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Proposed programme budget for 2020

Proposed programme budget for 2020

Part II **Political affairs**

Section 3 **Political affairs**

Special political missions

Thematic cluster III: regional offices, offices in support of political processes and other missions

Summary

The present report contains the proposed resource requirements for 2020 for nine special political missions grouped under the thematic cluster of regional offices, offices in support of political processes and other missions that emanate from the decisions of the Security Council.

The proposed resources for 2020 for special political missions grouped under the cluster amount to \$291,182,600 (net of staff assessment).

* A/74/50.



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** The part consisting of the proposed programme plan for 2020 is submitted for the consideration of the General Assembly in accordance with the established budgetary procedures and practices reaffirmed in paragraph 13 of resolution [72/266 A](#).

*** In keeping with paragraph 11 of resolution [72/266 A](#), the part consisting of the post and non-post resource requirements is submitted through the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions for the consideration of the General Assembly.

I. Financial overview

1. The proposed resources for 2020 for special political missions grouped under thematic cluster III amount to \$291,182,600 (net of staff assessment). Table 1 provides for a comparison between the proposed resources for 2020 and the requirements for 2019 as approved by the General Assembly in its resolutions [72/262 A](#) and [73/279 A](#). Information on the proposed vacancy rates for 2020 with respect to the computation of personnel costs is provided in the annex, which contains comparative information with 2018 and 2019.

Table 1
Resource requirements
 (Thousands of United States dollars)

Category of expenditure	2018	2019	2020		Variance
	Expenditures	Appropriation	Total requirements	Non-recurrent requirements	2020 vs. 2019 Increase/(decrease)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)=(3)-(2)
United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel	12 835.6	12 700.7	12 688.4	–	(12.3)
United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau	18 611.7	16 868.8	16 018.2	–	(850.6)
United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia	86 373.7	102 858.4	106 021.6	1 000.0	3 163.2
United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia	2 685.1	3 033.5	2 901.4	–	(132.1)
United Nations support for the Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission	3 578.3	3 501.0	3 501.0	–	–
Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon	8 850.9	8 842.1	8 953.6	–	111.5
United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa	6 588.3	7 263.7	7 171.3	–	(92.4)
United Nations Support Mission in Libya	64 968.6	76 398.9	72 475.8	527.1	(3 923.1)
United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia	59 244.9	65 323.5	61 451.3	–	(3 872.2)
Total (net of staff assessment)	263 737.1	296 790.6	291 182.6	1 527.1	(5 608.0)

II. Special political missions

1. United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel

(\$12,688,400)



Foreword

The year 2018 was marked by encouraging efforts towards consolidating democracy and stability, including the peaceful resolution of electoral-related tensions in Sierra Leone, a consolidated regional effort to promote political dialogue in Togo and efforts to reactivate the peace architecture in Nigeria. Steps were taken also to address human rights and rule of law issues underpinning conflict in West Africa and the Sahel.

However, the West Africa and Sahel region has continued to face a broad array of peace and stability, including an increase in armed attacks by non-State actors, notably in the Liptako-Gourma area and the Lake Chad basin; farmer-herder conflicts; transnational criminality; widespread youth unemployment; and growing socioeconomic inequalities and governance deficits, which collectively undermine the respect for human rights and the rule of law. While progress has been made in the fight against terrorism and violent extremism, including through robust regional responses, the security situation in the region remains highly fragile owing to the persistence of governance challenges that constitute the root causes of insecurity. In the Lake Chad basin, despite regional efforts led by the Multinational Joint Task Force against Boko Haram, insecurity has contributed to a serious humanitarian crisis and profound development deficits. In addition, the reach of violent extremist groups from Mali into Burkina Faso and Niger remains a source of concern, despite progress made in the operationalization of the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel. The persistent security challenges in the region have exacted a heavy toll on public expenditure, sometimes to the detriment of social sectors.

The use of good offices, in close collaboration with regional partners, to prevent violence in West Africa and the Sahel will remain a key focus of my attention in 2020. I saw first-hand the positive impact of joint regional good offices in the Gambia following the initial decision of former President Yahya Jammeh not to accept the outcome of the presidential elections in December 2016. In the period that followed his decision, working in close coordination with regional partners, I accompanied several high-level mediators from the region to the Gambia in a unified good offices effort to appeal to President Jammeh to step down and peacefully transfer power to the elected president. These efforts, accompanied by concerted international messaging and the threat of military intervention by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), eventually convinced former President Jammeh to concede defeat and leave the country peacefully, thereby making space for the assumption of power by the elected president. This concerted diplomatic effort, led by ECOWAS, contributed to preventing the outbreak of electoral-related violence with a potential spillover into neighbouring countries. It serves today as a best-practice example for an effective regional collaboration to foster democratization efforts.

Given the ongoing regional electoral cycle and the continuing instability, the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS) will continue to contribute to efforts to prevent violent conflict, sustain peace and address root causes of instability jointly with its partners.

(Signed) Mohamed **Ibn Chambas**
Special Representative of the Secretary-General
United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel

Overall orientation

Mandates and background

2. The United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS) is responsible for: (a) monitoring political developments in West Africa and the Sahel and carrying out good offices and special assignments on behalf of the Secretary-General to assist in peacebuilding, sustaining peace efforts and enhancing capacities for conflict prevention and mediation in countries of the subregion; (b) enhancing subregional capacities to address cross-border and cross-cutting threats to peace and security, in particular election-related instability and challenges related to security sector reform, transnational organized crime, illicit trafficking, terrorism and violent extremism; (c) supporting the implementation of the United Nations integrated strategy for the Sahel and the coordination of international and regional engagements in the Sahel; and (d) promoting good governance and respect for the rule of law, human rights and the mainstreaming of gender into conflict prevention and management initiatives in West Africa and the Sahel.
3. The mandate of UNOWAS derives from an exchange of letters between the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council (see [S/2016/1128](#) and [S/2016/1129](#)).
4. In 2017, the Security Council entrusted UNOWAS with additional responsibilities relating to the implementation of the United Nations integrated strategy for the Sahel (see [S/PRST/2017/2](#)) and the provision of technical assistance to the permanent secretariat of the Group of Five for the Sahel (see Council resolution [2391 \(2017\)](#)). Further, in its resolution [2349 \(2017\)](#), the Council called upon relevant United Nations entities, including UNOWAS, to redouble their support for Governments in the region, as well as subregional and regional organizations, to address the impact of Boko Haram on the peace and stability of the Lake Chad basin region. Following the closure of the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) and the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) in June 2017 and April 2018, respectively, UNOWAS was tasked with making its good offices available to the Government of Côte d'Ivoire and the Government of Liberia, as well as to the United Nations resident coordinators in the two countries (see [S/PRST/2017/8](#) and [S/PRST/2018/8](#)).

Alignment with the Charter of the United Nations and the Sustainable Development Goals

5. The mandate of the Office guides it in producing the respective deliverables, which contribute to the attainment of the objective. The objective of UNOWAS is aligned with the Organization's purpose of maintaining international peace and security, as stipulated in Article 1 of the Charter of the United Nations. In the context of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, the purposes stipulated in Article 1 of the Charter are embodied by the Sustainable Development Goals. The objective, and therefore the deliverables, is aligned with a number of Sustainable Development Goals, as reflected in paragraphs 20 and 21 below.

Recent developments

6. In 2018, the West Africa and Sahel region experienced increasing challenges related to governance and cross-border security, including transnational organized crime, illicit trafficking and irregular migration; intercommunal tensions, including violence related to conflicts between farmers and herders; and radicalization, violent extremism and terrorism. Collectively, these serve to undermine respect for human rights and the rule of law. The adverse impact on the human rights situation is especially pronounced for the realization of the rights of women and girls. Across the region, economic and social progress remains fragile, with increasing risk for political tensions.
7. UNOWAS, in collaboration with its regional partners, continued efforts to support the consolidation of democracy and stability in West Africa and the Sahel, including by carrying out good offices on

behalf of the Secretary-General to support the peaceful resolution of electoral-related tensions in Sierra Leone. The Office contributed to regional initiatives by promoting political dialogue in Togo and assisting with the reactivation of the peace architecture in Nigeria ahead of the general elections. UNOWAS also provided support for peace initiatives in Burkina Faso and the Gambia and for efforts to introduce political reforms in a number of other West African countries, including Benin, Guinea and Niger.

8. While Mali continued to be the epicentre of violent extremist activities and instability in the Sahel, terrorist attacks perpetrated by Boko Haram splinter groups remained a high threat in the Lake Chad basin. Transnational organized crime, such as the trafficking of small arms, light weapons and drugs, as well as maritime crime had an adverse impact on peace and security in West Africa and the Sahel. Women continued to suffer disproportionately from the consequences of regional security challenges and displacement related to violent extremism.
9. While the region is making progress in creating an enabling environment for the respect of human rights through reforms to align national standards with regional and international standards, challenges persist. These include limited access to justice, impunity, incomplete transitional justice processes and instrumentalization of the justice systems, as well as limited access to social facilities and economic opportunities. These challenges are among the main drivers of conflict in the region.
10. The humanitarian situation in the region continues to be a significant challenge. Around 32 million people are confronted with food insecurity, with some 10.8 million people suffering from severe food insecurity and 4.7 million children facing malnutrition. In addition, over 5 million refugees, internally displaced persons and returnees are grappling with the consequences of forced displacement, mostly related to violent conflict in the Sahel and the Lake Chad basin.
11. Regional and subregional organizations, namely the African Union, ECOWAS, the Lake Chad Basin Commission, the Group of Five for the Sahel, the Gulf of Guinea Commission and the Mano River Union, stepped up efforts to enhance regional capacities to address cross-cutting threats to peace and security and to address longer-term structural challenges such as regional insecurity and the risk of election-related violence.

Strategy and external factors for 2020

12. In line with its mandated activities, UNOWAS will closely monitor political developments in West Africa and the Sahel and carry out its good offices role and special assignments on behalf of the Secretary-General to prevent and address instability. The Office will support ECOWAS, the Group of Five for the Sahel, the Mano River Union, the Lake Chad basin Commission and other regional institutions with a view to enhancing regional capacities for conflict prevention, conflict management and mediation.
13. UNOWAS will place particular emphasis on improving the coordination and coherence of efforts of United Nations and international partners in the Sahel, including through enhanced support for the implementation of the United Nations integrated strategy for the Sahel. In this context, UNOWAS will focus on advocacy with Member States and regional organizations for the enhancement of regional capacities in the areas of good governance, security sector reform, respect for the rule of law and human rights, as well as the mainstreaming of gender in conflict resolution initiatives. As High Representative of the Secretary-General on the security situation in Nigeria, the Special Representative will continue to pursue efforts through his good offices missions to Nigeria to mobilize international and regional partners to assist Nigeria in addressing its critical challenges, particularly those related to Boko Haram. The Office will continue to place emphasis on supporting conflict prevention and peacebuilding efforts in Côte d'Ivoire, Liberia and Sierra Leone, following the recent withdrawal of United Nations peacekeeping operations.
14. With regard to the external factors, the overall plan for 2020 is based on the following planning assumptions:

- (a) Presidential elections will be held in Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea, Ghana and Togo;
 - (b) The constitutional review process in countries such as Guinea and Benin will continue;
 - (c) There will be a transfer of power in Côte d'Ivoire and Guinea following the presidential elections in 2020;
 - (d) Violent extremism in the Sahel and Lake Chad basin will continue to pose challenges to peace and stability in the subregion;
 - (e) The demand for good offices of the United Nations Office in West Africa and the Sahel will remain high;
 - (f) There will be no new conflicts or crises in the subregion that would bring about a shift in priorities;
 - (g) The Heads of State and Government of West Africa, ECOWAS, the Lake Chad Basin Commission, the Mano River Union, the African Union and the Group of Five for the Sahel will demonstrate the commitment to mobilize resources to address challenges to peace and stability, as well as the political will to ensure that regional peace and security are operationalized;
 - (h) The ECOWAS early warning mechanism and other regional conflict prevention instruments will be operational;
 - (i) Peacebuilding and peace consolidation efforts by partners such as regional organizations, including in post-electoral contexts, will continue;
 - (j) There will be continued strong political commitment on the part of Member States and regional organizations to work with the United Nations in the context of the United Nations integrated strategy for the Sahel;
 - (k) Countries in the region will continue to make progress in implementing their obligations under national and international human rights standards.
15. UNOWAS integrates a gender perspective in its operational activities, deliverables and results, as appropriate. The good offices role of the Special Representative will include consultations with women groups and UNOWAS will continue to advocate for the implementation of Security Council [1325 \(2000\)](#) through the elaboration of national and regional action plans.
16. With regard to cooperation with other entities, as described above, UNOWAS will be an active partner of ECOWAS, the African Union, the Lake Chad Basin Commission, the Group of Five for the Sahel, the Gulf of Guinea Commission and the Mano River Union in developing and harmonizing regional capacities for conflict prevention, conflict resolution and peacebuilding; advancing the promotion of good governance and respect for human rights; advancing the promotion of gender and the participation of youth in democratic processes; and supporting regional responses to address cross-border threats to peace and security, including transnational organized crime, illicit trafficking, radicalization, violent extremism and terrorism. UNOWAS will also continue to collaborate with regional and subregional partners through joint high-level missions, as well as technical assessment and fact-finding missions. UNOWAS continues to work also with the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa (UNOCA) on issues affecting West and Central Africa, including the threats posed by Boko Haram, conflicts relate to pastoralism, piracy and maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea.
17. With regard to inter-agency coordination and liaison, UNOWAS will promote synergies with United Nations agencies, funds and programmes to address the multifaceted challenges facing the region. Coordination with United Nations entities will continue within the framework of the United Nations integrated strategy for the Sahel. The engagement of UNOWAS will remain consistent with the priorities of the strategy, with a focus on cross-border threats to peace and security and efforts to counter radicalization. The Office will work closely with the resident coordinators in its mission area, with a focus on the sustaining peace agenda. In that context, UNOWAS further strengthened

its coordination with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the Peacebuilding Support Office for targeted interventions.

Evaluation activities

18. The following self-evaluations are planned for 2020:
 - (a) The contribution of UNOWAS to peaceful, fair and transparent elections in West Africa and the Sahel in 2020;
 - (b) The implementation of delegation of authority in UNOWAS.

A. Proposed programme plan for 2020 and programme performance for 2018



1. Objective

19. The objective, to which the Office contributes, is to achieve peace and security in West Africa and the Sahel.

2. Alignment with the Sustainable Development Goals

20. The objective is aligned with Sustainable Development Goal 5, which is to achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls. Progress towards the attainment of the objective will help end all forms of discrimination against all women and girls and ensure women's full and effective participation and equal opportunities for leadership at all levels of decision-making in political, economic and public life.
21. The objective is aligned with Sustainable Development Goal 16, which is to promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels. Progress towards the attainment of this objective will help to significantly reduce all forms of violence and related death rates; promote the rule of law and ensure equal access to justice for all; develop effective, accountable and transparent institutions at all levels; ensure responsive, inclusive, participatory and representative decision-making at all levels; ensure public access to information and protect fundamental freedoms in accordance with national legislation and international agreements; strengthen relevant national institutions, including through international cooperation, for building capacity at all levels, in particular in developing countries, to prevent violence and combat terrorism and crime; and promote and enforce non-discriminatory laws and policies for sustainable development.

3. Highlighted result in 2018

Joint mediation efforts with ECOWAS assist in overcoming election-related tensions in Sierra Leone

In 2018, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General conducted four good offices missions to support efforts to defuse election-related tensions in Sierra Leone. In advance of the first visit, a small team composed of a political officer and a human rights officer was deployed to conduct assessments and meet national and

international stakeholders, to provide feedback to the Special Representative on possible areas where good offices may be required.

During his first mission, the Special Representative consulted national stakeholders to assess the electoral environment and delivered key messages urging all political actors to exercise restraint, conduct peaceful and credible elections and settle electoral disputes solely through legal and constitutional means. The facilitation contributed significantly to the signing of a peace pledge by all presidential candidates on 28 February 2018 and to the peaceful settlements of electoral disputes.

On the day of the election (7 March 2018) and the run-off election (31 March 2018), the Special Representative consulted and closely coordinated his monitoring activities with the electoral observer missions in Sierra Leone dispatched by the Commonwealth, ECOWAS, the Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa and the African Union, which were led by the former presidents of Ghana, Liberia, Nigeria and South Africa, respectively. Immediately after election day, the high-level electoral observer missions, in consultation with the Special Representative, joined efforts to mediate disputes over the tabulation of results between the main contesting political parties, which threatened to escalate and derail the process and spiral into violence. The joint mediation facilitated an agreement on methodology for electoral results. However, the tabulation of results was suspended after conflicting interpretations of the methodology arose and political groups obstructed the transport of tabulation forms to regional tally centres. Once again, the Special Representative contributed his good offices to the mediation efforts of the heads of the electoral observer missions with the presidential candidates, the electoral commission and the Government, leading to resumption of the tallying of electoral results. Throughout the process, the Special Representative regularly briefed the diplomatic corps and international partners about the ongoing joint mediation efforts.

In April the Special Representative conducted a final mission, together with the President of the ECOWAS Commission, which succeeded in reducing tensions after controversy arose surrounding the election of a new Speaker of Parliament, and facilitated the swearing-in of the opposition's parliamentarians.

Result and evidence

The deliverables contributed to the result, which is the overcoming of electoral tensions. Evidence of the result includes the signing of the peace pledge, the agreement on a tabulation methodology for electoral results accepted by all political groups, the subsequent continuation of the tabulation of electoral results and the swearing-in of all parliamentarians.

The result demonstrates progress made in 2018 towards the collective attainment of the objective.

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22. A planned result for 2018, which is increased good offices and mediation efforts and improved regional early warning and analysis, as referred to in the report of the Secretary-General on estimates in respect of special political missions, good offices and other political initiatives authorized by the General Assembly and/or the Security Council for 2018 for thematic cluster III (A/72/371/Add.3, table 2), was achieved, as evidenced by the conduct of eight good offices missions and mediation activities with ECOWAS and regional partners to prevent conflict in several countries in West Africa, including the missions to Sierra Leone.

4. Highlighted planned result for 2020

Accompanying electoral processes throughout West Africa and the Sahel

In 2018, the Office was involved in eight good offices missions and mediation activities with ECOWAS and regional partners to prevent conflict in several countries in West Africa and the Sahel.

Challenge and response

The challenge was the lack of a standardized approach to the deployment of technical, expert teams ahead of high-stake elections to conduct assessments and identify entry points for early-warning and conflict prevention activities in advance of the good offices mission conducted by the Special Representative.

In response, for 2020, the Office will work to standardize the approach, jointly with regional partners, in advance of the technical preparation for key elections in West Africa and the Sahel scheduled for 2020, including presidential elections in Burkina Faso (November), Côte d'Ivoire (October), Guinea (October), Ghana (November) and Togo (April).

Following the good practice of conducting joint missions with regional partners to countries facing electoral tensions, the Special Representative will increase the number of joint missions with representatives of ECOWAS and the African Union in the pre-electoral period to assess the electoral environment and to deliver messages calling for the peaceful and credible outcome of the elections and the need to pursue legal and constitutional means to settle electoral disputes. This will include missions to the five countries before, on and after election day to support efforts to resolve election-related crises that might arise on the day of the vote or thereafter.

To further strengthen its support to electoral processes in coordination with relevant national and regional actors, as well as other United Nations entities, UNOWAS will further refine and standardize its approach of deploying multidimensional teams ahead of high-stake elections, composed of a political affairs officer and a human rights officer, to conduct assessments, meet national and international stakeholders, identify entry points for early-warning and conflict prevention activities, prepare scenario plans for United Nations action and provide feedback to the Special Representative where his good offices may be required. A key element of the successful engagement of UNOWAS in the defusing of electoral tensions will be close coordination with the United Nations resident coordinators and country teams. UNOWAS engagement will contribute to ensuring the peaceful conduct of high-stakes elections in the subregion.


Result and evidence

The planned deliverable is expected to contribute to the result, which is overcoming electoral tensions ahead of the high-stake elections in five countries in West Africa and the Sahel in 2020.

Evidence of the result, if achieved, will include a further increase in high-level joint mediation activities with ECOWAS and regional partners for conflict prevention in the region, as shown in the figure below.

The result, if achieved, will demonstrate progress made in 2020 towards the collective attainment of the objective.

Performance measures: high-level joint mediation activities with ECOWAS and regional partners for conflict prevention in West Africa and the Sahel



23. The Office will continue to be guided by all mandates entrusted to it, which provide the legislative framework for its deliverables.

5. Deliverables for the period 2018–2020

24. Table 2 lists all deliverables, by category and subcategory, for the period 2018–2020 that contributed and are expected to contribute to the attainment of the objective stated in paragraph 19 above.

Table 2

Deliverables for the period 2018–2020, by category and subcategory

	2018 planned	2018 actual	2019 planned	2020 planned
Quantified deliverables				
A. Facilitation of the intergovernmental process and expert bodies				
Parliamentary documentation (number of documents)	2	2	2	2
Substantive services for meetings (number of three-hour meetings)	2	2	2	2
B. Generation and transfer of knowledge				
Seminars, workshops and training events (number of days)	9	9	9	9
Technical materials (number of materials)	4	4	4	4
Non-quantified deliverables				
C. Substantive deliverables				
Good offices				
Consultation, advice and advocacy				
Fact-finding, monitoring and investigation missions				
D. Communication deliverables				
Outreach programmes, special events and information materials				
External and media relations				
Digital platforms and multimedia content				

B. Proposed post and non-post resource requirements for 2020

Resource requirements (regular budget)

Table 3

Financial resources

(Thousands of United States dollars)

Category of expenditure	2018	2019	2020	Variance
	Expenditure (1)	Appropriation (2)	Total requirements (3)	2020 vs. 2019 Increase/(decrease) (5)=(3)-(2)
Military and police personnel costs	114.3	139.3	139.6	0.3
Civilian personnel costs	7 866.5	7 645.6	7 654.1	8.5
Operational costs	4 854.8	4 915.8	4 894.7	(21.1)
Total (net of staff assessment)	12 835.6	12 700.7	12 688.4	(12.3)

Table 4
Positions

	<i>Professional and higher categories</i>									<i>General Service and related categories</i>		<i>National staff</i>				
	<i>USG</i>	<i>ASG</i>	<i>D-2</i>	<i>D-1</i>	<i>P-5</i>	<i>P-4</i>	<i>P-3</i>	<i>P-2</i>	<i>Subtotal</i>	<i>Field/ Security Services</i>	<i>General Service</i>	<i>Total inter-national</i>	<i>National Professional Officer</i>	<i>Local level</i>	<i>United Nations Volunteers</i>	<i>Total</i>
Approved 2019	1	1	–	2	7	13	7	–	31	7	–	38	6	19	–	63
Proposed 2020	1	1	–	2	7	13	7	–	31	7	–	38	6	18	–	62
Change	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	(1)	–	(1)

25. The proposed resource requirements for UNOWAS for 2020 amount to \$12,688,400 (net of staff assessment) and would provide for the deployment of two military observers (\$139,600); salaries and common staff costs (\$7,654,100) for 38 international positions (1 Under-Secretary-General, 1 Assistant Secretary-General, 2 D-1, 7 P-5, 13 P-4, 7 P-3 and 7 Field Service) and 24 national positions (6 National Professional Officer and 18 Local level); and operational costs (\$4,894,700) comprising costs for consultants and consulting services (\$256,900), official travel (\$992,100), facilities and infrastructure (\$347,000), ground transportation (\$78,300), air operations (\$2,316,700), communications and information technology (\$634,400) and other supplies, services and equipment (\$269,300).
26. The General Assembly, by its resolution [73/279 A](#) of 22 December 2018, decided to retain one position of Finance and Budget Assistant (Local level) as a general temporary assistance position until 31 December 2019. In 2020, the number and levels of positions for UNOWAS are proposed to remain unchanged, except for the discontinuation of one Local level position from 1 January 2020.
27. The variance (decrease) between the proposed resources for 2020 and the approved budget for 2019 is mainly attributable to: (a) lower national staff costs resulting from the lower percentage of common staff costs, based on recent expenditure patterns, and the discontinuation of the general temporary assistance position of a Finance and Budget Assistant (Local level) from 1 January 2020; (b) reduced requirements for facilities and infrastructure for the rental of premises, utilities and waste disposal services and maintenance services, based on contractual prices and past expenditures; and (c) the discontinuation of the Office's contribution to the Global Service Centre for procurement support services, resulting from the transfer of the services to the Regional Procurement Office in Entebbe, Uganda. The variance is partly offset by increased requirements for: (a) international staff costs, attributable mainly to the higher percentage of common staff costs based on recent expenditure patterns; and (b) air operations, attributable mainly to the increase in rental and operation costs of the fixed-wing aircraft owing to changes in the terms of the contract.

Extrabudgetary resources

28. In 2019, it is projected that extrabudgetary resources in the amount of \$345,100 will be available to UNOWAS to support: (a) political transitions in the region (\$152,800); (b) the involvement of young women and men in peace processes in West Africa and the Sahel (\$98,000); and (c) the Ministerial Coordination Platform for the Sahel (\$94,300).
29. In 2020, UNOWAS will continue to explore the possibility of receiving additional extrabudgetary resources from the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and other partners to support its work in the region.

2. United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau

(\$16,018,200)



Foreword

Since my deployment in May 2018, I have been leading the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNIOGBIS) through a period of high social and political tensions. Over the course of 2018, a series of strikes and demonstrations took place notably in the education sector, and affecting essential public services, including health care and transport. The beginning of 2019 saw mounting social and political tensions ahead of parliamentary elections, which were held on 10 March 2019.

No President or Government of Guinea-Bissau has served a full term in office. The last four years of political stalemate and social and political exclusion of the great majority of the population (particularly women and youth) have deepened the crisis and created further polarization.

At the present juncture, the work of UNIOGBIS in Guinea-Bissau will support the national Government and authorities in efforts to stabilize the political situation and ensure the process of democratic transition and peacebuilding. UNIOGBIS will remain engaged with its partners in providing good offices and technical support for mediation with political leaders and civil society and to ensure inclusive dialogue. I have interacted closely with the group of five international organizations represented in Guinea-Bissau (the African Union, the Community of Portuguese-speaking Countries, ECOWAS, the European Union and the United Nations) to ensure a coordinated and coherent approach among the international community to assisting Guinea-Bissau. In 2019, I am consulting with the highest national authorities to foster a conducive political environment for elections and to reduce the latent mistrust that exists between the political parties. Going forward into 2020, I will work to ensure that UNIOGBIS provides the new Government the support it needs to carry out important legal and institutional reforms.

In my regular engagements with regional stakeholders, I have embraced the maxim of the ECOWAS Mediator, Alpha Condé, President of Guinea, that in Guinea-Bissau, “nobody can do it alone”. UNIOGBIS engagement with the resident United Nations agencies in realizing six Peacebuilding Fund projects complements the mission’s high-level good offices and our “bottom-up” approach to empowerment and political participation, especially for women and youth, who have shown great potential as future peacebuilders. With our support, political leaders have now signed a stability pact and a code of conduct for the pre- and post-election periods. Although the legislative elections were twice delayed in 2018 for technical reasons, UNIOGBIS has worked hard to ensure that resources have been mobilized for the government agencies to conduct elections, especially through the election support basket fund established by UNDP.

UNIOGBIS stands ready to support the implementation of the necessary institutional reforms envisioned for 2020. The proposed reforms cover a constitutional review, as well as revision of laws relating to the organization of political parties and elections. During this sensitive period, I will lead mission efforts for fostering dialogue and reconciliation between the various political actors and civil society. All of these actions will only be possible if there is sufficient national political will. The holding of a peaceful, credible, free and transparent presidential election is a milestone for rallying Bissau-Guineans to move on from years of political crisis and set the country more firmly on the path to peace and development.

(Signed) José Viegas **Filho**
Special Representative of the Secretary-General
United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau

Overall orientation

Mandates and background

30. The United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNIOGBIS) is responsible for assisting, coordinating and leading international efforts in the following areas to ensure lasting peace and stability in Guinea-Bissau:
 - (a) Providing support to the Government of Guinea-Bissau in strengthening democratic institutions and enhancing the capacity of State organs to function effectively and constitutionally;
 - (b) Assisting the national authorities and stakeholders in the promotion and protection of human rights, as well as undertaking human rights monitoring and reporting activities;
 - (c) Providing strategic and technical advice and support to the Government of Guinea-Bissau in its efforts to combat drug trafficking and transnational organized crime, in close cooperation with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC);
 - (d) Providing support to the Government of Guinea-Bissau to incorporate a gender perspective into peacebuilding, in line with Security Council resolutions [1325 \(2000\)](#), [1820 \(2008\)](#) and [2242 \(2015\)](#), as well as implementation of the national action plan on gender in order to ensure the involvement, representation and participation of women at all levels through, inter alia, the provision of gender advisers;
 - (e) Supporting the Government of Guinea-Bissau, in close cooperation with the Peacebuilding Commission, in the mobilization, harmonization and coordination of international assistance, namely from the African Union, ECOWAS, the Community of Portuguese-speaking Countries and the European Union, with a view to the upcoming legislative and presidential elections.
31. The mandate is defined in Security Council resolution [2458 \(2019\)](#). UNIOGBIS will focus on the following priorities stipulated by the Security Council:
 - (a) Supporting the full implementation of the Conakry Agreement on the Implementation of the ECOWAS Road Map for the Resolution of the Political Crisis in Guinea-Bissau and the ECOWAS road map and facilitating an inclusive political dialogue and national reconciliation process, and strengthening democratic governance, particularly with regard to the implementation of urgent and necessary reforms;
 - (b) Supporting, through good offices, the electoral process so as to ensure inclusive, free and credible legislative elections on 10 March 2019 and the presidential election in 2019 within the legally-mandated time frame;
 - (c) Providing support, including technical assistance, to the national authorities in expediting and completing the review of the Constitution of Guinea-Bissau.

Alignment with the Charter of the United Nations and the Sustainable Development Goals

32. The mandate of the Office guides it in producing the respective deliverables, which contribute to the attainment of the objective. The objective of UNIOGBIS is aligned with the Organization's purpose to maintain international peace and security, as stipulated in Article 1 of the Charter of the United Nations. In the context of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, the purposes stipulated in Article 1 of the Charter are embodied by the Sustainable Development Goals. The objective, and therefore the deliverables, is aligned with a number of Sustainable Development Goals, as reflected in paragraphs 52 and 53 below.

