



# General Assembly

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## Seventy-sixth session

Item 140 of the preliminary list\*

### Proposed programme budget for 2022

## Proposed programme budget for 2022

### Part II Political affairs

### Section 3 Political affairs

#### Special political missions

#### Thematic cluster I: special and personal envoys, advisers and representatives of the Secretary-General

#### *Summary*

The present report contains the proposed resource requirements for 2022 for 10 special political missions grouped under the thematic cluster of special and personal envoys, advisers and representatives of the Secretary-General.

The proposed resource requirements for 2022 for special political missions grouped under this cluster amount to \$50,739,800 (net of staff assessment).

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\* A/76/50.



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\*\* The part consisting of the proposed programme plan for 2022 is submitted for the consideration of the General Assembly in accordance with the established budgetary procedures and practices reaffirmed in paragraph 13 of resolution [72/266 A](#).

\*\*\* In keeping with paragraph 11 of resolution [72/266 A](#), the part consisting of the post and non-post resource requirements is submitted through the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions for the consideration of the General Assembly.

## I. Financial overview

1. The proposed resource requirements for 2022 for special political missions grouped under thematic cluster I amount to \$50,739,800 (net of staff assessment). Table 1 provides a comparison between the resources proposed for 2022 and the resources for 2021 as approved by the General Assembly in its resolution [75/253 A](#).

Table 1  
**Resource requirements**  
 (Thousands of United States dollars)

Category of expenditure	2020	2021	2022		Variance
	Expenditure	Appropriation	Total requirements	Non-recurrent requirements	2022 vs. 2021 Increase/(decrease)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)=(3)-(2)
Office of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Cyprus	2 468.0	2 821.2	2 967.9	–	146.7
Office of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide	1 698.9	2 267.1	2 724.5	–	457.4
Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Western Sahara	–	501.2	484.6	–	(16.6)
Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the implementation of Security Council resolution <a href="#">1559 (2004)</a>	344.1	357.6	343.2	–	(14.4)
United Nations Representative to the Geneva International Discussions	1 638.8	1 856.2	2 082.7	–	226.5
Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria	15 075.4	16 187.5	16 423.3	–	235.8
Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Horn of Africa	1 429.2	1 782.8	1 776.7	–	(6.1)
Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region	4 459.6	5 056.4	5 165.4	–	109.0
Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen	18 115.7	17 551.1	17 601.8	–	50.7
Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Myanmar	942.0	1 105.5	1 169.7	–	64.2
<b>Total</b>	<b>46 171.7</b>	<b>49 486.6</b>	<b>50 739.8</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>1 253.2</b>



## II. Special political missions

### 1. Office of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Cyprus

(\$2,967,900)

#### Foreword

Over the course of 2020, while fully fledged negotiations between the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots remained on hiatus, the bicomunal technical committees established by the two leaders in the track 1 process continued their work, albeit with varied outcomes. I engaged with a wide range of stakeholders of the peace process throughout 2020, including in the light of the commitment of the Secretary-General to revitalize the process and the consensus among the parties to proceed with initiatives on the Cyprus peace talks after the leadership elections in the north held in October 2020.

The outbreak of the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) in Cyprus in early March 2020 resulted in unprecedented public health and socioeconomic difficulties for both sides of the island. While movement restrictions and other measures introduced to tackle the pandemic deepened the separation between the two communities and cooperation between the sides proved challenging, I continuously engaged with the Greek Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot leaders and other actors in both communities, working to help maintain the space for dialogue and to contribute to the creation of conditions conducive to the peace process.

In February 2020, in an event facilitated by the Office of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Cyprus, the leader of the Greek Cypriot community, Nicos Anastasiades, and the then leader of the Turkish Cypriot community, Mustafa Akıncı, met jointly with the Technical Committee on Health to receive information about the virus and discuss preventive measures. Since then, however, the responses of the two sides to the pandemic have, for the most part, been separate and uncoordinated. Throughout the year, the work of the committee, supported by the mission, proved to be instrumental in facilitating support for individual humanitarian cases and for the transfer of specific materials and equipment across the divide. In early 2021, COVID-19 vaccines for the Turkish Cypriot community that had been approved by the European Union were handed over by the Greek Cypriot co-chair of the Technical Committee on Health to his Turkish Cypriot counterpart, with the support of the European Commission and facilitation by the mission, constituting an important confidence-building measure.

Although the work of the Technical Committee on Gender Equality stagnated during 2020, I continued to urge the two sides to empower the Committee to urgently develop an action plan supporting the full, equal and meaningful participation of women in the peace talks, as requested by the Security Council. I encouraged the two leaders to consider the outcome of the gender-sensitive socioeconomic impact assessment and its recommendations in order to work towards a transformative gender-sensitive settlement that could achieve greater economic opportunities for women and men alike.

In my engagement with the leaders and other stakeholders, I strongly echoed the appeal of the Secretary-General for a global ceasefire related to the pandemic, stressing that cooperation and coordinated initiatives would help to tackle the island-wide socioeconomic and humanitarian consequences of COVID-19. Also, to facilitate practical and financial assistance, I ensured coordination with United Nations agencies, funds and programmes, as well as the European Commission and the World Bank, to try to reduce the impact of the pandemic in Cyprus. I urged the sides to pursue meaningful progress on mutually acceptable confidence-building measures in order to deliver tangible benefits to their communities and improve the daily lives of Cypriots island-wide.

Seeing the devastating impact of COVID-19 and having in mind that a settlement has the potential to unlock collaborative and mutually beneficial solutions for Cyprus, as well as the broader region, I echo the words of the Secretary-General and remain committed to continuing to support the two leaders in revitalizing their dialogue and demonstrating their commitment to an enduring, comprehensive and just settlement.

(Signed) Elizabeth **Spehar**  
Deputy Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Cyprus

## A. Proposed programme plan for 2022 and programme performance for 2020

### Overall orientation

#### Mandates and background

2. The mandate of the Office of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Cyprus derives from the priorities established in relevant Security Council resolutions and decisions and an exchange of letters between the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council (S/2008/456 and S/2008/457). In its resolution 1818 (2008), the Council welcomed the intention of the Secretary-General to appoint a Special Adviser at the appropriate time. In a letter dated 10 July 2008 addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2008/456), the Secretary-General announced his intention to appoint his Special Adviser on Cyprus as from 14 July 2008. Relevant Council resolutions from which the mandate derives include resolution 186 (1964) and subsequent Council resolutions, including resolutions 367 (1975), 1250 (1999), 1475 (2003), 1758 (2007), 1818 (2008), 1873 (2009), 1930 (2010), 1986 (2011), 2026 (2011), 2058 (2012), 2114 (2013), 2135 (2014), 2168 (2014), 2197 (2015), 2234 (2015), 2263 (2016), 2300 (2016), 2338 (2017), 2369 (2017), 2398 (2018), 2430 (2018), 2453 (2019), 2483 (2019), 2506 (2020), 2537 (2020) and 2561 (2021).
3. In its resolution 2561 (2021), the Security Council stressed that the status quo in Cyprus was unsustainable, and that the lack of an agreement furthered political tensions and deepened the estrangement of both communities, risking irreversible changes on the ground and reducing the prospects of a settlement. The Council underscored that the responsibility for finding a solution lay first and foremost with the Cypriots themselves. It urged the sides and all involved participants to approach the talks in the spirit of openness, flexibility and compromise and to show the necessary political will and commitment to freely negotiate a mutually acceptable settlement under United Nations auspices.
4. Also in resolution 2561 (2021), the Security Council reaffirmed the primary role of the United Nations in assisting the parties to bring the Cyprus conflict and division of the island to a comprehensive and durable settlement with a sense of urgency, expressed full support for the Secretary-General's ongoing efforts, welcoming his intention to convene an informal five-plus-United Nations meeting, as well as for his good offices, including the existing body of work, remaining available to assist the sides. It also called on the two leaders to provide the necessary political support to free the technical committees from obstructions in their work and consider the advice of the good offices mission of the Secretary-General regarding further ways to empower the technical committees.
5. Since the closure of the Conference on Cyprus in July 2017, the engagement between the sides and the guarantor powers has decreased significantly, and the uncertain prospects for the future of the process are a serious cause for concern for many Cypriots and the international community alike.
6. After the conclusion of the Turkish Cypriot leadership elections on 18 October 2020, the Greek Cypriot leader, Nicos Anastasiades, and the newly-elected Turkish Cypriot leader, Ersin Tatar, held a first informal meeting under the auspices of the Deputy Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Cyprus, Elizabeth Spehar, on 3 November 2020. After this meeting, the United Nations issued a statement noting that the two leaders had expressed their determination to positively respond to the commitment of the Secretary-General to explore the possibility of convening an informal five-plus-one meeting, in a conducive climate, at an appropriate stage.
7. In January 2021, in his report on his mission of good offices in Cyprus (S/2021/5), the Secretary-General reconfirmed that he remained committed to supporting the two leaders in revitalizing their dialogue. On behalf of the Secretary-General, United Nations senior official Jane Holl Lute continued her engagement with the parties to the Conference on Cyprus as part of the efforts to prepare for an informal five-plus-one meeting.

8. On 25 February 2021, the Secretary-General sent invitation letters for an informal five-plus-one meeting to be held from 27 to 29 April in Geneva, to determine whether common ground existed for the parties to negotiate a lasting solution to the Cyprus problem, within a foreseeable horizon. The leaders of both communities and the representatives of the guarantor powers, Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, expressed their willingness to attend.

## **Programme of work**

### **Objective**

9. The objective, to which this mission contributes, is to achieve a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem.

### **Strategy**

10. To contribute to the objective, the mission will use its best endeavours with the sides and the guarantor powers to promote a peaceful solution and to assist them, should they jointly agree, in the conduct of full-fledged negotiations. This is expected to contribute to the progressive bridging of the gap between the sides through an increased number of bilateral and joint meetings between the leaders of the communities, their negotiating teams and key stakeholders, an increased number of papers of convergence, an increased number of meetings of technical committees and working groups and the implementation of confidence-building measures.
11. The mission will, when called upon, facilitate regular bilateral and joint meetings between the leaders, negotiators, working groups and experts and will “shuttle” between the sides until a comprehensive settlement is reached. The mission will also continue the coordination of technical work in preparation for settlement implementation. In addition, the mission will, through the facilitation of meetings between the sides, as well as bilateral contacts and discussions with each of them, intensify its support for the implementation of confidence-building measures and the work of the technical committees to help both sides make progress towards promoting just, peaceful and inclusive societies.
12. The mission plans to support both sides on issues related to the COVID-19 pandemic by continuing to facilitate meetings and further strengthening the efforts of the technical committees to share information, cooperate and design joint responses to mitigate the broader negative impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic.
13. The above-mentioned work is expected to result in:
  - (a) A continuation of dialogue and/or talks towards an enduring, comprehensive and just settlement of the Cyprus problem. Should significant progress be achieved in 2022, the United Nations may be called upon to convene the stakeholders to address outstanding issues of the negotiations;
  - (b) Implementation of confidence-building measures;
  - (c) Empowerment of the work of the technical committees.
14. The planned support on issues related to COVID-19 is expected to result in an increased number of meetings of the Technical Committee on Health and other relevant technical committees to ensure a continuation of dialogue and exchange of information between the sides and to encourage joint responses. This is specified in more detail in the proposed programme plan for 2022.

## External factors for 2022

15. With regard to the external factors, the overall plan for 2022 is based on the following planning assumptions:
  - (a) Continued and sustained political commitment to the political process and the implementation of confidence-building measures;
  - (b) Continued and sustained international support for the negotiation process.
16. With regard to the COVID-19 pandemic, the proposed programme plan is based on the assumption that the proposed deliverables and activities for 2022 will be feasible to implement. However, if the pandemic were to continue to have an impact on the planned deliverables and activities, they would be adjusted during 2022 within the scope of the overall objectives, strategies and mandates. Any such adjustments would be reported as part of the programme performance information.
17. The mission integrates a gender perspective in its operational activities, deliverables and results. The Security Council, in its resolution [2561 \(2021\)](#), recognized that the full, equal and meaningful participation and leadership of women was essential in building peace in Cyprus and would contribute to making any future settlement sustainable. The Council looked forward to the full and swift implementations of the recommendations of the gender-sensitive socioeconomic impact assessment launched by the mission on 17 February 2020 in response to resolution [2453 \(2019\)](#). It called on the leaders to increase their support for civil society engagement including by empowering the Technical Committee on Gender Equality to develop an action plan supporting the participation of women in peace talks. The mission continues to facilitate the work of the Committee in this regard. The mission also supports women's civil society platforms that allow women's perspectives on peace and security issues to be deliberated and helps to empower the voices of women on the issues that matter to them.
18. In line with the United Nations Disability Inclusion Strategy, the mission will advance disability inclusion, including through awareness-raising and promotion of the Strategy in its work, the negotiation process and the future comprehensive settlement.
19. With regard to cooperation with other entities at the global, regional, national and local levels, the mission, if so requested by the sides, will continue to coordinate the engagement of international financial institutions in support of the process, in particular, the European Central Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. In addition, the mission cooperates and coordinates activities with the European Commission, which supports the negotiation process.
20. With regard to inter-agency coordination and liaison, the mission, the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus and the United Nations country team will continue to operate in an integrated way to maximize synergies and ensure coherent and effective support for United Nations peace efforts.

## Evaluation activities

21. The Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs will lead a systematic assessment with the overall purpose of improving the gender sensitivity of the political analyses developed by the Department and the special political missions.

## Programme performance in 2020

### Terms of reference for a process to resume talks<sup>1</sup>

22. In 2020, the mission continued its engagement with the sides and supported the Secretary-General and United Nations senior official Jane Holl Lute in their engagement aimed at achieving a

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<sup>1</sup> As reflected in the proposed programme budget for 2020 ([A/74/6 \(Sect. 3\)/Add.2](#)).


consensus starting point for meaningful results-oriented negotiations. Furthermore, the mission continued to facilitate the meetings and the work of the technical committees and working groups and the implementation of confidence-building measures.

*Progress towards the attainment of the objective, and performance measure*

23. The above-mentioned work contributed to the holding of 95 bilateral and joint meetings with the leaders and their negotiating teams and 218 meetings of the technical committees and working groups, which did not meet the target of 125 meetings of the leaders and their negotiating teams and 380 meetings of the technical committees and working groups, as reflected in the proposed programme budget for 2020. The target could not be met because of restrictions imposed in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, which had a direct impact on the number of meetings (see figure I).

Figure I

**Performance measure: number of bilateral and joint meetings with the leaders of the communities and their negotiating teams, and number of meetings of working groups and technical committees towards a settlement of the Cyprus problem**



**Impact of COVID-19 on programme delivery**

24. During 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic had an impact on the planned deliverables and activities of the mission. The impact of the restrictions put in place by both sides increased political tensions and posed practical challenges to movement across the divide and to the continuation of bicomunal contacts and trust-building activities on the island.
25. The mission demonstrated its adaptability to the operational realities imposed by the COVID-19 pandemic and creatively used communications technologies to connect people virtually and to hold meetings with representatives from both communities. However, despite the change from in-person meetings to virtual meetings, fewer meetings were held between the sides, and between the mission and the leaders and their negotiating teams, and there were fewer meetings of the technical committees. In-person meetings that required more than a very limited number of people were cancelled or held virtually. While some adaptation was possible, there were losses in terms of the quality of discussions given the nature, complexity and confidentiality of the interactions around the Cyprus issue. Travel to meetings outside Cyprus was severely reduced in 2020 and replaced by virtual contacts when possible and appropriate.
26. The change of meeting formats from in-person meetings to the use of virtual platforms and the severe travel restrictions influenced the number of planned deliverables and activities. This had an impact on the expected results for 2020, as described in the programme performance for 2020.
27. Some planned deliverables and activities were adjusted during 2020 within the overall scope of the objectives of the mission, to support both sides on issues related to the COVID-19 pandemic. Those modifications, such as the virtual facilitation of meetings of the Technical Committee on Health, are included as part of the deliverables and activities of the mission.

## Planned result for 2022

### Resumed dialogue to find a solution to the Cyprus problem

28. The mission will continue its engagement with the sides and the guarantor powers on the possible resumption of full-fledged negotiations until a comprehensive settlement is reached. Should the talks resume and significant progress be achieved in 2022, the United Nations may be called upon to convene the stakeholders to address outstanding issues of the negotiations. The requirement to coordinate technical work in preparation for settlement implementation may also increase.
29. Efforts will include shuttle diplomacy and a greater number of bilateral meetings, the facilitation of joint meetings, and meetings of the negotiating teams, working groups and technical committees. Also, the mission will intensify its support for the implementation of confidence-building measures and the work of the technical committees, with a particular focus on assisting the sides to follow up on the recommendations of the stocktaking exercise on the activities of the technical committees.

### *Lessons learned and planned change*


30. The lesson for the mission was to react effectively and swiftly to mitigate the challenges that were posed to mandate implementation because of COVID-19 restrictions. In applying the lesson, the mission increased the use of information technology to organize virtual meetings, workshops and training sessions to respond to the drastically limited opportunities for in-person meetings and restricted movement. It also introduced alternative work arrangements and strengthened its business continuity plan. While recognizing that the use of modern technology provides a time-effective alternative for some meetings, it also became apparent that certain in-person meetings are indispensable due to the nature, complexity and confidentiality of the interactions and thus could not successfully be conducted virtually. The mission will aim to “build back better” and adjust its efforts to facilitate a mix of in-person and virtual meetings while ensuring the confidentiality of the talks.

### *Expected progress towards the attainment of the objective, and performance measure*

31. This work is expected to contribute to the objective, as demonstrated by an increased number of bilateral and joint meetings with the leaders of the communities, their negotiating teams and key stakeholders and a higher number of meetings of working groups and technical committees towards a settlement of the Cyprus problem (see figure II).

Figure II

**Performance measure: number of bilateral and joint meetings with the leaders of the communities, their negotiating teams and key stakeholders, and number of meetings of working groups and technical committees towards a settlement of the Cyprus problem**



## Deliverables

32. Table 2 lists all deliverables, by category and subcategory, for the period 2020–2022 that contributed and are expected to contribute to the attainment of the objective stated above.

Table 2

### Deliverables for the period 2020–2022, by category and subcategory

<i>Category and subcategory</i>	<i>2020 planned</i>	<i>2020 actual</i>	<i>2021 planned</i>	<i>2022 planned</i>
<b>A. Facilitation of the intergovernmental process and expert bodies</b>				
<b>Parliamentary documentation</b> (number of documents)	2	3	3	3
1. Reports of the Secretary-General to the Security Council	2	3	3	3
<b>Substantive services for meetings</b> (number of three-hour meetings)	2	3	3	2
2. Meetings of the Security Council	2	3	3	2
<b>C. Substantive deliverables</b>				
<b>Good offices:</b> provision of good offices through engagement, and bilateral and joint meetings with the Greek Cypriot leader and the Turkish Cypriot leader and other stakeholders in both communities, as well as the guarantor powers, towards a settlement of the Cyprus problem.				
<b>Consultation, advice and advocacy:</b> advice on procedural, legal, technical and substantive issues towards a settlement of the Cyprus issue; coordination, management and facilitation of advisory meetings on issues related to the peace process; and advocacy on gender equality and the encouragement of participation in and public support for the peace process.				
<b>D. Communication deliverables</b>				
<b>External and media relations:</b> interviews and press releases to inform the public about the peace process.				

## B. Proposed post and non-post resource requirements for 2022

### Resource requirements (regular budget)

Table 3

#### Financial resources

(Thousands of United States dollars)

<i>Category of expenditure</i>	<i>2020</i>	<i>2021</i>	<i>2022</i>		<i>Variance</i>
	<i>Expenditure</i>	<i>Appropriation</i>	<i>Total requirements</i>	<i>Non-recurrent requirements</i>	<i>2022 vs. 2021 Increase/(decrease)</i>
	<i>(1)</i>	<i>(2)</i>	<i>(3)</i>	<i>(4)</i>	<i>(5)=(3)-(2)</i>
Military and police personnel costs	–	–	–	–	–
Civilian personnel costs	2 282.4	2 381.0	2 526.2	–	145.2
Operational costs	185.6	440.2	441.7	–	1.5
<b>Total (net of staff assessment)</b>	<b>2 468.0</b>	<b>2 821.2</b>	<b>2 967.9</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>146.7</b>

Table 4  
Positions

	<i>Professional and higher categories</i>								<i>General Service and related categories</i>			<i>National staff</i>				
	<i>USG</i>	<i>ASG</i>	<i>D-2</i>	<i>D-1</i>	<i>P-5</i>	<i>P-4</i>	<i>P-3</i>	<i>P-2</i>	<i>Subtotal</i>	<i>Field/ Security Services</i>	<i>General Service<sup>a</sup></i>	<i>Total inter-national</i>	<i>National Professional Officer</i>	<i>Local level</i>	<i>United Nations Volunteers</i>	<i>Total</i>
Approved 2021	1 <sup>b</sup>	–	–	1	3	5	1	–	11	4	1	16	–	5	–	21
Proposed 2022	1 <sup>b</sup>	–	–	1	3	5	1	–	11	4	1	16	–	5	–	21
<b>Change</b>	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–

<sup>a</sup> Other level, unless otherwise stated.

<sup>b</sup> The Under-Secretary-General is on a when-actually-employed contract.

33. The proposed resource requirements for 2022 for the Office of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Cyprus amount to \$2,967,900 (net of staff assessment) and would provide for the salaries and common staff costs (\$2,526,200) for the continuation of 21 positions (1 Under-Secretary-General, 1 D-1, 3 P-5, 5 P-4, 1 P-3, 4 Field Service, 1 General Service and 5 Local level), as well as operational costs (\$441,700), comprising costs for consultants and consulting services (\$32,100), official travel (\$123,900), facilities and infrastructure (\$95,200), ground transportation (\$40,800), communications and information technology (\$72,200) and other supplies, services and equipment (\$77,500).
34. For 2022, it is proposed that the number and levels of the positions for the Office remain unchanged.
35. A vacancy rate of 12.5 per cent has been applied to all international positions. Proposed resources for national positions are based on the assumption of full incumbency.
36. The increase in the requirements proposed for 2022 compared with the appropriation for 2021 is attributable primarily to increased requirements under civilian personnel costs, resulting from the application of the latest salary scale and post adjustment multiplier to the cost of international positions and the application of the latest operational rate of exchange to the cost of national positions.

#### **Extrabudgetary resources**

37. No extrabudgetary resources were available in 2021 or are projected for 2022.

## 2. Office of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide

(\$2,724,500)

### Foreword

This past year has shown us again how vulnerable our societies are to division, racism, xenophobia and other forms of intolerance that can lead to discrimination, violence and even, in the most serious cases, the commission of genocide and other related crimes. Investing in prevention is more important than ever. Prevention of genocide does not only mean responding to situations of crisis, where populations are at imminent risk. It also means addressing the structural risk factors of this crime and preventing them from escalating to the point of a crisis. This includes tackling discrimination in our societies, addressing and countering hate speech and promoting equal rights, inclusion and dialogue within and between communities.

I am alarmed at the increasing rate at which we are seeing hate speech and incitement to violence flourish online and offline. I am also concerned by the continued deepening of inequality, the rise of intolerance and the targeting of ethnic and religious minorities through discriminatory laws and practices and disenfranchisement. The coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic, which ought to have brought us together, has in many instances exacerbated hate and stigmatization of vulnerable populations, as well as given rise to other forms of hatred and xenophobia. In conflict situations, we continue to observe the disregard for well-established principles of international humanitarian law, placing civilian populations at heightened risk.

In response to these developments, my Office will continue to monitor situations worldwide and provide timely analysis and recommendations for preventative action to the Security Council, through the Secretary-General. The Office will also continue and intensify its efforts related to technical assistance and capacity-building for Member States, regional organizations and civil society actors to address early risk factors of genocide and other related crimes. This includes implementing the United Nations Strategy and Plan of Action on Hate Speech, as well as the other policy tools developed by my Office. The Office will place a specific emphasis on promoting community and grass-roots engagement in these efforts, as well as accelerating the inclusion of women, youth and other key actors in prevention.

*(Signed)* Alice Wairimu **Nderitu**  
Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide

## A. Proposed programme plan for 2022 and programme performance for 2020

### Overall orientation

#### Mandates and background

38. The Office of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide is mandated to collect information, in particular from within the United Nations system, on massive and serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law of ethnic and racial origin that, if not prevented or halted, might lead to genocide; to act as a mechanism of early warning to the Secretary-General and, through the Secretary-General, to the Security Council, by bringing to their attention situations that could potentially result in genocide; to make recommendations to the Council, through the Secretary-General, on action to prevent or halt genocide; and to liaise with the United Nations system on activities for the prevention of genocide and work to enhance the capacity of the United Nations to analyse and manage information regarding genocide or related crimes.
39. The mandate derives from the invitation of the Security Council to the Secretary-General in its resolution 1366 (2001) to refer to the Council information and analysis from within the United Nations system on cases of serious violations of international law, including international humanitarian law and human rights law. The Secretary-General, in a letter dated 12 July 2004 (S/2004/567), informed the President of the Security Council of his decision to appoint a Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide. In his reply, dated 13 July 2004 (S/2004/568), the President of the Security Council informed the Secretary-General that the Council had taken note of his intention. The mandate has been reaffirmed by the Council in its resolution 1674 (2006), through an exchange of letters between the Secretary-General and the Council (S/2007/721 and S/2007/722) and resolutions of the General Assembly, the Commission on Human Rights and the Human Rights Council, including Assembly resolutions 60/1 and 63/308, Commission on Human Rights resolution 2005/62 (2005) and Human Rights Council resolutions 7/25, 22/22, 28/34, 33/19, 37/26 and 43/29.
40. With regard to the responsibility to protect, the General Assembly, in paragraphs 138 and 139 of its resolution 60/1 on the 2005 World Summit Outcome, addressed the responsibility of Member States and the international community to protect populations by preventing genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, and their incitement. The assembled Heads of State and Government pledged to support the United Nations in establishing early warning capacity in that regard and called upon the Assembly to continue its consideration of the responsibility to protect. The Security Council reaffirmed the provisions of paragraphs 138 and 139 in the context of its resolution 1674 (2006) and recalled that reaffirmation in its resolution 1706 (2006). In addition, the Assembly, in paragraph 140 of its resolution 60/1, in which it expressed full support for the Office of the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide, underscored the close relationship between the two mandates.
41. The Secretary-General, in a letter dated 31 August 2007 addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2007/721), expressed his intention to appoint a Special Adviser to focus on the responsibility to protect. In his reply, dated 7 December 2007 (S/2007/722), the President of the Security Council informed the Secretary-General that the Council had taken note of the intention of the Secretary-General. In this regard, the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on the Responsibility to Protect is charged with the conceptual, institutional and operational development of the principle and with continuing a political dialogue with Member States on the implementation of the responsibility to protect.
42. The prevention of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity remains a key part of the broader prevention strategy of the Secretary-General, as well as his call to action on human rights. The need for timely analysis and recommendations on situations in which there is a risk of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity is critical in these efforts. The rise in hate speech, racism and xenophobia has continued and in many situations been

exacerbated by the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. Despite the call of the Secretary-General for a global ceasefire, the protection of civilians in armed conflict continues to be threatened, and ensuring accountability for genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity remains a challenge. These developments demonstrate again the importance of remaining vigilant to the indicators of risk and early warning signs of these crimes.

