



# General Assembly

Distr.: General  
30 August 2018  
Original: English

---

## Seventy-third session

Item 137 of the provisional agenda\*\*

### Programme budget for the biennium 2018–2019

## **Estimates in respect of special political missions, good offices and other political initiatives authorized by the General Assembly and/or the Security Council**

### **Thematic cluster I: Special and personal envoys, advisers and representatives of the Secretary-General**

### **Report of the Secretary-General**

#### **Addendum**

#### *Summary*

The present report contains the proposed resources for 2019 for 11 special political missions grouped under the thematic cluster of special and personal envoys, advisers and representatives of the Secretary-General.

The proposed resources for 2019 for special political missions grouped under this cluster amount to \$55,900,900 (net of staff assessment).

---

\* Reissued for technical reasons on 18 October 2018.

\*\* [A/73/150](#).



## Contents

	<i>Page</i>
I. Financial overview .....	3
II. Special political missions .....	4
A. Office of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Cyprus .....	4
B. Office of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide ..	9
C. Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Western Sahara .....	18
D. Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the implementation of Security Council resolution <a href="#">1559 (2004)</a> .....	21
E. United Nations Representative to the Geneva International Discussions .....	26
F. Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria .....	31
G. Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Sudan and South Sudan ..	39
H. Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region. ....	45
I. Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen .....	53
J. Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Burundi .....	60
K. Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Myanmar .....	65

## I. Financial overview

1. The proposed resources for 2019 for special political missions grouped under thematic cluster I amount to \$55,900,900 (net of staff assessment). Table 1 below provides a comparison between the proposed resources for 2019 and the resources for 2018 as approved by the General Assembly in its resolution [72/262 A](#).

Table 1

### Resource requirements

(Thousands of United States dollars)

Category of expenditure	2018			2019		Variance	Net requirements for 2019
	Appropriation	Estimated expenditures	Estimated variance	Total requirements	Non-recurrent requirements	2019 vs. 2018 Increase/ (decrease)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)=(2)-(1)	(4)	(5)	(6)=(4)-(1)	
Office of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Cyprus	2 792.1	2 700.5	(91.6)	2 775.8	19.7	(16.3)	2 684.2
Office of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide	2 118.2	2 227.6	109.4	2 198.2	—	80.0	2 307.6
Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Western Sahara	444.9	381.8	(63.1)	456.3	—	11.4	393.2
Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the implementation of Security Council resolution <a href="#">1559 (2004)</a>	367.7	319.8	(47.9)	363.7	—	(4.0)	315.8
United Nations Representative to the Geneva International Discussions	1 750.7	2 022.6	271.9	1 887.1	—	136.4	2 159.0
Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria	16 428.3	16 118.8	(309.5)	16 402.2	56.8	(26.1)	16 092.7
Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Sudan and South Sudan	1 409.5	1 450.1	40.6	1 502.5	2.3	93.0	1 543.1
Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region	3 706.6	4 324.9	618.3	4 400.4	20.3	693.8	5 018.7
Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen	13 051.8	15 780.2	2 728.4	17 192.9	534.1	4 141.1	19 921.3
Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Burundi	6 370.9	6 441.9	71.0	7 489.5	224.0	1 118.6	7 560.5
Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Myanmar	853.8	760.0	(93.8)	1 232.3	—	378.5	1 138.5
<b>Total</b>	<b>49 294.5</b>	<b>52 528.2</b>	<b>3 233.7</b>	<b>55 900.9</b>	<b>857.2</b>	<b>6 606.4</b>	<b>59 134.6</b>

## II. Special political missions

### A. Office of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Cyprus

(\$2,775,800)

#### Background, mandate and objective

2. The Office of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Cyprus, also known as the good offices mission, supports the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Cyprus, whose mandate is to assist the parties in the conduct of negotiations aimed at reaching a comprehensive settlement.

3. On 10 July 2008, in a letter to the President of the Security Council ([S/2008/456](#)), the Secretary-General announced the appointment of his Special Adviser on Cyprus as from 14 July 2008, to assist the parties in the conduct of full-fledged negotiations aimed at reaching a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus issue. On 3 September 2008, the leaders began the negotiations under the auspices of the United Nations on chapters related to the issues of governance and power-sharing, property, European Union matters, economic matters, security and guarantees, and territory. Espen Barth Eide served as the most recent Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Cyprus from 22 August 2014 to 14 August 2017. Pending the appointment of a new Special Adviser, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Deputy Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Cyprus, Elizabeth Spehar, oversees the work of the Office of the Special Adviser.

4. Since the start of the full-fledged negotiations, the Secretary-General has provided progress reports to the Security Council on the activities of the Office of the Special Adviser ([S/2009/610](#), [S/2010/238](#), [S/2010/603](#), [S/2011/112](#), [S/2011/498](#), [S/2012/149](#), [S/2016/15](#), [S/2016/599](#), [S/2017/814](#) and [S/2018/610](#)). The Special Adviser and the Deputy Special Adviser have briefed the Council 16 times, most recently on progress towards a settlement on 17 July 2018. The Council, in its resolution [2430 \(2018\)](#), reaffirmed the primary role of the United Nations in assisting the parties to bring the Cyprus conflict and division of the island to a comprehensive and durable settlement, and expressed its full support for the Secretary-General's good offices and welcomed his willingness for his good offices to remain available to assist the sides, should they jointly decide to re-engage in negotiations with the necessary political will. Both the Secretary-General and the Deputy Special Adviser have maintained a steady pace of meetings to brief international stakeholders and key regional governments.

5. From June 2017 to July 2018 the United Nations continued its engagement with the sides in carrying out the Secretary-General's good offices mandate. The frequency of meetings increased when the two sides and the guarantor powers travelled to Crans-Montana, Switzerland, for the Conference on Cyprus from 27 June to 7 July 2017, facilitated by the Secretary-General. Following the inconclusive closure of the Conference, the Secretary-General called for a period of reflection to determine if and when conditions will mature again for a meaningful process. The Office of the Special Adviser continued its engagement with the leaders and other actors bilaterally. On 16 April 2018, the United Nations facilitated an informal meeting between the two leaders, to take stock of the situation. In his latest report ([S/2018/610](#)), the Secretary-General conveyed his intentions to engage a United Nations senior official to conduct consultations with the two leaders and the guarantor powers to seek, in a formal, structured and detailed manner, the outcome of their reflections and on a way forward. To this end, he asked Jane Holl Lute to conduct the consultations. In resolution [2430 \(2018\)](#), the Security Council urged the sides and all involved participants to seize the important opportunity presented by the appointment of Ms. Lute to conduct in-depth

consultations on a way forward, by renewing their political will and commitment to a settlement under United Nations auspices. The Office of the Special Adviser is providing substantive, financial, logistical and administrative support to Ms. Lute in carrying out the consultations.

6. The Office of the Special Adviser continues to support the work of expert working groups and the 13 technical committees focused on crime and criminal matters, European Union preparations, economic and commercial matters, cultural heritage, crisis management, humanitarian matters, health, the environment, broadcasting, crossings, culture, education, and gender equality. These continued to meet under the facilitation of the Office of the Special Adviser and the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP).

### **Cooperation with other entities**

7. In line with the integrated approach of the United Nations in Cyprus, the Office of the Special Adviser, UNFICYP and other United Nations entities operate in a way that maximizes synergies and ensures coherent and effective support to the peace effort. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Cyprus and Head of UNFICYP acts as Deputy Special Adviser to the Secretary-General with regard to the negotiations, ensuring and coordinating the provision of support to the Office of the Special Adviser by both UNFICYP and the United Nations country team (both on a non-reimbursable basis).

8. Since late 2015, the Office of the Special Adviser has coordinated and provided political oversight for the engagement of international financial institutions in support of the process, particularly the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the European Central Bank, and the technical assistance of the European Commission. This includes the provision of political guidance and input, monthly coordination videoconferences and the preparation, facilitation and coordination of regular expert missions to Cyprus and workshops with the sides.

9. The outcome of the detailed review of coordination arrangements between the Office of the Special Adviser and UNFICYP conducted in June 2010 remains valid (see [A/65/706](#), annex III). A formal agreement on administrative and logistical support was concluded between the two missions in 2013, and was subsequently revised and signed in August 2016.

### **Performance information**

10. Since the resumption of the negotiations in May 2015, the process continued at a varied pace. The sides engaged in intensive negotiations in the period leading up to and at the Conference on Cyprus in January 2017 as well as in June and July 2017, and the engagement decreased in the period following the Conference. Between January and May 2018, the leaders held one informal meeting under the auspices of the Deputy Special Adviser, who also met with the leaders bilaterally six times. With the start of the consultations by Ms. Lute in July 2018, engagement will intensify and it is estimated that 20 meetings will take place between the leadership on the island, the guarantor powers and the United Nations representatives.

11. The United Nations met with the negotiating teams 10 times in the first half of 2018. Should the engagement between the leaders intensify, the core outstanding issues will have to be negotiated in detail and the meetings between the negotiating teams will also increase. It is estimated that in the second half of 2018, 40 more meetings between the negotiating teams and the United Nations will be organized.

12. Based on the ongoing commitment of the leaders to find a solution, the Office of the Special Adviser continues to assist the parties, including through shuttle

diplomacy and the facilitation and support of high-level meetings. Through sustained engagement with the sides, the international community, political actors, academia, media and civil society, including women's groups in Cyprus, the Office also continues to exchange information and to provide detailed and comprehensive analysis and regular reporting on political developments to United Nations Headquarters and the Security Council. During the period of reflection which followed the closure of the Conference on Cyprus, the Office engaged in intensive internal lesson-learned exercises, including a retreat in January 2018.

13. Between January and July 2018, 75 meetings of working groups and technical committees were held to discuss specific areas of expertise and identify areas of convergence. It is estimated that by the end of 2018, 200 such meetings will have taken place and, should the process intensify following the consultations, it is expected that 70 papers concerning movement towards convergence between the parties will be produced.

14. Two new confidence-building measures were implemented by the technical committees between January and July 2018. Another seven such measures are expected to be completed before the end of 2018, bringing the total number of cumulative confidence-building measures to 105.

#### **Planning assumptions for 2019**

15. With the United Nations consultations under way, in the second half of 2018 engagement will intensify, with prospects for the process to proceed further with the potential resumption of full-fledged negotiations towards reaching a comprehensive settlement. The Office of the Special Adviser would therefore be called upon to continue to facilitate regular meetings between the leaders, negotiators and experts and to "shuttle" between the sides and the parties to the Conference on Cyprus separately until a comprehensive settlement is reached. The requirement to coordinate technical work in preparation for settlement implementation will also continue and could increase.

16. Should the talks resume, the United Nations may be called upon to again host the Conference on Cyprus to finalize core outstanding issues of the negotiations.

17. The Office of the Special Adviser will continue to engage with a variety of interlocutors, including representatives of political parties, civil society and women's groups, as well as with regional and international stakeholders, to galvanize support for the process and help the leaders to prepare their communities for a settlement. It will also support meetings and the engagement of the European Union and international financial institutions in support of the process.

18. The Office will also continue to facilitate meetings of the technical committees, including any new committees that may be established, and support confidence-building measures.

19. At the appropriate time, to be determined by the Secretary-General, a new Special Adviser to the Secretary-General will be appointed, who would be expected to travel to Cyprus, the countries in the region and United Nations Headquarters to hold meetings with the sides, facilitate the negotiations and galvanize support for the process.

20. The objective, expected accomplishments, indicators of achievement and performance measures for the mission are set out below.

Table 2

**Objective, expected accomplishments, indicators of achievement and performance measures***Objective:* To achieve a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem

Expected accomplishments	Indicators of achievement		Performance measures			
			2019	2018	2017	2016
(a) Progress in the full-fledged negotiations towards a comprehensive settlement	(i) Increased convergence among parties on core and substantive issues [number of meetings between the leaders]	Target	70	70	70	54
		Estimate		27	70	66
		Actual			101	77
	[number of meetings between the representatives/negotiators of the leaders to identify areas of convergence]	Target	80	100	160	146
		Estimate		50	100	160
		Actual			47	103
	[number of meetings of the working groups and technical committees to discuss specific areas of expertise and identify areas of convergence]	Target	250	350	350	250
		Estimate		200	350	350
		Actual			284	345
	[number of papers indicating movement towards convergence between the parties within the full-fledged negotiation process]	Target	150	200	200	150
		Estimate		70	200	200
		Actual			78	305
	(ii) Implementation of confidence-building measures formulated by the technical committees and approved by the leaders aimed at easing the daily life of Cypriots across the island [number of confidence-building measures implemented]	Target	115	105	80	60
		Estimate		105	96	75
		Actual			96	86

*Outputs*

- Meetings with Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot leaders, or their representatives or advisers, with United Nations representatives, related to the negotiations (150)
- Advice to the sides on issues related to all chapters of the negotiations (150)
- Briefings and bilateral meetings with the international community (170)
- Facilitation of meetings of working groups and technical committees on procedural, legal, technical and substantive issues related to all chapters of the negotiations and confidence-building measures (150)
- Meetings with leaders of political parties and other influential individuals and groups, the media, academics and civil society from the two communities, and participation in events contributing to an enabling environment for the negotiation process (80)
- Contact with the Cypriot and international media (50 interviews and 15 press releases) in cooperation with UNFICYP
- Reports and briefings to the Security Council (4)

**External factors**

21. The objective is expected to be achieved provided that the political will of the leaders and of their respective communities overcomes current political and economic challenges and that there is continuing support from the international community.

## Resource requirements (regular budget)

Table 3

## Financial resources

(Thousands of United States dollars)

Category of expenditure	2018			2019		Variance	Net requirements for 2019
	Appropriation	Estimated expenditures	Estimated variance	Total requirements	Non-recurrent requirements	2019 vs. 2018 Increase/ (decrease)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)=(2)-(1)	(4)	(5)	(6)=(4)-(1)	
Civilian personnel costs	2 209.4	2 209.4	–	2 252.8	–	43.4	2 252.8
Operational costs	582.7	491.1	(91.6)	523.0	19.7	(59.7)	431.4
<b>Total (net of staff assessment)</b>	<b>2 792.1</b>	<b>2 700.5</b>	<b>(91.6)</b>	<b>2 775.8</b>	<b>19.7</b>	<b>(16.3)</b>	<b>2 684.2</b>

Table 4

## Positions

	Professional and higher categories								General Service and related categories		National staff				United Nations Volunteers	Total
	USG	ASG	D-2	D-1	P-5	P-4	P-3	P-2	Sub-total	Field/ Security Services	General Service	Total inter-national	National Professional Officer	Local level		
Approved 2018	1 <sup>a</sup>	–	–	1	3	5	1	–	11	4	1	16	–	5	–	21
Proposed 2019	1 <sup>a</sup>	–	–	1	3	5	1	–	11	4	1	16	–	5	–	21
<b>Change</b>	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–

<sup>a</sup> The Under-Secretary-General is on a when-actually-employed contract.

22. The anticipated underexpenditure in 2018 is attributable to the lower requirements for operational costs, mainly for consultants, non-training travel and other supplies, services and equipment due to the slower pace of the talks during the period.

23. The proposed resources for the Office of the Special Adviser for 2019 amount to \$2,775,800 (net of staff assessment) and would provide for the salaries and common staff costs (\$2,252,800) for the continuation of 16 international positions (1 Under-Secretary-General, 1 D-1, 3 P-5, 5 P-4, 1 P-3, 4 Field Service and 1 General Service (Other level)) and 5 national staff positions (Local level), as well as operational costs (\$523,000) comprising costs for consultants and consulting services (\$48,400), official travel (\$150,500), facilities and infrastructure (\$85,600), ground transportation (\$40,200), communications and information technology (\$97,000) and other supplies, services and equipment (\$101,300).

24. In 2019, the proposed number and levels of positions for the Office of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Cyprus would remain unchanged.

25. The variance (decrease) between the proposed resources for 2019 and the approved budget for 2018 reflects the net effect of lower operational costs attributable to the reduced requirements for consultants and consulting services, official travel and translation services based on the progress made in negotiations, partly offset by higher personnel costs attributable mainly to an increase in the international personnel common staff costs reflecting the ratio of actual common staff costs to actual salaries, based on expenditure trends.



### Extrabudgetary resources

26. No extrabudgetary resources were available in 2018 or are projected for 2019.

## **B. Office of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide**

(\$2,198,200)

### **Background, mandate and objective**

27. Pursuant to the invitation of the Security Council to the Secretary-General in its resolution [1366 \(2001\)](#) to refer to the Council information and analysis from within the United Nations system on cases of serious violations of international law, including international humanitarian law and human rights law, the Secretary-General, in a letter dated 12 July 2004 ([S/2004/567](#)), informed the President of the Council of his decision to appoint a Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide. In his reply dated 13 July 2004 ([S/2004/568](#)), the President of the Council informed the Secretary-General that the Council had taken note of his intention.

28. The Secretary-General listed the responsibilities of the Special Adviser as follows:

(a) To collect existing information, in particular from within the United Nations system, on massive and serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law of ethnic and racial origin that, if not prevented or halted, might lead to genocide;

(b) To act as a mechanism of early warning to the Secretary-General, and through him to the Security Council, by bringing to their attention situations that could potentially result in genocide;

(c) To make recommendations to the Security Council, through the Secretary-General, on actions to prevent or halt genocide;

(d) To liaise with the United Nations system on activities for the prevention of genocide and work to enhance the United Nations capacity to analyse and manage information regarding genocide or related crimes.

29. The normative reference of the work of the Special Adviser is drawn, in addition to the exchange of letters, from the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide; the wider body of international human rights law, international humanitarian law and international criminal law; and resolutions of the General Assembly, the Security Council and the Human Rights Council, including the 2005 World Summit Outcome.

30. As regards the responsibility to protect, it will be recalled that in paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome, the General Assembly addressed the responsibility of Member States and the international community to protect populations by preventing genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, and their incitement. The assembled Heads of State and Government pledged, among other things, to support the United Nations in establishing early warning capability in this regard. They also called on the Assembly to continue consideration of the responsibility to protect. The Assembly adopted the World Summit Outcome in its resolution [60/1](#), while the Security Council reaffirmed the provisions of paragraphs 138 and 139 in paragraph 4 of its resolution [1674 \(2006\)](#) and recalled this reaffirmation in the second preambular paragraph of resolution [1706 \(2006\)](#). By including paragraph 140 in the section of the outcome document on the responsibility to protect, in which the Assembly expressed full support for the mission

of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide, the World Summit participants underscored the close relationship between the two mandates.

31. On 31 August 2007, in a letter to the President of the Security Council (S/2007/721), the Secretary-General expressed his intention to appoint a Special Adviser to focus on the responsibility to protect. In his reply dated 7 December 2007 (S/2007/722), the President of the Council informed the Secretary-General that the Council had taken note of the Secretary-General's intention. The Special Adviser is charged with the conceptual, institutional and operational development of the principle and with continuing a political dialogue with Member States on its implementation.

32. To contribute to dialogue with and among Member States and to outline a strategy for addressing the provisions of paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome, in January 2009 the Secretary-General issued a report on implementing the responsibility to protect (A/63/677). In the annex to that report, the Secretary-General indicated his intention to establish a joint office for the Special Advisers on the Prevention of Genocide and on the Responsibility to Protect, given the close and complementary nature of their work. The report of the Secretary-General was debated in the General Assembly in July 2009 leading to the adoption, by consensus, of the first resolution on the responsibility to protect (resolution 63/308), in which the Assembly reaffirmed its intention to continue its consideration of the concept. In his report to the Assembly of July 2010 on early warning, assessment and the responsibility to protect (A/64/864), the Secretary-General reiterated his proposal to institutionalize the collaboration between the two Special Advisers. In its resolutions 2150 (2014) on the maintenance of international peace and security and the prevention of genocide and 2171 (2014) on the maintenance of international peace and security: conflict prevention, the Security Council reaffirmed paragraphs 138 and 139 of the World Summit Outcome document and recalled the important role of the Special Advisers on the Prevention of Genocide and on the Responsibility to Protect, and noted that their functions include acting as an early warning mechanism to prevent potential situations that could result in genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and ethnic cleansing.

### **Cooperation with other entities**

33. The Special Advisers work in close collaboration with other United Nations entities, in particular in relation to the collection of information for early warning purposes, policy development and activities aimed at the prevention of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity. In 2019, among others, the Special Advisers will cooperate with the Department of Peace Operations, the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and special procedures of the Human Rights Council, the Office of Legal Affairs, the Office of the Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict, the Office of the Special Representative on Violence against Children, the Office of the Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict, the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).

34. The Office of the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide will be supported by the joint Executive Office of the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and Department of Peace Operations, as well as the Department of Management Strategy, Policy and Compliance for administrative activities.

## Performance information

35. The Special Advisers have established an early warning methodology for consistent and timely collection and assessment of information on developments worldwide so as to alert the Secretary-General and, through him, the Security Council, as well as the broader United Nations system, to situations where there is a potential risk of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity (see [S/2004/567](#), annex, para. (b)). The collection and assessment of information is based on the Framework of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes developed by the Office, which has been issued as a United Nations document ([A/70/741-S/2016/71](#), annex) and was developed based on a review of applicable international law and jurisprudence. In January 2016, the Secretary-General presented the Framework to the Presidents of the General Assembly and the Security Council and recommended its widest possible use by United Nations entities and the membership of the United Nations to support prevention strategies at the national, regional and international levels. In its resolution 37/26, the Human Rights Council took note of the Framework of Analysis and encouraged Member States and regional and subregional organizations to use relevant frameworks, as appropriate, for guidance in their prevention work.

