

UNITED NATIONS



# SECURITY COUNCIL

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# 2486<sup>th</sup>

MEETING: 25 OCTOBER 1983

NEW YORK

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#### NOTE

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Documents of the Security Council (symbol S/ . . .) are normally published in quarterly *Supplements* of the *Official Records of the Security Council*. The date of the document indicates the supplement in which it appears or in which information about it is given.

The resolutions of the Security Council, numbered in accordance with a system adopted in 1964, are published in yearly volumes of *Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council*. The new system, which has been applied retroactively to resolutions adopted before 1 January 1965, became fully operative on that date.

## 2486th MEETING

Held in New York on Tuesday, 25 October 1983, at 3.15 p.m.

*President:* Mr. Abdullah SALAH (Jordan).

*Present:* The representatives of the following States: China, France, Guyana, Jordan, Malta, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Poland, Togo, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Zaire, Zimbabwe.

### Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/2486)

1. Adoption of the agenda
2. The situation in Namibia:
  - (a) Letter dated 17 October 1983 from the Permanent Representative of Senegal to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/16048);
  - (b) Letter dated 18 October 1983 from the Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/16051);
  - (c) Further report of the Secretary-General concerning the implementation of Security Council resolutions 435 (1978) and 439 (1978) concerning the question of Namibia (S/15943)

*The meeting was called to order at 4.50 p.m.*

### Adoption of the agenda

*The agenda was adopted.*

#### The situation in Namibia:

- (a) Letter dated 17 October 1983 from the Permanent Representative of Senegal to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/16048);
- (b) Letter dated 18 October 1983 from the Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/16051);
- (c) Further report of the Secretary-General concerning the implementation of Security Council resolutions 435 (1978) and 439 (1978) concerning the question of Namibia (S/15943)

1. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Arabic*): In accordance with the decision taken at the 2481st meeting, I invite the representative of Senegal to take a place at the Council table.

*At the invitation of the President, Mr. Kamara (Senegal) took a place at the Council table.*

2. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Arabic*): In accordance with the decision taken at the 2481st meeting, I invite the President of the United Nations Council for Namibia and the other members of the delegation of the Council to take places at the Security Council table.

*At the invitation of the President, Mr. Lusaka (President of the United Nations Council for Namibia) and the other members of the delegation took places at the Council table.*

3. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Arabic*): In accordance with the decision taken at the 2481st meeting, I invite Mr. Mueshihange to take a place at the Council table.

*At the invitation of the President, Mr. Mueshihange took a place at the Council table.*

4. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Arabic*): In accordance with decisions taken at the 2481st and 2485th meetings, I invite the representatives of Algeria, Angola, Botswana, Canada, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, the German Democratic Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, India, Kenya, Kuwait, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Mexico, Mozambique, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Tunisia, the United Republic of Tanzania, Venezuela, Yugoslavia and Zambia to take the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber.

*At the invitation of the President, Mr. Sahnoun (Algeria), Mr. de Figueiredo (Angola), Mr. Legwaila (Botswana), Mr. Pelletier (Canada), Mr. Roa Kouri (Cuba), Mr. Kulawiec (Czechoslovakia), Mr. Wolde (Ethiopia), Mr. Ott (German Democratic Republic), Mr. van Well (Federal Republic of Germany), Mr. Krishnan (India), Mr. Wabuge (Kenya), Mr. Abulhassan (Kuwait), Mr. Treiki (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), Mr. Muñoz Ledo (Mexico), Mr. Dos Santos (Mozambique), Mr. Fafowora (Nigeria), Mr. Koroma (Sierra Leone), Mr. von Schirnding (South Africa), Mr. Fonseka (Sri Lanka), Mr. Slim (Tunisia), Mr. Rupia (United Republic of Tanzania), Mr. Martini Urdaneta (Venezuela), Mr. Golob (Yugoslavia) and Mr. Kunda (Zambia) took the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber.*

5. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Arabic*): I should like to inform the members of the Council that I have received letters from the representatives of Argentina, Bulgaria and the Syrian Arab Republic, in which they request to be invited to participate in the discussion of the item on the Council's agenda. In conformity with the usual practice, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to

invite those representatives to participate in the discussion without the right to vote, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure.

*At the invitation of the President, Mr. Muñiz (Argentina), Mr. Tsvetkov (Bulgaria) and Mr. El-Fattal (Syrian Arab Republic) took the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber.*

6. Mr. MASHINGAIDZE (Zimbabwe): Sir, I have already congratulated you on your assumption of the presidency of the Council for this month. For now, however, allow me to say how pleased and satisfied my delegation is to see you, a very worthy and distinguished representative of your great country, guiding the deliberations of the Council, especially at this time when the Council is considering the situation in Namibia. Your long diplomatic experience and skill, both of which you have very amply demonstrated in the manner in which you conducted preliminary consultations leading to the holding of the current meetings of the Council, inspire us with confidence about the outcome of these deliberations.

