations officials to Somalia, as required; and support and guide targeted outreach activities, as required, on an ad hoc basis.

**External and media relations**: build working relationships with Somali and international media to help to ensure a better understanding of the work of the United Nations in Somalia and development of the Somali communications sector through capacity-building programmes for the media and government communications offices, both at the national and subnational levels; and organize at least two press conferences for United Nations leadership and arrange for interviews and other media coverage with United Nations officials, as required.

**Digital platforms and multimedia content**: four digital platforms (social and digital media) that produce multilingual and multimedia content, with at least 250 items (including cards, infographics and videos) for dissemination on social media and online channels; for traditional platforms, produce Somali-language radio programming, with at least 50 episodes of the "Path to peace" programme and the continuation of long-term awareness campaigns centred on radio programming, targeting Somali audiences; produce a series of radio programmes on high-priority topics on an ad hoc basis; production of 12 monthly updates (both English and Somali) highlighting the work of the United Nations system in Somalia; four English-language United Nations quarterly updates, highlighting the work of the United Nations system in Somalia, aimed at Somali government partners, international partners and donors; and design and production support for a range of digital newsletters highlighting work of the United Nations.

## B. Proposed post and non-post resource requirements for 2024

#### Resource requirements (regular budget)

#### Table 12 Financial resources

(Thousands of United States dollars)

	202	2	2023	2024	Variance
	Appropriation	Expenditure	Appropriation	Requirements	2024 vs. 2023 Increase/(decrease)
Category of expenditure	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)=(4)-(3)
Military and police personnel costs	16 284.3	15 743.6	16 305.2	16 497.8	192.6
Civilian personnel costs	41 478.3	43 753.1	41 814.4	44 833.6	3 019.2
Operational costs	40 744.6	40 504.1	38 451.7	39 944.2	1 492.5
Total (net of staff assessment)	98 507.2	100 000.8	96 571.3	101 275.6	4 704.3

#### Table 13 Human resources

	International staff									National staff United Nations Volunteers								
	USG	ASG	D-2	D-1	P-5	P-4	P-3	P-2	FS	GS	Subtotal	NPO	LL S	Subtotal	International No	ntional S	ubtotal	Total
Approved 2023	1	2 <sup><i>a</i></sup>	1	$8^b$	30	51	37	_	5	_	187	87	45	132	18	1	19	338
Proposed 2024	1	2 <i><sup>a</sup></i>	1	$8^b$	30	51	37	-	57	-	187	87	45	132	18	1	19	338
Change	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	_	_	-	-	-	-	_	_

<sup>a</sup> One position is funded at 50 per cent and cost-shared with the Development Coordination Office.

<sup>b</sup> Includes one D-1 and one P-4 general temporary assistance positions.

- 68. The proposed resource requirements for 2024 for UNSOM amount to \$101,275,600 (net of staff assessment) and would provide for the deployment of 625 United Nations Guard Unit personnel and 14 United Nations police officers (\$16,497,800), salaries and related costs (\$44,833,600) for 187 international positions (1 Under-Secretary-General, 2 Assistant Secretary-General, 1 D-2, 8 D-1, 30 P-5, 51 P-4, 37 P-3 and 57 Field Service), 132 national positions (87 National Professional Officer and 45 Local level), 19 United Nations Volunteers and 23 government-provided personnel, as well as operational costs (\$39,944,200), comprising the costs for consultants and consulting services (\$571,300), official travel (\$1,061,600), facilities and infrastructure (\$20,121,500), ground transportation (\$1,644,900), air operations (\$6,775,300), communications and information technology (\$5,862,900), medical (\$1,333,800), and other supplies, services and equipment (\$2,572,900).
- 69. A vacancy rate of zero per cent has been applied to the estimates for military contingents, based on the vacancy rate in March 2023. A vacancy rate of 21.4 per cent has been applied to the estimates for United Nations police, based on the vacancy rate in March 2023. A vacancy rate of 13.9 per cent has been applied to the estimates for international positions based on the vacancy rate in March 2023. Vacancy rates of 11.5 and 20.0 per cent have been applied to the estimates for National Professional Officer and Local level positions, respectively, based on vacancy rates in March 2023. A vacancy rate of 22.2 per cent has been applied to the estimate for international United Nations Volunteers, and 21.7 per cent for government-provided personnel, taking into account the actual average vacancy rates in 2022. A vacancy rate of 50.0 per cent has been applied to the estimate for one position of National United Nations Volunteer approved in 2023 which is currently vacant.

- 70. In 2024, the proposed staffing complement includes the redeployment of one position of Political Affairs Officer (P-4) from the Office of the Chief of Staff to the Political Affairs and Mediation Group, to facilitate additional focus of the Group on the politics of security, while closely coordinating with relevant United Nations internal stakeholders.
- 71. The Mission's approved 2023 staffing table includes two general temporary assistance positions. It is proposed that the positions be continued in 2024:
  - (a) Chief, Programme Management (D-1), in the Office of the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General/Rule of Law and Security Institutions Group, would continue to be required to oversee UNSOM mine action component, leading strategic and operational planning, advising the UNSOM leadership on mine action issues, supervising the implementation of the workplan, leading engagement with the national authorities, the United Nations country team and other stakeholders involved in mine action;
  - (b) Environmental Affairs Officer (P-4) would continue to be required to focus on delivering the environmental components of the UNSOM mandate in accordance with Security Council resolutions 2592 (2021) and 2657 (2022), in close collaboration with UNSOS and the United Nations country team. There is a sustained need for environmental and climate change-related advice owing to the increased impact of climate change on Somalia and related requests for support from the Federal Government and the federal member states. The position continues to support the Mission's leadership on all environmental and climate change-related issues, including providing up-to-date analysis of the environmental causes and consequences of conflict and insecurity and providing risk assessments and risk management strategies.
- 72. The increase in requirements for 2024 compared with the appropriation for 2023 is attributable primarily to: (a) an increase under civilian personnel costs, owing to the application of a lower vacancy rate of 13.9 per cent for international positions, compared with 15.0 per cent in 2023; a lower vacancy rate of 11.5 per cent for National Professional Officer positions, compared with 15.0 per cent in 2023; and a lower vacancy rate of 20.0 per cent for Local level positions, compared with 22.0 per cent in 2023; and (b) an increase under operational costs owing to higher requirements for facilities and infrastructure mainly related to the ongoing construction of facilities for its field office in Dhusamareb.

#### Extrabudgetary resources

- 73. In 2023, extrabudgetary resources in the amount of \$100,000 are projected to be utilized to support planned activities related to peace and reconciliation in Somalia.
- 74. In 2024, extrabudgetary resources in the amount of \$100,000 are projected to be utilized to continue to support peace and reconciliation activities.

# 3. United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia

(\$3,233,200)

## Foreword

The global context marked by polarization, disrupted supply chains, food insecurity and climate change impact the situation in Central Asia. Despite those challenges, relations among the five Central Asian states remain constructive and saw deepening in certain areas. The fourth consultative meeting of the Central Asian Heads of State reaffirmed their commitment to pursue closer cooperation vis-à-vis common challenges, as well as on inclusive dialogue and trust-building on the basis of existing and new initiatives. Such overall developments provided the context for additional engagement by the United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia.

While regional cooperation is growing, some tensions remain, particularly in the Fergana Valley. The United Nations engaged to de-escalate and provide humanitarian assistance in the area.

With the adoption of the updated Joint Plan of Action for the Implementation of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy in Central Asia in 2022, more opportunities arise for the Regional Centre to spearhead initiatives to address radicalization and terrorism in the region. The implementation of the Regional Centre's water and climate strategy for the period 2022–2025 offers a regionally-owned forum for relevant experts. The Regional Centre will galvanize its work on the women and peace and security and youth, peace and security agendas, which are fully embedded into the regional agenda, based on the Central Asian Women Leaders' Caucus flagship initiative and the Preventive Diplomacy Academy project.

The Regional Centre will be convening its regional formats, including meetings of deputy ministers for foreign affairs, closely following potential challenges to peace and security, facilitating cooperation, dialogue and trust among the countries in the region.

*(Signed)* Miroslav Jenča Assistant Secretary-General, Officer in Charge United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia

# A. Proposed programme plan for 2024 and programme performance in 2022

## **Overall orientation**

## Mandates and background

- 75. The United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia is responsible for supporting national authorities in identifying and addressing existing and emerging threats to regional peace and security. The open-ended mandate was defined through an exchange of letters between the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council (\$/2007/279 and \$/2007/280).
- 76. The Regional Centre plays a central role in preventive diplomacy efforts in Central Asia and provides a platform for regional dialogue on the most pressing challenges to security and stability. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the Regional Centre provides good offices in Central Asia to promote regional cooperation through meetings with authorities, civil society and other stakeholders.
- 77. The main function of the Regional Centre is to strengthen United Nations capacity for conflict prevention in Central Asia through liaising with the Governments of the region and, with their concurrence, engaging with other concerned parties on issues relevant to preventive diplomacy; monitoring and analysing the situation on the ground and providing the Secretary-General with up-to-date information related to conflict prevention efforts; maintaining contact with relevant regional organizations, encouraging their peacemaking efforts and initiatives and facilitating coordination and information exchange, with due regard to their specific mandates; providing a political framework and leadership for the preventive activities of the United Nations country teams in the region and supporting the efforts of the resident coordinators and representatives of the United Nations system, including the Bretton Woods institutions, in promoting an integrated approach to preventive diplomacy and humanitarian assistance; and maintaining close contact with the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) to ensure a comprehensive and integrated analysis of the situation in the wider region.
- 78. The Regional Centre's current work is guided by a five-year programme of action for the period 2021–2025, which was adopted at the annual meeting of deputy ministers for foreign affairs in December 2020.

## **Programme of work**

## Objective

79. The objective, to which this mission contributes, is to enhance regional security and stability in Central Asia.

## Strategy and external factors for 2024

- 80. To contribute to the objective, the mission will:
  - (a) Engage regularly with the region's capitals, regional organizations and relevant Member States. The Regional Centre will also carry out good offices functions for preventive diplomacy in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, as well as monitor and analyse regional developments, while maintaining contact with regional organizations and other parts of the United Nations system on behalf of the Secretary-General. Using its extrabudgetary funding, the Centre will implement activities such as meetings of senior

officials, expert forums, workshops and training sessions to support cooperation among the countries of the region and increase capacity on issues related to preventive diplomacy;

- (b) Convene preparatory expert forums to inform the annual consultative meetings of the Central Asian Heads of State. It will continue to organize an annual meeting of deputy ministers for foreign affairs of Central Asia. The Regional Centre, in cooperation with UNDP, will also promote the increased political participation of women in the region through the engagement of senior women political leaders on issues relevant to preventive diplomacy through the Central Asia Women Leaders' Caucus regional platform;
- (c) Promote arrangements on transboundary water management in the region. Specifically, the Regional Centre will focus its work on fostering and supporting initiatives on water, energy and environmental and climate cooperation. The Regional Centre's water and climate strategy for the period 2022–2025 is being implemented with the close involvement of all five States of the region. Through convening a series of seminars and workshops, the Regional Centre will work to increase decision makers' knowledge of international water law, best practices from around the world and possible options for regional arrangements tailored to the specific needs and circumstances of Central Asia;
- (d) Implement the fourth phase of the joint project with the Office of Counter-Terrorism on the basis of the new Joint Plan of Action for the implementation of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy in Central Asia. In addition, through the preventive diplomacy academy project, the Centre will continue its efforts to engage young people in some of the region's most marginalized areas. The Regional Centre will continue to partner with relevant United Nations entities and regional organizations on the implementation of projects to promote preventive diplomacy in the region. The threats of terrorism and violent extremism, the lack of an agreement on transboundary water management, the developing effects of climate change and a growing youth population seeking new opportunities remain key challenges for stability and security in the region;
- (e) Support the five countries of Central Asia in addressing emerging threats to security and stability and humanitarian assistance during emergency situations, especially in the context of the consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic and the complex humanitarian situation in Afghanistan. Relevant proposals will be developed and put forward for discussions at the annual meeting of deputy ministers for foreign affairs.
- 81. The above-mentioned work is expected to result in:
  - (a) Improved regional cooperation among the national Governments in addressing transnational threats of terrorism, violent extremism conducive to terrorism, drug trafficking and organized crime, as well as coping with regional challenges concerning the management of water and natural resources;
  - (b) Enhanced preparedness of the Governments of the Central Asian States, through enhanced cooperation and trust-building in the region, for deeper engagements in promoting sustainable peace and stability in the region, including on high-level platforms such as the consultative meeting of Heads of State.
- 82. With regard to cooperation with other entities, the Regional Centre maintains contacts with the Commonwealth of Independent States, the European Union, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, as well as other relevant organizations. The Regional Centre will continue exchanges with the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-building Measures in Asia and the Collective Security Treaty Organization on topics of common interest. The Regional Centre will continue the useful practice of convening "troika" coordination meetings among the Regional Centre, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the European Union.
- 83. With regard to inter-agency coordination and liaison, the Regional Centre cooperates closely with the resident coordinators in the five countries, the Development Coordination Office and the entities

represented in the United Nations country teams, including UNDP and the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN-Women) on gender issues, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime on illicit drug trafficking, the Office of Counter-Terrorism on counterterrorism; the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization on water issues, and the Economic Commission for Europe on water, environment and climate. The Regional Centre provides overall policy guidance to the United Nations country teams in the field of preventive diplomacy to ensure the coherence and complementarity of efforts in conflict prevention and peacebuilding. It will also continue to cooperate with relevant actors, including international financial institutions such as the World Bank. On Afghanistan related issues, the Regional Centre regularly shares information and coordinates activities with UNAMA.

- 84. With regard to the external factors, the overall plan for 2024 is based on the following planning assumptions:
  - (a) The continued commitment by the five Governments of the region and national stakeholders to preventive diplomacy and regional cooperation;
  - (b) The five countries of the region continue to monitor developments in Afghanistan and enhance preparedness to existing and potential threats and risks of violent extremism and terrorism, drug trafficking, and a refugee crisis. They continue to provide and advocate for humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan.
- 85. The Regional Centre integrates a gender perspective in its operational activities, deliverables, and results, as appropriate. It encourages participating countries to ensure gender balance in their delegations and include gender-related issues in the agendas of three regional expert-level workshops on issues related to preventive diplomacy and confidence-building for officials from the Central Asian States and Afghanistan. The Regional Centre also pays due attention to incorporating such cross-cutting topics as the youth, peace and security agenda and climate and security into its programmatic activities, as well as continuing to implement the United Nations Disability Inclusion Strategy for the entity.
- 86. In line with the United Nations Disability Inclusion Strategy, the Regional Centre implemented the Disability Inclusion Strategy Action Plan and promoted disability inclusion both internally and publicly. The Strategy is considered as an inherent part of the Regional Centre's programmatic activities. It continued to liaise and coordinate with the United Nations country teams in five Central Asian states, and actively participated in events on the Strategy organized by the United Nations agencies in the States of Central Asia to promote the topic and highlight the importance of the inclusion of persons with disabilities.

### Impact of the pandemic and lessons learned

- 87. The COVID-19 pandemic continued to impact the implementation of mandates into 2022. In particular, owing to the remaining travel restrictions such as the absence of regular international flights, most of the activities were held in online or hybrid formats. This allowed widening the scope of participants. The majority of the online events were conducted within the Regional Centre's Preventive Diplomacy Academy project and were designed for young people. However, work in preventive diplomacy often requires person-to-person contacts, particularly on sensitive political issues such as high-level bilateral meetings, the annual meeting of deputy ministers for foreign affairs, Women Leaders' Caucus events, and meetings of water and climate experts from Central Asian States. The Regional Centre organized in-person activities in those instances to the extent possible. No events were cancelled due to the pandemic.
- 88. The mission continues to mainstream lessons learned and best practices related to the adjustments to and adaptation of the programme owing to the COVID-19 pandemic including, meetings in a hybrid format, the online attendance of regional conferences and forums and capacity-building events. Flexible working arrangements will be used in the event of pandemics or the spread of communicable diseases.

## Programme performance in 2022

Relations among the Central Asian States remained constructive and deepened in certain areas

- 89. Despite the global context and the challenges to regional peace and security in 2022, the relations among the five Central Asian States have remained constructive and even deepened in certain areas. Many Central Asian countries engaged on the path of domestic political, social and economic reforms.
- 90. The mission worked on regional security and stability through prevention and helping States address challenges to peace and security, in particular, tensions related to border disputes. For example, in the wake of the border clashes between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in September 2022, the Head of the Regional Centre engaged with the states and partners to de-escalate tensions and offered assistance in finding a long-term sustainable solution for the border issues.
- 91. One of the key achievements in 2022 was the adoption of an updated Joint Plan of Action for the Implementation of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy in Central Asia. The Regional Centre began the implementation of its new water and climate strategy for the period 2022–2025 providing a unique forum for water experts from the Central Asian States. The Centre strengthened the regional partnership related to women's empowerment and the women and peace and security agenda through the Regional Centre's initiative, the Central Asia Women Leaders' Caucus. The Regional Centre continued to promote the youth, peace and security agenda in the region by training young women and men at its Preventive Diplomacy Academy. Regular consultations and meetings were held with high-level state officials, United Nations entities, resident coordinators and regional organizations, such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the European Union.
- 92. Progress towards the objective is presented in the performance measure below (see table 14).

## Table 14Performance measure

2020 (actual)	2021 (actual)	2022 (actual)
Expansion of involvement of additional groups to create more inclusive, structured discussions by key stakeholders in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan	The Regional Centre ensured further involvement of additional groups to create more inclusive discussions by key stakeholders in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan on the basis of the new initiatives and entry points of the Centre	The Regional Centre contributed to an enhancement of regional security and stability in Central Asia by supporting actions to promote peace and trust in the region through more inclusive and open discussions and new initiatives of the countries of the region and the Centre

### Planned result for 2024

## Enhanced regional interaction in Central Asia to address current and emerging risks and threats to peace and security

#### Programme performance in 2022 and target for 2024

93. The Regional Centre's work contributed to enhanced regional security and stability in Central Asia through preventive diplomacy, which met the planned target of enhancement of regional security and stability in Central Asia by supporting actions to promote peace and trust in the region through more inclusive and open discussions and new initiatives of the countries of the region and the Centre.

#### Lessons learned and planned change

- 94. The lesson for the Regional Centre was that online meetings with authorities resulted in less open and interactive exchanges. In applying the lesson, the Centre will strive to increase the number of meetings held in a hybrid format, as feasible, including participation in different regional events.
- 95. The Regional Centre will continue to support the countries of the region in taking concrete steps to promote peace and trust, ensuring a more inclusive and open dialogue on the basis of the existing and new initiatives.
- 96. Progress towards the objective and the target for 2024 are presented in the performance measure below (see table 15).

## Table 15Performance measure

2020 (actual)	2021 (actual)	2022 (actual)	2023 (planned)	2024 (planned)
Expansion of involvement of additional groups to create more inclusive, structured discussions by key stakeholders in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan	The Regional Centre ensures further involvement of additional groups to create more inclusive discussions by key stakeholders in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan on the basis of the new initiatives of the Centre	The Regional Centre contributes to an enhancement of regional security and stability in Central Asia by supporting actions to promote peace and trust in the region through more inclusive and open discussions and new initiatives of the States of the region and the Centre	The Regional Centre helps to spur regional interaction in Central Asia to address risks and threats to peace and security through expressed commitment by the States of the region to promoting peace and trust and creating inclusive and open discussions	Regional interaction is further spurred, to ensure peace and stability in Central Asia by addressing risks and threats to peace and security through expressed commitments by the States of the region on closer cooperation, an inclusive dialogue and trust building on the basis of existing and new initiatives

#### Deliverables

97. Table 16 lists all deliverables of the mission.

#### Table 16

#### Deliverables for the period 2022-2024, by category and subcategory

Category and subcategory	2022 planned	2022 actual	2023 planned	2024 planned
A. Facilitation of the intergovernmental process and expert bodies				
Substantive services for meetings (number of three-hour meetings)	2	2	2	2
1. Meetings of the Security Council	2	2	2	2
B. Generation and transfer of knowledge				
Seminars, workshops and training events (number of days)	3	3	3	3
2. Workshops on preventive diplomacy and confidence-building	3	3	3	3

#### C. Substantive deliverables

**Good offices**: provision of good offices on issues related to preventive diplomacy, such as water, energy, environmental and climate cooperation, drug trafficking and counter-terrorism.

	2022	2022	2023	2024
Category and subcategory	planned	actual	planned	planned

**Consultation, advice and advocacy**: consultations on political and security developments in the region and to seek areas for closer cooperation; and consultations and advice on implementing the Joint Plan of Action for the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy in Central Asia.

#### **D.** Communication deliverables

**Outreach programmes, special events and information materials**: brochures and information kits on the activities of the Mission; and publication of the *Aral Sea Basin Transboundary Water Early Warning Bulletin*, and other publications as part of the Preventive Diplomacy Academy project.

External and media relations: press conferences and press releases on the activities of the mission.

**Digital platforms and multimedia content**: dissemination of information through the Mission's website; matrix of activities on counter-terrorism and preventing extremism website (https://unrcca.unmissions.org/mapping-pvect-activities-5); and maintaining and updating the "Water Unites" portal as a source of information for regional water and climate activities.

## B. Proposed post and non-post resource requirements for 2024

#### Resource requirements (regular budget)

#### Table 17 **Financial resources**

(Thousands of United States dollars)

	2022		2023	2024	Variance	
	Appropriation	Expenditure	Appropriation	Requirements	2024 vs. 2023 Increase/(decrease)	
Category of expenditure	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)=(4)-(3)	
Military and police personnel costs	_	_	_	_	-	
Civilian personnel costs	2 203.8	2 437.8	2 646.3	2 466.2	(180.1)	
Operational costs	690.4	573.3	646.4	767.0	120.6	
Total (net of staff assessment)	2 894.2	3 011.1	3 292.7	3 233.2	(59.5)	

#### Table 18 Human resources

	International staff										National staff United Nations Volunteers			iteers				
	USG	ASG	D-2	D-1	P-5	P-4	P-3	P-2	FS	GS	Subtotal	NPO	LL	Subtotal	International	National	Subtotal	Total
Approved 2023	_	1	_	_	1	2	2	_	2	_	8	4	18	22	_	-	_	30
Proposed 2024	_	1	_	_	1	2	2	_	2	_	8	4	18	22	-	_	_	30
Change	-	_	-	_	_	_	_	_	_	_	_	-	_	-	_	-	-	-

98. The proposed resource requirements for 2024 for the Regional Centre amount to \$3,233,200 (net of staff assessment) and would provide for salaries and common staff costs \$2,466,200 for the continuation of 30 positions (1 Assistant Secretary-General, 1 P-5, 2 P-4, 2 P-3, 2 Field Service, 4 National Professional Officer and 18 Local level), as well as operational costs \$767,000, comprising the costs for official travel (\$206,600), facilities and infrastructure (\$117,400), ground transportation (\$32,300), communications and information technology (\$272,700), medical supplies (\$4,800) and other supplies, services and equipment (\$133,200).

- 99. For 2024, no change is proposed to the number and levels of the positions. A vacancy rate of 12.5 per cent has been applied to the estimates for international staff positions based on vacancy rates in March 2023. A vacancy rate of zero per cent has applied to the estimates for National Professional Officers and Local level positions, taking into account the actual average vacancy rates in 2022.
- 100. The decrease in requirements for 2024 compared with the appropriation for 2023 is attributable primarily to: (a) the application of a lower percentage of 46.2 per cent for common staff costs for international positions, compared with 55.3 per cent applied in 2023; and (b) the application of a higher vacancy rate of 12.5 per cent for international staff positions, compared with 5.0 per cent in 2023. The decrease is partially offset by an increase in operational costs, mainly owing to: (a) higher requirements for individual contractors to improve information management through digitization and software, licenses and fees; (b) higher requirements for security services; and (c) additional requirements for official travel, to attend high-level conferences, visits and meetings with political counterparts outside Central Asia, which is expected to be more extensive and frequent in 2024.

#### Extrabudgetary resources

- 101. In 2023, extrabudgetary resources in the amount of \$110,000 are projected to be utilized to support Central Asia regional cooperation on transboundary water management, and support for the Central Asian Women Leaders' Caucus to provide influential leadership on the issues pertaining to gender equality, women and peace and security and women's empowerment within and among the countries of the region. The annual meeting of Central Asian deputy ministers for foreign affairs, as well as activities under the preventive diplomacy academy project, and the meeting of the Central Asian expert forum were also funded through extrabudgetary resources. Many of the meetings are to be held in a hybrid format.
- 102. In 2024, extrabudgetary resources in the amount of \$110,000 are projected to be utilized, to continue supporting the Central Asian Women Leaders' Caucus and the annual meeting of Central Asian deputy ministers for foreign affairs, as well as activities under the Preventive Diplomacy Academy project, and the meeting of the Central Asian expert forum.

## 4. United Nations support for the Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission

(\$3,821,700)

## Foreword

Significant progress was made in 2022 in the implementation of the International Court of Justice judgment of 10 October 2002. As Chair of the Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission, the former Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Annadif Khatir Mahamat Saleh, brokered an agreement between the parties around one of the four outstanding areas of disagreement during the Mixed Commission session held in Abuja on 25 and 26 August 2022. Given the goodwill and strong commitment demonstrated by the heads of delegations, in 2024 we intend to continue working with the parties towards the resolution of the remaining areas of disagreement. Further, we will advance efforts towards concluding the demarcation of the land boundary, the pillar emplacements, as well as the final mapping and boundary statement.

The mission will continue to advocate for the implementation of cross-border confidence-building and development projects to assist the populations that have been affected by the demarcation process. We will mobilize support from donors to fund these initiatives. It is my belief that the resources, energies and hopes invested in this process will eventually be secured by a binding agreement and the commitment and support of the populations of the two countries.

The support provided by the Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission to ensure the full implementation of the International Court of Justice judgment of 2002, as well as its efforts in cross-border and confidence-building initiatives, is making a marked contribution to preventing conflict along the border of both countries and to the overall enhancement of stability in the subregion.

(*Signed*) Leonardo Santos **Simão** Chair of the Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission

# A. Proposed programme plan for 2024 and programme performance in 2022

## **Overall orientation**

### Mandates and background

- 103. The Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission is responsible for the implementation of the judgment of the International Court of Justice of 10 October 2002 on the Cameroon-Nigeria boundary and territorial dispute. Its responsibilities include support for the demarcation of the land boundary and the delineation of the maritime boundary; facilitating the withdrawal and transfer of authority in the Lake Chad area, along the boundary and in the Bakassi Peninsula; addressing the situation of affected populations; and making recommendations on confidence-building measures.
- 104. The current mandate of the United Nations support team to the Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission derives from the following exchanges of letters between the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council: S/2017/78 and S/2017/79, S/2018/1130 and S/2018/1131, S/2019/1012 and S/2019/1013, S/2020/1322 and S/2020/1323, S/2021/1069 and S/2021/1070, and, most recently, S/2022/832 and S/2022/833. The mandate is open-ended.

## **Programme of work**

## Objective

105. The objective, to which this mission contributes, is to achieve an orderly and peaceful implementation of the judgment of 10 October 2002 of the International Court of Justice delineating the course of the land and maritime boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria.

### Strategy and external factors for 2024

- 106. To contribute to the objective, the mission will:
  - (a) Facilitate cooperation between the parties to resolve the remaining three points of disagreement in the demarcation of the land boundary;
  - (b) Support the parties in constructing additional boundary pillars along the land boundary;
  - (c) Produce the draft maps to graphically record the demarcation of the boundary and have them validated by experts from the parties during joint working sessions;
  - (d) Organize and moderate meetings of the drafting committee to finalize a boundary statement at the conclusion of the final mapping;
  - (e) Regularly monitor the situation of populations affected by the demarcation and promote crossborder development projects as confidence-building measures, including livelihood support, access to potable water, capacity-building, green energy and security;
  - (f) Continue fundraising efforts among international donors and multilateral partners to finance the demarcation activities and confidence-building projects for populations affected by the demarcation;
  - (g) Enhance subregional cooperation and good practices in the management of international boundaries by disseminating lessons learned from the Mixed Commission.
- 107. The above-mentioned work is expected to result in:
  - (a) Consensus on the course of the boundary, as well as how the boundary will be physically demarcated;
  - (b) Physical demarcation of the land boundary shared by Cameroon and Nigeria through the construction and emplacement of boundary pillars;

- (c) Delivery of final geospatial maps of the complete land and maritime boundary;
- (d) Production of a boundary statement recording the field coordinates of the emplaced pillars;
- (e) Enhanced support for the demarcation work and improved living conditions of the affected populations;
- (f) Consensus on best practices with respect to border management.
- 108. With regard to cooperation with other entities, the mission cooperates with the national authorities of Cameroon and Nigeria towards the resolution of the border dispute between Cameroon and Nigeria through holding meetings, conducting field assessments and constructing boundary pillars along the border.
- 109. With regard to inter-agency coordination and liaison, the mission cooperates with the United Nations country teams in Cameroon and Nigeria to jointly develop confidence-building measures in accordance with the needs of the populations living along the land boundary, and to ensure the conditions for peace, security and sustainable cross-border development. The secretariat of the Mixed Commission is hosted within the UNOWAS premises in Dakar. UNOWAS provides administrative and logistical support to the Mixed Commission. The Head of UNOWAS serves as Chair of the Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission.
- 110. With regard to the external factors, the overall plan for 2024 is based on the following planning assumptions:
  - (a) The two State parties, Cameroon and Nigeria, will continue to adhere to the judgment of the International Court of Justice and the workplan adopted by the Mixed Commission;
  - (b) Safety, security and climate conditions will permit field operations to continue unimpeded;
  - (c) Extrabudgetary resources, including additional voluntary contributions, will continue to be made available for border demarcation, pillar construction and confidence-building initiatives.
- 111. The Mixed Commission integrates a gender perspective in its operational activities, deliverables, and results, as appropriate. Examples include targeting women's groups for the implementation of community development projects in the areas of potable water, capacity-building for employment and community access to the electricity network. The Mixed Commission will continue regular field visits along the land boundary to assess, monitor and ensure respect for the legal rights and well-being of the affected populations, with a special focus on women, young people and other vulnerable groups.

#### Impact of the pandemic and lessons learned

- 112. The continuation of the COVID-19 pandemic into 2022 had minimal impact on the implementation of the mandate as the mission was able to carry out most of its activities, including field assessments, pillar construction work and the convening of a session of the Mixed Commission, with physical attendance, by adhering to COVID-19 protocols.
- 113. The mission continues to mainstream lessons learned and best practices related to the adjustments to and adaptation of the programme owing to the COVID-19 pandemic, including early and advanced planning and increased field support to complement and strengthen existing approaches and activities.


#### **Programme performance in 2022**

#### Political agreement on border reached

114. During 2022, the Sub-Commission on Demarcation, which is chaired by the mission, undertook a field assessment mission to four disputed areas along the land boundary in an attempt to reconcile divergent positions on specific points of contention. The assessment resulted in an agreement reached on one of the remaining four points of disagreement. The parties agreed to refer the three remaining disagreement areas back to the International Court of Justice for clarification on the interpretation of the text. In this regard, they committed to accepting and fully implementing any ensuing International Court of Justice interpretation.

Figure III

- 115. Furthermore, the mission collaborated with the United Nations country teams in Cameroon and Nigeria to identify areas of cooperation for joint initiatives to assist the populations negatively impacted by the demarcation.
- 116. Progress towards the objective is presented in the performance measure below (see figure III).



Performance measure: remaining number of areas of disagreement

### Planned result for 2024


#### Achievement of consensus between Cameroon and Nigeria


#### Programme performance in 2022 and target for 2024

117. The mission's work contributed to the resolution of and agreement on 10 of 13 areas of disagreement along the land boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria since inception. In addition, in 2022, an additional 327 pillars were constructed, representing 74 per cent of the total demarcated boundary. This accomplishment met the planned target of 2,000 boundary pillars constructed.

#### Lessons learned and planned change

- 118. The lesson learned for the mission is that engaging the leadership of the two delegations in bilateral meetings and holding a Mixed Commission session facilitates the earlier resolution of areas of disagreement between the parties. In applying the lessons, the mission will hold more regular Mixed Commission meetings and continue to intensively engage the leadership and technical experts of the State parties, to make further progress towards settling the three remaining areas of contention. The Mixed Commission will also ensure the continued implementation of security protocols adopted by both parties to allow for enhanced access to work sites for the emplacement of pillars.
- 119. Progress towards the objective and the target for 2024 are presented in the performance measure below (see figure IV).





#### **Deliverables**

120. Table 19 lists all deliverables of the mission.

## Table 19**Deliverables for the period 2022–2024, by category and subcategory**

Cat	legory and subcategory	2022 planned	2022 actual	2023 planned	2024 planned
A.	Facilitation of the intergovernmental process and expert bodies				
	Parliamentary documentation (number of documents)	2	2	2	2
	1. Reports of the Secretary-General to the Security Council	2	2	2	2
	Substantive services for meetings (number of three-hour meetings)	2	2	2	2
	2. Meetings of the Security Council	2	2	2	2
B.	Generation and transfer of knowledge				
	Technical materials (number of materials)	9	6	9	7
	3. Communiqué of the Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission	2	1	2	1
	4. Report on the subcommission on demarcation	3	2	3	2
	5. Report of the project steering committee and technical monitoring team	4	3	4	4
	Fact-finding, monitoring and investigation missions (number of missions)	_	3	3	3
	6. Field assessment including data and map validation	_	1	1	1
	7. Sensitization of local population including monitoring the well-being of affected populations along the land boundary	_	1	1	1
	8. Security assessment	-	1	1	1

#### C. Substantive deliverables

**Good offices**: provision of good offices on issues related to the peaceful implementation of the judgment of the International Court of Justice, including on demarcation and cross-border cooperation; and good offices to build consensus on the border demarcation process.