36. In the first five months of 2018, six Member States and two regional organizations facilitated visits by the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide on matters related to his mandate. During the same period, the Special Advisers submitted four advisory notes to the Secretary-General on country, regional and thematic developments relevant to the prevention of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity, with recommendations for preventive action. When requested, the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide briefed the Security Council and Human Rights Council on developments relevant to his mandate.

37. In response to the request of the Human Rights Council in its resolution 33/19, in 2018 the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide and the Special Rapporteur on the promotion of truth, justice, reparation and guarantees of non-recurrence presented to the Human Rights Council a joint study on the contribution of transitional justice to the prevention of gross violations and abuses of human rights and serious violations of international humanitarian law ([A/HRC/37/65](#)).

38. The Special Advisers continued to develop initiatives in response to specific global risks. In February 2018, the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide organized a meeting in Vienna on the implementation of the Plan of Action for Religious Leaders and Actors to Prevent Incitement to Violence that Could Lead to Atrocity Crimes, which was developed by the Office based on broad consultations with religious leaders and actors worldwide over two years and was launched by the Secretary-General in July 2017. More than 50 Member States participated in the meeting, which resulted in commitments of support, the establishment of a global steering committee and the identification of priorities for implementing the Plan of Action.

39. The Special Advisers have continued to organize specialized training to develop capacity to: (a) identify and manage information on risk factors for genocide and related crimes; (b) develop early warning and prevention capacity to strengthen resilience to these crimes; and (c) develop structures, tools and policies to respond when these crimes are ongoing. Requests by Member States and civil society for this training remain high. In the first five months of 2018, the Office has organized training or provided technical assistance in Colombia, Guatemala, Kenya, Mexico, Montenegro, Uganda and the United Republic of Tanzania. Further training activities are planned in Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America and the Middle East. These

activities have been organized in cooperation with Member States, regional organizations, United Nations partners and civil society.

40. Emphasizing the importance of a regional approach, the Special Advisers have continued to develop operational partnerships with regional and subregional arrangements for the prevention of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. They have also provided support through training and technical assistance, aimed at developing or strengthening regional frameworks and mechanisms for the prevention of such crimes. Engagement with those organizations has led to: (a) increased cooperation on matters relevant to the mandates of the two Special Advisers; (b) greater awareness of the causes and dynamics of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and of the measures that can be taken to prevent them; and, as a consequence; (c) strengthened prevention, protection and response capacities.

41. With regard to cooperation with regional and subregional arrangements in Africa, the Special Advisers have continued to engage with the African Union, the Economic Community of West African States, the Southern African Development Community and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) on preventive action, including in relation to situations in the region. In 2018, the Office has worked in partnership with the African Union and the United Nations Office to the African Union to integrate risk factors and indicators for genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity into the Continental Early Warning System of the African Union and early warning mechanisms of the regional economic communities in Africa.

42. The Office has continued to provide particular support to the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region on implementation of the Protocol for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, War Crimes, Crimes against Humanity and All Forms of Discrimination. Under the Protocol, States members of the International Conference are required to domesticate and enforce its provisions by putting in place laws that will prevent and punish atrocity crimes, adopt measures that will eliminate discrimination and teach and encourage tolerance among national, racial and ethnic groups. In May 2011, the member States of the International Conference sought the technical support of the Special Advisers to develop regional and national early warning capacity and committed to establishing national committees on the prevention and punishment of genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and all forms of discrimination. The Office has since then provided training and technical assistance to the Regional Committee and to national committees in the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Kenya, South Sudan, Uganda and the United Republic of Tanzania, as well as to the national coordination mechanism in Zambia. In 2018, the Office supported the national committees of Kenya and the United Republic of Tanzania to engage with Members of Parliament on their role in prevention, including on the development of a legislative framework for the prevention of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity.

43. In the Asia-Pacific region, the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide has continued to engage with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and some of its member States on matters relevant to his mandate, in particular the prevention of incitement to violence.

44. In Europe, the Special Advisers have continued working with regional organizations to integrate atrocity prevention in policy and operational frameworks, in particular with the European Union. The Special Advisers have provided regular briefings to the European Union Political and Security Committee and the European Council Working Group for the United Nations. The Special Advisers have also held

high-level policy discussions with the European External Action Service on institutional arrangements for early warning and early response and on information-sharing arrangements. The Office has built on existing cooperation with the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and held consultations with the OSCE Office of the High Commissioner on National Minorities, Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights and Conflict Prevention Centre. The Office of the Special Adviser has also contributed to the development of policy recommendations aimed at the national and regional levels on the prevention of incitement to violence.

45. In the Americas region, the Special Advisers have continued their collaboration with the Latin American Network for Genocide and Mass Atrocity Prevention, which has 18 member States. Staff members of the Office have contributed as instructors to training activities of the Network and are working with the Network to strengthen policies aimed at the protection of vulnerable indigenous communities in the region.

46. Cooperation with the League of Arab States in the Middle East and North Africa region has included the contribution of the League to capacity-building activities of the Office in the region.

47. The Special Advisers have continued to encourage the appointment by Member States of national focal points on genocide prevention and on the responsibility to protect and have provided substantive input to the activities of the various national focal point networks.

48. The political, institutional and operational development of the responsibility to protect principle has continued, in line with the decision of the General Assembly to continue consideration of the responsibility to protect in 2009. The Assembly held a formal debate on the responsibility to protect on 25 June 2018, the first formal debate on the subject since 2009, following eight annual informal debates. The Special Adviser on the Responsibility to Protect oversaw the preparation of the tenth annual report of the Secretary-General on the responsibility to protect, entitled “The responsibility to protect: from early warning to early action” ([A/72/884-S/2018/525](#)). The report, which was informed by consultations with Member States, regional organizations and civil society, reflects on ways in which early warning can be turned into effective early action to prevent genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.

### **Planning assumptions for 2019**

49. The Special Advisers will continue to advise the Secretary-General on situations where there is a risk of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and will recommend preventive action to be taken by the United Nations system. The Special Advisers will also continue to engage with Member States and regional organizations to promote cooperation, dialogue and capacity-building, with a view to preventing genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and identifying best practices from countries and regions that have averted them, including through curbing their incitement. To that end, the Special Advisers will continue to focus on four areas of work: (a) raising awareness; (b) collecting information and identifying concerns; (c) communicating concerns and recommendations; and (d) developing capacities for the prevention of and response to genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.

### **Raising awareness**

50. In order to prevent genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, the Office of the Special Advisers will continue to support the United Nations system, Member States, regional and subregional organizations and civil

society to work collectively towards that goal. Promoting greater understanding of the causes and dynamics of genocide and related crimes and of the measures that can be taken to prevent them is a preventive measure in itself. In that regard, the Office will assist the General Assembly in its continued consideration of the responsibility to protect principle, including through the preparation of the reports of the Secretary-General on the principle and its implementation. In addition, the Office will organize, in partnership with the United Nations, Member States, regional organizations and civil society, activities to increase knowledge of and engagement on various dimensions of the prevention of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, and the responsibility to protect principle.

51. The Office will disseminate research and publications it has developed on different aspects of the prevention of genocide and the responsibility to protect principle, in collaboration with the United Nations system and academic and research institutions, including through its website.

### **Collecting information and identifying concerns**

52. The Special Advisers will continue to collect information and identify developments of concern worldwide from the perspective of the prevention of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity, in consultation with United Nations departments, offices, funds and programmes and the Member States concerned. They will draw upon relevant human rights, political, development and humanitarian information, gathered primarily from United Nations sources, and assess situations based on the Framework of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes developed by the Office ([A/70/741-S/2016/71](#)). When appropriate, and in consultation with the relevant State and regional authorities, the Special Advisers will conduct country visits.

### **Communicating concerns and recommendations**

53. In accordance with past practice and the procedures outlined by the Secretary-General (see [A/64/864](#)), the Special Advisers will alert the Secretary-General, and through him the Security Council, to situations of concern and recommend courses of action to prevent or halt genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. The Special Advisers can advocate for measures available under the Charter of the United Nations that could be implemented by States in the exercise of their responsibilities, by international organizations and more generally by the international community.

54. Noting that prevention and protection have been most successful where a State agrees to take prompt action and where the international community reaches a consensus on the problems and the response, the Special Advisers will use advocacy to encourage a political environment that supports prevention and protection through constructive engagement. Advocacy may be bilateral or multilateral, confidential or public.

### **Developing capacities to prevent and respond to genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity, as well as their incitement**

55. The Special Advisers will continue to provide or facilitate training and technical assistance to Member States, regional organizations and civil society. The Office will contribute, when requested, to the development of State-led mechanisms and initiatives, including those of international focal point networks, aimed at protecting populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, as well as their incitement. In collaboration with relevant United Nations entities, the

Special Advisers will also provide advice and assistance to strengthen resilience to these crimes.

56. The Special Advisers will continue to consult widely to identify concerns and fill gaps in existing policy and guidance on the prevention of genocide and on the implementation of the responsibility to protect.

57. The objective, expected accomplishments, indicators of achievement and performance measures for the mission are set out below.

Table 5

**Objective, expected accomplishments, indicators of achievement and performance measures**

*Objective:* To advance national, regional and international efforts to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, and their incitement

Expected accomplishments	Indicators of achievement		Performance measures			
			2019	2018	2017	2016
(a) Increased capacity of the United Nations system, Member States, regional and subregional organizations and civil society to identify and prevent or mitigate the risk of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity as a result of training and technical assistance provided by the Special Advisers	(i) Number of officials from the United Nations, Member States, regional and subregional organizations and civil society trained by the Office on the identification, analysis and management of information regarding genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and on measures to prevent and mitigate the risk of these crimes and violations	Target	300	300	350	350
		Estimate		350	350	350
		Actual			348	428
	(ii) Number of Member States and regional or subregional organizations that have received technical assistance from the Office and taken steps to establish or strengthen national and regional initiatives or mechanisms for the prevention of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, including early warning mechanisms	Target	6	6	6	6
		Estimate		6	6	6
		Actual			6	7
(b) Greater awareness of the causes and dynamics of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and the measures that could be taken to prevent or mitigate the risk of these crimes occurring, including within the framework of the responsibility to protect principle	Number of Member States and regional organizations that have requested or facilitated a visit by the Special Advisers on matters related to the prevention of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, including their incitement, and implementation of the responsibility to protect principle	Target	10	10	11	15
		Estimate		10	10	12
		Actual			11	12
(c) Increased capacity of the United Nations system as a whole to prevent or mitigate the risk of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity as a result of timely and relevant advice and analysis of the risk of genocide and related crimes in a given situation provided by the Office, with recommendations for preventive measures	Number of advisory notes, briefings, statements and policy documents that, based on consistent and reliable information received primarily from within the United Nations system, alert the Secretary-General and, through him, the Security Council, to situations where there is a potential risk of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and recommend courses of action to prevent these crimes	Target	50	50	50	50
		Estimate		50	50	50
		Actual			45	50

*Outputs*

- Early warning mechanism based on the systematic collection, management and analysis of information, primarily from within the United Nations system, on developments worldwide relevant to the prevention of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity (1)
- Reports, briefings and advisory notes to the Secretary-General that include recommendations on strategies and policy options for action by the United Nations system to address situations where there is a risk of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity (10)
- Training workshops, seminars and technical assistance to enhance the capacity of the United Nations, Member States, regional and subregional organizations and civil society to analyse the risk of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and to take preventive measures; development of training materials and establishment of a pool of expert trainers (10)
- Publications, research papers, guidance or policy tools on different aspects of the prevention of genocide and the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity to fill existing gaps (6)
- Report of the Secretary-General to the General Assembly on the responsibility to protect (1)
- Organization of an annual informal or formal debate in the General Assembly on the responsibility to protect in line with the decision of the Assembly to continue consideration of the responsibility to protect (1)
- Engagement with Member States, regional and subregional arrangements to advance national, regional and international efforts to prevent genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and their incitement through advisory missions, high-level meetings and consultations (25)
- Advocacy missions to countries or regions where the involvement of the Special Advisers is considered of particular value with respect to the prevention of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity (5)

**External factors**

58. The objective is expected to be achieved provided that there is continued commitment on the part of Member States, including the Security Council, to engage with the Special Advisers to advance the prevention of genocide and implement the responsibility to protect principle; that Member States that are host to critical events are willing to engage with the Special Advisers; and that there is active engagement of Member States and regional and other organizations to develop preventive capacity and take appropriate action for the prevention of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.

**Resource requirements (regular budget)**

Table 6

**Financial resources**

(Thousands of United States dollars)

Category of expenditure	2018			2019		Variance	Net requirements for 2019
	Appropriation	Estimated expenditures	Estimated variance	Total requirements	Non-recurrent requirements	2019 vs. 2018 Increase/ (decrease)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)=(2)-(1)	(4)	(5)	(6)=(4)-(1)	
Civilian personnel costs	1 470.8	1 582.1	111.3	1 552.7	–	81.9	1 664.0
Operational costs	647.4	645.5	(1.9)	645.5	–	(1.9)	643.6
<b>Total (net of staff assessment)</b>	<b>2 118.2</b>	<b>2 227.6</b>	<b>109.4</b>	<b>2 198.2</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>80.0</b>	<b>2 307.6</b>



Table 7  
Positions

	<i>Professional and higher categories</i>									<i>General Service and related categories</i>		<i>Total inter-national</i>	<i>National staff</i>			<i>United Nations Volunteers</i>	<i>Total</i>
	<i>USG</i>	<i>ASG</i>	<i>D-2</i>	<i>D-1</i>	<i>P-5</i>	<i>P-4</i>	<i>P-3</i>	<i>P-2</i>	<i>Subtotal</i>	<i>Field/ Security Services</i>	<i>General Service</i>		<i>National Professional Officer</i>	<i>Local level</i>			
Approved 2018	1	1 <sup>a</sup>	—	—	1	3	2	—	8	—	2	10	—	—	—	10	
Proposed 2019	1	1 <sup>a</sup>	—	—	1	3	2	—	8	—	2	10	—	—	—	10	
Change	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	

<sup>a</sup> The Assistant Secretary-General is on a \$1-a-year contract.

59. The projected overexpenditure in 2018 is attributable mainly to higher international staff salaries and entitlements, which reflect: (a) the actual average step in grade of current incumbents and the ratio of actual common staff costs to actual salaries; and (b) a lower actual vacancy rate (0 per cent) compared with the 2018 approved vacancy rate (3 per cent).

60. The proposed resources for 2019 for the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide amount to \$2,198,200 (net of staff assessment) and would provide for the salaries and common staff costs for the continuation of the 10 positions (1 Under-Secretary-General, 1 Assistant Secretary-General (on a \$1-a-year contract), 1 P-5, 3 P-4, 2 P-3 and 2 General Service (Other level)) (\$1,552,700), as well as operational costs (\$645,500) comprising consultants and consulting services (\$50,500), official travel (\$365,600), facilities and infrastructure (\$160,300), ground transportation (\$3,600), communications and information technology (\$37,200) and other supplies, services and equipment (\$28,300).

61. In 2019, the proposed number and levels of positions for the Office of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide will remain unchanged.

62. The variance (increase) between the 2019 requirements and the 2018 approved budget reflects mainly the provision at the actual average step in grade of current incumbents and the ratio of actual common staff costs to actual salaries, based on expenditure trends, partly offset by lower operational requirements related to communications and information technology attributable mainly to lower mobile telephone usage costs, based on actual patterns of expenditure.

### Extrabudgetary resources

63. In 2018, extrabudgetary resources amounting to approximately \$777,000 are committed to provide mainly for one P-3 position, the Office's capacity-building and technical assistance programme and the preparation of the 2018 report of the Secretary-General on the responsibility to protect.

64. In 2019, extrabudgetary resources amounting to \$904,000 are anticipated primarily to support one P-4 position and the continuation of one P-3 position, and the capacity-building programme.

## C. Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Western Sahara

(\$456,300)

### Background, mandate and objective

65. The Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Western Sahara continues to work with the parties and the neighbouring States on the basis of guidance contained in Security Council resolutions adopted since 2007 and in line with the Secretary-General's expressed intention to relaunch the political process in a new dynamic and new spirit, which will provide for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara. Through its resolution 2414 (2018), the Security Council expressed its full support for the Personal Envoy. The Council emphasized the need to make progress toward a realistic, practicable and enduring political solution to the question of Western Sahara based on compromise and called upon the parties to resume negotiations under the auspices of the Secretary-General without preconditions and in good faith, taking into account the efforts made since 2006 and subsequent developments. The Council called on neighbouring States to increase their engagement in the political process. It also requested the Secretary-General to brief the Council on a regular basis and at any time he deems appropriate on the status and progress of the negotiations.

### Cooperation with other entities

66. In 2019, the Personal Envoy will report on his findings and recommendations to the Secretary-General through the Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs. The Departments of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and Peace Operations, both at Headquarters and through the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO), will provide support to the Personal Envoy. MINURSO shares with the Personal Envoy media reports and code cables on the latest developments in the Western Saharan territory and in the refugee camps near Tindouf, Algeria. MINURSO also facilitates the trips of the Personal Envoy, on a non-reimbursable basis, within the MINURSO area of operation.

### Performance information

67. In 2018, the Personal Envoy continued to engage with the parties to the conflict and the neighbouring countries, Algeria and Mauritania, in the region, Berlin, Lisbon and New York.

68. The Personal Envoy also continued his consultations with members of the Group of Friends on Western Sahara, both in their capitals and in New York, to ensure the support of his interlocutors for the achievement of results during the year. Member States, in particular the members of the Security Council, recognized the momentum generated by the new Personal Envoy in the political process. Following his first mission to the region in mid-2017, where he was received at the highest level, the Personal Envoy held a successful first round of bilateral consultations with the parties to the conflict and the neighbouring States in Berlin and Lisbon during the first quarter of 2018. The Council affirmed its support to the Personal Envoy in elements for the press following the consultations in both November 2017 and March 2018. The Personal Envoy travelled to the region again in June 2018 and invited the parties and neighbouring States to continue to engage in dialogue before the end of 2018.

### Planning assumptions for 2019

69. In 2019, the Personal Envoy intends to build on the momentum created throughout 2018. This will include intensified efforts to make progress in the

negotiating process through consultations between the Government of Morocco and the Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguía el-Hamra y de Río de Oro, with the support of the neighbouring countries, conducting another visit to the region to meet key interlocutors and continuing to build trust with a view to convening a fifth round of negotiations.

70. The Personal Envoy will also continue to hold consultations with Member States in their capitals and, through the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, with the permanent missions of Member States in New York and elsewhere. He intends to hold face-to-face negotiating sessions once the parties have demonstrated sufficient willingness to engage in serious discussions. The Personal Envoy also intends to visit Geneva to discuss various aspects related to the conflict with relevant United Nations organizations. He also plans to regularly brief African Union and European Union interlocutors on the United Nations-led political process.

71. The work of the Personal Envoy will be concluded once the parties have reached a mutually acceptable political solution that will provide for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara.

72. The objective, expected accomplishments, indicators of achievement and performance measures for the mission are set out below.

Table 8

### Objective, expected accomplishments, indicators of achievement and performance measures

*Objective:* To achieve a comprehensive settlement of the question of Western Sahara

Expected accomplishments	Indicators of achievement		Performance measures			
			2019	2018	2017	2016
(a) Progress towards the comprehensive settlement of the question of Western Sahara	(i) Increased convergence among the parties on core and substantive issues [number of consultations between the Personal Envoy and the parties and neighbouring States (shuttle diplomacy)]	Target	5	5	5	5
		Estimate		5	5	5
		Actual			5	5
	(ii) Enhanced involvement of the international community [number of consultations with, and briefings for, the Group of Friends on Western Sahara]	Target	12	12	12	12
		Estimate		12	12	12
		Actual			12	12
	(iii) Enhanced implementation of confidence-building measures [number of review meetings for the plan of action on confidence-building measures]	Target	2	2	2	2
		Estimate		2	2	2
		Actual			2	2

#### Outputs

- Continued high-level dialogue between the parties and neighbouring States
- Informal negotiations between the parties (2)
- Political consultations with the parties and neighbouring States (5)
- Political consultations with the parties and neighbouring States at Headquarters (18)
- Reports and briefings to the Security Council (2)
- Briefings and consultations with the Group of Friends on Western Sahara and with the international community (12)

- Tour of the capitals of the members of the Group of Friends on Western Sahara (2)
- Meetings with UNHCR to review and support confidence-building measures (2)
- Inter-Sahrawi seminars operated by UNHCR (3)

### External factors

73. The objective of the good offices role of the Secretary-General, carried out largely through his Personal Envoy, is expected to be achieved provided that the parties are willing and committed to reaching a political solution and that the neighbouring States and the international community provide support for these efforts.