7. Through you, Mr. President, I should also like to pay a special and very warm tribute to our colleague, the representative of Guyana, Mr. Noel Sinclair, for the most exemplary manner in which he discharged his duties as President of the Council during the month of September.

8. On the afternoon of 20 October, at the 2481st meeting, the Council was particularly honoured to listen to a truly great statement by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia, Mr. Wolde. The Council is indeed in his debt for that major contribution and, while I pay a tribute to him, I also wish to call upon all my colleagues to ponder very seriously what the Minister said. I should also like to remind my colleagues that as the Ethiopian Minister spoke in his capacity as representative of the Chairman of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), his statement was therefore the embodiment of the collective sentiment of the entirety of free Africa, as expressed at the nineteenth session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU in June at Addis Ababa. The same applies to the statement made to the Council on the same day by the representative of the Chairman of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, Mr. Krishnan of India. Mr. Krishnan spoke with the unanimous voice of the entire membership of that international movement. The Political Declaration adopted at the Seventh Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at New Delhi in March this year is an eloquent testimony to that consensus. [See S/15675 and Corr.1 and 2, annex, sect. I.]

9. Indeed, the General Assembly and several of its bodies have all adopted resolutions, declarations and statements in support of Namibia's independence and sovereignty. The Council, too, has been expressing that same consensus, especially since 1976, through its resolutions, several of which have been adopted unanimously.

10. International consensus and unanimity have been expressed not only in support of Namibia's independence, but also with regard to the path leading to that noble goal, as outlined in resolution 435 (1978). And resolution 435 (1978) has long been accepted by the entire international community, including the Pretoria régime itself, as the basis for, and the only fair and realistic means of, achieving a peaceful settlement of the Namibian question.

11. And yet, despite all that international consensus behind them, the people of Namibia are still living under a colonial régime, which ruthlessly oppresses and exploits them. Resolution 435 (1978) and the plan it embodies not only remain unimplemented, but are also being seriously undermined by the *apartheid* régime's intransigence and prevarication. In defying international consensus on the Namibian question, the illegal Pretoria régime is very much encouraged by the attitudes of some members of the Western contact group who, to say the least, have so far displayed an amazing lack of political will and moral courage on this issue. Indeed, the attitudes and utterances of some members of the Western contact group, at some stage, were even calculated to throw into doubt the very role and position of the United Nations as the body legally responsible for Namibia, and the Council as the body primarily responsible for ensuring the implementation of the United Nations plan. Instead of pressuring, or even encouraging, South Africa to co-operate with the United Nations efforts to implement resolution 435 (1978), those members were trying, wittingly or otherwise, to usurp the role of the United Nations by seeking solutions to the Namibian question that were outside the United Nations plan.

12. It was those insidious machinations, contrived to undermine United Nations responsibility over Namibia, which prompted the convening of the Council in May this year [2439th to 2444th and 2446th to 2451st meetings]. Fortunately, as members will recall, with a remarkably unanimous voice and to its credit, the Council, at its 2449th meeting, adopted resolution 532 (1983) which, *inter alia*, reaffirmed the legal responsibility of the United Nations over Namibia and the primary responsibility of the Council for ensuring the implementation of the Namibian independence plan, as enshrined in resolution 435 (1978). Resolution 532 (1983) also condemned the Pretoria régime's continued illegal occupation of Namibia in flagrant defiance of international demands for the liberation of that country, and called upon it to co-operate forthwith and fully with the Secretary-General in order to expedite the implementation of the United Nations plan. The resolution also mandated the Secretary-General to consult with the parties to the cease-fire proposed under the United Nations plan, and to report the results of his consultations not later than 31 August 1983.

13. The current series of meetings of the Council has been convened because the Secretary-General has discharged his mandate and has, to that effect, submitted the report that is before the Council [S/15943]. My delegation wishes to put on record its deep appreciation for the diligent manner in which the Secretary-General has fulfilled his mandate under resolution 532 (1983).

14. The Secretary-General's consultations confirmed the following positions, which had already been partly known: first, that the questions relevant to the United Nations plan for the decolonization of Namibia had long since been clarified, to the satisfaction of all concerned, including the Pretoria régime; secondly, that the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) is still as ready as it has been since 1981 to sign a cease-fire agreement with South Africa and to co-operate in any way with the Secretary-General in his efforts to launch the United Nations plan, as contained in resolution 435 (1978), without any amendments or prevarication; thirdly, that all issues regarding the composition and emplacement of the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) have been resolved; and fourthly and finally, that the South African régime has yet to communicate to the Secretary-General its choice of the electoral system to be used in electing a Constituent Assembly for Namibia, as provided for under the United Nations plan.

