



Security Council

Sixty-fifth year

Provisional

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New York

<i>President:</i>	Mr. Araud	(France)
<i>Members:</i>	Austria	Mr. Mayr-Harting
	Bosnia and Herzegovina	Mr. Barbalčić
	Brazil	Mrs. Viotti
	China	Mr. Liu Zhenmin
	Gabon	Mr. Issoze-Ngondet
	Japan	Mr. Takasu
	Lebanon	Mr. Salam
	Mexico	Mr. Heller
	Nigeria	Mrs. Ogwu
	Russian Federation	Mr. Churkin
	Turkey	Mr. Apakan
	Uganda	Mr. Rugunda
	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	Sir Mark Lyall Grant
	United States of America	Ms. DiCarlo

Agenda

United Nations peacekeeping operations

Transition and exit strategies

Letter dated 3 February 2010 from the Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (S/2010/67)

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The meeting was called to order at 9.35 a.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

United Nations peacekeeping operations

Transition and exit strategies

Letter dated 3 February 2010 from the Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (S/2010/67)

The President (*spoke in French*): I would like to inform the Council that I have received letters from the representatives of Bangladesh, Egypt, India, Italy, Jordan, Morocco, Nepal, Pakistan, the Philippines, Rwanda and Uruguay, in which they request to be invited to participate in the consideration of the item on the Council's agenda. In accordance with the usual practice, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite those representatives to participate in the consideration without the right to vote in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure.

There being no objection, it is so decided.

At the invitation of the President, the representatives of the aforementioned countries took the seats reserved for them at the side of the Council Chamber.

The President (*spoke in French*): In accordance with the understanding reached in the Council's prior consultations, I shall take it that the Security Council agrees to extend an invitation under rule 39 of its provisional rules of procedure to Mr. Alain Le Roy, Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations; Ms. Susana Malcorra, Under-Secretary-General for Field Support; Mr. Alan Doss, Special Representative of the Secretary-General and head of the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo; Ms. Ellen Margrethe Løj, Special Representative of the Secretary-General and head of the United Nations Mission in Liberia; Mr. Michael von der Schulenburg, Executive Representative of the Secretary-General and head of the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone; Mr. Hans Peter Wittig, Chairperson of the Peacebuilding Commission and Permanent Representative of Germany; His Excellency Mr. Tété

António, Permanent Observer of the African Union to the United Nations; and His Excellency Mr. Pedro Serrano, acting head of the European Union delegation to the United Nations.

It is so decided.

The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. The Security Council is meeting in accordance with the understanding reached in its prior consultations.

Members of the Council have before them document S/2010/67, which contains the text of a letter dated 3 February 2010 from the Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations to the Secretary-General, transmitting a concept paper on the item.

I welcome the presence of the Secretary-General, His Excellency Mr. Ban Ki-moon, and invite him to take the floor.

The Secretary-General (*spoke in French*): I should like to thank France for having taken the initiative to focus our attention on the crucial question of the transition and exit strategies of peacekeeping operations.

In the broadest sense, our objective should be very clear. The Blue Helmets should themselves strive tirelessly to bring their own work to an end, but of course there is a great deal of time between the beginning and the end of an operation and many phases to go through. The road to follow is strewn with difficulties, dangers, setbacks and problems.

(spoke in English)

Over the years, we have learned many valuable lessons about how best to ensure the transition from peacekeeping to peacebuilding and, ultimately, to societies that can function and maintain stability on their own. Considerable work is under way to strengthen our response to conflict. Last year, the Security Council held a series of valuable debates on mediation, peacekeeping and peacebuilding. Member States, the United Nations system and our partners have gained a common understanding of the challenges involved.

I welcome today's debate as a further step in making the best possible use of all our tools and assets. The United Nations must be ready to help national authorities to implement peace agreements, re-establish

core Government functions, restore the rule of law and achieve at least a minimum level of sustainable security throughout their territory. We must promote reconciliation and inclusive political processes, and help to provide basic services and to generate employment and economic activity. All of this is essential to addressing the roots of crises, sustaining peace and achieving a viable exit strategy for United Nations peacekeeping missions.

The United Nations engagement in a country emerging from conflict will closely track the path that country takes. We are usually present well before a peacekeeping operation is deployed. We will usually remain well after the exit of our Blue Helmets. The post-peacekeeping United Nations presence might be a special political mission, a peacebuilding office or some other configuration. It might be large and multidimensional, or small and specialized. Whatever the case, peacekeeping activities must pave the way for what comes next.

For peace to be sustained, there must be an overarching strategy that unites the efforts of all United Nations actors and the international community, and that strengthens national capacity. The past decade has seen a continuous surge in United Nations peacekeeping operations. No one can predict the future, but in the years ahead we are likely to focus not so much on new missions, but on ensuring that current missions and their successor presences can help to consolidate peace and support lasting stability so that they can withdraw.

To achieve this, a peacekeeping mission requires a good entrance. This was emphasized in the 2001 report to the Security Council entitled “No exit without strategy” (S/2001/394). Allow me to recall that one of the authors of that report, Andrew Grene, was among those who perished in the earthquake in Haiti. His legacy lives on in a report whose recommendations remain valid today.

A good entrance means that the very mandate of an operation addresses the root causes of a conflict. It means charting a path out of violence through a solid and sustainable peace process. It means articulating a clear goal that can be jointly owned by national stakeholders and the international community. And it means the timely allocation of enough human and material resources — including, if necessary, the rapid

deployment of standing police and other civilian capacities.

Exits must be equally well considered from the very outset of a mission. In assessing whether and when a peacekeeping operation should be drawn down, we must look at the strength of national governance structures, including for security and the rule of law. We must consider the prospects for socio-economic recovery. We must examine the risk that a country could backslide into conflict, and ask whether the security guarantee provided by uniformed peacekeepers is still needed. We must look at how to reconfigure our presence. Drawing down in one area, such as security, might require temporary strengthening in another.

Peacekeeping missions should not stay longer than necessary, but we should also be wary of withdrawing prematurely only to have to return because of renewed violence. A key lesson of the 1990s was the need for some type of follow-on presence to protect gains and continue the process of building durable peace. In several recent cases, the transition has been made to a United Nations peacebuilding office, but other models, such as regional offices, could also be considered. Such presences may have smaller footprints, but still have complex and demanding mandates. They require resources and the support of the Security Council, the Peacebuilding Commission and the wider international community.

This year’s review of the United Nations peacebuilding architecture is thus very timely. We should discuss the transition from the core security components of a peacekeeping mission to longer-term peacebuilding, and we should also reflect on how the Peacebuilding Commission can engage early.

The engagement of United Nations country teams is critical throughout all phases of peacekeeping and peacebuilding, but the United Nations is only one of many international actors in peacebuilding. Regional institutions, bilateral partners and international financial institutions are also engaged. We need all these partners to be working coherently, with a shared sense of purpose. If stakeholders pursue competing individual agendas, all our efforts will suffer. We must guard against this risk. Our collective results will determine when and how a peacekeeping operation can exit. I urge that we explore how to ensure that the Security Council has the necessary benchmarks and information —

including the advice of the Peacebuilding Commission and the input of host Governments — to measure progress.

(spoke in French)

Three of my Special Representatives are with us today to give us the benefit of their great experience of and their thinking on transition and exit strategies. The countries whose missions they head illustrate the different phases in which United Nations peacekeeping and peacebuilding initiatives can find themselves, as well as the different models that exist and the different problems that they have to deal with. The activities of these three missions are invaluable, for they allow us to establish and build peace and give hope to millions of men and women.

I hope that we will be able to learn the right lessons and extract the full benefit of what there is to be learned from all who will speak today.

The President *(spoke in French)*: I thank the Secretary-General for his statement.

I now give the floor to Mr. Alain Le Roy, Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations.

Mr. Le Roy *(spoke in French)*: Our discussion on transition and exit strategies comes at the right time. It is true that in the last few years we have focused mostly on mission start-up and deployment. In the years to come, I expect that we will turn more of our attention to consolidating the progress made and to making a smooth transition as we reduce the size of our missions. That is a prognosis that I think will come to pass.

Today's debate is part of a broader discussion on peacebuilding. The Secretary-General has just recalled the key links between peacekeeping and peacebuilding. The New Horizon document describes the peacebuilding efforts that the United Nations peace missions have launched since the beginning of such operations.

Our missions, as we all know, provide a basic level of security that is essential for peace in the future. Such efforts include, in particular, the protection of civilians, the rule of law, the demobilization and reintegration of former combatants, security sector reform and anti-mining activity. The missions are also charged with supporting political processes and peace agreements, and thus with supporting electoral

processes, constitutional reform and national and local reconciliation.

Beyond that, peacekeeping operations are frequently required to support the restoration of essential government functions such as police, justice and correctional systems. Those operations present an integrated framework for all the efforts of the United Nations. They support other activities essential to peacebuilding, such as the restoration of basic services and the revitalization of the economy.

It is crucial that we arrive at a common understanding, a consensus concerning the link between peacekeeping and peacebuilding. That will allow clear foundations on which to plan transitions in a coherent fashion. Based on such clear foundations, and capitalizing on the comparative advantages and areas of expertise of the various players, the United Nations system can join effectively with other actors to more effectively help countries emerge from conflict. As the Council knows, the links between peacebuilding and peacekeeping are important issues and are being examined by the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations.

Once our personnel have achieved initial stabilization on the ground, we have to make sure that the collective rebuilding effort continues, so that peacekeeping operations can hand off the job and eventually withdraw. The question is, how do we identify this tipping point? How do we know when the security or stabilization that a peacekeeping mission brings is no longer required? Is there a tendency to overstay?

The long duration of some traditional peacekeeping missions — such as the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara, the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization and the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus — is not an indication of failure. Those operations show, rather, that a peacekeeping mission cannot be a substitute for a political process or for the will of the parties concerned. They challenge all of us to define a more creative and constructive political engagement.

Is there a tendency to leave too soon? In his statement the Secretary-General emphasized the risks inherent in leaving before peace has been consolidated. As the Council knows, there was the experience in Timor-Leste and Haiti, of leaving perhaps too early. There have also been instances where consent to

United Nations peacekeeping operations has been abruptly withdrawn, as in the case of the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea and the United Nations Operation in Burundi.

There are, of course, examples such as Sierra Leone, where the national authorities and the Security Council have worked together to continually adjust the United Nations presence according to the evolution of conditions on the ground. The United Nations thus concluded a peacekeeping operation and created, first, an integrated mission and then a peacebuilding office. Mr. von der Schulenberg will of course provide details.

In every case, progress is never linear. Peacebuilding inevitably encounters obstacles. And in every case it is essential, as Ms. Malcorra will tell you, to align operational and support functions.

(spoke in English)

The debate on staying too late versus leaving too soon is only one dimension. Getting a mission's mandate and structure right from the outset is also critical for a successful transition and eventual exit. We need the right tools to address the quickly evolving dynamics and adjust accordingly.

For example, more formed police units, rather than troops, were needed in Haiti to manage public order and to address the challenge of gangs and policing. But when the challenge is the institutional transformation of national police institutions, formed police units are not the right tool. Instead, institutional transformation requires a combination of individual police officers and civilian capacities that can support and advise the national police and authorities and assist in strategic planning.

We need reliable capacities and capabilities in a range of sectors, including rapidly deployable civilian capacities accompanied by adequate resources. In this area, we are seeking to expand the Standing Police Capacity, complemented by small justice and corrections expertise. Making sure we have the right tools from the beginning requires continuous and constructive dialogue between the Secretariat, the Council and the troop- and police-contributing countries.

The early initiation of peacebuilding efforts may enable an earlier exit for peacekeeping. But we must be clear that the exit of a peacekeeping operation should be part of a coherent strategy to support a country

emerging from conflict, and not an end in itself. To use a medical analogy, we need to be sure it is safe to leave the emergency room — that is, peacekeeping — before leaving others to ramp up longer-term recovery. That of course entails a partnership and shared vision among many actors, including regional and bilateral players. It is a heavy burden on national Governments as well as on the Special Representatives and their leadership teams. And it is a challenge for the Security Council and other Member States bodies.

A durable peace requires progress on many fronts — a reasonably stable security environment that protects the rule of law, a legitimate political order that can mediate differences and avoid renewed violence, improved governance and strengthened institution-building, the resumption of basic services and the start of socio-economic recovery. A number of those areas will not be directly mandated tasks of peacekeeping operations, but they could nonetheless be referenced as conditions for a safe drawdown and exit.

Ultimately, the defining factor for the drawdown of a peacekeeping operation is progress in the peace process and in the capacity of national institutions, including civil society. However, the strengthening of national capabilities cannot be enforced or imposed. States already made fragile by conflict are nonetheless asked to achieve radical and deep reforms across their entire governance systems in a matter of a few years.

Expectations must be realistic. Building capacity is not simply a numbers game. Strengthening civil society is not about holding a set number of workshops. Training hundreds of police becomes meaningless if there is no effective interior ministry to plan and support their work, or no legal and judicial structure for them to operate within. The absorption capacity of national authorities can vary across different sectors and geographic areas. Timing and sequencing need to be carefully considered, particularly with regard to the security sector. The United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, for example, is challenged by the need to plan for and respond to different degrees of peace consolidation across a vast country.

We need to be able to maintain flexibility to respond to changing circumstances and capacities on the ground, while providing timely information to the Security Council and contributors. This allows us to

respond to shifting obstacles and to maximize opportunities as they arise.

We need to ensure that critical gaps in peacebuilding are reflected in reports to the Security Council. But as the Secretary-General noted, there also needs to be new thinking on how best to measure actual progress on the ground, given the importance of subjective aspects such as legitimacy, expectations and authority. As we know, not everything that counts can be counted and not everything that can be counted counts. Capturing the ebbs and flows of a peace process needs to go beyond benchmarking, and strategic guidance from the Security Council needs to be based on as comprehensive a picture as possible.

National authorities must play a pivotal role in the actual planning for the exit of a peacekeeping operation. Transitions may be a sign of successful peace consolidation, but they are also a very sensitive period. National authorities may have concerns that the exit of a peacekeeping mission may have unintended impacts or coincide with a huge drop in political support or even donor attention. The country may need a security guarantor, as was the case with Sierra Leone. We need to listen to and understand the expectations and perceptions of national authorities and civil society alike. Of course, the Peacebuilding Commission can also play a key role in that respect.

Peacebuilding activities also need to be continued beyond the lifespan of a peacekeeping operation; if they are not, there is a risk that gains made in peace consolidation could be lost. One continuing challenge is the mismatch between the assessed budget and the voluntary funds available to peacebuilding, which can limit the capacities of other actors to step in or increase activities as a peacekeeping mission draws down.

