



Security Council

Seventy-sixth year

8811th meeting

Wednesday, 30 June 2021, 10 a.m.

New York

Provisional

President: Mr. Jürgenson (Estonia)

Members:

China	Mr. Geng Shuang
France	Mr. De Rivière
India	Mr. Raguttahalli
Ireland	Ms. Byrne Nason
Kenya	Mr. Kiboino
Mexico	Mr. De la Fuente Ramírez
Niger	Mr. Maman Sani
Norway	Ms. Juul
Russian Federation	Mr. Nebenzia
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	Ms. Prince
Tunisia	Mr. Ben Lagha
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland . .	Dame Barbara Woodward
United States of America	Mr. DeLaurentis
Viet Nam	Mrs. Nguyen

Agenda

Non-proliferation

Letter dated 16 June 2021 from the Security Council Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2021/578)

Eleventh report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015) (S/2021/582)

Letter dated 24 June 2021 from the Security Council Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2021/602)

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The meeting was called to order at 10.05 a.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

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The President: In accordance with rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, I invite the representatives of Germany and the Islamic Republic of Iran to participate in this meeting.

In accordance with rule 39 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, I invite the following briefers to participate in this meeting: Ms. Rosemary DiCarlo, Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs; and His Excellency Mr. Olof Skoog, Head of the Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations.

The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda.

I wish to draw the attention of Council members to the following documents: S/2021/578, which contains the text of a letter dated 16 June 2021 from the Security Council Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) addressed to the President of the Security Council; S/2021/582, which contains the eleventh report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015); and S/2021/602, which contains the text of a letter dated 24 June 2021 from the Security Council Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) addressed to the President of the Security Council.

At this meeting, the Security Council will hear briefings by Ms. Rosemary DiCarlo, His Excellency

Mr. Olof Skoog and Ambassador Geraldine Byrne Nason, Permanent Representative of Ireland, in her capacity as Security Council Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015).

I give the floor to Ms. DiCarlo.

Ms. DiCarlo: Thank you, Mr. President, for the opportunity to brief on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015).

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action on the Iranian nuclear issue is the outcome of 12 years of intense diplomatic effort and technical negotiations. The Secretary-General has always regarded the JCPOA as the best way to ensure that the nuclear programme of the Islamic Republic of Iran remains exclusively peaceful. He therefore considers it — and resolution 2231 (2015), which endorsed the Plan — to be crucial to the global nuclear non-proliferation architecture and regional and international security. Since July 2015, the Secretary-General has consistently and repeatedly underscored the importance for the international community of preserving the JCPOA. He has called for concerns with regard to its implementation to be addressed constructively by its participants and for issues outside the Plan to be addressed without prejudice to preserving the agreement and its accomplishments.

The context for the implementation of the JCPOA and resolution 2231 (2015) has improved considerably since the Security Council last met in December 2020 to discuss the Iranian nuclear issue (see S/2020/1324).

As noted in the eleventh report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) (S/2021/582), through its 18 February letter addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2021/158), the United States withdrew previous letters sent to the Council in August 2020 (S/2020/822) and September 2020 (S/2020/927), respectively. This was a first and necessary step to heal a divided Council and to pave the way for the Vienna talks. The continued diplomatic efforts in Vienna offer a critical opportunity for both the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran to return to the full and effective implementation of the Plan and of the resolution. This would be a welcome and crucial development. It is therefore essential that all Member States promote a conducive environment and avoid any action that may have a negative impact on these ongoing diplomatic efforts, as well as on regional stability. Likewise, all initiatives in support

of trade and economic relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran remain important, especially given the current economic and health challenges posed by the coronavirus disease pandemic.

Furthermore, I echo the Secretary-General's appeal to the United States to lift or waive its sanctions outlined in the Plan, extend the waivers with regard to the trade in oil with Iran, and to once again facilitate nuclear-related activities consistent with the Plan and the resolution. These activities relate to non-proliferation projects, including at the Bushehr nuclear power plant, the Fordow facility and the Arak reactor. These are steps needed to facilitate the full implementation of the Plan and resolution 2231 (2015) and to enable the Iranian people to secure the tangible benefits foreseen by the Plan.

A return to the full and effective implementation of the JCPOA and the resolution is all the more important in the light of the additional steps taken by the Islamic Republic of Iran to reduce its nuclear-related commitments under the Plan, following the withdrawal of the United States from the JCPOA. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) informed the Council that Iran has installed new and advanced centrifuges and begun research and development activities for the production of uranium metal. Iran has also enriched uranium up to 60 per cent and has now an estimated total enriched uranium stockpile of 3,241 kilograms — further surpassing JCPOA-stipulated limits in both cases. Iran has stated that these measures, as previous measures taken since 1 July 2019, are reversible. Furthermore, as of 23 February 2021, Iran decided to suspend voluntary transparency measures envisaged by the JCPOA, including the Additional Protocol to its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement. However, later in February the IAEA and the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran reached a temporary bilateral technical understanding, allowing the Agency to continue with its necessary monitoring and verification activities. This understanding expired on 24 June, and Iran has not indicated whether it intends to maintain the current arrangement.

The Agency's monitoring and verification activities in the Islamic Republic of Iran, including the uninterrupted collection and storage of data by its monitoring and surveillance equipment, are essential to helping to build international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme. I call on the Islamic Republic of Iran to

resume the temporary technical understanding with the Agency without delay, refrain from taking further steps to reduce its commitments and return to full implementation of the Plan. Iran should also carefully consider the other concerns raised by participants in the Plan and by other Member States in relation to resolution 2231 (2015).

I will now turn to the measures set out in annex B to the resolution, as outlined in the Secretary-General's eleventh report on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). First, on the nuclear-related provisions, we have not received any report on the supply, sale or transfer to Iran of nuclear and nuclear-related dual-use items contrary to paragraph 2 of annex B. The Security Council continued its consideration of requests for the supply, sale or transfer of nuclear and nuclear-related dual-use items to Iran through the procurement channel. One new proposal was submitted through the channel in the reporting period, bringing the total to 52 proposals received since 16 January 2016. The Council has received eight notifications submitted pursuant to paragraph 2 of annex B for certain nuclear-related activities consistent with the Plan.

Secondly, with regard to the ballistic-missile-related provisions of the resolution, information was provided to the Secretary-General and the Security Council by France, Germany, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Israel, the Russian Federation and the United Kingdom on ballistic-missile launches and a space-launch-vehicle test by Iran in January and February 2021. The information provided reflects divergent views among those Member States as to whether those launches are inconsistent with the resolution.

Thirdly, on the asset-freeze provisions, the Secretariat did not receive any official information alleging action inconsistent with the asset-freeze provisions.

Let me conclude by stressing again the importance and value of the JCPOA to the international non-proliferation architecture and for regional and international security. In this defining moment, it is therefore critical for all parties to seize this opportunity to put the JCPOA back on the right track as soon as possible. In so doing, the JCPOA would, again, serve as a powerful example of successful multilateral diplomacy and as proof that even the most contentious issues can be effectively addressed through dialogue, understanding and reciprocity.

Finally, I would like to acknowledge the leadership of Ms. Geraldine Byrne Nason, in her role as Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) and to assure her of our full support. I would also like to thank the Coordinator of the Procurement Working Group of the Joint Commission for our continued cooperation.

The President: I thank Ms. DiCarlo for her briefing.

I now give the floor to Mr. Skoog.

Mr. Skoog: This is the first time I address the Security Council during the Estonian presidency, Sir. Protocol holds that I should congratulate you on assuming the presidency, Mr. President, but given that today is the last day of your presidency, I should congratulate you, Sir, on a very successful presidency.

It is an honour to be addressing the Council today on behalf of the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Mr. Josep Borrell Fontenelles, in his capacity as Coordinator of the Joint Commission of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). I also want to thank the Secretary-General, Mr. António Guterres, and Ms. Rosemary DiCarlo and the Secretariat, for their steadfast dedication and professionalism in preparing the eleventh report on the implementation of the Security Council resolution 2231 (2015) (S/2021/582). I also want to express my appreciation to Ms. Geraldine Byrne Nason, Ambassador of Ireland, for her work as Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) and for the excellent cooperation during the past period, and I look forward to our continued collaboration.

Since my previous statement, six months ago (see S/2021/1324), a new level of optimism can be discerned given that the diplomatic environment surrounding the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action has improved. At the same time, there are serious concerns despite that new optimism.

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, now almost six years of age, is the fruit of effective multilateralism and a token of the important work done by members of the international community and by this Chamber in particular. The JCPOA has withstood significant pressure over the past years since the withdrawal of the United States from the agreement in 2018 and the reinstatement of sanctions, as well as the successive steps by Iran inconsistent with the agreement. During that time, the remaining JCPOA participants have demonstrated their conviction to work diplomatically

to preserve the deal. However, the agreement is still at a critical stage and needs to be urgently restored and fully implemented. That is a common responsibility that needs to be nurtured and protected by all of us.

Since our last discussion on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) in the Council, our efforts to ensure the full implementation of the JCPOA by all sides have intensified. To that end, we welcome the engagement of all JCPOA participants since early April in Vienna under the auspices of the Joint Commission, which the High Representative coordinates, as well as the separate contacts with the United States. Let me also take this opportunity to thank the Austrian authorities for providing the facilities and a conducive environment for our diplomatic efforts, in line with all the necessary coronavirus disease (COVID-19) protocols.

