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2585th

MEETING: 11 JUNE 1985

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NOTE

Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures. Mention of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United Nations document.

Documents of the Security Council (symbol S/ . . .) are normally published in quarterly *Supplements* of the *Official Records of the Security Council*. The date of the document indicates the supplement in which it appears or in which information about it is given.

The resolutions of the Security Council, numbered in accordance with a system adopted in 1964, are published in yearly volumes of *Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council*. The new system, which has been applied retroactively to resolutions adopted before 1 January 1965, became fully operative on that date.

2585th MEETING

Held in New York on Tuesday, 11 June 1985, at 4 p.m.

President: Mr. Errol MAHABIR (Trinidad and Tobago).

Present: The representatives of the following States: Australia, Burkina Faso, China, Denmark, Egypt, France, India, Madagascar, Peru, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America.

Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/2585)

1. Adoption of the agenda
2. The situation in Namibia:
 - (a) Letter dated 23 May 1985 from the Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/17213);
 - (b) Letter dated 23 May 1985 from the Permanent Representative of Mozambique to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/17222);
 - (c) Further report of the Secretary-General concerning the implementation of Security Council resolutions 435 (1978) and 439 (1978) concerning the question of Namibia (S/17242)

The meeting was called to order at 4.40 p.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

The situation in Namibia:

- (a) Letter dated 23 May 1985 from the Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/17213);
- (b) Letter dated 23 May 1985 from the Permanent Representative of Mozambique to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/17222);
- (c) Further report of the Secretary-General concerning the implementation of Security Council resolutions 435 (1978) and 439 (1978) concerning the question of Namibia (S/17242)

1. The PRESIDENT: In accordance with the decision taken at the 2583rd meeting, I invite the representative of Liberia to take a place at the Council table.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Kofa (Liberia) took a place at the Council table.

2. The PRESIDENT: In accordance with the decision taken at the 2583rd meeting, I invite the Acting President of the United Nations Council for Namibia and the other members of the delegation to take a place at the Council table.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Akyol, Acting President of the United Nations Council for Namibia, and the other members of the delegation took a place at the Council table.

3. The PRESIDENT: In accordance with the decision taken at the 2583rd meeting, I invite Mr. Nujoma to take a place at the Council table.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Nujoma took a place at the Council table.

4. The PRESIDENT: In accordance with decisions taken at the previous meetings on this item [2583rd and 2584th meetings], I invite the representatives of Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Cameroon, Canada, Cuba, Democratic Yemen, Ethiopia, the German Democratic Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ghana, Guyana, Indonesia, Jamaica, Kenya, Kuwait, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Poland, South Africa, Sri Lanka, the Sudan, the Syrian Arab Republic, Turkey, Uganda, the United Republic of Tanzania, Yugoslavia and Zambia to take the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Zarif (Afghanistan), Mr. Bessaieh (Algeria), Mr. de Figueiredo (Angola), Mr. Wasiuddin (Bangladesh), Mr. Tshering (Bhutan), Mr. Eteki Mboumoua (Cameroon), Mr. Lewis (Canada), Mr. Malmierca (Cuba), Mr. Al-Ashtal (Democratic Yemen), Mr. Dinka (Ethiopia), Mr. Ott (German Democratic Republic), Mr. Lautenschlager (Federal Republic of Germany), Mr. Asamoah (Ghana), Mr. Karran (Guyana), Mr. Alatas (Indonesia), Mr. Barnett (Jamaica), Mr. Küllu (Kenya), Mr. Abulhassan (Kuwait), Mr. Azzarouk (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), Mr. Zain (Malaysia), Mr. Muñoz Ledo (Mexico), Mr. Alaoui (Morocco), Mr. Icaza Gallard (Nicaragua), Mr. Gambari (Nigeria), Mr. Shah Nawaz (Pakistan), Mr. Kam (Panama), Mr. Nowak (Poland), Mr. von Schirnding (South Africa), Mr. Wijewardane (Sri Lanka), Mr. Birido (Sudan), Mr. Al-Atassi (Syrian Arab Republic), Mr. Türkmen (Turkey), Mr. Otunnu (Uganda), Mr. Mkapa (United Republic of Tanzania), Mr. Golob (Yugoslavia) and Mr. Lusaka (Zambia) took the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber.

5. The PRESIDENT: I should like to inform the Council that I have received letters from the representatives of Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, the Lao People's Democratic Republic and Mongolia in which they request to be invited to participate in the discussion of the item on the agenda. In conformity with the usual practice, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite those representatives to participate in the discussion without the right to vote, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Legwaila (Botswana), Mr. Maciel (Brazil), Mr. Tsvetkov (Bulgaria), Mr. Vongsay (Lao People's Democratic Republic) and Mr. Nyamdoo (Mongolia) took the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber.

6. The PRESIDENT: I should like to inform the Council that I have received a letter dated 11 June [S/17255] from the representative of Sudan, which reads as follows:

"I have the honour, in my capacity as Chairman of the Group of Arab States, to request the Security Council to extend an invitation, under rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure, to Mr. Clovis Maksoud, Permanent Observer of the League of Arab States to the United Nations, to participate in connection with the Security Council's consideration of the item at present on its agenda, entitled 'The situation in Namibia'."

If I hear no objection, I shall take it that the Council agrees to accede to this request.

It was so decided.

7. The PRESIDENT: The first speaker is the representative of the Sudan. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

8. Mr. BIRIDO (Sudan) (*interpretation from Arabic*): Mr. President, I should like to express our thanks to you and to the members of the Council for giving my delegation the opportunity to participate in these historic meetings on the question of Namibia.

9. I should also like to congratulate you, Sir, on your assumption of the presidency of the Council for this month. We are confident that your wisdom and long experience will aid the Council in achieving the positive results to which we all look forward. It also gives me pleasure to congratulate your predecessors, the Minister for Foreign Affairs and representative of Thailand, for the excellent conduct of the work of the Council last month.

10. The Council is meeting today against an extremely complicated background in southern Africa in general and in Namibia in particular. This background is characterized by the continuation of South Africa's occupation of Namibia, the depletion of its wealth and the pursuit of the ugliest form of the policy of *apartheid*. The racist régime has perpetrated heinous crimes and massacres

against the innocence of the sons of southern Africa. It has incarcerated thousands of them. It has also waged vicious aggressive campaigns against the front-line States with the aim of destabilization, the undermining of their security and the imposition of colonialist hegemony on them.

11. The most recent act was South Africa's decision to install a puppet régime in Namibia with a view to continuing its occupation and exploitation of its resources. All of this has been in flagrant violation of the resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly and designed to obstruct international efforts to attain a peaceful settlement of the question of Namibia. These vicious campaigns have been accompanied by an intensification of the struggle and opposition within and without Africa. Demonstrations, marches and strikes have included all segments of the people of South Africa, despite the policy of oppression and intimidation pursued by the racist régime in Pretoria.

12. For these reasons, we pay tribute to the initiative of the Extraordinary Ministerial Meeting of the Coordinating Bureau of Non-Aligned Countries on the question of Namibia, held at New Delhi last April, and its call for a meeting of the Security Council to consider the grave situation there. We hope that the deliberations of the Council will lead to international unanimity which will result in the independence of Namibia as soon as possible.

13. The Sudan, while unreservedly condemning the crimes committed by South Africa, emphasizes that the only basis for a peaceful settlement of the problem of Namibia lies in the implementation of resolution 435 (1978). At the same time, Sudan reaffirms its total rejection of linking the question of Namibia to extraneous matters because such linkage would only hamper the efforts to achieve the peaceful independence of Namibia and would encourage the racist régime of Pretoria to persist in its intransigence, arrogance and defiance of the will of the Council and the international community in general.