## **Programme of work**

### **Objective**

43. The objective, to which the Office contributes, is to advance national, regional and international efforts to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, and their incitement.

### **Strategy**

44. To contribute to the objective, the Office will conduct efforts in advocacy and providing timely recommendations on situations of concern. The Office will leverage its support to maximize its impact for monitoring, analysis and recommendations and will continue to respond to situations of concern as they arise, with a specific focus on new situations and emerging areas of concern. The Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide will continue to brief the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Human Rights Council and other intergovernmental bodies, as well as regional organizations, when requested. With respect to training, capacity-building and technical assistance, the Office will focus its support on initiatives that are likely to have a long-term and institutional impact. This will include working with regional and subregional organizations to develop the necessary early warning and prevention mechanisms. The Office will also continue to focus its engagement on capacity-building and technical assistance in areas that respond to critical needs in support of Member States, civil society and other relevant actors, including at the grass-roots and community levels. This will include building capacity on the prevention of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, and their incitement. It will also focus on continued efforts to support the implementation of the United Nations Strategy and Plan of Action on Hate Speech and the Plan of Action for Religious Leaders and Actors to Prevent Incitement to Violence that could lead to genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. These efforts will respond to the identified rise in hate speech and incitement to violence, as well as intolerance, racism and xenophobia.
45. The Office will continue to provide technical assistance and capacity-building to Member States and regional organizations focusing on building capacity and structures for analysis, early detection and response to risk factors of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.
46. The Office will raise awareness on the causes and dynamics of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, and will develop outreach materials on the mandate of the Special Adviser to enhance understanding within United Nations intergovernmental bodies, Member States and regional and subregional organizations on the causes, dynamics and lessons learned to prevent these crimes.
47. The Office plans to support Member States on issues related to the COVID-19 pandemic by supporting the implementation of the United Nations Strategy and Plan of Action on Hate Speech, which includes COVID-19-related hate speech, responding to the global call of the Secretary-General in May 2020 to address hate speech related to the pandemic. This support will be provided through its planned activities to implement the Strategy and Plan of Action. It will also build on a guidance note issued by the Office in May 2020 which provides recommendations on addressing and countering COVID-19-related hate speech.
48. The above-mentioned work is expected to result in:

- (a) increased action taken by Member States, and regional and subregional organizations, to prevent or mitigate the risk of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing or crimes against humanity, including their incitement;
  - (b) increased action taken by United Nations intergovernmental bodies, Member States and regional organizations to contribute to the prevention of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, including their incitement.
49. The planned support on issues related to COVID-19 pandemic is expected to result in increased awareness and United Nations system-wide capacity to counter and address COVID-19-related hate speech.

### **External factors for 2022**

50. With regard to external factors, the overall plan for 2022 is based on the following planning assumptions:
- (a) Continued commitment on the part of Member States, as well as the Security Council and other intergovernmental bodies, to engage with the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide to advance the prevention of genocide and implement the responsibility to protect principle;
  - (b) Member States that are host to key events relevant to the mandate are willing to engage with the Special Adviser and there is active engagement of Member States and regional and other organizations to develop preventive capacity and take appropriate action for the prevention of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, including their incitement.
51. With regard to the COVID-19 pandemic, the proposed programme plan is based on the assumption that the proposed deliverables and activities for 2022 will be feasible to implement. However, if the pandemic were to continue to have an impact on the planned deliverables and activities, they would be adjusted during 2022 within the scope of the overall objectives, strategies and mandates. Any such adjustments would be reported as part of the programme performance information.
52. The Office integrates a gender perspective in its operational activities, deliverables and results, as appropriate. For example, in its monitoring and analysis, the Office consistently reflects gender dynamics, as relevant. In its capacity-building and workshops, the Office will continue to strive for a minimum of 30 per cent participation of women.
53. In line with the United Nations Disability Inclusion Strategy, the Office will review and specifically examine the Strategy with a view to further advancing disability inclusion, including in its programmatic and policy activities. The Office has appointed a focal point within the Office to undertake this review.
54. With regard to inter-agency coordination and liaison, the Office will work in close collaboration with the United Nations Children's Fund, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), in particular in relation to the collection of information for early warning purposes, policy development and activities aimed at the prevention of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.
55. The Office will continue to work with the Department of Peace Operations, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs of the Secretariat, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and the special procedures of the Human Rights Council, the Office of Legal Affairs of the Secretariat, the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict, the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Violence against Children and the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict. The Office of the Special Adviser will also continue to work closely and support United Nations country teams on the implementation of the United Nations Strategy and Plan of Action on Hate Speech.

## Programme performance in 2020

### Collecting information and identifying and communicating concern and recommendations<sup>2</sup>


56. The Office monitored and analysed the risk of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and provided recommendations to Member States and regional and subregional organizations on preventing genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, including their incitement. The Office collected relevant information on political, human rights, humanitarian, social and economic developments in countries worldwide, with the aim of identifying early warning signs of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. The Special Adviser also undertook country visits, upon request.
57. In 2020, the Office issued seven public statements and six advisory notes to the Secretary-General. In addition, the Special Adviser undertook two country visits. The number of visits was affected by the COVID-19 pandemic restrictions. In response to those restrictions, the Office carried out monitoring remotely by constantly liaising with United Nations field presences, especially United Nations country teams and peace operations, to collect and verify information relevant to the mandate. In March 2020, the Special Adviser undertook a mission to Iraq aimed at identifying challenges in the field of transitional justice and reconciliation and advancing national and international efforts to overcome them. In particular, the mission focused on the importance of accountability for allegations of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity as instrumental to the prevention of future crimes. Efforts to promote intercommunal reconciliation included engagement with religious leaders and actors and led to the adoption of a landmark inter-faith statement in support of the victims and survivors of Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant by representatives of the Christian, Kaka'i, Shia, Sunni and Yazidi communities in Iraq.

#### *Progress towards the attainment of the objective, and performance measure*

58. The above-mentioned work contributed to the advancement of national, regional and international efforts to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, and their incitement, on the basis of timely and relevant analysis and recommendations provided by the Special Adviser, which met the planned target of specific action taken by Member States and regional and subregional organizations to prevent or mitigate the risk of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing or crimes against humanity, as reflected in the proposed programme budget for 2020 (see figure III).

Figure III

**Performance measure: action taken by Member States, regional and subregional organizations to prevent or mitigate the risk of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing or crimes against humanity**



<sup>2</sup> As reflected in the proposed programme budget for 2020 (A/74/6 (Sect. 3)/Add.2).

**Raising awareness and developing capacities to prevent and respond to genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, as well as their incitement<sup>2</sup>**


59. The increase in hate speech and incitement to violence continues to pose a challenge worldwide. The rise of hate speech has further been exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic, which has seen vulnerable populations stigmatized and become victims of hate speech. Hate speech and incitement to violence are among the risk factors associated with genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, in particular when aimed at ethnic, national, religious or racial groups. Building capacity to address and counter hate speech, in line with international human rights standards, is therefore an important tool towards building capacities to prevent genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, as well as their incitement. In its resolution [75/258](#), on promoting a culture of peace and tolerance to safeguard religious sites, the General Assembly urged Member States to take all appropriate measures to counter hate speech, and the Human Rights Council, in its resolution [43/29](#), on the prevention of genocide, welcomed the launch of the United Nations Strategy and Plan of Action on Hate Speech as an effective tool to fight incitement to discrimination, hostility and violence.
60. The United Nations Strategy and Plan of Action on Hate Speech provides a policy framework for addressing hate speech. As the focal point for its implementation, the Office has focused its efforts on supporting its implementation at the international and national levels. In May 2020, the Office issued a guidance note on tackling hate speech in the context of COVID-19, and in September 2020 the Office published detailed guidance for United Nations field offices on implementing the Strategy and Plan of Action at the national level. The Office also undertook 18 training and briefing sessions on the Strategy and its implementation for United Nations, Member States and civil society actors and supported four United Nations country teams and peace missions in developing specific action plans on tackling hate speech in their specific country contexts. In addition, the Office provided support for the implementation of such action plans through specific initiatives. The Office also continued to support other stakeholders in addressing and countering hate speech. For example, in May 2020, the Office's engagement with religious leaders and actors resulted in a global pledge for action by a cross section of religious leaders, who expressed their commitment to support United Nations efforts in addressing and countering COVID-19-related hate speech.
61. Moreover, the Office continued to engage at the national and community levels to build resilience against other risk factors of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. In 2020, the Office supported 16 community-level dialogues in the Morogoro, Rukwa, Arusha and Manyara regions of the United Republic of Tanzania. The dialogues brought together youth groups, women, traditional leaders and civil society representatives with the aim of enhancing the resilience of local communities and strengthening social cohesion, which contributed to the peaceful election period in 2020. In Kenya, the Office supported the development of legislation on the prevention of genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing. This included supporting an expert-level consultative meeting on 27 and 28 August 2020 in Naivasha. The meeting brought together relevant experts from the Office of the Attorney General, the Senate, the National Assembly, the Kenya Law Reform Commission and the Kenya National Committee on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, War Crimes, Crimes Against Humanity and All Forms of Discrimination to review the bill and develop advocacy for cross-sectoral support for the draft legislation. The consultations resulted in the raising of additional awareness and in broader support for the draft law among key relevant institutions and actors.

*Progress towards the attainment of the objective, and performance measure*

62. The above-mentioned work contributed to advancement of national, regional and international efforts to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, and their incitement, as a result of training and technical assistance provided by the Office, and met the planned target of follow-up actions taken for the prevention of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity at the national, regional or international levels as reflected in the proposed programme budget for 2020 (see figure IV).

Figure IV

**Performance measure: number of follow-up actions taken for the prevention of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity at the national, regional or international levels**



### **Impact of COVID-19 on programme delivery**

63. During 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic had an impact on the planned deliverables and activities of the Office of the Special Adviser. The impact included postponed assessment missions by the Special Adviser and her staff, as well as the postponement of the organization of in-person meetings and events.
64. At the same time, however, some planned deliverables and activities were modified and new activities were identified during 2020, within the overall scope of the objectives of the Office, in order to support Member States on issues related to the COVID-19 pandemic. Those included working with partners, especially United Nations field presences, to implement activities related to technical assistance and capacity-building for Member States, regional organizations and civil society. The COVID-19 pandemic has not reduced the demand for the Office's expertise; instead, it has created an increase in some areas where the pandemic has exacerbated the situation of populations at risk. In order to adapt to the COVID-19 pandemic, the Office has changed its implementation modalities, where possible, to virtual meetings and events. In May 2020, the Office issued a guidance note on countering and addressing COVID-19-related hate speech in follow-up to the appeal of the Secretary-General on the same topic.

### **Planned results for 2022**

#### **Collecting information and identifying and communicating concerns and recommendations**

65. The Office monitors and analyses the risk of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and provides recommendations to Member States and regional and subregional organizations on preventing genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, including their incitement. In order to achieve this, the Special Adviser conducts country visits, upon invitation. The Office also collects relevant information on political, human rights, humanitarian, social and economic developments in countries worldwide with the aim of identifying early warning signs of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.

#### *Lessons learned and planned change*


66. The lesson for the Office was that enhancing coordination with United Nations field presences, especially with United Nations country teams and peace operations, enabled the Office to implement some of the activities and programmes remotely, including monitoring and verifying United Nations information that is relevant to the mandate of the Special Adviser when travel to the field is not possible. In applying the lesson, the Office will intensify its awareness-raising activities to build the capacity of the United Nations country teams and peace operations on the elements relevant to the prevention of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.

*Expected progress towards the attainment of the objective, and performance measure*

67. The work of the Office is expected to contribute to the objective, as demonstrated by specific action taken by Member States and regional and subregional organizations to prevent or mitigate the risk of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing or crimes against humanity on the basis of timely and relevant analysis and recommendations provided by the Office (see figure V).

Figure V

**Performance measure: number of Member States and regional and subregional organizations that have taken action to prevent or mitigate the risk of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing or crimes against humanity on the basis of timely and relevant analysis and recommendations provided by the Office**



**Raising awareness and developing capacities to prevent and respond to genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, and their incitement**

68. The Office raises awareness and supports capacity development on the causes and dynamics of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, in particular for Member States, regional and subregional organizations and civil society.
69. In order to achieve this, the Office conducts tailored training and provides technical assistance to Member States, regional and subregional organizations and civil society on the prevention of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.

*Lessons learned and planned change*


70. The lesson for the Office was that through working with regional organizations and a coalition of civil society actors, the Office was able to reach more Member States and civil society actors in providing its technical assistance, and the ripple effect of its capacity-building was wider. In applying the lesson, the Office will prioritize working through regional organizations and a coalition of civil society actors to reach more Member States and civil society actors, including at the grass-roots and community levels.

*Expected progress towards the attainment of the objective, and performance measure*

71. The work is expected to contribute to the objective, as demonstrated by the number of follow-up actions taken by Member States, regional and subregional organizations and civil society actors as a result of training and technical assistance provided by the Office. The specific actions taken would include the appointment of focal points, national action plans and early warning mechanisms (see figure VI).

Figure VI

**Performance measure: number of follow-up actions taken by Member States, regional and subregional organizations and civil society actors as a result of training and technical assistance provided by the Office**



## Deliverables

72. Table 5 lists all deliverables, by category and subcategory, for the period 2020–2022 that contributed and are expected to contribute to the attainment of the objective stated above.

Table 5

### Deliverables for the period 2020–2022, by category and subcategory

Category and subcategory	2020 planned	2020 actual	2021 planned	2022 planned
<b>A. Facilitation of the intergovernmental process and expert bodies</b>				
<b>Parliamentary documentation</b> (number of documents)	<b>2</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>2</b>
1. Report of the Secretary-General on the responsibility to protect	1	1	1	1
2. Report of the Secretary-General on the prevention of genocide to the Human Rights Council	1	–	1	1
<b>Substantive services for meetings</b> (number of three-hour meetings)	<b>4</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>4</b>
3. Meetings of the General Assembly on the responsibility to protect	3	–	5	3
4. Meetings of the Human Rights Council on the prevention of genocide	1	–	1	1
<b>B. Generation and transfer of knowledge</b>				
<b>Field and technical cooperation projects</b> (number of projects)	<b>3</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>7</b>
5. Projects on national mechanisms, including legislation, for the prevention of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity	3	3	4	7
<b>Seminars, workshops and training events</b> (number of days)	<b>25</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>35</b>
6. Workshops on the prevention of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, including their incitement, and on the establishment and review of national and regional early warning mechanisms	25	32	25	35
<b>Publications</b> (number of publications)	<b>–</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>
7. Publication on the prevention of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity	–	1	1	1
<b>Technical materials</b> (number of materials)	<b>2</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>2</b>
8. Guidance note on countering and addressing related hate speech	–	1	–	1
9. Guidance notes on the prevention of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity	2	1	–	1

Category and subcategory	2020 planned	2020 actual	2021 planned	2022 planned
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**C. Substantive deliverables**

**Consultation, advice and advocacy:** advice on the risk of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and on preventive measures; advocacy and consultations on the prevention of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity; and briefings on country situations and thematic areas relevant to prevention.

**Fact-finding, monitoring and investigation missions:** country-specific assessment missions.

**D. Communication deliverables**

**Outreach programmes, special events and information materials:** commemoration of the International Day of Commemoration and Dignity of the Victims of the Crime of Genocide and of the Prevention of This Crime; anniversary of the adoption of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide; and commemoration of the genocide in Rwanda in 1994.

**External and media relations:** public statements by the Special Adviser; media briefings; and editorial opinions (op-eds).

**Digital platforms and multimedia content:** website; and social media.

## B. Proposed post and non-post resource requirements for 2022

### Resource requirements (regular budget)

Table 6

**Financial resources**

(Thousands of United States dollars)

Category of expenditure	2020	2021	2022		Variance
	<i>Expenditure</i>	<i>Appropriation</i>	<i>Total requirements</i>	<i>Non-recurrent requirements</i>	<i>2022 vs. 2021 Increase/(decrease)</i>
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)=(3)-(2)
Military and police personnel costs	–	–	–	–	–
Civilian personnel costs	1 355.5	1 695.5	2 131.1	–	435.6
Operational costs	343.4	571.6	593.4	–	21.8
<b>Total (net of staff assessment)</b>	<b>1 698.9</b>	<b>2 267.1</b>	<b>2 724.5</b>	–	<b>457.4</b>

Table 7

**Positions**

	<i>Professional and higher categories</i>								<i>General Service and related categories</i>			<i>National staff</i>				
	<i>USG</i>	<i>ASG</i>	<i>D-2</i>	<i>D-1</i>	<i>P-5</i>	<i>P-4</i>	<i>P-3</i>	<i>P-2</i>	<i>Subtotal</i>	<i>Field/ Security Services</i>	<i>General Service<sup>a</sup></i>	<i>Total inter-national</i>	<i>National Professional Officer</i>	<i>Local level</i>	<i>United Nations Volunteers</i>	<i>Total</i>
Approved 2021	1	1 <sup>b</sup>	–	–	2	3	2	–	9	–	2	11	–	–	–	11
Proposed 2022	1	1 <sup>b</sup>	–	–	2	4	2	–	10	–	2	12	–	–	–	12
<b>Change</b>	–	–	–	–	–	1	–	–	1	–	–	1	–	–	–	1

<sup>a</sup> Other level, unless otherwise stated.

<sup>b</sup> The Assistant Secretary-General is on a \$1-per-year contract.

73. The proposed resource requirements for 2022 for the Office of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide amount to \$2,724,500 (net of staff assessment) and would provide for the salaries and common staff costs (\$2,131,100) for the continuation of 11 positions (1 Under-Secretary-General, 1 Assistant Secretary-General, 2 P-5, 3 P-4, 2 P-3 and 2 General Service) and the proposed establishment of one position at the P-4 level, as well as operational costs (\$593,400), comprising costs for consultants and consulting services (\$39,600), official travel (\$272,300), facilities and infrastructure (\$215,900), ground transportation (\$3,600), communications and information technology (\$35,200) and other supplies, services and equipment (\$26,800).
74. In 2022, it is proposed that one position of Political Affairs Officer (P-4) be established for the Office to strengthen the implementation of the United Nations Strategy and Plan of Action on Hate Speech. The incumbent will coordinate the principal-level and expert-level working groups assigned to support the implementation of the Strategy and Plan of Action across the United Nations system, and provide support to Resident Coordinators and peacekeeping and special political missions through capacity-building training sessions and short-term deployments to provide technical assistance.
75. A vacancy rate of 13.5 per cent has been applied to the estimates for the existing positions based on recent incumbency and projected recruitment and a vacancy rate of 50 per cent has been applied for the position proposed for establishment.
76. The increase in the requirements proposed for 2022 compared with the appropriation for 2021 is attributable primarily to: (a) increased requirements under civilian personnel costs, resulting from factors that include the proposed establishment of one position at the P-4 level, the application of the revised salary scale effective 1 January 2021 and the application of a higher percentage of common staff costs, based on recent expenditure patterns; and (b) additional requirements under operational costs related to increased costs for the rental of premises and maintenance of communications, and information technology equipment and support services related to the proposed new position.

#### **Extrabudgetary resources**

77. In 2021, extrabudgetary resources amounting to approximately \$882,000 are committed to provide mainly for the staff costs of four positions (3 P-3 and 1 General Service), the Office's capacity-building and technical assistance programme and the preparation of the 2021 report of the Secretary-General on the responsibility to protect.
78. For 2022, extrabudgetary resources in the estimated amount of \$447,000 would provide for the continuation of four positions (3 P-3 and 1 General Service) and the Office's capacity-building and technical assistance programme.

### **3. Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Western Sahara**

*(\$484,600)*

#### **A. Proposed programme plan for 2022 and programme performance for 2020**

##### **Overall orientation**

##### **Mandates and background**

79. The Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Western Sahara is responsible for assisting the parties, Morocco and the Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguía el-Hamra y de Río de Oro (Frente POLISARIO), in finding a just, lasting and mutually acceptable political solution, which will provide for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara in the context of arrangements consistent with the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations.
80. The mandate derives from the communications between the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council dated 17 March 1997 (S/1997/236) and 25 and 30 May 2017 (S/2017/462 and S/2017/463), as well as from the priorities established in relevant Security Council resolutions, including resolutions 1813 (2008), 2099 (2013), 2468 (2019) and 2494 (2019). In its resolution 2548 (2020), the Council welcomed the momentum created by the first round-table meeting on 5 and 6 December 2018 and the second round-table meeting on 21 and 22 March 2019, and expressed its full support for the ongoing efforts of the Secretary-General and his Personal Envoy to sustain the renewed negotiations process. The Council called upon the parties to resume negotiations under the auspices of the Secretary-General without preconditions and in good faith, as well as to demonstrate political will and work in an atmosphere propitious for dialogue in order to advance negotiations, to achieve a just, lasting and mutually acceptable political solution, which would provide for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara in the context of arrangements consistent with the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations, and noted the role and responsibilities of the parties in that respect.

##### **Programme of work**

##### **Objective**

81. The objective, to which this mission contributes, is to advance the parties' efforts to achieve a just, lasting and mutually acceptable political solution, which will provide for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara.

##### **Strategy**

82. To contribute to the objective, the mission will encourage the parties to continue the discussion on the question of Western Sahara in order to identify elements of convergence, through bilateral consultations, including with the neighbouring countries of Algeria and Mauritania, visits to the region to meet with key interlocutors, and other activities deemed useful in this regard.
83. To further contribute to achieving a solution, the mission will consult with members of the Security Council and the Group of Friends on Western Sahara, both in their capitals and in New York, as well as with regional organizations.
84. The above-mentioned work is expected to result in:
  - (a) Building additional trust and strengthening involvement by the parties in the political process;
  - (b) Maintaining the support of the international community for the political process.

## External factors for 2022

85. With regard to external factors, the overall plan for 2022 is based on the following planning assumptions:
- (a) The parties continue to show willingness to meet for direct negotiations;
  - (b) The security situation remains conducive to the mission's objective for the region.
86. With regard to the COVID-19 pandemic, the proposed programme plan is based on the assumption that the proposed deliverables and activities for 2022 will be feasible to implement. However, if the pandemic were to continue to have an impact on the planned deliverables and activities, they would be adjusted during 2022 within the scope of the overall objectives, strategies and mandates. Any such adjustments would be reported as part of the programme performance information.
87. The mission integrates a gender perspective in its operational activities, deliverables and results, as appropriate. In order to strengthen women's participation, the mission will continue to actively work for the inclusion of women participants in meetings held in the context of the political process.
88. With regard to cooperation with other entities, the mission will regularly meet with representatives of regional organizations and other relevant stakeholders to exchange views on the United Nations-led political process.
89. With regard to inter-agency coordination and liaison, the mission will continue to receive support for visits and information on developments in Western Sahara from the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara. It will further coordinate and liaise with UNHCR in respect of visits to the refugee camps and on confidence-building measures, and will maintain close contact with OHCHR in Geneva on issues related to the human rights situation in the area of responsibility.

## Evaluation activities

90. The Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs will lead a systematic assessment with the overall purpose of improving the gender sensitivity of the political analyses developed by the Department and the special political missions.

## Programme performance in 2020

### Resumed process on Western Sahara<sup>3</sup>

91. Following the resignation of Personal Envoy Horst Köhler on 22 May 2019, the process on Western Sahara has not yet resumed. The Secretary-General has continued to maintain contact with the parties.

## Planned result for 2022

### Resumed process on Western Sahara

92. In his press statement upon the conclusion of the second round-table meeting, the former Personal Envoy expressed gratitude to the delegations for their agreement to continue the process and to convene again in the round-table format, and noted that delegations had agreed that additional trust needed to be built. He subsequently informed the Security Council of his intention to engage bilaterally with all participants to explore the best way of making substantive progress towards a solution. He announced his intention to convene a third round-table only once there were signs of real substantive progress and a negotiations process had been established that would give space to everyone, without preconditions.

<sup>3</sup> As reflected in the proposed programme budget for 2020 (A/74/6 (Sect. 3)/Add.2).

93. The mission will continue to build on the work of former Personal Envoys to advance the political process through consultations with the parties and neighbouring countries, visits to the region to meet key interlocutors, including representatives of civil society and women's organizations, and other measures deemed useful in this regard.
94. The mission will also continue to hold consultations with Member States in their capitals and in New York, as appropriate, through the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, with the permanent missions of Member States in New York and elsewhere. In addition, the mission will continue to liaise with relevant United Nations entities in Geneva and other locations to discuss various aspects related to the conflict. The mission will also regularly meet with representatives of relevant regional organizations to exchange views on the United Nations-led political process.

*Lessons learned and planned change*

95. The lesson for the mission was to maintain the momentum in the political process. In applying the lesson, the mission, through the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, will continue to engage the parties and neighbours to resume the discussion on the question of Western Sahara in order to identify elements of convergence as soon as a new Personal Envoy is appointed, with a view to achieving a mutually acceptable political solution to the question of Western Sahara.

*Expected progress towards the attainment of the objective, and performance measure*

96. This work is expected to contribute to the objective, which would be demonstrated by a continued engagement by the parties and neighbours with the United Nations-led process (see table 8).

Table 8  
**Performance measure**

<i>2018 (actual)</i>	<i>2019 (actual)</i>	<i>2020 (actual)</i>	<i>2021 (planned)</i>	<i>2022 (planned)</i>
One round-table meeting	One round-table meeting	No face-to-face meetings	Resumed engagement between the parties and neighbours	Continued engagement between the parties and neighbours

## Deliverables

97. Table 9 below lists all deliverables, by category and subcategory, for the period 2020–2022 that contributed and are expected to contribute to the attainment of the objective stated above.

Table 9  
**Deliverables for the period 2020–2022, by category and subcategory**

<i>Category and subcategory</i>	<i>2020 planned</i>	<i>2020 actual</i>	<i>2021 planned</i>	<i>2022 planned</i>
<b>A. Facilitation of the intergovernmental process and expert bodies</b>				
<b>Parliamentary documentation</b> (number of documents)	2	2	2	2
1. Reports of the Secretary-General to the Security Council	1	1	1	1
2. Report of the Secretary-General to the General Assembly	1	1	1	1
<b>Substantive services for meetings</b> (number of three-hour meetings)	2	2	2	2
3. Meetings of the Security Council	2	3	2	2

Category and subcategory	2020 planned	2020 actual	2021 planned	2022 planned
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### C. Substantive deliverables

**Good offices:** provision of good offices for high-level dialogue between the parties and with the neighbouring States, and for informal negotiations between the parties in the context of the political process on Western Sahara.

**Consultation, advice and advocacy:** consultations through bilateral discussions on the political process on Western Sahara.

**Fact-finding, monitoring and investigation missions:** fact-finding missions to the region to improve the understanding of the situation on the ground and to improve coordination with United Nations partners and other stakeholders.