Beyond that, the High Representative has spared no efforts and has been in close touch with all JCPOA participants and the United States, calling for the necessary flexibility to take the difficult political decisions needed to bring the JCPOA back on track. It is clear that time is not on our side and that what might be possible still today may prove impossible in the near future. We have a limited window ahead of us that we should not miss. The efforts of all relevant parties speak to the importance and the value of the JCPOA. They are solid evidence of the need to vigorously pursue diplomacy and to sustain and support multilateral agreements and institutions.

In that context, the European Union (EU) welcomes the declared intention of the United States to rejoin the JCPOA, and we feel encouraged by its expressed readiness to lift the JCPOA-related sanctions, in line with the provisions of the nuclear deal.

The EU remains fully committed to the JCPOA and is determined to continue working with the international community to preserve it. At the same time, we remain deeply concerned about Iran's continued accumulation of low-enriched uranium in excess of the JCPOA thresholds. At the moment, Iran is the only non-nuclear-weapon State to produce 60 per cent enriched uranium. Also of particular concern are Iran's continued research and development with advanced centrifuges, as well as activities with uranium metal. Those activities are inconsistent with the JCPOA. They also raise serious non-proliferation concerns, particularly following Iran's decision to suspend the implementation of the Additional Protocol and JCPOA transparency

provisions, which has substantially decreased access by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to key information about Iran's nuclear programme. We therefore call on Iran to reverse such activities and return to the full implementation of its commitments without delay.

It is crucial that Iran fully cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency. The necessary verification and monitoring activities, including transparency measures, foreseen under the JCPOA need to be restored. In addition, Iran should fully and promptly cooperate with the IAEA on the four outstanding safeguards-related issues, which have been raised to the attention of the IAEA Board of Governors and provide the necessary clarifications. Let me stress the EU's deep appreciation for the work and the professionalism of the IAEA. Its impartial and technical work is of the utmost importance and is a cornerstone of the credibility of the JCPOA.

We take note of Iran's reaffirmed position that it is ready to return to full JCPOA implementation. I remain optimistic that sufficient space for diplomacy will continue to be granted in order to be able bring the JCPOA back on a path of full implementation in the very near future.

We need to acknowledge the strain put on the JCPOA by the lack of concrete economic benefits expected by Iran in exchange for agreeing and implementing the JCPOA. The United States withdrawal from the JCPOA in 2018 and its reimposition of JCPOA-related sanctions created a significant challenge for Iran, as well as economic operators worldwide, to continue to engage in business relations, not least to maintain banking and payment channels. For its part, the EU lifted all its nuclear-related sanctions upon the conclusion of the deal in 2015 and spared no effort to maintain and promote economic and trade relations with Iran. That includes support for setting up and making operational the Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges, set up by European countries to allow for legitimate trade exchanges to continue.

The work of the procurement channel remains important as an independent and transparent Security Council mechanism. I am pleased to note that the channel continues to be used and that one new proposal has been transmitted to the Security Council for decision and endorsement during the reporting period, while another proposal that was under review

during the preceding reporting period has also been recommended for approval. The eleventh report of the Joint Commission to the Security Council on the status of the Procurement Working Group's decisions and on any implementation issues (see S/2021/578) provides evidence of the channel as an important confidence-building measure that gives assurances to Member States and private-sector actors that transfers of goods and services for civil nuclear purposes are fully in line with resolution 2231 (2015). The EU will continue to promote the use of the procurement channel, which, while enabling the trade of relevant items with Iran, ensures the consistency of relevant transfers with the JCPOA.

At the same time, I am also pleased to note that EU-Iran cooperation in the civil nuclear field under annex III of the JCPOA, particularly in the area of nuclear safety, continues despite the challenges of COVID-19. Civil nuclear cooperation not only helps build a better understanding of Iran's civil nuclear needs but also promotes cooperation in areas, such as nuclear safety, that are critical for the safety of Europe and the region.

While the JCPOA addresses nuclear non-proliferation aspects, a series of events outside the nuclear domain are increasingly worrisome. The EU continues to urge all actors to refrain from activities and escalatory rhetoric that enhance regional and international tensions and fuel a military build-up in the region. The EU has repeatedly urged Iran to desist from activities that could deepen mistrust, such as ballistic missile tests and space vehicle launches, which are inconsistent with resolution 2231 (2015).

In conclusion, let us make the best of the ongoing diplomatic efforts aimed at a return by the United States to the JCPOA and a full implementation of the JCPOA by all sides. Continued perseverance, flexibility and pragmatism provide the basis for a solid and sustainable framework that is a cornerstone for effective multilateral diplomacy. The JCPOA continues to be a key component of the global non-proliferation architecture that helps reduce regional and global security risks.

The President: I thank His Excellency Mr. Skoog for his briefing.

I now give the floor to Ambassador Byrne Nason.

Ms. Byrne Nason: I speak in my capacity as Security Council Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015).

As this is my first briefing as Facilitator, I wish to express my appreciation to the members of the Council for their trust in appointing me to that role. I will do my utmost to support the implementation of the agreement in an impartial and transparent manner. I will continue to listen to, and work closely with, all Council members as we meet our shared responsibility to ensure the full and effective implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which it underpins. I will continue to maintain an active dialogue with Member States, including the Islamic Republic of Iran, on issues related to the implementation of that resolution.

I would like to thank my predecessor, His Excellency Phillippe Kridelka of Belgium, and his team for their outstanding contribution over the previous two years. His efforts and those of previous Facilitators provide a strong foundation for our work and decisions going forward. I would also like to thank the staff of the Secretariat for their invaluable advice and support.

I now come to the eleventh report of the Facilitator (see S/2021/578), which was approved by all the members of the Council. I would like to thank each of them for their constructive engagement in that process in a spirit of compromise and flexibility. The report provides a factual account of the activities that took place in the 2231 format, covering the period from 17 December 2020 to 24 June 2021. It includes relevant communications, summarized in my report, as well as key aspects of the workings of the procurement channel. Council members may refer to the report for details, but I wish to mention three points in particular.

First, I would like to report that one meeting of the Security Council in the 2231 format was held during this reporting period, on 24 June, at which representatives of the Security Council for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) discussed the findings and recommendations contained in the eleventh report of the Secretary-General (S/2021/582) on resolution 2231 (2015), prior to its public release. Under-Secretary-General DiCarlo has already referred to some of those points in her briefing. The 2231 format held an open discussion on the ongoing talks in Vienna in and around the Joint Commission, on ballistic missile launches by

Iran and broader developments related to resolution 2231 (2015).

Secondly, during the reporting period a total of 35 notes were circulated in the 2231 format. In addition, I sent 26 official communications to Member States and the Coordinator of the Procurement Working Group of the Joint Commission. I received a total of 26 communications from Member States and the Coordinator. Among the communications circulated were the two regular quarterly reports issued by the International Atomic Energy Agency in February and May 2021, as well as 19 updates across the whole reporting period. I cannot emphasize enough the central, impartial and professional role played by the Agency as it continues to carry out its verification and monitoring activities in the Islamic Republic of Iran as requested under resolution 2231 (2015).

Also, on 18 February, the United States notified the Security Council (see S/2021/158) that it had withdrawn its letters of 20 August 2020 (see S/2020/815), 21 August 2020 (S/2020/822) and 21 September 2020 (S/2020/927). That made clear the understanding of all Council members that resolution 2231 (2015) remains in effect in all its parts.

Thirdly, only one new proposal was submitted to, and approved by, the Security Council during the reporting period through the procurement channel. That channel represents a key transparency and confidence-building mechanism under the JCPOA. I note that the channel is operational and effective and join the Secretary-General's encouragement of all participants in the JCPOA, Member States and the private sector to fully support and utilize that channel.

As Under-Secretary-General DiCarlo recalled, the JCPOA is a major achievement in nuclear non-proliferation. It is a successful example of how we can work together to resolve protracted and difficult issues through dialogue and diplomacy. It remains the best way to guarantee the exclusively peaceful nature of the Iranian nuclear programme.

As the Secretary-General states in his report, we are in a new environment as compared to where we were six months ago. Talks in Vienna offer the prospect of a return to the JCPOA by the United States and the full and effective implementation of the agreement by all parties. I hope that the talks in Vienna will soon reach a positive conclusion. We in turn must continue

to play our part in demonstrating that resolution 2231 (2015) is working as it should.

In conclusion, I underline the call set out in paragraph 2 of resolution 2231 (2015) to all

“Member States, regional organizations and international organizations to take such actions as may be appropriate to support the implementation of the JCPOA, including ... by refraining from actions that undermine implementation of commitments under the JCPOA”.

The President: I thank Ambassador Byrne Nason for her briefing.

I would like to draw the attention of speakers to paragraph 22 of note S/2017/507 by the President of the Security Council, which encourages all participants in Council meetings to deliver their statements in five minutes or less, in line with the Security Council’s commitment to making more effective use of open meetings.

I shall now give the floor to those members of the Council who wish to make statements.

Mr. DeLaurentis (United States of America): I thank our briefers for their remarks.

The United States appreciates the importance the United Nations places on ensuring that the eleventh report of the Secretary-General (S/2021/582) on resolution 2231 (2015) fairly reflects the political environment we are currently in, as well as the Secretary-General’s positive reflection of our ongoing discussions regarding a potential mutual return to compliance with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). We also appreciate that the information in the report on activities inconsistent with the resolution is of high credibility. The report is another testament to the critical role the Secretariat performs for the 2231 format. I would also like to express our gratitude for Ireland’s leadership as the Security Council Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) and its efforts in supporting the resolution’s implementation.

The report underscores what has been apparent for some time: Iran continues to disregard the provision of resolution 2231 (2015) that calls upon Iran not to undertake any activity related to ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons, including launches using such ballistic missile technology. We share the concerns stated by the E3 and

Israel in their letters regarding Iran’s ballistic missile activities, and we reject Russia’s and Iran’s assertions that those activities are not covered by resolution 2231 (2015). Those activities are clearly in defiance of the resolution.