### Resource requirements (regular budget)

Table 9

#### Financial resources

(Thousands of United States dollars)

Category of expenditure	2018			2019		Variance	Net requirements for 2019
	Appropriation	Estimated expenditures	Estimated variance	Total requirements	Non-recurrent requirements	2019 vs. 2018 Increase/ (decrease)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)=(2)-(1)	(4)	(5)	(6)=(4)-(1)	(7)=(4)+(3)
Civilian personnel costs	236.0	177.2	(58.8)	230.1	–	(5.9)	171.3
Operational costs	208.9	204.6	(4.3)	226.2	–	17.3	221.9
<b>Total (net of staff assessment)</b>	<b>444.9</b>	<b>381.8</b>	<b>(63.1)</b>	<b>456.3</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>11.4</b>	<b>393.2</b>

Table 10

#### Positions

	Professional and higher categories									General Service and related categories		National staff				
	USG	ASG	D-2	D-1	P-5	P-4	P-3	P-2	Subtotal	Field/ Security Services	General Service	Total inter-national	National Professional Officer	Local level	United Nations Volunteers	Total
Approved 2018	1 <sup>a</sup>	–	–	–	–	–	1	–	2	–	–	2	–	–	–	2
Proposed 2019	1 <sup>a</sup>	–	–	–	–	–	1	–	2	–	–	2	–	–	–	2
<b>Change</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>–</b>

<sup>a</sup> The Under-Secretary-General is on a when-actually-employed contract.

74. The projected unencumbered balance in 2018 is attributable mainly to decreased requirements for international staff costs due to the vacancy of the P-3 Political Affairs Officer post for five months in 2018.

75. The proposed resource requirements for 2019 for the Personal Envoy, which amount to \$456,300 (net of staff assessment), would provide for the salaries and common staff costs for the continuation of the two positions of the Office (1 Under-Secretary-General, on a when-actually-employed contract, and 1 P-3) (\$230,100), as well as operational costs (\$226,200) comprising: consultants and consulting services (\$29,600), official travel (\$113,800), facilities and infrastructure (\$41,000), ground transportation (\$1,000), communications and information technology (\$10,100) and other supplies, services and equipment (\$30,700).

76. In 2019, the proposed number and levels of the positions for the Office of the Personal Envoy will remain unchanged. In response to the recommendation of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions to review the duty station of the position of the Political Affairs Officer (P-3), the Office and the Department of Political Affairs reviewed the work required to provide substantive and practical support to the Special Envoy. In 2018, locating the P-3 in the same duty station as the Personal Envoy has facilitated the provision of timely and effective support to his efforts for the resumption of the negotiation process and it is assessed that maintaining the Political Affairs Officer position in the same duty station as the Special Envoy would ensure that substantive and practical support would continue to be provided in the most effective way. Therefore, for 2019 the Personal Envoy and the P-3 Political Affairs Officer positions would continue to be based in Berlin.

77. The variance (increase) between the 2019 requirements and the 2018 approved budget reflects mainly the actual requirements for facilities and infrastructure and communications and information technology based on the shared common-services costs for facilities in Berlin. At the time of the preparation of the 2018 budget, resource provisions for these requirements were not available and provisions were made at estimated amounts. The increase in requirements under operational costs is partly offset by reduced requirements under international staff costs owing to the actual average step in grade of the current incumbents and the ratio of actual common staff costs to actual salaries, based on expenditure trends and a lower post adjustment factor for Berlin for 2019.

#### **Extrabudgetary resources**

78. Extrabudgetary resources amounting to \$576,200 are estimated for 2018, which are being used to cover the costs of two positions, one P-5 Senior Political Affairs Officer and one P-3 Political Affairs Officer, and operational expenses, including travel, to support the mission. Any unspent balances for 2018 are expected to be utilized in 2019 in support of the mission. Additional extrabudgetary resources may be mobilized to continue to support the mission in 2019.

### **D. Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the implementation of Security Council resolution 1559 (2004)**

(\$363,700)

#### **Background, mandate and objective**

79. On 14 December 2004, the Secretary-General appointed a Special Envoy for the implementation of Security Council resolution 1559 (2004) to enable him to report to the Council every six months on the implementation of the resolution, as requested by the Council in its presidential statement of 19 October 2004 (S/PRST/2004/36). In carrying out this mandate, the Office of the Special Envoy for the implementation of Security Council resolution 1559 (2004) consults with political interlocutors in Lebanon, the Security Council and other interested Member States to prepare semi-annual reports of the Secretary-General to the Council on the implementation of the resolution. Since the Special Envoy stepped down from his post on 31 May 2016, the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs has taken on ad interim the responsibility of reporting on resolution 1559 (2004), an arrangement maintained to date. In 2019, the Secretary-General could decide to maintain the current arrangement whereby the Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs would continue ad interim the responsibility of reporting on resolution 1559 (2004), to nominate a new Envoy, or to avail himself of other options.

80. On 17 May 2006, in response to the third semi-annual report of the Secretary-General (S/2006/248), the Security Council adopted resolution 1680 (2006), in which it reiterated its call for the full implementation of the provisions of resolution 1559 (2004), strongly encouraged the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic to respond positively to the request made by the Government of Lebanon, in line with the agreements of the Lebanese national dialogue, to delineate their common border, especially in those areas where the border was uncertain or disputed, and to establish full diplomatic relations and representation, as a significant step towards asserting the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of Lebanon.

81. On 11 August 2006, the Security Council adopted resolution 1701 (2006), in which it emphasized the importance of the extension of the control of the Government of Lebanon over all Lebanese territory in accordance with the provisions of resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1680 (2006) and the relevant provisions of the Taif Accords. The Council requested the Secretary-General to develop, in liaison with relevant international actors and the concerned parties, proposals to implement the relevant provisions of the Taif Accords and Council resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1680 (2006), including with respect to disarmament and the delineation of the international borders of Lebanon.

82. The full implementation of resolution 1559 (2004) is a long and demanding process. Since the adoption of the resolution, on 2 September 2004, many of its provisions have been implemented, as set out in the Secretary-General's reports.

83. Over the past year, Lebanon continued its progress towards the full restoration of its institutions to their normal functioning. This was illustrated by the first parliamentary elections in almost 10 years, held on 6 May 2018.

84. At the same time, risks to Lebanon's stability persisted, as demonstrated by the offer by Prime Minister Saad Hariri to resign on 4 November 2017. On 5 December, the Council of Ministers of Lebanon confirmed its commitment to its ministerial statement of 28 December 2016, noting that Lebanon must be kept out of regional conflicts and the internal affairs of Arab countries, and reiterating its commitment to resolution 1701 (2006), the Taif Accords and the Charter of the League of Arab States. Subsequently, the Prime Minister withdrew his resignation.

85. In light of such developments, the international community held a cycle of international conferences in support of Lebanon in late 2017 and early 2018. On 8 December 2017, the International Support Group for Lebanon convened a high-level meeting in Paris. In a joint statement, the Group called upon all Lebanese parties to implement the tangible policy of disassociation from and non-interference in external conflicts, as an important priority, and reiterated the need for the full implementation of and full respect for all Security Council resolutions, including resolution 1559 (2004). These messages were reinforced by the Security Council in a press statement of 19 December 2017 (SC/13130).

86. Participants at the Rome meeting of 15 March 2018 similarly recalled relevant provisions of the Taif Accords and of Security Council resolutions 1559 (2004), 1680 (2006) and 1701 (2006), including provisions that there be no weapons or authority in Lebanon other than that of the Lebanese State and no sale or supply of arms related materiel to Lebanon except as authorized by its Government. The Security Council reiterated these messages in a press statement on 27 March 2018 (SC/13267).

87. The provision calling for the disbanding and disarming of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias has not yet been implemented and there have been no sessions of the Lebanese national dialogue since 5 May 2014. Over recent months, however, the Government of Lebanon recommitted to making progress on the development of a national defence strategy. On 6 December 2017, the President of Lebanon, Michel

Aoun, stated that through dialogue on various issues of concern, especially the defence strategy, common ground could be achieved. In its statement of 8 December 2017, the International Support Group for Lebanon called on all Lebanese parties to resume discussions towards a consensus on a national defence strategy and welcomed the statement of the President in that regard. On 8 May 2018, Mr. Aoun reportedly stated that he would be calling for the parties to sit down and discuss implementing the Taif Accords and a national defence strategy. This context offers an opportunity for the United Nations, including through the Office of the Special Envoy, to extend its good offices to support such a dialogue and the development of a national defence strategy.

88. The delineation and demarcation of the boundaries of Lebanon are an essential element for guaranteeing the country's territorial integrity, as called for in resolution 1559 (2004). Over the reporting period, there have been no discussions or contacts between Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic on the delineation of their common border pursuant to resolution 1680 (2006). While acknowledging the bilateral nature of border delineation and Lebanon's policy of disassociation with respect to the Syrian conflict, the need remains for progress on this matter under resolution 1680 (2006), as derived from resolution 1559 (2004).

89. The presence of Palestinian armed groups outside the camps continued. Notwithstanding the decision taken in 2006 by the Lebanese national dialogue to disarm Palestinian militias outside the camps within a six-month period, no progress was made during the reporting period in dismantling the military bases of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command and Fatah al-Intifada in the country. However, on 20 July 2017, in a document entitled "A unified Lebanese vision for the Palestinian refugees' affairs in Lebanon", the Lebanese Working Group on Palestinian Refugee Affairs reiterated decisions taken at the national dialogue and called for the Government to re-evoke the decisions of the national dialogue conference.

### **Cooperation with other entities**

90. The Special Envoy coordinates and works closely with the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon. Furthermore, the Special Coordinator, the Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia, UNDP and the United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process provide logistical support for visits to the Middle East.

### **Performance information**

91. There has been no further progress towards the implementation of the remaining provisions of resolution 1559 (2004). Yet, the possible resumption of the Lebanese-led, Lebanese-owned national dialogue towards a national defence strategy may present opportunities for progress.

### **Planning assumptions for 2019**

92. Provisions of resolution 1559 (2004) remain to be implemented, namely, the disbanding and disarming of Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias, the extension of the control of the Government of Lebanon over all its territory, and strict respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, unity and political independence of Lebanon. In 2019, the Secretary-General intends to continue his efforts to encourage the relevant parties to make further progress towards the full implementation of Security Council resolution 1559 (2004), in the interest of stability in the region.

93. The objective, expected accomplishments, indicators of achievement and performance measures of the Office of the Special Envoy are set out below.

Table 11

**Objective, expected accomplishments, indicators of achievement and performance measures***Objective:* To implement fully Security Council resolution 1559 (2004) and all subsequent related decisions of the Council

Expected accomplishments	Indicators of achievement	Performance measures				
			2019	2018	2017	2016
(a) Respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, unity and political independence of Lebanon under the sole and exclusive authority of the Government of Lebanon throughout its territory	(i) Absence of land, air and sea violations	Target	Absence of violations	Absence of violations	Absence of violations	Absence of violations
		Estimate		Violations occurred	Violations occurred	Violations occurred
		Actual			Violations occurred	Violations occurred
	(ii) Number of interactions with relevant parties to reduce violations and ultimately bring them down to zero	Target	36	36	35	35
		Estimate		35	35	34
		Actual			34	34
	(iii) Number of interactions with relevant parties to ensure progress in the extension of the authority of the Government of Lebanon throughout Lebanese territory, in particular along its borders	Target	36	36	35	35
		Estimate		35	35	34
		Actual			34	34
	(iv) Withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon	Target	Complete	Complete	Complete	Complete
		Estimate		Incomplete	Incomplete	Incomplete
		Actual			Incomplete	Incomplete
(b) Disbanding and disarmament of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias	Progress in disbanding and disarmament of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias	Target	Yes	Yes		
		Estimate		No	No	
		Actual			No	No
(c) A strengthened response by all Member States for the implementation of the remaining provisions of Security Council resolution 1680 (2006)	Number of interactions by the Special Envoy with the Government of Lebanon and other interested Governments for increased efforts to implement the remaining provisions of Security Council resolution 1680 (2006), taking into account significant progress made in this respect	Target	36	36	35	35
		Estimate		35	35	34
		Actual			34	34

*Outputs*

- Regular interactions of the Special Envoy with representatives of the Government of Lebanon and other interested Governments to advance the implementation of the resolution (36)
- Regular interactions with the Government of Lebanon in support of a resumption of the Lebanese national dialogue related to the disbanding and disarmament of Lebanese militias (36)
- Regular interactions with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)/Palestinian Authority and good offices between PLO and the Government of Lebanon to facilitate dialogue between the PLO/Palestinian Authority and the Government of Lebanon on the disbanding and disarmament of Palestinian militias (10)
- The provision of good offices and consultations with all foreign Governments that might have influence on the Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias in Lebanon to assist in implementing the requirements of relevant Security Council resolutions in a peaceful manner (32)
- Reports of the Secretary-General to the Security Council (2)



### External factors

94. The objective of the Special Envoy would be achieved on the assumption that: (a) there is political stability and security in Lebanon; (b) hostilities in the region do not further affect Lebanon; (c) there is political goodwill on the part of the parties concerned; (d) the political goodwill of Member States has a positive influence on the parties concerned; and (e) there are no tensions between Lebanon and other States in the region.

### Resource requirements (regular budget)

Table 12

#### Financial resources

(Thousands of United States dollars)

Category of expenditure	2018			2019		Variance	Net requirements for 2019
	Appropriation	Estimated expenditures	Estimated variance	Total requirements	Non-recurrent requirements	2019 vs. 2018 Increase/ (decrease)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)=(2)-(1)	(4)	(5)	(6)=(4)-(1)	
Civilian personnel costs	250.4	256.8	6.4	266.1	–	15.7	272.5
Operational costs	117.3	63.0	(54.3)	97.6	–	(19.7)	43.3
<b>Total (net of staff assessment)</b>	<b>367.7</b>	<b>319.8</b>	<b>(47.9)</b>	<b>363.7</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>(4.0)</b>	<b>315.8</b>

Table 13

#### Positions

	Professional and higher categories								General Service and related categories			National staff				Total
	USG	ASG	D-2	D-1	P-5	P-4	P-3	P-2	Subtotal	Field/ Security Services	General Service	Total inter-national	National Professional Officer	Local level	United Nations Volunteers	
Approved 2018	1 <sup>a</sup>	–	–	–	–	1	–	–	2	–	1	3	–	–	–	3
Proposed 2019	1 <sup>a</sup>	–	–	–	–	1	–	–	2	–	1	3	–	–	–	3
<b>Change</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>–</b>

<sup>a</sup> The Under-Secretary-General is on a \$1-a-year contract.

95. The anticipated unencumbered balance in 2018 reflects mainly the reduction in travel requirements as the Special Envoy functions are currently carried out by the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs and travel on Security Council resolution 1559 (2004) has been more limited, partially offset by higher than budgeted staff costs based on the actual step in grade and the cost of entitlements of the current incumbents.

96. The proposed resources for the Office of the Special Envoy for 2019, amounting to \$363,700 (net of staff assessment), would provide for the salaries and common staff costs for the continuation of the three positions (1 Under-Secretary-General, 1 P-4 and 1 General Service (Other level)) (\$266,100), as well as operational costs (\$97,600) comprising official travel (\$50,900), facilities and infrastructure (\$32,300), ground transportation (\$2,000), communications and information technology (\$10,400) and other supplies, services and equipment (\$2,000).

97. In 2019, the proposed number and levels of positions for the Office of the Special Envoy will remain unchanged.

98. The variance (decrease) between the proposed resources for 2019 and the 2018 approved budget reflects the reduced requirements mainly for travel and communications and information technology, taking into account the uncertainty regarding the appointment of a new Special Envoy, partially offset by the provision at the actual average step in grade of current incumbents and the ratio of actual common staff cost expenditures to actual salaries.

#### **Extrabudgetary resources**

99. No extrabudgetary resources were available in 2018 or are projected in 2019 for the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the implementation of Security Council resolution [1559 \(2004\)](#).

### **E. United Nations Representative to the Geneva International Discussions**

*(\$1,887,100)*

#### **Background, mandate and objective**

100. Following the non-extension of the mandate of the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia in June 2009, the United Nations has continued to support the Geneva international discussions on security and stability and the return of internally displaced persons and refugees, which commenced on 15 October 2008 in Geneva in accordance with the six-point agreement of 12 August 2008 and implementing measures of 8 September 2008, following the hostilities of August 2008 (see [S/2009/254](#), para. 5). In resolution [1866 \(2009\)](#), the Security Council welcomed the beginning of the discussions and requested the Secretary-General, through his Special Representative, to continue to fully support the process. The discussions, of which 44 rounds have been held to date, most recently on 20 June 2018, are co-chaired by the European Union, OSCE and the United Nations.

101. Against the background of the “Proposals for joint incident prevention and response mechanisms” agreed to in Geneva on 18 February 2009, the Secretary-General, on 28 September 2009, addressed a letter to the President of the Security Council in which he updated the members of the Council on the progress in the Geneva international discussions and the convening of the Joint Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism (IPRM) under the United Nations auspices in Gali (see [S/2009/254](#), paras. 5 and 6). The Secretary-General also stated that, following consultations with the relevant stakeholders, the United Nations would continue to support the Geneva international discussions and the IPRM through a limited number of personnel with the task of facilitating the United Nations participation in the international discussions in Geneva and in the IPRM, and liaising and coordinating with the relevant actors. He stated that those personnel would be based in Geneva and would spend as much time as required on the ground in order to perform those functions. The Secretary-General addressed a letter on this matter to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Georgia on 29 September 2009, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Georgia replied to the Secretary-General on 28 October 2009. Contacts and communications on this matter were conducted without prejudice to the respective positions of the participants in the ongoing Geneva discussions.

102. In a letter to the President of the Security Council dated 28 December 2009, the Secretary-General noted that, given the important role of the Geneva international discussions and the IPRM in stabilizing the situation and building confidence, and in

the light of the broad support, including from the main stakeholders, for a continued and effective United Nations engagement beyond 31 December 2009, the United Nations would continue to provide support to the Geneva international discussions and the work of the IPRM. In a letter dated 25 February 2010 (S/2010/103), the Secretary-General informed the President of the Council that, following consultations, it was his intention to appoint the United Nations representative responsible for United Nations support to the Geneva international discussions and the IPRM. In a letter dated 2 May 2011 (S/2011/279), the President of the Security Council informed the Secretary-General that the members of the Council had taken note of his intention and of the information contained in his letter of 25 February 2010.

103. The United Nations Representative to the Geneva International Discussions and his team are responsible for preparing, in consultation with the Co-Chairs, the sessions of the Geneva international discussions. They are also responsible for preparing, convening and facilitating the periodic IPRM meetings. With regard to the latter, the team maintains a hotline to facilitate timely communication and exchange of information among the parties on any issues of mutual concern.

104. The United Nations Representative and the team will continue to maintain an office in Geneva on the premises of the United Nations Office at Geneva on a reimbursable basis. The team members would regularly travel to the field to liaise with the relevant actors in preparation for and follow-up to the discussions in the IPRM. The team will continue to be co-located and logistically back-stopped by UNDP and UNHCR.

105. In the first half of 2018, the Office of the United Nations Representative to the Geneva International Discussions experienced a change in its leadership, following the stepping down of the previous United Nations Representative, Mr. Antti Turunen, in December 2017. Until the appointment of the new United Nations Representative, Ms. Ayşe Cihan Sultanoğlu, announced on 6 July 2018 and effective on 1 September 2018, the Director of the Europe Division of the Department of Political Affairs in New York served as acting United Nations Co-Chair of the Geneva international discussions and the Senior Political Officer served as acting head of the Office of the United Nations Representative in Geneva and Officer-in-Charge with responsibilities for managing day-to-day affairs of the Office, on an interim basis.

### **Future outlook**

106. The role of the United Nations Representative is expected to continue for the duration of the United Nations involvement in the Geneva international discussions and the Gali IPRM. There continues to be support among principal stakeholders for the discussions in Geneva and in the IPRMs, as well as for the continued engagement of the United Nations. The role of the United Nations will be reviewed depending on future developments with regard to the Geneva discussions and/or IPRMs and the views of the key stakeholders.

107. In January 2018, the Secretary-General called for the “revitalization” of ongoing mediation processes in Europe, including the Geneva international discussions. Ten years after the inception of the Geneva international discussions, all participants have also expressed interest in ensuring the continued effectiveness of this important process. To that end, the Office of the United Nations Representative to the Geneva International Discussions will continue to work with all stakeholders and Geneva international discussions participants to explore ways to further enhance the effectiveness of the Geneva international discussions.

**Cooperation with other entities**

108. The Office of the United Nations Representative will liaise with United Nations agencies, programmes and funds, such as the office of the Resident Coordinator, UNHCR, UNDP and other actors, in particular with respect to coordinating the role and contribution of the United Nations in the framework of the Geneva discussions and the Gali IPRM. The Office of the United Nations Representative will also maintain close contacts with the officials of the European Union and its monitoring mission in Georgia and officials of OSCE.

109. In 2019, the mission will be supported by the United Nations Office at Geneva and the Departments of Operational Support and Management Strategy, Policy and Compliance for administrative activities.

**Performance information**

110. On 20 June 2018, the United Nations Representative co-chaired the 44th round of the Geneva international discussions. Despite the complex issues under deliberation, the United Nations and the other Co-Chairs managed to keep all the participants actively engaged in the Geneva discussions. In order to encourage more informed debates, special “information sessions” were conducted in conjunction with the formal Geneva sessions, and on two occasions in the context of the Gali IPRM. Those sessions, co-facilitated by the United Nations, have helped to enrich the formal meetings of the Geneva international discussions. Two more rounds of the Geneva discussions are foreseen to be held in 2018.