Recent developments

33. Since April 2018, Guinea-Bissau has slowly been emerging from the protracted political and institutional crisis that resulted from the decision of President José Mário Vaz to dismiss Prime Minister Domingos Simões Pereira of the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cabo Verde (PAIGC) in August 2015. Over the past four years, seven prime ministers have been appointed and internal tensions and political rivalries have festered in the political vacuum created by the suspension of the National Assembly. This institutional paralysis prevented the adoption of any government programme or national budget. The impasse has curtailed efforts to promote socioeconomic development and crippled the State's already weak ability to perform basic functions and deliver social services for the population.
34. The extraordinary ECOWAS summit meeting on Guinea-Bissau held in Lomé on 14 April 2018 was a turning point in the resolution of the crisis. After sanctions were imposed by ECOWAS on 19 political leaders, President Vaz was persuaded to promulgate a series of measures to put an end to the political impasse: the Head of State appointed a Prime Minister of consensus, Aristides Gomes; the National Assembly reconvened; and a date for legislative elections was announced (18 November 2018). Yet despite these breakthroughs, political in-fighting persisted through most of 2018, stoked by the deep mistrust between the political parties and weak State institutions to resolve the crisis. Ultimately, the legislative elections of 18 November did not materialize owing to technical problems in the management and planning of electoral preparations. The delay resulted in calls for the resignation of the Prime Minister and changes in the management of the electoral processes and timelines.
35. An ECOWAS ministerial mission visited Bissau in December 2018 to mediate the crisis. President Vaz agreed to the setting of a new date for the legislative elections (10 March 2019). At its fifty-fourth ordinary session, held in Abuja on 22 December 2018, the Authority of Heads of State and Government of ECOWAS issued a statement calling upon the Government to respect the new date for elections and for the international community to provide the resources to ensure that free and fair elections could be held without further delay. Following the issuance on 20 December of the presidential decree on elections, political tensions and polarization between the main political parties in Guinea-Bissau decreased significantly as preparations for the legislative elections began in earnest.
36. UNIOGBIS and UNDP helped the key electoral management bodies, namely the Technical Support Office for the Electoral Process and the National Electoral Commission, have been supported by to deliver the election preparations on time. Key milestones in February 2019 were the completion of the update of the voter register and the validation by the Supreme Court of 21 political parties to contest the elections.
37. During 2018, six new political parties emerged, the most significant being the Movement for Democratic Change (MADEM-G15), the United People's Assembly – Democratic Party of Guinea-Bissau (APU-PDGB) and the Patriotic Front for National Salvation (FREPASNA), competing against the two major political blocs (PAIGC and the Party for Social Renewal (PRS)). In a positive development, some parties, but certainly not all, presented candidate lists that reflected the minimum quota of 36 per cent of women required by the newly promulgated Gender Parity Law of 2 August 2018.
38. On 14 February 2019, the Bissau-Guinean political parties signed the stability pact and the code of conduct and electoral ethics in a formal ceremony at the National Assembly in Bissau. President Vaz, Prime Minister Gomes the President of the National Assembly, the President of the Supreme Court and the President of the National Electoral Commission attended the event. Representatives of civil society and religious leaders also attended the ceremony, as well as the group of five international organizations represented in Guinea-Bissau. The stability pact reaffirmed several key principles, including respect of the Constitution and the laws of the country. Among other provisions the signatory parties committed themselves to:

- (a) Respect the results of elections and establish a government that represents the will expressed in the polls;
 - (b) Promote and respect gender equality and equity, including the implementation of the parity law in all the institutions of the State, in the private sector and in civil society organizations;
 - (c) Reinforce the fight against crimes committed in the exercise of public functions by holders of political and public positions, including improper and illegal use of the goods and/or patrimony of the treasury; and strengthen implementation of the Convention against Corruption;
 - (d) Proceed with reforms of the Constitution, the electoral law and the framework law on political parties;
 - (e) Reinforce the independence of the judiciary sector and create a constitutional court;
 - (f) Organize local elections;
 - (g) Create the conditions for the implementation of the national plan to combat drug trafficking and transnational crime;
 - (h) Establish a committee for the monitoring and evaluation of the pact.
39. On 21 February 2019, the Minister of Territorial Administration (responsible for updating the voter registry) officially delivered the final voter lists to the President of the National Electoral Commission in Bissau. A total of 761,676 citizens were registered to vote (approximately 86 per cent of the estimated number of eligible voters), while officials of the Technical Support Office for the Electoral Process worked on resolving problems with printouts of the voter rolls.

Strategy and external factors for 2020

40. In 2020, despite the sustained ECOWAS engagement and high-level United Nations good offices, many challenges lie ahead. The political consensus remains fragile and achieving political rapprochement remains challenging. To avert the risk of the country relapsing into a political and institutional crisis, the Office is adopting a three-pronged approach:
- (a) The Special Representative will broaden political outreach and advocacy efforts with regional partners and leaders in ECOWAS, the Community of Portuguese-speaking Countries, the African Union, the European Union and partners in the international community to mobilize, harmonize and coordinate international assistance to Guinea-Bissau;
 - (b) The Office will intensify contacts with all political parties and stakeholders in Guinea-Bissau to strengthen peace constituencies, facilitate political dialogue, promote inclusive national reconciliation and support civil society, including the Guinean Women's Council, in bottom-up peacebuilding efforts and buttressing results from credible legislative and presidential elections;
 - (c) The Special Representative and UNIOGBIS will strengthen democratic institutions and State organs by forging consensus necessary for the adoption of necessary institutional reforms, in line with the full implementation of the Conakry Agreement.
41. In the run-up to the presidential election later in 2019, further efforts are required to foster durable political consensus to consolidate the democratic process and political gains made since 2018. UNIOGBIS will advocate for and technically assist the Government and key stakeholders in the current election cycle into 2020 by undertaking the following key tasks:
- (a) Enhancing inclusive political dialogue, compromise and national cohesion along the entire spectrum of national stakeholders through the good offices of the Special Representative;
 - (b) Forging consensus for the adoption, implementation and monitoring of the stability pact, focusing on the necessary institutional reforms and revision of the Constitution;

- (c) Supporting a structured follow-up and full implementation of the outcomes of the national conference on peace and development in Guinea-Bissau under the leadership of the parliamentary organizing commission for the national conference;
 - (d) Providing strategic and technical advice and support to the Government of Guinea-Bissau to combat drug trafficking and transnational organized crime, in close cooperation with UNODC;
 - (e) Enhancing national capacity for the protection and promotion of respect for human rights and incorporating a gender perspective into peacebuilding efforts in Guinea-Bissau.
42. As observed in several post-election periods in Guinea-Bissau, the country will most likely face challenges in the implementation of institutional reforms and the creation of lasting political stability during the post-election periods in 2019 and 2020.
43. A strategic assessment mission led by an independent expert engaged by the former Department of Political Affairs (now Department of Political Affairs and Peacebuilding) was conducted from 27 September to 4 October 2018. The mission recommended that the Office strengthen its work in support of the political good offices of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and start a transition process in three phases for the projected closure of the Office by end 2020. As part of this process, UNIOGBIS tasks and responsibilities should be progressively handed over to the United Nations country team, UNOWAS and international partners.
44. On the basis of Security Council resolution [2458 \(2019\)](#), outlining the main phases of transition for the planned withdrawal of UNIOGBIS by 31 December 2020, in 2020 UNIOGBIS will be working closely with the United Nations country team, UNOWAS and national authorities in preparation of the withdrawal. The transition will take best practices and lessons learned into account, especially from closing peacekeeping missions in the subregion (UNMIL and UNOCI), reflecting the continued engagement of the Peacebuilding Commission through its Guinea-Bissau configuration, as requested in the Security Council resolution [2458 \(2019\)](#).
45. With regard to the external factors, the overall plan for 2020 is based on the following assumptions:
- (a) The parties remain committed to the implementation of the ECOWAS road map (September 2016) and the Conakry Agreement (October 2016);
 - (b) The security situation remains stable in areas in which the mission operates;
 - (c) International partners are engaged to support the peacebuilding and post-electoral reform programmes;
 - (d) The regional environment remains stable and there is no spillover from violent extremism, terrorism or transnational organized crime.
46. The Office integrates a gender perspective in its operational activities, deliverables and results, as appropriate. UNIOGBIS, jointly with the United Nations country team and in particularly close cooperation with the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN-Women), will strongly support the empowerment of women peacebuilders by providing and supporting high-level technical training for decision-makers, including senior political leaders, the Parliamentary Women Caucus, justice sector operators and registered civil society organizations; awareness-raising, information and social communication targeting civil society organizations and the larger public; monitoring of the gender aspects of reform processes; and supporting women's civil society groups in their advocacy strategies to implement recommendations from their internal consultations and national forums. These activities are designed to increase gender parity and effective representation in the government and in political parties.
47. With regard to cooperation with other entities, UNIOGBIS will work closely with the United Nations country team, the Peacebuilding Support Office, the Peacebuilding Commission and key bilateral and multilateral partners (the African Union, the Community of Portuguese-speaking Countries, ECOWAS and the European Union) to support the country's peacebuilding efforts. The Office will also continue to enhance cooperation on resource mobilization with the Peacebuilding Fund and

international financial institutions, including the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the African Development Bank and the World Bank.

48. Cooperation with United Nations and other entities will include: (a) close cooperation with UNOWAS on political and transition issues, including subregional issues; (b) collaboration with UNODC and other United Nations and bilateral partners on enhanced support for combatting drug trafficking and transnational organized crime in Guinea-Bissau; (c) sustained cooperation with the relevant members of the United Nations country team to ensure a coherent joint approach to matters pertaining to the reform of constitutional and electoral law, in anticipation of the handover from UNIOGBIS (31 December 2020); and (d) undertaking human rights activities in cooperation with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), as well as gender mainstreaming with the relevant members of the United Nations country team.

Evaluation activities

49. The following evaluations and self-evaluations completed in 2018 have guided the programme plan for 2020:
- (a) Technical assessment mission (24–31 March 2018), led by the Department of Political Affairs;
 - (b) Strategic assessment of UNIOGBIS (see [S/2018/1086](#)).
50. A self-evaluation of the implementation of delegation of authority in UNIOGBIS is planned for 2020.

A. Proposed programme plan for 2020 and programme performance for 2018



1. Objective

51. The objective, to which the Office contributes, is to achieve a politically stable, secure and socially and economically prosperous environment in Guinea-Bissau.

2. Alignment with the Sustainable Development Goals

52. The objective is aligned with Sustainable Development Goal 5, which is to achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls. Progress towards the attainment of the objective will help end all forms of discrimination against all women and girls and ensure women's full and effective participation and equal opportunities for leadership at all levels of decision-making in political, economic and public life.
53. The objective is aligned with Sustainable Development Goal 16, which is to promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels. Progress towards the attainment of this objective will help to significantly reduce all forms of violence and related death rates; promote the rule of law; develop effective, accountable and transparent institutions at all levels; ensure responsive, inclusive, participatory and representative decision-making at all levels; and strengthen relevant national institutions, including through international cooperation, for building capacity at all levels, to prevent violence and combat terrorism and crime.

3. Highlighted results in 2018

An inclusive Government is formed and a consensual Prime Minister appointed through joint UNIOGBIS and group of five international partners facilitation

Guinea-Bissau has been embroiled in protracted political instability owing to civil-military tensions and political actors struggling to reach consensus for a political settlement and national reconciliation. In 2016, the six-point ECOWAS road map and the Conakry Agreement signed by Guinea-Bissau's main political actors helped reach a political settlement. The Conakry Agreement underlined the importance of appointing a consensual Prime Minister and holding legislative and presidential elections.

In 2018, with a view to supporting the implementation of the ECOWAS commitments, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, through his good offices functions and using high-level political facilitation, coordinated international efforts in support of an inclusive political dialogue among key political actors and civil society representatives in Guinea-Bissau. This was achieved through a series of meetings, enlarged consultations, including regional actors, support for ECOWAS ministerial missions to Bissau, national consultative meetings with civil society groups and political parties and the provision of logistical and technical support to political actors attending ECOWAS key meetings. UNIOGBIS participated in ECOWAS Summits held in July and December 2018, at which the situation in Guinea-Bissau was assessed and which proved crucial for the follow-up of the country's implementation of the ECOWAS road map and the Conakry Agreement. The Special Representative also worked closely with the representatives of the African Union, ECOWAS and the European Union in Bissau to ensure a coordinated approach of the international community in the ongoing stabilization efforts of Guinea-Bissau. Regular consultations with President Vaz, Prime Minister Gomes and other Bissau-Guinean political actors, for the purpose of urging them to respect the electoral calendar and engage in dialogue, were also part of the Special Representative's efforts. The Special Representative briefed the Security Council in August 2018 to maintain broad political support for the full implementation of the Conakry Agreement achieved through ECOWAS mediation efforts in the country.



The Special Representative of the Secretary-General briefing the Security Council, August 2018. Source: United Nations

UNIOGBIS supported the Special Representative good offices efforts with key stakeholders, including the President of Guinea-Bissau, the Prime Minister, the President of the National Assembly, the Chief of General Staff of the Armed Forces, representatives of the group of five international organizations represented in Guinea-Bissau (the African Union, the Community of Portuguese-speaking Countries, ECOWAS, the European Union and the United Nations) and members of the diplomatic corps. The Special Representative liaised with all leaders of political parties and representatives of civil society, with a special focus on women's groups, youth and religious leaders, to ensure that their views and concerns were brought to the attention the concerned authorities and as part of the Office's support for the implementation of the Conakry Agreement.

From 24 October to 1 November 2018, the Special Representative engaged with regional leaders in Conakry and Abuja on the situation in Guinea-Bissau, including the President of Guinea, Alpha Condé, in his capacity as ECOWAS Mediator for Guinea-Bissau. In Abuja, he met separately with the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Nigeria and with the ECOWAS Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security, General Francis Behanzin. His consultations resulted in harmonized messaging and positions among international partners on the need to fully implement and abide by the Conakry Agreement, in particular the provisions concerning the holding of the legislative and presidential elections and review of the Constitution. The Special Representative provided several briefings on the situation in the country and the preparations for legislative elections to the Security Council and the Guinea-Bissau configuration of the Peacebuilding Commission in the course of 2018. The Special Representative stressed the importance of sustained international engagement and support in helping to resolve the political crisis in the country.

Moreover, UNIOGBIS provided support to civil society organizations, including women's groups, in the preparation of a code of conduct for the elections which was signed by the political parties before the holding of the legislative elections. Through its Senior Electoral Advisor, UNIOGBIS provided significant technical support

to the electoral management bodies and ensured joint United Nations action in support of the electoral process to maximize resources. Although twice delayed, legislative elections were successfully held on 10 March 2019.

Result and evidence

The deliverables contributed to the result, which is the demonstrated commitment by the parties to implement key elements of the ECOWAS road map and the Conakry Agreement. Evidence of the result includes the President setting a date for legislative elections and appointing a consensual Prime Minister, as well as the formation of an inclusive Government and, subsequently, the resumption of the National Assembly, which allowed for approval of the national budget and the production of legislation until the holding of the parliamentary elections.

The result demonstrates progress made in 2018 towards the collective attainment of the objective.

Guinea-Bissau recommit to effective drug trafficking controls, through delivery of UNIOGBIS/UNODC expert advice

In 2018, because of its protracted political and institutional crisis, Guinea-Bissau became increasingly vulnerable to drug trafficking and transnational organized crime. In order to provide strategic and technical advice and support to the Government of Guinea-Bissau in dealing with the situation, in close cooperation with UNODC, UNIOGBIS repositioned itself to focus on capacity-building of law enforcement agencies to combat drug trafficking and transnational organized crime. The Office's strategic advice and technical support aided the national authorities in putting national political declarations into practice.



Drugs confiscation by the Judiciary Police in Bissau on 14 March 2019, for prosecution/destruction. Source: United Nations

Joint training was provided by UNIOGBIS and UNODC to enhance the response capacity to combat drug trafficking and transnational organized crime. Training was delivered to 134 law enforcement officers, including 17 women, on basic criminal intelligence collection and investigation techniques. The training also included on-the-job technical advice for specialized units within national law enforcement agencies (the Judiciary Police, the national office of the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) and the Transnational Crime Unit).

Result and evidence

The deliverables contributed to the result, which is enhanced response capacity to combat drug trafficking and transnational organized crime.

Evidence of the result includes the increased number of drug interceptions at the Osvaldo Vieira Airport and the increased numbers of arrests. In 2018, 23 arrests were made, as compared with 14 in 2017, by the Airport Communication Programme, which is operated by UNODC and law enforcement agency partners and the UNIOGBIS adviser co-located at Bissau airport. During these operations, 33,678 grams of cocaine and 500 units of assorted illegal medicines were seized in 2018, as compared with 8,860 grams in 2017. This represents a 64.3 per cent increase in arrests and an almost 300 per cent increase in cocaine seized, confiscated and incinerated by the Government.

The result demonstrates progress made in 2018 toward the collective attainment of the objective.

An effective human rights early warning system is established by the National Network of Human Rights Defenders with UNIOGBIS support

In 2018, following the formalization of the National Network of Human Rights Defenders, UNIOGBIS scaled up its support to help the Network to expand geographically and operate effectively. The Office mapped human rights defenders across the country, which culminated in the identification of 897 human rights defenders, including 343 women, in all the regions and 35 sectors of the country. UNIOGBIS also supported the Network in defining its vision through a strategy-making retreat and capacity-building initiatives, which included eight training sessions for 315 defenders, including 128 women.



*Retreat of the National Network of Human Rights Defenders to shape a strategy for human rights protection, 21 April 2018.
Source: United Nations*

Result and evidence

The deliverables contributed to the result, which is the strengthening of the capacity of the National Network of Human Rights Defenders for the protection and promotion of respect for human rights, following its launch on 9 December 2017, Human Rights Defenders Day. The Network decentralized its structure and designated focal points in the regions with a view to establishing a country-wide human rights early warning system, an essential prerequisite for sustained stability, lasting peace and sustainable development. The Network also monitored respect of human rights across the country, including in the context of the legislative elections.

Evidence of the result includes increasing reports by members of the Network of cases in which they detected and prevented threats to human rights and/or assisted in effectively addressing human rights violations as a direct result of enhanced human rights capacity. At least 30 such reports were received by the Network's coordinating committee in 2018, its first operating year.

The result demonstrates progress made in 2018 towards the collective attainment of the objective.

54. A planned result for 2018, which is enhanced national capacity for the protection and promotion of respect for human rights and gender equality in Guinea-Bissau, as referred to in the report of the Secretary-General on estimates in respect of special political missions, good offices and other political initiatives authorized by the General Assembly and/or the Security Council for 2018 for thematic cluster III ([A/72/371/Add.3](#), table 5), was partially achieved, as evidenced by: (a) 10 recommendations of the universal periodic review implemented and reported; (b) 40 human rights abuses reported by community members and human rights defenders to law enforcement authorities; (c) one judicial case dealt with in compliance with the international standards on human rights in the administration of justice; and (d) two key laws and policies related to human rights protection revised to conform national laws to international standards. There were no reports submitted by the Government to the United Nations and regional treaty bodies on the status of implementation of ratified treaties.
55. A planned result for 2018, which is enhanced inclusive political dialogue and national reconciliation in Guinea-Bissau, as referred to in the report of the Secretary-General ([A/72/371/Add.3](#), table 5), was not achieved owing to the political situation prevailing at the time, which was not conducive to the holding of the national conference. Owing to the protracted political and institutional crisis, efforts were focused on achieving political consensus for the holding of the twice-postponed legislative elections, which were finally held on 10 March 2019. Given this situation, there was no achievement made with respect to transmission of concluding documents to the parliamentary organizing commission for the national conference and the conference itself. However, UNIOGBIS provided logistical support to the organizing commission in its strategic planning efforts for the holding of a national conference on peace, reconciliation and development in the near future. In 2018, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, through his good offices, facilitated

dialogue among key political actors to advance political dialogue and national reconciliation in the country as called for by the Conakry Agreement.

56. A planned result for 2018, which is enhanced coordination among international partners for a coherent approach on political and resource mobilization issues, as referred to in the report of the Secretary-General (A/72/371/Add.3, table 5), was partially achieved. Two joint communiqués were issued by international partners conveying a common and unified response to the unravelling political situation in Guinea-Bissau. UNIOGBIS mobilized the group of five to deploy significant efforts in 2018 during heightened political tensions and disagreements among political parties on key issues such as the appointment of a Prime Minister of consensus, the formation of a Government and the approval of its programme and budget. In addition, group of five meetings were held at least once a month throughout 2018. In 2018 there was no meeting of the International Contact Group on Guinea-Bissau, as the functions of the contact group were taken over by the group of five.

4. Highlighted planned results for 2020

Reforms are implemented in key sectors and national consensus is found for the constitutional review and related key institutional reforms

Guinea-Bissau is starting a new chapter following the 10 March 2019 legislative elections, from which the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC) emerged as the winner. The investiture of the newly elected members of Parliament on 18 April 2019 will be followed by the nomination of a new Prime Minister by the President and the formation of a new Government. PAIGC has concluded a political alliance with three other political parties in the National Assembly to achieve a parliamentary majority, and has indicated that reforms will be high on its agenda.

According to the legal framework, the presidential election should take place in 2019. Providing support for the organization of that election is one of the priorities of UNIOGBIS, as stipulated by the Security Council in resolution 2458 (2019).

Challenge and response

The challenge was to support the implementation of key reforms following the 10 March 2019 legislative elections.

In response, for 2020, the Office will focus on continuing to support the reforms and the Government of Guinea-Bissau in its efforts to strengthen its democratic institutions and enhance the capacity of State organs to function effectively and constitutionally, which will be crucial to ensure long-term stability in the country. Specifically, UNIOGBIS will: (a) provide assistance and expertise to the Government in passing key reform laws in Parliament in 2020, namely the Constitution, the law on political parties, and the electoral law; (b) increase the frequency of meetings of the group of five international organizations represented in Guinea-Bissau to more than once a month and issue at least six public joint statements related to the implementation of the Conakry Agreement and the stability pact; (c) assess the progress of key reforms as outlined in the Conakry Agreement with stakeholders; and (d) double the number of visits by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to neighbouring countries and in the region.

Result and evidence

The planned deliverables are expected to contribute to the result, which is the full implementation of key reforms stipulated in the Conakry Agreement and encapsulated in the stability pact signed by the Bissau-Guinean political parties on 14 February 2019. This includes revision of the Constitution, the electoral law and the law on political parties, creating the basis for the Government and Parliament to undertake the necessary reforms and democratic consolidation efforts in the country, including enhancing the role of women in the political process.

Evidence of the result, if achieved, will include a stable Government and the adoption by Parliament of a gender-sensitive national budget enabling the Government to deliver key public services and increase women's participation in Government.

The result, if achieved, will demonstrate progress made in 2020 towards collective attainment of the objective.

Performance measures

2018	2019	2020
Demonstrated commitment of the parties to implement the Conakry Agreement	Signing of the stability pact and signing of the code of conduct for elections	<p>Implementation of key reforms outlined in the Conakry Agreement and the stability pact to ensure sustained political and institutional stability</p> <p>Government remains in place and able to deliver on its responsibilities</p> <p>Parliament functioning and able to draft and pass legislation, including the adoption of a gender-sensitive national budget</p>

Arbitrary detention is reduced and detention conditions improved through UNIOGBIS human rights advocacy

In 2018, UNIOGBIS conducted human rights assessment and monitoring visits to 23 detention facilities in the country. UNIOGBIS confirmed the dire conditions of the penitentiary system, including various cases of arbitrary or prolonged detention in violation of international and national human rights standards. Information gathered through regular human rights monitoring served as the basis for UNIOGBIS advocacy with national authorities to effectively address instances of arbitrary/prolonged arrest and detention.

As a direct result of regular advocacy meetings with the responsible police commissioners, prosecutors and investigative judges, national authorities released 66 persons from prolonged/arbitrary detention in 2018, from the total 89 cases identified. UNIOGBIS also advocated for improvement of the dire conditions of detention in different regions and organized human rights training for prison guards, lectures and human rights-related film screenings for detainees. Through its routine advocacy with relevant national authorities, UNIOGBIS stressed the need to effectively address cases of prolonged/arbitrary detention and to prioritize improvement of detention conditions with the assistance of the international community. In 2019, UNIOGBIS, together with OHCHR, will issue a public report on the situation of people deprived of liberty in Guinea-Bissau and thereafter will issue periodic updates.



*Handover of mattresses at the Bandim detention centre, Bissau.
Source: United Nations*

Challenge and response

The challenge was to ensure continuous monitoring of the conditions of detention and to support the national authorities in undertaking systemic reform of the penitentiary system to improve detention conditions and reduce the occurrence of prolonged/arbitrary detention.

In 2020, UNIOGBIS plans to continue to undertake at least one monthly visit to each of the three prisons in the country; at least two monthly visits to selected Public Order Police cells in Bissau, Bafatá and Gabú and other regions of the country; and a least one quarterly monitoring visit to the detention facility at the military base in Bissalanca. Moreover, UNIOGBIS will continue its capacity building-initiatives and advocate for reform of the penitentiary system, the adoption of a strategy to prevent prolonged/arbitrary detentions and the establishment of

an independent national human rights institution compliant with the Paris Principles (General Assembly resolution 48/134), which in the future could assume human rights monitoring functions.

Result and evidence

The planned deliverables are expected to contribute to the result, which is strengthened national human rights capacity for the protection and promotion of the rights of persons deprived of liberty.

Evidence of the result, if achieved, will include increased effectiveness of the Government's response to cases of identified prolonged/arbitrary detention, as demonstrated by a decrease in the number of cases of arbitrary detention that are not effectively addressed by national authorities, compared with 23 cases in 2018 (89 cases of prolonged/arbitrary detention were identified in 2018; 66 of the detainees were released in the course of the year). Evidence of the result, if achieved, will also include the adoption of a national strategy to prevent prolonged/arbitrary detention by the National Prisons Directorate of the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights and the Ministry of the Interior.

The result, if achieved, will demonstrate progress made in 2020 towards collective attainment of the objective.

Performance measures

2018	2019	2020
23 unresolved cases of prolonged/arbitrary detention in 2018 (of the 89 cases identified in 2018, 66 were addressed through release of the detainee)	Reduction in the number of cases of prolonged/arbitrary detention	Reduction in the number of cases; adoption by the National Prisons Directorate of the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights and the Ministry of the Interior of a national strategy to prevent arbitrary detention

Drug traffickers are convicted and the criminal justice chain can handle sensitive drug cases

In 2018, UNIOGBIS offered technical support and expertise on combating drug trafficking and transnational organized crime. UNIOGBIS engaged national justice and judicial institutions through co-location and on-the-job transfer of skills with the objective of bolstering capacities of the criminal justice chain for investigation, prosecution and systemized use of standardized policies and approaches to combat drug trafficking.

Challenge and response

The challenge was to achieve progress in law enforcement and judiciary action to combat drug trafficking in a context of deeply ingrained drug smuggling networks, political instability and weak capacity, and to cooperate with external law enforcement partners. In response, for 2020, UNIOGBIS, jointly with UNODC, will scale up the provision of technical assistance and expertise in accordance with the revised multi-year national strategy and action plan to combat drug trafficking and transnational organized crime. UNIOGBIS, in collaboration with UNODC, will co-locate at least five technical advisers to mentor, advise and train national counterparts in key positions for drug control in the country. As a result, 100 per cent of officers of the Transnational Crime Unit will have enhanced capability to combat drug trafficking and the Unit will be effectively integrating personnel from the Judiciary Police and relevant line ministries. UNIOGBIS will also engage with leading national drug observatories in Guinea-Bissau and advocate for the Inter-Ministerial Committee against Drugs to work more effectively.

UNIOGBIS will also organize four targeted workshops, seminars and conferences to transfer technical knowledge, skills and lessons learned about combating drug trafficking to the national law enforcement practitioners, including prosecutors and criminal investigators. The Office will support the law enforcement agencies and prosecutors in establishing a sensitive case management system. UNIOGBIS will coordinate systematically with the United Nations country team to tackle societal aspects of drug trafficking, such as prevention of drug consumption among

youth. This will produce a fuller picture of the narcotics threats throughout the country and help UNODC assess risks and countermeasures.


Result and evidence

The planned deliverables are expected to contribute to the result, which is a bolstered criminal justice chain capacities and systemized use of standardized policies and approaches to combat drug trafficking.

Evidence of the result, if achieved, will include the number of arrests, as shown in the figure below.

The result, if achieved, will demonstrate progress made in 2020 towards the collective attainment of the objective.

Performance measures: number of arrests for drug trafficking



57. The Office will continue to be guided by all mandates entrusted to it, which provide the legislative framework for its deliverables.

5. Deliverables for the period 2018–2020

58. Table 5 lists all deliverables, by category and subcategory, for the period 2018–2020 that contributed and are expected to contribute to the attainment of the objective stated in paragraph 51 above.

Table 5

Deliverables for the period 2018–2020, by category and subcategory

	<i>2018 planned</i>	<i>2018 actual</i>	<i>2019 planned</i>	<i>2020 planned</i>
Quantified deliverables				
A. Facilitation of the intergovernmental process and expert bodies				
Parliamentary documentation (number of documents)	2	3	2	2
Substantive services for meetings (number of three-hour meetings)	15	15	15	15
B. Generation and transfer of knowledge				
Seminars, workshops and training events (number of days)	9	9	11	11
Publications (number of publications)	–	–	3	2
Technical materials (number of materials)	5	3	4	4
Non-quantified deliverables				
C. Substantive deliverables				
Good offices				
Consultation, advice and advocacy				
Fact-finding, monitoring and investigation missions				
Databases and substantive digital materials				

	<i>2018 planned</i>	<i>2018 actual</i>	<i>2019 planned</i>	<i>2020 planned</i>
D. Communication deliverables				
Outreach programmes, special events and information materials				
External and media relations				
Digital platforms and multimedia content				

6. Most significant relative variances in deliverables

Variations between the actual and planned figures in 2018

59. The variance in parliamentary documentation was attributable to one additional report of the Secretary-General being requested by the Security Council in its resolution 2404 (2018).
60. The variance in technical materials was attributable to the pocket edition of the annotated constitution document not being produced in 2018 owing to delays in the implementation of the constitutional reform agenda, and the text of the stability pact being produced only in 2019 owing to delays in the formation of a government and the delayed holding of the legislative elections.

Variations between the planned figures for 2020 and 2019

61. The variance in publications is attributable to the reduction in the number of joint thematic public human rights reports from two in 2019 to one in 2020 owing to the planned withdrawal of the Mission by the end of 2020.