**Consultation, advice and advocacy**: technical advice to experts from Cameroon and Nigeria to facilitate resolution of areas of disagreement; advocacy for cross-border cooperation and socioeconomic projects benefiting 177,000 affected people; and raising awareness of affected local communities in the Cameroon and Nigeria border area.

**Databases and substantive digital materials**: production of digital geospatial material on an estimated 6,117 agreed positions depicting the Cameroon-Nigeria boundary.

	2022	2022	2023	20.24
	2022	2022	2025	2024
Category and subcategory	planned	actual	planned	planned

#### **D.** Communication deliverables

**Outreach programmes, special events and information materials**: brochures, flyers, information kits and special events to promote the activities of the mission, notably the demarcation process, as well as to enhance its visibility.

**External and media relations**: press conferences, press releases and media interviews on the activities of the mission. **Digital platforms and multimedia content**: dissemination of information related to the mission on social media platforms.

## B. Proposed post and non-post resource requirements for 2024

#### **Resource requirements (regular budget)**

Table 20

#### **Financial resources**

(Thousands of United States dollars)

	2022		2023	2024	Variance
_	Appropriation	Expenditure	Appropriation	Requirements	2024 vs. 2023 Increase/(decrease)
Category of expenditure	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)=(4)-(3)
Military and police personnel costs	75.3	70.3	58.8	58.8	_
Civilian personnel costs	1 767.7	1 915.0	1 929.2	1 886.1	(43.1)
Operational costs	1 682.0	1 701.5	1 793.3	1 876.8	83.5
Total (net of staff assessment)	3 525.0	3 686.8	3 781.3	3 821.7	40.4

#### Table 21 Human resources

		International staff									National staff			United Nations Volunteers				
	USG	ASG	D-2	D-1	P-5	P-4	P-3	P-2	FS	GS	Subtotal	NPO	LL	Subtotal	International	National	Subtotal	Total
Approved 2023	_	_	_	_	2	6	_	_	1	_	9	_	2	2	_	-	_	11
Proposed 2024	_	_	_	_	2	6	_	_	1	_	9	_	2	2	_	_	_	11
Change	-	_	-	-	-	-	-	_	-	_	_	_	-	_	_	-	_	_

- 121. The proposed resource requirements for 2024 for the Mixed Commission amount to \$3,821,700 (net of staff assessment) and would provide for the deployment of one military observer (\$58,800), salaries and common staff costs (\$1,886,100) for nine international positions (2 P-5, 6 P-4 and 1 Field Service) and two national positions (Local level), as well as operational costs (\$1,876,800), comprising the costs for consultants and consulting services (\$525,700), official travel (\$236,400), facilities and infrastructure (\$149,600), ground transportation (\$53,800), air operations (\$194,100), communications and information technology (\$464,200), and other supplies, services and equipment (\$253,000).
- 122. In 2024, no change is proposed to the number and levels of the positions.
- 123. A vacancy rate of 3.7 per cent has been applied to the estimates for international positions based on the actual average vacancy rate in 2022. A vacancy rate of zero per cent has been applied to the estimates for Local level positions based on actual incumbency in March 2023.

124. The increase in requirements for 2024 compared with the appropriation for 2023 is attributable mainly to higher requirements under: (a) communications and information technology, related to the replacement of obsolete equipment; (b) other supplies, services and equipment related to contribution costs towards the UN House in Dakar at full capacity; and (c) official travel due to support to the final mapping and pillars emplacement activities combined with joint technical missions to Yaoundé. The increase is partly offset by decreases in: (a) facilities and infrastructure due to reduce costs for utilities and maintenance services which is factored into the contribution towards the UN House; and (b) civilian personnel costs, owing to a decrease in post adjustment multiplier for Senegal and the application of lower percentages of common staff costs for international and national staff, based on 2022 expenditure patterns.

#### **Extrabudgetary resources**

- 125. In 2023, extrabudgetary resources in the amount of \$1,444,000 are projected to be utilized to support the construction of 221 pillars along the border between Cameroon and Nigeria.
- 126. In 2024, extrabudgetary resources in the amount of \$2,294,000 are projected to be utilized to continue to support the pillar emplacement project, with a target of 262 pillars to be constructed. The Mixed Commission will continue fundraising activities to implement socioeconomic projects for the benefit of populations in the vicinity of the demarcation exercise.
- 127. The increase in the extrabudgetary resources projected to be utilized in 2024 compared with 2023 is due to a higher number of pillars anticipated for construction in 2024.

## 5. Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon

(\$11,308,900)

## Foreword

Lebanon remains in the throes of a multidimensional crisis presenting complex political, security, economic and humanitarian challenges. A vacant presidency, a caretaker Government with limited authority and deepened political polarization preclude decisive action on urgent reform imperatives. This imperils the functioning of State institutions, undermines service delivery and compounds the humanitarian conditions for Syrian and Palestine refugees and their Lebanese host communities. The stability of the country is jeopardized at a time when the security establishment and other State institutions face acute resource constraints and devalued staff salaries.

Continuing efforts to encourage and support Lebanon's recovery, including through the advocacy for the election of a president and formation of an empowered Government to implement comprehensive reforms, will by all estimates dictate the priorities of the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon through 2024.

The Special Coordinator's good offices remain critical in accelerating the political momentum towards stabilizing the economy, promoting good governance, justice, and accountability, extending the authority of the Government of Lebanon, and ensuring the country's disassociation from regional conflicts. The Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon will continue to advocate for comprehensive reforms and work with the United Nations country team and other partners to mobilize assistance for Lebanon's governing institutions to respond to the needs of its citizens.

The Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon, in coordination with the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, will continue to support Lebanon in upholding its obligations under Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) and promote its full implementation. In this connection, the Office will seek to build on the historic establishment of the maritime boundary between Israel and Lebanon.

(Signed) Joanna Wronecka United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon

# A. Proposed programme plan for 2024 and programme performance in 2022

## **Overall orientation**

### Mandates and background

- 128. The United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon is the most senior United Nations official responsible for the implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) and is the representative of the Secretary-General to the Government of Lebanon, political parties and the diplomatic community based in Lebanon. The mandate of the Special Coordinator stems from resolution 1701 (2006), as well as subsequent decisions of the Council, including S/2007/85 and S/2007/86, S/PRST/2015/7 and S/PRST/2016/10. The Special Coordinator provides political guidance and promotes coherence across the Organization's activities. The Deputy Special Coordinator/Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator leads the United Nations country team and humanitarian country team and is responsible for planning and coordinating United Nations humanitarian and development activities in Lebanon.
- 129. The Security Council, in its resolution 2433 (2018), stressed the need for enhanced cooperation between the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon and the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), with the goal of improving the effectiveness and efficiency of the missions. The Secretary-General outlined his recommendations in that regard in a letter to the Council (S/2018/1182) and in his report on the assessment of the continued relevance of UNIFIL resources and options for improving the efficiency and effectiveness between UNIFIL and the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon (S/2020/473). The Council, in its resolutions 2591 (2021) and 2650 (2022), requested the Secretary-General to implement the recommendations of the assessment report according to the Secretary-General's detailed plan and as appropriate. Expressing concern about the strong negative impact of the social, economic and humanitarian crises on the capacities of the Lebanese Armed Forces and security forces, the Council, in its resolutions 2591 (2021) and 2650 (2022), strongly urged further and increased international support for the Lebanese Armed Forces and all State security institutions in areas where they are most critically in need.
- 130. In line with the priorities adopted by the International Support Group for Lebanon and the Secretary-General's vision on prevention, the Office structures its engagement on the basis of three strategic pillars of intervention: (a) peace and security; (b) stability; and (c) stabilization and development support. This "whole-of-Lebanon" approach is reflected in all United Nations response and cooperation frameworks. In 2022, the United Nations launched the United Nations Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework with the Government of Lebanon, in complementarity to the Lebanon Crisis Response Plan and the joint United Nations-European Union-World Bank Reform, Recovery and Reconstruction Framework and the emergency response plan.
- 131. Amid a worsening economic and financial crisis, and a prolonged political stalemate that has eroded State institutions and precluded the urgently needed recovery and reform measures, the good offices of the Special Coordinator and United Nations system-wide support remain critical. A continued United Nations political presence remains essential to supporting Lebanese and international efforts to create an enabling environment for the implementation of resolution 1701 (2006). Within the territory of Lebanon, the continued maintenance of armed personnel, assets and weapons other than those of the Government of Lebanon continues to undermine the authority of the Lebanese State and to pose a risk of reigniting conflict. Continued violations by Israel of Lebanon's sovereignty, on land and by air, also impede efforts to work towards a permanent ceasefire between the parties. Those challenges are magnified in a volatile regional context that poses further risks of escalation and spill-over into Lebanon.

## **Programme of work**

#### Objective

132. The objective, to which this mission contributes, is to prevent and mitigate conflict between Israel and Lebanon in line with the current cessation of hostilities and towards an eventual permanent ceasefire, and to extend and consolidate state authority in support of the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon.

### Strategy and external factors for 2024

- 133. To contribute to the objective, the mission will:
  - (a) Exercise its good offices between the parties to pursue confidence-building opportunities, defuse tensions through shuttle diplomacy and address violations of resolution 1701 (2006) before they escalate into conflict;
  - (b) Continue efforts, building on the establishment of the maritime boundary between Israel and Lebanon on 27 October 2022, to help resolve outstanding obligations of both parties under resolution 1701 (2006) towards a permanent ceasefire and long-term solution to the conflict. This work will be carried out in coordination with UNIFIL, in cooperation with relevant Lebanese State authorities, including the Lebanese Armed Forces, and in line with relevant Security Council resolutions;
  - (c) Advocate for Lebanon's political leadership to ensure the uninterrupted functioning of State institutions, in particular, effective, transparent and accountable policy and decision-making in the cabinet and the parliament;
  - (d) Urge the Government of Lebanon to adopt an equitable macroeconomic stabilization and reform programme that addresses the ongoing financial and economic crisis, in line with the commitments made under the April 2022 staff-level agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and any future IMF programme, as well as the Reform, Recovery and Reconstruction Framework of 2021. To complement this, the Special Coordinator will continue to advocate for good governance and anti-corruption measures, the independence of the judicial system, transparency and accountability, and more effective and efficient public service delivery countrywide. The Office will mobilize urgent international support for State security institutions pursuant to resolution 2650 (2022) and more broadly for meeting Lebanon's increasing socioeconomic and humanitarian needs. This interrelated work will be carried out in coordination with UNIFIL and the United Nations country team, in cooperation with relevant Lebanese State authorities and civil society, and in partnership with key donor countries, international financial institutions, and members of the International Support Group for Lebanon.
- 134. The above-mentioned work is expected to result in:
  - (a) The upholding of commitments of the parties to the current cessation of hostilities;
  - (b) The creation of an environment conducive to dialogue to address outstanding obligations under resolution 1701 (2006) towards an eventual permanent ceasefire;
  - (c) The establishment by Lebanon's political leadership of State institutions capable of delivering comprehensive structural reforms to put the country on the path to recovery and exercise effective authority over all Lebanese territory in accordance with the provisions of resolution 1701 (2006).
- 135. With regard to cooperation with other entities, the mission coordinates with the League of Arab States, the European Union, and international financial institutions such as the World Bank and IMF to mobilize support for Lebanon's stability and sovereignty. The mission convenes with members of the International Support Group for Lebanon for coordinated messaging and advocacy with Lebanon's political leadership. The Special Coordinator will continue to engage regional

stakeholders as part of her good offices mandate, to help build trust and defuse tensions, and mobilize the broadest possible support for Lebanon's stability.

- 136. With regard to inter-agency coordination and liaison, the mission cooperates closely with UNIFIL in the implementation of resolution 1701 (2006). Both missions continue to deepen collaboration and joint engagement with national and international stakeholders to maintain the cessation of hostilities and to strengthen the security sector and the extension of state authority across all of Lebanon's territory. Under a memorandum of understanding between UNIFIL and the Office, UNIFIL supports the Office in finance, procurement, engineering, communications, medical services, transport and logistics. The Office also leverages the presence of other United Nations entities, bringing all the United Nations political, security and development tools to bear in support of Lebanon's stability.
- 137. To further integrate United Nations activities in Lebanon, the mission contributes to the elaboration of the common country analysis of the country team on key issues like peace and governance, political instability, regional dynamics, socio-economic implications, increased intra and inter-communal tensions, and reduction in the civic space. The mission contributes to the United Nations Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework components related to the Office's mandate, such as elections, support to law enforcement and security agencies, women and peace and security, human rights, prevention of violent extremism and hate speech. The Office leads the peace and governance results group of the United Nations Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework, and the country team integrated working groups related to human rights, gender and elections. The mission is also a member of the humanitarian-development-peace nexus task force, responsible for enhancing complementarity across all United Nations interventions.
- 138. With regard to the external factors, the overall plan for 2024 is based on the following planning assumptions:
  - (a) International consensus with regard to Lebanon, while present, will continue to be challenged;
  - (b) Political stalemate may hinder effective decision-making and undermine the implementation of meaningful economic, fiscal and monetary reforms, and prevent the conclusion of an agreement with IMF to the detriment of sustainable and inclusive recovery of the country;
  - (c) The deteriorating socioeconomic situation and its humanitarian repercussions will continue to impact Lebanon and will require a multi-year recovery and reform programme;
  - (d) Lebanon's protracted economic and financial crisis has eroded State institutions, diminishing their ability to provide essential public services and to consolidate State authority across the country. Continuing high inflation, currency depreciation, protracted unemployment, growing poverty and humanitarian challenges will remain sources of instability and social unrest;
  - (e) The tense and volatile regional environment will continue to affect Lebanon's internal stability and security;
  - (f) The continued presence of large numbers of Palestine and Syrian refugees will remain a factor;
  - (g) The cessation of hostilities between Lebanon and Israel will hold, potentially allowing for progress in line with resolution 1701 (2006), and the continuation of confidence-building efforts following the establishment of the maritime boundary;
  - (h) Violations of resolution 1701 (2006) will continue to be perpetrated by the parties and tensions will persist, including over the prevalence and proliferation of weapons in Lebanon outside the authority of the State, as well as violations of Lebanese sovereignty and territorial integrity;
  - (i) Increased extension of State authority south of the Litani river and along the borders will continue to be impacted by the law and order requirements elsewhere in the country, and the budgetary positions of the State security institutions.
- 139. The mission integrates a gender and women and peace and security perspective in its operational activities, deliverables, and results, as appropriate. As women currently hold only 8 out of 128 parliamentary seats (6.4 per cent) and one ministerial portfolio, the mission is working to enhance

women's participation and representation in political life through a range of initiatives including the development of gender quota proposals, targeted support for female electoral candidates, campaigns around voting practices and coalition building for electoral reform, initiatives that originated in the context of the 2022 parliamentary elections in coordination with UNDP and UN-Women and will continue through the municipal elections in May 2023. The mission has established an active network of women parliamentarians, leading media persons and civil society actors to foster women's empowerment. To advance the youth, peace and security agenda, the Office will work on expanding its engagement with youth groups through various platforms and continue to advocate for the empowerment of youth and their integration in political and decision-making processes.

#### Impact of the pandemic and lessons learned

- 140. The continuation of the COVID-19 pandemic into 2022 had an impact on the implementation of mandates by constraining the good offices role of the Special Coordinator in furthering the objectives of resolution 1701 (2006). The United Nations system faced challenges in meeting national needs and addressing critical gaps owing to the coronavirus pandemic and its devastating impact on the society, healthcare, and economy. In Israel, strict COVID-19 protocols and related travel restrictions, and within Lebanon the curtailment of in-person meetings with external interlocutors, as well as among the United Nations country team, remained a challenge in particular during the first half of 2022. The mission leadership worked with the United Nations country team to identify opportunities for joint action with special focus on strengthening gender mainstreaming, disability inclusion, human rights, and the principle of leaving no one behind.
- 141. The mission continues to mainstream lessons learned and best practices related to the adjustments to and adaptation of the programme owing to the COVID-19 pandemic. Strong precautionary measures were taken by the mission to avoid further transmission of COVID-19 among United Nations staff.

#### **Programme performance in 2022**

#### Promoting conditions for the further extension and consolidation of state authority

- 142. In 2022, the Special Coordinator led a range of initiatives that contributed to the timely conduct of the parliamentary elections in May 2022. These included political advocacy; outreach to civil society, religious leaders and opinion makers; leveraging the International Support Group for Lebanon and the Elections Forum (stakeholders' platform at the ambassadorial level co-chaired with the Minister of Interior); and working with UNDP on technical support for the elections. The mission engaged with political parties and the public to advance women's participation in the elections and representation in decision-making positions, rallied women members of parliament on a platform for women's empowerment, and advocated for implementation of Lebanon's National Action Plan on Security Council resolution 1325 (2000).
- 143. Progress towards the objective is presented in the performance measure below (see table 22).

## Table 22Performance measure

2020 (actual)	2021 (actual)	2022 (actual)
Agreement by political parties to the French-led initiative, with implementation pending Government delay in preparing the	Agreement by political parties on a comprehensive reform programme, in order to successfully conclude negotiations with IMF	Parliamentary elections conducted in May
2021 budget	Adoption of 2022 State budget	
Stalled discussions with IMF owing to Government resignation	Referral of 2022 State budget by Council of Ministers to Parliament	
Beginning of discussions on electoral reform	Successful support to Lebanese authorities in planning and	
Adoption of legislation establishing the National Anti-Corruption Institution	preparing for the 2022 elections	

## Planned results for 2024

## Result 1: support institutional reform and the democratic process post-elections, and implementation of the financial and economic reform agenda

#### Programme performance in 2022 and target for 2024

- 144. In 2022, the mission's work contributed to support for the democratic process, which met the planned target of holding parliamentary elections in May 2022. However, political disagreement prevented the timely election of a new president after the 6-year term of the President, Michel Aoun, concluded on 31 October 2022. With a vacant presidency and a caretaker Government with limited constitutional authority, decisive actions to launch reform imperatives remained stalled.
- 145. For 2024, the Office will encourage the uninterrupted functioning of State institutions, in particular, effective, transparent and accountable policy and decision-making in the Cabinet and Parliament. The mission, with its partners, will continue to support the recovery of Lebanon through targeted interventions, including to preserve the functioning of state institutions and enable them to deliver on a set of comprehensive reforms, including the implementation of an IMF programme and adoption of financial and macro-economic reforms necessary to stabilize the economy and for Lebanon to regain access to international financing opportunities. These will be critical conditions for Lebanon to meet in full its commitments and obligations under resolution 1701 (2006). The Office will advocate, along with the United Nations country team and the International Support Group for Lebanon, to enhance social protections for vulnerable groups, strengthen the independence and effectiveness of the judiciary; implement the national anti-corruption strategy; operationalize the National Human Rights Commission as well as the National Anti-Corruption Institution; and implement the National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security.
- 146. Progress towards the objective and the target for 2024 are presented in the performance measure below (see table 23).

Table 23	
Performance	measure

2020 (actual)	2021 (actual)	2022 (actual)	2023 (planned)	2024 (planned)
Launch of discussions in Parliament regarding a new elections law	Adoption of revised elections law	Parliamentary elections held on time, in line with the new elections law Presidential elections deadlocked due to disagreements among political parties Government and IMF reach Staff- level Agreement towards an IMF programme	Follow-up on implementation of reform agenda, in line with the IMF agreement	Follow-up on the implementation of an IMF programme and promote further international assistance for Lebanon Uninterrupted functioning of effective, transparent, and accountable State institutions Increased engagement of governing institutions with civil society, women and youth groups to restore confidence

## **Result 2:** facilitate increased international support for State security institutions through expedited assistance in the most critically required areas

#### Programme performance in 2022 and target for 2024

- 147. In 2022, to mitigate the impact of the economic crisis on the Lebanese Armed Forces and Internal Security Forces, the Office facilitated the establishment of a donor-funded United Nations mechanism for financial transfers to Lebanese Armed Forces and Internal Security Forces personnel as emergency support. The mechanism, operated by UNDP, will facilitate the livelihood support programme for Lebanese Armed Forces and Internal Security Forces personnel in line with paragraph 10 of Security Council resolution 2650 (2022) and the United Nations human rights due diligence policy.
- 148. For 2024, looking beyond the immediate financial assistance to security personnel, and taking into account the economic situation, the Office will direct renewed focus to the overall capability development of the Lebanese Armed Forces as a key element to support progress towards a permanent ceasefire. To this end, the Office will promote additional and expedited international assistance to the Lebanese Armed Forces, including for their daily logistical needs, and maintaining their counterterrorism, border protection, and naval capacities, in line with resolution 2650 (2022).

#### Lessons learned and planned change

- 149. The lesson for the mission was that an unintended effect of this initiative was a shift away from international support for the Lebanese Armed Forces' larger capabilities development as limited donor funds were focused on immediate financial assistance for security personnel. In applying this lesson, the mission will continue to work in a coordinated manner with the security institutions and donors to anticipate shortfalls and direct international support to the most urgent needs of Lebanon's security institutions with an eye on the larger capabilities development of the Lebanese Armed Forces.
- 150. Expected progress towards the objective and the target for 2024 are presented in the performance measure below (see table 24).

## Table 24Performance measure

2020 (actual)	2021 (actual)	2022 (actual)	2023 (planned)	2024 (planned)			
_		The Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon and UNDP developed a cash-transfer mechanism for emergency assistance to Lebanese Armed Forces and Internal Security Forces compliant with the human rights due diligence policy	Continued support to Lebanese Armed Forces and Internal Security Forces in compliance with the human rights due diligence policy	Support to further strengthen State security institution capabilities, beyond emergency assistance			

#### Deliverables

151. Table 25 lists all deliverables of the mission.

#### Table 25

#### Deliverables for the period 2022-2024, by category and subcategory

Category and subcategory	2022 planned	2022 actual	2023 planned	2024 planned
A. Facilitation of the intergovernmental process and expert bodies				
Parliamentary documentation (number of documents)	3	3	3	3
1. Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006)	3	3	3	3
Substantive services for meetings (number of three-hour meetings)	3	3	3	3
2. Meetings of the Security Council	3	3	3	3

#### C. Substantive deliverables

**Good offices**: provision of good offices in support of the prevention of conflict and the extension and consolidation of State authority; good offices on elections, peace and stability, including with respect to economic issues; intensive engagement with the Lebanese Armed Forces and the Internal Security Forces, as well as the donor community, to facilitate continued assistance to the security forces; and confidence-building measures between Israel and Lebanon, including with respect to the maritime boundary.

**Consultation, advice and advocacy**: consultations with Lebanese and Israeli interlocutors on the implementation of resolution 1701 (2006); consultations with the International Support Group for Lebanon and other regional stakeholders on ensuring Lebanon's stability; consultations on the economic and governance reform agenda and development priorities; advice on government accountability, governance policy formulation and public administration reforms; advocacy with international partners in support of Lebanon's efforts for extension of State authority, including strengthened state security agencies; consultations on integrated border management on the Lebanon-Syrian Arab Republic border; advocacy on key human rights standards and protections that could have an impact on long-term security and stability and the strengthening of human rights institutions in Lebanon; advocacy on the political participation and representation of women and young people; and advocacy with international partners in support of Lebanon for continued donor involvement and resources as Lebanon responds to the presence of Palestine and Syrian refugees, taking into account the needs of refugees and host communities.

#### A/78/6 (Sect. 3)/Add.4

	2022	2022	2023	2024
Category and subcategory	planned	actual	planned	planned

#### **D.** Communication deliverables

**Outreach programmes, special events and information materials**: outreach activities to support the implementation of resolution 1701 (2006) and other key priorities relating to Lebanon's sustainable peace, development and human rights agenda; activities to strengthen the relationship with key Lebanese partners and stakeholders; engaging with young people, including university students, and supporting women's empowerment and representation, in particular in the parliamentary elections; and outreach activities through special events such as United Nations Day and International Women's Day to communicate more effectively with local stakeholders and to spread broader knowledge of the work being undertaken through Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon information materials and joint outreach activities with other United Nations entities on the promotion of United Nations system-wide priorities such as the Sustainable Development Goals.

**External and media relations**: press conferences, press statements, background briefings, interviews, op-eds and other media engagements to communicate strategically on the implementation of resolution 1701 (2006); and press statements of the International Support Group for Lebanon on safeguarding Lebanon's security, stability and sovereignty and the implementation of resolution 1701 (2006).

**Digital platforms and multi-media content**: deepen local and national understandings of and support to the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon and its support for the implementation of resolution 1701 (2006) on website or social media.

## B. Proposed post and non-post resource requirements for 2024

#### **Resource requirements (regular budget)**

#### Table 26 Financial resources

(Thousands of United States dollars)

	2022		2023	2024	Variance
_	Appropriation	Expenditure	Appropriation	Requirements	2024 vs. 2023 Increase/(decrease)
Category of expenditure	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)=(4)-(3)
Military and police personnel costs	_	_	_	_	-
Civilian personnel costs	8 220.1	9 154.1	8 861.8	9 992.1	1 130.3
Operational costs	1 338.3	1 121.6	1 321.3	1 316.8	(4.5)
Total (net of staff assessment)	9 558.4	10 275.7	10 183.1	11 308.9	1 125.8

#### Table 27 Human resources

		International staff										National staff			United Nations Volunteers			
	USG	ASG	D-2	D-1	P-5	P-4	P-3	P-2	FS	GS	Subtotal	NPO	LL	Subtotal	International	National	Subtotal	Total
Approved 2023	1	1 <i>ª</i>	_	1	2	6	1	_	6	_	18	5	60	65	_	_	_	83
Proposed 2024	1	$1^a$	_	1	2	6	1	_	6	_	18	5	60	65	_	_	_	83
Change	_	_	_	_	_	_	_	_	_	_	_	_	_	_	_	_	-	_

<sup>a</sup> Position is funded at 50 per cent and cost-shared with the Development Coordination Office.

152. The proposed resource requirements for 2024 for the Office amount to \$11,308,900 (net of staff assessment) and would provide for salaries and common staff costs (\$9,992,100) for 18 international positions (1 Under-Secretary-General, 1 Assistant Secretary-General, 1 D-1, 2 P-5, 6 P-4, 1 P-3 and

6 Field Service) and 65 national positions (5 National Professional Officer and 60 Local level), as well as operational costs (\$1,316,800), comprising the costs for consultants and consulting services (\$12,300), official travel (\$164,500), facilities and infrastructure (\$719,500), ground transportation (\$73,900), communications and information technology (\$235,800), and other supplies, services and equipment (\$110,800).

- 153. In 2024, no change is proposed to the number and levels of positions.
- 154. A vacancy rate of 5.6 per cent has been applied to the estimates for international positions, a vacancy rate of zero per cent has been applied to the estimates for National Professional Officer positions and a vacancy rate of 6.7 per cent has been applied to the estimates for Local level positions, all based on the actual vacancy rates in March 2023.
- 155. The increase in requirements for 2024 compared with the appropriation for 2023 is attributable to the increased requirements under civilian personnel costs, resulting from the increase of the post adjustment multiplier in Lebanon and the application of the latest national staff salary scales promulgated in October 2022. The increase is partially offset by a decrease in operational costs under other supplies, services and equipment due to lower requirements for other freight and related costs, and medical services due to adequate stock acquired in previous periods.

## 6. United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa

(\$8,410,500)

## Foreword

In 2024, the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa (UNOCA) will strengthen its cooperation in peace and security with the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), including through joint early warning and good offices initiatives, and will mobilize the United Nations system to support the capacities of ECCAS and its member States in conflict prevention and resolution and sustaining peace. UNOCA will promote the contribution of civil society to peace and security, including by building the capacities of the regional Coalition of Civil Society Organizations for Peace and Conflict Prevention in Central Africa, the ECCAS network of women mediators and the Coalition for Youth, Peace and Security in Central Africa.

UNOCA will also work with ECCAS and its member States to prevent inter-communal violence and to fight hate speech, including through advocacy and support for the adoption and implementation of regulations and strategies, with a meaningful contribution of civil society and the media and the adequate participation of women and youth.

The mission will continue working with the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel to support joint efforts by ECCAS and the Economic Community of West African States aimed at addressing cross-regional peace and security challenges facing Central and West Africa, especially in the areas of maritime security and the fight against terrorism and violent extremism.

In carrying out its mandate, UNOCA will ensure gender mainstreaming and a human rights-based approach, limit its carbon impact, and contribute to the fight against climate change and its impact on peace and security.

(Signed) Abdou Abarry Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Central Africa Head of the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa

# A. Proposed programme plan for 2024 and programme performance in 2022

## **Overall orientation**

### Mandates and background

- 156. The United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa (UNOCA) is responsible for the prevention of conflicts and the consolidation of peace and security in Central Africa. The mandate was established through an exchange of letters between the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council (S/2009/697 and S/2010/457). Through another exchange of letters (S/2021/719 and S/2021/720), the mandate was extended until 31 August 2024.
- 157. The current mandate assigns four objectives to UNOCA, namely: (a) monitor political and security developments in Central Africa and carry out good offices on behalf of the Secretary-General in order to prevent and resolve conflicts, to help to sustain peace and to advise the Secretary-General and United Nations entities in the region on sustaining peace issues in Central Africa; (b) enhance subregional capacities for conflict prevention and mediation in countries of the subregion, with due attention given to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, including human rights and gender dimensions; (c) support and enhance United Nations efforts in the subregion, as well as regional and subregional initiatives on peace and security, including from human rights and gender perspectives; and, (d) enhance coherence and coordination in the work of the United Nations in the subregion on peace and security. UNOCA will also continue to host the secretariat of the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa, coordinate the implementation of the United Nations regional strategy to address the threat and impact of the Lord's Resistance Army and support the implementation of small arms and light weapons in Central Africa.

## **Programme of work**

### Objective

158. The objective, to which this mission contributes, is to prevent conflict and consolidate peace and security in the Central Africa subregion.

### Strategy and external factors for 2024

- 159. To contribute to the objective, the mission will:
  - (a) Engage in good offices activities to help countries to prevent political crises and electionrelated violence and peacefully resolve conflicts and crises stemming from political and electoral processes, and promote inclusive, peaceful and credible elections;
  - (b) Build regional and national capacities for conflict prevention and sustaining peace, including by providing support to national institutions and platforms for political dialogue where they exist. Where such institutions and platforms are lacking, UNOCA will advocate their establishment and mobilize relevant United Nations entities and other partners to support their operationalization;
  - (c) Leverage its partnership with subregional organizations, especially the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and the Central African Economic and Monetary Community, in conflict prevention, mediation and early warning, including promoting the participation of women, young people and other actors in peacebuilding and sustaining peace strategies and addressing the adverse effects of climate change on peace and security;

- (d) Address cross-regional peace and security challenges (farmer-herder dynamics), in partnership with United Nations entities in Central and West Africa. Continue to support a cross-regional approach to addressing the crisis in the Lake Chad Basin region and to improve regional coordination on mechanisms on maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea;
- (e) Continue its partnership with ECCAS on the development and the implementation of regional strategy on hate speech;
- (f) Carry out regular early warning analysis to inform preventive diplomacy and good offices efforts, to highlight threats to peace and security in Central Africa and mobilize support for preventive diplomacy, in collaboration with ECCAS and United Nations regional offices and regional representations of United Nations entities;
- (g) Enhance the coherence of the work of the United Nations on peace and security issues in Central Africa through regular consultations with relevant United Nations entities in the subregion, coordinate the efforts of United Nations entities geared towards the implementation of the regional conflict prevention framework and support the United Nations country teams in adopting and/or rolling out national sustaining peace strategies, aligned with the framework;
- (h) Ensure the regular holding of the ministerial meetings of the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa as a platform for confidence-building between Member States to discuss threats and challenges to regional peace and security, in particular with a view to preventing or addressing conflicts and crises that carry the risk of creating or exacerbating inter-State tensions, or the risk of expanding beyond national borders.
- 160. The above-mentioned work is expected to result in:
  - (a) Peaceful electoral processes in the subregion, with relevant prevention mechanisms in place for potential election-related violence;
  - (b) Prevention or mitigation of election-related violence and the initiation or continuation of political dialogue processes assisted by joint early-warning and good offices missions by UNOCA and ECCAS in countries holding elections or facing a political crisis;
  - (c) Progress made by ECCAS towards the adoption of a regional governance framework in Central Africa;
  - (d) The holding of successful ministerial meetings of the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa and two field visits of the Bureau of the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa to selected countries on topical issues related to regional peace and security in Central Africa;
  - (e) A common understanding of key peace and security challenges and priorities among United Nations entities in Central Africa, integrating emerging drivers of conflicts, including climate change;
  - (f) Enhanced coordination of United Nations efforts in support of regional and subregional initiatives on peace and security and governance;
  - (g) The adoption and/or implementation of national sustaining peace strategies aligned with the regional conflict prevention framework in at least three countries;
  - (h) Improved interregional coordination between Central and West Africa on maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea, farmer-herder dynamics and the crisis in the Lake Chad Basin region.
- 161. With regard to cooperation with other entities, the mission carries out joint analyses and activities on cross-regional peace and security challenges with other regional and subregional organizations. Early warning analysis and good offices are carried out, to the extent possible, jointly or in consultation with ECCAS.
- 162. With regard to inter-agency coordination and liaison, the mission continues to convene regular meetings of the United Nations presences in Central Africa to achieve a common understanding of the

key peace and security challenges in Central Africa and to build or reinforce synergies in the action of the United Nations, including through the regional conflict prevention framework. The mission works closely with UNOWAS, the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic, the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region and other relevant United Nations entities, including with respect to cross-border and transregional challenges to peace and security, in order to avoid duplication and ensure coherence in United Nations activities in the subregion. Country-specific early warning and good offices activities are carried out in close coordination with the offices of the resident coordinators concerned.