## B. Proposed post and non-post resource requirements for 2022

### Resource requirements (regular budget)

Table 10

#### Financial resources

(Thousands of United States dollars)

Category of expenditure	2020		2021		2022		Variance
	Expenditure		Appropriation		Total requirements	Non-recurrent requirements	2022 vs. 2021 Increase/(decrease)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)=(3)-(2)		
Military and police personnel costs	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Civilian personnel costs	–	317.3	300.7	–	–	–	(16.6)
Operational costs	–	183.9	183.9	–	–	–	–
<b>Total (net of staff assessment)</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>501.2</b>	<b>484.6</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>(16.6)</b>

Table 11

#### Positions

	Professional and higher categories								General Service and related categories			National staff			United Nations Volunteers	Total
	USG	ASG	D-2	D-1	P-5	P-4	P-3	P-2	Subtotal	Field/ Security Services	General Service	Total inter-national	National Professional Officer	Local level		
	Approved 2021	1 <sup>a</sup>	–	–	–	–	–	1	–	2	–	–	2	–		
Proposed 2022	1 <sup>a</sup>	–	–	–	–	–	1	–	2	–	–	2	–	–	–	2
<b>Change</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>–</b>

<sup>a</sup> The Under-Secretary-General is on a when-actually-employed contract.

98. The proposed resource requirements for 2022 for the Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Western Sahara amount to \$484,600 (net of staff assessment) and would provide for the salaries and common staff costs (\$300,700) for the continuation of the two positions in the mission (1 Under-Secretary-General, on a when-actually-employed contract, and 1 P-3), as well as operational costs (\$183,900), comprising costs for consultants and consulting services (\$22,700), official travel (\$83,000), facilities and infrastructure (\$41,000), ground transportation (\$1,000), communications and information technology (\$8,600) and other supplies, services and equipment (\$27,600).

99. For 2022, it is proposed that the number and levels of the positions for the mission remain unchanged. A vacancy rate of 5 per cent has been applied to the positions.
100. The decrease in the requirements proposed for 2022 compared with the appropriation for 2021 is attributable to reduced requirements under civilian personnel costs, resulting from the application of a lower percentage of common staff costs to salary costs of 27.5 per cent, compared with 29.9 per cent applied to the 2021 approved budget, based on recent expenditure patterns.

**Extrabudgetary resources**

101. No extrabudgetary resources were available in 2021 or are projected in 2022 for the Office of the Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Western Sahara.

#### 4. Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the implementation of Security Council resolution 1559 (2004)

(\$343,200)

##### A. Proposed programme plan for 2022 and programme performance for 2020

###### Overall orientation

###### Mandates and background

102. On 14 December 2004, the Secretary-General appointed his Special Envoy for the implementation of Security Council resolution 1559 (2004) to enable him to report to the Security Council every six months on the implementation of Council resolution 1559 (2004), as requested by the Council in its presidential statement of 19 October 2004 (S/PRST/2004/36). In carrying out this mandate, the mission consults with political interlocutors in Lebanon, the Council and other Member States to prepare the semi-annual reports of the Secretary-General. The mandate derives from the priorities established in relevant Security Council resolutions and decisions, including resolution 1559 (2004) and the statement by the President of the Security Council dated 19 October 2004 (S/PRST/2004/36). In addition, the mission has worked towards strengthening the response by relevant Member States in the implementation of the remaining provisions of Council resolution 1680 (2006).
103. On 17 May 2006, in response to the third semi-annual report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution 1559 (2004) (S/2006/248), the Security Council adopted resolution 1680 (2006), in which it reiterated its call for the full implementation of the provisions of resolution 1559 (2004). Through that resolution, the Council also strongly encouraged the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic “to respond positively to the request made by the Government of Lebanon, in line with the agreements of the Lebanese national dialogue, to delineate their common border, especially in those areas where the border was uncertain or disputed”.
104. On 11 August 2006, the Security Council adopted resolution 1701 (2006), in which it emphasized the importance of the extension of the control of the Government of Lebanon over all Lebanese territory in accordance with the provisions of resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1680 (2006), and of the relevant provisions of the Taif Accords. The Council requested the Secretary-General to develop, in liaison with relevant international actors and the parties concerned, proposals to implement the relevant provisions of the Taif Accords and resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1680 (2006), including with respect to disarmament and the delineation of the international borders of Lebanon. It also requested the Secretary-General to report to the Council on a regular basis on the implementation of resolution 1701 (2006).
105. In 2016, the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs was tasked by the Secretary-General with assuming the responsibility of reporting on the implementation of resolution 1559 (2004), an arrangement that has been maintained to date. In a press statement issued on 8 February 2019, the members of the Security Council reaffirmed their strong support for the stability, security, territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon, in accordance with Council resolutions 1701 (2006), 1680 (2006), 1559 (2004) and 2433 (2018), as well as other relevant Council resolutions and statements of the President of the Security Council on the situation in Lebanon.
106. In October 2019, large-scale peaceful protests began countrywide, as a broad cross-section of Lebanese society called for government change, just reforms, good governance, accountability for corruption, better management of the economy, the end of sectarian patronage and early parliamentary elections. In subsequent protests in the second and third quarters of 2020, protesters called for, among other things, the implementation of resolution 1559 (2004). The pandemic, the 4 August explosion in the port of Beirut and the Government vacuum compounded the effects of the socioeconomic crisis, posing risks to the country’s increasingly fragile stability.

## **Programme of work**

### **Objective**

107. The objective, to which this mission contributes, is to ensure full implementation of Security Council resolution [1559 \(2004\)](#) and all subsequent related resolutions of the Council.

### **Strategy**

108. To contribute to this objective, the Office of the Special Envoy will explore ways to foster consensus on a Lebanese-led and Lebanese-owned national dialogue, which is expected to result in progress in addressing the maintenance of weapons outside of State authority. Past results in this area include the holding of a national dialogue by Lebanese political decision makers.
109. The Office will produce two biannual reports of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on developments of relevance to the implementation of Security Council resolution [1559 \(2004\)](#). The report will address a number of key issues, such as: sovereignty, territorial integrity, unity and political independence of Lebanon; extension of control of the Government of Lebanon over all Lebanese territory; and disbanding and disarmament of Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias. Reporting on these categories, the Secretary-General will inform the Council of political and security developments which take place during the reporting period, violations of Lebanese sovereignty and the maintenance of weapons by Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias.
110. The above-mentioned work is expected to result in informed Security Council deliberations on possible opportunities for Lebanon to make progress on the outstanding provisions of Council resolution [1559 \(2004\)](#).

### **External factors for 2022**

111. With regard to the external factors, the overall plan for 2022 is based on the following planning assumptions:
- (a) The current political stalemate in Lebanon ends, the economic and financial deterioration is addressed and the security situation does not deteriorate;
  - (b) Hostilities in the region continue, but do not have a further impact on Lebanon;
  - (c) There is political will on the part of the parties concerned to address the disbanding and disarmament of Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias;
  - (d) The political goodwill of Member States has a positive influence on the parties concerned;
  - (e) There are no tensions between Lebanon and other States in the region.
112. The mission integrates a gender perspective in its operational activities, deliverables and results, as appropriate. For example, reports of the Secretary-General that are drafted by the Office take into account feedback from the Gender, Peace and Security Team of the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and input from relevant United Nations counterparts to ensure that gender considerations are mainstreamed and elements relevant to Security Council resolution [1325 \(2000\)](#) and subsequent relevant resolutions are brought to the attention of the Council.
113. With regard to inter-agency coordination and liaison, the Office of the Special Envoy coordinates and works closely with the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon, in particular in the process of developing the reports of the Secretary-General ahead of and during the visits to Lebanon by the staff of the Office of the Special Envoy.
114. With regard to the COVID-19 pandemic, the proposed programme plan is based on the assumption that the proposed deliverables and activities for 2022 will be feasible to implement. However, if the

pandemic were to continue to have an impact on the planned deliverables and activities, they would be adjusted during 2022 within the scope of the overall objectives, strategies and mandates. Any such adjustments would be reported as part of the programme performance information.

### Evaluation activities

115. The Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs will lead a systematic assessment with the overall purpose of improving the gender sensitivity of the political analyses developed by the Department and the special political missions.

### Programme performance in 2020

#### Informed Security Council deliberations through analytical reports of the Secretary-General<sup>4</sup>

116. The Office undertook one trip to Lebanon in 2020, which informed the October 2020 report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution 1559 (2004). The Office also produced the April 2020 report of the Secretary-General.

#### Progress towards the attainment of the objective, and performance measure

117. The above-mentioned work contributed to informing Security Council deliberations on possible opportunities for Lebanon to make progress on the outstanding provisions of Council resolution 1559 (2004), which did not meet the target of discussions of the Council on two biannual reports on the implementation of resolution 1559 (2004) that would begin to reflect the outcome of systematic consultations surveying the positioning of actors vis-à-vis the maintenance of weapons outside State authority, as reflected in the proposed programme budget for 2020. This is because the focus of Lebanese actors was overwhelmingly on the economic and financial crisis, the aftermath of the 4 August 2020 explosion in Beirut and challenges with regard to Government formation. Additionally, the pandemic meant that only one trip was undertaken to Lebanon instead of two. In the absence of a Government, a national dialogue could not be held, and actors therefore did not articulate their positioning vis-à-vis the maintenance of weapons outside of State authority (see table 12).

Table 12  
Performance measure

<i>2018 (actual)</i>	<i>2019 (actual)</i>	<i>2020 (actual)</i>
Discussions on the two semi-annual reports, to reflect the outcome of consultations on actors' positions vis-à-vis the maintenance of weapons outside of State authority	Discussions on the two semi-annual reports, to reflect the outcome of consultations on actors' positions vis-à-vis the maintenance of weapons outside of State authority	Discussions on the two semi-annual reports, which do not reflect the outcome of consultations on actors' positions vis-à-vis the maintenance of weapons outside of State authority

#### Impact of COVID-19 on programme delivery

118. Owing to the impact of COVID-19 during 2020, the Office cancelled one trip to Lebanon in March 2020. These changes had an impact on programme performance in 2020, whereby consultations were not undertaken to the same extent, including systematic consultations across the political spectrum surveying the positioning of actors vis-à-vis the maintenance of weapons outside State authority.

<sup>4</sup> As reflected in the proposed programme budget for 2020 (A/74/6 (Sect. 3)/Add.2).

## Planned result for 2022

### Informed Security Council deliberations through analytical reports of the Secretary-General

119. The Secretary-General will continue to report to the Security Council biannually on progress, or lack thereof, in the implementation of the resolution, particularly the disbanding and disarmament of Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias.

#### *Lessons learned and planned change*

120. The lesson for the office was that deeper and more regular coordination with other United Nations entities based at Headquarters could contribute to the achievement of results. In applying the lesson, the Office will further leverage engagement with United Nations entities at Headquarters and the United Nations country team in Lebanon, in addition to maintaining its network of interlocutors in Lebanon.

#### *Expected progress towards the attainment of the objective, and performance measure*

121. This work is expected to contribute to the objective, as demonstrated by reports to the Security Council reflecting the results of the outcome of systematic consultations surveying the positioning of actors vis-à-vis the maintenance of weapons outside State authority (see table 13).

Table 13

### Performance measure

<i>2018 (actual)</i>	<i>2019 (actual)</i>	<i>2020 (actual)</i>	<i>2021 (planned)</i>	<i>2022 (planned)</i>
–	–	–	–	Discussions on the two semi-annual reports, which reflect the outcome of systematic consultations surveying the positioning of actors vis-à-vis the maintenance of weapons outside of State authority

## Deliverables

122. Table 14 below lists all deliverables, by category and subcategory, for the period 2020–2022 that contributed and are expected to contribute to the attainment of the objective stated above.

Table 14  
**Deliverables for the period 2020–2022, by category and subcategory**

<i>Category and subcategory</i>	<i>2020 planned</i>	<i>2020 actual</i>	<i>2021 planned</i>	<i>2022 planned</i>
<b>A. Facilitation of the intergovernmental process and expert bodies</b>				
<b>Parliamentary documentation</b> (number of documents)	2	2	2	2
1. Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council	2	2	2	2
<b>Substantive services for meetings</b> (number of consultations)	–	2	–	2
2. Meetings (closed) of the Security Council on resolution 1559 (2004)	–	2	–	2
<b>C. Substantive deliverables</b>				
<b>Consultation, advice and advocacy:</b> consultations to gain an understanding of the political, economic and humanitarian situation in Lebanon, as well as its regional environment, as it may influence the implementation of resolution 1559 (2004); consultations surveying the systemic positioning of actors vis-à-vis the maintenance of weapons outside of State authority.				

## B. Proposed post and non-post resource requirements for 2022

### Resource requirements (regular budget)

Table 15  
**Financial resources**  
 (Thousands of United States dollars)

<i>Category of expenditure</i>	<i>2020</i>	<i>2021</i>	<i>2022</i>	<i>Variance</i>	
	<i>Expenditure</i>	<i>Appropriation</i>	<i>Total requirements</i>	<i>Non-recurrent requirements</i>	<i>2022 vs. 2021 Increase/(decrease)</i>
	<i>(1)</i>	<i>(2)</i>	<i>(3)</i>	<i>(4)</i>	<i>(5)=(3)-(2)</i>
Military and police personnel costs	–	–	–	–	–
Civilian personnel costs	292.2	272.5	248.5	–	(24.0)
Operational costs	51.9	85.1	94.7	–	9.6
<b>Total (net of staff assessment)</b>	<b>344.1</b>	<b>357.6</b>	<b>343.2</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>(14.4)</b>

Table 16  
**Positions**

	<i>Professional and higher categories</i>								<i>General Service and related categories</i>		<i>National staff</i>			<i>Total</i>		
	<i>USG</i>	<i>ASG</i>	<i>D-2</i>	<i>D-1</i>	<i>P-5</i>	<i>P-4</i>	<i>P-3</i>	<i>P-2</i>	<i>Subtotal</i>	<i>Field/ Security Services</i>	<i>General Service<sup>a</sup></i>	<i>Total inter-national</i>	<i>National Professional Officer</i>		<i>Local level</i>	<i>United Nations Volunteers</i>
Approved 2021	1 <sup>b</sup>	–	–	–	–	1	–	–	2	–	1	3	–	–	–	3
Proposed 2022	1 <sup>b</sup>	–	–	–	–	1	–	–	2	–	1	3	–	–	–	3
<b>Change</b>	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–

<sup>a</sup> Other level, unless otherwise stated.

<sup>b</sup> The Under-Secretary-General is on \$1-per-year contract.

123. The proposed resource requirements for 2022 for the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the implementation of Security Council resolution [1559 \(2004\)](#) amount to \$343,200 (net of staff assessment) and provide for salaries and common staff costs (\$248,500) for the continuation of three positions (1 Under-Secretary-General, 1 P-4 and 1 General Service), as well as operational costs (\$94,700), comprising costs for official travel (\$48,300), facilities and infrastructure (\$34,500), ground transportation (\$2,000), communications and information technology (\$8,100) and other supplies, services and equipment (\$1,800).
124. For 2022, it is proposed that the number and level of positions for the Office remain unchanged. A vacancy rate of 5 per cent has been applied to the positions.
125. The decrease in requirements proposed for 2022 compared with the appropriation for 2021 is attributable primarily to the application of a lower percentage of common staff costs to salary costs of 26.9 per cent, compared with 45.7 per cent applied to the 2021 approved budget, based on recent expenditure patterns, partly offset by higher travel requirements to undertake field missions and consultative visits for the implementation of the mandate of the mission.

**Extrabudgetary resources**

126. No extrabudgetary resources were available in 2021 or are projected for 2022.

## 5. United Nations Representative to the Geneva International Discussions

(\$2,082,700)

### Foreword

Over the course of 2022, together with the other two co-chairing organizations, the European Union and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), I am fully dedicated to pursuing our goal of revitalization of the Geneva International Discussions, which I believe will lead us to concrete and sustainable results on substantive issues. For that to happen, full commitment by all participants and contribution in good faith to the revitalization effort are essential. In addition to the joint engagements with all the participants of the Geneva International Discussions, in my capacity as United Nations Representative, I will also continue my bilateral consultations with each participating group and other relevant interlocutors.

In 2020, as in the case of other special political missions, the Office of the United Nations Representative to the Geneva International Discussions was significantly affected by the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic. Consequently, the mission and my two Co-Chair counterparts managed to organize only one round of the Geneva International Discussions, on 10 and 11 December 2020, instead of the planned four.

Due to international travel restrictions starting from March 2020, the Co-Chairs' regular visits to the region to hold face-to-face consultations with the participants of the Geneva International Discussions in their respective cities were affected. Nevertheless, several on-the-ground meetings were undertaken. Together with my European Union and OSCE Co-Chair counterparts, we regularly organized virtual meetings with each group of participants to keep the momentum and exchange information and views, as well as help address arising issues and needs. Efforts to resume the suspended Gali Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism were also hampered by a lack of consensus and by the pandemic. The usual rotational travels of mission team members on assignment have been suspended since March 2020.

Despite the eruption of hostilities in and around Nagorno-Karabakh in autumn 2020 and the heightened tensions in the wider region, the general security situation in Georgia has remained relatively calm and stable, albeit fragile. There has been no resumption of hostilities. However, overall peace and security is adversely affected by continuing instances of "borderization" along both the Abkhazia and South Ossetia administrative boundary lines. Several detentions and cases of imprisonment were registered for so-called "illegal crossings", which were the subject of intensive engagement by the Co-Chairs and continue to remain so.

Despite the above-mentioned challenges, positive developments in terms of cooperation between Georgia and the authorities in control in Abkhazia, Georgia, to jointly tackle COVID-19-related concerns were noted. The most significant was the 26 February 2020 meeting of the Tbilisi and Sukhumi health and security experts in Gali facilitated by the Office. Consequently, on 13 March 2020, the Government of Georgia handed over a first batch of medical and sanitary supplies. The Office coordinated the delivery with the logistical support of the United Nations Resident Coordinator and UNHCR in Georgia. More similar deliveries and expert assistance were provided by the Government of Georgia, with additional support from the United Nations and the international community throughout the year.

As part of efforts to implement a strategy on the women and peace and security agenda in the Geneva International Discussions framework, we organized, together with my Co-Chair counterparts and with support from the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, the Office's first high-level strategy session in November 2020. Due to COVID-19-related restrictions, only one meeting with representatives of women's organizations in Georgia was held in 2020. I will continue to engage in advocacy for gender equality and promoting the role of women in the peace process and peacebuilding.

*(Signed)* Ayşe Cihan **Sultanoğlu**  
United Nations Representative to the Geneva International Discussions

## A. Proposed programme plan for 2022 and programme performance for 2020

### Overall orientation

#### Mandates and background

127. The Office of the United Nations Representative to the Geneva International Discussions is mandated to support the Geneva International Discussions and the Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism under United Nations auspices in Gali, Georgia, by facilitating the participation of the United Nations in the international discussions in Geneva and in the Gali Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism, and by liaising and coordinating with the relevant actors. The mission is also responsible for preparing, convening and facilitating, in consultation with the other Co-Chairs, the sessions of the Geneva International Discussions, as well as the periodic meetings of the Gali Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism.
128. The United Nations has continued to support the Geneva International Discussions on security and stability and the return of internally displaced persons and refugees, which commenced on 15 October 2008 in Geneva in accordance with the six-point agreement of 12 August 2008 and the implementing measures of 8 September 2008, mediated by the French presidency of the European Union, following the hostilities of August 2008 (see [S/2009/254](#)). In its resolution [1866 \(2009\)](#), the Security Council welcomed the beginning of the discussions and requested the Secretary-General, through his Special Representative, to continue to fully support the process. The Secretary-General addressed a letter on this matter to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Georgia on 29 September 2009, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Georgia replied to the Secretary-General on 28 October 2009.
129. Against the background of the “Proposals for joint incident prevention and response mechanisms” agreed to in Geneva on 18 February 2009, the Secretary-General, on 28 September 2009, addressed a letter to the President of the Security Council in which he updated the members of the Council on the progress in the Geneva International Discussions and the convening of the Joint Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism under United Nations auspices in Gali (*ibid.*, paras. 5 and 6). The Secretary-General also stated that, following consultations with the relevant stakeholders, the United Nations would continue to support the Geneva International Discussions and the Mechanism through a limited number of personnel with the task of facilitating the United Nations participation in the international discussions in Geneva and in the Mechanism, and liaising and coordinating with the relevant actors.
130. In a letter dated 28 December 2009 addressed to the President of the Security Council, the Secretary-General noted that, given the important role of the Geneva International Discussions and the Mechanism in stabilizing the situation and building confidence, and in the light of the broad support, including from the main stakeholders, for a continued and effective United Nations engagement beyond 31 December 2009, the United Nations would continue to provide support to the Geneva International Discussions and the work of the Mechanism. In a letter dated 25 February 2010 addressed to the President of the Security Council ([S/2010/103](#)), the Secretary-General conveyed, following consultations, his intention to appoint a United Nations representative responsible for United Nations support to the Geneva International Discussions and the Mechanism. In a letter dated 2 May 2011 ([S/2011/279](#)), the President of the Security Council informed the Secretary-General that the members of the Council had taken note of his intention and of the information contained in his letter of 25 February 2010. In a letter dated 2 July 2018 addressed to the President of the Security Council ([S/2018/665](#)), the Secretary-General conveyed, following consultations, his intention to appoint Ayşe Cihan Sultanoğlu as the United Nations Representative. In a letter dated 5 July 2018 ([S/2018/666](#)), the President of the Security Council informed the Secretary-General that the members of the Council had taken note of the intention expressed in his letter of 2 July 2018.

## Programme of work

### Objective

131. The objective, to which this mission contributes, is to advance the main agenda items of the Geneva International Discussions, including the non-use of force/international security arrangements and addressing the issue of internally displaced persons and refugees, in the context of the Discussions and the Gali Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism.

### Strategy

132. To contribute to the objective, the mission, in close partnership with the offices of the other Co-Chairs, will continue to step up efforts to support the revitalization of the Geneva International Discussions and the resumption of the regular meetings of the Mechanism as results-oriented platforms for dialogue and conflict prevention, which is expected to result in contributing to the ultimate goal of transitioning the Discussions from a conflict management to a conflict transformation and resolution process. Emphasis will be placed on addressing and making progress on central issues, including the non-use of force/international security arrangements and internally displaced persons and refugees.
133. The mission plans to support Member States on issues related to COVID-19 by facilitating relevant discussions with a view towards facilitation of humanitarian action in the context of the Geneva International Discussions and the Gali Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism that would be beneficial for the participants. The main challenge for the mission in 2020 was the inability to resume the regular meetings of the Discussions due to COVID-19-related circumstances. Only one round was held in December 2020. Another continuing challenge is the need for resumption of the Gali Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism. The Co-Chairs presented a new initiative to establish a safe and secure environment along the administrative boundary lines with the aim of improving human security and ensuring the safe and unhindered mobility of the local population. All participants are engaged in how to advance these topics in the Discussions.
134. The above-mentioned work is expected to result in:
- (a) Contributing to the ultimate goal of transitioning the Discussions from a conflict management to a conflict transformation and resolution process;
  - (b) Addressing and making progress on central issues, including the non-use of force/international security arrangements and internally displaced persons and refugees.
135. The planned support on issues related to COVID-19 is expected to result in facilitating discussions among the participants and United Nations agencies and programmes and delivery of sanitary and medical supplies and equipment to Abkhazia. With respect to the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia, Georgia, the Mission will continue engaging intensively with the authorities in control in Tskhinvali regarding the availability of international humanitarian assistance, as in the case of Sukhumi.

### External factors for 2022

136. With regard to the external factors, the overall plan for 2022 is based on the following planning assumptions:
- (a) All stakeholders will continue to support the International Discussions in Geneva and the Gali Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism and the continued engagement of the United Nations;
  - (b) All relevant stakeholders and participants in the Geneva International Discussions will continue to support efforts to help to revitalize the Discussions and enhance their effectiveness;

- (c) The three organizations that serve as Co-Chairs will continue to collaborate closely to fulfil the mandate of the Discussions.
137. With regard to the COVID-19 pandemic, the proposed programme plan is based on the assumption that the proposed deliverables and activities for 2022 will be feasible to implement. However, if the pandemic were to continue to have an impact on the planned deliverables and activities, they would be adjusted during 2022 within the scope of the overall objectives, strategies and mandates. Any such adjustments would be reported as part of the programme performance information.
138. The mission integrates a gender perspective in its operational activities, deliverables and results, as appropriate. In close cooperation with the United Nations country team, the mission continues to engage in advocacy for gender equality and promoting the participation of women in the peace process as well as their direct involvement in development programmes. In close cooperation with the other Co-Chairs and their focal points on women and peace and security, the mission will continue to promote the role of women in conflict resolution and peacebuilding and work closely with the respective headquarters of the other Co-Chairs for that purpose and in the framework of the Co-Chairs' joint strategy and action plan adopted in 2019.
139. In line with the United Nations Disability Inclusion Strategy, the mission will be guided by the relevant measures adopted by the United Nations Office at Geneva, which provides facilities in which the mission operates.
140. With regard to cooperation with other entities, the mission adopts a proactive approach to ensure close and regular coordination and information-sharing with the European Union and OSCE Co-Chairs and their teams. The mission will also continue to maintain close contact with the European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia and OSCE, which jointly chair the Ergneti Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism. In addition, the mission will continue to pursue contacts with international non-governmental organizations and think tanks in the fields of conflict resolution, mediation and women and peace and security.
141. With regard to inter-agency coordination and liaison, the mission will continue to cooperate closely with the United Nations system agencies, funds and programmes, such as the United Nations Resident Coordinator Office in Georgia, UNHCR, UNDP, the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN-Women) and OHCHR, and other actors, so as to coordinate and strengthen the role and contribution of the United Nations within the framework of the Geneva International Discussions and the Gali Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism.

### **Evaluation activities**

142. The Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs will lead a systematic assessment with the overall purpose of improving the gender sensitivity of the political analyses developed by the Department and the special political missions. Self-evaluation of the mission's strategic and operational approaches is planned for 2022.

### **Programme performance in 2020**

#### **Revitalizing the Geneva International Discussions to achieve practical results<sup>5</sup>**

143. The mission continued its active work towards revitalizing the Geneva International Discussions. Despite the impact of COVID-19 during 2020, which hampered the implementation of the planned schedule of the in-person rounds of the Discussions, the mission engaged closely with other Co-Chairs and all participants virtually. The mission has substantively increased the number of regular senior-level and working-level virtual interactions with all participants to maintain the platform for dialogue and continue enabling results-oriented discussions in a regular and

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<sup>5</sup> As reflected in the proposed programme budget for 2020 (A/74/6 (Sect. 3)/Add.2).

uninterrupted manner. The mission also continued to work on a strategic approach to the information sessions that would aim at sharing international practices and lessons learned, with a view to helping to make greater progress on the core issues of the agenda. Regrettably, no information sessions were held in 2020 due to the pandemic conditions.

144. With respect to the non-use of force, the mission continued to work proactively with the other two co-chairing organizations and respective participants to find a solution to ease and eventually resolve the tensions, by proposing to create a safe and secure environment in an area which could serve as a model for addressing possible similar issues in the future.
145. With respect to the agenda item related to internally displaced persons and refugees, the United Nations Representative, with the other Co-Chairs and Co-Moderators of Working Group II (on humanitarian matters), actively engaged in urging and advocating to all participants to reach consensus in addressing this important mandate of the Geneva International Discussions.
146. Furthermore, the United Nations Representative and her team continued their intensive efforts to restart the work of the Gali Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism without further delay. However, due to the COVID-19 restrictions, and lack of consensus, the meetings have not resumed. Ensuring unconditional restoration of the Mechanism and its regular, unimpeded work, with observance of the founding principles and ground rules, remained a priority.