I would like to conclude by setting out some of the initiatives under way in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations aimed at strengthening transition strategies. We are working to initiate transition planning earlier. We are conducting a study on approaches to transitions in peacekeeping settings which considers the cases of Liberia and Timor-Leste. It also examines the experiences of Haiti, as the study was initiated before the devastating earthquake, which as the Council knows, one month ago took the lives of so many of our colleagues and Haitians. As Council members are aware, considerable progress was made in Haiti in terms of peace consolidation through the

United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti and under the leadership of Mr. Hédi Annabi and Mr. Luiz Carlos da Costa. Their contributions to the peace and security agenda were invaluable, and their insights and wisdom will be sorely missed.

In Haiti, as elsewhere, we are continuing our work to build stronger partnerships with critical United Nations actors, Member States and external partners such as the European Union, the World Bank, the African Union and others so that we can contribute to efforts to build coherent strategies in peacebuilding. We believe that strategic discussions with the World Bank, as called for in the Secretary-General's reports on peacebuilding, could be a useful tool for enhancing transition planning. We are also looking carefully at the experiences of past and ongoing missions and countries that have managed transitions so that we can draw on good practices and better articulate how peacekeeping can contribute to longer-term peacebuilding.

The President (*spoke in French*): I thank Mr. Le Roy for his briefing.

I now give the floor to Ms. Susana Malcorra, Under-Secretary-General for Field Support.

Ms. Malcorra: It gives me great pleasure to be here today to participate in this very important debate concerning transitions and exit strategies. This follows on naturally from several debates held in this Chamber last year on post-conflict peacebuilding and United Nations peacekeeping.

I offer a different perspective from the other speakers, to be sure, in terms of the challenges that we in the Secretariat face in our engagement with countries emerging from conflict. My department, the Department of Field Support (DFS) — the youngest department in the United Nations — was created in 2007 with the relatively narrow mandate to provide logistics and administrative support for the Secretariat's field operations, whether they are large-scale peacekeeping operations, small political presences or anything in between.

Many of the requirements of a large-scale, multifunctional peacekeeping operation with thousands of troops, military observers, police and civilian staff are, of course, quite different from the needs of the smaller presences, which are mostly composed of functional experts in the areas of governance, rule of law and security institutions, to name a few.

DFS is working hard to calibrate the services it provides according to the mandated objectives of each mission. At the same time, we recognize that there is a high degree of commonality in the support component for each field presence. The support needs to alter over time as the mission goes through its life cycle — start-up and surge, maturity, maintenance, reconfiguration, drawdown and exit — and has to change according to political developments on the ground and the mandates emanating from this Council. As a consequence, we need to be responsive, agile and flexible.

I have mentioned before in this Chamber the particular support challenges we face based on the existing regulatory framework and procedures, which do not always easily provide for such agility. But I assure the Council that my Department is working in close collaboration with other United Nations departments and, of course, with Member States on ways to improve the framework for the support we provide.

In this connection, we have just completed a document outlining our global field support strategy, which will be discussed in the General Assembly later in the year. The proposed strategy is very much intended to enable us to deliver our services better and faster. It would allow us to adapt to the requirements of each field operation as they evolve over time, from start-up until closure and in all transitions in between. Specifically, our proposal to service more than one operation from a regional service centre would facilitate the transformation from one type of mission to another and support that evolution in a much smoother manner.

Since the creation of DFS, we have seen the United Nations presence in several countries go through different configurations that have tested our ability to adapt ourselves within the limitations of the existing framework. The Secretariat's presence in Sierra Leone has transitioned from a fully fledged peacekeeping mission to a small integrated peacebuilding office. Mr. Von der Schulenburg is here today and will describe, I am sure, his effort to make that transition a success and the problems surmounted along the way.

I acknowledge that the path of that particular change was not always smooth from the mission support perspective, but we have learned many lessons that we are now applying successfully in Burundi and

also, as I speak, in Guinea-Bissau and the Central African Republic, where two more changes to the United Nations configuration in-country are well under way. These include better succession planning and targeted staffing of the follow-on presences, which address the requirements of personnel profiles and skill, which are quite different.

We have also supported three transitions in which a long-serving mission either closed or reconfigured itself into a much smaller operation. Last year we supported the liquidation of two quite different missions — the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea and the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia — within a very short time span. The two missions, however, had some similar support requirements, such as contingent repatriation, asset disposal and the retrenchment of civilian staff, which required us to move quickly. At the same time, we had to conclude a number of sensitive issues with respect to the host countries.

In Kosovo, we supported the reconfiguration of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo. From a support perspective, this involved the progressive retrenchment of over 1,000 civilian staff, who were either separated or reappointed to other missions where their skills and experience were needed. It also involved the disposal of a vast quantity of physical assets, either through redeployment to other missions or through sale or transfer to the European Union.

In addition, we need to be aware of the potential impact of mission drawdown on the local economy and, in particular, on the local labour market of a host country as procurement and staffing needs decrease as the size and geographical configuration of the United Nations footprint change. Among other efforts, partnerships with other international organizations and the local private sector can help our national staff to move on to other employment opportunities.

Each of these cases has reinforced in my mind the need to reconsider how the Organization generates the required civilian capacities, as well as how it finances its field operations. It goes without saying that when the Council decides to adopt a peacekeeping or peacebuilding mandate, it does so in the expectation that the Secretary-General will implement the mandate through an integrated approach maximizing the civilian capacities of the United Nations, the United Nations

country team and their implementing partners. I am sorry to say that we have not always been able to meet the Council's expectations in this regard. At the risk of oversimplifying, I should like to say that this is due in large part to diverse staffing practices among organizations, agencies, funds and programmes. We are working together with the Department of Management and other partners to resolve these issues or, until we have done so, to mitigate their effects on our ability to support the Organization in its response to post-conflict situations.

Finally, I should like to touch on another issue that impacts our ability to deliver — the question of financing. Council members are all aware that peacekeeping operations have a special scale of assessments. When an operation shifts to become a special political mission or peacebuilding office, it is then paid for from the regular budget of the United Nations and is thus financed by and assessed on all Member States accordingly, without the adjustments particular to the peacekeeping scale. The United Nations regular budget, as I am sure Council members know, comes under intense scrutiny and has only a small margin for growth during each biennium. Integrated United Nations offices and country team presences are financed from a separate set of funding streams, often relying on voluntary contributions and earmarked trust funds. An ongoing, predictable source of funding is required if a United Nations presence is to evolve smoothly with all the necessary capacities in place.

I do not offer any solutions to this problem today, and I recognize that resolving it goes beyond the purview of this body, but I would be remiss if I did not signal it as a very real challenge for us in how we think about support to peacekeeping transition and exit strategies. The constructive engagement of the full General Assembly membership will be required to address these issues.

We in DFS stand ready to address the challenges I have laid out with respect to countries in transition and countries emerging from conflict, where our collective efforts to nurture and consolidate peace are so critical. My Department will work closely with our partners within the Secretariat and the broader United Nations common system to ensure that support flows smoothly and reliably throughout the lifecycle of the United Nations presence in these countries.

We have a great deal of work before us to streamline business practices, establish common services and reconcile funding schemes. Unless we address these back-office challenges properly, it will be hard to really service these transitions as required because we will not always have the right tools.

The President (*spoke in French*): I thank Under-Secretary-General Malcorra for her statement.

I now give the floor to Mr. Alan Doss, Special Representative of the Secretary-General and head of the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Mr. Doss: Thank you, Mr. President, for having invited me to speak at this meeting. As a graduate of four peacekeeping operations, I come labelled as a practitioner — a term which, in the hierarchy of intellectual achievement, is ranked only marginally above the sobriquet of diplomat. Nevertheless, I have a few frank and perhaps unorthodox thoughts to share with the Council this morning on the issues that have been outlined in the concept paper (S/2010/67).

First, I shall say a word on the way in which mandates are drafted and the degree to which there is clear integration of transition and exit strategies. Rarely, if ever, do we plan the exit strategy at the outset of a mission. If we did, I suspect that we might not want to mount a mission in the first place. The collective mindset of the international community finds it hard to accept that some problems are not amenable to quick, time-bound solutions. Moreover, the United Nations is often pressed to intervene with haste in conflict-affected areas and countries, especially when there is daily media coverage filled with graphic images of human suffering. Yes, ideally our entry strategy would define our exit strategy and set out the benchmarks to guide that process, but reality usually reveals that, in failed or failing States, the predictability of progress is highly tenuous.

Perhaps we need to accept this complexity and uncertainty and recognize that we will often struggle to find the right approach and that persistence and perseverance are indispensable tools in the peacekeeping tool box. Perhaps we need to accept as well that most conflicts are not resolved through single solutions and certainly not in conformity with the timetable ordained by the international community.

We must also acknowledge that peace agreements do not always make peace. In the four countries where I have served in peacekeeping missions, numerous accords were brokered, signed and then discarded. Not unsurprisingly, therefore, peacekeeping missions established in support of peace agreements can quickly become hostages to fortune. In such circumstances, planning for transition and exit can only be an iterative process subject to the vagaries of shifting political and military realities on the ground.

This leads me to say that transition and exit strategies should not be conceived as a linear exercise with one step leading inexorably to another. Progress is neither inevitable nor predestined. Sadly, it is just as possible to go backwards as it is to go forwards. On the other hand, it is possible to move ahead with recovery, State-building and even economic development while there is still active conflict somewhere in a country. Transition strategies therefore have to be flexible and opportunistic.

The next topic is planning with reference to the end state, key tasks and the phased completion of the mission. In my view, planning in United Nations missions today — or at least peacekeeping missions — is largely geared to the reporting requirements of the budget and mandate cycle. In my experience, we do not sit down and think very far ahead. Inevitably, we are pulled into the immediate — the urgent displaces the important. The planning process as it is now practiced is not the best way to think about the future. We tend to get immersed in the details of mandate implementation and fail to see the broader strategic picture.

Planning should ideally start with the assessment of future risk and probability. On that basis, we can plan for a variety of outcomes, not just one. In peacekeeping, we will always be faced with uncertainty, but we should try to look around corners and get a better fix on possible alternative end states and not only the end of the State.

I hope that the development of integrated strategic frameworks will help us move in that direction, bringing together the analytical and operational capacities of the peacekeeping operation and the United Nations country team in a consultative process with national partners and other actors. This is what we are currently doing in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Now, if I may, allow me to make a couple of comments on capacities and resources. Resource constraints are a perennial problem of all peacekeeping missions. I doubt that we will ever have adequate resources. We therefore have to frame mandates that are manageable, and then ensure that missions make the best of whatever resources are available to them. As the concept paper points out, missions vary enormously in size and complexity. There is no obvious correlation between surface area, population size and the magnitude of a mission. While we should probably avoid a standard formula for determining mission size, we should try to ensure a reasonable fit between mandate and means.

That is especially important when a mission is mandated to protect civilians, as we are in the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC). When the Council gives a mission a protection mandate, it must make sure that this is a feasible proposition that can be achieved with the resources and capabilities available to that mission. Sometimes, I must say, there is a disconnect between the two, with the result that we create expectations that cannot be fulfilled.

But there will always be constraints, physical as well as financial. We must therefore also look for capacity multipliers. In MONUC, for example, we have introduced the concept of smart protection, recognizing that we cannot be everywhere all of the time. We are trying out a variety of innovations to better direct our resources to where they can be most effectively used to protect people most at risk.

To do that, however, our operational policies and procedures have to be adapted to get better value out of the resources that are available. Memorandums of understanding with troop- and police-contributing countries need to be more flexible to allow for quicker redeployment as operational situations develop. That also goes for our operational procedures. The way we manage our air operations, for example, is a case in point. Most important, our failure to equip missions with adequate tactical intelligence capabilities seriously reduces our operational effectiveness in conflict situations.

The coordination of international efforts in the field has also been listed as one of the issues for discussion. I am tempted to say that coordination is the holy grail of the international community — much

sought after, but never found. As peacekeeping missions have assumed a wider range of mandated tasks, the complexity of coordination has also increased within missions themselves, among United Nations partners, with Member States, donor partners and, of course, the Governments themselves. A great deal of energy is expended in the name of coordination, and not always with positive results. Coordination should be more than just information sharing.

From personal experience, I would recommend the creation of light but systematic consultation structures. In Kinshasa, we have the so-called Security Council-plus format, which meets at least every two weeks and where we brief and discuss military and political developments and explore and exchange ideas on emerging issues of strategic importance, such as elections, security sector reform and upcoming reports of the Secretary-General to the Council.

A broader coordination mechanism has been established for donors, in which the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund participate. There is also a mechanism for humanitarian coordination. I am not sure, however, that all those initiatives tie up as neatly as we might wish. That is especially of concern in the area of macroeconomic policy, where the impact of economic measures can have a very direct effect on security and stability.

Coordination within the international community needs to be matched by a parallel relationship with national authorities, especially in the area of national security. That is especially important when contemplating drawdown. In Sierra Leone, we met regularly with the National Security Council to make district-by-district security assessments as the basis for decision-making on troop drawdown. Similar assessments were done in Liberia, and perhaps my colleague will speak to that. We will also be doing the same in the Democratic Republic of the Congo as we move forward on contemplating a drawdown.

You have also asked us, Mr. President, to comment on political support for the peace process within the Council and beyond. Creating and sustaining political support for a peace process is a vital but sometimes elusive undertaking. Restoring peace and peacebuilding is an incremental process that rarely follows a straight and narrow path. That produces frequent frustration and occasional despondency.

Most of us in the international community will be associated with a given peace process only for a limited time before we move on, and so we are impatient for success. But often we lack a full appreciation of the historical, cultural and economic factors that created the conflict in the first place. We do not always understand the complex personal relationships that may exacerbate underlying problems. Our institutional memories can be quite short, while the cast of characters is very large.

The Council and its faithful servants, the special representatives of the Secretary-General, therefore have to find middle ground between empathy and firmness as we seek to move a peace process forward. Most important, the messages sent by the Council through its resolutions and statements, and echoed by special representatives, must show a high degree of consistency and political resolve. Frequent changes in tone or intent encourage intransigence, leading spoilers to believe that the Council will quickly back off in the face of adversity or opposition. In mid-2000, when the Revolutionary United Front attacked the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, the Council's unanimous and speedy reaction helped to turn the tide. More recently, the Council's determination to persevere with our efforts to put an end to armed violence in the Kivus has made a very significant difference.

Let me add that the alignment of political forces behind a peace process must extend to regional actors. In each of the four countries in which I have been involved with peace operations, neighbouring States have either been part of the problem or part of the solution. They must therefore be engaged, in one form or another, from the outset.

Finally, allow me to conclude with a couple of comments on processes, including benchmarks and the modalities for reporting to the Council on progress towards the achievement of the end state. Measuring and evaluating a peace process and the transition to an end state is not an exact science. Benchmarks, indicators and outcomes are all useful as tools for assessing progress, but they must be kept simple and relatively easy to monitor. They should be accessible and comprehensible to our national partners. Ideally, they should incorporate goals and targets already adopted by the Government concerned and its partners. They need to be consistent and applicable across a variety of sectors. They should serve essentially as a

set of traffic lights that are clearly visible and easily understood.