15. Yet, despite all these efforts by the Secretary-General and even in the wake of his visit to South Africa, in itself an act of great courage, no progress has been achieved towards implementing resolution 435 (1978). The reason for this lack of progress is, as the Secretary-General said in his report, that "the position of South Africa regarding the issue of the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola as a pre-condition for the implementation of resolution 435 (1978) still makes it impossible to launch the United Nations plan." [*Ibid.*, para. 25.]

16. This latest stratagem of the *apartheid* régime, whether expressed in the euphemism of "linkage" or in that of "parallelism", is too transparent to deceive anyone but the most gullible. It is, in our opinion, completely incompatible with the letter and spirit of resolution 435 (1978) and the United Nations plan. Linkage, or whatever else they call it, has also been described elsewhere and by various speakers here as utterly ridiculous, illogical, irrelevant, illegal, immoral and unfair. It is not surprising, therefore, that it has been roundly denounced and totally rejected, first by the Heads of State or Government of front-line States early in 1982 and at their subsequent meetings and then by the General Assembly at its thirty-seventh session, by the Seventh Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at New Delhi in March 1983, by the International Conference in Support of the Struggle of the Namibian People for Independence held in Paris last April and, in June, by the nineteenth session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of OAU, held at Addis Ababa.

17. If the Council's series of meetings in May was convened to reassert, once and for all, United Nations responsibility over Namibia—and of course resolution 532 (1983) did just that—the current series of meetings has been convened to protect resolution 435 (1978) and the United Nations plan from the newly-contrived stratagem of linkage. The question before us, therefore, is whether the Council will rise to this occasion and support the draft resolution, the text of which has been circulating among the members. The thrust of the proposed draft resolution is its condemnation and utter rejection of Pretoria's insistence

on linking the independence of Namibia to irrelevant and extraneous issues as incompatible with resolution 435 (1978), other decisions of the Council and the General Assembly resolutions on Namibia. Or will some members of the Council raise their hands to be counted together with racist South Africa in supporting linkage, thus confirming the claim made by the South African representative at the 2481st meeting that his Government's position is "acknowledged and has support within the international community"?

18. Secondly, this series of meetings has been convened in order to ensure that, at its conclusion, nothing should continue to obstruct or delay the launching of the United Nations plan. Should the Pretoria occupation régime, however, continue its prevarication and non-co-operation, we strongly recommend that the Council meet without delay to consider appropriate measures under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations. Surely, the Council cannot accept, or even tolerate, the cheek and arrogance of the illegal régime, which seeks to shift the responsibility for the delaying of Namibia's independence to Angola, a country which, as we all know, has never known secure borders and peace during the eight years of its independence because of that régime's continuous acts of aggression. Who here does not know that the sovereign Government of Angola was compelled by those very unprovoked acts of aggression to ask the Government of Cuba to assist it in defending its borders in 1975—three years before resolution 435 (1978) was adopted? Who here does not know that, without the assistance of friendly countries such as Cuba, Angola's territorial integrity would be in serious danger from Pretoria's terrorism and thuggery?

19. South Africa must be told in no uncertain terms that the issue of the Cuban troops in Angola, which has been dragged into the question of Namibia's decolonization, cannot be considered by the Council, or for that matter by any organ of the United Nations, as it is interference in a matter concerning two sovereign Members of the United Nations and therefore a serious violation of the bedrock principles of the Charter. Those who incline towards the South African view often cite the need to address the concerns of all the peoples of the region as a justification for their position. One of these concerns, and by far the most important one, we are told, is security. In practice, however, the major concern is South Africa's security—and not anyone else's security. We are left wondering aloud as to who is threatening South Africa's security in the region. For is it not South Africa itself which is threatening the security of its neighbours—by its own policy of internal oppression of the masses and terrorism, sabotage and naked military aggression against its neighbours in the region? South African forces have been occupying a large part of Angolan territory for over two years now, and yet those who are concerned about our countries' security do not seem to be doing anything to restrain the régime from pursuing its policies.

20. Finally, we wish to emphasize that resolution 435 (1978) was never conceived or designed as an answer or

solution to all the problems of the southern African region. Nor was it ever the thought to address the geopolitical concerns of any Power or group of Powers. It was designed only to bring about a peaceful solution to the Namibian question. And let us keep it that way, in the interest of progress towards the achievement of that goal.

21. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Arabic*): The next speaker is the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

22. Mr. van WELL (Federal Republic of Germany): Mr. President, let me first of all express my gratitude to you and to the other members of the Council for allowing my delegation to participate in this debate. This gives me the opportunity to underline our confidence in your wisdom, experience and skill and our deep satisfaction at the excellent relations between our two countries.

23. We express our appreciation for the dedication with which the President of the Council for last month, the representative of Guyana, discharged his high responsibilities.