14. We asserted this position in the statement issued by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Republic of the Sudan concerning the declaration by the racist régime of South Africa of the establishment of an "interim government" of Namibia. This statement was circulated to the Member States, wherein it was stated:

"The Government and people of the Democratic Republic of the Sudan strongly condemn and reject outright the establishment of such a government in Namibia and call upon all countries to reject that satanic growth and to refrain from recognizing any client régime established as a result of these malicious and persistent attempts on the part of the racist Pretoria régime to achieve its criminal goals in the Territory of Namibia.

"In this connection, the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Sudan would like to stress anew

the legal responsibility of the United Nations with respect to the independence of Namibia and to reaffirm the basic duty of the Security Council to take action to implement its resolutions, particularly resolution 435 (1978). The Government of the Democratic Republic of the Sudan reaffirms that the sole basis for a peaceful solution to the Namibia problem is the unconditional implementation of Security Council resolution 435 (1978). It furthermore asserts that the legitimate administrative authority for the Territory of Namibia is the United Nations Council for Namibia until such time as the Territory obtains its full and unconditional independence.

“The Government of the Democratic Republic of the Sudan, disturbed and concerned by the difficulties encountered in seeking a peaceful solution to the Namibia problem because of the persistence of the racist Pretoria régime in obstinately raising matters which have no relation to the problem and its attempts to impose on the people of Namibia a client régime which is subservient to it, calls upon the contact group of Western States fully to bear its responsibilities, to adopt a decisive policy towards the racist régime and to compel it to abandon its malicious manoeuvres aimed at hindering the Territory of Namibia from achieving its independence.” [See S/17205, annex.]

15. The statement reiterated Sudan’s support for the legitimacy of the armed struggle and all forms of struggle waged by the people of Namibia under the leadership of the South West Africa People’s Organization (SWAPO), the sole, legitimate representative of the people of Namibia.

16. Twenty-five years have elapsed since the birth of SWAPO; 100 years have elapsed since the occupation of Namibia by colonialist Powers. During the continuing battles they have waged, the people of Namibia and SWAPO have lost thousands of martyrs, and the goals of South Africa have received thousands of honourable freedom fighters. The people of Namibia has demonstrated its readiness to make sacrifices in the cause of the independence of its country.

17. On this occasion we commend SWAPO’s struggle and pay a tribute to the wisdom and steadfastness of its leadership and the flexibility it has displayed during various battles. We strongly support the appeal made the other day by the great freedom fighter Sam Nujoma that 1985 be made the year of Namibia’s independence. We believe that that appeal assumes special significance in view of the fact that the United Nations is this year observing the fortieth anniversary of its founding and the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. Hence it is imperative to intensify international efforts and to renew our commitment to the objectives of the Charter and the resolutions of the United Nations.

18. The intransigence of South Africa and its insistence on defying the international will and the resolutions of the United Nations make it imperative also that Member

States intensify their assistance and their political, material and military support for SWAPO so as to enable it to continue its just war with all the means available to it, including armed struggle, against the racist régime of Pretoria until independence is achieved for the people of Namibia. It is imperative as well to support the front-line States, which are facing a war of attrition waged by the Pretoria régime, because those States, on behalf of the international community, are bearing the brunt of the liberation struggle in the southern part of the continent.

19. We stress the necessity of halting the assistance South Africa is receiving in view of the fact that technical, financial and military support received by the Pretoria Government from some Western Powers and Israel encourages it to persist in its occupation of Namibia and the pursuit of its abominable racist policy and to continue its aggression against the front-line States. Hence these countries must abide by United Nations resolutions calling for a boycott of South Africa. This Council must assume its responsibilities in full and impose mandatory sanctions against South Africa in accordance with Chapter VII of the Charter, because the crimes perpetrated by South Africa constitute a blatant threat to international peace and security and a flagrant violation of the Charter and resolutions of the United Nations.

20. On this occasion we commend the efforts of various non-governmental organizations to promote the severing of economic and other links with South Africa as part of a co-ordinated campaign against the policy of *apartheid* and the occupation of Namibia. In this connection we observe that in its final document, the Extraordinary Ministerial Meeting of the Co-ordinating Bureau of Non-Aligned Countries commends the efforts of some Governments to boycott South Africa, as follows:

“The Bureau expresses its appreciation to all those Governments which have taken legislative and other measures in compliance with relevant United Nations resolutions, aimed at bringing about the isolation of the racist régime. The Bureau calls upon the Governments of other Member States of the United Nations to take appropriate legislative, administrative and other measures, unilaterally and collectively, pending the imposition of mandatory sanctions against South Africa, in order to isolate it effectively in the political, economic, military and cultural fields according to the relevant United Nations resolutions.” [S/17184, annex, chap. II, para. 41.]

21. The delegation of Sudan would like to express its support and appreciation to the Secretary-General for his comprehensive report on the implementation of Security Council resolutions 435 (1978) and 439 (1978) concerning the question of Namibia [S/17242], and for his invaluable efforts to implement them. We call upon him to continue these efforts, especially in this critical period for the people of Namibia.

22. Finally we affirm that the question of Namibia is inseparable from the question of Palestine. It is the same battle against Zionist and racist occupation and hegemony

in southern Africa and in Palestine. The increasing co-operation between South Africa and Israel in all fields increases the suffering of those peoples under the yoke of racist régimes and prevents freedom from coming to the peoples of Palestine and Namibia. Hence we advocate support for the struggle of the Palestinian people under the leadership of the Palestine Liberation Organization, the sole and legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. We also strongly condemn the policies pursued and the crimes committed by Israel in Palestine and the occupied Arab territories. We emphasize the necessity of intensifying political, military and material support for SWAPO in its just struggle for freedom and independence.

23. The PRESIDENT: The next speaker is the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Zambia, Mr. Lameck Goma. I welcome him, and invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

24. Mr. GOMA (Zambia): Mr. President, I am grateful to you and your colleagues on the Council for the opportunity given to my delegation to participate in these important deliberations on the situation in Namibia.

25. I congratulate you, Sir, on your assumption of the presidency of the Council for this month. Your country, Trinidad and Tobago, and you personally are well known for your commitment to Namibia's independence and have worked tirelessly to this end, particularly in the context of your membership of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. Your deep knowledge of and interest in the question of Namibia will, I am confident, be of great value to the Council as it once again takes up the vexing question of Namibia's long delayed independence.

26. I should like to take this opportunity to commend the Secretary-General for the active role he continues to play in pursuing the cause of the independence of Namibia. He has consistently underscored the need urgently to implement resolution 435 (1978), and has taken several important initiatives to break the impasse created in this regard by South Africa. I wish in particular to thank him for his latest report on the matter [*ibid.*].

27. These meetings of the Council are taking place almost two years since those held in 1983, meetings which led to the adoption of resolutions 532 (1983) and 539 (1983). The background to the Council meetings then was—as it is now—the strong concern of the international community that, because of the non-implementation of resolution 435 (1978), the Namibian people continued to be denied their inalienable right to freedom and independence and to languish under illegal South African occupation. Like the present meetings, the Council meetings of 1983 were held at the behest of non-aligned countries, among others.

28. Resolution 435 (1978) was adopted by the Council in 1978. We had hoped that the meetings held in 1983, five

years after the adoption of that resolution, would at long last have provided the impetus for its implementation. Now, two years later, it has once again become necessary for the Council to meet. Like last time, the objective of these meetings—certainly the objective of those of us in the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries who requested them—is to seek the implementation of resolution 435 (1978) and thus, through that process, the independence of Namibia.

29. The questions that must necessarily confront the Council at this time are simply the following: How many more times will it be necessary for the Council to meet before Namibia achieves its independence? What really is the problem preventing the implementation of resolution 435 (1978)? Is it really beyond the competence of the Council to take decisive action in favour of the implementation of its own resolution on the independence of Namibia? Are all the members of the Council genuinely interested in the independence of Namibia on the basis of resolution 435 (1978)?

30. In recent times, certain developments in southern Africa have been variously interpreted by different people. These developments, whatever their significance, do not relate to Namibia. They should not be used by anybody to confuse the situation *vis-à-vis* the independence of Namibia.