They should also draw a distinction between core and contextual concerns. Core concerns relate to the security and political mandates of a mission — the goals that must be achieved before a drawdown can be initiated or withdrawal completed. Contextual benchmarks encompass a broader set of goals, such as poverty reduction, that may not be achieved within the lifetime of a mission, highly desirable though they may be.

Albert Einstein once remarked that all knowledge was experience. So I hope that my limited experience, which I have shared with the Council this morning, will serve to expand, if only marginally, our common knowledge about transition and exit strategies.

The President (*spoke in French*): I thank Mr. Doss for his briefing.

I now give the floor to Ms. Ellen Margrethe Løj, Special Representative of the Secretary-General and head of the United Nations Mission in Liberia.

Ms. Løj: I thank the Security Council for inviting me to participate in this important debate about United Nations peacekeeping. The debate on this issue over the past 12 months in the Security Council and in the General Assembly, as well as internally in the Secretariat, has been not only timely but also necessary to ensure common understanding on how to tackle future peacekeeping challenges. Let me add that, in thinking about these issues, it is not always necessary to develop fresh ideas. Sometimes, it is also useful to revisit long-standing proposals and evaluate them against today's and tomorrow's challenges.

Today's debate has a special focus on how to end peacekeeping operations and how to transition into longer-term conflict-prevention activities. Based on my experience from two years as Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Liberia, I would like to focus my remarks on three issues: mandates, implementation and tools.

At the outset, however, let me underline that for all three of those elements, there is no one-size-fits-all solution. Each and every conflict and peacekeeping challenge has to be reviewed and the solutions adjusted to the specific challenges characterizing the country or the conflict. There is no recipe that can be applied across the board. Country-specific challenges and

capacities have to be taken into account from the outset, and measures need to be decided and applied accordingly.

First, a few words about mandates. In his report in April 2001 (S/2001/394, para. 6), the then-Secretary-General states "A good exit or transition strategy depends on a good entrance strategy" — with the entrance strategy, of course being embodied in the mandate of the mission. It is therefore paramount that a mission's initial mandate be clear in its priorities, be realistic and leave no room for ambiguity.

In Liberia, some of the day-to-day challenges we face are related to the interpretation of our mandate — with regard to the protection of civilians, for instance. How should "imminent threat of physical danger" and "within its capabilities" be interpreted? These are weak phrases that can be taken as all-encompassing or as nothing at all. Furthermore, in Liberia incidents of mob violence are common and often involve attacks not only on the Liberian National Police but also on civilians. How are such incidents meant to be treated in a peacekeeping mission? How is a mission to deal with an imminent threat when the threat comes from civilians? Such questions need to be well thought through when mandates are formulated.

We need implementable mandates rather than politically correct ones, which I have often more informally called "Christmas trees". Each mandate should be adjusted to the specific context on the ground. What works in one place may be impossible to implement in another. Furthermore, it is important that the Council exercise great care when changing a mission's mandate. If new tasks are being continuously added, the context surrounding the original ones, including the provision of a security umbrella, and the conditions for its transition and exit will become increasingly difficult. If the goal post keeps changing, so to speak, there will be consequences as to when the desired end state can be reached.

Secondly, I would like to make a few comments on the challenges and constraints we face when implementing mandates, especially in integrated missions. Integrated missions are generally tasked not only with keeping the peace but also with assisting to build national capacities to sustain the peace — in other words, peacebuilding. For those missions, peacekeeping and peacebuilding are not two separate sequential processes; they are two sides of the same

coin, are closely interlinked and must be pursued simultaneously.

There appears to be conceptual agreement across the United Nations system and among Member States concerning the integrated approach to keep, to build and to sustain the peace, for instance in a country like Liberia. The challenges we face, however, concern how to implement that approach in practice. That is further accentuated by the institutional framework we have established, both in terms of governing bodies and the generation of resources, especially assessed versus voluntary contributions. Let me provide a few concrete examples of these implementation challenges.

While Liberia is not yet a self-starter, delivering as one country — although I expect it to become one soon — the level of integration between the country team and the Mission is very good. It includes innovated approaches such as joint programmes, joint offices and joint use of United Nations assets — but also a general willingness to find pragmatic solutions to common challenges. We are, as we say, working together and trying hard to deliver as one.

Keeping in mind that an exit strategy should form part of every entrance strategy, that integration should be institutionalized early on in the life of a mission. However, due to different governing bodies, budget cycles and even procurement rules and regulations, achieving true integration and delivering as one can be extremely challenging. My plea would be that the various governing bodies and the Member States consider that issue.

Another point has to do with assessed versus voluntary contributions. In my mind, there is no doubt that for peacebuilding activities to succeed, funds other than, and in addition to, assessed funds — whether through the agencies and programmes working with a mission or through bilateral partners — must be available. Security sector reform is more than plans and policies. It is also implementation. If voluntary funds to sustain implementation do not materialize, that creates significant gaps on the ground.

Let me illustrate with the case of the Liberian National Police. The Mission's mandate is primarily focused on training and mentoring. But even the best trained police officer needs the means to function — equipment, transport, etc. Unless the voluntary funds are forthcoming, the police force will not have the desired impact.

A third set of challenges relates to ensuring national ownership — the overarching prerequisite for any transition or exit. Transforming a mission from doers to mentors is the key to sustainability and is probably the hardest task for any mission. Yet without national ownership, no peace can be sustained. The United Nations in Liberia was able to plan its intervention based on clear national leadership and in alignment with national planning frameworks fairly early on.

I wish to conclude with a few words on the tools available to facilitate transitions and exits. First of all, as I have said, exit strategies should be incorporated from the early days of the mission, even if they are not fully formulated. Otherwise, the mission will act like a ship without a clear destination. The development of benchmarks to monitor the consolidation, draw-down and withdrawal of a mission is important and is a vital tool to guide transition.

In Liberia — thanks to my colleague on my left — we have been working with benchmarks since 2006 and have learned how important it is to define clearly what we are measuring. Are we assessing the achievements of the Mission against its mandate, or against overall progress in the country? I strongly believe it should be the latter. If it is, we need to measure not only the impact of the Mission's activities, but also the impact of those being conducted by the entire United Nations family, the Government and other partners.

Finally, Member States and the Council have much focused on reporting from missions. While that is understandable, let me reiterate that nothing beats experiencing the challenges at first hand, in the field. We always welcome visits to Liberia from the Security Council and other Member States at different levels, especially since so many Members are not represented in Monrovia.

Mr. President, thank you once again for inviting me to participate in this debate. Merci beaucoup.

The President (*spoke in French*): I thank Ms. Løj for her briefing.

I now give the floor to Mr. Michael von der Schulenburg, Executive Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone.

Mr. Von der Schulenburg: First of all, let me thank you, Mr. President, for inviting me to this very important discussion. It will have a great impact not only on Member States but also on how we in the field — your field commanders, so to speak — will work. I am therefore glad that the Council has taken this laudable initiative to listen to what we have to say.

As I am the last speaker here, I thought I would only make one clarification and three suggestions. First is the clarification.

Sierra Leone is probably the first example in the United Nations of a full transition from a once very large peacekeeping operation to a now small, fully civilian, integrated peacebuilding mission. There is a similar example in Burundi, but it is somewhat different, so I think that we are the first example. For this reason, I would like to limit my recommendations on this experience.

Therefore, in the recommendations I will use the term “peacebuilding” or “peacebuilding mission” not in the general sense of State-building and that type of activity, but simply as a next phase, a successor arrangement to a peacekeeping operation. This is of course a limited use of the term, but I think it is useful for this purpose.

Let me now come to the suggestions I have to make. The first point is that, if we can prove that integrated peacebuilding missions work, that may facilitate the decision to withdraw peacekeepers earlier. I am very much aware that this is a very touchy suggestion. I am also fully aware that the Council’s decision to exit or close a peacekeeping mission will depend on many other factors. I nonetheless would like to maintain that knowing that one have a less risky and less abrupt exit strategy through an integrated peacebuilding mission would make that decision much easier. From my point of view, a peacebuilding mission is basically an interim arrangement between a peacekeeping operation and the normal system of resident coordinators.

If one compares our mandate to the resident coordinator system, the great advantage we have is that we still have a political mandate, and that allows us to make political interventions and promote conflict prevention measures. That is not the case with resident coordinators. I would suggest that, for instance, the way we handled the conflict we had in March of last year would not have been possible had we not had a

political mandate. In a situation where there are no more peacekeepers, having a political mandate allows one to act.

If that is possible, such a thing would have considerable financial benefits for Member States. Here again, I want to use the example of Sierra Leone. At the peacekeeping mission’s peak, in 2004, we still had about 20,000 staff, of which 17,500 were peacekeepers. The total cost at the time was well over \$600 million. Four years later, with the new integrated peacebuilding mission — and of course there is a slow transition with these things — we had only 77 staff members, of which half were actually national staff. The total costs had sunk to \$15 million in 2009, a mere 2.5 per cent of the previous cost.

That means that we can prove, with functioning integrated peacebuilding missions, that if the Council makes a decision even six months earlier — and I am not saying that this is the core of the whole thing — we could ensure considerable savings for Member States. We could, basically, for the cost of six months of operations, run 20 years of an integrated peacebuilding mission. However, I am not suggesting that we stay 20 years.

In Sierra Leone there is also another aspect related to early withdrawal. I think Sierra Leone is probably one of the countries where we decided very quickly to draw down — and that might be for completely different reasons, of course. I think that the conditions I see when I go through the country today and the very positive image we still have in Sierra Leone, despite having been engaged there since 1991, have to a very large extent to do with the fact that we did not keep soldiers for a longer time than they were absolutely needed. We all know that large contingents of soldiers also have negative effects, and those negative effects were largely prevented in Sierra Leone. So I think there is an additional advantage in peacebuilding missions. They are less intrusive and less visible and hence more acceptable to the population in host countries.

Let me come to the next point, which I think is even more important. If we have integrated peacebuilding missions, we must not see them as simply smaller peacekeeping missions without peacekeepers. They must develop their own character. That is exactly what we have tried to do in Sierra Leone. We are only one example and are not

necessarily the model case, but there are a number of points I want to raise here.

The first issue one has to raise, once all the soldiers have gone, is where is an Assistant Secretary-General getting his political weight from? Suddenly all the trappings of power that come with large peacekeeping operations are gone. The many soldiers, the helicopters, the cars and the huge chunk of resources that go all around the country — where have they gone? How does one maintain one's influence?

I have come to some conclusions about how we should build an integrated mission. I want to mention here some of the most important aspects of it.

We have to realize that the transition from peacekeeping to peacebuilding is a change in focus from peace and security to peace and development. The shift is really therefore from security to development. That is not to say that we do not have peacebuilding operations already under peacekeeping operations, but the focus has to change, and that change in focus is fundamental for understanding the other points.

Peacebuilding missions will be successful only if they are based on a national agenda. That is why I have always been opposed to the peacebuilding frameworks drawn up by the Peacebuilding Commission. It has to be a national agenda. We cannot come from outside and develop another agenda. In the case of Sierra Leone, it is the Government's Agenda for Change. I think it is something that will work. What we have done is to build our strategy on top of that one, saying how the United Nations system as a whole can support it. That is what we call the Joint United Nations Vision.

Peacebuilding requires the full integration of the political mandate of the mission with the various development mandates. I do not want to dwell too much on those, but the Council is aware that in Sierra Leone we have agreed for quite some time now, and with the help of the Peacebuilding Commission, that we will only have one strategy, that is the joint United Nations strategy. There is not a separate one for the political mission, a separate one for the development agencies and so forth. We have all agreed on this one. It is a very simple strategy, only seven pages, so everybody can read it, and 18 agencies have signed on to it.

This is a very important thing. We are no longer talking about negotiating conflicts; we are talking

about State-building. There is always a political and a development aspect to this, and they are so intertwined that we cannot separate them.

We have tried from the very beginning to encompass all development partners in peacebuilding. Peacebuilding is not an issue only for the United Nations missions. For that reason, we have taken the lead in donor coordination. It is also equally important that we provide considerable logistics and other services for Member States in order to make their work in the field much easier. Our regional field offices, the use of the helicopter, the use of our communication infrastructure, the medical clinic and many other things will help all the other countries in their work in Sierra Leone. We are therefore really acting as a Member States organization, on behalf of Member States.

Another point that I would like to make is that an integrated peacebuilding mission, if it is properly designed, makes an exit strategy actually relatively easy. In fact, the exit strategy in Sierra Leone is the Joint Vision. The Joint Vision is so geared towards development that a gradual transition into the development agenda, slowly leaving the political arena, will almost go unnoticed. The transition from a peacebuilding mission to the normal resident coordinator system is therefore much easier than it is when there are large military forces and a very visible change must be made.

This is the conclusion I would like to make here: that when you talk about exit strategies, it would probably be better to always talk about transition strategies. It is a transition from peacekeeping to peacebuilding — if you want to put things in boxes — and from peacebuilding to the resident coordinator system. That would probably make some of the Council's decisions much easier.

The President (*spoke in French*): I thank Mr. Von der Schulenburg for his statement.

In accordance with the understanding reached among Council members, I wish to remind all speakers to limit their statements to no more than five minutes in order to enable the Council to carry out its work expeditiously. Delegations with lengthy statements are kindly requested to circulate the texts in writing and to deliver a condensed version when speaking in the Chamber.

I shall now give the floor to members of the Council.

Sir Mark Lyall Grant (United Kingdom): I thank you, Sir, for instigating this important debate today. I also thank the Secretary-General, the Under-Secretaries-General and the Special Representatives for their important remarks and for bringing their expertise to the Council.

We have been looking at peacekeeping issues in a more systematic way for over a year now, and we have made some progress in this Council, but today's speakers have identified an issue that goes to the heart of the Council's role in peacekeeping, which is how the United Nations presence should evolve to support a country's progress from conflict through post-conflict to peace consolidation. We have heard today about how this is an essential challenge to three important United Nations mission — in Sierra Leone, where a series of successful transitions have taken us from a peacekeeping operation to an integrated peacebuilding mission; in Liberia, which has begun the process of drawdown and transition; and in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where the forthcoming strategic review will be an important opportunity to set a new course for peace consolidation.

I have one strategic point and five practical suggestions to make.

The strategic point is that transition — as Ms. Løj explained — is not about a linear progression from one kind of activity — peacekeeping — to another — peacebuilding. Peacebuilding is the objective at the outset, and a peacekeeping operation is often important but only a part of achieving that objective. Thus, peacekeeping and peacebuilding must form part of a single, comprehensive and integrated plan. And that plan should have a political settlement at its heart. As all three Special Representatives have stated, it should unite the efforts of all United Nations actors and the broad international community, and it should strengthen national capacity.