As the reports of both the Secretary-General (S/2021/582) and the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) (see S/2021/558) make clear, Iran continues its escalatory steps, including many that exceed the JCPOA’s nuclear limits. In particular, Iran continues installing and operating numbers and types of centrifuges beyond JCPOA limits; producing quantities and enrichment levels of uranium well beyond the deal’s limits, including enrichment of uranium-235 up to 60 per cent; and producing uranium metal. We urge Iran to refrain from taking further escalatory steps and to return to the full implementation of all its JCPOA commitments, including those related to IAEA verification, monitoring and implementation of the Additional Protocol.

We note with great concern that, as stated in the report of the IAEA Director General, Iran has not replied to his letter requesting Iran’s position regarding the possible continued collection, recording and retention of data necessary for JCPOA verification by IAEA monitoring and surveillance equipment, and the maintenance and retention of related records. We urge Iran to allow that temporary arrangement to proceed so that the continuity of those verification measures can be maintained. We also call on Iran to fully cooperate with the IAEA, in accordance with its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement required under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to resolve the outstanding safeguards issues without further delay.

Beyond Iranian nuclear activity, Iran’s support for terrorism threatens United States forces, diplomatic personnel and our partners in the region and elsewhere. It drives instability and negatively impacts millions of civilians. We will continue to use all the tools at our disposal to counter Iran’s destabilizing activities in the region and to promote the implementation of other Security Council resolutions to address Iranian conventional-weapons proliferation, including the prohibition of resolution 1701 (2006) on the unauthorized transfer of arms and related materiel to Hezbollah in Lebanon and the prohibition of resolution 2216 (2015) on the transfer of arms and related materiel to the Houthis in Yemen.

The United States is committed to ensuring Iran never acquires a nuclear weapon and we believe diplomacy, in coordination with our allies and regional partners, is the best path to achieve that goal. The last few rounds of discussions in Vienna have helped to crystallize the choices that need to be made by Iran and by the United States in order to achieve a mutual return to compliance with the JCPOA.

In closing, we appreciate the continued work of the Secretary-General and Secretariat and look forward to working alongside Member States to fully implement our commitments.

Mr. Maman Sani (Niger) (*spoke in French*): At the outset, I wish to welcome the convening of this briefing on the eleventh report of the Secretary-General (S/2021/582) on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015).

I would like to thank Ms. Rosemary DiCarlo, Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs; Ambassador Geraldine Byrne Nason, Permanent Representative of Ireland, in her capacity as Facilitator; and Mr. Olof Skoog, observer of the European Union, in his capacity as Coordinator of the Joint Committee to the Security Council, for their presentations.

My delegation has taken note of the conclusions and recommendations contained in the eleventh report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) and calls on Member States and all parties to the agreement to comply with their obligations.

I would like to reaffirm the attachment of the Niger to the full implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), which approved, in 2015, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on the Iranian nuclear programme.

My delegation welcomes the discussions under way in Vienna on the return of the United States to the JCPOA in order to revitalize it and ensure its full and transparent implementation by all parties.

In that regard, the procurement channel continues to be a key transparency and confidence-building mechanism, ensuring that the transfer of nuclear and dual-use nuclear-related goods and related services to the Islamic Republic of Iran is in line with resolution 2231 (2015), as well as with the provisions and objectives of the JCPOA. My delegation therefore calls on States not party to the JCPOA to refrain from taking measures that would hamper the ability of the

remaining parties to fully meet their commitments and calls on all JCPOA, Member States and relevant sectors to support and make full use of that channel.

The importance of the full and effective implementation of the JCPOA by all parties was underlined during the ministerial meeting among China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Islamic Republic of Iran, held virtually on 21 December 2020 and chaired by the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.

The expiration on 24 June of the temporary bilateral technical agreement concluded on 24 May between the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Iran and its non-renewal constitute a source of concern and a setback for the mechanism for monitoring nuclear programme activities in Iran. My delegation calls on the Islamic Republic of Iran to consider positively the IAEA's extension requests, including that relating to the continuous collection and storage of data by its monitoring and surveillance equipment, and to enable the Agency to continue its work beyond 24 June.

In conclusion, my delegation remains concerned at the prevailing tensions in the Persian Gulf region and reiterates the call made by the Secretary-General to ease, for humanitarian reasons, all unilateral economic measures that could prevent Iran from mobilizing the resources required to fight the coronavirus disease pandemic. That gesture of flexibility could also have the benefit of helping move certain positions in the context of the negotiations under way.

Ms. Nguyen (Viet Nam): I would like to thank Under-Secretary-General DiCarlo and Ambassador Skoog for their comprehensive briefings.

I take this opportunity to thank Ambassador Geraldine Byrne Nason, as Facilitator of the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), for her able leadership and tireless efforts in ensuring the timely adoption of the report of the Joint Commission to the Security Council on the status of the Procurement Working Group's decisions and on any implementation issues (see S/2021/578).

I also welcome the representatives of Germany and of Iran to this meeting.

It was encouraging to witness positive developments in the negotiations to revive the full and effective implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of

Action (JCPOA) and resolution 2231 (2015) over the past six months.

Despite differences and challenges, the ongoing efforts of the concerned parties through six rounds of talks in Vienna have offered a valuable opportunity for progress on this matter. Therefore, we join other Member States in welcoming such diplomatic engagements and calling on the concerned parties to refrain from hardening rhetoric that may undermine the negotiation on the landmark agreement and resolution 2231 (2015).

We take note of the findings of the eleventh report of Secretary-General (S/2021/582) on the implementation of the Security Council resolution 2231 (2015) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board's reports on verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in the light of resolution 2231 (2015). We also share the views of Member States on the information contained in the reports on activities that exceed the limits set out in the JCPOA.

Against this backdrop, we urge all stakeholders to comply with the obligations set out in the resolution. We call for continued cooperation between Iran and IAEA for monitoring purposes, as transparency is an important element of the confidence-building aspect of the JCPOA.

We also call on relevant parties to continue dialogue and negotiations to resolve differences. It is necessary for all parties to exercise self-restraint and refrain from any acts that may exacerbate the situation, erode trust and escalate tension.

In that process, we applaud all constructive contributions made by the international community and the countries of the region to the ongoing diplomatic efforts with the aim of avoiding negative impacts on the current negotiating process and regional stability.

We have always considered the JCPOA and resolution 2231 (2015) as the best instruments to ensure a comprehensive, long-term and proper solution to the Iranian nuclear issue, as well as to contribute to regional and international peace and security. We share the assessment of the Secretary-General that those two documents remain a successful example of multilateral diplomacy and nuclear non-proliferation and continue to enjoy the full support of the broader international community.

With regard to the implementation of non-proliferation obligations, we advocate the promotion of balanced implementation of the three pillars of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: disarmament, the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

As we have stated time and again, Viet Nam has relentlessly pursued the policy of upholding international law, including the Charter of the United Nations and its purposes and principles. We stress the utmost importance of the principles of the settlement of disputes by peaceful means and the fulfilment in good faith of obligations under international law.

In closing, we would like to reiterate our full support for all meaningful contributions that help foster an environment conducive to dialogue and cooperation within and beyond the Security Council for peace, stability and development in the Middle East.

Mr. Ben Lagha (Tunisia): I would like to thank Under-Secretary-General DiCarlo, the Head of the Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations and the Permanent Representative of Ireland, in her capacity as Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), for their detailed briefings.

Tunisia welcomes the resumption of discussions to revive the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), and we hope an agreement will soon be reached. We indeed share the view that the JCPOA constitutes an important addition to the global non-proliferation architecture and that its full restoration remains the best way to guarantee the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme. We therefore renew our call for the full and effective implementation of that agreement and of resolution 2231 (2015) by all parties.

We take note of the continuing differences in interpretation regarding the implementation of the provisions of annex B of resolution 2231 (2015), in particular with regard to ballistic missile-related activities. We also reaffirm the importance of giving due consideration to legitimate security concerns in the region that were left unaddressed by the JCPOA. In the meantime, we urge all parties to refrain from any activities that can deepen mistrust and engage in dialogue and negotiations to reduce tensions and resolve differences.

Lastly, I would like to again underline the critical importance for peace and stability of the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. The United Nations Conference aiming at elaborating a legally binding treaty establishing such a zone, which held its first session in 2018 and in which all Arab countries and Iran participated constructively, represents a positive step towards that goal and deserves full support. In that regard, we encourage all the parties concerned to take part in the forthcoming sessions of that Conference.

Mr. Raguttahalli (India): I would like to begin by thanking Under-Secretary-General Rosemary DiCarlo and Ambassador Olof Skoog, Head of the Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations in New York, for their briefings. I would like in particular to thank Ambassador Geraldine Byrne Nason, Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), for her briefing and express appreciation for her efforts in finalizing the Facilitator's semi-annual report (see S/2021/602).

India supports the full and effective implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and resolution 2231 (2015). We have always maintained that all JCPOA-related issues should be resolved peacefully through dialogue and diplomacy and have extended our support to all such efforts that help in constructively addressing and resolving outstanding issues. All participants should adhere to their respective obligations under resolution 2231 (2015). We hope that the ongoing engagement will result in a positive outcome.

Let me also use this opportunity to commend the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for its role and continued efforts towards ensuring the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme. We urge Iran to continue to cooperate with the IAEA in the performance of its verification activities and in addressing all outstanding issues.

We count on the full implementation of the JCPOA by all parties, which will serve the shared and long-term interests of all countries.