- 163. With regard to the external factors, the overall plan for 2024 is based on the following planning assumptions:
  - (a) ECCAS institutional reform becomes fully operational, with all peace and security institutions and mechanisms established and provided with adequate resources for their functioning. UNOCA and the ECCAS Commission maintain or strengthen their cooperation and regular consultations, and adopt and roll out a joint plan of action, within the framework of a new memorandum of understanding between the Commission and the United Nations on peace and security issues;
  - (b) ECCAS member States remain committed to establishing a regional governance framework, work genuinely towards the adoption and implementation of regional governance standards and mechanisms, and solicit or accept the support of regional and international partners, including UNOCA, to that end;
  - (c) The political landscape remains polarized in several countries of the subregion, against the backdrop of growing demands for the opening of political space and the improvement in electoral frameworks, increasing the risks of political violence or conflict while distrust in public institutions persists, prompting some stakeholders to demand neutral platforms for discussion on key political, electoral and institutional reforms;
  - (d) The elections scheduled in the countries of the region are held according to the constitutional and legal time frames and the countries concerned accept the political engagement of UNOCA to prevent election-related violence and resolve election-related crises;
  - (e) Tensions erupt, persist or heighten between several countries of the subregion over crossborder security issues, warranting an increased role of regional institutions and mechanisms, which is accepted by the States concerned and supported by international partners, to calm tensions, build trust and resolve disputes peacefully;
  - (f) The ECCAS Commission and member States show a genuine commitment to the involvement of civil society actors, including the regional Coalition of Civil Society Organizations for Peace and Conflict Prevention in Central Africa and women and youth organizations, in the activities of ECCAS in the realm of peace and security, including early warning, conflict prevention and peace-making. The Coalition becomes fully operational, with adequate human resources, and is supported by ECCAS member States and partners;
  - (g) ECCAS member States adopt and begin to implement a regional regulation on pastoralism and transhumance in Central Africa, support national and local mechanisms in preventing and peacefully addressing farmer-herder conflicts, and take collective measures to promote peaceful cross-border transhumance.
- 164. The mission integrates a gender perspective in its operational activities, deliverables and results, as appropriate, including support for the implementation of the regional action plan on Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) and the adoption and rolling out of national action plans. The mission continues its advocacy on the reinforcement of the role of women in conflict prevention and sustaining peace, as well as adequate representation of women in decision-making positions at both the national and regional levels. The mission works with other relevant United Nations entities and external partners to reinforce the capacities of women in decision-making and in mediation. UNOCA will support the

operationalization and build the capacity of the ECCAS network of women mediators established in December 2021 and endorsed by the Heads of State in January 2022. In its analysis and reporting, the mission ensures that data and information are disaggregated by gender and that analyses and recommendations give due consideration to the specific situation and needs of women. During fact-finding and good offices visits, the mission ensures adequate consultation and engagement with women and women's groups. Human rights aspects, including the protection of women's rights, are also integrated into conflict analysis and early warning and preventive diplomacy work of the mission.

165. In line with the United Nations Disability Inclusion Strategy, the mission advocates for political and electoral processes in the region to be disability-sensitive, by encouraging Member States to take appropriate measures to facilitate the participation of persons with disabilities. The mission also encourages and supports experience-sharing between the States of the region on disability inclusion, thus facilitating the adoption of measures that take into consideration the specificities of the regional and national contexts. The mission further integrates the situation of persons with disabilities into its analysis and reporting and ensures proper consultation and engagement with organizations representing persons with disabilities during fact-finding, early warning and good offices activities.

#### Impact of the pandemic and lessons learned

- 166. In 2022, the COVID-19 pandemic did not impact the UNOCA programme performance. The mission continued to implement its mandate in good offices, preventive diplomacy and mediation; support regional and subregional initiatives on peace and security; and enhance the coherence and coordination of United Nations action in the area of peace and security in the subregion.
- 167. The mission continues to mainstream lessons learned and best practices related to the adjustments to and adaptation of the programme owing to the COVID-19 pandemic, including strengthening internal and external communication in a hybrid environment (e.g. by providing regular, coordinated and transparent internal communications to engage and inform personnel and promote well-being) and simplifying and streamlining business processes (e.g. events organized in a hybrid format).

#### Programme performance in 2022

#### **Reduced tensions in electoral contexts**

- 168. In 2022, elections took place in Angola, Gabon, the Congo, Equatorial Guinea and São Tome and Principe. While the elections were generally peaceful and orderly, the subregion faced substantial challenges with electoral governance. The revision of electoral lists in some electoral processes was a particular source of tensions. Low voter turnout and boycotts of elections in some countries, as well as demands for independent verification and counting of votes highlighted a general mistrust of electoral systems in the subregion. UNOCA monitored the situation closely in the lead-up to the election, including by deploying fact-finding missions. UNOCA also encouraged political dialogue, including through standing or ad hoc platforms established to that end, with a view to creating conditions for inclusive, peaceful and credible elections.
- 169. UNOCA carried out joint fact-finding and assessment missions with ECCAS to Angola and São Tome and Principe, identifying risks of violence and conflicts and making recommendations for good offices initiatives. In Gabon, Angola and São Tome and Principe, UNOCA organized capacitybuilding workshops for women's and youth organizations to increase their engagement in politics. The mission also worked with the United Nations country teams and civil society organizations in Angola, Gabon and São Tome and Principe to promote women's political participation in elections.
- 170. The recurrence and persistence of hate speech and statements inciting violence emerged as one of the major concerns of member States, particularly in a context already marked by socio-political tensions, disinformation and misinformation. UNOCA continued to advocate with the ECCAS Commission and other regional stakeholders for the development and adoption of a regional strategy to prevent and combat hate speech in Central Africa.

171. Progress towards the objective is presented in the performance measure below (table 28).

## Table 28Performance measure

2020 (actual)	2021 (actual)	2022 (actual)
Progress ongoing towards the adoption by ECCAS of regional legislation on pastoralism, and by ECCAS and ECOWAS of common policies and joint programmes, which were delayed owing to COVID-19 restrictive measures and the ECCAS institutional reform process	Reduction in election-related incidents and an increase in the number of constructive and inclusive dialogue initiatives in the subregion	Early warning and good offices missions were conducted by UNOCA and ECCAS to States holding elections Elections in Central Africa were generally peaceful, with no or low level of violence

### Planned result for 2024

## Election-related violence is prevented or mitigated in line with the Malabo Declaration on democratic elections

#### Programme performance in 2022 and target for 2024

172. Based on the lessons learned from the electoral processes held recently in the region, including those that took place in Angola, Equatorial Guinea and São Tome and Principe in 2022, and in line with the Malabo Declaration adopted at the fiftieth meeting of the Unites Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa, the mission will provide support through early warning and good offices initiatives aimed at contributing to peaceful and inclusive electoral processes in Chad, the Congo and Rwanda where elections will be held in 2024. UNOCA will also encourage the establishment of inclusive political dialogue frameworks and support those already in existence as a tool to defuse tensions, promote inclusive processes and enhance confidence in electoral frameworks and the institutions involved in the organization of elections. In coordination with regional actors, including ECCAS, UNOCA will also deploy technical assessment missions to work closely with the resident coordinators and United Nations country teams, which will focus on identifying and defusing emerging peace and security threats or election-related tensions. UNOCA will also encourage and support a greater role for the media and civil society in promoting inclusive and peaceful elections, including by promoting the participation of women and youth and in the fight against hate speech.

#### Lessons learned and planned change

- 173. A lesson for the mission was that early warning, good offices initiatives and facilitating political dialogue frameworks contribute to peaceful and inclusive electoral processes.
- 174. In applying the lesson, the mission plans to work closely with United Nations country teams and national stakeholders to design and implement activities aimed at ensuring a greater participation of youth and women in elections. UNOCA will also use good offices to promote dialogue among electoral stakeholders to build consensus on the electoral frameworks, processes and outcomes.
- 175. Progress towards the objective and the target for 2024 are presented in the performance measure below (see table 29).

## Table 29Performance measure

2020 (actual)	2021 (actual)	2022 (actual)	2023 (planned)	2024 (planned)
Finalization of ECCAS-wide legislation on pastoralism; progress towards the adoption of common policies and joint programmes ahead of the next ECCAS- ECOWAS summit	Reduction in election-related incidents and increase in the number of constructive and inclusive dialogue initiatives in the subregion	Early warning and good offices missions conducted by UNOCA and ECCAS to States holding elections Peaceful elections took place in Angola, the Congo, Equatorial Guinea and São Tome and Principe, with no or low levels of violence	Six early warning and good offices missions conducted by UNOCA and ECCAS to States of the region contribute to peaceful elections, with no or low level of violence Progress is achieved in the implementation of the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa Malabo Declaration and towards the adoption of a regional protocol on elections	Six early warning and good offices missions conducted by UNOCA and ECCAS to States of the region contribute to peaceful elections, with no or low level of violence Progress is achieved in the implementation of the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa Malabo Declaration and towards the adoption of a regional protocol on elections

## Deliverables

#### 176. Table 30 lists all deliverables of the Mission.

#### Table 30

#### Deliverables for the period 2022–2024, by category and subcategory

Category and subcategory	2022 planned	2022 actual	2023 planned	2024 planned
A. Facilitation of the intergovernmental process and expert bodies				
Parliamentary documentation (number of documents)	3	3	3	4
1. Reports of the Secretary-General to the Security Council	2	2	2	2
<ol> <li>Report of the Secretary-General on the activities of the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa</li> </ol>	1	1	1	1
Substantive services for meetings (number of three-hour meetings)	12	12	12	12
3. Meetings of the Security Council	2	2	2	2
4. Ministerial meeting of the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa	10	10	10	10
B. Generation and transfer of knowledge				
Seminars, workshops and training events (number of days)	70	20	70	26
5. Workshop on conflict prevention, mediation, human rights and women's empowerment	45	17	45	20
6. Workshop for journalists/media on their role in conflict prevention and protection of civilian	s 25	3	25	6
Fact-finding, monitoring and investigation missions (number of missions)	_	-	-	30
7. Field visits to Member States to gather information, consult stakeholders and coordinate actio on issues related to subregional peace and security, activities monitoring, data collecting	n —	_	_	30

	2022	2022	2023	2024
Category and subcategory	planned	actual	planned	planned

#### C. Substantive deliverables

**Good offices**: good offices, preventive diplomacy and mediation, high-level diplomatic missions and meetings, including jointly with regional organizations (ECCAS and the African Union), regional and subregional summits, forums and high-level meetings to promote peace and stability, maritime safety and human rights.

**Consultation, advice and advocacy**: strategic coordination meetings and round tables with regional and subregional organizations on regional integration, peace and security, human rights and counterterrorism (including addressing security threats in the Lake Chad basin).

#### **D.** Communication deliverables

**Outreach**: collaborate with civil society (e.g., media associations, women's and youth groups), ECCAS and other key stakeholders for the holding of events to raise awareness of UNOCA mandate and activities; collaborate with broadcast media to raise the profile of UNOCA and the public's better understanding of its good offices and mediation work; support United Nations Communications Group – Gabon joint activities, harmonizing communications and messaging campaigns (e.g. marking official United Nations observances relevant to UNOCA mandate and Central African region).

**External and media relations**: capacity-building programmes for the media and communications stakeholders in the subregion, especially in the context of national elections scheduled for 2024 (Chad, the Congo, Rwanda); build and maintain working relationships with media at national, subregional and international level to help to ensure a better understanding of the work of UNOCA; organize at least two press conferences for UNOCA leadership; arrange for interviews and other media coverage with UNOCA political affairs staff.

**Digital platforms and multimedia content**: three online platforms (social and digital media) to disseminate multilingual content; produce and disseminate various digital materials (cards, infographics, videos, digital newsletters) and multimedia content to reflect UNOCA activities for peace and stability in the subregion; produce a podcast programme on high-priority areas of UNOCA mandate.

## B. Proposed post and non-post resource requirements for 2024

#### **Resource requirements (regular budget)**

#### Table 31

#### **Financial resources**

(Thousands of United States dollars)

	2022		2023	2024	Variance
_	Appropriation	Expenditure	Appropriation	Requirements	2024 vs. 2023 Increase/(decrease)
Category of expenditure	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)=(4)-(3)
Military and police personnel costs	_	_	_	_	-
Civilian personnel costs	6 894.3	6 569.8	7 238.0	6 610.2	(627.8)
Operational costs	1 635.8	1 474.4	1 836.1	1 800.3	(35.8)
Total (net of staff assessment)	8 530.1	8 044.2	9 074.1	8 410.5	(663.6)

#### Table 32 Human resources

		International staff										National staff			United Nations Volunteers			
	USG	ASG	D-2	D-1	P-5	P-4	P-3	P-2	FS	GS	Subtotal	NPO	LL	Subtotal	International	National	Subtotal	Total
Approved 2023	1	_	_	2	5	12	6	_	7	_	33	4	12	16	_	1	1	50
Proposed 2024	1	_	_	2	5	12	6	_	7	_	33	4	12	16	_	1	1	50
Change	_	_	_	_	_	_	_	_	_	_	_	_	_	_	_	_	_	_

- 177. The proposed resource requirements for 2024 for UNOCA amount to \$8,410,500 (net of staff assessment) and would provide for salaries and common staff costs (\$6,610,200) for the continuation of 33 international positions (1 Under-Secretary-General, 2 D-1, 5 P-5, 12 P-4, 6 P-3 and 7 Field Service), 16 national positions (4 National Professional Officer and 12 Local level) and 1 national United Nations Volunteer, as well as operational costs (\$1,800,300) comprising the costs for consultants (\$17,800), official travel (\$568,100), facilities and infrastructure (\$283,100), ground transportation (\$60,000), air operations (\$145,800), communications and information technology (\$534,400), and other supplies, services and equipment (\$191,100).
- 178. In 2024, it is proposed to reassign one position of Military Adviser (P-4) as Legal Officer, under the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, to provide timely and effective legal expertise and advice on legal issues affecting the mission's mandate and activities, including public, international, private and administrative law matters, as well as issues of constitutional and other national law.
- 179. A vacancy rate of 18.2 per cent has been applied to the estimates for international positions and 25.0 per cent for National Professional Officer positions based on the actual vacancy rate in March 2023. A vacancy rate of zero per cent has been applied to the estimates for local level positions and national United Nations Volunteers based on the actual vacancy rate in March 2023. A vacancy rate of 50 per cent has been applied for the estimate of one position proposed for reassignment.
- 180. The decrease in requirements for 2024 compared with the appropriation for 2023 is attributable mainly to (a) decreased requirements for international staff and National Professional Officers, due to the application of higher vacancy rates of 18.2 per cent and 25.0 per cent, based on vacancy rates in March 2023, compared with the rates applied in the 2023 budget; and (b) lower requirements for communications and information technology due lower volume of acquisition of equipment. Those decreases are offset in part by higher requirements for other supplies, services and equipment related to the contribution to common services for compound management and security in Gabon.

#### **Extrabudgetary resources**

- 181. In 2023, extrabudgetary resources in the amount of \$765,000 were projected to be utilized to support regional capacity to prevent, mitigate and resolve election-related crises and violence in the Central Africa subregion, including through the strengthening of electoral governance and support for the adoption of regional norms and mechanisms on democratic elections; support for the effective functioning of a regional women's platform for peace and security in the Central Africa subregion; support for ECCAS in strengthening its conflict prevention and resolution capacities, with a view to enhancing its effectiveness in early warning; and the strengthening of the role of media organs as a catalyst for peace and security, as well as social cohesion. The funding will also provide for one post of Political Affairs Officer (P-4).
- 182. In 2024, extrabudgetary resources in the amount of \$765,000 are projected to be utilized, to continue supporting regional capacities to prevent, mitigate and resolve election-related crises and violence in the Central Africa subregion, including through the strengthening of electoral governance and support for the adoption of a regional protocol on democratic elections, and the continuation of one post of Political Affairs Officer (P-4).

## 7. United Nations Support Mission in Libya

(\$87,903,700)

## Foreword

Since the postponement of elections in December 2021, Libya has faced a protracted political stalemate and a fragile security environment. I have consulted a wide range of Libyan stakeholders to gather views on how to solve the political crisis since arriving in Libya in October 2022. On 27 February 2023, I presented to the Security Council a comprehensive approach to enable elections in 2023.

The United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) will continue to support the establishment of unified and elected institutions and national reconciliation. The Mission and the United Nations country team will support progress on peacebuilding and the development of legal and policy frameworks to promote the rule of law in line with international human rights norms and standards. The United Nations in Libya will improve the capacity of rule of law institutions to address human rights abuses and violations, support a transitional justice process and promote the unification and professionalization of security sector institutions, building on efforts to disarm, demobilize and reintegrate armed groups. UNSMIL will also support efforts to reunify economic institutions, with a focus on the transparent, equitable and accountable management of natural resources and revenues across Libya. Through integrated efforts, the United Nations will seek to advance the women and peace and security agenda and improve coordination, outreach and training with youth towards an inclusive political process, the promotion of national reconciliation and the protection of civic space. The United Nations in Libya will also continue to monitor and address the humanitarian situation of migrants, refugees and asylum-seekers and support durable solutions for people who remain internally displaced in Libya.

Our comprehensive approach will maximize the gains of interventions on these priorities to support stabilization efforts in the transitional political context.

(Signed) Abdoulaye **Bathily** Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Libya Head of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya

# A. Proposed programme plan for 2024 and programme performance in 2022

## **Overall orientation**

## Mandates and background

- 183. The United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) is an integrated special political mission established on 16 September 2011 by the Security Council in its resolution 2009 (2011) to support the country's transition and post-conflict efforts, including through an inclusive national dialogue and a constitution-drafting process.
- 184. Following the signing of a nationwide ceasefire agreement on 23 October 2020 that ended the armed conflict, which had begun in April 2019, the Security Council, in its resolution 2570 (2021), mandated UNSMIL to provide support to the 5+5 Joint Military Commission and the Libyan-led and Libyan-owned ceasefire monitoring mechanism, including through the facilitation of confidence-building measures and the scalable and incremental deployment of UNSMIL ceasefire monitors.
- 185. On 28 October 2022, in its resolution 2656 (2022), the Security Council extended the mandate of UNSMIL, as set out in Council resolution 2542 (2020) and paragraph 16 of resolution 2570 (2021), until 31 October 2023.
- 186. In the same resolution, the Security Council reiterated its request for UNSMIL to implement the recommendations of the independent strategic review (see S/2021/716) and its request that UNSMIL explore all avenues to increase efficiency and redeploy existing resources, including through prioritization and the reconfiguration of tasks and resources, as needed and where appropriate.
- 187. On 27 February 2023, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Libya proposed to the Security Council a comprehensive approach for enabling elections in Libya in 2023. The approach includes generating political buy-in from the main Libyan actors for elections, creating a conducive security environment for elections, finalizing the necessary legal framework for holding elections, engaging with a wide spectrum of Libyans to support elections and creating the necessary regional and international buy-in for elections.

## **Programme of work**

## Objective

188. The objective, to which this Mission contributes, is to support an inclusive political process leading to credible, transparent and inclusive elections; to support rights-based national reconciliation, peacebuilding and State-building efforts; to advance gender equality; to advance human rights and transitional justice processes; to support the reform of the security sector; to support the 5+5 Joint Military Commission in continuing to implement the October 2020 ceasefire agreement; and to provide support in other areas as mandated in accordance with Security Council resolutions 2542 (2020), 2570 (2021) and 2656 (2022).

### Strategy and external factors for 2024

- 189. To contribute to the objective, the Mission will:
  - (a) Provide mediation and good offices, as well as technical assistance, engaging Libyan stakeholders at all levels and leaving no one behind, to contribute to the reunification of the Libyan institutions and promote progress in the Libyan-led and Libyan-owned political process to complement the efforts of the working groups of the International Follow-up Committee on Libya;

- (b) Provide technical assistance to the High National Elections Commission and the Central Committee for Local Elections;
- (c) Support Libyan parties and international actors in continuing to engage in an inclusive, victimcentred and rights-based national reconciliation process, on the basis of the principles of transitional justice and the principles of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development of leaving no one behind, with a view to ensuring a Libyan-led and Libyan-owned inclusive political process and contributing to lasting peace;
- (d) Provide support and good offices within the area of rule of law, to support the judiciary and prosecutorial system, including their critical role in ensuring justice for all;
- (e) Promote and protect human rights, ensure monitoring and reporting of abuses and violations of human rights and international human rights and humanitarian law, including sexual violence in conflict and violations against migrants, and advocate on the humanitarian situation and support the delivery of humanitarian assistance in the country;
- (f) Provide good offices and work with national authorities on reforming the country's security sector, reinforcing the role of civil society organizations in civilian oversight, including support for mine action, support for laying the groundwork for a disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process and facilitating operational planning with national stakeholders on issues of process design, institutional set-up and economic aspects of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and support for coordinating the provision of technical expertise, training and equipment, and assist the ongoing efforts on the unification of military and security institutions;
- (g) Support the 5+5 Joint Military Commission in continuing to implement the nationwide ceasefire agreement through the work and deployment of the UNSMIL ceasefire monitoring component in support of the Libyan ceasefire monitoring mechanism, including the provision of technical assistance and working towards the withdrawal of foreign fighters, foreign forces and mercenaries, and support the two Chiefs of Staff in their efforts on trust-building and reunification of the military institutions through the establishment of professional, unified and accountable defence and security forces;
- (h) Support economic policy reform, in close cooperation with Member States and international financial institutions, including reunification and reform of the country's banking system, a decentralization policy and the establishment of a revenue management and oversight mechanism;
- Promote the rights of women and support the institutional capacity of governmental and non-governmental organizations to ensure that women's concerns are addressed and that the women and peace and security agenda is incorporated in national planning and national processes;
- (j) Engage with neighbouring countries, including sub-Saharan countries, to ensure that their views and concerns are taken into consideration.
- 190. The above-mentioned work is expected to result in:
  - (a) Unified and functional government institutions, including economic institutions, contributing to political and economic stability and rights-based reconciliation, a functional legislative body and the development of a constitutional framework in accordance with universally recognized democratic principles and human rights standards;
  - (b) Enhanced accountability of institutions, the promotion of the rule of law throughout the country, and reconciliation and transitional justice processes;
  - (c) Unified security sector institutions operating under civilian oversight, including professional, unified and accountable defence and security forces, as well as a maintained ceasefire

supported through the implementation of the provisions of the ceasefire agreement, including the withdrawal of foreign fighters, foreign forces and mercenaries.

- 191. With regard to cooperation with other entities, the Mission works with relevant local and international partners, regional organizations and civil society groups, including by conducting briefings with the diplomatic community and coordinating with the African Union, the League of Arab States and the European Union (Libya Quartet) to ensure a unified approach towards supporting the country's political and security processes and resolving the Libyan crisis. Furthermore, the work of the United Nations-African Union-European Union tripartite task force will continue, in particular on stranded migrants and refugees in Libya.
- 192. With regard to inter-agency coordination and liaison, the Mission and the United Nations country team have taken steps towards enhancing integration and will continue to operationalize the Secretary-General's focus on the humanitarian-development-peace nexus to facilitate long-term peace, security and sustainable development, in order to enhance the impact of United Nations interventions in support of all people in Libya.
- 193. With regard to the external factors, the overall plan for 2024 is based on the following planning assumptions:
  - (a) The Libyan Political Agreement of December 2015, Security Council resolution 2510 (2020), endorsing the conclusions of the Berlin Conference on Libya, the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum Tunis road map and accompanying outputs and resolutions 2542 (2020), 2570 (2021), 2629 (2022) and 2656 (2022), as well as the comprehensive approach to enabling elections, will remain the guiding framework for United Nations support in Libya;
  - (b) Libyan political actors and institutions are able to reach consensus on a way out of the political stalemate, leading to the holding of an inclusive and transparent electoral process whose results are accepted, thus establishing new executive and legislative authorities;
  - (c) The Libyan ceasefire agreement of October 2020, including the withdrawal of foreign forces, foreign fighters and mercenaries, will be implemented, and consensus will be reached among relevant security and political actors in Libya to reform and unify security institutions, including the establishment of conditions conducive to the launch of a disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process;
  - (d) The human rights situation in Libya is expected to remain of great concern, especially with respect to enhancing the rule of law and protecting and promoting civic space for all people in Libya to exercise their fundamental rights, in particular civil and political rights. Intentional marginalization and poor representation of women in political and reconciliation processes pose a challenge to peacebuilding;
  - (e) Elements of instability, including proponents of the status quo and other spoilers, will continue attempting to disrupt progress in the political, security and economic processes, requiring continued good offices efforts in parallel with sustained support for reconciliation and support for transitional justice mechanisms;
  - (f) The humanitarian situation will continue to improve, proportional to the stabilization of the security situation, with a steady decrease in the number of people in need of humanitarian assistance and the number of internally displaced persons;
  - (g) The economic sector of Libya will continue to suffer from a lack of oversight and transparent management over the use of public funds, while efforts towards the reunification of the Central Bank will continue as part of the implementation of the road map and independent audit recommendations for reunification;
  - (h) Strategic partnerships will continue between the members of the international community, including regional organizations and the United Nations, in support of a Libyan-led and Libyan-owned political process adhering to the United Nations sanctions regime.

194. The Mission integrates a gender perspective in its operational activities, deliverables and results, as appropriate. The Mission continues to promote women's participation in the political and reconciliation processes and representation in government institutions, including to ensure effective gender mainstreaming into the constitution-making and electoral processes. In order to safeguard equal rights and opportunities for women, the Mission and the country team will jointly promote equal rights and opportunities for women's equal enjoyment of their political, civil, economic and social rights. Such efforts would include the provision of technical assistance to national institutions and civil society members; support for government efforts on legislation and policies that protect women from all forms of violence; efforts to address gaps in service provision, in line with national legislation and in line with applicable international law and relevant Security Council resolutions, while taking the national context into consideration; and efforts to address and prevent violence against women and girls, in particular those in vulnerable situations, including displaced, migrant and refugee women and girls, and to identify the impact of extremism conducive to terrorism on women in Libya. The Mission and the country team will continue to improve prevention and protection efforts to support relevant institutions to deliver their mandate in promoting and protecting women and girls.

### **Evaluation activities**

- 195. An independent strategic review was carried out in 2021, which provided an assessment and recommendations for improving the efficiency of the overall structure, the prioritization of tasks and the capacity and effectiveness of staffing of UNSMIL, including as it related to mediation and peace process management. The Security Council endorsed the review's recommendations in its resolution 2629 (2022) and requested the Mission to explore all avenues to increase efficiency and redeploy existing resources, including through the prioritization and reconfiguration of tasks and resources.
- 196. In January 2023, a joint assessment mission was conducted by the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, the Department of Operational Support and the Department of Safety and Security to provide strategic advice and support to the UNSMIL leadership to operationalize the recommendations of the independent strategic review focusing on: (a) the structure of UNSMIL; (b) priorities and capacities of the Mission, including re-evaluating the necessary resources, capacities and support to the Mission's ceasefire monitoring component; and (c) the footprint of the United Nations in Libya. The Mission took the preliminary recommendations into consideration in preparing the proposed programme plan for 2024.
- 197. Further to this, in 2024, the Mission will continue its efforts to enhance programme planning, monitoring and reporting on programme performance, as an element of self-assessment. As part of these efforts, the implementation of the United Nations Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework for the period 2023–2025 includes a monitoring, evaluation and learning plan and the UN-Info tool, which will be used by UNSMIL to monitor progress in the implementation of its peacebuilding objectives.

#### Impact of the pandemic and lessons learned

- 198. Although the continuation of the COVID-19 pandemic into 2022 did not result in the cancellation of Mission activities, it had an impact on the modalities by which UNSMIL delivered its mandate. The Mission was able to continue to deliver by means of face-to-face meetings and virtual means. Face-to-face working sessions were held to continue the delivery of good offices in support of all tracks, such as the plenary of the security working group in Tunis. In-person international visits were key to making progress on the 5+5 Joint Military Commission's action plan for the withdrawal of foreign forces, foreign fighters and mercenaries from Libya.
- 199. The Mission continues to mainstream lessons learned and best practices related to the adjustments to and adaptation of the programme owing to the COVID-19 pandemic, including innovative digital dialogue and the online delivery of technical assistance and advisory services key to supporting an inclusive political process, such as the 2022 digital dialogue on human rights.

### **Programme performance in 2022**

## Effective and inclusive mechanisms established and efforts enhanced for the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of armed groups

- 200. The Security Council, in its resolution 2656 (2022), underlined the need to plan for the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of armed groups and all relevant non-State armed actors as part of an approach to improving security and establishing a security architecture for Libya as a whole, including for arms and ammunition management and mine action.
- 201. In 2022, UNSMIL continued its advocacy for the full implementation of the ceasefire agreement, which included the identification and categorization of armed groups. In 2022, UNSMIL provided technical support to the 5+5 Joint Military Commission for establishing a technical disarmament, demobilization and reintegration committee to undertake a classification of armed groups.
- 202. In 2022, the Mission's ceasefire monitoring component continued to support efforts to maintain the ceasefire agreement through meetings with the Libyan monitors and the 5+5 Joint Military Commission focal points, advice and technical assistance on the planned withdrawal of mercenaries, foreign fighters and foreign forces, and capacity-building for Libyan and international monitors. Throughout 2022, the component also carried out efforts to build trust between the Libyan monitors and 5+5 Joint Military Commission focal points and monitored triggers for potential violations of the ceasefire agreement.
- 203. Progress towards the objective is presented in the performance measure below (see table 33).

#### Table 33 **Performance measure**

2020 (actual)	2021 (actual)	2022 (actual)
Ceasefire arrangements agreed and road map adopted for the transitional period until elections are held	An inclusive disarmament, demobilization and reintegration committee was activated with UNSMIL support	Endorsement of the terms of reference for the establishment of a disarmament, demobilization and reintegration committee by the 5+5 Joint Military Commission to categorize armed groups

#### Planned results for 2024

#### Result 1: fostering reconciliation and an inclusive democratic process

#### Programme performance in 2022 and target for 2024

204. In 2022, the Mission contributed to the resumption of the talks between the House of Representatives and the High State Council to reach consensus on a constitutional framework for national elections. The Mission facilitated four rounds of constitutional talks between the two chambers, including a meeting between the heads of the two chambers in June. Through UNSMIL mediation, the two chambers made significant progress, but failed to agree on one contentious issue regarding the eligibility criteria for presidential candidates. These efforts are being carried forward through the good offices of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in 2023. The Mission, in cooperation with UNDP, continued to provide technical assistance to the High National Elections Commission to prepare for the implementation of the electoral process once the legal framework is finalized. Meanwhile, the two branches of the Central Bank of Libya began to implement the recommendations of the United Nations-sponsored financial audit review aimed at integrating the divided financial sector. The economic working group, co-chaired by UNSMIL, convened five times to discuss the establishment of a Libyan-owned revenue management and oversight mechanism.

- 205. In 2024, UNSMIL will continue to provide support to national efforts for a peaceful political transition, national reconciliation and, after the holding of elections, the consolidation of democratically elected institutions. Specifically, UNSMIL will support efforts led by the Presidential Council, with support from the African Union, to consolidate and implement a national reconciliation strategy, as well as the adoption and operationalization of a comprehensive law on transitional justice. Capacity-building of the electoral management bodies will continue in 2024 to prepare for future electoral cycles and referendums. The Mission will continue to implement its communication strategy to support the political process and to build capability around preventing hate speech, incitement and disinformation.
- 206. Progress towards the objective and the target for 2024 are presented in the performance measure below (see table 34).

## Table 34Performance measure

2020 (actual)	2021 (actual)	2022 (actual)	2023 (planned)	2024 (planned)
Intra-Libyan economic-financial, military-security and political dialogue tracks launched and supported by respective working groups under the framework of the International Follow- up Committee on the Libya Berlin process Ceasefire agreement signed in October 2020 and political road map adopted in November for the transitional period through national elections Board of directors of the Central Bank of Libya reactivated, enabling harmonization of monetary policies Contract with auditing company concluded and parallel audits of both Central Bank of Libya branches launched Establishment of the Libyan Expert	A new temporary executive authority selected by the UNSMIL-facilitated Libyan Political Dialogue Forum and endorsed by the House of Representatives to govern Libya for the period leading up to national elections, and no longer than a total of 18 months Agreement on a constitutional basis for the elections was not reached Central Bank of Libya board of directors unified exchange rates, thereby strengthening real currency value and expunging market distortions Audit report on the Central Bank of Libya published on the basis of the audit initiated to restore national accountability process and move	A multifaceted national approach to reconciliation continued with the launch of the Presidential Council's project on a strategic vision for national reconciliation in June 2022 Continuation of dialogue process to adopt a constitution that is in line with minimum internationally recognized standards Support continued for unification of the Central Bank of Libya, management of national deficits and access to foreign exchange in a manner that maintains currency value and steadies the price of vital commodities	Unified elected parliament and functional Government and its institutions contribute to political stability and reconciliation Constitutional framework is agreed and developed in line with international norms and standards Equitable access to political and democratic processes, including access by women and young people, guaranteed and protected under the Constitution Economic and financial institutions have increased capacity to provide macroeconomic stability and enact economic reforms, towards a more productive, efficient and	Functional parliament, Government and its institutions are in place and contribute to political stability and reconciliation Upon agreement on a national constitutional framework in line with international norms and standards, and following elections in 2023, a national constitutional referendum to take place in 2024 Equitable access to political and democratic processes, including access by women and young people, guaranteed and protected under the Constitution Economic and financial institutions have increased capacity to provide macroeconomic stability and enact economic reforms,

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2020 (actual)	2021 (actual)	2022 (actual)	2023 (planned)	2024 (planned)
Economic Commission formalized as an interim consultative body to harmonize economic policy and create the conditions for institutional unification	towards unification of the two branches Economic experts supported the transition process to a new unified national Government by taking continuous steps towards supporting the unification of the national budget and other economic processes	Economic reform efforts in order to make the Libyan economy more productive, efficient and transparent continued	transparent Libyan economy	towards a more productive, efficient and transparent Libyan economy

## Result 2: strengthened rule of law institutions and transitional justice process protecting the rights of all people in Libya

#### Programme performance in 2022 and target for 2024

- 207. In 2022, UNSMIL, in cooperation with other stakeholders, facilitated the development by Libyan experts of a draft law on combating violence against women. UNSMIL continued to advocate against arbitrary detention and supported a high-level committee representing the public prosecution, the military prosecution, the police, and intelligence and judicial institutions. In 2022, the working group on arbitrary detention was re-established following a hunger strike in Mitiga prison. UNSMIL organized a digital dialogue on human rights reaching 330 people across Libya who expressed their concerns on human rights, which fed into a discussion with over 500 people across Libya, and collected perspectives to inform the good offices of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the political process. UNSMIL further increased the capacity of prosecutors and lawyers on international standards on human rights and criminal justice and on migrants' rights through training.
- 208. In 2024, UNSMIL, together with the country team, will support government institutions in respect of their obligations to protect and promote human rights, transitional justice and the rule of law, with an emphasis on opening civic space, eliminating arbitrary detention, enforced disappearances and torture, addressing the situation of migrants, advancing transitional justice and national reconciliation, guaranteeing women's rights and eliminating sexual- and gender-based violence. The Mission will support African Union efforts aimed at supporting Libyan institutions in implementing an inclusive reconciliation process, based on transitional justice principles and with the rights of victims at the centre of the process. UNSMIL will continue strengthening civil society networks and human rights mechanisms and protecting human rights defenders. The Mission will further deepen its engagement with State entities and armed groups involved in the detention of civilians to address human rights violations and abuses. UNSMIL will further increase its efforts to advocate for the rights and protection of migrants and asylum-seekers and their access to justice, accountability and redress mechanisms, regardless of status. The Mission will use its good offices to advance the recognition and enjoyment of women's rights and the institutionalization of policies and procedures related to the empowerment of women, and protection of women's and children's rights and victims of violence.
- 209. Progress towards the objective and the target for 2024 are presented in the performance measure below (see table 35).