B. Proposed post and non-post resource requirements for 2020

Resource requirements (regular budget)

Table 6

Financial resources

(Thousands of United States dollars)

<i>Category of expenditure</i>	<i>2018</i>	<i>2019</i>	<i>2020</i>		<i>Variance</i>
	<i>Expenditures</i>	<i>Appropriation</i>	<i>Total requirements</i>	<i>Non-recurrent requirements</i>	<i>2020 vs. 2019 Increase/(decrease)</i>
	<i>(1)</i>	<i>(2)</i>	<i>(3)</i>	<i>(4)</i>	<i>(5)=(3)-(2)</i>
Military and police personnel costs	556.9	84.8	84.9	–	0.1
Civilian personnel costs	14 097.7	12 002.0	11 758.7	–	(243.3)
Operational costs	3 957.1	4 782.0	4 174.6	–	(607.4)
Total (net of staff assessment)	18 611.7	16 868.8	16 018.2	–	(850.6)

Table 7
Positions

	<i>Professional and higher categories</i>								<i>General Service and related categories</i>		<i>National staff</i>				<i>Total</i>
	<i>USG</i>	<i>ASG</i>	<i>D-2</i>	<i>D-1</i>	<i>P-5</i>	<i>P-4</i>	<i>P-3</i>	<i>P-2</i>	<i>Subtotal</i>	<i>Field/ Security Services</i>	<i>General Service</i>	<i>Total inter-national</i>	<i>National Professional Officer</i>	<i>Local level</i>	
Approved 2019 ^a	1	–	1	2	6	12	9	31	27	–	58	25	42	11	136
Proposed 2020	–	1	1	1	6	12	8	29	27	–	56	22	39	4	121
Change	(1)	1	–	(1)	–	–	(1)	(2)	–	–	(2)	(3)	(3)	(7)	(15)

^a Includes one position of Finance Officer (P-3) that was approved for the period from 1 January to 30 June 2019 only.

62. The proposed resource requirements for 2020 for UNIOGBIS amount to \$16,018,200 (net of staff assessment) and would provide for the deployment of one military observer (\$84,900), salaries and common staff costs (\$11,758,700) for 56 international positions (1 Assistant Secretary-General, 1 D-2, 1 D-1, 6 P-5, 12 P-4, 8 P-3 and 27 Field Service), 61 national positions (22 National Professional Officer and 39 Local level) and four United Nations Volunteers, as well as operational costs (\$4,174,600) comprising costs for consultants and consulting services (\$59,900), official travel (\$527,000), facilities and infrastructure (\$783,400), ground transportation (\$201,400), air operations (\$731,500), marine operations (\$27,400), communications and information technology (\$1,244,900), medical services (\$179,700) and other supplies, services and equipment (\$419,400).
63. The Security Council, by its resolution [2458 \(2019\)](#), took note of the report of the Secretary-General on the strategic assessment of UNIOGBIS ([S/2018/1086](#)) and endorsed the recommendations of the Secretary-General regarding the reconfiguration of UNIOGBIS and the reprioritization of its tasks. The Security Council stressed that the reconfiguration of UNIOGBIS should take place after the completion of the electoral cycle in 2019. In this regard, the UNIOGBIS drawdown, initiated pursuant to Security Council resolution [2404 \(2018\)](#), commenced with the immediate closure of its regional offices after completion of the electoral cycle.
64. Furthermore, by its resolution [2458 \(2019\)](#), the Security Council decided that as of June 2019, UNIOGBIS should operate as a streamlined good offices special political mission, led by a Special Representative at the Assistant Secretary-General level.
65. For 2020, a net decrease of 15 positions in the staffing establishment of the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau is proposed as follows:
 - (a) The downward reclassification of the position of Special Representative of the Secretary-General from the level of Under-Secretary-General to the level of Assistant Secretary-General; and the downward reclassification of the position of Chief of Staff from the D-1 level to the P-5 level;
 - (b) The abolishment of 14 positions (1 P-5, 3 National Professional Officer, 3 Local level and 7 United Nations Volunteer), comprising:
 - (i) four positions in the Political Affairs Section: one Senior Electoral Adviser (P-5) and three United Nations Volunteer positions that were established in support of the 2019 legislative and presidential elections, pursuant to Security Council resolution [2404 \(2018\)](#);
 - (ii) 10 positions in the regional offices: two Political Affairs Officers (National Professional Officer) in the Political Affairs Section, one Human Rights Officer (National Professional Officer) in the Human Rights Section, three Field Security Assistants (Local level) in the Integrated Safety and Security Office and four Public Information Officers (United

Nations Volunteer) in the Public Information Unit, owing to the planned closure of UNIOGBIS regional offices after the completion of the electoral cycle;

- (c) The absence of one position of Finance and Budget Officer (P-3) approved for the period from 1 January to 30 June 2019 only.
66. The variance (decrease) between the proposed resources for 2020 and the approved budget for 2019 is attributable to: (a) reduced requirements under operational costs resulting from the closure of UNIOGBIS regional offices; and (b) reduced requirements under civilian personnel costs resulting from the proposed staffing changes set out in paragraph 65 above in connection with the reconfiguration of UNIOGBIS as a streamlined good offices special political mission, to be headed by a Special Representative at the Assistant Secretary-General level, pursuant to Security Council resolution [2458 \(2019\)](#).

Extrabudgetary resources

67. In 2019, UNIOGBIS projects extrabudgetary resources in the amount of \$532,800, comprising \$482,800 from the Peacebuilding Fund to support political dialogue and national reconciliation and to boost the media sector to promote greater peace and stability in Guinea-Bissau; and \$50,000 from OHCHR for specific activities prioritized by OHCHR related to the protection, promotion and monitoring of human rights.
68. In 2020, extrabudgetary resources in the amount of \$60,000 are expected from OHCHR in support of activities related to the protection, promotion and monitoring of human rights.

3. United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia

(\$106,021,600)



Foreword

Since taking up my assignment in Somalia in January 2015, I have witnessed Somalia's significant advances, albeit fragile, towards long-term peacebuilding and rebuilding State institutions after decades of conflict. In 2017, the Federal Government of Somalia undertook a peaceful transition of presidential power, following an electoral process in 2016–2017. A new Upper House representing the federal states was established and the electoral process yielded a significant increase in the number of women Members of Parliament from 14 to 24 per cent; higher than both the African and global averages. A nascent federal state structure now exists, and the Provisional Constitution is under review. The Federal Government of Somalia, led by President Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed "Farmajo" and Prime Minister Hassan Ali Khaire, is committed to pushing forward a far-reaching reform agenda that includes implementation of road maps for inclusive politics, economic recovery, security and social service delivery.

There have also been successes in conflict prevention and resolution. The United Nations, together with the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), has facilitated solutions that de-escalated the conflicts in Galkayo and Tukaraq. In Galkayo, armed clashes led to casualties and mass displacement in 2016. With the support of the United Nations and IGAD, new initiatives were established to provide security in the area. In Tukaraq, conflict flared up in early 2018 between Puntland and "Somaliland" forces, resulting in intense fighting and displacement of civilians. Sustained joint mediation efforts by the United Nations and IGAD have led to a de facto cessation of hostilities in Tukaraq.

The Federal Government of Somalia has taken steps towards assuming the lead for security responsibility, including implementation of the transition plan and national security architecture through the comprehensive approach to security. The year 2020 should see increased capability, professionalism and effectiveness of Somali security forces and institutions. In recognition of the country's significant progress under the third IMF staff-monitored programme, the World Bank's 2019–2022 country partnership framework has unlocked financing from the International Development Association through pre-arrears clearance grants. The year 2020 should witness further normalization with international financial institutions and increased access to international financing for the Government.

Somalia has begun preparations to conduct universal one-person-one-vote elections in 2020–2021, the first such elections since 1969. In preparation for this historic event, work is under way to ensure an adequate legal framework is in place and major security concerns are addressed. Continued progress on the political, security and humanitarian fronts will require all Somali stakeholders to be united in the pursuit of common objectives, at all levels of government, between the executive and the legislature and with the coordinated support of international partners. The work of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) in support of Somali-led, Somali-owned State-building and peacebuilding efforts remains crucial in enabling Somalia to build functional, legitimate and affordable State institutions which are accountable to its people.

I am privileged to serve in a Somalia that is maintaining a positive trajectory overall, with strong support from committed United Nations personnel working under extremely challenging conditions.

(Signed) Raisedon **Zenenga**
Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Officer-in-Charge
United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia

Overall orientation

Mandates and background

69. The United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) is responsible for: (a) the provision of good offices for the peace and reconciliation process; (b) provision of strategic advice on peacebuilding and State-building; (c) assistance to the Federal Government of Somalia in coordinating international donor support for Somalia's security sector in compliance with the human rights due diligence policy; and (d) capacity-building of the Federal Government of Somalia and its federal member states on human rights, women's empowerment and child protection issues, including through monitoring, reporting on and helping to prevent human rights violations. The mandate is defined in Security Council resolution [2102 \(2013\)](#), which established UNSOM, and was subsequently renewed in Council resolutions [2158 \(2014\)](#), [2221 \(2015\)](#), [2232 \(2015\)](#), [2275 \(2016\)](#), [2358 \(2017\)](#), [2408 \(2018\)](#) and most recently [2461 \(2019\)](#), by which the Council extended the mandate of UNSOM until 31 March 2020.
70. The Security Council, by its resolution [2408 \(2018\)](#), requested UNSOM to support Somali efforts in countering and preventing violent extremism; to support the implementation of the national security architecture and the transition plan; to encourage engagement with civil society and youth; to provide political, technical, operational and logistical support, in collaboration with the United Nations Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS), in preparing for the 2020–2021 elections, as well as system-wide implementation of the human rights due diligence policy in respect of all United Nations support for the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and the Somali security sector. The year 2020 will be a critical period for the implementation of this mandate, as Somalia will progress towards the envisioned one-person, one-vote elections in 2020/21, which will be the first such elections in Somalia since 1969.
71. In Somalia, political stability will be crucial leading up to the elections and to confirm that progress is made in the review of the Federal Constitution. A safe and secure environment will also be essential to making progress in the transition of security responsibilities from AMISOM to the Somali security forces.

Alignment with the Charter of the United Nations and the Sustainable Development Goals

72. The mandate of the Mission guides it in producing the respective deliverables, which contribute to the attainment of the objective. The objective of UNSOM is aligned with the Organization's purpose, to maintain international peace and security, as stipulated in article 1 of the Charter of the United Nations. In the context of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, the purposes stipulated in Article 1 of the Charter are embodied by the Sustainable Development Goals. The objective, and therefore the deliverables, is aligned with a number of Sustainable Development Goals, as reflected in paragraphs 91 and 92 below.

Recent developments

73. In early 2018, the adoption of a national road map for inclusive politics (2018–2020), which combines the constitutional review, elections and federalism agenda in a comprehensive and inclusive approach, generated renewed momentum to advance the country's peacebuilding and State-building priorities.
74. Improved cooperation between three key constitutional players (the Ministry of Constitutional Affairs, the Parliamentary Oversight Committee and the Independent Constitutional Review and Implementation Commission) resulted in the successful holding of the National Constitutional Convention from 13 to 15 May 2018 to build broad consensus around key principles, sequencing

and timelines. The Federal Government of Somalia established a new mechanism, the Federalization Negotiation Technical Committee, to bring together government representatives at both the federal and state levels to conduct technical negotiations on key constitutional issues. Following the political agreements reached among federal and state leaders at the National Security Council in Baidoa on 5 June 2018, several technical sessions of the Federalization Negotiation Technical Committee were held on important constitutional and federalism issues to prepare the ground for further political agreements, which would form the basis of constitutional amendments.

75. While cooperation and interaction at the technical level continued in 2018, deepening tensions between decision-makers in the Federal Government of Somalia and federal member states, and the executive and legislative branches, affected the implementation of the political agenda. A major political crisis was triggered by a no-confidence motion against the then-Speaker of the House of the People in March 2018. In the subsequent months, heightened tensions between the executive and legislative branches culminated on 9 December 2018 in a motion of impeachment against the President, which was subsequently withdrawn on 20 December 2018.
76. The draft electoral law, prepared by the Ministry of the Interior, Federal Affairs and Reconciliation in close consultation with the technical working group, which included the National Independent Electoral Commission and various ministries, political parties and civil society organizations, was submitted to the Cabinet on 11 November 2018. Meanwhile, the Electoral Commission established one office at the subnational level in 2018 and it has established four additional offices in various federal member state capitals in 2019.
77. While the security situation remains fragile across the country owing to continuing threats posed by Al-Shabaab and elements affiliated with Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, as well as simmering local conflicts, Somalia has made a strong commitment to the gradual transition of primary security responsibilities from AMISOM to the Somali security forces and institutions. The Federal Government of Somalia developed a four-year transition plan in March 2018, which was agreed to by federal member states, AMISOM and the international community. The transition plan was subsequently endorsed by the African Union Peace and Security Council and recognized by the Security Council of the United Nations, and implementation began in 2018 notwithstanding challenges. In September 2018, the Federal Government of Somalia issued the security and justice road map, containing milestones in the national security architecture and the transition plan, in order to track progress.

Strategy and external factors for 2020

78. UNSOM will play a lead role in monitoring and facilitating progress towards attainment of the key milestones of Somalia's road map for inclusive politics. UNSOM will promote the participation and representation of women and youth in all political processes, including local reconciliation initiatives. UNSOM will advocate for accelerated high-level decision-making on outstanding political issues relating to the constitutional review; the federal model and system of governance, including on allocation of powers, resource sharing and fiscal responsibilities; and the status of Mogadishu. UNSOM will strengthen the legislative assemblies at both federal and state levels and support capacity-building efforts targeting the federal and state institutions to improve service delivery and extend state authority to district and local levels. UNSOM will support Somali-led initiatives for the peaceful resolution of clan-based local conflicts, as well as the Tukaraq conflict between Puntland and "Somaliland", in coordination with key partners, including by ensuring that human rights and protection considerations are incorporated into reconciliation processes. UNSOM will also promote the capacity of local media to raise public awareness of peace and reconciliation issues. The Integrated Electoral Support Group will provide advice on the development and implementation of the remaining legal frameworks, regulations and policies needed in anticipation of national elections in 2020/21, including through support for the National Independent Electoral Commission at the subnational level. Support for the implementation of voter registration will run

- concurrently with the planning for the electoral process, as well as country-wide civic education and voter sensitization campaigns.
79. Partnerships with AMISOM, UNSOS and other international partners will continue to enable the implementation of phases 1 and 2 of the transition plan, including a shift away from stand-alone military operations as security responsibility in urban areas is transferred from Somali military units to the federal and state police forces.
 80. A premature drawdown of AMISOM with insufficient preparedness of the Somali security forces may negatively affect the security situation. AMISOM will continue to play a critical role in providing security, in close coordination with the Somali security forces, including in the preparations for the electoral process. Somalia will continue to experience widespread insecurity stemming from Al-Shabaab attacks, activities of Islamic State-affiliated groups, inter-clan tensions and climate-related shocks, keeping the cost of doing business in Somalia high for the United Nations. Improvised explosive devices will continue to be the weapon of choice, with increasing attacks along main supply routes and in urban areas.
 81. In the context of the AMISOM drawdown, UNSOM will support the security objectives of the Federal Government of Somalia by utilizing its convening power to coordinate planning and international assistance to Somalia, in compliance with the human rights due diligence policy, including through the comprehensive approach to security, with a focus on the implementation of the national security architecture and the transition plan, as well as the new policing model and the justice and corrections model. UNSOM will work closely with the Ministry of the Interior, Federal Affairs and Reconciliation and relevant counterparts at the subnational level to align stabilization initiatives with the priorities identified in the later phases of the transition plan. These efforts will focus on areas recovered from Al-Shabaab and currently under the control of the Government where significant drivers of fragility persist, with a view to extending the authority of the State to the benefit of the population.
 82. In the context of the transition of security responsibilities from AMISOM to Somali security institutions and in view of potential elections-related violence, UNSOM will strengthen its monitoring, investigation and reporting to the Security Council with regard to abuses or violations of human rights and/or international humanitarian law, including any violations or abuses committed against children and women and all forms of sexual exploitation and abuse committed in Somalia. Existing tools and policies, such as the human rights due diligence policy, will be enhanced, including through robust advocacy for the implementation of identified mitigation measures in the context of United Nations support for the Somali security sector and AMISOM. Critical mission support services provided by UNSOS will not be affected by any adjustment to the level of logistics support provided by UNSOS to AMISOM.
 83. While AMISOM will strengthen further and maintain its presence in all federal member states, including establishing a permanent presence in Dhusamareb, it aims to operate with agility, mobility and flexibility, including through the constructive use of official travel and consultants in areas that do not allow for a permanent staff presence.
 84. With regard to external factors, the overall plan for 2020 is based on the following planning assumptions:
 - (a) Political tensions between the Federal Government of Somalia and federal member states are expected to decrease in 2019, with stakeholders remaining committed to federalism and State-building. However, occasional tensions between the different level of governments may hamper decision-making on political, security and election preparation issues. The review of the Provisional Constitution is expected to be completed in 2019;
 - (b) The power-sharing agreement between the Galmudug Interim Administration and Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama'a will hold;
 - (c) Somalia will remain on track regarding ongoing economic reforms and progress made towards the benchmarks for Somalia to obtain debt relief under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative;

- (d) Key benchmarks towards the holding of the universal suffrage elections scheduled for 2020/21 will be achieved by the Federal Government of Somalia, in collaboration with federal member states, in line with the five-year strategic plan (2017–2021) of the National Independent Electoral Commission, including the adoption of the electoral law in early 2019, country-wide voter registration starting in early 2020 and the establishment of integrated electoral security coordination mechanisms. Donor funding and partners' commitment to and engagement in the electoral process will continue;
 - (e) Somalia will progressively assume responsibility for comprehensive security matters, with the Federal Government of Somalia and federal member states remaining committed and making progress towards building security institutions as outlined in the national security architecture. The National Security Council will remain an important decision-making forum on outstanding issues;
 - (f) Human rights violations by parties to the conflict are expected to continue, with young Somalis remaining particularly vulnerable to radicalization and recruitment by extremist groups;
 - (g) The Security Council, the African Union and the broader international community will remain sufficiently united in their approach to Somalia, notably during the transition of security from AMISOM to Somalis.
85. The Mission integrates a gender perspective in its operational activities, deliverables and results, as appropriate. UNSOM will use its good offices to promote a quota of 30 per cent women for elected officials and political appointments in Somalia.
86. With regard to cooperation with other entities, UNSOS performs the mission support function for UNSOM, including its regional offices located outside the AMISOM area of operations, in "Somaliland", Puntland and Galmudug. UNSOM will work closely with AMISOM to ensure alignment of strategic priorities and operational efforts, including through the Senior Leadership Coordination Forum, which brings together the Heads of AMISOM, UNSOM and UNSOS. Furthermore, the United Nations-AMISOM joint working group on human rights due diligence policy and the United Nations task force on human rights due diligence policy (comprising United Nations entities that deliver support to AMISOM and the Somali security forces) will be strengthened to guide and ensure robust implementation of prevention and response measures in line with the policy.
87. With regard to inter-agency coordination and liaison, UNSOM continues its effort to advance integration and cooperation with United Nations agencies, funds and programmes to enhance and accelerate the delivery of results in Somalia in line with the United Nations strategic framework (2017–2020). UNSOM, in close coordination with the United Nations country team and international partners, will work closely with the Federal Government in developing and implementing the mutual accountability framework to ensure consistency and alignment of international support with the country's priorities.
88. In addition, UNSOM will implement joint programmes with the United Nations country team to advance peacebuilding and State-building goals. Integrated teams are utilized in the areas of electoral support, constitutional support, rule of law, security sector reform and women's empowerment. The global focal point arrangement has served as the United Nations platform for joint planning and programme implementation to support Somali police, justice and corrections, and will expand to include security sector reform in 2019. Support to preparations for the 2020 electoral process will be provided jointly with UNDP and UNSOS.

Evaluation activities

89. A self-evaluation of the implementation of delegation of authority in UNSOM is planned for 2020.

A. Proposed programme plan for 2020 and programme performance for 2018



1. Objective

90. The objective, to which the Mission contributes, is to achieve peace, security, political stability and national reconciliation in Somalia.

2. Alignment with the Sustainable Development Goals

91. The objective is aligned with Sustainable Development Goal 5, which is to achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls. Progress towards the attainment of the objective will help to ensure women's full and effective participation and equal opportunities for leadership at all levels of decision-making in political, economic and public life.
92. The objective is aligned with Sustainable Development Goal 16, which is to promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development and provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels. Progress towards the attainment of the objective will help to significantly reduce all forms of violence and related death rates; promote the rule of law and ensure equal access to justice for all; develop effective, accountable and transparent institutions; ensure responsive, inclusive, participatory and representative decision-making at all levels; and strengthen relevant national institutions, including through international cooperation, for building capacity to prevent violence and combat terrorism and crime at all levels.

3. Highlighted results in 2018

Conflict prevented in Galkayo in cooperation with the Intergovernmental Authority on Development

The current state of Galmudug was formed in 2015, with its capital in Adado. The border with the neighbouring state of Puntland crosses the city of Galkayo, which is claimed by both Puntland to the north and Galmudug to the south.

Forces from the two sides clashed, resulting in dozens of casualties, damaged properties and mass displacement before a ceasefire agreement was eventually reached.

UNSOM, together with the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), formed a ceasefire advisory team and provided both political and technical advice on maintaining the ceasefire to the joint ceasefire committee. UNSOM worked with authorities, security officials and AMISOM police to form the Galkayo joint police patrols and train the officers, including on human rights.



Participants attend the opening ceremony of a joint training exercise for Puntland and Galmudug police officers, held in Galkayo, Somalia, on 17 July 2017. Source: United Nations

A turning point came when local officials, clan elders and senior security officials reached an agreement in December 2017, in which they committed to pursuing lasting peace and security in Galkayo. Significantly, the peace initiative was led by a supreme traditional leader of the Omar Mahmoud/Majerteen/Darood clan and, of the 26 co-signees, six were women. After the agreement was reached, all roadblocks installed by both Puntland and Galmudug were removed and roads were opened, restoring free movement of people and goods. In 2018, the United Nations accompanied the process from ceasefire efforts to peacebuilding through good offices, deployment of the ceasefire advisory team, technical and financial support for the joint ceasefire committee (through Interpeace) and local conferences, and training of the Galkayo joint police patrols. Other partners, including IGAD, the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, Interpeace and the transition initiatives for stabilization programme of the United States Agency for International Development have also contributed to ceasefire and peacebuilding efforts.

UNSOM also advocated for the inclusion of women and youth in the peace process, and United Nations-supported youth activities on International Peace Day reinforced youth's quest for peace. Meanwhile, the United Nations joint rule of law programme supported the capacity-building of the joint police patrols in Galkayo to provide better policing services to the local community. The support chiefly targeted enhancing police and community engagements, including through the establishment of two community policing committees and support for youth volunteers to interact with police on a range of community peace and security issues.

Result and evidence

The deliverables contributed to the result, which is the prevention of conflict in Galkayo, with both sides refraining from engagement in hostile activities.

Evidence of the result includes the reduction of cross-boundary violence in terms of a reduction in the number of incidents in the Galkayo city area.

The result demonstrates progress made in 2018 towards the collective attainment of the objective.

Paving the way towards Somalia's first universal multiparty elections since 1969

Established under the Provisional Constitution of the Federal Republic of Somalia, the National Independent Electoral Commission is the mandated statutory body in charge of organizing universal multiparty elections in 2020, the first such elections in Somalia since 1969. In 2018, the Integrated Electoral Support Group, comprising UNSOM and UNDP personnel, provided significant support to the Electoral Commission in the form of capacity development workshops, training sessions and technical and strategic advice.

Technical and legal support was provided for the Ministry of the Interior, Federal Affairs and Reconciliation to establish the necessary legal framework for the elections. On 11 November 2018, the draft electoral law was submitted to the Cabinet but was not submitted to and adopted by Parliament by the end of 2018, as envisaged in road map for inclusive politics of the Federal Government of Somalia.



Officials representing political parties in Somalia, the National Independent Electoral Commission and the United Nations hold copies of the Somali lexicon of electoral terminology and the Electoral Commission's five-year strategic plan at a launching ceremony held in Mogadishu on 11 December 2017. Source: United Nations

Based on the findings of the electoral needs assessment mission conducted in May 2018, UNSOM deployed international field staff in late 2018 to each of the state capitals (except for Dhusamareb, owing to logistical and security impediments) to support the National Independent Electoral Commission in the planning, coordination and conduct of electoral activities, such as the identification of voter registration sites and public outreach.

Result and evidence

The deliverables contributed to the result, which is strengthened capacity of the National Independent Electoral Commission to plan for the conduct of universal elections. Evidence of this result includes the conduct by the Commission of a desktop mapping of potential voter catchment areas using geographic information system (GIS) technology, as well as a pilot exercise identifying voter registration sites in the districts of Wadajir in Mogadishu and Jowhar in Hirshabelle. This allowed for the testing of recruitment and training procedures and manuals and the testing of hardware and software specifically developed for the voter registration site mapping operation scheduled for 2019.

The result demonstrates progress made in 2018 towards the collective attainment of the objective.

Creating the necessary structures to transition AMISOM security responsibilities to Somali national security forces

At the London Conference held on 4 May 2017, the Federal Government of Somalia, federal member states, AMISOM and its troop-contributing countries, the United Nations and international partners agreed on the comprehensive approach to security. As an integrated concept of reform, the comprehensive approach combines and links strategies and activities of uniformed security forces (military, police and coastguard), justice and rule of law, stabilization and preventing and countering elements of violent extremism. National and international stakeholders decided on the comprehensive approach as the mechanism for the implementation of the national security architecture and the Somalia transition plan, to facilitate a conditions-based transition of security responsibilities from AMISOM to Somali national security institutions and forces. The comprehensive approach comprises four thematic areas (strands): (a) enabling AMISOM operations; (b) accelerating the development of Somali security institutions; (c) supporting stabilization; and (d) preventing and countering violent extremism. The secretariat of the comprehensive approach, which is directly supported by UNSOM, is responsible for coordinating the workflow and ensuring regular information exchange among the strands of the comprehensive approach. Through strategic policy advice to the Federal Government counterparts, UNSOM effectively supports the secretariat and the thematic areas under the comprehensive approach.

In 2018, the comprehensive approach to security was used as a platform for coordination among the Federal Government ministries and the international community to build consensus among national and international stakeholders on key security issues for Somalia. It also facilitated continued technical cooperation between federal government departments and between the Federal Government of Somalia and the federal member states. Even during the period with increased political tensions between Federal Government of Somalia and federal member states, the Ministry of the Interior, Federal Affairs and Reconciliation, ministries of the interior of federal member states and UNSOM were able to translate the stabilization policy and coordination architecture into practical confidence-building measures based on a comprehensive approach. In addition, the comprehensive approach to security provided a platform for the establishment of a coordination structure to prevent and counter violent extremism, which also served as an entry point for other actors to provide specialist training and support according to their areas of expertise.



Somali police officers march at a ceremony marking the 74th anniversary of the founding of the Somali Police Force at General Kahiye Police Academy in Mogadishu on 20 December 2017. Source: United Nations Photo

Result and evidence

The deliverables contributed to the result, which is a strengthened security sector in Somalia and functioning, independent and accountable justice and corrections institutions capable of addressing the justice needs of the Somali people.

Evidence of the result includes the development of the transition plan in March 2018 and technical plans by the Federal Government of Somalia to implement its phase 1 priorities (i.e., Mogadishu-Baidoa main supply route; handover of the Mogadishu stadium to Somali security forces; the implementation of over 50 per cent of the recommendations of the operational readiness assessment, including the commencement of a comprehensive biometric enrolment process (linked to the payment of salaries) and the development of a code of conduct for the Somali National Army and the Somali Police Force. Further evidence of the result includes the traditional justice mechanisms now operating alongside the formal justice system; enhanced access to justice for women through the establishment of the dispute resolution centres, which have dealt with about 200 cases since they were opened in mid-2018, and the appointment of two women (out of five staff) to key positions in the coordination office for the prevention and countering of violent extremism under the Office of the Prime Minister, as well as the appointment of three women as focal points in the line ministries of the federal member states, the Somali Police Force and the Somali National Army. Finally, in Baidoa, 24 convicted Al-Shabaab fighters benefited from rehabilitation programmes as part of the interventions to counter violent extremism. In addition, rehabilitation support by Somali authorities is provided to 217 low-risk defectors located in Kismayo, 249 in Baidoa and 116 in Mogadishu. The programme to rehabilitate and support reintegration of persons who defected from Al-Shabaab has become an integral part of the Somali strategy for the prevention and countering of violent extremism and has resulted in an increase of over 100 per cent in the number of people in the rehabilitation centres in Baidoa and Kismayo.

The result demonstrates progress made in 2018 towards the collective attainment of the objective.

93. A planned result for 2018, which is strengthened, broad-based and representative government institutions in Somalia, as referred to in the report of the Secretary-General on estimates in respect of special political missions, good offices and other political initiatives authorized by the General Assembly and/or the Security Council for 2018 for thematic cluster III (A/72/371/Add.3, table 8), was partially achieved, as evidenced by the finalization of the national reconciliation framework; the submission in November 2018 by the Ministry of the Interior, Federal Affairs and Reconciliation of the electoral law to the Cabinet, which has not yet submitted the electoral law to the Parliament; the launching of provisional registration of political parties in 2018; the pilot project on voter registration held in Mogadishu and Jowhar; the identification of potential voter registration sites using GIS technology; and the finalization of the voter registration operational plan by mid-2019.
94. A planned result for 2018, which is functioning, independent and accountable justice and corrections institutions capable of addressing the justice needs of the Somali people by delivering justice for all, as referred to in the report of the Secretary-General (A/72/371/Add.3, table 8), was partially achieved, as evidenced by approximately 10 per cent of phase 2 of the joint rule of law programme being implemented as a result of a decision to extend the implementation of phase 2 of the programme until September 2018.
95. Another planned result for 2018, which is a strengthened security sector in Somalia, as referred to in the report of the Secretary-General (A/72/371/Add.3, table 8), was achieved, as evidenced by 582 newly disengaged combatants completing rehabilitation, additional Somali National Army units being certified as operationally ready to assume security tasks from AMISOM and the ongoing implementation of the Somali maritime resource and security strategy priorities through the Maritime Security Coordination Committee. Basic structures for the creation of unified, effective, accountable and rights-based security forces and institutions, such as police services of the federal member states, remained partially achieved, as evidenced by the partial implementation of the national security architecture agreement and state police organizations commencing operations in the five federal member states and the establishment of the Somali federal police.

4. Highlighted planned results for 2020

Effective and coordinated approach by the Federal Government of Somalia and federal member states to conflict prevention and resolution

In 2018, UNSOM provided strategic advice to prevent and resolve conflict. Progress was made on some key conflicts in Somalia: Galkayo is gradually transforming into a peaceful city; and a de facto ceasefire between Puntland and “Somaliland” has been maintained, partially owing to sustained joint efforts undertaken by IGAD and UNSOM. In addition, Galmudug embarked on a new start after the signing of a power-sharing agreement with Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama’a in January 2018. With regard to Marka in the Lower Shabelle region, the Federal Government of Somalia held a peace and reconciliation conference with a number of stakeholders in March 2018 and the tensions between the Bimal and Habergidir clans appear to have diminished.

Challenge and response

The challenge was to offer good offices to Puntland and “Somaliland” when Puntland was entering an electoral season in late 2018, followed by the setting up of a new administration in early 2019. Another challenge was the absence of the national reconciliation framework and gaps in the coordination mechanism. The framework, to be finalized in 2019, will introduce a set of guiding principles to promote Somali-led and Somali-owned reconciliation processes. Political commitments of both the Federal Government and federal member states will remain key to its implementation.