All actors must understand the overall objective and their role in contributing to it. Ms. Løj has worked hard to ensure that we have such a strategy in Liberia under the United Nations Development Assistance Framework. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the staff of the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) have created such a plan in the first integrated strategic

framework. In Sierra Leone, we have the joint vision drawn up by Mr. Von der Schulenburg. Without these overall strategies, peacekeeping efforts can lack coordination and risk duplicating effort in support of some priorities, while neglecting others.

In our view, to make this work in practice, we need five things. First, we need a clear understanding from the outset of the outcome we seek from the peacekeeping operation. The overall objective should be to help create the conditions for a peace process to prosper. The Council needs to get better at defining what that success will look like in each individual case. As Mr. Doss said, sometimes we concentrate too much on the urgent at the expense of the important, and we need to ensure that the Council has enough time to discuss and monitor at a strategic level what a United Nations operation is trying to achieve.

Secondly, we need a clear and prioritized set of tasks that fall to the peacekeeping operation and a way to measure their progress. I think that we are getting better at this, including through the use of benchmarking, but we still have a long way to go in developing flexible but effective ways of evaluating success.

Thirdly, we need to be clear about what peacekeepers can do and cannot do. There is much that peacekeepers can do to support peacebuilding, as the Secretary-General set out in his report. This can include providing a minimum level of sustainable security or helping to restore core Government functions, but peacekeepers cannot deliver an entire peacebuilding strategy.

Fourthly, the Security Council needs to focus its attention on the critical obstacles to achieving the strategic objectives. Sometimes we will need tougher political messages; sometimes we will need to reconfigure the mission, as we have done in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. We spend too much time talking about what is happening now and not enough about what is required to get to sustainable peace.

Lastly, I think we need to make better use of the Peacebuilding Commission. At its conception in 2005, we wanted the Commission to help the Council manage the drawdown and transition of successful peacekeeping operations, and it has done a lot of admirable work. But like the Secretary-General, we would like to see an even sharper focus on what

concrete action needs to be taken by the Council, by peacekeepers and by the rest of the United Nations system to achieve that strategic objective. There is a broader point here. We need to draw in advice more regularly from across the range of military, police, development and other expertise available.

We should celebrate the many successes of United Nations peacekeeping. It has been a remarkable institution, but we often ask too much of it and expect it to deliver what only national authorities can deliver: security and prosperity. We should give the peacekeepers clear and achievable goals, and recognize when their work is done and it is time for others to take up the burden. That will often involve a degree of risk, and we must be realistic about that risk. But the alternative is overstretch and failure to achieve the unachievable. And that, in our view, is the biggest threat to United Nations peacekeeping.

The President (*spoke in French*): I thank the representative of the United Kingdom for his concision and the good example he has set for the Security Council as a whole.

Mr. Salam (Lebanon) (*spoke in French*): I will set another good example today by speaking in French.

Our delegation welcomes your initiative, Sir, to convene this important thematic debate. I also thank the Secretary-General for his participation today, and express our deep appreciation to the Assistant Secretaries-General, the Under-Secretaries-General and the Special Representatives of the Secretary-General for their valuable contributions.

My delegation associates itself with the statement to be made by the representative of Morocco on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement.

My delegation has closely followed the Security Council's efforts over the past 15 months simultaneously to promote the maintenance and building of peace. Lebanon is convinced that successful United Nations peacekeeping operations and their transition and exit strategies require partnership between the Security Council, the Secretariat, the troop-contributing countries and host countries, as has often been noted.

As you note, Sir, in your concept paper (S/2010/67), peacekeeping missions have reached an all-time high in recent years, with over 96,000 men and women in uniform deployed in 15 missions and a

budget of about \$7.8 billion. These figures are unprecedented. We therefore need to ensure adequate resources, which are presently disproportionate to the complexity of activities of the peacekeeping operations. It is also vital that the objectives of the operations be well defined; they must clearly help to resolve conflicts and to establish lasting peace through a successful exit strategy.

In the Middle East, the Israeli occupation of Palestinian, Lebanese and Syrian territories is at the heart of the conflict and must be resolved if we are to achieve a comprehensive settlement of the conflict in the region and the successful drawdown of the United Nations missions there.

It is mostly through a comprehensive and inclusive political process that peacekeeping operations are able to help protect civilians and achieve sustainable peace. A successful transition also depends on defining clear and achievable mandates and on adequate financing. In the southern part of my country, the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) is an example of how the clarity of objectives has been translated into close cooperation and coordinated action between the Lebanese Army and the mission.

The scope and complexity of peacekeeping operations are currently incompatible with existing capabilities. We must therefore set realistic goals and ensure that missions enjoy adequate financing and appropriate logistical support that will facilitate successful transition and exit strategies. Lebanon stresses the close link between the maintenance and building of peace. Indeed, recovery and peacebuilding activities are essential from the earliest phases of peacekeeping. They must be undertaken in coordination with host Governments and through development programmes, as well as by strengthening national institutions and the rule of law. In this regard, we very much appreciate the role that UNIFIL is playing and call on international partners to assist in building the capacities of the Lebanese armed forces.

We also stress the importance of the consulting role of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) and call for regular coordination with the Commission. Indeed, peacebuilding efforts made right from the start of peacekeeping will help to ensure stability, especially in the area of economic recovery, which will help strengthen security and build trust in peacekeepers and their mission. In this regard, a post-conflict country's

initiative to prioritize its peacebuilding needs is essential to constructive dialogue and effective partnership with the international community. The involvement of the PBC in Burundi and Sierra Leone has facilitated the transition from peacekeeping to peacebuilding, largely through the support of integrated peacebuilding strategies defined and implemented by national Governments.

In Guinea-Bissau and the Central African Republic, the involvement of the PBC has resulted in a new generation of integrated United Nations offices. Lebanon welcomes the PBC's review exercise, which will open a unique opportunity to strengthen its role in the countries where it is operating.

Finally, we note yet again that the success of peacekeeping missions and their transition and exit strategies require genuine partnership among all stakeholders. We also draw the Council's attention to the key role played by the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations in developing political plans, and the role of the General Assembly's Fifth Committee in providing adequate financing.

Mrs. Ogwu (Nigeria): My first words must be to thank you, Mr. President, for your initiative in organizing this thematic debate. The concept paper accompanying the discussion (S/2010/67) has also proved invaluable in crystallizing perspectives for the debate. I welcome the presence of the Secretary-General and thank him for his useful statement. I would also like to thank the Under-Secretaries-General and Special Representatives for their invaluable contribution to the debate.

My intervention will focus on six key elements. First, with respect to mandates, I believe that we could be more precise in the drafting of mandates to include clear transition and exit strategies. Such clarity should cover mission objectives, mandates and strategies. The Council should be clear and firm on the need to link exit and transition strategies to the achievement of stated objectives. Mandates should be realistic and achievable, allowing for flexibility in their interpretation, and we should not overlook the moral imperatives that impel peacekeeping operations in the first place. Exit for its own sake would be counterproductive, if not prejudicial, to peacekeeping missions. We want neither to see a repeat of the mistakes in Rwanda and Srebrenica nor to relive the painful memory of their tragic consequences.

Secondly, planning must be comprehensive and provide for an integrated approach that allows peacekeeping operations to dovetail with peacebuilding and peacemaking. Lessons should be drawn from the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), especially during its forthcoming review, to guide future planning. We support a broad and integrated approach, with a phased completion of peacekeeping missions. We believe that there should be wider consultations with relevant stakeholders, particularly troop- and police-contributing countries, on the planning and deployment of missions.

Thirdly, we believe that capacities and resources must be adequate and predictable. Our experience has affirmed the point well articulated in this Chamber today that resources for peacekeeping operations are often disproportionately allocated, resulting in an abundance of resources where there is the least need and a shortage where the need is greater. Liberia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo are cases in point.

On the other hand, the strengthening of national capacities on which a successful exit strategy will depend does not receive sufficient and sustained support. It is therefore necessary for the Council and, indeed, for Member States to attach greater importance to building and strengthening capacities, and to allocate adequate and predictable resources to promote quick-impact programmes and, ultimately, sustainable development in its integrated economic, social and environmental dimensions.

Fourthly, the challenge of coordination is manifested not only in security sector reform, but in all phases of United Nations operational activities, especially at the country level. The capacity of the United Nations to lead international efforts in peacekeeping should be strengthened. Accordingly, the Council should intensify its promotion of coordination and synergy among the various actors and stakeholders.

The United Nations goal of acting and delivering as one will be tested on its ability to coordinate effectively. More importantly, the United Nations must give practical expression to the notion of national ownership of development priorities and needs. Our support must be sequenced to take into account such identified priorities and needs, with a view to

promoting coherence in the actions of international actors.

Fifthly, sustained political support for peace processes is essential if peacekeeping operations are to succeed and, indeed, pave the way for an orderly and honourable exit. The discordance and lack of consistency in the political support given to different conflict situations call for profound rethinking. Here, consideration should be given to other mechanisms, notably preventive diplomacy, as soon as the signs are clear that conflict is imminent. The capacity to respond, especially at the regional and subregional levels, should be built and, indeed, strengthened. The growing cooperation between the United Nations, the African Union and the Economic Community of West African States could provide useful lessons to draw on in designing operational models and frameworks.

Sixthly, all this will depend on the processes we put in place with regard to measurable performance benchmarks, reporting systems and evolution of results. Mandatory reporting to the Security Council and review of results will be necessary if members of the Council and, indeed, the international community are to have a better appreciation of the exit and transition targets that will be established. We would warn against a precipitate exit and transition strategy that does not take into account the significant achievement of the set objectives of peacekeeping missions. The Council should also resist the temptation to exit simply because a mandate requires an exit by a set period or an exit motivated by other extraneous factors. The United Nations should endeavour to go in early and stay long enough, if need be, to give hope to the hopeless and succour to the millions of helpless, distressed and displaced victims of conflict.

Mr. Mayr-Harting (Austria): We welcome your initiative, Sir, in organizing today's debate on transition and exit strategies. We thank the Secretary-General, the Under-Secretaries-General and the Special Representatives present here today for their important and thought-provoking contributions to this discussion. We are convinced that this meeting can also serve as an important opportunity for troop- and police-contributing countries to share their highly relevant experience with Council members and the Secretariat.

Austria aligns itself with the statement to be delivered by the representative of the European Union

later in this meeting, but let me make the following additional points.

The draft presidential statement before the Council rightly underlines that the overarching objective of successful United Nations peacekeeping operations should be the creation of conditions for sustainable peace on the ground, ultimately allowing for a mission's reconfiguration and withdrawal. For a successful transition from peacekeeping to continued peacebuilding or other forms of United Nations presence, it is necessary that effective national capacities for the provision of security, basic services, rule of law and long-term development be put in place in an integrated manner by national authorities, in close cooperation with international stakeholders. Mr. von der Schulenburg has underlined the key role of the national contribution. Peacebuilding and peacekeeping efforts need to go hand in hand from an early stage, based on a common and integrated strategy.

That approach should also guide future mandating of United Nations missions. Clear, credible and achievable mandates must be oriented towards a desired outcome or, as Mr. Doss has suggested, at least towards alternative outcomes. We also need clear benchmarks and a clear prioritization of tasks. I must say that I sympathize with the criticism expressed by Ms. Løj, Special Representative of the Secretary-General, regarding the Council's calls that missions should fulfil protection mandates within their capabilities. The Council must ensure – at least, this is our opinion — that mandates are matched with the resources required for their full implementation from the very start.

In order to avoid premature closure of operations, however, both benchmarks and objectives must be field-driven and shared by all parties. Moreover, those tools for monitoring progress must be reviewed regularly and aligned with the needs on the ground.

Against the background of increasing, and increasingly complex, operations, cooperation with regional and subregional organizations and other international actors, in particular in a transition context, will become ever more important. The Council has already discussed this. But to give one example from one of the cases being discussed today, the European Union has for several years actively supported the transition process in the Democratic

Republic of the Congo under the framework of the security sector reform launched by that country's Government.

More often than not, the active involvement of regional and subregional organizations is essential for ensuring the sustainability of peacekeeping and peacebuilding activities undertaken by the United Nations. There is therefore a need to ensure close coherence among peacebuilding plans and programmes launched by those organizations, Member States and the financial institutions, as well as the United Nations presence on the ground.

In line with Security Council resolution 1894 (2009), the protection of civilians must be duly taken into account throughout the life cycle of peacekeeping operations, including in the transition phase. That is a very important angle of our discussion here today. The ability and willingness of a State to protect its own civilian population is a precondition for sustainable peace and thus for the withdrawal of a peacekeeping operation.

Creating a favourable protection environment goes beyond protecting civilians from physical violence and must be complemented by activities in the fields of security sector reform, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, rule of law, transitional justice, human rights and empowerment of local society. Early coordination of these activities and a common strategy among all actors involved will be crucial for success. Let me also emphasize that the full participation of women in all processes has to be ensured, in accordance with resolution 1325 (2000). Liberia, for instance, is clearly a model case in that regard.

We welcome the clear link made in the draft presidential statement between peacekeeping, peacebuilding and sustainable development, an interconnection Mr. Von der Schulenburg pointed out very eloquently in the model case — and it is truly a model case — of Sierra Leone. This interrelationship must also be taken into account in the ongoing Peacebuilding Commission review process. Early economic recovery and the delivery of a peace dividend are crucial incentives for societies to invest in peace and stability. In this context, let me also point out the significant contribution peacekeeping missions can make to socio-economic development in their areas of deployment, not least through local procurement.

And let me say that my delegation is very supportive of the work of Under-Secretary-General Malcorra in this field.

Over the past years, several peacekeeping operations have been closed and followed by other forms of United Nations engagement, in many cases by integrated peacebuilding offices. We agree that the time has come to draw lessons learned from those examples. Therefore we welcome the decision of the Security Council Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations to address in the coming months key lessons learned from past and current missions regarding the successful implementation of transition strategies. We believe that continued dialogue between the Working Group and troop- and police-contributing countries will contribute to this exercise.

Mr. Rugunda (Uganda): I thank you, Mr. President, for organizing this important debate. I would like to thank the Secretary-General, the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations and the Under-Secretary-General for Field Support for their useful statements, as well as the Special Representatives of the Secretary-General who have given us their field experiences and advice.

This debate on transition and exit strategies comes at an opportune moment. We have had extensive deliberations on how peacekeeping can be made more effective, including through strengthening strategic partnerships with regional organizations and troop- and police-contributing countries. The United Nations and the wider international community have sustained efforts to resolve conflicts by peaceful means. However, those endeavours are being put to the test by new threats to global peace and security such as terrorism, piracy, drug trafficking and organized crime. The situation is further complicated by the increasing activities of non-State actors and dire humanitarian consequences for innocent civilian populations, including women and children.