111. On 27 June 2018, the 57th Gali IPRM meeting took place under United Nations chairmanship. All participants actively took part in the meetings in a business-like atmosphere and used the platform for additional side-line bilateral talks. All participants have underlined the importance of the mechanism and reconfirmed their commitment to continue engagement in the future. Six more Gali IPRM meetings are foreseen for 2018.

**Planning assumptions for 2019**

112. It is expected that the Geneva discussions and the Gali Joint Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism will continue to convene regularly, requiring United Nations substantive and technical support. Both continue to remain the essential platforms for dealing with the issues of concern for all stakeholders involved. The situation on the ground is likely to continue to warrant international involvement and support in preventing instability and facilitating regular contact and exchange of information among the parties. The mission’s strategy is to continue promoting mutual understanding and to facilitate dialogue among the key stakeholders of the Geneva process.

113. It is expected that the Geneva discussions will continue to be convened with approximately the same frequency in 2019: on average, once every two and a half or three months. In preparation for these meetings, the United Nations Representative will be expected to take part in preparatory visits by the Co-Chairs of the Geneva discussions. The Gali IPRM is also expected to maintain the established regularity of meetings — once per month, on average — with possible emergency meetings to be convened at short notice by the United Nations Representative. The United Nations Representative remains ready to contribute to the prevention of any incident of concern in the area of responsibility through the good services offered to the participants of the Gali IPRM.

114. The United Nations Representative is responsible for the coordination of the United Nations role in the framework of the Geneva international discussions and the

Gali IPRM. The mission will continue to carry out the task assigned to it through close cooperation with the United Nations partners engaged in the Geneva process.

115. The objective, expected accomplishments, indicators of achievement and performance measures for the mission are set out below.

Table 14

**Objective, expected accomplishments, indicators of achievement and performance measures**

*Objective:* To promote mutual understanding and dialogue among the key stakeholders of the Geneva international discussions and the Joint Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism

Expected accomplishments	Indicators of achievement		Performance measures			
			2019	2018	2017	2016
(a) Progress on the key agenda issues in Working Group I (on security and stability) and Working Group II (on humanitarian matters) of the Geneva international discussions	Continued engagement of participants in the Geneva discussions in Working Groups I and II [number of sessions of the Geneva discussions]	Target	4	4	4	4
		Estimate		4	4	4
		Actual			4	4

*Outputs*

- Consultations by the United Nations Representative with the participants in the Geneva discussions (10)
- Joint visits by the Co-Chairs of the Geneva discussions in preparation for the sessions of the Geneva discussions (5)
- Thematic non-papers by the Co-Chairs (2)
- Information sessions on specific issues on the agenda for the participants in the Geneva discussions (4)
- Press communiqué of the Co-Chairs after each round of the Geneva discussions (4)
- Periodic spot reports (4)

Expected accomplishments	Indicators of achievement		Performance measures			
			2019	2018	2017	2016
(b) Improved cooperation between the IPRM participants to prevent and respond to incidents on the ground	(i) Number of IPRM meetings conducted	Target	12	12	12	12
		Estimate		12	12	12
		Actual			10	6
	(ii) Number of incidents addressed through IPRM or good offices of the United Nations Representative to the Geneva International Discussions	Target	20	25	20	20
		Estimate		25	20	20
		Actual			20	23

*Outputs*

- Agendas for the IPRM meetings prepared on the basis of the suggestions of IPRM participants (12)
- Press releases (12) and summary conclusions (12) of the Chair issued following each IPRM meeting
- Notes for the file on each IPRM meeting (12)
- Briefings to international and diplomatic community representatives on the ground (12)
- Use of the hotline (at least 5 phone calls per week to exchange information)
- Weekly security situation reports (52)
- Weekly humanitarian situation reports (52)
- Weekly political situation reports (52)

### External factors

116. The objective would be achieved on the assumption that: (a) the participants in the Geneva discussions and IPRM will continue to engage in the respective processes; and (b) the expected submissions from the participants in the sessions of the Geneva discussions and IPRM meetings will be received in full and on time.

### Resource requirements (regular budget)

Table 15

#### Financial resources

(Thousands of United States dollars)

Category of expenditure	2018			2019		Variance	Net requirements for 2019
	Appropriation	Estimated expenditures	Estimated variance	Total requirements	Non-recurrent requirements	2019 vs. 2018 Increase/ (decrease)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)=(2)-(1)	(4)	(5)	(6)=(4)-(1)	
Civilian personnel costs	1 238.9	1 580.6	341.7	1 376.1	–	137.2	1 717.8
Operational costs	511.8	442.0	(69.8)	511.0	–	(0.8)	441.2
<b>Total (net of staff assessment)</b>	<b>1 750.7</b>	<b>2 022.6</b>	<b>271.9</b>	<b>1 887.1</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>136.4</b>	<b>2 159.0</b>

Table 16

#### Positions

	Professional and higher categories									General Service and related categories			National staff			
	USG	ASG	D-2	D-1	P-5	P-4	P-3	P-2	Subtotal	Field/ Security Services	General Service	Total inter-national	National Professional Officer	Local level	United Nations Volunteers	Total
Approved 2018	–	1	–	–	1	2	2	–	6	–	1	7	–	–	–	7
Proposed 2019	–	1	–	–	1	2	2	–	6	–	1	7	–	–	–	7
<b>Change</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>–</b>

117. The anticipated overexpenditure in 2018 is attributable primarily to the increase in personnel costs due to staff turnover in the first half of the year resulting in higher common staff costs for separation of staff and installation entitlements of new personnel, partly offset by lower operational requirements mainly under official non-training travel and ground transportation mainly due to the United Nations Representative position being vacant for part of the budget period.

118. The proposed resources for the United Nations Representative to the Geneva International Discussions for 2019 amount to \$1,887,100 (net of staff assessment) and would provide for the salaries and common staff costs for the continuation of seven positions based in Geneva (1 Assistant Secretary-General, 1 P-5, 2 P-4, 2 P-3 and 1 General Service (Other level)) (\$1,376,100), as well as for operational costs (\$511,000), comprising costs for official travel (\$317,200), facilities and infrastructure (\$92,900), ground transportation (\$35,500), communications and information technology (\$33,400) and other supplies, services and equipment (\$32,000).

119. In 2019, the number and levels of positions for the Office of the United Nations Representative to the Geneva International Discussions will remain unchanged.

120. The variance (increase) between the proposed resources for 2019 and approved budget for 2018 is attributable mainly to the proposed lower vacancy rate for international personnel of 5 per cent in 2019 compared with 14 per cent for 2018. The proposed 2019 vacancy rate reflects an expected full incumbency as of September 2018.

#### **Extrabudgetary resources**

121. No extrabudgetary resources were available in 2018 or are projected for 2019 for the mission.

### **F. Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria**

*(\$16,402,200)*

#### **Background, mandate and objective**

122. On 16 February 2012, the General Assembly, in its resolution [66/253 A](#), requested the Secretary-General and all relevant United Nations bodies to support the efforts of the League of Arab States aimed at promoting a peaceful solution to the conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic, including through the appointment of a special envoy. On 23 February 2012, the Secretaries-General of the United Nations and the League of Arab States appointed Kofi Annan as their Joint Special Envoy.

123. On 21 March 2012, the Security Council, in a presidential statement ([S/PRST/2012/6](#)), endorsed a six-point plan. Pursuant to the plan, the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic and the armed opposition forces broadly adhered to a cessation of violence by 12 April 2012, diminishing violence significantly for approximately five weeks. In its resolution [2043 \(2012\)](#) of 21 April 2012, the Council decided to establish, for an initial period of 90 days, a United Nations Supervision Mission in the Syrian Arab Republic (UNSMIS) to monitor a cessation of armed violence and to monitor and support the full implementation of the six point plan.

124. Meeting in Geneva under the auspices of the Joint Special Envoy, the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the members of the Action Group for Syria adopted the Geneva communiqué on 30 June 2012 ([S/2012/523](#)).

125. Following a resurgence of violence in the Syrian Arab Republic, the mandate of UNSMIS was not renewed, leading to the liquidation of the mission on 19 August 2012.

126. On 27 September 2013, the Security Council, in its resolution [2118 \(2013\)](#), called for the convening of an international conference on the Syrian Arab Republic, to include the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic and the opposition, with a view to reaching agreement on the full implementation of the Geneva communiqué. The Joint Special Representative of the United Nations and the League of Arab States for Syria, Lakhdar Brahimi, convened the conference on 22 January 2014 in Montreux, Switzerland. The conference was followed by two rounds of negotiations between the two parties in Geneva.

127. On 10 July 2014, the Secretary-General appointed Staffan de Mistura as his Special Envoy for Syria, to assume his functions on 1 September 2014. On 5 May 2015, the Special Envoy launched the Geneva Consultations, aimed at opening consultations with a broad spectrum of Syrian interlocutors, along with countries from the region and beyond, to help identify points of convergence that could allow for the launch of a political process.

128. In October 2015, new political momentum at the international and regional levels to achieve a political settlement of the conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic

resulted in the establishment of the International Syria Support Group, co-chaired by the Russian Federation and the United States of America, the adoption of four political statements (on 30 October and 14 November 2015 and 11 February and 17 May 2016) and two Security Council resolutions (2254 (2015) and 2268 (2016)).

129. Through this process, the Security Council, by its resolutions 2254 (2015) and 2268 (2016), tasked the Special Envoy with: (a) convening formal negotiations between the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic and the opposition on a political transition; (b) supporting the monitoring of the cessation of hostilities by the Co-Chairs of the International Syria Support Group; (c) supporting the Support Group's task forces on humanitarian access and a ceasefire; and (d) supporting the Secretary-General's reporting obligations before the Council. The resolutions further called upon Member States to prevent and suppress terrorist acts committed specifically by the listed Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and the Nusrah Front and further noted that the cessation of hostilities would not apply to these groups.

130. In the light of this mandate, the Special Envoy convened three rounds of intra-Syrian talks in Geneva, in a proximity format, between January and April 2016.

131. With respect to the cessation of hostilities, the International Syria Support Group established a ceasefire task force. Pursuant to Security Council resolution 2268 (2016), the Office of the Special Envoy serves as secretariat of the task force and supports the monitoring of the cessation of hostilities through an operations centre in Geneva. As of the fall of 2016, and by delegation of the Co-Chairs of the Support Group, the Office of the Special Envoy assumed the chairmanship of the task force ad interim.

132. In addition, the Office of the Special Envoy convenes and coordinates the task force of the International Syria Support Group on humanitarian access, which addresses urgent priorities related to the implementation of paragraphs 12 and 13 of resolution 2254 (2015), including: the lifting of all sieges in the Syrian Arab Republic; obtaining unhindered and sustainable humanitarian access to besieged and hard-to-reach areas; and protecting civilians. In coordination with the United Nations country team in the Syrian Arab Republic, the Office of the Special Envoy chairs the task force and serves as its secretariat.

133. During the remainder of 2016 the Office of the Special Envoy supported efforts by the Co-Chairs of the International Syria Support Group to restore the cessation of hostilities and launched a political initiative to reduce the violence engulfing the city of Aleppo, Syrian Arab Republic. The Office further advocated for increased humanitarian access to besieged and hard-to-reach areas in the country.

134. On 29 December 2016, the Governments of the Russian Federation and Turkey announced a nationwide ceasefire in the Syrian Arab Republic. The Security Council welcomed these efforts and took note of the ceasefire in its resolution 2336 (2016). The ceasefire is supported by regular meetings between the three guarantor States (Iran (Islamic Republic of), the Russian Federation and Turkey) as well as the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic and a number of armed opposition groups, in Astana. The Office of the Special Envoy has provided technical support to the Astana meetings.

135. The Special Envoy reconvened four rounds of intra-Syrian talks in Geneva between February and July 2017. On 19 May 2017, the Special Envoy announced the establishment of a technical consultative process on constitutional and legal issues raised within formal sessions of the talks. Technical consultations were conducted separately with experts from the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic and from the opposition between May and July 2017.



136. From August to November 2017, the Office of the Special Envoy provided support to Saudi Arabia in convening a conference in Riyadh on 22 and 23 November 2017, with the aim of forming a unified delegation of the opposition for the talks. Shortly after the conference, the Special Envoy convened another round of intra-Syrian talks in Geneva from 28 November to 14 December 2017. On 30 November 2017, the Special Envoy issued a paper setting out 12 living intra-Syrian essential principles based on consultations conducted in previous rounds of talks.

137. On 25 and 26 January 2018, the Special Envoy convened a special ninth round meeting of the intra-Syrian talks in Vienna focusing on constitutional issues. The Special Envoy subsequently attended the Congress of the Syrian National Dialogue in Sochi, Russian Federation, on 29 and 30 January 2018. The Congress produced a final statement supporting the 12 essential principles and indicating the will to form a constitutional committee, with final agreement on the composition and set-up to be reached in the United Nations-facilitated Geneva process. The statement appeals to the Secretary-General to assign the Special Envoy to assist the constitutional committee's work in Geneva.

138. Through the Civil Society Support Room, a consultative platform to maintain sustained, regular consultations with civil society so as to ensure an inclusive political process, the Special Envoy also engaged with more than 300 Syrian civil society organizations, including women's groups.

139. The Special Envoy also regularly consults with the Syrian Women's Advisory Board, which is made up of 12 diverse women from civil society who provide gendered perspectives and analysis on all substantive issues under discussion in the intra-Syrian talks.

#### **Cooperation with other entities**

140. In 2019, substantive and administrative support for the Office of the Special Envoy will be provided by the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, the Department of Operational Support and the Department of Management Strategy, Policy and Compliance. In the implementation of the good offices mandate, the Special Envoy and his Office will continue to consult and coordinate closely with the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, the relevant peacekeeping and special political missions in the region and, when appropriate, the Department of Peace Operations, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, OHCHR, UNHCR and the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN-Women). Cooperation will continue with the agencies, funds and programmes of the United Nations operating in the Syrian Arab Republic and the region and with the United Nations country team in the Syrian Arab Republic through the Office of the Special Envoy in Damascus. In addition, agencies working in the Syrian Arab Republic are represented within the headquarters of the Inter-Agency Task Force for the Syrian Crisis, which ensures the coordination and coherence of United Nations political, humanitarian, human rights and other efforts in the country. Furthermore, the Office partners with Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the European Union, the Norwegian Centre for Conflict Resolution and Swisspeace in the implementation of the Civil Society Support Room.

141. In incorporating the principles of the global field support strategy, the Office of the Special Envoy will continue to leverage the existing logistical and administrative capacity of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon and the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force. The Office has also established a memorandum of understanding with the United Nations Office at Geneva for the provision of support and coordination in Geneva on a cost-reimbursable basis. Since 2017 the Office has been a client of the Kuwait Joint Support Office, which assumes the role of an

administrative service provider for transactional, non-location-dependent finance and human resources support to the Office of the Special Envoy.

### **Performance information**

142. On 22 December 2017 in Astana, the three guarantor States agreed to establish a working group on the release of detainees/abductees, the handover of bodies and the identification of missing persons. The working group consists of representatives of the guarantor States and the Office of the Special Envoy. So far four meetings have taken place. The Office of the Special Envoy has been playing an active role in supporting the working group.

143. With violence escalating in several parts of the country in early 2018, particularly in eastern Ghutah, Damascus and Idlib Governorate, the Security Council adopted resolution [2401 \(2018\)](#) on 24 February, in which the Council demanded that all parties cease hostilities without delay and engage immediately to ensure full and comprehensive implementation of that demand by all parties, for a durable humanitarian pause for at least 30 consecutive days throughout the Syrian Arab Republic. The Office of the Special Envoy supported the implementation of resolution [2401 \(2018\)](#) by engaging with relevant parties.

144. Accomplishments achieved during the period from January to June 2018 reflect steps towards ending the violence and reaching a peaceful resolution of the conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic. These included the special ninth round meeting of the intra-Syrian talks with the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic and the Syrian opposition, and agreement at the Sochi Congress of the Syrian National Dialogue to form a constitutional committee, to be finalized in the United Nations-facilitated Geneva process, as well as the provision of technical support to the guarantors of the ceasefire established on 29 December 2016, the setting up the working group on the release of detainees/abductees, the handover of bodies and the identification of missing persons, of which the United Nations is a member, engagement with the International Syria Support Group and the members of the Security Council to reduce the level of violence, increase of access to humanitarian assistance, and serving as an incremental building block for an overarching political solution. In addition, the Special Envoy continued to consult widely with other relevant Member States, civil society organizations and women's representatives.

### **Planning assumptions for 2019**

145. The broad activities of the Special Envoy in 2019 are expected to be as follows:

(a) Applying the good offices of the Secretary-General to achieve a peaceful political solution to the conflict. To that end, the Special Envoy will continue to convene intra-Syrian talks in line with Security Council resolution [2254 \(2015\)](#) and related processes, and to consult broadly with domestic and international stakeholders, including neighbouring States and other Governments with an interest in or having influence over the Syrian parties, the Syrian authorities, opposition groups, armed groups, women's representatives and civil society organizations. In consultation with the Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, the Special Envoy will advise the Secretary-General on the political process;

(b) Working with the States members of the International Syria Support Group, participants in the Astana meetings, all relevant Syrian parties and civil society organizations and entities of the United Nations, as well as international non-governmental organizations and other organizations, to end the violence and to support the sustained and unimpeded delivery of humanitarian assistance. As appropriate, the Special Envoy will maintain close contact with the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, the Emergency Relief Coordinator, other

relevant United Nations agencies, funds and programmes, the International Committee of the Red Cross and the Syrian Red Crescent Society, to support their efforts, mainly through his Office in Damascus;

(c) Briefing the Security Council and/or the General Assembly, as appropriate.

146. The objective, expected accomplishments, indicators of achievement and performance measures for the mission are set out below.

Table 17

**Objective, expected accomplishments, indicators of achievement and performance measures**

*Objective:* To achieve through peaceful and inclusive means a Syrian-led political solution to the Syrian conflict, which will meet the legitimate aspirations of the Syrian people to dignity, freedom and justice, based on the principles of equality and non-discrimination

Expected accomplishment	Indicator of achievement		Performance measures			
			2019	2018	2017	2016
(a) Progress towards the cessation of violence	Absence of politically motivated violence in the Syrian Arab Republic	Target	Yes	Yes	Yes	Not achieved
		Estimate		Not achieved	Not achieved	Not achieved
		Actual			Not achieved	Not achieved

*Outputs*

- Provision of technical expertise to meetings of the guarantors of the ceasefire established on 29 December 2016 (10)
- Meetings of the ceasefire task force and related meetings that support the Syrian parties and members of the International Syria Support Group in the negotiation and implementation of a nationwide ceasefire (100)
- Updates and briefings to the Security Council, the General Assembly and other relevant United Nations bodies, as well as the League of Arab States and other regional organizations and the diplomatic community, on the political and security situation in the Syrian Arab Republic and the efforts of the Special Envoy (25)
- Press statements stressing the importance of political dialogue, an end to violence and human rights violations, and humanitarian access (24)
- Background briefings, including to media outlets, stressing the importance of political dialogue, an end to violence and human rights violations, and humanitarian access (104)
- Interviews with major media outlets, stressing the importance of political dialogue, an end to violence and human rights violations, and humanitarian access (24)

Expected accomplishment	Indicators of achievement		Performance measures			
			2019	2018	2017	2016
(b) Progress towards an inclusive Syrian-led political process in a safe environment that provides for a political transition and aims to address effectively the legitimate aspirations and concerns of the Syrian people	(i) Number of meetings between representatives of the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic and the whole spectrum of Syrian opposition groups in a credible and comprehensive political process	Target	500	500	500	100
		Estimate		150	150	350
		Actual			310	275
	(ii) Road map or agreement is reached on a solution that meets the legitimate will and aspirations of the Syrian people and ensures full respect for their fundamental rights	Target	1	1	1	1
		Estimate		1	1	1
		Actual			—	—

(iii) Number of meetings relating to the political process that include representatives of civil society organizations	Target	200	200	200	
	Estimate		145	180	100
	Actual			132	–
(iv) Number of meetings relating to the political process that include women's representatives and organizations	Target	100	100	80	
	Estimate		70	80	35
	Actual			65	41

*Outputs*

- Provision of good offices and organization of talks, consultations and negotiations with all concerned internal, regional and international parties and actors aimed at finding a political solution to the Syrian conflict (350)
- Meetings and workshops for all Syrian stakeholders on topics relating to the peace talks, such as human rights and humanitarian access (8)
- Regular visits to the Syrian Arab Republic and other countries to promote a political solution to the Syrian conflict (30)
- Facilitation of direct and indirect meetings between representatives of the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic and a broad spectrum of the Syrian opposition to reach an agreement to end the conflict and put forward a political solution acceptable to all concerned (85)

Expected accomplishment	Indicator of achievement		Performance measures			
			2019	2018	2017	2016
(c) Progress towards improvement of the human rights situation	Number of meetings with the Syrian parties and other relevant stakeholders to facilitate the release of detainees and prisoners related to events since March 2011	Target	90	60	50	50
		Estimate		70	70	50
		Actual			70	30

*Output*

- Mechanism to coordinate the release of detainees (1)

Expected accomplishment	Indicator of achievement		Performance measures			
			2019	2018	2017	2016
(d) Improved access for humanitarian assistance to people in need	Percentage of people in need reached by international humanitarian assistance	Target	100	100	100	100
		Estimate		80	80	80
		Actual			83	83

*Output*

- Meetings of the humanitarian task force with all members of the International Syria Support Group and related meetings to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance, in particular to besieged and hard-to-reach areas (104)

**External factors**

147. The objective will be achieved on the assumption that all domestic, regional and international stakeholders cooperate with the Special Envoy.