In response, for 2020, UNSOM will provide good offices and strategic advice to parties in conflict to address the root causes of the conflicts and resolve them in a sustainable manner. UNSOM and IGAD will continue joint mediation efforts, while UNSOM, together with the Federal Government of Somalia and partners, will design a process for the Somalia-“Somaliland” dialogue, if requested. To enhance capacity-building of partners in mediation and conflict resolution, UNSOM plans to facilitate training courses for Somali institutions and members of civil society, including women and youth, who can contribute to resolving local, district and state-level conflicts. UNSOM, through its offices in federal member states, will strengthen the ability of state administrations to promote reconciliation in line with the national reconciliation framework. Furthermore, UNSOM and government partners will undertake joint analysis, planning and implementation of the activities that will prevent emerging conflicts from turning violent.

Result and evidence

The planned deliverables are expected to contribute to the result, which is more effective, coordinated and structured responses by the Federal Government of Somalia and federal member states to conflict situations in Somalia, and the ability of institutions to pursue a whole-of-government approach, inclusive of the federal, state and district tiers, in developing comprehensive responses covering governance, development and rule of law initiatives to achieve a lasting peace.

Evidence of the result, if achieved, will include the adoption of the national reconciliation framework at the state level and the conduct of local reconciliation efforts to safeguard the rights of minorities and marginalized groups.

The result, if achieved, will demonstrate progress made in 2020 towards the collective attainment of the objective.

Performance measures

2018	2019	2020
Ad hoc conflict resolution and reconciliation mechanisms	Adoption of a national reconciliation framework	The national reconciliation framework provides the basis for a whole-of-government approach, inclusive of the federal, state and district tiers, in developing comprehensive responses covering governance, development and rule of law initiatives to achieve a lasting peace

Completion of voter registration across Somalia

In 2018, the Integrated Electoral Support Group assisted the National Independent Electoral Commission in publishing a joint voter registration feasibility study so that the Commission could take an informed decision on the voter registration methodology. The Support Group also provided technical support to the Electoral Commission in conducting a pilot project in the districts of Wadajir in Mogadishu and Jowar in Hirshabelle to test recruitment and training procedures and manuals, as well as hardware and software specifically developed for the voter registration site mapping operation scheduled in 2019. Ahead of the voter registration scheduled to start in early 2020, the Electoral Commission, with the continuous support of the Support Group, will identify voter registration sites, undertake training of its staff at national and subnational levels and conduct country-wide civic and voter education and sensitization and stakeholder engagement initiatives.

Challenge and response

The challenge was the difficult security environment, which made the initial, physical identification of potential voter registration sites problematic.

In response, for 2020, building on progress made in 2018 and 2019, the voter registration mapping exercise will provide the National Independent Electoral Commission with a revised list of potential voter registration sites to conduct security verification of those sites with the relevant security forces. Those sites will subsequently be used as polling centres for the 2020 elections. Somalia's security forces and AMISOM will play an instrumental role in securing voter registration, including the vetting and securing of voter registration sites. The securing of the voter registration process will be jointly planned, monitored and implemented through an integrated Somalia security task force, comprising both national and international security forces at the national and subnational levels. Security and access challenges pose a key risk to the successful implementation of the voter registration exercise.

To support preparations for voter registration, the National Independent Electoral Commission, with the assistance of the Integrated Electoral Support Group and logistic support to be provided by UNSOS, will facilitate the deployment of staff and registration kits and materials in 2020, which are jointly procured by the Somali authorities and the international community.

Result and evidence

The planned deliverables are expected to contribute to the result, which is increased readiness of Somalia to conduct the first universal elections since 1969. The voter registration operation will culminate in the consolidation of Somalia's first comprehensive and inclusive voters' roll in decades. The publication of the detailed list of voter registration and polling centres will assist in increasing participation of Somalia's voters in the electoral process.

Evidence of the result, if achieved, will include national and international security forces and stakeholders having developed an electoral security plan through an integrated and joint coordination mechanism to provide security for voter registration and elections and to ensure the participation of the Somali electorate in the process. Evidence

will also include the conduct of the voter registration exercise in all secure areas across the country, including in internally displaced persons' camps.

The result, if achieved, will demonstrate progress made in 2020 towards the collective attainment of the objective.

Performance measures

2018	2019	2020
Conduct of a pilot project to test recruitment and training procedures as well as hardware and software for the voter registration site mapping operation scheduled for 2019 by the National Independent Electoral Commission	Conduct of the voter registration site mapping operation	Conduct of the voter registration exercise in all secure areas across the country by the National Independent Electoral Commission

Somalia taking greater ownership of its security

In 2018, the transition plan was developed and foresees the handover of prioritized locations from AMISOM to Somali security forces, while focusing on the continued capacity-building of Somali security forces and institutions. In addition, for the transition to be sustainable, the plan includes local stabilization activities, supported by political and economic reforms. The Federal Government of Somalia, in close partnership with federal member states, has led implementation of the plan, working with AMISOM, troop-contributing countries, the United Nations and international partners through the comprehensive approach to security.

Challenge and response

The challenge was to meet the deadlines set by the transition plan timeline. The plan is comprehensive and divided into three phases, culminating in the envisaged completion of the security transition by the end of 2021. The Federal Government of Somalia has decided that the transition plan will be carried out using the comprehensive approach to security mechanism. The Federal Government will lead coordination by, inter alia: (a) chairing thematic group (strand) meetings to deliver coordinated planning and implementation of the transition plan; and (b) chairing regular meetings of the Executive Group of the comprehensive approach to set the objectives for strand activities and take decisions on issues presented by the strands.

In response, for 2020, an enhanced Somali and UNSOM partnership, including at the federal member state level, will result in effective support for the coordination of international partners' contributions to the Somali-led conditions-based handover of security responsibilities from AMISOM to Somali security forces and institutions, and the implementation of related capacity-building initiatives, in accordance with phase 2 of the transition plan. The Federal Government of Somalia is likely to take an increasing leadership role in the comprehensive approach to security mechanism to guide international partners' support. As a result of the security transition, Somalia's institutions will assume greater responsibility for providing security across the country. The Office of the Prime Minister and the secretariat of the comprehensive approach will work together to ensure that, in addition to the individual strands directly supporting the implementation of the transition plan, the technical strand meetings are used to prepare discussions at the meetings of the Executive Group of the comprehensive approach and other senior-level meetings.

Result and evidence

The planned deliverable is expected to contribute to the result, which is that Somalia's federal ministries lead each of the strands of the comprehensive approach to security alongside international partners, establishing the means

for each strand to support priorities determined by the Cabinet. In addition, federal member states will play an active role in each of the strands to enable provisions for progress in the security transition to be embedded at both the national and subnational levels. International partners will coordinate all of their security assistance through the strands with increased transparency. Financial support will be reported to the Federal Government of Somalia in order for gaps and duplications to be identified.

Evidence of the result, if achieved, will include attainment of key milestones in the national security architecture and transition plan to enable gradual handover of security responsibilities from AMISOM to Somali security forces and institutions, as well as greater levels of transparency and coordination in support of Somali-agreed priorities.

The result, if achieved, will demonstrate progress made in 2020 towards the collective attainment of the objective.

Performance measures

<i>2018</i>	<i>2019</i>	<i>2020</i>
Development of a framework/plan for the transition of security responsibilities to Somali security forces and institutions	Gradual handover of security responsibilities from AMISOM to Somali security forces and institutions, and implementation of related capacity building initiatives, in accordance with locations outlined under phase 1 of the transition plan	Gradual handover of security responsibilities from AMISOM to Somali security forces and institutions, and implementation of related capacity building initiatives, in accordance with locations outlined under phase 2 of the transition plan, including enhanced preparations towards security of the national elections

96. The Mission will continue to be guided by all mandates entrusted to it, which provide the legislative framework for its deliverables.

5. Deliverables for the period 2018–2020

97. Table 8 lists all deliverables, by category and subcategory, for the period 2018–2020 that contributed and are expected to contribute to the attainment of the objective stated in paragraph 90 above.

Table 8

Deliverables for the period 2018–2020, by category and subcategory

	<i>2018 planned</i>	<i>2018 actual</i>	<i>2019 planned</i>	<i>2020 planned</i>
Quantified deliverables				
A. Facilitation of the intergovernmental process and expert bodies				
Parliamentary documentation (number of documents)	7	7	8	8
B. Generation and transfer of knowledge				
Field and technical cooperation projects (number of projects)	4	4	4	4
Seminars, workshops and training events (number of days)	257	161	293	304
Publications (number of publications)	34	33	34	34
Technical materials (number of materials)	5	5	23	23

	<i>2018 planned</i>	<i>2018 actual</i>	<i>2019 planned</i>	<i>2020 planned</i>
Non-quantified deliverables				
C. Substantive deliverables				
Good offices				
Consultation, advice and advocacy				
Fact-finding, monitoring and investigation missions				
Databases and substantive digital materials				
D. Communication deliverables				
Outreach programmes, special events and information materials				
External and media relations				

6. Most significant relative variances in deliverables

Variations between the actual and planned figures in 2018

98. The variance in seminars, workshops and training events was attributable mainly to fewer workshops and forums being organized on justice, prison management, maritime issues, stabilization and preventing and countering violent extremism, owing to an uncondusive political environment. In addition, a lower number of workshops was held for the Executive Group of the comprehensive approach to security since work mainly proceeded through individual strand workshops at the technical level following the endorsement of the transition plan in April 2018.

B. Proposed post and non-post resource requirements for 2020

Resource requirements (regular budget)

Table 9

Financial resources

(Thousands of United States dollars)

<i>Category of expenditure</i>	<i>2018</i>	<i>2019</i>	<i>2020</i>		<i>Variance</i>
	<i>Expenditures</i>	<i>Appropriation</i>	<i>Total requirements</i>	<i>Non-recurrent requirements</i>	<i>2020 vs. 2019 Increase/(decrease)</i>
	<i>(1)</i>	<i>(2)</i>	<i>(3)</i>	<i>(4)</i>	<i>(5)=(3)-(2)</i>
Military and police personnel costs	13 793.1	14 089.9	16 139.0	–	2 049.1
Civilian personnel costs	35 283.4	39 791.9	40 553.9	–	762.0
Operational costs	37 297.2	48 976.6	49 328.7	1 000.0	352.1
Total (net of staff assessment)	86 373.7	102 858.4	106 021.6	1 000.0	3 163.2

Table 10
Positions

	Professional and higher categories									General Service and related categories		National staff					Total
	USG	ASG	D-2	D-1	P-5	P-4	P-3	P-2	Subtotal	Field/ Security Services	General Service	Total inter-national	National Professional Officer	Local level	United Nations Volunteers		
Approved 2019	1	2	1	7	31	48	35	1	126	57	–	183	84	45	13	325	
Proposed 2020	1	2	1	7	30	50	36	–	127	57	–	184	84	45	38	351	
Subtotal, regular change	–	–	–	–	(1)	2	1	(1)	1	–	–	1	–	–	25	26	
Approved general temporary assistance 2019	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	
Proposed general temporary assistance 2020	–	–	–	–	–	–	3	–	3	–	–	3	8	–	–	11	
Subtotal, general temporary assistance change	–	–	–	–	–	–	3	–	3	–	–	3	8	–	–	11	
Total approved 2019	1	2	1	7	31	48	35	1	126	57	–	183	84	45	13	325	
Total proposed 2020	1	2	1	7	30	50	39	–	130	57	–	187	92	45	38	362	
Total change	–	–	–	–	(1)	2	4	(1)	4	–	–	4	8	–	25	37	

99. The proposed resource requirements for 2020 for UNSOM amount to \$106,021,600 (net of staff assessment) and would provide for the deployment of 625 United Nations Guard Unit personnel and 14 United Nations police officers (\$16,139,000); civilian personnel costs (\$40,553,900) for 184 international positions (1 Under-Secretary-General, 2 Assistant Secretary-General, 1 D-2, 7 D-1, 30 P-5, 50 P-4, 36 P-3 and 57 Field Service), 129 national positions (84 National Professional Officer and 45 Local level), 11 general temporary assistance positions (3 P-3 and 8 National Professional Officer), 38 United Nations Volunteer positions and 23 Government-provided personnel; and operational costs (\$49,328,700), comprising costs for consultants and consulting services (\$841,100), official travel (\$1,321,300), facilities and infrastructure (\$21,793,800), ground transportation (\$1,810,200), air operations (\$10,479,500), communications and information technology (\$7,891,500), medical services (\$1,637,100) and other supplies, services and equipment (\$3,554,200).

100. In 2020, an increase of 37 positions in the staffing establishment of UNSOM is proposed, as follows:

- (a) The establishment of 37 positions (1 P-4, 25 United Nations Volunteer, 3 international general temporary assistance (P-3) and 8 national general temporary assistance positions (National Professional Officer)), as follows:

Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs

- (i) One position of Electoral Officer (P-4) (Backstopping) in New York;

Integrated Electoral Support Group

- (ii) 25 positions (United Nations Volunteer): 20 positions of Electoral Specialist (10 in Mogadishu; 2 in Jowhar, 2 in Baidoa; two in Kismayo; 2 in Garowe; 2 in Dusamareeb); four positions of Information Analyst in Mogadishu; and one position of Reporting and Operations Officer in Mogadishu;

- (iii) One general temporary assistance position of Electoral Officer (P-3) in Mogadishu;
 - (iv) One general temporary assistance position of Information Systems Officer (Voter registration and results management) (P-3) in Mogadishu;
 - (v) One general temporary assistance position of Electoral Officer (Training) (P-3) in Mogadishu;
 - (vi) Eight general temporary assistance positions of Electoral Officer (including one position for electoral security and one position for voter education and outreach) (National Professional Officer) in Mogadishu (3), Jowhar (1), Baidoa (1), Kismayo (1), Garowe (1) and Dusamareeb (1);
- (b) The reclassification of two positions as follows:

Office of the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General (Resident/Humanitarian Coordinator) for Somalia

- (i) One position of Special Assistant, Political Affairs from the P-5 level to the P-4 level in Mogadishu;

Integrated Information Hub

- (ii) One position of Associate Joint Operations Officer (P-2) to a position of Joint Operations Officer (P-3) in Somalia.

101. The variance (increase) between the resources proposed for 2020 and the approved budget for 2019 is mainly attributable to: (a) additional requirements under military and police personnel costs, owing to the provision for the full deployment of an additional 95 Guard Unit personnel (an increase in the total strength of the Guard Unit from 530 personnel in 2019 to 625 personnel in 2020), on the basis of an exchange of letters between the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council (S/2019/140 and S/2019/141); (b) increased requirements under civilian personnel costs, resulting mainly from the proposed establishment of one international position (P-4), 25 United Nations Volunteer positions and 11 general temporary assistance positions (3 P-3 and 8 National Professional Officer) in connection with the implementation of the Mission's electoral mandate; and (c) additional requirements under operational costs, mainly resulting from increased costs for the rental of fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft and related fuel requirements, which were offset in part by reduced requirements under facilities and infrastructure, owing to the projected completion of the construction of major projects in 2019.

Extrabudgetary resources

102. UNSOM manages the trust fund for peace and reconciliation in Somalia. As at 31 January 2019, the trust fund had a balance of approximately \$1.1 million. UNSOM works closely with its partners in Somalia and expects to receive additional contributions to support its work in the country. In 2019, the overall expected level of funding will be \$2 million and is expected to remain at the same level in 2020 as UNSOM, in collaboration with the Federal Government of Somalia, seeks additional funding to support the New Partnership for Somalia and the strengthening of the national security architecture.

4. United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia

(\$2,901,400)



Foreword

In recent years, the five countries of Central Asia have begun to revitalize their common interest in regional cooperation, mutual understanding and collective efforts to address some of the greatest threats facing the region. Since I assumed my responsibilities as the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, in October 2017, I have been striving to ensure that the United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia is well positioned to support the countries in their efforts.

The core functions of the Centre remain to provide good offices for preventive diplomacy to Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, as well as monitoring and analysing the regional situation and maintaining contact with regional organizations and other parts of the United Nations common system. For many years, we have worked with the countries of the region on programmatic activities. In 2019 we launched a new framework for transboundary water management and we continue with the implementation of the third phase of our joint project with the Office of Counter-Terrorism in support of implementing the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy in Central Asia. I led the Centre's efforts to engage with young men and women in some of the region's most marginalized areas. Added to this, we continue to convene our strategic dialogue seminars and our annual meeting of deputy ministers for foreign affairs of Central Asia. In all our work, we regularly involve representatives of Afghanistan, in line with the countries of the region having prioritized renewed engagement with their southern neighbour. One key recent success was the expansion of the annual meeting of deputy ministers for foreign affairs to include Afghanistan, starting in 2017.

Cooperation at both the bilateral and multilateral levels in Central Asia is increasing every day, and this provides us with a wide spectrum of new entry points to support the countries of the region in resolving some long-standing issues on the regional agenda in various spheres. I believe wholeheartedly that this stands as a positive example for a world that is otherwise at an increasingly confusing and conflicting point in time.

To be sure, many issues remain in Central Asia, most notably the threats of terrorism and extremism, the lack of agreement on transboundary water management, the developing effects of climate change and a growing youth population seeking new opportunities. But I am encouraged by the growing understanding that regional cooperation is not only possible, but that it holds the key to resolving many seemingly intractable problems. The United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia is prepared to stand with the countries of the region as they continue to develop for the benefit of their citizens.

Finally, I am pleased to mention two recent General Assembly resolutions: resolution [72/7](#) of 7 November 2017, on the role of the United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia, and resolution [72/283](#) of 22 June 2017, on strengthening cooperation in Central Asia. These resolutions, initiated by the Central Asian countries themselves, were a great expression of appreciation for our work and encourage us to continue to build trust, dialogue and cooperation in Central Asia.

(Signed) Natalia Gherman
Special Representative of the Secretary-General
United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia

Overall orientation

Mandates and background

103. The United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia is responsible for supporting national authorities in identifying and addressing existing and potential threats to regional peace and security. The open-ended mandate was defined through an exchange of letters between the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council ([S/2007/279](#) and [S/2007/280](#)).
104. The Centre's work is guided by a three-year programme of action, most recently covering the period 2018–2020. The document was endorsed by the deputy ministers for foreign affairs of five countries in the region, in 2017, and lays out five key priorities: (a) promoting prevention among the Governments of Central Asia; (b) monitoring and early warning; (c) building partnerships for prevention; (d) strengthening the preventive activities of the United Nations in the region; and (e) encouraging cooperation and interaction between Central Asia and Afghanistan.

Alignment with the Charter of the United Nations and the Sustainable Development Goals

105. The mandate of the Centre guides it in producing the respective deliverables, which contribute to the attainment of the objective. The objective of the Centre is aligned with the Organization's purpose to maintain international peace and security, as stipulated in Article 1 of the Charter of the United Nations. In the context of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, the purposes stipulated in Article 1 of the Charter are embodied by the Sustainable Development Goals. The objective, and therefore the deliverables, is aligned with a number of Sustainable Development Goals, as reflected in paragraphs 116 to 118 below.

Recent developments

106. Throughout 2018, Central Asia saw a sustained continuation of the positive regional dynamic that began in late 2016. The countries' leaders continued to enhance regional cooperation, which has provided the United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia with new entry points to engage with the countries in pursuit of the resolution of longstanding issues that affect regional peace and security.
107. In March 2018, the leaders of the countries of the region convened a summit meeting, the first since 2009, in Nur-Sultan. One key outcome was an agreement to make the gathering an annual event, hosted on a rotational basis among the five countries. The second summit was held in April 2019 in Tashkent. This development was a watershed moment for regional cooperation and demonstrates the increasing willingness of the countries to jointly address the regional challenges and threats facing Central Asia.
108. Positive trends are also apparent at various levels of government and increasingly within the societies. A number of ambitious working-level and inter-agency bilateral and regional agreements have been concluded with a view to promoting collaboration in areas such as management of transboundary water resources, although a regional agreement on the matter remains elusive. Furthermore, cooperation among security agencies to tackle transnational threats has been increasing, as shown by the active participation of representatives and experts from the Central Asian countries and Afghanistan in regional workshops convened by the United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia on preventing violent extremism and terrorism. Finally, new border crossings and simplified border regimes, particularly in the Fergana Valley, have led to increased trade and interaction among populations, which are leading to improvements in the daily lives of those living close to the international borders. At the same time, certain key portions of the

borders between several of the countries of the region remain disputed, which can be a source of low-level tension.

Strategy and external factors for 2020

109. In 2020, the United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia will strive to sustain the positive regional momentum through implementation of its programme of action for 2018–2020. This includes supporting efforts towards transboundary water management; supporting implementation of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy in Central Asia; and working to instil a culture of prevention among the region's youth. The Centre will organize its annual strategic dialogue seminar and meeting of deputy ministers for foreign affairs in a format involving the five Central Asian states plus Afghanistan and the United Nations.
110. With regard to the external factors, the overall plan for 2020 is based on the following planning assumptions:
 - (a) Continued commitment by the five Governments of the region and national stakeholders to preventive diplomacy and regional cooperation;
 - (b) Ongoing interest among the five countries of the region in engaging Afghanistan in regional cooperation;
 - (c) Availability of extrabudgetary funds to pursue project activities in support of implementing the Centre's mandate.
111. The Centre integrates a gender perspective in its operational activities, deliverables and results, as appropriate. The deliverable of three regional expert-level workshops on issues related to preventive diplomacy and confidence-building for officials from the Central Asian states and Afghanistan includes encouraging countries to send gender-balanced delegations to participate, as well as inclusion of gender-related issues in the agenda of workshops whenever possible.
112. With regard to cooperation with other entities, the Centre maintains contact with the Commonwealth of Independent States, the European Union, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and other relevant organizations.
113. With regard to inter-agency coordination and liaison, the Centre cooperates closely with the World Bank. The Centre will also continue to cooperate with relevant actors, including the United Nations resident coordinators in the five countries and the organizations represented in the country teams, including UNDP and UN-Women on gender issues and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization on water issues. The Centre provides overall policy guidance to the country teams in the field of preventive diplomacy to ensure the coherence and complementarity of efforts in conflict prevention and peacebuilding.

Evaluation activities

114. A self-evaluation of the implementation of delegation of authority in the Centre is planned for 2020.

A. Proposed programme plan for 2020 and programme performance for 2018



1. Objective

115. The objective, to which the Centre contributes, is to enhance regional security and stability in Central Asia.

2. Alignment with the Sustainable Development Goals

116. The objective is aligned with Sustainable Development Goal 5, which is to achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls. Progress towards the attainment of the objective will help to ensure women's full and effective participation and equal opportunities for leadership at all levels of decision-making in political, economic and public life.
117. The objective is also aligned with Sustainable Development Goal 6, which is to ensure access to water and sanitation for all. Progress towards the attainment of the objective will help to achieve equitable access to safe and affordable drinking water.
118. Finally, the objective is aligned with Sustainable Development Goal 16, which is to promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels. Progress towards the attainment of the objective will help to strengthen relevant national institutions for building capacity at all levels to prevent violence and combat terrorism and crime.

3. Highlighted result in 2018

Positive dynamics and fostering new political will in Central Asia

In 2018, the United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia worked to support positive dynamics in the region and to generate new political will to enhance regional cooperation. The Centre played an important role in preventive diplomacy efforts in Central Asia, providing a platform for regional dialogue on issues and challenges relating to security and stability. Recent dynamics in the region have led to an increased number of interactions among the leaders of the Central Asian States at multilateral and bilateral levels. The Centre contributed to this positive momentum by providing unique discussion platforms ahead of major events, such as the landmark summit held in Nur-Sultan in March 2018 and the summit of the International Fund for Saving the Aral Sea in Turkmenbashi, Turkmenistan, in August 2018.



Eighth annual meeting of deputy foreign ministers of Central Asian States, Bishkek, 15 November 2018. Source: United Nations

In 2018, the Centre convened its annual meeting of Central Asian deputy ministers for foreign affairs in Bishkek, which fostered discussions between the United Nations and the Central Asian countries on existing and emerging challenges and threats to peace in the region. For the second consecutive year, parts of this meeting were joined by

the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of Afghanistan and representatives of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan. This encouraged constructive talks in a format involving the five Central Asian states plus Afghanistan and the United Nations and was a landmark in the expansion of cooperation between the countries of Central Asia and Afghanistan.

In addition, in October 2018, the Centre partnered with the Government of Uzbekistan to organize the first Central Asian expert forum, gathering representatives of the region's institutes of strategic studies, and also the February 2019 international conference entitled "Central Asian connectivity: challenges and new opportunities".

In this process, role has been to organize and convene high-level events and to promote a common understanding of the challenges and opportunities of the region in the light of the Centre's work on preventive diplomacy.

Result and evidence

The deliverables contributed to the result, which is more structured regional engagement among the five countries of Central Asia and Afghanistan. While numerous contacts are taking place at the bilateral level and increasingly at the multilateral level within the region, fostering a more structured engagement contributes to supporting further development and evolution of the current positive dynamics in the region.

Evidence of the result includes the participation of the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of Afghanistan in the annual meeting of Central Asian deputy ministers for foreign affairs in Bishkek; and the convening of the Central Asian expert forum, which served as a preparatory meeting for the April 2019 summit meeting of Central Asian Heads of State.

The result demonstrates progress made in 2018 towards the collective attainment of the objective.

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119. A planned result for 2018, which is improved regional cooperation among the five Governments of Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan), as referred to in the report of the Secretary-General on estimates in respect of special political missions, good offices and other political initiatives authorized by the General Assembly and/or the Security Council for 2018 for thematic cluster III (A/72/371/Add.3, table 11), was achieved, as evidenced by the joint initiatives by the Governments of Central Asia, with the support of the Regional Centre, to address common security threats with regard to: (a) implementation of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy in Central Asia; (b) strengthening the region's ability to manage transboundary water resources in the Aral Sea basin; and (c) facilitating political dialogue and promoting preventive diplomacy tools.

4. Highlighted planned result for 2020

Support for the positive regional momentum

In 2018, the improving dynamics in the region provided a range of new entry points for the United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia to engage with the countries of the region to address longstanding challenges. Efforts were undertaken by the Centre to support the positive regional momentum at various levels of society, including launching a new initiative aimed at fostering a culture of prevention among the region's young men and women, and particularly those living in marginalized communities close to the international borders of the five countries of the region.

Challenge and response

The challenge was to reach out to a young generation, particularly in the marginalized communities of the five Central Asian countries, in the context of efforts to achieve lasting peace in various parts of the region. The Centre is building support among the Governments of the five countries to organize targeted interventions in border communities among young people. Throughout 2019, the Centre will continue to engage with the five Governments with a view to garnering support for young people to undertake their own initiatives to promote cross-border cooperation, people-to-people contacts and intercultural understanding.

In response, for 2020, the Centre plans to build on this initiative, taking into account lessons learned in 2019. The Centre will conduct outreach to identify new donors to support the work and will invite youth representatives to events throughout the year, as appropriate, to present their initiatives and engage directly with officials from the countries of the region. This will be a part of the continuing implementation of the three-year programme of action (2018–2020), which includes implementation of the strategy to encourage closer cooperation on transboundary water management in Central Asia. The Centre will also continue its support for the implementation of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy in Central Asia, in cooperation with the Office of Counter-Terrorism, by offering capacity-building and policy advice to facilitate joint and effective responses to the threat of violent extremism and terrorism across the region. The Centre will continue to provide a unique platform for coordinating international efforts to counter terrorism and prevent violent extremism in the region.

Result and evidence

The planned deliverables are expected to contribute to the result, which is greater engagement by key stakeholders in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan in tackling regional challenges jointly, including political dialogue that is more inclusive of all levels of society, particularly youth and women, in efforts to safeguard international peace and security in Central Asia for the long term.

Evidence of the result, if achieved, will include increased interaction and regional cooperation among the five countries of the region, at all levels, from the highest echelons of government to the grass roots, and among all social groups, including young people in particular.

The result, if achieved, will demonstrate progress made in 2020 towards the collective attainment of the objective.

Performance measures

2018	2019	2020
Support for a more structured engagement in the context of new initiatives by the countries of the region to prepare for the annual Nowruz summit	Increased involvement of different groups in discussions by key stakeholders in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, including through the Centre's new youth initiative	Further expansion of involvement of additional groups to create more inclusive, structured discussions by key stakeholders in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan

120. The Centre will continue to be guided by all mandates entrusted to it, which provide the legislative framework for its deliverables.

5. Deliverables for the period 2018–2020

121. Table 11 lists all deliverables, by category and subcategory, for the period 2018–2020 that contributed and are expected to contribute to the attainment of the objective stated in paragraph 115 above.

Table 11
Deliverables for the period 2018–2020, by category and subcategory

	2018 planned	2018 actual	2019 planned	2020 planned
Quantified deliverables				
A. Facilitation of the intergovernmental process and expert bodies				
Substantive services for meetings (number of three-hour meetings)	2	2	2	2
B. Generation and transfer of knowledge				
Seminars, workshops and training events (number of days)	3	3	3	3
Non-quantified deliverables				
C. Substantive deliverables				
Good offices				
Consultation, advice and advocacy				
D. Communication deliverables				
Outreach programmes, special events and information materials				
External and media relations				
Digital platforms and multimedia content				

B. Proposed post and non-post resource requirements for 2020

Resource requirements (regular budget)

Table 12
Financial resources
 (Thousands of United States dollars)

Category of expenditure	2018	2019	2020		Variance
	Expenditures	Appropriation	Total requirements	Non-recurrent requirements	2020 vs. 2019 Increase/(decrease)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)=(3)-(2)
Military and police personnel costs	–	–	–	–	–
Civilian personnel costs	2 038.9	2 135.2	2 157.1	–	21.9
Operational costs	646.2	898.3	744.3	–	(154.0)
Total (net of staff assessment)	2 685.1	3 033.5	2 901.4	–	(132.1)

Table 13
Positions

	Professional and higher categories									General Service and related categories		National staff			Total	
	USG	ASG	D-2	D-1	P-5	P-4	P-3	P-2	Subtotal	Field/ Security Services	General Service	Total inter-national	National Professional Officer	Local level		United Nations Volunteers
Approved 2019	–	1	–	–	1	2	2	–	6	2	–	8	4	18	–	30
Proposed 2020	–	1	–	–	1	2	2	–	6	2	–	8	4	18	–	30
Change	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–

122. The proposed resource requirements for 2020 for the United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia amount to \$2,901,400 (net of staff assessment) and would provide for salaries and common staff costs (\$2,157,100) for eight international positions (1 Assistant Secretary-General, 1 P-5, 2 P-4, 2 P-3 and 2 Field Service) and 22 national positions (4 National Professional Officer and 18 Local level), as well as operational costs (\$744,300) comprising costs for consultants and consulting services (\$30,800), official travel (\$228,500), facilities and infrastructure (\$101,200), ground transportation (\$53,000), communications and information technology (\$227,800) and other supplies, services and equipment (\$103,000).
123. In 2020, the number and levels of positions for the United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia are proposed to remain unchanged.
124. The variance (decrease) between the proposed resources for 2020 and the approved budget for 2019 is mainly attributable to reduced requirements under operational costs, resulting from: (a) the discontinuation of a leased line from a local Internet service provider; (b) the reduction in rental costs for the four locations shared with UNDP and lower provisions for construction, alternations, renovation and major maintenance and for the acquisition of equipment; and (c) lower provisions for freight and related costs and for the Centre's share of operational expenses in the four locations shared with UNDP.