31. Regarding Namibia itself, the impasse concerning the implementation of resolution 435 (1978) has persisted, and there are no hopeful signs on the horizon for the independence of the Territory in the near future. South Africa has persisted in its intransigence and duplicity. It has continued to insist on linking the independence of Namibia to the extraneous and irrelevant issue of the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. The United States Administration has not renounced that position either. The insistence on linkage by the United States and South Africa can only be interpreted as an undeclared repudiation of resolution 435 (1978) and of the United Nations plan for the independence of Namibia.

32. South Africa and the current United States Administration have sought deliberately to distort the purpose and meaning of the struggle of the Namibian people for freedom and independence. Through their preoccupation with the question of the presence of Cuban troops in Angola, they have sought to inject East-West rivalries into the question of Namibia's independence. South Africa in particular is also guilty of orchestrating a vicious propaganda campaign against SWAPO, which it seeks to depict as a terrorist organization which would bring communism to South Africa's doorstep if it were to come to power in Namibia.

33. Duplicity is, of course, a characteristic of the Pretoria régime which has always been present in its dealings with the United Nations concerning Namibia's independence. The so-called linkage between Namibia's independence and the presence of Cuban troops in Angola was invented with the one and only purpose of blocking the implementation of resolution 435 (1978) and thus delay-

ing the independence of Namibia. The cheap propaganda campaign about the perceived threat of communism in southern Africa is intended for the same purpose. Indeed, South Africa has repeatedly sought to impose a so-called internal settlement in Namibia with no reason other than to frustrate and circumvent United Nations efforts in favour of the genuine independence of Namibia. All this South Africa has done while at the same time professing commitment to an internationally acceptable settlement of the question of Namibia.

34. South Africa is at it again. Last April it announced its plans to establish in Namibia a so-called interim government. That so-called interim government is scheduled to be installed on 17 June 1985. It is to comprise persons who will have neither the authority nor the credibility to run the affairs of Namibia independently of South Africa.

35. It seems that when South Africa talks about its commitment to an internationally acceptable settlement in Namibia it is talking about its own prescribed settlement, which it would like the international community to accept. South Africa is not talking about an internationally acceptable settlement based on the implementation of resolution 435 (1978) in letter and spirit. In short, South Africa is intent on imposing a puppet régime in Namibia and parading that régime for acceptance and recognition by the international community.

36. Zambia's position on the so-called linkage between Namibia's independence and the withdrawal of Cuban troops has been made clear time and again, but we shall not tire of repeating our position as long as South Africa and the United States cling to that artificial problem, which they have invented to obstruct Namibia's independence. I wish therefore to reiterate that Zambia is categorically and unequivocally opposed to the so-called linkage between Namibia's independence and the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. We see no rational justification for South Africa and the United States to continue insisting on that linkage; they should not be impervious to overwhelming—indeed, universal—opposition to the so-called linkage.

37. The question of Namibia's independence and the presence of Cuban troops in Angola are separate. Reason demands that this fact be recognized and that the two be dealt with separately. Namibia must proceed to independence whether or not the Cuban troops leave or remain in Angola. The Namibian people are entitled to their independence and they should not be held hostage to an issue with which they have nothing to do.

38. My Government has been outraged that the question of the presence of Cuban troops in Angola ever arose in the context of Namibia's independence. Cuban presence in Angola is a matter between the Cuban and the Angolan authorities. However, South Africa's actions continue to endanger the security of Angola. As the Council is aware, only last month South African troops on a sabotage mission of the Gulf Oil installations in Cabinda were captured by the Angolan authorities. This incident

belied South Africa's purported withdrawal of its troops from Angola in accordance with the Lusaka Agreement. It showed that South Africa had not given up its acts of destabilization against Angola. Such acts by South Africa leave Angola with no choice but to defend itself by all means and to count on the support of its friends.

39. Regarding South Africa's plan to establish a so-called interim government in Namibia, I wish to make it abundantly clear that my Government strongly condemns this latest invention of South Africa. South Africa is in Namibia illegally, and its creations such as the so-called interim government cannot but be illegal, null and void. If anything, this decision is illustrative of the bad faith of South Africa in relation to its obligations assumed in respect of resolution 435 (1978). Zambia cannot and will not recognize such an administration and calls upon the entire international community to reject it.

40. Seven years is too long a period of time to wait for the implementation of resolution 435 (1978). The adoption of this resolution had raised hope in the international community that we were at long last close to resolving the problem of Namibia; but such hope has been diminishing by each passing year as the lapse of time has clearly shown that South Africa, perhaps from the very beginning of this exercise, meant to take the international community for a ride. All the concessions made by the front-line States and SWAPO in the long and arduous negotiations for the implementation of resolution 435 (1978) have been to no avail. South Africa has continued to make demand after demand, thereby literally seizing the initiative and ensuring that the negotiations for the implementation of resolution 435 (1978) were an endless exercise. Indeed, South Africa is likely to continue playing this game as long as it believes, rightly or wrongly, that some important members of the Council are prepared to entertain and acquiesce in its numerous excuses for delaying the independence of Namibia. Certainly policies such as constructive engagement have not brought about anything constructive in the attitude or position of South Africa. On the contrary, those who advocate and practise this policy have been embraced by South Africa as allies and, fortified by what it perceives in constructive engagement as tacit support for its policies and practices, the Pretoria régime has become more impervious to demands for positive change.

41. The time has come for all members of the Council and the international community as a whole to speak with one voice and act in unison regarding the independence of Namibia. Let us all demonstrate in word and deed that we genuinely want and we are working for Namibia's independence on the basis of resolution 435 (1978). This means that none of us, not one single member of the Council, should any longer entertain the irrational and extraneous demands of South Africa which have hitherto prevented the implementation of the United Nations plan for the independence of Namibia. South Africa should be left in no doubt that it stands alone and isolated in blocking the independence of Namibia. It should feel the full pressure of the international community.

42. To demonstrate its seriousness and unity of purpose, the Council should, at this meeting, establish the date for the emplacement of the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) in Namibia. As the Council acknowledged in its resolution 539 (1983) when considering the report of the Secretary-General [S/15943], all the outstanding issues relevant to resolution 435 (1978) have been resolved. There simply is no valid reason to delay further the implementation process of resolution 435 (1978) and thus the independence of Namibia.

43. If South Africa should persist in its intransigence and fail to respect the deadline established for the emplacement of UNTAG in Namibia, it must be incumbent upon the Council to take measures under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations to ensure its compliance.

44. Let there be no doubt that peace and security in southern Africa will remain threatened for as long as the Pretoria régime is allowed to persist in its illegal occupation of Namibia, to commit acts of destabilization against independent States in the region and to maintain and practise its system of *apartheid* and minority rule in South Africa. These three represent the basic problems of southern Africa and are at the core of the ever-growing conflict in the region. South Africa, which maintains its stranglehold on Namibia, indulges in acts of destabilization against independent African countries and shamelessly practises the obnoxious and evil system of *apartheid* and minority rule, is, therefore, the source of conflict in southern Africa. South Africa as it exists today is unquestionably a threat to international peace and security.

45. The Council has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. It is incumbent upon the Council to take effective measures to eliminate the threat to international peace and security that exists in southern Africa. Namibia's independence would represent a positive and significant step in the direction of creating favourable and realistic conditions for peace and security in the region.

46. We in Zambia are glad that there is an increasing appreciation of the problems of southern Africa among important sections of public opinion in several Western countries which the South African régime claims as its friends and allies. Many people are refusing to allow their countries to continue being portrayed as friends and allies of *apartheid* South Africa. They are speaking out strongly against the evil system of *apartheid* and are calling for meaningful action by their Governments against *apartheid*.