*Progress towards the attainment of the objective, and performance measure*

147. The above-mentioned work contributed to maintaining dialogue with the participants of the Geneva International Discussions, which did not meet the planned target of greater progress achieved on the substantive issues of the Discussions agenda, such as reaching an agreement on the non-use of force/international security arrangements, improving the lives of internally displaced persons and facilitating greater freedom of movement across the dividing lines, as reflected in the proposed programme budget for 2020. Due to the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and persisting significant differences among the participants on the substantive issues of the Discussions agenda, the non-use of force/international security arrangements and the return of internally displaced persons and refugees, no substantial progress has been achieved. The pandemic has also significantly affected freedom of movement of the local population due to the closure of crossing points along the Abkhazia administrative boundary line since February 2020. However, the authorities in control in Abkhazia opened humanitarian corridors six times between February and December 2020. Unfortunately, despite the Co-Chairs' efforts, the authorities in control in South Ossetia have refused to follow the example of Abkhazia and have kept the crossing points closed since September 2019, including for medical cases. Despite difficulties, the Co-Chairs managed to convene one round of the Discussions and provide a platform for the participants to maintain dialogue in the Discussions process (see table 17).

Table 17  
**Performance measure**

<i>2018 (actual)</i>	<i>2019 (actual)</i>	<i>2020 (actual)</i>
Continued engagement of the participants and progress on the key agenda issues in Working Groups I and II of the Geneva International Discussions	More result-oriented discussions on the substantive Geneva International Discussions issues, such as the non-use of force/ international security arrangements and the issues related to internally displaced persons and refugees, including with the support of the dedicated expert-level information sessions	No progress was made on substantive agenda items. One round of the Geneva International Discussions was held

**Impact of COVID-19 on programme delivery**

148. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic-related restrictions during 2020, the United Nations Representative, in cooperation with the other two Co-Chairs and in consultation with the participants, had to postpone the fifty-first round of the Geneva International Discussions three times during the period between March and November. As a result, the first and only round of the Discussions in 2020 were held on 10 and 11 December 2020. The meetings of the Gali Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism were also not held in 2020. Furthermore, due to the postponement of the official rounds of the Discussions, the mission also had to limit pre-round consultations to three on-the-ground meetings in Tbilisi, two in Moscow, two in Sukhumi and one in Tskhinvali throughout the year.
149. At the same time, the mission, together with the other two Co-Chairs' teams, modified its activities to support the participants, including on issues related to COVID-19, within the overall scope of its objectives, namely, by holding regular virtual bilateral meetings with all participants and discussing most relevant issues, including the response to COVID-19, the security situation and humanitarian issues on the ground. Regular virtual meetings were also held with the United Nations country team in Georgia and the European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia.

**Planned result for 2022****Revitalizing the Geneva International Discussions to achieve practical results**

150. In 2020, notwithstanding strong commitments by all participants to help to preserve and revitalize the Geneva International Discussions and due to the impact of COVID-19-related restrictions, the process was unable to produce tangible progress on the key issues on the agenda of the Discussions that could become the basis for transforming the conflict dynamics and moving from conflict management to eventually conflict resolution. In 2022, the mission and the two other co-chairing organizations, the European Union and OSCE, will continue to engage with the participants to help revitalize the Discussions process and achieve tangible results.
151. To date, the Co-Chairs of the Geneva International Discussions have convened 51 rounds of discussions. In the past 12 years, the security situation on the ground has remained relatively calm and stable, albeit fragile, without a resumption of hostilities. This continues to underline the contribution of the Discussions to overall peace and security. However, overall peace and security has been adversely affected by continued instances of "borderization" along both the Abkhazia and South Ossetia administrative boundary lines. In 2020, the mission continued to work on de-escalating tensions along the Abkhazia administrative boundary line, related mainly to detentions for so-called "illegal crossings", and the facilitation of the release of the detained and imprisoned Georgian nationals, as appropriate. The mission also continued its intensive engagement with the authorities in control in Abkhazia to lift the crossing restrictions imposed in February 2020. The mission worked closely with the relevant participants and the United Nations country team in Georgia to facilitate the delivery of sanitary and medical supplies and equipment to Abkhazia.
152. In 2022, the mission, together with its partners, will continue to closely engage with the relevant participants to encourage them to participate constructively in the Discussions and to jointly address any security concerns within the framework of the Incident Prevention and Response Mechanisms. The Co-Chairs will continue working with the respective participants to find a solution to ease and eventually resolve the tensions, by creating a safe and secure environment in the area which could serve as a model for addressing possible similar issues in the future.
153. In 2022, the mission will continue to make every effort to work with the participants to ensure the resumption of the meetings of the Mechanism. The mission will facilitate direct engagement between the relevant participants with a view to avoiding disruptions of the meetings and closure of the crossing points.
154. In 2022, together with the European Union and OSCE, the mission will continue to work with the participants to organize and facilitate four rounds of the Geneva International Discussions and information sessions related to security and humanitarian issues.

155. Furthermore, in coordination with the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, in accordance with Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) and subsequent relevant resolutions, and in keeping with the Department's policy on women and peace and security, the mission will continue to revitalize the ongoing Discussions by raising awareness of gender and issues related to women and peace and security during the rounds of the Discussions. In November 2020, with the participation of the other two Co-Chairs and the respective departments of the co-chairing organizations, and with the support of the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, the mission organized a virtual high-level strategy session to discuss further steps in the implementation of the Co-Chairs' joint strategy and action plan on the women and peace and security agenda in the Geneva International Discussions and beyond. In 2022, the mission will continue its work on the implementation of this strategy as per the agreed priorities. In addition, the mission, with the support of the Department and the co-chairing organizations, will undertake a gendered analysis of the conflict in 2021, the results of which will be used in 2022 for the work of the Discussions going forward.
156. The planned support on issues related to COVID-19 is expected to result in the facilitation of the continuation of provision of the most-needed sanitary and medical supplies and equipment to Abkhazia to help prevent and mitigate the consequences of the pandemic.

*Lessons learned and planned change*

157. The lesson for the mission was the need to adapt to a different mode of engagement (virtual) with the participants of the Geneva International Discussions. While the mission staff was able to work efficiently under alternate arrangements in the face of the pandemic, the effectiveness of engagement with the local actors was sometimes reduced due to the lack of face-to-face meetings. In applying the lesson, the mission will continue the use of virtual and alternate methods, while also increasing bilateral engagement with the participants of the Discussions, especially with the participants of the Gali Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism.

*Expected progress towards the attainment of the objective, and performance measure*

158. This work is expected to contribute to the objective, as demonstrated by progress towards the reaching of an agreement on substantive issues and the facilitation of greater freedom of movement across the dividing lines (see table 18).

Table 18  
Performance measure

2018 (actual)	2019 (actual)	2020 (actual)	2021 (planned)	2022 (planned)
Continued engagement of the participants and progress on the key agenda issues in both Working Groups I and II of the Geneva International Discussions	More results-oriented discussions on the substantive Geneva International Discussions issues, such as the non-use of force/international security arrangements and the issues related to internally displaced persons and refugees, including with the support of dedicated expert-level information sessions	No progress was made on substantive agenda items. One round of the Geneva International Discussions was held	Greater progress achieved by the stakeholders on the substantive issues of the Geneva International Discussions agenda and in the work of the Gali Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism to promote peace and stability on the ground	Greater progress achieved by the stakeholders on the substantive issues of the Geneva International Discussions agenda and in the work of the Gali Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism to promote peace and stability on the ground

## Deliverables

159. Table 19 lists all deliverables, by category and subcategory, for the period 2020–2022 that contributed and are expected to contribute to the attainment of the objective stated above.

Table 19

### Deliverables for the period 2020–2022, by category and subcategory

<i>Category and subcategory</i>	<i>2020 planned</i>	<i>2020 actual</i>	<i>2021 planned</i>	<i>2022 planned</i>
<b>A. Facilitation of the intergovernmental process and expert bodies</b>				
<b>Substantive services for meetings</b> (number of three-hour meetings)	<b>16</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>16</b>
1. Rounds of the Geneva International Discussions	4	1	4	4
2. Meetings of the Gali Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism	12	–	12	12
<b>B. Generation and transfer of knowledge</b>				
<b>Technical materials</b> (number of materials)	<b>2</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>2</b>
3. Thematic non-papers prepared by the Co-Chairs on non-use of force, freedom of movement, internally displaced persons and other issues related to the Geneva International Discussions agenda	2	–	2	2
<b>C. Substantive deliverables</b>				
<b>Consultation, advice and advocacy:</b> consultations on thematic issues on the Geneva International Discussions agenda related to peace and security and humanitarian issues; advice through information sessions on specific thematic issues on the agenda for participants in the Geneva International Discussions; and advocacy through information sessions on areas of interest to the participants related to the Geneva International Discussions agenda.				
<b>D. Communication deliverables</b>				
<b>External and media relations:</b> press communiqué of the Co-Chairs after each round of the Geneva International Discussions; and press releases and summary conclusions of the Chair after each meeting of the Gali Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism.				

## B. Proposed post and non-post resource requirements for 2022

### Resource requirements (regular budget)

Table 20

#### Financial resources

(Thousands of United States dollars)

<i>Category of expenditure</i>	<i>2020</i>	<i>2021</i>	<i>2022</i>		<i>Variance</i>
	<i>Expenditure</i>	<i>Appropriation</i>	<i>Total requirements</i>	<i>Non-recurrent requirements</i>	<i>2022 vs. 2021 Increase/(decrease)</i>
<i>Category of expenditure</i>	<i>(1)</i>	<i>(2)</i>	<i>(3)</i>	<i>(4)</i>	<i>(5)=(3)-(2)</i>
Military and police personnel costs	–	–	–	–	–
Civilian personnel costs	1 467.0	1 418.9	1 583.2	–	164.3
Operational costs	171.8	437.3	499.5	–	62.2
<b>Total (net of staff assessment)</b>	<b>1 638.8</b>	<b>1 856.2</b>	<b>2 082.7</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>226.5</b>

Table 21  
Positions

	<i>Professional and higher categories</i>								<i>General Service and related categories</i>			<i>National staff</i>			<i>Total</i>	
	<i>USG</i>	<i>ASG</i>	<i>D-2</i>	<i>D-1</i>	<i>P-5</i>	<i>P-4</i>	<i>P-3</i>	<i>P-2</i>	<i>Subtotal</i>	<i>Field/ Security</i>		<i>Total inter-national</i>	<i>National Professional Officer</i>	<i>Local level</i>		<i>United Nations Volunteers</i>
										<i>Services</i>	<i>Service<sup>a</sup></i>					
Approved 2021	–	1	–	–	1	2	2	–	6	–	1	7	–	–	–	7
Proposed 2022	–	1	–	–	1	2	2	–	6	–	1	7	–	–	–	7
<b>Change</b>	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–

<sup>a</sup> Other level, unless otherwise stated.

160. The proposed resource requirements for 2022 for the Office of the United Nations Representative to the Geneva International Discussions amount to \$2,082,700 (net of staff assessment) and would provide for the salaries and common staff costs (\$1,583,200) for the continuation of six positions based in Geneva (1 Assistant Secretary-General, 1 P-5, 2 P-4, 1 P-3 and 1 General Service) and one position based in Zugdidi, Georgia (P-3), as well as for operational costs (\$499,500), comprising costs for consultants and consulting services (\$8,900), official travel (\$246,700), facilities and infrastructure (\$127,700), ground transportation (\$23,400), communications and information technology (\$47,800) and other supplies, services and equipment (\$45,000).
161. For 2022, it is proposed that the number and levels of the positions for the Office of the United Nations Representative to the Geneva International Discussions remain unchanged. The resource requirements are based on the assumption of full incumbency of the positions, based on the actual average vacancy rate in 2020.
162. The increase in the requirements proposed for 2022 compared with the appropriation for 2021 is attributable mainly to: (a) increased requirements under civilian personnel costs, resulting from the assumption of full incumbency of the positions compared with the 5 per cent vacancy rate applied in 2021, based on the actual average vacancy rate in 2020; (b) increased requirements for the rental of premises and maintenance services attributable to estimated higher rates charged by the outside venues due to the renovation of the Palais des Nations at the United Nations Office at Geneva; (c) higher requirements for communications and information technology equipment to replace seven laptops that exceeded their life expectancy and higher requirements for telecommunications and network services with respect to fixed telephone lines and cellular services; and (d) higher requirements for translation and interpretation services and catering services provided by external vendors due to the renovation of the Palais des Nations under other supplies, services and equipment.

#### **Extrabudgetary resources**

163. No extrabudgetary resources were available in 2021 or are projected for 2022.



## 6. Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria

(*\$16,423,300*)

### Foreword

As the Syrian people face the year 2021, a decade of conflict has seen them experience indiscriminate death, destruction, detention, torture, terror, indignities, division and destitution on a massive scale – and now the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic and economic collapse brought about by war economies, corruption, mismanagement and external factors. Today, millions inside the country and the millions of refugees outside are grappling with deep trauma, grinding poverty, personal insecurity and a lack of hope for the future.

Against these hard realities, the imperative of charting a path towards a credible and inclusive political process to ensure the full implementation of Security Council resolution [2254 \(2015\)](#) remains as urgent as ever.

Throughout the past year, I have advocated for immediate and unhindered humanitarian access; urged meaningful progress on detainees, abductees and the missing; and explored the feasibility of a more constructive form of international action on the Syrian Arab Republic. In these efforts, engaging Syrian civil society holds special significance to me and I am deeply grateful to the wide range of Syrian women and men, including the Syrian Women’s Advisory Board and the participants in the Civil Society Support Room, who have offered their advice and insight.

The onset of the COVID-19 pandemic prevented us from convening sessions of the Constitutional Committee in Geneva for several months. Nevertheless, despite the restrictions the pandemic imposed, we were able to hold several sessions in the latter half of 2020, implementing strict protocols that ensured the safety of our staff and delegates. With the operational challenges successfully addressed, it will be critical for the Committee to finally start to work expeditiously to produce results and continued progress, in line with Security Council resolution [2254 \(2015\)](#).

Looking ahead, my actions as Special Envoy will be guided by the conviction that the political process mandated by Security Council resolution [2254 \(2015\)](#) remains the only viable and internationally accepted path to end the conflict and enable the Syrian people to independently and democratically determine their own future. In pursuit of advancing this, our focus will go beyond the constitutional track to the establishment of credible, inclusive and non-sectarian governance, as well as free and fair elections, administered under United Nations supervision. I am confident that we should be able to move on these priorities together and I count on the continued support of Member States as we strive to forge, at long last, a durable political solution that meets the legitimate aspirations of the Syrian people for dignity, freedom and justice based on the principles of equality and non-discrimination.

*(Signed)* Geir O. Pedersen  
Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria

## A. Proposed programme plan for 2022 and programme performance for 2020

### Overall orientation

#### Mandates and background

164. On 16 February 2012, the General Assembly, in its resolution [66/253 A](#), requested the Secretary-General and all relevant United Nations bodies to support the efforts of the League of Arab States aimed at promoting a peaceful solution to the conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic, including through the appointment of a special envoy.
165. The Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria is responsible for facilitating an inclusive, comprehensive and credible Syrian-owned and Syrian-led political solution to the conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic that will meet the legitimate aspirations of the Syrian people for dignity, freedom and justice based on the principles of equality and non-discrimination. The mandate derives from the priorities established by Security Council resolutions [2118 \(2013\)](#), [2254 \(2015\)](#), [2268 \(2016\)](#) and [2336 \(2016\)](#), as well as General Assembly resolution [66/253 A](#).
166. The conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic, now entering its eleventh year, has caused enormous humanitarian suffering, a record number of refugees and internally displaced persons and vast destruction in the country. Amidst the continued presence of five foreign armies in the Syrian Arab Republic, the conflict continues to pose significant risks to regional and international security. Accordingly, it is critical to continue to work towards an inclusive, credible and comprehensive political solution to the conflict that sees the full implementation of Security Council resolution [2254 \(2015\)](#).

### Programme of work

#### Objective

167. The objective, to which the Office contributes, is to advance the full implementation of all the relevant General Assembly and Security Council resolutions, including Assembly resolution [66/253 A](#) and Council resolutions [2118 \(2013\)](#), [2254 \(2015\)](#), [2268 \(2016\)](#) and [2336 \(2016\)](#), towards an inclusive, credible, comprehensive Syrian-owned and Syrian-led political solution to the conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic that meets the legitimate aspirations of the Syrian people for dignity, freedom and justice, based on the principles of equality and non-discrimination and with the full and meaningful participation of women.

#### Strategy

168. To contribute to the objective, the Office will continue to engage with national, regional and international stakeholders; deepen the discourse with the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic and the opposition; intensify efforts on the issue of detainees, abductees and missing persons; and work to create the conditions for a safe, calm and neutral environment conducive to advancing an inclusive, comprehensive and credible political settlement of the Syrian conflict in line with Security Council resolution [2254 \(2015\)](#).
169. The Office will to that end focus on improving international cooperation to help international parties deepen their own dialogue in new formats towards the common purpose of a sustainable political settlement of the Syrian conflict that can enjoy international legitimacy and encompass all elements of Security Council resolution [2254 \(2015\)](#). The Office will continue to convene and facilitate the work of the Constitutional Committee to catalyse a wider positive dynamic to progress the political

process, including working to create the conditions for inclusive, free and fair elections administered under United Nations supervision.

170. The above-mentioned work is expected to result in:
- (a) Sustained, regular and substantive negotiations and discussions among relevant stakeholders on all issues outlined in Security Council resolution [2254 \(2015\)](#);
  - (b) Enhanced trust and confidence among the parties;
  - (c) Strengthened international consensus to advance the political process across all elements of resolution [2254 \(2015\)](#), notably the establishment of credible, inclusive and non-sectarian governance, and the setting of a schedule and process for drafting a new constitution, as well as free and fair elections, pursuant to the new constitution, to be administered under United Nations supervision and to the highest international standards of transparency and accountability, with all Syrians, including members of the diaspora, eligible to participate.

### **External factors for 2022**

171. With regard to the external factors, the overall plan for 2022 is based on the following planning assumptions:
- (a) All national, regional and international stakeholders will cooperate with the Special Envoy;
  - (b) International consensus with regard to the Syrian Arab Republic will continue to be difficult to achieve and sustain;
  - (c) The security situation will remain volatile in 2022, posing a threat to regional and international peace and security;
  - (d) The conflict will continue to severely affect civilians, especially women and children, risking high levels of civilian casualties and other human rights violations. Lack of accountability for grave human rights violations will hamper genuine reconciliation among the parties.
172. With regard to the COVID-19 pandemic, the proposed programme plan is based on the assumption that the proposed deliverables and activities for 2022 will be feasible to implement. However, if the pandemic were to continue to have an impact on the planned deliverables and activities, they would be adjusted during 2022 within the scope of the overall objectives, strategies and mandates. Any such adjustments would be reported as part of the programme performance information.
173. The Office integrates a gender perspective in its operational activities, deliverables and results, as appropriate. The Office will continue to ensure the full and meaningful participation of women throughout all stages of the political process, in line with Security Council resolutions [1325 \(2000\)](#) and [2254 \(2015\)](#). The Office will continue to regularly consult with the Syrian Women's Advisory Board and diverse representatives of women's civil society groups and hear their perspectives on a sustainable and inclusive political solution.
174. In line with the United Nations Disability Inclusion Strategy, the mission will review and specifically examine the Strategy with a view to further advancing disability inclusion, and will include mitigating measures to overcome any challenges while operationalizing disability inclusion.
175. With regard to cooperation with other entities, in line with its mandate, the Office will continue to partner with the international community and international non-governmental organizations to facilitate and support the work of the Civil Society Support Room and the Syrian Women's Advisory Board. The Office will also continue to liaise with specialized international organizations (e.g. the International Committee of the Red Cross) in the context of its work on the file of detainees, abductees and missing persons.
176. With regard to inter-agency coordination and liaison, cooperation will continue with the Resident Coordinators and the agencies, funds and programmes of the United Nations operating in the Syrian

Arab Republic and the region, including through the Office's presence in Damascus. In addition, United Nations system entities working in the Syrian Arab Republic are represented on the Inter-Agency Task Force, which ensures the coordination and coherence of United Nations political, humanitarian, human rights and other efforts in the country.

### **Evaluation activities**

177. The Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs will lead a systematic assessment with the overall purpose of improving the gender sensitivity of the political analyses developed by the Department and the special political missions.

### **Programme performance in 2020**

#### **Advancement of the implementation of the road map as outlined for advancing the political process in the Syrian Arab Republic<sup>6</sup>**

178. The Special Envoy carried out the good offices of the Secretary-General to advance towards the full implementation of Security Council resolution 2254 (2015). He prioritized engaging the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic and the opposition in substantive negotiations. He also consulted broadly with national, regional and international stakeholders to end the violence and create the conditions for an inclusive, credible and comprehensive political solution and regularly convened the Task Force on the Ceasefire of the International Syria Support Group.
179. The Special Envoy also expended great efforts towards regularly convening the Constitutional Committee facilitated by the United Nations, despite prolonged restrictions and uncertainty in response to the COVID-19 pandemic around international travel and health risks to Constitutional Committee members and United Nations staff preventing physical meetings. Furthermore, the Special Envoy advocated for progress on full, safe and unhindered humanitarian access and regularly convened the Task Force on Humanitarian Access of the International Syria Support Group. He emphasized the issue of detainees, abductees and missing persons, and urged relevant parties to pursue meaningful action at scale.
180. The Special Envoy continued to engage with Syrian women's representatives. Throughout 2020, the Office held regular meetings with the Syrian Women's Advisory Board and other civil society groups to ensure inclusivity and gender mainstreaming in the political process.

#### *Progress towards the attainment of the objective, and performance measure*

181. The above-mentioned work contributed to the advancement of the full implementation of all relevant General Assembly and Security Council resolutions, which met the planned target of (a) progress towards an inclusive political process in a safe, calm and neutral environment; (b) progress towards the cessation of violence and improved access for humanitarian assistance; (c) progress towards improvement of the human rights situation; and (d) deep engagement by members of Syrian civil society, including women representatives, through the Civil Society Support Room and the Syrian Women's Advisory Board in the broader political process, as reflected in the proposed programme budget for 2020 (see table 22).

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<sup>6</sup> As reflected in the proposed programme budget for 2020 (A/74/6 (Sect. 3)/Add.2).

Table 22  
Performance measure

2018 (actual)	2019 (actual)	2020 (actual)
International consensus regarding a new constitution, in accordance with Security Council resolution <a href="#">2254 (2015)</a> , as a door-opener to a broader political process	Composition of the Constitutional Committee and its terms of reference and core rules of procedure negotiated and agreed, followed by its launch in Geneva	Constitutional Committee meetings in Geneva, in tandem with international engagements on other elements of the political process, as per resolution <a href="#">2254 (2015)</a> , to improve conditions on the ground, build trust and confidence and open a path to credible negotiations

### Impact of COVID-19 on programme delivery

182. During 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic had an impact on the planned deliverables and activities of the Office. The impact included a change in the mode of the Special Envoy's engagement with key stakeholders from in-person to virtual. The Office also had to cancel sessions of the Constitutional Committee in the first half of 2020, and later implemented strict physical distancing, and security and hygiene protocols, to ensure the safety of staff and delegates during in-person sessions in Geneva. These changes had an impact on the programme performance in 2020.
183. At the same time, however, the mission identified modified activities during 2020, within the overall scope of its programme objectives, namely utilizing new information technology solutions to enable regular substantive consultations with members of the Civil Society Support Room and the Women's Advisory Board, as well as meetings of the Task Force on the Ceasefire and the Task Force on Humanitarian Access.

### Planned result for 2022

#### Establishing and advancing a credible inclusive and comprehensive political process to advance on all elements of Security Council resolution [2254 \(2015\)](#)

184. The Office has been working along several paths to make progress towards establishing an inclusive, credible and comprehensive political process that provides for a political transition intended to effectively address the legitimate aspirations and concerns of the Syrian people for dignity, freedom and justice based on the principles of equality and non-discrimination.

#### *Lessons learned and planned change*

185. One of the lessons learned was the requirement to better adjust the internal mechanisms and processes in the light of the progress and new responsibilities vis-à-vis the Constitutional Committee. In applying the lesson, the Office will strengthen its internal mechanisms to appropriately support the Committee in the preparation, execution and follow-up of its meetings.

#### *Expected progress towards the attainment of the objective, and performance measure*

186. This work is expected to contribute to the objective, as demonstrated by (a) sustained, regular and substantive discussions between relevant stakeholders producing tangible results, including in the Constitutional Committee; (b) meaningful progress towards the cessation of violence; (c) progress on the release of detainees, abductees and information on missing persons; (d) continued advocacy with all key stakeholders for improved access for humanitarian assistance to people most in need; (e) progress and advocacy towards an improvement in the human rights situation across the country; and (f) deep engagement with members of Syrian civil society, including women representatives,

through the Civil Society Support Room and the Syrian Women's Advisory Board in the broader political process (see table 23).

Table 23  
Performance measure

2018 (actual)	2019 (actual)	2020 (actual)	2021 (planned)	2022 (planned)
International consensus regarding a schedule and process for the drafting of a new constitution, in accordance with resolution 2254 (2015), as a door-opener to a broader political process	Constitutional Committee launched in Geneva, facilitated by the United Nations, and discussions held on other elements of the political process	Continuation of the work of the Constitutional Committee in tandem with progress on the broader political process as per Security Council resolution 2254 (2015)	Constitutional Committee makes progress in its discussions, based on its terms of reference, including by finding agreement on specific provisions and principles, which would also help with making progress on the broader political process as per Security Council resolution 2254 (2015)	Constitutional Committee produces tangible results in tandem with sustained and substantive negotiations between the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic and the opposition to advance the full implementation of Security Council resolution 2254 (2015)

## Deliverables

187. Table 24 below lists all deliverables, by category and subcategory, for the period 2020–2022 that contributed and are expected to contribute to the attainment of the objective stated above.

Table 24  
Deliverables for the period 2020–2022, by category and subcategory

Category and subcategory	2020 planned	2020 actual	2021 planned	2022 planned
<b>A. Facilitation of the intergovernmental process and expert bodies</b>				
<b>Substantive services for meetings</b> (number of three-hour meetings)	<b>148</b>	<b>48</b>	<b>160</b>	<b>160</b>
1. Meetings of the Security Council	12	13	12	12
2. Meetings of the Task Force on the Ceasefire of the International Syria Support Group	26	3	12	12
3. Meetings of the Task Force on Humanitarian Access of the International Syria Support Group	26	16	24	24
4. Meetings of the large body of the Constitutional Committee	9 <sup>a</sup>	–	12	12
5. Meetings of the small body of the Constitutional Committee	75 <sup>a</sup>	16	100	100
<b>B. Generation and transfer of knowledge</b>				
<b>Seminars, workshops and training events</b> (number of days)	<b>8</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>8</b>
6. Workshops for all Syrian stakeholders on topics relating to the peace talks, such as governance, the constitution, elections, security governance/counter-terrorism and confidence-building measures	8	13	8	8

Category and subcategory	2020 planned	2020 actual	2021 planned	2022 planned
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**C. Substantive deliverables**

**Good offices:** provision of good offices to facilitate an inclusive Syrian-led and Syrian-owned political solution to the Syrian conflict, which will meet the legitimate aspirations of the Syrian people for dignity, freedom and justice based on the principles of equality and non-discrimination.