## Resource requirements (regular budget)

Table 18

### Financial resources

(Thousands of United States dollars)

Category of expenditure	2018			2019		Variance	Net Requirements for 2019
	Appropriation	Estimated expenditures	Estimated variance	Total requirements	Non-recurrent requirements	2019 vs. 2018 Increase/ (decrease)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)=(2)-(1)	(4)	(5)	(6)=(4)-(1)	
Civilian personnel costs	7 448.5	8 324.7	876.2	8 488.4	—	1 039.9	9 364.6
Operational costs	8 979.8	7 794.1	(1 185.7)	7 913.8	56.8	(1 066.0)	6 728.1
<b>Total (net of staff assessment)</b>	<b>16 428.3</b>	<b>16 118.8</b>	<b>(309.5)</b>	<b>16 402.2</b>	<b>56.8</b>	<b>(26.1)</b>	<b>16 092.7</b>

Table 19

### Positions

	Professional and higher categories									General Service and related categories		National staff				Total
	USG	ASG	D-2	D-1	P-5	P-4	P-3	P-2	Subtotal	Field/ Security Services	General Service	Total inter-national	National Professional Officer	Local level	United Nations Volunteers	
Approved 2018	1	1	1	3	8	15	12	1	42	10	9	61	—	31	—	92
Proposed 2019	1	1	1	3	8	16	12	1	43	11	7	61	—	33	—	94
<b>Change</b>	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	1	1	(2)	—	—	2	—	2

148. In 2018 the anticipated unencumbered balance is attributable primarily to the lower than budgeted requirement for the rental of premises in Damascus as some of the rental costs would be covered through the anticipated cost-recovery from United Nations agencies, funds and programmes. In 2018, underexpenditures are also projected under official travel, partly as a result of efforts to increase usage of alternative means of communication where possible. The unencumbered balance is partly offset by increased requirements under civilian personnel owing to the actual lower than budgeted vacancy rate for international staff (35 per cent compared with the approved 45 per cent).

149. The estimated requirements for the Office of the Special Envoy for 2019 amount to \$16,402,200 (net of staff assessment) and provide for civilian personnel costs (\$8,488,400) for 94 positions (1 Under-Secretary-General, 1 Assistant Secretary-General, 1 D-2, 3 D-1, 8 P-5, 16 P-4, 12 P-3, 1 P-2, 11 Field Service, 7 General Service (Other level) and 33 Local level), as well as operational costs (\$7,913,800), comprising costs for consultants and consulting services (\$198,000), official travel (\$1,648,900), facilities and infrastructure (\$4,420,400), ground transportation (\$372,100), communications and information technology (\$490,100), medical (\$7,700) and other supplies, services and equipment (\$776,600).

150. In 2019, the Office of the Special Envoy proposes:

(a) Establishment of one Chief Human Resources Officer position (P-4) in the support component in the Chief of Mission Support Office based in Geneva. The position will provide mission leadership with advice on all human resources planning, management and policy implementation issues. The establishment of the position is

in line with the expressed vision of the Secretary-General to delegate decision-making closer to the point of delivery;

(b) Establishment of two Finance Assistant positions (1 Field Service and 1 Local level), and one Human Resources Assistant position (Local level) in Kuwait. The Kuwait Joint Support Office provides a full range of transactional support services for its core client missions, which include the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria, the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen and the United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia. Following an evaluation of the requirements for the Support Office, it has been determined that the staff required for the Office should be redistributed across all of its client missions to ensure that each mission shares the burden of costs appropriately. Accordingly, it is proposed that three new positions be established in each of the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria and the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen, to be based in Kuwait, with a corresponding reduction of these positions in UNAMA and UNAMI;

(c) Abolishment of two Administrative Assistant positions (General Service (Other level)) in the substantive component of the Political Affairs Office based in Geneva. The proposed staffing strength of Administrative Assistant positions would be sufficient to provide the necessary backstopping support in the Office.

151. The proposed number of positions for the substantive component of the mission is 49, 31 of which will be based in Geneva (1 Under-Secretary-General, 1 Assistant Secretary-General, 3 D-1, 4 P-5, 10 P-4, 6 P-3, 1 P-2 and 5 General Service (Other level)), 15 in Damascus (1 D-2, 2 P-5, 3 P-4, 5 P-3, 1 Field Service and 3 Local level) and 3 in New York (1 P-5, 1 P-4 and 1 General Service (Other level)).

152. The proposed number of positions for the security component is 22, all based in Damascus (1 P-4, 5 Field Service and 16 Local level).

153. The proposed number of positions for the support component is 23, 4 of which will be based in Geneva (1 P-5, 1 P-4, 1 P-3 and 1 General Service (Other level)), 16 in Damascus (4 Field Service and 12 Local level) and 3 in Kuwait (1 Field Service and 2 Local level).

154. The variance (decrease) between the proposed resources for 2019 and the approved budget for 2018 reflects mainly the reduced requirements for operational costs mainly due to the lower requirement for rental of premises in Damascus as a result of cost recovery from United Nations agencies, funds and programmes, and reduced travel as a result of the use of alternative means of communication where possible. The decrease is partly offset by increased requirements for civilian staff costs owing to the proposed establishment of four new positions (1 P-4 in Geneva and 1 Field Service and 2 Local level in Kuwait) and the application of a lower vacancy rate for 2019 for international (35 per cent) and national (6 per cent) staff than approved for 2018 (45 per cent and 12 per cent, respectively).

### **Extrabudgetary resources**

155. In 2018, extrabudgetary resources estimated at \$758,000 have been utilized in support of the Office of the Special Envoy. Extrabudgetary resources have been used to cover post-agreement planning activities and backstopping requirements at Headquarters in New York. In 2019, the work of the Office will continue to be supported through the trust fund in support of the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, which will provide additional funds to cover unforeseen or expanded activities during the course of the year. In particular, the trust fund would

provide support for intra-Syrian talks, technical support to the Astana process, meetings between international and regional stakeholders, meetings of domestic Syrian representatives and the work of consultants. In 2018, four positions of Political Affairs Officer (3 P-4 and 1 P-3) are being funded from extrabudgetary resources. It is expected that those positions would be continued in 2019, and that the extrabudgetary resources in an approximate amount of \$850,000 will be available for the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs for 2019.

## **G. Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Sudan and South Sudan**

*(\$1,502,500)*

### **Background, mandate and objective**

156. The Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Sudan and South Sudan was established in July 2011 through an exchange of letters between the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council ([S/2011/474](#) and [S/2011/475](#)). Subsequent exchanges of letters in 2016 ([S/2016/258](#) and [S/2016/259](#)) further reaffirmed the establishment and mandate of the Office of the Special Envoy. The Office supports the establishment and maintenance of good and peaceful neighbourly relations between the Sudan and South Sudan through a good offices role on behalf of the Secretary-General. This includes cooperating with the African Union High-level Implementation Panel in efforts to implement Security Council resolution [2046 \(2012\)](#), which calls on the Sudan and South Sudan to reach agreement on critical issues, including: (a) modalities for implementing provisions under the Comprehensive Peace Agreement that remain outstanding, including a political settlement between the Government of the Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N) of the conflict in Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan States; and (b) key post-separation arrangements critical for the establishment of good neighbourly relations between the parties.

157. On 27 September 2012, the Governments of the Sudan and South Sudan signed nine agreements in Addis Ababa brokered by the African Union High-level Implementation Panel and closely supported by the Office of the Special Envoy. In the overall cooperation agreement, the parties recommitted to the overriding principle of establishing the Sudan and South Sudan as two viable neighbouring States cooperating with each other for that purpose. The eight additional agreements covered arrangements on oil, trade, banking, certain economic matters, pensions, border issues, the status of nationals in each other's countries and security arrangements. While the joint mechanisms envisaged in the agreements have been activated, little progress has been made in utilizing them to address outstanding issues. Furthermore, despite continued engagement and shuttling between both Governments, no progress has been achieved on the temporary arrangements in the Abyei Area and its final status.

158. Relations between the Sudan and South Sudan have continued to be marked by mistrust and mutual accusations of support to rebel groups active in each country. Slow progress in improving the relations is further attributed to the internal conflicts that preoccupy both countries and have diverted attention from the resolution of outstanding bilateral issues, with South Sudan particularly consumed in an ongoing crisis after the resumption of fighting in July 2016. The Office of the Special Envoy has supported regional efforts by the African Union and IGAD to seek political solutions to the internal conflict in each country.

159. While the support of the Office of the Special Envoy for the efforts of the African Union High-level Implementation Panel in the Sudan has been longstanding, with regard to South Sudan, United Nations support to IGAD and the African Union was reconfirmed at a joint consultative meeting of the leadership of the three organizations in January 2017 on the margins of the African Union summit. The African Union, IGAD and the United Nations agreed to work jointly on finding a lasting and inclusive political solution to the conflict, within the framework of the 2015 Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan, encouraging the African Union High Representative for South Sudan, Alpha Oumar Konare, in particular to undertake active shuttle diplomacy, in close consultation with the United Nations and IGAD and, notably, supported by the Office of the Special Envoy. The Security Council reaffirmed the call for trilateral collaboration at its meeting on 23 March 2017 while considering the report of Secretary-General on South Sudan (S/2017/224). The Office of the Special Envoy has been actively engaged, in cooperation with other entities, in the quest to find a regionally supported political solution to the collapse of the peace agreement of 2015. Benefiting from its co-location with the African Union and the office of the Chair of IGAD, and its access to the IGAD member States, opposition parties and the envoys of the troika (the United States, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Norway), the Office of the Special Envoy has been required or requested to engage with or to convene meetings of these stakeholders in Addis Ababa, Brussels, New York, Juba and Khartoum.

#### **Cooperation with other entities**

160. The Office of the Special Envoy will continue to extend full support to, and coordinate efforts with, the African Union, including the African Union High Representative for South Sudan, and IGAD. The Office of the Special Envoy will continue to work in close collaboration and coordination with the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), the United Nations-African Union Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) and the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei, and to conduct consultations with international and regional partners, including neighbouring States, donor countries and members of the Security Council. Coordination with other United Nations entities and international organizations also remains a priority, which is reflected, for example, in the close cooperation with the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and UNDP on the issue of humanitarian access to Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile States. The Office of the Special Envoy will continue to be administratively supported by the United Nations Office to the African Union in Addis Ababa, as well as by UNAMID and UNMISS in Khartoum and Juba, respectively.

#### **Performance information**

161. The Office of the Special Envoy continued actively engaging with key officials in both countries and other stakeholders to promote the resolution of outstanding issues arising from the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, pursue arrangements to strengthen bilateral relations and address related internal conflicts in both countries that are an impediment to the normalization of bilateral relations. The Office also cooperated with, and supported, the African Union and IGAD, including by providing analysis and inputs for resolving obstacles to the peace processes in the Sudan and South Sudan.

162. There was minimal progress on the two main outstanding issues from the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. On the Abyei Area, the Governments of the Sudan and South Sudan have made no progress in the implementation of the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of the Sudan and the Sudan People's



Liberation Movement on temporary arrangements for the administration and security of the Abyei Area of 20 June 2011 or the resolution of the final status of the territory, and the Abyei Joint Oversight Committee has not met since March 2015. With the expectation that addressing the Abyei final status issue will be deferred for the time being, the Special Envoy engaged with officials in Juba and Khartoum to encourage both sides to establish the relevant institutions that would facilitate support to the communities in the area in the meantime.

163. The conflict in the Two Areas (Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile) is also yet to be resolved. The African Union High-level Implementation Panel, closely supported by the Office of the Special Envoy, convened the parties in August 2016 on humanitarian aid delivery and a road map agreement that envisages the next steps in the peace process, including talks on the cessation of hostilities, the political negotiations on a settlement of the conflicts in the Two Areas and Darfur and the options to ensure the participation of the opposition in an inclusive national dialogue. However, the parties were unable to agree on humanitarian aid delivery, and the conclusion of the national dialogue in October 2016 without the participation of the major opposition organizations and armed movements has stalled the process. In an effort to break the impasse, in November 2016, the United States proposed it would deliver medicines to the Two Areas by air. While the Government accepted this, SPLM-N requested that up to 20 per cent of humanitarian assistance be channelled through Assosa in Ethiopia, a proposal that the Government had earlier rejected. This stand-off delays humanitarian services and blocks progress on a joint cessation of hostilities agreement. The internal crisis within the SPLM-N leadership that erupted in March 2017 risks further delaying the negotiations. The African Union High-level Implementation Panel and the Office of the Special Envoy have continued to engage with the Government and the opposition groups in search of a more inclusive political process, and have sought support from key international partners for finding agreement on the humanitarian aid question as well as an expedited path to an agreed cessation of hostilities. The latter would finally allow for a substantive engagement by all parties on the negotiation of a new social contract and sustainable peace.

164. With regard to the cooperation agreements between the two countries, the Safe Demilitarized Border Zone has been partially operationalized and, in March 2018, the African Union border programme technical team completed the marking of 3 of the 10 crossing points along the corridors of the Safe Demilitarized Border Zone between South Sudan and the Sudan, in line with the directives issued by the African Union High-level Implementation Panel and the Joint Political and Security Mechanism for the Sudan and South Sudan, which is the key mechanism for addressing issues related to border security between the Sudan and South Sudan. Some progress has also been made in implementing some of the outcomes of the meeting of the Joint Political and Security Mechanism in March 2018, particularly the commitment by the two countries to restore direct communication hotlines between the chiefs of military intelligence; strengthen relations between the intelligence services of the two countries through information-sharing; reactivate the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism and meetings of the Joint Security Committee; and activate the Technical Ad Hoc Border Committee. The parties also reduced trading accusations of providing support or harbouring each other's rebels and continued to cooperate in the oil sector on the basis of the agreement they had reached in February 2017, adopting a flexible arrangement on fees paid to the Sudan for the transportation, transit and processing of oil.

165. Against the background of concerns expressed in the Security Council over the slow implementation of previous decisions of the Joint Political and Security Mechanism, particularly regarding continued funding for the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism if it is not fully operationalized, the parties

met again in an extraordinary session on 5 March 2018. They confirmed the activation of the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism and their resolution to facilitate its work, as well as the redeployment of their forces outside the Safe Demilitarized Border Zone, and recommitted to the implementation of previous decisions of the Joint Political and Security Mechanism meetings. The Office of the Special Envoy supported the African Union High-level Implementation Panel in convening the Joint Political and Security Mechanism meetings and in engaging the parties on the matter, and will continue to encourage the implementation of all cooperation agreements.

166. Since the events of July 2016, when fighting broke out in Juba and Vice President Riek Machar, together with other SPLM in Opposition forces, fled the country, the Office of the Special Envoy, in close collaboration with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for South Sudan and Head of UNMISS, has re-energized its support to the efforts of the African Union and IGAD by engaging with the parties, both in Juba and outside South Sudan, the countries of the region and the international community in seeking a political solution to the conflict. The African Union High Representative, the Chair of the Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission and the United Nations Special Envoy have all been conducting shuttle diplomacy with the aim of supporting the ongoing political process spearheaded by IGAD. The Office of the Special Envoy also sought to establish close working relationships and a shared strategy between the three organizations. However, the Government of South Sudan has continued to reject meeting the former First Vice President, Riek Machar. Through defections from both sides, new opposition forces have been established and have positioned themselves politically and/or militarily. Meanwhile, the national dialogue initiative launched by the President of South Sudan, Salva Kiir, in December 2016 has evolved into a concrete process conducted in government-controlled areas of the country, but in its current form the initiative lacks inclusivity and continues to be rejected by the opposition.

### **Planning assumptions for 2019**

167. The efforts of the Office of the Special Envoy will assist the parties to resolve the two main outstanding issues in the implementation of Security Council resolution [2046 \(2012\)](#), namely, the conflict in the Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile States of the Sudan and the establishment of temporary arrangements for, and agreement on, the process to determine the final status of Abyei. The Office will also continue to support efforts to reach an agreement on a timeline for border demarcation and a dispute resolution mechanism for disputed border areas. The sustained engagement of stakeholders in both countries will remain important to stabilize the security situation and eventually find a lasting solution to these issues.

168. The Special Envoy will also continue to work towards the achievement and consolidation of peace and stability between, and within, the Sudan and South Sudan. The Special Envoy will shuttle regularly between the two countries and will travel to countries of the region and other pertinent locations for necessary consultations.

169. The Office of the Special Envoy will continue to support efforts, including those of the African Union, notably the shuttle diplomacy of the African Union High Representative, Mr. Konare, and IGAD to end the internal conflicts in the Sudan and South Sudan through holistic and inclusive processes. The Special Envoy will participate in all rounds of negotiations conducted under the auspices of the African Union High-level Implementation Panel in the Sudan, together with the African Union, the office of the African Union High Representative and IGAD, with respect to South Sudan. The Special Envoy will furthermore continue to exercise the good offices of the Secretary-General in the IGAD region in support of these efforts and as requested by the Security Council with regard to the Sudan and South Sudan.

170. The objective, expected accomplishments, indicators of achievement and performance measures for the mission are set out below.

Table 20

**Objective, expected accomplishments, indicators of achievement and performance measures**

*Objective:* To support the process of negotiations to achieve consolidation of peace and stability within and between the Sudan and South Sudan through political engagement

Expected accomplishments	Indicators of achievement		Performance measures			
			2019	2018	2017	2016
(a) Implementation of bilateral agreements	(i) Establishment of the Abyei Area Administration	Target	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
		Estimate		No	No	No
		Actual			No	No
	(ii) Full withdrawal of armed forces and police from the Abyei Area	Target	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
		Estimate		No	No	No
		Actual			No	No
	(iii) Full operationalization of the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism and full establishment of the Safe Demilitarized Border Zone	Target	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
		Estimate		No	No	No
		Actual			No	No
	(iv) Cessation of hostilities and an agreement on security and political arrangements in Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan States	Target	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
		Estimate		No	No	No
		Actual			No	No
	(v) Humanitarian access for vulnerable populations in Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan States	Target	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
		Estimate		No	No	No
		Actual			No	No
(b) Completion of negotiations on the outstanding issues between the Sudan and South Sudan	(i) Agreement between the Sudan and South Sudan on a timeline for border demarcation and a dispute resolution mechanism for disputed areas	Target	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
		Estimate		No	No	No
		Actual			No	No
	(ii) Agreement between the Sudan and South Sudan on the process leading to the determination of the final status of the Abyei Area	Target	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
		Estimate		No	No	No
		Actual			No	No
(c) Consolidation of peace and stability within the Sudan and South Sudan	(i) Effective and timely implementation of the agreement on the resolution of the conflict in South Sudan	Target	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
		Estimate		Yes	Yes	Yes
		Actual			Yes	Yes
	(ii) Inclusive and credible implementation of the outcomes of the national dialogue in the Sudan	Target	Yes	Yes	Yes	
		Estimate		No	No	
		Actual			No	

*Outputs*

- Regular engagement and consultations with the authorities of the Sudan and South Sudan and other relevant parties and stakeholders on all issues related to the peace consolidation process, regarding (a) the implementation of bilateral agreements, (b) the completion of negotiations on the outstanding issues between the Sudan and South Sudan, and (c) the consolidation of peace and stability within the Sudan and South Sudan (6 visits each to the Sudan and South Sudan)
- Provision of advice or technical assistance through regular meetings and consultations with the African Union and IGAD on (a) the implementation of bilateral agreements, (b) the completion of negotiations on the outstanding issues between the Sudan and South Sudan, and (c) consolidation of peace and stability within the Sudan and South Sudan (50 meetings/consultations)

- Regular engagement and consultations with key Member States, including countries of the region and neighbouring States, to develop and foster common approaches (12 meetings/consultations)
- Biannual briefings by the Special Envoy to the Security Council and the General Assembly on various related issues (2 briefings)

### External factors

171. The objective is expected to be achieved provided the political will of the leaders and their respective communities prevails, particularly in view of the internal crises in both countries, and that there is continuing support from the international community.

### Resource requirements (regular budget)

Table 21

#### Financial resources

(Thousands of United States dollars)

Category of expenditure	2018			2019		Variance	Net requirements for 2019
	Appropriation	Estimated expenditures	Estimated variance	Total requirements	Non-recurrent requirements	2019 vs. 2018 Increase/ (decrease)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)=(2)-(1)	(4)	(5)	(6)=(4)-(1)	
Civilian personnel costs	1 157.9	1 208.4	50.5	1 259.8	—	101.9	1 310.3
Operational costs	251.6	241.7	(9.9)	242.7	2.3	(8.9)	232.8
<b>Total (net of staff assessment)</b>	<b>1 409.5</b>	<b>1 450.1</b>	<b>40.6</b>	<b>1 502.5</b>	<b>2.3</b>	<b>93.0</b>	<b>1 543.1</b>

Table 22

#### Positions

	Professional and higher categories									General Service and related categories		National staff				Total
	USG	ASG	D-2	D-1	P-5	P-4	P-3	P-2	Subtotal	Field/ Security Services	General Service	Total inter-national	National Professional Officer	Local level	United Nations Volunteers	
Approved 2018	1	—	—	1	—	2	1	—	5	—	—	5	2	2	—	9
Proposed 2019	1	—	—	1	—	2	1	—	5	—	—	5	2	2	—	9
<b>Change</b>	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—

172. The projected overexpenditure for 2018 is mainly attributable to the higher actual average step in grade of current incumbents and the ratio of actual common staff costs to actual salaries, based on expenditure trends, partially offset by a decrease in requirements mainly under repair and maintenance and spare parts for communications and information technology, and other supplies, services and equipment.