## Table 35**Performance measure**

2020 (actual)	2021 (actual)	2022 (actual)	2023 (planned)	2024 (planned)
Enhanced capacities of Libyan women municipal councillors on the inclusion of Libyan women in the peace and electoral process, on international human rights, national legislation and recommendations on eliminating violence against women	Strengthened judicial leadership, including of the Supreme Judicial Council, on respect, protection and promotion of human rights, with an emphasis on fact- finding and enhancing the judiciary and prosecutorial systems	UNSMIL and partners supported a group of national experts to draft and submit a draft law on combating violence against women to the legislative bodies Establishment of a joint consultation forum, strengthening civil society monitoring, analysis and reporting of human rights abuses and violations Continuation of a high-level committee on arbitrary detention, representing the Attorney General, the military prosecution, the police, and intelligence and judicial institutions	Legal and policy frameworks enacted and implemented by legitimate authorities to promote the rule of law, including the endorsement of a law on violence against women, the amendment of Transitional Justice Law 29 of 2013 and the drafting of a new national reconciliation law Rule of law institutions strengthened to investigate, prosecute, adjudicate and prevent abuses and violations of human rights, while monitoring and reporting capacities of civil society organizations are enhanced	Authorities implement legal and policy frameworks to promote the rule of law, including the law on violence against women and the amendment of Transitional Justice Law 29 of 2013, and finalize the drafting of a new national reconciliation law Rule of law institutions strengthened to investigate, prosecute, adjudicate and prevent abuses against and violations of human rights of Libyans, migrants and asylum-seekers Civil society networks are facilitated, strengthened and developed, while monitoring and reporting capacities of civil society organizations are enhanced and protection mechanisms for victims of sexual and gender-based violence are established

# Result 3: unified security institutions promoting progress on security sector reform and the implementation of the ceasefire agreement, including an effective Libyan ceasefire monitoring mechanism

#### Programme performance in 2022 and target for 2024

210. In 2022, the Mission facilitated the negotiations with Libyan and regional partners to support the 5+5 Joint Military Commission action plan for the withdrawal of foreign fighters, foreign forces and mercenaries from Libya. This resulted in the activation of liaison and communication committees between Libya, Chad, the Niger and the Sudan in Cairo in November 2022. UNSMIL efforts also contributed to further work towards the unification of security institutions and reform of the security sector, including by supporting negotiations between the two Chiefs of Staff from the east and the west. In 2022, UNSMIL efforts focused on supporting the 5+5 Joint Military Commission to reach an agreement and endorse the terms of reference of the joint military force, as stipulated in the 2020 ceasefire agreement.

#### Lessons learned and planned change

- 211. The lesson learned was that despite the protracted political stalemate and lack of trust among Libyan actors, the 5+5 Joint Military Commission can continue to make progress on the security track. In applying the lesson, the Mission will identify areas of agreement and determine activities to be undertaken to lay the foundation for effective security sector reform and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, including the unification of the security institutions. It will continue to strengthen its support to the Libyan ceasefire monitoring mechanism, build mutual trust between all stakeholders and provide capacity-building on operational planning, monitoring, validation and reporting on ceasefire provisions. To control and/or minimize ceasefire violations, the Mission will continue to monitor the situation, reporting on potential threats, hate speech, major military movement or exercises, and other triggers that could lead to a violation of the ceasefire.
- 212. Progress towards the objective and the target for 2024 are presented in the performance measure below (see table 36).

2020 (actual)	2021 (actual)	2022 (actual)	2023 (planned)	2024 (planned)
Ceasefire agreement signed in October 2020 Libyan Political Dialogue Forum political road map adopted in November 2020 for the transitional period until national elections are held Libyan-owned ceasefire monitoring mechanism signed on 3 November 2020 by the 5+5 Joint Military Commission and UNSMIL	Trust built between the parties to the ceasefire agreement led to the signing by the 5+5 Joint Military Commission on 8 October of an action plan for the withdrawal of mercenaries, foreign fighters and foreign forces from Libya 5+5 Joint Military Commission signed action plan for the implementation of	Maintenance of the ceasefire agreement Consensus built among stakeholders for the implementation of the action plan for the withdrawal of foreign forces, foreign fighters and mercenaries, including the establishment of a joint operations room and capacity- building programme for the local monitors	Unified security sector institutions, under civilian oversight including functional, professional and accountable military and police forces Libyan ceasefire monitoring mechanism fully operational and monitors and reports on breaches in the implementation of the ceasefire agreement	Unified security sector institutions, under civilian oversight including functional, professional and accountable military and police forces Continued implementation of the capacity-building programme for the Libyan monitors Comprehensive security sector reform initiatives, including disarmament, demobilization and

### Table 36 **Performance measure**

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2020 (actual)	2021 (actual)	2022 (actual)	2023 (planned)	2024 (planned)
	the ceasefire agreement	<ul> <li>Endorsement of the terms of reference for the establishment of a disarmament, demobilization and reintegration committee by the 5+5 Joint Military Commission to categorize armed groups</li> <li>Activation of a liaison and communication committee endorsed in meetings held in Cairo in November 2022 with neighbouring countries for the withdrawal of foreign fighters and mercenaries</li> <li>The 5+5 Joint Military Commission agreed on the terms of reference of the joint military force</li> </ul>	Comprehensive security sector reform initiatives, including disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of non-State armed groups through effective and inclusive mechanisms established by a national disarmament, demobilization and reintegration committee	reintegration of non-State armed groups through effective and inclusive mechanism established by a national disarmament, demobilization and reintegration committee

## Deliverables

213. Table 37 lists all deliverables of the Mission.

## Table 37

## Deliverables for the period 2022–2024, by category and subcategory

Category and subcategory	2022 planned	2022 actual	2023 planned	2024 planned
A. Facilitation of the intergovernmental process and expert bodies				
Parliamentary documentation (number of documents)	3	3	3	3
1. Report to the Security Council	3	3	3	3
Substantive services for meetings (number of three-hour meetings)	6	6	6	6
2. Meeting of the Security Council	6	6	6	6
B. Generation and transfer of knowledge				
Field and technical cooperation projects (number of projects)	16	12	16	17
3. Projects on policing and security joint programme	15	10	15	15

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egor	y and subcategory	2022 planned	2022 actual	2023 planned	2024 planned
4.	Projects related to arms, ammunition management, counter-proliferation and humanitarian mine action	1	2	1	2
Sei	minars, workshops and training events (number of days)	138	130	138	13(
5.	Seminars and workshops on the political process, confidence-building, constitution- making, legislative and economic reform, electoral management and campaigning, mediation and conflict resolution, prevention of and response to incitement to violence and hatred, media, young female social media activists, digital Libyan dialogue, unification of the army, and demobilization of armed groups; technical advice, coordination support and advocacy on unexploded ordnance and ammunition management; 4 mine action-related workshops/training events to build national capacities on weapons and ammunition management and explosive ordnance response management	138	130	138	13
Fa	ct-finding, monitoring and investigation missions (number of missions)	35	35	35	4
6.	Monitoring missions of the UNSMIL ceasefire monitoring component in support of the efforts of the Libyan ceasefire monitoring mechanism, to record and report on any alleged violation of the ceasefire, as well as analysis and reporting on the most recent developments in Libya, including periodic threat assessments of the overall situation that could risk and have an impact on the ceasefire monitoring capacity-building programme established for the international monitors, Libyan monitors and the 5+5 Joint Military Commission (3 workshops); missions to support mine action efforts with regard to ammunition management; monitoring missions on the human rights situation, with visits to 6 prisons and detention centres, subject to access guarantees by official counterparts, including makeshift and secret detentions and other types of places where there are deprivations of liberty, such as women's shelters and reformatories; monitoring of and reporting on some 60 cases of abuse and violations of human rights and violations of international humanitarian law, including sexual violence in conflict, and monitoring protection issues, with a focus on women and children; and monitoring of protection issues with a victim-centred approach and focus on women, children and migrants, reaching up to 30 beneficiaries who are referred to embassies concerned and/or legal and psychological aid for smooth integration into society	35	35	35	4
Ele	ectoral missions (number of missions)	224	224	224	22
7.	Electoral assistance missions to the High National Elections Commission headquarters in Tripoli or its field offices, providing technical advice and capacity-building to the electoral management body and to electoral counterparts	224	224	224	22

#### C. Substantive deliverables

Good offices: provision of good offices to further an inclusive political, security and economic dialogue through engagement with Libyan institutions and political parties and activities with civil society, women and youth. To ensure a wide participation and buy-in of Libyans, the Mission will simultaneously organize a series of meetings with community leaders, women, youth, security actors and political activists; 1 political, 1 economic and 1 human rights working group meeting per month; good offices on the implementation of the ceasefire agreement, including 1 meeting of the 5+5 Joint Military Commission per month (reaching 12 to 15 key Libyan actors); 1 Co-Chair security working group meeting (reaching 10 to 15 key ambassadorial-level actors) and 1 plenary security working group meeting (reaching 20 to 25 ambassadorial-level actors); 1 security sector working group meeting (reaching 20 beneficiaries, including key defence attachés and police advisers) per month, as well as various subcommittees and liaison committees both inside and outside Libya at least once per month (reaching, on average, 12 beneficiaries), including meetings of the various subcommittees aimed at the unification of the military to address, among other things, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and strategic security policy and frameworks (reaching some 20 beneficiaries); meetings between the UNSMIL ceasefire monitoring component, Libyan monitors and 5+5 Joint Military Commission focal points (once per month) and implementation of the capacity-building programme for international monitors, Libyan monitors and the 5+5 Joint Military Commission (3 workshops in 2023); monthly coordination meeting co-chaired with the Libyan Mine Action Centre and mine action stakeholders (reaching some 20 people); 1 conference to mark the International Day for Mine Awareness and Assistance in Mine Action organized in collaboration with the Libyan Mine Action Centre (reaching 50 people, including mine action partners, the diplomatic community and Libyan authorities); provision of good offices to support accountability and transitional justice and strengthen national capacities through the provision of direct technical advice and capacity-building programmes to 15 lawyers and 15 prosecutors/judges, and provision of good offices to support the judiciary and prosecutorial system on sustainable rule of law and access to justice and fair trials; provision of good offices to support the judiciary and prosecutorial system; and provision of good offices to advance the recognition and enjoyment of women's rights, in line with the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, and advocacy on the institutionalization of systems, policies, procedures and mechanisms related to the protection and empowerment of women victims of violence, as well as women's access to equitable justice and the prioritization of the

	2022	2022	2023	2024
Category and subcategory	planned	actual	planned	planned

protection of women's and children's rights, including through meetings with women empowerment units at the police force, the High National Elections Commission and the women's unit at the Presidential Council.

**Consultation**, advice and advocacy: support for subsequent phases of the Libyan political process, electoral assistance, information-sharing and coordination meetings with international electoral assistance partners and embassies, reaching 100 beneficiaries, as well as advice to advance the constitution-making process and referendum; provision of daily advice to the High National Elections Commission and the Central Committee for Municipal Council Elections on electoral matters; assistance in strengthening the electoral management bodies' technical capacities; coordination of international electoral assistance; support for electoral security planning and for the Central Committee for Municipal Council Elections in municipal elections through work with local electoral stakeholders; support to rebuild Libya's national polity by addressing roots of grievances through an inclusive, victim-centred and rights-based national reconciliation process and transitional justice mechanisms, with workshops and seminars reaching 50 beneficiaries; planning and implementation of ceasefire monitoring activities; provision of advice to the 5+5 Joint Military Commission and the Libyan-led and Libyan-owned ceasefire monitoring mechanism, including legal advice, where required, to establish an effective monitoring mechanism that coordinates and assesses progress on the withdrawal of foreign forces and mercenaries; provision of advice on security policy and frame works, including a capacity-building programme for the international and Libyan monitors and the 5+5 Joint Military Commission implemented by the ceasefire monitoring mechanism; provision of advice and consultations with the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum and House of Representatives women's caucus and civil society and women's groups, reaching approximately 500 women; setting up of advocacy plan for the law on violence against women; support for security sector governance, reform and development, including reintegration of non-State armed groups and supporting the increased presence of women in the police force; provision of advice to the 5+5 Joint Military Commission, the Libyan-led and Libyan-owned ceasefire monitoring mechanism, the Libyan Mine Action Centre, and national and international mine action organizations, entities and stakeholders on the control of heavy weapons, arms and ammunition management, including advice on the survey and clearance of explosive remnants of war, booby traps, improvised explosive devices and mines; conduct of advocacy and provision of advice on international arms control and disarmament instruments; support for mine action coordination and facilitation of capacity building within available resources; confidence-building sessions with 50 participants from national and local authorities, and civil society organizations in support of reconciliation dialogue initiatives; advocacy on and implementation of the human rights due diligence policy framework, including the monitoring, reporting and communication strategy; advocacy on respect for civic space/freedom of assembly and freedom of expression, involving 30 participants and 4 local institutions, including the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Interior, the prosecutor's office and the High Judicial Council, for the release of individuals detained without a legal basis; advocacy on women's rights by facilitating discussions among institutions and actors working on women's rights and advising on laws and policies that promote gender equality; advice on violence against women and gender-based violence linked to the electoral process; and advice and support to reinforce the capacity of 30 human rights defenders and women human rights defenders on the Monitoring, Analysis and Reporting Arrangements Technical Working Group; advocacy for the rights and protection of migrants and asylum-seekers and their access to justice, accountability and redress mechanisms, regardless of status.

#### **D.** Communication deliverables

**Outreach programmes, special events and information materials**: media and communications campaigns and messaging through traditional and social media outlets promoting the peace process, as well as developing content promoting reconciliation, social cohesion and the respect for humanitarian and human rights law, to a range of Libyan audiences (including young people, women, cultural components, social media influencers and the general public) and 20 official media entities and counterparts, including civil society organizations and non-governmental organizations; targeted meetings, events and leadership field visits in the east, south and west, engaging with young people and women activists from all parts of Libya to promote their key role in peacebuilding and the peace process in Libya; development and delivery of the Rayidat training programme for 30 young women from across Libya to increase advocacy and communication skills; development of misinformation and disinformation awareness training programme with Libyan universities; promotion of the Mission's outreach activities and engagement with local communities, building trust and support for UNSMIL leadership and high-level officials in their international tours and meetings with Member States and diplomatic corps.

**External and media relations**: development and delivery of the UNSMIL strategic communication strategy, and advice on and pitching of strategic media interviews, statements and interactions with top-tier international and regional media outlets in Arabic, English and French, as well as select national media; frequent engagement with local media from all parts of Libya, promoting conflict-sensitive reporting; troubleshooting and crisis management pertaining to polarized media campaigns aimed at undermining the implementation of the Mission's mandate; establishment of partnerships with social media platforms to strengthen efforts in countering hate speech, fake news and misinformation; production of daily traditional monitoring reports and quarterly social media monitoring; fostering of professional ties with local, regional and international media outlets; reporting on the human rights situation and acting as a public resource; production of press releases and statements relating to progress in the good offices process; in-house production of multimedia products; holding of a large-scale public perception survey across Libya.

	2022	2022	2023	2024
Category and subcategory	planned	actual	planned	planned

**Digital platforms and multimedia content**: update of the Mission's website and feed on the Mission's official social media platforms in Arabic and English, highlighting activities, meetings, events, public messaging and the implementation of projects and programmes of UNSMIL and the United Nations country team; development, with the help of the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs Innovation Cell, of a digital public perception survey and holding of digital dialogues, engaging hundreds of Libyans in thematic dialogues, including social groups (youth and women), to seek their views and their recommendations and involve them in the political dialogue.

## B. Proposed post and non-post resource requirements for 2024

#### **Resource requirements (regular budget)**

Table 38

Financial resources

(Thousands of United States dollars)

	2022		2023	2024	Variance
_	Appropriation	Expenditure	Appropriation	Requirements	2024 vs. 2023 Increase/(decrease)
Category of expenditure	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)=(4)-(3)
Military and police personnel costs	6 676.5	5 884.9	6 761.1	6 673.2	(87.9)
Civilian personnel costs	33 256.5	39 460.1	41 363.6	42 725.8	1 362.2
Operational costs	29 329.0	36 995.9	39 921.8	38 504.7	(1 417.1)
Total (net of staff assessment)	69 262.0	82 340.9	88 046.5	87 903.7	(142.8)

#### Table 39 Human resources

		International staff									National staff United Nations Volunteers							
	USG	ASG	D-2	D-1	P-5	P-4	P-3	P-2	FS	GS S	Subtotal	NPO	LL	Subtotal	International	National S	Subtotal	Total
Approved 2023	1	2 <sup><i>a</i></sup>	_	7	$18^b$	43	46	2	154	$1^c$	274	17	118	135	6	_	6	415
Proposed 2024	1	2 <i><sup>a</sup></i>	_	7	$19^b$	42	46	2	154	$1^c$	274	17	120	137	6	_	6	417
Change	_	_	_	_	1	(1)	_	_	_	_	_	_	2	2	-	_	_	2

<sup>a</sup> One position is funded at 50 per cent and cost-shared with the Development Coordination Office.

<sup>b</sup> Includes one general temporary assistance position.

<sup>c</sup> Other level, unless otherwise stated.

214. The proposed resource requirements for 2024 for UNSMIL amount to \$87,903,700 (net of staff assessment) and would provide for the deployment of 234 United Nations Guard Unit personnel (\$6,673,200), salaries and related costs (\$42,725,800) for the deployment of 274 international positions (1 Under-Secretary-General, 2 Assistant Secretary-General, 7 D-1, 19 P-5, 42 P-4, 46 P-3, 2 P-2, 154 Field Service and 1 General Service) and 137 national positions (17 National Professional Officer and 120 Local level), 6 international United Nations Volunteers and 7 government-provided personnel, and operational costs (\$38,504,700) comprising the costs for consultants and consulting services (\$175,100), official travel (\$1,029,600), facilities and infrastructure (\$22,953,700), ground transportation (\$379,900), air operations (\$6,804,900), communications and information technology (\$3,092,500), medical (\$746,100) and other supplies, services and equipment (\$3,322,900).

- 215. A vacancy rate of 29.6 per cent has been applied to the estimates for international staff based on the actual vacancy rate in March 2023. The vacancy rates of 52.9 per cent and 35.6 per cent have been applied for National Professional Officers and Local level staff positions, respectively, based on the actual vacancy rates in March 2023. A vacancy rate of 50.0 per cent has been applied for the two positions proposed for establishment. A vacancy rate of 50.0 per cent has been applied to the estimates for United Nations Volunteers and a vacancy rate of 57.1 per cent has been applied to the estimates for government-provided personnel based on the actual vacancy rate as at 31 March 2023. The estimates for United Nations Guard Unit personnel are based on the assumption of full deployment, based on the actual incumbency in March 2023.
- 216. In 2024, the following changes to the number and levels of positions for a net increase of two positions are proposed, reflecting the establishment of two positions, the reclassification of one position and the redeployment of one position, as detailed below:

#### Office of the Chief of Staff

(a) Reclassification of one position of Coordination Officer, Political Affairs (P-4) in Tripoli to Senior Coordination Officer, Political Affairs (P-5) in Tripoli in the Office of the Chief of Staff, to strengthen strategic planning and operational coordination for the expansion of the Mission's footprint in Libya, including closer coordination with field offices;

#### Mission Support Service

- (b) Establishment of one position of Finance and Budget Assistant (Local level) in the Budget Unit to assist in the review, analysis and preparation of cost estimates and budget proposals;
- (c) Establishment of one position of Human Resources Assistant (Local level) in the Human Resources Unit to support and assist hiring managers in expediting the recruitment of staff;
- (d) Redeployment one position of Contracts Management Assistant (Local level) from the Procurement Unit to the Centralized Warehouse and Acquisition Requisition Unit to support the requisitioning processes for the acquisition of various projects related to the procurement of diverse services and commodities to support the implementation of the Mission's acquisition plan.
- 217. The Mission's approved 2023 staffing table includes one general temporary assistance position. It is proposed that this position, Chief of Mine Action Section (P-5), be continued in 2024 to lead the UNSMIL mine action component, advise the UNSMIL leadership on mine action issues, supervise the implementation of the workplan and lead engagement with the national authorities, the United Nations country team and other stakeholders involved in mine action activities.
- 218. The net decrease in requirements for 2024 compared with the approved resources for 2023 is attributable mainly to decreased requirements under operational costs, comprising: (a) decreased requirements under facilities and infrastructure owing to a reduction in the provision for major construction projects, which are expected to be completed in 2023; (b) decreased requirements under air operations owing to lower fleet costs for the fixed-wing aircraft, based on the actual contractual agreement; and (c) reduced requirements for communications and information technology equipment following the acquisitions in previous periods. The decrease is partially offset by increased requirements for civilian staff costs owing to the updated salary scales and the application of a lower budgeted vacancy rate of 29.6 per cent for international staff compared to 32.9 per cent applied in the 2023 budget.

## 8. United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia

(\$66,971,700)

## Foreword

The Final Agreement for Ending the Conflict and Building a Stable and Lasting Peace, adopted in 2016, remains the essential road map for Colombia to uphold victims' rights, bring about development opportunities and address the root causes of the armed conflict. It is heartening that its signatories – the Government of Colombia and the former Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia – People's Army (FARC-EP) – are fully committed to its implementation.

The Government has pledged to implement the Final Agreement in a comprehensive manner, making it the cornerstone of its peace-related efforts and placing a particular focus on those areas where implementation is lagging. This commitment represents a renewed opportunity to consolidate peace in Colombia.

The United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia is resolved to continue to work alongside Colombians to strengthen peace dividends. Its verification helps support the reintegration of thousands of former combatants and the implementation of much-needed security guarantees across conflict-affected regions. Similarly, as the country's Special Jurisdiction for Peace is making progress to deliver restorative sentences for crimes committed during the conflict and relevant State entities prepare to support their implementation, the Mission stands prepared to verify this crucial stage. In addition, the Security Council, in its resolution 2673 (2023), tasked the Mission to monitor the implementation of the comprehensive rural reform and ethnic chapters of the Final Agreement. Those provisions are critical to address deep-rooted patterns of inequality and exclusion of rural regions and ethnic peoples that have perpetuated, and have been exacerbated by, the armed conflict. Across all those mandated tasks, the Mission's verification role remains vital.

(Signed) Carlos **Ruiz Massieu** Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Colombia Head of the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia

# A. Proposed programme plan for 2024 and programme performance in 2022

## **Overall orientation**

## Mandates and background

- 219. The United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia is mandated by the Security Council, at the request of the Colombian Government and the former Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia People's Army (FARC-EP), to verify three key aspects of the Final Agreement for Ending the Conflict and Building a Stable and Lasting Peace, adopted in 2016 by the two parties: (a) the reintegration of FARC-EP members into political, economic and social life (section 3.2 of the Agreement); (b) the implementation of personal and collective security and protection measures for ex-combatants, and comprehensive security and protection programmes for the communities and organizations in the territories (section 3.4 of the Agreement); and (c) compliance and implementation of the sentences issued by the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (section 5.1.2 of the Agreement). The mandate is defined in Security Council resolution 2366 (2017), was subsequently renewed by the Council in its resolutions 2435 (2018), 2487 (2019), 2545 (2020), 2574 (2021), 2603 (2021) and 2655 (2022) and was expanded by the Council in its resolution 2673 (2023) to verify the implementation of section 1 and section 6.2 of the Final Agreement with respect to the implementation of rural reform and the ethnic chapter.
- 220. The Verification Mission works closely with the two parties, including in the framework of the relevant verification bodies established by the Final Agreement, in particular the Commission for the Follow-up, Promotion and Verification of the Implementation of the Final Agreement, the National Reintegration Council and the National Commission on Security Guarantees, as well as with members of the United Nations country team, local and departmental authorities and civil society. The work of the Verification Mission will remain of vital significance in 2024 with regard to supporting the parties in the implementation of the reintegration process and the extension of security and protection to vulnerable communities, social leaders, human rights defenders and former combatants, and providing support to the transitional justice process through the Mission's verification of restorative sentences issued by the Special Jurisdiction for Peace. In addition, the Mission will play a significant role through its verification of the comprehensive rural reform and ethnic chapters of the Final Agreement, two components of particular importance to address structural causes of the conflict, integrate rural areas into national development dynamics and tackle poverty and inequality, and whose implementation is lagging. These additional tasks were mandated by the Security Council in its resolution 2673 (2023), in response to a request from the parties.

## **Programme of work**

## Objective

221. The objective, to which the Mission contributes, is to advance the effective implementation of the provisions of the Final Agreement for Ending the Conflict and Building a Stable and Lasting Peace concerning reintegration, security guarantees, restorative sentences, comprehensive rural reform and the ethnic chapter.

### Strategy and external factors for 2024

- 222. To contribute to the objective, the Mission will:
  - (a) Apply a proactive and inclusive approach to verification, which includes advocacy, good offices and close engagement with the parties to the Final Agreement, relevant institutions and authorities at the national, regional and local levels;
  - (b) Conduct independent verification and participate, jointly with the parties, in key forums and institutions created for the implementation of the Final Agreement;
  - (c) Promote constructive dialogue and trust-building between the Government and the Comunes party to address pending issues related to peace implementation, and maintain constant coordination and dialogue with key interlocutors, including actors across the political spectrum, civil society, the private sector and the international community, to foster support for the implementation of the Final Agreement.
- 223. The above-mentioned work is expected to result in:
  - (a) Increased trust between the parties to the Final Agreement; intensified efforts to ensure the sustainability of the reintegration process; sustained progress on tangible issues that impede successful reintegration, including access to land for the consolidation of former territorial areas for training and reintegration for former combatants' productive projects and housing solutions; the promotion of gender-sensitive reintegration and the active participation of women former combatants; the provision by the Government of more sustainable solutions for former combatants residing inside and outside of former territorial areas for training and reintegration; progress in the implementation of key components of the comprehensive rural reform in prioritized areas; increased capacity to prevent and address land-related conflict; progress in the reduction of inequalities in access to land; and progress in the implementation of development plans with a territorial focus in prioritized areas, with the active participation of local communities;
  - (b) Enhanced State capacity and responsiveness to better prevent and investigate attacks against former combatants, social leaders and human rights defenders, as well as increased trust and understanding between the parties regarding security and protection mechanisms, taking into consideration the particular needs of women, children and former combatants of ethnic origin, as well as those of Indigenous Peoples and other communities at risk;
  - (c) Enhanced trust in the transitional justice system; the reinforced ability of the Special Jurisdiction for Peace to ensure compliance with and implementation of its restorative sentences; and contributions to the realization of victims' rights to truth, justice, reparation and non-repetition, and their full inclusion in the reparative system;
  - (d) Strengthened implementation of the ethnic provisions of the Final Agreement; enhanced capacity of the High-level Forum of Ethnic Peoples as a consultative body on ethnic matters to the Commission for the Follow-up, Promotion and Verification of the Implementation of the Final Agreement; and improved functioning of dialogue mechanisms pertaining to ethnic matters.
- 224. With regard to cooperation with other entities, the Mission will continue to engage extensively with international, national and local actors supporting the implementation of the Final Agreement. At the international level, the Mission's close engagement with the diplomatic community and regional organizations will help identify synergies and areas of mutual interest and support for peace implementation. At the national and local levels, the Mission will continue to strengthen ties with a broad range of political, civil society and private sector actors, including community; religious; youth; women; ethnic; and lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex organizations; and the transitional justice institutions. In Colombia, where civil society is vibrant and highly engaged in the peace process, such cooperation remains an essential aspect of the Mission's work. The Mission will also continue to bolster its relationships with departmental and local authorities, particularly as they gain more responsibilities with regard to the reintegration process and ensuring security guarantees for communities.

- 225. With regard to inter-agency coordination and liaison, the Mission will continue to work closely with the United Nations country team and the Resident Coordinator Office. The work of the country team is guided by the United Nations Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework, which is scheduled to be reviewed in 2023. Through coordination in joint mechanisms at different levels, the Mission is able to share conflict analyses and encourage coherent action and engagement across the peace and security and the development pillars. This close working relationship is not only undertaken at the national level, where the Mission participates in the regular meetings of the United Nations country team, but also at the local level, where Mission staff work closely with the teams deployed by different agencies, funds and programmes. Moreover, in the spirit of sustaining peace and contributing to long-term stability, the Mission and the country team have enhanced synergies in the implementation of productive projects for former FARC-EP members and have worked together on efforts related to security guarantees, as well as on the implementation of projects supported by the Peacebuilding Fund.
- 226. With regard to the external factors, the overall plan for 2024 is based on the following planning assumptions:
  - (a) Continued international support for the close engagement of the United Nations and the Mission in the peace process;
  - (b) The national Government and legislature will remain focused on the implementation of the Final Agreement;
  - (c) National and local authorities, State entities and mechanisms tasked with preventing, addressing and investigating security incidents in conflict-affected areas, including the Office of the Attorney General, will remain committed to strengthened collaboration with the Verification Mission;
  - (d) Continued progress in the transitional justice system resulting in the issuance of restorative sentences.
- 227. The Mission integrates a gender perspective in its operational activities, deliverables and results, as appropriate. The Mission will work to ensure the adequate implementation of its gender directive and gender parity strategy and that the specific needs of female former FARC-EP members are fully incorporated into programme design, implementation and monitoring, and give priority to the security guarantees of female leaders, human rights defenders and former combatants. The Mission will also ensure the adequate inclusion of a gender perspective in the verification of restorative sentences, rural reform and ethnic aspects.
- 228. In line with the United Nations Disability Inclusion Strategy, the Mission will continue to promote inclusion internally by opening employment opportunities for qualified candidates. At the political level, the Mission will continue to advocate for inclusion of the views of people with disabilities in all decision-making platforms, including the National Reintegration Council, so as to ensure that the issue is included as a cross-cutting approach to all reintegration aspects.

### Impact of the pandemic and lessons learned

- 229. The continuation of the COVID-19 pandemic into 2022 had some impact, but despite the challenges, the Mission resumed all activities in 2022 and was able to carry out its verification activities throughout the country.
- 230. The Mission continues to mainstream lessons learned and best practices related to the adjustments to and adaptation of the programme owing to the COVID-19 pandemic. Teams deployed in the field resumed in-person activities as communities do not always have access to remote modalities. The Mission has supported flexible working arrangements for staff dealing with family challenges, but such arrangements have not affected the footprint of the Mission.

## Programme performance in 2022

## Strengthening security guarantee efforts for former FARC-EP combatants and civil society organizations

- 231. The Mission's work on security guarantees includes providing advisory recommendations to the Government on the way forward to comply with the commitments within the Final Agreement. The Mission provided the Government with recommendations to strengthen security guarantees for former FARC-EP combatants and civil society organizations, including through actions in the regions, a review of public policies, and legislation. The Mission supported the construction of an emergency plan for the protection of social leaders, human rights defenders and former combatants, which was presented to the Government on 5 August 2022. The Government later formally adopted the plan as its principal guideline to respond to the security crisis in the regions. The actions implemented included the creation of "unified command posts" in a set of prioritized regions to quickly attend to urgent security situations; the reactivation of key institutions and inter-institutional spaces as provided in the Final Agreement; the amendment of legislation to comply fully with the Agreement; and a restructuring of the National Protection arrangements for former combatants and human rights defenders.
- 232. Progress towards the objective is presented in the performance measure below (see table 40).

## Table 40Performance measure

2020 (actual)	2021 (actual)	2022 (actual)
_	_	Relevant Government and State entities strengthened security guarantees for former FARC-EP combatants and civil society organizations through actions in the regions, a review of public policies, and legislation

## Planned results for 2024

#### Result 1: accelerating efforts towards sustainable reintegration

#### Programme performance in 2022 and target for 2024

- 233. The Mission contributed to accelerating the implementation of the reintegration process. By 2022, 75 per cent of former combatants (including 84 per cent of women former combatants) benefited from collective and individual productive initiatives. The parties, with international support, agreed on a sustainability strategy that includes access to markets, land and credit, technical assistance, strengthening of former combatants' cooperatives, security and the participation of women.
- 234. The Mission will continue working alongside the parties to promote the sustainability of reintegration.
- 235. Progress towards the objective and the target for 2024 are presented in the performance measure below (see table 41).

