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Provisional

6762nd meeting Thursday, 26 April 2012, 10.20 a.m. New York

President: Ms. Rice (United States of America)

Members: Azerbaijan Mr. Musayev

ChinaMr. Wang MinColombiaMr. AlzateFranceMr. AraudGermanyMr. WittigGuatemalaMr. Rosenthal

India Mr. Manjeev Singh Puri

MoroccoMr. BouchaaraPakistanMr. TararPortugalMr. CabralRussian FederationMr. PankinSouth AfricaMr. SangquTogoMr. Menan

United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland Sir Mark Lyall Grant

Agenda

Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan

Report of the Secretary-General on the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (S/2012/231)

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The meeting was called to order at 10.20 a.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan

Report of the Secretary-General on the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (S/2012/231)

The President: In accordance with rule 39 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, I invite Mr. Hervé Ladsous, Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, to participate in this meeting.

The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda.

I wish to draw the attention of Council members to document S/2012/231, which contains the report of the Secretary-General on the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur.

I now give the floor to Mr. Ladsous.

Mr. Ladsous: I thank you, Madam President, for the opportunity to brief the Council on the situation in Darfur and the implementation of the mandate of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID).

I would like to start with the peace process. The Darfur Regional Authority is preparing strategies and workplans to progress in the implementation of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur. While UNAMID and the United Nations country team are looking at how they can support this process, concerns have been raised by the Darfur Regional Authority about the lack of funding from the Government. In his address to Parliament on 23 April, the Chairperson of the Darfur Regional Authority, El Tigani Seisi, stated that unless funding was provided the process could collapse.

Regarding the security provisions of the Doha Document, the parties must resolve a number of issues to move beyond the initial verification of the forces of the Liberation and Justice Movement (LJM). The LJM and the Sudanese Armed Forces were to move in parallel through a process of verification, disengagement, redeployment, limited arms control and finally, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. Moreover, in accordance with the agreement, the LJM

has requested the Government to provide non-military logistical support to its verified forces.

Now the Government and the LJM must decide how to proceed. Will the Government be ready to move through the process in parallel with the LJM, or will the LJM accept an amendment to the synchronization of the process? In that connection, it is important that a time frame be established for the provision of non-military logistical support. We have, of course, encouraged UNAMID to work with the parties towards the resolution of those issues.

On a positive note, as agreed with the LJM, UNAMID and its partners are undertaking further screening of LJM elements to dissociate children assembled with the Movement's forces.

Prospects for the resumption of negotiations non-signatory between the Government and movements do not look good at present. The Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and the Sudan Liberation Army-Minni Minawi — which are both members, as the Council is aware, of the Sudan Revolutionary Front alliance — have informed the Joint Chief Mediator ad interim that they will negotiate only over national, political and economic reforms. The Sudan Liberation Army-Abdul Wahid has stated that it is not willing to negotiate until the root causes of the Darfur conflict have been addressed. For its part, the Government is willing to negotiate only on the basis of the Doha Document on issues related to Darfur.

Regarding internal dialogue on the peace process, the parties are due to complete in June the Doha Document information campaign and the canvassing of Darfuri stakeholders' views on the conditions they consider important to a credible dialogue. A preliminary analysis has indicated that the stakeholders are in favour of such a dialogue, but have concerns related to equitable representation, freedom of expression, the security of the participants and the commitment of the signatory parties to respecting the outcome. UNAMID will continue to work with the Government, the LJM and the Darfuri stakeholders to address those issues and will work towards strengthening its monitoring capacity.

Turning now to the implementation of the protection mandate of UNAMID and, further, to the incidents outlined in the report, on 17 April unidentified armed movement forces attacked a place

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called El Simah near the border of Eastern Darfur and South Kordofan; Um Dafok, on the border of Eastern Darfur and the Central African Republic; and Saysaban in Southern Darfur. While the fighting has since subsided, the potential for additional clashes remains. UNAMID has assessed that the incidents are related to hostilities between South Sudan and the Sudan and, of course, remains vigilant within its capacity in monitoring the security situation along the border between Southern Darfur and South Sudan.

Attempts by UNAMID and humanitarian agencies to access those areas and other areas affected by fighting, including Jebel Marra, have been repeatedly obstructed by Government authorities. At the most recent tripartite meeting held in Addis Ababa February, Government officials committed themselves to ensuring that **UNAMID** humanitarian agencies had unhindered throughout Darfur. In reality, however, UNAMID has continued to face access restrictions, particularly in militarily sensitive areas.

In other security incidents, the targeting by armed groups of South Sudanese in camps in Eastern Darfur is of concern. On 9, 17 and 18 April, groups of armed assailants attacked Dinka refugees in three camps near El Daein, in Eastern Darfur. In response, UNAMID has increased patrolling in the area and additional Government police have been deployed to deter such attacks. This brings me to the subject of the safety and security of the Mission and humanitarian personnel.