Extrabudgetary resources

125. In 2019, extrabudgetary resources in the estimated amount of \$1.2 million are projected to support the following activities:
 - (a) A strategic dialogue seminar with Central Asian institutes of strategic studies and a series of capacity-building activities for the countries of Central Asia and Afghanistan, with the overall goal of assisting and supporting regional Governments in building conflict-prevention capacities (\$350,000);
 - (b) The Central Asia and Afghanistan regional cooperation project on transboundary water sharing (\$250,000);
 - (c) The continuation of the third phase of the joint project with the Office of Counter-Terrorism on implementing the Joint Plan of Action for the Implementation of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy in Central Asia (\$500,000).
126. In 2020, extrabudgetary resources in the estimated amount of \$1.0 million are projected for the Centre's activities, including the following:
 - (a) A meeting of Central Asian deputy ministers for foreign affairs, a strategic dialogue seminar with Central Asian institutes of strategic studies and a series of capacity-building activities for the countries of Central Asia and Afghanistan, with the overall goal of assisting and supporting regional Governments in building conflict prevention capacities (\$300,000);
 - (b) The Central Asia and Afghanistan regional cooperation project on transboundary water sharing (\$200,000);
 - (c) The continuation of the third phase of the joint project with Office of Counter-Terrorism on implementing the Joint Plan of Action for the Implementation of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy in Central Asia (\$500,000).

5. United Nations support for the Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission

(\$3,501,000)



Foreword

As Chair of the Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission, I have actively worked to resolve the remaining issues in contention in physically demarcating the land boundary shared by Nigeria and Cameroon through mediation between the two parties. While the work of the Commission has been referred to as a good example of a peaceful resolution of a boundary conflict, the advances made over the last few years have the potential to unravel if the demarcation is not formally concluded with all signed templates binding the parties into a final boundary statement. Going forward, well-demarcated boundaries would greatly assist in governing relations between the two parties. The technical support of the United Nations in mapping the boundary, along with its transborder development projects and confidence-building initiatives, will deter possible disputes along the agreed upon and demarcated border. Furthermore, the peaceful resolution of the demarcation dispute between key member States of ECOWAS and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) will greatly contribute to enhancing the stability of the subregion.

I personally witnessed the importance of the work of the Commission when we completed the demarcation of the boundary between the villages of Tipsan in Nigeria and Kontcha in Cameroon. Kontcha village had always been dependent on receiving supplies from Tipsan because access to Cameroon was impeded by a large river. After the placement of pillars between the two villages, municipal officials were able to open customs posts and formalize business dealings, which has significantly increased trade between the two villages. In some cases, where communities had been divided by the border demarcation works, the United Nations support team engaged in enhanced monitoring of the situation to ensure that the rights of the population affected by the demarcation were protected and that the border functioned as a bridge and not a barrier. Boundary statements and final mapping will bring finality to the demarcation, and cross-border development projects, implemented by United Nations country teams or donors, will build support for the demarcation among populations that have been impacted by the process.

The work of the Commission continues to make progress. Of the 2,100 km of the countries' shared land boundary, only 95 km remain to be agreed. I intend to continue working with the parties towards the conclusive resolution of the remaining disagreement areas on this outstanding 95 km of border, making way for the pillar emplacement project to be advanced, followed by the drafting of a boundary statement that would finalize the demarcation. I will also continue to advocate for the implementation of socioeconomic projects and joint economic ventures in support of populations affected by the demarcation. This will entail cross-border development projects and support for the secretariat of the Lake Chad Basin Commission to enhance confidence-building between the two largest countries in West and Central Africa.

The resources, energies and hopes invested in this process will eventually yield a binding agreement and the commitment and support of the populations of the two countries.

(Signed) Mohamed **Ibn Chambas**
Special Representative of the Secretary-General
Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission

Overall orientation

Mandates and background

127. The Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission is responsible for the implementation of the decision of the International Court of Justice of 10 October 2002 on the Cameroon-Nigeria boundary dispute. Its responsibilities include: (a) providing support for the demarcation of the land boundary and the delineation of the maritime boundary; (b) facilitating the withdrawal and transfer of authority in the Lake Chad area, along the boundary and in the Bakassi peninsula; (c) addressing the situation of affected populations; and (d) making recommendations on confidence-building measures. The mandate of the United Nations support team to the Mixed Commission derives from an exchange of letters between the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council (S/2018/1130 and S/2018/1131).
128. Agreements on the four sections of the ruling of the International Court of Justice have been reached, including the withdrawal and transfer of authority in the Lake Chad area (December 2003), along the land boundary (July 2004) and in the Bakassi peninsula (June 2006). Implementation of the Court's ruling in respect of the maritime boundary was completed after the formal approval of the maritime chart in March 2008 and the acknowledgement by the two States parties, Cameroon and Nigeria, in April 2011 that the Working Group on the Maritime Boundary had fulfilled its mandate. With the settlement of the maritime boundary, the role of the United Nations is to ensure that the boundary statement and final mapping accurately reflect the judgment of the International Court of Justice.
129. While advances have been made in the pacific settlement of this border dispute, this progress could unravel if the demarcation is not formally concluded through the signing of a final boundary statement following the emplacement of all pillars. The support of the United Nations to the Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission in 2020 will be focused on completing the negotiations on the contentious areas of the border and signing of the boundary statement after the construction of the remaining pillars.

Alignment with the Charter of the United Nations and the Sustainable Development Goals

130. The mandate of the mission guides it in producing the respective deliverables, which contribute to the attainment of the objective. The objective of the support team is aligned with the Organization's purpose to maintain international peace and security, as stipulated in Article 1 of the Charter of the United Nations. In the context of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, the purposes stipulated in Article 1 of the Charter are embodied by the Sustainable Development Goals. The objective, and therefore the deliverables, is aligned with Sustainable Development Goal 16, as reflected in paragraph 142 below.

Recent developments

131. In 2018, insecurity in the northern Cameroon-Nigeria border areas, as a result of Boko Haram-related violence, continued to adversely affect the work of the Commission, delaying field assessment and demarcation in several locations. In addition, increased tensions in the Anglophone regions of Cameroon raised additional security concerns. As a result, the ongoing demarcation and pillar emplacement activities faced additional challenges. To address these challenges, the State parties reinforced security measures for field operations to allow the continuation of the demarcation work.
132. A total of 13 areas of disagreement remain outstanding. The Chair of the Commission, with a view to building consensus, engaged the heads of the Nigerian and Cameroonian delegations in bilateral consultations in efforts to reconcile their divergent positions concerning certain paragraphs of the

judgment of the International Court of Justice. The parties formally submitted their positions to the Chair, which may lead to concrete proposals for resolving their differences.

133. The parties also renewed their commitment and efforts in respect of replenishment of the voluntary funds supporting the process and remain steadfast in their determination to fully implement the judgment of the International Court of Justice, including the related confidence-building measures and cross-border development projects to benefit populations affected by the demarcation.

Strategy and external factors for 2020

134. On the basis of reasonable projections, the land boundary is believed to extend over a distance of 2,100 km in its entirety. A total of 2,005 km were assessed during field missions and both parties signed templates indicating their agreement. With respect to the physical demarcation of the land boundary, thus far 49 per cent has been demarcated.
135. In 2020, the United Nations support team for the Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission will continue to facilitate cooperation between the parties to: (a) resolve demarcation disagreements that were deferred, primarily as a result of divergent interpretations of certain paragraphs in the judgment of the International Court of Justice, as well as difficulty in accessing the terrain and local security concerns; (b) construct approximately 486 pillars; (c) produce the draft maps and have them validated by experts from the parties; (d) provide legal guidance and produce and organize data pertinent for inclusion in the drafting of a boundary statement and its technical annexes; (e) provide support for the development of programmes for confidence-building and cross-border development projects for populations in the areas affected by the demarcation; (f) support the rehabilitation and densification of the boundary demarcated in the Lake Chad area, comprising the section of boundary extending from the tri-point Cameroon-Nigeria-Chad to pillar No. 5; (g) advocate for support for the Lake Chad Basin Commission in the implementation of its socioeconomic projects, including for women and youth; (h) promote subregional cooperation on good practices in management of boundary lines by disseminating lessons learned from the Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission; and (i) support the fundraising campaign to continue the demarcation and implement confidence-building projects.
136. With regard to the external factors, the overall plan for 2020 is based on the following planning assumptions:
- (a) The two States parties, Cameroon and Nigeria, continue to adhere to the judgment of the International Court of Justice, as well as the workplan adopted by the Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission;
 - (b) There is an enabling security environment for the continued work of the support team;
 - (c) Extrabudgetary resources continue to be made available for pillar emplacement and confidence-building initiatives and additional voluntary contributions are received to carry out the border demarcation project.
137. The mission integrates a gender perspective in its operational activities, deliverables and results, as appropriate. Examples include the implementation of community development projects in the areas of potable water, capacity-building for employment and community access to the electricity network. The Commission will continue regular field visits along the land boundary to monitor the legal rights and well-being of the affected populations, with special focus on vulnerable groups, including women and youth.
138. The support team, which serves as the secretariat of the Commission, is hosted within the UNOWAS premises in Dakar, provided free of charge by the host Government. UNOWAS provides administrative and logistics support to the team (travel and office management, including information technology, human resources, finance, budget and procurement).

139. With regard to inter-agency coordination and liaison, the mission cooperates with the United Nations country teams in Cameroon and Nigeria to jointly develop confidence-building measures in accordance with the needs of the populations living along the land boundary and to ensure the conditions for peace, security and sustainable cross-border development.

Evaluation activities

140. A self-evaluation of the implementation of delegation of authority in the Commission is planned for 2020.

A. Proposed programme plan for 2020 and programme performance for 2018



1. Objective

141. The objective, to which the mission contributes, is to achieve an orderly and peaceful implementation of the decision of 10 October 2002 of the International Court of Justice regarding the land and maritime boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria.

2. Alignment with the Sustainable Development Goals

142. The objective is aligned with Sustainable Development Goal 16, which is to promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels.
143. Progress towards the attainment of the objective will help to significantly reduce all forms of violence and related death rates; promote the rule of law; develop effective, accountable and transparent institutions at all levels; ensure responsive, inclusive, participatory and representative decision-making at all levels; and strengthen relevant national institutions, including through international cooperation, for building capacity at all levels to prevent violence and combat terrorism and crime.

3. Highlighted result in 2018

Only 100 kilometres away from a fully assessed border between Cameroon and Nigeria

The construction of boundary pillars along the border between Cameroon and Nigeria is under way. As of October 2018, 991 of an estimated 2,696 pillars that physically mark the boundaries had been built. Construction works on lot 4B (335 pillars) commenced in December 2018. In 2019, 430 pillars are projected to be constructed, followed by 486 pillars in 2020 and 454 pillars in 2021.

While the majority of the border (2,005 km) has been assessed and agreed upon between the two States parties, efforts are under way to break the deadlock in the areas of disagreement regarding the remaining 95 km of the border. In 2018, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General conducted two mediation missions to discuss this matter with the heads of the delegations of the two States parties, Cameroon and Nigeria, with a view to finding a solution in the near future.

In light of increased activities of terrorists along the border between Nigeria and Cameroon, in 2018, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General convened a further high-level meeting to urge the Governments of Cameroon and Nigeria to operationalize the security protocols that they agreed to put in place prior to the continuation of the works. Accordingly, each country agreed to provide a minimum of one battalion of soldiers, one helicopter and medical staff for the field teams, not only for the close protection of staff and contractors but also in areas of operation to avoid potential attacks by criminal elements. Consequently, the construction of boundary pillars resumed in December 2018.

Result and evidence

The deliverable contributed to the result, which is the continued demonstration of political will by the States parties to resolve the boundary dispute. Evidence of the result includes additional voluntary funds being earmarked by the two States parties for pillar construction along the border between the two countries. Evidence also includes the agreement of the States parties to ensure security for the remaining works, reflecting the cooperation between the two Governments and their commitment to finalizing the demarcation of the border.

The result demonstrates progress made in 2018 towards the collective attainment of the objective.

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144. A planned result for 2018, which is progress towards the completion of the demarcation of the land boundary and the conclusion of a cooperation agreement on maritime boundary matters between Cameroon and Nigeria, as referred to in the report of the Secretary-General on estimates in respect of special political missions, good offices and other political initiatives authorized by the General Assembly and/or the Security Council for 2018 for thematic cluster III ([A/72/371/Add.3](#), table 14), was not achieved, as evidenced by the remaining disagreement regarding the outstanding 95 km of the border. Delays in finalizing security arrangements for field operations contributed to this development.

4. Highlighted planned result for 2020

Political agreement on border reached, which allows the drafting of the final boundary statement to commence

In 2018, the mission continued construction of boundary pillars along the border between Cameroon and Nigeria.

Challenge and response

The challenge was to continue pillar construction and commence the drafting process of the boundary statement, given the unstable security situation and the political deadlock in the areas of disagreement regarding the remaining 95 km of the border, which had a negative effect on the pillar construction, as well as the commencement of the drafting process of the boundary statement.

In response, for 2020, the mission will support the establishment of robust security measures for the continuation of pillar emplacement work and assist in the renewal of political commitments of both States parties to continue demarcation activities and resolve outstanding disagreements. In 2020, the mission will draft the legally binding boundary statement.

Result and evidence


The planned deliverable is expected to contribute to the result, which is a fully demarcated boundary through a legally binding boundary statement. Evidence of the result, if achieved, will include construction of 2,696 boundary pillars along the border, the production of final maps of the border and the finalization of the boundary statements, as shown in the figure below.

The boundary statement will settle the border dispute between the two countries and respond to the requirements of the judgment of the International Court of Justice. In addition, progress towards the construction of pillars is

expected to further accelerate, owing to more favourable topography and easier access to the remaining portions of the boundary, as well as the reinforced security measures by the two States parties along the border.

The result, if achieved, will demonstrate progress made in 2020 towards the collective attainment of the objective.

Performance measures: number of pillars along the land boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (cumulative)



145. The mission will continue to be guided by all mandates entrusted to it, which provide the legislative framework for its deliverables.

5. Deliverables for the period 2018–2020

146. Table 14 lists all deliverables, by category and subcategory, for the period 2018–2020 that contributed and are expected to contribute to the attainment of the objective stated in paragraph 142 above.

Table 14

Deliverables for the period 2018–2020, by category and subcategory

	2018 planned	2018 actual	2019 planned	2020 planned
Quantified deliverables				
A. Facilitation of the intergovernmental process and expert bodies				
Parliamentary documentation (number of documents)	2	2	2	2
Substantive services for meetings (number of three-hour meetings)	2	2	2	2
B. Generation and transfer of knowledge				
Technical materials (number of materials)	22	13	22	22
Non-quantified deliverables				
C. Substantive deliverables				
Good offices				
Consultation, advice and advocacy				
Fact-finding, monitoring and investigation missions				
Databases and substantive digital materials				

	2018 planned	2018 actual	2019 planned	2020 planned
D. Communication deliverables				
Outreach programmes, special events and information materials				
External and media relations				
Digital platforms and multimedia content				

6. Most significant relative variances in deliverables

Variations between the actual and planned figures in 2018

147. The variance in technical materials was attributable mainly to the issuance of fewer reports of the project steering committee and the technical monitoring team owing to delays in the operationalization of security protocols agreed upon by the parties prior to the continuation of the pillar emplacement works and disagreements between the parties over the demarcation of some areas of the boundary where discussions are ongoing.

B. Proposed post and non-post resource requirements for 2020

Resource requirements (regular budget)

Table 15

Financial resources

(Thousands of United States dollars)

Category of expenditure	2018	2019	2020		Variance
	Expenditures	Appropriation	Total requirements	Non-recurrent requirements	2020 vs. 2019 Increase/(decrease)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)=(3)-(2)
Military and police personnel costs	51.4	71.9	72.0	–	0.1
Civilian personnel costs	1 874.4	1 354.9	1 354.4	–	(0.5)
Operational costs	1 652.5	2 074.2	2 074.6	–	0.4
Total (net of staff assessment)	3 578.3	3 501.0	3 501.0	–	–

Table 16

Positions

	Professional and higher categories									General Service and related categories		National staff			Total	
	USG	ASG	D-2	D-1	P-5	P-4	P-3	P-2	Subtotal	Field/ Security Services	General Service	Total inter-national	National Officer	Local level		United Nations Volunteers
Approved 2019	–	–	–	–	2	6	–	–	8	1	–	9	–	2	–	11
Proposed 2020	–	–	–	–	2	6	–	–	8	1	–	9	–	2	–	11
Change	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–

148. The proposed resource requirements for 2020 for the Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission amount to \$3,501,000 (net of staff assessment) and would provide for the deployment of one military adviser

(\$72,000), salaries and common staff costs (\$1,354,400) for nine international staff positions (2 P-5, 6 P-4 and 1 Field Service) and two national staff positions (Local level), as well as operational costs (\$2,074,600) comprising costs for consultants and consulting services (\$701,500), official travel (\$310,200), facilities and infrastructure (\$304,200), ground transportation (\$43,500), air operations (\$215,100), communications and information technology (\$297,800) and other supplies, services and equipment (\$202,300).

149. In 2020, the number and levels of positions for the United Nations support for the Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission are proposed to remain unchanged.

Extrabudgetary resources

150. The pillar construction work is executed by qualified contractors selected by the United Nations through a competitive procurement process, in accordance with the applicable United Nations regulations and rules, as well as the United Nations Procurement Manual. At the time of writing, 1,326 of an estimated 2,696 pillars had been built with the extrabudgetary resources received.
151. The remaining 1,370 pillars will complete the physical demarcation of the Cameroon-Nigeria land boundary. The overall cost of the project is estimated to be \$9.8 million. At the time of writing, the unspent balance available in the trust fund to implement the pillar construction project amounted to \$1.1 million funded by the Government of Germany.
152. Considering the depletion of the trust fund and the need to continue the pillar emplacement exercise, the Government of Cameroon and the Government of Nigeria committed to contributing an additional amount of \$6.0 million (\$3.0 million each). A contribution of \$1.5 million has been received from the Government of Nigeria and the remaining amount is expected to be received in 2019. The contribution from the Government of Cameroon is also expected to be received in 2019.
153. The amount of \$7.1 million is expected to be available in the trust fund in 2019, including the unspent balance. The European Union is also in favour of funding the demarcation activities and the Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission will continue its fundraising activities to fill the funding gap, estimated at \$2.7 million.
154. In addition, resources will need to be mobilized to fund projects to foster confidence-building projects and cross-border development in support of populations affected by the demarcation.

6. Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon

(\$8,953,600)



Foreword

The year 2018 revealed the persistent challenges facing Lebanon, which could unsettle its delicate political balance and impact its security and stability. Lebanon has long been a model of relative stability in an unstable region, but this stability cannot be taken for granted.

With a prevention lens in mind, the work of the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon (UNSCOL) is guided by a “whole-of-Lebanon” approach combining the pillars of peace and security, political stability and socioeconomic stabilization. Prevention goes beyond averting conflict with external actors: it also requires that we look holistically at the internal challenges facing a society, from poverty to violent extremism, from gender inequality to poor governance, as well as the extension and effectiveness of State authority, that could bear implications for the country’s stability.

This is the underlying essence and vision of Security Council resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#). While resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#) calls for a permanent ceasefire and a long-term solution to the conflict between Israel and Lebanon, this objective is both a process and an outcome. Our work to seek entry points to build confidence between the parties and to facilitate a conducive environment for eventual dialogue is all part of this process, which is not linear but can involve setbacks as well as achievements.

The younger generation in Lebanon today has not experienced the devastating consequences of war first-hand that have had an impact upon the country for decades, but it has had the opportunity to begin to see the dividends that stability can yield. Incrementally, over time, this experience may translate into stability beginning to become the norm.

The United Nations has stood with Lebanon through difficult times before as a partner; we continue to stand with Lebanon today to nurture this fragile, hard-won stability and to support the Lebanese in making the investments both domestically and regionally for this stability to thrive.

(Signed) Ján Kubiš
Under-Secretary-General
United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon

Overall orientation

Mandates and background

155. The Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon (UNSCOL) is responsible for advancing peace and security in Lebanon through the prevention of inter-State conflict, supporting enhanced sovereignty and extending State authority through strengthened and stable State institutions. UNSCOL coordinates international assistance in support of a strengthened security sector, as well as humanitarian and development work, thereby promoting a “whole-of-Lebanon” approach. UNSCOL also coordinates the work of 24 United Nations system entities that operate in Lebanon in the discharge of their respective mandates in the fields of development, humanitarian assistance and human rights. UNSCOL provides political guidance to the United Nations system in Lebanon on all of these matters.
156. The origin of the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon can be traced to the report of 20 July 2000 (S/2000/718), in which the Secretary-General expressed the intention to appoint a senior official to be based in Beirut. This was followed by an exchange of letters between the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council (S/2005/216, S/2005/725 and S/2007/85). The mandate further evolved with the adoption of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006), as well as subsequent determinations by the Council (see S/PRST/2015/7 and S/PRST/2016/10). The Security Council, in renewing the mandate of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) (see Council resolution 2433 (2018)), assigned additional reporting responsibilities to UNIFIL and UNSCOL in respect of compliance with the arms embargo under Council resolution 1701 (2006) and stressed the need for enhanced cooperation between UNSCOL and UNIFIL to improve the management of civilian resources and the effectiveness and efficiency of the two missions. On 31 December 2018, the Secretary-General addressed a letter on the latter topic to the President of the Security Council (S/2018/1182).
157. Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) was adopted to end the escalation of hostilities between Lebanon and Israel. Thirteen years later, key provisions of the resolution remain outstanding, which poses a threat to the stability of Lebanon and that of the region. Periodically, tensions between the parties escalate, requiring the conflict prevention efforts of UNSCOL to mitigate and contain them. Within the territory of Lebanon, the continued maintenance of armed personnel, assets and weapons other than those of the Government of Lebanon and the lack of delineated borders in disputed areas continue to undermine the authority of the Government of Lebanon and pose a risk of reigniting conflict after more than a decade of calm. In addition, there are insufficient numbers of Lebanese Armed Forces personnel deployed to South Lebanon to extend the authority of the State. Meanwhile, ongoing violations by Lebanon and Israel of each other’s sovereignty, on land and by air, impede efforts to work towards a permanent ceasefire between them. These challenges are magnified in a polarized regional context that poses further risks of escalation and spillover to Lebanon.

Alignment with the Charter of the United Nations and the Sustainable Development Goals

158. The mandate of the Office guides it in producing the respective deliverables, which contribute to the attainment of the objective. The objective of UNSCOL is aligned with the Organization’s purpose to maintain international peace and security, as stipulated in Article 1 of the Charter of the United Nations. In the context of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, the purposes stipulated in Article 1 of the Charter are embodied by the Sustainable Development Goals. The objective, and therefore the deliverables, is aligned with a number of Sustainable Development Goals, as reflected in paragraphs 174 and 175 below.

Recent developments

159. In 2018, the cessation of hostilities between Lebanon and Israel remained generally stable, although there were no steps taken towards a permanent ceasefire. Solutions to land border and maritime disputes along Lebanon's southern border were not forthcoming either. Moreover, violations of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006), including most recently tunnels found to be crossing the Blue Line, in addition to construction in disputed reservation areas and heightened rhetoric, at times exacerbated tensions between both sides.
160. Meanwhile, along Lebanon's border with the Syrian Arab Republic, the Government of Lebanon has greatly improved control and security of its eastern border, including through deployments and training of its armed forces, although border demarcation efforts continued to be complicated by evolving regional dynamics.
161. In recognition of Lebanon's commitment to strengthening the extension and consolidation of State authority, an international conference to mobilize support for the strengthening of Lebanon's security institutions was convened in Rome in March 2018 under the auspices of the International Support Group for Lebanon.
162. On the domestic front, after two extensions of the previous Parliament's term, elections held on 6 May 2018 renewed the Parliament's democratic and legislative mandate, which represented a milestone in the reactivation of key governance institutions. Following the elections, Lebanon's leadership encouraged all political parties to work in a spirit of national unity in the formation of an inclusive and consensual Government, with a view to preserving Lebanon's internal stability and safeguarding its regional and international partnerships. Nearly nine months after parliamentary elections, on 31 January 2019, Prime Minister Saad Hariri announced the formation of Lebanon's new 30-member Government. The new Cabinet includes four women ministers, one of whom notably is the first female minister of the interior in the Arab region. In his remarks announcing the new Government, Prime Minister Hariri said, "This Government will not be a Government that just talks, but a Government that works ... [we will] start our work to revive the country and open a new page." The protracted stalemate in forming a Government had generated concern that positive momentum garnered through the International Support Group for Lebanon road map in 2018 would be eroded. It also exacerbated the existing economic strain on the country.
163. As the conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic entered its eighth year, international humanitarian assistance for refugees and Lebanese host communities continued to support Lebanon in coping with the sizeable refugee presence. Given this strain, among other economic pressures, international efforts also focused on revitalizing Lebanon's economy. In this regard, the Government of France, with support from UNSCOL, the World Bank and donors, convened the *Conférence économique pour le développement, par les réformes et avec les entreprises (CEDRE)*, an international investors' conference, in Paris on 6 April 2018, which yielded commitments on economic reforms as well as pledges of financial assistance for Lebanon.

Strategy and external factors for 2020

164. In order to deliver on its mandate, UNSCOL pursues a threefold approach centred on the three pillars of the "whole-of-Lebanon" approach (peace and security with an emphasis on prevention, political stability and socioeconomic stabilization and development). Consistent with Security Council resolution 1701 (2006), the United Nations strategic framework and the three baskets of international support under the auspices of the International Support Group for Lebanon (assistance for the Lebanese army, for Syrian refugees and host communities in Lebanon and for government programmes and public services impacted by the Syrian crisis), this approach enables UNSCOL to lead the United Nations system in supporting Lebanon's efforts to address issues of peace and security, stability, development and human rights in a holistic manner, with a focus on the extension of State authority.

165. UNSCOL supports coordinated efforts across the United Nations system. As coordinator of all United Nations activities in Lebanon, the Special Coordinator, with the Deputy Special Coordinator/Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator, will further seek to enhance the integration of the United Nations system in Lebanon to ensure complementary and coherent efforts in support of the implementation of Government priorities and commitments and Security Council resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#).
166. In line with Security Council resolutions [1701 \(2006\)](#) and [2433 \(2018\)](#), UNSCOL will work in close cooperation with UNIFIL to support the strengthening of security institutions and the extension and consolidation of State authority, and to foster conditions that will enable progress towards a permanent ceasefire and identify synergies and economies of scale wherever possible. In addition, the Office will work closely with bilateral, regional and multilateral partners, including through its leadership at the Beirut level of the International Support Group for Lebanon, to coordinate and align messaging and political advocacy in support of these efforts.
167. With regard to the external factors, the overall plan for 2020 is based on the following planning assumptions:
 - (a) The tense regional environment will continue to affect internal stability;
 - (b) The internal political balance will continue to be influenced by externally-driven policies;
 - (c) International consensus with regard to Lebanon will continue to be challenged;
 - (d) Lebanon will have a Government in place that will facilitate the enabling conditions for the country to move forward on the implementation of its reform agenda;
 - (e) The internal economic situation, as well as governance challenges, will continue to be a source of potential instability;
 - (f) The cessation of hostilities between Lebanon and Israel will hold, potentially allowing for further progress in line with Security Council resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#), increased extension of State authority south of the Litani river and along the borders, and the continuation of confidence-building efforts;
 - (g) Violations of Security Council resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#) will continue to be perpetrated by the parties and tensions will remain, including over the prevalence and proliferation of weapons in Lebanon outside the authority of the State.
168. UNSCOL integrates a gender perspective in its operational activities, deliverables and results, as appropriate. In its good offices function and its support for the strengthening of State institutions, the Office ensures that its political consultations include women in government, security forces, political parties and civil society. As an example, UNSCOL advocated for the inclusion of women when the Government was formed in early 2019; four women ministers were appointed, including the first female minister of the interior in the Arab region. In the absence of a gender quota in the national elections law, UNSCOL advocated for the inclusion of women candidates in elections, including the May 2018 parliamentary elections, and will do so for the municipal elections in 2022. UNSCOL also participates in events highlighting challenges and opportunities facing women's political participation in Lebanese society as part of advocacy efforts. Internally, meanwhile, UNSCOL is working to ensure gender parity in its staffing.
169. UNSCOL cooperates closely with UNIFIL in the implementation of Security Council resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#). Pursuant to the strategic review of UNIFIL in 2017 and the exercise on efficiencies and effectiveness mandated by the Security Council in 2018 (see para. 156 above), both missions are deepening collaboration and joint engagement with national and international stakeholders to maintain the cessation of hostilities and to strengthen the security sector and the extension of State authority across all of Lebanon's national territory, including in line with the communiqué of the Rome II conference dated 15 March 2018 (see [S/2018/703](#), para. 60) UNSCOL also leverages the presence of other United Nations entities, bringing all the Organization's political, security and development tools to bear in support of Lebanon's stability. Under a memorandum of understanding

between UNIFIL and UNSCOL, UNIFIL supports UNSCOL in finance, procurement, engineering, communications, medical services, transport and logistics.

170. With regard to cooperation with other entities, UNSCOL coordinates with the League of Arab States, the European Union, the International Support Group for Lebanon and its members and civil society, including women's groups, to sustain consensus and mobilize support for Lebanon's stability, sovereignty and State institutions, including by convening members of the International Support Group for Lebanon to agree upon coordinated messaging and advocacy with Lebanon's political leadership, including the issuance of joint statements.
171. With regard to inter-agency coordination and liaison, to further integrate United Nations activities in Lebanon under the United Nations strategic framework, the Special Coordinator, together with the Deputy Special Coordinator/Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator, interacts with other United Nations entities, the World Bank and international donors through the United Nations country team and the Lebanon Development Forum. Strengthening the United Nations partnership with the World Bank across humanitarian, development and peacebuilding spheres has enabled enhanced information-sharing, joint analysis and policy coordination. Collaborative efforts between UNSCOL and the United Nations country team have since been launched, including in the areas of anti-corruption and good governance.

Evaluation activities

172. A self-evaluation of the implementation of delegation of authority in UNSCOL is planned for 2020.

A. Proposed programme plan for 2020 and programme performance for 2018



1. Objective

173. The objective, to which the Office contributes, is to prevent the outbreak of conflict between Israel and Lebanon, achieve political stability and sustainable economic and social development, extend and consolidate State authority and preserve peace and security in Lebanon.