## Table 41Performance measure

2020 (actual)	2021 (actual)	2022 (actual)	2023 (planned)	2024 (planned)
Significant increase in the number of State-sponsored collective reintegration projects for former combatants, fostering the consolidation of the socioeconomic integration of former combatants throughout Colombia	All State-sponsored collective reintegration projects took into consideration elements to ensure their sustainability, including access to markets, land and credit, technical assistance, strengthening of former combatants' productive associations and ensuring the active participation of women	Significant increase in the number of former combatants and their families benefiting from State-sponsored measures to guarantee sustainable reintegration solutions in and outside former territorial areas for training and reintegration	Sustained increase in the number of former combatants and their families benefiting from State-sponsored measures to guarantee sustainable reintegration solutions in and outside former territorial areas for training and reintegration	Reintegration benefits and State- sponsored opportunities are available to all accredited former combatants, their families and surrounding communities, contributing to the sustainability of the process through a broader focus on community-based initiatives, reconciliation and locally-led efforts

#### **Result 2: timely and effective implementation of the restorative sentences issued by the Special Jurisdiction for Peace**

#### Programme performance in 2022 and target for 2024

- 236. The Mission's work contributes to verifying that the forthcoming restorative sentences are complied with and that the conditions for their implementation are met, which will help build confidence in the process and support the Special Jurisdiction for Peace in laying the foundations for reconciliation among all Colombians.
- 237. The Mission will continue to engage with entities responsible for the implementation of the sentences and for their monitoring and verification. The Mission will fine-tune the verification methodology for general trends and patterns and select individual cases for closer monitoring and verification purposes. The Mission will also engage with State institutions to monitor and verify that the conditions for implementing restorative sentences are fulfilled.
- 238. Progress towards the objective and the target for 2024 are presented in the performance measure below (see table 42).

## Table 42Performance measure

2020 (actual)	2021 (actual)	2022 (actual)	2023 (planned)	2024 (planned)
_	The Mission	Establishment of	Compliance with	Relevant
	contributed to initial	the monitoring and	and implementation	government and
	efforts to establish	verification	of a significant	State entities ensure
	the monitoring and	mechanism	number of	the necessary
	verification	composed of the	sentences is	conditions for the
	mechanism	Mission and the	verified, including	effective
	composed of the	Special Jurisdiction	the fulfilment by	implementation of
	Mission and the	for Peace	sentenced persons	restorative

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2020 (actual)	2021 (actual)	2022 (actual)	2023 (planned)	2024 (planned)
	Special Jurisdiction for Peace	Compliance with and implementation of an initial number of sentences was verified, including the fulfilment by sentenced persons of the terms of their sentences as well as the establishment by the Colombian authorities of the conditions necessary for this	of the terms of their sentences as well as the establishment by the Colombian authorities of the conditions necessary for this	sentences issued by the Special Jurisdiction for Peace in its difference cases Compliance with restorative sentences by individuals subject to the jurisdiction of the Special Jurisdiction for Peace is verified

## **Result 3:** progress in the effective implementation of comprehensive rural reform and ethnic chapters

#### Proposed programme plan for 2024

239. The Security Council, in resolution 2673 (2023), expanded the Mission's mandate to verify the implementation of the Final Agreement's comprehensive rural reform chapter. The Government has committed to foster access to land and to accelerate the implementation of plans to extend the presence of the State in rural areas.

#### Lessons learned and planned change

- 240. The lesson learned for the Mission was the importance of working with the Government and civil society organizations, among other interlocutors, to identify progress and areas of improvement, and of offering support to ensure comprehensive and coordinated implementation. In applying the lesson, and to support the implementation of the expanded areas of work, the Mission will work alongside government and State entities as well as with civil society organizations, notably from Afro-Colombian and Indigenous communities, to foster implementation by identifying possible obstacles and recommending solutions.
- 241. Expected progress towards the objective is presented in the performance measure below (see table 43).

2020 (actual)	2021 (actual)	2022 (actual)	2023 (planned)	2024 (planned)
_	_	_	_	Increase in the number of landless farmers, women and victims who received land (or were granted land titles) through mechanisms provided for in the Final Agreement. An effective, comprehensive and inclusive implementation of th development programmes with a territorial focus and the national plans for rural reform

## Table 43Performance measure

#### A/78/6 (Sect. 3)/Add.4

2020 (actual)	2021 (actual)	2022 (actual)	2023 (planned)	2024 (planned)
				Establishment of a dedicated coordination mechanism between the Government and State institutions in charge of the implementation of the ethnic chapter
				Significant progress in the implementation of the ethnic chapter
				Establishment of a dialogue mechanism between institutions responsible for implementation ethnic peoples, private sector entities and other relevant stakeholders
				The High-level Forum of Ethnic Peoples is strengthened

## Deliverables

242. Table 44 lists all deliverables of the Mission.

#### Table 44

## Deliverables for the period 2022–2024, by category and subcategory

Cat	egory and subcategory	2022 planned	2022 actual	2023 planned	2024 planned
A.	Facilitation of the intergovernmental process and expert bodies				
	Parliamentary documentation (number of documents)	4	4	4	4
	1. Reports of the Secretary-General to the Security Council	4	4	4	4
B.	Generation and transfer of knowledge				
	Publications (number of publications)	2	2	2	2
	2. Thematic reports on security guarantees	2	2	2	2
	Technical materials (number of materials)	2	1	2	1
	3. Verification manual, including a gender-sensitive verification guide	1	1	1	1
	4. Thematic report on lessons learned from the first year of the verification of the restorative sentences	1	_	1	_
	Seminars, workshops and training events (number of days)	105	62	133	129
	5. Workshops to strengthen the implementation and strategic engagement with the Special Jurisdiction for Peace and the individuals placed under its jurisdiction	11	12	11	11
	6. Workshops and training with individuals placed under the jurisdiction of the Special Jurisdiction for Peace	11	2	11	11
	7. Regional workshops and training with individuals placed under the jurisdiction of the Special Jurisdiction for Peace to promote guidance in the tasks, works or activities with reparatory and restorative content and the restriction of freedoms and rights	11	10	11	11
	8. Forum with international academics and policymakers on the transitional justice system in Colombia and the role of the Mission	1	1	1	_

egory and subcategory	2022 planned	2022 actual	2023 planned	202 planne
9. Specialized forums with groups of jurists, academics and judicial sector organizations from each region to explain the new mandate	11	_	11	
10. Training and sensitization sessions with women's organizations at the field level	4	_	6	
11. Workshops to support the data management and data-sharing protocols with the Special Jurisdiction for Peace and other counterparts	10	20	16	1
12. Workshops relating to cases Nos. 2, 4, 5, 7 and 9 with Indigenous and Afro-Colombian populations and authorities	4	3	_	
13. Regional exchange workshops for local and international journalists	6	1	5	
14. Workshops with media at the local, regional, national and international levels on the mandate	12	1	9	1
15. Workshops relating to cases under the purview of the Special Jurisdiction for Peace with Indigenous and Afro-Colombian populations and authorities	_	_	10	
16. Regional media tours to former territorial areas for training and reintegration and new reintegration areas for special communication and outreach campaigns	12	5	9	
17. Events to promote gender equality and prevention of gender-based violence related to reintegration, security guarantees and implementation of the women and peace and security agenda	_	_	6	
18. Events with Indigenous, Afro-Colombian and Roma populations and authorities with regard to sentences involving members of their communities	12	3	9	
19. Workshops with key counterparts and stakeholders to advance and follow up on preventive and protection measures as part of the security guarantees provisions of the Final Agreement	_	_	4	
20. Workshops with Indigenous, Afro-Colombian and Roma populations and authorities	_	_	4	
21. National event with Indigenous, Afro-Colombian and Roma populations and authorities	_	_	1	
22. Events with government officials on the Mission's mandate and advocacy on the implementation of the Final Agreement	_	_	4	
23. Regional events with Final Agreement stakeholders, including former combatants, on its implementation	_	4	4	
24. Workshop for regional reintegration focal points on the implementation of new approaches to the verification of social, political and economic reintegration	_	_	1	
25. Workshop for regional reintegration and rural reform focal points on the implementation of new approaches to the verification of social, political and economic reintegration and rural reform	_	_	_	
26. Workshop with government stakeholders regarding the implementation of the national agrarian reform system	_	_	_	
27. Event with local and regional community members and national authorities to take stock of progress made in the implementation of the development plans with a territorial focus	_	_	_	
28. Workshop to take stock of community-based reintegration initiatives	_	_	_	
<ul><li>29. Workshop to take stock of community based reintegration initiatives</li><li>29. Workshop on capacity-building for Indigenous and Afro-Colombian guards with regional stakeholders</li></ul>	_	_	_	
30. Seminar on illicit crops and ethnic communities	_	_	_	
31. Event to strengthen ethnic organizations at the local level	_	_	_	
32. National event with High-level Forum of Ethnic Peoples	_	_	_	
32. National gathering of ethnic former combatants	_	_	_	

	2022	2022	2023	2024
Category and subcategory	planned	actual	planned	planned

#### C. Substantive deliverables

**Good offices**: provision of good offices to implement provisions in sections 1, 3.2, 3.4, 5.1.2 and 6.2 of the Final Agreement, including for the implementation of the respective gender provisions and the chapter on ethnic perspectives within the Final Agreement; good offices to promote problem-solving, confidence-building and unity of effort in response to implementation challenges in the field; good offices and advocacy on the establishment and strengthening of spaces and forums that bring together relevant counterparts and stakeholders for productive dialogue and decision-making; good offices and advocacy on visits from key stakeholders to reintegration areas and other relevant locations where former combatants are developing productive projects and community-based initiatives as part of their reintegration process, including support to reinforce the role of the technical working group on gender within the National Reintegration Council; good offices for the implementation of the women and peace and security agenda as part of the implementation of the Final Agreement, including advancing women's participation; systematic engagement with the different actors and State entities that have responsibilities in the implementation of the restorative sentences and in their monitoring and verification.

**Consultation, advice and advocacy**: consultations and advice to identify, prevent or resolve challenges in the conditions for increased political participation by the Comunes political party, reintegration of former combatants, improving security and protection measures and conditions, and increased participation in the implementation of the Final Agreement; advocacy for the full implementation of the gender provisions within the Final Agreement, including support to government counterparts and regular consultation with women's organizations and female former combatants; support for the information-management mechanisms of the Special Jurisdiction for Peace to facilitate information-sharing, specifically on the follow-up of restorative sentences.

**Databases and substantive digital materials**: integrated tools for verification of rural land reform based on geostatistical models and methodologies for prioritization, advances and follow-up; integrated tools for the verification of the ethnic chapter considering a cross-cutting approach (phase 1: integrated database, phase 2: automation); integrated tools for information management on verification of restorative sentences (early warnings and individual cases of special interest); verification reporting system at local, regional and national levels (phase 1: repository, phase 2: forms automation, phase 3: text mining tools); advance of implementation of Final Agreement follow-up tool at local, regional and national levels; databases and information system for indicators related to verification context; database of incidents against former FARC-EP combatants, relatives, political party members, social leaders and communities (phase 1: early warnings, phase 2: incidents, phase 3: other security guarantees issues); information management platform on organizations engaged in economic reintegration projects and productive projects; tripartite database of transit to legality.

#### **D.** Communication deliverables

**Outreach programmes, special events and information materials**: information materials for former FARC-EP combatants and communities explaining the progress of the Mission's mandate and the implementation of the Final Agreement; outreach programmes to increase the visibility of the reintegration process and security guarantees measures, of the implementation of restorative sentences, and of advances in comprehensive rural reform and ethnic aspects; outreach programmes with local communities and former combatants on areas in the Mission's mandate; production and dissemination/broadcasting of thematic videos in support of Mission engagement areas; events to promote reconciliation between ex-combatants and local communities; brochures, flyers, flipcharts, infographics, inserts, profiles and promotional material on the Mission's mandate and developments; outreach programmes through radio and television broadcasting in local, regional and national media; partnership with the United Nations country team and United Nations information centre to share relevant information on the progress of the Mission's mandate and the implementation of the Final Agreement.

**External and media relations**: conferences with key media partners such as journalists, directors and editors of local, regional and national media; press conferences, press briefings and media field visits; media briefing products; coverage of the quarterly reports of the Secretary-General.

**Digital platforms and multimedia content**: maintenance of social media channels and United Nations information platforms; animated podcast series showcasing the Mission's mandate and activities; special reports; continuous analysis to help improve dissemination and impact.

## B. Proposed post and non-post resource requirements for 2024

#### Resource requirements (regular budget)

#### Table 45 Financial resources

(Thousands of United States dollars)

	202	2	2023	2024	Variance
	Appropriation	Expenditure	Appropriation	Requirements	2024 vs. 2023 Increase/(decrease)
Category of expenditure	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)=(4)-(3)
Military and police personnel costs	4 140.4	3 509.9	3 234.4	2 972.1	(262.3)
Civilian personnel costs	35 419.6	34 402.5	38 453.5	37 035.3	(1 418.2)
Operational costs	27 240.6	23 205.3	25 556.4	26 964.3	1 407.9
Total (net of staff assessment)	66 800.6	61 117.7	67 244.3	66 971.7	(272.6)

#### Table 46 Human resources

		International staff								National staff United Nations Volunteers								
	USG .	ASG	D-2	D-1	P-5	P-4	P-3	P-2	FS	$GS^a$	Subtotal	NPO	LL	Subtotal	International	National	Subtotal	Total
Approved 2023	1	1	1	5	25	38	54	1	44	1	171	95	87	182	118	23	141	494
Proposed 2024	1	1	_	6	26	38	58	1	48	1	180	101	88	189	121	24	145	514
Change	_	-	(1)	1	1	_	4	_	4	-	9	6	1	7	3	1	4	20

<sup>*a*</sup> Other level, unless otherwise stated.

- 243. The proposed resource requirements for 2024 for the Verification Mission amount to \$66,971,700 (net of staff assessment) and would provide for the deployment of 120 military observers (\$2,972,100); salaries and common staff costs (\$37,035,300) for 180 international positions (1 Under-Secretary-General, 1 Assistant Secretary-General, 6 D-1, 26 P-5, 38 P-4, 58 P-3, 1 P-2, 48 Field Service and 1 General Service), 189 national positions (101 National Professional Officer and 88 Local level) and 145 United Nations Volunteers (121 international and 24 national); and operational costs (\$26,964,300), comprising the costs for consultants and consulting services (\$520,900), official travel (\$1,878,000), facilities and infrastructure (\$6,829,700), ground transportation (\$2,883,500), air operations (\$8,090,000), marine operations (\$111,800), communications and information technology (\$4,834,400), medical (\$417,400) and other supplies, services and equipment (\$1,398,600).
- 244. A vacancy rate of 23.0 per cent has been applied to the estimates for international positions, taking into account the actual average vacancy rates in 2022; 20.0 per cent for National Professional Officer positions, based on the vacancy rate in March 2023; 11.5 per cent for Local level positions, based on the vacancy rate in March 2023; 5.8 per cent for military observers, based on the vacancy rate in March 2023; 3.4 per cent for international United Nations Volunteers, based on the vacancy rate in March 2023; and 8.7 per cent for national United Nations Volunteers, taking into account the actual average vacancy rates in 2022. A vacancy rate of 50 per cent has been applied to the estimates for the positions proposed for establishment and reassignment.
- 245. With a view to ensuring the effective delivery of its mandate, including the expanded areas of work mandated by the Security Council in resolution 2673 (2023), a number of changes to the

organizational and staffing structure are proposed for 2024, including the establishment of 20 positions, the reclassification of 1 position, the reassignment of 3 positions and the redeployment of 11 positions, as detailed below:

#### Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General

(a) Redeployment of one position of Head of Office, Political Affairs (P-5) from the Regional Office of Quibdó to strengthen the capacity of the Office of the Special Representative with respect to developments on the ground and to provide planning and strategic leadership to the Mission's headquarters and field offices;

#### Office of the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General

- (b) Realignment of all regional offices, and by extension the Field Coordination Office and all subregional and local offices, from the Office of the Chief of Staff to the Office of the Deputy Special Representative in an effort to adapt the Mission's structure for the effective implementation of mandates, including the newly mandated areas of work with respect to the rural reform and ethnic chapters;
- (c) Redeployment of one position of Head of Office, Political Affairs (P-5) from the Regional Office of San José del Guaviare to reinforce senior guidance, analysis, management and reporting capacities for the Mission's verification mandate;
- (d) Redeployment of one position of Associate Child Protection Officer (National Professional Officer) from the Cross-cutting Issues Team to ensure that direct advice on child protection issues is provided to the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General, ensuring enhanced communication and reporting;
- (e) Redeployment of two positions, namely one Associate Liaison Officer (National Professional Officer) and one Administrative Assistant (Local level), from the Verification Division to streamline reporting lines and improve business processes;

#### Political Affairs Office

- (f) Renaming of the Verification Division as the Political Affairs Office to ensure that political and operational issues are considered in a comprehensive and coherent manner and that they are reflected in the activities in the field;
- (g) Reclassification of one position of Director, Political Affairs (D-2) in the Political Affairs Office as Principal Political Affairs Officer (D-1). The change will ensure effective monitoring and evaluation of actions implemented through integrated frameworks, as well as proper coordination of information on cross-cutting issues and more coherent communication between structures and the Mission's headquarters in Bogotá;
- (h) Reassignment of one position of Coordination Officer (National Professional Officer) as Liaison Officer to engage with key stakeholders, including senior government officials, former combatants, civil society representatives and different substantive areas and offices within the Mission, in line with the new and increased political demands at the national level;
- (i) Redeployment of one position of Policy and Best Practices Officer (P-4) from the Office of the Chief of Staff to the Political Affairs Office to ensure best practices and guidance to support the Government of Colombia to attain total peace, including collecting practices in its establishment of political dialogues with other armed groups and sharing knowledge and lessons learned in an effective and efficient manner;

#### Verification of Reintegration and Rural Reform Office

- (j) Renaming of the Verification of Political, Social and Economic Reincorporation Office as the Verification of Reintegration and Rural Reform Office to reflect the inclusion of section 1 of the Final Agreement as responsibilities conducted in this Office;
- (k) Establishment of three positions, namely one Liaison Officer (P-3) and two Associate Liaison Officers (National Professional Officer), to ensure the Mission's ability to respond to the new mandated areas of work and verify the comprehensive rural reform chapter of the Final Agreement, including responding to requests emerging from regional offices and government institutions, liaising with government and civil society actors and compiling information provided by the Government for its quarterly reports;

#### Ethnic Affairs Section

- (1) Renaming of the Cross-cutting Issues Team as the Ethnic Affairs Section to provide a dedicated team within the Mission to be in charge of the ethnic affairs chapter, guiding and supporting the field offices to carry out the new verification tasks, while advocating with the institutions in charge of the implementation of this chapter and engaging with ethnic authorities and their representative organizations;
- (m) Establishment of five positions, namely one Senior Liaison Officer (P-5), one Liaison Officer (P-3), two Associate Liaison Officers (National Professional Officer) and one Administrative Assistant (Local level), to verify the implementation of the ethnic chapter (section 6.2) of the Final Agreement. Currently, the Mission only has one staff member at the P-4 level in charge of the ethnic chapter. The expansion of the mandate requires a substantial strengthening of such capacity in the Mission;

#### Regional offices, sub-offices, hubs and local teams

- (n) Renaming of the Regional Offices of Quibdó and San José del Guaviare as sub-offices to streamline reporting lines; these sub-offices will report to the Regional Offices of Medellín and Villavicencio, respectively;
- (o) Establishment of two positions of Liaison Officer (National Professional Officer) in the Regional Offices of Cúcuta and Florencia, respectively, to reinforce these Offices by liaising with multiple government interlocutors, civil society organizations, academia and the private sector, participate in mechanisms designed to coordinate the implementation of the mandate and ensure coordination and complementary action with the United Nations country team. These positions will provide technical expertise and political analysis on the implementation of the ethnic and rural reform chapters of the Final Agreement;
- (p) Establishment of two positions of Liaison Officer (P-3) in the Regional Offices of Medellín and Valledupar, respectively, to ensure the successful implementation of the Mission's mandate. These positions will constitute the link between senior staff and the teams they lead, as well as the Mission's representatives, and national authorities and counterparts in these duty stations;
- (q) Redeployment of one Liaison Officer (National Professional Officer) from the former Verification Division to the Regional Office of Bogotá, to support the Head of Office's responsibilities in the region;

#### Office of the Chief of Staff

(r) Realignment of the Legal Unit, the Gender Team, the Conduct and Discipline Team and the Military Adviser's Office from the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to streamline reporting lines and improve business processes; (s) Establishment of one position of Victims' Rights Officer (international United Nations Volunteer) to strengthen the country's structure and capacity in the prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse, enforce a strong framework, particularly at the community engagement level, and work closely with partners to prioritize the rights and needs of the victims/survivors/affected persons;

#### Office of the Chief of Mission Support

- (t) Establishment of one position of Administrative Assistant (Field Service) to ensure that a central administrative control function and tracking system is available, strengthening effectiveness and efficiency in the provision of administrative services. This position will ensure a proper and timely response to the increased work of the Office derived from the expansion of the mandate and the increased staffing of the Mission;
- Redeployment of one position of Administrative Officer (National Professional Officer) from the Regional Office of Quibdó in order to strengthen the administrative and coordination capacity of Mission Support;

#### Mission Support Unit

- (v) Redeployment of one position of Administrative Officer (P-4) from the Office of the Chief of Mission Support to ensure that administrative and logistical support is provided to all components of the Mission. This change will ensure proper coordination with all regional and subregional offices, as well as the United Nations agencies, funds and programmes operating in Colombia;
- (w) Reassignment of one position of Logistics Officer (Field Service) as Administrative Officer to address the additional administrative and logistics workload;

#### Human Resources Unit

(x) Establishment of one position of Human Resources Assistant (Field Service) to reinforce the Human Resources Unit to ensure that sound and reliable strategic support and advice are provided to senior managers in the Mission, ensuring a timely and smooth recruitment and onboarding process, especially with the requirement for additional positions and the need to fill them expeditiously for the successful implementation of the expanded mandate;

#### Movement Control Unit

- (y) Renaming of the Movement Control Team in the Supply Chain Management Section as the Movement Control Unit to reflect the increased responsibilities of the Unit in response to the increased complexity of the required outputs and deliverables, to provide improved client services for both the multimodal transportation of passengers and the handling of cargo in support of the Mission, and to ensure that all activities are carried out in accordance with the applicable United Nations security rules, regulations and procedures;
- (z) Establishment of two positions of Movement Control Officer (1 national United Nations Volunteer and 1 international United Nations Volunteer) to support the daily air operations and guarantee the safe and timely movement of personnel as well as cargo to all regions, further to the Mission's expanded mandate and the additional aircraft (fixed-wing) now deployed in the Mission;

#### Financial Resourcing, Performance and Risk Management Unit

(aa) Establishment of one position of Finance and Budget Assistant (international United Nations Volunteer) to provide additional support in a range of different office tasks, such as management of value added tax (VAT) receivables, VAT claims, reconciliation of all accounts receivable balances, liaison with the relevant tax authority, follow-up of outstanding balances, setting up accurate and complete filing and records management, and invoice tracking;

#### Field Technology Unit

(bb) Reassignment of one position of Information Systems Assistant (Local level) as Receiving and Inspection Assistant to ensure a cohesive, integrated and effective approach to warehousing activities within the Field Technology Unit, including the receipt, storage, safeguarding and issuance of goods;

#### Centralized Warehousing Team

(cc) Redeployment of one position of Property Control and Inventory Assistant (Local level) from the Life Support Unit to ensure that the right goods are delivered at the right time, to the right place and in the right quantity, and to ensure that goods are received in an undamaged condition and recorded on the appropriate platforms to ensure good record-keeping;

#### **Operations and Resource Management Section**

(dd) Redeployment of one position of Administrative Officer (National Professional Officer) from the Regional Office of San José del Guaviare to strengthen the administrative, logistics and coordination capacity of this Section, which now also includes the Training Unit;

#### Service Delivery Section

(ee) Redeployment of one position of Administrative Assistant (Local level) from the Operations and Resource Management Section to strengthen administrative support within this Section;

#### Security Section

- (ff) Establishment of two positions of Close Protection Officer (Field Service) in the Protection Services Unit to ensure the security of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General based on a security risk management assessment from the Department of Safety and Security. The Close Protection Officers will manage close protection operations for the Head of Mission and implement mitigating measures to ensure his security and safety.
- 246. The decrease in requirements for 2024 compared with the appropriation for 2023 is attributable mainly to: (a) lower military and civilian personnel costs for observers, international and national staff and United Nations Volunteers, owing to the application of higher vacancy rates in 2024 compared with those applied in the approved budget for 2023; and (b) lower requirements for meeting facilitation services. The decrease is partially offset by: (a) the proposed establishment of 14 new positions to implement the expanded mandate; (b) higher costs for national staff owing to the updated salary scales promulgated in 2022; (c) higher requirements for air operations, as a result of the application of the latest contractual prices for helicopters; (d) higher requirements for facilities and infrastructure, as a result of the application of the latest contractual prices for official travel to support the implementation of mandates.

#### **Extrabudgetary resources**

- 247. In 2023, extrabudgetary resources in the amount of \$743,000 are projected to be utilized to provide resources for five main initiatives on promoting access to security guarantees, strengthening conditions for reconciliation, dialogue facilitation, restorative sentences, and women and peace and security efforts.
- 248. In 2024, extrabudgetary resources in the amount of \$743,000 are projected to be utilized to provide resources to further support the continuation of successful projects that have been instrumental in gaining political space for the implementation of the mandates, and new proposals focusing on victims and communities.

## 9. United Nations Mission to Support the Hudaydah Agreement

(\$34,766,200)

## Foreword

In 2024, the United Nations Mission to Support the Hudaydah Agreement will maintain the agility required to deliver on its mandate and respond to the dynamic environment in which it works. The 2024 budget seeks to reflect the next phases of the Mission's work in line with its mandate, responding to the evolving situation in Yemen and supporting the full realization of the Agreement on the City of Hudaydah and the Ports of Hudaydah, Salif and Ra's Isa (Hudaydah Agreement). This includes re-establishing joint forums for de-escalation and collaboration between the parties; the establishment of a UNMHA presence in areas controlled by the Government of Yemen; expanded patrolling to the ports and front lines; oversight of mine action coordination; and community engagement.

Underpinning this, the budget will continue to support the Mission's endeavours to be a data-driven, knowledgebased entity that can serve as an analytical hub for the United Nations system in Hudaydah. The enhancement of the Mission's geospatial capacity, data collection and information management tools and the appropriate structures to improve information management are integral to this effort.

Sustained engagement with the parties, regional actors and the diplomatic community will remain paramount in 2024. Similarly, an increased emphasis on coordination with the United Nations system in Yemen to leverage a collective effort to support nascent stability in Hudaydah will be pursued as a priority. This budget will provide UNMHA with the tools and resources needed to meet these ends.

(Signed) Major General (retired) Michael Beary Head of the United Nations Mission to Support the Hudaydah Agreement Chair of the Redeployment Coordination Committee

# A. Proposed programme plan for 2024 and programme performance in 2022

## **Overall orientation**

### Mandates and background

- 249. The United Nations Mission to Support the Hudaydah Agreement (UNMHA) is responsible for supporting the parties to the Stockholm Agreement (S/2018/1134, annex) in implementing the provisions of the Agreement on the City of Hudaydah and the Ports of Hudaydah, Salif and Ra's Isa (Hudaydah Agreement), and their commitments in accordance with the Hudaydah Agreement. The mandate was defined in Security Council resolution 2452 (2019) and extended in resolutions 2481 (2019), 2505 (2020), 2534 (2020), 2586 (2021) and, most recently, in resolution 2643 (2022) until 14 July 2023.
- 250. The mandate of the Mission, as set out in resolution 2643 (2022), is to: (a) lead, and support the functioning of, the Redeployment Coordination Committee, assisted by a secretariat staffed with United Nations personnel, to oversee the Governorate-wide ceasefire, the redeployment of forces and mine action operations; (b) monitor the compliance of the parties with the ceasefire in Hudaydah Governorate and the mutual redeployment of forces from the city of Hudaydah and the ports of Hudaydah, Salif and Ra's Isa; (c) work with the parties so that local security forces assure the security of the City of Hudaydah and the ports of Hudaydah, Salif and Ra's Isa; in accordance with Yemeni law; and (d) facilitate and coordinate United Nations support to assist the parties to fully implement the Hudaydah Agreement.
- 251. In November 2021, the unilateral withdrawal of the Government of Yemen-aligned joint forces from Hudaydah city to the southern districts of Hudaydah shifted the front line over 100km to the south. Limited hostilities continue in these areas but have remained tactical in nature.
- 252. The positive impacts of the six-month truce (from 2 April to 2 October 2022) brokered by the United Nations can be seen in Hudaydah. However, the increased freedom of movement enjoyed by the civilian population has led to a major increase in casualties related to landmines as people return to their places of residence.
- 253. Maintaining the civilian nature of the ports of Hudaydah Governorate is of paramount importance. UNMHA patrols to the ports found no evidence of military objects or manifestations during 2022. Until a durable political settlement is reached, however, armed confrontation for the control of these ports remains a possibility.
- 254. The period of relative stability that emerged in 2022 enabled UNMHA to act upon new opportunities, including monitoring visits to conflict-affected districts on both sides of the front line. The Mission intends to conduct such activities on a routine basis.

## **Programme of work**

## Objective

255. The objective, to which the Mission contributes, is to support the parties in the implementation of the Agreement on the City of Hudaydah and the Ports of Hudaydah, Salif and Ra's Isa, and their commitments in accordance with the Hudaydah Agreement.

### Strategy and external factors for 2024

- 256. To contribute to the objective, the Mission will:
  - (a) Adapt to the evolving environment across Hudaydah Governorate to ensure it is best positioned and structured to advance its mandate. The Mission will establish and operate a presence in the territory of the Government of Yemen south of the newly formed front lines, in conjunction with the operation of its base in Hudaydah city, to ensure representation, capacity and activities in the territories of both parties;
  - (b) Lead and support the sustained operation of the Redeployment Coordination Committee as the key oversight body of the Hudaydah Agreement. The Head of Mission, acting as Chair, will lead regular Committee meetings between the parties at a location mutually agreed to by both parties with the intent of reinstating dialogue and liaison mechanisms to oversee and ensure implementation of the redeployment of forces, the Governorate-wide ceasefire and the provision of security by local security forces within Hudaydah city and its ports in accordance with Yemeni law;
  - (c) Strengthen and realign the joint structures previously agreed as part of the framework of the Redeployment Coordination Committee to address shifted realities and conflict-affected areas in the evolved environment, including de-escalation;
  - (d) Maintain increased monitoring capacity within the authorized ceiling to expand and strengthen monitoring of the Hudaydah, Ra's Isa and Salif ports with daily patrols to all port installations, with a view to monitoring the redeployment of all military forces from such locations, and the removal of military manifestations, in accordance with the mandate. On-the-ground patrolling will also be expanded in the territories held by the parties on either side of the front lines, including conflict-affected areas;
  - (e) Provide technical expertise and support to advance mine action efforts in Hudaydah Governorate, in close coordination with partners and in accordance with the priorities identified by both sides, with a focus on locations posing a high risk to civilians;
  - (f) Advance assessment and coordination to implement community-focused projects in key locations on either side of the front lines, with a focus on vulnerable groups, including conflictaffected groups, women and children, and in coordination with and fully complementary to wider development actions that support the local population, de-escalate tensions between communities, strengthen social cohesion and enhance stability.
- 257. The above-mentioned work is expected to result in:
  - (a) Enhanced mutual trust, confidence and dialogue between the parties to strengthen the implementation of the Hudaydah Agreement as a key contribution to the broader peace process;
  - (b) Equal and sustained access and dialogue across both sides in the respective shifted territories of the parties in Hudaydah Governorate;
  - (c) Strengthened ceasefire implementation across the Governorate and improved security of the local population, including a reduction in casualties resulting from ceasefire violations;
  - (d) Maintenance of the security of Hudaydah city and its ports, and assurance that military forces are redeployed from such locations, remaining military manifestations are removed and security responsibilities are assumed by local security forces in accordance with Yemeni law in these locations;
  - (e) Reduced violence in Hudaydah Governorate due to the de-escalation of tensions between the parties, enhanced stability and strengthened measures to protect the local population;
  - (f) Advancement in demining in Hudaydah city, its ports and other priority locations, reducing the risk of civilian casualties caused by improvised explosive devices or other explosive remnants of war;

- (g) An enhanced and inclusive process to ensure implementation of the Agreement on the basis of strengthened community participation.
- 258. With regard to cooperation with other entities, the Mission will continue to liaise and coordinate with the parties to ensure the safety and security of Mission personnel and premises, and the unhindered and expeditious movement of Mission personnel and equipment, provisions and essential supplies into and within Yemen. The Mission will continue to engage, where possible, with local stakeholders, partners and other bodies within Hudaydah Governorate to ensure a unified approach in supporting the Hudaydah Agreement and its implementation and identifying opportunities to enhance stability and confidence in this process. The Mission will intensify its engagements with regional actors that can positively influence progress towards mandate implementation.
- 259. With regard to inter-agency coordination and liaison, the Mission closely coordinates with the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen, through which the Mission reports to Headquarters. The two missions share information and analysis, coordinate movements and briefings to the Security Council and align messaging, while sharing a mission support structure. The Mission also facilitates the support provided by United Nations agencies, funds and programmes and other partners to assist the parties in fully implementing the Hudaydah Agreement. The Mission maintains close working relationships with the Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator and members of the United Nations country team, particularly the World Food Programme, UNDP and the United Nations Verification and Inspection Mechanism, as well as other development and humanitarian actors operating in Hudaydah Governorate. The Mission consults and coordinates, as necessary, with the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and UN-Women to strengthen ceasefire implementation, achieve de-escalation and ensure access to areas of need.
- 260. With regard to the external factors, the overall plan for 2024 is based on the following planning assumptions:
  - (a) There is sufficient political will and engagement from domestic, regional and international stakeholders to enable the implementation of the Hudaydah Agreement;
  - (b) Major combat operations between the parties will not recommence in Hudaydah Governorate, nor will there be sustained military impediments that would preclude the use of the main supply routes to and from the Mission's areas of operation;
  - (c) A political environment exists that does not obstruct the work of the Redeployment Coordination Committee and its subsidiary joint mechanisms, enabling the parties to advance full redeployment and activate the local security forces;
  - (d) The parties resume their full participation in the activities of the Redeployment Coordination Committee and commit to a revived dialogue process and participation in subsidiary joint mechanisms to monitor the ceasefire and foster de-escalation, confidence-building and collaborative demining efforts;
  - (e) The Government of Yemen agrees to, and cooperates in, facilitating the establishment of a Mission presence in areas to the south of the new front lines to ensure the Mission's equal access to both parties and enable the full deployment and ongoing unimpeded functioning of the Mission;
  - (f) A suitably safe, secure and permissive operating environment exists, and sufficient confidence is established between the parties and other partners to generate sustained support for and participation in the activities of the Mission;
  - (g) Continued operational cooperation exists with effective command and control structures within both parties to enable engagement at all levels;
  - (h) The parties facilitate the Mission's full access and freedom of movement to all areas required for the effective observation and monitoring of the ports of Hudaydah, Ra's Isa and Salif to

enable daily access to all port installations and to conflict-affected areas across the Governorate, including in the southern districts in the vicinity of the shifted front lines;

- (i) The parties provide needed access and cooperation to advance demining in Hudaydah city, the ports and areas of priority in other districts to enhance the protection of the local population in the Governorate's shifted context.
- 261. The Mission integrates a gender perspective in its operational activities, deliverables and results, as appropriate. The implementation of quick-impact community projects in 2023 will include partnering with civil society and groups working to support women and girls in Hudaydah Governorate. This will be supported by continuing broader consultations to promote women's participation in the implementation of the Hudaydah Agreement and related activities and mechanisms. The Mission will work to reduce the disproportionate impact of landmines and explosive remnants of war on women and children throughout the Governorate, supporting risk awareness campaigns tailored for women and children. In addition, the Mission will promote equal rights and opportunities for women by fully and actively considering gender perspectives in planning and implementing Mission activities and those undertaken by the parties. Within the Mission, UNMHA will establish a gender parity working group to progress and monitor the gender parity action plan on internal issues related to gender parity, from recruitment and retention to conducive work environments and an empowering work culture. Particular attention will be given to the needs and concerns of female national staff.
- 262. In line with the United Nations Disability Inclusion Strategy, a disability inclusion working group in the Mission (made up of members from mission support and the Office of the Chief of Staff) will develop and implement a disability inclusion action plan that addresses barriers, challenges and priorities of persons with disabilities that is specific to the Mission's working environment. Initial focus will be given to recruitment and accessibility concerns. In addition, given the role of UNMHA in mine action coordination and the devastating impact of landmines on the civilian population of Hudaydah, disability inclusion will be mainstreamed into programmatic activities so that landmine victims can take full and active part in the work of the Mission where possible.