Peacekeeping is an essential and indispensable tool available to the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in the maintenance of international peace and security. It is therefore important to ensure that peacekeeping operations are carried out in an effective manner, with built-in transition and exit strategies. Their primary and key objective should be to create conditions for sustainable peace on the ground so that the reconfiguration or

withdrawal of United Nations peacekeeping missions can be carried out with minimal or no risk of relapse into conflict.

We are convinced that to be successful, any transition or exit strategy must be underpinned by five essential considerations.

First, there must be careful planning that entails a thorough understanding of the causes of the conflict and how existing local or internal structures can be utilized in the search for a solution. Secondly, clear and situation-specific peacekeeping mandates should be developed, kept under review by the Security Council and varied as may be necessary, based on the dynamics of the situation on the ground.

Thirdly, a programme with timelines and benchmarks for priority activities, including reconciliation, stabilization and consolidation of the peace, should be developed and owned by the national authorities. It should focus on key priorities such as support for building the capacity of national institutions, including security sector reform.

Fourthly, some peacebuilding activities should be planned and implemented at the earliest stages of peacekeeping. It is important to ensure that people afflicted by conflict receive tangible peace dividends through provision of basic services such as health care, education, shelter and improvement of their standards of living. To this end, more resources need to be allocated to programmes and activities that improve the welfare of the people.

Fifthly, we reiterate the need for the United Nations system to ensure greater coherence in peacekeeping, peacemaking, peacebuilding and development activities. In our view, it is time that the United Nations system and the broader international community commit more resources to peacebuilding activities. The Peacebuilding Fund is an important instrument for the provision of flexible funding to countries on the Peacebuilding Commission agenda and other countries in need. However, its total financial resources are limited to about \$350 million, and yet the budgets of some peacekeeping missions amount to \$500 million or even \$1 billion per year.

In conclusion, Uganda reiterates the need to further strengthen the partnership between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations. This is critical if we are to optimize their contributions

to conflict prevention, conflict mediation, conflict resolution, peacekeeping and peacebuilding.

Ms. DiCarlo (United States of America): I should like to express our appreciation to you, Mr. President, for having organized this important debate. I should also like to thank the Secretary-General and Under-Secretaries-General Le Roy and Malcorra for their valuable insights, and Mr. Doss, Ms. Løj and Mr. Von der Schulenburg for having provided their unique perspectives from the field.

Over the past year, the Council has devoted considerable attention to ways to strengthen United Nations peacekeeping. Today's debate on transition and exit strategies will enhance this effort.

In numerous debates, the Council has noted that, with the growth in volume and complexity of peacekeeping operations, United Nations peacekeeping is under severe strain. We have also noted that we are placing multiple demands on a finite supply of well-equipped and trained troops and police. We must keep these factors in mind before renewing peacekeeping mandates or establishing new operations, especially where conditions on the ground are ill-suited to successful peacekeeping.

But we must not forget why the Security Council establishes peacekeeping operations in the first place. United Nations peacekeeping saves lives and delivers real results. Many countries are far more stable today because of past and current United Nations peacekeeping efforts. Sierra Leone and Burundi are both consolidating hard-won peace; Liberia is on a promising track. But we must stay the course.

But we have also seen what can happen when we are too swift to terminate a mission, as in Timor-Leste. We must resist the temptation to withdraw peacekeepers prematurely or to downsize or terminate missions on the basis of arbitrary timelines and false readings of progress. Hard-won progress can unravel swiftly if peacekeepers depart precipitously without leaving behind the foundations for a sustainable peace.

In its presidential statement of August 2009 (S/PRST/2009/24), the Security Council recommitted itself to improving the overall performance of United Nations peacekeeping and to addressing the challenges it faces today. The measures outlined in that statement and those in the draft statement before us today provide us with tools to strengthen peacekeeping in the interest

of helping countries make a swift transition to a durable peace. I should like to comment on a few of these measures today.

Firstly, as other speakers have noted, at the outset we must develop credible and achievable mandates for peacekeeping operations. Mandates and means must be better aligned, and we must be realistic about what we can achieve. We are improving our ability to measure progress through the use of benchmarks that are tailored to the circumstances of each conflict and reviewed periodically for their viability. But we can do better.

Secondly, it is important to work together to breathe new life into faltering peace processes in countries where peacekeeping operations are deployed. Peacekeeping must be accompanied by vigorous peacemaking efforts; it is not a substitute for them. International leverage may at times be needed to revive stalled negotiations, and we may wish to consider whether informal mechanisms, such as the Core Group for Timor-Leste, have practices that can be helpfully applied to other situations.

Thirdly, we need to help expand the pool of capable and willing military and police forces. Therefore, bilateral programmes that train and equip potential contributors are essential. The increased communication among troop- and police-contributors, the Council and the Secretariat has been helpful, but we should do better if we are to make informed decisions regarding future mandates and eventual drawdown.

Finally, it is critical that we do more to build up host Governments' security sectors and rule of law institutions. The United Nations Security Sector Reform Team can play a useful role in serving as a focal point for technical support in this area. Other relevant peacebuilding activities should also be an essential element of any new mandate. Earlier and enhanced cooperation with the Peacebuilding Commission is also needed.

As Ms. Løj stated, one size does not fit all, and our peacebuilding strategies, just like our overall peacekeeping strategies, should be tailored to the needs of the country in question. As we consider revising mandates or downsizing some missions, we will have to augment others, as we just did in Haiti. A few months ago, we had hoped that the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) would

soon be in the position to begin successfully downsizing. Instead, MINUSTAH is now important than ever, serving as a critical lifeline to millions of Haitians in desperate need.

I should like to underscore the continued support of the United State for United Nations peacekeeping and express our gratitude for the contribution that United Nations peacekeepers make around the world.

Mr. Churkin (Russian Federation) (*spoke in Russian*): We thank the delegation of France for having organized today's meeting on the timely theme of United Nations peacekeeping operations. We welcome the participation of the Secretary-General, the Under-Secretaries-General and the leaders of three important United Nations missions. We listened carefully to their assessments.

Russia attaches the highest importance to the role of United Nations peacekeeping in maintaining international peace and security, and seeks to build up its capabilities for peacekeeping operations. United Nations peacekeeping is now more necessary than ever, and it is quite possible that the demand for peacekeepers will only grow.

United Nations peacekeeping operations are undergoing not only quantitative but also qualitative changes with the growing complexity of peacekeeping mandates. Many peacekeeping operations are given a whole range of varied duties, such as helping to advance political settlements, monitoring compliance with peace agreements and identifying tasks to strengthen national capacities. In addition to military and political stabilization in zones of conflict, peacekeepers also provide support to security sector reform, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, the building of durable governing institutions and the completion of other complex tasks of State-building.

The challenge before us is how to further improve the work of United Nations peacekeeping. Addressing that challenge will require our collective efforts and productive cooperation among the Security Council, General Assembly and Secretariat. A major line of action should be aimed at increasing the effectiveness of United Nations peacekeeping operations. They should be undertaken in strict conformity with the Charter of the United Nations, with unflinching respect for the Security Council's primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security. That is

the political guarantee of the successful conduct of peacekeeping operations.

The lack of financial, logistical and technical resources dictates the need to enhance the quality of management of peacekeeping operations and to make optimal use of existing potential in that respect. A relevant issue is the need to ensure the effective transition from peacekeeping to peacebuilding functions for the purpose of consolidating stabilization achievements.

It is important to clearly delineate between peacekeeping and peacebuilding activities, which should be clearly defined in mandates. United Nations peacekeepers should be given only initial recovery duties, while, for peacebuilding processes and interventions of a purely socio-economic nature, we should more actively involve United Nations specialized agencies, regional and subregional organizations and the donor community.

In developing and adopting peacebuilding decisions, we need to consider the interests of all parties, respect the sovereignty of States and encourage national responsibility for implementing relevant programmes. Such programmes must be implemented solely with the consent and in coordination with national Governments.

The problem of ensuring the required level of military expertise in the Council's peacekeeping decisions deserves particular attention. We believe that, along with related initiatives, it remains relevant to consider the Russian proposal on reinvigorating the work of the Military Staff Committee, with a full complement of 15 Council members and the flexible involvement of leading troop-contributing countries. The assessments of the Committee with regard to the situation in countries where peacekeeping operations exist, its recommendations on operational aspects of peacekeeping and its participation in and cooperation with the Secretariat in missions and in defining the preparedness of contingents and the infrastructure of peacekeeping operations would provide the Council with reliable and timely information and build up the military expertise of United Nations peacekeeping.

The scope of the challenges to contemporary peacekeeping requires effective interaction between the United Nations and regional organizations. Experience has shown that more active use of the potential of regional organizations and subregional mechanisms is

justified so long as they operate in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their relations with the Organization, and with the Security Council in particular, are governed by the provisions of Chapter VIII of the Charter.

Good opportunities for establishing cooperation with the United Nations in the area of peacekeeping are emerging as a result of the establishment of the peacekeeping capabilities of the Collective Security Treaty Organizations (CSTO). The upcoming adoption, on the initiative of Russia and other CSTO members, of a General Assembly resolution on cooperation between the United Nations and the CSTO will provide further impetus in that regard.

Of particular significance is the development of strategies for the drawdown of peacekeeping operations once their Security Council mandates have been implemented. We believe that a discussion on the exit of operations and a transition from peacekeeping operations to other types of United Nations presences will help us to address this challenge.

We were interested to acquaint ourselves with our partner's concept paper (S/2010/67) on the theme "United Nations peacekeeping operations: Transition and exit strategies". We believe that a wide range of its ideas and concepts could serve as a reasonable basis for further discussion aimed at achieving concrete results. Of course, the major criterion in planning such strategies must be to ensure that peacekeepers create favourable conditions for advancing the process of political settlement.

We thank the delegation of France for preparing the draft presidential statement to be adopted today. We also appreciate the flexibility and constructiveness shown by colleagues in discussing the draft statement, which is a substantive and useful document.

Mrs. Viotti (Brazil) (*spoke in French*): I shall follow the example of the representative of Lebanon by speaking in French.

I would like to thank you, Mr. President, for organizing this debate. I would also like to thank the Secretary-General for his statement. We very much appreciate the briefings by Mr. Le Roy and Ms. Malcorra, as well as the valuable contributions by Mr. Doss, Ms. Løj and Mr. Von der Schulenburg.

In discussing transition and exit strategies for peacekeeping operations, we must not lose sight of the

fundamental objective of such operations. Their ultimate goal is to contribute to the consolidation of sustainable peace. Transition and exit strategies are therefore always a means to an end, and never an end in themselves. That distinction is not academic; it is political. That means that such strategies should respond to political dynamics on the ground.

The transition from peacekeeping to peacebuilding should be an undertaking for the entire United Nations system. Peacekeeping exit and transition strategies must be coordinated with the wider United Nations presence on the ground in a coherent manner. That requires system-wide coordination from the earliest stages of peacekeeping. We therefore need to work on three main areas: intensifying the Council's political support for peace processes, improving United Nations structures for dealing with those situations, and securing the necessary human and material resources.

A minimal level of political stability is the *sine qua non* condition for an exit strategy. We must continue to gather lessons learned and improve our efforts in such areas as capacity- and institution-building, improving the ability of States to provide basic services, protecting civilians, revitalizing the economy and creating jobs. Local actors must be constructively engaged in peace, reconciliation and reconstruction processes. The crucial task of peacekeeping is to help them to embark upon and proceed along that path.

Re-establishing peace should be a priority for the Council as it sets mandates and reacts to developments on the ground. To that end, the Security Council should improve its ability to monitor peace processes. The establishment of benchmarks in several missions is a positive innovation. I should like to thank Mr. Doss for the clarity he has brought to our discussion in that regard.

The transition from peacekeeping is a systemic undertaking that requires the Council's cooperation with other relevant parties. The General Assembly, in particular its Fifth Committee and Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (C-34), is a crucial stakeholder in that regard. The Council should take advantage of the breadth of membership and level of expertise of those bodies in order to make peacekeeping more effective and transparent.

The relationship between Security Council decisions and the work of the Organization's development bodies needs further attention. Peacekeeping and peacebuilding should not be considered sequential stages of the United Nations presence in a given country. Whenever possible, development-related entities should be active on the ground from the beginning of the post-conflict phase so that, once peacekeepers leave, the socio-economic conditions for peace are firmly in place.

The Peacebuilding Commission is another potentially important actor. The latest report of the C-34 (A/63/19) recognizes the value of the Commission's advice on the peacebuilding aspects of peacekeeping mandates. The roles and responsibilities of the Commission vis-à-vis the Security Council should be further clarified. The Commission's review is an opportunity to strengthen its capacity to dispense such advice.

The Secretariat must also have at its disposal the structures and expertise required to allow it to adequately address peacebuilding elements of peacekeeping. In that regard, social and economic aspects of peacebuilding must receive greater attention.

There have been positive developments recently with regard to human and material resources for peacekeeping as such. Little progress, however, has been made in securing resources to help implement sustainable transition and exit strategies. The well-known problems that undermine the effectiveness of international aid are the same that must be overcome when it comes to official development assistance to post-conflict countries. Donors, international financial institutions and the United Nations itself must work more vigorously to free up significant funds — from the outset of and throughout the entire process — in a predictable, flexible and coherent way. Coordination and programmatic coherence could both contribute to reducing duplication and filling existing gaps, thereby enhancing the effectiveness of funds invested.

We must also strengthen the ability of peacekeeping operations to liaise with United Nations country teams on the ground and to mainstream peacebuilding concerns in their day-to-day operations, especially when transition and exit strategies are being implemented. The special representatives of the

Secretary-General and resident coordinators have a key role to play in this regard.

In conclusion, we should see transitions as a step on the road towards helping countries achieve sustainable peace and inclusive socio-economic development. In so doing, we will be strengthening international peace and security.

The President (*spoke in French*): I think the whole Council will agree that the statement made by the representative of Brazil was exceptionally clear in nature, an attribute that she shares with the representative of Lebanon, and that I am sure she will also share with the representative of Gabon.

Mr. Barbačić (Bosnia and Herzegovina): Bosnia and Herzegovina would like to thank France for putting this important debate on the Security Council's agenda. We would like to thank Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, and Under-Secretaries-General Alain Le Roy and Susana Malcorra. We would also like to thank Special Representatives of the Secretary-General Ms. Ellen Margrethe Løj, Mr. Alan Doss and Mr. Michael von der Schulenburg for their clear briefings.

Bosnia and Herzegovina wishes to align itself with the statement to be made by the acting head of the European Union delegation to the United Nations, Mr. Pedro Serrano.

We would finally like to reiterate our gratitude to the personnel of United Nations missions for their dedicated work and daily commitment to advancing peace and security.