2. Alignment with the Sustainable Development Goals

174. The objective is aligned with Sustainable Development Goal 5, which is to achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls. Progress towards the attainment of the objective will help to ensure women's full and effective participation and equal opportunities for leadership at all levels of decision-making in political, economic and public life.
175. The objective is also aligned with Sustainable Development Goal 16, which is to promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels. Progress towards the attainment of the objective will help to strengthen relevant national institutions, including through international cooperation, to build the capacity to prevent conflict and violence and combat terrorism and crime; and ensure responsive, inclusive, participatory and representative decision-making at all levels.

3. Highlighted result in 2018

A road map for international support to preserve Lebanon's stability

In order to contribute to maintaining the international consensus behind Lebanon's stability, especially in an unstable regional context, UNSCOL, through its leadership of the International Support Group for Lebanon, supported the implementation of a road map for international support for Lebanon agreed to in December 2017 in Paris. This included mobilizing international support for Lebanon through, inter alia, the convening of international conferences in Rome, Paris and Brussels focused on strengthening the security sector, economic reforms and revitalization and mitigating the impact of the Syrian refugee crisis on Lebanon. The objective of this road map was to galvanize the high-level political and financial support that would create positive pressure for Lebanon to live up to its international obligations and address key security, economic and humanitarian challenges facing the country. The road map also identified key milestones for Lebanon during 2018, including the conduct of parliamentary elections, to ensure that the process was on track.

In the first quarter of 2018, as the first key milestone, UNSCOL worked closely with the Governments of Lebanon and Italy, the International Support Group and regional partners and UNIFIL in the preparation of the political and technical aspects of the Rome II conference in support of the extension of State authority and strengthening of Lebanese security institutions. As the second key milestone of this international support agenda, UNSCOL worked closely with the Governments of Lebanon and France, the World Bank and donors to prepare for the CEDRE international investors' conference held in Paris on 6 April 2018. As the third key milestone, UNSCOL worked in close coordination with the European Union, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the Government of Lebanon to prepare for the "Brussels II" conference on the theme "Supporting the future of Syria and the region," co-chaired by the European Union and the United Nations on 24 and 25 April 2018 to further mobilize support for the humanitarian response. In that context, UNSCOL worked closely with partners to develop the Lebanon partnership paper to frame the mutual commitments of Lebanon and international donors in managing the refugee response. In addition, UNSCOL worked with the United Nations country team and international partners to support the timely and successful conduct of Lebanon's parliamentary elections, which were held on 6 May 2018.

Result and evidence

The deliverable contributed to the result, which included reaffirmations of political support from key international partners for Lebanon's security apparatus and governance institutions, as well as financial and in-kind support from partners.

Evidence of the result includes the adoption of a communiqué following the Rome II conference which reaffirmed Lebanon's commitments in the areas of a national defence strategy, its disassociation from regional conflicts consistent with the Baabda Declaration of 2012, the strengthening of Lebanon's human rights mechanisms and the inclusion of women in the armed and security forces in line with Security Council resolution [1325 \(2000\)](#). Evidence also includes the commitment of over \$10 billion at the CEDRE international investors' conference in medium and long-term soft-loan financing for Lebanon in critical areas, such as public infrastructure, energy and telecommunications.

The result demonstrates progress made in 2018 towards the collective attainment of the objective.

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176. A planned result for 2018, which is sustained political dialogue among Lebanese parties on key issues, as referred to in the report of the Secretary-General on estimates in respect of special political missions, good offices and other political initiatives authorized by the General Assembly and/or the Security Council for 2018 for thematic cluster III ([A/72/371/Add.3](#), table 17), was partially achieved, as evidenced by the holding of parliamentary elections in May 2018. The target number of Cabinet meetings held with the participation of all major confessional groups was not met, as there was no Government in place and the Cabinet could not convene. The target number of women elected to Parliament was not achieved, as a 30 per cent gender quota in the elections law was not adopted. In addition, the target for number of meetings of the President-led national dialogue and/or the Speaker-

led parliamentary dialogue was not met, as the President did not convene a national dialogue during 2018, when the focus was on elections and then on the formation of a Government.

4. Highlighted planned result in 2020

Extending and consolidating Lebanese State authority

In 2018, a key focus for UNSCOL was supporting the extension and consolidation of the authority of the Lebanese State. UNSCOL sought to implement this focus through support to Lebanon's conduct of parliamentary elections, which renewed the democratic mandate of the legislature; support and advocacy for the strengthening of Lebanon's security institutions, including the increased deployment of the Lebanese Armed Forces south of the Litani river, as well as the increased deployment of the Internal Security Forces to take over their law enforcement functions, and a focus on border security and management; the adoption of a reform agenda to revitalize Lebanon's economy and improve its institutional delivery and responsiveness to its citizens; and political advocacy to maintain funding support to assist Lebanon's vulnerable refugees and host communities and reduce tensions.

Challenge and response

The challenge was to support the Government in extending its authority and consolidating security throughout the country and delivering services to citizens along its borders. The risks inherent in weak State authority came under sharp focus towards the end of 2018 with the discovery of tunnels crossing the Blue Line in violation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) (see S/2019/237, sect. II.A).

In the absence of a unified Government position on a strategy to extend and consolidate State authority, there was limited political momentum to implement such a strategy. Following the May 2018 elections, negotiations among the political blocs under Prime Minister Saad Hariri culminated in the announcement of a new Government nine months later, on 31 January 2019. With a caretaker Government in place for most of 2018, there was limited political momentum to implement elements of the strategy.

In response, for 2020, with the Government of Lebanon moving forward on the implementation of the international support agenda, UNSCOL will work with ministerial counterparts, political actors and partners to support implementation of the follow-up mechanisms to the international conferences held in 2018. The Office will continue to pursue the parties' adherence to Security Council resolution 1701 (2006), and consolidation and extension of the authority of the Lebanese State will remain at the forefront of the Office's agenda.

The extension and consolidation of State authority in the security realm will entail pressing for increased deployments of the Lebanese Armed Forces throughout Lebanon's territory, consolidating State authority along its borders and strengthening the Internal Security Forces to assume law enforcement functions. In addition, the UNSCOL will pursue entry points to revive dialogue on the resolution of the disputed maritime area and related natural resources and other steps towards a permanent ceasefire with Israel. UNSCOL will also continue to encourage and support Lebanon's leadership with a view to its reviving discussions on a national defence strategy.

On the economic and governance front, UNSCOL will work with the Government of Lebanon on the follow-up to the CEDRE international investors' conference to support the revitalization of Lebanon's economy, including support for an accountability tracking mechanism to ensure progress on the reform agenda and the provision of loans by international partners.

Result and evidence

The planned deliverables are expected to contribute to the result, which is strengthened authority of the Lebanese State and improved governance, accountability and service delivery throughout its territory.

Evidence of the result, if achieved, will include the ratification of key legislation integral to the CEDRE reform agenda and the establishment of a governmental accountability tracking mechanism to measure progress in the implementation of reforms and in the functioning of institutions.

The result, if achieved, will demonstrate progress made in 2020 towards the collective attainment of the objective.

Performance measures

<i>2018</i>	<i>2019</i>	<i>2020</i>
Absence of ratified legislation to ensure fiscal and sectoral accountability	Legislation ratified, but no implementing decrees issued	Legislation integral to the reform agenda is adopted along with the relevant implementing decrees and is implemented, as reflected in progress measured by the governmental accountability tracking mechanism

177. The Office will continue to be guided by all mandates entrusted to it, which provide the legislative framework for its deliverables.

5. Deliverables for the period 2018–2020

178. Table 17 lists all deliverables, by category and subcategory, for the period 2018–2020 that contributed and are expected to contribute to the attainment of the objective stated in paragraph 173 above.

Table 17

Deliverables for the period 2018–2020, by category and subcategory

	<i>2018 planned</i>	<i>2018 actual</i>	<i>2019 planned</i>	<i>2020 planned</i>
Quantified deliverables				
A. Facilitation of the intergovernmental process and expert bodies				
Substantive services for meetings (number of three-hour meetings)	3	3	3	3
Non-quantified deliverables				
C. Substantive deliverables				
Good offices				
Consultation, advice and advocacy				
D. Communication deliverables				
Outreach programmes, special events and information materials				
External and media relations				
Digital platforms and multimedia content				

B. Proposed post and non-post resource requirements for 2020

Resource requirements (regular budget)

Table 18

Financial resources

(Thousands of United States dollars)

Category of expenditure	2018	2019	2020		Variance
	Expenditures	Appropriation	Total requirements	Non-recurrent requirements	2020 vs. 2019 Increase/(decrease)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)=(3)-(2)
Military and police personnel costs	–	–	–	–	–
Civilian personnel costs	7 625.6	7 326.8	7 438.3	–	111.5
Operational costs	1 225.3	1 515.3	1 515.3	–	–
Total (net of staff assessment)	8 850.9	8 842.1	8 953.6	–	111.5

Table 19

Positions

	Professional and higher categories									General Service and related categories			National staff				Total
	USG	ASG	D-2	D-1	P-5	P-4	P-3	P-2	Subtotal	Field/ Security Services	General Service	Total inter- national	National Professional Officer	Local level	United Nations Volunteers		
Approved 2019	1	1	–	1	2	6	1	1	13	7	–	20	4	58	–	82	
Proposed 2020	1	1	–	1	2	6	1	1	13	7	–	20	4	58	–	82	
Change	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	

179. The proposed resource requirements for 2020 for UNSCOL amount to \$8,953,600 (net of staff assessment) and would provide for salaries and common staff costs (\$7,438,300) for 20 international positions (1 Under-Secretary-General, 1 Assistant Secretary-General, 1 D-1, 2 P-5, 6 P-4, 1 P-3, 1 P-2 and 7 Field Service) and 62 national positions (4 National Professional Officer and 58 Local level), as well as operational costs (\$1,515,300) comprising costs for consultants and consulting services (\$15,600), official travel (\$228,800), facilities and infrastructure (\$812,400), ground transportation (\$80,300), communications and information technology (\$276,600), medical services (\$4,000) and other supplies, services and equipment (\$97,600).
180. In 2020, the number and levels of positions for UNSCOL are proposed to remain unchanged.
181. The variance (increase) between the resources proposed for 2020 and the approved budget for 2019 is attributable to additional requirements under civilian personnel costs, resulting from: (a) the application of a lower vacancy rate of 5 per cent for international positions and the assumption of full incumbency for National Professional Officer positions for 2020, taking into account the actual average vacancy rates for 2018, and compared with the vacancy rates of 6 per cent for international positions and 5 per cent for National Professional Officer positions approved for 2019; and (b) the application of a higher percentage of estimated common staff costs based on recent expenditure patterns.

Extrabudgetary resources

182. No extrabudgetary resources were available in 2019 or are projected for 2020 for UNSCOL.

7. United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa

(\$7,171,300)



Foreword

For the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa (UNOCA), the year 2020 will be characterized by intensified engagement with national Governments, regional and subregional organizations, as well as other stakeholders, in support of their efforts towards sustaining peace in Central Africa. I will focus my attention to such countries as Gabon, Cameroon, the Congo, Chad and Equatorial Guinea, some of which remain at a risk of sliding into violent conflict. No efforts will be spared to detect the risk of escalating tensions in the subregion, and I will renew my good offices for promoting constructive dialogues.

Looking back on the past years, I am happy to note the tangible impact that UNOCA has had in Central Africa, including in Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea and Sao Tome and Principe. Since the beginning of 2018, I have regularly visited Cameroon in support of national peace efforts and assisted the Government as it continued to seek ways to address the situation in the English-speaking regions of the country. During my three separate visits, I held consultations with the national authorities and other stakeholders, and on each occasion, reiterated the need for dialogue and for implementing confidence-building measures. During my visit in November after the presidential elections, the Prime Minister indicated that the Government was taking all possible measures to address the political situation, an assurance which gave me confidence. Within days after the visit, on 30 November, the President of Cameroon, Paul Biya, established a national disarmament, demobilization and reintegration committee, which was followed shortly by his decision to halt the prosecution of 289 prisoners detained in connection with the situation in the English-speaking regions.

In 2018, I also stepped up my good offices in Equatorial Guinea, as the country was faced with challenges in maintaining its stability following the foiled coup attempt in December 2017. In early January 2018, I visited the country and held discussions with the President, Teodoro Obiang Nguema. While I condemned any attempts to replace the Government by unconstitutional means, I urged the President to move forward with plans for a national dialogue. In June 2018, furthermore, in my consultations with national authorities and political parties in Malabo, I encouraged them to make the most of the national forum convened by the President as a platform for constructive discussions. Based on the recommendations of the national dialogue, which included the release of political prisoners, I am optimistic that the tensions in Equatorial Guinea will further dissipate.

I therefore look forward to 2020 with a strong commitment to working closely with all political actors and stakeholders in the quest for peace and security in Central Africa.

(Signed) François **Loucény Fall**
Special Representative of the Secretary-General
United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa

Overall orientation

Mandates and background

183. The United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa (UNOCA) is responsible for the prevention of conflicts and the consolidation of peace and security in Central Africa. The mandate was established through an exchange of letters between the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council (S/2009/697 and S/2010/457). In the face of the ongoing armed conflicts in the Central African Republic, the crisis in the English-speaking regions in Cameroon, political tensions in the Congo, Chad, Equatorial Guinea and Democratic Republic of the Congo and threats of terrorism and violent extremism, UNOCA aims to support Central African states in addressing these serious political and security challenges, which are further complicated by an overall economic slowdown within the subregion.

Alignment with the Charter of the United Nations and the Sustainable Development Goals

184. The mandate of the Office guides it in producing the respective deliverables, which contribute to the attainment of the objective. The objective of UNOCA is aligned with the Organization's purpose to maintain international peace and security, as stipulated in Article 1 of the Charter of the United Nations. In the context of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, the purposes stipulated in Article 1 of the Charter are embodied by the Sustainable Development Goals. The objective, and therefore the deliverables, is aligned with a number of Sustainable Development Goals, as reflected in paragraphs 197 and 198 below.

Recent developments

185. In 2018, the Central Africa subregion continued to face a number of threats to its political, security and socioeconomic stability. These threats included the crisis in the English-speaking regions of Cameroon, the deteriorating security situation in the Central African Republic and the growing threat of the Boko Haram terrorist group in the Lake Chad basin, among others.
186. The escalation of violence and tensions in the north-west and south-west regions of Cameroon, including the increased number of abductions of civilians and attacks against defence and security forces, along with military operations by Government forces, had adverse effects upon local populations. In addition, the crisis in the Central African Republic has had a negative impact on the situation in the subregion, particularly the continuing flow of large numbers of refugees into neighbouring countries.
187. The scourge of terrorism and violent extremism continues to affect populations of the subregion and to divert Government resources from much-needed development programmes to costly security operations. Boko Haram and the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) have not ceased deadly attacks against civilians, committing egregious human rights abuses, all of which have resulted in loss of life and property. Boko Haram's activities and the response by the affected countries have led to a major humanitarian crisis in the Lake Chad basin region.
188. Furthermore, the Central African subregion has experienced a prolonged economic crisis, which has been particularly acute since 2014 owing to falling petroleum prices. This led to the adoption of austerity measures by Governments in the subregion, often causing significant social unrest. For instance, in Chad, the decision of the Government to cut the emoluments of civil servants prompted a general strike by trade unions and led to widespread social tensions. Similarly, in Gabon, the Government decided to decrease the number of civil servants and reduce salaries, which resulted in hostile reactions from labour unions.

189. During 2018, a number of countries within the subregion held presidential, legislative and local elections, including the presidential elections in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Cameroon, as well as legislative elections in Gabon, Rwanda and Sao Tome and Principe. The conduct and results of these elections often led to political tensions and disagreements.

Strategy and external factors for 2020

190. Building upon recent developments, UNOCA will enhance its focus on its core mandate: preventive diplomacy, good offices and mediation. It will further build on its engagement with all stakeholders and promote inclusive dialogue to help address ongoing conflicts. With regard to subregional security threats, UNOCA will support regional and subregional entities involved in combating terrorism and violent extremism. UNOCA will work closely with the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the Multinational Joint Task Force of the Lake Chad Basin Commission and the African Union. On electoral affairs, UNOCA will have a twofold role: (a) good offices and mediation activities during and after elections; and (b) capacity-building of and political consultations with various stakeholders in preparation for elections.
191. As several countries of the region are scheduled to hold presidential (Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Sao Tome and Principe), legislative (Central African Republic, Sao Tome and Principe), senatorial (Burundi, Gabon) or local (Burundi, Rwanda) elections in 2020 and 2021, UNOCA will use its good offices and, under the guidance of the Electoral Assistance Division of the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs of the Secretariat, work jointly with ECCAS to support these countries to put in place mechanisms for the prevention and peaceful resolution of election-related crises. UNOCA will also closely monitor the situation in countries preparing for or holding elections and deploy high-level good offices missions to prevent and/or alleviate election-related tensions. Lastly, UNOCA will work closely with UNOWAS on issues related to the farmer-herder conflict and in developing a subregional strategy on transhumance.
192. With regard to the external factors, the overall plan for 2020 is based on the following planning assumptions:
- (a) There will be no new conflict or crisis in the subregion;
 - (b) The heads of State and Government of Central Africa will remain committed to keeping ECCAS and other subregional peace and security mechanisms operational;
 - (c) The agreed election timetables in the subregion will be respected and the elections will be credible;
 - (d) UNOCA efforts towards peace and security in the subregion will continue to gain the support of Member States.
193. UNOCA integrates a gender perspective in its operational activities, deliverables and results, as appropriate. Gender-sensitive conflicts analysis will support good offices and mediation strategies. Continuous strategic technical and financial support will also be provided to ECCAS, government partners and civil society groups for the implementation of Security Council resolution [1325 \(2000\)](#) on women and peace and security in the region. UNOCA aims for this support to bring about an increase in the participation of women in conflict prevention and resolution mechanisms, as well as enhanced visibility of the contribution of women to peacebuilding. UNOCA will also support the participation of women and youth in democratic institutions and in elections, which will be reflected in their representation in elected and nominated positions.
194. With regard to cooperation with other entities, UNOCA will partner with the African Union, ECCAS, the Central African Economic and Monetary Community, the Gulf of Guinea Commission, the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region and the Lake Chad Basin Commission to promote regional integration as a means for preventing and addressing threats to regional peace and stability in Central Africa. UNOCA will support the ongoing processes of ECCAS reform and

rationalization of regional economic communities in Central Africa aimed at establishing a clear distribution of responsibilities, including in the area of peace and security. UNOCA will also continue to reinforce ECCAS capacity in the field of peace and security through training, as well as joint prevention and good offices activities.

Evaluation activities

195. A self-evaluation of the implementation of delegation of authority in UNOCA is planned for 2020.

A. Proposed programme plan for 2020 and programme performance for 2018



1. Objective

196. The objective, to which the Office contributes, is to prevent conflict and consolidate peace and security in the Central Africa subregion.

2. Alignment with the Sustainable Development Goals

197. The objective is aligned with Sustainable Development Goal 5, which is to achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls. Progress towards the attainment of the objective will help to ensure women's full and effective participation and equal opportunities for leadership at all levels of decision-making in political, economic and public life.
198. The objective is aligned with Sustainable Development Goal 16, which is to promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels. Progress towards the attainment of the objective will help to significantly reduce all forms of violence and the illicit flow of small arms and light weapons; develop effective, accountable and transparent institutions; and ensure responsive, inclusive, participatory and representative decision-making at all levels.

3. Highlighted result in 2018

Prevention of post-electoral conflict in Sao Tome and Principe

The 7 October 2018 legislative elections brought longstanding tensions between the ruling party and opposition parties to the fore. This was marked by open and intense public debates that produced a climate of distrust among the politicians. The growing post-electoral tensions posed a risk of plunging the country into a political crisis following a sustained period of peace and stability.



Francois Louncény Fall, Special Representative of the Secretary-General, holds media briefing during his visit to Sao Tome and Principe in October 2018. Source: United Nations

Between 14 and 21 October 2018, after close consultations with the Resident Coordinator, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, as part of his good offices engagement, travelled to Sao Tome and Principe to help defuse the tensions and prevent an escalation of the political impasse. A series of discussions was held to facilitate dialogue between the ruling party and the opposition parties. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General reiterated his calls for a consensual and inclusive political dialogue to preserve the stability of the country and ensure a peaceful transfer of power. Separate meetings were held with senior Government officials, political parties, civil society representatives and international partners.

In consultation with ECCAS and the Resident Coordinator, UNOCA played an enabling role in facilitating dialogue among the different stakeholders, stressing the importance of dialogue and political will in its good offices efforts. The Office's engagement benefited from the new regional political structure.

Result and evidence

The deliverables contributed to the result, which is the increased commitment by all parties to reach a workable consensus and to peacefully resolve the conflict.

Evidence of the result includes the announcement of the Constitutional Court on 19 November 2018 that the final results of the legislative elections had been accepted by all, and on 4 December that the new Prime Minister had been appointed.

The result demonstrates progress made in 2018 towards the collective attainment of the objective.

199. A planned result for 2018, which is increased engagement and cooperation by Central African States and subregional organizations on peace and security through good offices, preventive diplomacy and mediation, as referred to in the report of the Secretary-General on estimates in respect of special political missions, good offices and other political initiatives authorised by the General Assembly and/or the Security Council for 2018 for thematic cluster III ([A/72/371/Add.3](#), table 20), was achieved, as evidenced by the effective functioning of the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa. During the year, the Advisory Committee held two ministerial meetings as planned with the secretariat support of UNOCA. The first meeting was held in Brazzaville on 1 June 2018 and the second meeting in N'Djamena on 7 December 2018. Through these meetings, the member States renewed their commitments to jointly addressing various security issues in the subregion.

4. Highlighted planned result for 2020

Strengthened national and regional mechanisms for improved management of farmer-herder conflicts

In 2018, UNOCA advocated for Member States and regional organizations to address the issue of transhumance as recommended during the forty-fifth, forty-sixth forty-seventh ministerial meetings of the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa. Transhumance, practiced in many parts of the world, is a seasonal movement of herders and their livestock to areas where pasture and water are available, and back to their place of origin. In the past decade, this traditional practice has invited violent farmer-herder conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa owing to changing economic, environmental and social conditions. Within this framework, in October 2018, UNOCA supported and participated in a field visit to southern Chad, along the border with the Central African Republic, which contributed to the discussions at the ministerial level.

The importance of addressing transhumance was further reinforced at the subregional level by the Council for Peace and Security in Central Africa, which in March 2018 called for work towards the adoption of ECCAS-level legislation on pastoralism. On 30 July, in the Lomé Declaration on Peace, Security, Stability and the Fight against Terrorism and Violent Extremism, the Heads of State and Government of ECCAS and ECOWAS stressed the cross-border nature of transhumance and instructed the ministers in charge of agriculture, livestock and security of their respective member States to undertake regular consultations. To that end, UNOCA helped coordinate positions on the issue and organized a field visit to galvanize regional responses to the increasing security threat posed by farmer-herder conflicts.

Challenge and response

The challenge was to support the ECCAS member States in implementing the conclusions of the abovementioned declarations. In response, for 2020, UNOCA will support the subregional and transregional initiatives on the farmer-herder conflicts. UNOCA will build upon subregional engagement and bring together representatives of the 11 ECCAS member States to discuss these matters. UNOCA and UNOWAS will engage in regular consultations with their counterparts in ECCAS and ECOWAS on cooperative and concrete approaches to identify potential gaps and support cross-regional needs. UNOCA will conduct a series of activities aimed at building trust among the local populations to prevent farmer-herder conflicts, including field trips to areas affected by such conflicts, to improve its understanding of the phenomenon and promote peaceful coexistence between farming and herding communities. In this regard, UNOCA will organize joint events and conduct training workshops for peaceful coexistence. Attention will be given to the role women and youth play in confidence-building and positively influencing peaceful coexistence in communities affected by the farmer-herder conflict.

Result and evidence

The planned deliverables are expected to contribute to the result, which is enhanced local and regional mechanisms and tools to prevent farmer-herder conflict and protect local populations.

Evidence of the result, if achieved, will include the adoption of ECCAS-level legislation on pastoralism and the adoption of common policies and joint programmes ahead of the next joint ECCAS-ECOWAS summit, scheduled to take place in N'Djamena in 2020.

The result, if achieved, will demonstrate progress made in 2020 towards the collective attainment of the objective.

Performance measures

2018	2019	2020
Discussions between Member States on the issue of transhumance, including during meetings of the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa and the Council for Peace and Security in Central Africa	ECCAS and its member States are engaged in consultations on an agreed regional political framework on transhumance and take concrete steps towards the adoption of a regional regulation on pastoralism and transhumance	Adoption of ECCAS-level legislation on pastoralism; adoption of common policies and joint programmes ahead of the next joint ECCAS-ECOWAS summit, scheduled to take place in N'Djamena in 2020

200. The Office will continue to be guided by all mandates entrusted to it, which provide the legislative framework for its deliverables.

5. Deliverables for the period 2018–2020

201. Table 20 lists all deliverables, by category and subcategory, for the period 2018–2020 that contributed and are expected to contribute to the attainment of the objective stated in paragraph 196 above.

Table 20

Deliverables for the period 2018–2020, by category and subcategory

	2018 planned	2018 actual	2019 planned	2020 planned
Quantified deliverables				
A. Facilitation of the intergovernmental process and expert bodies				
Parliamentary documentation (number of documents)	3	3	3	3
Substantive services for meetings (number of three-hour meetings)	6	6	6	6
B. Generation and transfer of knowledge				
Seminars, workshops and training events (number of days)	55	55	50	50
Non-quantified deliverables				
C. Substantive deliverables				
Good offices				
Consultation, advice and advocacy				
Fact-finding, monitoring and investigation missions				
D. Communication deliverables				
Outreach programmes, special events and information materials				
External and media relations				
Digital platforms and multimedia content				

B. Proposed programme plan for 2020 and programme performance for 2018

Resource requirements (regular budget)

Table 21

Financial resources

(Thousands of United States dollars)

Category of expenditure	2018	2019	2020		Variance
	Expenditures	Appropriation	Total requirements	Non-recurrent requirements	2020 vs. 2019 Increase/(decrease)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)=(3)-(2)
Military and police personnel costs	–	–	–	–	–
Civilian personnel costs	5 327.9	5 614.3	5 410.4	–	(203.9)
Operational costs	1 260.4	1 649.4	1 760.9	–	111.5
Total (net of staff assessment)	6 588.3	7 263.7	7 171.3	–	(92.4)

Table 22

Positions

	Professional and higher categories									General Service and related categories			National staff			Total
	USG	ASG	D-2	D-1	P-5	P-4	P-3	P-2	Subtotal	Field/ Security Services	General Service	Total inter-national	National Professional Officer	Local level	United Nations Volunteers	
Approved 2019	1	–	–	2	4	11	4	–	22	7	–	29	3	9	–	41
Proposed 2020	1	–	–	2	4	11	4	–	22	7	–	29	3	9	–	41
Change	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–

202. The proposed resource requirements for 2020 for UNOCA amount to \$7,171,300 (net of staff assessment) and would provide for salaries and common staff costs (\$5,410,400) for 29 international positions (1 Under-Secretary-General, 2 D-1, 4 P-5, 11 P-4, 4 P-3 and 7 Field Service) and 12 national positions (3 National Professional Officer and 9 Local level), as well as operational costs (\$1,760,900) comprising costs for consultants and consulting services (\$34,600), official travel (\$675,100), facilities and infrastructure (\$242,900), ground transportation (\$60,700), air operations (\$140,900), communications and information technology (\$468,700) and other supplies, services and equipment (\$138,000).
203. In 2020, the number and levels of positions for UNOCA are proposed to remain unchanged.
204. The variance (decrease) between the proposed resources for 2020 and the approved budget for 2019 is mainly attributable to reduced requirements under civilian personnel costs, owing to the lower percentage of common staff costs based on recent expenditure patterns; and the application of a higher vacancy rate of 10.0 per cent, compared with the approved rate of 7.0 per cent for 2019, for international positions. The variance is offset in part by increased requirements under operational costs, resulting mainly from: (a) higher costs for leased lines for communications and information technology; and (b) the higher number of trips planned for official travel in support of good offices, preventive diplomacy and mediation in emerging conflicts as well as other regional efforts to enhance peace and security.

Extrabudgetary resources

205. During 2019, extrabudgetary resources in the estimated amount of \$335,100 are projected to support the following activities: (a) the participation of a delegation of six women from the Central Africa subregion in the sixty-third session of the Commission on the Status of Women; (b) the participation of the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Central African Armed Forces in the meeting of sector commanders of the African Union Regional Task Force, created to combat LRA, in Addis Ababa; and (c) activities to promote dialogue between local authorities, communities and security forces in the Boko Haram-affected areas of Cameroon and Chad.
206. For 2020, extrabudgetary resources in the estimated amount of \$200,000 are projected to support the implementation of the United Nations regional strategy on pastoralism and transhumance in Central Africa, the strengthening of women's networks in Central Africa and the organization of meetings and related activities of the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa.

8. United Nations Support Mission in Libya

(\$72,475,800)



Foreword

From the first days after I took up my appointment as the Secretary-General's Special Representative for Libya and Head of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) in the summer of 2017, Libyans have conveyed to me their strong desire to overcome the divisions in the country and the political stalemate that has emerged since the signing of the Libyan Political Agreement in December 2015. In September 2017, during a high-level meeting in the margins of the seventy-second session of the General Assembly, the Secretary-General launched the United Nations action plan aimed at overcoming this stalemate.

With no convergence among the parties about amending the Libyan Political Agreement and the political stalemate continuing, I shifted my approach towards working with the Libyan people to hear from them directly. Throughout 2018, in partnership with the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, UNSMIL conducted a national conference consultative process, in which over 7,000 Libyans participated in almost 80 meetings across the country and abroad. In these meetings, courageous and committed Libyans have genuinely engaged in dialogue and discussions. They freely shared their concerns and hopes, their fears and expectations about the way forward for their country. The most powerful message I heard was the yearning of the people for a united and sovereign nation and for a peaceful and inclusive transition for their country.

The next step will be to move forward with the national conference to give a wider and more representative group of Libyans the opportunity to meet on Libyan soil, with no external interference, in order to devise a clear path out of the continuing impasse. The national conference is planned for early 2019, with electoral processes to follow. According to a recent poll, 80 per cent of Libyans insist on having elections to end the current political impasse.

The conference will be Libyan-led and Libyan-owned, providing a platform to enable the Libyan people to push the national institutions to take the necessary and long-awaited steps to move the political process forward. The national conference will not be a new institution, nor will it replace existing legislative bodies. Rather, it will create a space for Libyans to crystallize their vision for the transition, and no longer be ignored by their politicians.

UNSMIL aims to support Libyans in building credible and legitimate institutions accountable to the citizens. Elections will be the path to establishing legitimate institutions, representing the will of the electorate, and choosing representatives accountable to the Libyan population. This path will not be easy, and obstacles and challenges lie ahead, which the members of the House of Representatives and the High Council of State need to work together to overcome, including through the conduct of free and fair elections.