24. The Federal Republic of Germany participated, as a member of the Security Council at the time, in the elaboration of resolution 435 (1978) and later in the efforts to start its implementation. We have tried our best to remove obstacles to implementation and to foster the confidence between the parties immediately concerned that is necessary for implementation.

25. When the Council held its last debate on this issue, in May of this year [2439th to 2444th and 2446th to 2451st meetings], there was a general awareness that some major problems remained in the way of implementation of resolution 435 (1978). On 31 May 1983, the Council adopted its resolution 532 (1983), by which it decided, *inter alia*, to mandate the Secretary-General to undertake consultations with the parties to the proposed cease-fire with a view to securing the speedy implementation of resolution 435 (1978).

26. In carrying out his mandate, the Secretary-General visited southern Africa in August. The Federal Republic of Germany welcomed his trip as a serious effort to generate the confidence necessary for the early conclusion of negotiations leading to the independence of Namibia.

27. Upon his return, the Secretary-General submitted his report to the Council [S/15943]. My Government considers this comprehensive report an important contribution towards a speedy solution of the Namibia problem. The objectivity of the Secretary-General's report has rightly been stressed by the speakers in this debate.

28. As a result of the intensive consultations undertaken by the Secretary-General with the parties, as envisaged in resolution 532 (1983), all outstanding issues under the United Nations plan were solved. Accordingly, in the conclusion of his report the Secretary-General stated that: "In

fact, we have never before been so close to finality on the modalities of implementing resolution 435 (1978)." [*Ibid.*, para. 24.]

29. The Federal Republic of Germany warmly commends the Secretary-General, his Special Representative and the Secretariat as a whole for their untiring efforts to maintain the momentum of the peace efforts. Not only did the Secretary-General's visit to the region bring about the necessary formal conditions under the United Nations plan for the early commencement of the independence process; he also helped personally in fostering the essential atmosphere of trust and confidence among the parties concerned.

30. In spite of those efforts and achievements, the Secretary-General has had to state in his report that "the issue of the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola as a pre-condition for the implementation of resolution 435 (1978) still makes it impossible to launch the United Nations plan." [*Ibid.*, para. 25.]

31. We too view this situation with grave concern. We believe that the right of the Namibian people to self-determination and independence must be recognized and should be implemented irrespective of any other problem. During the last Council debate, my delegation emphasized that this issue does not fall within the scope of the mission the contact group undertook in 1977. However, we are still confronted with the fact that the problem exists and will have to be taken into account by all who realistically aim at the implementation of resolution 435 (1978), whether we like it or not.

32. As the Secretary-General has pointed out in his report, this difficulty can only be dealt with in its own context by those directly concerned acting within their sovereign rights and, above all, by a determined effort by all concerned to reduce the tensions and contentious issues and to put an end to conflict in the area as a whole. Any solution of this issue will have to take into account the legitimate security interests of all the parties concerned.

33. Too much time has already elapsed. While we understand and share the frustration our African friends feel in view of the situation, we appeal to them not to forget and not to abandon what we have achieved together so far. I wish on this occasion to stress that it was only through close co-operation among all parties concerned, especially the front-line States, Nigeria, SWAPO and the contact group, which took place in a spirit of confidence and perseverance, that it proved possible to settle all questions under the United Nations plan. It is that spirit which must now generate the momentum necessary to overcome the final stumbling-block to implementation of resolution 435 (1978).

34. In the light of the report of the Secretary-General to the Council, we urge South Africa to make an early determination of the electoral system and then send a corresponding communication to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in accordance with the United Nations plan. It is our firm view that this issue must not

cause any delay in the implementation of resolution 435 (1978). SWAPO has indicated its readiness to accept either of the two electoral systems under discussion.

35. If all parties to the negotiations continue their endeavours in the spirit of realism and determination that has prevailed so far, we will reach our common goal, which is the independence of Namibia.

36. Mr. AMEGA (Togo) (*interpretation from French*): I should like at the outset to address to you, Mr. President, my delegation's warmest congratulations on the outstanding manner in which you have been presiding over the work of the Council since you assumed the presidency. Your ability and your qualities as a wise and informed diplomat as well as your broad-ranging experience in international relations are indeed certain guarantees of the successful outcome of the Council's current debate on the question of Namibia.

37. I should also like to address to your predecessor, Mr. Noel Sinclair of Guyana, the congratulations and thanks of my delegation for the excellent work he did last month as President of the Council. Once again he placed at the service of the Council his well-known qualities.

38. I should also like to take this opportunity to thank most warmly the Secretary-General for his tireless efforts to promote Namibia's accession to independence within the framework of Council resolution 435 (1978). My delegation is particularly grateful to the Secretary-General for the very full report he has submitted to us pursuant to Council resolution 532 (1983).

