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Item 139 of the preliminary list*

Proposed programme budget for 2024

Proposed programme budget for 2024

Part II

Political affairs

Section 3

Political affairs

Special political missions

Thematic cluster I: special and personal envoys, advisers and representatives of the Secretary-General

Summary

The present report contains the proposed resource requirements for 2024 for 10 special political missions grouped under the thematic cluster of special and personal envoys, advisers and representatives of the Secretary-General.

The proposed resource requirements for 2024 for special political missions grouped under this cluster amount to \$47,873,300 (net of staff assessment).

* [A/78/50](#).



Contents

	<i>Page</i>
I. Resource overview	4
II. Cross-cutting information	6
III. Special political missions	7
1. Office of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Cyprus	7
A. Proposed programme plan for 2024 and programme performance in 2022**	8
B. Proposed post and non-post resource requirements for 2024***	13
2. Office of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide	15
A. Proposed programme plan for 2024 and programme performance in 2022**	16
B. Proposed post and non-post resource requirements for 2024***	22
3. Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Western Sahara	25
A. Proposed programme plan for 2024 and programme performance in 2022**	26
B. Proposed post and non-post resource requirements for 2024***	29
4. Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the implementation of Security Council resolution 1559 (2004)	31
A. Proposed programme plan for 2024 and programme performance in 2022**	31
B. Proposed post and non-post resource requirements for 2024***	35
5. Office of the United Nations Representative to the Geneva International Discussions	37
A. Proposed programme plan for 2024 and programme performance in 2022**	38
B. Proposed post and non-post resource requirements for 2024***	43
6. Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria	45
A. Proposed programme plan for 2024 and programme performance in 2022**	46
B. Proposed post and non-post resource requirements for 2024***	51
7. Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Horn of Africa	53
A. Proposed programme plan for 2024 and programme performance in 2022**	54
B. Proposed post and non-post resource requirements for 2024***	59
8. Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region	61
A. Proposed programme plan for 2024 and programme performance in 2022**	62
B. Proposed post and non-post resource requirements for 2024***	70
9. Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen	73
A. Proposed programme plan for 2024 and programme performance in 2022**	74
B. Proposed post and non-post resource requirements for 2024***	79

** The part consisting of the proposed programme plan for 2024 is submitted for the consideration of the General Assembly in accordance with the established budgetary procedures and practices reaffirmed in paragraph 7 of Assembly resolution [77/267](#).

*** In keeping with paragraph 10 of General Assembly resolution [77/267](#), the part consisting of the post and non-post resource requirements (part III) is submitted through the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions for the consideration of the Assembly.

10. Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Myanmar	81
A. Proposed programme plan for 2024 and programme performance in 2022**	82
B. Proposed post and non-post resource requirements for 2024***	88
Annexes	
I. Summary of follow-up action taken to implement decisions and requests of the General Assembly, including the requests and recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions endorsed by the Assembly	90
II. Organizational structure and post distribution for 2024	92

I. Resource overview

1. The proposed resources for 2024 for the 10 special political missions grouped under thematic cluster I amount to \$47,873,300 (net of staff assessment). Tables 1 and 2 provide a comparison between the financial and human resources proposed for 2024 and such resources for 2023 as approved by the General Assembly in its resolution [77/263 A](#).

Table 1
Financial resources

(Thousands of United States dollars)

Mission	2022		2023	2024	Variance
	Appropriation	Expenditure	Appropriation	Estimate	2024 vs. 2023 Increase/ (decrease)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)=(4)-(3)
Office of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Cyprus	2 955.0	2 523.5	3 036.3	3 079.1	42.8
Office of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide	2 698.3	2 393.6	2 816.4	2 819.3	2.9
Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Western Sahara	476.5	267.9	475.2	567.8	92.6
Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the implementation of Security Council resolution 1559 (2004)	338.6	393.4	372.2	420.1	47.9
Office of the United Nations Representative to the Geneva International Discussions	2 045.0	1 745.4	1 950.0	2 059.1	109.1
Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria	16 132.6	12 630.3	15 001.6	14 200.6	(801.0)
Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Horn of Africa	1 763.6	1 586.1	1 754.5	1 654.6	(99.9)
Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region	5 133.9	4 406.1	5 737.9	4 984.1	(753.8)
Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen	17 202.0	16 240.6	17 051.3	16 708.3	(343.0)
Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Myanmar	1 153.5	1 223.8	1 408.6	1 380.3	(28.3)
Total	49 899.0	43 410.7	49 604.0	47 873.3	(1 730.7)

Table 2
Human resources

	<i>Military observers/ advisers</i>	<i>Military contingents</i>	<i>United Nations police</i>	<i>Government- provided personnel</i>	<i>International staff^a</i>	<i>National staff^b</i>	<i>United Nations Volunteers^c</i>	<i>Total</i>
Office of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Cyprus								
Approved 2023	–	–	–	–	16	5	–	21
Proposed 2024	–	–	–	–	16	5	–	21
Office of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide								
Approved 2023	–	–	–	–	13	–	–	13
Proposed 2024	–	–	–	–	13	–	2	15
Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Western Sahara								
Approved 2023	–	–	–	–	2	–	–	2
Proposed 2024	–	–	–	–	2	–	–	2
Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the implementation of Security Council resolution 1559 (2004)								
Approved 2023	–	–	–	–	3	–	–	3
Proposed 2024	–	–	–	–	3	–	–	3
Office of the United Nations Representative to the Geneva International Discussions								
Approved 2023	–	–	–	–	7	–	–	7
Proposed 2024	–	–	–	–	7	–	–	7
Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria								
Approved 2023	–	–	–	–	57	31	–	88
Proposed 2024	–	–	–	–	53	34	–	87
Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Horn of Africa								
Approved 2023	–	–	–	–	5	4	–	9
Proposed 2024	–	–	–	–	5	4	–	9
Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region								
Approved 2023	–	–	–	–	22	8	–	30
Proposed 2024	–	–	–	–	22	8	–	30
Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen								
Approved 2023	–	–	–	–	59	42	–	101
Proposed 2024	–	–	–	–	59	42	–	101
Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Myanmar								
Proposed 2023	–	–	–	–	4	1	–	5
Proposed 2024	–	–	–	–	4	1	–	5
Total								
Approved 2023	–	–	–	–	188	91	–	279
Proposed 2024	–	–	–	–	184	94	2	280
Net change	–	–	–	–	(4)	3	2	1

^a Includes staff in the Professional and higher categories and Field Service and General Service staff.

^b Includes National Professional Officers and Local level staff.

^c Includes international and national United Nations Volunteers.

Note: The following abbreviations are used in the tables: ASG, Assistant Secretary-General; FS, Field Service; GS, General Service; LL, Local level; NPO, National Professional Officers; USG, Under-Secretary-General.

2. The proposed vacancy rates applied in the budget take into account the experience to date. The assumptions considered for the proposed vacancy factors include the 12-month average vacancy rate in 2022 and the actual vacancy rate as at 31 March 2023. The lower of the two was used as the budgeted vacancy rate. This is in line with the policy guidance provided by the Field Operations Finance Division of the Department of Management Strategy, Policy and Compliance to improve the accuracy and consistency of the vacancy factors applied in the proposed budgets for 2024 and to ensure that the proposed vacancy rates are based, as much as possible, on actual rates. A vacancy rate of 50 per cent has been applied in the calculation of costs for the proposed establishment of new posts and positions, or posts and positions proposed for reassignment or conversion.
3. For the sake of brevity, the present document will include a section on extrabudgetary resources only for those missions that have projected extrabudgetary resources in 2023 or 2024.

II. Cross-cutting information

Gender perspective

4. Special political missions are guided by Security Council resolutions [1325 \(2000\)](#), [1820 \(2008\)](#), [1888 \(2009\)](#), [1889 \(2009\)](#), [1960 \(2010\)](#), [2106 \(2013\)](#), [2122 \(2013\)](#), [2242 \(2015\)](#), [2467 \(2019\)](#) and [2493 \(2019\)](#), which together constitute the women and peace and security agenda and mandate the incorporation of a gender perspective into the political work of the United Nations, including in special political missions. The missions are also guided by General Assembly resolution [75/100](#) on the comprehensive review of special political missions, in which the Assembly reaffirmed the important role of women in the prevention and resolution of conflicts and in peacebuilding and recognized the importance of the equal and effective participation and the full involvement of women at all levels, at all stages and in all aspects of the peaceful settlement of disputes, conflict prevention and conflict resolution.
5. Specific examples of how special political missions integrate a gender perspective into their operational activities, deliverables and results are given under the individual missions in the present report.

Disability inclusion

6. In line with the United Nations Disability Inclusion Strategy, special political missions review the Strategy with a view to further advancing disability inclusion through inclusive messaging, awareness-raising and promoting the Strategy through their work, including in political and peace processes. The missions also support mitigating measures to overcome accessibility challenges, in addition to the efforts by relevant United Nations entities to ensure the accessibility of facilities, platforms, security and other infrastructure to facilitate easy access and use by persons with disabilities.

Evaluation activities

7. The Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs will support the biennial assessment by the Office of Internal Oversight Services on strengthening the role of evaluation and the application of evaluation findings on programme design, delivery and policy directives. Mission-specific evaluation activities are described, as applicable, under the specific missions in the present report.

Impact of the pandemic and lessons learned

8. The continuation of the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic into 2022 had an impact on the implementation of mandates in the special political missions. Specific examples are provided under the individual missions in the present report.
9. Special political missions continue to mainstream lessons learned and best practices related to the adjustments to and adaptation of the programme owing to the COVID-19 pandemic. At the same time, it is assumed that those operational conditions have improved and allow for mandate implementation through formerly established approaches. Any modifications to planned deliverables would be in pursuance of the objectives, strategies and mandates and would be reported as part of the programme performance information.

III. Special political missions

1. Office of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Cyprus

(\$3,079,100)

Foreword

The United Nations continues its efforts to bring the sides closer together and find opportunities for cooperation. The Greek Cypriot leader and the Turkish Cypriot leader met twice in 2022, in April for the launch of the “action plan on ways to ensure women’s full, equal and meaningful participation in the settlement process/an eventual settlement process in Cyprus” and at an end-of-year reception that I hosted in December. These events were received positively by the public as a sign that, despite their differences, the two leaders were still willing to meet and talk.

In the absence of active peace talks, the ongoing dialogue in my weekly meetings with the representatives of the two leaders and in the working-level meetings of the good offices mission with the coordinators of the 12 technical committees have provided an important space to discuss issues of mutual importance and solve problems. The technical committees have also continued their work to achieve practical improvements in the daily lives of Cypriots and to build favourable conditions for an eventual settlement. This dialogue produced some positive results, but the dynamics on the ground caused delays in the implementation of some projects.

In 2024, I will continue my engagement with the two Cypriot leaders and their teams, civil society and the international community towards finding a lasting settlement in Cyprus.

(Signed) Colin **Stewart**
Deputy Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Cyprus

A. Proposed programme plan for 2024 and programme performance in 2022

Overall orientation

Mandates and background

10. The mandate of the Office of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Cyprus derives from the priorities established in relevant Security Council resolutions and decisions and an exchange of letters between the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council ([S/2008/456](#) and [S/2008/457](#)). In resolution [1818 \(2008\)](#), the Council welcomed the intention of the Secretary-General to appoint a Special Adviser at the appropriate time. In a letter dated 10 July 2008 addressed to the President of the Security Council ([S/2008/456](#)), the Secretary-General announced his intention to appoint his Special Adviser on Cyprus as from 14 July 2008. Relevant Security Council resolutions from which the mandate derives include resolution [186 \(1964\)](#) and subsequent Council resolutions, including resolutions [367 \(1975\)](#), [1250 \(1999\)](#), [1475 \(2003\)](#), [1758 \(2007\)](#), [1818 \(2008\)](#), [1873 \(2009\)](#), [1930 \(2010\)](#), [1986 \(2011\)](#), [2026 \(2011\)](#), [2058 \(2012\)](#), [2114 \(2013\)](#), [2135 \(2014\)](#), [2168 \(2014\)](#), [2197 \(2015\)](#), [2234 \(2015\)](#), [2263 \(2016\)](#), [2300 \(2016\)](#), [2338 \(2017\)](#), [2369 \(2017\)](#), [2398 \(2018\)](#), [2430 \(2018\)](#), [2453 \(2019\)](#), [2483 \(2019\)](#), [2506 \(2020\)](#), [2537 \(2020\)](#), [2561 \(2021\)](#), [2587 \(2021\)](#), [2618 \(2022\)](#), [2646 \(2022\)](#) and [2674 \(2023\)](#).
11. In its resolution [2674 \(2023\)](#), the Security Council noted with regret the lack of progress made towards restarting formal negotiations, and fully supported the Secretary-General's ongoing engagement with the sides and encouraged further rounds of informal talks. The Council urged the sides to engage actively and without further delay with the Secretary-General and his team, including by reaching an agreement regarding the proposal of the Secretary-General to appoint a United Nations envoy.
12. The Secretary-General, in his latest report ([S/2023/6](#)), encouraged the two leaders to engage in a constructive dialogue that could contribute to a more conducive environment for a settlement. He also stressed that the demonstration by the sides of political will and flexibility remained of paramount importance, and he noted that a United Nations envoy could lead the engagement with the parties and provide critical support to explore ways to reach common ground towards resuming negotiations for a lasting settlement in Cyprus. The two leaders have continued to demonstrate a willingness to work with the United Nations in the past year, and this openness will be needed in the coming period.
13. In the absence of agreement on a United Nations envoy, the Secretary-General and United Nations senior officials have continued to engage with the parties with a view to finding agreement on a way forward on the Cyprus peace process. While the regional dynamics remained complicated for most of 2022, there have been positive steps towards rapprochement following the devastating earthquakes of 6 February 2023. These steps could help re-energize the parties' commitment to finding common ground on the way forward.

Programme of work

Objective

14. The objective, to which this mission contributes, is to achieve a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem.

Strategy and external factors for 2024

15. To contribute to the objective, the mission will:
 - (a) Use its best endeavours with the two leaders and the guarantor powers to promote a peaceful solution and to assist them, should they jointly agree, in the conduct of full-fledged negotiations;
 - (b) Regularly conduct bilateral meetings and facilitate joint meetings between the leaders, negotiators/representatives and their teams, working groups and experts;
 - (c) Intensify its support for the implementation of confidence-building measures and the work of the technical committees to help both sides make progress towards promoting just, peaceful and inclusive societies.
16. The above-mentioned work is expected to result in:
 - (a) Continuation of dialogue towards an enduring, comprehensive and just settlement of the Cyprus problem. Should significant progress be achieved, the United Nations may be called upon to intensify its support, possibly also by convening the stakeholders to address substantive issues;
 - (b) Implementation of confidence-building measures;
 - (c) Empowerment and facilitation of the work of the technical committees.
17. With regard to cooperation with other entities at the global, regional, national and local levels, the mission, if so requested by the sides, will continue to coordinate the engagement of international financial institutions in support of the process, in particular, the European Central Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. In addition, the mission will cooperate and coordinate activities with the European Commission as relevant to its support for the peace process.
18. With regard to inter-agency coordination and liaison, the mission, the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) and the United Nations country team will continue to operate in a cooperative way to maximize synergies and ensure coherent and effective support for United Nations peace efforts.
19. With regard to the external factors, the overall plan for 2024 is based on the following planning assumptions:
 - (a) Continued and sustained political commitment of the parties to the political process and the implementation of confidence-building measures;
 - (b) Continued and sustained international support for the peace process.
20. The mission integrates a gender perspective in its operational activities, deliverables and results, as appropriate. The mission supports activities by both sides, the work of the Technical Committee on Gender Equality and women's civil society platforms in both communities to advance gender-related issues and provides support for greater civic engagement towards a more inclusive peace process. In accordance with best practice, the mission will support the involvement of underrepresented groups, including women, minorities, youth and persons with disabilities, in discussions pertaining to the Cyprus issue and in the peace process.
21. In line with the United Nations Disability Inclusion Strategy, the mission will further seek to promote disability inclusion internally by creating the space for employment opportunities for qualified candidates. At the political level, it will continue to advocate for inclusion of the views of persons with disabilities in all decision-making platforms, including the technical committees, as change agents for peace, security and sustainable development. In order to mainstream disability inclusion into the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of their activities, as well as targeted measures where appropriate, UNFICYP and the Office of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Cyprus envision developing a joint action plan for the implementation of the Strategy.

Impact of the pandemic and lessons learned

22. The continuation of the COVID-19 pandemic into 2022 had an impact on mandate implementation. The mission organized fewer large-scale in-person meetings with the leaders and their representatives and other stakeholders. Such meetings, which bring stakeholders from both sides of the island together to ensure the inclusion of representatives of civil society in dialogue processes towards a solution to the Cyprus issue, are an important part of the peace process and have been requested by the Security Council. The mission continued the use of virtual and hybrid meetings and increased the number of smaller-format in-person meetings with the sides and the guarantor powers. In-person meetings continue to be indispensable to ensure the quality of interactions because of the nature, complexity and confidentiality of the discussions around the Cyprus issue.
23. In addition, to support the communities on issues related to COVID-19, within the overall scope of the objectives, the mission engaged in dialogue with representatives of both sides and the Technical Committee on Health to strengthen cooperation on health, vaccines and other COVID-19-related issues.
24. The mission continues to mainstream lessons learned and best practices related to the adjustments to and adaptation of the programme owing to the COVID-19 pandemic, including the continued implementation of alternative work arrangements and the use of information and communications technology to reduce the need for travel, as online meetings are a time- and cost-effective method of communication. However, some in-person meetings are crucial owing to the nature and confidentiality of good offices work, and some interactions require a high level of interaction and trust-building. Furthermore, events with a higher number of participants can only take place in person and will remain an indispensable component for effective mandate delivery. Online training tools, workshops and training sessions will continue to be utilized as a time- and cost-effective alternative; however, face-to-face seminars and conferences are in some circumstances indispensable owing to the nature of interactions and the complexity of content and learning activities.

Programme performance in 2022

Consistent engagement, conflict prevention and efforts to reach common ground towards resuming peace talks

25. In 2022, the Secretary-General met separately with the two leaders and held meetings with the guarantor powers. The Assistant Secretary-General for Europe, Central Asia and the Americas of the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and the Department of Peace Operations visited Cyprus three times and also visited the guarantor powers. Both leaders met on 13 April and on 7 December in Cyprus, with both engagements providing important positive political signals. The mission continued its engagement with the sides, including by facilitating weekly meetings, supporting the work of the technical committees and interacting with a broad network of interlocutors.
26. Progress towards the objective is presented in the performance measure below (see table 3).

Table 3
Performance measure

2020 (actual)	2021 (actual)	2022 (actual)
Continued engagement with the two leaders and their teams and provision of the required support for senior-level engagement, including consultations by a senior United Nations official aimed at achieving a consensus starting point for negotiations	Continued engagement with the two leaders and their teams and provision of the required support for senior-level engagement, including an informal five-plus-one meeting convened by the Secretary-General in Geneva and an informal lunch for the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot leaders hosted by the Secretary-General in New York	Engagement with the two leaders and their teams and support for senior-level engagement, including separate meetings between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot leaders with the Secretary-General, three visits of the Assistant Secretary-General for Europe, Central Asia and the Americas to Cyprus and one to each of the guarantor powers, and two meetings of the leaders in Cyprus

Planned result for 2024

Continued dialogue to assist in the search for common ground

Programme performance in 2022 and target for 2024


27. In 2022, the mission's work contributed to the holding of 90 bilateral and joint meetings with the leaders and their teams and 350 meetings of the technical committees and working groups, which partially met the planned targets of 140 meetings and 410 meetings, respectively. This was primarily due to the absence of active negotiations, but also in part to COVID-19-related measures.
28. In 2024, the mission will engage with the sides and the guarantor powers to support efforts to build common ground towards negotiations. Should significant progress be achieved, the United Nations may be called upon to intensify its efforts, including by convening meetings of the stakeholders and through enhanced coordination of technical work. Efforts will include shuttle diplomacy and bilateral meetings, and the facilitation of joint meetings and meetings of the two sides' teams. The mission will continue its support for the implementation of confidence-building measures, the work of the 12 technical committees and greater civic engagement, including with women, minorities, youth and persons with disabilities, to support a more inclusive peace process.

Lessons learned and planned change

29. The lesson for the mission was that the peace process requires continued political commitment and sustained international support, as well as continued engagement with the sides and the guarantor powers. The work of the technical committees to build trust and reduce tensions is critical when there are no active negotiations. Engagement with civil society representatives, including women's and youth groups, is key to ensuring the inclusivity of the peace process, as requested by the Security Council. While the enhanced use of information technology for virtual meetings provided a time-effective alternative to in-person meetings, in-person meetings remain indispensable owing to the nature, complexity and confidentiality of the Cyprus issue.
30. In applying the lesson, the mission will continue to enhance dialogue with the sides and the guarantor powers; will continue the weekly coordination meetings with the sides to further empower the work of the technical committees; and will organize events to enhance the participation of civil society actors.
31. Expected progress towards the objective is presented in the performance measure below (see figure I).

Figure I

Performance measure: number of bilateral and joint meetings with the leaders and their negotiating teams and number of meetings of working groups and technical committees



Deliverables

32. Table 4 lists all deliverables of the mission.

Table 4

Deliverables for the period 2022–2024, by category and subcategory

Category and subcategory	2022 planned	2022 actual	2023 planned	2024 planned
A. Facilitation of the intergovernmental process and expert bodies				
Parliamentary documentation (number of documents)	3	1	2	2
1. Reports of the Secretary-General to the Security Council	3	1	2	2
Substantive services for meetings (number of three-hour meetings)	2	2	2	2
2. Meetings of the Security Council	2	2	2	2
C. Substantive deliverables				
Good offices: provision of good offices through engagement and bilateral and joint meetings with the Greek Cypriot leader and the Turkish Cypriot leader and other stakeholders in both communities as well as the three guarantor powers towards a settlement of the Cyprus issue. Conduct and facilitation of bilateral and joint meetings with the leaders and their teams and facilitation of the technical committees and working groups.				
Consultation, advice and advocacy: provision of advice on procedural, legal, technical and substantive issues towards a settlement of the Cyprus issue; coordination, management and facilitation of advisory meetings on issues related to the peace process; and advocacy on gender equality and encouragement of participation by women, youth and persons with disabilities in the peace process, and public support for the peace process.				
D. Communication deliverables				
External and media relations: interviews and press releases to inform the public about the peace process.				

B. Proposed post and non-post resource requirements for 2024

Resource requirements (regular budget)

Table 5

Financial resources

(Thousands of United States dollars)

Category of expenditure	2022		2023		2024	Variance
	Appropriation	Expenditure	Appropriation			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	Requirements	(4)	2024 vs. 2023 Increase/(decrease) (5)=(4)-(3)
Military and police personnel costs	—	—	—	—	—	—
Civilian personnel costs	2 529.3	2 254.6	2 608.1	2 650.9	2 650.9	42.8
Operational costs	425.7	268.9	428.2	428.2	428.2	—
Total (net of staff assessment)	2 955.0	2 523.5	3 036.3	3 079.1	3 079.1	42.8

Table 6

Human resources

	International staff											National staff			United Nations Volunteers			Total
	USG	ASG	D-2	D-1	P-5	P-4	P-3	P-2	FS	GS	Subtotal	NPO	LL	Subtotal	International	National	Subtotal	
Approved 2023	1 ^a	—	—	1	3	5	1	—	4	1 ^b	16	—	5	5	—	—	—	21
Proposed 2024	1 ^a	—	—	1	3	5	1	—	4	1 ^b	16	—	5	5	—	—	—	21
Change	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—

^a The Under-Secretary-General is on a when-actually-employed contract.^b Other level, unless otherwise stated.