**Consultation, advice and advocacy:** consultation, advice and advocacy in support of the political process with Member States, regional and international organizations; consultations and advice as a member of the Working Group on the release of detainees/abductees, the handover of bodies and the identification of missing persons; consultations in support of the political process with representatives of civil society organizations; consultations in support of the political process with women's representatives and women's organizations.

**D. Communication deliverables**

**External and media relations:** press statements, interviews, video messages and briefings stressing the importance of political dialogue, the end of violence and human rights violations, humanitarian access and the role of women in the peace process.

<sup>a</sup> The deliverables for meetings of the large body and small body of the Constitutional Committee were not included in the proposed programme budget for 2020, as the budget had been prepared prior to the agreement between the Syrian parties on the terms of reference and the composition of the Constitutional Committee.

**B. Proposed post and non-post resource requirements for 2022****Resource requirements (regular budget)**

Table 25

**Financial resources**

(Thousands of United States dollars)

Category of expenditure	2020	2021	2022		Variance
	Expenditure	Appropriation	Total requirements	Non-recurrent requirements	2022 vs. 2021 Increase/(decrease)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)=(3)-(2)
Military and police personnel costs	–	–	–	–	–
Civilian personnel costs	8 692.7	9 244.8	9 157.8	–	(87.0)
Operational costs	6 382.7	6 942.7	7 265.5	–	322.8
<b>Total (net of staff assessment)</b>	<b>15 075.4</b>	<b>16 187.5</b>	<b>16 423.3</b>	–	<b>235.8</b>

Table 26

**Positions**

	Professional and higher categories								General Service and related categories			National staff				Total
	USG	ASG	D-2	D-1	P-5	P-4	P-3	P-2	Subtotal	Field/ Security Services	General Service <sup>a</sup>	Total inter-national	National Professional Officer	Local level	United Nations Volunteers	
Approved 2021	1	1	1	3	8	14	14	–	42	10	8	60	–	31	–	91
Proposed 2022	1	1	1	3	8	14	14	–	42	10	8	60	–	31	–	91
<b>Change</b>	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–

<sup>a</sup> Other level, unless otherwise stated.

188. The proposed resource requirements for 2022 for the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria amount to \$16,423,300 (net of staff assessment) and would provide for salaries and common staff costs (\$9,157,800) for the continuation of 91 positions (1 Under-Secretary-General, 1 Assistant Secretary-General, 1 D-2, 3 D-1, 8 P-5, 14 P-4, 14 P-3, 10 Field Service, 8 General Service and 31 Local level), as well as operational costs (\$7,265,500), comprising costs for consultants and consulting services (\$158,400), official travel (\$1,343,100), facilities and infrastructure (\$3,670,800), ground transportation (\$374,500), communications and information technology (\$395,800), medical (\$11,900) and other supplies, services and equipment (\$1,311,000).
189. For 2022, it is proposed that the number and levels of the positions for the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria remain unchanged.
190. A vacancy rate of 27.6 per cent has been applied to estimates for international positions based on the average vacancy rate in 2020. Resource requirements for national positions were estimated on the assumption of full incumbency.
191. The increase in the requirements proposed for 2022 compared with the appropriation for 2021 is attributable mainly to additional requirements under other supplies, services and equipment for meeting and conference services related to the Constitutional Committee, partly offset by lower requirements under civilian personnel costs owing to the application of the revised salary scales for national positions.

**Extrabudgetary resources**

192. In 2021, extrabudgetary resources in the estimated amount of \$800,000 are planned to provide for four positions of Political Affairs Officer (3 P-4 and 1 P-3) providing backstopping at Headquarters in New York, as well as for post-agreement planning activities.
193. For 2022, extrabudgetary resources in the estimated amount of \$900,000 would provide for the continuation of four positions of Political Affairs Officer (3 P-4 and 1 P-3) and activities related to the implementation of Security Council resolution [2254 \(2015\)](#).
194. Extrabudgetary resources in the estimated amount of \$3,000,000 were available in 2021 to support the Office of the Special Envoy in its role of facilitating the Constitutional Committee through the provision of substantive, logistical, security and support arrangements, including liaison with interlocutors of the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic and the opposition, civil society and regional and international interlocutors, and outreach to women's groups and Syrian civil society, as well as other activities. For 2022, extrabudgetary resources in the estimated amount of \$500,000 will be available to support the Office of the Special Envoy in its role of facilitating the Constitutional Committee.

## 7. Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Horn of Africa

(\$1,776,700)

### Foreword

The establishment of the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Horn of Africa in 2018 was largely driven by dynamic changes in the region, triggered by the rapprochement between Ethiopia and Eritrea and the strengthening of relations between Eritrea, Ethiopia and Somalia, as well as the cooling off of tensions between Eritrea and Djibouti.

The Office of the Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa is mandated to support the region in sustaining gains in peace and security, including the ongoing peace process in South Sudan and the improved relationships between the Sudan and South Sudan, and the positive prospects this offers for resolving the situation in Abyei. The Office of the Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa was established when the remit of the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Sudan and South Sudan was expanded to cover the entire Horn of Africa region, encompassing all the countries of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), including Eritrea. This approach has been taken by other institutions, including IGAD, the European Union and the African Union High-level Implementation Panel, and enhances symmetry between the United Nations and its partners in their engagement with the Governments and other actors in the region.

Over the course of 2022, the Office of the Special Envoy will coordinate and enhance the coherence of the collective work of the United Nations in the region and focus on the prevention of crises affecting human security through joined-up action in support of Member States' national strategies and regional strategies in the pursuit of lasting peace and sustainable development. Despite the impact of restrictions related to the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic in 2020 and 2021, which have rendered face-to-face collaboration cumbersome, implementation efforts related to the United Nations comprehensive regional prevention strategy for the Horn of Africa continued, predominantly through virtual means.

In my role as Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Horn of Africa, I will continue to provide political leadership and coordinated implementation of the strategy with a focus on the key pillars of the strategy: supporting regional peace, security and long-term stability; building resilience and promoting socioeconomic development; promoting inclusive and responsive governance; and supporting sustainable natural resources management and climate resilience. It is my sincere hope that through our collective efforts, we will better understand and serve the Governments and people of the region in contributing to the achievement of their legitimate aspirations for a more peaceful and prosperous Horn of Africa.

I look forward to continuing my representation of the Secretary-General in this effort, in close collaboration with our partners IGAD and the African Union.

*(Signed)* Parfait **Onanga-Anyanga**  
Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Horn of Africa

## **A. Proposed programme plan for 2022 and programme performance for 2020**

### **Overall orientation**

#### **Mandates and background**

195. The overall objective of the mission is to work closely with and support IGAD member States, in line with the framework for cooperation between the United Nations and IGAD signed in Djibouti on 17 November 2015, and other regional organizations in promoting peace and security across the Horn of Africa. This primarily involves enhancing subregional capacities for conflict prevention and mediation and addressing cross-cutting issues. On this basis, the mission supports the good offices of the Secretary-General. The mission has been tasked with enhancing linkages in the work of the United Nations and other partners in the Horn of Africa region, with a view to promoting a joined-up regional approach, including through facilitating coordination and information exchange within the United Nations system.
196. The mandate of the mission derives from an exchange of letters between the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council ([S/2018/955](#) and [S/2018/979](#)), when the remit of the mandate of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Sudan and South Sudan was expanded to cover the entire Horn of Africa region, following previous exchanges of letters (including [S/2016/258](#) and [S/2016/259](#)). In line with the exchange of letters referenced above, the mission also continues to carry out the functions previously performed by the Special Envoy for the Sudan and South Sudan relating to the maintenance of good and peaceful neighbourly relations between the Sudan and South Sudan, established pursuant to the exchange of letters between the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council ([S/2011/474](#) and [S/2011/475](#)). The mandate was renewed through an additional exchange of letters between the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council in March 2016 ([S/2016/258](#) and [S/2016/259](#)). The mandate includes cooperation with the African Union High-level Implementation Panel in efforts to implement Security Council resolution [2046 \(2012\)](#), in which the Council called upon the Sudan and South Sudan to reach an agreement on critical issues, including: (a) the full and urgent advancement of all outstanding issues from the Comprehensive Peace Agreement; and (b) the easing of tensions and the facilitation of the resumption of negotiations on post-secession relations and the normalization of their relations.
197. The Horn of Africa region has long been a focus of United Nations engagement and investment. The region faces major challenges, including long-standing civil conflicts and unrest, poverty and vulnerability to climate change. However, the region also presents significant opportunities, including rapid economic growth in several countries, a young and dynamic population and new momentum for regional cooperation. Realizing the region's enormous potential requires a collective approach, tackling shared challenges in a coordinated manner. The task of the mission is to accompany the region at this critical juncture and ensure that it benefits from the full range of the expertise and capacities of the United Nations.

### **Programme of work**

#### **Objective**

198. The objective, to which this mission contributes, is to establish and maintain good and peaceful neighbourly relations between the countries of the Horn of Africa region, encompassing Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, the Sudan and Uganda, with a view to consolidating and sustaining recent gains in peace and security and enhancing regional conflict prevention.

## Strategy

199. To contribute to the objective, the mission will focus on promoting regional peace and security, resilience and socioeconomic development, inclusive and responsive governance and sustainable natural resources development and climate resilience. This will be done by providing political leadership to the United Nations engagement in these areas and ensuring joined-up action and system-wide ownership of outcomes through the comprehensive regional prevention strategy for the Horn of Africa.
200. The mission will focus on supporting IGAD in strengthening the link between early warning and early response, increasing its capacity to respond to and resolve conflicts, including through mediation and the improvement of information-sharing and knowledge management by learning from good practices in the region and beyond. This will be done by deploying the good offices of the Secretary-General and leveraging the collective influence of IGAD member States to support dialogue and joint initiatives among the countries.
201. The mission will work closely with and support the African Union, the African Union High-level Implementation Panel and other relevant regional organizations in addressing recent and emerging security threats. This will be done through information-sharing, the convening of regular meetings with relevant partners and other special envoys in the Horn of Africa region and the development of appropriate messages and approaches for supporting regional peace and security.
202. The mission plans to support Member States on issues related to COVID-19 by continuing its enhanced partnership with IGAD and supporting the Authority in its regional response to the pandemic. Following the assistance the mission provided to IGAD in 2020 by mobilizing United Nations experts to provide substantive support to the Authority in finalizing the regional response strategy to address COVID-19, the mission will continue to support IGAD in the implementation of the strategy.
203. The above-mentioned work is expected to result in strengthened subregional capacities, as well as improved relations and enhanced mutual trust and confidence between countries of the region to address the root causes of conflicts. More specifically, these actions are expected to result in strengthened synergies between partners in the region and the alignment of interventions and responses with the respective strategic frameworks of the United Nations, IGAD and the African Union. In addition, the above-mentioned work will help operationalize the Secretary-General's vision of prevention through further implementing the action plan of the comprehensive regional prevention strategy.
204. The planned support on issues related to COVID-19 is expected to result in a strengthened partnership with IGAD.

## External factors for 2022

205. With regard to the external factors, the overall plan for 2022 is based on the following planning assumptions:
  - (a) Opportunities exist to address long-standing sources of tension, particularly through shuttle diplomacy;
  - (b) IGAD and the African Union continue to be fully engaged in the maintenance of peace and security in the region, paying special attention to Ethiopia, Somalia, the Sudan and South Sudan;
  - (c) States in the region continue to engage constructively with the Special Envoy and continue to work with the United Nations in the area of capacity-building, in particular in the area of mediation and conflict prevention and resolution;
  - (d) South Sudanese parties, with the support of the region, progressively show commitment to the implementation of the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan and are prepared to consolidate gains;

- (e) The relationship between the Sudan and South Sudan remains constructive, enabling direct negotiations between the two countries on outstanding bilateral issues, including the situation of Abyei and its final status.
206. With regard to the COVID-19 pandemic, the proposed programme plan is based on the assumption that the proposed deliverables and activities for 2022 will be feasible to implement. However, if the pandemic were to continue to have an impact on the planned deliverables and activities, they would be adjusted during 2022 within the scope of the overall objectives, strategies and mandates. Any such adjustments would be reported as part of the programme performance information.
207. The mission integrates a gender perspective in its operational activities, deliverables and results, as appropriate, and good offices and planned missions will include gender-sensitive and focused activities. With regard to seminars and workshops, gender-related aspects are included in the agenda of those events. Much of the Horn of Africa region's potential hinges on the meaningful involvement of women and youth in its efforts to promote stability and prosperity. With this in mind, the Special Envoy will continue to work with relevant stakeholders to promote inclusive messaging to enhance the participation of women in all political and peace processes. The Special Envoy will also actively engage in regional and global meetings to lobby for the acceleration of the implementation of the women and peace and security agenda.
208. With regard to cooperation with other entities, in order to capitalize on the opportunities for closer cooperation on peace and security in the Horn of Africa, the mission will continue to work closely with IGAD and its member States, as well as other organizations such as the African Union and the European Union. Support will be provided to address the regional dimensions of crises and conflicts in the Horn of Africa, with a particular focus on their cross-border and regional implications. The mission will also cooperate with the African Union High-level Implementation Panel to support the bilateral negotiations between the Sudan and South Sudan to resolve outstanding issues, including finding a settlement to the issue of the final status of Abyei. In addition, the mission will continue to work closely with the African Union, IGAD, the troika and other Member States supporting political cooperation in the region. The mission will continue to provide technical and advisory support to the IGAD secretariat, part of which will include reviewing and updating the regional action plan on women and peace and security in support of the implementation of Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) and regional commitments by Member States.
209. With regard to inter-agency coordination and liaison, the mission will engage with Special Representatives of the Secretary-General, Resident Coordinators, and peace and development advisers in the countries of the region, and with United Nations agencies, funds and programmes active in the areas identified as collective priorities by the United Nations system.

### **Evaluation activities**

210. The Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs will lead a systematic assessment with the overall purpose of improving the gender sensitivity of the political analyses developed by the Department and the special political missions.

### **Programme performance in 2020**

#### **Deepened partnership with the Horn of Africa region through collaboration with the Intergovernmental Authority on Development<sup>7</sup>**

211. In line with the joint framework of cooperation between IGAD and the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, the mission supported the implementation of the joint framework and worked with IGAD programmes, including the IGAD Peace and Security Division, the Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism, the Office of the IGAD Special Envoy for the Sudan and South

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<sup>7</sup> As reflected in the proposed programme budget for 2020 (A/74/6 (Sect. 3)/Add.2).

Sudan and the Office of the IGAD Special Envoy for Somalia, the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. The mission convened a conference with IGAD high-level officials, the European Union and civil society organizations in early March 2020 on deepening partnerships in the Horn of Africa region, which examined regional peace and security and the impact of violent conflicts in the region. The mission also supported the mobilization of 18 United Nations experts to help IGAD finalize its regional response strategy to address the COVID-19 pandemic and provided substantive support to the process. While other face-to-face meetings were postponed due to COVID-19, the mission and the IGAD secretariat continued to engage on key areas of collaboration, including identifying and enhancing avenues for the strategic, technical and proactive prevention of conflicts and crises; catalysing processes for reinforcing internal dialogue among IGAD member States; supporting ongoing normalization processes and the positive environment created in the region; establishing mechanisms for utilizing the vast knowledge in the region; and creating synergies between the partnership and relevant stakeholders and partners in the region, particularly the African Union.

*Progress towards the attainment of the objective, and performance measure*

212. The above-mentioned work contributed to the maintenance of good and peaceful neighbourly relations between the countries of the Horn of Africa region and enhanced regional conflict prevention, as well as deepened collaboration in addressing peace and security issues between IGAD and the United Nations. This has been demonstrated by the implementation of the joint framework of cooperation through joint initiatives and regular engagement with the IGAD Executive Secretary and the IGAD Special Envoys. The mission also supported the capacity of IGAD to address cross-border and cross-cutting issues. A conference was also held in early March 2020 with high-level officials from IGAD to deepen the partnership with that organization, specifically with regard to peace and security. Due to the COVID-19 outbreak, some of the planned activities, such as the Secretariat-to-secretariat workshop, were postponed. While much of the face-to-face good offices work was hampered by restrictions related to the pandemic, virtual collaboration between IGAD and the United Nations continued and deepened (see table 27).

Table 27  
**Performance measure**

<i>2018 (actual)</i>	<i>2019 (actual)</i>	<i>2020 (actual)</i>
Secretariat-to-secretariat meeting to translate the broad areas of collaboration into priority actions; operationalization and implementation of joint activities	The capacity of IGAD to provide early warning and policy advice on conflict response measures to its member States was strengthened through the implementation of the framework through joint initiatives and regular engagement	The capacity of IGAD to address cross-border and cross-cutting issues was strengthened, creating the conditions for joint action taken by IGAD member States on the prevention of conflict and on regional initiatives to reduce vulnerability and address the root causes of crises

**Impact of COVID-19 on programme delivery**

213. Owing to the impact of COVID-19 during 2020, the mission observed an additional burden on the region's ongoing vulnerabilities. Among its regional impacts, the COVID-19 pandemic exacerbated political tensions in some countries, particularly in the run-up to elections that were scheduled to be held in 2020 and 2021. In the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, the Special Envoy worked to enhance coordination between United Nations entities in their COVID-19 mitigation efforts, as well as to provide support to IGAD as it developed its own regional response strategy. The Office of the Special Envoy was able to carry out its political and partnership mandates remotely. However, as physical meetings were largely suspended, the Special Envoy's good offices functions were

hampered. While COVID-19 had an impact on travel during 2020, regional face-to-face diplomatic efforts gradually resumed on a smaller scale, with the necessary precautions in place.

214. At the same time, the mission identified new activities to support Member States on issues related to the COVID-19 pandemic, within the overall scope of its objectives, namely sourcing and coordinating technical experts to help finalize the IGAD regional response strategy to address the pandemic. Additionally, in April 2020, the Office of the Special Envoy convened a meeting on United Nations support to regional mobilization in response to the pandemic. The meeting was attended by Resident Coordinators from Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, the Sudan and South Sudan, as well as by the Development Coordination Office, the UNDP Regional Service Centre for Africa, the Economic Commission for Africa and the World Health Organization. Furthermore, in May 2020, the Special Envoy held consultations with regional coordinators in the region to take stock of COVID-19 mitigation efforts and discuss relevant political and humanitarian developments. During the same month, the Special Envoy also held consultations with the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the European Union to discuss the response to COVID-19, including support packages, the current course of action in the Horn of Africa region, specifically vis-à-vis the Sudan, South Sudan, Somalia and Eritrea, and support for peace processes in the region.

## **Planned result for 2022**

### **Enhanced collective action in implementing the prevention agenda in the Horn of Africa**

215. The Secretary-General's holistic prevention vision encourages collective action within United Nations entities working in the region. The mission's work on regional prevention seeks to prevent the loss of life and suffering from conflict and other humanitarian crises in the Horn of Africa. The region has enormous potential, innovation and vast resources. Crises still persist, and require the Secretary-General's good offices to make progress towards their resolution, but opportunities for transformation, peace and regional integration also exist and should be maximized where possible.
216. To advance the prevention agenda, the mission will continue to use the Secretary-General's good offices and provide increased support to the IGAD Special Envoys, the African Union and the African Union High-level Implementation Panel, including by undertaking joint missions and messaging on conflict prevention and resolution in the Horn of Africa. This is expected to result in improved regional approaches to the prevention of crises and conflict by strengthening the capacity of the IGAD secretariat in conflict prevention, negotiation and mediation. It is also expected to deepen the collaboration between the African Union, IGAD and other regional and subregional organizations in supporting the implementation of existing peace agreements. Furthermore, the mission will continue to coordinate implementation of the internal United Nations regional prevention strategy, encompassing peace and security issues, socioeconomic development, governance challenges and climate risks and resilience.

### *Lessons learned and planned change*

217. The challenge for the mission was that the implementation of the Horn of Africa strategy has not progressed at the same pace among all actors. While some agencies, funds and programmes of the United Nations have been very active in implementing the priority activities identified in the action plan, the need to enhance the inclusion and participation of other United Nations entities in their respective thematic groups has been a challenge. In response, the mission engaged entities in a better position to take the lead in the pillars concerned and designated focal points within the mission to engage with each of the respective pillars. In 2022, the mission will continue to review the suitability of pillar leads, as well as the membership of the pillars to ensure that implementation of the strategy continues apace.

### *Expected progress towards the attainment of the objective, and performance measure*

218. This work is expected to contribute to the objective, as demonstrated by the implementation of the action plan through partnerships and collaboration with other United Nations entities, as well as IGAD and the African Union (see table 28).

Table 28  
Performance measure

<i>2018 (actual)</i>	<i>2019 (actual)</i>	<i>2020 (actual)</i>	<i>2021 (planned)</i>	<i>2022 (planned)</i>
Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and UNDP develop an internal prevention strategy for the Horn of Africa	The Executive Committee established by the Secretary-General endorses the strategy; and the Office of the Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa convenes a workshop to kick-start the implementation of the strategy	Implementation of the action plan through collective actions and messaging on conflict prevention	Regional capacity to address and prevent conflict and crisis in the region enhanced	Implementation of the action plan through partnerships and collaboration with other United Nations entities, as well as IGAD and the African Union

### Deliverables

219. Table 29 below lists all deliverables, by category and subcategory, for the period 2020–2022 that contributed and are expected to contribute to the attainment of the objective stated above.

Table 29  
Deliverables for the period 2020–2022, by category and subcategory

<i>Category and subcategory</i>	<i>2020 planned</i>	<i>2020 actual</i>	<i>2021 planned</i>	<i>2022 planned</i>
<b>A. Facilitation of the intergovernmental process and expert bodies</b>				
<b>Substantive services for meetings</b> (number of three-hour meetings)	2	2	2	2
Meetings of the Security Council	2	2	2	2
<b>C. Substantive deliverables</b>				
<b>Good offices:</b> provision of good offices through engagement, including shuttle and quiet diplomacy, on issues related to peace consolidation and conflict prevention, including the implementation of bilateral agreements and the completion of negotiations on outstanding bilateral issues.				
<b>Consultation, advice and advocacy:</b> consultations and advice on consolidating recent gains in peace and security in the Horn of Africa region; and advice on enhancing subregional capacities to address cross-border and cross-cutting issues.				
<b>D. Communication deliverables</b>				
<b>External and media relations:</b> social media outreach and briefings to raise awareness of key developments and promote support for addressing challenges to peace and security in the region.				

## B. Proposed post and non-post resource requirements for 2022

### Resource requirements (regular budget)

Table 30

#### Financial resources

(Thousands of United States dollars)

Category of expenditure	2020	2021	2022		Variance
	Expenditure	Appropriation	Total requirements	Non-recurrent requirements	2022 vs. 2021 Increase/(decrease)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)=(3)-(2)
Military and police personnel costs	–	–	–	–	–
Civilian personnel costs	1 331.0	1 586.4	1 580.3	–	(6.1)
Operational costs	98.2	196.4	196.4	–	–
<b>Total (net of staff assessment)</b>	<b>1 429.2</b>	<b>1 782.8</b>	<b>1 776.7</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>(6.1)</b>

Table 31

#### Positions

	Professional and higher categories								General Service and related categories		National staff					Total
	USG	ASG	D-2	D-1	P-5	P-4	P-3	P-2	Subtotal	Field/ Security Services	General Service	Total inter-national	National Professional Officer	Local level	United Nations Volunteers	
Approved 2021	1	–	–	1	–	2	1	–	5	–	–	5	2	2	–	9
Proposed 2022	1	–	–	1	–	2	1	–	5	–	–	5	2	2	–	9
<b>Change</b>	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–

220. The proposed resource requirements for 2022 for the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Horn of Africa amount to \$1,776,700 (net of staff assessment) and would provide for salaries and common staff costs (\$1,580,300) for the continuation of nine positions (1 Under-Secretary-General, 1 D-1, 2 P-4, 1 P-3, 2 National Professional Officer and 2 Local level), as well as operational costs (\$196,400), comprising costs for official travel (\$123,700), facilities and infrastructure (\$11,400), ground transportation (\$8,300), communications and information technology (\$43,400), medical (\$3,300) and other supplies, services and equipment (\$6,300).
221. For 2022, it is proposed that the number and levels of the positions for the Office remain unchanged. A vacancy rate of 3 per cent has been applied to international positions based on recent incumbency, while proposed resources for national positions are based on the assumption of full incumbency on the basis of the average actual vacancy rate in 2020.
222. The decrease in the requirements proposed for 2022 compared with the appropriation for 2021 is attributable mainly to lower requirements under international staff due mainly to the application of a lower percentage of common staff costs to salary costs of 70.4 per cent for 2022, compared with 85.3 per cent applied to the 2021 approved budget.

**Extrabudgetary resources**

223. In 2021, extrabudgetary resources amounting to approximately \$1,064,400 are committed to provide for five positions (1 P-5, 1 P-4, 1 P-3, 1 P-2 and 1 General Service), for consultancy services and for temporary administrative support.
224. In 2022, the projected extrabudgetary resources for the Office of the Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa amount to \$1,065,000 to provide for the continuation of five positions (1 P-5, 1 P-4, 1 P-3, 1 P-2 and 1 General Service), as well as for consultancy and temporary administrative support services.



## 8. Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region

(\$5,165,400)

### Foreword

The positive dynamic towards greater cooperation observed in the Great Lakes Region since 2019 has continued. Increasingly, signatory countries of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Region address differences through dialogue and cooperation. Recent electoral processes and the peaceful transfer of power in some countries have created space for regional diplomacy and the improvement of relations with neighbours. Despite the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic, efforts to pursue political and security cooperation, as well as economic integration, continued at the bilateral and multilateral levels. The countries of the region have also taken measures to enhance coordination to mitigate the implications of the pandemic.

This progress notwithstanding, continued efforts are required to address the outstanding causes of instability and threats to peace and security that hamper the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals. Tensions between some countries, the persistent threat of armed groups, partly financed by proceeds from the illicit exploitation of and illegal trade in natural resources, human rights violations and impunity for perpetrators, and the persisting humanitarian crisis continue to challenge collective efforts towards long-term stability and sustainable development. Focus by all actors is now required on sustaining the positive momentum and delivering tangible results for all the people of the region.

The United Nations Strategy for Peace Consolidation, Conflict Prevention and Conflict Resolution in the Great Lakes Region, approved by the Secretary-General in October 2020, seeks to guide, align and strengthen the action of the United Nations in the region in support of the implementation of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework. The Strategy offers a 10-year perspective for its implementation, aligned to the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, with well-sequenced political and programmatic interventions, identified in its action plan for the period 2021–2023.

In 2022, I will work towards the implementation of the Strategy and its action plan, including by promoting concerted and impactful United Nations action in the region and using the convening power of my office to further rally support for regional priorities in the areas of peace and sustainable development. In line with the mandate of the Office, I will continue to prioritize my good offices, including on behalf of the Secretary-General, through quiet and shuttle diplomacy, to promote and support dialogue among countries towards greater trust and the normalization of relations where tensions persist. In so doing, I shall further deepen cooperation with regional and subregional organizations, as well as with international partners, including international financial institutions. I will also ensure support for specific areas of cooperation, such as security, economic, judicial and rule of law cooperation, as well as women and peace and security, in line with the commitments of the Framework and the priorities of the countries in the region.