39. This is the second time this year that the Council has been seized of the question of Namibia at the joint request of the countries of the Non-Aligned Movement and the African Group. This new request for our evaluation and action reflects very clearly the great concern of the non-aligned countries and the bitter frustration of the Africans, particularly of the valiant people of Namibia who are faced with South Africa's arrogance, coupled with the delaying tactics and, indeed, the culpable impotence of certain countries in the Western contact group.

40. It was in order to help us get out of this impasse artificially created by South Africa and its friends that, on 31 May of this year, the Council unanimously adopted resolution 532 (1983). That resolution reaffirmed all the provisions of earlier relevant resolutions on the matter, condemned South Africa's continued illegal occupation of Namibia and called upon South Africa to make a firm commitment as to its readiness to comply with Security Council resolution 435 (1978) and to co-operate forthwith and fully with the Secretary-General in order to expedite the implementation of resolution 435 (1978) for the early independence of Namibia.

41. To an experienced observer, that new resolution of the Council was doomed to failure from the moment of its adoption because South Africa, through its representative, responded to the reproaches and appeals addressed to it during the debate with sarcasm, insult and threats.

42. Last May, my delegation, drawing upon the lessons of the past, predicted in the Council that our decision would indeed be futile. We pointed out that resolution 435 (1978) had not even begun to be implemented for four reasons. First, the so-called acceptance of that resolution by South Africa was in reality merely a ruse to gain time so that it could continue its racist domination of Namibia. Secondly, there was South Africa's intransigence, demonstrated by its shameless assassination of brave freedom fighters and its cowardly acts of aggression against neighbouring States. The third reason was the bad faith of certain members of the contact group who, through their attitude, were encouraging the racist régime to persist in its illegal occupation of Namibia. Finally, the fourth reason was the introduction of extraneous factors relating to the presence of Cuban troops in Angola.

43. Thus, for those reasons—or rather, on those very specious pretexts—we arrived at the present impasse, and once again the Council has shown itself unable to shoulder its primary responsibilities in a domain where, because of its legitimate rights and particularly because of its authority, it could have proved itself master of the situation. Indeed, resolution 435 (1978), which embodies the settlement plan for Namibia, does not contain—and for that matter, could not have contained—any reference to the presence of foreign troops in Angola, for that presence stems from a sovereign request by an independent and sovereign Government. The members of the Council are thus fully justified in describing that factor as extraneous, which they did implicitly on 31 May, when, in adopting resolution 532 (1983), they condemned South Africa's continued illegal occupation of Namibia and called upon it to make a firm commitment as to its readiness to comply with Council resolution 435 (1978), it being understood that for that resolution's implementation all that remained to be settled was the choice of electoral system and a few problems relating to the composition of UNTAG.

44. Nevertheless, after having tricked the Secretary-General into going to South Africa, the racist Government of that country revealed its true colours and once again voiced its earlier demands for a preliminary withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. Indeed, such a Government cannot enjoy our trust. Now that its back is to the wall, that Government will resort to any means—trickery as well as perfidy—to gain time and to postpone the legitimate hopes of the people of Namibia to realize their long-awaited patriotic dream. In so doing, South Africa does not seem to realize that time is working against it and in favour of those gallant freedom fighters who are fighting tooth and nail, breasts bared to the elements, heads held high and filled with an eradicable national dream, like the soldiers of year II of the French Revolution described by the poet Victor Hugo.

45. Here my delegation wishes to condemn the delaying tactics and pretexts invented by the racist South African Government to evade the obligation incumbent upon it under the Charter to implement resolution 435 (1978), and to strongly reaffirm our opposition to the prior condition introduced by that Government with regard to Namibia's

accession to independence within the context of that resolution. South Africa is obviously being encouraged by some of its friends, who lend a willing ear to its empty rantings. Those friends are, however, seriously mistaken in mortgaging the future for immediate interests, forgetting that those interests would, in fact, be better protected in an independent and sovereign Namibia, master of its own vast wealth. Thus my delegation strongly rejects this strange linkage, because it is both fallacious and an attempt to intimidate. Angola has every right to conclude international agreements within the context of its own security and it is, in fact, precisely because that security is being threatened that the Cuban troops are still in Angola. Their withdrawal, which some desire, would indeed be greatly facilitated by South Africa's military withdrawal from Namibia and southern Angola. This position was clearly stated by Mr. Paulo Jorge, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Angola, when, on 24 May last, he spoke in this very chamber. He quoted a joint Angolan-Cuban statement, saying:

"When the Angolan and Cuban Governments so agree, the withdrawal of the Cuban forces stationed in Angolan territory will be carried out by sovereign decision of the Government of the People's Republic of Angola, once there is no further possibility of aggression or armed invasion" [2441st meeting, para. 21].