## **Evaluation activities**

- 263. The following evaluations completed in 2022 have guided the proposed programme plan for 2024:
  - (a) An internal review process took place between July and October 2022 to ensure that UNMHA was optimally positioned to deliver on the emerging priorities outlined in the renewed mandate of July 2022 and that the Mission would have the agility required to respond to the shifting context in Hudaydah and the trajectories of the broader peace process in Yemen. A strategic-focused retreat was held in August 2022, which was guided by the new Head of Mission's intent, which was drafted in response to the mandate renewal and which outlines the strategic vision to drive the Mission's activities during 2023 and 2024;
  - (b) UNMHA undertakes regular reviews of progress against targets and the impact that the Mission is delivering. Revised strategic planning documents, together with regular results monitoring, provide the framework in which this takes place. The Mission intends to further evaluate aspects of its operational activities in 2023, from which lessons learned can be applied to its work in 2024. This may in turn lead to additional or follow-up evaluation activities in 2024. The exact nature of evaluation efforts will be developed with the support of the Evaluation Section of the Business Transformation and Accountability Division of the Department of Management Strategy, Policy and Compliance, and the Inspection and Evaluation Division of the Office of Internal Oversight Services.
- 264. The results and lessons of the evaluations referenced above have been taken into account for the proposed programme plan for 2024. For example, the evaluative process highlighted above led to the creation of the patrolling task force and the successful expansion of patrolling and monitoring in

2022. Progress was made towards the establishment by UNMHA of a presence in Government of Yemen-controlled areas of Hudaydah Governorate.

265. A self-evaluation on one aspect of mandate implementation is planned for 2024, with the exact focus of the evaluation yet to be determined.

#### Impact of the pandemic and lessons learned

- 266. The continuation of the COVID-19 pandemic into 2022 had a reduced impact on the implementation of the Mission's mandate. Earlier in the year, the biggest challenge that persisted was the impact on staff movements in and out of Yemen, although this was managed in ways that mitigated the worst potential effects on operations. By the latter half of 2022, the bulk of COVID-19-specific restrictions had been eased or lifted to the extent that COVID-19 did not result in any major curtailments to programme delivery.
- 267. The Mission continues to mainstream lessons learned and best practices related to the adjustments to and adaptation of the programme owing to the COVID-19 pandemic, including measures to ensure that risk assessments are regularly carried out by the Mission in coordination with the United Nations system in Yemen and that COVID-19 protocols are reviewed and updated to address the evolving situation in Yemen. In addition, the Mission's business continuity and criticality plan is continuously reviewed and adjusted to address evolving realities and risks in the Yemen environment.

### **Programme performance in 2022**

## Enhanced situational awareness provided stakeholders with strengthened analysis on the situation in Hudaydah Governorate

- 268. The Mission's operations and expanded presence left it well placed to act as an analytical hub for the United Nations system in Hudaydah. Given the humanitarian, development and economic importance of the ports of Hudaydah, enhanced situational awareness and deepened analysis pertaining to the ports, ceasefire violations and the military situation on the front line, landmine incidents and areas of contamination, and political developments are essential for the Mission and its partners in supporting the implementation of the Hudaydah Agreement and an emergence from conflict. To accomplish this, the Mission significantly improved its geospatial tools and data collection and analysis methods and strengthened its information management structures. When combined with an increase in monitoring visits to conflicted-affected districts that can feed direct observations into analysis, the Mission is well placed to continue such efforts.
- 269. Progress towards the objective is presented in the performance measure below (see table 47).

#### Table 47 **Performance measure**

2020 (actual)	2021 (actual)	2022 (actual)
_	_	Improved situational awareness and analytical products supported partner planning and programming in Hudaydah Governorate

### Planned results for 2024

Result 1: monitor the redeployment of military forces and removal of all military manifestations from the ports of Hudaydah, Ra's Isa and Salif and ensure the Mission's equal access to the territories of both parties

#### Programme performance in 2022 and target for 2024

- 270. In 2022, the Mission revised its patrol strategy and, despite significant restrictions on its freedom of movement, successfully progressed its unannounced patrolling in line with its mandate and met the target of ensuring the Mission's equal access to the territories of both parties across the Hudaydah front lines. A notable success was the first monitoring visits to the south of Hudaydah Governorate. A subsequent milestone included monitoring visits to conflict-affected districts on both sides of the front line. Patrolling to the ports increased in frequency during 2022, although still subject to freedom of movement restrictions.
- 271. In 2024, UNMHA will seek to expand and intensify monitoring of front-line areas and conflictaffected districts under Government of Yemen and de facto authority control, and to conduct unannounced visits that encompass all areas of the ports and their surrounding areas.
- 272. Progress towards the objective and the target for 2024 are presented in the performance measure below (see table 48).

## Table 48Performance measure

2020 (actual)	2021 (actual)	2022 (actual)	2023 (planned)	2024 (planned)
_	_	The Mission's equal access to the territories of both parties across the Hudaydah front lines was ensured	Monitor the redeployment of military forces and removal of all military manifestations from the ports of Hudaydah, Ra's Isa and Salif and ensure the Mission's equal access to the territories of both parties	Expand patrolling and monitoring within the ports and their surrounding areas to conflict- affected districts and to both sides of the front line controlled by the parties

## **Result 2: raised community confidence in the Hudaydah Agreement and related United Nations activities**

#### Proposed programme plan for 2024

273. The conflict in Hudaydah Governorate continues to have a devastating impact on the lives of communities. An active front line in the south of the Governorate means many communities have stayed outside the reach of humanitarian assistance efforts. Consequently, confidence in the Hudaydah Agreement and the broader peace process has remained limited. Outreach work with community groups has been undertaken to gain better access to potential beneficiaries and an informed understanding of their needs. This work was carried out in coordination with the United Nations country team and other actors. The first monitoring visits carried out in conflict-affected districts on both sides of the front line have built a platform for UNMHA to open space for other entities to deliver humanitarian and development programming in areas that had previously been unreached or underserved. The Mission's community-focused projects will therefore be at the

forefront of a coordinated approach that enables the efforts of the United Nations country team to improve the situation for communities living in the south of Hudaydah Governorate.

#### Lessons learned and planned change

- 274. The lesson learned for the Mission was that community-focused projects should focus on revenue generation activities and small-scale infrastructure rehabilitation.
- 275. In applying the lesson, the Mission will base revenue creation around areas of cultural and economic importance to communities in Hudaydah, primarily within the fishing sector given that Hudaydah is a coastal area. Monitoring visits to conflict-affected areas have shown the need for small-scale infrastructure projects, including solar panels for schools and clinics, as well as the rehabilitation of water points.
- 276. Expected progress towards the objective is presented in the performance measure below (see table 49).

## Table 49**Performance measure**

2020 (actual)	2021 (actual)	2022 (actual)	2023 (planned)	2024 (planned)
_	_	_	Increased capacity of women's groups in conflict-affected districts to support initiatives in their community	Improved availability of services and income-generating opportunities for men and women in conflicted-affected districts

### Deliverables

#### 277. Table 50 lists all deliverables of the Mission.

#### Table 50

#### Deliverables for the period 2022–2024, by category and subcategory

Category and subcategory		2022 planned	2022 actual	2023 planned	2024 planned
A. Fa	acilitation of the intergovernmental process and expert bodies				
Ра	arliamentary documentation (number of documents)	1	1	1	1
1.	Letters of the Secretary-General to the Security Council	1	1	1	1
Sı	Substantive services for meetings (number of three-hour meetings)		32	36	36
2.	Meetings of the Security Council, Security Council Informal Expert Group on Women and Peace and Security	7	12	12	12
3.	Redeployment Coordination Committee meetings	17	9	9	9
4.	Bilateral meetings with regional political stakeholders	11	11	15	15
<b>B. G</b>	eneration and transfer of knowledge				
Se	Seminars, workshops and training events (number of days)		1	16	8
5.	Workshops with local community representatives on Hudaydah Agreement implementation	8	1	8	4

stegory and subcategory	2022 planned	2022 actual	2023 planned	2024 planned
6. Workshops with political/civil stakeholders on Hudaydah Agreement implementation	8	_	8	4
Fact-finding, monitoring and investigation missions (number of missions)	60	63	108	108
7. Monitoring missions and patrols conducted	60	63	108	108

#### C. Substantive deliverables

**Good offices**: provision of good offices in the context of the efforts of the parties to fully implement the Hudaydah Agreement, including meetings with local political actors in Hudaydah and from both parties in Aden and Sana'a, as well as regional and international interlocuters.

**Consultation, advice and advocacy**: consultations with the relevant Yemeni, regional and international stakeholders, with a view to comprehensively understanding the challenges at hand and to providing advice to the parties in their efforts to implement the Hudaydah Agreement; advocacy among Yemeni, regional and international stakeholders in support of the implementation of the Agreement and enhancement of the ceasefire in the Governorate; exploring the possibility of leveraging support from the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs innovation cell to launch a public opinion poll among the public in Hudaydah Governorate, focusing on the impact of the conflict and ceasefire violations on the civilian population, particularly after the shifting of the military landscape in Hudaydah, with 500–600 participants from both sides of the shifted front lines, to better understand the experiences of the civilian population, with particular reference to marginalized groups and women and youth; provision of technical advice to the parties on mine action, oversight and coordination of mine action initiatives among partners in Hudaydah, and advocacy for international mine action non-governmental organizations to operate in the Governorate.

#### **D.** Communication deliverables

**Outreach programmes, special events and information materials**: development and maintenance of strategic relationships with Mission partners, including the United Nations Communications Group, to ensure alignment in United Nations common messaging and cooperation across different levels; development and regular updating of the Mission's key messages transmitted publicly and in response to developments on the ground; outreach events to enable UNMHA to adequately consult different community-level interest groups, prominent religious figures, civil society, youth and women's organizations to broaden participation and ensure an inclusive process on the implementation of the Agreement.

**External and media relations**: press releases, messages and audiovisual material on the Mission's activities and key messages; relationships developed with media partners to ensure accurate coverage of the Mission's messaging and activities; answers in a timely manner to media inquiries; strengthened informal interaction and relationships with media partners.

**Digital platforms and multimedia content**: website establishment and frequent updates on the Mission's activities and public statements; regular updates through social media channels on the Mission's activities and public statements; photographs and videos shared promoting the Mission's activities and key messages on all digital platforms.

## B. Proposed post and non-post resource requirements for 2024

#### **Resource requirements (regular budget)**

#### Table 51 Financial resources

(Thousands of United States dollars)

	202	2	2023	2024	Variance
	Appropriation	Expenditure	Appropriation	Requirements	2024 vs. 2023 Increase/(decrease)
Category of expenditure	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)=(4)-(3)
Military and police personnel costs	2 343.1	171.6	2 342.1	678.5	(1 663.6)
Civilian personnel costs	13 160.5	11 093.1	13 448.0	15 777.8	2 329.8
Operational costs	26 788.4	18 266.3	20 281.5	18 309.9	(1 971.6)
Total (net of staff assessment)	42 292.0	29 531.0	36 071.6	34 766.2	(1 305.4)

	International staff							National staff			United Nations Volunteers							
	USG	ASG	D-2	D-1	P-5	P-4	P-3	P-2	FS	GS	Subtotal	NPO	LL S	Subtotal	International	National	Subtotal	Total
Approved 2023	_	1	1	1	6	11 <sup><i>a</i></sup>	19 <sup>a</sup>	1	31	_	71	11	80	91	_	_	_	162
Proposed 2024	_	1	1	1	6	$11^a$	$20^a$	1	32	_	73	12	80	92	_	_	_	165
Change	_	_	_	_	_	_	1	_	1	_	2	1	_	1	_	_	_	3

<sup>a</sup> Includes one P-4 and one P-3 general temporary assistance positions.

- 278. The proposed resource requirements for 2024 for the Mission amount to \$34,766,200 (net of staff assessment) and would provide for the deployment of 75 United Nations monitors (\$678,500); salaries and common staff costs (\$15,777,800) for 73 international positions (1 Assistant Secretary-General, 1 D-2, 1 D-1, 6 P-5, 11 P-4, 20 P-3, 1 P-2 and 32 Field Service), 92 national positions (12 National Professional Officer and 80 Local level) and 5 government-provided personnel; and operational costs (\$18,309,900), comprising the costs for official travel (\$629,100), facilities and infrastructure (\$4,862,200), ground transportation (\$500,600), air operations (\$9,461,200), communications and information technology (\$1,126,100), medical (\$773,600), other supplies, services and equipment (\$657,100) and quick-impact projects (\$300,000).
- 279. A vacancy rate of 88.0 per cent has been applied to the estimates for United Nations monitors, 23.9 per cent for international positions, 18.2 per cent for National Professional Officers and 13.8 per cent for Local level positions, on the basis of the vacancy rate in March 2023. A vacancy rate of 90.0 per cent has been applied to the estimates for government-provided personnel. For proposed new and reassigned positions, a vacancy rate of 50.0 per cent has been applied.
- 280. With a view to ensuring the effective delivery of its mandate, a number of changes to the organizational and staffing structure are proposed for 2024, including the establishment of three positions, the reassignment of one position, and the redeployment of five positions, as detailed below:

#### Office of the Head of Mission/Chair of the Redeployment Coordination Committee

- (a) Redeployment of One Senior Political Affairs Officer (P-5) position from the Political Affairs Section to provide advice to the Head of Mission in addressing the complex political dynamics in Yemen and the diverse political actors in the peace process;
- (b) Redeployment of one Legal Officer (P-4) position from the Office of the Chief of Staff, owing to the refocusing of the Office of the Chief of Staff (as explained in subparagraph (c) below);

#### Office of the Chief of Staff

- (c) With a view to optimizing strategic planning and coordination functions in the Mission, the Office of the Chief of Staff will be recalibrated to focus primarily on situational awareness and analysis, information management (including information flows), strategic planning and communications. To this end, the below changes are proposed:
  - (i) Realignment of the Joint Operations Centre from the Office of the Head of Mission to the Office of the Chief of Staff to enhance situational awareness and increase the impact of the work;
  - (ii) Realignment of the Joint Coordination and Communication Centre from the Office of the Head of Mission to the Office of the Chief of Staff, and its renaming as Joint Mission Analysis Centre, to strengthen joint analysis and to transform the Mission into a

knowledge-based entity that can serve as an analytical hub for the United Nations system with respect to the situation in Hudaydah;

- (iii) Redeployment of one Coordination Officer (P-4) position from the Office of the Deputy Head of Mission and Coordination to support strategic planning, foster partnerships and strengthen integrated approaches;
- (iv) Redeployment of one Public Information Officer (P-3) and one Associate Public Information Officer (National Professional Officer) from the Office of Head of Mission to extend the Mission's external communications and public information efforts under the supervision of Chief of Staff;

#### Political Affairs Section

(d) Reassignment of one position of Civil Affairs Officer (P-3) as Data Analyst to expedite the efforts towards a data-driven organization by using and managing data to enable informed decision-making and responses;

#### Military Advisory Unit

(e) Renaming of the Liaison and Coordination Mechanism Section as the Military Advisory Unit in the light of the situation in Hudaydah and the recalibration of the Office of the Chief of Staff, through which the integrated operational coordination role will now be assumed by the Joint Operations Centre in the Office of the Chief of Staff;

#### Office of the Chief of Mission Support

(f) Establishment of one Medical Officer (P-3) in Hudaydah, one Medical Officer (National Professional Officer) and one Paramedic (Field Service) to establish in-house medical capacity as a result of the review of the Mission's medical concept as further elaborated in the paragraphs below.

#### Review of the Mission's medical concept in Hudaydah

- 281. UNMHA conducted a review of its medical concept in Hudaydah in December 2022 and February 2023. The review covered the UNMHA medical clinic at the Four Villas compound in Hudaydah, other hospitals and health facilities in Hudaydah, Sana'a and Aden, the medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) standard operating procedures and the implementation of policies and procedures promulgated by the Health-Care Management, Occupational Safety and Health Division of the Department of Operational Support. The review also considered medical statistics provided by the contractor and the United Nations clinic, and a comprehensive health risk assessment was conducted to determine effective health risks and mitigation controls that would eliminate or lower the identified risks to acceptable levels. In addition, the Mission carried out assessment visits to the Sudanese military hospital and the French military hospital in Djibouti, as well as meetings with the aviation team and the Aeromedical Evacuation Team based in Djibouti and meetings and interviews with key UNMHA personnel.
- 282. The findings and recommendations of the review were as follows:
  - (a) The Al-Amal hospital in Hudaydah is assessed as "level III" and can be used as a referral hospital by UNMHA. A memorandum of understanding should be developed with this hospital to serve UNMHA personnel, including a walk-in blood donor programme;
  - (b) For hospital care, referral and casualty evacuation (CASEVAC)/MEDEVAC services, UNMHA can count on national health facilities rather than Djibouti for urgent and critical medical and surgical cases;
  - (c) Existing contracts for air ambulance MEDEVAC from Sana'a can be used for advanced medical conditions;

- (d) There are possible synergies through the supporting of the country team's clinic in Hudaydah with UNMHA-funded medical personnel, also allowing UNMHA medical personnel access to EarthMed (which is not accessible for contractors);
- (e) In Sana'a, it is recommended that the University of Science and Technology Hospital, the Yemen German Hospital and the Saudi German Hospital be used as referral hospitals by UNMHA;
- (f) A temporary mortuary facility should be established in the UNMHA compound.
- 283. On the basis of these recommendations, the Mission proposed the establishment of an in-house medical capacity consisting of three positions. It has also terminated its aeromedical evacuation services contract in Djibouti. It has also been in liaison with the medical team of the United Nations country team on ways to support the country team's clinic in Hudaydah to extend coverage to UNMHA personnel. In addition, UNMHA started a procurement process to support mortuary facilities in Hudaydah in accordance with the recommendation from the review.
- 284. The Mission's approved 2023 staffing table includes two general temporary assistance positions. It is proposed that these positions be continued in 2024:
  - (a) A Programme Management Officer (P-4) in the Office of the Deputy Head of Mission and Coordination in Hudaydah would be required to continue to provide demining expertise in Hudaydah city, the ports and the wider Governorate, and to lead the mine action programme embedded in the Mission;
  - (b) A Finance and Budget Officer (P-3) in the Field Operations Finance Division of the Department of Management Strategy, Policy and Compliance in New York would perform backstopping support and continues to be essential in ensuring sufficient capacity at Headquarters for the management of financial resources, the preparation of budgets and the provision of services to the legislative bodies during their review of the proposed budgets for special political missions.
- 285. The decrease in requirements for 2024 compared with the appropriation for 2023 is attributable mainly to: (a) reduced requirements for medical services provided by the contracted surgical and aeromedical evacuation teams; (b) lower requirements for United Nations monitors owing to the application of a higher vacancy rate of 88.0 per cent compared with the rate of 25.0 per cent applied in 2023; and (c) reduced requirements under other supplies, services and equipment owing to a lower provision for Redeployment Coordination Committee and bilateral meetings. The reduced requirements are offset in part by: (a) the proposed establishment of three new positions (1 P-3, 1 National Professional Officer and 1 Field Service); (b) higher requirements for international staff owing to the higher salary rates used in estimates based on actual average salary scales of existing staff, and an increase in the common staff costs for positions in Yemen based on the actual expenditure patterns in 2022; (c) increased requirements for the rental and operation of one rotarywing aircraft based on higher fleet costs and costs per flight hour; (d) increased requirements for quick-impact projects to engage communities on both sides of the conflict; and (e) operational and security services for one additional land-based premises in Hudaydah city and one additional sub-office in southern districts of Hudaydah Governorate.

## **10. United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti**

(\$29,975,100)

## Foreword

Haiti continues to face immense challenges related to restoring democratic institutions and the rule of law and protecting human rights. A path for Haitians to engage in dialogue towards restoring democratic institutions in the country has been charted, with the adoption of Security Council resolution 2653 (2022) and the signature on 21 December 2022 of the National Consensus for an Inclusive Transition and Transparent Elections. However, gang violence has been expanding at an alarming rate in areas previously considered relatively safe in Port-au-Prince and outside the capital, resulting in one of the worst human rights crises in decades.

The United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti continues to encourage Haitian political, civil society and economic actors to unite to address the country's political and security crises. Efforts are under way to tackle community violence, protect and promote human rights and continue building the Haitian National Police. However, more must be done to address the impunity of armed gangs and their backers, including by countering increasing armed gang violence and supporting the police.

Progress towards a nationally-led solution to the long-standing political impasse is urgently required to restore sustainable and durable security, as well as social and economic stability. Moreover, the rapidly deteriorating security situation demands that the country remain at the centre of international attention and action. In this context, the decisive support of the United Nations will remain crucial in advancing security, the rule of law, stability and peace in Haiti.

(Signed) María Isabel **Salvador** Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Haiti Head of the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti

# A. Proposed programme plan for 2024 and programme performance in 2022

## **Overall orientation**

## Mandates and background

- 286. The United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH) is responsible for advising the Government of Haiti in promoting and strengthening political stability and good governance, including the rule of law; advancing a peaceful and stable environment, including through supporting an inclusive inter-Haitian national dialogue; and protecting and promoting human rights. Its mandate derives from the priorities established in relevant Security Council resolutions and decisions, in particular Security Council resolution 2476 (2019). By its resolution 2645 (2022), the Council extended the mandate of the mission to 15 July 2023.
- 287. The signature of the National Consensus for an Inclusive Transition and Transparent Elections on 21 December 2022 by the Prime Minister and a broad range of stakeholders represents an important step towards the implementation of inclusive transitional arrangements to help to create the necessary conditions to restore democratic institutions. In 2023, the Government of Haiti is therefore focused on implementing and broadening consensus around the agreement, including through the establishment of a High Transitional Council and the preparation of multi-stakeholder discussions on security and on developing a more detailed road map for the transition, culminating in the preparation of a constitutional referendum and the holding of elections. In the light of these efforts, in 2024, the strategic priorities for BINUH, in full collaboration with United Nations agencies, funds and programmes, are to advise the national Government on political, good governance, police, rule of law and human rights matters; encourage dialogue and consensus among stakeholders on key constitutional, security and governance reform efforts; enhance the capacity of the Haitian National Police to ensure public safety; and strengthen the justice and corrections sectors to guarantee the rule of law and protect human rights.

## **Programme of work**

## Objective

288. The objective, to which the mission contributes, is to strengthen political stability and good governance, including accountability and the rule of law; advance a peaceful and stable environment; protect and promote human rights; and strengthen gender equality, in Haiti.

## Strategy and external factors for 2024

- 289. To contribute to the objective, the mission will:
  - (a) Facilitate dialogue and engagement among national stakeholders to further enlarge national consensus and to establish a road map towards elections;
  - (b) Provide strategic advice and technical assistance to the national police, judiciary and corrections systems and to the national human rights institutions in Haiti to promote international norms, human rights and gender parity;
  - (c) Contribute to the reduction of crime and community violence, in partnership with United Nations agencies, funds and programmes, in support of governmental institutions addressing the socioeconomic root causes of insecurity.

- 290. The above-mentioned work is expected to result in:
  - (a) The enhanced capacity of State institutions to lead an effort to address causes of instability and inequality in Haiti;
  - (b) Effective, inclusive and accountable institutions that contribute to consolidating stability, combating impunity and enabling a protective environment;
  - (c) Enhanced support to State institutions with regard to the protection of women and youth, communities and livelihoods through a reduction in gang violence;
  - (d) Enhanced police performance in ensuring public safety through police reform as a result of the implementation of the 2022–2025 national police strategic development plan, supported by adequate government funding and a multi-donor basket fund.
- 291. With regard to cooperation with other entities, the mission collaborates with regional organizations, including the Organization of American States and the Caribbean Community. The mission also engages closely with the diplomatic community to support coordinated approaches to encouraging political consensus and tackling stalemates, when appropriate.
- 292. With regard to inter-agency coordination and liaison, BINUH works in an integrated manner with the United Nations country team in mandated areas. The mission and the country team have jointly finalized a United Nations Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework for the period 2023-2027, which lays out four strategic priorities encompassing five planned goals.
- 293. With regard to the external factors, the overall plan for 2024 is based on the following planning assumptions:
  - (a) Political polarization is likely to continue to undermine the parties' ability to achieve the consensus required to advance tangible initiatives to implement political, legal and economic reforms;
  - (b) The fragile security situation may continue to have a negative impact on both the pace and the sustainability of political, legal and economic reforms. Moreover, as most incidents in the country occur in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area, the allocation of overstretched State resources is further distorted, exhausting the capacity of security institutions and diminishing the returns on capacity investments in the security infrastructure. These security incidents, however, do not critically affect the ability of the United Nations to carry out its tasks;
  - (c) The Government of Haiti is expected to remain committed to further developing the capacities of the Haitian National Police and its Directorate of Prison Administration, including through the ongoing provision of sufficient budget allocation, complemented by external contributions through a multi-donor basket fund managed by UNDP;
  - (d) The impact of natural hazards on Haiti, including hurricanes and earthquakes, is unpredictable and expected to remain in line with recent years;
  - (e) The international donor community and the national authorities agree on and properly resource key development priorities linked to structural development issues while implementing stronger coordination arrangements to advance the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.
- 294. The mission integrates a gender perspective in its planning, operations, deliverables and results, and encourages the meaningful participation of women in political processes, dialogues and negotiations, as well as their representation in decision-making positions in institutions, in line with the Constitution's mandated minimum 30 per cent quota for women's participation at all levels. The mission's reporting will include disaggregated data on the impact of human rights violations and abuses on women, as well as on accountability and justice for crimes of violence against women and girls, in coordination with UN-Women. In addition, the mission will work with civil society actors focusing on gender and human rights in the context of the implementation of recommendations issued by the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women in 2016 and the second universal periodic review cycle for Haiti in 2016 on the human rights situation.

## **Evaluation activities**

- 295. BINUH is undertaking an evaluation of the mission's response to civil unrest between September and November 2022 to strengthen the mission's approach to responding to and addressing potential future crises.
- 296. An evaluation of the implementation of support to political and electoral processes contributing to the re-establishment of democratic governance is planned for 2024, assuming the Government of Haiti holds elections by the end of 2023, as proposed.

## Impact of the pandemic and lessons learned

- 297. The continuation of the COVID-19 pandemic into 2022 had an impact on the implementation of mandates, in particular by forcing the reconfiguration of seminars, workshops and training events to allow for their delivery online, and necessitating the provision of strategic and advisory support through online means.
- 298. The mission continues to mainstream lessons learned and best practices related to the adjustments to and adaptation of the programme owing to the COVID-19 pandemic, including the incorporation of hybrid and virtual meeting modalities to strengthen existing approaches and activities.

## **Programme performance in 2022**

#### National police authorities improved police performance and enhanced security in Haiti

- 299. The year 2022 saw an increase in crimes in Haiti, including homicide, kidnapping and rape, as well as recurring inter-gang turf wars that killed and displaced many civilians, as gang-related violence remained the major threat to public security in Haiti. Despite the very challenging operational environment, the mission continued to support police efforts to dismantle criminal networks and gangs, particularly through the provision of strategic advice through co-location with the police, including the General Inspectorate of the Haitian National Police and the Directorate of Prison Administration, to assist in strengthening their operational and anti-gang capacity while supporting senior police leadership to respond to security challenges, including using anti-kidnapping and police intelligence approaches. BINUH and other partners further supported the police to develop a new, more actionable three-year strategic development plan for 2022-2025 that focuses on strengthening the institutional and operational capacities, promoting the rule of law and improving security governance in Haiti. In addition, momentum to address the security situation in Haiti continued to build through joint efforts by the international community in the fourth quarter of 2022 to support the professionalization of the national police. Advocacy, supported by BINUH, for a UNDP-managed, multi-donor basket fund has so far resulted in pledges of \$17.75 million out of the \$28 million requested for the two-year joint programme. The basket fund's technical working group, consisting of members of the Haitian National Police, the United Nations and funding partners, held its first meeting on 30 November 2022.
- 300. Progress towards the objective is presented in the performance measure below (see table 53).

# Table 53Performance measure

2020 (actual)	2021 (actual)	2022 (actual)
Low satisfaction among the population with public services offered by national institutions	Disruptions in governance owing to a political crisis and a lack of responsive, inclusive, participatory and representative decision-making	The basket fund received strong support from donors, and reforms were devised and implemented to strengthen police performance

## Planned results for 2024

Result 1: effective, inclusive and accountable institutions contribute to consolidating stability and enabling a protective environment

- 301. The mission's work contributed to efforts by the Government to strengthen institutions and support reforms to contribute to the re-establishment of democratic institutions and effective governance in Haiti. Among the main initiatives were efforts to strengthen the national justice system, including through the revitalization of the Court of Cassation, the continuation of efforts to release detainees from pretrial detention, the establishment of the basket fund for support to the professionalization of the Haitian National Police, and activities to bolster the capacity of the police to address insecurity, which met the planned target of key reforms to Haitian judicial, police, corrections and anti-corruption institutions having been adopted, laying the foundation for enhanced effectiveness, accountability and transparency.
- 302. Progress towards the objective and the target for 2024 are presented in the performance measure below (see table 54).

Table 54	
Performance	measure

2020 (actual)	2021 (actual)	2022 (actual)	2023 (planned)	2024 (planned)
Improved satisfaction among the population through the alignment of the Penal Code and Criminal Procedural Code with international criminal justice and human rights norms and standards and the adoption by presidential decree; the appointment of female leaders for the Bar Association of Port-au-Prince and the Ministry of Human Rights and Fight against Extreme Poverty	The implementation of key reforms to Haitian judicial, police and corrections institutions began, laying the foundation for enhanced effectiveness, accountability and increasing accessibility for the population A new Government assumed office and training on the national strategy to reduce pretrial detention levels resumed	Key reforms to Haitian judicial, police, corrections and anti-corruption institutions continued The implementation of the basket fund began, laying the foundation for enhanced effectiveness, accountability and transparency	Justice institutions begin to take ownership of key reforms to implement anti-corruption measures, increasing accountability and access to justice, while sustainably reducing the pretrial detention rate The national human rights action plan is endorsed by the Council of Ministers The Haitian National Police strategic plan for 2022–2025 provides effective technical support The basket fund receives strong support from donors, and reforms strengthen police performance	Continued efforts to implement the Haitian National Police strategic development plan for 2022–2025 contribute to enhanced effectiveness and accountability in the police force The implementation of the basket fund contributes to strengthened performance in areas including: (a) police administration and command and control; (b) technical and specialized management and criminal investigation skills; (c) accountability and police oversight, including the General Inspectorate; and (d) strategic planning Judicial institutions perform their duties in accordance with the national legal framework

2020 (actual)	2021 (actual)	2022 (actual)	2023 (planned)	2024 (planned)
				Justice reforms are implemented amid ongoing efforts to reduce the pretrial detention rate

# Result 2: engagement and consensus-building among key stakeholders and State institutions help address the country's institutional vacuum and causes of instability

#### Programme performance in 2022 and target for 2024

303. The mission's work contributed to the establishment of an environment conducive to consensusbuilding, which resulted in the signing of a new consensus agreement on 21 December 2022, but which did not meet the planned target of preparing national presidential and legislative elections, establishing a credible national Provisional Electoral Council and organizing a constitutional referendum, owing to deteriorating political divisions and increasing gang violence in Haiti, resulting in government efforts to renew and broaden consensus on the way forward.