The three fatal attacks on UNAMID peacekeepers that have occurred since the beginning of the year are of serious concern. That includes an attack on a UNAMID convoy in Western Darfur on 20 April that resulted in the death of a Togolese police officer. I again express my condolences to the Ambassador of Togo over that loss. We are also deeply concerned about the World Food Programme staff member who was kidnapped in Nyala on 6 March. Of course, I call on the Government to spare no effort to secure his safe release. Furthermore, I would strongly urge the Government of the Sudan to release the two staff members of the United Nations Mission in the Sudan who have been detained in Eastern Darfur since 24 February.

I will now turn to operational issues and the review of uniformed personnel. In regard to the police component, one of the key findings of the review is an increased risk to civilians from violent crimes, particularly in urban areas and camps for internally displaced persons (IDP), as opposed to armed conflict. Further, the review found that formed police unit operations in outlying areas overlap with military patrols. It therefore recommends that formed police unit deployment be reconfigured from outlying to urban areas and sensitive IDP camps, thereby increasing their capacity for 24/7 patrolling and providing the security necessary for individual police officers to facilitate their community policing work. In so doing, the overall requirement for formed police units can be lowered from 19 to 17.

The community policing concept was reviewed in the light of the trend in some areas towards returns, criminality in urban areas and IDP camps, and the potential benefits of co-locating police with military for security reasons. The review noted that, of the 69 planned community policing centres, 49 are operational, of which 36 are in temporary facilities or co-located with team sites. The concept of community policing will be maintained, but the community policing centres have not been as effective as was hoped in facilitating outreach to local populations. That is due to challenges related to acquiring land for construction and the requirement for a military or formed police unit presence to secure individual police officers.

UNAMID will maintain the 13 community policing centres already fully constructed, but dispense with plans to utilize 20 centres not yet constructed. The others will be moved to team site locations, which in many cases are close to IDP camps and local communities. Co-location will alleviate requirement for UNAMID troops to provide static security at community policing centres and team sites, thus enabling resources to be redirected towards more proactive protection activities. It will also improve coordination among military, police and civilian personnel at the team site level, affording greater flexibility in assisting IDPs and local communities as the situation requires.

The impact will be a police component that is more flexible, more mobile and better able to patrol where assistance is most needed. The result of these measures would be a recommended decrease of 663 individual police officers.

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The review also found that a further reduction of 107 police officers who fulfil functions at mission or sector headquarters similar to those already undertaken by civilian personnel, including in the areas of gender, human rights and child protection, could be made without any significant impact on operations.

Turning to the military component, the total adjustment to the number of currently deployed military personnel would be 3,260, including 1,600 infantry. The proposed reduction in infantry is due mainly to improvements in security along the Chad-Darfur border and in far northern Darfur following rapprochements between the Sudan and Chad, and between the Sudan and Libya. The changed security situation also makes it prudent to redeploy 29 out of a total of 64 infantry companies from areas where the security threat has diminished to potential flashpoints and areas of higher threat. This relates principally to transferring forces to a relatively populous band that runs from east to west through the centre of Darfur. from the border with Chad to the border with Kordofan.

As deployment is largely complete, the number of engineering personnel would be reduced by 450 from the current deployment figure of 981, and the remaining personnel and assets reconfigured into a multirole engineering capability that would enhance the mobility of the force. Moreover, the currently deployed number of transport and logistics personnel will be adjusted downward by 525 in the light of plans to outsource those functions to commercial providers.

With regard to aviation units, a reduction of 200 personnel is recommended in connection with the proposed redeployment of tactical helicopters. This is in the light of a decline in the requirement for aerial fire support due to the reduction in hostilities between Government and movement forces. Military aviation support would therefore consist of eight military medium-utility helicopters to facilitate the changed needs of the force, conduct aerial surveillance and enhance the mobility of the reserve units.

In addition, a reduction of 240 reconnaissance unit personnel is recommended, as the need for them has diminished now that units are familiar with the area of operations. Current deployment figures would also be reduced by 245 signal elements, as units have deployed with that capacity embedded. The number of military police would also be reduced commensurately with the overall reduction in the force.

Additional recommendations for the military component include elevating the status of the three sector reserve units to force reserve units to place them at the direct disposal of the Force Commander, thereby increasing their mobility and the speed at which they can respond to incidents. Other measures include improved military planning and procedures, coordination and operational control, such as joint military, police and civil planning at the team site level, to improve incident responses and conflict mitigation.

The implementation of the adjustments would be completed over a period of 18 months, in accordance with pre-existing rotation schedules. The estimated cost savings in the 2012/2013 financial year would be \$76.1 million against the mission's budget of \$1.5 billion and approximately \$135 million per annum in subsequent years.

In the months ahead, we will continue to streamline and strengthen the effectiveness of UNAMID uniformed personnel. On the political front, progress has been affected by the internal problems in the Sudan as a whole and, needless to say, the hostilities between the Sudan and South Sudan. Nevertheless, I call on the signatory parties to live up to their commitment to implement the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur for the sake of the long-suffering people of Darfur.

The President: I thank Mr. Ladsous for his briefing.

I now invite Council members to informal consultations to continue our discussion on the subject.

The meeting rose at 10.35 a.m.

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