46. Five years have passed since the adoption of resolution 435 (1978), during which anguished expectation has led to frustration and despair, which in turn have led to hatred and violence, followed by repression and stubbornness. Those are the only real results of the failure of the Geneva pre-implementation meeting of January 1981 and of South Africa's destruction of the consensus that had been patiently achieved on settlement proposals in conformity with resolution 435 (1978) when that country dramatically introduced into the negotiations the strange question of parallelism, which had never been raised or envisaged during earlier talks.

47. We would have been on the verge of an agreement had South Africa not decided to scuttle the United Nations settlement plan. The bad faith of that State and its violation of its obligations under the Charter obliged the Council, at its meetings last May, to make the demands contained in resolution 532 (1983) and to give the Secretary-General a new mandate "with a view to securing the speedy implementation of Security Council resolution 435 (1978)".

48. As we see from the report of the Secretary-General, despite the efforts made with regard to the parties, and especially to South Africa, the latter country remains stubborn and has given not even the slightest hint of any intention to implement the United Nations settlement plan.

49. Under these circumstances, all that is left for the Council—whose decision has yet again been trampled under foot by South Africa—is to rebuke, even condemn, that country for its repeated refusal to implement resolution 435 (1978), whose clear terms include no reference whatsoever to "linkage", and for its persistent violation of

obligations deriving from Article 2, paragraph 2, of the Charter. The Council must also unambiguously declare as unfounded and reject this parallelism drawn between the withdrawal of Cuban troops and Namibia's accession to independence.

50. With reference to Article 2, paragraph 2, of the Charter, I recall that, in his report of last year, the Secretary-General rightly deplored the fact that: "There is a tendency in the United Nations for Governments to act as though the passage of a resolution absolved them from further responsibility for the subject in question."<sup>1</sup>

51. South Africa's behaviour on the question of Namibia is clear evidence of this laxity. Therefore, having long since declared South Africa's occupation of Namibia illegal, the Council, in order to protect its dignity and authority, can no longer hesitate to invoke Chapter VII of the Charter in the event that South Africa refuses to make known its choice of electoral system promptly, thus preventing the Council once again from adopting the resolution authorizing the implementation of the United Nations plan for the independence of Namibia.

52. In conclusion, I wish first of all to reaffirm my country's position as expressed during the general debate at the thirty-eighth session of the General Assembly by Mr. Akakpo-Ahiany, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation of Togo, who said that, since the adoption of resolution 435 (1978),

"South Africa has continued to defy the Organization. Worse still, [powerful] Member States of the Organization which unconditionally voted for Security Council resolution 435 (1978) too often today show an accommodating attitude towards South Africa and its claim to link Namibian independence to the breaking of international agreements made by neighbouring sovereign States. Togo believes that Namibia's independence is a problem of decolonization, which falls within the framework and the objectives of the United Nations, and that this problem must be separated from South Africa's interference in the internal affairs of Angola and the other front-line States."<sup>2</sup>

53. Secondly, I wish to make a personal comment on the denial to the Namibian people of their inalienable right to live in freedom and independence in their own land, and on the horrible circle of violence brought about by that situation. With the adoption of resolution 435 (1978), hope was born in the hearts of the suffering people of Namibia, but as years go by that hope is fading and yielding to a deep feeling of frustration; on the brows of these valiant freedom fighters, that frustration has inscribed the words, "Abandon all hope", an inscription similar to that on the lintel of the gateway of Dante's *Inferno*.

54. But I still believe that, whatever the price, the Namibian people, led by their legitimate representative, SWAPO, will continue to hymn the glorious epics of the liberation struggle of their heroic sons and daughters. The tragic example of their many martyrs will live forever.

They stood up to *apartheid*, making the supreme sacrifice, for they were not born to resign themselves to the inhuman conditions imposed on their people. That is why they fought the good fight; they could not accept so unworthy and repugnant a life.

55. Mr. SHAH NAWAZ (Pakistan): Your assumption of the presidency of the Council for the month of October, Sir, has been a matter for very special pleasure and satisfaction to me personally and to the other members of the Pakistan delegation. During the past year I have had the privilege as a member of the Council of working in close association with you on many important issues which have come before the Council, which has given me the opportunity of becoming acquainted with your special qualities as a statesman, a distinguished diplomat and an experienced and skilful negotiator. These qualities, combined with your warm and friendly personality, constitute insurance that the important work of the Council will be guided during your presidency with competence, consideration and success. It is equally a matter of great satisfaction to us that you represent a country with which Pakistan enjoys the closest brotherly relations and for whose leaders and people Pakistan has the most profound respect and admiration.

56. I also wish to place on record our deep admiration for Mr. Noel Sinclair of Guyana for his skilful and effective leadership of the Council last month.

57. The speakers who have preceded me have covered with great diligence and authority all aspects of the question of Namibia. Yet the importance of the issue is such that many home truths about it will bear repetition as long as the issue remains unresolved on account of the intransigence of Pretoria, which does not want to part with its ill-gotten gains from the continuing colonization of Namibia. The success with which Pretoria has so far delayed the attainment of independence by Namibia has emboldened it to persist in this course, which it has done with impunity.