33. The proposed resource requirements for 2024 for the Office of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Cyprus amount to \$3,079,100 (net of staff assessment) and would provide for salaries and common staff costs (\$2,650,900) for the continuation of 21 positions (1 Under-Secretary-General, 1 D-1, 3 P-5, 5 P-4, 1 P-3, 4 Field Service, 1 General Service (Other level) and 5 Local level), as well as operational costs (\$428,200), comprising costs for consultants and consulting services (\$28,600), official travel (\$100,300), facilities and infrastructure (\$96,000), ground transportation (\$45,300), communications and information technology (\$75,200), medical (\$300) and other supplies, services and equipment (\$82,500).
34. In 2024, no change is proposed to the number and levels of the positions.
35. A vacancy rate of 12.5 per cent has been applied to the estimates for international positions based on the vacancy rate in March 2023. A vacancy rate of 3.3 per cent has been applied to Local level positions, taking into account the actual average vacancy rate in 2022.
36. The increase in the requirements proposed for 2024 compared with the appropriation for 2023 is attributable mainly to increased requirements under civilian personnel costs, resulting from higher salary costs for international positions, offset in part by the application of a vacancy rate of 3.3 per cent compared to the budgeted vacancy rate of zero per cent for Local level positions in 2022.

Extrabudgetary resources

37. In 2023, extrabudgetary resources in the amount of \$35,400 are estimated for the support of a project that aims to ensure women's participation and the integration of gender perspectives, as well as the participation of civil society, including women's organizations and youth, in a future peace process in Cyprus. The project will conclude in 2023.
38. In 2024, no extrabudgetary resources are currently projected.

2. Office of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide

(\$2,819,300)

Foreword

Although the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide was adopted almost 75 years ago in 1948, the prevention of genocide remains a challenge. The legacy of unchecked advocacy of hatred, division and intolerance continues to challenge our collective resolve and capacity to prevent genocide and related crimes.

In 2022, we celebrated the first International Day for Countering Hate Speech, renewing our commitment against a risk factor that preceded the Holocaust, subsequent genocides and related crimes. Technology is important to the work that we do, in terms of monitoring and early warning. Through early warning and action, societies can address risk factors and prevent their progression. My Office is therefore placing a renewed focus on strengthening its analysis capacity to include online monitoring and increased reliance on technology to keep pace with new manifestations of threats. We will continue to prioritize action against Holocaust and genocide denial and advocacy for the universal ratification of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. Other priorities of the Office include strengthening the provision of technical assistance and capacity-building for Member States, regional organizations and civil society actors, including in the implementation of the United Nations Strategy and Plan of Action on Hate Speech.

(Signed) Alice Wairimu **Nderitu**
Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide

A. Proposed programme plan for 2024 and programme performance in 2022

Overall orientation

Mandates and background

39. The Office of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide is mandated to collect information, in particular from within the United Nations system, on massive and serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law of ethnic and racial origin that, if not prevented or halted, may lead to genocide; to act as a mechanism of early warning to the Secretary-General and, through him, to the Security Council, by bringing to their attention situations that could potentially result in genocide; to make recommendations to the Council, through the Secretary-General, on action to prevent or halt genocide; and to liaise with the United Nations system on activities for the prevention of genocide and on work to enhance the capacity of the United Nations to analyse and manage information regarding genocide or related crimes.
40. The mandate derives from the invitation of the Security Council to the Secretary-General in its resolution [1366 \(2001\)](#) to refer to the Council information and analysis from within the United Nations system on cases of serious violations of international law, including international humanitarian law and human rights law. The Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide was appointed through an exchange of letters between the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council ([S/2004/567](#) and [S/2004/568](#)). The mandate was reaffirmed in Council resolution [1674 \(2006\)](#), a further exchange of letters between the Secretary-General and the Council ([S/2007/721](#) and [S/2007/722](#)), and resolutions of the General Assembly (resolutions [60/1](#) and [63/308](#)), the Commission on Human Rights (resolution 2005/62) and the Human Rights Council (resolutions [7/25](#), [22/22](#), [28/34](#), [33/19](#), [37/26](#), [43/29](#) and [49/9](#)). In its resolution [49/9](#), the Human Rights Council, inter alia, invited the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide to continue to execute the activities under her mandate, including in the follow-up to the resolution, by providing States with guidance, assistance and follow-up, upon their request.
41. With regard to the responsibility to protect, the General Assembly, in paragraphs 138 and 139 of its resolution [60/1](#) on the 2005 World Summit Outcome, addressed the responsibility of Member States and the international community to protect populations. This was reaffirmed by the Security Council in its resolutions [1674 \(2006\)](#) and [1706 \(2006\)](#). Through an exchange of letters ([S/2007/721](#) and [S/2007/722](#)), the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on the Responsibility to Protect was appointed and charged with the conceptual, institutional and operational development of the principle. The Assembly, in resolution [75/277](#), included an item on the responsibility to protect on its agenda and requested the Secretary-General to report annually on that item.
42. The prevention of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, together with the realization of the Sustainable Development Goals (especially Goals 10 and 16, on reduced inequalities and on peace, justice and strong institutions, respectively), remains a key part of the broader prevention strategy of the Secretary-General, as well as of his call to action for human rights on 24 February 2020.

Programme of work

Objective

43. The objective, to which this mission contributes, is to advance national, regional and international efforts to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and their incitement.

Strategy and external factors for 2024

44. To contribute to the objective, the Office will:
 - (a) Raise awareness of the causes and dynamics of genocide through predictive and action-oriented analysis, enhanced by the collection and sharing of information from field missions and regional offices in accordance with the early warning mandate of the Office;
 - (b) Alert relevant actors with respect to the risk of genocide, through the implementation of the United Nations Strategy and Plan of Action on Hate Speech, capacity-building and advocacy. This includes implementing other key policy products, including the Plan of Action for Religious Leaders and Actors to Prevent Incitement to Violence that could lead to genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity; the policy paper entitled “Combating Holocaust and genocide denial: protecting survivors, preserving memory, and promoting prevention”; the plan of action for women in the prevention of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity; and the “Game Plan” on the role of sports leagues in addressing and countering hate speech;
 - (c) Advocate and mobilize for appropriate action through engagement within the United Nations and with external partners;
 - (d) Strengthen community-level efforts for prevention, including by assisting locally led initiatives aimed at bringing communities together;
 - (e) Harness technology to enhance prevention and counter its negative impacts, as outlined in Human Rights Council resolution 49/9;
 - (f) Increase female participation in decision-making roles and support implementation of the plan of action for Women in the prevention of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity;
 - (g) Prioritize action against Holocaust and genocide denial and the glorification of war crimes and criminals;
 - (h) Support the universal ratification of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, and support efforts towards its implementation at the national level through legislation and implementation mechanisms.
45. The above-mentioned work is expected to create conditions conducive to increased action by United Nations intergovernmental bodies, Member States and regional and subregional organizations to prevent and mitigate the risk of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, including their incitement.
46. With regard to the external factors, the overall plan for 2024 is based on the following planning assumptions:
 - (a) Continued commitment of Member States, the Security Council and other intergovernmental bodies to engage with the Office to advance the prevention of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and enhance efforts aimed at conceptualizing the principle of the responsibility to protect;
 - (b) Active engagement of Member States and regional and other organizations to develop preventive capacity and take appropriate action for the prevention of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, including their incitement.
47. With regard to cooperation with other entities, the Office will continue to work and partner with regional organizations, including the African Union, the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, the Economic Community of West African States, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Organization of American States and the European Union, as well as with civil society, including religious leaders, traditional leaders, academia and traditional media.

48. With regard to inter-agency coordination and liaison, the Office of the Special Adviser works with the Department of Peace Operations, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), the Office of Legal Affairs, the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict, the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Violence against Children and the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, as well as with relevant mechanisms of the Human Rights Council. In addition, the Office works closely with and supports United Nations country teams on the implementation of the United Nations Strategy and Plan of Action on Hate Speech. The Office also works in close collaboration with the United Nations Children's Fund, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization in relation to the collection of information for early warning purposes, policy development and activities aimed at the prevention of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.
49. The Office integrates a gender perspective in its operational activities, deliverables and results, as appropriate. This includes reflecting the gender dynamics in its monitoring and analysis and striving for the equal participation of women in its capacity-building events and workshops. In 2023, the Office launched a specific plan of action for women in the prevention of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.
50. In line with the United Nations Disability Inclusion Strategy, the Office has developed an internal guidance note on integrating disability inclusion in its programmes and activities, and initiated the process of drafting guidance notes on persons with disabilities and the prevention of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and on addressing hate speech to support mental health. Additionally, the Office continues to review and examine the United Nations Strategy and Plan of Action on Hate Speech with a view to further advancing disability inclusion, including in its programmatic and policy activities. It is developing a guidance note on disability inclusion and hate speech, which is expected to be finalized in 2023.

Impact of the pandemic and lessons learned

51. The continuation of the COVID-19 pandemic into 2022 had an impact on the implementation of mandates. Travel restrictions in some countries hindered high-level and working-level missions as well as the organization of capacity-building and technical assistance workshops and trainings. For example, some technical-level missions were postponed to late 2022. In some instances, workshops and trainings were organized remotely in a virtual format when travel was not possible. For example, in January 2022, the Office organized a virtual training session on countering and addressing hate speech for the National Cohesion and Integration Commission in Kenya, which was originally planned as an in-person workshop.
52. The Office continues to mainstream lessons learned and best practices related to adjusting its programmes and activities, including reliance on virtual options for meetings and engagements. For example, the Office provided support remotely to United Nations country teams to develop context-specific action plans on hate speech. The Office also organized several briefings and trainings on the mandate of the Office to Member States, civil society and other actors virtually. The increased use of virtual engagement has also enabled the Office to have consistent engagements with resident coordinators and their offices as well as United Nations country teams and peacekeeping mission staff. For example, the Office has been able to organize or provide virtual briefings on its mandate and work, including on the United Nations Strategy and Plan of Action on Hate Speech, and to organize regular bilateral exchanges as needed. The extent of this engagement has increased markedly as a result of the lessons learned from the pandemic and the increase in accessibility and use of virtual means. This has improved the Office's access to timely information on developing situations as well as its ability to provide direct technical assistance and support on prevention. The Office will continue to apply these lessons in 2024, taking into consideration the nature of its mandate, which requires field deployment for fact-finding missions to engage directly with

communities and/or provide technical assistance and capacity-building to Member States, regional organizations and civil society. Such activities will continue to require the regular travel of the Special Adviser and Office personnel.

Programme performance in 2022

Plan of action for women in the prevention of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity

53. In 2022, the Office initiated a consultation process to develop a plan of action for women in the prevention of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. The resultant plan of action entails actions that women can take to prevent these crimes within the communities in which they operate, as well as actions that other stakeholders, including Governments, civil society and international organizations, can implement to support the role of women in this regard. The recommendations in the plan of action focused on three main areas: (a) strengthening of protection structures for women in contexts where genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity may be occurring; (b) strengthening of and support for the role of women, with technical know-how and capacity-building, in preventing genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and their incitement; and (c) provision of knowledge-sharing opportunities.
54. In line with the recommendations of the plan of action, a global network of women in the prevention of genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing was established, to be supported by the Office in implementing the plan of action through regional and national implementation workshops.
55. Progress towards the objective is presented in the performance measure below (see table 7).

Table 7
Performance measure

2020 (actual)	2021 (actual)	2022 (actual)
Responses and policy options on the prevention of genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing are largely non-inclusive of women's perspectives, voices and concerns	Responses and policy options on the prevention of genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing are largely non-inclusive of women's perspectives, voices and concerns	Global consultations with women leaders are held and a plan of action for women in the prevention of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, as well as a global network of women in the prevention of genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing, are established

Planned result for 2024

Collecting and processing information, providing early warning, raising awareness, building capacities and making recommendations to Member States and regional and subregional organizations on the prevention of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, as well as their incitement

Programme performance in 2022 and target for 2024

56. The Office's work contributed to the advancement of national, regional and international capacities and efforts to protect populations from genocide and related crimes and met the planned target of 19

follow-up actions taken by Member States and regional and subregional organizations to prevent or mitigate the risk of genocide and related crimes. In 2022, the Special Adviser undertook eight official visits, issued 15 public statements on situations of concern and sent 20 internal notes to the Secretary-General. The Office organized 25 workshops and training sessions and seven technical assistance initiatives. The Office supported the development of context-specific action plans for United Nations country teams in four countries on countering and addressing hate speech and executed several policy initiatives highlighting the voices of new and underutilized actors in prevention. For example, in 2022, the Office initiated a consultation process to develop a plan of action to counter hate speech through engagement with sport (the Game Plan). The Game Plan provides recommendations on actions to identify and combat hate speech using the power and reach of sport to speak out against hate speech and promote positive messages, inclusion and non-discrimination. At its launch, the Secretary-General called for the widest possible dissemination and implementation of the Game Plan. As part of the consultation process for the development of the Game Plan and to coordinate its implementation, a sports working group on countering hate has been established. The working group is led by the Office and the Eradicate Hate Global Summit and comprises representatives of various sports leagues around the world.


57. In 2024, the Office will continue to collect and process information from United Nations sources to provide early warning and advice on the prevention of genocide and related crimes. The Office will conduct country visits and undertake assessments to collect relevant information on political, human rights, humanitarian, social and economic developments in countries worldwide with the aim of identifying early warning signs of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. It will provide tailored training and technical assistance to Member States, regional and subregional organizations and civil society on the prevention of genocide and related crimes. The Office will continue its support to the implementation of the United Nations Strategy and Plan of Action on Hate Speech, working closely with and providing support to United Nations country teams in developing context-specific action plans. The Office will also prioritize enhanced data collection and use of new technologies in its monitoring and analysis work, including online trends of hate speech.

Lessons learned and planned change

58. A lesson for the mission was the importance of partnerships with United Nations field entities, country teams and peace operations, which are instrumental to strengthening the Office's assessment and response capacity in multiple locations. In applying the lesson, the Office will intensify its efforts to build the capacity of the United Nations country teams and peace operations on elements relevant to the prevention of genocide and related crimes. The Office will also prioritize working through regional organizations and coalitions of civil society actors to reach more Member States and civil society actors, including at the community level, where prevention action will remain paramount.
59. Expected progress towards the objective and the target for 2024 are presented in the performance measure below (see figure II).

Figure II

Performance measure: number of follow-up actions taken by Member States, regional and subregional organizations and civil society actors to prevent genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, as well as their incitement, as a result of early warning and recommendations provided by the Office of the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide



Deliverables

60. Table 8 lists all deliverables of the Office.

Table 8

Deliverables for the period 2022–2024, by category and subcategory

Category and subcategory	2022 planned	2022 actual	2023 planned	2024 planned
A. Facilitation of the intergovernmental process and expert bodies				
Parliamentary documentation (number of documents)	2	1	2	2
1. Report of Secretary-General on the responsibility to protect	1	1	1	1
2. Report of Secretary-General on the prevention of genocide to the Human Rights Council	1	—	1	1
Substantive services for meetings (number of three-hour meetings)	4	4	5	5
3. Meetings of the General Assembly on the responsibility to protect	3	4	3	3
4. Meetings of the Human Rights Council on the prevention of genocide	1	—	2	2
B. Generation and transfer of knowledge				
Field and technical cooperation projects (number of projects)	7	12	8	8
5. Projects on national mechanisms, including legislation, for the prevention of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity	7	12	8	8
Seminars, workshops and training events (number of days)	35	25	45	45
6. Workshops on the prevention of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, including their incitement, and on the establishment and review of national and regional early warning mechanisms	35	25	45	45

Category and subcategory	2022 planned	2022 actual	2023 planned	2024 planned
Publications (number of publications)	1	1	2	2
7. Publication on the prevention of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity	1	1	2	2
Technical materials (number of materials)	2	2	4	4
8. Guidance notes on countering and addressing hate speech	1	1	2	2
9. Guidance notes on genocide denial and the prevention of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity	1	1	2	2
Fact-finding, monitoring and investigation missions (number of missions)	–	10	10	10
10. High-level and country-specific assessment missions	–	10	10	10

C. Substantive deliverables

Consultation, advice and advocacy: advice on the risk of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and on preventive measures; advocacy and consultations on the prevention of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity; briefings on country situations and thematic areas relevant to prevention.

D. Communication deliverables

Outreach programmes, special events and information materials: commemoration of the International Day of Commemoration and Dignity of the Victims of the Crime of Genocide and of the Prevention of This Crime; anniversary of the adoption of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide; commemoration of the International Day for Countering Hate Speech.

External and media relations: public statements by the Special Adviser on situations of concern, on commemorative events and upon the conclusion of high-level missions; media briefings; editorial opinions (op-eds).

B. Proposed post and non-post resource requirements for 2024

Resource requirements (regular budget)

Table 9

Financial resources

(Thousands of United States dollars)

Category of expenditure	2022		2023	2024	Variance
	Appropriation	Expenditure	Appropriation	Requirements	2024 vs. 2023 Increase/(decrease)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)=(4)-(3)
Military and police personnel costs	–	–	–	–	–
Civilian personnel costs	2 133.9	1 861.1	2 261.9	2 260.8	(1.1)
Operational costs	564.4	532.5	554.5	558.5	4.0
Total (net of staff assessment)	2 698.3	2 393.6	2 816.4	2 819.3	2.9

Table 10
Human resources

	International staff											National staff			United Nations Volunteers			Total
	USG	ASG	D-2	D-1	P-5	P-4	P-3	P-2	FS	GS	Subtotal	NPO	LL	Subtotal	International	National	Subtotal	
Approved 2023	1	1 ^a	–	–	2	4 ^b	2	1 ^b	–	2 ^c	13	–	–	–	–	–	–	13
Proposed 2024	1	1 ^a	–	–	2	4 ^b	2	1 ^b	–	2 ^c	13	–	–	–	–	2	2	15
Change	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	2	2	2

^a The Assistant Secretary-General is on a \$1-per-year contract.

^b Includes one P-4 position and one P-2 position approved as general temporary assistance in the 2023 budget.

^c Other level, unless otherwise stated.

61. The proposed resources for 2024 for the Office of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide amount to \$2,819,300 (net of staff assessment) and would provide for salaries and common staff costs (\$2,260,800) for the continuation of 13 positions (1 Under-Secretary-General, 1 Assistant Secretary-General, 2 P-5, 4 P-4, 2 P-3, 1 P-2 and 2 General Service (Other level)) and 2 national United Nations Volunteer positions proposed for establishment, as well as operational costs (\$558,500), comprising costs for consultants and consulting services (\$35,600), official travel (\$245,100), facilities and infrastructure (\$210,600), ground transportation (\$3,600), communications and information technology (\$36,800) and other supplies, services and equipment (\$26,800).
62. For 2024, the following positions are proposed for establishment:
- The establishment of one Political Affairs Officer (national United Nations Volunteer) position in Addis Ababa will enable the Office to further build and enhance its engagement with the African Union as well as broaden and scale up its capacity-building and awareness-raising on the prevention of genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing with partners in the Africa region, with and in support of Member States, subregional organizations and other stakeholders, including the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in East Africa, and the Economic Community of West African States;
 - The establishment of one Political Affairs Officer (national United Nations Volunteer) position in Bangkok will enable the Office to broaden and scale up its capacity-building and awareness-raising on the prevention of genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing with partners in the Asia-Pacific region, in particular on the role of education in prevention, with and in support of Member States, subregional organizations and other stakeholders. The position will also enable the Office to build and enhance its cooperation with ASEAN.
63. It is also proposed that two general temporary assistance positions approved in 2023 be continued in 2024, as follows:
- A Political Affairs Officer (P-4) to enable the Office to continue its support to the implementation of the United Nations Strategy and Plan of Action on Hate Speech, which was launched by the Secretary-General in 2019, in a context where the global rise and spread of hate speech continue to pose a challenge worldwide. The continuation of this position would allow the Office to continue providing sustained assistance in response to requests from Member States, regional organizations and United Nations field presences for technical assistance and capacity-building in the development and implementation of context-specific action plans to address and counter hate speech;
 - An Associate Political Affairs Officer (P-2) to strengthen the analysis capacity of the Office and support campaigns of the Office on Holocaust denial, countering hate speech and

ratification of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. The position will continue to focus on data analytics and use new technologies to research and gather information, including online trends of hate speech, as a key indicator of risk and potential trigger of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, which will enable the Office to respond to these new challenges and trends in the prevention of these crimes.

64. A vacancy rate of 15.4 per cent has been applied to the estimates for continuing positions based on the vacancy rate in March 2023. A vacancy rate of 50 per cent has been applied for the two national United Nations Volunteer positions proposed for establishment.
65. The increase in requirements for 2024 compared with the appropriation for 2023 is mainly attributable to the cost of two national United Nations Volunteer positions proposed for establishment, offset in part by the application of a higher vacancy rate of 15.4 per cent compared with the budgeted vacancy rate of 5 per cent in 2023.

Extrabudgetary resources

66. In 2023, extrabudgetary resources amounting to approximately \$525,300 are to be utilized mainly for the staff costs of three positions (2 P-3 and 1 General Service (Other level)), the Office's capacity-building and technical assistance programme and the preparation of the 2023 report of the Secretary-General on the responsibility to protect.
67. For 2024, extrabudgetary resources in the estimated amount of \$274,800 would provide for two positions (1 P-3 and 1 General Service (Other level)) as well as the Office's capacity-building and technical assistance programme.
68. The decrease in the estimated extrabudgetary resources to be utilized in 2024 compared with 2023 is due mainly to the completion of projects supporting capacity-building and technical assistance work of the Office as well as decreased unearmarked contributions.

3. Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Western Sahara

(\$567,800)

Foreword

Since taking up my assignment in November 2021, I have taken a proactive approach to advance the political process on Western Sahara in line with Security Council resolutions [2602 \(2021\)](#) and [2654 \(2022\)](#).

In January 2022, I completed an initial tour of the region, which offered me a valuable opportunity to hear positions, as well as views on how to make progress towards a constructive resumption of the political process. In the third quarter of 2022, I completed a second set of visits to all concerned actors in the region, with a view to deepening the consideration of the respective positions. Throughout the year, I continued to undertake further consultations with members of the Security Council, members of the Group of Friends on Western Sahara and other interested actors.

My engagements have taken place against the backdrop of new challenges and setbacks on the ground. The lack of an effective ceasefire in Western Sahara, the dire humanitarian situation in the refugee camps in Tindouf and regional tensions remain deeply concerning and underscore the urgent need for a long overdue peaceful solution to this conflict. I will continue to assist the parties to achieve a just, lasting and mutually acceptable solution that will provide for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara, in line with relevant Security Council resolutions. In this regard, it will be essential for me to continue to rely on strong and united support from the international community and the appropriate resources to carry out my mandate.