Mr. Geng Shuang (China) (*spoke in Chinese*): I thank Under-Secretary-General DiCarlo, Ambassador Skoog and Ambassador Byrne Nason for their briefings.

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) is a diplomatic outcome achieved through hard work by all parties that engaged in the consultations

and negotiations. It is an example of successful multilateralism. It is an essential safeguard for the international nuclear non-proliferation architecture, as well as for peace and stability in the Middle East. In total disregard for the opposition of the international community, the United States made the obstinate and unilateral decision to withdraw from the agreement and has continued to apply maximum pressure on Iran. That is the root of the current dilemma regarding the Iranian nuclear issue. As the Chinese say, let the one who tied the bell on the tiger's neck take it off. It is incumbent upon the United States, which is responsible for this dilemma, to take the lead in returning to the JCPOA with no preconditions. On that premise, Iran should subsequently also return to full compliance. That is the right way to put the Iranian nuclear deal back on track and de-escalate the situation in the region.

Since the beginning of this year, the parties concerned have actively implemented the consensus reached at the Foreign Ministers' meeting in December in order to facilitate the return to compliance by the United States and Iran as soon as possible. At present, important progress was made in the relevant negotiations in Vienna, although much remains to be done before consensus can be reached. We hope that all parties will have a greater sense of urgency, take a political decision as soon as possible, demonstrate flexibility and commit to working towards the same goal. At the same time, they must exercise restraint, refrain from making moves that may further complicate the situation and strive to reach consensus on a swift return to compliance.

In particular, I would like to point out here that the United States has indicated on several occasions its willingness to return to the deal. It has declared that multilateralism is back. That being the case, the United States should make a greater effort and demonstrate greater sincerity in arriving at consensus. Whether or not the United States can reach an agreement with Iran and other relevant parties on a return to compliance will be the ultimate litmus test to prove whether or not the United States practices multilateralism.

The withdrawal of the United States from the JCPOA has led to a serious trust deficit between the United States and Iran, which considerably hinders a return to compliance negotiations between the two sides. Out of concern that the United States may again withdraw from the agreement, Iran has requested that the current United States Administration provide some

guarantee that another unilateral withdrawal will not occur. The request is completely understandable, and the United States should respond to it. It is our hope that all parties will adopt a positive posture and demonstrate political wisdom in finding a solution.

As a member of the international community, Iran has the right to use outer space for peaceful purposes. Parties have different understandings with regard to the nature of Iran's missile programme and space programme. If deemed necessary, the parties may establish a new platform, or use other suitable forums, to discuss the matter so as to avoid any confusion in negotiations on the return to compliance, as that would complicate and impede the negotiations process.

Unilateral sanctions undermine mutually beneficial cooperation among countries. Such measures are at variance with international equity and justice, are in flagrant breach of international law and have an adverse impact on international relations. The international community has time and again called upon the United States to lift sanctions against Iran, and the Secretary-General repeatedly emphasized that point in his report (S/2021/582). We hope the United States will pay attention and respond positively in the negotiations.

China categorically rejects all illegal unilateral sanctions imposed by the United States. All illegal measures by the United States — be they sanctions against Iran or long-arm jurisdiction targeting third-party entities and individuals, including Chinese entities and individuals — should be lifted immediately. That will help ensure that Iran enjoys legitimate economic dividends, create the conditions for all parties to resume normal economic and trade cooperation with Iran and pave the way for negotiations to finalize a return to compliance with the agreement.

The Iranian nuclear issue has an impact on the situation in the Middle East. Preserving the JCPOA is conducive to maintaining regional security and stability. That is in line with the interests of all parties, including those in the Gulf region. Nevertheless, regional security issues should not be directly linked to the JCPOA. China has proposed that, on the premise of upholding the JCPOA, a multilateral dialogue platform be established in the Gulf region as a way to encourage countries of the region to reach consensus on regional security issues through dialogue and consultation.

The Chinese State Councillor and Foreign Minister, Mr. Wang Yi, paid a visit to the region in

March this year. During the visit, he put forward a five-point proposal, which includes advocating for mutual respect, upholding equity and justice, achieving non-proliferation, jointly fostering collective security and accelerating development cooperation. That proposal reflects China's sincerity in promoting regional peace and its strong sense of responsibility as a permanent member of the Security Council.

Preserving the JCPOA means upholding multilateralism, safeguarding international equity and justice and defending the authority of the Security Council. China has always participated in the relevant JCPOA negotiations in a constructive manner and has played an important role in promoting consensus and resolving differences among the parties. China will continue playing a constructive role to facilitate the earliest conclusion of the compliance resumption talks, move the Iranian nuclear issue towards a political settlement, safeguard the international nuclear non-proliferation regime and promote peace and stability in the Middle East.

Ms. Prince (Saint Vincent and the Grenadines): I also thank Under-Secretary-General DiCarlo, Ambassador Skoog and Ambassador Byrne Nason, in her capacity as Security Council Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), for their briefings.

Saint Vincent and the Grenadines remains committed to the full implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), and we continue to strongly support the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The JCPOA is undoubtedly a triumph of multilateral diplomacy and a central pillar of the global nuclear non-proliferation architecture. Its preservation and revival are critical to safeguarding peace and stability in the Middle East and, indeed, the wider world.

We deeply regret the United States withdrawal from the Agreement in May 2018, as well as its subsequent decisions to re-impose sanctions and terminate waivers. Those actions are antithetical to the requirements and goals of resolution 2231 (2015) and the JCPOA. We continue to urge the United States to rejoin the Agreement and, furthermore, we appeal for the lifting of all unilateral coercive measures. Those measures not only contravene resolution 2231 (2015) and conflict with the objectives of the JCPOA but have also debilitated Iran's economy and considerably impeded

its ability to effectively respond to the coronavirus disease pandemic.

We have taken note of the United States notification in February indicating its withdrawal of letters to the Security Council issued in August and September 2020. We welcome that decision. It is our hope that it will foster an environment conducive to international cooperation.

We regret Iran's decision to cease performing several of its nuclear-related commitments under the JCPOA. Iran has indicated that those steps are reversible, having undertaken them subsequent to the United States withdrawal from the Agreement. We therefore urge Iran to return to full compliance to fulfil the totality of its obligations.

The International Atomic Energy Agency's mandate to promote the safe, secure and peaceful use of nuclear science and technology is vital to maintaining international peace and security, and we remain in support of it. The recent halting of the Agency's verification and monitoring activities in Iran is concerning, as it inhibits the Agency's ability to assess the implementation of Iran's nuclear-related commitments, thereby undermining transparency and confidence. We strongly urge Iran to extend the monitoring agreement and restore access to the Agency in accordance with resolution 2231 (2015) and the JCPOA.

Resolution 2231 (2015) and the JCPOA were not only conceived to guarantee the peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme but are also intended to cultivate an environment that facilitates the development of normal trade and economic relations with the country. In that regard, the continued effective functioning of the procurement channel and the Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges is essential.

Only through a commitment to dialogue and negotiation and the effective fulfilment of all obligations will the current differences be resolved. We therefore support the ongoing diplomatic process in Vienna, and we welcome the progress made thus far. We implore the parties to remain committed to preserving the Agreement and to continue to engage constructively in a spirit of mutual respect and compromise. Furthermore, we urge the entire international community to refrain from provocative actions and rhetoric that may inflame tensions and deter positive engagement.

The JCPOA remains the only viable path to ensure a peaceful, comprehensive and long-term solution to the Iranian nuclear issue. The international community must therefore support it and all similar multilateral instruments.

As a member of the Community of Latin America and the Caribbean's Zone of Peace and a party to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines reaffirms its commitment to achieving a world free of nuclear weapons and remains steadfast in its commitment to disarmament — a goal that is inextricably linked to non-proliferation.

In conclusion, we congratulate Estonia on a well-organized and successful presidency.

Dame Barbara Woodward (United Kingdom): I would like to start by welcoming the Secretary-General's eleventh report on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015) (S/2021/582) and thanking the Secretariat for its continued professionalism and the support provided to the Secretary-General in enabling the production of the report. We also thank the Security Council Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) and her team for their work on a balanced and accurate Facilitator's report (see S/2021/602).

We support the Secretary-General's findings and remain committed to the full implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and resolution 2231 (2015). That is why we are engaging in talks in Vienna aimed at finding a diplomatic solution to revitalize and restore the benefits of the JCPOA. Our priority is for the United States to return to the deal, for Iran to return to compliance with its commitments and to restore the benefits of the deal for all. The talks cannot be open-ended, and the time for reaching a decision is fast approaching. We cannot guarantee that the same terms for a deal will be on offer later in the year.

We remain deeply concerned by Iran's continued violations of its nuclear-related commitments, including the escalatory steps taken since January. Collectively, those steps present a significant nuclear proliferation risk. They have irreversible consequences for Iran's nuclear capabilities and undermine the non-proliferation benefits of the JCPOA. In that context, we are also concerned by the continued limits

placed on the monitoring and surveillance activities of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Iran. Iran must cooperate fully with the IAEA and grant unimpeded access to all relevant sites and activities to ensure that the Agency can continue to fulfil its reporting mandate under resolution 2231 (2015).

The year 2021 has also seen a continuation of Iran's destabilizing activity around the Middle East, including activities that are inconsistent with resolution 2231 (2015). Iran's ballistic missile technologies pose a threat to regional security, including as a potential delivery system for weapons of mass destruction.

We welcome the talks between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Dialogue is the cornerstone for the de-escalation of regional tensions. We note Iranian President-elect Raisi's comments on 18 June stating that his Administration is open to continuing dialogue with Saudi Arabia. We urge all regional partners to engage constructively to improve the security and prosperity of the region.