58. It is nearly 17 years now since the General Assembly, in its resolution 2145 (XXI), terminated South Africa's Mandate over Namibia. A significant step towards the resolution of the Namibian question came when the International Court of Justice in 1971 ruled against Pretoria's occupation of the Territory.<sup>3</sup> This was followed by Council resolution 435 (1978), providing the blueprint for the independence of Namibia, which remains unimplemented to this date.

59. The current session of the Council to discuss the question of Namibia is a sequel to its meetings last May, when resolution 532 (1983) mandated the Secretary-General to undertake consultations with the parties concerned with a view to securing the speedy implementation of resolution 435 (1978). The outcome of the Secretary-General's contacts with the parties concerned, during his visit to the region last August, is contained in his report [S/15943].

60. I take this opportunity to pay a tribute to the dedication with which the Secretary-General carried out his man-

date and to commend him for his admirable report, which illustrates with clarity the progress already achieved towards the implementation of resolution 435 (1978) and identifies the obstruction that has been placed on Namibia's path to independence.

61. The Secretary-General's report has established that the two outstanding issues, namely, the choice of electoral system and certain problems relating to UNTAG and its composition, have been resolved. The full measure of progress on these issues is evident from the observation of the Secretary-General that: "In fact we have never before been so close to finality on the modalities of implementing resolution 435 (1978)." [*Ibid.*, para. 24.]

62. With that positive assessment, one would have hoped that the next logical step would be the realization of the Namibian independence plan embodied in resolution 435 (1978). This hope is, however, belied by the Secretary-General's forthright comment that "the position of South Africa regarding the issue of the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola as a pre-condition for the implementation of resolution 435 (1978) still makes it impossible to launch the United Nations plan." [*Ibid.*, para. 25.]

63. As stated in his report, the Secretary-General has taken care to remind the South African authorities at every stage during his recent discussions in New York and in Pretoria that the United Nations cannot accept the spurious linkage of the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola as a pre-condition for the implementation of the United Nations plan for Namibia's independence. In doing so, the Secretary-General has indeed reaffirmed the consistent position of the General Assembly, the Non-Aligned Movement and the International Conference in Support of the Struggle of the Namibian People for Independence, held in Paris last April.

64. Throughout its leadership of the liberation struggle of the people of Namibia, SWAPO has acted with an admirable sense of responsibility and restraint. In his statement before the Council on 20 October [2481st meeting] Peter Mueshihange, Secretary for Foreign Relations of SWAPO, reaffirmed the political will and determination of SWAPO to move forward with the implementation of resolution 435 (1978) and reiterated its readiness to sign a cease-fire agreement and to co-operate with the Secretary-General and his Special Representative in the judicious implementation of the United Nations plan for Namibia's independence.

65. South Africa's insistence on linking Namibia's independence with the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola is unwarranted and clearly aimed at thwarting the implementation of the United Nations plan. That this demand is no more than a pretext is evident from South Africa's attitude and deeds following the adoption of resolution 435 (1978). Having ostensibly agreed to the United Nations plan, presumably under pressure from its authors, the five members of the Western contact group, South Africa lost no time in renegeing on its commitment to the implementation of the plan by questioning the impartiality of the United Nations. Since this objection could not be

sustained, particularly after the United Nations and SWAPO indicated their readiness to accommodate every legitimate concern of South Africa over the modalities of elections and their supervision in Namibia, the Pretoria authorities raised the entirely extraneous issue of the Cuban troops, which had not even remotely figured at the time of the adoption of resolution 435 (1978).

66. If the United Nations were to accept that demand, it would concede to powerful States the impermissible right to deny freedom to small nations on the basis of arbitrarily defined security interests.

67. South Africa's aggressive behaviour in the region does not encourage for a moment the expectation that it would allow the implementation of resolution 435 (1978) unless it were compelled to do so. It regularly engages in brutal attacks against all its neighbours in an attempt to harass them and force them to withdraw their support for the Namibian people and the people of South Africa against its colonialism and its inhuman policies of *apartheid*. Mozambique has been the latest victim of South African military adventurism. The scant respect with which Pretoria treats international law and the decisions of the United Nations became evident when its representative, referring to the attack on Mozambique, made the defiant statement that it would repeat such attacks whenever it deemed these to be necessary. This was a blatant assertion of a doctrine of aggression in a forum on which the nations of the world have bestowed a solemn mandate for the maintenance of international peace and security.

68. South Africa has arrogated to itself the right to strike against its neighbours at will and to hold Namibia hostage to its whims, depriving its people of independence on a pretext contrived on the basis of the military machine that it has been able to build with the help of resources available from its Western allies and friends. Five of these allies and friends are the members of the Western contact group which had initially worked out the United Nations independence plan for Namibia. Accordingly, they bear a heavy moral and political responsibility to compel South Africa to implement the plan.