As a police- and troop-contributing country — a country, moreover, with critical experience of United Nations peacekeeping and peacebuilding efforts — Bosnia and Herzegovina is particularly cognizant of the vital importance of this debate. Allow me to make a few brief remarks.

It is a long road from an initial peace agreement to sustainable peace. Travelling this road to the endpoint requires clear and adequate mandates, strategic planning and coherent implementation, as well as the commitment of the host country. Only through all this can the transition to peacebuilding succeed.

This process begins with mandate design. To achieve a successful transition, it is vital for mandates

to be clear, appropriate and sufficient to addressing both immediate and long-term needs. A key part of that mandate design is the definition of a desired outcome that, as the draft presidential statement recognizes, reflects the need to create conditions favourable to sustainable peace. Appropriate and sufficient mandates allow the United Nations mission to take full advantage of the narrow window of opportunity to effect rapid change in the immediate post-conflict environment.

Furthermore, mandate renewal should not be automatic, but rather sensitive to and conditioned upon the evolution of in-country circumstances. This presupposes a sustained focus by the United Nations on cognitive capacity, that is, the ability to collate, examine and interpret all the necessary data to assess the mission's impact. The Security Council would benefit from the availability of clear and precise recommendations from the Secretariat, as referred to in the draft presidential statement, at least one month prior to mandate renewal.

At the same time, Bosnia and Herzegovina attaches the utmost importance to defining exit strategies for United Nations peacebuilding missions. A clear exit strategy must be founded on a thorough evaluation of the situation on the ground and an accurate assessment of whether peacebuilding processes have reached a lasting, irreversible stage. We should not allow inaccurate assessments to prevail and lead to the premature termination of missions.

Mandates must be matched from the start by sufficient resources. It is widely recognized — and the trials of our own experience bear this out — that early investments are effective investments. Bosnia and Herzegovina consequently endorses the precedents relating to resources and achievable goals expressed in the presidential statement of 5 August 2009 (S/PRST/2009/24) and the Secretary-General's report of 20 April 2001 (S/2001/394).

Bosnia and Herzegovina stresses the significance of including, wherever possible, integrated strategic planning and benchmarks. Clear and carefully calibrated benchmarks can help improve the Security Council's strategic oversight of a mission's progress towards sustainable peace. Such benchmarks will be meaningful in direct proportion to the cognitive capacity of the United Nations. We endorse the further development of existing benchmarks for the United

Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the creation of a strategic integrated plan for the United Nations Mission in Liberia.

To achieve a successful transition, coordination among various actors and the coherence of complex, integrated missions are of vital importance. Bosnia and Herzegovina shares the common belief that regional organizations, such as the European Union and the African Union, can play a constructive role in transitions. Most peacekeeping and peacebuilding environments will involve an extensive array of stakeholders. Drawing upon their best abilities is essential to the success of the peacebuilding missions. The peacebuilding initiatives that worked in Bosnia and Herzegovina were marked by synergy between multiple actors and, most important, between civilian and military endeavours.

Bosnia and Herzegovina is of the belief that the quality of dialogue among stakeholders can be further improved. The Security Council, its Working Group of the Whole on Peacekeeping Operations, the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, the Fifth Committee of the General Assembly, the Peacebuilding Commission and the police- and troop-contributing countries are all salient in planning and implementing United Nations missions. In particular, the Security Council could rely more upon the advice of the Peacebuilding Commission.

Finally, it has been exactly 18 years since the United Nations Protection Force was deployed at the very outset of the post-cold war period of peacekeeping. Since that disastrous beginning, the United Nations has notably improved the effectiveness of its peacekeeping. It has entered into a new phase of peacebuilding operations, which has had greater success in achieving objectives, such as the sustained peace in El Salvador.

Facing the challenges of an unprecedented degree of global deployment of United Nations missions will require further improvements, with particular reference to mandate design, strategic planning, cognitive capacity and coherence. The task will continue to demand the political will of host countries and Member States alike as an ineluctable prerequisite for successful transitions and exit strategies. Bosnia and Herzegovina stands ready to share its experiences and

looks forward to contributing fully to post-conflict peacebuilding processes.

Mr. Issoze-Ngondet (Gabon) (*spoke in French*): I would like to join previous speakers in thanking you, Mr. President, for having convened this informative debate on peacekeeping operations. Their role, although crucial — as attested by their proliferation — is increasingly being questioned today as a result of the difficulties that they face in achieving their objectives and the limited capacities of the United Nations.

The main point of holding this debate on our quest for a pragmatic approach to the transition from peacekeeping operations to peacebuilding is, we all agree, to enable the United Nations to deepen its consideration of the ways and means to make peacekeeping operations more effective, of shorter duration and more predictable in terms of their end date. In so doing, as was rightly underscored by the Secretary-General, our Organization should be able to usefully reduce its presence in the security sector and increase it in other, more decisive areas of peacebuilding.

Indeed, it is not the length of a peacekeeping operation that guarantees its success. In fact, a great many peacekeeping operations of egregious duration have not achieved significant progress. The reasons for this failure — or paradox — were underscored by Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Alain Le Roy. Establishing a good mandate for a good exit from a crisis requires more constructive political commitment at the outset and, of course, a more forward-looking approach in laying the foundations for a country to emerge from crisis.

It is obvious that the key to a good exit strategy lies in the mandates of peacekeeping operations. It thus seems to be important, as the Brahimi report (see S/2000/809) recommends, to rethink them in an objective way in order to have a clear idea about the changes that are needed in their design and structure.

It is true that for a few years now, the United Nations has significantly improved the design, conduct and implementation of peacekeeping operations. It is also true that these developments have essentially led the United Nations to into account the need to clearly define clear, credible and achievable mandates that can guarantee the success of peacekeeping operations.

Rethinking peacekeeping mandates involves revisiting both the philosophy and the process of their implementation. As many speakers have stressed, a good mandate must take the causes of a conflict into account, and its implementation should be underpinned by robust planning of its various phases and sequences, and by the identification of criteria that define the appropriate moment for exit. It is clear that mandate implementation should be marked by realistic stages, accompanied by anticipated achievements, quantifiable benchmarks and well-defined priorities to prevent the United Nations from being bogged down and resources from being wasted that would be more useful in other sectors.

Mandates should also include mechanisms for cooperation with neighbouring States to prevent possible incursions by destabilizing forces. Let us not forget that the crises we face too often have regional implications, which of course can be managed only through an approach that takes this aspect into account. I note that this crucial phase in the drafting of a mandate should be subordinated to the dispatch to the field of multisectoral and multidisciplinary scouting teams to identify precisely the optimal conditions for the conduct of the mission. It would be equally useful to systematize the establishment of a technical evaluation mission to determine a peacekeeping mission's exit strategy.

The end of a peacekeeping operation increasingly requires, on the one hand, that security conditions be satisfactory and, on the other, the restoration of a modicum of a functional State, characterized by the resumption of basic systems of governance, such as judicial institutions, police forces, penitentiary services, civil administration and public services. Elections are often considered to be the conclusion of post-conflict transition. However, they can lead to the withdrawal of the United Nations presence only if the prior conditions are fulfilled. We must therefore ensure that a country's stability is irreversible and that the restoration of Government has been concluded.

We must also ensure that peace agreements concluded between the parties concerned have been applied and implemented in good faith to the satisfaction of the parties, and that the immediate causes of the conflict have been addressed. It is clear that the progressive reduction and drawdown of a peacekeeping operation and its transition to the consolidation and peacebuilding phase depend to a

large extent on evaluation of progress achieved in relation to the objectives laid out in the mandate.

We believe that, in order to better take these stages of a mission into account, any peacekeeping mandate should provide for a civil component that would, in cooperation with local Government, assess progress achieved by the mission pursuant to fixed objectives, and that would propose a transition towards peacebuilding. During the transition, the capacity-building of security and defence forces should be accelerated to ensure that national forces are in a position to assume responsibility for the mechanism deployed by the peacekeeping operation.

We believe that the success of a peacekeeping operation also requires additional coordination efforts within the United Nations to strengthen peacekeeping partnerships. The Secretariat, the members of the Security Council, the General Assembly, the troop-contributing countries, donors and other partners within and outside the United Nations system are all called on to play a critical role in that respect. Similarly, the United Nations should strive to strengthen partnerships between the Government in a crisis situation and international actors.

These, in our view, are the elements necessary to the establishment of effective transition and exit strategies for peacekeeping operations leading to the peacebuilding phase. In conclusion, I express our support for the draft presidential statement presented by France.

Mr. Takasu (Japan): At the outset, I would like to express my deep appreciation to the Secretary-General, the two Under-Secretaries-General and the three heads of very important missions for their informative briefings and lessons learned.

I also pay tribute to France for its very important initiative. United Nations peacekeeping operations are sent to monitor ceasefires and assist national efforts to restore security and stability. Our primary focus, therefore, should be on how effectively peacekeeping operations can achieve the objectives mandated by the Security Council rather than on discussing how soon to exit. Such an approach is in fact more effective in achieving transition.

Peacekeeping operations are one of the most valuable and indispensable tools available to the Security Council for peace and security. I would like to

stress the importance of considering the role of a peacekeeping mission in the much broader context of a continuum from the end of conflict to social and economic stability.

In launching a new mission, the Security Council needs to exercise self-restraint in the wording of mandates. It is important for the Council to set clear, concrete and achievable goals from the outset, which will help in planning a smooth transition. For instance, complex mandates such as the protection of civilians need to be defined more clearly for implementable, specific tasks in mission planning. There should also be a clear priority among a set of mandates. We also need to set benchmarks against which progress is monitored and adjustment made in a timely manner, taking into account the changing situation on the ground. Such an approach would contribute to enhancing the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations, thereby achieving a smooth transition.

The main challenge that many operations face is the lack of capacity of the host country to provide for basic security and to deal with urgent issues in the post-conflict situation. To address this challenge, it is essential to promote the institution-building of the host country and the training of its nationals.

The instability of the security situation and a lack of productive economic activity are two major impediments to transition. Transition — in other words, the completion of the main task of peacekeeping operations to ensure a stable security situation — depends on the extent of the progress made in security sector reform and the establishment of the rule of law.

An equally serious challenge to transition is the absence of a peace dividend and a lack of social and economic stability after the end of a conflict. A prerequisite for durable peace is to secure basic services, including electricity, to every household and to facilitate the reintegration of people affected by the conflict and reconciliation and coexistence in isolated communities. Above all, the reintegration of former combatants into normal civilian life and the creation of job opportunities for younger people are vitally important to ending the vicious cycle of conflict and poverty. Thus, we need to establish a comprehensive and integrated strategy of peacebuilding towards transition.

Peacekeeping operations are expected to maintain peace and security in the host country to create an environment for peacebuilding activities. In considering transition, there are three types of relationships between peacekeeping operations and peacebuilding activity. In the first type, the mandate of a peacekeeping operation itself contains some elements of peacebuilding activity, such as in East Timor. The second is the type in which a peacekeeping operation does not include a mandate for peacebuilding activities, while other United Nations entities carry out peacebuilding activities in the country of operation. The third is the type in which peacebuilding activities are carried out after a peacekeeping mission completes its mandate. This type applies to countries taken up by the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), such as Burundi and Sierra Leone.

We should be more sensitive to these different types of relationship. We should consider what type of peacebuilding activity could be implemented within the mandate of a peacekeeping operation in the future, and how such operations can support peacebuilding activity when another organization is in charge of that aspect. We believe that such considerations will help to make transition strategies more effective.

Up to now, the PBC has been in charge mostly of the third category of mission. We should be mindful that peacebuilding as a whole is a broad concept involving large-scale activities in various post-conflict or fragile situations, and it is totally unrealistic to expect that the PBC can be responsible for and engaged in every peacebuilding need in the world. However, we might consider the possibility that the PBC should give advice on peacebuilding to the Security Council in cases of the first type, and also of the second type, in which peacekeeping and peacebuilding are implemented simultaneously. At the same time, we must all be very clear as to the kind of advice and added value that the PBC may be able to provide in those cases.

One can hardly overemphasize the importance of formulating strategic goals for peacebuilding at an early stage. The opportunity to take advantage of the golden hour immediately after a ceasefire is very frequently lost and never comes back. We need to promote activities to achieve strategic goals along a road map with a clear timeline, as well as to identify the stakeholders responsible for each goal. An

integrated and coordinated approach is therefore key to success.

For instance, the successful implementation of security sector reform and the rule of law are critical to stability and transition. Security sector reform cannot be completed merely by strengthening the institutional capacity of the national police or by downsizing, disarming and demobilizing the military. It must be accompanied by support for security personnel, the reintegration of former combatants and the creation of economic opportunity for young people.

Peacebuilding activities require more varied expertise and civilian specialists than peacekeeping operations. They are tied to diverse programmes with differing implementation procedures and funding sources. The United Nations may not necessarily be the strongest player on the ground. It is therefore essential to strengthen coordination mechanisms according to an integrated plan and to ensure active interaction among all stakeholders, including, of course, the Security Council, the PBC, the host country, donor countries, troop- and police-contributing countries, international financial institutions and the private sector.

The Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations, which Japan chairs, has agreed to discuss, first, key gaps in capabilities, resources and training; and secondly, key lessons learned from completed and current missions about the successful implementation of transition strategies. I would like to conclude by reaffirming Japan's very strong interest in developing effective transition strategies.

Mr. Apakan (Turkey): I would first like to thank you, Sir, for organizing this debate. I also wish to thank the Secretary-General and his Under-Secretaries-General, as well as his Special Representatives, for their thought-provoking briefings.

The views expressed so far reflect the common will and determination of this Council to improve, in consultation with partners, its response to the needs of United Nations peacekeeping. Turkey is certainly committed to contributing to this endeavour. Over time, we have already accumulated a wealth of lessons learned on how we can further enhance the effectiveness of United Nations peacekeeping. It is now the right time to analyse those lessons and to develop a clear strategy that will help us chart a viable road map to peace in conflict situations.

Much of what I want to say has already been said by the previous speakers, particularly the briefers, so I will not repeat them. Moreover, the draft presidential statement that we are going to adopt today also contains all the right elements, allowing me to be rather brief.

The only point I wish to stress further is the need for an integrated political strategy that will merge peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding tools into a single framework. Undoubtedly, such a strategy can succeed only if all partners are willing to back it. It must therefore reflect the shared vision of all stakeholders and address all phases of a peace mission: the entry and, perhaps even more important, the post-conflict recovery phases, including, of course, transition and exit.

As Under-Secretary-General Le Roy said, peacekeeping can be seen as the emergency room of a hospital, where the patient should continue to be treated in the aftermath of a recovery phase. But there is no doubt that transition and exit strategies should be part and parcel of this overall strategy. Unless we determine at the beginning what we want to achieve in the end, we can neither properly set the course of the mission in terms of mandates and task prioritization, nor answer the question of how we are going to achieve it.