47. I particularly wish to commend those people in the United States who are engaged in a sustained campaign against *apartheid*. The importance of their efforts cannot be over-emphasized. Let them know that they have the full gratitude of those of us in Africa in general and, indeed, of the oppressed people concerned. The news of the votes a few days ago in the United States House of Representatives and Senate Foreign Relations Committee in favour of economic sanctions against South Africa was particularly heartening and encouraging to us. We com-

mend, and register our appreciation to, those who had the courage, wisdom and vision to spearhead the campaign for sanctions against South Africa in the interest of justice, freedom, independence, human dignity, peace and security in southern Africa. Such concrete and realistic action can only bring honour and increased prestige to the United States.

48. Those who oppose the imposition of economic sanctions against South Africa are hypocritical. They argue that economic sanctions will hurt the black people of Namibia, South Africa and the neighbouring countries. Conveniently, they gloss over the fact that the black people are already suffering under *apartheid* and minority rule. Their suffering cannot, and will not, diminish as long as *apartheid* and minority rule persist. In the interest of finding a permanent solution to the problem of *apartheid* and minority rule, economic hardship is a price that the black people would be prepared to pay, as against the alternative of continuing enslavement, oppression and destruction of human lives and property.

49. In any case, the argument that the innocent suffer when economic sanctions are imposed against countries becomes all the more preposterous and indefensible when one considers the fact that economic sanctions have been imposed by the United States against countries like Nicaragua, Cuba, Libya, Poland and the Soviet Union. Similarly, sanctions have been imposed by the United Kingdom against Argentina and the then Southern Rhodesia. South Africa itself has used, or threatened the use of, economic sanctions against some of its neighbours in order to conclude so-called non-aggression pacts with them. In all those cases, considerations that sanctions would hurt the innocent, for whom they were not intended, were brushed aside or did not even enter the minds of the decision makers.

50. Clearly, we are being treated to double standards. In reality, those who oppose sanctions against South Africa do so because of their narrow and ill-conceived economic interests, and ideological and strategic considerations. They are prepared to sacrifice principles on the altar of expediency.

51. It is not enough to profess commitment to the lofty ideals of freedom, justice and human dignity. It is not enough to practise democracy at home and profess commitment to democracy elsewhere, but do nothing to bring it about. Freedom, justice, human dignity and democracy do not exist in Namibia and South Africa. Let all countries which subscribe to those ideals genuinely work for their realization in Namibia and South Africa.

52. Namibia's independence has been delayed for too long. Let these be the meetings of the Council which will, at long last, bring about the immediate independence of Namibia.

53. The PRESIDENT: The next speaker is the Chairman of the Special Committee against *Apartheid*, Major-General

Joseph Garba. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

54. Mr. GARBA (Chairman of the Special Committee against *Apartheid*): Mr. President, I wish to thank you and the other members of the Council for allowing me to participate in this meeting on behalf of the Special Committee against *Apartheid*. May I also on behalf of the Special Committee, of which your country is an active and valued member, Sir, offer you our sincere congratulations on assuming the presidency for this month. It is our fervent hope that under your skilful and wise guidance the Council will be able to agree on taking prompt and effective measures to deal with the challenge to the authority of the Council presented by South Africa's actions in Namibia and its other actions which have breached international peace and security.

55. The position of the Security Council on Namibia is clearly and unequivocally set out in resolution 435 (1978), which it adopted, without a dissenting vote, nearly seven years ago. That resolution called for South Africa's withdrawal from Namibia, which it is illegally occupying, and the transfer of power to the people of Namibia, through free elections to be held under the supervision and control of the United Nations.

56. It is important to recall the reason for the termination of South Africa's Mandate over Namibia. The decision of the General Assembly then was that South Africa had failed to advance to the utmost the material and moral well-being and social progress of the Namibian people. That was what the General Assembly decided 19 years ago [*resolution 2145 (XXI) of 27 October 1966*]. Today we know more about the nature of the *apartheid* State itself in its savage occupation of Namibia. Four years of protracted and exhaustive consultations followed the adoption of resolution 435 (1978), but led to no result. On 31 May 1983 [*resolution 532 (1983)*] the Security Council, faced with South Africa's dilatory tactics, took a unanimous decision, calling on South Africa, *inter alia*, to make a firm commitment as to its readiness to comply with the Council's decision. Some months later [*resolution 539 (1983)*], the Council was obliged to meet again, and this time, with only the United States abstaining, it squarely condemned South Africa for obstructing the implementation of the United Nations plan for the independence of Namibia, and rejected South Africa's attempt to link the matter to irrelevant and extraneous considerations.

57. I should like at this stage to note the efforts made by the Secretary-General during this period, in meetings with all the concerned parties and in personal visits to southern Africa, to bring about the implementation of the Council decisions on Namibia and to resolve the specific disagreements which at that time stood in the way. The Secretary-General has given a comprehensive account of those efforts in his reports to the Council, and on reading them it is not difficult to understand why his efforts came to naught and where the responsibility lies for the failure of his efforts, as of all other attempts to enable Namibia to attain independence peacefully.

58. In his report of 29 August 1983 [*S/15943*], the Secretary-General found it necessary to reaffirm that discussions should not be reopened on matters in regard to which agreement and understandings had already been reached, and confirmed as such to the United Nations. In this context he specifically urged the South African Government to respond positively on the two remaining outstanding issues—the electoral system and UNTAG. In further contacts with the Secretary-General, South Africa took the position that the question of the electoral system was not of great importance, but that “no settlement plan can be implemented unless a firm agreement is reached on Cuban withdrawal from Angola” [*see S/16106*].

59. I do not intend to say anything concerning the presence of the Cuban troops who are in Angola at the request of the Government of that country. This, I believe, is a matter that lies within the jurisdiction of Angola as a sovereign State, and Angola has already stated its position on it. The United Nations position on the subject, as stated in Security Council and General Assembly resolutions, is unequivocal: the question of Cuban troops is irrelevant and extraneous to that of the independence of Namibia and must not be used to obstruct the implementation of the United Nations plan embodied in resolution 435 (1978)—a plan which was and continues to be accepted by all the parties concerned, including—ostensibly—South Africa itself.

60. As the Secretary-General's reports show, long before there were any Cubans in Angola South Africa had raised other obstacles to the implementation of the plan for the independence of Namibia. The Cuban presence in Angola is itself the consequence of South Africa's campaign to destabilize the Angolan Government, damage the country's economy and disrupt its society. Seven years of negotiation on Namibia's independence have been a history of evasions and prevarication, intransigence and bad faith on the part of South Africa, a history which ought to shake the confidence of the most credulous or benevolent of its friends in South Africa's intentions. The developments we are now witnessing are the penultimate phase in a process which South Africa has pursued single-mindedly and unswervingly from the beginning and which is aimed at continuing and consolidating its occupation and exploitation of Namibia behind the façade of an “internal solution”.

61. Recent events have unfolded like a well-rehearsed scenario. First, South Africa announced the withdrawal of its troops from Angola. Mr. Botha declared that the move would enhance the prospect for peace in the region and open the way for the peaceful resolution of the question of independence for Namibia. That declaration was followed three days later by another to the effect that South Africa intended to go ahead and set up an interim government in Namibia; South African troops later marched out ceremoniously. The South African President told Parliament that the move “places the burden of ensuring that cross-border violence does not escalate squarely on the shoulders of the Angolan Government” [*see S/17152, annex, appendix 2*]. But a few weeks later it is Botha's troops who steal back—unaccompanied this

time by television cameras and regimental bands—and are caught trying to blow up vital oil installations in the enclave of Cabinda. Let it be noted that Cabinda is some 2,000 miles from South Africa's frontiers and, indeed, 1,000 miles north of the Namibian borders. Writing about this episode, the *Daily Telegraph* provides the liberal commentary that South Africa is plainly "prepared to go to any lengths, break any promises, threaten any alliances, in order to defend what she regards as her own legitimate interests". That commentary leaves undefined the so-called legitimate interests of South Africa. Those "legitimate interests" of South Africa are self-evident. They underpin the *raison d'être* of the South African State and embody the views, values and conduct of that State. These are the interests of racism, the destabilization of the front-line States and attempts to bantustanize them. Pretoria serves as the faithful lap-dog of the West and, in more ways than one, embodies the original and historical traits of the West, which today strenuously seeks to shed lingering attitudes to slavery, religious prejudice, class snobbery, neo-Nazi attitudes and pure racism. Although *apartheid* South Africa is bad enough in serving its own vile and reprehensible interests, the evidence is also conclusive that it acts as the West's cat's-paw.