Together, we must support the citizens in speaking to their institutions, press the institutions to listen and compel them to deliver what is required of them. In this highly volatile and complex situation, UNSMIL will continue to work with the Libyan people and the Libyan institutions, with the support of the international community, to achieve a peaceful, stable and prosperous Libya.

(Signed) Ghassan Salamé
Special Representative of the Secretary-General
United Nations Support Mission in Libya

Overall orientation

Mandates and background

207. The United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) is responsible for mediation and good offices to support: (a) an inclusive political process and security and economic dialogue within the framework of the Libyan Political Agreement and the United Nations action plan; (b) continued implementation of the Libyan Political Agreement; (c) consolidation of the governance, security and economic arrangements of the Government of National Accord, including support for economic reform in collaboration with international financial institutions; (d) subsequent phases of the Libyan transition process, including the constitutional process and the organization of elections. In addition, within operational and security constraints, UNSMIL will provide support for securing uncontrolled arms and related materiel and countering their proliferation and coordinate international assistance and advice and assistance for efforts led by the Government of National Accord.
208. The mandate is defined in Security Council resolution [2009 \(2011\)](#). UNSMIL is an integrated special political mission whose objective is to support Libya's democratic transition on the basis of the Libyan Political Agreement of 17 December 2015 and in accordance with the United Nations action plan for Libya announced in the margins of the General Assembly in September 2017. On 6 June 2018, the Security Council issued a presidential statement ([S/PRST/2018/11](#)) in which it reaffirmed the Council's endorsement of and full support for the action plan for Libya and underscored the importance of the role of the United Nations in facilitating a Libyan-led political solution to the challenges facing the country.
209. Three years after the signing of the Libyan Political Agreement in December 2015, many of its provisions to address the fragmentation in State institutions and bring the Libyan transition to an end, leading to the establishment of inclusive, stable and effective governance, have yet to be implemented. While Tripoli currently hosts the Government of National Accord, consisting of the Presidency Council and the High Council of State, the House of Representatives, the legislative authority under the Libyan Political Agreement, continues to be based in Tobruk in the east. Supported by the international community, the Government of National Accord has been consolidating its power in Tripoli, while the east is de facto under the control of the Libyan National Army led by General Khalifa Haftar. Meanwhile, in the southern part of the country, the Libyan National Army is using the deteriorating socioeconomic conditions and the absence of security forces from the Government of National Accord to expand its influence.
210. The political deadlock in Libya is underpinned by a complex web of narrow interests. Civilians continue to live in fear of violent conflict and struggle to cope with deteriorating public services and a worsening socioeconomic situation. The legal framework is broken, and refugees and migrants, detainees, journalists and members of the judiciary are among those subject to abuse and violence.
211. To end the political transition in Libya and for economic stability to return, it is vital that UNSMIL facilitate the Libyan-owned and Libyan-led national conference, which should be held under the right conditions with participants capable of producing an outcome that is agreeable to the broad majority, working in full accordance with the principle of national ownership. State-building needs to continue – as do counter-terrorism activities – as a basis to transform Libya into a stable and secure State based on unified bodies and democratically-elected institutions.

Alignment with the Charter of the United Nations and the Sustainable Development Goals

212. The mandate of the Mission guides it in producing the respective deliverables, which contribute to the attainment of the objective. The objective of UNSMIL is aligned with the Organization's purpose to maintain international peace and security, as stipulated in Article 1 of the Charter of the United Nations. In the context of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, the purposes stipulated in Article 1 of the Charter are embodied by the Sustainable Development Goals. The objective, and

therefore the deliverables, is aligned with a number of Sustainable Development Goals, as reflected in paragraphs 229 and 230 below.

Recent developments

213. In late August and early September 2018, violence broke out in Tripoli between armed groups based in the capital and others from the neighbouring cities of Tarhouna and Misrata, which resulted in the loss of over 120 lives, including women and children. As a result of ceasefire agreements brokered by UNSMIL, most of the attackers from outside the city withdrew. After 25 September 2018, the ceasefire was largely respected and reinforced through a comprehensive security plan prepared by the newly-established Security Arrangements Committee for Greater Tripoli and endorsed by the Presidency Council.
214. Following the signing of the ceasefire agreements, the Presidency Council announced a set of monetary and fiscal reforms. These included: (a) the imposition of a foreign currency transaction fee; (b) an increase of the annual allowance for foreign currency from 500 United States dollars to 1,000 United States dollars; and (c) a partial reduction of fuel subsidies. The imposition of the surcharge of 183 per cent on foreign currency transactions effectively raised the value of the Libyan dinar against the United States dollar, contributing to a significant drop in black-market exchange rates and a reduction in prices for basic goods.
215. A reshuffling of the Presidency Council's cabinet took place on 7 October 2018, ushering in four new ministers. Following months of delay, on 26 November 2018, the House of Representatives adopted two amendments to the 2011 Constitutional Declaration, and two days later, issued a long-awaited law to clear the way for a referendum on the constitutional proposal. While some uncertainties surrounding the legality of the process remain, preparations for a referendum were to begin in January 2019 with an update of the voter registry. Meanwhile, municipal elections are moving ahead, supported by a UNDP-funded electoral assistance project providing technical support to the Central Committee for Municipal Council Elections. The Committee organized municipal elections in Bani Walid and Derj on 15 September 2018, which were conducted largely peacefully. These elections, including the election held in Zawiya in May 2018, are part of the process to renew the four-year mandates of more than 100 municipal councils between 2018 and 2020.
216. Across the country, incidents of arbitrary detention and torture continued to be reported. As of November 2018, an estimated number of 6,400 individuals were held in 26 official prisons under the Ministry of Justice, an estimated 75 to 80 per cent of whom were in pre-trial detention. Thousands of others are held in facilities nominally under the control of the Ministries of the Interior or Defence, as well as facilities directly run by armed groups. Those held had little opportunity to challenge the legality of their detention or seek redress for violations suffered. Among many who are arbitrarily detained are women and girls, at times on the basis of their family affiliation or for "moral crimes" such as engaging in consensual sexual relations outside of marriage. Women were arbitrarily deprived of their liberty, including in facilities without female guards, exposing them to the risk of sexual abuse.
217. Migrants and refugees continued to be vulnerable to deprivation of liberty and arbitrary detention in official and unofficial places of detention; torture, including sexual violence; abduction for ransom; extortion; forced labour; and unlawful killings. The number of detainees increased owing to more frequent interceptions at sea and closure of sea routes to migrants, preventing their departure. Perpetrators included State officials, armed groups, smugglers, traffickers and criminal gangs. To date, an estimated 5,300 refugees and migrants are detained in Libya, of whom 3,700 are in need of international protection.

Strategy and external factors for 2020

218. In presenting the United Nations action plan for Libya in September 2017, the Secretary-General relaunched the process to complete Libya's political transition. The action plan reiterated that the December 2015 Libyan Political Agreement, endorsed by the Security Council in resolution [2259 \(2015\)](#), would remain the only framework to end the Libyan crisis. The United Nations action plan identified five main priorities to end the transition period: (a) limited amendments to the Libyan Political Agreement; (b) the constitution drafting process; (c) intensification of local reconciliation efforts and the national conference process; (d) dialogue with armed groups with a view to their eventual integration with the political process and civil life; and (e) parliamentary and presidential elections. UNSMIL also provides opportunities for Libyan women from civil society organizations and activists to make their voices heard in the peace process and work for specific gender provisions within the framework of the action plan.
219. In 2020, UNSMIL will continue to carry out the United Nations action plan for Libya. Despite progress made to date in the implementation of the plan, the prevailing fragile political and security situation in Libya will require the continued close and active engagement of UNSMIL at the political level, particularly through mediation and good offices, especially facilitating the maintenance of ceasefire agreements by all parties, as well as technical support for security arrangements and a national security architecture. Furthermore, it has become widely recognized that the ability of the financial institutions of Libya to continue to operate independently and effectively remains decisive for a peaceful and inclusive transition, including by preventing further political fragmentation. Accordingly, and in addition to its work on the political and security tracks, the Mission will further intensify its efforts aimed at unifying financial institutions and ensuring cooperation among them, as well as increasing their capacity to implement national and international economic priorities and to work effectively with the national authorities.
220. UNSMIL will engage with Libyan interlocutors in the security sector to provide support in developing a national security architecture and capacity-building, particularly in the areas of police, defence, arms and ammunition management and border management. These efforts will also aim at fostering trust and building confidence among Libyan security actors (including armed groups).
221. UNSMIL will work directly with Libyan stakeholders to promote human rights, transitional justice and the rule of law. The activities include monitoring and reporting on the human rights situation, providing support to justice and corrections actors, developing civil society's capacity to promote human rights standards and supporting the transitional justice process. Regular reports on various aspects of the human rights situation in Libya will serve to raise awareness and draw attention to the problems as well as ongoing needs in this area. UNSMIL will also organize seminars and workshops to provide technical assistance to national counterparts and build capacity.
222. In January 2019, UNSMIL headquarters returned to Tripoli and international staff were reassigned from Tunis to Tripoli. A regional office in Benghazi was opened in early 2019 as a base for the regular presence of the United Nations, providing space for work and accommodation. The security context will continue to impact mandate implementation and operational activities. The numerous actors controlling different regions of the Libyan territory, along with the fact that some of them consider the United Nations a legitimate target, will continue to represent a significant challenge that requires consistent and adequate mitigation measures to be in place and reviewed periodically. UNSMIL will continue to operate with a low profile and expand its outreach across the country in a gradual manner, commensurate with the security environment.
223. With regard to the external factors, the overall plan for 2020 is based on the following planning assumptions:
- (a) Presidential and parliamentary elections will take place in 2019;
 - (b) Actors, including but not limited to armed groups, interested in the status quo will hinder the electoral process and try to undermine the electoral results and/or their acceptance;

- (c) Instability or stagnation stemming from the formation of a new Government will continue;
 - (d) Successful elections and a smooth government formation process will take place, allowing for progress in the transition to State-led security in Tripoli and elsewhere in the country.
224. The Mission integrates a gender perspective in its operational activities, deliverables and results, as appropriate. UNSMIL will promote women's participation in the peace process and representation in government institutions, which will be reflected in broad and inclusive participation of women across Libyan society in the peace process, including effective gender mainstreaming in the constitution-making and electoral processes to safeguard equal rights and opportunities for women. In addition, UNSMIL and the United Nations country team, through the Office of the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General (Resident/Humanitarian Coordinator) will together promote equal rights and opportunities for women. This will include support for the efforts of the Government of National Accord to protect women from all forms of violence and guarantee their participation in all security processes/arrangements in the transition period, in line with human rights law, international humanitarian law and relevant Security Council resolutions; to address and prevent violence against women and girls in vulnerable situations, including displaced persons, migrants and refugees; to identify the gendered impacts of violent extremism on women in Libya; and to explore ways to improve prevention and protection efforts.
225. With regard to cooperation with other entities, UNSMIL remains uniquely placed to coordinate international assistance and provision of advice and assistance to efforts led by the Government of National Accord to stabilize the country. UNSMIL will seek to maximise collective results in all contexts through partnership with relevant local and international partners, regional organizations and civil society groups. In addition, UNSMIL will conduct diplomatic briefings and coordinate with the African Union, the League of Arab States and the European Union to ensure a unified approach in supporting Libya's political process and resolving the Libyan crisis.
226. With regard to inter-agency coordination and liaison, UNSMIL will work closely with the United Nations country team. This strategic partnership serves to carry forward the Secretary-General's emphasis on the nexus between the peace and security, development and human rights, as well as efforts focused on addressing humanitarian crises, to facilitate long-term peace, security and sustainable development. In recognition that political and security interventions will have a major impact on development efforts, and vice versa, an integrated approach will strengthen the ability of UNSMIL to implement its mandate, increase the ability of the country team to carry out its role and, ultimately, the United Nations to serve the Libyan people. UNSMIL works jointly with the United Nations country team on: (a) electoral support for the Libyan authorities; (b) security and justice sector reform; and (c) increasing support for basic services, economic development and security in the southern part of Libya.

Evaluation activities

227. A self-evaluation of the implementation of delegation of authority in UNSMIL is planned for 2020.

A. Proposed programme plan for 2020 and programme performance for 2018



1. Objective

228. The objective, to which the Mission contributes, is to achieve a peaceful, orderly and democratic transition process to meet the aspirations of the Libyan people for a united Libyan State that enjoys stability and is governed by legitimate institutions, and whose officials are accountable to the Libyan people.

2. Alignment with the Sustainable Development Goals

229. The objective is aligned with Sustainable Development Goal 5, which is to achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls. Progress towards the attainment of the objective will help to end all forms of discrimination against all women and girls, ensure women's full and effective participation and equal opportunities for leadership at all levels of decision-making in political, economic and public life; and adopt and strengthen sound policies and enforceable legislation for the promotion of gender equality and the empowerment of all women and girls at all levels.
230. The objective is also aligned with Sustainable Development Goal 16, which is to promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels. Progress towards the attainment of the objective will help to develop effective, accountable and transparent institutions at all levels and to promote the rule of law at the national level.

3. Highlighted results in 2018

Transforming challenges into opportunities – from ceasefire to new security in Tripoli

On 24 August 2018, clashes broke out in Tripoli between armed groups based in the capital and others from the neighbouring cities of Tarhouna and Misrata. The nearly month-long conflict resulted in the destruction of critical infrastructure, suspension of civil air movement and the loss of at least 32 civilian lives in Tripoli. UNSMIL, carrying out the Secretary-General's good offices, hosted a meeting that allowed the parties to reach a ceasefire agreement on 4 September 2018, supplemented by a consolidation agreement on 9 September 2018, which de-escalated the fighting. The Security Council on 6 September welcomed the Mission's mediation efforts and called upon all parties to implement and uphold the ceasefire.

Since 25 September 2018, the ceasefire has largely been respected and reinforced through a new comprehensive security plan for Tripoli endorsed by the Presidency Council of the Government of National Accord. In addition, on 7 October 2018, the Presidency Council appointed new ministers of the interior, economy, finance and youth and sport. In parallel, the Presidency Council agreed to confidence-building measures, which UNSMIL had strongly advocated and created support for, including the release of a number of prisoners; the



UNSMIL hosts a round table to reach a ceasefire in September 2018. Source: United Nations

handover of vital installations from armed groups to State security providers; and a package of economic reforms. The economic reforms started to achieve their aims by alleviating the dire economic situation of the Libyan people and reducing the stakes of militias in the shadow economy.

The Special Representative's engagement with Libyan, regional and international stakeholders to support the implementation of the United Nations action plan continued. On 8 November 2018, he announced the start of preparations and the time frame for the Libyan national conference to build momentum towards holding credible and inclusive elections aimed at ending Libya's prolonged transition.

Result and evidence

The deliverables contributed to the result, which is the positive steps taken to date by the Government of National Accord with a view to restoring the rule of law in Tripoli and achieving a Libyan-led and Libyan-owned political solution that would bring security, political and economic sustainability and national unity to Libya.

Evidence of the result includes the adoption of the security plan for Greater Tripoli following the ceasefire agreement. The security plan for greater Tripoli established the coordination and implementation functions of the Joint Operations Centre, which is under the direct authority of the Government of National Accord.

The result demonstrates progress made in 2018 towards the collective attainment of the objective.

Enhanced participation in elections

In 2018, the High National Electoral Commission conducted an update of its voter registry that resulted in a sharp increase in the overall number of registrants, including, in particular, increased registration of women voters that raised the proportion of women registrants by three percentage points. UNSMIL contributed advice and technical support to the process.

According to the Civil Registry Authority, 4 million Libyans are over 18 years old and thus eligible to register to vote. A voter registration process ahead of the 2014 legislative elections had resulted in an increase of the total number of registrants from 1.1 to 1.5 million. This relatively low figure and the even lower voter turnout was seized on by some actors to question the legitimacy and the results of the elections.



A wall inscription reading "WE WANT Elections & Democracy". Source: United Nations

Starting in the latter half of 2017 and through the first quarter of 2018, UNSMIL assisted the High National Electoral Commission in developing an operational plan and timeline, updating the national polling centre list, establishing data management procedures and protocols for the registration of voters, reactivating the voter registration software to implement the exercise and coordinating international electoral assistance.

Owing to some scepticism on the part of the High National Electoral Commission that the process would have the necessary political support in the prevailing fragmented and volatile political environment, with the assistance of United Nations good offices, political and financial support to the process was strengthened. UNSMIL conducted outreach workshops for representatives of Libyan civil society organizations targeting women and youth organizations to increase their participation. The voter registration update took place between December 2017 and March 2018, enfranchising over 1 million additional Libyans across the country, raising the overall figure from 1.5 to 2.5 million registrants. The proportion of women registrants increased from 40 to 43 per cent. This exercise demonstrated that the High National Electoral Commission, a key Libyan institution, shows growing capacity to step up its operations and manage the upcoming national electoral processes.

Result and evidence

The deliverable contributed to the result, which is enhanced participation in and broader legitimacy of future elections.

Evidence of the result includes the increase of the overall voter registration figure from 1.5 to 2.5 million, including an increase in the proportion of women registrants from 40 to 43 per cent.

The result demonstrates progress made in 2018 towards the collective attainment of the objective.

231. A planned result for 2018, which is capable Libyan security sector institutions, including improved national security governance through the allocation of clear roles and responsibilities, effective coordination and democratic oversight over the security sector, as referred to in the report of the Secretary-General on the proposed resource requirements for UNSMIL for 2018 (A/72/371/Add.8, table 1), was partially achieved, as evidenced by the maintenance of the ceasefire agreed following the violent clashes in September, decrees issued and implemented by the Presidency Council concerning the Committee on Security Arrangements and new security arrangements for Tripoli, the agreement of armed groups to those arrangements and the appointment of a new Minister of the Interior. Weapons management and monitoring and the establishment of a national security coordination mechanism, in line with the Libyan Political Agreement, were not achieved owing to ongoing divisions in the country and the resultant outbreaks of violence in the capital and the south during 2018.
232. A planned result for 2018, which is electoral processes being conducted in accordance with timelines agreed by key Libyan stakeholders in mediation and political dialogue processes or within a newly adopted constitution, as referred to in the report of the Secretary-General (A/72/371/Add.8, table 1), was partially achieved. Despite the success in updating the voter registry at national level, conducting municipal elections in three municipalities, revising the existing electoral regulatory framework and adopting a number of by-laws for elections slated for 2018, the House of Representatives did not formally adopt the constitutional referendum law until 29 November 2018, hence making the holding of elections in 2018 impossible. The timely allocation of the electoral budget and the security and safety of the High National Electoral Commission staff following an ISIS attack on its headquarters in May 2018 posed additional challenges to electoral preparations.

4. Highlighted planned results for 2020

Transition to State-led security and a State monopoly on the use of force

In 2018, UNSMIL provided dedicated support to Government authorities in efforts to empower the State security forces, provided capacity-building to the Ministry of the Interior, engaged in advocacy to promote consensus concerning the unification of the army and conducted outreach to armed groups to engage them in the transition to State-led security. Following violent clashes in the latter part of the year, UNSMIL played a key role in brokering a ceasefire and led efforts to transition from armed group control to State-led security.

Challenge and response

The challenge was to support the process, which remained fragile and continued to experience setbacks as armed groups struggled to retain their influence and access to state resources.

In response, for 2020, UNSMIL will enhance its support for the transition to a State monopoly on the use of force using a broad spectrum of direct and indirect approaches, including measures to encourage: (a) unity across Libya, national ownership of the process and the political will to facilitate the transformation; (b) re-establishing government oversight and control of security actors; (c) military unification and building and empowering State security forces; (d) the demobilization of armed groups; and (e) a significant reduction in the uncontrolled stockpiles of arms, ammunition and explosive remnants of war.

Result and evidence

The planned deliverables are expected to contribute to the result, which is consolidating the State's monopoly on the use of force so that it can contribute to a Libyan-led transition to greater human security, rule of law and the fairer distribution of wealth and opportunities to the benefit of all Libyans.

Evidence of the result, if achieved, will include progress towards the provision of security by legitimate security institutions to the entire country as they consolidate the State's monopoly on the use of force; decreased activity of non-State security forces; reorganization and development of the national army; better public security and increased accountability for crimes of all types.

The result, if achieved, will demonstrate progress made in 2020 towards the collective attainment of the objective.

Performance measures

2018	2019	2020
Ceasefire and other emergency measures (Presidency Council decrees and temporary security committees) adopted to address violence in the capital Partial handover of vital infrastructure including Matiga airport from armed groups to State forces completed	National conference addresses unification of the army	Full unification of the army; army reorganization begins
	Expansion of State control through legitimate State forces	Demobilization activities for armed groups commence
	Full handover of vital infrastructure from armed groups to State forces in Tripoli, including the international airport	National security framework adopted and implementation begins
	Appointment of one chief of general staff. Planning for a national security framework begins	Libya begins capacity-building of army
	Reviews of army organization begin	
	Police capacity-building expanded to Benghazi and other regions	

Ending arbitrary detention and improving detention conditions

In 2018, UNSMIL provided policy advice and technical assistance to justice sector personnel on the treatment of persons deprived of their liberty, judicial screening of detainees and legal, institutional and prison reform.

Individuals detained by armed groups are frequently held in detention conditions that fall far short of international minimum standards. In many cases, conditions include torture, sexual abuse, appalling sanitation and deprivation of basic food, water and medical needs. By the end of 2018, over 8,000 individuals were estimated to be held in prisons officially under the Ministry of Justice, including prisons managed by armed groups integrated in the Ministry of Justice.

Rihab (alias) was arrested by an armed group in late 2016. She was held in arbitrary detention for a period of 19 months, during which she was subjected to regular beatings and other ill-treatment. Rihab was denied access to her family and legal assistance, did not appear before any judicial authorities and was never formally charged. Her family contacted UNSMIL human rights personnel who, despite heavy restrictions on access and security concerns surrounding detention facilities, managed to visit the victim three times at her place of detention. As in many other cases, UNSMIL advocacy, follow-up with politicians and armed group leaders, awareness-raising activities with civil society and workshops and seminars to increase capacity among justice and corrections actors directly resulted in Rihab's release by the armed group in May 2018.

Challenge and response

The challenge was to support criminal justice actors in exercising control of armed groups managing prisons where detainees are deprived of the rights provided by international conventions and Libyan law.


In response, for 2020, UNSMIL will intensify its capacity-building support for criminal justice actors to improve effective State control over prisons with a view to increasing the number of released detainees. UNSMIL will also work closely with the committees established by Presidency Council decrees 1301 and 1304 of 16 September 2018 to monitor and facilitate the screening and release of detainees in Mitiga and other detention facilities in Tripoli.

Result and evidence

The planned deliverables are expected to contribute to the result, which is the transfer of a greater number of detainees to prisons which are fully under the control of professional and trained prison officials, thereby enhancing the human rights and rule of law situation in accordance with international instruments and Libyan national legislation.

Evidence of the result, if achieved, will include an increased number of detainees screened in 2020 (1,800) and the release of 1,200 of the screened detainees, as shown in the figure below.

The result, if achieved, will demonstrate progress made in 2020 towards the collective attainment of the objective.

Performance measures: number of detainees screened and released

233. The Mission will continue to be guided by all mandates entrusted to it, which provide the legislative framework for its deliverables.

5. Deliverables for the period 2018–2020

234. Table 23 lists all deliverables, by category and subcategory, for the period 2018–2020 that contributed and are expected to contribute to the attainment of the objective stated in paragraph 228 above.

Table 23

Deliverables for the period 2018–2020, by category and subcategory

	2018 planned	2018 actual	2019 planned	2020 planned
Quantified deliverables				
A. Facilitation of the intergovernmental process and expert bodies				
Parliamentary documentation (number of documents)	4	3	3	3
Substantive services for meetings (number of three-hour meetings)	6	6	6	6

	<i>2018 planned</i>	<i>2018 actual</i>	<i>2019 planned</i>	<i>2020 planned</i>
B. Generation and transfer of knowledge				
Field and technical cooperation projects (number of projects)	32	15	73	57
Seminars, workshops and training events (number of days)	101	91	134	158
Non-quantified deliverables				
C. Substantive deliverables				
Good offices				
Consultation, advice and advocacy				
Fact-finding, monitoring and investigation missions				
D. Communication deliverables				
Outreach programmes, special events and information materials				
External and media relations				
Digital platforms and multimedia content				

6. Most significant relative variances in deliverables

Variations between the actual and planned figures in 2018

235. The variance in parliamentary documentation was attributable to the adoption of a 60-day reporting cycle for reports of the Secretary-General to the Security Council in November 2018, alternating between oral and written reports, as a result of the situation on the ground.
236. The variance in field and technical cooperation projects was attributable mainly to a lesser number of meetings of the Policing and Security Joint Programme with Libyan counterparts and the delivery of fewer projects on arms and ammunition management and counter-proliferation owing to the destruction of critical infrastructure as the security situation deteriorated in and around the capital during the second half of 2018.
237. The variance in seminars, workshops and training events was attributable mainly to the lack of commitment among and engagement between army officers from the east and west to achieve military unification and reform; the lack of a secure environment for reaching local communities and Government-authorized Libyan counterparts owing to the political stalemate and the failure of the concerned Libyan parties to adopt the constitutional framework and make the necessary amendments to the Libyan Political Agreement; and the outbreak of armed conflict in and around the capital during the second half of 2018.

Variations between the planned figures for 2020 and 2019

238. The variance in field and technical cooperation projects is attributable mainly to the strong impetus given by the Policing and Security Joint Programme to the implementation of projects in 2019, resulting in the expected completion of many projects in that year and fewer projects carried over to 2020.
239. The variance in seminars, workshops and training events is attributable mainly to the expected increase in the delivery of capacity-building training in the areas of human rights monitoring and advocacy targeting local civil society organizations, the media and the Government on the prevention of and response to incitement to violence and hatred; arms and ammunition management and counter-proliferation, including raising community awareness and education on the risks of explosive remnants of war and detecting and clearing improvised explosive devices; and supporting future women candidates running for elections.

B. Proposed post and non-post resource requirements for 2020

Resource requirements (regular budget)

Table 24

Financial resources

(Thousands of United States dollars)

Category of expenditure	2018	2019	2020		Variance
	Expenditures	Appropriation	Total requirements	Non-recurrent requirements	2020 vs. 2019 Increase/(decrease)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)=(3)-(2)
Military and police personnel costs	4 316.5	6 196.6	6 196.6	–	–
Civilian personnel costs	26 973.1	36 479.7	32 557.9	–	(3 921.8)
Operational costs	33 679.0	33 722.6	33 721.3	527.1	(1.3)
Total (net of staff assessment)	64 968.6	76 398.9	72 475.8	527.1	(3 923.1)

Table 25

Positions

	Professional and higher categories								General Service and related categories			National staff			United Nations Volunteers	Total
	USG	ASG	D-2	D-1	P-5	P-4	P-3	P-2	Subtotal	Field/Security Services	General Service international	Total Professional Officer	Local level			
Approved 2019 ^a	1	2	–	7	13	35	29	2	89	120	1	210	14	88	6	318
Proposed 2020	1	2	–	7	13	35	29	2	89	120	1	210	13	84	6	313
Change	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	(1)	(4)	–	(5)

^a Includes four national positions (Local level) approved for the period from 1 January to 30 June 2019 only.

240. The proposed resource requirements for 2020 for UNSMIL amount to \$72,475,800 (net of staff assessment) and would provide for the deployment of 234 Guard Unit personnel (\$6,196,600); civilian personnel costs (\$32,557,900) for 210 international positions (1 Under-Secretary-General, 2 Assistant Secretaries-General, 7 D-1, 13 P-5, 35 P-4, 29 P-3, 2 P-2, 120 Field Service and 1 General Service), 97 national positions (13 National Professional Officer and 84 Local level), six United Nations Volunteers and seven Government-provided personnel; and operational costs (\$33,721,300) comprising costs for consultants and consulting services (\$550,200), official travel (\$1,491,300), facilities and infrastructure (\$20,118,600), ground transportation (\$375,900), air operations (\$4,304,500), communications and information technology (\$2,958,300), medical services (\$414,000) and other supplies, services and equipment (\$3,508,500).

241. For 2020, a net decrease of one national position is proposed for the staffing establishment of UNSMIL. Based on current operational requirements related to the consolidation of its presence in Libya and the delivery of its mandated activities according to the United Nations action plan for Libya, pursuant to Security Council resolution [2434 \(2018\)](#), the following staffing changes are proposed:

- (a) the abolishment of one position of Field Language Assistant (Local level) in the Office of the Chief of Staff;

- (b) the absence of two positions of Human Resources Assistant (Local level) and two positions of Finance Assistant (Local level) approved for the period from 1 January to 30 June 2019, only;
 - (c) the reclassification of one position of Human Resources Officer (National Professional Officer) as a Contract Management Assistant (Local level) and relocation of the post from Brindisi to Tripoli;
 - (d) the relocation of one position of Finance Assistant (Local level) from Brindisi to Tunis;
 - (e) the redeployment of one position of Administrative Assistant (Field Service) in Tripoli from the Security Institutions Service to the Human Rights, Rule of Law and Transitional Justice Service;
 - (f) the reassignment of three positions and relocation of two of those positions, as follows:
 - (i) one Finance Assistant (Local level) from Brindisi, as a Property Management Assistant (Local level) in Tripoli;
 - (ii) one Travel Assistant (Local level) from Brindisi, as an Administrative Assistant (Local level) in Tunis;
 - (iii) one Contracts Management Assistant (Field Service) as a Requisitions Officer (Field Service) in Tripoli.
242. The variance (decrease) between the proposed resources for 2020 and the approved budget for 2019 is mainly attributable to reduced requirements under civilian personnel costs, resulting from lower common staff costs for international positions owing to the exclusion of provisions for relocation/reassignment costs related to the change in duty station of 166 positions from Tunis to Tripoli in 2019, and the lower post adjustment multiplier in connection with the consolidation of the UNSMIL presence in Libya in 2019. The variance is offset in part by increased requirements under facilities and infrastructure, air operations and communications and information technology, in connection with the continuation of the re-establishment of the Mission's offices and locations in Libya.

Extrabudgetary resources

243. No extrabudgetary resources were available in 2019 or are projected for 2020 for UNSMIL.

9. United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia

(\$61,451,300)



Foreword

The signing of a final peace agreement between the Government of Colombia and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia – People’s Army (FARC-EP) in November 2016 signified the end of the Western hemisphere’s longest-running internal armed conflict and fuelled hope for a lasting peace. In the more than two years of implementation, the gains of peace are irrefutable. FARC-EP have laid down their arms and renounced violence, they have formed a political party, the People’s Alternative Revolutionary Force (FARC), and participated in elections. Under the terms of the agreement, the party has representation in Congress and former combatants have received financial, economic and social support to reintegrate in society. During the same period, a new Government and Congress have taken office following the most peaceful elections in decades, with the highest participation ever, particularly in regions formerly affected by the conflict. The Government has committed to bringing the peace process forward, stressing in particular a commitment to ensuring the reintegration of former combatants and the stabilization of former conflict areas within a framework of reinforcing legality. Independent national and international institutes have noted a historical drop in conflict-related violence in Colombia, with some estimates indicating that the peace process prevented the death of at least 2,670 Colombians in its first 12 months of implementation.