I would like to count on your continued support to advance the implementation of the mandate of the Office, and to effectively contribute to the consolidation of efforts towards a more peaceful, economically integrated and prosperous Great Lakes Region.

*(Signed)* Huang Xia  
Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region

## A. Proposed programme plan for 2022 and programme performance for 2020

### Overall orientation

#### Mandates and background

225. Established in 2013, the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region is responsible for supporting the implementation of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Region, which was signed on 24 February 2013 by Angola, Burundi, the Central African Republic, the Congo, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, South Africa, South Sudan, Uganda, the United Republic of Tanzania and Zambia, as well as representatives of the United Nations, the African Union, the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region and the Southern African Development Community (SADC), acting as guarantors. On 31 January 2014, Kenya and the Sudan also signed the Framework. The Framework outlines key national, regional and international commitments required to end the recurring cycles of violence in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo and address the root causes of conflict in the region.
226. The mandate of the mission derives from Security Council resolution [2098 \(2013\)](#) and from subsequent Council resolutions and documents, including resolutions [2147 \(2014\)](#), [2211 \(2015\)](#), [2277 \(2016\)](#), [2348 \(2017\)](#) and [2502 \(2019\)](#). Recently, in its resolution [2556 \(2020\)](#), the Council reiterated its support for the Special Envoy in his efforts to address the remaining challenges in the implementation of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework, including through good offices, and urged enhanced cooperation with the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), other United Nations entities and all relevant actors in the search for political solutions to mitigate the persistent factors related to instability, including cross-border flows of armed combatants, arms and conflict minerals, through information-sharing and coordinated strategies.
227. Since the beginning of 2019, following the peaceful transfer of power in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and efforts by some countries in the region to improve bilateral and multilateral relations, a positive momentum has emerged to reinvigorate cooperation towards peace, stability and development in the region. Against this backdrop, the Secretary-General approved on 22 October 2020 the United Nations Strategy for Peace Consolidation, Conflict Prevention and Conflict Resolution in the Great Lakes Region, prepared by the Office of the Special Envoy, which was finalized in December 2020 and published in January 2021 (see [S/2020/1168](#)). The Strategy, developed following extensive consultations, is designed to provide the political and operational framework for United Nations action to support the implementation of the commitments under the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework. It is structured around three pillars: peace, security and justice; sustainable development and shared prosperity; and resilience to long-standing and emerging challenges.
228. In 2021, the Office will support the implementation of the Strategy and its action plan by engaging the Governments of the signatory countries and key partners to seize and consolidate the positive momentum in the region. Through the Secretary-General's good offices, the Office will sustain support for easing tensions, building confidence and encouraging political dialogue between countries. The Office will also continue to support the regional priorities identified by the countries of the Great Lakes Region in an effort to implement the Framework, including on security, economic, judicial cooperation and rule of law matters. The Office will continue its efforts to support the women and peace and security agenda, as well as promote ways to enhance the participation of youth in matters of regional relevance.

## Programme of work

### Objective

229. The objective, to which the Office contributes, is to advance the effective implementation of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Region by supporting and facilitating political, security and economic engagements among and between the signatory countries, while ensuring coherent and coordinated support from regional and international organizations and other partners, in line with the United Nations Strategy for Peace Consolidation, Conflict Prevention and Conflict Resolution in the Great Lakes Region.

### Strategy

230. To contribute to the objective, the Office will deploy the Secretary-General's good offices, including discreet and shuttle diplomacy, collaborate closely with the co-guarantors of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework and reinforce coordination with international partners, including the International Contact Group and international financial institutions.
231. The Office will support the implementation of a regional non-military approach against negative forces, facilitate confidence-building consultations between the chiefs of military and civilian intelligence and security services from concerned countries, help to strengthen existing security-related mechanisms, mobilize resources for a long-term stabilization programme targeting affected communities and promote the repatriation and reintegration of former combatants, in line with international standards.
232. The Office will promote cross-border investment and responsible trade projects, including by following up on the outcome and recommendations of the Great Lakes Investment and Trade Conference, rescheduled to be held in 2021 due to the COVID-19 pandemic, and the transparent and sustainable management of natural resources.
233. The Office will promote the rule of law and regional judicial cooperation, as well as the protection of human rights, including by supporting targeted initiatives aimed at supporting Member States in implementing the 2019 Nairobi Declaration on Justice and Good Governance.
234. The Office plans to support Member States on issues related to COVID-19 by providing technical support to coordinate regional response and recovery plans; continuing to engage international partners, including international financial institutions, to support resource mobilization efforts; continuing to advocate support within the region for the Secretary-General's policy brief on COVID-19 and human rights of April 2020 and his call for a global ceasefire, as recognized by the Security Council in its resolution [2532 \(2020\)](#); calling attention to the disproportionate impact of the pandemic on women and youth, and supporting efforts, including by working with civil society organizations, to promote the inclusion of tailored measures in response and recovery plans; pursuing the call for ensuring the full protection of human rights for all people; and promoting and supporting the use of innovative forms of communication.
235. The above-mentioned work is expected to result in:
- (a) Enhanced mutual trust between countries of the region;
  - (b) Improved relations, including concrete steps taken by countries to address issues of contention among them;
  - (c) Increased resort to regional mechanisms to address impunity, and the upholding of the rule of law in the fight against serious crimes with a transborder dimension;
  - (d) Increased mobilization and harmonization of support from the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework co-guarantors, international partners and other stakeholders;

- (e) Operationalization of the contact coordination group on non-military measures in security cooperation;
- (f) Joint initiatives on comprehensive regional non-military measures against negative forces, including the role of civil society organizations, women and youth in peacebuilding processes;
- (g) Repatriation of disarmed combatants and improved reintegration programmes, in line with international standards;
- (h) Increased bilateral and multilateral economic cooperation and support for concrete initiatives to curb the illicit exploitation of and trade in natural resources and to transform natural resources into a driver for shared prosperity;
- (i) Strengthened regional judicial cooperation with the Great Lakes Judicial Cooperation Network as the main mechanism for cross-border cases;
- (j) A decrease of human rights violations in the region and an increase in the number of perpetrators held accountable;
- (k) Coordinated and inclusive regional response and recovery plans to address the impact of COVID-19 and to contribute to laying the foundations for “building back better”.

### **External factors for 2022**

- 236. With regard to the external factors, the overall plan for 2022 is based on the following planning assumptions:
  - (a) Continued political will among the signatory countries of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework to implement national and regional commitments for enhanced regional cooperation and the stabilization of the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo and the region;
  - (b) The situation in the region allows for continued political dialogue among countries and the effective collaboration with relevant regional organizations;
  - (c) Continued support for and focus on the Great Lakes Region by Member States and international partners, including coordinated action and support for signatory countries.
- 237. With regard to the COVID-19 pandemic, the proposed programme plan is based on the assumption that the proposed deliverables and activities for 2022 will be feasible to implement. However, if the pandemic were to continue to have an impact on the planned deliverables and activities, they would be adjusted during 2022 within the scope of the overall objectives, strategies and mandates. Any adjustments would be reported as part of the programme performance information.
- 238. The Office integrates a gender perspective in its operational activities, deliverables and results, as appropriate. Good offices will include focused gender-sensitive activities, in addition to high-level advocacy meetings and missions on gender by women leaders throughout the region. To contribute to the advancement of the women and peace and security agenda, the Office will support the Advisory Board for Women, Peace and Security in the Great Lakes Region in its efforts to advocate for women’s participation and representation in peacebuilding, political and electoral processes; strengthen the monitoring and evaluation capacities of International Conference on the Great Lakes Region mechanisms on sexual and gender-based violence; and support cross-border communities in the prevention and resolution of conflict and elections-related violence.
- 239. In line with the United Nations Disability Inclusion Strategy, the Office will specifically examine the Strategy with a view to further advancing disability inclusion and will include mitigating measures to overcome any challenges while operationalizing disability inclusion.
- 240. Regarding cooperation with other entities, the Office cooperates with and supports signatory countries of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework on priority political, security and socioeconomic initiatives aimed at ensuring the implementation of national and regional

commitments under the Framework. In an effort to promote the alignment of approaches and a strengthening of partnerships as outlined in the United Nations Strategy for Peace Consolidation, Conflict Prevention and Conflict Resolution in the Great Lakes Region, the Special Envoy also encourages joint and/or harmonized initiatives by the co-guarantor institutions of the Framework. He further participates in the International Contact Group for the Great Lakes Region, engaging in regular exchanges with other special envoys for the Great Lakes Region. In support of the Framework's economic focus, the Special Envoy cooperates with financial institutions, including the World Bank Group, the African Development Bank and other relevant partners.

241. With regard to inter-agency coordination and liaison, the Office works closely with MONUSCO, including in the context of the joint strategy of MONUSCO and the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo on a progressive and phased drawdown of the Mission, in support of efforts by the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to achieve its national commitments under the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework. The senior policy group, chaired by the Special Envoy, along with its implementation support mechanism, which were both established to facilitate the implementation of the United Nations Strategy for Peace Consolidation, Conflict Prevention and Conflict Resolution in the Great Lakes Region, will continue to ensure alignment among United Nations missions and offices in the region, including the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa, MONUSCO and the United Nations Office to the African Union, in addition to regional coordinators and representatives from the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, OHCHR, UNHCR and other United Nations agencies, funds and programmes.

### **Evaluation activities**

242. A self-evaluation of the implementation of the Strategy and its action plan, including a consultation with United Nations presences in the region and the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs to identify progress and shortcomings, is planned for 2022. This will serve as a precursor to a more extensive evaluation process foreseen for 2023, which will mark the 10-year anniversary of the signing of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework.
243. The Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs will lead a systematic assessment with the overall purpose of improving the gender sensitivity of the political analyses developed by the Department and the special political missions.

### **Programme performance in 2020**

#### **Strengthened regional cooperation on negative forces<sup>8</sup>**

244. The Office continued to prioritize multi-layered support to regional efforts towards neutralizing negative forces, complementing support for consultations among the concerned intelligence and security services with enhanced coordination with regional mechanisms, such as the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region Expanded Joint Verification Mechanism, as well as with national disarmament, demobilization and reintegration commissions. The Office also continued to support efforts to promote the rule of law and fight impunity in the region, including by mainstreaming human rights considerations into efforts towards enhanced security cooperation.
245. Following a series of confidence-building meetings of the chiefs of intelligence and security services from Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, the United Republic of Tanzania and Uganda, facilitated by the Office of the Special Envoy together with the African Union, the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region and SADC, in 2019, a consensus emerged among the countries concerned with regard to the imperative of a comprehensive approach comprising military operations and non-military measures in efforts to neutralize armed groups in the region. Consequently, in February 2020, the chiefs of intelligence and security services and the

<sup>8</sup> As reflected in the proposed programme budget for 2020 (A/74/6 (Sect. 3)/Add.2).

Technical Support Committee of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework approved the draft terms of reference of a proposed contact coordination group envisaged to coordinate the implementation of non-military measures aimed at complementing ongoing military operations by promoting voluntary disarmament and repatriation, and undercutting the recruitment and supply lines of armed groups. They recommended that the establishment of the group be endorsed by the Regional Oversight Mechanism of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework at the level of Heads of State.

246. While the tenth Summit of the Regional Oversight Mechanism had to be postponed due to the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, throughout 2020 the Office continued to engage key actors in the respective countries with a view to ensuring political ownership of the proposed approach at all levels and to promoting continued consultations among the countries concerned on security issues along their common borders. In this regard, the mission collaborated closely with the co-guarantors of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework and explored options to enhance its cooperation with, and technical support for, the Expanded Joint Verification Mechanism to further step up support for the peaceful resolution of cross-border security incidents. These confidence-building consultations contributed to security cooperation at the technical level, leading to a reduction in cross-border security incidents seen during the second half of 2020. In November 2020, leaders of the region approved the operationalization of the contact coordination group during the eighth International Conference on the Great Lakes Region Summit. Its launch, planned for the second quarter of 2021, will formalize and further boost regional cooperation among the countries concerned.
247. Concurrently, the Office promoted the effective functioning of the Great Lakes Judicial Cooperation Network and the strengthening of the rule of law in the region. Initiatives were taken to support the implementation of the Nairobi Declaration on Justice and Good Governance adopted by the Ministers of Justice of the States members of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region in May 2019. The Nairobi Declaration made specific recommendations for action at the national and regional levels towards ensuring full respect for human rights and the rule of law. In this regard, the Office collaborated closely with the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region in efforts to build the capacities of national authorities and strengthen regional collaboration to advance on cross-border cases involving serious human rights violations, notably in the context of crimes committed by leaders of negative forces, the illegal exploitation of and trade in natural resources and sexual and gender-based violence. In addition, a series of virtual workshops and consultations strengthened the capacities of national human rights institutions, including through the development of national road maps tailored to the needs of each participating country, to enable them to better fulfil their mandates. By creating linkages and mainstreaming human rights considerations into the work on security cooperation, notably regarding repatriation processes, a holistic approach was adopted and promoted to ensure that perpetrators of serious crimes are not accommodated in related processes, notably with regard to demobilization, disarmament and reintegration into civilian life.

*Progress towards the attainment of the objective, and performance measure*

248. The above-mentioned work contributed to strengthened trust and enhanced regional cooperation despite the restrictions imposed by the COVID-19 pandemic, which met the planned target of participation in regular confidence-building meetings among security agencies of the countries concerned, agreement on priority initiatives on the negative forces and effective implementation of and follow-up on recommendations from the justice and good governance conference, as reflected in the proposed programme budget for 2020. Due to challenges related to measures put in place to counter the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic, some initiatives had to be reorganized and were held virtually (see table 32).

Table 32  
Performance measure

<i>2018 (actual)</i>	<i>2019 (actual)</i>	<i>2020 (actual)</i>
Call by signatory countries to the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for a new approach, beyond the existing measures, to ensure greater regional cooperation for the full neutralization of negative forces without delay	Initial confidence-building meeting among security agencies of the countries concerned  Adoption by the Ministers of Justice of the States members of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region of the Nairobi Declaration on Justice and Good Governance  Operationalization of the Great Lakes Judicial Cooperation Network, including cooperation among judiciaries in between the meetings of the Network	Participation in regular confidence-building meetings among security agencies of the countries concerned and agreement on priority initiatives on negative forces  Effective implementation of the Nairobi Declaration on Justice and Good Governance  Progress in facilitating cross-border judicial cooperation, including through capacity-building on remote access to justice for members of the Great Lakes Judicial Cooperation Network

#### **Impact of COVID-19 on programme delivery**

249. Owing to the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic during 2020, the Office programme delivery was affected as follows:
- (a) While some consultations and conferences were carried out virtually, at times with a modified format or agenda, limitations on physical engagement constrained some of the Special Envoy's good offices engagements aimed at building trust, especially on security and other issues deemed sensitive by regional stakeholders;
  - (b) Plans for meetings of the governing mechanisms of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework were disrupted, notably the tenth Summit of the Regional Oversight Mechanism of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework, to be hosted by the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which was postponed. There was a related delay in the implementation of some initiatives, such as the effective operationalization of the contact and coordination group on non-military measures in security cooperation;
  - (c) The postponement of the second Great Lakes Investment and Trade Conference and the regional high-level workshop on natural resources resulted in a slowdown in support for regional economic integration;
  - (d) Effects on the functioning of justice systems led to a slowdown in efforts related to regional judicial cooperation, the work of the Great Lakes Judicial Cooperation Network (postponement of its sixth meeting) and the fight against impunity, as well as the promotion of human rights (increased case backlogs and a disparate impact on the most vulnerable groups);
  - (e) The workshop on lessons learned from electoral processes and a workshop envisaged to be held with signatory countries on progress under the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework had to be postponed.
250. At the same time, however, the Office identified changes in its approaches and new activities to support Member States on issues related to the COVID-19 pandemic, within the overall scope of its objectives, namely:
- (a) With regard to humanitarian and economic cooperation, the Office refocused efforts on advocating for a coordinated regional response to the pandemic and on mobilizing support and resources from international partners for COVID-19 response and post-COVID-19 recovery,

including through the organization of a meeting of regional stakeholders with international financial institutions;

- (b) The Office advocated with Member States to ensure that the rights and needs of women were adequately reflected in the design and implementation of socioeconomic policies for short-, medium- and long-term COVID-19 recovery plans. Further advocacy efforts of the Special Envoy included an appeal to Member States to facilitate the reduction of customs duties for women operating in the cross-border trade and the agricultural sectors. The Special Envoy, along with the Advisory Board for Women, Peace and Security in the Great Lakes Region, intends to advocate for basic social protection measures for women and girls in informal employment, including those with disabilities;
- (c) In response to the effects on justice systems, the Office conducted a series of capacity-building workshops to help strengthen capacities to handle judicial cases remotely and ensure that regional guidelines were established to improve processes related to mutual legal assistance requests;
- (d) The Office adopted new ways of communication and information-sharing and encouraged training to ensure that all staff were adequately equipped to make full use of the different digital tools available. The digital formats also promoted more focused meeting agendas, a greater number of engagements and more stringent timekeeping;
- (e) Notwithstanding the postponement of the tenth Summit of the Regional Oversight Mechanism, virtual meetings of its Technical Support Committee were held on 21 September 2020 and 18 March 2021, underscoring the continued willingness of the countries of the region to pursue their cooperation efforts towards the implementation of their respective commitments under the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework. To that end, the Office continuously engaged regional stakeholders and partners and expressed readiness to fully support the timely organization of the next Summit of the Regional Oversight Mechanism. The Office also convened the 8th meeting of the guarantors of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework on 3 March 2021, with a view to identifying common priorities and the way forward for 2021.

## **Planned result for 2022**

### **Strengthened relations among countries of the Great Lakes region**

- 251. Since early 2019, the region has seen positive momentum towards enhanced regional diplomacy and cooperation, a dynamic which was further accelerated following the peaceful transfer of power in Burundi in June 2020. Efforts in this regard include the quadripartite process towards the normalization of relations between Rwanda and Uganda, facilitated by Angola and the Democratic Republic of the Congo; the beginning of a dialogue between Burundi and Rwanda in 2020 as testament to their commitment to resolve issues of contention and work towards a gradual rapprochement; and enhanced engagement by regional and subregional organizations in support of peaceful and credible electoral processes in the region.
- 252. Despite these collective efforts, underlying and contentious issues straining bilateral relations are yet to be addressed in order to further advance towards lasting peace and stability in the region. In this regard, the Secretary-General's good offices carried out by the Special Envoy remain crucial to consolidate and further expand the incremental progress made in these areas.
- 253. The Office will therefore increase the political engagements of the Special Envoy, including discreet and shuttle diplomacy, in favour of good neighbourly relations and the resolution of contentious bilateral and multilateral issues. In so doing, the Office will also offer its support, as appropriate, to the implementation of the agreements achieved in the context of respective dialogue processes so as to help build trust and provide tangible results, including for affected populations. These good offices will be bolstered by tailored interventions on technical aspects, such as the provision of technical support to existing regional security and rule of law mechanisms, among others. Direct exchanges among the signatory countries will also continue to be favoured, including in the context of the

governing mechanisms of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework. These efforts will be undertaken in close collaboration with the United Nations missions and entities in the region and under the overarching political framework provided by the United Nations Strategy for Peace Consolidation, Conflict Prevention and Conflict Resolution in the Great Lakes Region and its action plan.

*Lessons learned and planned change*

254. The lesson for the mission is the imperative of regional ownership and political will for efforts to promote lasting peace and stability. In this regard, and despite some recent progress made, the persistence of mistrust among countries and communities in the region remains a key root cause of instability and a factor which could influence the recently witnessed commitment in the region to improving and strengthening bilateral relations. In applying the lesson, the Office will therefore step up its interactions with stakeholders from the region at all levels, including civil society, women and youth, to further bolster the Special Envoy's engagement at the political level. The multilayered approach already adopted, combining security with human rights and inclusion concerns, among others, will be further strengthened. This will include supporting existing platforms for regular exchanges, including through support for the governing mechanisms of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework, for the regional forums of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (economic, judicial, youth and civil society), as well as for the Advisory Board for Women, Peace and Security in the Great Lakes Region. Furthermore, in line with the Secretary-General's vision, partnerships with regional and subregional organizations will be further deepened, including through measures taken to provide technical support, as appropriate, with a view to enhancing the collective impact of peace and security, as well as confidence-building initiatives.

*Expected progress towards the attainment of the objective, and performance measure*

255. This work is expected to contribute to the objective, as demonstrated by the systematic resort to dialogue to prevent tensions among countries, including with the help of regional mechanisms; the continued rapprochement between Rwanda and Uganda, and between Burundi and Rwanda, respectively, including progress made in resolving and agreeing on contentious issues and steps taken by these countries to implement agreements achieved; and the implementation of decisions to be taken at the tenth Summit of the Regional Oversight Mechanism of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework, once held. It would further be strengthened by initiatives taken by regional and subregional organizations and signatory countries of the Framework to support peaceful, inclusive and credible political and electoral processes (see table 33).

Table 33  
Performance measure

2018 (actual)	2019 (actual)	2020 (actual)	2021 (planned)	2022 (planned)
Holding of the ninth Summit of the Regional Oversight Mechanism of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework	Signing of the memorandum of understanding between Rwanda and Uganda, facilitated by Angola and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and follow-up meetings to make progress in	Holding of the fourth quadripartite summit on 21 February 2020 between Rwanda and Uganda, with the facilitation of Angola and the Democratic Republic of the Congo Meeting of the guarantors of the	Enhanced consultations, coordination and joint action among the guarantor institutions in support of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework Holding of the tenth Summit of the	Decisions of the tenth Summit of the Regional Oversight Mechanism are effectively followed up on or implemented, and enable the region to move forward the regional peace, security and cooperation agenda

<i>2018 (actual)</i>	<i>2019 (actual)</i>	<i>2020 (actual)</i>	<i>2021 (planned)</i>	<i>2022 (planned)</i>
	the implementation of the memorandum	Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework on 2 April 2020 Meeting of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Burundi and Rwanda on 19 October 2020	Regional Oversight Mechanism Continuation of incremental dialogue between Burundi and Rwanda, including information exchange at the technical level, such as on security along the common border and the return of refugees Resumption of meetings and implementation of decisions taken under the quadripartite process towards the normalization of relations between Rwanda and Uganda, facilitated by Angola and the Democratic Republic of the Congo Initiatives taken by regional and subregional organizations and signatory countries of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework to support peaceful, inclusive and credible political and electoral processes	Systematic resort by countries of the region to dialogue to prevent tensions, including with the help of regional mechanisms Rapprochement between Rwanda and Uganda, and between Burundi and Rwanda, respectively, is sustained, including progress in resolving and agreeing on contentious issues and steps taken by both countries to implement the agreements achieved Initiatives taken by regional and subregional organizations and signatory countries of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework to support peaceful, inclusive and credible political and electoral processes Implementation of the United Nations Great Lakes Regional Strategy leads to joint regional initiatives of United Nations entities in key areas of regional security and sustainable development

## Deliverables

256. Table 34 below lists all deliverables, by category and subcategory, for the period 2020–2022 that contributed and are expected to contribute to the attainment of the objectives stated above.

Table 34

### Deliverables for the period 2020–2022, by category and subcategory

<i>Category and subcategory</i>	<i>2020 planned</i>	<i>2020 actual</i>	<i>2021 planned</i>	<i>2022 planned</i>
<b>A. Facilitation of the intergovernmental process and expert bodies</b>				
<b>Parliamentary documentation</b> (number of documents)	2	2	2	2
1. Reports of the Secretary-General to the Security Council	2	2	2	2
<b>Substantive services for meetings</b> (number of three-hour meetings)	4	5	5	5
2. Meetings of the Security Council, the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004) concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and the Peacebuilding Commission	4	5	5	5
<b>B. Generation and transfer of knowledge</b>				
<b>Field and technical cooperation projects</b> (number of projects)	3	4	3	3
3. Projects on economic cooperation, land and conflict	2	2	2	2
4. Projects to promote cross-border trade and investment	1	2	1	1
<b>Seminars, workshops and training events</b> (number of days)	4	1	4	2
5. Workshop on exchange of lessons learned from elections and political processes	1	–	1	–
6. Workshops on resolving existing challenges in the implementation of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework	2	–	2	2
7. Workshop on youth employment and engagement on peace and security	1	1	1	–
<b>C. Substantive deliverables</b>				
<b>Good offices:</b> provision of good offices through engagement, including shuttle and discreet diplomacy, as well as through the facilitation of direct exchanges with regional leaders and senior representatives of signatory countries and co-guarantors of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework, to advance the implementation of the Framework and address challenges to peace and security, including impunity for gross human rights violations; provision of good offices to the follow-up mechanism on the repatriation of disarmed combatants, in line with international standards; and good offices to enhance coordination and cooperation against the armed groups in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo; and good offices to sustain international support for the implementation of the United Nations Strategy for Peace Consolidation, Conflict Prevention and Conflict Resolution in the Great Lakes Region and its action plan.				
<b>Consultation, advice and advocacy:</b> consultations to gain a shared regional and international assessment of the situation in the region; consultation and advice on a shared vision of regional human rights and humanitarian trends in the Great Lakes region; consultation and advice on delinking negative forces from natural resources revenues; advocacy to facilitate political conversation and agreement on regional integration with natural resources as a driver of shared prosperity; advocacy to advance gender equality in the region; and advocacy to promote a concerted approach on the way forward in the region.				
<b>Fact-finding, monitoring and investigation missions:</b> fact-finding mission on women's political participation; monitoring missions with the follow-up mechanism on the repatriation of disarmed combatants; and fact-finding and monitoring missions of the Technical Support Committee on priorities determined by the signatory countries.				
<b>D. Communication deliverables</b>				
<b>Outreach programmes, special events and information materials:</b> campaign in support of the implementation of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework; outreach towards strengthening partnerships with regional and international stakeholders on a concerted approach in support of the implementation of the Framework; and campaign to provide information on the United Nations Strategy for Peace Consolidation, Conflict Prevention and Conflict Resolution in the Great Lakes Region and its action plan.				
<b>External and media relations:</b> press conferences and briefings to raise awareness of key developments and promote support for addressing challenges to peace and security in the region.				
<b>Digital platforms and multimedia content:</b> video coverage of engagement with regional partners.				

## B. Proposed post and non-post resource requirements for 2022

### Resource requirements (regular budget)

Table 35

#### Financial resources

(Thousands of United States dollars)

Category of expenditure	2020	2021	2022		Variance
	Expenditure	Appropriation	Total requirements	Non-recurrent requirements	2022 vs. 2021 Increase/(decrease)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)=(3)-(2)
Military and police personnel costs	–	–	–	–	–
Civilian personnel costs	3 787.1	4 151.4	4 260.0	–	108.6
Operational costs	672.5	905.0	905.4	–	0.4
<b>Total (net of staff assessment)</b>	<b>4 459.6</b>	<b>5 056.4</b>	<b>5 165.4</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>109.0</b>

Table 36

#### Positions

	Professional and higher categories								General Service and related categories		National staff			Total		
	USG	ASG	D-2	D-1	P-5	P-4	P-3	P-2	Subtotal	Field/ Security Services	General Service <sup>a</sup>	Total inter-national	National Professional Officer		Local level	United Nations Volunteers
Approved 2021	1	–	1	1	4	6	4	–	17	1	1	19	1	7	–	27
Proposed 2022	1	–	1	1	5	7	5	–	20	1	1	22	1	7	–	30
<b>Change</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>3</b>

<sup>a</sup> Other level, unless otherwise stated.