(Signed) Staffan **de Mistura**
Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Western Sahara

A. Proposed programme plan for 2024 and programme performance in 2022

Overall orientation

Mandates and background

69. The Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Western Sahara is responsible for assisting the parties, Morocco and the Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguía el-Hamra y de Río de Oro (Frente POLISARIO), in finding a just, lasting and mutually acceptable political solution, which will provide for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara in the context of arrangements consistent with the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations.
70. The mandate derives from the communications between the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council dated 17 March 1997 ([S/1997/236](#)), 1 October 2021 ([S/2021/851](#)) and 5 October 2021 ([S/2021/852](#)), as well as from the priorities established in relevant Security Council resolutions, including resolutions [1813 \(2008\)](#), [2099 \(2013\)](#), [2468 \(2019\)](#), [2494 \(2019\)](#), [2548 \(2020\)](#) and [2602 \(2021\)](#). In its resolution [2654 \(2022\)](#), the Council expressed its full support for Staffan de Mistura, the Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Western Sahara, and his efforts to advance the political process, and welcomed the visits undertaken by the Personal Envoy in that regard to the region. The Council called upon the parties to resume negotiations under the auspices of the Secretary-General without preconditions and in good faith, as well as to demonstrate political will and work in an atmosphere propitious for dialogue, and stressed the importance of all concerned expanding on their positions in order to advance a solution. The Council reaffirmed its commitment to assist the parties to achieve a just, lasting and mutually acceptable political solution, based on compromise, which would provide for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara in the context of arrangements consistent with the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations, and noted the role and responsibilities of the parties in that respect.

Programme of work

Objective

71. The objective, to which this mission contributes, is to advance the parties' efforts to achieve a just, lasting and mutually acceptable political solution, which will provide for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara.

Strategy and external factors for 2024

72. To contribute to the objective, the mission will:
 - (a) Encourage the parties to continue the discussion on the question of Western Sahara in order to identify elements of convergence, through bilateral consultations, including with the neighbouring countries of Algeria and Mauritania, conduct visits to the region to meet with key interlocutors and engage in shuttle diplomacy and other activities deemed useful in that regard;
 - (b) Consult with members of the Security Council and the Group of Friends on Western Sahara, both in their capitals and in New York, as well as with regional organizations, towards a solution;
 - (c) Work towards organizing two international meetings on Western Sahara.

73. The above-mentioned work is expected to result in:
 - (a) Building additional trust and strengthening involvement by the parties in the political process;
 - (b) Maintaining support by the international community for the political process.
74. With regard to cooperation with other entities, the mission will regularly meet with representatives of regional organizations and other relevant stakeholders to exchange views on the United Nations-led political process.
75. With regard to inter-agency coordination and liaison, the mission will continue to receive support for visits and information on developments in Western Sahara from the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara, as well as coordinating and liaising with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) with respect to visits to the refugee camps and on confidence-building measures and maintaining close contact with OHCHR in Geneva on issues related to the human rights situation in its area of responsibility.
76. With regard to the external factors, the overall plan for 2024 is based on the following planning assumptions:
 - (a) All concerned show willingness to meet for direct negotiations;
 - (b) The security situation remains conducive to the mission's objective for the region.
77. The mission integrates a gender perspective in its operational activities, deliverables and results, as appropriate. The mission will continue to actively work for the participation of women in meetings held in the context of their inclusion in the political process.

Impact of the pandemic and lessons learned

78. The continuation of the COVID-19 pandemic into 2022 had a moderate impact on the implementation of mandates, somewhat limiting travel of the Personal Envoy under the provision of good offices for high-level dialogue involving the stakeholders concerned.
79. The mission continues to mainstream lessons learned and best practices related to the adjustments to and adaptation of the programme owing to the COVID-19 pandemic, including through the use of digital tools for stakeholder engagements and by allowing flexible working arrangements in the office of the Personal Envoy.


Programme performance in 2022

Resumed engagement with all concerned

80. In 2022, the Personal Envoy continued his efforts to engage all concerned stakeholders. From 13 to 20 January 2022, the Personal Envoy completed an initial tour of the region, visiting successively Rabat, Tindouf/Rabouni, Nouakchott and Algiers. In the third quarter of 2022, the Personal Envoy completed a second set of visits to all concerned actors in the region with a view to deepening the consideration of the respective positions. Throughout the year, the Personal Envoy continued to undertake further consultations on the issue of Western Sahara, including by visiting capitals of all members of the Group of Friends on Western Sahara, briefing the Security Council and further engaging Security Council members and other interested actors.
81. Progress towards the objective is presented in the performance measure below (see figure III).

Figure III

Performance measure: number of rounds of engagement with all concerned



Planned result for 2024

Advancing the process on Western Sahara

Programme performance in 2022 and target for 2024

82. In 2022, the mission's work, including through the resumed engagement of the Personal Envoy with all concerned stakeholders, contributed to meeting the planned target of continued engagement between the parties and neighbours towards advancing the political process.
83. In 2024, the mission will continue to build on past work to advance the political process through consultations with all concerned, visits to the region to meet key interlocutors, including representatives of civil society and women's organizations, and other measures deemed useful in this regard. It will also continue to hold consultations with Member States in their capitals and in New York, as appropriate. In addition, the mission will continue to liaise with relevant United Nations entities in Geneva and other locations to discuss various aspects related to the conflict. The mission will also meet regularly with representatives of relevant regional organizations to exchange views on the United Nations-led political process.

Lessons learned and planned change

84. The lesson for the mission was to maintain the momentum in the political process. In applying the lesson, the mission will continue to engage regularly with all concerned to resume the discussion on the question of Western Sahara in order to identify elements of convergence, with a view to achieving a mutually acceptable political solution to the question of Western Sahara.
85. Expected progress towards the objective and the target for 2024 are presented in the performance measure below (see table 11).

Table 11

Performance measure

2020 (actual)	2021 (actual)	2022 (actual)	2023 (planned)	2024 (planned)
No face-to-face meetings	Resumed engagement between the parties and neighbours	Continued engagement between the parties and the neighbours	Two international meetings	Two international meetings

Deliverables

86. Table 12 lists all deliverables of the mission.

Table 12

Deliverables for the period 2022–2024, by category and subcategory

Category and subcategory	2022 planned	2022 actual	2023 planned	2024 planned
A. Facilitation of the intergovernmental process and expert bodies				
Parliamentary documentation (number of documents)	2	2	2	2
1. Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council	1	1	1	1
2. Report of the Secretary-General to the General Assembly	1	1	1	1
Substantive services for meetings (number of three-hour meetings)	2	2	2	2
3. Meetings of the Security Council	2	2	2	2
B. Generation and transfer of knowledge				
Fact-finding, monitoring and investigation missions (number of missions)	2	2	2	2
4. Missions undertaken to the region to improve understanding of the situation on the ground and to improve coordination with United Nations partners and other stakeholders	2	2	2	2
C. Substantive deliverables				
Good offices: provision of good offices for high-level dialogue involving the stakeholders concerned; good offices for informal negotiations between concerned stakeholders in the context of the political process on Western Sahara.				
Consultation, advice and advocacy: consultations through bilateral discussions on the political process on Western Sahara; engagement with women's groups and civil society groups.				

B. Proposed post and non-post resource requirements for 2024

Resource requirements (regular budget)

Table 13

Financial resources

(Thousands of United States dollars)

Category of expenditure	2022		2023		Variance
	Appropriation	Expenditure	Appropriation	Requirements	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)=(4)-(3)
Military and police personnel costs	—	—	—	—	—
Civilian personnel costs	301.3	140.3	285.6	379.6	94.0
Operational costs	175.2	127.6	189.6	188.2	(1.4)
Total (net of staff assessment)	476.5	267.9	475.2	567.8	92.6

Table 14
Human resources

	<i>International staff</i>											<i>National staff</i>			<i>United Nations Volunteers</i>			<i>Total</i>
	<i>USG</i>	<i>ASG</i>	<i>D-2</i>	<i>D-1</i>	<i>P-5</i>	<i>P-4</i>	<i>P-3</i>	<i>P-2</i>	<i>FS</i>	<i>GS</i>	<i>Subtotal</i>	<i>NPO</i>	<i>LL</i>	<i>Subtotal</i>	<i>International</i>	<i>National</i>	<i>Subtotal</i>	
Approved 2023	1 ^a	–	–	–	–	–	1	–	–	–	2	–	–	–	–	–	–	2
Proposed 2024	1 ^a	–	–	–	–	–	1	–	–	–	2	–	–	–	–	–	–	2
Change	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–

^a The Under-Secretary-General is on a when-actually-employed contract.

87. The proposed resource requirements for 2024 for the Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Western Sahara amount to \$567,800 (net of staff assessment) and would provide for salaries and common staff costs (\$379,600) for the continuation of the two positions (1 Under-Secretary-General, on a when-actually-employed contract, and 1 P-3), as well as operational costs (\$188,200), comprising costs for consultants and consulting services (\$20,400), official travel (\$74,700), facilities and infrastructure (\$52,000), ground transportation (\$1,000), communications and information technology (\$11,000) and other supplies, services and equipment (\$29,100).
88. In 2024, no change is proposed to the number and levels of the positions. A vacancy rate of zero per cent has been applied to the positions based on the actual vacancy rate in March 2023.
89. The increase in the requirements proposed for 2024 compared with the appropriation for 2023 is attributable mainly to the application of a zero per cent vacancy rate compared with the budgeted vacancy rate of 5 per cent in 2023, as well as higher salaries and common staff costs based on recent expenditure patterns.

4. Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the implementation of Security Council resolution 1559 (2004)

(\$420,100)

A. Proposed programme plan for 2024 and programme performance in 2022

Overall orientation

Mandates and background

90. On 14 December 2004, the Secretary-General appointed his Special Envoy for the implementation of Security Council resolution 1559 (2004) to enable him to report to the Council every six months on the implementation of Council resolution 1559 (2004), as requested by the Council in its presidential statement of 19 October 2004 (S/PRST/2004/36). In carrying out this mandate, the mission consults with political interlocutors in Lebanon, the Council and other Member States to prepare the semi-annual reports of the Secretary-General. The mandate derives from the priorities established in relevant Council resolutions and decisions, including resolution 1559 (2004), and the statement by the President of the Security Council dated 19 October 2004 (S/PRST/2004/36). In addition, the mission has worked towards strengthening the response by relevant Member States in the implementation of the remaining provisions of Council resolution 1680 (2006).
91. On 17 May 2006, in response to the third semi-annual report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution 1559 (2004) (S/2006/248), the Security Council adopted resolution 1680 (2006), in which it reiterated its call for the full implementation of the provisions of resolution 1559 (2004). Through that resolution, the Council also strongly encouraged the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic to respond positively to the request made by the Government of Lebanon, in line with the agreements of the Lebanese national dialogue, to delineate their common border, especially in those areas where the border was uncertain or disputed.
92. On 11 August 2006, the Security Council adopted resolution 1701 (2006), in which it emphasized the importance of the extension of the control of the Government of Lebanon over all Lebanese territory in accordance with the provisions of resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1680 (2006), and of the relevant provisions of the Taif Accords. The Council requested the Secretary-General to develop, in liaison with relevant international actors and the parties concerned, proposals to implement the relevant provisions of the Taif Accords and resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1680 (2006), including with respect to disarmament and the delineation of the international borders of Lebanon. It also requested the Secretary-General to report to the Council on a regular basis on the implementation of resolution 1701 (2006).
93. In resolution 2236 (2015) and all subsequent resolutions on Lebanon, including, most recently, resolution 2650 (2022), the Security Council continued to urge all parties to make tangible progress towards all outstanding issues in the implementation of resolutions 1701 (2006), 1680 (2006) and 1559 (2004), and other relevant Council resolutions. On 25 May 2022, the Council issued a press statement to reaffirm the Council's strong support for the stability, security, territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon, consistent with Council resolutions 1701 (2006), 1680 (2006), 1559 (2004) and 2591 (2021), as well as other relevant Security Council resolutions and statements of the President of the Security Council on the situation in Lebanon. In 2016, the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs was tasked by the Secretary-General with assuming the responsibility of reporting on the implementation of resolution 1559 (2004), an arrangement that has been maintained to date.
94. In October 2019, large-scale peaceful protests began countrywide. Some groups called for, among other things, the implementation of Security Council resolution 1559 (2004). The COVID-19

pandemic, the 4 August 2020 explosion in the Port of Beirut and the government vacuum that followed compounded the effects of the socioeconomic crisis in the country. In May 2022, Lebanon held its parliamentary elections. On 23 June 2022, the caretaker Prime Minister, Najib Mikati, was designated to form a new Government. On 31 October 2022, the term of the President, Michel Aoun, ended. To date, a new Government has not been formed and a new President has not been elected.

Programme of work

Objective

95. The objective, to which this mission contributes, is to ensure full implementation of Security Council resolution [1559 \(2004\)](#) and all subsequent related resolutions of the Council.

Strategy and external factors for 2024

96. To contribute to the objective, the mission will:
 - (a) Explore ways to foster consensus on a Lebanese-led and Lebanese-owned national dialogue, which is expected to result in progress on addressing the maintenance of weapons outside State authority. Past results in this area include the holding of a national dialogue by Lebanese political decision makers;
 - (b) Produce two semi-annual reports of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on developments of relevance to the implementation of Security Council resolution [1559 \(2004\)](#). The reports will address a number of key issues, such as the sovereignty, territorial integrity, unity and political independence of Lebanon; the extension of control of the Government of Lebanon over all Lebanese territory; and the disbanding and disarmament of Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias. Reporting on these categories, the Secretary-General will inform the Council on political and security developments during the reporting period, violations of Lebanese sovereignty and the maintenance of weapons by Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias.
97. The above-mentioned work is expected to result in informed Security Council deliberations on possible opportunities for Lebanon to make progress on the outstanding provisions of Council resolution [1559 \(2004\)](#).
98. With regard to inter-agency coordination and liaison, the Office of the Special Envoy coordinates and works closely with the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon, in particular in the process of developing the reports of the Secretary-General ahead of and during the visits to Lebanon by the staff of the Office of the Special Envoy.
99. With regard to the external factors, the overall plan for 2024 is based on the following planning assumptions:
 - (a) Presidential election and government formation continue to be challenging and the current economic and financial crisis remains a source of instability and social unrest;
 - (b) The tense and volatile regional environment affects Lebanon's internal stability and security;
 - (c) There is limited political will on the part of the parties concerned to address the disbanding and disarmament of Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias;
 - (d) The political goodwill of Member States has limited influence on the parties concerned;
 - (e) Tensions between Lebanon and other States in the region are somewhat eased.

Impact of the pandemic and lessons learned

100. The continuation of the COVID-19 pandemic into 2022 had limited impact on the implementation of mandates. In-person consultations in Lebanon prior to the production of the semi-annual reports of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution [1559 \(2004\)](#) took place as planned.
101. The Office continues to mainstream lessons learned and best practices related to the adjustments to and adaptation of the programme owing to the COVID-19 pandemic. However, the key lesson for the Office is that in-person consultations are necessary to contribute to achieving results.

Programme performance in 2022

Enhanced understanding of Security Council members on developments of relevance to the implementation of resolution [1559 \(2004\)](#)

102. The Office undertook two trips to Lebanon in March and September 2022, which informed the drafting of the April and October 2022 reports of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution [1559 \(2004\)](#).
103. The above-mentioned work contributed to the understanding of Security Council members on developments of relevance to the implementation of the outstanding provisions of Security Council resolution [1559 \(2004\)](#).

Planned result for 2024

Informed Security Council deliberations through analytical reports of the Secretary-General Programme performance in 2022 and target for 2024

104. The Office's work contributed to informing Security Council deliberations on developments of relevance to the implementation of the outstanding provisions of Council resolution [1559 \(2004\)](#). It met the planned target of Council discussions on the two semi-annual reports to reflect the outcome of consultations on the positions of Lebanese actors vis-à-vis the maintenance of weapons outside State authority.
105. In 2024, the Office will continue to report to the Security Council semi-annually on progress in the implementation of the resolution, in particular the disbanding and disarmament of Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias.

Lessons learned and planned change

106. The lesson for the Office is that in-person consultations are necessary to contribute to the achievement of results. In applying the lesson, the Office will further leverage engagement with United Nations entities both at United Nations Headquarters and among the United Nations country team in Lebanon, in addition to maintaining its network of interlocutors in the country.
107. Expected progress towards the objective and the target for 2024 are presented in the performance measure below (see table 15).

Table 15
Performance measure

2020 (actual)	2021 (actual)	2022 (actual)	2023 (planned)	2024 (planned)
Discussions on the two semi-annual reports, which did not reflect the outcome of consultations on the positions of Lebanese actors vis-à-vis the maintenance of weapons outside State authority	Discussions on the two semi-annual reports to reflect the outcome of consultations on the positions of Lebanese actors, which were only partially articulated, vis-à-vis the maintenance of weapons outside State authority	Discussions on the two semi-annual reports, which reflect the outcome of systemic consultations surveying the positions of Lebanese actors vis-à-vis the maintenance of weapons outside State authority	Discussions on the two semi-annual reports, which reflect the outcome of systemic consultations on the positions of Lebanese actors vis-à-vis the maintenance of weapons outside State authority	Discussions on the two semi-annual reports, which reflect the outcome of consultations on the positions of Lebanese actors vis-à-vis the maintenance of weapons outside State authority

Deliverables

108. Table 16 lists all deliverables of the mission.

Table 16
Deliverables for the period 2022–2024, by category and subcategory

Category and subcategory	2022 planned	2022 actual	2023 planned	2024 planned
A. Facilitation of the intergovernmental process and expert bodies				
Parliamentary documentation (number of documents)	2	2	2	2
1. Reports of the Secretary-General to the Security Council	2	2	2	2
Substantive services for meetings (number of consultations)	2	2	2	2
2. Meetings of the Security Council on resolution 1559 (2004)	2	2	2	2
C. Substantive deliverables				
Consultation, advice and advocacy: consultations to gain an understanding of the political, socioeconomic and humanitarian situation in Lebanon, as well as its regional environment, as it may influence the implementation of resolution 1559 (2004) ; consultations on the positions of Lebanese actors vis-à-vis the maintenance of weapons outside State authority.				

B. Proposed post and non-post resource requirements for 2024

Resource requirements (regular budget)

Table 17

Financial resources

(Thousands of United States dollars)

Category of expenditure	2022		2023	2024	Variance
	Appropriation	Expenditure	Appropriation	Requirements	2024 vs. 2023 Increase/(decrease)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)=(4)-(3)
Military and police personnel costs	—	—	—	—	—
Civilian personnel costs	249.1	342.7	287.1	337.4	50.3
Operational costs	89.5	50.7	85.1	82.7	(2.4)
Total (net of staff assessment)	338.6	393.4	372.2	420.1	47.9

Table 18

Human resources

	International staff											National staff			United Nations Volunteers			
	USG	ASG	D-2	D-1	P-5	P-4	P-3	P-2	FS	GS	Subtotal	NPO	LL	Subtotal	International	National	Subtotal	Total
Approved 2023	1 ^a	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	1 ^b	3	—	—	—	—	—	—	3
Proposed 2024	1 ^a	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	1 ^b	3	—	—	—	—	—	—	3
Change	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—

^a The Under-Secretary-General is on a \$1-per-year contract.^b Other level, unless otherwise stated.

109. The proposed resource requirements for 2024 for the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the implementation of Security Council resolution [1559 \(2004\)](#) amount to \$420,100 (net of staff assessment) and would provide for salaries and common staff costs (\$337,400) for the continuation of three positions (1 Under-Secretary-General, 1 P-4 and 1 General Service (Other level)), as well as operational costs (\$82,700), comprising costs for official travel (\$39,100), facilities and infrastructure (\$32,500), ground transportation (\$2,000), communications and information technology (\$7,300) and other supplies, services and equipment (\$1,800).
110. In 2024, no change is proposed to the number and level of positions. A vacancy rate of zero per cent has been applied to the positions based on the actual average vacancy rate in 2022.
111. The increase in requirements proposed for 2024 compared with the appropriation for 2023 is attributable mainly to the application of a lower vacancy rate of zero per cent compared with the budgeted vacancy rate of 5 per cent in 2023, as well as higher salary and common staff costs based on recent expenditure patterns.

5. Office of the United Nations Representative to the Geneva International Discussions

(\$2,059,100)

Foreword

In 2022, the tense geopolitical situation affected the Geneva International Discussions. Instead of the four rounds planned, only one round took place in October. After the postponements in March and June, consultations resumed with the participants in person and online in May and June 2022.

Ahead of the fifty-sixth round, in September 2022, the United Nations Representative to the Geneva International Discussions, with the European Union and Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Co-Chairs, conducted visits to Tbilisi and Moscow, as well as to Sukhumi and Tskhinvali, and held consultations with the participants. In Tbilisi, they held a meeting with the representative of the delegation of the United States of America to the Geneva International Discussions.

Subsequently, the fifty-sixth round of the Geneva International Discussions was held on 5 October 2022 in Geneva, with all participants taking part. With a view to protecting and maintaining the Discussions, the Co-Chairs postponed the fifty-seventh round to April 2023.

The Co-Chairs' constant engagement with all participants contributed to the relatively calm, stable and secure humanitarian situation on the ground.

I continued negotiations with the participants of the Gali Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism to resume the suspended meetings and reiterated the Mechanism's importance to maintaining security and stability on the ground.

In furthering the implementation of the Co-Chairs' joint strategy and action plan on women and peace and security, I met with women's non-governmental organizations, civil society representatives and activists and continued to advocate for gender equality and the promotion of the role of women in peace and security. In cooperation with the Co-Chairs, I will continue consultations with all the participants and relevant authorities to bring a lasting solution to the conflict.