62. One might ask what interests South Africa is defending in Namibia. The International Court of Justice has declared that South Africa's presence in that Territory is illegal.¹ The General Assembly terminated South Africa's Mandate over South West Africa 19 years ago. South Africa cannot therefore claim to have any legitimate interests whatsoever in that Territory. The aim of its policy is to prevent by all means the transfer of power to the sole, legitimate and authentic representative of the Namibian people, SWAPO. The interests it protects are the power, privileges and brutality of the white minority, the powerful South African and foreign mining companies, banks and financial institutions which between them own 95 per cent of the entire marketable agricultural product—all the diamonds, copper, uranium and other mineral resources—and control most of the trade and credit of Namibia.

63. The means South Africa employs to protect those interests in Namibia are the same as those it uses to maintain minority rule in South Africa itself: *apartheid* and racial segregation, discrimination against the black majority in education, wages, health, housing and so on, fragmentation and segregation of the population into racial, ethnic and tribal groups, uprooting and resettling black population groups to inhospitable and arid areas, and so forth. All this is accomplished in Namibia by the same method of State terrorism employed against the blacks in South Africa itself—Draconian security laws, repression and brutality, mass arrests and detentions, bannings and expulsions and full-scale military operations with the most modern weapons against the peoples' resistance. South Africa has transformed Namibia into Hobbes's State, that State where "life is nasty, solitary, brutish and short".

64. Mr. Botha's statement to the *apartheid* Parliament on 18 April [*ibid.*] spelt out how South Africa intends now

to pursue its long-standing aim in Namibia, which is to exclude the participation of SWAPO, the sole authentic representative of the Namibian people, in any future government of Namibia. That is undoubtedly the principal objective of South Africa's latest scheme to impose a unilateral settlement in Namibia, and it is not the first such attempt. Mr. Botha himself referred, in passing, to the failure of all previous attempts by South Africa to set up a subservient administration in Namibia—the creation and breakup of the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance, the collapse of the National Assembly and Council of Ministers set up after the rigged elections of 1978 and the still-born Council of State. Now, the Multi-Party Conference proposals put forward at the behest of Mr. Botha are to provide the justification for reinstating, in his words, "legislative and executive authorities for South West Africa . . . which will be empowered to promulgate a bill of rights and establish a constitutional court and a constitutional council". Mr. Botha explained the rationale for this move as follows: "The leaders of the Territory must themselves work out their own constitutional future; the South African Government cannot consult the leaders of the Territory on an *ad hoc* basis; it needs to consult them in some institutionalized form."

65. But who are these leaders, and how are they to be chosen? Not by the means laid down in the United Nations plan, namely, free and fair elections. Mr. Botha holds that "a national election at this time would complicate current efforts to achieve an internationally acceptable independence for Namibia". What he fears is that free and fair elections held in the manner prescribed in the agreed United Nations plan would result in a victory for SWAPO and frustrate and undo all of South Africa's tactics and game plans to maintain its unlawful hold on the Territory. This is also precisely the reason why the régime did not dare to go ahead with elections, even under its own auspices, in 1982 and again in 1983. The Multi-Party Conference proposals that Mr. Botha so enthusiastically espouses and commends represent yet another attempt by the *apartheid* régime to bypass the United Nations plan, to pre-empt the right of the Namibian people to self-determination and independence and to bring about by means of a so-called internal settlement an administration which would be of South Africa's making, one composed of individuals of South Africa's choosing and run for the benefit of *apartheid* South Africa.

66. In his response to a statement made on 3 May by the then President on behalf of the Security Council [*S/17151*], racist Foreign Minister Botha held out a double threat, saying: if in the view of the South African régime there is no prospect of agreement on the pre-condition concerning the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola—a pre-condition which the Council has already held to be irrelevant and extraneous—then the question must be reconsidered "how internationally acceptable independence may best be attained in the light of the prevailing circumstances". Then he added: "South Africa reserves the right to withdraw unilaterally its administration and its presence from the Territory at any time that it may so wish" [*see S/17152, annex*].

67. The implication of those declarations cannot be plainer. The South African régime, which is doing everything to hinder an agreement on the Cuban matter, will now use that very matter to force a reconsideration of the agreed United Nations plan. Meanwhile, it is proceeding to put together, with the help of puppets and front men, some sort of institutions which will enable it to go through the charade of withdrawing its administration and presence from Namibia.

68. Of course no one has been duped by that manoeuvre—not even those Western Powers which have been so ready to believe in the *apartheid* régime's professions of reform and change. They have rejected as null and void any attempt by South Africa to establish an interim government in Namibia. They have all reiterated that resolution 435 (1978) is and remains the only agreed basis for internationally recognized independence for Namibia.

69. I should like to ask a simple question, one which I am sure agitates the minds of representatives from Africa and, indeed, the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries. Where does the West stand in all this? On what side of the borderline does it pitch its camp? During these two days the Council has listened to approximately 27 speakers; yet no major Western country has yet spoken. This is a debate that focuses on fundamental principles central—at least rhetorically so—to Western civilization. These are the principles couched in such highly refined and edifying formulations as majority rule, one man one vote, advancing the cause of freedom, liberty, equality, freedom and fraternity. In a major Council debate such as this, involving those essential principles declared by the West to be its very own, no major Western country has yet spoken. But I am sure they will speak later on: clarifications will be made, reservations stated and objections raised. At the most, there will be rhetorical declarations and platitudes, followed by inaction, lack of political will and ultimately a surrender to business interests and short-sighted strategic complicity with evil.

70. The question now is what the Council and specifically those Western Powers intend to do about the present situation in Namibia. South Africa is proceeding with its plans and has announced its decision to install an interim government in Namibia in the course of this week. In the light of that and bearing in mind the whole history of negotiations with South Africa on the subject, how is it possible to pin any hopes—for example, as the Government of the United Kingdom seems prepared to do—on the South African Government's willingness to continue negotiations on Namibia's independence? To continue a dialogue in these circumstances and on terms set by South Africa will only give South Africa what it seeks, that is, the time to put into effect its designs.

71. After eight years of negotiation by the Western contact group and seven years after the Council adopted the plan that it had negotiated and agreed upon with South Africa, the Council is being confronted with a South African *fait accompli* which violates the letter and the spirit of that agreement, makes a mockery of Western attempts at

direct dialogue and "constructive engagement" and, unless South Africa is stopped now, could mark the end of the road for a peaceful settlement of the Namibian problem. The moral and political responsibility of Western Powers is great in this regard. Their tolerance of South Africa's delays and evasions and their support of its pre-conditions have emboldened the *apartheid* régime to flout Council decisions.

72. No meaningful dialogue—in fact, no dialogue—with Pretoria is possible. Previous efforts have clearly demonstrated that. Yesterday, as on previous occasions, the Council was subjected to the odium, insults and innuendo of racist South Africa. In his statement, the representative of South Africa made a number of spurious points.

73. First, South Africa asserts that it is engaged in a struggle against communism and would therefore use any method to fight it, including the violation of the territorial integrity of Angola. The problem is that, in South Africa's lexicon, independence and self-determination are synonymous with communism. In addition, talk of the communist peril is a catch-all bait for its friends and allies in the West.