Since assuming the position of Special Representative of the Secretary-General in January of this year, I have had the opportunity to meet with a broad spectrum of Colombian leaders and visited mission offices and teams working in close proximity in the former conflict zones with Government officials, FARC representatives and communities. I am struck by the desire of so many Colombians to put violence behind them and to build a lasting peace, as well as the strong commitment of the United Nations family and the broader international community to support them.

These favourable factors notwithstanding, challenges to the peace process remain, most notably the need to accelerate the development of viable opportunities for former combatants, to stem the violence against social leaders and human rights defenders, to combat the illicit economies that continue to generate violence and to overcome the polarization that stands in the way of reconciliation. The extension of the presence of the State to long-neglected rural areas is the paramount challenge for consolidating peace.

As Colombia seeks to consolidate peace in a manner that makes it truly irreversible, the ongoing support and assistance of the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia, the United Nations country team and the broader international community will continue to be an important factor contributing to a safer, more secure and peaceful Colombia.

(Signed) Carlos Ruiz Massieu
Special Representative of the Secretary-General
United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia

Overall orientation

Mandates and background

244. The United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia is responsible for verification of two key aspects of the Final Agreement for Ending the Conflict and Building a Stable and Lasting Peace, adopted in 2016 by the Government of Colombia and FARC-EP: (a) the reintegration of FARC-EP members into political, economic and social life (section 3.2 of the Agreement); and (b) the implementation of personal and collective security and protection measures for ex-combatants and comprehensive security and protection programmes for the communities and organizations in the territories (section 3.4 of the Agreement). The mandate is defined in Security Council resolution [2366 \(2017\)](#). The Verification Mission works closely with the relevant verification bodies established by the Final Agreement, in particular, the Commission for the Follow-up, Promotion and Verification of the Implementation of the Final Agreement, the National Reintegration Council and the National Commission for Security Guarantees, as well as with members of the United Nations country team. In these tasks, the Verification Mission is building upon the work of its predecessor, the United Nations Mission in Colombia, which worked with both parties on the monitoring and verification of a bilateral ceasefire and the laying down of arms. The work of the Verification Mission will remain of vital significance in 2020 as the Government furthers the implementation of the final peace agreement.

Alignment with the Charter of the United Nations and the Sustainable Development Goals

245. The mandate of the Mission guides it in producing the respective deliverables, which contribute to the attainment of the objective. The objective of the Mission is aligned with the Organization's purpose to maintain international peace and security, as stipulated in Article 1 of the Charter of the United Nations. In the context of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, the purposes stipulated in Article 1 of the Charter are embodied by the Sustainable Development Goals. The objective, and therefore the deliverables, is aligned with a number of the Sustainable Development Goals, as reflected in paragraphs 261 and 262 below.

Recent developments

246. The peace process has entered a new phase of implementation under the responsibility of the Administration led by President Iván Duque, who assumed office in August 2018. President Duque committed to pursuing the peace process, focusing, in particular, on reintegrating law-abiding former combatants and on providing security and promoting development in former conflict areas. The Government has made efforts to move in that direction, but challenges persist.
247. The reintegration of former FARC-EP fighters continues to advance, albeit with a need to accelerate the pace of implementation and ensure that legal guarantees and the rights of victims are respected given the continued polarization around the transitional justice component of the peace agreement. The Government has assured former FARC-EP leaders and members of a smooth transition of the territorial areas for training and reintegration beyond their legal expiration date in August 2019.
248. Ongoing violence against former members of FARC-EP, community leaders, human rights defenders and social leaders remains of concern, despite efforts to address this issue, including plans developed by the Administration. Most of the institutional mechanisms required by the Final Agreement to provide security guarantees to former combatants and communities have been created, but additional efforts and resources are needed to ensure their effective impact on the ground in the conflict-affected areas.

Strategy and external factors for 2020

249. In 2020, the Mission will implement a proactive approach to verification, which includes: (a) working closely to accompany and support institutions charged with aspects of implementation of the peace process; (b) seeking solutions to implementation challenges; and (c) fostering trust between the parties to the Final Agreement. This strategy of proactive verification will require close engagement with both the Government and the People's Alternative Revolutionary Force (FARC) and with key national, regional and local interlocutors encompassing political, business, community and religious leaders, as well as with women's groups, ethnic groups and other peace support actors. Accelerating the implementation of the reintegration projects and strengthening the security guarantees for former FARC-EP members, as well as community leaders, social leaders and human rights defenders will remain central tenets of the Mission's strategy in 2020.
250. The reassessment of the Mission's footprint and operational deployment is an ongoing process, currently in its fourth iteration. This regular analysis and rebalancing is made necessary by the movement of former FARC-EP members between existing and emerging concentration areas, as well as to other population centres. Through a process of regular engagement, detailed analysis, movement forecasting and a "hub-and-spoke" approach, the Mission is able to respond in a timely and effective manner to such movements with former FARC-EP members and their families. Such an approach is linked to the Mission's requirement for a more mobile posture, with fewer fixed locations and an increased requirement for vehicles.
251. With regard to the external factors, the overall plan for 2020 is based on the following planning assumptions:
- (a) Renewal of the Mission's mandate, which currently extends through September 2019;
 - (b) Continued cross-party and international support for the close engagement of the United Nations and the Mission in the peace process;
 - (c) Ongoing support for and positive perception of the peace process among the population;
 - (d) The peaceful conduct of the October 2019 local elections;
 - (e) The impact of increasing numbers of migrants entering Colombia from Venezuela and the status of the peace process with the National Liberation Army (ELN) may be of consequence in 2020.
252. The Mission integrates a gender perspective in its operational activities, deliverables and results, as appropriate. The Mission's gender team will work closely with the security guarantees verification and reintegration verification teams to ensure that the specific needs of female former FARC-EP members are fully incorporated into programme design, implementation and monitoring.
253. With regard to cooperation with other entities, the Mission will undertake extensive engagement and liaison with international, national and subnational bodies supporting the implementation of the peace process. At the international level, the Mission will engage closely with members of the diplomatic community and regional organizations to identify synergies and areas of mutual interest and support in peace implementation and verification. At the national and subnational levels, the Mission will undertake extensive engagement with relevant community, religious, youth, women's and special interest groups in order to support the peace process. In Colombia, where the civil society sector is extremely developed and highly engaged in the peace process, this engagement and cooperation with other entities is an essential and invaluable aspect of the Mission's work.
254. With regard to inter-agency coordination and liaison, the Mission will work closely with the United Nations country team and with United Nations agencies, funds and programmes. Through comprehensive coordination and cooperation, the Mission is able to encourage consistent action and messages across peace and security and development pillars. This close working relationship is not only undertaken at the national level, where the Mission is represented on the United Nations country team, but also at the local level, where the staff work closely with the local coordination teams

deployed by the country team. Moreover, the Mission and the country team have been able to support and assist each other in the implementation of productive projects for former FARC-EP members and have worked together on submissions to and projects of the Peacebuilding Fund.

Evaluation activities

255. The following evaluations and self-evaluations completed in 2018 have guided the programme plan for 2020:
 - (a) Audit of the Verification Mission conducted by the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS);
 - (b) Self-evaluation: reassessment of the Mission's footprint and operational deployment.
256. The findings of the OIOS evaluation report are in the process of being implemented. Among other elements, this includes enhancing information reporting flows and tools and maximizing access to life support assets in the field (telecommunications and fuel).
257. The reassessment of the Mission's footprint and operational deployment is an ongoing process, currently in its fourth iteration (see para. 250 above).
258. The following evaluations and self-evaluations are planned for 2020:
 - (a) OIOS report: update on implementation of the 2018 audit findings;
 - (b) Self-evaluations: preparation for and planning of mission transition; implementation of delegation of authority in the Verification Mission.

A. Proposed programme plan for 2020 and programme performance for 2018



1. Objective

259. The objective, to which the Verification Mission contributes, is to advance the effective implementation of the provisions of the Final Agreement for Ending the Conflict and Building a Stable and Lasting Peace concerning reintegration and security guarantees.

2. Alignment with the Sustainable Development Goals

260. The objective is aligned with Sustainable Development Goal 5, which is to achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls. Progress towards the attainment of the objective will help to end all forms of discrimination against all women and girls; ensure women's full and effective participation and equal opportunities for leadership at all levels of decision-making in political, economic and public life; and adopt and strengthen sound policies and enforceable legislation for the promotion of gender equality and the empowerment of all women and girls at all levels.
261. The objective is aligned with Sustainable Development Goal 16, which is to promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels. Progress towards the attainment of the objective will help to reduce all forms of violence and related deaths and to ensure responsive, inclusive, participatory and representative decision-making at all levels.

3. Highlighted results in 2018

First-time participation of former FARC-EP members in national elections proceeded without major security incidents

In 2018, Colombia experienced its most peaceful, inclusive and participatory national elections in decades as a direct result of the end of the conflict through the signing of the peace agreement and FARC-EP laying down its arms. It was a historic moment for the implementation of the Final Agreement.

It was also the first time former FARC-EP members were allowed to vote in presidential and legislative elections. Guaranteeing individual and collective security of former FARC-EP members to participate in politics through their political party, the People's Alternative Revolutionary Force (FARC), was key to their successful transition from an armed group to a political party.



Former FARC-EP commander, Rodrigo Londoño, "Timochenko", exercising his right to vote for the first time in his life. Source: United Nations

Therefore, in February 2018, to ensure effective political participation by FARC, and drawing on the experience of a tripartite mechanism that operated in support of the bilateral ceasefire agreement, the Mission recommended the establishment of a coordination mechanism to bring the parties together with the institutions in charge of the personal and collective protection measures for FARC. This led to the creation of the Tripartite Protection and Security Mechanism (Instancia Tripartita de Protección y Seguridad) under the joint leadership of the Mission, the national police and the specialized subdirectorate of the National Protection Unit, which is composed of former FARC-EP members. In addition, the Mission provided secretariat services and technical advice to the Tripartite Mechanism and contributed to the creation of a road map to address the specific risks for FARC women involved in political activities during the election process. At first, the Tripartite Mechanism was established at the national level and later, on the basis of satisfactory results, was progressively expanded to 10 regions where FARC carried out most of its electoral activities, as well as the 24 territorial areas for training and reintegration where many of the former combatants lived. Thus, through the effective deployment and response of State institutions included in the Tripartite Mechanism, immediate solutions were provided to guarantee the rights of former FARC-EP members to be part of this historic democratic moment.

Result and evidence

The deliverables contributed to the result, which is ensuring that the former combatants and the FARC political party were able to exercise their political and electoral rights during the campaign period and in national elections, without fear of being attacked.

Evidence of the result includes the absence of attacks against former FARC-EP combatants during election days in both parliamentary elections on 11 March and in the two rounds of presidential elections on 27 May and 17 June 2018. Furthermore, the role of the Tripartite Protection and Security Mechanism went beyond the electoral context and helped to strengthen engagement and cooperation between the parties and is today the main communication and coordination mechanism between public forces and former FARC-EP members with regard to security guarantees.

The result demonstrates progress made in 2018 towards collective attainment of the objective.

Local solutions to reintegration challenges of former FARC-EP members: a regional story

In 2018, all stakeholders identified the need for more regional and locally based decision-making relating to the reintegration of former FARC-EP members. Having a highly-centralized reintegration process, with decision-making concentrated in national-level agencies and institutions – such as the National Reintegration Council and the Agency for Reintegration and Normalization – was limiting the operation of the territorial reintegration councils at the level of the territorial areas for training and reintegration and, in turn, was starting to have an impact on the implementation of reintegration plans. In response, it was necessary to promote ownership by regional actors and local communities to help decentralize the reintegration process in line with the territorial approach of the Final Agreement.



Mission supporting former FARC-EP members and community members in a chicken and egg farming project in El Estrecho, Cauca Department. Source: United Nations

Following a recommendation by the Mission on the need to promote greater local ownership and to support the engagement of the Governor of Antioquia, FARC leadership and regional stakeholders in this issue, the first regional reintegration committee was established in Antioquia Department in late 2017. The committee provided a space for discussing and deciding upon key aspects of the implementation of the reintegration process. For instance, the committee was able to settle the issue of land tenure for economic and social reintegration projects by earmarking funds for the purchase of land, avoiding protracted legal discussion at the national level.

In response to the growing consensus among all stakeholders that the reintegration process would have to be decentralized, the Mission, through its regional offices, and the Agency for Reintegration and Normalization fostered the creation of other regional reintegration committees. These bodies were established to ensure alignment of national and regional reintegration plans and adequate responses to specific regional dynamics. By December 2018, seven more regional committees had been established in the departments of Bolívar, Cauca, Chocó, Meta, Santander, Sucre and Valle del Cauca, under the leadership of the governors and with the active participation of private sector representatives, universities, United Nations agencies, funds and programmes, FARC leadership and the Mission itself.

Result and evidence

The deliverables contributed to the result, which is the establishment of regionally and locally owned initiatives to foster reintegration efforts, in the form of regional reintegration committees in different locations.

Evidence of the result includes the positive developments registered as part of the committees' activation, such as the earmarking of funds under regional budgets and development plans, fundraising activities to back self-funded economic and social reintegration projects like in municipalities in Meta and Bolivar, and the inclusion of the territorial areas for training and reintegration and new settlements in regional intervention plans and delivery of social services (such as mobile clinics on sexual and reproductive rights, immunizations, gender and women's rights and vocational training provided in Antioquia). Other activities included the provision of multidisciplinary technical assistance from public agencies and universities to scale up agricultural and farming activities implemented by former combatants, and the provision of legal and administrative assistance to legalize cooperatives. These committees have also been instrumental in addressing the issue of reintegration of former FARC-EP members who have resettled in urban areas and aspire to an individual reintegration path, as observed in the provinces of Bolívar, Santander and Sucre.

More generally, the committees have helped to build confidence among the population in the State actors and proved to be instrumental in fostering reconciliation between victims and FARC representatives at the regional level, either through the sponsoring and organization of reconciliation events or by the linkage with the regional and local peace, reconciliation and coexistence councils in Valle del Cauca and Bolivar.

The involvement of social actors and local authorities in the reintegration process through the committees' activities has also proven to strengthen the territorial and community-based approach in the midterm. Such processes help to accelerate the deployment of regional and national State authorities in areas severely affected by the conflict and by poverty, contributing to positive local changes and, by extension, to putting down the roots of a sustainable territorial peace.

Drawing from the experience of these committees, other initiatives have been established with a view to getting key stakeholders closer to former FARC-EP members, ensuring a greater accountability and at promoting regular direct dialogue on issues of concern and aspirations between the FARC leadership, the Government and regional authorities. As an example, in late November, a south-eastern subregional meeting on reintegration was organized in the capital of Meta Department with the participation of representatives from eight territorial areas for training and reintegration and eight new resettlements to discuss socioeconomic challenges and innovative ways to move forward in the process.

Finally, the national Government and its implementing agencies, such as the Ministry of the Interior and the Agency for Reintegration and Normalization, have acknowledged and supported these initiatives. As a matter of fact, in the national strategic stabilization plan entitled "Peace with legality", the High Counsellor for Post-Conflict recognizes the fundamental role of regional and local authorities in stabilizing the territories, including their support for the reintegration process. More importantly, positive feedback has been received from the former combatants, the local communities and social groups, illustrating the need to widen the engagement with local actors and authorities.

The result demonstrates progress made in 2018 towards the collective attainment of the objective.

262. A planned result for 2018, which is the FARC-EP new political party and the political movement Voces de Paz having access to media and the representative bodies specified in the Final Agreement, as referred to in the report of the Secretary-General on the proposed resource requirements for the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia for 2018 ([A/72/371/Add.7](#), table 1) was partially achieved, as evidenced by the establishment of the FARC political party, the successful and peaceful participation of both former FARC-EP combatants and the new FARC political party in elections, the taking up of the majority of seats allocated to the former FARC-EP in Parliament. However, there were some delays in the release of funding to the new political party, which did affect their ability to carry out their planned campaign activities.
263. A planned result for 2018, which is the active involvement of the registered former combatants of FARC-EP in individual and collective reintegration programmes/projects, as referred to in the report of the Secretary-General ([A/72/371/Add.7](#), table 1), was partially achieved, as evidenced by the initiation of 20 Government-funded and 190 self-funded and externally funded reintegration projects. Delays in the achievement of this result were in part due to the transition to a new Government and to extended timelines for the approval of reintegration projects.
264. A planned result for 2018, which is the effective establishment of the agreed institutional arrangements for implementation, as referred to in the report of the Secretary-General ([A/72/371/Add.7](#), table 1), was partially achieved, as evidenced by the adoption and implementation of security and protection policies and the establishment of the Special Investigation Unit of the Office of the Attorney General and some of its territorial sections, as well as the specialized subdirectorates of the National Protection Unit. The effective establishment of these bodies has been an incremental process, owing to the need to take certain steps to achieve their full operationalization.

4. Highlighted planned results for 2020

Fostering shared local ownership of security guarantees for former FARC-EP members and communities

Challenge and response

In 2018, the challenge was for the Mission to be actively involved in advocating for a strong institutional response to the need for security guarantees for former FARC-EP members. The roll-out of the Tripartite Protection and Security Mechanism to the regions, and specifically to the territorial areas for training and reintegration, where most of the former combatants were concentrated, was a first initiative to build trust and strengthen coordination between the parties in response to the above challenge.

As implementation continues, the requirement for security guarantees continues to evolve and new challenges have arisen. For example, former FARC-EP members have progressively moved out of the territorial areas to new settlements in urban and rural areas, leading to redeployment of the Mission and reprioritization of its areas of operation. This is a process that is anticipated to continue through 2019 and into 2020. Furthermore, experience has shown that departmental and municipal elections tend to give rise to higher levels of localized violence than national elections. Therefore, in anticipation of departmental and municipal elections scheduled for late 2019, the Mission has started to enhance its engagement with key local stakeholders and actors with a view to expanding the security guarantees approach to encompass a more widespread, community-based framework. This action also responds to the concern expressed by the Security Council about the continued insecurity in areas most affected by the conflict and its urging of the Government of Colombia to take urgent action to expand State presence and ensure the provision of security in these areas.

In response, for 2020, the Mission plans to support the Government and State institutions in charge of prevention, protection and investigation in the development and implementation of a more holistic concept of security guarantees. The new concept, building on the current approach of individual security measures for former FARC-EP members in defined geographical areas, proposes a more collective and widespread approach that encompasses the security needs of both former FARC-EP members and communities across the whole territory of Colombia. The Mission envisages facilitating this shift through advocacy, outreach and proactive verification activities with former FARC-EP members in their new settlements and with local communities and municipal authorities. By engaging at the local level with these actors, who are best equipped to identify territorial threats and propose adequate protection measures, the Mission will act as a bridge to enhance connection between national-level policies and local needs.

The Mission plans to increase bilateral contact and good offices with former FARC-EP members, local communities and local government authorities, and to expand verification activities as a means to externally validate and build confidence in the process. These activities are expected to enhance knowledge, implementation and accountability regarding FARC and community security guarantees. Through such activities, the Mission also plans to promote the ongoing reconciliation and confidence-building process between former FARC-EP members, communities and State institutions. This will enhance FARC and communities' confidence and opportunities to report human rights violations to responsible State institutions and ensure effective investigative processes to fight impunity, criminal conduct and structures behind such violations.

Result and evidence

The planned deliverables are expected to contribute to the result, which is enhanced knowledge and ownership by local actors of matters related to security guarantee measures in their areas, as well as improved coordination and communication among State entities in charge of prevention, protection and investigation and between those entities and communities.

Evidence of the result, if achieved, will be the increased coordination and communication between State entities responsible for security guarantees through a wider deployment of security guarantees implementing entities at the regional and local levels and wider participation of local stakeholders with a clearer view of the operation of the prevention, protection and investigation mechanisms, as shown in the figure below.

The result, if achieved, will demonstrate progress made in 2020 towards the collective attainment of the objective.

Performance measures

2018	2019	2020
<p>Security guarantee mechanisms and institutions established at the national level contribute to increased coordination and communication between the parties</p> <p>The establishment of such mechanisms in selected regions sets the ground for similar improvements in engagement with stakeholders in prioritized areas</p>	<p>Expansion of subnational security guarantee mechanisms across the country and the resulting increased coordination and communication with local actors contribute to raised awareness of the need to shift from an individual protection approach to a collective security guarantees perspective with a community focus</p>	<p>Countrywide coverage of subnational security guarantee mechanisms attracts wide and informed participation from local actors, allowing for fluid communication and coordination between them and the State and enhancing the shift from individual to individual and collective security approaches</p>

Expanding political and geographic engagement in socioeconomic reintegration

In 2018, the Mission was highly engaged in the process to facilitate local and regional responses to challenges in socioeconomic reintegration. The establishment of regional committees for reintegration was a concrete step that supported the acceleration of the rural and collective socioeconomic reintegration process, while nation-wide plans and programmes were being designed and gradually implemented by the Agency for Reintegration and Normalization. Such bottom-up initiatives brought a wide variety of regional and local actors and authorities within their scope, allowing for trust to build locally in support of the reintegration of former fighters.

Challenge and response

The challenge was to promote socioeconomic reintegration in the midst of the political transition following the elections at both national and regional levels, and the movement of former fighters to new geographic areas, including urban areas. In response, the Mission identified a need to facilitate successful continuity, ownership and responsiveness in socioeconomic reintegration, as well as to work with local authorities to address new individual and urban reintegration needs.

In response, for 2020, the Mission will enhance its proactive verification activities by promoting spaces for dialogue, engagement and experience exchange with and between stakeholders involved in successful reintegration initiatives at the regional level, newly elected officials and local authorities in areas to which former FARC-EP fighters have relocated with a view to promoting relationship-building while advocating for and raising awareness of the importance of continuity, accountability and increased coordination in reintegration efforts. Additionally, the inclusion of cross-cutting information and activities in areas such as gender equality, child protection and respect of ethnic rights will be of key significance in ensuring effective sustainable reintegration in accordance with the terms of the final peace agreement. The Mission will also promote the participation of State authorities at the national level in such spaces and in its advocacy and awareness efforts to help ensure coherence at all levels of the reintegration process.

Result and evidence

The planned deliverables are expected to contribute to the result, which is the engagement of new political actors in regional reintegration committees.

Evidence of the result, if achieved, will include increased engagement of local stakeholders and new political actors in regional reintegration committees in support of continuity and strengthening of reintegration in previously designated areas, as well the initiation of projects in areas of relocation of former FARC-EP members.

The result, if achieved, will demonstrate progress made in 2020 towards the collective attainment of the objective.

Performance measures

2018	2019	2020
Initiation of regional committees for reintegration and the sharing of best practices and lessons learned among them	Growth in number and scope of regional reintegration committees, with full support of the national Government and the engagement of new diverse regional actors in reintegration and rural development	Regional reintegration committees are functioning, with high levels of local engagement and support, and appropriate and differentiated projects are initiated in all areas where significant numbers of former FARC-EP members are living

265. The Mission will continue to be guided by all mandates entrusted to it, which provide the legislative framework for its deliverables.

5. Deliverables for the period 2018–2020

266. Table 26 lists all deliverables, by category and subcategory, for the period 2018–2020 that contributed and are expected to contribute to the attainment of the objective stated in paragraph 259 above.

Table 26

Deliverables for the period 2018–2020, by category and subcategory

	2018 <i>planned</i>	2018 <i>actual</i>	2019 <i>planned</i>	2020 <i>planned</i>
Quantified deliverables				
A. Facilitation of the intergovernmental process and expert bodies				
Parliamentary documentation (number of documents)	4	4	4	4
B. Generation and transfer of knowledge				
Technical materials (number of materials)	–	1	1	1
Non-quantified deliverables				
C. Substantive deliverables				
Good offices				
Consultation, advice and advocacy				
Fact-finding, monitoring and investigation missions				
Databases and substantive digital materials				
D. Communication deliverables				
Outreach programmes, special events and information materials				
External and media relations				
Digital platforms and multimedia content				

6. Most significant relative variances in deliverables

Variations between the actual and planned figures in 2018

267. The variance in technical materials was attributable to the fact that a mission-wide internal verification manual was developed through a consultative process between reintegration and security guarantee teams, cross-cutting affairs advisers, the analysis unit, field offices and other units. The manual provides guidance, parameters and instructions for verification activities in the field. The manual was shared with all field offices and an internal training and outreach strategy was carried out to ensure that all teams were fully familiar with the document. The manual was completed in January 2018 and an update was made available in July 2018.

B. Proposed post and non-post resource requirements for 2020

Resource requirements (regular budget)

Table 27

Financial resources

(Thousands of United States dollars)

Category of expenditure	2018	2019	2020		Variance
	Expenditures	Appropriation	Total requirements	Non-recurrent requirements	2020 vs. 2019 Increase/(decrease)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)=(3)-(2)
Military and police personnel costs	4 154.4	4 016.1	4 063.4	–	47.3
Civilian personnel costs	30 216.2	30 777.9	32 629.5	–	1 851.6
Operational costs	24 874.3	30 529.5	24 758.4	–	(5 771.1)
Total (net of staff assessment)	59 244.9	65 323.5	61 451.3	–	(3 872.2)

Table 28

Positions

	Professional and higher categories									General Service and related categories			National staff			Total
	USG	ASG	D-2	D-1	P-5	P-4	P-3	P-2	Subtotal	Field/ Security Services	General Service	Total inter-national	National Officer	Local level	United Nations Volunteers	
Approved 2019	1	1	1	6	21	39	46	1	116	41	1	158	77	80	113	428
Proposed 2020	1	1	1	6	22	38	46	1	116	41	1	158	77	80	131	446
Change	–	–	–	–	1	(1)	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	18	18

268. The proposed resource requirements for 2020 for the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia amount to \$61,451,300 (net of staff assessment) and would provide for the deployment of 120 military observers (\$4,063,400); salaries and common staff costs (\$32,629,500) for 158 international positions (1 Under-Secretary-General, 1 Assistant Secretary-General, 1 D-2, 6 D-1, 22 P-5, 38 P-4, 46 P-3, 1 P-2, 41 Field Service and 1 General Service), 157 national positions (77 National Professional Officer and 80 Local level) and 131 United Nations Volunteers; as well as operational costs (\$24,758,400) comprising costs for consultants and consulting services (\$245,700), official travel (\$1,611,500), facilities and infrastructure (\$5,738,000), ground transportation (\$2,915,300), air operations (\$6,806,300), marine operations (\$402,000), communications and

information technology (\$5,388,000), medical services (\$392,200) and other supplies, services and equipment (\$1,259,400).

269. For 2020, a net increase of 18 positions for the staffing establishment of the Mission is proposed, as follows:
- (a) Reclassification of the position of Liaison Officer at the P-4 level to Head of Office at the P-5 level in the Tolima Bogota regional office to oversee and supervise a sub-office;
 - (b) The establishment of 17 positions of National Liaison Officer (United Nations Volunteer) and one position of National Support Officer (United Nations Volunteer) to provide the Mission with the ability to cover a larger geographic area and to strengthen relations at the regional/departmental and subregional levels.
270. The variance (decrease) between the proposed resources for 2020 and the approved budget for 2019 is mainly attributable to reduced requirements under operational costs, primarily under facilities and infrastructure, owing to the projected closure of four remote field locations during 2020 as a result of the dispersal of former FARC-EP members around the country. The variance is offset in part by additional requirements for civilian personnel costs, resulting from: (a) the application of lower vacancy rates of 16 per cent for international positions and 10 per cent for Local level positions, compared with 21 per cent and 30 per cent, respectively, in 2019; and (b) the proposed establishment of 18 positions of United Nations Volunteer.

Extrabudgetary resources

271. No extrabudgetary resources were available in 2019 or are projected for 2020 for the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia.

Annex

Planned and actual vacancy rates for special political missions

(Percentage)

Mission	Category	Actual average 2018	Approved 2019		Actual February 2019	Proposed 2020	
			Continuing	New		Continuing	New
United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS)	Military observers (military advisers)	–	5.0		–	5.0	
	International staff	13.2	11.0		13.0	13.0	
	National Professional Officers	–	5.0		–	–	
	National staff (Local level)	–	5.0		–	–	
United Nations Integrated Peace-building Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNIOGBIS)	Military observers (military advisers)	50.0	–		–	–	
	International staff	4.8	5.0	50.0	–	5.0	
	National Professional Officers	3.8	4.0	35.0	4.0	4.0	
	National staff (Local level)	4.8	5.0	35.0	7.1	5.0	
	United Nations Volunteers – international	14.3	29.0		25.0	15.0	
	United Nations Volunteers – national	–	5.0	35.0	–	–	
United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM)	Contingents	0.2	–		0.2	–	
	Police advisers (United Nations police)	7.1	–		14.3	–	
	International staff	6.8	7.0	50.0	18.6	11.0	50.0
	National Professional Officers	25.4	29.0	35.0	34.5	30.0	50.0
	National staff (Local level)	24.4	36.0	35.0	24.4	34.0	35.0
	General temporary assistance – international	–	–		–	–	25.0
	General temporary assistance – national	–	–		–	–	25.0
	United Nations Volunteers – international	–	–		69.2	–	50.0
	Government-provided personnel	18.2	30.0		9.5	27.0	
United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy in Central Asia	International staff	–	5.0		–	5.0	
	National Professional Officers	–	5.0		–	5.0	
	National staff (Local level)	–	9.0		–	5.0	
United Nations support for the Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission	Military observers (military advisers)	–	5.0		–	5.0	
	International staff	–	5.0		–	5.0	
	National staff (Local level)	–	5.0		–	–	

Mission	Category	Actual average 2018	Approved 2019		Actual February 2019	Proposed 2020	
			Continuing	New		Continuing	New
Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon (UNSCOL)	International staff	5.0	6.0		10.0	5.0	
	National Professional Officers	–	5.0		–	–	
	National staff (Local level)	5.0	5.0		2.0	5.0	
United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa (UNOCA)	International staff	6.9	7.0		3.0	10.0	
	National Professional Officers	33.3	33.0		–	33.0	
	National staff (Local level)	11.1	11.0		–	11.1	
United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL)	Contingents	1.7	–		2.1	1.7	
	International staff	13.3	12.0	50; FS: 35	18.1	13.3	
	National Professional Officers	35.6	23.0	35.0	64.3	37.0	
	National staff (Local level)	26.7	23.0	35.0	39.8	27.5	35.0
	United Nations Volunteers – international	–	20.0	50.0	16.7	10.0	
	Government-provided personnel	14.3	–		14.3	3.9	
United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia	Military observers (military advisers)	5.8	5.0		1.7	4.0	
	International staff	20.4	21.0	50.0	21.7	16.0	
	National Professional Officers	11.1	10.0	35.0	13.0	10.0	
	National staff (Local level)	24.7	30.0	35.0	6.3	10.0	
	United Nations Volunteers – international	8.0	8.0		8.0	10.0	
	United Nations Volunteers – national	–	8.0		–		50.0