(Signed) Ayse Cihan **Sultanoglu**
United Nations Representative to the Geneva International Discussions

A. Proposed programme plan for 2024 and programme performance in 2022

Overall orientation

Mandates and background

112. The Office of the United Nations Representative to the Geneva International Discussions is mandated to support the Geneva International Discussions and the Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism under United Nations auspices in Gali, Georgia, by facilitating the participation of the United Nations in the international discussions in Geneva and the Gali Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism, and by liaising and coordinating with the relevant actors. The mission is also responsible for preparing, convening and facilitating, in consultation with the other Co-Chairs, the European Union and OSCE, the sessions of the Geneva International Discussions as well as the periodic meetings of the Gali Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism.
113. The United Nations has continued to support the Geneva International Discussions on security and stability and the return of internally displaced persons and refugees, which commenced on 15 October 2008 in Geneva in accordance with the six-point agreement of 12 August 2008 and the implementing measures of 8 September 2008, mediated by the French Presidency of the European Union, following the hostilities of August 2008 (see [S/2009/254](#)). In its resolution [1866 \(2009\)](#), the Security Council welcomed the beginning of the discussions and requested the Secretary-General, through his Special Representative, to continue to fully support the process. The Secretary-General addressed a letter on this matter to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Georgia on 29 September 2009 and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Georgia replied to the Secretary-General on 28 October 2009.
114. Against the background of the “Proposals for joint incident prevention and response mechanisms”, agreed to in Geneva on 18 February 2009, the Secretary-General, on 28 September 2009, addressed a letter to the President of the Security Council in which he updated the members of the Council on the progress in the Geneva International Discussions and the convening of the joint Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism under United Nations auspices in Gali (*ibid.*, paras. 5 and 6). The Secretary-General also stated that, following consultations with the relevant stakeholders, the United Nations would continue to support the Geneva International Discussions and the Mechanism through a limited number of personnel with the task of facilitating the United Nations participation in the international discussions in Geneva and in the Mechanism, and liaising and coordinating with the relevant actors.
115. In a letter dated 28 December 2009 addressed to the President of the Security Council, the Secretary-General noted that, given the important role of the Geneva International Discussions and the Mechanism in stabilizing the situation and building confidence, and in the light of the broad support, including from the main stakeholders, for a continued and effective United Nations engagement beyond 31 December 2009, the United Nations would continue to provide support for the Geneva International Discussions and the work of the Mechanism. In a letter dated 25 February 2010 addressed to the President of the Security Council ([S/2010/103](#)), the Secretary-General conveyed, following consultations, his intention to appoint a United Nations Representative responsible for United Nations support for the Geneva International Discussions and the Mechanism. In a letter dated 2 May 2011 ([S/2011/279](#)), the President of the Security Council informed the Secretary-General that the members of the Security Council had taken note of his intention and of the information contained in his letter of 25 February 2010. In a letter dated 2 July 2018 addressed to the President of the Security Council ([S/2018/665](#)), the Secretary-General conveyed, following consultations, his intention to appoint Ayşe Cihan Sultanoğlu as the United Nations Representative. In a letter dated 5 July 2018 ([S/2018/666](#)), the President of the Security Council informed the Secretary-General that the members of the Council had taken note of the intention expressed in his letter of 2 July 2018.

Programme of work

Objective

116. The objective, to which this mission contributes, is to advance the main agenda items of the Geneva International Discussions, including the non-use of force/international security arrangements and addressing the issue of internally displaced persons and refugees, in the context of the Discussions and the Gali Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism.

Strategy and external factors for 2024

117. To contribute to the objective, the mission, in close partnership with the offices of the other Co-Chairs, will continue to step up efforts to maintain the Geneva International Discussions and to revitalize them, and to resume the regular meetings as result-oriented platforms for dialogue and conflict prevention, which is expected to result in contributing to the ultimate goal of transitioning the Discussions from a conflict management to a conflict transformation and resolution process. Emphasis will be placed on addressing and making progress on central issues, including the non-use of force/international security arrangements and internally displaced persons and refugees.
118. The above-mentioned work is expected to result in:
- (a) Contributing to the ultimate goal of transitioning the Discussions from a conflict management to a conflict transformation and resolution process.
 - (b) Addressing and making progress on central issues, including the non-use of force/international security arrangements and internally displaced persons and refugees.
119. With regard to the external factors, the overall plan for 2024 is based on the following planning assumptions:
- (a) All stakeholders will continue to support the International Discussions in Geneva and the Gali Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism and the continued engagement of the United Nations;
 - (b) All relevant stakeholders and participants in the Geneva International Discussions will continue to support efforts to help to revitalize the Discussions and enhance their effectiveness;
 - (c) The three organizations that serve as Co-Chairs will continue to collaborate closely to fulfil the mandate of the Discussions.
120. With regard to cooperation with other entities, the mission will continue its proactive approach to ensure close and regular coordination and information-sharing with the European Union and OSCE Co-Chairs and their teams. The Mission will also continue to maintain close contact with the European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia and OSCE, which jointly chair the Ergneti Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism. In addition, the mission will continue to pursue contacts with international non-governmental organizations and think tanks in the fields of conflict resolution, mediation and women and peace and security.
121. With regard to inter-agency coordination and liaison, the mission will continue to cooperate closely with the United Nations agencies, funds and programmes, such as the Resident Coordinator Office in Georgia, UNHCR, UNDP, the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN-Women), OHCHR, the World Health Organization and other actors so as to coordinate and strengthen the role and contribution of the United Nations within the framework of the Geneva International Discussions and the Gali Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism.
122. The mission integrates a gender perspective in its operational activities, deliverables and results, as appropriate, including engaging in advocacy for gender equality and promoting the participation of women in the peace process, as well as their direct involvement in development programmes. In close cooperation with the other Co-Chairs and their focal points on women and peace and security,

the mission continues to promote the role of women in conflict resolution and peacebuilding and works closely with the respective headquarters of the other Co-Chairs for that purpose and in the framework of the Co-Chairs' joint strategy and action plan adopted in 2019. In 2024, the Co-Chairs will continue their engagement initiated in 2019 to take advantage of the synergies between the women and peace and security and the youth and peace and security agendas.

Impact of the pandemic and lessons learned

123. In 2022, the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic significantly subsided in Georgia. As a result, crossing points on the Georgian-Abkhaz line of control/administrative boundary line have remained open, with humanitarian deliveries resuming as before the pandemic. In the Georgian-South Ossetian line of control/administrative boundary line, as of August 2022, two crossing points remained partially open for 10 days from the 20th to the 30th of each month. The mission will continue to engage with relevant Member States in advocacy of substantive humanitarian and economic assistance for the vulnerable population, including in Abkhazia, Georgia, and the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia, Georgia.
124. In addition, the mission continues to mainstream lessons learned and best practices related to the adjustments to and adaptation of the programme owing to the COVID-19 pandemic, including flexible working arrangement approaches, changes in the footprint of the premises, the use of online meetings and the reduction of travel to the extent possible to reduce its carbon footprint.

Programme performance in 2022

Continuation of efforts to achieve concrete results on key issues on the agenda of the Geneva International Discussions

125. While the challenging geopolitical context in 2022 limited space for holding the planned rounds of the Geneva International Discussions, one of the rounds took place on 5 October 2022, co-chaired by the representatives of the United Nations, the European Union and OSCE, which all participants attended. In 2022, the Co-Chairs organized three visits to Tbilisi, Sukhumi and Tskhinvali, and one visit to Moscow for pre-round consultations. In May 2022, they paid a visit to Washington, D.C., and New York and held discussions with United States officials. In New York, they met with United Nations officials and other relevant stakeholders. The Co-Chairs made their annual presentation to the OSCE Permanent Council in Vienna in November 2022. The field trips of the mission's political and humanitarian affairs officers resumed to Tbilisi, Gali and Sukhumi in a more systematic manner to engage in person with relevant authorities, civil society actors and representatives of United Nations agencies and international non-governmental organizations, as well as with other interlocutors to deepen their understanding of the political, security and humanitarian situations and how to address them in the rounds of the Geneva International Discussions.
126. For the fifth year in a row, no regular or ad hoc Gali Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism meetings took place in 2022. However, the mission has continued to be in close contact with the Georgian and Abkhaz participants, as well as Russian and European Union Monitoring Mission participants. Through these contacts, the mission has managed to achieve results in security- and humanitarian-related issues. Freedom of movement along the authorized crossing points continued throughout the year, and the security situation on the ground remained calm and stable.
127. Progress towards the objective is presented in the performance measure below (see table 19).

Table 19

Performance measure

<i>2020 (actual)</i>	<i>2021 (actual)</i>	<i>2022 (actual)</i>
Owing to the COVID-19 pandemic, only one round of the Geneva International Discussions took place. Participants resumed engagement on the key agenda items in both Working Group I and II. No information session was organized	Four in-person rounds of the Geneva International Discussions took place Two information sessions on “Comprehensive/human dimension of security”, one technical meeting of medical experts on COVID-19 and a sub-working group on “Freedom of movement and other related aspects” were organized	Owing to the tense geopolitical situation, only one round of the Geneva International Discussions took place

Planned result for 2024**Revitalizing the Geneva International Discussions to achieve practical results****Programme performance in 2022 and target for 2024**

128. The mission’s work contributed to the firm commitment of all participants of the Geneva International Discussions to continue engagement to prevent a resumption of hostilities. The mission did not meet the target of progress by the stakeholders on the substantive issues of the Geneva International Discussions agenda, owing to the challenging geopolitical context, differences among the participants and the suspension of the Gali Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism to promote peace and stability on the ground.
129. The mission, in cooperation with the other Co-Chairs, will make every effort to hold the regular rounds of the Geneva International Discussions in 2024 and will strive to make progress on substantive agenda items.
130. In relation to the Gali Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism, it has not been possible to resume it since its suspension in June 2018. After the mission’s active and continuous negotiations, the participants agreed to resume the meetings on the basis of existing principles and practices but with one precondition. Consultations to solve this issue are ongoing.
131. If the Gali Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism meetings fail to be resumed in 2023, the mission will continue to make every effort to work with the participants to ensure the resumption of the meetings of the Mechanism. In addition, in close cooperation with the European Union and OSCE, the mission will facilitate engagement as appropriate between the relevant participants with a view to solving topical issues, and will continue to advocate for freedom of movement and for the crossing points to remain open.

Lessons learned and planned change

132. The lesson for the mission was the need to adapt alternative (virtual) modes of engagement with the participants of the Geneva International Discussions and the participants of the Gali Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism. In applying the lesson, the mission will continue to use virtual and alternate methods as appropriate in its engagement with the participants of the Discussions, especially with the participants of the Gali Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism and other interlocutors, including relevant officials.
133. Expected progress towards the objective and the target for 2024 are presented in the performance measure below (see table 20).

Table 20
Performance measure

2020 (actual)	2021 (actual)	2022 (actual)	2023 (planned)	2024 (planned)
One round of the Geneva International Discussions took place. No progress was made on substantive agenda items	Four rounds of the Geneva International Discussions took place. No progress was made on substantive agenda items	One round of the Geneva International Discussions took place. No progress was made on substantive agenda items	Progress achieved by the stakeholders on the substantive issues of the Geneva International Discussions agenda and in the work of the Gali Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism to promote peace and stability on the ground	Progress achieved by the stakeholders on the substantive issues of the Geneva International Discussions agenda and in the work of the Gali Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism to promote peace and stability on the ground
No meetings of the Gali Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism took place during the period	No meetings of the Gali Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism took place during the period	No meetings of the Gali Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism took place during the period		

Deliverables

134. Table 21 lists all deliverables of the mission.

Table 21
Deliverables for the period 2022–2024, by category and subcategory

Category and subcategory	2022 planned	2022 actual	2023 planned	2024 planned
A. Facilitation of the intergovernmental process and expert bodies				
Substantive services for meetings (number of three-hour meetings)	16	1	10	10
1. Rounds of the Geneva International Discussions	4	1	4	4
2. Meetings of the Gali Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism	12	–	6	6
B. Generation and transfer of knowledge				
Technical materials (number of materials)	2	–	2	2
3. Thematic non-papers prepared by the Co-Chairs on non-use of force, freedom of movement, internally displaced persons and other issues related to the Geneva International Discussions agenda	2	–	2	2
C. Substantive deliverables				
Consultation, advice and advocacy: consultations on thematic issues on the Geneva International Discussions agenda related to peace and security and humanitarian issues; advice through information sessions on specific thematic issues on the agenda for participants in the Geneva International Discussions; advocacy through information sessions on areas of interest to the participants related to the Geneva International Discussions agenda.				
D. Communication deliverables				
External and media relations: four Geneva International Discussions rounds, and six Gali Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism meetings are planned. Accordingly, four press communiqués of the Co-Chairs after the rounds and six press releases after each meeting of the Gali Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism meetings are planned to be issued.				

B. Proposed post and non-post resource requirements for 2024

Resource requirements (regular budget)

Table 22

Financial resources

(Thousands of United States dollars)

Category of expenditure	2022		2023	2024	Variance
	Appropriation	Expenditure	Appropriation	Requirements	2024 vs. 2023 Increase/(decrease)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)=(4)-(3)
Military and police personnel costs	—	—	—	—	—
Civilian personnel costs	1 584.9	1 508.1	1 488.4	1 589.7	101.3
Operational costs	460.1	237.3	461.6	469.4	7.8
Total (net of staff assessment)	2 045.0	1 745.4	1 950.0	2 059.1	109.1

Table 23

Human resources

	International staff											National staff			United Nations Volunteers			
	USG	ASG	D-2	D-1	P-5	P-4	P-3	P-2	FS	GS	Subtotal	NPO	LL	Subtotal	International	National	Subtotal	Total
Approved 2023	—	1	—	—	1	2	2	—	—	1 ^a	7	—	—	—	—	—	—	7
Proposed 2024	—	1	—	—	1	2	2	—	—	1 ^a	7	—	—	—	—	—	—	7
Change	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—

^a Other level, unless otherwise stated.

135. The proposed resource requirements for 2024 for the Office of the United Nations Representative to the Geneva International Discussions amount to \$2,059,100 (net of staff assessment) and would provide for salaries and common staff costs (\$1,589,700) for the continuation of six positions based in Geneva (1 Assistant Secretary-General, 1 P-5, 2 P-4, 1 P-3 and 1 General Service (Other level)) and one position based in Zugdidi, Georgia (P-3), as well as for operational costs (\$469,400), comprising costs for consultants and consulting services (\$10,100), official travel (\$210,000), facilities and infrastructure (\$134,700), ground transportation (\$21,800), communications and information technology (\$47,800) and other supplies, services and equipment (\$45,000).
136. In 2024, no change is proposed to the number and levels of the positions. A vacancy rate of zero per cent has been applied on the basis of the actual average vacancy rate in 2022.
137. The increase in the requirements proposed for 2024 compared with the appropriation for 2023 is attributable to higher salary and common staff costs on the basis of recent expenditure patterns and slightly higher costs for the rental of premises in Tbilisi.

6. Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria

(\$14,200,600)

Foreword

As the conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic enters its thirteenth year, Syrians continue to suffer in profound ways, with growing humanitarian needs, the continued effects of the destruction in the country and the collapse of the Syrian economy. The devastating earthquake that struck the northern part of the country on 6 February 2023 claimed thousands of lives and caused further destruction, exacerbating an already dire humanitarian and economic situation.

No one actor or group of actors in the Syrian Arab Republic can determine the outcome of this conflict. What is needed is a comprehensive political solution. I therefore continue to focus on identifying concrete, reciprocal steps that could help build trust and facilitate a genuine process to implement Security Council resolution [2254 \(2015\)](#). To this end, I continue to engage with national, regional and international stakeholders. I also continue to consult with the Syrian Women's Advisory Board and Syrian civil society representatives.

Any credible attempt to build trust must include serious steps in relation to the plight of the detained, the disappeared and the missing. I will continue to underline the importance of a nationwide ceasefire and finding a cooperative approach towards countering listed terrorist groups, in line with international law. I will also continue efforts to unblock obstacles to convening the Constitutional Committee in Geneva.

Progress is achievable with concerted effort. I appeal to all relevant Syrian and international actors to coordinate with the United Nations and set us on a path towards a comprehensive political solution, in line with resolution [2254 \(2015\)](#), that meets the legitimate aspirations of all Syrians and restores the country's sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity.

(Signed) Geir O. Pedersen
Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria

A. Proposed programme plan for 2024 and programme performance in 2022

Overall orientation

Mandates and background

138. On 16 February 2012, the General Assembly, in its resolution [66/253 A](#), requested the Secretary-General and all relevant United Nations bodies to support the efforts of the League of Arab States aimed at promoting a peaceful solution to the conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic, including through the appointment of a special envoy.
139. The Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria is responsible for facilitating an inclusive, comprehensive and credible Syrian-owned and -led political solution to the conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic that will meet the legitimate aspirations of the Syrian people for dignity, freedom and justice based on the principles of equality and non-discrimination. The mandate derives from the priorities established by the Security Council in resolutions [2118 \(2013\)](#), [2254 \(2015\)](#), [2268 \(2016\)](#) and [2336 \(2016\)](#), as well as by the General Assembly in resolution [66/253 A](#).
140. The conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic, now in its thirteenth year, has caused enormous humanitarian suffering, a record number of refugees and internally displaced persons and vast destruction in the country. Amid the continued presence of foreign armies in the Syrian Arab Republic and Security Council-listed terrorist groups, the conflict continues to pose significant risks to regional and international security. Accordingly, it is critical to continue to work towards an inclusive, credible and comprehensive political solution to the conflict that sees the full implementation of Security Council resolution [2254 \(2015\)](#).

Programme of work

Objective

141. The objective, to which this mission contributes, is to advance the full implementation of all the relevant General Assembly and Security Council resolutions, including Assembly resolution [66/253 A](#) and Council resolutions [2118 \(2013\)](#), [2254 \(2015\)](#), [2268 \(2016\)](#) and [2336 \(2016\)](#), towards an inclusive, credible, comprehensive Syrian-owned and -led political solution to the conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic that meets the legitimate aspirations of the Syrian people for dignity, freedom and justice, based on the principles of equality and non-discrimination and with the full and meaningful participation of women.

Strategy and external factors for 2024

142. To contribute to the objective, the mission will:
 - (a) Continue to engage with the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic and the opposition, as well as with regional and international stakeholders, including in the context of the aftermath of the earthquake, on various aspects of the political process, including on identifying and implementing initial step-for-step confidence-building measures in line with Security Council resolution [2254 \(2015\)](#); continue to focus on the file of the detained, the disappeared and the missing, and further deepen the engagement with victims' and family associations and civil society organizations; and work to create the conditions for a safe, calm and neutral environment conducive to advancing an inclusive, comprehensive and credible political settlement of the Syrian conflict in line with Security Council resolution [2254 \(2015\)](#);

- (b) Focus on improving international cooperation to help international stakeholders deepen their own dialogue in new formats towards the common purpose of a sustainable political settlement of the Syrian conflict that can enjoy international legitimacy and encompasses all elements of Security Council resolution [2254 \(2015\)](#);
 - (c) Continue efforts to resume meetings of the small body of the Syrian-led, Syrian-owned, United Nations-facilitated Constitutional Committee in Geneva and work with the Co-Chairs on finding ways to improve the substance and working methods of the Committee to catalyse a wider positive dynamic to move the political process forward, including working to create the conditions for inclusive, free and fair elections administered under United Nations supervision;
 - (d) Promote inclusive Syrian-Syrian dialogue and the exchange of knowledge, expertise and ideas through the Syrian Women's Advisory Board and the Syrian Civil Society Support Room; and continue to engage with the members of the Task Force on Humanitarian Access of the International Syria Support Group on key humanitarian priorities and with the members of the Group's Task Force on the Ceasefire on security-related developments and trends on the ground.
143. The above-mentioned work is expected to result in:
- (a) Sustained, regular and substantive negotiations and discussions among relevant stakeholders on all issues outlined in Security Council resolution [2254 \(2015\)](#);
 - (b) Enhanced trust and confidence among the Syrian parties as well as regional and international stakeholders;
 - (c) Strengthened international consensus to advance the political process across all elements of Security Council resolution [2254 \(2015\)](#), notably the establishment of a credible, inclusive and non-sectarian governance, the setting of a schedule and process for drafting a new constitution, as well as free and fair elections, pursuant to the new constitution, to be administered under United Nations supervision and to the highest international standards of transparency and accountability, with all Syrians, including members of the diaspora, eligible to participate.
144. With regard to the external factors, the overall plan for 2024 is based on the following planning assumptions:
- (a) All national, regional and international stakeholders will cooperate with the Special Envoy;
 - (b) International consensus with regard to the Syrian Arab Republic will continue to be difficult to achieve and sustain;
 - (c) The security situation will remain volatile in 2024, posing a threat to regional and international peace and security;
 - (d) The conflict will continue to severely affect civilians, especially women and children, risking more civilian casualties and further destruction of civilian infrastructure as well as human rights violations. Lack of accountability for grave human rights violations will hamper genuine reconciliation among the parties.
145. With regard to cooperation with other entities, in line with its mandate, the mission will continue to partner with the international community and international non-governmental organizations to facilitate and support the work of the Civil Society Support Room and the Syrian Women's Advisory Board. The Office will also continue to liaise with specialized international organizations (for example, the International Committee of the Red Cross) in the context of its work on the file of the detained, the disappeared and the missing.
146. With regard to inter-agency coordination and liaison, cooperation will continue with the resident coordinators and the agencies, funds and programmes of the United Nations operating in the Syrian Arab Republic and the region, including through the Office's presence in Damascus. In addition, agencies working in the Syrian Arab Republic are represented within the Inter-Agency Task Force

on the country, which ensures the coordination and coherence of United Nations political, humanitarian, human rights and other efforts in the country.

147. The mission integrates a gender perspective in its operational activities, deliverables and results, as appropriate, and will continue to consult regularly with the Syrian Women's Advisory Board and diverse women representatives from civil society to hear their perspectives on a sustainable and inclusive political solution.

Impact of the pandemic and lessons learned

148. The continuation of the COVID-19 pandemic into 2022 had no negative impact on the implementation of the mandate. As restrictions were eased, the mission resumed in-person meetings in Geneva of the Task Force on Humanitarian Access of the International Syria Support Group and of the thematic working groups of the Syrian Civil Society Support Room. The Office also resumed in-person regional outreach to Syrian civil society in Beirut, Amman and Gaziantep, Türkiye. The members of the Syrian Women's Advisory Board resumed in-person meetings in Geneva and several other locations, and the small body of the Constitutional Committee physically gathered twice in Geneva.
149. The mission continues to mainstream lessons learned and best practices related to the adjustments to and adaptation of the programme owing to the COVID-19 pandemic, including allowing staff members, within the framework of the flexible working arrangements policy and subject to exigencies of service, to work in a hybrid team set-up and telecommute two working days per week from the official duty station. The regular use of online platforms for internal meetings and engagements with external interlocutors has become part of the Office's new modus operandi.

Programme performance in 2022

Advancement of the implementation of the road map as outlined in resolution 2254 (2015) for the political process in the Syrian Arab Republic

150. The Special Envoy carried out the Secretary-General's good offices to advance towards the full implementation of resolution 2254 (2015), prioritizing engagement with the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic and the Syrian opposition on various aspects of the political process. He also consulted broadly with regional and international stakeholders to help create the conditions for an inclusive, credible and comprehensive political solution, in line with resolution 2254 (2015).
151. The mission convened seven plenary meetings of the Task Force on Humanitarian Access of the International Syria Support Group in Geneva as well as four ad hoc Task Force meetings to address pressing humanitarian issues. In addition, one plenary meeting of the Group's Task Force on the Ceasefire as well as three ad hoc Task Force meetings were convened to discuss security-related developments and trends on the ground. Furthermore, the Office continued to prioritize work on the file of the detained, the disappeared and the missing, and regularly engaged with the Syrian Women Advisory's Board, as well as with members of the Syrian Civil Society Support Room, to ensure inclusivity and gender mainstreaming in the political process.
152. Progress towards the objective is presented in the performance measure below (see table 24).