We call upon President-elect Raisi to set Iran on a different course. He can do that by addressing concerns about Iran's nuclear programme, putting an end to Iran's destabilizing activity and human right abuses and releasing British nationals detained in Iran. Upholding the nuclear non-proliferation regime, ensuring the authority and integrity of the Security Council and improving regional security should remain our shared objectives.

Mr. De la Fuente Ramírez (Mexico) (*spoke in Spanish*): I am grateful to Under-Secretary-General Rosemary DiCarlo and Ambassador Olof Skoog for their briefings. I am also grateful for the report of Ambassador Geraldine Byrne Nason, in her capacity as Security Council Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) (see S/2021/602). I also welcome the presence of the representatives of Iran and Germany.

Since the adoption of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), reached in 2015 between Iran and the permanent members of the Security Council, accompanied by Germany, Mexico has supported the Plan in its belief that it is a successful example of multilateral diplomacy and a key component to ensuring the stability of the international nuclear non-proliferation architecture. The agreement in and of itself represented a major shift in the way the Security Council would deal with the issue of Iran's nuclear

programme by opting for a collaborative approach over a sanctions regime and confrontation.

Mexico believes that it is important to acknowledge that there are no preconditions for a return to the JCPOA. It would require of the United States that it lift its unilateral sanctions against Iran and of Iran that it resume upholding all the commitments it made in 2015. While we understand the position of those who believe that addressing the broader security dynamics in the region is a priority, my country believes that it would be preferable to conduct another dialogue and decide on separate agreements that do not limit the full implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) or hinder the prospect of a return to the JCPOA.

We are concerned about the activities referred to in the report of the Secretary-General (S/2021/582) and the report of the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) (see S/2021/239), in particular concerning the enrichment of uranium-235 up to 60 per cent, as well as research in more technical areas, such as the production of uranium metal and the installation of new and advanced centrifuges, not foreseen in the JCPOA. The restriction of access to undeclared facilities and sites for inspectors under the Additional Protocol to IAEA Safeguards Agreement gives reason for further concern.

While transparency and cooperation are crucial elements for the proper functioning of the Plan of Action, Iran must undo actions that are out of bound of the agreements reached in the JCPOA, and we call for renewing the temporary agreement with the IAEA to continue monitoring and verification. With regard to missile-related activities — rather than levelling mutual recriminations — we must acknowledge that the launches and the responses they lead to are moving us increasingly farther away from a climate of trust, which is needed at this time. We therefore urge all actors to exercise maximum restraint and avoid actions that are unhelpful to achieving de-escalation.

Mexico is committed to achieving and maintaining a world free of nuclear weapons by upholding the commitments and obligations under the various legal instruments at our disposal, including the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. My country seeks to strengthen and maintain the non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament regime established by the NPT. It therefore consistently

defends the right of all countries to benefit from the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It is clear, however, that this right goes hand in hand with the obligation to comply with all the commitments and obligations under the NPT, in particular full cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency.

It is a question of restoring a climate of complete trust and, in that regard, we are optimistically looking forward to the outcome of the discussions in Vienna. We believe that the return to full compliance with resolution 2231 (2015) is key to resolving disputes through multilateral solutions, as well as to ensuring the peaceful development of Iran's nuclear programme and stability in the Middle East. We therefore urge the parties to the JCPOA to resolve their differences and promptly resume upholding their commitments under the agreement.

Ms. Byrne Nason (Ireland): I would like to thank Under-Secretary-General DiCarlo and Ambassador Skoog for their briefings. We welcome the eleventh report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) (S/2021/582), as well as the report of the Joint Commission on the status of the Procurement Working Group's decisions (see S/2021/578). We have taken due note of both reports, their findings and recommendations.

Ireland remains strongly committed to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). As the three reports before us today make clear, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action is an important achievement in multilateral diplomacy and nuclear non-proliferation, and, fully implemented, it remains the best way to guarantee the exclusively peaceful nature of the Iranian nuclear programme.

We welcome positive steps over the past six months, including the United States withdrawal of its claims of snapback. We strongly support the ongoing talks in Vienna under the framework of the Joint Commission. We welcome the commitment of the United States to return to the JCPOA, as well as that of all parties to the talks. We hope that the negotiations, under the European Union chairmanship, will soon reach an agreement on the United States return to the JCPOA and the full and effective implementation of commitments under the JCPOA by all sides, notably a return to compliance by Iran. It is vital that this opportunity be seized.

Ireland is deeply concerned about actions taken by Iran with regard to its nuclear commitments under the

JCPOA. As the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has reported, that includes uranium enrichment up to 60 per cent, the installation of new and advanced centrifuges and the production of uranium metal. We are seriously concerned about those activities, particularly around the irreversibility of the knowledge being acquired by such activities. We once again urge Iran to fully implement its commitments under the JCPOA.

We are deeply concerned about Iran's decision to suspend, as of 23 February, the implementation of transparency measures as envisaged in the JCPOA. It is essential that Iran cooperate fully with the IAEA to ensure the full implementation of all monitoring and verification measures, in particular the Additional Protocol to its Safeguards Agreement. In that regard, we call on Iran to return to full cooperation with the IAEA without delay. That is important not only to meet its commitments under the JCPOA, but it is essential for the international community to have confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme.

We regretted the decision of the previous United States Administration to leave the JCPOA and impose sanctions. We call on the United States to take all steps necessary to facilitate the full and proper implementation of the JCPOA and resolution 2231 (2015), including the removal of sanctions. It is important that the Iranian people see tangible benefits from the Plan.

It was intended that the JCPOA would provide space to build trust and confidence between the parties, which might allow cooperation to address other challenges in the region. We also stress that all parties should refrain from any actions, including missile launches, that undermine trust and stability in the region. Ireland supports the Secretary-General's call on all States, including those in the region, to support the Plan.

It is important that we here in New York demonstrate that resolution 2231 (2015) is working as it should. Ireland will continue to support all efforts to that end.

Finally, as I conclude, I wanted to offer sincere congratulations to you and your excellent team on such an effective and efficient presidency during the month of June. As a fellow European Union member State, we are proud of the manner in which Estonia has presided over our business this month, and I wanted to wish you a sincere *comhghairdeas leat*, which means "congratulations" in my own Irish language.

Mr. De Rivière (France) (*spoke in French*): I thank the Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, the Head of the Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations, and the Security Council Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) for their briefings.

Since the most recent meeting of the Security Council on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), in December 2020 (see S/2020/1324), we have noted both a constructive dynamic towards the return to the Iranian nuclear agreement and a series of disquieting developments.

France echoes the support expressed for the negotiation process under way in Vienna on the resumed implementation by the United States and Iran of all commitments under the Iranian nuclear agreement and resolution 2231 (2015). France is actively involved, notably with its E3 partners, in an exacting manner, in particular with respect to preserving the non-proliferation benefits of the agreement, and pragmatic, given that the priority is the early stabilization of the nuclear situation in Iran. After six negotiating sessions, the parameters of a return to the agreement have been clearly identified, and the most difficult questions remain pending.

It is now crucial for the necessary courageous decisions to be taken so as to conclude the negotiations and allow for the swift return of all parties to the agreement. We shall continue to mobilize all efforts to expedite the conclusion of the negotiations. That process cannot drag on indefinitely, because the parameters and benefits of a return to the agreement will no longer be the same if too much time goes by.

Despite the launch of that process, almost three months ago now, the nuclear situation has continued to deteriorate in Iran. Iran is developing particularly sensitive nuclear activities, in violation of the provisions of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action: research and development on uranium metal production; uranium enrichment first at 20 per cent, since the beginning of the year, and now at 60 per cent, in the absence of any civilian need in Iran for such enrichment rates; the accumulation of advanced centrifuges at enrichment facilities; and so on. As a result, Iran has never been so close to a nuclear threshold.

In addition, Iran has suspended for more than four months now the implementation of the voluntary transparency and verification measures laid down in

the Vienna agreement, in particular the Additional Protocol. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) informed the Council that its activities had been hampered by that decision. A mechanism was implemented to make it possible for the IAEA to maintain its knowledge of the nuclear programme in the context of a future return to the agreement; however, that mechanism expired on 24 June, and Iran has not yet confirmed to the IAEA that it intends to continue implementing those provisions.

It is deeply worrisome to note that the IAEA is no longer able to fully comply with the monitoring and verification mission with which the Security Council entrusted it in the framework of resolution 2231 (2015). We therefore call on Iran to resume cooperation with the IAEA and to immediately restore all its access.

The nuclear developments in Iran are also worrisome given the continuation of ballistic activities during the past six months, which run counter to resolution 2231 (2015). France is particularly concerned at the proliferation of missile activities and technologies in the region, notably ballistic missiles, whose consequences are particularly destabilizing.

France believes that the full implementation of the Iranian nuclear agreement and resolution 2231 (2015) is an imperative both for non-proliferation and for the stability of the Middle East. Our priority is to rapidly seek a conclusion to the current negotiations on a return to the agreement, so as to resume full implementation as soon as possible.

But we cannot stop here. Above and beyond that nuclear agreement, there are other areas of concern in terms of regional and international security that will have to be addressed with our partners and the States of the region.

Mr. Kiboino (Kenya): This being the first biannual briefing, I congratulate Ireland on its role as Facilitator of the implementation of the resolution 2231 (2015) process. I also thank the Under-Secretary-General, Ms. Rosemary DiCarlo, and His Excellency Olof Skoog, Head of the Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations. We also recognize the presence of the representatives of Germany and the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Kenya strongly believes that global nuclear disarmament and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons constitute the core guarantee against the use

or threat of use of nuclear weapons. We see the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and resolution 2231 (2015) as critical multilateral achievements and mechanisms in the area of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.