74. Secondly, the racist representative spoke of tragic outcomes in countries outside the southern African region. The question which has not been raised is: What outcome in modern international relations is more tragic than the situation in South Africa—a situation which remains even at the best of times, indeed at all times, a serious affront to and a major crime against humanity?

75. Thirdly, in his pathetic attempt at diversion and distortion, the South African representative spoke of democracy, change and reform in his country. Obviously, democracy has a new definition in Pretoria: democracy with 75 per cent of the indigenous majority excluded from power; democracy with denationalization of millions of that indigenous majority; democracy with the Group Areas Act and racism in the constitution and in 300 other pieces of legislation; democracy of a significant genre with the illegal and bloody occupation of Namibia; democracy that dispatches search-and-destroy missions into a sovereign country far away from its borders.

76. South Africa regards as a major reform the abrogation of the Immorality Act. I think that this Council and, indeed, the international community have no interest whatsoever in whom the Boers sleep with at night. Tokenism such as this does not address the main question of *apartheid*.

77. Let me state categorically that, if the West had not demonstrated such a lack of commitment, Namibia would have been free. If quiet diplomacy and constructive engagement had been jettisoned—because they are misguided and based on erroneous assumptions—*apartheid* would have collapsed.

78. While acknowledging the support of the international community in the past few years for the people of

South Africa in their just struggle, permit me to say that the time has come for positive and affirmative action along the following lines: first, all attempts and efforts at negotiating Namibian independence outside the context of the United Nations must be repudiated and frustrated; secondly, a time-frame must be established for the independence of Namibia within the framework of resolution 435 (1978); thirdly, South Africa must be mandatorily and comprehensively sanctioned because of its disregard and defiance of both the Security Council and the General Assembly; and, fourthly, the Council must declare categorically that linkage has no validity.

79. In conclusion, and although he is not here with us today, I should like specially to address the following to the new representative of the United States of America, Mr. Vernon Walters, who brings to his job a long experience in diplomacy and a vast knowledge of world affairs. I take this opportunity to welcome him to the United Nations and to express the hope that we can work together to strengthen the Organization and the principles for which it stands. We hope that the United States, in consonance with the clear manifestations of its public opinion, will enable the Council unanimously to ask South Africa to hold its hand. This is the time to let South Africa know in very clear terms that the Council is determined to proceed with the implementation of its plan for the independence of Namibia and is prepared to take firm and decisive action to that end.

80. The PRESIDENT: The next speaker is the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Cameroon, Mr. William Eteki Mboumoua. I welcome him and I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

81. Mr. MBOUMOUA (Cameroon) (*interpretation from French*): Mr. President, allow me to express my gratitude to all the members of the Council for having given me the opportunity to participate in this important debate. My country is particularly gratified at the importance the Government of Trinidad and Tobago attaches to these meetings in appointing a figure of your level and rank to preside over the deliberations of these meetings. Your country thus fully shares my country's concern at the deterioration of the situation in southern Africa in general and in Namibia in particular. We are convinced that the noble ideals of your country regarding racial harmony and the peaceful coexistence of peoples, in addition to your well-known statesmanlike qualities, will enable us successfully to complete our work.

82. I also pay tribute to an outstanding son and representative of Thailand, Mr. Kasemsri, for having enhanced the efforts of the Council during the month of May through his special display of oriental wisdom and patience.

83. To the Secretary-General I should like to express the appreciation of my delegation for his commitment to the cause of peace, a crucial quality in the search for, and the maintenance of, international peace and security.

84. The high level of participation at these Security Council meetings demonstrates the seriousness of interna-

tional concern at the present situation in Namibia. This is not a spontaneous emotional reaction which has brought so many representatives together in New York. Rather, it is a universal recognition of frustrations endured over decades of efforts aimed at making South Africa share the humanist ethics of those who apply the moral foundations of the Charter of the United Nations, which must indeed "unite our strength to maintain international peace and security" in the region.

85. One after the other the speakers in this chamber recalled facts attesting to the atrocities perpetrated by the South African régime, characterized by the denial of fundamental human rights, arrests unjustified in terms of respect for the legal norms of a civilized society, brutal acts of military occupation, indiscriminate murders of men, women and children who could have dedicated their lives to building an independent Namibia.

86. The democratic nature of this Organization, with its universal mission, enables any nation that wishes to be heard to make statements. Thus, the representatives of the system of *apartheid* requested to speak and have been heard.

87. The line of reasoning of the representatives of the racist régime in the Council once again bore witness to the cynical arrogance with which they try to hide their true ambition: to dominate all of southern Africa, and even those countries beyond the borders of that region. For them the settlement of disputes must be done in accordance with their conditions. Hence, all independent nations should sacrifice their independence and security to South Africa's ambitions to dominate and to what that country considers to be its legitimate interests.

88. In other words, all the States of the region must remain weak and adapt themselves to the definition of democracy according to the racists and become satellites of South Africa.

89. The statement of the South African delegation in the Council vigorously denounced interference in the internal affairs of its country, including in illegally occupied Namibia.

90. However, that same racist régime, while arrogating to itself the right to defame Angola, supports rebellion there and is trying to legitimize its aggression in that independent and sovereign country. The Cuban troops invited by the Government of Angola to strengthen resistance to such racist aggression are today described as intruders in the region. Here we wish vigorously to denounce the link created between the Cuban troops in Angola and the full implementation of resolution 435 (1978).

91. In the context of self-determination, the Namibian question is a subject of universal concern.

92. Given the new developments in the region that threaten international peace and security, the Council, which has the primary role in maintaining international

security, should consider the situation with the urgency and seriousness it merits.

93. It is important to put the current meetings of the Security Council into the broadest possible context. The Council is meeting at a crucial moment in history, when the international community is marking the fortieth anniversary of the United Nations and of the victory over fascism and totalitarianism.

94. The principal body of the Organization for the maintenance of international peace and security is the Security Council, whose mandate is "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war". With regard to the problem of Namibia, the credibility of the Council, and, indeed, that of the United Nations as a whole, is at stake in the international community for several fundamental reasons.

95. First of all, Namibia is, *de jure*, a Trust Territory. Its fate therefore falls within the purview of international responsibility, under the aegis of the United Nations, in accordance with decisions taken by the Organization, and in particular by the Council. Hence, one may conclude that consideration of this question within the framework of the United Nations is in no way interference in the internal affairs of any State whatsoever.

96. Secondly, viewed in their entirety, current events in Namibia pose a grave threat to international peace and security. South Africa's arrogance and intransigence are a serious challenge to the authority, credibility and even the very *raison d'être* of the United Nations. The numerous tragic events experienced before and during the Second World War led to the founding of the United Nations. It is to be hoped, therefore, that international consensus will emerge in order to avoid the re-emergence of the tragedies and nightmares mankind has already experienced twice within the course of a single century. In this nuclear era when the world is living under the constant threat of total destruction, the mission entrusted to the Council is both urgent and especially important.

97. The time for rhetoric and diatribe is past. The more time passes, the more prospects for peace in South Africa are jeopardized. To allow opportunities for a peaceful settlement to the problem of Namibia to be lost is to run the risk of making the United Nations itself a victim of procrastination. If the Organization can no longer exercise its authority over its Territory, which it has the right to administer and to bring to independence; if the Organization, and in particular the Council, can no longer implement its decisions, especially those adopted in an area that falls within its competence; and if the Organization can no longer take measures to eliminate the threat to world peace resulting from the ominous situation in Namibia, then general doubt and concern regarding the functioning of multilateral organizations could spiral into a dangerous crisis of confidence for world public opinion.

98. That would be an unfortunate development, but it would be understandable, given the frustration and disappointment of oppressed and disadvantaged peoples. Those peoples have long considered the United Nations, and particularly the Security Council, their only hope for freedom, security and possibilities of development.

99. Thus the Namibian problem is a shared and universal challenge. It should not be confused with issues that are strategic and limited in nature. This is not an ideological battle between the East and the West; even less is it a North-South confrontation. It is clearly a question that requires this institution fully and effectively to exercise its legal mandate over the Trust Territory. The United Nations and in particular the Security Council must be asked to exercise their primary role as laid down by the Charter, namely, to avert threats to peace and security.