257. The proposed resource requirements for 2022 for the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region amount to \$5,165,400 (net of staff assessment) and would provide for the salaries and common staff costs (\$4,260,000) for the continuation of 27 positions (1 Under-Secretary-General, 1 D-2, 1 D-1, 4 P-5, 6 P-4, 4 P-3, 1 Field Service, 1 General Service, 1 National Professional Officer and 7 Local level) and the proposed establishment of 3 international positions (1 P-5, 1 P-4 and 1 P-3), as well as operational costs (\$905,400), comprising costs for consultants and consulting services (\$25,100), official travel (\$291,300), facilities and infrastructure (\$61,600), ground transportation (\$39,000), air operations (\$68,600), communications and information technology (\$161,200), medical (\$14,000) and other supplies, services and equipment (\$244,600).

258. In 2022, the following changes are proposed to the staffing complement:

- Establishment of one position of Senior Political Affairs Officer (P-5) in the Office of the Special Envoy to provide strategic advice and support to the Special Envoy for the execution and delivery of the mandate, notably in the implementation of the United Nations Strategy for Peace Consolidation, Conflict Prevention and Conflict Resolution in the Great Lakes Region;
- Establishment of one position of Political Affairs Officer (P-4) in the Office of the Chief of Political Affairs to provide dedicated expertise to support the strengthening of partnerships between the mission and regional and subregional organizations;

- (c) Establishment of one position of Finance and Budget Officer (P-3) in the Office of the Chief of Staff to provide strengthened oversight and management of all financial reporting and business processes of the Office of the Special Envoy.
259. For international positions, vacancy rates of 5.3 per cent and 50 per cent have been applied to estimates for continuing and new positions, respectively, and resource requirements for national positions are estimated on the assumption of full incumbency.
260. The increase in the requirements proposed for 2022 compared with the appropriation for 2021 is attributable mainly to additional requirements under civilian personnel costs resulting from the proposed establishment of three international positions, partly offset by a lower percentage of common staff costs to salary costs of 63.8 per cent for 2022, compared with 82.2 per cent applied to the 2021 approved budget for international posts, and a lower requirement for national staff costs due to foreign exchange fluctuations.

**Extrabudgetary resources**

261. In 2021, the mission projects that it will mobilize extrabudgetary resources in the estimated amount of \$1.3 million to support the mission in its implementation of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework through various projects under different thematic areas.
262. In 2022, the mission projects that it will mobilize extrabudgetary resources in the estimated amount of \$1.6 million. Extrabudgetary resources will be utilized to support the mission in its implementation of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework through various projects under different thematic areas.



## 9. Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen

(\$17,601,800)

### Foreword

Yemen and its people are enduring a period of sustained and deepening suffering, tumult and insecurity. The humanitarian situation continues to worsen, and the economy and State institutions are in severe danger of disintegration. Civilians continue to bear the brunt of the military operations in numerous areas of the country. The coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic has severely affected the country, overwhelming the embattled health services and deepening economic and humanitarian suffering. The pandemic has also served to underline the grim impact of the war and the depth of the political divisions between the parties.

Amid the multitude of challenges, the political process and its promise of a negotiated solution to the conflict remain at the forefront of my efforts. At several moments during my discussions with Yemeni leaders, I have sensed promising signs of momentum towards reaching a negotiated political settlement. And the parties are well aware of the parameters of a solution. Progress, however, has been grinding, not least due to the slower tempo of negotiations caused by the pandemic.

The parties have shown that political negotiations can produce tangible benefits for the Yemeni people. In September 2020, the parties met face-to-face in Switzerland and reached an agreement on the release of more than 1,000 prisoners and detainees, in line with the commitments made in Stockholm in 2018. The largest prisoner exchange since the start of the conflict, the releases brought enormous relief to the prisoners and their families. The ceasefire in Hudaydah agreed in Stockholm broadly continues to hold, and humanitarian aid continues to flow through the port, although restrictions on commercial goods and, most importantly, fuel remain, which contribute to the worsening humanitarian situation. Following months of negotiations on implementation, the Riyadh Agreement signed in November 2019 has produced a new Government, based on political partnership, which continues to function from Aden.

Unfortunately, alongside these signs of hope have been acts setting back the negotiations between the parties. The periodic intensification of military operations, particularly in Ma'rib, the December 2020 attack on the Aden airport and the continued attacks on Saudi territory have been a severe challenge to the peace process and have increased the threat of the conflict to regional stability.

The negotiations to end the conflict will undoubtedly introduce new challenges, including with regard to political and military arrangements that will silence the guns and forge a new political partnership. After several years of war, this will be no small task.

The guidance that I have received from women, youth and civil society representatives has been of vital importance to my efforts. Even during the COVID-19 pandemic, my Office has increased its outreach to an ever-widening range of stakeholders, using innovative technologies. The space for these voices to inform the peace process must be maintained and expanded. I will continue to invest in outreach to women, youth and civil society, and will urge the parties to do the same. It is of vital importance that the parties and the international community hear the voices calling for peace and what needs to be done to make it happen.

*(Signed)* Martin Griffiths  
Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen

## A. Proposed programme plan for 2022 and programme performance for 2020

### Overall orientation

#### Mandates and background

263. The Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen is responsible for carrying out the good offices of the Secretary-General in order to enable the resumption of a peaceful, inclusive, orderly and Yemeni-led political transition process that meets the legitimate demands and aspirations of the Yemeni people, including women and youth, for peaceful change and meaningful political, economic and social reform, as set out in the Initiative of the Gulf Cooperation Council and its implementation mechanism and the outcomes of the comprehensive National Dialogue Conference. The mandate derives from Security Council resolution 2014 (2011) and from subsequent Council resolutions, including resolutions 2051 (2012), 2140 (2014), 2201 (2015), 2216 (2015), 2266 (2015), 2342 (2017), 2402 (2018), 2451 (2018), 2452 (2019), 2456 (2019), 2481 (2019) and 2505 (2020), as well as exchanges of letters between the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council (S/2012/469 and S/2012/470, S/2016/488 and S/2016/489, and S/2018/126 and S/2018/127).
264. To ensure the full and effective implementation of Security Council resolutions 2014 (2011) and 2051 (2012), together with the political transition agreed in November 2011 under the Initiative of the Gulf Cooperation Council and its implementation mechanism for the political transition process in Yemen, the Secretary-General established the Office of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Yemen, in accordance with an exchange of letters with the President of the Security Council in June 2012, which was then subsumed into the Office of the Special Envoy (see S/2012/469 and S/2012/470; see also S/2015/283 and S/2015/284, and S/2018/126 and S/2018/127).
265. The overall aim of the mission is to provide support to the Yemen peace process and the implementation of any eventual agreements to enable the resumption of a peaceful, inclusive, orderly and Yemeni-led transition. In line with Security Council resolution 2216 (2015), as well as other Council resolutions on Yemen, including resolutions 2014 (2011), 2051 (2012), 2140 (2014), 2201 (2015), 2451 (2018) and 2452 (2019), and the letter dated 24 May 2016 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2016/488), the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen will mediate between the parties with a view to ending the conflict. The mission will provide facilitation and technical advice on the negotiation and design of interim security arrangements, the restoration of State institutions and preparations for the resumption of political dialogue, including on finalizing and adopting a draft constitution and an electoral road map and on national reconciliation and transitional justice.
266. The mission also participates in the mediation of the political and security arrangements to end the current conflict between the Government of Yemen and the Houthi movement and in supporting the resumption of the political transition, which began in 2011 and was interrupted by the current conflict. The mission shares its support component with the United Nations Mission to Support the Hudaydah Agreement (UNMHA), which also reports to Headquarters through the Special Envoy.

### Programme of work

#### Objective

267. The objective, to which this mission contributes, is to achieve a negotiated political settlement between the parties to end the conflict in Yemen and enable the resumption of a peaceful, inclusive, orderly and Yemeni-led political transition that will lead Yemenis towards a path of sustainable peace.

## Strategy

268. To contribute to the objective, the mission will utilize negotiations, consultations and shuttle diplomacy to achieve an agreement between the parties to end the conflict in Yemen and resume the political transition.
269. The mission will support the Yemen peace process by providing political, technical and logistical support, including in supporting the parties to resume the political process, implement the Stockholm Agreement and de-escalate the conflict at the local, national and regional levels.
270. The mission will work on a consultative process which will include women, civil society and youth. The mission will continue to assess the sentiment, views and recommendations of Yemenis through direct outreach and engagement or indirect and virtual methods. The mission will also continue to integrate gender responsiveness and youth engagement in its multitrack diplomacy and peace negotiations on the peace agreement and the post-transition process.
271. Mission support functions for the Office of the Special Envoy and UNMHA are shared. In 2022, UNMHA will undertake budget-neutral restructuring to respond to a changed and evolving political context and operational environment in order to strengthen mandate implementation. This will focus on the mission's balanced representation and capacity in the territories controlled by each side. There are therefore updates to mission support functions funded by the Office to reflect these changes.
272. The mission plans to support Member States on issues related to COVID-19 by engaging, as necessary, with the United Nations country team and supporting Member States with logistical arrangements in support of planned vaccination delivery programmes by the COVID-19 Vaccine Global Access (COVAX) Facility for Yemen-based staff, and with logistical and administrative support for possible medical evacuation operations.
273. The above-mentioned work is expected to result in the following:
  - (a) A peace agreement with the parties to determine interim security and political arrangements for a sustainable, peaceful and inclusive transitional period;
  - (b) Development of an inclusive participatory mechanism for diverse political and social Yemeni stakeholders, including women and youth, to inform the track 1 United Nations-facilitated political process;
  - (c) Increased confidence of the parties towards a resumption of political talks, including through the ceasefire mechanism;
  - (d) Refined security governance options at both the national and local levels;
  - (e) Effective and transparent implementation of negotiated transitional security arrangements;
  - (f) Prioritized work with community safety partners to support dialogue between communities and security actors;
  - (g) Ongoing utilization of the Peace Support Facility managed by UNDP to support violence reduction at the community level and strengthen civilian oversight of the security sector;
  - (h) Development of an inclusive transitional agenda that will be informed by women's and gender perspectives and will include implementation mechanisms and bodies;
  - (i) Continued implementation of the Stockholm Agreement, including the uninterrupted flow of commercial imports, including fuel, into the Hudaydah ports, and further prisoner exchanges;
  - (j) Women's and gender perspectives informing all substantive areas, agreements, arrangements and implementation mechanisms, when relevant.
274. The planned support on issues related to COVID-19 is expected to result in facilitating the work of the United Nations country team in Yemen, including, where practicable, logistical support for Yemenis in need of vital medical care.

## External factors for 2022

275. With regard to the external factors, the overall plan for 2022 is based on the following planning assumptions:
- (a) The parties to the conflict will engage in the peace process in the form of successive rounds of peace consultations under the auspices of the Special Envoy, with the aim of reaching a comprehensive negotiated political settlement;
  - (b) The Yemeni Women's Technical Advisory Group will continue to exist and contribute to the process by advising the mission and the peace process on women's concerns and perspectives;
  - (c) The mission will have greater access to key Yemeni stakeholders, albeit with some restrictions imposed by the parties and the security situation on the ground.
276. With regard to the COVID-19 pandemic, the proposed programme plan is based on the assumption that the proposed deliverables and activities for 2022 will be feasible to implement. However, if the pandemic were to continue to have an impact on the planned deliverables and activities, they would be adjusted during 2022 within the scope of the overall objectives, strategies and mandates. Any such adjustments would be reported as part of the programme performance information.
277. The mission integrates a gender perspective in its substantive work and operational activities, deliverables and results, as appropriate. These efforts contribute to a more inclusive peace process in Yemen, which would contribute to the viability and sustainability of any agreement. The mission will work to increase the representation and meaningful participation of Yemeni women across all tracks of the peace process, with a particular focus on formal negotiations. The mission will engage with initiatives at the national and local levels that promote the political participation and representation of women, their full citizenship rights and the incorporation of their human rights, security needs and concerns in the planning and preparation for the transition and early recovery, conflict resolution and peacebuilding processes. Gender perspectives will be mainstreamed into all cross-mission policies and activities, including through relevant partnerships, in line with Security Council mandates under the women and peace and security agenda.
278. In line with the United Nations Disability Inclusion Strategy, the mission has reviewed and specifically examined the Strategy with a view to advancing disability inclusion, and has included mitigating measures to overcome challenges while operationalizing disability inclusion. These measures include improvements in the accessibility of facilities, facilities management, security and other areas, and the adaptation of office layout, amenities, furniture and fixtures to facilitate easy access and use by persons with disabilities.
279. With regard to cooperation with other entities in the implementation of the good offices mandate, the Special Envoy and his Office will continue to engage closely with Member States and the Security Council, as well as international and regional organizations, including the League of Arab States, the Gulf Cooperation Council, the European Union and other international partners. Furthermore, the Office will continue to pursue joint efforts with international financial institutions to facilitate joint response strategies for post-agreement planning, including recovery and peacebuilding activities.
280. With regard to inter-agency coordination and liaison, the mission will continue its cooperation with the Resident/Humanitarian Coordinator and the United Nations country team in Yemen. In addition, United Nations agencies working in Yemen are represented in the Inter-Agency Task Force on Yemen at Headquarters, which ensures the coordination and coherence of United Nations political, humanitarian, human rights and other efforts in Yemen. Work on the draft constitution, electoral reform and other transition tasks will be conducted in close coordination with the Electoral Assistance Division of the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, the Resident Coordinator and the United Nations country team.
281. The Special Envoy and the Office will continue to consult and coordinate closely with the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and special political missions in the region, as

appropriate. In line with Security Council resolution 2452 (2019), the mission closely coordinates with UNMHA, which reports to Headquarters through the Special Envoy and the Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, and shares an integrated support structure with UNMHA.

### **Evaluation activities**

282. The Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs will lead a systematic assessment with the overall purpose of improving the gender sensitivity of the political analyses developed by the Department and the special political missions.

### **Programme performance in 2020**

#### **Building momentum towards a comprehensive political solution<sup>9</sup>**

283. The mission conducted months of shuttle diplomacy between the parties to the conflict; due to the COVID pandemic, many of these visits were virtual. These consultations focused on the Joint Declaration, which aimed at bringing the parties to the conflict to agreement on three areas: a nationwide ceasefire, humanitarian and economic measures, and the resumption of political consultations on a final negotiated political settlement to the conflict. The mission also prepared for a ceasefire mechanism and developed options for security arrangements which will support the Special Envoy and encourage the parties to resume political talks. Work was undertaken to support efforts to reduce the intensity of the armed conflict and its impact on the population, and to prepare armed groups and local communities for future security sector reform and broader transitional security arrangements. Furthermore, the mission moved forward with confidence-building measures, including efforts to facilitate an agreement between the parties to ensure the regular flow of fuel and other essential commodities into Hudaydah port, and co-chairing with the International Committee of the Red Cross the 4th meeting of the Supervisory Committee for the Implementation of the Stockholm Agreement on Detainees to work on the Prisoners Exchange Agreement that was part of the Stockholm Agreement, which led to the release of 1,056 conflict-related detainees and prisoners. The mission worked with the parties and United Nations partners throughout 2020 to help efforts to secure urgent access for a United Nations-supervised international technical mission to assess and undertake initial repairs on the FSO Safer tanker. The mission undertook monitoring and assessment of the implementation of the Riyadh Agreement brokered under the mediation of Saudi Arabia, as an important parameter that affects the parties' readiness to resume the political process.

#### *Progress towards the attainment of the objective, and performance measure*

284. The above-mentioned work contributed to building momentum towards a comprehensive political solution; however, it did not meet the target of the adoption of joint outcome documents arising from the consultations and negotiations, and the formation of specific mechanisms to implement the agreements reached, as reflected in the proposed programme budget for 2020. The parties were unable to reach a consensus on the joint outcome documents due to diverging viewpoints, particularly on certain economic and humanitarian aspects of the text, and a lack of sufficient momentum to reduce the level of military confrontation (see table 37).

<sup>9</sup> As reflected in the proposed programme budget for 2020 (A/74/6 (Sect. 3)/Add.2).

Table 37  
Performance measure

<i>2018 (actual)</i>	<i>2019 (actual)</i>	<i>2020 (actual)</i>
Confidence-building measures agreed	Talks on transitional political and security arrangements initiated; inclusivity (the south and women) enhanced; and implementation of confidence-building measures in progress	Joint outcome documents arising from the consultations and negotiations not agreed; formation of specific mechanisms to implement the agreements not achieved

### **Impact of COVID-19 on programme delivery**

285. Owing to the impact of COVID-19 during 2020, the mission changed its approach to shuttle diplomacy by utilizing digital tools to engage with the parties to the conflict. Virtual platforms have also allowed more Yemeni women to join conversations, and the office held a two-week-long track 2 coordination meeting in April 2020 and its first virtual consultations with some 600 Yemenis in June 2020. The COVID-19 pandemic has also provided some opportunity for engagement with security actors on capacity-building for COVID-safe policing procedures. These changes had an impact on the programme performance in 2020.
286. At the same time, however, the mission, wherever possible, has provided logistical support to Member States within the overall scope of its objectives with relation to COVID-19 issues, including support of planned COVAX vaccination delivery programmes for Yemen-based staff, and with logistical and administrative support for possible medical evacuation operations.

### **Planned result for 2022**

#### **Expanding the mission's political engagement and consultations to better include diverse Yemeni perspectives and enhance impetus towards a Yemeni-owned and sustainable peace**

287. The mission conducted work in 2020 that contributed to its objective of achieving a negotiated political settlement between the parties to end the conflict in Yemen and enable the resumption of a peaceful, inclusive, orderly and Yemeni-led political transition. The mission expanded efforts to broaden inclusion in the peace process, including through greater and more diversified outreach to civil society and consultations with Yemeni women, youth and different political actors through the mission's Aden, Amman and Sana'a offices, and virtually. The mission engaged with partners to support efforts to reduce the intensity of the armed conflict by addressing some of the security needs of the local population. Through expanding consultations to civil society and representatives of the business community, the mission was able to further develop the ceasefire mechanism and further strengthened its outreach to the Yemeni media constituency through in-person and virtual engagement and surveys, such as by the Special Envoy virtually meeting with representatives of civil society from Ta'izz in December 2020 to gather their views on a solution for Ta'izz in line with the Stockholm Agreement and to solicit ideas on how to improve the situation in Yemen. The mission also continued to explore ways in which women's perspectives can be more actively considered by the parties to the conflict and is committed to actively consulting women, including through forthcoming digital discussions; the mission held virtual consultations with Yemeni women in June 2020 on gender, ceasefires and community safety and a December 2020 digital discussion on women's everyday peace perspectives. In October 2020, the mission and UN-Women in Yemen renewed their commitment to the women and peace and security agenda and to advancing the meaningful participation of women and their inclusion in the peace process during a virtual event commemorating the twentieth anniversary of Security Council resolution [1325 \(2000\)](#). The Special Envoy also met and consulted with the Yemeni Women's Technical Advisory Group in March 2020 on the Joint Declaration and in September 2020 on women's priorities for the peace agreement.

Furthermore, the mission conducted capacity-, knowledge- and skills-building sessions and exercises with the Yemeni Women's Technical Advisory Group in September and November 2020.

*Lessons learned and planned change*

288. The lesson for the mission was that it needs to more effectively engage with Yemeni representatives to build a more inclusive peace process. In applying the lesson, the mission will actively seek to create additional opportunities to engage directly with diverse Yemeni stakeholders to enhance their focus on and relationship with the track 1 process and also engage with Yemeni journalists and media professionals in an effort to strengthen transparency and to address misinformation and disinformation around the process. Further expanding and regularizing consultation with these actors is a priority for the mission, albeit while working in a difficult and restrictive political environment. The mission will emphasize to the parties the need to maintain the focus on the political process. The mission will also engage with armed groups to better understand their concerns, as well as their political and security views, for a future peace process that enhances the tangibility of the link between the track 2 and track 1 processes.

*Expected progress towards the attainment of the objective, and performance measure*

289. This work is expected to contribute to the objective, as demonstrated by the number of meetings held by the mission with different stakeholder groups and the number of proposals received on specific issues related to the political process in 2020. The mission will also continue working with partners supporting community safety initiatives to facilitate dialogue between communities and armed groups and other community safety activities with the goal of reducing violence at the community level and strengthening the capacity of civilian oversight of the security sector. The mission will continue to use new technologies to increase its reach with diverse audiences, similarly to when it conducted its first virtual conversations with some 600 Yemenis in June 2020, 30 per cent of whom were women and over 50 per cent of whom logged into the discussions from inside Yemen, to consult on the proposals included in the Joint Declaration (see table 38).

Table 38

**Performance measure**

<i>2018 (actual)</i>	<i>2019 (actual)</i>	<i>2020 (actual)</i>	<i>2021 (planned)</i>	<i>2022 (planned)</i>
Confidence-building measures agreed	Talks on transitional political and security arrangements initiated; inclusivity (the south and women) enhanced; and implementation of confidence-building measures in progress	Adoption of joint outcome documents from consultations and negotiations	Implementation of joint outcome documents, including specific mechanisms that involve diverse Yemeni perspectives	Expanding the mission's political engagement and consultations to better include diverse Yemeni perspectives and enhance impetus towards a Yemeni-owned and sustainable peace

**Deliverables**

290. Table 39 below lists all deliverables, by category and subcategory, for the period 2020–2022 that contributed and are expected to contribute to the attainment of the objective stated above.

Table 39  
**Deliverables for the period 2020–2022, by category and subcategory**

<i>Category and subcategory</i>	<i>2020 planned</i>	<i>2020 actual</i>	<i>2021 planned</i>	<i>2022 planned</i>
<b>A. Facilitation of the intergovernmental process and expert bodies</b>				
<b>Substantive services for meetings</b> (number of three-hour meetings)	<b>12</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>12</b>
Meetings of the Security Council	12	12	17	12
<b>C. Substantive deliverables</b>				
<b>Good offices:</b> provision of good offices to end the conflict.				
<b>Consultation, advice and advocacy:</b> consultations and advice on political and security proposals aimed at mediating an agreement to end the conflict and enable the completion of the political transition.				

## B. Proposed post and non-post resource requirements for 2022

### Resource requirements (regular budget)

Table 40  
**Financial resources**  
 (Thousands of United States dollars)

<i>Category of expenditure</i>	<i>2020</i>	<i>2021</i>	<i>2022</i>		<i>Variance</i>
	<i>Expenditure</i>	<i>Appropriation</i>	<i>Total requirements</i>	<i>Non-recurrent requirements</i>	
	<i>(1)</i>	<i>(2)</i>	<i>(3)</i>	<i>(4)</i>	<i>(5)</i>
Military and police personnel costs	–	–	–	–	–
Civilian personnel costs	11 296.6	11 266.1	11 427.1	–	161.0
Operational costs	6 819.1	6 285.0	6 174.7	–	(110.3)
<b>Total (net of staff assessment)</b>	<b>18 115.7</b>	<b>17 551.1</b>	<b>17 601.8</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>50.7</b>

Table 41  
**Positions**

	<i>Professional and higher categories</i>									<i>General Service and related categories</i>		<i>National staff</i>			<i>Total</i>	
	<i>USG</i>	<i>ASG</i>	<i>D-2</i>	<i>D-1</i>	<i>P-5</i>	<i>P-4</i>	<i>P-3</i>	<i>P-2</i>	<i>Subtotal</i>	<i>Field/ Security Services</i>	<i>General Service</i>	<i>Total inter-national</i>	<i>National Professional Officer</i>	<i>Local level</i>		<i>United Nations Volunteers</i>
Approved 2021	1	–	1	1	6	15	11	–	35	25	1	61	10	29	–	100
Proposed 2022	1	–	1	1	6	15	13	–	37	25	1	63	10	29	–	102
<b>Change</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>2</b>

291. During 2022, the Office of the Special Envoy and UNMHA will continue to deploy an integrated mission support structure, which enables both entities to achieve economies of scale and minimize duplication. A rebalancing exercise has been undertaken in 2021 to review the structure and capacity of the two missions in their respective areas of operation.

292. With the rebalancing of UNMHA representation and capacity in the respective territories in Yemen, the combined mission support structure requires its presence on the ground to be strengthened in

order to enhance the support for the work of the Special Envoy, including by intensifying engagement with Yemeni counterparts based in Yemen. Mission support functions in Aden are also proposed to be strengthened to ensure the presence of senior mission support personnel in the duty station to coordinate all mission support activities there. It is also proposed to establish a coordination function in Amman to coordinate with ministries and departments of host Governments and other regional stakeholders. The missions will continue operating in the existing locations of Amman, Hudaydah, Sana'a and Aden, with office and accommodation costs shared between the two missions.

293. The proposed resource requirements for 2022 for the Office of the Special Envoy amount to \$17,601,800 (net of staff assessment) and would provide for the salaries and common staff costs (\$11,427,100) for the continuation of 100 positions (1 Under-Secretary-General, 1 D-2, 1 D-1, 6 P-5, 15 P-4, 11 P-3, 25 Field Service, 1 General Service (Other level), 10 National Professional Officer and 29 Local level), the proposed establishment of two P-3 positions and the proposed redeployment of seven positions, as well as operational costs (\$6,174,700) comprising: official travel (\$544,400), facilities and infrastructure (\$2,932,700), ground transportation (\$339,300), air operations (\$1,075,700), communications and information technology (\$737,600), medical (\$300,500) and other supplies, services and equipment (\$244,500).
294. In 2022, the establishment of two positions and the redeployment of seven positions are proposed:

*Front Office of the Special Envoy*

- (a) Redeployment of one Team Assistant (Local level) position from the Political Affairs Section in Amman to the Front Office of the Special Envoy as Administrative Assistant (Local level) to address increased needs for administrative support and coordination between the Aden, Amman and Sana'a offices;

*Security Sector Section*

- (b) Redeployment of one Senior Security Sector Reform Officer (P-5) position from Sana'a to Amman to coordinate directly with the Special Envoy, Deputy Head of Mission and all other substantive chiefs (Political Affairs and Public Information) based in Amman;

*Political Affairs Section*

- (c) Redeployment of one Associate Political Affairs Officer (National Professional Officer) position from Sana'a to Aden to liaise with Government of Yemen officials in Aden as well as political actors and interlocutors in Aden and other parts in the south;

*Public Information Section*

- (d) Redeployment of one Public Information Officer (P-3) position from Amman to Sana'a to address misinformation and disinformation campaigns, increase awareness of the role of the office and the mediation process, engage directly with the Yemeni media constituency, especially the independent segment, and strengthen the relationship with peace advocates inside Yemen;

*Office of the Chief of Mission Support*

- (e) Establishment of one Coordination Officer (P-3) position in the Office of the Chief of Mission Support in Amman to coordinate with ministries and departments of the host Government and other countries of the region in support of the regional and international travels of the Special Envoy, and other teams, owing to the increased pace of peace negotiations in the Mission and the increased level of interactions with UNMHA stakeholders in Yemen and the wider region;
- (f) Establishment of one Administrative Officer (P-3) position in the Office of the Chief of Mission Support in Aden to provide administrative support and coordinate all mission support functions

in Aden, in line with the result of a rebalancing exercise, which highlighted the need for an Administrative Officer to be responsible for all mission support activities in each duty station;

- (g) Redeployment of one Medical Officer (National Professional Officer) position from Sana'a to Aden. The medical services in Sana'a and Aden are provided to Secretariat entities and to United Nations agencies, funds and programmes through UNDP clinics on a cost-shared basis. On the advice of the Chief Physician in Yemen, there is a need for a locally qualified medical doctor to support the Aden office, while the clinic in Sana'a does not require such capacity;

*Procurement Unit*

- (h) Redeployment of one Procurement Officer (P-3) position from Amman to Sana'a to provide the capacity necessary to support procurement operations in Yemen in all locations (Sana'a, Aden and Hudaydah) and for better coordination and provision of expert advice within the operations hub in Sana'a;

*Movement Control, Transport and Aviation Unit*

- (i) Redeployment of one Movement Control Assistant (Field Service) position from Sana'a to Amman. The position is approved for Sana'a and is currently temporarily deployed in Amman to facilitate the movement of cargo from the Amman hub.
295. Vacancy rates of 15 per cent and 50 per cent have been applied to estimates for continuing and new international positions, respectively, and vacancy rates of 15 per cent and 20 per cent have been applied to estimates for National Professional Officer and Local level positions, respectively.
296. The increase in requirements proposed for 2022 compared with the appropriation for 2021 is attributable primarily to increased requirements for civilian personnel costs, resulting mainly from the proposed establishment of two positions at the P-3 level, and the revised salary scales. The overall increase in the requirements is offset in part by: (a) reduced requirements for international positions owing to the application of a lower percentage of common staff costs to salary costs of 70.9 per cent, compared with 79.8 per cent applied in 2021; and (b) reduced requirements for operational costs, resulting mainly from a reduced cost-share ratio of the rental and operation costs for one fixed-wing aircraft with the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq, from 40 per cent in 2021 to 30 per cent in 2022, and reduced requirements for freight on acquisitions and non-standardized freight services, and additional requirements for medical services due to a cost-sharing arrangement for the collective response to the COVID-19 pandemic by the United Nations country team in Yemen, partly offset by higher costs for rental of premises, environmental safety and accessibility initiatives, and increased requirements for communications and information technology services.