In the development of an integrated strategy, it is important that we should first agree on the end state that we want to achieve through peacekeeping missions, as well as their role and place within the bigger picture of sustaining peace. Only then, and in consultation with troop- and police-contributing countries, can we develop clear and credible mandates providing a sound political directive to our troops. In this critical process, the input of regional organizations should also be given the utmost attention. The Security Council's cooperation with the African Union is a good example of such a relationship.

We should also agree on a shared vision of what constitutes success. Indeed, one of the perennial questions facing us is how the Council can assess when a political and security situation has stabilized sufficiently to warrant a significant transition. To this end, we can make better use of benchmarks to measure progress in achieving tasks and as a tool for reviewing mandates.

Yet we should also be careful to avoid creating benchmarks that are solely Council-driven, which could result in a lack of local ownership. This is also important in setting priorities, which ought to reflect the unique conditions and needs of a country. It is in this frame of mind that we look forward to the review in the coming months of the mandate of the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Indeed, given the evolution of the situation in that country, this is going to be an important challenge for the Council, and we need to get it right this time.

In conclusion, I once again reiterate the vital importance of an integrated approach to conflict situations. Indeed, the coherence and coordination of broader international efforts in an area of conflict is key to helping countries succeed in their efforts to sustain peace. The Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) in particular could play an earlier and enhanced role in that respect. In that regard, we look forward to the comprehensive review of the PBC and express our commitment to contributing actively to that process. Moreover, for better coordination among Member States and other partners, we can also make use of the clearinghouse type of mechanisms to promote synergy and complementarity in our peacebuilding activities. I agree with Mr. Doss as to the difficulties of coordination and the need to streamline our existing arrangements.

Last but not least, I would like to emphasize that the real challenge lies in the creation of a suitable foundation on which the transition from the phase of the strategic use of security to that of the strategic use of development can take place, because the exit or withdrawal of United Nations troops cannot be an end in itself. We have to think beyond the lifecycle of a peacekeeping mission, as security is not the only element of peace and stability.

In this regard, there is no linear relationship between peacekeeping and peacebuilding, and thus the early integration of peacebuilding elements into our peacekeeping strategies becomes crucial. After all, the inextricable link between development and security compels us to do so. As the Secretary-General pointed out on an earlier occasion, there can be no security without development, and vice versa. So our efforts on both accounts should go hand in hand from the very outset. Turkey commits itself to further advancing the implementation of such an integrated approach.

Mr. Liu Zhenmin (China) (*spoke in Chinese*): The Chinese delegation thanks the French delegation for organizing today's thematic debate. I welcome Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and thank him for his statement. I also welcome the presence of the Executive Representative of the Secretary-General Michael von der Schulenburg, Under-Secretaries-General Le Roy and Malcorra, and Special Representatives Doss and Løj and thank them for their briefings.

After more than six years of continuing development, peacekeeping operations have become the most important of United Nations measures for maintaining international peace and security. In recent years, rapidly changing situations have raised the bar to success for peacekeeping operations and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) has faced severe challenges. Tensions between scale and efficiency, resources and demand, and mandates and capacities have hindered the development of peacekeeping operations, and there is a widening gap between peacekeeping operations and the expectations of Member States. It is imperative that experiences be comprehensively assessed in order to overcome shortcomings and improve peacekeeping operations.

In these circumstances, it is urgent and necessary for the Security Council to discuss peacekeeping reform, addressing transition and exit strategies as a starting point. Transition and exit strategies not only involve improved management of peacekeeping operations, but are also important for the overall coordination of peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding. Therefore, when devising transition and exit strategies, the Council must work from the perspective of a peacekeeping strategy.

I would like to focus on the following points. First, coordination between peacekeeping and peacebuilding must be strengthened. Important as they are, peacekeeping operations are not a panacea. The Security Council should attach equal importance to the political settlement of armed conflicts and the deployment of peacekeeping operations. We can eliminate post-conflict destabilizing elements only by strengthening the promotion of political dialogue and reconciliation processes, thus establishing a peace to keep and laying the foundation for transition and exit strategies. In addition, the Security Council must bring into full play the good offices of the Secretary-General and his special envoys, and support the peace

initiatives of the regional and subregional organizations concerned.

Secondly, the division of labour between peacekeeping and peacebuilding must be further improved, and coordination and cooperation between the two strengthened to ensure implementation of the transition and exit strategies. In order to smoothly and successfully transition from peacekeeping to peacebuilding, the Security Council should consider peacebuilding issues when it takes decisions on peacekeeping operations, and at the same time clarify the division of labour. In the transitional stage, peacekeeping operations should create conditions conducive to peacebuilding and facilitate implementation of exit strategies, without duplicating the work of either peacekeeping or peacebuilding.

The parties concerned should take the opportunity of the upcoming comprehensive review of the work of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) to further consider the role of the PBC; mobilize the participation of all United Nations operational departments, the international financial institutions and the relevant regional organizations; and strengthen exchange and interaction between the PBC and the Security Council in order to fundamentally assist the countries concerned to end conflicts and establish lasting peace and stability.

Thirdly, the Security Council and the Secretariat should strengthen cooperation at the mandate, deployment, planning and administrative levels of peacekeeping operations. In deploying peacekeeping operations, the Security Council must comprehensively consider the host country's situation and the available peacekeeping resources, formulate a clear and targeted mandate, identify priorities and set goals for the various stages.

The Security Council should closely monitor and follow up implementation of the mandate and formulate an exit strategy in a timely manner. In the implementation of a mandate, attention should be paid to capacity-building of the host country so as to avoid the overdependence on the peacekeeping operations that could make implementation of the exit strategy impossible.

Fourthly, strong partnerships must be established to ensure the participation and cooperation of all parties concerned.

Continued adherence to the Hammarskjöld principles of peacekeeping is an important foundation for the success of United Nations peacekeeping operations at the deployment, transition and exit stages. The host country's opinion must be accorded important consideration, while fully taking into account the active participation of the countries concerned. The support and cooperation of troop-contributing countries, donor States and regional organizations are also very important, and their roles must be fully integrated to strengthen coordination and cooperation and to pool their strengths in order to ensure the success of the peacekeeping operation.

This year marks the tenth anniversary of the Brahimi report (see S/2000/809) and the fifth anniversary of the founding of the PBC. The Security Council, the Secretariat, the major troop-contributing countries and all of the other parties have quite high expectations for the reform of United Nations peacekeeping operations. China is willing to join efforts with all parties concerned in engaging in in-depth consultations to seek consensus on the question of the reform of peacekeeping operations and to promote the improved organization and efficiency of peacekeeping operations.

Mr. Heller (Mexico) (*spoke in Spanish*): We are grateful for the presentations of the Secretary-General, Under-Secretaries-General Alain Le Roy and Susana Malcorra, Special Representatives Alan Doss and Ellen Margrethe Løj. We are also grateful to have Executive Representative Michael Von der Schulenburg in the Council today. Mexico welcomes the initiative of France to pursue the analysis and discussion of the various ways in which peacekeeping operations can be improved, as well as how to design transition and exit strategies — an issue that undoubtedly represents one of the main challenges to the Security Council in fulfilling its fundamental role of maintaining international peace and security.

In the light of lessons learned in recent years, it has been recognized that peacekeeping operations must incorporate a number of essential elements if they are to meet their main objective of attaining sustainable peace. Among the most important of these elements is the drafting of clear, credible and achievable mandates supported by the material resources, troops, police and civilian capacities required to fulfil their functions. The unequivocal commitment of the parties to achieving a negotiated solution to the conflict is also necessary.

Other essential elements are the existence of a general peace agreement that also addresses the underlying causes of the conflict, and an understanding on the part of the parties to the conflict and the population in general of the benefits of achieving the mission objectives, which they should also perceive as their own.

Likewise, with respect to these elements, there is consensus that objectives should be established with defined timeframes at every stage, including a transition and exit strategy, and that peacekeeping missions should adopt an integrated approach that takes peacebuilding considerations into account from an early stage. To achieve this, it is imperative for the Security Council to establish an efficient planning and coordination mechanism involving special representatives of the Secretary-General and those responsible for the coordination and direction of the military, civil, financial and humanitarian components of missions.

Within the framework of the United Nations, we reaffirm the importance for the Security Council to continue to promote ongoing and substantive dialogue among the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, the Fifth Committee of the General Assembly, the Peacebuilding Commission, troop-contributing countries and major financial donors to peacekeeping operations, especially given the current international economic climate. The aim of such dialogue would be to afford these actors greater input in the process or drafting, adopting and revising mandates.

In this regard, we recognize that there has been positive progress in the dialogue among these actors. However, greater coordination can still be achieved. That is why we stress the importance of following up on resolution 1353 (2001), and commend the work of the Working Group of the Whole on United Nations Peacekeeping Operations to offer recommendations with a view to improving cooperation and coordination mechanisms throughout the entire lifecycle of a peacekeeping operation.

Moreover, we encourage the Security Council, in drawing up peacebuilding strategies, to cooperate with regional organizations and such informal mechanisms as the groups of friends of the Secretary-General, in recognition of their broad experience, knowledge of the

specifics of a conflict and interest in guaranteeing the transition to stability for the country and the region.

It is essential for a host country to cooperate with a peacekeeping operation throughout the entire length of its deployment, on which the successful transition to a peacebuilding process depends. A peacekeeping operation cannot be perceived as having been imposed by the international community alone. The reconfiguration of a United Nations presence should also be accompanied by a high degree of coordination between the United Nations system and other international actors, including financial institutions and civil society organizations on the ground.

It is also important to explore mechanisms for strengthening cooperation between the Security Council and the Peacebuilding Commission in order to ensure coherence in mandates between peacemaking, peacekeeping, peacebuilding and development activities so as to establish conditions conducive to peacekeeping transition strategies. Consideration of this issue could help to strengthen the role of the Peacebuilding Commission in the context of its review later this year.

We cannot ignore the fact that no two operations are the same. We have to take into account not only the nature of the conflict, but also and above all the institutional structure present in the host country of the peacekeeping operation. Let us not forget that we frequently face situations in which there is an institutional vacuum or extreme fragility that calls for the United Nations to perform a support role that goes beyond simply ending the military aspect of the conflict. Where there is no State, the international community must take on the responsibilities of a State in support of and consultation with national authorities. What rule of law can we speak of when there are no sustainable national institutions?

The Security Council should closely monitor the situation at all stages of a peacekeeping operation. That would help to ensure that the transition from one stage to another occurs in the most effective way possible and to incorporate timely modifications into the mandate, including in terms of logistical and operational capacities, always with the aim of adapting to events on the ground.

In this context, we support the use by the Security Council of follow-up mechanisms, such as benchmarks, which help to improve the relationship

between peacekeeping operation mandates and their due implementation, underscore the achievement of objectives, and help to more clearly define the lifecycle of each operation.

Finally, we reaffirm the importance of the Secretariat and the Security Council pursuing periodic consideration of ways to improve peacekeeping operations, and we encourage the relevant Working Group to continue its consideration of transition strategies and to make recommendations in that area.

The President (*spoke in French*): I shall now make a statement in my capacity as the representative of France.

I wish to thank all the participants in today's debate. My thanks go, of course, to those who have travelled a great distance — in particular, the Special Representatives of the Secretary-General, who came to share their experience with us. My thanks go, too, to those without whom the various phases of peacekeeping operations would not be possible: the contributors of the troops and police who carry out activities on the ground; the Peacebuilding Commission, which is called upon to play an increasingly important role; the international organizations that contribute directly to the implementation of mandates; and, of course and perhaps above all, the men and women who serve, often in difficult conditions, in all United Nations operations.

Why have we organized this debate? Our fundamental aim, which is quite evident, is to make operations successful. Today, we are, however, confronted by two contradictory trends.

First of all, the operations that have been established in recent years have relied entirely on a Secretariat whose resources we know to be modest, not to say limited. In addition, in recent months prospects have emerged for reductions in several operations. We should therefore be prepared to succeed in such transitions.

We must succeed, because we are talking about the condition for lasting peace on the ground following the departure of our forces. And we must succeed in a complex, progressive transition towards a situation in which the host country fully carries out all the functions normally performed by a sovereign State, without a foreign presence on its territory. Several

operations have already served as the stage for overall successful transitions, including Cambodia and Sierra Leone, to which Mr. Von der Schulenburg has referred.

In the concept paper that we distributed prior to this meeting (see S/2010/67), we identified the factors that seem to us to explain the difficulties we sometimes encounter in trying to carry out successful transitions. In that regard, we think that there are numerous elements that are crucial for success, and we should consider them.

First — and I am far from being the first to mention it — there is the issue of the quality of mandates. How can we ascertain if United Nations efforts have achieved their goals and must now gradually be brought to an end while benefiting the host country, if the desired objectives and end state are not clear? It goes back to a mandate that is clear and concise. It was Ms. Løj who referred to the real “Christmas tree” that our resolutions often are. I recall the resolution on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 41 missions.

It is then up to the Secretariat, on the basis of its mandates, to carry out careful planning and to report in a way that makes it possible to clearly understand where a mission stands with regard to the completion of its mandate.

It is very important to maintain an ongoing exchange between missions and the Council.

Clearly, the availability of resources is a crucial element. We all know that resources are limited in several key areas — including in security sector reform, which is undoubtedly essential in a transition. Anything that can contribute to increasing resources is to be welcomed.

Lastly, many times the Secretariat rightly reminds us of the need to strengthen peace processes.

On the basis of those common-sense considerations, the Council has arrived at an agreement on a draft presidential statement that sets out our desire to improve our efforts in the area of transition by, as we say in French, getting our own house in order. In particular, we will endeavour to better define the expected outcome in our mandates, set out tasks hierarchically and strengthen dialogue between the Council and the Secretariat by improving the reciprocal provision of information and better utilizing such tools

as strategic frameworks and plans that make it possible to measure progress in carrying out a mission. As a consequence, the Secretariat will be able to plan for the various stages of a mission and develop timetables. In order to better take post-conflict reconstruction into account at earlier stages of a mandate, the Council will, among other things, turn to the Peacebuilding Commission. Lastly, the Council will make every effort to support peace processes.

With those commitments we are not going to change either the essentially political character of the situations brought before the Council, or the long period of time required for peace and reconciliation processes. But we do hope to contribute to a process that is more thought-out and more responsible, both in the Council itself and in our dialogue with the Secretariat.

I believe that the decisions that we are prepared to take are both simple and make good sense. We have agreed to carry out an assessment of these efforts at the end of 2010. As members of the Council are aware, my country is committed to maintaining the reform momentum and to tirelessly work to strengthen the valuable partnership that links us to the Secretariat and the main peacekeeping stakeholders.

I now resume my functions as President of the Council.

I give the floor to His Excellency Mr. Peter Wittig, Chairperson of the Peacebuilding Commission and Permanent Representative of Germany.