Table 24
Performance measure

2020 (actual)	2021 (actual)	2022 (actual)
Constitutional Committee sessions in Geneva, in tandem with international engagements on other elements of the political process, in accordance with Security Council resolution 2254 (2015) , to improve conditions on the ground, build trust and confidence, and open a path to credible negotiations	Constitutional Committee started discussions, based on its terms of reference, to find agreement on basic constitutional principles, while international engagements on other elements of the political process, in accordance with Security Council resolution 2254 (2015) , were deepened	Constitutional Committee discussed draft constitutional texts. The Office shared ideas with the Committee's Co-Chairs on ways to expedite the work and produce results and continued progress. Opportunities to advance a step-for-step confidence-building process in line with Security Council resolution 2254 (2015) were explored with national, regional and international stakeholders

Planned result for 2024

Establishing and advancing a credible, inclusive and comprehensive political process to advance on all elements of Security Council resolution [2254 \(2015\)](#)

Programme performance in 2022 and target for 2024

153. The mission's work contributed to the Constitutional Committee holding substantive discussions on draft constitutional texts on several titles of constitutional principles and submitting some revisions to reflect the content of the discussions. The Special Envoy expended significant effort towards facilitating the work of the small body of the Syrian Constitutional Committee in Geneva. In the first half of 2022, the mission convened the seventh and eighth sessions, allowing for substantive discussions on draft constitutional texts and constitutional principles. A ninth session, scheduled for July 2022, was postponed for reasons unrelated to the Syrian file. Throughout the second half of 2022, the Special Envoy continued to work to unblock obstacles to convening a ninth session and to address the substantive challenges that have faced the Committee. The mission's consultations with national, regional and international stakeholders resulted in a deepened dialogue on initial step-for-step confidence-building measures and the identification of some precise, concrete, reciprocal, verifiable, potential steps that could have a positive impact on the lives of Syrians and contribute to the creation of a safe, calm and neutral environment conducive to advancing an inclusive, comprehensive and credible political settlement of the Syrian conflict in line with resolution [2254 \(2015\)](#).

Lessons learned and planned change

154. The lesson for the mission was the need to continue to expand its engagement beyond the traditional interlocutors, including international stakeholders, firstly to broaden national ownership over the political process, and secondly to expand the scope of issues that are addressed in the political process. In applying the lesson, the mission will further broaden its scope and work with a wider range of stakeholders to ensure a comprehensive and holistic approach towards the implementation of Security Council resolution [2254 \(2015\)](#).
155. Expected progress towards the objective and the target for 2024 are presented in the performance measure below (see table 25).

Table 25

Performance measure

<i>2020 (actual)</i>	<i>2021 (actual)</i>	<i>2022 (actual)</i>	<i>2023 (planned)</i>	<i>2024 (planned)</i>
Continuation of the work of the Constitutional Committee in tandem with progress on the broader political process in accordance with Security Council resolution 2254 (2015)	Constitutional Committee made progress in its discussions, based on its terms of reference, in tandem with progress on the broader political process in accordance with Council resolution 2254 (2015)	Constitutional Committee discussed draft constitutional texts. The Office shared ideas with the Committee's Co-Chairs on ways to expedite the work for continued progress. Opportunities to advance a step-for-step confidence-building process in line with Security Council resolution 2254 (2015) were explored with national, regional and international stakeholders	Constitutional Committee continues producing tangible results in tandem with sustained negotiations and consultations to advance the full implementation of Security Council resolution 2254 (2015)	Constitutional Committee continues producing tangible results in tandem with further progress on the broader political process in accordance with Security Council resolution 2254 (2015)

Deliverables

156. Table 26 lists all deliverables of the mission.

Table 26

Deliverables for the period 2022–2024, by category and subcategory

<i>Category and subcategory</i>	<i>2022 planned</i>	<i>2022 actual</i>	<i>2023 planned</i>	<i>2024 planned</i>
A. Facilitation of the intergovernmental process and expert bodies				
Substantive services for meetings (number of three-hour meetings)	160	47	144	140
1. Meetings of the Security Council	12	12	12	12
2. Meetings of the Task Force on the Ceasefire of the International Syria Support Group	12	4	–	4
3. Meetings of the Task Force on Humanitarian Access of the International Syria Support Group	24	11	20	12
4. Meetings of the large body of the Constitutional Committee	12	–	12	12
5. Meetings of the small body of the Constitutional Committee	100	20	100	100
B. Generation and transfer of knowledge				
Seminars, workshops and training events (number of days)	8	31	8	8
6. Workshops for all Syrian stakeholders on topics relating to the peace talks, such as governance, constitution, elections, security governance/counter-terrorism and confidence-building measures	8	31	8	8

Category and subcategory	2022 planned	2022 actual	2023 planned	2024 planned
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C. Substantive deliverables

Good offices: provision of good offices to facilitate an inclusive Syrian-led and -owned political solution to the Syrian conflict, in line with Security Council resolution 2254 (2015), which will meet the legitimate aspirations of the Syrian people to dignity, freedom and justice based on the principles of equality and non-discrimination.

Consultation, advice and advocacy: consultation, advice and advocacy in support of the political process with Member States and regional and international organizations; consultations and advice as a member of the Working Group on the release of detainees/abductees, the handover of bodies and the identification of missing persons; consultations in support of the political process with representatives of civil society organizations; consultations in support of the political process with women's representatives and women's organizations.

D. Communication deliverables

External and media relations: press statements, interviews, video messages and briefings stressing the importance of political dialogue, the end of violence, human rights violations, humanitarian access and the role of women in the peace process.

B. Proposed post and non-post resource requirements for 2024

Resource requirements (regular budget)

Table 27

Financial resources

(Thousands of United States dollars)

Category of expenditure	2022		2023	2024	Variance
	Appropriation	Expenditure	Appropriation	Requirements	2024 vs. 2023 Increase/(decrease)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)=(4)-(3)
Military and police personnel costs	—	—	—	—	—
Civilian personnel costs	9 169.8	8 587.6	8 327.1	8 382.2	55.1
Operational costs	6 962.8	4 042.7	6 674.5	5 818.4	(856.1)
Total (net of staff assessment)	16 132.6	12 630.3	15 001.6	14 200.6	(801.0)

Table 28

Human resources

	International staff											National staff			United Nations Volunteers			Total
	USG	ASG	D-2	D-1	P-5	P-4	P-3	P-2	FS	GS	Subtotal	NPO	LL	Subtotal	International	National	Subtotal	
Approved 2023	1	1	1	3	8	14	11	—	10	8 ^a	57	—	31	31	—	—	—	88
Proposed 2024	1	1	1	3	8	13	10	—	8	8 ^a	53	1	33	34	—	—	—	87
Change	—	—	—	—	—	(1)	(1)	—	(2)	—	(4)	1	2	3	—	—	—	(1)

^a Other level, unless otherwise stated.

157. The proposed resource requirements for 2024 for the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria amount to \$14,200,600 (net of staff assessment) and would provide for salaries and common staff costs (\$8,382,200) for 87 positions (1 Under-Secretary-General, 1 Assistant Secretary-General, 1 D-2, 3 D-1, 8 P-5, 13 P-4, 10 P-3, 8 Field Service, 8 General Service (Other level), 1 National Professional Officer and 33 Local level), including the proposed staffing changes below, as well as operational costs (\$5,818,400), comprising costs for consultants and consulting

services (\$128,200), official travel (\$969,900), facilities and infrastructure (\$2,473,700), ground transportation (\$365,000), air transportation (\$356,000), communications and information technology (\$396,400), medical (\$7,800) and other supplies, services and equipment (\$1,121,400).

158. For 2024, the following changes are proposed for staffing:
 - (a) Abolishment of a Senior Political Affairs Officer (P-5) in the Damascus Office and establishment of a Senior Human Rights Officer (P-5) in the Political Affairs Office in Geneva. The repurposing of this long-vacant position by abolishing it and establishing a Senior Human Rights Officer to focus on the release of arbitrarily detained persons, particularly women and children, will contribute to the mission's work as a member of the Working Group on the release of detainees/abductees, the handover of bodies and the identification of missing persons. This highly sensitive and critical work requires a dedicated senior person to lead efforts from Geneva to enable, inter alia, effective and confidential coordination with OHCHR and the International Committee of the Red Cross in Geneva. This proposal will strengthen the work of the Office of the Special Envoy and enable it to carry out a key function of the mandate;
 - (b) Abolishment of a Military Adviser (P-4) in Geneva considering both the vacancy length of the position and the changed nature of the conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic;
 - (c) Conversion of a Political Affairs Officer (P-3) to an Associate Political Affairs Officer (National Professional Officer) in the Damascus Office to strengthen liaison and outreach with all national stakeholders in the Syrian Arab Republic and develop a deeper understanding of conflict dynamics, which will be better served by a National Professional Officer;
 - (d) Conversion of a Human Resources Assistant (Field Service) and a Security Officer (Field Service) to Local level positions, following a review of workloads and in an effort to strengthen national staff capacity in administration and security.
159. A vacancy rate of 35.1 per cent has been applied to estimates for continuing international positions based on the vacancy rate in March 2023. A vacancy rate of 50 per cent has been applied to the P-5 position proposed for establishment and three positions proposed for conversion. A vacancy rate of 3.2 per cent has been applied to the other Local level positions on the basis of the actual average vacancy rate in 2022.
160. The decrease in the requirements proposed for 2024 compared with the appropriation for 2023 is attributable mainly to lower requirements for facilities and infrastructure and for security services, which are offset in part by increased requirements for civilian personnel, due to higher salaries and common staff costs for international staff based on recent expenditure patterns.

Extrabudgetary resources

161. In 2023, extrabudgetary resources of \$272,500 are projected to fund a Senior Human Rights Officer (P-5) and an Associate Political Affairs Officer (National Professional Officer) and support the Office of the Special Envoy in its role of facilitating the Constitutional Committee through the provision of substantive, logistical, security and support arrangements, including liaison with interlocutors of the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic and the opposition, civil society, including women's groups, and regional and international stakeholders, as well as other activities.
162. For 2024, extrabudgetary resources of \$279,000 are projected to continue supporting the Office of the Special Envoy in its role of facilitating the Constitutional Committee. At the time of reporting, there is no clarity on whether there will be positions funded from such resources in 2024.

7. Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Horn of Africa

(\$1,654,600)

Foreword

The establishment of the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Horn of Africa in 2018 was primarily driven by dynamic changes in the region. The Office is mandated to support the Horn of Africa region in sustaining gains in peace and security, encompassing all the member States of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), including Eritrea. While new trends and challenges have emerged since 2018, and others have resurfaced, the Office has worked with partners to identify entry points for engagement and is addressing these challenges.

Over the course of 2024, my Office will seek to respond to the new challenges in the region while continuing to coordinate and enhance the coherence of the collective work of the United Nations in the region, and focus on the prevention of crises affecting human security through joined-up action in support of Member States' national and regional strategies in the pursuit of lasting peace and sustainable development. In this regard, I will provide political leadership and coordinate implementation of the comprehensive regional prevention strategy for the Horn of Africa, with a focus on prevention and supporting regional peace, security and long-term stability; building resilience and promoting socioeconomic development; promoting inclusive and responsive governance; and supporting sustainable natural resources management and climate resilience. In addition, I will work closely with the African Union and IGAD to support their efforts in achieving a more peaceful, integrated and prosperous Horn of Africa.

I look forward to representing the Secretary-General in this effort.

(Signed) Hanna **Tetteh**
Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Horn of Africa

A. Proposed programme plan for 2024 and programme performance in 2022

Overall orientation

Mandates and background

163. The overall objective of the mission is to work closely with and support member States of IGAD, in line with the Joint Framework for Cooperation between the United Nations and IGAD signed in Djibouti on 17 November 2015, and other regional organizations in promoting peace and security across the Horn of Africa. This primarily involves enhancing subregional capacities for conflict prevention and mediation and addressing cross-cutting issues. On this basis, the mission supports the good offices of the Secretary-General. In addition, the mission has been tasked with enhancing linkages in the work of the United Nations and other partners in the Horn of Africa region, with a view to promoting a joined-up regional approach, including through facilitating coordination and information exchange within the United Nations system.
164. The mandate of the mission derives from an exchange of letters between the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council ([S/2018/955](#) and [S/2018/979](#)), when the remit of the mandate of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Sudan and South Sudan was expanded to cover the entire Horn of Africa region, following previous exchanges of letters (including [S/2016/258](#) and [S/2016/259](#)). In line with the letters of 2018, the mission also continues to carry out the functions previously performed by the Special Envoy for the Sudan and South Sudan relating to the maintenance of good and peaceful neighbourly relations between the Sudan and South Sudan, established pursuant to the exchange of letters between the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council in 2011 ([S/2011/474](#) and [S/2011/475](#)). The mandate includes cooperation with the African Union High-level Implementation Panel in efforts to implement Security Council resolution [2046 \(2012\)](#), in which the Council called upon the Sudan and South Sudan to reach an agreement on critical issues, including: (a) the full and urgent advancement of all outstanding issues from the Comprehensive Peace Agreement; and (b) the easing of tensions and the facilitation of the resumption of negotiations on post-secession relations and the normalization of their relations.
165. The Horn of Africa region has long been a focus of United Nations engagement and investment. The region faces major challenges, including long-standing civil conflicts and unrest, poverty and vulnerability to climate change. The region also possesses significant opportunities, however, including rapid economic growth in several countries, a young and dynamic population and new momentum for regional cooperation. Realizing the region's enormous potential requires a collective approach, tackling shared challenges in a coordinated manner. The task of the mission is to support the region at this critical juncture and ensure that it benefits from the full range of the expertise and capacities of the United Nations.

Programme of work

Objective

166. The objective, to which this mission contributes, is to establish and maintain good and peaceful neighbourly relations between the countries of the Horn of Africa region, encompassing Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, the Sudan and Uganda, with a view to consolidating and sustaining gains in peace and security and enhancing regional conflict prevention.

Strategy and external factors for 2024

167. To contribute to the objective, the Office will:
 - (a) Promote regional peace and security, resilience and socioeconomic development, inclusive and responsive governance and sustainable natural resources development and climate resilience. This will be done by providing political leadership for the United Nations engagement in these areas and ensure joined-up action and system-wide ownership of outcomes through the comprehensive regional prevention strategy for the Horn of Africa;
 - (b) Support IGAD in strengthening the link between early warning and early response, increasing its capacity to respond to and resolve conflicts, including through mediation and improving information-sharing and knowledge management by learning from good practices in the region and beyond. This will be done by deploying the Secretary-General's good offices and leveraging the collective influence of IGAD member States to support dialogue and joint initiatives among the countries;
 - (c) Work closely with and support the African Union, the African Union High-level Implementation Panel and other relevant regional organizations in addressing recent and emerging security threats. This will be done through information-sharing, the convening of regular meetings with relevant partners and other special envoys in the Horn of Africa region and the development of appropriate messages and approaches for supporting regional peace and security. This will also include working with the African Union, IGAD and other partners in supporting the Ethiopian peace process, in particular, the implementation of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement.
168. The above-mentioned work is expected to result in:
 - (a) Strengthened subregional capacities, improved relations and enhanced mutual trust and confidence between countries of the region to address the root causes of conflicts. More specifically, these actions are expected to result in strengthened synergies between partners in the region and the alignment of interventions and responses with the respective strategic frameworks of the United Nations, IGAD and the African Union;
 - (b) Operationalizing the Secretary-General's vision of prevention through further reviewing and implementing the action plan of the comprehensive regional prevention strategy;
 - (c) Strengthened partnership with IGAD and the African Union.
169. With regard to the external factors, the overall plan for 2024 is based on the following planning assumptions:
 - (a) Opportunities exist to address long-standing sources of tension, particularly through shuttle diplomacy;
 - (b) IGAD and the African Union continue to be fully engaged in the maintenance of peace and security in the region, paying particular attention to Ethiopia, Somalia, the Sudan and South Sudan;
 - (c) States in the region continue to engage constructively with the Special Envoy and continue to work with the United Nations in the area of capacity-building, in particular in the area of mediation and conflict prevention and resolution;
 - (d) South Sudanese parties, with support from the region, progressively show commitment to the implementation of the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan and are prepared to consolidate gains;
 - (e) The relationship between the Sudan and South Sudan remains constructive, enabling direct negotiations between the two countries on outstanding bilateral issues, including the situation of Abyei and its final status.

170. With regard to cooperation with other entities at the global, regional, national and local levels, in order to capitalize on the opportunities for closer cooperation on peace and security in the Horn of Africa, the mission will continue to work closely with IGAD and its member States, as well as other organizations such as the African Union and the European Union. Support will be provided to address the regional dimensions of crises and conflicts in the Horn of Africa, focusing on their cross-border and regional implications. The mission will also cooperate with the African Union High-level Implementation Panel to support the bilateral negotiations between the Sudan and South Sudan to resolve outstanding issues, including finding a settlement to the issue of the final status of Abyei. In addition, the mission will continue to work closely with the African Union, IGAD, the troika and other Member States supporting political cooperation and regional integration. The mission will continue to work with other United Nations entities to provide technical and advisory support to the IGAD secretariat.
171. With regard to inter-agency coordination and liaison, the mission will engage with special representatives of the Secretary-General, resident coordinators and peace and development advisers in the countries of the region, and with United Nations agencies, funds and programmes that are active in the areas identified as collective priorities by the United Nations system.
172. The mission integrates a gender perspective in its operational activities, deliverables and results, as appropriate, and good offices and planned missions will include gender-sensitive and focused activities. With regard to seminars and workshops, gender-related aspects are included in the agenda of those events. Much of the Horn of Africa region's potential hinges on the meaningful involvement of women and youth in its efforts to promote stability and prosperity. With this in mind, the Special Envoy will continue to work with relevant stakeholders to promote inclusive messaging to enhance the participation of women in all political and peace processes. The Special Envoy will actively engage in regional and global meetings to lobby for the acceleration of the implementation of the women and peace and security agenda.

Impact of the pandemic and lessons learned

173. The continuation of the COVID-19 pandemic into 2022 affected the mission's representation and participation at meetings and events, for which the mission used alternative approaches, including organizing hybrid events and delegating other staff members to represent the Office, such as the IGAD-United Nations high-level interministerial conference on climate change, peace and security held on the margins of the twenty-seventh session of the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. The continuation of the COVID-19 pandemic did not significantly impact mandate implementation.
174. The mission continues to mainstream lessons learned and best practices related to the adjustments to and adaptation of the programme owing to the COVID-19 pandemic, including using alternative working methods and organizing virtual meetings, such as two regional multi-stakeholder workshops on addressing hate speech and disinformation in the Horn of Africa.

Programme performance in 2022

Enhanced collective action in implementing the prevention agenda in the Horn of Africa and deepened partnership in the region through collaboration with the Intergovernmental Authority on Development

175. To enhance regional prevention, the mission coordinated and led the implementation of the comprehensive regional prevention strategy with concrete joint activities undertaken across the four pillars of the strategy, including the publication of three joint regional analysis reports, and organized two regional workshops on addressing hate speech.
176. The Special Envoy carried out the Secretary-General's good offices mandate and specifically engaged on the conflict in northern Ethiopia, supporting the African Union High Representative for

the Horn of Africa Region, and participated as an observer in the peace talks between the Government of Ethiopia and the Tigray People's Liberation Front, which resulted in the signing of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement on 2 November 2022.

177. Within the IGAD-United Nations cooperation framework, the mission provided support to IGAD and regularly engaged the IGAD Executive Secretary and other IGAD officials working together to address recent challenges in the region, including climate, peace and security.
178. Progress towards the objective is presented in the performance measure below (see table 29).

Table 29

Performance measure

<i>2020 (actual)</i>	<i>2021 (actual)</i>	<i>2022 (actual)</i>
The capacity of IGAD to provide early warning and policy advice on conflict response measures to its member States was strengthened through the implementation of the joint framework through joint initiatives and regular engagement	IGAD capacity to address cross-border and cross-cutting issues was strengthened, creating the conditions for joint action taken by IGAD member States on the prevention of conflict and on regional initiatives to reduce vulnerability and address the root causes of crises	IGAD-United Nations partnership strengthened and IGAD capacity to address issues related to climate, peace and security and women and peace and security enhanced through the development of the regional action plan for women and peace and security and a regional climate security coordination mechanism

Planned result for 2024**Enhanced collective action in implementing the prevention agenda in the Horn of Africa****Programme performance in 2022 and target for 2024**

179. In 2022, the mission's work contributed to the maintenance of good and peaceful neighbourly relations between the countries in the Horn of Africa region and enhanced regional conflict prevention, as well as deepened collaboration in addressing peace and security issues between IGAD, the African Union and the United Nations, which met the planned target of implementing the action plan through partnerships and collaboration with other United Nations entities, as well as IGAD and the African Union.
180. In 2024, the mission will continue to carry out the Secretary-General's good offices, including supporting ongoing peace processes and political transitions within the Horn of Africa region by working with the African Union, IGAD and the Governments of the States Members of the United Nations within the IGAD region, as well as other regional actors, and coordinating with other Special Representatives of the Secretary-General in charge of political and peacekeeping missions within the region. This is expected to result in improved regional approaches to the prevention of crises and conflict by enhancing support to and strengthening the capacity of IGAD to address emerging security threats with a view to achieving improved information-sharing, developing joint messaging and implementing joint approaches towards addressing the peace and security challenges of the region. This is also expected to deepen collaboration with IGAD, the African Union and other relevant regional and subregional organizations in supporting the implementation of existing peace agreements as well as in mediation, facilitation and other relevant areas where cooperation and collaboration would be advantageous to ensure complementarity in reducing tensions, conflict prevention and peacebuilding efforts. Furthermore, the mission will continue to coordinate implementation of the United Nations comprehensive regional prevention strategy, encompassing peace and security issues, socioeconomic development, governance challenges and climate risks and resilience.

Lessons learned and planned change

181. The lesson for the mission was the need to review and adjust the action plans to include new and emerging threats as well as to enhance implementation. In applying the lesson, the mission will continue to engage IGAD, the African Union and United Nations agencies, funds and programmes to ensure the priorities are still relevant in the current context and that the comprehensive regional prevention strategy reflects an all-of-United Nations approach.
182. Expected progress towards the objective and the target for 2024 are presented in the performance measure below (see table 30).

Table 30

Performance measure

2020 (actual)	2021 (actual)	2022 (actual)	2023 (planned)	2024 (planned)
Implementation of the action plan through collective actions and messaging on conflict prevention	Regional capacity to address and prevent conflict and crisis in the region enhanced	Implementation of the action plan through partnerships and collaboration with other United Nations entities, as well as IGAD and the African Union	Revision and implementation of the prevention strategy through partnerships and collaboration with other United Nations entities, as well as IGAD and the African Union	Implementation of the prevention strategy through partnerships and strengthened collaboration with other United Nations entities, as well as IGAD and the African Union, within the revised framework

Deliverables

183. Table 31 lists all deliverables of the mission.

Table 31

Deliverables for the period 2022–2024, by category and subcategory

Category and subcategory	2022 planned	2022 actual	2023 planned	2024 planned
A. Facilitation of the intergovernmental process and expert bodies				
Substantive services for meetings (number of three-hour meetings)	2	2	2	2
Meetings of the Security Council	2	2	2	2
C. Substantive deliverables				
Good offices: provision of good offices through engagement, including shuttle and quiet diplomacy, on issues related to peace consolidation and conflict prevention, including the implementation of bilateral agreements and the completion of negotiations on outstanding bilateral issues. This includes engagements with the authorities in the Sudan and South Sudan on their bilateral relations, as well as other leaders, officials and stakeholders in the region regarding regional peace and security issues.				
Consultation, advice and advocacy: consultations and advice on consolidating recent gains in peace and security in the Horn of Africa region; advice on enhancing subregional capacities to address cross-border and cross-cutting issues. Consultations will be undertaken with IGAD member States and the IGAD secretariat, civil society organizations and partners working in the IGAD region. Engagement with the African Union, including the African Union High-level Implementation Panel, will also continue.				
D. Communication deliverables				
External and media relations: social media outreach and briefings to raise awareness of key developments and promote support for addressing challenges to peace and security in the region. Social media outreach and briefings will target United Nations entities working in the region, United Nations Headquarters, partners and IGAD member States.				