#### Lessons learned and planned change

304. The lesson for the mission was that, in order to address institutional dysfunction in Haiti, a holistic yet flexible approach to building consensus on a political way forward is required to ensure that causes of instability can be addressed. In applying the lesson, the mission will ensure that its good offices and political engagement efforts focus on building consensus about the future direction for Haiti, which will set the country on a path towards peace and sustainable development. Expected progress towards the objective is presented in the performance measure below (see table 55).

2020 (actual)	2021 (actual)	2022 (actual)	2023 (planned)	2024 (planned)
The mandates of all Lower Chamber Parliamentarians and two thirds of the Senate ended The President, acting by decree, prepared for a constitutional referendum and presidential and legislative elections to return the country to a normal status	The assassination of the President, as well as the death of the President of the Cour de cassation, left all three branches of power in the country dysfunctional Haitian stakeholders worked together to agree on a way forward Prime Minister Ariel Henry assumed office with a pledge to organize elections as soon as possible	Significant civil unrest and increased gang violence led to heightened international concern about the situation in Haiti, a recommendation by the Secretary-General for the deployment of a non-United Nations rapid action force in response to a request from the Government of Haiti for assistance through an armed international specialized force, and the imposition of sanctions, contributing to the signing of a consensus agreement on 21 December as a road map to elections in 2023	Following the proposed holding of a constitutional referendum by the Government in 2023, elections take place	Following the proposed holding of a constitutional referendum by the Government in 2023, and under the assumption that general elections take place as foreseen, elected institutions begin functioning, including the executive branch and the Parliament

## Table 55Performance measure

## Deliverables

305. Table 56 lists all deliverables of the mission.

#### Table 56

#### Deliverables for the period 2022–2024, by category and subcategory

Cate	gory and subcategory	2022 planned	2022 actual	2023 planned	2024 planned
A.	Facilitation of the intergovernmental process and expert bodies				
	Parliamentary documentation (number of documents)	3	3	4	4
	1. Reports of the Secretary-General to the Security Council	3	3	4	4
	Substantive services for meetings (number of three-hour meetings)	3	7	4	4
	2. Meetings of the Security Council	3	7	4	4
B.	Generation and transfer of knowledge				
	Seminars, workshops and training events (number of days)	55	87	40	150
	3. Seminars, workshops and training events on four main areas of work: (a) implementation of and resource mobilization for the strategic plan to further develop and equip the Haitian National Police, sustain police service capable of maintaining public security, reduce gang violence, enhance police oversight and protect human rights; (b) implementation by national authorities and the United Nations country team of programmes on disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, community violence reduction and weapons and ammunition management; (c) management and oversight of prisons and detention centres according to international standards; and (d) promotion of human rights and participation of women as decision-makers in State institutions, political parties and initiatives of dialogue and consensus-building	55	87	40	150
	Field and technical cooperation projects (number of projects)	_	_	9	9
	4. Projects in support of operationalizing the Haitian National Police basket fund, including on strategic planning, vetting, intelligence-led operations, anti-gang activities, efforts against illicit financial flows and support for the development of the national police legal framework	_	_	6	6
	5. Projects to support strengthened air, land and sea border controls, including the Container Control Programme, the Airport Communication Programme and the Global Maritime Crime Programme	_	_	3	3
	Publications (number of publications)	2	3	2	2
	6. Joint thematic public human rights reports	2	3	2	2
	Technical materials (number of materials)	11	9	11	10
	7. Materials conveying advisory support to national interlocutors	11	9	11	10
	Fact-finding, monitoring and investigation missions (number of missions)	-	19	45	50
	8. Fact-finding, monitoring and investigation missions to assess prison facilities, the condition of detainees and administration and security arrangements; to conduct police inspections to assess the status of police stations and police services in each department, as well as the internal administration and quality of police services; to conduct an assessment of police stations and police; to assess the implementation of the basket fund in support of the Haitian National Police; to assess human rights and allegations of violations; to assess implementation of the human rights due diligence policy; and to carry out joint monitoring missions to assess gang violence in seven gang-controlled neighbourhoods of Port-au-Prince and other communities across Haiti	_	19	45	50

#### C. Substantive deliverables

**Good offices**: good offices of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to: (a) foster cooperation and dialogue among the main political and social actors, build consensus and strengthen political stability and good governance; (b) support the efforts of national authorities and international partners to facilitate local peace initiatives, reduce gang and community violence and advance a peaceful and stable environment, including by further developing and equipping the Haitian National Police through a multi-donor basket fund; and (c) raise awareness about human rights abuses and violations, sexual and gender-based violence and gender discrimination, and strengthen institutional accountability to address these problems and end impunity for perpetrators.

	2022	2022	2023	2024
Category and subcategory	planned	actual	planned	planned

**Consultation, advice and advocacy**: efforts focus on: developing initiatives that promote dialogue and consensus-building; advising on the development of effective, accountable and transparent institutions and advancing political, legal and economic reforms; developing the institutional framework and the electoral calendar; providing the Haitian National Police and the Directorate of Prison Administration with expert advice to strengthen the capacity and oversight of the police and corrections service; advising State institutions and agencies on the implementation of action plans to promote and protect human rights and gender equality; and advising on the development of a regulatory arms control framework, including the effective implementation of a holistic weapons and ammunition inter-institutional mechanism.

#### **D.** Communication deliverables

**Outreach programmes, special events and information materials**: field outreach and advocacy materials (brochures, flyers, flipcharts, infographics, banners) explaining thematic objectives in the mission's mandate; outreach events on key priorities of the mission in close collaboration with the United Nations Communications Group; traditional and digital media campaigns, inclusive of print, radio and social platforms, to support United Nations electoral, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration/community violence reduction, police, corrections, justice and human rights initiatives and joint programmes.

**External and media relations**: strategic plan to ensure coverage of key activities of the mission, inclusive of press conferences, editorials on key issues, press briefings, press releases, targeted interviews and publications with target audiences and networks in close coordination with the United Nations Communications Group; daily media and social platform monitoring providing strategic analysis of media and social platform trends, risks and opportunities to provide guidance for crisis communication management.

**Digital platforms and multimedia content**: creation and management of website and social media; production and dissemination of content for multimedia products and campaigns (with a focus on digital radio) able to engage key actors on mission priorities and promoting transparency and accountability; campaigns and products for social media platforms showing the impact of the mission's work in close collaboration with the United Nations Communications Group, the United Nations country team and United Nations Headquarters.

## B. Proposed post and non-post resource requirements for 2024

#### **Resource requirements (regular budget)**

Table 57 Financial resources (Thousands of United States dollars)

	2022		2023	2024	Variance	
_	Appropriation	Expenditure	Appropriation	Requirements	2024 vs. 2023 Increase/(decrease)	
Category of expenditure	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)=(4)-(3)	
Military and police personnel costs	826.4	609.0	1 226.1	1 056.9	(169.2)	
Civilian personnel costs	16 254.3	16 474.8	19 278.1	22 403.4	3 125.3	
Operational costs	4 760.6	5 933.5	7 397.9	6 514.8	(883.1)	
Total (net of staff assessment)	21 841.3	23 017.3	27 902.1	29 975.1	2 073.0	

Table 58	5
Human	resources

	International staff										National staff			United Nations Volunteers				
	USG	ASG	D-2	D-1	P-5	P-4	P-3	P-2	FS	$GS^a$	Subtotal	NPO	LL	Subtotal	International	National	Subtotal	Total
Approved 2023 <sup>b</sup>	_	1	1°	5	10	22	14	1	34	2	90	21	37	58	_	_	_	148
Proposed 2024 <sup>b</sup>	_	1	$1^c$	5	10	23	14	2	35	2	93	21	37	58	4	_	4	155
Change	_	-	_	-	_	1	_	1	1	-	3	_	_	_	4	_	4	7

<sup>a</sup> Other level, unless otherwise stated.

<sup>b</sup> Includes one D-1, one P-5, one P-4 and two General Service positions approved as general temporary assistance positions.

<sup>c</sup> Position is funded at 50 per cent and cost-shared with the Development Coordination Office.

- 306. The proposed resources for 2024 for BINUH amount to \$29,975,100 (net of staff assessment) and would provide for the deployment of 21 United Nations police officers (\$1,056,900); salaries, common staff costs and danger pay (\$22,403,400) for 93 international positions (1 Assistant Secretary-General, 1 D-2, 5 D-1, 10 P-5, 23 P-4, 14 P-3, 2 P-2, 35 Field Service and 2 General Service) and 58 national positions (21 National Professional Officer and 37 Local level), including the establishment of 7 new positions (1 P-4, 1 P-2, 1 Field Service and 4 international United Nations Volunteer), as well as 2 government-provided personnel; and operational costs (\$6,514,800), comprising costs for consultants and consulting services (\$224,900), official travel (\$248,300), facilities and infrastructure (\$3,257,200), ground transportation (\$639,900), communications and information technology (\$1,507,800), medical (\$252,000) and other supplies, services and equipment (\$384,700).
- 307. A vacancy rate of 15.9 per cent has been applied to the estimates for international positions based on the actual average vacancy rate in 2022. Vacancy rates of 14.7 per cent and 15.5 per cent have been applied to the estimates for National Professional Officer and Local level positions, respectively, based on the actual average vacancy rates in 2022. A vacancy rate of 15.4 per cent has been applied to the estimates for United Nations police based on the actual average vacancy rate in 2022. A vacancy rate of 50.0 per cent has been applied to the new positions proposed for establishment, including international civilian staff and United Nations Volunteers. The cost estimates for government-provided personnel for 2024 are based on the assumption of full deployment on the basis of the actual incumbency in March 2023.
- 308. The Mission conducted a civilian staffing review to enhance its mission support structure and respond to changing contexts on the ground. The proposed establishment of new positions and reporting lines is designed to address the structural gaps and needs of the mission support component and to position it for the more effective delivery of its mandate. To this end, the following is proposed:

#### Office of the Chief of Mission Support

(a) Establishment of one position of Programme Management Officer (P-4) to enhance the coordination of the work of the mission support units, serving as an interlocutor between mission support and the Office of the Chief of Staff within the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and substantive sections. The incumbent would be responsible for developing standard operating procedures and circulars; ensuring compliance with policies and procedures; the delegation of authority and monitoring and implementing the recommendations of auditors and boards of inquiry;

#### Procurement Unit

- (b) Realignment of the Procurement Unit from the Supply Chain Management and Service Delivery Section to the Operations and Resource Management Section to ensure the adequate segregation of responsibilities and better balance of the workload between the two pillars;
- (c) Establishment of one position of Associate Procurement Officer (P-2) to be responsible for the acquisition and delivery of goods and services, achieving cost efficiency and compliance with United Nations procurement policies and practices. The incumbent will ensure adherence with the mandatory segregation of functions by reviewing and performing roles in Umoja, allowing the focus of the Chief Procurement Officer to be on more strategic activities;

#### Human Resources Unit

(d) Establishment of one position of Human Resources Officer (international United Nations Volunteer) to be responsible for the administration of staff benefits and entitlements and the onboarding of national and international staff members. The incumbent would support the Unit with recruitment and placement, including by participating in the selection of candidates for clerical and related categories of positions. The incumbent would also be responsible for managing and coordinating travel requests and training activities;

#### Finance and Budget Unit

(e) Establishment of one position of Finance and Budget Officer (international United Nations Volunteer) to provide support to the Finance and Budget Unit to carry out the effective stewardship of resources, including the monitoring of budgetary resources and financial performance;

#### Supply Chain Management and Service Delivery Section

(f) Establishment of one position of Property Management Assistant (Field Service) to head the Property Management and Centralized Warehousing Unit, with functions such as: receiving and inspecting goods received; conducting periodic inventory verification of United Nations non-expendable property; and maintaining accurate records in Umoja for transparency and accountability.

#### Engineering Unit

(g) Establishment of one position of Engineering Officer (international United Nations Volunteer). The incumbent would be responsible for ensuring that the mission maintains appropriately serviced and sufficient office accommodation, reliable electrical power supply, adequate air conditioning, uninterrupted water provisioning and a sustainable waste management programme. The incumbent would ensure the appropriate segregation of duties in the Unit when processing transactions in the real estate module in Umoja;

#### Acquisition and Contracts Management Unit

- (h) Establishment of one position of Requisitions Officer (international United Nations Volunteer). The incumbent would be responsible for preparing requisitions for diverse services and commodities in accordance with the mission's acquisition plan. The incumbent would contribute to the development of the source selection plan and maintain relevant internal databases and overviews to keep track of outstanding requisitions.
- 309. The mission's approved 2023 staffing table includes five general temporary assistance positions. It is proposed that the positions be continued in 2024:
  - (a) One Principal Human Rights Officer (D-1) in the Human Rights Service of the mission to respond to and address the human rights requirements set by the Security Council as reflected in the BINUH mandate, adopted in resolution 2476 (2019). Such a dedicated position, with specific human rights expertise, is important to facilitate trusted engagement at a high level

with senior Haitian authorities, allowing for the provision of technical assistance and advice to the country's national human rights institutions;

- (b) Three backstopping positions in the Haiti team of the Americas Division of the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, comprising one Senior Political Affairs Officer (P-5), one Political Affairs Officer (P-4) and one Team Assistant (General Service), who have been providing backstopping support to BINUH since 2019 and will remain critical to ensuring ongoing support and strategic advice and analysis to principals at Headquarters for decisionmaking with regard to BINUH. The core functions they undertake are not required on a temporary basis but needed throughout the lifespan of the mission, including its start-up, the duration of the implementation of its mandate, and its closing;
- (c) One Finance and Budget Assistant (General Service) backstopping position in the Department of Management Strategy, Policy and Compliance, where the need remains high for the Field Operations Finance Division to continue delivering high-intensity and high-quality support to legislative bodies in their review of the budgets of special political missions. The continuation of this position will also ensure sufficient capacities for budget preparation, budget administration and performance monitoring of all 39 special political missions.
- 310. The increase in requirements for 2024 compared with the appropriation for 2023 is attributable mainly to increased requirements under civilian staff costs, as follows: (a) the provision of danger pay which was approved in October 2022 and not provided for in the 2023 budget; (b) the reduction of the rest and recuperation cycle from 8 to 6 weeks, resulting in additional payments; (c) increased international staff salaries and common staff costs; and (d) the establishment of seven positions, including three international staff and four international United Nations Volunteers. The increase is offset in part by the application of a higher vacancy rate of 15.4 per cent to United Nations police personnel costs compared with the assumption of full deployment in 2023; decreased requirements under communications and information technology owing to the acquisition of adequate stock in the previous period; and reduced requirements for outsourced expertise and temporary duty assignments owing to the establishment of positions to perform the required functions.

## 11. United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in the Sudan

(\$64,897,500)

## Foreword

In 2022, the consequences of the 2021 coup continued to plunge the Sudan into further uncertainty and a multidimensional political, economic and security crisis. Development assistance remained suspended. Security incidents affecting civilians increased across the country and humanitarian needs significantly expanded. Protests against the coup and the socioeconomic situation continued.

On 5 December 2022, the military leadership and a broad range of civilian actors signed a political framework agreement laying the groundwork for a final political accord and the formation of a new civilian-led government, opening the way for the resumption of a transitional period towards democratic governance. In this context, the integrated United Nations presence in the Sudan anticipated to continue working closely with the international community to support the priorities of a new transitional period, in order to provide solid grounding for a new government.

However, on 15 April 2023, large-scale fighting erupted between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces, engulfing the country in conflict with a humanitarian catastrophe in the making. The United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in the Sudan (UNITAMS) remains in the Sudan and has temporarily reconfigured its presence. Its immediate objectives are: (a) achieving a stable ceasefire between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces with a monitoring mechanism; (b) preventing the escalation of the conflict; (c) protection of civilians and provision of humanitarian relief; and (d) preparing, for when the time is ripe, a fresh political process with the participation of a broad array of civil and political actors, including women. UNITAMS is coordinating its efforts with the African Union and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development.

The priorities for UNITAMS in 2024 will necessarily depend on the further evolution of the situation. If the immediate objectives outlined above are met, UNITAMS will renew its efforts to support an inclusive political transition, while strengthening the protection of civilians, support to the Sudan Police Force and the rule of law, and advocacy for resources and support to the humanitarian response. The Mission will continue to support the comprehensive implementation of the Juba Agreement for Peace in the Sudan through its chairing of the Darfur Permanent Ceasefire Committee as well as efforts to bring non-signatory armed movements into the peace process and by coordinating peacebuilding initiatives at the subnational level.

UNITAMS remains committed to supporting a Sudanese-owned and Sudanese-led political transition that offers a path to realizing the aspirations of youth, women and men.

(Signed) Volker **Perthes** Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the Sudan Head of the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in the Sudan

# A. Proposed programme plan for 2024 and programme performance in 2022

## **Overall orientation**

## Mandates and background

- 311. The mandate of the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in the Sudan (UNITAMS) is contained in Security Council resolutions 2524 (2020), 2579 (2021) and 2636 (2022). The mandate defined in paragraph 3 of Security Council resolution 2579 (2021) set out the four strategic objectives of the Mission: (a) to assist in the political transition, progress towards democratic governance, the protection and promotion of human rights, and sustainable peace; (b) to support peace processes and the implementation of the Juba Peace Agreement and future peace agreements; (c) to assist peacebuilding, civilian protection and the rule of law, in particular in Darfur and the Two Areas (Blue Nile and South Kordofan); and (d) to support the mobilization of economic and development assistance and the coordination of humanitarian and peacebuilding assistance. The Council further decided that the Mission should prioritize support to six areas, namely: (a) ceasefire monitoring in Darfur; (b) the implementation of the Government's national plan for the protection of civilians (see S/2020/429); (c) ongoing and future peace negotiations between the Government of the Sudan and Sudanese armed groups; (d) the inclusive implementation of the power-sharing agreements of the Juba Peace Agreement; (e) the constitutional drafting process; and (f) the Sudan Police Force and the justice sector. The mandate also recognized the need for scalable support for the implementation of any future peace agreements if so requested by the parties to the negotiations.
- 312. The political impasse caused by the 2021 coup continued to have an impact on progress towards the transition and mandate implementation. Significant gaps in the leadership of key government institutions and counterparts were felt throughout 2022. In addition, as the political crisis continued, tensions escalated into violence in areas that had previously experienced calm. The resurgence of large-scale violence demonstrated the increasing fragility at the state level, exacerbated by the continued governance vacuum. Local authorities lacked capacity and resources to protect civilians, while root causes and fundamental grievances remained unaddressed. Furthermore, in the absence of a civilian-led government, there was no progress in the resumption of peace talks with armed movements that were not signatories to the Juba Peace Agreement. Across the Sudan, over 260,000 people were displaced owing to conflict and 349,000 were affected by floods in 2022. Since April 2023, and as at the time of reporting, the Sudan is once again being ravaged by the eruption of conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces, which has forced the United Nations in the Sudan to temporarily reconfigure its presence while staying in the country and delivering support to the Sudanese people, focused on securing humanitarian pauses or ceasefires, de-escalation and a return to political negotiations. Humanitarian partners estimate that 15.8 million people, about a third of the population, are already in need of humanitarian assistance in 2023, the largest number in a decade.
- 313. As part of the trilateral mechanism with the African Union and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, UNITAMS had achieved progress in facilitating and supporting Sudanese-led dialogue to reach agreement to resume a civilian-led political transition. In the aftermath of the eruption of conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces in April 2023, UNITAMS, in coordination with its regional partners, is currently prioritizing: (a) achieving a stable ceasefire with a monitoring mechanism; (b) preventing the escalation or ethnicization of the conflict; (c) protection of civilians and provision of humanitarian relief; and (d) preparing, for when the time is ripe, a fresh political process with the participation of a broad array of civil and political actors, including women. Depending on the further evolution of the situation, and once a stable ceasefire is achieved, UNITAMS hopes to be able to continue its work, when possible, on the following: (a) as part of the trilateral mechanism, intensive good offices, including by facilitating dialogue at the request of Sudanese parties to broaden political participation; (b) in collaboration with partners, preparations to support the transitional process once a civilian-led government is

established; (c) human rights and the protection of civilians, including through intensified advocacy efforts in the context of continued reporting on human rights violations, and support to the Sudan Police Force and rule of law institutions in collaboration with the United Nations country team; and (d) support for the implementation of the Juba Peace Agreement, in particular by supporting the Darfur Permanent Ceasefire Committee and other critical mechanisms, securing peace agreements with non-signatory armed movements once a civilian-led government is restored and collaborating with partners to promote peace implementation and peacebuilding based on detailed assessments of local conditions.

## **Programme of work**

## Objective

314. The overall objective, to which the Mission contributes, is to support a political transition towards inclusive democratic governance in the Sudan, taking into account the consequences of the eruption of violence in April 2023, in a manner that fosters sustainable peace and development and ensures that civilians are protected, human rights are respected and the rule of law is upheld.

## Strategy and external factors for 2024

- 315. To contribute to the objective, and depending on the further evolution of the situation, the Mission will:
  - (a) Provide good offices and technical assistance in support of peace and the political transition in the Sudan, including by facilitating talks and providing assistance towards critical milestones in the transition, such as the constitution-making process and the holding of elections;
  - (b) Facilitate meaningful participation in the political transition and the implementation of peace agreements by a wide and diverse range of Sudanese stakeholders, including civil society, women, youth, refugees, internally displaced persons and members of marginalized groups;
  - (c) Facilitate talks to secure peace agreements with non-signatory parties;
  - (d) Support Sudanese institutions in their efforts to deliver justice and accountability and coordinate the civilian protection and peacebuilding activities of the United Nations, including local-level conflict prevention, mitigation and reconciliation, and community violence reduction, in particular for women, children and vulnerable groups. The Mission will, in particular, continue its support for the full implementation of the national plan for the protection of civilians by the Sudanese authorities, including through support for the Sudan Police Force and rule of law institutions in collaboration with the United Nations country team;
  - (e) Fulfil its obligations as Chair of the Darfur Permanent Ceasefire Committee and support its various structures under the security arrangements of the Juba Peace Agreement;
  - (f) Support international resource mobilization, national socioeconomic reforms and the establishment of a national architecture for development planning and aid effectiveness.
- 316. The above-mentioned work is expected to result in:
  - (a) Inclusive, comprehensive and sustainable peace agreements and a Sudanese-owned and -led path to a democratic and inclusive political transition;
  - (b) Strengthened and accountable human rights and rule of law institutions;
  - (c) An enhanced protective environment and reinforced peaceful coexistence and reconciliation between communities;

- (d) Coherent support by the United Nations and the international community to address socioeconomic challenges.
- 317. The 2021 coup complicated an already complex political situation in the Sudan, with deepening distrust among the stakeholders, mounting frustrations and grievances, particularly at the subnational level, along with worsening security, economic and social conditions. It also resulted in an operating environment where the Mission was prevented from fully implementing its mandate and had to adapt to respond to changed circumstances. The eruption of renewed conflict in April 2023, with the fighting between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces, dramatically affected the security situation and the operating environment of UNITAMS. It forced the Mission to temporarily reconfigure its presence and reprioritize its immediate actions, focusing on establishing and sustaining a ceasefire, responding to humanitarian needs and fostering a path for the return to political negotiations.
- 318. In this context, the needs for good offices and political facilitation by UNITAMS will remain high in support of Sudanese efforts to implement existing and future peace or ceasefire agreements and the political transition. Support needs are expected to increase in 2024, as they have done for the past few years, and the recent resurgence of violence has further eroded Sudanese capacities and increased overall fragility throughout the country. Since the Mission was originally designed under significantly different circumstances prior to the 2021 coup, its capacities will be insufficient to meet the new requirements and expectations given the dramatic change in the operating environment.
- 319. To respond to these increased needs, UNITAMS will realign its structure to establish a political pillar led by an additional Deputy Special Representative, consolidating capacities related to political affairs, constitutional support, electoral assistance, the rule of law, the Darfur Permanent Ceasefire Committee mission component, and the regional offices. Additional senior-level oversight will be dedicated to the complex political engagements required at this critical juncture at the national and subnational levels. UNITAMS will reinforce strategic direction and management in effectively delivering technical advice and assistance in the implementation of the transitional tasks and reforms, as well as in the implementation of the Juba Peace Agreement. It will also enable coordinated efforts to engage with parties outside of existing political and peace agreements to build confidence and encourage them to join the peace process and support the implementation of transition agreements.
- 320. The continued political partnership of the trilateral mechanism will remain critical. The Mission will also continue to closely coordinate with other partners, including Member States and international financial institutions, to maximize collective impact and avoid a duplication of efforts, on the basis of comparative advantages and a clear division of labour.
- 321. With regard to inter-agency coordination and liaison, the Mission and the United Nations country team will continue to work as an integrated United Nations presence in the Sudan with joint planning, programming and delivery in support of its mandate. With a view to responding to the changing operational environment and to supporting a new transition process, a new interim cooperation framework was being developed. This was expected to serve as the integrated strategic framework between UNITAMS and the United Nations country team and articulate the integrated support of the United Nations, covering programme areas of both UNITAMS and the United Nations country team. However, owing to the eruption of conflict in April 2023, the draft interim cooperation framework was put on hold and the existing United Nations Development Assistance Framework was extended until 31 December 2024. Despite this setback, UNITAMS will have a critical role to play in rejuvenating donor coordination mechanisms and mobilizing international assistance to catalyse support to the Sudanese population and the aimed resumption of the political transition and a civilian-led government. The Mission will explore partnerships with international financial institutions to ensure a coherent approach to multidimensional risks and conflict and fragility. UNITAMS will work closely with the United Nations country team to support the implementation of human rights, accountability and rule of law provisions of the transition and peace agreements, in particular those provisions that guarantee justice and women's rights. The Mission will also ensure

continued effective inter-mission cooperation on regional issues with relevant United Nations missions and envoys with a focus on regional prevention.

- 322. With regard to the external factors, the overall plan for 2024 is based on the following planning assumptions:
  - (a) A sustained ceasefire between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces, with a monitoring mechanism, will be achieved;
  - (b) Following resumed political talks, Sudanese stakeholders agree on a path to political transition, enabling the formation of a credible civilian-led transitional government and other key transitional institutions and the resumption of peace talks with non-signatory parties, and a growing focus on constitutional reforms and preparation for elections;
  - (c) While the Juba Peace Agreement remains not fully comprehensive, its implementation progresses in a sustained manner, with the commitment of the signatories, resulting in tangible benefits for the population;
  - (d) The security situation in parts of the country remains volatile and unpredictable, with the potential for a major escalation of violence should the renewed political transition stall;
  - (e) The economic situation remains dire, with the risk of threatening the political transition; however, international financial technical assistance and financial support slowly resumes on the basis of the resumption of a credible transition;
  - (f) Trust of the population in institutions, in particular those responsible for civilian protection, justice and rule of law, is low; however, the Sudan begins to implement the national plan for the protection of civilians and other reforms, creating opportunities for progress with international support;
  - (g) UNITAMS continues to serve as Chair of the Darfur Permanent Ceasefire Committee, with a role focused mainly on facilitation and advisory functions to the parties;
  - (h) The Sudanese authorities remain supportive of the Mission's mandate and presence in the country, including with regard to honouring the status-of-mission agreement;
  - (i) International partners remain committed to supporting the Sudanese transition and implementation of the Juba Peace Agreement, including by making available assistance for priority peacebuilding and development initiatives.
- 323. The Mission integrates a gender perspective in its activities, deliverables and results, with a view to supporting the full and effective participation, representation and protection of women in the implementation of peace and political processes and all social and economic aspects of life. This will include support to address and overcome all forms of disparities and discrimination and promoting an inclusive and gender equitable transition by keeping the women and peace and security agenda, as well as youth engagement, at the centre of its efforts, in accordance with relevant Security Council resolutions on women and peace and security and on youth and peace and security. This is reflected in the participation of diverse groups of women from across the Sudan in political negotiations, constitution-drafting, capacity-building and securing a seat in decision-making bodies in the political transition.

## **Evaluation activities**

324. No formal evaluations were completed in 2022. Nonetheless, UNITAMS continues to review internal mechanisms for improved programmatic planning, implementation and monitoring and evaluation to build capacities to better measure progress on impact, efficiency, coherence and sustainability across mission activities. In addition, UNITAMS continues to make use of its best practices and lessons learned along with the United Nations country team, serving as a Co-Chair of the integrated monitoring, evaluation and learning working group.

325. In 2024, when possible, UNITAMS will seek to strengthen the role of evaluation and the application of evaluation findings on programme design, delivery and policy directives that examine the state and utilization of resources and the efficient achievement of results.

## Impact of the pandemic and lessons learned

- 326. COVID-19 was an additional challenge to an already precarious environment in the Sudan marked by socioeconomic and political instability. Delays related to COVID-19 and the October coup in 2021, coupled with interruptions in the issuance of visas in 2022, had a negative impact on mandate implementation, slowing the deployment of staff, especially in new field locations, which further caused delays in programmatic planning and delivery. The impact of the pandemic on mission activities was seen in the postponement or cancellation of in-person meetings, workshops, conferences and engagement both at the national and subnational levels where digital access to stakeholders was limited across different areas in the Sudan.
- 327. UNITAMS set in place all necessary COVID-19 protocols and recommendations for staff and partners and employed many of the modified ways of working to deliver on its mandate, including online training and onboarding and exceptional telecommuting arrangements while also limiting travel for workshops and conferences. Successful modalities have been mainstreamed into the Mission's plans for 2024. In a fragile political context, often with limited Internet access in field locations, the Mission was confronted with the need to pragmatically balance the risks with the need to deliver.

## **Programme performance in 2022**

#### Facilitation of women's participation in peace processes

- 328. UNITAMS engaged with Sudanese women's groups from across the political spectrum to hear their views on the political process, the role of women and their inclusion in decision-making. In UNITAMS-facilitated consultations in early 2022, the Mission successfully secured 33 per cent participation of women. Following those consultations, UNITAMS further supported Sudanese women in the formation of a stand-alone women's rights delegation to participate on an equal footing with other negotiating delegations in the political process facilitated by the trilateral mechanism. This body, the Women's Rights Group, provided gender-specific recommendations and perspectives, and received capacity-building and technical support from UNITAMS on mediation and negotiation.
- 329. With UN-Women and UNDP, the Mission facilitated dialogues that led to a coalition of women from diverse political parties, armed movements and civil society coming together around a unified platform to advocate for women's participation in political and peace processes and for the mainstreaming of gender equality in constitution-making. These efforts directly ensured the inclusion of gender provisions in the political framework agreement of 5 December 2022. UNITAMS also supported the coalition's high-level advocacy with capacity-building and provided training sessions. In addition, UNITAMS supported further capacity-building for women from areas controlled by the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North Abdelaziz al-Hilu faction, in particular with respect to the women and peace and security agenda, gender, mediation and ceasefires. Regular engagement with women from political parties, armed movements, civil society and academia continued throughout 2022.
- 330. Progress towards the objective is presented in the performance measure below (see table 59).

## Table 59Performance measure

2020 (actual)	2021 (actual)	2022 (actual)
_	Progress made in facilitating women's engagement in and influence on political processes	Meaningful participation of women advanced through 33 per cent representation of women in the political process; establishment of a stand-alone women's rights delegation (the Women's Rights Group) as an equal participant in the negotiations; and formation of a coalition of women from across political spectrum on gender mainstreaming, resulting in the inclusion of gender provisions in the political framework agreement

## Planned results for 2024

Result 1: political transition and progress towards democratic governance and an inclusive and comprehensive peace in the Sudan

- 331. UNITAMS launched an inclusive intra-Sudanese political process in early 2022. On the basis of its conclusion, the trilateral mechanism developed a framework for engagement for the next phase of the process. This culminated in the signing of the political framework agreement on 5 December 2022 between the military and civilian parties, which met the target of progress towards an inclusive political agreement. Through this process, the Mission, among other things, supported greater inclusion of political parties in the political framework agreement, promoted broad-based consultations throughout the Sudan, empowered women's groups to act as a formal party to the political talks, and brought the agenda of the east to the table at the national level, including through a high-level joint visit by the trilateral mechanism to Kassala. The trilateral mechanism also sought to ensure the inclusion of parties that were not signatories to the Juba Peace Agreement in the peace and political processes through outreach and engagements.
- 332. In 2024, subject to the securing of a sustained ceasefire with a return to political negotiations and the resumption of a transitional period towards democratic governance, UNITAMS will use its good offices to support a civilian-led political transition with a focus on key priorities identified by Sudanese stakeholders. The Mission will continue to deliver political, technical and advisory support, including to address increasing needs related to constitutional and electoral preparations, to advance critical issues, such as transitional justice and the implementation of the Juba Peace Agreement, and to facilitate peace talks with non-signatories.
- 333. Progress towards the objective and the target for 2024 are presented in the performance measure below (see table 60).