Mr. Wittig (Germany) (*spoke in French*): I would like to thank you, Mr. President, for inviting me to address the Security Council in my capacity as Chairperson of the Peacebuilding Commission. Allow me to thank you in particular for your initiative to bring us together to discuss peacekeeping and peacebuilding in the Security Council.

(*spoke in English*)

May I recall that a core mandate of the Peacebuilding Commission is to promote coherence among all relevant actors. That is all the more important for peacekeeping and peacebuilding actors on the ground in order to ensure an integrated, sustainable and consistent approach to the post-conflict response.

Ideally, therefore, the linkage between peacekeeping and peacebuilding should not be approached as an issue of reducing the mounting costs of peacekeeping operations. Rather, we should take an approach aimed at protecting the enormous investments in peacekeeping by introducing a peacebuilding perspective early on. Investment in peacekeeping will be optimized by securing sustainable and long-term engagement by the United Nations and other international, regional and subregional actors through an early peacebuilding perspective.

As noted by Special Adviser Brahimi in his landmark report on peace operations,

“Although multi-dimensional United Nations peacekeeping operations may be required to initiate a limited number of critical peacebuilding activities, they are neither designed nor equipped to engage in longer-term institution and capacity-building efforts.”

In other words, while peacekeepers are early peacebuilders, they are not long-term peacebuilders. That is why it is so important that the Security Council draws on the experience of, and works closely with, the Peacebuilding Commission.

Let me briefly highlight the objectives of peacebuilding and the role of peacekeepers therein.

In his report on peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of conflict, the Secretary-General underlined that

“The immediate post-conflict period offers a window of opportunity to provide basic security, deliver peace dividends, shore up and build confidence in the political process, and strengthen core national capacity to lead peacebuilding efforts.” (*S/2009/304, para. 3*)

The Secretary-General’s report specifically identified five peacebuilding priority areas in the immediate aftermath of conflict, namely, support for basic safety and security, support for the political process, support for the provision of basic services, support for restoring core Government functions and, finally, support for economic revitalization. Peacekeeping can assist in laying the foundations for socio-economic recovery and long-term development through work in the first two of those priorities. Indeed, it is through their work in supporting those

priorities that peacekeepers lay the foundation for stability and development.

From the perspective of the Chair of the Peacebuilding Commission, the key challenges in transition lie in searching for the right timing and sequencing among the many other priorities in post-conflict situations. Prioritization needs to take place within the framework of a coherent strategy. Timing and sequencing are also closely linked to setting indicators and benchmarks for transition to longer-term peacebuilding engagement.

While peacekeepers contribute to peacebuilding, their transition and exit strategy should be conceived in terms of peacebuilding's core function of stabilization, including overseeing the implementation of peace agreements. The drawdown and withdrawal of peacekeeping missions should not be conceived as a sign of dissipating international attention and engagement but rather as a transition to longer-term peacebuilding that should indeed upscale the international and United Nations engagement.

Finally, let me point out the opportunities and potential for a role for the Peacebuilding Commission in a transition situation and period. The period before the drawdown and withdrawal of a peacekeeping operation should be the ideal moment for peacebuilding engagement with the Commission and the country. Especially at that time, the Commission can offer an inclusive and flexible platform for engaging all relevant actors and advising the Council on approaches to secure a coherent and integrated approach in this critical transition in United Nations engagement. For the same reason, the Commission's advisory role can be crucial throughout the life of a peacekeeping mission.

Concretely, the Peacebuilding Commission could potentially play an early and critical role in four major areas. First, the Commission could provide early peacebuilding perspectives in the design and review of, or transition from, peacekeeping mandates. Secondly, the Commission should be able to identify and promote country-specific sustainability factors. That is particularly critical in jumpstarting early efforts for institution-building and national capacity development in the areas of security, governance and economic generation.

Thirdly, the Commission should be able to catalyze early partnerships with the international

financial institutions and regional and bilateral political and economic actors. Finally, the Commission may benchmark for and monitor the progression from stabilization to transition and consolidation, which is essential for a well-informed exit strategy for peacekeeping operations.

All this suggests that the Peacebuilding Commission would report periodically to the Security Council on progress in peacebuilding in countries where peacekeeping operations are also deployed.

Let me conclude by saying that the early and consistent engagement of the Peacebuilding Commission in the design, review and drawdown of peacekeeping mandates would increase the chances of sustaining our collective attention and our engagement with countries emerging from conflict.

The President (*spoke in French*): I thank Mr. Witting for his statement.

After the statement of Mr. Serrano, we shall suspend the meeting for lunch — the Council does understand that a French president requires a hearty lunch — and will resume the meeting at 3 p.m.

I now give the floor to His Excellency Mr. Tete Antonio, Permanent Observer of the African Union to the United Nations.

Mr. Antonio (*spoke in French*): Mr. President, I would like first to thank you for pronouncing my name correctly. I wish to express my great satisfaction at participating in this debate and to congratulate the French presidency of the Council for having chosen a topic so important to the African continent, one which constitutes one of the challenges that we must meet but whose recipes for success remain to be clearly determined.

I also wish to take this opportunity to pay tribute to all speakers who preceded me for proposals that will enrich the experience that the African Union is working to develop.

As far as we are concerned, one could not have chosen a better time to debate a topic so vital to thousands of Africans who daily endure the consequences of armed conflict. The African Union has just concluded its summit at Addis Ababa. It has thought a great deal about issues of peace and security in Africa and declared 2010 the year of peace and security in Africa. Indeed, for the African Union this

debate constitutes a substantial contribution to that objective, which is aimed at seeking lasting solutions to the conflicts in the African continent. It is a continent where thousands of men and women are deployed as part of United Nations political and peacekeeping operations and where the Peacebuilding Commission is sparing no effort to ensure that peace becomes a lasting reality in Burundi, Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau and the Central African Republic.

As African heads of State indicated in the Tripoli Declaration, Africa is determined to put a definitive end to the scourge of conflicts and violence, aware of its shortcomings and its errors but motivated by the will to mobilize all means and human resources necessary and to seize every opportunity to promote and advance the agenda for conflict prevention, peacekeeping and peacebuilding, as well as for post-conflict reconstruction.

Therefore we cannot but seize the opportunity afforded us by today's exercise to share the varied experiences that can enrich the action of the African Union, which has itself gone through a number of important stages in its efforts to meet, in a comprehensive and global way, the challenges of the prevention, management and settlement of conflicts in Africa. Efforts include the setting up the Peace and Security Council, the development of the necessary normative and institutional frameworks, including the continental peace and security architecture, and the adoption of numerous instruments on human rights, governance, the rule of law, democracy, elections, disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation, terrorism, and policies of good-neighbourliness.

Those instruments constitute a consolidated whole of norms and principles, respect for which will significantly reduce the risk of conflicts and violence and will contribute to peacebuilding. We believe that a number of elements of that consolidated whole, developed by the African Union, are also necessary for the successful transition for countries emerging from conflict.

As this Council well knows, the African Union is present in Darfur, alongside the United Nations, through the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID). The African Union has also deployed a force in Somalia, which is currently 5,500 men strong, to protect the institutions of that country — the only country in the world that

has had no State, no institutions for close to 20 years and has been abandoned by almost everybody. It is therefore natural that our organization should be interested in today's debate and in exit and transition strategies.

In Darfur, the report drawn up by the panel led by the former South African President, Thabo Mbeki, which was presented to the Security Council (S/2009/599, annex I), contains important elements for an integrated approach for crisis exit and transition management.

A question that is often raised here in this Chamber is that of how to reduce the boundaries between peacekeeping operations and peacebuilding. A number of ideas have been raised here today concerning the forecasting, from the initial phase of peacekeeping operations, actions for peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction. It would be useful to re-enforce the idea of a hybrid formula, by which peacekeeping operations would be bolstered by significant peacebuilding actions aimed at strengthening national capacities, including the creation of conditions conducive to establishing strong State institutions. It has been demonstrated in a number of cases that deterioration of the State usually leads to degradation of other components of the economic and political apparatus, and even of the social fabric of the country.

We also need to reflect on an increased role of civilian personnel during this phase, as underscored by the delegation of Gabon, including recourse to the diaspora of the States concerned, in cooperation with local authorities.

In addition, at a time when there are signs of impatience to see Blue Helmets leave certain countries, including African countries, there is a need for us to address the issues of timelines, without questioning the achievements in the field of peace and stability in those countries.

The implementation of exit and transition strategies must start, as indicated in the concept paper that the French delegation has so kindly shared with us (S/2010/67), by defining a clear and credible mandate in order to preserve the prestige of the mission in the eyes of the public it serves. Our approach to peacekeeping, including through the Peacebuilding Commission, is silent on this matter, and it is high time that these bodies, whether it be the peacekeeping

operations or the Peacebuilding Commission, address it.

We also believe, along with Brazil, that we must strengthen the concept of development and lay the foundation for development during the peacekeeping and peacebuilding phases. Indeed, peacebuilding requires timely assistance to meet immediate needs. However, there are often difficulties in moving from emergency to substantial development assistance. Introducing such innovative elements will contribute to a successful exit and transition strategy, as it will enable peacekeeping operations and the Peacebuilding Commission to leave behind a solid basis for stable peace in countries emerging from crisis.

The African Union has included the concept of development into its approach to post-conflict reconstruction. In that context, in decision 228 (VII) of the Executive Council, the Commission was asked to develop the African Union Policy Framework on Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development, based on the relevant provisions of the Protocol Establishing the Peace and Security Council and on experiences accumulated on the continent. As a result, the African Union Commission has undertaken a number of initiatives that led to the adoption of the decision endorsing the African Union Policy Framework.

The African Union is also working on the development of guidelines on policy revisions at the national and regional level, as well as on the creation of a database for African experts on post-conflict reconstruction and development, which will be made available to member States emerging from conflict. The African Union is also working on mobilizing resources to that end and on capacity-building, including through the use of volunteers.

In conclusion, I would again like to thank the French presidency of the Security Council for this initiative and express the hope that our deliberations today will lead to recommendations that will advance our collective peacebuilding efforts in countries emerging from crisis situations.

The President (*spoke in French*): I now give the floor to Mr. Pedro Serrano, acting head of the European Union delegation to the United Nations.

Mr. Serrano (*spoke in French*): Let me begin by thanking you, Mr. President, for having invited the European Union to this timely and important debate. In

accordance with your instructions, in order to expedite the Council's work I will make an abridged statement. The full text of the European Union statement will be distributed in the Chamber.

(*spoke in English*)

The candidate countries Turkey, Croatia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia; the countries of the Stabilisation and Association Process and potential candidates Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia; as well as Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova, Armenia and Georgia align themselves with this statement.

Peacebuilding provides the vital bridge that helps create the conditions for peacekeeping missions to be drawn down, laying the foundations for longer-term efforts to consolidate stability and achieve sustainable development. At the heart of this process are efforts to strengthen national capacities to manage conflict and early investments in economic recovery, basic services and national institutions. The sooner such efforts start, the quicker they can contribute to building long-term stability and reduce the risk of a relapse into war.

The peacebuilding tasks in peacekeeping missions — such as disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, security sector reform, rule of law, good governance and human rights — have a critical role to play and should feed into the broader peacebuilding efforts. In pursuing these tasks, attention must be placed on strengthening local capacities and civil society, encouraging the participation of women in peace processes and peacebuilding, and promoting dialogue among stakeholders. Special efforts should be undertaken in assisting national authorities in the protection of civilians from acts of violence.

We have listened today to statements from some of the most highly qualified professionals and experts on these issues, starting with the Secretary-General. I would like on my part to share some views based on the experience of the European Union (EU) in the field.

First, the success of peacekeeping efforts requires a comprehensive, holistic and inclusive approach. To this end, early and comprehensive planning to integrate peacekeeping and peacebuilding is essential. The integrated mission planning process and the development of integrated strategic frameworks are, in the EU's view, essential tools for the coordination and

prioritization of the security, political, development and humanitarian activities undertaken by the United Nations.

Secondly, peacebuilding tasks need to be taken into consideration in mandates from the outset. At the same time, The Security Council has to make sure, in cooperation with contributing countries, that missions are mandated and equipped with the adequate capabilities to carry out these tasks. Where relevant, peacekeeping missions should be requested to include information on progress in peacebuilding in their regular assessments of mandated tasks in order to identify and draw attention collectively to critical gaps and to harmonize future steps. In this context, peacebuilding actors, including the Peacebuilding Support Office, should be involved from the earliest stages of a peacekeeping mission.

Thirdly, effective peacebuilding needs strong coordination. The United Nations could play an even more important role in this regard, including through the Peacebuilding Commission, which could help to generate a more coherent and coordinated approach, including beyond the United Nations system, and to maintain a framework of mutual accountability between the host Government and its partners. The European Union hopes that the forthcoming session of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and the Peacebuilding Commission review process will provide opportunities to elaborate and enhance those linkages.

Fourthly, to ensure that the peacebuilding agenda bears fruit on the ground, it is essential that personnel responsible for peacekeeping be aware of the importance of this supportive work. An efficient in-country coordination mechanism must be in place to facilitate close communication between these agents and peacekeeping personnel. Equally, peacekeepers have to play their part in supporting confidence-building in the political process and delivering initial peace dividends.

Fifthly, a critical element required for a sustainable exit from conflict is economic recovery. The European Union has seen this clearly in theatres

ranging from Aceh to Guinea-Bissau. Peacekeepers play a critical role in helping to stabilize the situation. They can also play a small but significant role through the implementation of quick-impact projects, such as undertaking interim repairs of infrastructure. They also play a key role in the disarmament and demobilization of ex-combatants and initial support for their reinsertion into civilian life. In this regard, the EU underlines the importance of improving the pace at which and the way in which we approach the reintegration of ex-combatants, including the rehabilitation of former child soldiers and the specific needs of girls, which is a major issue in many of today's conflicts, in particular in Africa.

Lastly and fundamentally, the European Union believes that local and national ownership of the peacebuilding process is the single most important element in bringing about a successful transition from conflict. Responsibility for building a peaceful and stable society rests first and foremost with communities themselves. From the outset of a peacekeeping mission, the international community should focus on supporting this responsibility. That requires the development of an operational strategy to assess needs and identify local capabilities and partnerships, including with neighbouring countries.

We dissect the crisis management and peacebuilding processes into their security, political and development dimensions in order to structure the work and ensure coordination of the different international actors involved. But it is only when such projects are joined under one goal capable of uniting a society — a project for living together, in the words of the Spanish philosopher Ortega y Gasset — that they acquire their full meaning. The European Union is ready to continue working with the United Nations, other crisis-management actors and the countries affected by conflict in pursuit of this comprehensive approach.

The President (*spoke in French*): There are a number of speakers remaining on my list. I therefore propose, with the consent of the members of the Council, to suspend the meeting until 3 p.m.

The meeting was suspended at 1 p.m.