B. Proposed post and non-post resource requirements for 2024

Resource requirements (regular budget)

Table 32

Financial resources

(Thousands of United States dollars)

Category of expenditure	2022		2023	2024	Variance
	Appropriation	Expenditure	Appropriation	Requirements	2024 vs. 2023 Increase/(decrease)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)=(4)-(3)
Military and police personnel costs	—	—	—	—	—
Civilian personnel costs	1 581.8	1 425.5	1 583.7	1 450.9	(132.8)
Operational costs	181.8	160.6	170.8	203.7	32.9
Total (net of staff assessment)	1 763.6	1 586.1	1 754.5	1 654.6	(99.9)

Table 33

Human resources

	International staff											National staff			United Nations Volunteers			Total
	USG	ASG	D-2	D-1	P-5	P-4	P-3	P-2	FS	GS	Subtotal	NPO	LL	Subtotal	International	National	Subtotal	
Approved 2023	1	—	—	1	—	2	1	—	—	—	5	2	2	4	—	—	—	9
Proposed 2024	1	—	—	1	—	2	1	—	—	—	5	2	2	4	—	—	—	9
Change	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—

184. The proposed resource requirements for 2024 for the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Horn of Africa amount to \$1,654,600 (net of staff assessment) and would provide for salaries and common staff costs (\$1,450,900) for nine positions (1 Under-Secretary-General, 1 D-1, 2 P-4, 1 P-3, 2 National Professional Officer and 2 Local level), as well as operational costs (\$203,700), comprising costs for official travel (\$102,700), facilities and infrastructure (\$32,000), ground transportation (\$9,700), communications and information technology (\$40,100), medical (\$3,800) and other supplies, services and equipment (\$15,400).
185. It is proposed that a Political Affairs Officer (P-4) be redeployed from Addis Ababa to Khartoum, where the position was initially established in 2011 and where it was based until 2018 when the mandate of the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Sudan and South Sudan was expanded to cover the entire Horn of Africa pursuant to the exchange of letters between the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council ([S/2018/955](#) and [S/2018/979](#)). There is currently only one Political Affairs Officer (National Professional Officer) in Khartoum. Owing to the volatile situation in the Sudan and the developments in Abyei, the redeployment of the Political Affairs Officer (P-4) to Khartoum to support the Political Affairs Officer (National Professional Officer) already deployed there would contribute to the implementation of the mandate. The two positions will closely monitor developments in the Sudan, and engage and work closely with the IGAD Special Envoy to South Sudan as well as key partners and other United Nations entities based in Khartoum and Abyei.
186. A vacancy rate of 20.0 per cent has been applied to the five international positions on the basis of the actual vacancy rate in March 2023. For National Professional Officer and Local level positions, a vacancy rate of zero per cent has been applied on the basis of the actual average vacancy rate in 2022.

187. The decrease in the requirements proposed for 2024 compared with the appropriation for 2023 is attributable mainly to the application of a 20.0 per cent vacancy rate for international staff compared with the budgeted vacancy rate of 3.0 per cent in 2023 and lower salary costs for National Professional Officers. The decreased requirements are offset in part by increased requirements for facilities and infrastructure and other supplies, services, and equipment, owing mainly to higher requirements for the rental of premises and the increased provision for training fees, supplies and services as a result of more online training.

Extrabudgetary resources

188. In 2023, extrabudgetary resources amounting to approximately \$830,200 are being utilized to provide for five positions (1 P-5, 1 P-4, 1 P-3, 1 P-2 and 1 Local level), a consultancy and temporary administrative support services.
189. In 2024, extrabudgetary resources in the estimated amount of \$830,200 will continue to provide for the continuation of five positions (1 P-5, 1 P-4, 1 P-3, 1 P-2 and 1 Local level), a consultancy and temporary administrative support services.

8. Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region

(\$4,984,100)

Foreword

2023 marked the tenth anniversary of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Region. While progress has been achieved in various areas, the region currently faces a crisis triggered by the resurgence of the Mouvement du 23 mars (M23), coupled with the persistent activities of local and foreign armed groups. In 2022, a significant increase in tensions and mistrust between some countries was observed, despite increased regional peace efforts supported by my Office. The continued illicit exploitation of and trade in natural resources, human rights violations and humanitarian crises also remain serious challenges. As requested by the African Union Peace and Security Council on 17 February 2023, options for the Framework's revitalization should be explored while ensuring that all actors in and beyond the region remain firm in their efforts to help address the current crisis.

The United Nations Strategy for Peace Consolidation, Conflict Prevention and Conflict Resolution in the Great Lakes Region ([S/2020/1168](#)) and its action plan identify United Nations action in the region over the next few years, in support of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework.

In 2024, I will therefore increase efforts to support regional political processes, promote dialogue and help address sources of mistrust through shuttle diplomacy and other engagements. I will also continue to spearhead the collective engagements of the United Nations towards the implementation of the Strategy. Strengthening partnerships at all levels will remain central to these efforts. In this regard, I count on Member States' continued support.

(Signed) Huang Xia
Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region

A. Proposed programme plan for 2024 and programme performance in 2022

Overall orientation

Mandates and background

190. Established in 2013, the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region is responsible for supporting the implementation of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Region, which was signed on 24 February 2013 by Angola, Burundi, the Central African Republic, the Congo, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, South Africa, South Sudan, Uganda, the United Republic of Tanzania and Zambia, as well as representatives of the United Nations, the African Union, the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region and the Southern African Development Community, acting as guarantor institutions. On 31 January 2014, Kenya and the Sudan also signed the Framework. The Framework outlines national, regional and international commitments required to end the recurring cycles of violence in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo and address the root causes of conflict in the region.
191. The mandate of the mission derives from Security Council resolution [2098 \(2013\)](#) and subsequent Council resolutions and documents, including resolutions [2147 \(2014\)](#), [2211 \(2015\)](#), [2277 \(2016\)](#), [2348 \(2017\)](#), [2389 \(2017\)](#), on the implementation of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework, [2502 \(2019\)](#), [2556 \(2020\)](#), [2612 \(2021\)](#) and [2666 \(2022\)](#). In a press statement of 28 April 2022, the Council called for sustained support to the implementation of the United Nations Strategy for Peace Consolidation, Conflict Prevention and Conflict Resolution in the Great Lakes Region ([S/2020/1168](#)) and its action plan. In the Statement by the President of the Security Council of 3 June 2022 ([S/PRST/2022/4](#)), the Council welcomed regional efforts to implement the two-track approach aimed at finding lasting peace in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, noting the support provided by the Office of the Special Envoy to that effect. In a press statement issued by the Security Council on 3 February 2023, Council members emphasized the commitments undertaken by the region under the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework, reiterated their support to the regional efforts under way with regard to the East African Community-led and African Union-mandated Nairobi and Luanda processes, and encouraged the Special Envoy to pursue engagements with regional leaders in support of those peace initiatives.
192. The Strategy, developed by the mission following extensive consultations and published on 4 December 2020, is designed to provide the political and operational framework for United Nations action to support the implementation of the commitments under the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework. It is structured around three pillars: peace, security and justice; sustainable development and shared prosperity; and resilience to long-standing and emerging challenges. The action plan to implement the Strategy, covering policy and programmatic priority activities for the period from 2021 to 2023, was adopted by the senior policy group for the Strategy in July 2021. A new action plan, covering the period from 2024 onwards, is expected to be finalized before the end of 2023.
193. In 2024, the mission will continue supporting the implementation of the Strategy and its action plan, including through the sustained engagement of the Governments of the signatory countries and key partners. In view of the deteriorating security situation, notably in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, and heightened tensions between some countries in the region, the Office, through the Special Envoy's good offices, will further enhance its efforts towards easing tensions and encouraging political dialogue between countries. The Office will also provide political and technical support to ongoing regional political processes, including by mobilizing concerted support from the international community. The Office will also continue to support the regional priorities identified by the countries of the Great Lakes region in efforts to implement the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework, including on security, economic and judicial cooperation and the rule of law. In the area of security, the Office will further step up its support for regional efforts aimed at

putting an end to the persistent threat posed by armed groups in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. In so doing, it will support the activities of the operational cell of the Contact and Coordination Group on non-military measures. Finally, the Office will continue its efforts to support the women and peace and security agenda, as well as promote the economic empowerment and inclusion and the political participation of youth in matters of regional relevance.

Programme of work

Objective and external factors for 2024

194. The objective, to which this mission contributes, is to advance the effective implementation of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework by supporting and facilitating political, security and economic engagements among and between the signatory countries, while ensuring coherent and coordinated support from regional and international organizations and other partners, in line with the United Nations Strategy for Peace Consolidation, Conflict Prevention and Conflict Resolution in the Great Lakes Region and its action plan.
195. To contribute to the objective, the mission will:
 - (a) Deploy the Secretary-General's good offices, including discreet and shuttle diplomacy, support regional dialogue and peace efforts, collaborate closely with the guarantor institutions of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework and other subregional organizations involved in the ongoing diplomatic and military efforts, and reinforce coordination with international partners, including the International Contact Group for the Great Lakes Region and international financial institutions;
 - (b) Support the implementation of a regional non-military approach against armed groups; facilitate confidence-building consultations between the chiefs of military and civilian intelligence and security services from concerned countries; help strengthen existing security cooperation mechanisms, taking into account the decisions taken under the Nairobi and Luanda peace processes and related follow-up efforts by countries in the region, as applicable; and promote the repatriation and reintegration of former combatants, in line with international standards;
 - (c) Promote cross-border investments and responsible trade projects, including by furthering the implementation of the recommendations and decisions of the high-level workshop on natural resources held in 2021 in Khartoum;
 - (d) Promote the rule of law and regional judicial cooperation, as well as the protection of human rights, including by supporting targeted initiatives towards supporting Member States in implementing the 2019 Nairobi Declaration on Justice and Good Governance and the 2022 Kinshasa Declaration on Enhancing Judicial Cooperation in the Great Lakes Region;
 - (e) Advocate for and support the effective participation of women and youth in political and peace processes.
196. The above-mentioned work is expected to result in:
 - (a) Progress in resolving the current crisis, including concrete steps taken by concerned stakeholders to address issues of contention, as outlined in the decisions of the Luanda and Nairobi peace processes;
 - (b) Improved relations between countries of the region;
 - (c) Increased resort to regional mechanisms to address impunity and the upholding of the rule of law in the fight against serious crimes with a transborder dimension;
 - (d) Increased mobilization and harmonization of support from the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework guarantor institutions, international partners and other stakeholders;

- (e) Enhanced cooperation among concerned countries to neutralize armed groups and increase support for regional disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration initiatives through the activities of the Contact and Coordination Group on non-military measures and its operational cell;
 - (f) Joint initiatives on comprehensive regional non-military measures against armed groups, including the role of civil society organizations, women and youth in the peacebuilding processes;
 - (g) Increased bilateral and multilateral economic cooperation and support for concrete initiatives to curb the illicit exploitation of and trade in natural resources;
 - (h) Strengthened regional judicial cooperation through the Great Lakes Judicial Cooperation Network as the main mechanism for cross-border cases;
 - (i) A decrease of human rights violations in the region and an increase in the number of perpetrators held accountable.
197. With regard to the external factors, the overall plan for 2024 is based on the following planning assumptions:
- (a) The signatory countries of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework will have the political will to implement national and regional commitments, including commitments made in ongoing regional processes, to address the root causes of instability in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo and tensions among neighbouring countries, as well as to strengthen regional cooperation;
 - (b) Continued security challenges in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo will remain linked to the activities of local and foreign armed groups;
 - (c) The situation in the region will be conducive to political dialogue among countries and effective collaboration with relevant regional organizations;
 - (d) There will be continued support for and focus on the Great Lakes region by Member States and international partners, including coordinated action and support for signatory countries.
198. With regard to cooperation with other entities, the mission cooperates with and supports signatory countries of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework and regional organizations on priority political, security and socioeconomic initiatives aimed at ensuring the implementation of national and regional commitments under the Framework and promoting peace in the region. In an effort to further align approaches and strengthen partnerships as outlined in the United Nations Strategy for Peace Consolidation, Conflict Prevention and Conflict Resolution in the Great Lakes Region, the Special Envoy also encourages joint and/or harmonized initiatives by the guarantor institutions of the Framework. He also participates in the International Contact Group and engages in regular exchanges with other special envoys for the Great Lakes region. In support of the Framework's economic focus, the Special Envoy also cooperates with financial institutions, including the World Bank Group, the African Development Bank and other relevant partners.
199. With regard to inter-agency coordination and liaison, the mission works closely with the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), including in the context of the joint strategy of MONUSCO and the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo on a progressive and phased drawdown of MONUSCO, in support of efforts by the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to achieve its national commitments under the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework. The senior policy group, which is chaired by the Special Envoy, along with its implementation support mechanism, both established to facilitate the implementation of the United Nations Strategy for the Great Lakes Region, will continue to ensure alignment among United Nations missions and offices in the region, including, among others, the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa, MONUSCO and the United Nations Office to the African Union, in addition to regional coordinators and representatives of the

Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, OHCHR, UNHCR, the Economic Commission for Africa and other United Nations agencies, funds and programmes.

200. The mission integrates a gender perspective in its operational activities, deliverables and results, as appropriate. In addition to high-level advocacy meetings and missions by women leaders throughout the region, the Office of the Special Envoy supports the Advisory Board for Women, Peace and Security in the Great Lakes Region in its efforts to advocate for women's participation and representation in peacebuilding, political and electoral processes, to strengthen the monitoring and evaluation capacities of the mechanisms on sexual and gender-based violence of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region and to support cross-border communities in the prevention and resolution of conflict and election-related violence.

Impact of the pandemic and lessons learned

201. The continuation of the COVID-19 pandemic into 2022 had limited impact on the implementation of the mandate, owing to the easing of travel restrictions in the Great Lakes region and the use of digital platforms where possible.
202. The mission continues to mainstream lessons learned and best practices related to the adjustments to and adaptation of the programme owing to the COVID-19 pandemic, with regard to travel and training and flexible working arrangements.

Programme performance in 2022

Adoption of Kinshasa Declaration on Enhancing Regional Judicial Cooperation in efforts to advance the fight against impunity

203. In June 2022, ministers of justice of member States of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region adopted the Kinshasa Declaration on Enhancing Regional Judicial Cooperation, and standardized guidelines for requesting mutual legal assistance in criminal matters. The guidelines will contribute to harmonizing judicial cooperation procedures in the region, thereby reducing obstacles to the cross-border exchange of intelligence and/or evidence and, in turn, enhance the effectiveness of criminal investigations and prosecutions.
204. The ministerial meeting was facilitated by the mission, together with International Conference and with the support of other United Nations entities, including the Department of Peace Operations and OHCHR, in efforts to advance cross-border collaboration among judicial authorities on conflict-related crimes, including those related to armed groups and the illicit exploitation of and trade in natural resources. The ministerial meeting was preceded by technical-level engagements within the Great Lakes Judicial Cooperation Network on 13 and 14 June 2022.
205. Progress towards the objective is presented in the performance measure below (see table 34).

Table 34
Performance measure

<i>2020 (actual)</i>	<i>2021 (actual)</i>	<i>2022 (actual)</i>
Initial steps taken towards the implementation of the 2019 Nairobi Declaration on Justice and Good Governance	Discussions about draft harmonized guidelines for mutual legal assistance during the sixth meeting of the Great Lakes Judicial Cooperation Network	Seventh meeting of the Great Lakes Judicial Cooperation Network results in the identification of short-, medium- and long-term measures to enhance collaboration on specific cases related to cross-border crimes

2020 (actual)

2021 (actual)

2022 (actual)

Adoption by the Ministers of Justice of the Kinshasa Declaration on Enhancing Regional Judicial Cooperation and harmonized guidelines for mutual legal assistance

Establishment of the review committee for the implementation of the Nairobi and Kinshasa Declarations

Planned result for 2024

Strengthened relations among countries of the Great Lakes region

Programme performance in 2022 and target for 2024

206. The tenth Summit of the Regional Oversight Mechanism was successfully held on 24 February 2022. Despite the current crisis in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, cooperation on political, security and economic issues between countries of the region has continued and further accelerated. The rapprochement between Burundi and Rwanda is ongoing. The resumption of dialogue between Rwanda and Uganda started in January 2022 and continued throughout the year. The operational cell of the Contact and Coordination Group on non-military measures was operationalized and launched reconnaissance and contact missions in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. The Office also continued to cooperate with the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region in support of the transparent management of natural resources in the region, including through joint advocacy missions to promote agreement on, and implementation of, recommendations developed during a stakeholder consultation held in 2020. As outlined below, sustained consultations led by the Office, together with the International Conference and other partners, resulted in the adoption of the Kinshasa Declaration on Enhancing Judicial Cooperation in the Great Lakes Region and the holding of joint engagements and a workshop aimed at strengthening the capacities of women and youth to contribute to ongoing peace efforts. Furthermore, as part of efforts to advance the implementation of the United Nations Strategy for Peace Consolidation, Conflict Prevention and Conflict Resolution in the Great Lakes Region, the Office convened two meetings bringing together United Nations entities in the region, which contributed to enhanced information-sharing and joint analysis on ongoing political processes and the threat of terrorism and violent extremism in the region.
207. In 2024, the Special Envoy will further increase his political engagements, including discreet and shuttle diplomacy, in favour of good neighbourly relations and the resolution of contentious bilateral and multilateral issues, including continued instability in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. His high-level political engagements will be bolstered by enhanced joint analysis among United Nations presences and with regional stakeholders, as well as tailored interventions on technical aspects, such as the provision of technical support for existing regional security, economic cooperation and rule of law mechanisms, among others. Support for regional efforts to address the persistent threat posed by armed groups in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo and the region will also remain a priority and will be further stepped up in the context of support to the Nairobi and Luanda processes and the Contact and Coordination Group on non-military measures.

Lessons learned and planned change

208. A principal lesson for the Office remains the need to encourage all the signatory countries of the region to fully implement their commitments under the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework and under the International Conference's Pact on Security, Stability and Development in the Great

Lakes Region, signed in 2006 with a view to ensuring lasting peace and stability. In applying the lesson, the Office will continue to strengthen its interactions with stakeholders from the region at all levels, including civil society, women and youth, to further bolster the Special Envoy's engagement at the political level. The adopted multilayered approach, combining security with human rights and inclusion concerns, among others, will be further reinforced. The Office will further step up its engagements in support of consultations on ways to revitalize the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework, as called for by the African Union Peace and Security Council on 17 February 2023.

209. Expected progress towards the objective and the target for 2024 are presented in the performance measure below (see table 35).

Table 35

Performance measure

<i>2020 (actual)</i>	<i>2021 (actual)</i>	<i>2022 (actual)</i>	<i>2023 (planned)</i>	<i>2024 (planned)</i>
Holding of the fourth quadripartite summit on 21 February 2020 between Rwanda and Uganda, with the facilitation of Angola and the Democratic Republic of the Congo	Enhanced consultations, coordination and joint action among the guarantor institutions in support of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework	Holding of the tenth Summit of the Regional Oversight Mechanism and the Ministerial Conference on Enhancing Judicial Cooperation	Decisions of the tenth Summit of the Regional Oversight Mechanism are followed up on or implemented effectively and enable the region to advance its regional peace, security and cooperation agenda	Holding of the twelfth Summit of the Regional Oversight Mechanism and implementation of the recommendations on the revitalization of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework
Meeting of the guarantors of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework on 2 April 2020	Continuation of incremental dialogue between Burundi and Rwanda, including information exchange at the technical level, such as on security along the common border and the return of refugees	Enhanced consultations, coordination and joint action among the guarantor institutions in support of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework	Holding of the eleventh Summit of the Regional Oversight Mechanism and commemoration of the tenth anniversary of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework	Further support to the Nairobi and Luanda processes, leading to a normalization of relations between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda
Meeting of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Burundi and Rwanda on 19 October 2020	Continued commitment and consultations between Rwanda and Uganda towards the normalization of their bilateral relations	Continuation of incremental dialogue between Burundi and Rwanda, including information exchange at the technical level, such as on security along the common border and the return of refugees	Initiatives under the second and third phases of the action plan of the United Nations Strategy for Peace Consolidation, Conflict Prevention and Conflict Resolution in the Great Lakes Region are implemented	Rapprochement between Rwanda and Uganda and between Burundi and Rwanda is sustained
	Initiatives taken by regional and subregional organizations and signatory countries of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework to support peaceful,	Continued commitment and consultations between Rwanda and Uganda towards the normalization of their bilateral relations	Progress in the implementation of the Contact and Coordination Group action plan and	Initiatives under the second and third phases of the action plan of the United Nations Strategy for Peace Consolidation, Conflict Prevention and Conflict Resolution in the Great Lakes Region are implemented
				Progress in the implementation of

<i>2020 (actual)</i>	<i>2021 (actual)</i>	<i>2022 (actual)</i>	<i>2023 (planned)</i>	<i>2024 (planned)</i>
	inclusive and credible political and electoral processes	Initiatives taken by regional and subregional organizations and signatory countries of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework to support peaceful, inclusive and credible political and electoral processes	support for other security-related cooperation efforts by the region	the Contact and Coordination Group action plan and support for other security-related cooperation efforts by the region
	Operationalization of the Contact and Coordination Group and its operational cell	Operationalization of the Contact and Coordination Group and its operational cell	Progress in the implementation of the recommendations to curb the illicit exploitation of and trade in natural resources	Progress in the implementation of the recommendations to curb the illicit exploitation of and trade in natural resources
	Agreement on recommendations to curb the illicit exploitation of and trade in natural resources	Agreement on recommendations to curb the illicit exploitation of and trade in natural resources	Initiatives taken by the Advisory Board for Women, Peace and Security in the Great Lakes Region contribute to advancing women's participation in peacebuilding at various levels	Initiatives taken by the Advisory Board for Women, Peace and Security in the Great Lakes Region contribute to advancing women's participation in peacebuilding at various levels
	Capacity-building of women and youth	Adoption of the Kinshasa Declaration on Enhancing Judicial Cooperation in the Great Lakes Region		
		Capacity-building of women and youth		