100. Cameroon continues to believe in the original ideal of an effective international system capable of maintaining peace in a world that is increasingly interdependent and complex. Like Namibia, Cameroon was at one time in its history a Trust Territory. The difference lies in the fact that, in the case of Cameroon, trust was not betrayed, as it has been in the case of Namibia. The people of Cameroon remain in solidarity with the fraternal people of Namibia, who share the hope that they too will go from being a Trust Territory to independence. Non-respect for the authority of the United Nations can only provoke indignation.

101. The only legal basis for consideration of Namibia's future is the decisions and resolutions adopted on that subject by the United Nations, in particular Council resolution 435 (1978). That resolution and the Charter of the United Nations have stood the test of time, and their relevant provisions remain valid. Like the provisions of the Charter, the aforementioned resolution only needs concrete, courageous implementation to bring about Namibia's peaceful transition to independence and self-determination, which have been delayed for so long. Cameroon, like other peace-loving countries, is today, as in the past, continuing to work in the search for a peaceful solution and immediate cessation of the occupation and foreign domination of Namibia.

102. The critical period we are now experiencing is a direct consequence of the occupying forces' intransigence, and their refusal to implement the United Nations plan for Namibia; of the resurgence of the use of force within Namibia and against neighbouring independent States; and of the continuing pillage of the natural resources of Namibia, though that was forbidden by Decree No. 1 of the United Nations Council for Namibia.² All these activities are a ticking time bomb that can be defused only through peaceful means, which we hope will happen very soon, for otherwise it will explode violently with all the foreseeable consequences.

103. Yes, time is running out for a peaceful solution. The challenge given the Security Council is very clear: either we adopt effective measures to force South Africa to accept a peaceful settlement of the Namibian problem based on resolution 435 (1978), or we can expect an inevitable and stepped-up armed conflict. In any case, the final victory of the freedom fighters is beyond doubt, so why not avoid futile, unproductive and costly resistance? Pretoria should understand the inevitable consequences of its negative and suicidal attitude.

104. The fortieth anniversary of the United Nations must truly strengthen our determination to make more rational and more exhaustive use of the machinery of the Security Council in accordance with the Charter—above all as regards complex issues involving the maintenance of international peace and security—including the implementation of Chapter VII, on sanctions. The inability of the Council to act resolutely and effectively could allow and indeed passively exacerbate some of the crises confronting the Organization, including the question of Namibia. In the future, such an attitude could be catastrophic, above all in view of the growing threat of a nuclear holocaust.

105. The Government of my country therefore attaches the greatest importance to the Council's role in the settlement of global conflicts such as the Namibian conflict and makes an urgent appeal to the permanent members, the founding fathers of the Organization, to demonstrate the same collective foresight and sense of leadership and thus enable the Organization to act effectively in the interests of peace and security, as they originally conceived it.

106. Aside from the clear interest in freedom, self-determination and independence, the question of Namibia raises other fundamental issues for young developing and non-aligned States in the areas of security and development. Complacency and the failure to avert and punish South African acts of aggression and subversion directed against front-line States have clearly given rise to new perceptions and concerns regarding security, development and priorities in the subregion and throughout Africa and the world.

107. Because of the Council's inability to respond effectively and appropriately to the requests of countries that are victims of South African aggression, other countries of the region have been forced to sacrifice for military and security needs those meagre resources they desperately need for economic development and the well-being of their peoples. This climate of insecurity involves other military expenditures, thus creating a vicious circle of generalized instability. This encourages the arms race to the detriment of development. This situation increases the risk of generalized local conflicts, which threaten peace and international security and the very survival of mankind in this nuclear era.

108. The nuclear aspect is therefore one of the ultimate and perhaps the most terrible means used by South Africa in its desperate effort to maintain its policy of colonization and racial supremacy through aggression and intimidation. This aspect is particularly relevant, inasmuch as South Africa to this day continues to exploit Namibian uranium in pursuing its nuclear programme.

109. It is now more than 20 years since, during its first regular session, held at Cairo from 17 to 21 July 1964, the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity adopted the Declaration on the denuclearization of Africa.³ That Declaration was on several occasions endorsed by the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries and by the United Nations with the

noble objective of preserving Africa from nuclear weapons. That ideal has now been brutally jeopardized by the South African nuclear programme.

110. The Council must meet this challenge, for which the five nuclear Powers, which are also the permanent members of the Council, bear a special responsibility.

111. Cameroon is in favour of a full use of mankind's resources, including nuclear energy, for the peaceful construction of our societies. But it is to be doubted whether we can hope to engage in nuclear co-operation for peaceful means with South Africa, a régime for which the policy of destabilization and aggression constitutes a code of behaviour.

112. South Africa's authority over Namibia was withdrawn by the United Nations [*General Assembly resolution 2145 (XXI) of 27 October 1966*] because South Africa betrayed the trust placed in it. To replace it, the General Assembly created the United Nations Council for Namibia [*resolution 2248 (S-V) of 19 May 1967*] as the legal Administering Authority of the Territory. The Security Council had the privilege yesterday of hearing a statement by the Acting President of the Council for Namibia, Mr. Noel Sinclair [*2583rd meeting*]. He spoke of the adoption by the United Nations Council for Namibia during its Extraordinary Plenary Meeting, held at Vienna from 3 to 7 June, of a Declaration and Programme of Action [*see S/17262, annex*], in which the Council, among other things, once again makes a fervent appeal to the international community for maximum support for the early attainment of independence by Namibia. That document reiterates the responsibility of the Security Council to secure the implementation of its own relevant resolutions.

113. Cameroon totally rejects the puppet "interim government" in occupied Namibia as another illegal and unacceptable attempt by South Africa to sidestep the only internationally acceptable path towards a peaceful settlement of the Namibian question.

114. We trust that the Council will act resolutely to block other attempts by South Africa to escape implementation of the United Nations plan for the peaceful transition of Namibia to freedom and sovereignty.

115. Cameroon pays tribute to the fraternal front-line States and to the leadership of SWAPO, the sole authentic representative of the Namibian people, for their courage, patience and firm devotion to the goals set out in resolution 435 (1978).

116. The world knows the dangers posed by South Africa's *apartheid* policy and by its illegal occupation of Namibia to peace, security and justice. Increasingly, the world opposes the exploitation of cheap labour, organized racism and the illegal occupation of foreign territories. The world is rising up to defend our noble purposes, as set out in the Charter, to secure the advent of a world free from war and poverty, a free and peaceful world.

117. The Namibian question, and, indeed, the international crime of *apartheid*, can no longer be considered to be the problems of any one sector or region. They affect all of mankind. In an increasingly interdependent world, we face shared threats and shared challenges.

118. We welcome the wind of freedom which blows across ideological, racial and geographical barriers as a positive contribution to the international campaign aimed at increasing the awareness of world public opinion and at supporting the principles and purposes of the Charter as regards the crucial question of the liberation of Namibia.

119. The PRESIDENT: The next speaker is the representative of Morocco. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

120. Mr. ALAOUI (Morocco) (*interpretation from French*): I wish first of all, Sir, to express my pleasure at seeing you presiding over the work of the Security Council for the month of June. We hope that, under your guidance, these anxiously awaited meetings of the Council will mark a turning-point in the liberation process of the Namibian people.

121. I wish also to congratulate the Minister for Foreign Affairs and representative of Thailand on having conducted the work of the Council in May with distinction and effectiveness.

122. Finally, I should like to thank all the members of the Council for having granted me this opportunity to reiterate the support of the people of Morocco for the heroic struggle waged by the fraternal people of Namibia to gain the exercise of their inalienable right to self-determination and independence.