173. The proposed resources for 2019 for the Office of the Special Envoy amount to \$1,502,500 (net of staff assessment) and would provide for salaries and common staff costs for the continuation of nine positions (1 Under-Secretary-General, 1 D-1, 2 P-4, 1 P-3, 2 National Professional Officers and 2 Local level) (\$1,259,800), as well as operational costs (\$242,700), comprising official travel (\$161,700), facilities and infrastructure (\$11,300), ground transportation (\$8,300), communications and

information technology (\$51,100), medical (\$3,300) and other supplies, services and equipment (\$7,000).

174. In 2019, the proposed number and levels of positions for the Office of the Special Envoy for the Sudan and South Sudan will remain unchanged.

175. The variance (increase) between 2019 requirements and the 2018 approved budget reflects the provision at the actual average step in grade of current incumbents and the ratio of actual common staff cost expenditures to actual salaries. The increase is partially offset by reduced operational costs, mainly under other supplies, services and equipment owing to reduced requirements for freight, based on expenditure trends.

#### **Extrabudgetary resources**

176. In 2018, the Office of the Special Envoy for the Sudan and South Sudan benefited from extrabudgetary resources in an estimated amount of \$167,000 for consultancy services and temporary administrative support. No extrabudgetary resources are projected for the Office of the Special Envoy in 2019.

### **H. Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region**

*(\$4,400,400)*

#### **Background, mandate and objective**

177. On 24 February 2013, recognizing the recurring cycles of conflict and violence that have plagued the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, Angola, Burundi, the Central African Republic, the Congo, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, South Africa, South Sudan, Rwanda, Uganda, the United Republic of Tanzania and Zambia signed the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Region. The Framework outlines key national, regional and international actions required to end the cycles of conflict in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. Kenya and the Sudan joined the Framework in January 2014. The Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region was established in 2013 with the mandate to support the implementation of the Framework.

178. In continuation of Security Council resolutions [2098 \(2013\)](#), [2147 \(2014\)](#), [2211 \(2015\)](#), [2277 \(2016\)](#) and [2348 \(2017\)](#), in resolution [2389 \(2017\)](#) the Council requested the Special Envoy to continue his regional and international engagement in furtherance of peace and stability in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the region, including through the promotion of timely, credible and inclusive national elections and regional dialogue. The Council also requested the Special Envoy, in close coordination with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the Democratic Republic of the Congo, to engage in regional initiatives to address the underlying root causes of conflict, while avoiding overlapping with other United Nations institutions. Furthermore, in resolution [2389 \(2017\)](#) the Council welcomed the commitment of the signatory States of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework to complete without precondition the repatriation of the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR) disarmed combatants and former Mouvement du Mars 23 (M23) combatants within the shortest possible time frame and urged the Governments of the region, with the support of the Framework guarantors, to strengthen their collaboration to meet the agreed time frame.

179. In March 2016, the Security Council took note of the Special Envoy's road map aimed at supporting the implementation of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework and endorsed the Great Lakes Regional Strategic Framework 2016–2017 (see [S/PRST/2016/2](#)), which harmonizes and aligns United Nations programmatic interventions in support of the political objectives of the Framework.

#### **Cooperation with other entities**

180. The Office of the Special Envoy will continue to collaborate closely with the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), especially on the implementation of national and regional commitments, as outlined in the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework and relevant Security Council resolutions. It will also cooperate with the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Burundi and the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa (UNOCA), as well as the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic, UNMISS and the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Sudan and South Sudan, to avoid overlap and maximize synergies in mandate implementation.

181. The Office of the Special Envoy for the Great Lakes Region will collaborate with United Nations country teams in the region to ensure the effective implementation of the Great Lakes Regional Strategic Framework.

182. The Office of the Special Envoy will continue to collaborate with the Regional Service Centre in Entebbe, Uganda, on non-locational administrative support elements and the United Nations Office at Nairobi on locational administrative support elements, so as to ensure timely support and efficient service delivery to the Office. Support provided by both entities is on a cost-reimbursable basis.

#### **Performance information**

183. During the first half of 2018, the Office of the Special Envoy continued to support the signatory countries in the implementation of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework. The Office also continued to support the governing mechanisms of the Framework, with a view to strengthening regional ownership and engagement in the implementation process. Political engagement by the Special Envoy, in cooperation with the guarantor institutions, led to the launch of the follow-up mechanism on the repatriation of disarmed combatants. The Special Envoy further engaged in good offices to promote concerted regional and international support to the holding of peaceful and credible elections in the region and in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and to strengthen relations between the core countries of the region. Furthermore, the Office has supported resource mobilization for and the overall implementation of the Great Lakes Regional Strategic Framework.

184. During the first half of 2018, the Office accomplished the following targets under expected accomplishment (a):

(a) Continuous support to the dialogue process in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in coordination with the other guarantors of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework, including high-level missions to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Angola, the Congo, the United Republic of Tanzania, Uganda, Ethiopia (headquarters of the African Union), Belgium and France to engage with regional and international partners in support of the implementation of the Comprehensive and Inclusive Political Agreement signed on 31 December 2016;

(b) Sustained outreach and good offices to concerned stakeholders in support of the neutralization of negative forces, in coordination with MONUSCO, including through the launching of the follow-up mechanism on the repatriation of disarmed combatants;

(c) Support to the East African Community-led dialogue process in Burundi, through engagement with regional leaders;

(d) Continued support to the implementation of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework commitments, including through: (i) the meeting of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the core countries of the Framework in Addis Ababa on 24 January to review the implementation of the Great Lakes Regional Strategic Framework and discuss solutions to ongoing political crises in the region; (ii) the holding of a meeting of stakeholders and experts in Addis Ababa on 26 and 27 February which sought the views of participants, including those of Member States, the guarantors, international partners, civil society, women, youth and the private sector, on challenges and progress in the implementation of the Framework and reflected on the way forward, in line with the request contained in Security Council resolution [2389 \(2017\)](#); (iii) technical assistance and facilitation of the Technical Support Committee meetings; and (iv) high-level engagement with leaders of the region, including of Angola, the Congo and Uganda.

185. The Office of the Special Envoy accomplished the following targets under expected accomplishment (b):

(a) Continued coordination, including a strategic meeting between the Special Envoy and the Executive Secretary of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region on 22 March, in Nairobi, followed by technical-level discussions in Bujumbura on 12 and 13 April and from 23 to 25 May;

(b) Engagement with national and regional stakeholders in support of durable solutions for displacement;

(c) Coordination with the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo and other partners on initiatives to address the illegal exploitation and illicit trade of natural resources;

(d) Ongoing collaboration and coordination with the United Nations country teams in the region, including one coordination meeting with the Resident Coordinators of Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, Uganda and the United Republic of Tanzania and the Regional Directors of UNHCR, the International Organization for Migration, UNDP, UN-Women, UNICEF and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and one principal-level meeting of the working group on displacement, both held on 22 January 2018;

(e) Engagement with the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, the Government of Rwanda and the Rwanda Development Board on the convening of the second Private Sector Investment Conference for the Great Lakes Region;

(f) Face-to-face meeting of the Advisory Board of the Women's Platform for the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework, preceded by a technical preparatory meeting, in support of the women and peace and security agenda in the region;

(g) Development of the Women Platform's for the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework strategy in support of commitments related to women and peace and security in the Great Lakes region;

(h) Technical support to the secretariat of the International Conference for the development of a regional action plan for the implementation of Security Council resolution [1325 \(2000\)](#);

(i) Ongoing collaboration with the secretariat of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Judicial Cooperation Network;

(j) Support to the International Conference's Regional Training Facility on Sexual and Gender Based Violence.

### Planning assumptions for 2019

186. Based on the Special Envoy's mandate, the overarching planning assumptions for the 2019 budget will focus on the following priorities and programmatic activities:

- (a) Conduct good offices to support efforts to neutralize armed groups;
- (b) Support the implementation of existing accords and mechanisms that promote regional cooperation and confidence-building;
- (c) Provide good offices to support the conduct of timely, credible and inclusive elections in countries of the region;
- (d) Support the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework governance structures, including for the effective functioning of the Technical Support Committee and the Regional Oversight Mechanism;
- (e) Collaborate on durable solutions for displaced persons in the region;
- (f) Consolidate efforts to ensure that gender and women and peace and security perspectives are mainstreamed in peace and development processes, and encourage greater participation of women in peace processes;
- (g) Initiate and support efforts to engage civil society and youth in the implementation of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework;
- (h) Promote initiatives on socioeconomic cooperation in the region, including support for organizing the second Private Sector Investment Conference;
- (i) Support efforts to strengthen judicial cooperation in the Great Lakes region;
- (j) Support efforts to address the illegal exploitation and trade of natural resources in the Great Lakes region;
- (k) Provide support to the implementation of the Great Lakes Regional Strategic Framework.

187. The objective, expected accomplishments, indicators of achievement and performance measures for the mission are set out below.

Table 23

### Objective, expected accomplishments, indicators of achievement and performance measures

*Objective:* To advance the implementation of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Region, and promote durable solutions to prevent and resolve recurring conflicts in the Great Lakes region, including by carrying out tasks mandated by the Security Council in resolution [2389 \(2017\)](#)

Expected accomplishment	Indicators of achievement	Performance measures			
			2019	2018	2017 2016
(a) Progress in the implementation of the commitments under the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework according to the established benchmarks and the Special Envoy's road map	(i) Support increased efforts to neutralize negative forces in line with relevant Security Council resolutions (with a focus on FDLR, the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) and the former M23)  [increased number of advocacy meetings at political and technical levels, both diplomatic and military]	Target	8	7	
		Estimate		7	6
		Actual			6 6



[number of initiatives to reinforce or establish mechanisms to promote voluntary defection within ADF and facilitate a political solution]	Target	2		
	Estimate		1	
	Actual			
(ii) Progress in the implementation of the repatriation of former M23 combatants from Rwanda and Uganda to the Democratic Republic of the Congo	Target	7	4	
	Estimate		5	
	Actual			–
[number of pending issues resolved by the Democratic Republic of the Congo and former M23 combatants]	Target			
	Estimate			
	Actual			
(iii) Progress on the voluntary repatriation of FDLR elements in voluntarily disarmed persons camps	Target	6	3	
	Estimate		5	2
	Actual			2
[number of initiatives within the framework of the follow-up mechanism]	Target			1
	Estimate			
	Actual			
(iv) Increase in confidence-building initiatives facilitated for enhanced cooperation between the Governments of the region	Target	7	5	
	Estimate		6	5
	Actual			6
[number of high-level meetings and summits, including sectoral meetings]	Target			4
	Estimate			
	Actual			
(v) Increased efforts towards promoting peaceful, inclusive and transparent elections in the region including	Target	20	20	
	Estimate		20	15
	Actual			17
[number of good offices activities and high-level engagements in support of the political dialogues in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Burundi]	Target			15
	Estimate			
	Actual			
[number of high-level engagements and joint statements with international partners in support of a coherent international engagement to support inclusive and transparent elections in the region]	Target	15	6	
	Estimate		10	6
	Actual			8
(vi) Strengthening the effectiveness of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework governance structures, including through regular high-level and ministerial meetings of the Regional Oversight Mechanism and meetings of the Technical Support Committee.	Target	6	6	
	Estimate		6	6
	Actual			6
[number of high-level and ministerial meetings of the Regional Oversight Mechanism and number of meetings of the Technical Support Committee held]	Target			5
	Estimate			
	Actual			
[percentage of priority activities implemented by countries of the region]	Target	30	30	
	Estimate		30	20
	Actual			20
[number of meetings of guarantors on joint initiatives in support of the implementation of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework]	Target	4	4	
	Estimate		4	2
	Actual			2
				–

#### Outputs

- Reports of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on the implementation of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework (2)
- Briefings to the Security Council on the implementation of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework (2)

- Joint statements of the guarantors of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework to support and promote the political dialogue processes in the Great Lakes region (3)
- Joint meetings and/or missions conducted/undertaken with the other guarantors to promote confidence-building among regional leaders (5)
- Meetings of the Technical Support Committee convened jointly with the African Union Commission (3)
- Meetings of the Regional Oversight Mechanism jointly convened and co-chaired by the United Nations Secretary-General and the Chairperson of the African Union Commission (1)
- Good offices work to support the holding of free, fair and peaceful presidential elections in the region and a politically stable post-electoral environment, through high-level visits to the countries in the region (9)
- Reports on the progress under the follow-up mechanism in the repatriation of FDLR combatants and their dependants and the former M23 still present in Rwanda and Uganda (6)
- Joint engagement with the guarantors to support the acceleration of the neutralization of FDLR, ADF and other armed groups operating in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, including through missions and meetings (4)
- Advocacy missions by the Advisory Board of the Women's Platform for the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework to Burundi, the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and South Sudan to increase participation and official representation of women in political and dialogue processes and legislative bodies in the Great Lakes region (4)
- High-level stakeholders consultation convened jointly with the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region in view of reaching agreement on regional political cooperation to address displacement and promote just and durable solutions (1)

Expected accomplishments	Indicators of achievement		Performance measures			
			2019	2018	2017	2016
(b) Progress in facilitating a political process that involves Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework signatory countries, the international community, civil society, women, youth and other stakeholders to address the underlying root causes of the conflict in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo	(i) Implementation of initiatives and projects to support durable solutions to address displacement in the region [number of initiatives and projects]	Target	5	5	5	5
		Estimate		8	8	5
		Actual			5	5
	(ii) Improved socioeconomic development and enhanced regional economic integration [number of initiatives and projects implemented including in the context of the Great Lakes Regional Strategic Framework]	Target	10	7	5	4
		Estimate		8	5	4
		Actual			5	4
	(iii) Increased mobilization and engagement of civil society and grassroots movements in the region to promote a shared vision for peace and prosperity in the region [number of initiatives and projects implemented]	Target	8	6	5	4
		Estimate		7	5	4
		Actual			7	5
	(iv) Progress in fighting impunity, improving accountability and advancing regional judicial cooperation to strengthen the rule of law in the region [number of extraditions and prosecutions of high-profile perpetrators and masterminds of serious human rights violations]	Target	6	5	5	4
		Estimate		7	5	4
		Actual			5	4
	(v) Strengthened strategic partnership with donors [mobilization of resources for projects supporting the implementation of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework]	Target	\$1 million	\$4 million	\$3 million	\$4 million
		Estimate		\$0.5 million	\$3 million	\$2.6 million
		Actual			\$3 million	\$1.4 million
	[number of initiatives taken to mobilize resources]	Target	15	12		
		Estimate		15	12	
		Actual			12	8

*Outputs*

- Thematic papers and/or related projects developed jointly with partners in which concrete regional actions to widen and deepen regional integration are proposed (5)
- Quarterly updates on women and peace and security issues in the region produced with inputs from all relevant stakeholders (4)
- Conference to be facilitated together with partners on substantive matters to make recommendations for action, with participation of government representatives, civil society groups, human rights defenders and women's groups from the Great Lakes region (1)
- Tours in the region to engage the political leadership on the full implementation of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework (8)
- Weekly consultations with the African Union, the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region and the Southern African Development Community (52)
- Increased efforts and initiatives in resource mobilization for the cross-border trust fund in support of the Great Lakes Regional Strategic Framework (12)
- Technical and advisory support to judicial officials of the International Conference countries on regional judicial cooperation in the framework of the Great Lakes Judicial Cooperation Network (12)
- Facilitation of an international conference on strengthening the economic sector in the Great Lakes region (1)

**External factors**

188. The Office of the Special Envoy is expected to achieve its mandate provided that there is political will among signatory countries of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework to implement national and regional commitments for the stabilization of eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo and the overall implementation of the Framework; the situation in the region allows for continued political dialogue between countries in the region; and there is continued support and focus on the Great Lakes region by Member States to ensure success in the implementation process, including coordinated actions and coherent messaging to signatory countries.

**Resource requirements (regular budget)**

Table 24

**Financial resources**

(Thousands of United States dollars)

Category of expenditure	2018			2019		Variance	Net requirements for 2019
	Appropriation	Estimated expenditures	Estimated variance	Total requirements	Non-recurrent requirements	2019 vs. 2018	
						Increase/ (decrease)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)=(2)-(1)	(4)	(5)	(6)=(4)-(1)	(7)=(4)+(3)
Civilian personnel costs	2 577.6	3 228.1	650.5	3 271.4	—	693.8	3 921.9
Operational costs	1 129.0	1 096.8	(32.2)	1 129.0	20.3	—	1 096.8
<b>Total (net of staff assessment)</b>	<b>3 706.6</b>	<b>4 324.9</b>	<b>618.3</b>	<b>4 400.4</b>	<b>20.3</b>	<b>693.8</b>	<b>5 018.7</b>

Table 25  
Positions

	<i>Professional and higher categories</i>								<i>General Service and related categories</i>		<i>National staff</i>				<i>United Nations Volunteers</i>	<i>Total</i>
	<i>USG</i>	<i>ASG</i>	<i>D-2</i>	<i>D-1</i>	<i>P-5</i>	<i>P-4</i>	<i>P-3</i>	<i>P-2</i>	<i>Subtotal</i>	<i>Field/ Security Services</i>	<i>General Service</i>	<i>Total inter-national</i>	<i>National Professional Officer</i>	<i>Local level</i>		
Approved 2018	1	–	1	1	4	6	4	–	17	1	1	19	1	7	–	27
Proposed 2019	1	–	1	1	4	6	4	–	17	1	1	19	1	7	–	27
<b>Change</b>	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–

189. The projected overexpenditure for 2018 is mainly attributable to lower projected actual average vacancy rates (16 per cent) for international staff than budgeted (32 per cent), partly offset by lower than budgeted requirements for operational costs, mainly under: (a) official travel, as a result of increased utilization of videoconferencing for a number of meetings in lieu of undertaking travel; and (b) air operations, as a result of use of commercial flights for regional travel to the maximum extent possible and consolidation of special flights into round trips instead of stand-alone special flights.

190. The proposed resources for 2019 for the Office of the Special Envoy amount to \$4,400,400 (net of staff assessment) and would provide for salaries and common staff costs for the continuation of 27 positions (1 Under-Secretary-General, 1 D-2, 1 D-1, 4 P-5, 6 P-4, 4 P-3, 1 Field Service, 1 National Professional Officer, 1 General Service and 7 Local level) (\$3,271,400), as well as operational costs (\$1,129,000), comprising consultants and consulting services (\$68,000), official travel (\$367,600), facilities and infrastructure (\$126,200), ground transportation (\$64,600), air operations (\$51,800), communications and information technology (\$208,600), medical (\$7,800) and other supplies, services and equipment (\$234,400).

191. In 2019, the number and levels of the positions for the Office of the Special Envoy are proposed to remain unchanged.

192. The variance (increase) between 2019 requirements and the 2018 approved budget is mainly attributable to the application of lower vacancy rates in 2019 (20 per cent) compared with the budgeted vacancy rates in 2018 (32 per cent) for international staff. Under operational costs, there are increased requirements mainly under consultants and consulting services, and other supplies, services and equipment, as a result of increased activities for thematic workshops and organization of meetings requiring translation and interpretation services. These increases are fully offset by reduced requirements mainly under: (a) official travel, as a result of efforts to continue increased utilization of video- and teleconferencing for some meetings in lieu of travel; and (b) air operations, as a result of use of commercial flights for regional travel to the maximum extent possible and consolidation of special flights into round trips instead of stand-alone special flights.

### Extrabudgetary resources

193. The Office of the Special Envoy estimates that it will mobilize \$0.5 million in extrabudgetary resources in 2018. Extrabudgetary resources have been utilized to support the Office of the Special Envoy in its implementation of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework through various projects under the different thematic areas. In 2019, the Office is projecting that \$1.0 million in extrabudgetary resources would be mobilized, to be utilized for implementation of the Framework through various projects under the different thematic areas.

## I. Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen

(\$17,192,900)

### Background, mandate and objective

194. Since the beginning of the uprising in Yemen in early 2011, the Secretary-General has used his good offices to promote peace and stability through dialogue and negotiations in accordance with Security Council resolutions [2014 \(2011\)](#), [2051 \(2012\)](#), [2140 \(2014\)](#), [2201 \(2015\)](#), [2204 \(2015\)](#) and [2216 \(2015\)](#).

195. To ensure the full and effective implementation of Security Council resolutions [2014 \(2011\)](#) and [2051 \(2012\)](#), together with the political transition agreed in November 2011 under the Gulf Cooperation Council Initiative and the agreement on the implementation mechanism for the transition process in Yemen in accordance with the Initiative, the Secretary-General established the Office of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Yemen (see also [S/2015/283](#) and [S/2015/284](#)), in accordance with an exchange of letters with the President of the Security Council in June 2012 ([S/2012/469](#) and [S/2012/470](#)).