# Table 60Performance measure

2020 (actual)	2021 (actual)	2022 (actual)	2023 (planned)	2024 (planned)
	Progress towards political transition and towards a more comprehensive peace agreement with increased participation of women and youth was stalled following the October 2021 coup	Progress was made towards an inclusive political agreement to restore a civilian- led transition with increased participation of women and youth Progress towards securing peace with non-signatories and acceleration of necessary further negotiations was limited following the October 2021 coup	A sustained ceasefire between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces is achieved, paving the way for a return to political negotiations Progress on constitutional arrangements and continued commitment of the parties to peace agreements alongside the conclusion of necessary further negotiations	Progress in the implementation of transition priorities, including on transitional justice, constitutional and electoral arrangements, and commitment of the non-signatory parties to peace agreements following the conclusion of necessary further negotiations

Result 2: increased mobilization of economic and development assistance and coordination of humanitarian and peacebuilding assistance

- 334. The economic situation in the Sudan remained fragile following the coup of October 2021. Meanwhile, development support operations and programmes remained suspended, with profound implications on the country's social, economic, recovery and development situation. UNITAMS and the country team had strengthened internal coordination and developed a United Nations common approach for the period 2022–2023 to set common goals and priorities in this environment. They identified priorities spanning the humanitarian-development-peace nexus, comprising: (a) basic services, community stabilization and resilience; (b) protection of civilians, rule of law and human rights; and (c) democratic transition, peacebuilding and conflict prevention. The multi-partner trust fund promoted integrated support.
- 335. The target of mobilizing resources for critical peacebuilding in conflict-affected areas was not met. Given the continued suspension of international donor assistance, the Mission's efforts on resource mobilization were severely restrained. At the end of 2022, UNITAMS and the country team started a planning process that would allow for a scaling-up of coordination and resource mobilization should a new civilian-led government be formed.
- 336. The economic and humanitarian situation deteriorated dramatically with the eruption of the conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces in April 2023, further affecting the Mission's targets for 2023. In 2024, subject to a cessation of current hostilities and the return to a political process that would enable full re-engagement, the Mission will reinvigorate its efforts to support and coordinate economic development undertakings between the transitional Government and the international community, including efforts towards debt relief initiatives, economic assistance and increased foreign direct investment. It will also continue to coordinate humanitarian assistance in a context of increased needs.

337. Progress towards the objective and the target for 2024 are presented in the performance measure below (see table 61).

## Table 61 **Performance measure**

2020 (actual)	2021 (actual)	2022 (actual)	2023 (planned)	2024 (planned)
_	Increased engagement with international financial institutions, resulting in debt relief and coordination of donor assistance, but progress reversed as a result of the October coup	Progress in mobilizing resources for critical peacebuilding in conflict-affected areas was mostly stalled owing to the suspension of the development assistance following the October 2021 coup	Subject to a cessation of current hostilities and the return to a political process, re-engagement to supporting and coordinating on economic development between the transitional Government and international partners, including in the form of debt relief and increased foreign economic assistance	Progress in coordinating economic development assistance through co-convened structures with international financial institutions and partners, and delivery of socioeconomic support package to hotspot areas

Result 3: improved protective environment and human rights supported by the implementation of the Juba Peace Agreement, including its security arrangements

- 338. In 2022, UNITAMS supported the Government of the Sudan in accelerating the implementation of the National Plan for the Protection of Civilians, including through technical advice to the national mechanism on the National Plan. While progress was limited, UNITAMS and the United Nations country team provided technical assistance to the Joint Security-Keeping Force in line with the National Plan and the Juba Peace Agreement. In this regard, from November to December 2022, UNITAMS and the country team facilitated two workshops for the Joint Security-Keeping Force on compliance with international human rights and international humanitarian law principles. A total of 1,500 Joint Security-Keeping Force members benefited from these trainings with a focus on child protection. The workshops equipped the Joint Security-Keeping Force with essential knowledge and protection principles critical to its functions as detailed in the Juba Peace Agreement. In addition, in May 2022, UNITAMS and the country team implemented a training-of-trainers course for 56 Joint Security-Keeping Force officers to build a pool of competent military structures to ensure a sustainable corps of trainers for new recruits and to strengthen compliance with international human rights and the country team implemented a training-of-trainers course for 56 Joint Security-Keeping Force officers to build a pool of competent military structures to ensure a sustainable corps of trainers for new recruits and to strengthen compliance with international human rights and international humanitarian law.
- 339. In 2024, provided that the operational environment allows (i.e. security conditions permitting, including through a sustained ceasefire), UNITAMS will continue to strengthen its work on human rights, civilian protection, women's protection, the rule of law and child protection. This entails strengthening monitoring and reporting of human rights violations and protection incidents in hotspot and conflict-affected areas. The Mission will integrate human rights in mandated tasks and support justice and legislative reforms, transitional justice, accountability and the rule of law. The implementation of the Juba Peace Agreement will remain a priority, and UNITAMS will provide scalable support to mechanisms outlined in the Juba Peace Agreement, with a focus on the National Peace Commission and the monitoring and evaluation mechanism, and to the implementation of

provisions concerning land ownership and usage. UNITAMS will also provide a platform to discuss peacebuilding issues and will chair and continue to strengthen the Darfur Permanent Ceasefire Committee through training to operationalize the Committee in all sectors. Mine action activities will also continue, focusing on creating a protective environment.

340. Progress towards the objective and the target for 2024 are presented in the performance measure below (see table 62).

# Table 62Performance measure

2020 (actual)	2021 (actual)	2022 (actual)	2023 (planned)	2024 (planned)
_	National capacity for civilian protection was enhanced and steps were taken to develop key reforms for the protection of human rights and the upholding of the rule of law, but progress stalled or was rolled back after the October coup	Progress in restoring national capacity for civilian protection and the implementation of key provisions of the Juba Peace Agreement stalled following the October 2021 coup	Subject to a cessation of current hostilities, national capacity for civilian protection is enhanced	Progress in reforms for protection of human rights, accountability and the rule of law The Juba Peace Agreement is in the process of implementation, including a permanent ceasefire and final security arrangement protocol for durable peace in Darfur

## Deliverables

#### 341. Table 63 lists all deliverables of the Mission.

#### Table 63

#### Deliverables for the period 2022-2024, by category and subcategory

Del	liverables	2022 planned	2022 actual	2023 planned	2024 planned
A.	Facilitation of the intergovernmental process and expert bodies				
	Parliamentary documentation (number of documents)	4	4	4	4
	1. Reports of the Secretary-General to the Security Council	4	4	4	4
	Substantive services for meetings (number of three-hour meetings)	4	4	4	4
	2. Meetings of the Security Council	4	4	4	4
B.	Generation and transfer of knowledge				
	Field and technical cooperation projects (number of projects)	2	2	2	2
	3. United Nations joint peacebuilding programme launched	2	2	2	2
	Seminars, workshops and training events (number of days)	375	190	311	402
	4. Workshops and civic consultations on subjects relating to peace negotiations and peace agreements, as well as the political transition, including constitution drafting and population census	61	90	60	90

ivera	bles	2022 planned	2022 actual	2023 planned	2024 planned
5.	Meetings and workshops related to the implementation of the permanent ceasefire and security arrangements	43	9	60	60
6.	Seminars and consultations on electoral matters	53	_	14	14
7.	Workshops and consultations on disarmament, demobilization and reintegration	28	6	18	18
8.	Workshops on community violence reduction	21	7	10	15
9.	Workshops and training sessions on human rights and protection	49	16	28	30
10.	Workshops on rule of law	23	18	24	25
11.	Trainings, workshops and seminars for Sudan Police Force officers on civilian protection, community policing and sexual and gender-based violence and investigation	97	36	91	136
12.	Training for the members of the Darfur Permanent Ceasefire Committee, Sectoral Committees and Field Teams to enhance their capabilities to perform their roles in accordance with the mandates of the Permanent Ceasefire Committee	_	8	6	14
Pu	blications (number of materials)	16	27	10	16
13.	Newsletters featuring news and human-interest stories on United Nations engagement, achievements and work throughout the Sudan	6	18	4	10
14.	Promotional and educational materials, including posters and/or brochures, on thematic issues of sustainable peace and development	10	9	6	6
Тес	chnical materials (number of materials)	5	1	3	1
15.	Manual on civilian protection for the Sudan Police Force and pocket booklets for commanders on the protection of civilians, based on competent laws	1	_	1	-
16.	Manual on community-oriented policing for the Sudan Police Force	1	_	_	_
17.	Manual on conflict-related sexual violence and sexual and gender-based violence for the Sudan Police Force	1	_	1	_
18.	Material on peacebuilding financing in the Sudan	2	1	1	1
Fa	ct-finding, monitoring and investigation missions (number of missions)	-	31	30	30
19.	Human rights and protection of civilian monitoring and investigation missions	_	31	30	30

#### C. Substantive deliverables

**Good offices**: good offices to engage with all concerned parties to support the Sudanese transition, including facilitating political talks, peace negotiations and the implementation of peace agreements, as well as technical assistance to the country's political transition; provision of technical assistance for national efforts for an inclusive, participatory and transparent constitution drafting process that provides the basis for consensus-building and dialogue on social cohesion, good governance, protection of civilians, human rights and the rule of law; support for the efforts of national authorities to implement the human rights, equality, accountability and rule of law provisions of the Constitutional Declaration, including the strengthening of independent and representative rule of law institutions; support for the efforts of national authorities to provide and ensure security, justice and protection, including to raise awareness about human rights abuses and violations, sexual and gender-based violence and gender discrimination, to strengthen trust and national accountability and to address those abuses and violations and end impunity for the perpetrators.

**Consultation, advice and advocacy**: consultations, advice and advocacy on the political transition and peace processes with a broad range of Sudanese stakeholders from throughout the Sudan, including civil society, women, youth, refugees, persons with disabilities and internally displaced persons and members of marginalized groups; meetings and consultations with international, regional and subregional organizations, as well as with concerned Member States, on the political and security situation in the Sudan; advice on and advocacy for the establishment and formulation of institutions, legislative and policy frameworks required to implement the human rights, equality, gender mainstreaming, accountability and rule of law provisions of the Constitutional Declaration, including the strengthening of accountable and representative rule of law institutions in conflict-affected areas that foster a protective environment and advance the peace process, in strong partnership with civil society; advocacy for progress towards the effective re-establishment of the criminal justice chain throughout the Sudan; advice to the Sudan National Mine Action Centre pertaining to mine action and compliance with the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention; provision of advocacy and advice in support of development of local mine action initiatives in areas controlled by non-State armed groups.

	2022 20.	2 2023	2024
Deliverables	planned actu		planned

#### **D.** Communication deliverables

**Outreach programmes, special events and information materials**: information materials (brochures, flyers, flipcharts, infographics, promotional material, frequently asked questions, messaging) explaining the Mission's mandate and developments; outreach events on key priorities of the Mission in close collaboration with partners and United Nations agencies, funds and programmes in the Mission area and awareness-raising events with national stakeholders; production of content for dissemination through national and local media; outreach activities targeted at hard-to-reach audiences through partners, using alternate means such as telecommunications, theatre and other traditional communication methods; training sessions to build capacity, improve relationships and support media relations and improved reporting on the work of the United Nations; public outreach, sensitization and interaction programmes with local people and stakeholders in five Darfur states about the activities of the Permanent Ceasefire Committee structures; outreach programmes with the Sudan Police Force on civilian protection, community policing and sexual and gender-based violence.

**External and media relations**: strategic plan to cover key activities of the Mission; press conferences, press briefings, press releases; targeted interviews and publications with media in close coordination with the United Nations Communications Group and with target audiences and networks; videos of Mission activities; weekly media monitoring and analysis of media trends, including misinformation and disinformation, risks and opportunities and crisis communications management.

**Digital platforms and multimedia content**: digital platforms (web and social media); content for various multimedia products and campaigns that promote transparency and accountability and engage key actors on the priorities of the Mission; campaigns and products for social media platforms to show the impact of the Mission's work in close collaboration with the United Nations Communications Group, the United Nations country team and United Nations Headquarters.

## B. Proposed post and non-post resource requirements for 2024

#### **Resource requirements (regular budget)**

## Table 64 **Financial resources**

(Thousands of United States dollars)

	2022		2023	2024	Variance
	Appropriation	Expenditure	Appropriation	Requirements	2024 vs. 2023 Increase/(decrease)
Category of expenditure	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)=(4)-(3)
Military and police personnel costs	1 900.5	1 483.5	2 035.1	2 699.3	664.2
Civilian personnel costs	27 601.4	30 785.2	38 355.3	36 460.6	(1 894.7)
Operational costs	26 817.7	24 380.3	25 737.6	25 737.6	-
Total (net of staff assessment)	56 319.6	56 649.0	66 128.0	64 897.5	(1 230.5)

## Table 65 Human resources

		International staff										National staff United Nations Volunteers						
	USG	ASG	D-2	D-1	P-5	P-4	P-3	P-2	FS	GS <sup>a</sup>	Subtotal	NPO	LL	Subtotal	International	National	Subtotal	Total
Approved 2023	1	$1^b$	2	5	21 <sup>c</sup>	40 <sup>c</sup>	37	2	68	1	178	57	109	166	7	5	12	356
Proposed 2024	1	$2^b$	2	5	21 <sup>c</sup>	40 <sup>c</sup>	37	2	68	1	179	57	109	166	7	5	12	357
Change	-	1	_	_	_	_	_	_	-	_	1	_	_	_	_	_	_	1

<sup>*a*</sup> Other level, unless otherwise stated.

<sup>b</sup> One Assistant Secretary-General position is funded at 50 per cent and cost-shared with the Development Coordination Office.

<sup>c</sup> Includes one P-5 and one P-4 general temporary assistance positions.

- 342. The eruption of conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces in April 2023 dramatically affected the security situation and the operating environment of UNITAMS. The Mission had to temporarily reconfigure its presence and reprioritize its immediate actions. Currently, the Mission has temporarily relocated the mission support activities from Khartoum and other regions within Sudan to Port Sudan, Kassala and Entebbe, Uganda, leveraging the existing presence of the UNITAMS offices and other United Nations entities located in Port Sudan. The Mission deployed a small team to coordinate the Mission's operations from Port Sudan in support of the good offices functions of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, who has been relocated to Port Sudan to continue the Mission's mandated activities. Furthermore, a critical mission support team has been retained at the Regional Service Centre in Entebbe to continue to support the Mission's operations organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo providing support to the team in Entebbe in the areas of finance, logistics and communications and information technology.
- 343. The proposed resource requirements for 2024 for UNITAMS amount to \$64,897,500 (net of staff assessment) and would provide for the deployment of 28 military observers (\$1,322,300); 42 United Nations police officers (\$1,377,000); salaries and common staff costs (\$36,460,600) for 179 international positions (1 Under-Secretary-General, 2 Assistant Secretaries-General, 2 D-2, 5 D-1, 21 P-5, 40 P-4, 37 P-3, 2 P-2, 68 Field Service and 1 General Service), including the establishment of one Assistant Secretary-General position; 166 national positions (57 National Professional Officer and 109 Local level); and 12 United Nations Volunteers (7 international and 5 national United Nations Volunteers); and operational costs (\$25,737,600), comprising costs for consultants and consulting services (\$210,900), official travel (\$876,300), facilities and infrastructure (\$3,279,500), ground transportation (\$1,327,200), air operations (\$10,320,000), communications and information technology (\$3,168,200), medical (\$868,100) and other supplies, services and equipment (\$5,687,400).
- 344. A vacancy rate of 23.7 per cent has been applied to the estimates for continuing international positions on the basis of the actual vacancy rate in March 2023. Vacancy rates of 43.8 per cent for National Professional Officers, 29.4 per cent for Local level positions and 43.0 per cent and 80.0 per cent for international and national United Nations Volunteers, respectively, have been applied on the basis of the actual vacancy rates in March 2023. A vacancy rate of 50 per cent has been applied for the one new proposed position. The estimates include the application of vacancy rates of 10.7 per cent and 38.0 per cent for the military observers and United Nations police personnel, respectively, on the basis of the actual deployment as of March 2023.
- 345. In 2024, building on experience and adapting to fast-changing realities on the ground, some key reconfigurations and additions are proposed to the Mission's structure and staffing to further optimize resources and mandate delivery, as follows:

#### Office of the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Political Affairs

- (a) Establishment of the Office of the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Political Affairs in Khartoum to be headed by an Assistant Secretary-General to report to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General. The proposed establishment is in response to the increased need for good offices and political facilitation by UNITAMS to implement existing and future peace or ceasefire agreements and the political transition. The proposed establishment of a political pillar will entail a realignment of the substantive sections of the mission, including the Office of Support to the Political Transition, the Integrated Electoral Assistance Division, the Police Advisory Unit, the Rule of Law Unit, Heads of the regional offices and the Darfur Permanent Ceasefire Committee mission component reporting to the Office of the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Political Affairs;
- (b) Establishment of one position of Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Political Affairs at the Assistant Secretary-General level, based in Khartoum, to report to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and deputize for the Special Representative in political engagement, and enhance the overall management of the Mission's activities related to the political pillar while strengthening the presence of senior management in the field. In a fastpaced, highly volatile political and security context and a challenging operating environment,

the Deputy Special Representative will become key to supporting the Special Representative, providing strategic direction and managing the political component of the mission. These functions will be essential at a time of growing need for the political leadership of the Mission to travel outside of the country to engage with key interlocutors. They would also allow the other Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General (who is also Resident Coordinator and Humanitarian Coordinator) to focus on integration within the United Nations country team and wider humanitarian community, especially on the protection of civilians, peacebuilding and human rights. The proposed position would be responsible for: (a) providing substantive and technical advice to the Special Representative on all issues related to good offices and the facilitation of negotiations aimed at fostering peace and confidence-building among parties; (b) leading strategic planning and implementation of programmes under the political pillar of the mission, including through the development of a coherent political vision for the work of all sections and field presences; and (c) establishing close working relationships at senior level with key subnational, national, regional and international interlocutors, in support of the Special Representative's good offices, and guiding the Mission's strategic engagement with relevant stakeholders, with particular attention to the subnational level.

- 346. The Mission's approved 2023 staffing table includes two general temporary assistance positions. It is proposed that these positions be continued in 2024, as follows:
  - (a) One Senior Coordination Officer (P-5) in the Integrated Office of the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Resident Coordinator and Humanitarian Coordinator would be required to support the oversight and coordination of the Mission's protection of civilians, peacebuilding and human rights pillars, implement the joint vision and oversee strategic partnerships and engagement with international financial institutions, international donors and the Government, in line with requested prioritization of integration by the Security Council in its resolution 2579 (2021);
  - (b) One Programme Management Officer (P-4) in the Mine Action Unit of the Integrated Office of the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Resident Coordinator and Humanitarian Coordinator would be required to provide technical assistance on mine action matters and the clearance of explosive ordnance within priority areas in the UNITAMS area of responsibility, with a focus on the Two Areas, and to advocate for mine action initiatives in areas under the control of armed groups.
- 347. The decrease in requirements for 2024 compared with the appropriation for 2023 is attributable to the decreased requirements under civilian personnel costs, resulting from the application of a lower percentage of common staff costs of 66.8 per cent compared with 77.7 per cent applied in the 2023 budget, as well as the application of a higher vacancy rate of 43.8 per cent for National Professional Officers in 2024 compared with 30.0 per cent applied in 2023. The decrease is partially offset by higher requirements under military and police personnel costs, owing to the application of a lower vacancy rate of 10.7 per cent for military observers compared with 40.0 per cent applied in the 2023 budget, coupled with the application of the latest standard mission subsistence allowance rates, which are higher than those applied in the 2023 budget.
- 348. With regard to operational costs, given the fluidity and volatility of the security and operational landscapes, the proposed resources for UNITAMS as contained in the present budget have been kept at a maintenance level equal to the appropriation for 2023, in the amount of \$25,737,600, to allow the Mission to continue to execute its mandate, subject to further changes and evolution in the security and operational parameters, which will take time to manifest. The Secretariat will continue to assess the situation and take measures as required to respond adaptively to the needs arising on the ground, including ensuring proper duty of care to Mission staff, to support the continuation of political and other efforts being delivered or facilitated by UNITAMS towards resolving the current crisis and a return to stability and a political process.

#### Extrabudgetary resources

- 349. In 2023, extrabudgetary resources in the amount of \$6,025,000 are projected to be utilized, comprising the following funding sources:
  - (a) \$5,781,000 under the Mission's trust fund in support of the good offices and political functions of the Mission and to provide for the continuation of six positions (1 P-3, 3 Field Service, 1 National Professional Officer and 1 Local level) and other activities, including support to extend and expand the Mission's support to ongoing peace processes, the good offices of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, the implementation of the Juba Peace Agreement and local deployments to defuse tensions;
  - (b) \$244,000 under the multi-year appeal trust fund of the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs to provide for the staff costs of two positions (1 P-4 and 1 National Professional Officer) to support Sudanese women to meaningfully participate in future inclusive dialogues for a sustainable political solution to the crisis in the Sudan and ensure that their rights are safeguarded in the democratic transition and to provide an adviser for climate and peace and security.
- 350. For 2024, extrabudgetary resources in the amount of \$2,744,000 are projected to be utilized as follows:
  - (a) \$2,500,000 under the Mission's trust fund in support of the good offices and political functions of the Mission and to provide for the continuation of six positions (1 P-3, 3 Field Service, 1 National Professional Officer and 1 Local level) and other activities, including support to extend and expand the Mission's support to ongoing peace processes, the good offices of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, the implementation of the Juba Peace Agreement and local deployments to defuse tensions;
  - (b) \$244,000 under the multi-year appeal trust fund of the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs to provide for the continuation of two positions (1 P-4 and 1 National Professional Officer) to support Sudanese women to meaningfully participate in future inclusive dialogues for a sustainable political solution to the crisis in the Sudan and ensure that their rights are safeguarded in the democratic transition and to provide an adviser for climate and peace and security.
- 351. The decrease in the estimated extrabudgetary resources available for utilization in 2024 compared with 2023 is a consequence of the suspension of aid owing to the 2021 coup. It is hoped that a resumption of the transitional process will facilitate resource mobilization and voluntary contributions. In addition, it is expected that this will result in progress towards a more comprehensive peace agreement and enable a shift towards peace implementation and development.

## Annex I

Summary of follow-up action taken to implement decisions and requests made by the General Assembly, including the requests and recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions endorsed by the Assembly

Brief description of the recommendation

Action taken to implement the recommendation

#### Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions A/77/7/Add.4

The Advisory Committee notes the existing capacity of the Integrated Office of the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Resident Coordinator and Humanitarian Coordinator, which has six positions currently, as well as additional capacity in the component offices working on civilian protection and electoral assistance. Therefore, the Committee is not fully convinced by the proposal and recommends that the proposed Senior Coordination Officer (P-5) be established as a general temporary assistance position at this stage. The Committee trusts that updated information will be provided in the next budget submission (para. 44).

The Advisory Committee notes with concern the number of vacant positions, particularly at the national level, and trusts that the recruitment for all vacant positions will be completed expeditiously and that updated information will be provided to the General Assembly in the next budget submission (para. 48). The Integrated Office in the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in the Sudan (UNITAMS) comprises the immediate front office of the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Resident Coordinator and Humanitarian Coordinator and the peacebuilding team, and is integrated with the Resident Coordinator's Office, the joint secretariat of the Peacebuilding Fund and the United Nations multi-partner trust fund and the Durable Solutions Unit.

These capacities, managed by the Chief of the Integrated Office, support the Deputy Special Representative, Resident Coordinator and Humanitarian Coordinator in her role to ensure coherence around expected outputs and results for her pillar, encompassing peacebuilding, human rights and protection, mine action, and integration with the United Nations country team across the peace, humanitarian and development nexus.

Special political missions have invested efforts in recruitment to fill vacancies as expeditiously as possible.

For example, the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia reinforced its Human Resources Unit to cope with the high volume of recruitments (over 90 since June 2022). Furthermore, the Mission plans to migrate the recruitment of national positions to Inspira in the second quarter of 2023, which will also expedite the recruitment process for national positions. This will also ensure a streamlined, fair and transparent process, broader outreach, easier monitoring and proper segregation of responsibilities.

The United Nations Mission to Support the Hudaydah Agreement (UNMHA) ramped up its recruitment campaign throughout 2022 and significantly raised the number of onboarded civilian personnel and observers, from 90 in 2021 to 141 in March 2023. Brief description of the recommendation

UNITAMS actively recruited to fill vacant positions, including national positions. In 2022, the Mission faced delays with the issuance of visas to finalize onboarding of internationally recruited staff. Furthermore, national recruitment challenges included the unavailability of profiles, mainly in the regions, where additional outreach activities would be carried out. The Mission strived to reflect the ethnic diversity of the country, especially in the regions, which required additional outreach efforts and re-advertising of vacancies.

The United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH) experienced a high turnover of national staff positions (47 per cent during the past three budget years), owing mainly to the deteriorating security situation across the country. Although outreach efforts are being made by the mission to attract interest from the national workforce, the number of qualified applicants remains low owing to a lack of proper professional experience, training and qualifications. The same experience has been shared among agencies, funds and programmes in Haiti.

Detailed information with respect to the latest recruitment status of positions vacant for longer than two years under each mission is provided in the supplementary information.

UNMHA has conducted an independent review of its medical resources to ensure the efficient and effective use of resources and services. The findings are provided in paragraph 281 of the present report. The findings also informed the proposed budget for 2024, which includes the establishment of three medical positions and the reduction in contractual services.

Special political missions have taken measures to strengthen efforts to achieve equitable geographical representation in their workforce. In many missions, hiring managers are required to demonstrate, using the current data on geographical representation, the impact of such recommendations. The revised template of the selection memorandums now allows hiring managers to review, before a candidate is selected, whether the proposed selection improves the geographical representation of the mission. The data are also monitored on a quarterly basis through the management dashboard to guide the course of recruitment actions.

Further efforts include reviewing language requirements with a view to lowering such requirements in order to broaden the pool of applicants. For example, in the United Nations

The Advisory Committee notes the significant variances between the appropriations and expenditures since 2020, and trusts that an evaluation of medical resources will be conducted to ensure the efficient and effective use of resources and services, and that an update will be provided in the next budget report (para. 71).

The Advisory Committee notes the continued disparity among regional groups and trusts that more efforts will be made to achieve an equitable geographical representation of Member States among the staff in all the special political missions, and that an update will be provided in all future budget submissions (para. 75). Brief description of the recommendation

Action taken to implement the recommendation

Verification Mission in Colombia, consideration was given to reduce the requirement for Spanish from "fluency" to "working knowledge", or to include it as a desirable criterion rather than a mandatory criterion. However, this is not always feasible, as language fluency has proven critical for performing the functions of substantive positions.

The geographical representation, by country, of the international staff positions in all 39 special political missions is provided centrally in annex XIX of document A/78/6 (Sect. 3)/Add.1.

The cost recovery and cost-sharing arrangements of all special political missions are centrally presented in annexes VI, VII and VIII of document A/78/6 (Sect. 3)/Add.1 to enable a consolidated and holistic view.

budgetIn both integrated and non-integrated missions, special<br/>political missions continue to maximize cooperation<br/>with the resident coordinator system to achieve greater<br/>synergy. A few examples are provided below.

The United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa (UNOCA) collaborates with the resident coordinator offices in the region to identify and implement extrabudgetary projects. In 2022, three such projects were implemented in collaboration with the resident coordinator offices. It also monitors the political and security situation in countries of the Economic Community of Central African States in collaboration with the resident coordinator offices. UNOCA also supports resident coordinators and United Nations country teams in helping to address structural conflict prevention efforts at the country level, including through contributions to common country assessments, United Nations Sustainable Development Cooperation Frameworks and relevant sustaining peace strategies.

The United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia worked closely with the Resident Coordinator Office and the country team to promote the comprehensive implementation of the Final Agreement for Ending the Conflict and Building a Stable and Lasting Peace at the national/strategic level and at sectorial/technical levels. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General participates in regular meetings with the Resident Coordinator and agencies, funds and programmes to discuss the status of implementation of the specific elements of the Agreement. These meetings include a meeting every two months with the country team on peace issues, weekly meetings with the Resident Coordinator Office and heads of United

The Advisory Committee trusts that disaggregated cost recovery data and resources related to cost-sharing will be included as separate tables in future budget submissions (para. 78).

The Advisory Committee trusts that future budget submissions will include more detailed information on the cooperation between special political missions and the resident coordinator system (para. 80). Brief description of the recommendation

Nations agencies, funds and programmes, and quarterly meetings with women's organizations to discuss progress on the implementation of gender provisions of the Agreement. Joint missions to the field with the Resident Coordinator Office and heads of agencies, funds and programmes were also undertaken. At the sectorial/technical level, different verification pillars of the Mission also meet regularly with United Nations agencies, funds and programmes to coordinate activities aimed at advancing the implementation of the Agreement, such as the interagency working group on security guarantees, working groups on reintegration, the inter-agency task force on ethnic issues and the gender task force of international cooperation.

UNMHA cooperates with the Resident Coordinator Office and the country team across a range of areas that contribute to the advancement of the UNMHA mandate. Two such examples are the joint work on mine awareness campaigns, carried out with the country team in Yemen, and the coordination and logistical support provided to the salvage operation for the FSO Safer oil tanker.

In BINUH, efforts to strengthen integration include joint participation by the mission and the United Nations country team in the key policymaking and strategy forums. At the technical level, BINUH, the Resident Coordinator Office and the country team collaborate through joint programmes and teams in areas including community violence reduction, justice, elections and police reform.

#### BINUH is undertaking a year-long national communications campaign particularly targeting youth, through radio, print, video, social media and outreach activities, to garner support for the mission's advocacy and good offices efforts to advance a peaceful and stable environment, including by fostering cooperation and dialogue among the main political and social actors, building consensus and strengthening political stability and good governance, as well as promoting the participation of women as decision makers in State institutions, political parties and initiatives of dialogue and consensus-building.

As part of this campaign, strategic communications activities using radio broadcasts, print, video and the Internet will seek to promote the implementation of the mission's strategic plan to support the Government to further develop the Haitian National Police, reduce

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The Advisory Committee trusts that information on the communications strategy and its impact will be provided in the next programme budget report (para. 13).

Brief description of the recommendation	Action taken to implement the recommendation
	gang violence and enhance police oversight. Other communications activities will seek to inform the Haitian public about the mission's advocacy programmes on disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, community violence reduction and weapons and ammunition management.
	To complement communications activities focused on public security and support to the police, a strategic communications campaign will employ mass media, social media and public events, in cooperation with the United Nations Communications Group, to raise awareness about human rights abuses and violations, sexual and gender-based violence and gender discrimination, and to strengthen institutional accountability to address these problems and end impunity for perpetrators.
	Finally, the communications strategy also encompasses strategic communications activities through print and broadcast outlets to improve Haitians' understanding of their rights and legal processes and to raise awareness among the population of the efforts made by BINUH and the national institutions towards the improved functionin of judicial and penitentiary institutions.
	While implementation of the strategy is still in progress, BINUH has increased the use of social media to better reach key Haitian stakeholders and th population, in addition to disseminating multiple pres releases, news articles and items of multimedia content that have focused attention on United Nations activities and statements, as well as increased engagement with national and international news media to increase impact.
The Advisory Committee trusts that updated information on the security situation will be provided in the next budget submission (para. 17).	Gang-related violence has reached levels not seen in decades and remains the major threat to public security in Haiti. Armed gangs are expanding their influence into neighbourhoods of the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area that were considered relatively safe until recently. Turf battles between gangs have displaced tens of thousands of people in Port-au- Prince, with most of the affected living in spontaneou sites for internally displaced persons. These, too, hav become hotspots for violent crime, further challengin the capacity of the already overstretched national police.
	Although the Verneur fuel terminal is new neutially


Although the Varreux fuel terminal is now partially operational – after a two-month gang blockade in 2022 that left the country almost without fuel – the National Port Authority and other commercial ports remain under constant attack by gangs. Road transportation

Brief description of the recommendation	Action taken to implement the recommendation
	remains at risk, with cargo shipping containers and goods being regularly hijacked and stolen. Police continued to struggle to maintain patrols around the ports, while gangs retained control of most of the main transport thoroughfares linking Port-au-Prince with the northern and southern departments.
Noting the need to deploy mission support staff on temporary duty assignments, the Advisory Committee trusts that further information on the efficacy of the mission support business model will be provided in the next budget submission (para. 24).	From December 2022 to early 2023, BINUH conducted a civilian staffing review of its mission support structure. The review took into account cost- effectiveness, the complexity of the workload, the volume and number of assets, the number of staff and clients served, and the fast-increasing demands in the area of operational resources and supply chain. The review also considered the reduction of temporary duty assignment requests and the use of regular positions to fulfil roles of a continuing nature. The result of this review has informed the proposal put forward in the proposed budget for 2024.
The Advisory Committee is not fully convinced on the need for outsourced personnel to resolve periodic mission support requirements. The Committee trusts that further information on the efficacy of the support business model in Haiti will be provided in the next budget report (para. 26).	BINUH plans to streamline and strengthen its mission support structure with a view to enhancing operational efficiency in the provision of enabling services with both the existing and new proposed staffing resources. The proposed establishment of new positions is designed to respond to structural gaps and needs in the mission support architecture and to position the mission for the effective delivery of its mandate.

## Annex II


## Organizational structure and post distribution for 2024

1. United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel




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#### 2. United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia




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
## **3.** United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia




4. United Nations support for the Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission




#### 5. Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon




#### 6. United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa



#### 7. United Nations Support Mission in Libya




#### United Nations Support Mission in Libya (continued): Mission Support Service




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#### 8. United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia




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
#### United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia (continued): Mission Support




#### 9. United Nations Mission to Support the Hudaydah Agreement



#### 10. United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti




#### 11. United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in the Sudan



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#### United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in the Sudan (continued): Mission Support



Abbreviations: ASG, Assistant Secretary-General; FS, Field Service; GS (OL), General Service (Other level); GTA, general temporary assistance; LL, Local level; NPO, National Professional Officer; RB, regular budget; UNV, United Nations Volunteer; USG, Under-Secretary-General; XB, extrabudgetary.

- <sup>*a*</sup> Redeployment.
- <sup>b</sup> Reassignment.
- <sup>c</sup> Reclassification.
- <sup>d</sup> Establishment.
- <sup>e</sup> Conversion.

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