**Extrabudgetary resources**

297. In 2021, the Office of the Special Envoy projects that extrabudgetary resources carried over from 2020 in the amount of \$73,900 will be utilized to support Yemeni women's groups and build upon their advisory capacities and their ability to more effectively contribute to the peace process; to develop training and capacity-building resources and materials to bolster Yemeni women's skills and knowledge on conducting effective political advocacy; and to consult with women peace leaders on the key substantive issues to be covered in the peace agreement. No extrabudgetary resources are expected for 2022.

## 10. Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Myanmar

*(\$1,169,700)*

### Foreword

The democratic transition in Myanmar came to an abrupt halt when the Myanmar military declared a state of emergency and detained political leaders and others on the basis of contesting the outcomes of an election that clearly gave a strengthened mandate to the ruling National League for Democracy. While the population engaged in peaceful protests, intimidation of journalists and activists rapidly turned into violent repression by the security forces, against a backdrop of the deprivation caused by the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic.

It is in this difficult context, marked by uncertainty, grave concerns for the humanitarian consequences of the military's actions and ongoing international divisions over the multifaceted issues affecting Myanmar and regional stability, that the present budget proposal has been prepared. The shockwave created by the events in February, coupled with the COVID-19 pandemic, will create further hardship for over a million people in Myanmar who rely on humanitarian assistance facilitated by the United Nations. An additional significant number of refugees continue to live in dire conditions in the camps across the border in Bangladesh.

Past years saw minimal progress on the safe, voluntary, dignified and sustainable repatriation of the Rohingya and other refugees to their places of origin or choice, as underlying issues of conflict, persecution and discrimination remained largely unaddressed. These were compounded by armed conflict between the Tatmadaw and ethnic armed organizations and by the COVID-19 pandemic. Incipient post-election overtures, including the de facto ceasefire in Rakhine State established after the November 2020 elections and signs of growing solidarity between communities, have been jeopardized by the transfer of all legislative, executive and judicial powers to the military under the Commander-in-Chief. These developments have gravely undermined momentum for social cohesion.

In 2022, it will be critical to continue pressing for genuine accountability for grave human rights violations and the effective implementation, in full, of the recommendations of the Advisory Commission on Rakhine State, to help facilitate refugee returns. Complexities in Rakhine State are not limited to the plight of the Rohingya, however. Parts of Rakhine, and other States, continue to be inaccessible to humanitarian workers, with COVID-19-related movement restrictions coming on top of existing access constraints. This further jeopardizes prospects for returns. Enabling lifesaving assistance to populations in need will therefore remain another focus area in 2022.

International unity remains critical. In 2022, the urgency in helping consolidate nascent pluralistic democracy in Myanmar should be balanced with due consideration of the various complex domestic challenges following decades of military rule. As I will continue bridging different views inside Myanmar, in the region and among the membership of the United Nations, I count on the international community's backing for the restoration of the democratic path in Myanmar. For my part, I pledge to continue coordinating a coherent system-wide approach and to engage Member States in a timely manner to help mobilize collective support.

*(Signed)* Christine Schraner **Burgener**  
Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Myanmar

## **A. Proposed programme plan for 2022 and programme performance for 2020**

### **Overall orientation**

#### **Mandates and background**

298. The Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Myanmar is responsible for the provision of the Secretary-General's good offices through discussions involving all relevant stakeholders and assistance to the Government of Myanmar. The mandate was defined by the General Assembly in its resolution [72/248](#), and renewed in its resolutions [73/264](#) and [74/246](#). On 31 December 2020, the mandate was extended until 31 December 2021 by the Assembly in its resolution [75/238](#). The next extension of the mandate will be considered by the Assembly at its seventy-sixth session.
299. The Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Myanmar will continue to provide the good offices of the Secretary-General by promoting the return to democratic reforms and coordinating the Organization's efforts. Strategic priorities for the mission in 2022 include helping Myanmar address the underlying issues and efforts related to creating conducive conditions for the safe, voluntary, dignified and sustainable return of refugees and forcibly displaced persons to their place of origin or choice; facilitating unhindered humanitarian access to populations in need; and supporting national reconciliation. Accountability for those responsible for mass atrocities and human rights violations and abuses, the promotion of human rights more broadly, and the meaningful participation of women in all decision-making processes will remain a cross-cutting focus. This will require the Special Envoy to work in close and trusted partnership with the authorities, local communities and civil society, and stakeholders in the region, notably the Government of Bangladesh and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), while keeping the broader membership of the United Nations informed of the Envoy's activities and their impact.

### **Programme of work**

#### **Objective**

300. The objective, to which the Office contributes, is to advance national reconciliation and the democratic reform process in Myanmar.

#### **Strategy**

301. To contribute to the objective, the Office will closely liaise with and assist the authorities of Myanmar and Bangladesh in their bilateral efforts to create a conducive environment for the voluntary, safe, dignified and sustainable return of the forcibly displaced Rohingya in Bangladesh to Rakhine State. To that end, the Special Envoy will continue promoting a political solution in consultation with the Rohingya and other key stakeholders, and in line with recommendations of the Advisory Commission on Rakhine State, while helping alleviate tensions through support for intercommunal dialogue and social cohesion initiatives in Rakhine State, in addition to facilitating inclusive solutions for the acute humanitarian and development needs for all communities there and other areas of Myanmar, including in close cooperation with ASEAN. The Envoy will press for local initiatives to be geared towards the sustainable integration of returnees and internally displaced persons, in line with international standards for durable solutions, including as regards implementation of the Government's national strategy on the resettlement of internally displaced persons and the closure of camps for internally displaced persons. At the international and regional levels, the Special Envoy will continue to mobilize constructive support from regional and international stakeholders aimed at solutions that address root causes of conflict inside Myanmar,

and implications in the region, including illicit activities and maritime movements of refugees and migrants. Within the United Nations system, as the Special Envoy helps coordinate the Organization's efforts in support of repatriation of forcibly displaced persons, the Special Envoy will build on the comparative advantages of specialized agencies, funds and programmes, notably UNHCR, UNDP and Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, to advance progress on conditions for returns. The Office's support for the work of the United Nations country team on the full and effective implementation of the recommendations of the Advisory Commission on Rakhine State will be part of that.

302. Building on the coordinated system-wide support for the country's COVID-19 response, the Office will engage the authorities of Myanmar towards an inclusive response, the delivery of lifesaving assistance and COVID-19 prevention and response measures for all vulnerable communities, especially conflict-affected populations, internally displaced persons and returning migrants, against a backdrop of exacerbated humanitarian needs due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The Special Envoy will advocate with the authorities of Myanmar to lift ongoing restrictions on humanitarian access in all conflict areas, in particular in Rakhine and Chin States. The Office will pursue a strengthened partnership with ASEAN.
303. The Office will promote inclusive political dialogue and solutions to the decades-old armed strife between the Myanmar military and dozens of ethnic armed organizations. Democratic and peaceful pathways to address grievances of all ethnic minorities remain the Office's core focus. Existing and new initiatives promoting tolerance, respect for diversity and fundamental freedoms, such as outreach campaigns and confidence-building measures, will receive the Office's backing, countrywide. The Office will press for national dialogue to promote peaceful coexistence and inclusive democracy through continued engagement with all sides and ensure ownership by Myanmar of efforts against incitement, hate speech and discrimination. Assistance will also be offered to strengthen institution-building and structural reforms to uphold the rule of law, human rights and democratic principles, through a participatory and inclusive approach, including efforts to ensure the independence of the judiciary and reform of the security sector. In this regard, the Special Envoy will continue to fulfil the bridging role between civilian and military actors.
304. The above-mentioned work is expected to result in:
  - (a) Increased trust between the Governments of Bangladesh and Myanmar, with the latter implementing concrete measures to improve conditions for the safe, voluntary, dignified and sustainable return of forcibly displaced populations;
  - (b) A de-escalation in tensions between civilian political actors, the Myanmar Armed Forces (Tatmadaw), ethnic armed organizations and civil society stakeholders, and an increase in trust among different ethnic communities.

### **External factors for 2022**

305. With regard to external factors, the overall plan for 2022 is based on the following planning assumptions:
  - (a) All political actors will cooperate in the greater interest of national stability, unity and democratic reforms. The deep fault lines between domestic stakeholders, exacerbated by the military takeover in February 2021 and subsequent violent repression of protesters and activists, will present a significant challenge in securing a coherent policy, notably for national reconciliation and democratic reforms, as well as for the return of forcibly displaced persons;
  - (b) Authorities in Myanmar and Bangladesh will manifest clear political will supported by concrete actions for the safe, dignified, voluntary and sustainable return and reintegration of Rohingya Muslims in Myanmar;

- (c) COVID-19 travel restrictions and the declaration of a state of emergency on 1 February 2021 will continue to pose challenges to access by the Special Envoy and the Office to and inside Myanmar, as well as to the ability of humanitarian actors to deliver aid;
  - (d) Illicit activities and related financial flows, closely linked to conflict in Myanmar, will continue to hamper conflict resolution, despite “the eradication of illicit drugs” being part of the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement, and impede the strengthening of rule of law, institution-building, socioeconomic and development efforts;
  - (e) The authorities are willing to seek compromises in the peace process negotiations with ethnic armed organizations around questions of power-sharing and federalism, while they will also proceed to open individual negotiations with non-signatory ethnic armed organizations, which they previously rejected;
  - (f) Political fragility, lack of capacity in governance, corruption, inadequate economic growth, recurring humanitarian pressures, poverty, displacement, unemployment, migration and returns will constrain social and economic development that is reliant on donor funding and foreign investment.
306. With regard to the COVID-19 pandemic, the proposed programme plan is based on the assumption that the proposed deliverables and activities for 2022 will be feasible to implement. However, if the pandemic were to continue to have an impact on the planned deliverables and activities, they would be adjusted during 2022 within the scope of the overall objectives, strategies and mandates. Any such adjustments would be reported as part of the programme performance information.
307. The Office integrates a gender perspective in its operational activities, seizing every opportunity and encounter with government and international stakeholders to highlight the different needs of women and men, and push for the full, safe, equal, effective and meaningful involvement of women from all communities in decision-making processes, particularly those related to peace and security matters. To gain an improved understanding of women’s perspectives, livelihoods and needs, and the contributions they can make to peace and reconciliation, the Office continued informal consultations with women from different ethnic, religious and socioeconomic backgrounds in 2020, which is central to the Office’s activities. As appropriate, the Office will strive in its activities to create better understanding of, and seek solutions for, gender-related issues, including but not limited to sexual and gender-based violence and the underrepresentation of women in public life.
308. With regard to cooperation with other entities, the Office works in partnership with ASEAN, other regional organizations, neighbouring countries and international donors to mobilize constructive support to address underlying issues hampering democratization and refugee returns. The Office also offers its backing to the bilateral instruments on repatriation signed by the Governments of Myanmar and Bangladesh, and other regional processes, including those aimed at tackling the regional implications of the Rohingya crisis.
309. With regard to inter-agency coordination and liaison, the Special Envoy will continue to ensure a coherent and principled but constructive approach of the United Nations system, as guided by the Secretary-General, in close consultation with the Resident Coordinators in Myanmar and Bangladesh, especially on the pressing issues in relation to the Rohingya crisis. Building on the comparative and complementary expertise of the 20 resident and non-resident United Nations funds, programmes and specialized agencies composing the country team, and in close coordination with specialized offices at Headquarters, the Special Envoy continues to carry out the good offices mandate. Conversely, the Office provides political updates that inform policy development by other United Nations entities at the field and headquarters levels to facilitate their programme delivery. The Office engages closely with the various human rights mechanisms on Myanmar mandated by the Human Rights Council. In discussions with government counterparts, the Special Envoy also complements the advocacy and work of the Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict, the Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict and the Special Representative on the Prevention of Genocide. This has helped strengthen a “One United Nations” approach.

## Evaluation activities

310. The Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs will lead a systematic assessment with the overall purpose of improving the gender sensitivity of the political analyses developed by the Department and the special political missions.

## Programme performance in 2020

### Safe, dignified and voluntary repatriation<sup>10</sup>

311. The mission maintained close contact with government counterparts and local communities in Myanmar and Bangladesh throughout 2020, including after COVID-19 restrictions made it impossible to travel or hold in-person meetings. Prior to the pandemic, the Special Envoy held high-level meetings in Nay Pyi Taw, Yangon, Dhaka and Bangkok to understand impediments to the creation of conducive conditions for returns. She mobilized constructive support from international partners in Brussels, countries in the region, ASEAN and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation towards addressing root causes in Rakhine State to enable returns.
312. In continuing exchanges with the civilian and military leadership, the Special Envoy pressed for the backing of initiatives promoting village-based repatriation; social cohesion and the countering of hate speech; the full and effective implementation of the recommendations of the Advisory Commission on Rakhine State; an end to violence between the Tatmadaw and the Arakan Army; unfettered humanitarian access; accountability, including outside of criminal justice proceedings in civilian and military courts; fundamental freedoms and the release of detained journalists and activists; clear and accessible pathways to citizenship; the lifting of restrictions on freedom of movement; the release of Rohingyas imprisoned on travel documentation charges; the meaningful participation of women in decision-making processes; the prevention of political disenfranchisement of ethnic and religious minorities in the 2020 elections; the lifting of the Internet ban in townships in Rakhine and Chin States; an inclusive COVID-19 response; and durable solutions for displaced persons which, inter alia, address housing, land and property issues. The Special Envoy also amplified the Secretary-General's global COVID-19 ceasefire call. She urged the Government of Myanmar to cooperate fully with existing accountability mechanisms, including the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar, to adopt national legislation to criminalize war crimes in accordance with international law and to ensure that national accountability efforts are independent, transparent and credible. She concentrated her efforts on convincing the conflict parties in Rakhine to conclude a ceasefire, to release prisoners and to investigate violations of international humanitarian law.

### *Progress towards the attainment of the objective, and performance measure*

313. The above-mentioned work contributed to improving the conditions in Rakhine State with a view to ultimately enabling refugee returns, but did not meet the target of safe, voluntary and dignified returns, as reflected in the proposed programme budget for 2020. Intense clashes between the Tatmadaw and the Arakan Army, the surge of COVID-19 cases and other domestic tensions undermined reconciliation and repatriation efforts in the pre-election period. Fighting hampered humanitarian access, augmented political disenfranchisement and complicated the addressing of root causes and advancing repatriation in line with the recommendations of the Advisory Commission on Rakhine State. At the same time, the Government of Myanmar remained engaged with the Special Envoy and her Office on critical issues, leading to several policy changes which will contribute to creating conducive conditions for returns. On accountability, the Special Envoy obtained a verbal commitment from the Tatmadaw to hold perpetrators accountable in several individual cases of serious human rights violations. On the freedom of movement of Rohingyas, the Government introduced a new policy, as advocated for by the Special Envoy, not to punish Rohingyas for

<sup>10</sup> As reflected in the proposed programme budget for 2020 (A/74/6 (Sect.3)/Add.2).

travelling without documentation, and took measures to return them to their places of origin upon quarantine. In April 2020, more than 800 Rohingyas were released from prisons in Yangon, as had been also advocated by the Special Envoy through her advocacy. On the development of a policy regarding refugees' right to return to their places of origin, the mission advocated with the Governments of Myanmar and Bangladesh for village-based returns, which both sides agreed to (see table 42).

Table 42  
Performance measure

<i>2018 (actual)</i>	<i>2019 (actual)</i>	<i>2020 (actual)</i>
No repatriation process	Creation of enabling conditions for a smooth repatriation process	Return of refugees in a more enabling environment was not realized. Nevertheless, efforts continued

### **Impact of COVID-19 on programme delivery**

314. Owing to the impact of COVID-19 during 2020, the Special Envoy moved her diplomatic engagement efforts online. Despite the pandemic, the Special Envoy remained actively engaged with actors in Myanmar and the region, including in close contact with the State Counsellor, key ministries and other civilian and military leaders who were keen to maintain dialogue on critical peace, security and democratization issues in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic. However, some issues could not be discussed virtually, highlighting the urgency for in-person engagement, as well as field visits to affected sites. Multilateral exchanges and focus group discussions proved equally challenging, even more so if the discussion required interpretation into or from local languages. The small team was affected by a staff member who suffered from COVID-19 and required extended medical leave. This highlighted the ongoing resource challenges the Office continues to face in a rapidly evolving environment requiring the Secretary-General's good offices engagement on multifaceted and interlinked issues relevant to the mandate.

### **Planned result for 2022**

#### **Progress towards national reconciliation and the creation of conducive conditions for the return of Rohingya and other forcibly displaced persons**

315. Against the backdrop of significant domestic tensions following the military's declaration of a state of emergency and the military's violent repression of country-wide protests and a civil disobedience movement that followed, the mission will press for an end to violence against peaceful protests and a negotiated solution to the political crisis, while promoting a political culture of power sharing, flexibility, compromise and inclusivity among stakeholders at all levels. The mission will also support intracommunal and intercommunal dialogue efforts and advocate at the highest levels of power for concrete measures to be taken to end discrimination against ethnic minorities. Inside Myanmar, 126,000 internally displaced persons remain confined in camps since violence broke out in Rakhine in 2012, an additional more than 100,000 people are displaced by conflict in Rakhine and Chin States, while some 860,000 Rohingya refugees continue to reside in 34 congested and squalid camps in Cox's Bazar district, with some of them having been relocated to the island of Bhasan Char. Considering their continuing plight, the mission will continue to work to achieve progress towards the creation of conditions conducive to return as a priority.

*Lessons learned and planned change*

316. The lesson for the mission was that virtual meetings, which the mission heavily relied on due to the COVID-19 pandemic, do not substitute for in-person encounters. In applying the lesson, the mission will explore possibilities for dialogue, diplomacy and mediation associated with the use of digital technologies, post-COVID-19, to complement its in-person work, and facilitate more frequent dialogue among all parties on the ground and the mission.

*Expected progress towards the attainment of the objective, and performance measure*

317. This work is expected to contribute to the objective, as demonstrated by a de-escalation of tensions between the civilian and military leadership, including concessions made by both sides in relation to power-sharing and reforms, as well as a reduction in armed clashes and an increase in the political participation of ethnic minorities and women. Moreover, the Mission's efforts towards the creation of conducive conditions are expected to contribute to the expansion of humanitarian and development programming in Rakhine State, in furtherance of the implementation of the recommendations of the Advisory Commission on Rakhine State, which in turn will help convince forcibly displaced persons in Bangladesh and internally displaced persons inside Myanmar to progressively return to their places of origin or choice (see table 43).

Table 43

**Performance measure**

<i>2018 (actual)</i>	<i>2019 (actual)</i>	<i>2020 (actual)</i>	<i>2021 (planned)</i>	<i>2022 (planned)</i>
No repatriation process	Bilateral discussions between Myanmar and Bangladesh on a repatriation framework continued	The Special Envoy advocated for tangible commitments from the Government of Myanmar on the implementation of the recommendations of the Advisory Commission on Rakhine State	As the military-imposed state of emergency and subsequent protests delay progress on implementation of the recommendations of the Advisory Commission on Rakhine State, the Envoy helps facilitate a negotiated solution out of the crisis	The mission facilitates local initiatives in support of social cohesion

**Deliverables**

318. Table 44 below lists all deliverables, by category and subcategory, for the period 2020–2022 that contributed and are expected to contribute to the attainment of the objective stated above.

Table 44  
**Deliverables for the period 2020–2022, by category and subcategory**

<i>Deliverables</i>	<i>2020 planned</i>	<i>2020 actual</i>	<i>2021 planned</i>	<i>2022 planned</i>
<b>A. Facilitation of the intergovernmental process and expert bodies</b>				
<b>Parliamentary documentation</b> (number of documents)	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>
1. Reports of the Secretary-General to the General Assembly	1	1	1	1
<b>Substantive services for meetings</b> (number of three-hour meetings)	<b>4</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>4</b>
2. Meetings of the Security Council	2	2	2	2
3. Meetings of the General Assembly	2	2	2	2
<b>B. Generation and transfer of knowledge</b>				
<b>Seminars, workshops, and training events</b> (number of days)	–	–	–	<b>6</b>
4. Workshops supported by the mission on social cohesion and anti-discrimination; women's political empowerment; power-sharing arrangements; strengthening of rule of law and accountability for serious human rights violations; fundamental freedoms; and implementation of the recommendations of the Advisory Commission on Rakhine State	–	–	–	6
<b>C. Substantive deliverables</b>				
<b>Good offices:</b> good offices with the Government, political parties, civil society, ethnic armed organizations and countries in the region in support of: a return to democratic reforms, peace and stability at the national, subnational and local levels, and humanitarian access; voluntary, safe, dignified and sustainable repatriation of the Rohingya and durable solutions and reintegration of forcibly displaced persons.				
<b>Consultation, advice and advocacy:</b> consultations with the Government, civil society and the international community on electoral and constitutional issues, options for power-sharing arrangements, federalism, accountability for serious human rights violations and cooperation with international accountability mechanisms, good governance and the strengthening of the rule of law, including normative issues related to governance and judicial reforms and anti-corruption measures; human rights issues, including fundamental freedoms, civilian protection, child rights, the elimination of discrimination and violence against minorities, the promotion of gender equality and the involvement of women and youth in peace initiatives.				
<b>D. Communication deliverables</b>				
<b>Outreach programmes, special events and information materials:</b> outreach activities with local communities, government partners, opinion leaders, the media, civil society and other agents of change to support the implementation of the Office's mandate.				
<b>External and media relations:</b> press conferences, statements, advisories, backgrounders, interviews and other media engagements related to the Office's objective.				

## B. Proposed post and non-post resource requirements for 2022

### Resource requirements (regular budget)

Table 45  
**Financial resources**  
 (Thousands of United States dollars)

<i>Category of expenditure</i>	<i>2020</i>	<i>2021</i>	<i>2022</i>		<i>Variance</i>
	<i>Expenditure</i>	<i>Appropriation</i>	<i>Total requirements</i>	<i>Non-recurrent requirements</i>	<i>2022 vs. 2021 Increase/(decrease)</i>
	<i>(1)</i>	<i>(2)</i>	<i>(3)</i>	<i>(4)</i>	<i>(5)=(3)-(2)</i>
Military and police personnel costs	–	–	–	–	–
Civilian personnel costs	777.3	814.1	861.0	–	46.9
Operational costs	164.7	291.4	308.7	–	17.3
<b>Total (net of staff assessment)</b>	<b>942.0</b>	<b>1 105.5</b>	<b>1 169.7</b>	–	<b>64.2</b>

Table 46  
Positions

	<i>Professional and higher categories</i>									<i>General Service and related categories</i>		<i>National staff</i>			<i>Total</i>	
	<i>USG</i>	<i>ASG</i>	<i>D-2</i>	<i>D-1</i>	<i>P-5</i>	<i>P-4</i>	<i>P-3</i>	<i>P-2</i>	<i>Subtotal</i>	<i>Field/ Security Services</i>	<i>General Service</i>	<i>Total inter-national</i>	<i>National Professional Officer</i>	<i>Local level</i>		<i>United Nations Volunteers</i>
Approved 2021	1 <sup>a</sup>	–	–	1	1	1	–	–	4	–	–	4	–	1	–	5
Proposed 2022	1 <sup>a</sup>	–	–	1	1	1	–	–	4	–	–	4	–	1	–	5
<b>Change</b>	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–

<sup>a</sup> The Under-Secretary-General is on a when-actually-employed contract.

319. The proposed resource requirements for 2022 for the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Myanmar amount to \$1,169,700 (net of staff assessment) and would provide for salaries and common staff costs (\$861,000) for the continuation of five positions (1 Under-Secretary-General, 1 D-1, 1 P-5, 1 P-4 and 1 Local level), as well as operational costs (\$308,700), comprising costs for official travel (\$167,400), facilities and infrastructure (\$52,600), ground transportation (\$4,800), communications and information technology (\$14,000), medical (\$1,000) and other supplies, services and equipment (\$68,900).
320. For 2022, it is proposed that the number and levels of the positions for the mission remain unchanged. A vacancy rate of 5 per cent has been applied to international positions, while proposed resources for one national position are based on the assumption of full incumbency.
321. The increase in the requirements proposed for 2022 compared with the appropriation for 2021 is attributable mainly to increased requirements for civilian personnel costs resulting from the application of the revised salary scales and the application of a higher percentage of common staff costs based on recent expenditure patterns. In addition, under operational costs, the increase in resource requirements is attributable mainly to the increased outside-mission travel for the Special Envoy and her staff to conduct political consultations and good offices missions, and increased requirements for other services with respect to administrative and financial services provided by the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific and UNDP, partly offset by lower requirements under facilities and infrastructure owing to the lower estimated costs of rental of premises.

#### **Extrabudgetary resources**

322. In 2021, the mission projects that extrabudgetary resources estimated in the amount of \$500,000 will be used to support activities and relevant initiatives aimed at promoting the implementation of General Assembly resolution 74/246. These activities and initiatives include: (a) support for the return of Rohingya refugees and internally displaced persons; (b) intercommunal dialogues; (c) countering discrimination and hate speech; and (d) national reconciliation.
323. In 2022, extrabudgetary resources in the estimated amount of \$250,000 are projected to support the mission's efforts to further the consolidation of democracy and to advance justice, peace and human rights in Myanmar.