196. With the support and facilitation provided by the United Nations, Yemenis concluded a national dialogue conference in January 2014. The outcomes of the conference provided a blueprint for the creation of a new federal State underpinned by a commitment to democracy, good governance, the rule of law, national reconciliation and respect for the human rights and fundamental freedoms of all the people of Yemen. A constitution drafting commission was created to draft a new constitution on the basis of the outcomes of the National Dialogue Conference.

197. Despite important progress in the political transition, conflicts between government forces, the Houthis and other armed groups over the draft constitution and power-sharing arrangements led to an escalation of military violence in mid-2014 when the Houthis and allied units of the armed forces seized control of Sana'a and other parts of the country.

198. At the request of the President of Yemen, Abdrabuh Mansour Hadi, a coalition of countries led by Saudi Arabia intervened militarily on 26 March 2015 in support of the Government of Yemen. More than three years of fighting between pro-Government of Yemen forces and pro-Houthi forces on several fronts has led to thousands of civilian casualties, destruction of infrastructure and a large-scale humanitarian crisis. Political tensions between the Government and southern groups have also increased, leading to deadly outbreaks of violence in Aden, Yemen. In addition, attacks claimed by Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula and ISIL continue in many parts of Yemen. The overall security situation remains highly volatile.

199. The previous Special Envoy facilitated successive rounds of consultations aimed at obtaining a negotiated settlement to end the conflict and resume the political transition process, including direct talks in Switzerland in June and December 2015, and in Kuwait from April to August 2016. The parties agreed through United Nations-mediated negotiations that a solution to the conflict would include a series of political and security arrangements leading to the formation of a government of national unity, the withdrawal of forces and the handover of heavy weapons. The previous Special Envoy also mediated and provided technical support to the implementation of a cessation of hostilities agreement, which lasted from 10 April to 7 August 2016. In addition, he urged the parties to implement measures that would build trust between the parties and relieve humanitarian suffering, as outlined in the statements by the President of the Security Council of 15 June 2017 ([S/PRST/2017/7](#)) and 15 March 2018 ([S/PRST/2018/5](#)).

200. Following on from these previous efforts, a new Special Envoy was appointed by the Secretary-General on 16 February 2018 (see [S/2018/126](#) and [S/2018/127](#)) to continue exercising his good offices role to enable a resumption of a peaceful, inclusive, orderly and Yemeni-led political transition process that meets the legitimate demands and aspirations of the Yemeni people, as well as relevant Security Council resolutions on Yemen.

201. The overall aim of the Office of the Special Envoy is to provide support to the Yemen peace process and the implementation of any eventual agreements to enable the resumption of a peaceful, inclusive, orderly and Yemeni-led transition. In line with Security Council resolution [2216 \(2015\)](#), as well as other Council resolutions on Yemen, including resolutions [2051 \(2012\)](#) and [2014 \(2011\)](#), and the letter from the Secretary-General to the Security Council dated 24 May 2016 ([S/2016/488](#)), the Special Envoy will mediate between the parties with a view to ending the conflict. The Office will support the Special Envoy in providing facilitation and technical advice on the negotiation and design of interim-security arrangements, the restoration of State institutions and preparations for the resumption of political dialogue, including on finalizing and adopting a draft constitution, an electoral road map, national reconciliation and transitional justice. It will also facilitate and provide technical advice to the Yemeni parties to ensure respect for and compliance with interim security arrangements. In addition, it will lead United Nations assistance for the implementation of the initial stages of agreements concluded through negotiations, and plan and prepare for United Nations support for the implementation of more comprehensive agreements.

#### **Cooperation with other entities**

202. In 2019, the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs will be responsible for providing strategic guidance and substantive backstopping support to the Office of the Special Envoy.

203. In 2019, the Department of Operational Support will continue to provide strategic guidance on field support issues relating to the Office in Yemen and Jordan. In the implementation of the good offices mandate, the Special Envoy and his Office will continue to consult and coordinate closely with the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, the relevant missions in the region and, when appropriate, the Department of Peace Operations, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, OHCHR, UNDP and UN-Women. Cooperation will continue with the United Nations Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator and the agencies, funds and programmes of the United Nations operating in Yemen. In addition, agencies working in Yemen are represented in the Inter-Agency Task Force on Yemen at Headquarters, which ensures the coordination and coherence of United Nations political, humanitarian, human rights and other efforts in Yemen. Furthermore, the Office will continue to pursue joint efforts with international financial institutions to facilitate joint response strategies for post-agreement planning, including recovery and peacebuilding activities.

204. The Kuwait Joint Support Office will continue to provide transactional support in the areas of finance, human resources and travel. The Office of the Special Envoy will draw support from the Support Office for finance-related transactional activities. Furthermore, the Support Office will address all transactional and back office processing, which includes settlement of vendor invoices and staff member travel claims and processing of the payroll for national staff.

205. In fulfilling his tasks, the Special Envoy and his Office engage closely with Member States and the Security Council, as well as international and regional

organizations, including the League of Arab States, the Gulf Cooperation Council and other international partners.

206. Work on the draft constitution, electoral reform and other transition tasks will be conducted in close coordination with the Electoral Assistance Division of the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, the Resident Coordinator and the United Nations country team.

### **Performance information**

207. Accomplishments achieved during the period from January to June 2018 reflected ongoing efforts to end the violence and facilitate a negotiated political settlement in Yemen, including consultations with key stakeholders on elements of a framework for negotiations as well as possible confidence-building measures. The arrival of a new Special Envoy renewed momentum towards a peace process. This has included enhanced access to and engagement with the main parties to the conflict, including the Government of Yemen, Sana'a-based parties and southern political and security stakeholders.

208. At his first briefing to the Security Council, in April 2018, the new Special Envoy announced his intention to put forward a framework for negotiations. The Special Envoy and his Office continued their close collaboration with regional and international partners to design and organize consultative meetings with Yemeni interlocutors, intended to gather input on and build broad understanding and acceptance of the elements of a framework for negotiations and an agreement, which would allow for the resumption of the political transition process. The consultation meetings considered a range of issues, including peace negotiations and the current challenges, political and interim security arrangements, restoration of State institutions, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, the constitution-making process, elections and electoral reform, the issue of southern Yemen, and women and peace and security.

209. During the second half of the reporting period in 2018, the Special Envoy and his Office will continue efforts to promote a negotiated settlement to end the conflict. In this regard, mediation efforts will initially focus on finalizing the details of a framework for negotiations, including the security and political elements of an agreement to relaunch the political process. It is anticipated that an agreement will lead to the restoration of Yemen's political transition process, including finalizing the constitution, holding general elections, addressing the issue of southern Yemen and advancing national reconciliation. The Office will also expand its efforts to promote inclusive political participation in the peace process, involving southern political groups, women, youth and civil society organizations. The Office will continue its partnership with the entities of the Humanitarian-Development-Peace Initiative, which also includes the United Nations Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator for Yemen, the European Union delegation to Yemen and the Islamic Development Bank, and will continue broader consultations with Yemeni stakeholders, the United Nations country team and other international partners to establish a coordinated approach on priorities and planning for the completion of the transition period.

### **Planning assumptions for 2019**

210. The broad activities of the Office of the Special Envoy in 2019 are expected to be as follows:

(a) Applying the good offices of the Secretary-General through his Special Envoy for Yemen to achieve a negotiated political settlement to end the conflict, consistent with the Gulf Cooperation Council Initiative and its implementation mechanism, the outcomes of the comprehensive national dialogue conference and

relevant Security Council resolutions. To that end, the Special Envoy will continue to mediate between the principal parties to the conflict in an effort to facilitate a comprehensive and inclusive agreement based on political and security arrangements to end the conflict; provide support in the negotiations regarding the design of mechanisms and processes that would form part of an agreement to end the conflict, including interim security and related monitoring arrangements, the restoration of State institutions and the resumption of the political transition process (finalizing and adopting a draft constitution, an agreement on an electoral road map and promoting national reconciliation and transitional justice); and consult broadly with domestic and international stakeholders, including the Government of Yemen, representatives of the Houthis, southern political groups, all other relevant Yemeni parties, women's and youth representatives, civil society organizations, the Gulf Cooperation Council and Member States with influence over the Yemeni parties. In consultation with the Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, the Special Envoy will advise the Secretary-General and Security Council on the political process;

(b) Working with the principal parties to the conflict, other Yemeni constituencies and stakeholders in the region and beyond, to reach agreement on interim security arrangements, including appropriate mechanisms for implementation, monitoring and de-escalation. If the parties agree on interim security arrangements as part of the peace process and, should the parties so request, the Office would need to mobilize extensive technical resources to support effective monitoring procedures.

211. It is expected that the engagement of the Security Council will remain active and high, including through regular reporting requirements to the Council (every 60 days). The reports are presented to the Council by the Special Envoy and, given the expected challenges to the peace process, frequent and ad hoc briefings can be anticipated.

212. The security conditions in Yemen are expected to remain very challenging for United Nations staff. Consequently, the Office of the Special Envoy and most of its staff will continue to be based outside Yemen but travel periodically to the country when required, and as security and operational conditions permit. The Office in Amman will continue to serve as the hub for support to Yemeni parties and operations in Yemen, and for consultations with Yemeni and international community stakeholders based in the region. The appointment of the new Special Envoy brought renewed momentum to the peace process and, consequently, increased engagement with Yemeni stakeholders. In this connection, the Special Envoy expects to undertake increased travel to Sana'a, Aden and elsewhere in Yemen. Staff presence in Sana'a grew in 2018; the further increase of personnel will depend on security and operational conditions. The Office intends to relocate to larger dedicated premises in Sana'a in early 2019.

213. Since the Government of Yemen has declared Aden the temporary capital, tensions between southern political groups and the Government of Yemen have increased. The Office of the Special Envoy has invested in office and accommodation space for a team in Aden, which is expected to deploy once appropriate security enhancements are completed in the last quarter of 2018. The presence in Aden will facilitate the good offices of the Secretary-General through the Special Envoy and his Office, including enhanced engagement with Yemeni interlocutors, such as those representing government (national and local), political parties, the southern political and security stakeholders and civil society. The Office increased its activities and engagements in Aden, especially given the heightened prominence of southern political and security stakeholders, and is expected to continue in 2019. Given the highly volatile security situation and the operationally challenging environment, staff presence in Aden is expected to increase gradually in 2018 and through 2019.



214. The Office will continue to collaborate with the United Nations country team and international financial institutions to guide transition planning in support of the political process and ensuring close linkages between development actors and the peace process.

215. The Office of the Special Envoy currently relies on the United Nations Humanitarian Air Service to travel to and from Yemen, as there are no commercial flights available. Capacity constraints and the priority given by the Service to humanitarian actors negatively affects the Office's ability to implement its activities in a predictable and timely manner. It is therefore proposed that the Office of the Special Envoy share an aircraft with the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) in 2019 to meet the travel requirements of the Special Envoy and other staff.

216. The objective, expected accomplishments, indicators of achievement and performance measures for the mission are set out below.

Table 26

**Objective, expected accomplishments, indicators of achievement and performance measures**

*Objective:* Inclusive peace process in Yemen is advanced, while levels of violence are reduced

Expected accomplishment	Indicators of achievement	Performance measures				
			2019	2018	2017	2016
(a) A negotiated solution is agreed that meets the legitimate will of the Yemeni people	(i) A framework for negotiations is agreed by the parties to the conflict	Target	Yes			
		Estimate				
		Actual				
	(ii) Number of meetings of representatives of parties to the conflict in an inclusive and comprehensive process [bilateral meetings, facilitated talks]	Target	200	60	50	
		Estimate		150	60	50
		Actual			100	150
	(iii) Number of instances of technical advice provided on the negotiation and design of elements for an agreement [capacity-building, options papers]	Target	50			
		Estimate		20		
		Actual				
	(iv) Number of cases in which women, youth and civil society organizations are meaningfully included in the political process [memberships in political bodies, capacity-building]	Target	150	100	80	
		Estimate		65	30	30
		Actual			86	16
	(v) Number of consultations conducted with southern political and security stakeholders to facilitate their meaningful participation in the political process.	Target	21			
		Estimate		15		
		Actual				

*Outputs*

- Regular engagement and consultations on political elements of an agreement, including but not limited to the constitution, elections and national reconciliation (40)
- Consultations and provision of technical advice on the restoration of State institutions, including respect for the legally established lines of authority and the removal of any obstructions to the proper functioning of State institutions (40)
- Consultations and technical advice on the resumption of the political dialogue, including agreements for finalizing and adopting the draft constitution, undertaking electoral reform and holding general elections (60)

Expected accomplishment	Indicators of achievement	Performance measures			
		2019	2018	2017	2016
(b) Parties agree to implement interim security arrangements that allow for the effective functioning of the Transitional Government	(i) Number of technical support initiatives provided to the parties on interim security arrangements [capacity-building, advisory products]	Target	24		
		Estimate		9	
		Actual			
	(ii) Number of cases in which women, youth and civil society organizations are meaningfully included in formulation or implementation of security arrangements	Target	10		
		Estimate		6	
		Actual			
	(iii) Number of consultations with southern political and security stakeholders to facilitate their contribution to the formulation and implementation of interim security arrangements	Target	21		
		Estimate		15	
		Actual			
Output					
• Regular engagement, consultations and provision of technical advice on the negotiation and design of interim security arrangements, including the formation of security committees, the negotiated disengagement/withdrawal of armed groups and the orderly handover of heavy weapons to an agreed upon mechanism (100)					

### External factors

217. The objective will be achieved provided there is sufficient political will and engagement from domestic, regional and international stakeholders, and there is continued support from the international community for the Special Envoy.

### Resource requirements (regular budget)

Table 27

#### Financial resources

(Thousands of United States dollars)

Category of expenditure	2018			2019		Variance	
	Appropriation	Estimated expenditures	Estimated variance	Total requirements	Non-recurrent requirements	2019 vs. 2018 Increase/ (decrease)	Net requirements for 2019
	(1)	(2)	(3)=(2)-(1)	(4)	(5)	(6)=(4)-(1)	(7)=(4)+(3)
Civilian personnel costs	8 332.7	11 182.4	2 849.7	11 114.5	—	2 781.8	13 964.2
Operational costs	4 719.1	4 597.8	(121.3)	6 078.4	534.1	1 359.3	5 957.1
<b>Total (net of staff assessment)</b>	<b>13 051.8</b>	<b>15 780.2</b>	<b>2 728.4</b>	<b>17 192.9</b>	<b>534.1</b>	<b>4 141.1</b>	<b>19 921.3</b>

Table 28

#### Positions

	Professional and higher categories									General Service and related categories		National staff				
	USG	ASG	D-2	D-1	P-5	P-4	P-3	P-2	Subtotal	Field/ Security Services	General Service	Total inter-national	National Professional Officer	Local level	United Nations Volunteers	Total
Approved 2018	1	—	1	1	7	14	11	—	35	25	1	61	8	26	—	95
Proposed 2019	1	—	1	1	6	15	11	—	35	26	1	62	8	28	—	98
<b>Change</b>	<b>—</b>	<b>—</b>	<b>—</b>	<b>—</b>	<b>(1)</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>—</b>	<b>—</b>	<b>—</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>—</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>—</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>—</b>	<b>3</b>

218. The projected overexpenditure in 2018 is mainly the result of lower average vacancy rates for international (approved 30 per cent; projected 16 per cent) and national (approved 50 per cent; projected 29 per cent) staff, and the ratio of actual common staff cost expenditures to actual salaries, based on expenditure trends. The overexpenditure is partly offset by reduced requirements under operating costs, mainly under ground transportation as a result of reduced requirements for petrol, oil and lubricants, repairs and maintenance, and spare parts based on the number of vehicle holdings of the Office of the Special Envoy.

219. The estimated requirements for the Office of the Special Envoy for 2019 amount to \$17,192,900 (net of staff assessment) and provides for 98 civilian personnel (1 Under-Secretary-General, 1 D-2, 1 D-1, 6 P-5, 15 P-4, 11 P-3, 26 Field Service, 1 General Service (Other level), 8 National Professional Officers and 28 Local level) (\$11,114,500), as well as operational costs (\$6,078,400), including official travel (\$760,700), facilities and infrastructure (\$2,512,700), ground transportation (\$569,100), air operations (\$1,305,800), communications and information technology (\$518,200), medical (\$122,500) and other supplies, services and equipment (\$289,400).

220. The proposed staffing complement for the Office of the Special Envoy for 2019 includes a total of 98 positions, as shown in table 28. In 2019, the Office of the Special Envoy proposes the following changes:

(a) Proposed establishment of one backstopping Political Affairs Officer position (P-4) in the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs to ensure appropriate Headquarters-level backstopping support to the Office of the Special Envoy in fulfilment of its strengthened and expanded role in accordance with relevant Security Council resolutions and presidential statements;

(b) Proposed abolishment of one Senior Security Sector Reform Officer position (P-5) in Amman in the Security Sector Section due to delays in the peace process which entailed a shift in focus away from programming and capacity-building associated with security sector reform implementation;

(c) Proposed redeployment of one Political Affairs Officer position (P-4) in the Political Affairs Section from Amman to Sana'a for additional substantive support;

(d) Proposed redeployment of one Security Officer position (Field Service) in the Safety and Security Section from Sana'a to Aden to enhance the Office's security capacity in Aden;

(e) Proposed establishment of two Human Resources Assistant positions (1 Field Service and 1 Local level) and one Finance Assistant position (Local level) in Kuwait. The Kuwait Joint Support Office provides a full range of transactional support services for its core client missions, which include UNAMA, UNAMI, the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria, the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen and the United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia. Following an evaluation of the requirements for the Support Office, it has been determined that the staff required for the Office should be redistributed across all of its client missions to ensure that each mission shares the burden of costs appropriately. Accordingly, it is proposed that three new positions be established in each of the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria and the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen, to be based in Kuwait with a corresponding reduction of these positions in UNAMA and UNAMI.

221. The variance (increase) between the resources proposed for 2019 and the 2018 approved budget is mainly attributable to the increased requirements for international and national staff, which reflects the actual lower vacancy rate applied in 2019 based on the actual vacancy rate in August 2018 for continuing positions (international staff:

15 per cent; national staff: 30 per cent) compared with the approved vacancy rate in 2018 (international staff: 30 per cent; national staff: 50 per cent), and the provision at the actual average step in grade of the current incumbents and the ratio of actual common staff cost expenditures to actual salaries, based on expenditure trends. A 50 per cent vacancy rate has been applied to the proposed establishment of a backstopping Political Affairs Officer (P-4) position and a Human Resources Assistant position (Field Service). A 35 per cent vacancy rate has been applied to the proposed establishment of a Finance Assistant position (Local level) and a Human Resources Assistant position (Local level). Operational costs are projected to increase in 2019 mainly owing to (a) the rental and operation of a fixed-wing aircraft based on a contract effective 1 January 2019 which is cost shared between the Office of the Special Envoy and UNAMI; (b) the acquisition of prefabricated facilities and accommodation, and refrigeration, water treatment and security equipment; security and maintenance services; rental of premises; and petrol, oil and lubricants for the generators for the new office space in Sana'a which will be ready by the first quarter of 2019 on a 25:75 cost-share ratio basis between the Office and other agencies, funds and programmes, respectively; and (c) the acquisition of two armoured vehicles based on security requirements which would support the movements of the Special Envoy in Sana'a.

#### **Extrabudgetary resources**

222. In 2018, extrabudgetary resources estimated at \$1,684,000 have been utilized to support the Office of the Special Envoy to assist the De-escalation and Coordination Committee and the negotiations on security arrangements; to strengthen the gender capacity of the Office to support the leadership role and active and meaningful engagement of Yemeni women; and to provide continued support to the constitution-making process. In 2019, funding amounting to \$549,000 is projected to support the Office to assist in negotiating the security aspects of an agreement and the establishment of effective transitional security arrangements.

### **J. Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Burundi**

*(\$7,489,500)*

#### **Background, mandate and objective**

223. More than three years after the outbreak of a violent political crisis, the situation in Burundi remains precarious. A political and peaceful settlement that addresses the root causes of the crisis has yet to be found, despite the continuing efforts of the East African Community to promote an inclusive political dialogue.

224. The socioeconomic and humanitarian fallout of the crisis continues to have a severe impact on the livelihood and security of the Burundian population. Human rights violations continue to be reported, including enforced disappearances, torture and ill-treatment, as well as arbitrary arrests by security forces and members of youth militias. Since April 2015, more than 420,000 Burundians have sought refuge in neighbouring countries. Despite the voluntary return of some refugees through the tripartite voluntary repatriation programme, the number of Burundian refugees in neighbouring countries continues to be high.

225. The Security Council has remained seized of the situation in Burundi. In its resolution [2248 \(2015\)](#), the Council requested the Secretary-General to deploy a team in Burundi to coordinate and work with the Government of Burundi, the African Union and other partners to assess the situation and develop options to address political and security issues. The Office of the Special Envoy (previously the Office

of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Conflict Prevention, including in Burundi) has been operational in Bujumbura since January 2016.

226. In its subsequent resolutions [2279 \(2016\)](#) and [2303 \(2016\)](#), the Security Council reaffirmed the need for the Secretary-General, through his good offices, to continue to support the inter-Burundian dialogue and coordinate and provide all necessary technical and substantive support to the mediation process led by the East African Community, and to work with the Government of Burundi and other concerned stakeholders in the areas of security and the rule of law. The Council also requested the Secretary-General to report on the situation in Burundi every three months, if necessary, and to provide written reports immediately to the Council on grave security incidents, violations of international humanitarian law and violations or abuses of human rights. In its presidential statement of 5 April 2018 ([S/PRST/2018/7](#)), the Council reiterated its support to the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General in the efforts to overcome the current political impasse and foster an inclusive reconciliation process.