Kenya commends the ongoing diplomatic engagements that began in Vienna on 6 April focusing on the revival of the JCPOA. The decision by the United States Government to reaffirm the measures and provisions contained in resolution 2231 (2015) early this year was an important preamble to those efforts. We encourage the affected neighbouring countries in the region to engage constructively in support of the implementation of the JCPOA and resolution 2231 (2015).

We also urge all the JCPOA members to ensure that the outcome of the ongoing talks addresses the gaps and loopholes of that 2015 mechanism. Specifically, the talks should provide clear and practical steps and arrangements that situate the outcome road map within the current imperatives, which include the following.

First, the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran must return to the full and effective implementation of the JCPOA and resolution 2231 (2015); secondly, all parties must adhere to their commitments under the 2015 Iran nuclear deal, including the lifting of additional sanctions and all retaliatory measures, which are in violation of the principles and procedures laid out in the JCPOA; thirdly, a strengthened utilization of the JCPOA's dispute-resolution mechanisms to address differences and preserve the Plan's agreements; and, last but not least, the important verification and monitoring work of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) must continue unhampered on the ground.

We encourage Iran to fully implement, as before, its Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA and the voluntary transparency and implementation measures, which includes Iran taking ownership of and committing to the JCPOA through non-violation of the Plan and refraining from further acting on irreversible measures it has undertaken.

Resolution 2231 (2015) notes that the political and diplomatic efforts that went into the establishment of the JCPOA were geared towards, inter alia, ensuring the economic and technological development of Iran in the area of peaceful nuclear activities. We therefore urge that the Joint Commission remains committed to upholding the integrity, transparency

and confidence-building approach of the procurement channel to enable the continuation of trade with the Islamic Republic of Iran and relevant transfers within the JCPOA framework.

Let me reiterate that adherence to the provisions of the JCPOA and agreed mechanisms by all parties is a critical first step that will further enhance trust and build confidence among all parties and neighbouring States for the long-term stability of the Middle East region. Indeed, the usefulness of the JCPOA will become evident only through the full implementation of its provisions. Its utility cannot and should not be measured on the basis of non-compliance.

In conclusion and as part of the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) and in alignment with the JCPOA framework and the role of the IAEA, Kenya urges the Security Council to integrate in its considerations the potential of strengthening the peaceful application of nuclear technology in industrial development projects, including in the areas of food and agriculture, health, energy planning and water management for the benefit of the Iranian people and the holistic stability of the subregion.

Let me take this opportunity to congratulate you, Mr. President, and the entire Estonian team, on a successful presidency of the Council during the month of June.

Ms. Juul (Norway): I would like to start by thanking the briefers for their briefings.

Norway welcomes the eleventh report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) (S/2021/582). We share his view and that of other Council members that the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), as endorsed by the Security Council through resolution 2231 (2015), remains a success of multilateral diplomacy. The JCPOA strengthened global nuclear non-proliferation and is important for regional and international stability and security. Its full implementation, supported by the broader international community, is vital.

Over the past few years, the JCPOA has been put under increasing strain. We remain of the view that the full and effective implementation of the JCPOA is the best opportunity available to build international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme. In this regard, we join the Secretary-General and other Council members in

commending the professional, factual and impartial work of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

We also remain committed to efforts to facilitate legitimate trade with Iran, and we echo the Secretary-General in calling on Member States to work effectively, including by supporting the INSTEX mechanism to allow economic operators to engage in trade with Iran.

Norway regrets the decision of the United States to withdraw from the JCPOA in 2018 and to unilaterally reimpose sanctions. We also deeply regret the worrying series of steps taken by Iran since 2019 that go against its nuclear-related commitments. As the Secretary-General's report notes, the IAEA has documented Iran's activities in relation to the installation of new and advanced centrifuges, research and development for uranium metal production and enrichment of uranium up to 60 per cent. The Secretary-General's report further shows that Iran's decisions have affected the IAEA's verification and monitoring activities, including reporting provided for in resolution 2231 (2015). Such actions are a direct challenge to the international community.

The continuing escalation is deeply unsettling and must be reversed. We urge Iran to return to full compliance with the JCPOA, resume its provisional application of the Additional Protocol and other transparency measures, and renew full cooperation with the IAEA without delay. We stress the importance of an urgent and clear solution for the Agency's ability to recover and re-establish the necessary continuity of knowledge. We share the concerns brought to the Secretary-General's attention relating to several ballistic-missile launches and a space-launch-vehicle test and encourage Iran to address these concerns. As several States have pointed out, these activities are not consistent with paragraph 3 of annex B of resolution 2231 (2015).

The security situation in the region remains tense and unpredictable. We call on all stakeholders to show restraint and avoid action that might contribute to escalation. Norway remains a steadfast supporter of the constructive diplomatic dialogue to decrease tensions and increase trust and cooperation.

I would like to conclude by emphasizing that we welcome ongoing efforts by the remaining JCPOA participants and United States on the possible return of the United States to the agreement and the return

of Iran to full JCPOA implementation. The full and effective implementation of the JCPOA by all parties will contribute positively to building confidence, stability and security in the region and beyond.

Mr. Nebenzia (Russian Federation) (*spoke in Russian*): I would like to thank Under-Secretary-General Rosemary DiCarlo, Head of the Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations Olof Skoog, and the Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) and Permanent Representative of Ireland Geraldine Byrne Nason, for their briefings.

Today's meeting is taking place in a situation that is completely different from that of six months ago. We have left behind us the illegitimate attempts by the United States to restore United Nations sanctions against Iran and use the Security Council to set up an arms embargo of unprecedented strictness. The Council unanimously rejected these destructive moves. At the beginning of this year, our American colleagues officially withdrew their illegitimate claims to trigger a snapback. We have therefore turned the page once and for all on this issue.

A diplomatic process is in full swing in Vienna to restore the full-fledged functioning of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), and we are already seeing the profile of a future agreement. There is a general understanding of how to move forward to attain the goals set before us.

The current report of the Secretary-General (S/2021/582) is another signal that the overall dynamic compared to last year is moving in the right direction. It confirms that the regime set up in resolution 2231 (2015) continues to operate. Any extraordinary events that might have influenced this were not mentioned in the report.

I wish to separately note the Secretary-General's conclusion that during the reporting period there were no violations identified in terms of

“the supply, sale, transfer or export to the Islamic Republic of Iran of nuclear-related items undertaken contrary to paragraph 2 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015)” (S/2021/582, *para. 7*).

Further, according to paragraph 9 of the report, the Secretary-General did not receive any official information regarding transfers undertaken contrary to paragraph 4 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015),

including on ballistic missile-related transfers from the Islamic Republic of Iran.

I want to stress that those are the conclusions of the Secretary-General, not the Russian Federation. In our letter drafted in connection with the statements of several countries, we explained in detail that the accusations of our Western colleagues regarding Iran's ballistic missile programme were unfounded. They are simply statements based on the notion of "highly likely". No single fact was mentioned in their accusations. That is also confirmed by the Secretary-General. It is strange and doubly unacceptable to hear about violations of the ballistic-missile provisions of resolution 2231 (2015) from the representative of the United States of America, which themselves continue to violate that resolution.

The report of the Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) (see S/2021/578) is also balanced overall. For that, we should pay tribute to the efforts of the Irish Facilitator, Ambassador Byrne Nason, and her team. Although there were certain comments on that document, in a constructive spirit and with a view to agreement on the format of resolution 2231 (2015), we decided to support the consensus forming around it.

Any stabilization process clearly requires time and is not easy. It would be naive to expect that the detritus left behind by the United States unilateral withdrawal from the JCPOA and its subsequent steps to destroy the deal can somehow be magically cleared up in a few days or weeks. We all need to be realistic. Restoring the normal functioning of the JCPOA requires patience, perseverance and the political will of all participants.

For many years now, we have been appealing to the common sense of our partners, trying to convey a simple logic: if the objective is to reach an agreement, then we should not demonize Iran and make it the source of all evil. Iran is an equal partner with its own interests, concerns and perception of national security risks. As a sovereign State, it is fully entitled to all that. In international relations, countries do not have to like each other. However, they are obliged to treat each other with respect. As we all remember, *par in parem non habet imperium*. If that principle is respected in relations with Iran, the resolution process will go much faster.

Let me recall that the purpose of the JCPOA was precisely to acknowledge that the Iranian nuclear programme was no different from that of any other

non-nuclear-weapon State party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Other provisions of the deal, including the now expired special procedure for conventional arms transfers to and from Iran, also pursued the same goal of gradually restoring the same cooperation regime with Iran as with any other State Member of the United Nations. It is important that the call for Member States to strengthen normal trade cooperation with Iran, including through the mechanism of the Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges and the JCPOA Joint Commission's procurement channel, is also mentioned in the Secretary-General's current report.

However, we hear from some colleagues the opposite call, that is, to extend the restrictions on Iran's nuclear activities and maintain the unilateral sanctions on conventional arms transfers that violate resolution 2231 (2015), and even veiled hints that the JCPOA should be revised or somehow expanded to include aspects of regional security. I would like to recall that the purpose of resolution 2231 (2015) has never been to contain Tehran. It was always about the ultimate normalization of international economic, scientific and technical cooperation with the Islamic Republic of Iran, including in the area of peaceful nuclear energy, after the earlier issues with the IAEA had been resolved. The final report on that topic was prepared in December 2015, and its conclusions were endorsed in the relevant resolution of the IAEA Board of Governors. It was the resolving of issues concerning Tehran and the resulting transparency regime for the Iranian nuclear programme, primarily through the implementation of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between Iran and the IAEA for the Application of Safeguards, that became the key non-proliferation achievement of the JCPOA.