123. The current meetings are the first that the Council has held on the question of Namibia since the adoption of resolution 539 (1983). Nearly two years have passed without the efforts of the Secretary-General having led to the implementation of the United Nations settlement plan. For that reason, the Co-ordinating Bureau of Non-Aligned Countries recommended that several Foreign Ministers take part in these meetings. I venture to hope that Council members will appreciate the great importance the Movement attaches to the question of Namibia and will take decisive action to lend impetus to its settlement.

124. These meetings are taking place at a critical moment in the history of the struggle of the Namibian people, at a moment when South Africa is trying yet again to undermine the United Nations settlement plan with another *fait accompli*. Pursuing its policy of defying the international community, the Pretoria régime has decided to establish, on 17 June, an "interim government" at Windhoek. In its logic and aims, this new *fait accompli* is similar to the so-called constitutional reforms, and it is nothing but a way to prevent the exercise by the Namibian people of its right to self-determination and to promote the establishment of a puppet entity. It was right

that it should have given rise to the condemnation and indignation of the international community as a whole.

125. That is why the Co-ordinating Bureau of Non-Aligned Countries, at the inaugural session of the Extraordinary Ministerial Meeting on the question of Namibia, held at New Delhi from 19 to 21 April 1985, adopted a statement which stated in part:

"The Ministers energetically condemn and reject this latest action by South Africa and call upon the international community to condemn it and refrain from according any recognition to this latest ploy of the racist Pretoria régime" [*see S/17114*].

126. In the statement issued by its President on 3 May, the Security Council has already rejected this measure, stating, *inter alia*, that:

"Members of the Council condemn and reject any unilateral action by South Africa leading towards an internal settlement outside resolution 435 (1978) as unacceptable, and declare the establishment of the so-called interim government in Namibia to be null and void" [*see S/17151*].

127. So categorical and unanimous a rejection by the international community of this further manoeuvre by the South African Government should have caused that Government to forswear its plans and face the fact that it must agree to immediate and unconditional implementation of resolution 435 (1978). But that was not to be, for in its 4 May reply [*S/17152, annex*] to the statement issued by the President of the Council, the Pretoria Government showed itself to be consistent in its scorn for United Nations resolutions, thus removing any lingering doubts about its true intentions and about the real meaning of its so-called constitutional reforms.

128. Even yesterday we all noted the cynicism of the representative of the South African Government when he spoke to the Council; we witnessed his arrogance in inviting us to see what was happening elsewhere, as if that might somehow provide justification for South Africa's repeated crimes against the peoples of South Africa and Namibia.

129. He failed to understand that this series of meetings in itself makes it unmistakably clear that the international community wants the question of Namibia settled by peaceful means; he failed to understand that the presence here at the Council table of the President of SWAPO, Mr. Nujoma, is highly symbolic inasmuch as it demonstrates the sense of responsibility and desire for dialogue of the legitimate representative of the Namibian people.

130. The question of Namibia has been on the agenda of the Organization since its first session; the Security Council alone has devoted 109 meetings to it and has adopted no fewer than 22 resolutions, not counting the resolutions of other United Nations bodies and the rulings and opinions of the International Court of Justice.

131. The adoption of resolutions 385 (1976) and 435 (1978), in which the Council laid down the framework for a peaceful and democratic settlement of the question of Namibia, and their unreserved acceptance by the Government of South Africa gave rise to the hope that there would be a speedy settlement of the question of Namibia. Unfortunately, every time there was some indication that progress was being made in establishing settlement machinery, South Africa managed to confuse the issue and set up further obstacles to the independence of Namibia.

132. Notwithstanding the injunctions of the Security Council and the condemnations of the General Assembly, South Africa continues with impunity to oppress the people of Namibia, to impose its *apartheid* régime on them and to imprison and torture its combatants.

133. Similarly, its intensive military buildup in the Territory of Namibia speaks volumes about South Africa's intention to use Namibia more and more as a springboard for its acts of aggression against neighbouring countries, in particular against Angola. By violating the territorial integrity of neighbouring States and intervening in their internal affairs, South Africa is running the risk of setting the whole continent aflame, and of course Africa would be increasingly exposed to foreign interventions as a result. In these circumstances the preventive role of the Council, in eliminating the seeds of instability in that part of Africa, is of paramount importance.

134. South Africa's continuing threats to the peace and security of Africa and the world at large require that the Council take more concrete, more binding, measures, including a demand that the Pretoria régime respect the aspirations of the Namibian people for independence and ensure Namibia's territorial integrity, including Walvis Bay and the Penguin Islands and other offshore islands.

135. The adoption of such measures must go hand in hand with stricter application by all countries of the arms embargo against South Africa decreed by the Council in 1977 [*resolution 418 (1977)*]; at the same time there must be an end to all forms of co-operation which would be likely to strengthen the military and, in particular, the nuclear capacity of South Africa.

136. Finally, it is imperative that there be an end to the systematic and unbridled plundering of the natural resources of Namibia in violation of Decree No. 1 of the United Nations Council for Namibia² and to the detriment of the interests of the Namibian people. The ending of foreign investments in the Territory of Namibia would be an effective means of forcing South Africa to comply with the international consensus. The United Nations Council for Namibia, at its Extraordinary Plenary Meeting, held at Vienna from 3 to 7 June 1985, reached certain conclusions to which my country fully subscribes. The outstanding work done by that Council, as the legal authority charged with safeguarding the interests of the Namibian people until they achieve independence, deserves our fullest appreciation.

137. At this time when the United Nations is prepared to celebrate the twenty-fifth anniversary of the adoption of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, what better way of marking this event could there be than giving decisive momentum to the implementation of resolution 435 (1978), which would have the effect of eliminating the last bastion of colonialism in Africa?

138. The Namibian people and with it the whole of Africa have demonstrated wisdom and moderation and deserve a peaceful settlement of the question under the aegis of the United Nations. It is incumbent upon the Security Council, as the organ primarily responsible for international peace, to take account of the frustrations of the Namibian people and appreciate the bitterness of African nations and the impatience of the international community.

139. The exemplary struggle of the Namibian people, under the leadership of SWAPO, their legitimate representative, can only win our admiration and must be crowned with the accession of the Namibian nation to independence and national sovereignty. The victory of the Namibian people is inevitable, as is the coming of the day when an independent and sovereign Namibia will join the independent nations and, we are convinced, will join in our efforts in support of international peace and co-operation.

140. Since the beginning of its own struggle for liberation, Morocco has by every means available supported the national liberation movements on our continent, particularly in southern Africa. It is determined to persevere along the same course until the achievement of Namibia's independence, the ending of the inhuman system of *apartheid* and the establishment in South Africa of a free and democratic society without any distinctions as to race or ethnic origin.

141. My country will continue to give its fraternal and unconditional support to the Namibian people in their struggle for independence and the safeguarding of their territorial integrity. Morocco is convinced that settlement of the Namibian problem is to be found in the implementation of resolution 435 (1978); we condemn the attitude of the Government of South Africa, which, after accepting the United Nations plan in all its details, is trying to impose pre-conditions on its implementation.

142. On behalf of my country, I wish to state that we support the Secretary-General's efforts to break the deadlock in the Namibian question; we hope that his role will be strengthened and that the means will be made available to him to enable him to carry out his mission in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations.

143. My country endorses the appeal made by the Secretary-General in his report of 6 June 1985, in which he urges

“that the Government of South Africa in particular, and all others in a position to help, make a renewed

and determined effort to expedite implementation of resolution 435 (1978) so that the people of Namibia can exercise their inalienable right to self-determination and independence without further delay" [S/17242, para. 48].

The meeting rose at 6.30 p.m.

NOTES

¹ *Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1971*, p. 16.

² Decree No. 1 for the Protection of the Natural Resources of Namibia, enacted by the United Nations Council for Namibia on 27 September 1974 (*Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 24 (A/35/24)*, vol. I, annex II).

³ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twentieth Session, Annexes*, agenda item 105, document A/5975.

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