### **Cooperation with other entities**

227. The Office of the Special Envoy liaises and coordinates closely with United Nations regional political offices in the region, including UNOCA, the Office of the Special Envoy for the Great Lakes Region and the United Nations Office to the African Union to ensure adequate support to regional and subregional initiatives on Burundi. The Office also closely cooperates with the Peacebuilding Commission in its configuration on Burundi, OHCHR and the Office of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide in order to promote coherence on Burundian political issues.

228. The Office of the Special Envoy collaborates closely with the Office of the United Nations Resident Coordinator and the United Nations country team in Burundi. Where appropriate, synergies have been found with ongoing programmes and projects that are relevant to the implementation of the Special Envoy's mandate. The Special Envoy continues to rely on technical advice and support from the OHCHR country office to ensure that respect for human rights are mainstreamed into all activities.

229. In 2019, at the Headquarters level, the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs will chair the Inter-Agency Task Force on Burundi, which includes representatives of all relevant Secretariat departments and United Nations agencies, funds and programmes. The Special Envoy also represents the United Nations in coordination meetings with various special envoys for Burundi, including from the International Contact Group, among others.

230. In order to promote efficiency and maximize the use of cost-sharing initiatives, the staff of the Office of the Special Envoy deployed in Burundi is serviced by the Regional Service Centre in Entebbe for finance and human resources requirements. The small office support team deployed in Bujumbura supports the day-to-day administrative and logistical needs of the team, undertaking those functions which cannot be performed remotely and providing an administrative link with the Service Centre.

### **Performance information**

231. In 2018, achievement of the inclusive inter-Burundi dialogue process, which is nationally owned and internationally accepted, has been adversely affected by the external factors identified in the proposed budget reports for 2017 and 2018, notably a lack of progress in the political dialogue process led by the East African Community due to the continued unwillingness of the parties to meet face to face or agree on a

process, structure and timeline. The fifth dialogue session, which was scheduled for April 2018, did not take place as the Government cancelled its participation because of its preoccupation with the May 2018 constitutional referendum. The organization of further sessions is being discussed and they are likely to be held before the end of the year. The Joint Technical Working Group consisting of the African Union, the East African Community and the United Nations is fully operational in providing support to the East African Community-led political process and is expected to be strengthened further during the remainder of 2018. The dialogue support team has been deployed to Dar es Salaam, United Republic of Tanzania, to ensure coordination and more effective liaison between the Facilitator of the Inter-Burundi Dialogue and the Office of the Special Envoy on all issues relating to dialogue planning and preparations.

232. No progress has been noted on the accomplishment of governance and civilian oversight of the security sector and rule of law institutions in Burundi (as was also the case in 2017), as bilateral and multilateral donors have suspended their technical cooperation programmes with the Government of Burundi because of the political crisis, and efforts by the Office of the Special Envoy to implement initiatives to address challenges within the security sector in Burundi have not yet been successful.

#### **Planning assumptions for 2019**

233. In the period covered by the present budget, the political and security crisis in Burundi is expected to continue owing to the lack of a political settlement, with the political dialogue currently being deadlocked. The political crisis is expected to continue beyond 2018 and the need for the presence of the Office of the Special Envoy to perform the task mandated by the Security Council will remain unchanged.

234. Apart from the Inter-Burundi Dialogue led by the East African Community and supported by the Office of the Special Envoy, 2019 will witness the run up to the 2020 elections. While it is still unclear whether the United Nations will play any role in the preparation or the conduct of these polls, it is certain that the Office will be required to continue to carry out the Secretary-General's good offices role and to maintain its monitoring and reporting activities. This is especially important in order to ensure that the Security Council is kept abreast of developments on the ground and to be able to provide recommendations when or if requested.

235. On the operational side, the Office will continue to rely on regional synergies to support its requirements for supply chain management as well as compound and facilities management currently provided by United Nations Office for Project Services. Office space at the UNDP premises in Ouagadougou and Dar es Salaam has been provided through cost-reimbursement agreements.

236. The objective, expected accomplishments, indicators of achievement and performance measures for the mission are set out below.

Table 29

**Objective, expected accomplishments, indicators of achievement and performance measures**

*Objective:* To support the Government of Burundi and other stakeholders in establishing a credible and inclusive political dialogue process that is nationally owned, while security and rule of law institutions are strengthened

Expected accomplishment	Indicators of achievement		Performance measures			
			2019	2018	2017	2016
(a) A credible and inclusive political agreement is reached through a nationally owned and internationally accepted East African Community-led dialogue process	(i) Inclusive dialogue sessions are convened with the participation of all key stakeholders under the auspices of the East African Community Facilitator and Mediator [number of dialogues sessions]	Target	4	4		
		Estimate		2	4	
		Actual			2	3
	(ii) Key international and regional partners support the process through the Joint Technical Working Group composed of the African Union, the United Nations and the East African Community, by participating in relevant meetings and providing technical and financial support [number of meetings of the Joint Technical Working Group]	Target	5	8		
		Estimate		4	6	
		Actual			6	2
	(iii) Follow up mechanism composed of the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General, the African Union, the East African Community, the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region and the Ombudsman of Burundi is put in place and meetings are held to monitor the implementation of the political agreement and to support the 2020 elections [number of meetings]	Target	6			
		Estimate		5		
		Actual			5	
<i>Outputs</i>						
<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>Engagements by the Special Envoy and his staff in Burundi and the region to ensure progress is made on the political solution for the Burundian crisis with key stakeholders (6)</li><li>Provision of technical support by the Office of the Special Envoy through active participation in meetings of the Joint Technical Working Group (5)</li><li>United Nations technical mediation expertise in process design and structure is provided through deployments of mediation experts (2)</li><li>Advice to the East African Community-led facilitation process by the Joint Technical Working Group through exchange of visits and regular contacts (5)</li><li>Reports of the Secretary-General and Security Council briefings by the Special Envoy on the latest developments in Burundi (4)</li></ul>						
Expected accomplishment	Indicators of achievement		Performance measures			
			2019	2018	2017	2016
(b) Governance and civilian oversight mechanisms of the security sector and rule of law institutions are in place	(i) Progress is made by the Government of Burundi on right-sizing a security sector that is well- managed and respectful of human rights [number of initiatives]	Target	3	2		
		Estimate		2		
		Actual			2	2
	(ii) Security concerns of political parties and civil society organizations, including of women, youth and the media, are taken into consideration and streamlined [number of consultation meetings]	Target	10			
		Estimate		4		
		Actual			3	2

*Outputs*

- Meetings with political parties and civil society organizations, including representatives of women, youth and the media, to ensure that their security concerns are taken into consideration (6)
- Coordination meetings and partnership activities among bilateral and multilateral partners involved in security sector programming to achieve coherence and complementarity (10)
- Consultation meetings with national authorities to raise awareness of the security and rule of law situation and the reform of those sectors (12)

**External factors**

237. The objective will be achieved on the assumption that there is sufficient political will and engagement from various stakeholders and there is continued support from the international community.

**Resource requirements (regular budget)**

Table 30

**Financial resources**

(Thousands of United States dollars)

Category of expenditure	2018			2019		Variance	Net requirements for 2019
	Appropriation	Estimated expenditures	Estimated variance	Total requirements	Non-recurrent requirements	2019 vs. 2018	
						Increase/ (decrease)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)=(2)-(1)	(4)	(5)	(6)=(4)-(1)	(7)=(4)+(3)
Civilian personnel costs	2 893.4	3 859.2	965.8	4 136.7	—	1 243.3	5 102.5
Operational costs	3 477.5	2 582.7	(894.8)	3 352.8	224.0	(124.7)	2 458.0
Total (net of staff assessment)	6 370.9	6 441.9	71.0	7 489.5	224.0	1 118.6	7 560.5

Table 31

**Positions**

	Professional and higher categories								General Service and related categories			National staff					United Nations Volunteers	Total
	USG	ASG	D-2	D-1	P-5	P-4	P-3	P-2	Sub-total	Field/ Security Services	General Service	Total inter-national	National Professional Officer	Local level				
Approved 2018	1 <sup>a</sup>	—	1	2	4	5	3	—	16	7	1	24	2	5	—	31		
Proposed 2019	1 <sup>a</sup>	—	1	2	4	5	3	—	16	7	1	24	2	5	—	31		
Change	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—		

<sup>a</sup> The Under-Secretary-General is on a when-actually-employed contract.

238. The projected overexpenditure in 2018 reflects higher staff costs attributable to: (a) a lower average level of the projected vacancy rate of 18 per cent for international staff and full incumbency for national staff compared with the vacancy rates of 31 per cent and 5 per cent respectively included in the approved budget for 2018; (b) a 7 per cent increase in national staff salary scales; and (c) higher common staff costs reflecting actual expenditure levels. This is largely offset by lower operational costs resulting from: (a) a lower than planned amount of official travel due to delays in the dialogue and mediation process and an increase in the use of video- and teleconferencing; (b) lower than planned levels of consultancy due to the delay in the dialogue process; and (c) reduced costs of communications services due the increased



use of local Internet service providers enabling a reduction in more expensive satellite communications usage.

239. The estimated requirements for the Office of the Special Envoy for 2019 amount to \$7,489,500 (net of staff assessment) and provide for 31 civilian personnel (1 Under-Secretary-General on a when-actually-employed basis, 1 D-2, 2 D-1, 4 P-5, 5 P-4, 3 P-3, 7 Field Service, 1 General Service (Other level), 2 National Professional Officers and 5 Local level) (\$4,136,700), as well as operational costs (\$3,352,800), including consultants and consulting services (\$77,200), official travel (\$607,700), facilities and infrastructure (\$1,594,800), ground transportation (\$132,700), communications and information technology (\$604,700), medical (\$54,000) and other supplies, services and equipment (\$281,700).

240. In 2019, there will be no change in the proposed number and levels of positions for the office of the Special Envoy. In response to the recommendation of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions to review the duty station of the position of the Special Assistant (P-3), the Office reviewed the work required to provide substantive and practical support to the Special Envoy and determined that this is most effective when carried out in the same duty station as the Special Envoy. The Special Envoy is based in Ouagadougou; therefore the optimal location for ensuring smooth, effective and efficient support for the Special Envoy is also Ouagadougou.

241. The variance (increase) in the proposed resources for 2019 compared with the approved budget for 2018 is due to: (a) increased personnel costs with the application of a lower vacancy rate of 21 per cent for international staff compared with the 31 per cent vacancy rate included in the approved budget for 2018; (b) the provision of the actual average step in grade of current incumbents and the ratio of actual common staff cost expenditures to actual salaries, based on expenditure trends; (c) higher national staff salary scales for 2019 compared with what was reflected in the 2018 budget; and (d) increased costs of rental of premises following the ending of the sharing arrangements with the United Nations country team. This is partially offset by: (a) reductions in official travel reflecting the increasing usage of video- and teleconferencing and the lower amount of travel bearing in mind the anticipated level of progress in the dialogue process; (b) reductions in the levels of funding for consultancies in line with the expected amount of progress in the dialogue process; and (c) a decrease in the costs of communication services reflecting a partial replacement of satellite communications services with locally sourced Internet services.

#### **Extrabudgetary resources**

242. No extrabudgetary resources were available in 2018 or are projected for the Office for 2019.

### **K. Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Myanmar**

*(\$1,232,300)*

#### **Background, mandate and objective**

243. On 24 December 2017, the General Assembly adopted resolution [72/248](#) on Myanmar, in which it established the role of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Myanmar. The Office of the Special Envoy works with a wide range of actors, including the Government of Myanmar, to provide the Secretary-General's good offices and encourage the authorities in Myanmar to ensure the safe, voluntary, dignified and sustainable return of the refugees to their areas of origin. As part of the efforts to help promote inclusive political dialogue in the peace process, the Special Envoy would also seek to de-escalate tensions and address human rights and

humanitarian issues arising from other areas inhabited by ethnic minorities, including in Kachin and northern Shan States.

### **Cooperation with other entities**

244. In 2019, the Special Envoy and her Office will cooperate closely with the departments, agencies, funds and programmes of the United Nations, including the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, OHCHR and the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, supporting them in the execution of their respective mandates and providing them with the necessary political advice and guidance. The Office of the Special Envoy will continue to extend cooperation to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict. The Special Envoy will continue the established practice of consulting with the United Nations country team when visiting Myanmar. These regular consultations, including with other senior United Nations officials, are aimed at strengthening system-wide coherence and coordination.

245. Mission support requirements will leverage existing regional capacities in order to achieve efficiencies and lighten the deployment footprint of the Office. Taking advantage of economies of scale by using existing service capacity and expertise, administrative support will be delivered by the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP), with logistics and administrative support provided in Myanmar by UNDP.

### **Performance information**

246. Following extensive consideration, the Secretary-General appointed on 26 April 2018, Ms. Christine Schraner Burgener as his Special Envoy on Myanmar. Since mid-May, the Special Envoy has visited Myanmar on several occasions, during which she established positive relations with key leaders. She also held consultations in New York and Geneva as well as in interested Member States. The Myanmar State Counsellor, in her first meeting with the Special Envoy in June, agreed on the establishment of an office in Nay Pyi Taw for the Envoy. Efforts are ongoing to establish this office during the reporting period.

247. While in Myanmar, the Special Envoy's field visits included affected areas in Rakhine State. The Special Envoy has underlined the need to address the root causes and the need for accountability as an essential step towards genuine reconciliation and preventing future violations, and urged for greater action by the Myanmar authorities on setting the right conditions for the safe, voluntary, dignified and sustainable return of Rohingya refugees to their places of origin or choice. During 2018, a key achievement has been the signing of a memorandum of understanding between the Government of Myanmar, UNHCR and UNDP on United Nations system support to creating conditions for voluntary, safe and sustainable refugee returns from Bangladesh and their reintegration in Rakhine State.

248. The Special Envoy also visited the refugee camps in Bangladesh where hundreds of thousands of Rohingya had fled from Rakhine State. She appealed for greater international assistance to alleviate the very real risks threatening the camps from monsoon rains. In addition to strengthened assistance towards life-saving priorities, the Special Envoy urged for greater measures needed to prepare for the future, including access to education and livelihoods.

249. In her first briefing to the Security Council on 23 July 2018, the Special Envoy noted that in addition to helping address international concerns relating to the pressing, vast and complex challenges of the Rohingya crisis, her initial engagements had and would continue to focus also on broader democratization and human rights

issues as well as the peace process. While advocating for the protection of civilians in the wake of intensified violence in Rakhine State and beyond in other parts of the country, the Special Envoy underlined that patterns of violations against ethnic and religious minorities in Myanmar needed to be addressed for democracy to take root.

### Planning assumption for 2019

250. The following planning assumptions underpin the resource requirements of the Office in 2019:

(a) To improve the conditions of the members of the Rohingya community living in Myanmar and Bangladesh, the Office of the Special Envoy will work with officials and all actors within and outside Myanmar to allow unfettered access for humanitarian support, as well as to ensure the safe, voluntary, dignified and sustainable return of the refugees to their areas of origin. Furthermore, the Special Envoy will support the efforts of the international community to provide continued political and financial support to Bangladesh's management of the multidimensional crisis. In this regard, the Special Envoy will work for the implementation of the memorandum of understanding reached by the Government of Myanmar, UNHCR and UNDP on United Nations system support to creating conditions for voluntary, safe and sustainable refugee returns from Bangladesh and their reintegration in Rakhine State;

(b) The Office of the Special Envoy will continue to work on promoting social cohesion and ending deep-seated institutionalized discrimination against the Rohingya community in Myanmar. In this context, in line with the recommendations of the Advisory Commission on Rakhine State, the Special Envoy will undertake efforts so that there is a definite advancement towards attainment of political, social and economic rights of the Rohingya community. The Special Envoy will continue to support and advocate the scaling-up of development projects in Rakhine, one of the poorest states in Myanmar;

(c) On national reconciliation, the Office of the Special Envoy will continue to support efforts that would advance the peace process and help in greater inclusivity. The Special Envoy will aim to lead the efforts of the United Nations system so that national stakeholders and mechanisms are able to engage with various arms of the United Nations with the resources and tools available to support national reconciliation efforts.

251. In order to ensure close coordination with key stakeholders in Myanmar, the Office will be located in Nay Pyi Taw.

252. The objective, expected accomplishments, indicators of achievement and performance measures for the mission are set out below.

Table 32

### Objective, expected accomplishments, indicators of achievement and performance measures

*Objective:* To advance the national reconciliation and democratization process in Myanmar

Expected accomplishment	Indicators of achievement		Performance measures			
			2019	2018	2017	2016
(a) Progress towards humanitarian access	Sustained full humanitarian access to affected areas of Myanmar [number of areas where United Nations agencies and partners are granted access]	Target	6			
		Estimate		4		
		Actual				

(b) Progress in the democratic transition process	Consolidation of democratic institutions [number of inclusive dialogues among the nation's political stakeholders]	Target	4	
		Estimate		3
		Actual		
(c) Progress towards returns from Bangladesh	Safe and voluntary returns	Target	Implementation of agreement initiated	
		Estimate		Agreement between Myanmar and United Nations agencies on conditions of return signed
		Actual		

#### Outputs

- Engagement dialogues and consultations with the authorities of Myanmar and other relevant parties, including civil society groups, on all issues in connection with the democratic transition and national reconciliation (4)
- Engagement dialogues with interested Member States, including neighbouring States and other countries of the region, to develop common approaches in addressing the humanitarian and human rights situation in Myanmar (2)
- Briefings to the General Assembly and the Security Council (4)

#### External factors

253. The good offices role of the Secretary-General will be carried out through the Special Envoy and is expected to achieve its objective on the assumption that the Government of Myanmar, including the military leadership, demonstrates its willingness to take steps to assuage international concerns relating to the Rohingya community. In addition, the national reconciliation in Myanmar continues to be contingent on the success of ongoing peace discussions taking place on multiple levels.

#### Resource requirements (regular budget)

Table 33

#### Financial resources

(Thousands of United States dollars)

Category of expenditure	2018			2019		Variance 2019 vs. 2018 Increase/ (decrease)	Net requirements for 2019
	Appropriation	Estimated expenditures	Estimated variance	Total requirements	Non-recurrent requirements		
	(1)	(2)	(3)=(2)-(1)	(4)	(5)	(6)=(4)-(1)	(7)=(4)+(3)
Civilian personnel costs	567.9	474.1	(93.8)	861.4	—	293.5	767.6
Operational costs	285.9	285.9	—	370.9	—	85.0	370.9
<b>Total (net of staff assessment)</b>	<b>853.8</b>	<b>760.0</b>	<b>(93.8)</b>	<b>1 232.3</b>	<b>—</b>	<b>378.5</b>	<b>1 138.5</b>

Table 34  
Positions

	<i>Professional and higher categories</i>								<i>General Service and related categories</i>		<i>National staff</i>				<i>United Nations Volunteers</i>	<i>Total</i>
	<i>USG</i>	<i>ASG</i>	<i>D-2</i>	<i>D-1</i>	<i>P-5</i>	<i>P-4</i>	<i>P-3</i>	<i>P-2</i>	<i>Sub-total</i>	<i>Field/ Security Services</i>	<i>General Service</i>	<i>Total inter-national</i>	<i>National Professional Officer</i>	<i>Local level</i>		
Approved 2018	1 <sup>a</sup>	–	–	1	1	1	–	–	4	–	–	4	–	1	–	5
Proposed 2019	1 <sup>a</sup>	–	–	1	1	1	–	–	4	–	–	4	–	1	–	5
<b>Change</b>	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–

<sup>a</sup> The Under-Secretary-General is on a when-actually-employed contract.

254. The projected unencumbered balance for 2018 reflects the lower costs of staff owing to the planned location of the Mission in Myanmar and delays in the recruitment of staff.

255. The estimated requirements for the Office of the Special Envoy on Myanmar for 2019 amount to \$1,232,300 (net of staff assessment) and provide for salaries and common staff costs (\$861,400) for the proposed staffing complement of four international staff positions (1 Under-Secretary-General, 1 D-1, 1 P-5 and 1 P-4) and one national staff position (Local level). Operational costs amount to \$370,900, comprising official travel (\$174,900), facilities and infrastructure (\$64,800), ground transportation (\$24,000), communications and information technology (\$18,000) and other supplies, services and equipment (\$89,200).

256. In 2019, the number and levels of positions for the Office of the Special Envoy on Myanmar will remain unchanged.

257. The variance (increase) in the proposed resources for 2019 compared with the approved budget for 2018 are primarily attributable to the provision for the full year deployment of civilian personnel in 2019. Under operational costs, increased requirements are mainly for official travel, as a result of intensification of good offices engagements in the region and other supplies, services and equipment, in connection with increased anticipated costs for administrative support services. These increased requirements are partly offset by reduced requirements under facilities and infrastructure and communications and information technology, as a result of the discontinuation of one-time acquisition of equipment which was budgeted in 2018.

#### Extrabudgetary resources

258. No extrabudgetary resources were available in 2018 or are projected for the Office of the Special Envoy for 2019.