The tensions in that area that we have seen today are the direct result of the destructive actions of the United States in undermining the JCPOA. The cause-and-effect correlation is exactly that. All Iran's steps to temporarily freeze its commitments are not some arbitrary violations, as some colleagues are now trying to portray it, but were a legitimate response to the non-compliance on the part of the United States with the deal. That conclusion, albeit, in our view, presented somewhat obliquely, is also reflected in the report of the Secretary-General.

Unfortunately, we have not yet seen a real revision of the decisions taken by the previous United States

Administration. In practice, the United States continues its policy of maximum pressure on Iran and violation of resolution 2231 (2015), including by maintaining the unilateral sanctions and the arms embargo against Iran, while all United Nations sanctions in that regard have ceased to apply. Of course, it is regrettable that the escalation has led, among other things, to a significant reduction in the IAEA verification activities in the Islamic Republic of Iran. However, it is significant that all of Iran's steps are reversible, as has been repeatedly confirmed by the IAEA. Equally important is the fact that Iran continues its dialogue with the Agency without renegeing on its non-proliferation commitments.

I will now say a few words on regional security in the Persian Gulf. That is a very important topic, but it goes beyond the JCPOA. Rather, it is a discussion for the future once the deal is fully restored.

Our idea of launching a regional dialogue on security issues in the Persian Gulf is well known. We talked about it in detail last October during a separate meeting of the Security Council on this topic under the Russian presidency that month (see S/2020/1037). We believe that there is a need for concrete steps towards strengthening mutual trust, preventing crises and reducing the risk of military clashes, misunderstandings and escalation. We could consider the experience of other regions in developing a system of confidence-building measures. In doing so, security issues in the Persian Gulf should be resolved primarily by regional States. We noted a similar appeal by the Secretary-General in his report with regard to creating a conducive environment for diplomatic efforts in Vienna and refraining from provocative rhetoric and actions that could undermine them, as well as his point that issues related to the broader context of regional security should be considered without being linked to the task of preserving the JCPOA and its achievements.

A calm, pragmatic discussion is needed now more than ever. There is no need to raise the stakes or fuel emotions. In any case, there is no alternative to the JCPOA. That needs to be clearly understood. I urge everyone to imagine for a moment a world where there is no deal. Would it be safer for someone than the current one?

Fortunately, understanding the value of the JCPOA seems to unite us all. That is why all efforts should now be focused on restoring it. That is what the Secretary-General calls for in his report. In practice, that means

that the United States must immediately return to full compliance with the requirements of resolution 2231 (2015) and the JCPOA, and that Iran must immediately respond to those steps and ensure the unfreezing of all the obligations it previously suspended, first and foremost in terms of the transparency of its nuclear programme and cooperation with the IAEA.

The task of other parties to the agreement is to cooperate to ensure the convergence of positions. Our primary duty now is to help our colleagues in Vienna. Russia is ready to do everything necessary to achieve that. We are counting on the common sense and support of the other members of the Council.

The President: I shall now make a statement in my capacity as the representative of Estonia.

I thank Under-Secretary-General Rosemary DiCarlo, Ambassador Olof Skoog and Ambassador Geraldine Byrne Nason for their briefings.

As we have heard from many Council members today, this is a crucial moment for the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) — an agreement that six years ago was created to ensure the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme.

Estonia has repeatedly emphasized the importance of and its support for the Plan. We continue to consider the JCPOA a key element in global nuclear non-proliferation architecture and crucial for regional and wider international security.

No doubt the past few years have been challenging to the agreement, but we have now reached a new and hopefully positive milestone. Like the Secretary-General, we are encouraged by the diplomatic engagements that have taken place in Vienna since April, offering an opportunity for the United States and Iran to return to the full and effective implementation of the JCPOA and resolution 2231 (2015). Indeed, this is a unique moment to preserve and revitalize the agreement that is in the collective security interests of us all. In that regard, it is more important than ever to refrain from actions that further violate and undermine the agreement and are counterproductive to the ongoing diplomatic efforts.

Estonia deeply regrets Iran's decision of 2019 to start reducing its nuclear-related commitments under the Plan. Unfortunately, those worrying developments have not stopped even during the Vienna negotiations. As the Secretary-General points out in his latest report

(S/2021/582) on the implementation of the Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), in recent months Iran has considerably increased its uranium enrichment capabilities and stockpile. Those activities present serious nuclear proliferation risks. We urge Iran to stop them and return to compliance with its commitments.

Full cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) remains crucial in averting the prospect of a nuclear-armed Iran. Estonia commends the impartial and professional work of the Agency in verifying and monitoring Iran's nuclear commitments under the JCPOA.

We are concerned about the limits placed on the IAEA's access to all relevant sites and activities in Iran. The temporary technical understanding between Iran and the Agency expired on 24 June and we understand that to date the question of its extension remains open. In order to ensure that the IAEA can fulfil its reporting mandate under resolution 2231 (2015) to retain the international community's confidence in the peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear activities, as well as to seize the opportunity of the Vienna talks, the Agency must be granted unimpeded access to all relevant sites and activities in Iran.

Finally and very briefly with respect to annex B to resolution 2231 (2015), we consider Iran's developing and testing of nuclear-capable ballistic missiles and related technologies as inconsistent with its paragraph 3. We note that several such ballistic missile launches were undertaken during the reporting period and find them destabilizing for regional security.

We hope that with the help of strong political will the negotiations in Vienna can conclude soon. Estonia believes that a full restoration of the Plan is the best way to uphold the nuclear non-proliferation regime, prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon and eventually bring greater security to the region and the world.

I now resume my functions as President of the Council.

I give the floor to the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Mr. Takht Ravanchi (Islamic Republic of Iran): I would like to thank the briefers for their reports. The Council's message today on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and resolution 2231 (2015) is loud and clear: the JCPOA must be implemented and there is no better alternative.

Despite such encouraging statements, we have recently heard — including in this meeting — discouraging statements from a few Council members pointing their fingers at the victim instead of demanding that the culprit act responsibly. They have deliberately ignored the fact that Iran's steps in ceasing the implementation of some of its commitments are remedial in nature. They have called on Iran to come to full compliance with its JCPOA commitments as if it were Iran that withdrew from the JCPOA; as if it were Iran that reimposed or introduced countless inhumane sanctions with the publicly declared objective of starving an entire nation; as if it were Iran that brazenly threatened all States either to violate resolution 2231 (2015) or face punishment; as if it were Iran that pursued a maximum pressure policy; and as if it were Iran that made every attempt to kill the JCPOA and resolution 2231 (2015) forever.

Our record and that of the United States with respect to the JCPOA are clear. The challenges of the JCPOA's implementation cannot be assessed in isolation. Those challenges arose when President Trump started to demonize the JCPOA even before coming to office and to harass Iran's business partners, and later in 2018, when he unilaterally and unlawfully withdrew from the JCPOA and by reimposing sanctions waged an all-out economic war against Iran with the deliberate objective of starving the Iranian people. Weaponizing food and medicine is prohibited, even in wartime, and is indeed a manifestation of crimes against humanity.

Nevertheless, instead of taking immediate remedial measures allowed by the JCPOA, we exercised strategic patience for one year, but to no avail. Our maximum restraint was responded to with the so-called maximum pressure policy of the United States and the appeasement policy of Europe.

Only one year after the United States withdrawal, we took certain remedial steps authorized by the JCPOA's paragraphs 26 and 36, according to which, in case of "a re-introduction or re-imposition of the sanctions" (*resolution 2231 (2015), annex A, para. 26*), Iran has the right to cease performing its commitments in whole or in part.

At the same time, Iran's response was applied in a reasonable and incremental manner in order to provide more time for common sense to prevail. Yet while Iran's steps are reversible, the sufferings of our people are not. Of course, we cannot and will not overlook

hundreds of billions of dollars of damages inflicted upon the Iranian economy. But unfortunately, precious lives lost due to sanctions are irreversible.

How can the pain, grief and emotional problems throughout the life of a kid for the loss of his or her mother due to the lack of certain medicines, the import of which was prevented by sanctions, be compensated? How will the lifelong suffering of mothers and fathers who have lost their children owing to the lack of medicines for rare diseases be relieved and compensated? That is the factual context in which the current implementation status of the JCPOA must be evaluated.

We must recall that the JCPOA is not a one-way street. It is founded on two pillars: Iran's nuclear-related commitments and the reciprocal commitments for the lifting of all sanctions by the United Nations, the European Union and the United States of America, as well as promoting normal economic and trade relations with Iran. All those commitments are meticulously worded and explained in detail in the JCPOA and in resolution 2231 (2015).

Since the Council's previous meeting on resolution 2231 (2015) (see S/2020/1324), nothing has changed except the verbal declaration of the United States of its intention to return to compliance with the JCPOA. In reality, until this very moment the maximum pressure policy and the draconian sanctions against our people still continue, and the United States remains in violation of the JCPOA and resolution 2231 (2015).

Even despite the unanimous order of the International Court of Justice, on 3 October 2018, obliging the United States to remove impediments to humanitarian trade with Iran, all humanitarian goods, including much-needed medicine and medical equipment, have been subjected to sanctions.

The general authorization by the United States Treasury Department on 17 June 2021 of certain coronavirus-related transactions with Iran clearly and conclusively refutes the previous claims by the United States that such items were exempted from sanctions.