Deliverables

210. Table 36 lists all deliverables of the mission.

Table 36

Deliverables for the period 2022–2024, by category and subcategory

<i>Category and subcategory</i>	<i>2022 planned</i>	<i>2022 actual</i>	<i>2023 planned</i>	<i>2024 planned</i>
A. Facilitation of the intergovernmental process and expert bodies				
Parliamentary documentation (number of documents)	2	2	2	2
1. Reports of the Secretary-General to the Security Council	2	2	2	2
Substantive services for meetings (number of three-hour meetings)	5	3	5	5
2. Meetings of the Security Council, the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004) concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Peacebuilding Commission	5	3	5	5
B. Generation and transfer of knowledge				
Field and technical cooperation projects (number of projects)	3	3	3	3
3. Projects on economic cooperation, land and conflict	2	2	2	2
4. Projects to promote cross-border trade and investment	1	1	1	1
Seminars, workshops and training events (number of days)	2	7	9	8
5. Workshop on exchange of lessons learned from elections and political processes	–	–	1	1
6. Workshop on economic cooperation, natural resources and conflict	–	2	3	2
7. Workshops on resolving existing challenges in the implementation of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework	2	3	2	2
8. Workshop on youth employment and engagement on peace and security	–	1	1	1
9. Advisory Board for Women, Peace and Security in the Great Lakes Region annual meetings to support national/regional-level initiatives to empower women and achieve 30 per cent women's representation	–	1	2	2
Fact-finding, monitoring and investigation missions (number of missions)	–	–	6	8
10. Missions of the operational cell of the Contact and Coordination Group on non-military measures	–	–	6	8
C. Substantive deliverables				
<p>Good offices: provision of good offices through engagement, including shuttle and discreet diplomacy, as well as through the facilitation of direct exchanges with regional leaders and senior representatives of signatory countries and co-guarantors of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework to advance the implementation of the Framework and address challenges to peace and security, including impunity for gross human rights violations; support to regional peace efforts, notably the Nairobi and Luanda processes; provision of good offices to the follow-up mechanism on the repatriation of disarmed combatants in line with international standards; good offices to enhance coordination and cooperation against the armed groups in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo; good offices to sustain international support for the implementation of the United Nations Strategy for Peace Consolidation, Conflict Prevention and Conflict Resolution in the Great Lakes Region and its action plan.</p> <p>Consultation, advice and advocacy: consultations to gain a shared regional and international assessment of the situation in the region; consultation and advice to gain a shared vision of regional human rights and humanitarian trends in the Great Lakes region; consultation and advice on delinking armed groups from natural resources revenues; advocacy to facilitate political conversation and agreement on regional integration with natural resources as a driver of shared prosperity; advocacy to advance gender equality in the region; advocacy to promote a concerted approach on the way forward in the region.</p>				

B. Proposed post and non-post resource requirements for 2024

Resource requirements (regular budget)

Table 37

Financial resources

(Thousands of United States dollars)

Category of expenditure	2022		2023	2024	Variance
	Appropriation	Expenditure	Appropriation	Requirements	2024 vs. 2023 Increase/(decrease)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)=(4)-(3)
Military and police personnel costs	–	–	–	–	–
Civilian personnel costs	4 265.7	3 605.9	4 838.3	4 133.0	(705.3)
Operational costs	868.2	800.2	899.6	851.1	(48.5)
Total (net of staff assessment)	5 133.9	4 406.1	5 737.9	4 984.1	(753.8)

Table 38

Human resources

	International staff											National staff			United Nations Volunteers			
	USG	ASG	D-2	D-1	P-5	P-4	P-3	P-2	FS	GS	Subtotal	NPO	LL	Subtotal	International	National	Subtotal	Total
Approved 2023	1	–	1	1	5	7	5	–	1	1 ^a	22	1	7	8	–	–	–	30
Proposed 2024	1	–	1	1	5	7	5	–	1	1 ^a	22	1	7	8	–	–	–	30
Change	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–

^a Other level, unless otherwise stated.

211. The proposed resource requirements for 2024 for the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region amount to \$4,984,100 (net of staff assessment) and would provide for salaries and common staff costs (\$4,133,000) for the continuation of 30 positions (1 Under-Secretary-General, 1 D-2, 1 D-1, 5 P-5, 7 P-4, 5 P-3, 1 Field Service, 1 General Service (Other level), 1 National Professional Officer and 7 Local level), as well as operational costs (\$851,100), comprising costs for consultants and consulting services (\$26,400), official travel (\$295,700), facilities and infrastructure (\$40,600), ground transportation (\$41,800), air operations (\$68,600), communications and information technology (\$141,400), medical (\$14,000) and other supplies, services and equipment (\$222,600).
212. A vacancy rate of 18.2 per cent has been applied to estimates for the international positions on the basis of the actual vacancy rate in March 2023. Vacancy rates of 91.7 per cent and zero per cent have been applied to the estimates for National Professional Officer and Local level positions, respectively, on the basis of the actual average vacancy rates in 2022.
213. The decrease in requirements proposed for 2024 compared with the appropriation for 2023 is attributable mainly to the vacancy rates of 18.2 per cent and 91.7 per cent applied to the estimates for international and National Professional Officer positions, respectively, compared to the respective budgeted vacancy rates of 5 per cent and zero per cent in 2023, as well as decreased requirements for other supplies, services and equipment, facilities and infrastructure, and communications and information technology.

Extrabudgetary resources

214. In 2023, extrabudgetary resources in the amount of \$2,808,000 are estimated to support the implementation of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework through various projects under different thematic areas.
215. In 2024, extrabudgetary resources in the amount of \$1,500,000 are estimated to support the implementation of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework through various projects under different thematic areas.
216. The decrease in the estimated extrabudgetary resources to be utilized in 2024 as compared with 2023 is due to lower projected contributions.

9. Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen

(\$16,708,300)

Foreword

The year 2022 saw a major opportunity towards ending the conflict in Yemen. In early April, my continued engagement with the Government of Yemen, the Saudi-led coalition and the Houthis resulted in an agreement on a truce between the Government of Yemen and the Houthis, which resulted in a marked reduction in violence on the front lines, the first commercial flights to and from Sana'a airport since 2016 and a consistent flow of fuel through the Hudaydah port. Despite the non-renewal of the truce in early October, the relative calm on the front line remains and other key elements of the truce have continued. The period of calm since April 2022 is the longest since the beginning of the conflict.

I continue to mediate between the parties to ensure that the gains of the truce are sustained and to bring them to an agreement on the way forward, building on the achievements of the truce and deepening cooperation between the parties.

These efforts must be geared towards achieving a nationwide ceasefire and the reactivation of a Yemeni-led political process under United Nations auspices.

Lasting peace requires the contribution of a diverse range of Yemenis, including women, youth and civil society, beyond the parties to the conflict. The parties have an opportunity to end the conflict, of which they must take advantage. There is still a danger of a return to a major outbreak of violence as long as there is no political settlement to the conflict. I will exert all efforts, with the backing of the regional and international community, to bring the parties to the negotiating table to find a solution.

(Signed) Hans **Grundberg**
Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen

A. Proposed programme plan for 2024 and programme performance in 2022

Overall orientation

Mandates and background

217. The Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen is responsible for carrying out the good offices of the Secretary-General to enable the resumption of a peaceful, inclusive, orderly and Yemeni-led political transition process that meets the legitimate demands and aspirations of the Yemeni people, including women and youth, for peaceful change and meaningful political, economic and social reform, as set out in the Initiative of the Gulf Cooperation Council and its implementation mechanism and the outcomes of the comprehensive National Dialogue Conference. The mandate derives from Security Council resolution [2014 \(2011\)](#) and from subsequent Council resolutions, including resolutions [2051 \(2012\)](#), [2140 \(2014\)](#), [2201 \(2015\)](#), [2216 \(2015\)](#), [2266 \(2015\)](#), [2342 \(2017\)](#), [2402 \(2018\)](#), [2451 \(2018\)](#), [2452 \(2019\)](#), [2456 \(2019\)](#), [2481 \(2019\)](#) and [2505 \(2020\)](#), as well as exchanges of letters between the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council ([S/2012/469](#) and [S/2012/470](#), [S/2016/488](#) and [S/2016/489](#) and [S/2018/126](#) and [S/2018/127](#)).
218. To ensure the full and effective implementation of Security Council resolutions [2014 \(2011\)](#) and [2051 \(2012\)](#), together with the political transition agreed in November 2011 under the Initiative of the Gulf Cooperation Council and its implementation mechanism for the political transition process in Yemen, the Secretary-General established the Office of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Yemen, in accordance with an exchange of letters with the President of the Security Council in June 2012, which was then subsumed into the Office of the Special Envoy ([S/2012/469](#) and [S/2012/470](#); see also [S/2015/283](#) and [S/2015/284](#) and [S/2018/126](#) and [S/2018/127](#)).
219. In line with Security Council resolution [2216 \(2015\)](#), as well as other Council resolutions on Yemen, including resolutions [2014 \(2011\)](#), [2051 \(2012\)](#), [2140 \(2014\)](#), [2201 \(2015\)](#), [2451 \(2018\)](#) and [2452 \(2019\)](#), and the letter from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council ([S/2016/488](#)), the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen will continue to mediate between the parties with a view to ending the conflict. The Office will provide facilitation and technical advice on the negotiation and design of interim security arrangements, the restoration of State institutions and preparations for the resumption of political dialogue, including on finalizing and adopting a draft constitution and an electoral road map and on national reconciliation and transitional justice.
220. The mission also participates in the mediation of the political, security and economic arrangements to end the current conflict between the Government of Yemen and the Houthi movement and in supporting the resumption of the political transition, which began in 2011 and was interrupted by the current conflict. Against this backdrop, the two-month nationwide, renewable truce agreed by the parties in Yemen from April to October 2022 and the relative de-escalation and reduction of violence since present positive developments and important first steps towards resuming an inclusive political process to reach a negotiated settlement to the conflict. In the delivery of these efforts, the Office shares its support component with the United Nations Mission to Support the Hudaydah Agreement (UNMHA), which also reports to Headquarters through the Special Envoy.

Programme of work

Objective

221. The objective, to which this mission contributes, is to achieve a negotiated political settlement between the parties to end the conflict in Yemen and enable the resumption of a peaceful, inclusive, orderly and Yemeni-led political transition that will lead Yemenis towards a path of sustainable peace.

Strategy and external factors for 2024

222. To contribute to the objective, the mission will:
- (a) Utilize negotiations, consultations and shuttle diplomacy to achieve an agreement between the parties to end the conflict in Yemen and resume the political transition;
 - (b) Support the Yemen peace process by providing political, technical and logistical support, including in supporting the parties to identify long-term measures and immediate priorities related to political, security and economic issues to resume the political process, implement the Stockholm Agreement and de-escalate the conflict at the local, national and regional levels;
 - (c) Work on a consultative process, which will include, among others, women, civil society and youth, including assessing the sentiments, views and recommendations of Yemenis through direct outreach and engagement or indirect and virtual methods and integrating gender-responsiveness and youth engagement in its multitrack diplomacy and negotiations on the peace agreement and the post-transition process;
 - (d) Foster international engagement in resolving the conflict in Yemen, notably through awareness-building and frequent dialogue and information exchange;
 - (e) Continue to adapt its posture and positioning to respond to the changing and evolving political context and operational environment in order to strengthen mandate implementation, with a focus on the Office's balanced representation and capacity in the territories controlled by each side.
223. The above-mentioned work is expected to result in:
- (a) A peace agreement with the parties to determine interim security and political arrangements for a sustainable, peaceful and inclusive transitional period;
 - (b) The development of an inclusive participatory mechanism for diverse political and social Yemeni stakeholders, including women and youth, to inform the track 1 United Nations-facilitated political process;
 - (c) Increased confidence of the parties and engagement in the United Nations-facilitated political process towards a resumption of political talks;
 - (d) Increased confidence of the parties towards a resumption of political talks, including through focusing on political, security and economic elements;
 - (e) Refined security governance options at both the national and local level;
 - (f) Effective and transparent implementation of negotiated transitional security arrangements;
 - (g) Development of an inclusive transitional agenda that will be informed by women's and gender perspectives and will include implementation mechanisms and bodies;
 - (h) Continued implementation of the Stockholm Agreement, including the uninterrupted flow of commercial imports, including fuel, into the Hudaydah ports, and further prisoner exchanges;
 - (i) Women's and gender perspectives informing all substantive areas, agreements, arrangements and implementation mechanisms, when relevant.
224. With regard to the external factors, the overall plan for 2024 is based on the following planning assumptions:
- (a) The parties to the conflict will engage in the peace process in the form of successive rounds of peace consultations under the auspices of the Special Envoy, with the aim of reaching a comprehensive negotiated political settlement;
 - (b) The Office will have greater access to key Yemeni stakeholders, albeit with some restrictions imposed by the parties and the security situation on the ground;

- (c) The Office will strengthen its presence inside Yemen, including with women and youth, and will expand its outreach to Yemeni constituencies inside and outside the country through digital tools and specific outreach missions and visits.
- 225. With regard to cooperation with other entities, the mission engages closely with international and regional organizations, including the League of Arab States, the Gulf Cooperation Council, the European Union and other international partners. Furthermore, the Office pursues joint efforts with international financial institutions to facilitate joint response strategies for post-agreement planning, including recovery and peacebuilding activities.
- 226. With regard to inter-agency coordination and liaison, the mission cooperates with the Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator and the United Nations country team in Yemen. In addition, United Nations agencies, funds and programmes working in Yemen are represented in the Inter-Agency Task Force on Yemen at United Nations Headquarters, which ensures the coordination and coherence of United Nations political, humanitarian, human rights and other efforts in Yemen. In line with Security Council resolution [2452 \(2019\)](#), the Office closely coordinates with UNMHA, which reports to the Secretary-General through the Special Envoy and the Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, and shares an integrated support structure with UNMHA.
- 227. The mission integrates a gender perspective in its operational activities, deliverables and results, as appropriate. The Office will continue to engage and support gender initiatives, such as consultations and gender-related training at the national and local levels, that promote women's political participation and representation, their full citizenship rights and the incorporation of women's human rights, security needs and concerns in the planning and preparation for the transition and early recovery, conflict resolution and peacebuilding processes.

Impact of the pandemic and lessons learned

- 228. The continuation of the COVID-19 pandemic into 2022 had an impact on the implementation of the mandate, in particular the postponement of meetings and consultations, which at times resulted in a shift to virtual meetings, such as in three instances, owing to risk mitigation related to the pandemic.
- 229. The mission continues to mainstream lessons learned and best practices related to the adjustments to and adaptation of the programme owing to the COVID-19 pandemic, including through the use of hybrid meetings, a combination of videoconference and in-person meetings, and flexible working arrangements. Business continuity planning takes into consideration the need for a rapid shift to ensuring the use of virtual technology consultations and that outreach efforts to Yemeni and international interlocutors are not disrupted owing to the COVID-19 pandemic.

Programme performance in 2022


Introduction of the truce and reduction of violence

- 230. The truce, negotiated by the mission, lasted from 2 April to 2 October 2022, and represented the longest period of calm in the eight-year conflict. The truce contributed to a significant reduction of violence and civilian casualties. It started providing relief to Yemenis as a result of regular commercial flights between Amman and Sana'a and an increase in fuel imports through the Hudaydah port. It also helped build trust between the parties and showed that mutually acceptable solutions could be found through dialogue. Despite the formal expiration of the truce, there has been no return to large-scale violence and the current low levels of violence are similar to those that were witnessed during the truce. The relative calm allowed for the continuation of arrangements operated under the truce, despite its formal expiration. The truce provided the space for continued discussions on the way forward for its renewal, work towards a nationwide ceasefire and the resumption of the political process. The mission continues to work with all sides to translate understandings from this dialogue into an inclusive, multi-track process, under the auspices of the United Nations, in order to achieve a sustainable and inclusive peace agreement.

231. Progress towards the objective is presented in the performance measure below (see figure IV).

Figure IV

Performance measure: number of one-way flights^a to and from Sana'a and Amman



^a As part of the truce's commitment to reopening the Sana'a international airport, the number of flights between Sana'a and Amman grew significantly in 2022, helping to support the mobility and travel of Yemenis.

Planned results for 2024

Result 1: expanding political engagement and consultations to better include diverse Yemeni perspectives and enhance impetus towards a Yemeni-owned and sustainable peace

Programme performance in 2022 and target for 2024

232. The mission's work contributed to expanding efforts to broaden inclusion in the peace process, including through greater and more diversified outreach to civil society and consultations with Yemeni women and youth and different political actors through offices in Aden, Amman and Sana'a, which met the planned target.
233. In March 2022, the Office launched a series of structured bilateral engagements with over 100 representatives of Yemeni political parties, security actors, economic development experts, representatives of civil society and women's groups. The aim was to consult a wide range of Yemenis on their views on the immediate and longer-term priorities for the three tracks, as well as their aspirations and broader vision for ending the conflict. Consultations with various Yemeni stakeholders continued throughout the year, the outcomes of which have continuously informed the engagements of the Special Envoy with and proposals to the parties to the conflict. Women's participation in the consultations was over 30 per cent.
234. Progress towards the objective and the target for 2024 are presented in the performance measure below (see table 39).

Table 39
Performance measure

2020 (actual)	2021 (actual)	2022 (actual)	2023 (planned)	2024 (planned)
The 2020 objective of adopting joint outcome documents from consultations and negotiations was not achieved	Despite progress in consultations, the 2021 objective of implementing joint outcome documents, including specific mechanisms that involve diverse Yemeni perspectives, was not yet achieved	The mission's political engagement and consultations were expanded to better include diverse Yemeni perspectives and enhance impetus towards a Yemeni-owned and sustainable peace	Continued expansion of the mission's political engagements across the spectrum of pertinent actors, including through consultations to better include diverse Yemeni perspectives and enhance impetus towards a Yemeni-owned and sustainable peace	Inclusion of diverse Yemeni and international community perspectives to identify ways to move towards a Yemeni-led sustainable peace process

Result 2: mobilize the international community in support of implementing a Yemeni-led, inclusive peace process

Proposed programme plan for 2024

235. The Special Envoy will continue to focus on strengthening engagement with the international community through his regular briefings to the Security Council and visits to Member States and regional organizations. The emphasis of the Special Envoy on updating the international community on his continued efforts on the ground (through the mission's offices in Yemen) and in interactions with Yemeni interlocutors in the region is aimed at encouraging exchanges with Member States on ways to support a Yemeni-led political process that focuses on inclusivity, with a wide range of Yemeni partners.

Lessons learned and planned change

236. The lesson for the mission was that it needs to leverage its presence more effectively in Yemen to engage with Yemeni representatives to build a more inclusive peace process. In applying the lesson, the mission will actively seek to create additional opportunities to engage directly with diverse Yemeni stakeholders. This will include increased outreach on the track 1 process and engagement with Yemeni journalists and media professionals in an effort to strengthen transparency and to address misinformation and disinformation around the process. Further outreach will require an increased number of personnel redeployed to or frequently visiting Yemen to better engage with Yemeni interlocutors.
237. Expected progress towards the objective is presented in the performance measure below (see table 40).

Table 40
Performance measure

2020 (actual)	2021 (actual)	2022 (actual)	2023 (planned)	2024 (planned)
—	—	—	Mobilize the international community to identify ways to engage with Yemenis and move towards a sustainable peace process	Increased focus of the international community in seeking the views of diverse groups of Yemenis across various geographical locations in Yemen and within the diaspora

Deliverables

238. Table 41 lists all deliverables of the mission.

Table 41
Deliverables for the period 2022–2024, by category and subcategory

Category and subcategory	2022 planned	2022 actual	2023 planned	2024 planned
A. Facilitation of the intergovernmental process and expert bodies				
Substantive services for meetings (number of three-hour meetings)	12	12	12	12
Meetings of the Security Council	12	12	12	12
C. Substantive deliverables				
Good offices: provision of good offices to end the conflict.				
Consultation, advice and advocacy: consultations and advice on political and security proposals aimed at mediating an agreement to end the conflict and enable the completion of the political transition.				

B. Proposed post and non-post resource requirements for 2024

Resource requirements (regular budget)

Table 42
Financial resources
(Thousands of United States dollars)

Category of expenditure	2022		2023		Variance 2024 vs. 2023 Increase/(decrease)
	Appropriation	Expenditure	Appropriation	Requirements	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)=(4)-(3)
Military and police personnel costs	—	—	—	—	—
Civilian personnel costs	11 292.5	10 544.9	11 491.2	11 025.7	(465.5)
Operational costs	5 909.5	5 695.7	5 560.1	5 682.6	122.5
Total (net of staff assessment)	17 202.0	16 240.6	17 051.3	16 708.3	(343.0)

Table 43
Human resources

	International staff											National staff			United Nations Volunteers			Total
	USG	ASG	D-2	D-1	P-5	P-4	P-3	P-2	FS	GS	Subtotal	NPO	LL	Subtotal	International	National	Subtotal	
Approved 2023	1	–	1	1	6	15	10	–	24	1 ^a	59	14	28	42	–	–	–	101
Proposed 2024	1	–	1	1	6	15	10	–	24	1 ^a	59	14	28	42	–	–	–	101
Change	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–

^a Other level, unless otherwise stated.

239. The proposed resource requirements for 2024 for the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen amount to \$16,708,300 (net of staff assessment) and would provide for salaries and common staff costs (\$11,025,700) for 101 continuing positions (1 Under-Secretary-General, 1 D-2, 1 D-1, 6 P-5, 15 P-4, 10 P-3, 24 Field Service, 1 General Service (Other level), 14 National Professional Officer and 28 Local level), as well as operational costs (\$5,682,600), comprising costs for official travel (\$407,700), facilities and infrastructure (\$3,014,900), ground transportation (\$280,900), air operations (\$817,700), communications and information technology (\$709,000), medical (\$204,300) and other supplies, services and equipment (\$248,100).
240. Vacancy rates of 21.3 per cent, 33.4 per cent and 17.5 per cent have been applied to the estimates for international, National Professional Officer and Local level positions, respectively, taking into account the actual average vacancy rates in 2022.
241. The decrease in requirements proposed for 2024 compared with the appropriation for 2023 is attributable mainly to reduced requirements for civilian personnel, resulting from the application of vacancy rates of 21.3 per cent, 33.4 per cent and 17.5 per cent for international, National Professional Officer, and Local level positions, respectively, compared with the budgeted rate of 15 per cent for international and national staff positions in 2023. The decreased requirements are offset in part by increased requirements for operational costs owing to increases in: (a) rental of premises and related operating costs for the additional office space in Amman as a result of the increased staff engagement for an enhanced level of consultations with stakeholders, requiring more meetings and conference space; (b) petrol, oil and lubricants for facilities and infrastructure and ground transportation; (c) security services for unarmed security guards; and (d) construction, alteration, renovation and major maintenance for enhanced security and electrical projects.

Extrabudgetary resources

242. In 2023, the Office projects that extrabudgetary resources in the total amount of \$540,100 will be utilized, including \$312,100 to support gender through training and meetings with Yemeni and international interlocutors and \$228,000 on political affairs expertise for the Special Envoy's multitrack support to the political process through the provision of a Political Affairs Officer (P-3) position.
243. No extrabudgetary resources are projected for 2024 owing to the conclusion of and project activities in 2023 that involve advising the Special Envoy on gender and political affairs.

10. Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Myanmar

(\$1,380,300)

Foreword

Since the military takeover of February 2021, the multidimensional crisis in Myanmar has inflicted enormous damage on the country and people, causing immense human suffering with severe humanitarian, human rights and socioeconomic consequences and serious regional ramifications. In keeping with the Secretary-General's calls to support the democratic aspirations of the people of Myanmar for an inclusive, peaceful and just society, in my role as Special Envoy I focused on engaging key stakeholders to support a Myanmar-led process to find a political solution to the conflict and the suffering of the people.

In the context of a proliferating conflict, I will continue to focus on building cooperation with national, regional and international stakeholders to facilitate a Myanmar-led process, including for the Rohingya. I will pursue concrete initiatives in support of peace in Myanmar in four key areas: an inclusive humanitarian forum; women and peace and security in Myanmar; education for Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh and the region; and a regional refugee protection framework. I will continue to work in partnership with the Special Envoy of the ASEAN Chair to ensure full complementarity of our roles.

Pursuant to my mandate from the General Assembly, I will continue to address the root causes of the disenfranchisement of the Rohingya and ethnic minorities and to strive towards their safe, dignified, voluntary and sustainable return. In advancing these objectives, I will promote a coherent and coordinated system-wide approach in regular liaison with the Security Council and the General Assembly.

(Signed) Noeleen **Heyzer**
Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Myanmar

A. Proposed programme plan for 2024 and programme performance in 2022

Overall orientation

Mandates and background

244. The Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Myanmar is responsible for the provision of the Secretary-General's good offices through discussions involving all relevant stakeholders and assistance to Myanmar. The mandate was defined by the General Assembly in its resolution [72/248](#) and renewed in its resolutions [73/264](#), [74/246](#), [75/238](#), [76/180](#) and [77/227](#). In its first resolution on Myanmar, resolution [2669 \(2022\)](#), adopted on 21 December 2022, the Security Council reinforced the urgent need to end the human suffering, provided further guidance on the scope of work of the Special Envoy, and called for, inter alia, close coordination between the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General and the Special Envoy of the ASEAN Chair on Myanmar. The Special Envoy of the Secretary-General will continue to listen carefully and engage with all stakeholders and communities on the ground to support durable peace and national reconciliation and build regional and international coherence based on an accurate assessment of the situation.
245. The mission will continue to provide the good offices of the Secretary-General in a conflict environment that has expanded since the military takeover on 1 February 2021, which has compounded pre-existing challenges facing vulnerable communities such as the Rohingya. The mission will focus on supporting a Myanmar-led process reflective of the will of the people to find a political solution to the conflict, advocating for the rights and voices of the Rohingya as integral to an inclusive and stable future for Myanmar and addressing those systemic inequalities affecting all marginalized people. Accountability for those responsible for mass atrocities and human rights violations and abuses, the promotion of human rights more broadly and the meaningful participation of women in all decision-making processes will remain key cross-cutting priorities. This will require the Special Envoy to work in close and trusted partnership with all stakeholders, local communities and civil society, and regional partners, notably the Government of Bangladesh, ASEAN and neighbouring countries, while keeping the broader membership of the United Nations informed of the Special Envoy's activities and their impact.

Programme of work

Objective

246. The objective, to which the mission contributes, is to support a Myanmar-led democratic and peaceful nation-building process and to support the creation of the conditions necessary for the safe, dignified and sustainable return and reintegration of Rohingya in Myanmar.

Strategy and external factors for 2024

247. To contribute to the objective and address the deterioration of the situation in Myanmar, the mission will:
- (a) Implement a multitrack approach, including strengthening cooperation between the United Nations and ASEAN to address humanitarian and other critical needs on the ground without discrimination. In close partnership with the ASEAN Special Envoy, the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General will seek to facilitate the delivery of assistance to affected communities through all existing channels and address the multiple priority needs of the people across the country, including civilian protection, food security, socioeconomic resilience and humanitarian and COVID-19 assistance. The Special Envoy will complement regional efforts

to support effective implementation of the five-point consensus of the ASEAN Leaders' Meeting in alignment with the will of the people of Myanmar, and coordinate system-wide support that will help strengthen application of the norms and values of the United Nations to this process. The Special Envoy will also continue to initiate concrete initiatives, including a regional refugee protection framework, a women and peace and security platform on Myanmar; initiatives on education for Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh and the region, and an inclusive humanitarian forum;

- (b) Advocate for a Myanmar-led process towards a peaceful, democratic and inclusive future. In support of this, the Special Envoy will mobilize a coherent international approach based on regional unity. She will facilitate initiatives to support a return to civilian rule and to advance the implementation of democratic and human rights norms towards a path of democratic consolidation and reform. The Special Envoy will continue to initiate inclusive and participatory approaches with minorities, youth and women, whose voices and empowerment are critical to fostering social cohesion and developing a viable way out of the current political crisis and in line with the will of the people;
 - (c) Continue efforts to create a conducive environment for the voluntary, safe, dignified and sustainable return to Rakhine State of the forcibly displaced Rohingya in the region, including in Bangladesh. To that end, the Special Envoy will continue to promote a political solution in consultation with the Rohingya and other key stakeholders, so as to improve the conditions of Rohingyas on the ground, in line with the recommendations of the Advisory Commission on Rakhine State. The Special Envoy will also continue her ongoing dialogue with leaders of regional countries and the international community to promote burden-sharing, including scaling up humanitarian assistance, educational opportunities and durable solutions for refugees.
248. The above-mentioned work is expected to result in:
- (a) Improved conditions for the safe, voluntary, dignified and sustainable return of forcibly displaced populations;
 - (b) Creating conducive conditions for a de-escalation of violence and an increase in trust among communities;
 - (c) Greater international and regional political support towards improved humanitarian assistance for populations in need, whose conditions have dramatically worsened countrywide since the military takeover;
 - (d) Contributing to the establishment of a Myanmar-led process with key stakeholders to advance discussions on restoring democratic and human rights norms as part of a negotiated political solution.
249. With regard to the external factors, the overall plan for 2024 is based on the following planning assumptions:
- (a) The grave impact on civilians and communities across Myanmar from the continued intensification of violence and repression since the military takeover, serious human rights violations and the need for civilian protection will remain a significant challenge in securing a coherent policy, notably for narrowing the trust deficit towards national reconciliation;
 - (b) The plight of Rohingya refugees will continue to require concrete actions for their safe, dignified, voluntary and sustainable return and reintegration in Myanmar. The rights and security of the Rohingya people need to be guaranteed and embedded in Myanmar-led solutions towards a peaceful, democratic and inclusive future;
 - (c) Illicit activities and related financial flows, closely linked to the conflict in Myanmar and the downfall of the formal economy, will continue to hamper conflict resolution and impede the strengthening of rule of law, institution-building, socioeconomic and development efforts.

250. With regard to cooperation with other entities, the mission works in partnership with ASEAN, especially the ASEAN Special Envoy, other key regional organizations, such as the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and the European Union, neighbouring countries and international donors to mobilize constructive support to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance through all available channels, support dialogue among all concerned parties and facilitate refugee returns.
251. With regard to inter-agency coordination and liaison, the mission will continue to coordinate closely with the United Nations system through established inter-agency channels, in close consultation with the Resident Coordinators in Myanmar and Bangladesh. The Special Envoy of the Secretary-General continues to carry out the good offices mandate in close cooperation with the United Nations country team and specialized offices at Headquarters, as well as various human rights mechanisms on Myanmar mandated by the Human Rights Council.
252. The mission integrates a gender perspective in its operational activities, deliverables and results, as appropriate, and will co-facilitate with key relevant regional leaders a women and peace and security platform on Myanmar to amplify the voices of the most marginalized women and advance their protection agenda.

Impact of the pandemic and lessons learned

253. The continuation of the COVID-19 pandemic into 2022 had a limited impact on mandate implementation, with the gradual resumption of more regular in-person meetings. Throughout the year, the mission continued to mitigate the potential impact on operational activities through online engagement with stakeholders, where relevant, including with domestic and international actors. When conditions allowed, the Special Envoy conducted in-person discussions while following adequate prevention protocols, including masking and social distancing, during her visits to the region, which allowed for more effective discussions.
254. The mission continues to mainstream lessons learned and best practices related to the adjustments to and adaptation of the programme owing to the COVID-19 pandemic, including on limiting travel where needed and by adopting flexible working arrangements.

Programme performance in 2022

Safe, dignified and voluntary repatriation

255. The Special Envoy maintained close contact with all stakeholders, including local communities in Rakhine, throughout 2022, while progress in Myanmar was curtailed by escalating violence throughout the country and the resumption of violence in Rakhine for several months. The Special Envoy regularly engaged with civil society, community leaders, women's groups, human rights activists and other key stakeholders in Myanmar, including in Rakhine. The Special Envoy visited Bangladeshi refugee camps in August 2022 to renew international attention on the Rohingya crisis and keep the hopes of refugees alive.
256. The Special Envoy continued her close consultation with Rohingya groups and engagement with key Member States to support the conditions conducive to the safe, dignified, voluntary and sustainable return of the Rohingya population to Myanmar in a rapidly changing political context. She mobilized constructive support from international and regional partners, ASEAN and OIC towards addressing the root causes of conflict in Rakhine State to enable returns, including through her participation in a side event convened by Bangladesh on the Rohingya crisis during the high-level week of the seventy-seventh session of the General Assembly. However, the ongoing conflict, the broad humanitarian crisis and the significant economic downturn following the military takeover undermined reconciliation and repatriation efforts. In this context, the Special Envoy continued her close engagement with key ethnic armed organizations and other stakeholders with a view to promoting an inclusive Myanmar-led process.

257. Progress towards the objective is presented in the performance measure below (see table 44).

Table 44

Performance measure

<i>2020 (actual)</i>	<i>2021 (actual)</i>	<i>2022 (actual)</i>
Return of refugees in a more enabling environment was not realized; efforts continued nevertheless	Preparation for repatriation was disrupted by the military takeover and the interventions had to be reformulated taking into consideration the changing political dynamics	Repatriation was further delayed by the escalating violence throughout Myanmar, including in Rakhine State

Planned result for 2024**Progress towards improved humanitarian conditions and a Myanmar-led inclusive, democratic and peaceful nation-building process****Programme performance in 2022 and target for 2024**

258. In 2022, the mission's work contributed to creating conditions for the safe, voluntary, sustainable and dignified return of Rohingya refugees, including through regular consultation with Rohingya groups and key regional stakeholders, but the planned target of facilitating local initiatives in support of social cohesion was not met, as efforts towards achieving it were disrupted following the military takeover and the deterioration of security conditions in Myanmar, including in Rakhine State.
259. The mission will continue to focus on improving the conditions of Rohingya remaining in Rakhine State by engaging key stakeholders to build confidence and improve the reintegration prospects of the returning refugees. These efforts will be supported by enhanced coordination among agencies providing support to Rohingya, as well as improved support towards displaced Rohingya and Bangladeshi host communities in line with the Special Envoy's efforts to promote the regional and international response and burden-sharing.
260. In 2024, the mission, in close cooperation with ASEAN, will concentrate its efforts on improving the security and humanitarian situation in Myanmar in line with the ASEAN five-point consensus, reducing violence against civilians and enabling a Myanmar-led process to identify a political solution to the current crisis and build an inclusive, democratic and peaceful country.

Lessons learned and planned change

261. A lesson learned for the mission was the ongoing importance of close cooperation and engagement with key regional organizations, namely ASEAN and OIC. To this end, the mission will continue strengthening cooperation with ASEAN and the ASEAN Special Envoy to garner regional support for concrete initiatives that support Myanmar-led solutions towards a peaceful, democratic and inclusive future for the country. Furthermore, the mission will foster close cooperation with other regional actors, including joint platforms, to advance key policy areas on expanding humanitarian access and the women and peace and security agenda. This will also include closer cooperation with OIC to advance an education initiative for the Rohingya.
262. Expected progress towards the objective and the target for 2024 are presented in the performance measure below (see table 45).

Table 45
Performance measure

2020 (actual)	2021 (actual)	2022 (actual)	2023 (planned)	2024 (planned)
The Special Envoy advocated for tangible commitments from the Government of Myanmar on the implementation of the recommendations of the Advisory Commission on Rakhine State	The military takeover and ensuing broader conflict and humanitarian crisis forced the Special Envoy to reformulate her strategy on Rohingya repatriation	The Special Envoy elevated international engagement on the Rohingya through a visit to Bangladesh and by reinforcing cooperation with OIC	The Special Envoy engages with key actors towards a cessation of violence and improved humanitarian conditions, including in Rakhine State, to support the return of refugees	The Special Envoy moves forward with concrete initiatives on the inclusive humanitarian forum, women and peace and security, education for Rohingya refugees and host communities and regional refugee protection mechanisms

Deliverables

263. Table 46 lists all deliverables of the mission.

Table 46
Deliverables for the period 2022–2024, by category and subcategory

Category and subcategory	2022 planned	2022 actual	2023 planned	2024 planned
A. Facilitation of the intergovernmental process and expert bodies				
Parliamentary documentation (number of documents)	1	1	1	1
1. Reports of the Secretary-General for the General Assembly	1	1	1	1
Substantive services for meetings (number of three-hour meetings)	4	5	4	4
2. Meetings of the Security Council	2	3	2	2
3. Meetings of the General Assembly	2	2	2	2
B. Generation and transfer of knowledge				
Seminars, workshops and training events (number of days)	–	–	6	6
4. Workshops supported by the mission on social cohesion and anti-discrimination; women's political empowerment; strengthening of the rule of law and accountability for serious human rights violations; fundamental freedoms; and implementation of the recommendations of the Advisory Commission on Rakhine State	–	–	6	6
C. Substantive deliverables				
Good offices: 200 good offices engagements with Myanmar stakeholders, civil society, ethnic armed organizations and countries in the region in support of: a return to democratic reforms, peace and stability at the national, subnational and local levels, and humanitarian access to help support the more than 17 million people in need of assistance in Myanmar; and the voluntary, safe, dignified and sustainable repatriation of the Rohingya and durable solutions and reintegration of forcibly displaced persons.				
Consultation, advice and advocacy: 200 consultations with Myanmar stakeholders, civil society, key regional organizations, including ASEAN and OIC, and the international community, including all ASEAN member States, on electoral and constitutional issues; accountability for serious human rights violations and cooperation with international accountability mechanisms; good governance and the strengthening of the rule of law; human rights issues, including fundamental freedoms, civilian protection, child rights, the elimination of discrimination and violence against minorities; the promotion of gender equality; and the involvement of women and youth in peace initiatives.				

<i>Category and subcategory</i>	<i>2022 planned</i>	<i>2022 actual</i>	<i>2023 planned</i>	<i>2024 planned</i>
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D. Communication deliverables

Outreach programmes, special events and information materials: 20 outreach activities with local communities, government partners, opinion leaders, the media, civil society and other agents of change to support the implementation of the Office's mandate.

External and media relations: press conferences, statements, advisories, backgrounders, interviews and other media engagements related to the Office's objective, and the development of additional communication capacities, including a dedicated website.

B. Proposed post and non-post resource requirements for 2024

Resource requirements (regular budget)

Table 47

Financial resources

(Thousands of United States dollars)

Category of expenditure	2022		2023		2024	Variance
	Appropriation	Expenditure	Appropriation	Requirements		2024 vs. 2023 Increase/(decrease)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)		(5)=(4)-(3)
Military and police personnel costs	–	–	–	–		–
Civilian personnel costs	862.2	994.7	1 116.6	1 089.4		(27.2)
Operational costs	291.3	229.1	292.0	290.9		(1.1)
Total (net of staff assessment)	1 153.5	1 223.8	1 408.6	1 380.3		(28.3)

Table 48

Human resources

	International staff											National staff			United Nations Volunteers			Total
	USG	ASG	D-2	D-1	P-5	P-4	P-3	P-2	FS	GS	Subtotal	NPO	LL	Subtotal	International	National	Subtotal	
Approved 2023	1	–	–	1	1	1	–	–	–	–	4	–	1	1	–	–	–	5
Proposed 2024	1	–	–	1	1	1	–	–	–	–	4	–	1	1	–	–	–	5
Change	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–

264. The proposed resource requirements for 2024 for the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Myanmar amount to \$1,380,300 (net of staff assessment) and would provide for salaries and common staff costs (\$1,089,400) for the continuation of five positions (1 Under-Secretary-General, 1 D-1, 1 P-5, 1 P-4 and 1 Local level), as well as operational costs (\$290,900), comprising costs for official travel (\$150,400), facilities and infrastructure (\$21,200), ground transportation (\$7,000), communications and information technology (\$24,600), medical (\$1,000) and other supplies, services and equipment (\$86,700).
265. For 2024, no change is proposed to the number and levels of the positions. Vacancy rates of zero and 41.7 per cent have been applied to the estimates for international positions and one Local level position, respectively, on the basis of the actual average vacancy rates in 2022.
266. The decrease in the requirements proposed for 2024 compared with the appropriation for 2023 is attributable mainly to decreased requirements for civilian personnel costs owing to lower common staff costs and the application of a vacancy rate of 41.7 per cent compared with the budgeted rate of zero per cent in 2023 for the Local level position. The decreased requirements are offset in part by the change in the vacancy rates from 5 per cent in 2023 to zero per cent in 2024 for international staff.
267. After a security assessment conducted by the Department of Safety and Security of the Secretariat in early 2022, all international staff were temporarily relocated from Nay Pyi Taw to Bangkok and are currently sharing space with the regional office of the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs hosted in the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) compound. The situation on the ground remains fluid, and it is unclear when staff will be able to return to Myanmar. The only national staff position remains vacant; therefore, all administrative support will be provided by ESCAP or from mission staff funded by extrabudgetary resources.

Extrabudgetary resources

268. In 2023, the mission projects that extrabudgetary resources estimated in the amount of \$1,699,100 will be used to support activities and relevant initiatives aimed at promoting the implementation of General Assembly resolution [76/180](#) and would provide for two P-5 positions. These activities and initiatives include: (a) support towards the return of Rohingya refugees and internally displaced persons; (b) intercommunal dialogues; (c) anti-discrimination and countering hate speech; and (d) national reconciliation.
269. In 2024, extrabudgetary resources in the estimated amount of \$483,800 are projected to support the mission's efforts to further the consolidation of democracy and to advance justice, peace and human rights in Myanmar. At the time of reporting, there is no clarity on whether there will positions funded from such resources in 2024.
270. Extrabudgetary resources in 2024 are projected to decrease from estimates in 2023, pending final donor agreements that would be solidified in the fourth quarter of 2023 in line with the mission's single-year donor agreements practice.

Annex I

Summary of follow-up action taken to implement decisions and requests of the General Assembly, including the requests and recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions endorsed by the Assembly

Brief description of the recommendation

Action taken to implement the recommendation

Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions

[A/77/7/Add.2](#)

The Advisory Committee notes that the proposed position would provide some analytical support, including on the use of social media in hate speech, and trusts that the Secretariat will undertake a review of the appropriate funding mechanism for such a position with system-wide functions. The Committee therefore recommends at this stage the provision of resources for a general temporary assistance P-2 position for one year. The Committee trusts that the Office will coordinate with the Development Coordination Office and the Department of Global Communications on its work on hate speech (para. 10).

The Advisory Committee is not fully convinced by the justifications provided, including from an efficiency perspective, bearing in mind that multiple options for the mission headquarters exist, including Djibouti, which hosts the IGAD secretariat; Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, where the African Union Peace and Security Council and the Peace and Security Division of IGAD are based; as well as Khartoum, Sudan, and Juba, South Sudan, the original signatories of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. The Committee therefore recommends a continuation of the current location and a further refinement of the proposal regarding the location of the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Horn of Africa, for the consideration of the General Assembly in the next budget submission (para. 19).

The Office of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide partners with the Development Coordination Office and the Department of Global Communications, which are also members of the inter-agency Working Group on Hate Speech. However, the technical expertise and focal point responsibility for the implementation of the United Nations Strategy and Plan of Action on Hate Speech lies with the Office of the Special Adviser. The implementation of the 13 commitments of the Strategy necessitates a multisectoral approach linking addressing hate speech to broader United Nations prevention efforts, for which the analysis and coordination provided by a dedicated focal point located in the Office remains essential. The Office is the only United Nations entity that undertakes analysis of genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing and advises United Nations organs, including the Security Council, the General Assembly and the Secretariat, and mechanisms such as the Human Rights Council and related bodies on the potential risks of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and measures to address them.

The Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Horn of Africa is not proposing a redeployment of the three international positions (1 Under-Secretary-General, 1 D-1 and 1 P-3) from Addis Ababa to Nairobi. The Office is proposing the redeployment of a Political Affairs Officer (P-4) from Addis Ababa back to Khartoum, where the position was initially established in 2011 and where it was based until 2018 when the mandate of the Office of the Special Envoy for the Sudan and South Sudan was expanded to cover the entire Horn of Africa.

*Brief description of the recommendation**Action taken to implement the recommendation*

The Advisory Committee trusts that updated information, including lessons learned and best practices, on the coordination of activities between the special political missions and the resident coordinator offices will be provided in the context of the next programme budget submission (para. 33).

Special political missions continue to coordinate activities and cooperate with the resident coordinators' offices. One example of good practice in this context has been the strategic review of the Peace Support Facility conducted by the Office of the Special Envoy for Yemen, which represents a major partnership between the mission, the Resident Coordinator's Office and the United Nations Development Programme. The finalization of the strategic review is under way, and it is expected that decisions on the implementation of the recommendations will start by the second quarter of 2023.


The Advisory Committee trusts that the cost-sharing arrangements in place maximize the efficient and transparent use of resources. The Committee trusts that disaggregated cost recovery and resources related to the cost-sharing arrangements will be included in future budget submissions (para. 34).

The cost recovery and cost-sharing arrangements of all special political missions are centrally presented in annexes VI and VII to the report on estimates in respect of special political mission ([A/78/6 \(Sect. 3\)/Add.1](#)) to facilitate a consolidated review.


Annex II

Organizational structure and post distribution for 2024

A. Office of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Cyprus



B. Office of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide



C. Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Western Sahara

Office of the Personal Envoy

RB (2 positions)

1 USG, 1 P-3

D. Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the implementation of Security Council resolution **1559 (2004)**

Office of the Special Envoy

RB (3 positions)

1 USG, 1 P-4, 1 GS (OL)


E. Office of the United Nations Representative to the Geneva International Discussions

**Office of the United Nations
Representative**


RB (7 positions)

1 ASG, 1 P-5, 2 P-4, 2 P-3, 1 GS (OL)


F. Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria




G. Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Horn of Africa



H. Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region



I. Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen



J. Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Myanmar

Office of the Special Envoy

RB (5 positions)

1 USG, 1 D-1, 1 P-5, 1 P-4, 1 LL

Abbreviations: ASG, Assistant Secretary-General; FS, Field Service, GS (OL), General Service (Other level); GTA, general temporary assistance; LL, Local level; NPO, National Professional Officer; PK, peacekeeping; RB, regular budget; UNV, United Nations Volunteer; USG, Under-Secretary-General; XB, extrabudgetary. These abbreviations apply to all organizational charts in annex II.

^a Establishment.

^b Conversion.

^c Redeployment.