In contrast to certain remaining JCPOA participants, which have only paid lip service to the JCPOA in the past years, Iran is the country that has paid a heavy price to preserve that agreement. Therefore, it is high time for the United States and of course the European Union and France, Germany and the United Kingdom

(EU/E3) to make difficult decisions to return to full compliance with the JCPOA.

We fully proved our sincerity during the JCPOA's negotiation, conclusion and implementation. We have demonstrated our resolute determination to keep it alive by exercising strategic patience and maximum restraint for years. We did that while we were not — and still are not — receiving the intended benefits from the deal. Those who broke their promises are the ones who must prove their sincerity and genuine political will. They are the ones who must take hard decisions.

Therefore, they are not in a position to criticize Iran for taking remedial measures that are fully authorized under the deal, are in no way inconsistent with our obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and our Safeguards Agreement and do not lead to any alleged proliferation concerns, contrary to what certain countries attempt to portray, as our nuclear programme has been under the Agency's most robust monitoring and verification mechanism. The Islamic Republic of Iran continues to cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in line with its international obligations.

IAEA reports, including in the past six months, confirm that there is no safeguards-related issue regarding Iran's ongoing nuclear activities, and there is no evidence of diversion of nuclear materials to non-peaceful purposes. It should be added that, contrary to what has been declared, the uranium enriched up to 60 per cent and the uranium metal have legitimate civilian applications, and none of them are prohibited under the NPT.

The law passed by our Parliament was indeed a calibrated response to the dismal record of unlawful measures by the United States and the impotence of the EU/E3 to withstand such measures for well over three years. The objective of that law is to retrieve the lost balance in the JCPOA's implementation, as it clearly states that Iran's remedial measures are reversible if the JCPOA is fully implemented by others in practice and all sanctions are fully removed.

At the same time, to give more room for diplomacy, a temporary technical understanding was reached between Iran and the IAEA in February and extended in May. Nevertheless, after four months of negotiations nothing has changed in practice, and the Iranian nation continues to suffer from the unlawful sanctions.

In the past few months, certain attempts have also been made to establish a possible link between paragraph 3 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015) and the launches by Iran of certain ballistic missiles or space-launch vehicles and consequently to draw an arbitrary conclusion. Paragraph 3 of annex B does not concern space-launch vehicles, for a number of obvious reasons, including their different design, technical nature and mission. In addition, Iran's ballistic missiles are designed to deliver conventional warheads and are not designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons; accordingly, they are outside the purview of resolution 2231 (2015).

To develop a conventional missile programme is an inherent right under international law and is neither prohibited nor limited by resolution 2231 (2015). The Islamic Republic of Iran, like every other country, will not compromise on its security and its conventional defensive capability.

We are also determined to pursue the realization of our inalienable right to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes despite all plots, sabotage and terrorist acts. The latest such unlawful measures were the assassination of martyr Fakhrizadeh, an outstanding Iranian nuclear scientist, as well as the 11 April terrorist act at the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant, with clear indications pointing to the Israeli regime's responsibility for both cases, as was also recently acknowledged by the former head of Mossad. The Council must hold the Israeli regime to account for such adventurist practices.

Iran's decision to negotiate and conclude the JCPOA was based on our principled policy to make the best use of dialogue and diplomacy in advancing our foreign-policy objectives. We have always been steadfast in applying this policy. Iran will remain consistent and resolute in pursuing that approach regarding the JCPOA as long as other parties put an end — completely and without any precondition or further delay — to their bullying policies, violating their obligations and disregarding their promises.

The JCPOA is a deal made to secure the interests of all sides. While we are sincere and serious in current negotiations, our ultimate goal is only to ensure the implementation of the deal as is by all — no more, no less.

Given years of serious violations of the JCPOA by other sides, it is essential to secure enough assurances

that all sanctions are removed verifiably and that the United States will not once again withdraw from the JCPOA or abuse its mechanisms to create another implementation crisis to deprive Iran of its benefits from the deal. This is vital for establishing confidence in the full and continued adherence of the United States and E3/EU to their commitments, and thereby creating the calm and stable atmosphere required for promoting and facilitating the development of normal economic and trade contacts and cooperation with Iran, as expressly stated in resolution 2231 (2015). That is of particular importance for Iran's business partners to conclude agreements with Iran with peace of mind. It is also critical for Iran to fully benefit from the deal's dividends.

Finally, our observations on the eleventh report of the Secretary-General (S/2021/582) on the implementation of the resolution 2231 (2015) are contained in my letter already submitted to the Council.

In reaction to what has been said in this meeting, I would like to say a few words about our region. We are living in a volatile region. The challenges are enormous, and at the same time the opportunities for better relations among regional countries are great. However, there are forces that do not want to see rapprochement, reconciliation and good neighbourliness established in this region.

The United States, with its interventionist policies in the Middle East, including its unbridled export of sophisticated ordnance and advanced weaponry to the region and its blind support for the Israeli regime, has thrown this sensitive region into chaos and turmoil. The United States cannot distract attention from its military adventurism and destabilizing role in our region by baselessly accusing Iran of violating resolutions 1701 (2006) and 2231 (2015), which I categorically reject. I also reject references made by the British Ambassador to human rights, as they are outside the agenda of this meeting and the purview of the Security Council.

The President: I now give the floor to the representative of Germany.

Mr. Sautter (Germany): At the outset, let me congratulate you, Sir, on a momentous Security Council presidency. I would like to thank Olaf Skoog for reminding us of the important role of the European Union High Representative as Coordinator of the Joint Commission, and for the strong support for the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), not only from

the External Action Service but from the European Union (EU) and its member States as a whole. I would also like to thank Geraldine Byrne Nason for having taken on the important role of Security Council Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), and Rosemary DiCarlo for the continuing and ongoing support of the Secretariat for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015).

We also welcome the support expressed by the Secretary-General for the Vienna talks and for our efforts to restore and fully revive the JCPOA. We have now had six rounds of talks, during which we have made important progress.

The point I am now making is perhaps the most important one in my intervention — there is no reasonable alternative to the JCPOA. We believe that it is entirely feasible to bring the nuclear deal fully back to life. We all know we are not yet there. In order to get there, all parties need to show flexibility and a willingness to take tough decisions. In the end, every party needs to be convinced that a return to full JCPOA implementation is in its best interests, and it is therefore willing to give. That is how negotiations work; they cannot succeed without compromise.

With regard to the Secretary-General's report (S/2021/582) under discussion today, I would like to stress that we fully share the Secretary-General's concerns about the nuclear steps that Iran has taken. Those worrisome steps include, first of all, the development and use of advanced centrifuges, far beyond JCPOA limits; secondly, uranium enrichment of up to 60 per cent and, thirdly, the ongoing research and development activities on uranium metal production. Unfortunately, we do not share the assessment expressed by some colleagues today that those measures are fully reversible. They result in technological knowledge gains and undermine the non-proliferation benefits of the JCPOA. They are not conducive to building trust and confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of the Iranian nuclear programme.

Another point that concerns us is transparency. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) plays a vital role in monitoring and verifying Iran's nuclear-related commitments, as the Council requested in resolution 2231 (2015). It is therefore deeply concerning that the Agency's work has been affected as a result of Iran's decision to reduce the implementation of its nuclear-related commitments. We strongly support the

continued efforts of the IAEA and urge Iran to restore IAEA access in full.

Turning now to annex B of the resolution, let me briefly reiterate that we continue to consider Iran's development of ballistic missiles, designed to be capable of delivering a nuclear weapon, including launches using such ballistic missile technology, as inconsistent with paragraph 3 of annex B. We are concerned about Iran's development of a number of relevant ballistic missile types and continued test activities. Clearly, such ballistic missile activity is not conducive to fostering stability and security in the region. Moreover, we reaffirm the need to ensure compliance by all States, in particular by Iran, with the prohibition on the transfer of Missile Technology Control Regime-listed items to and from Iran. The delivery of missile technology to non-State actors in the region is destabilizing and must cease.

Lastly, while the European Union embargo on conventional arms remains in place vis-à-vis Iran, we acknowledge and recognize that the conventional arms provisions laid out in annex B expired last October. Iran is called upon to behave in a responsible manner and refrain from destabilizing actions in that regard.

Let me conclude by noting the following. We have heard different nuances in today's discussion but, at the same time, it appears that all of us around the table have again stressed the importance of the JCPOA as a key contribution to the non-proliferation and security architecture in the region and beyond. That is why we — Germany — worked very hard here in New York last summer in order to defend and protect the JCPOA. We will now do everything in our power to see the JCPOA talks in Vienna succeed. We count on all parties to return with a mandate that is suitable so as to put this important agreement fully back in place.

The President: Before adjourning today's meeting, as it is the last scheduled open meeting of the Security Council for the month of June, I would like to express the sincere appreciation of the delegation of Estonia to the members of the Council for their cooperation and support. Let me also thank Ms. Hasmik Egian and the secretariat of the Council for all the assistance and support given to us.

I thank all members for their congratulations to us on either assuming or concluding the presidency. Receiving congratulatory remarks at the end of the presidency is perhaps of more substance and importance

than on the first day, because congratulations on the first day are an advance payment. But now the job is done.

Indeed, it has been a busy month — one in which we rallied to consensus on several important issues within our purview. We have been able to return to the Council Chamber for almost all Council meetings. We could not have done any of that alone or without the hard work, support and positive contributions of every

delegation and the representatives of the Secretariat, including the technical support team, conference services officers, interpreters, translators, verbatim reporters and security staff. I thank them all.

As we end our presidency, I know I speak on behalf of the Council in wishing the delegation of France good luck in the month of July.

The meeting rose at 12.15 p.m.