69. The United Nations must fulfil its obligation to the people of Namibia, who have borne with great patience their sufferings under colonial subjugation and the inhuman *apartheid* system. It is clear that developments have now reached a stage when the Council should prescribe a time-frame for the implementation of the Namibian independence plan. If South Africa persists with its obstructionist policy, the Council should not hesitate to use all the powers invested in it by the Charter of the United Nations, including the imposition of comprehensive sanctions, to secure South Africa's compliance with its decisions and to bring the nearly one-hundred-year-long dark chapter of colonialism in Namibia to a close.

70. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Arabic*): The next speaker is the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic, whom I invite to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

71. Mr. EL-FATTAL (Syrian Arab Republic) (*interpretation from Arabic*): The delegation of the Syrian Arab Republic had the opportunity of taking part in the Council's discussions on Namibia last May. Those discussions, which were conducted at a high level, led to the adoption of resolution 532 (1983) the purpose of which was to give South Africa a new time-limit so that it might come to its senses and implement without reservations the commitments entered into by it and its allies to achieve the independence of Namibia through the United Nations plan as set forth in resolution 435 (1978). Once again the Council, quite rightly, entrusted the Secretary-General with the task of consulting the parties concerned, with the object of ensuring the prompt attainment of independence by Namibia. The Secretary-General has carried out his mandate with integrity, patience and exactitude and has submitted his report to the Council [S/15943].

72. It is clear from that report that SWAPO is keeping its commitments and abiding by the word of honour given. Despite the concessions made by SWAPO, with the aim of halting the massacres, the racist régime of South Africa is more intransigent than ever—making the keeping of its commitments dependent on stipulations that are not connected directly or indirectly with the provisions of Council resolution 435 (1978), which reflect international legitimacy.

73. This linkage or parallelism, which has been rejected by most States and by the Secretary-General, is designed only to perpetuate the occupation and colonization of Namibia, the plunder of its resources and the humiliation of its inhabitants. It is intended as defiance of the international community and in particular of the Council.

74. Furthermore, South Africa's purpose in resorting to this linkage, which has been fervently embraced by Washington, is to keep Namibia in its present situation as a colony, to serve the strategic interests of international imperialism, under the guidance of the United States.

75. The repeated acts of aggression against Angola, Mozambique, Lesotho and Zambia prove that Pretoria and its allies are trying to impose their complete hegemony on southern Africa, in order to prevent the peoples of the region achieving peace and stability, which are two essential conditions for their social and economic progress.

76. The excuse of the parallelism or linkage is a threat to peace and security in Angola, and is designed to prevent the independence of Namibia. What is more, this parallelism or linkage may be regarded—indeed, is regarded—as interference in Angola's sovereignty. It is a sort of blackmail, particularly as we all knew in advance that South Africa's commitments with regard to the implementation of Council resolution 435 (1978) were simply a manoeuvre to gain time so that the racist Pretoria Government might build up an armed force able to commit aggression against any neighbouring African State, with the support of the strategic alliance with the American Administration. The latest information shows that Pretoria's military capacity, either on its own or with its allies, has doubled since the Council adopted resolution 435 (1978).

77. The matter of linkage or parallelism is simply a machination to distract the world's attention from what is really going on in South Africa. The heroic resistance operations of the peoples of South Africa against the *apartheid* régime have increased. Because of the internal blow dealt to it by the heroic resistance of the people of South Africa, the régime has begun to feel its own fragility and has begun to vacillate. Today there can be no doubt that there is a crack in the racist Pretoria régime and in its barbaric institutions, represented by the *apartheid* system.

78. The racist Pretoria régime tries to export its internal crisis by the armed aggressions that previous speakers have enumerated. It is absolutely logical for South Africa; it has always tried to export its crises. We are accustomed to this kind of crisis export, as we are accustomed to it in the Middle East. The export of internal crises is a headlong flight; whereas it might seem to involve running towards something, it really means running backwards. There are no gains here. South Africa will not triumph in any battle nor will it be able to keep its racist structure or the institutions that are destined to protect it. It is unthinkable that the minority régime of exploitation will be able to stand in the way of millions struggling for their future in the war being waged by the people of South Africa and the peoples of Namibia and of the other countries surrounding South Africa, peoples whose freedom, independence and security are continually under threat.

79. Basing ourselves on a geopolitical analysis and on a review of the history of southern Africa and of other regions of the world, we can see that the racist Pretoria régime, like any other racist régime, has to choose between a peaceful solution to the question of Namibia and the total destruction of its own structures and the ensuing toll. We are sure that the oppressors view the future only in terms of the benefits and profits they plunder—at the expense of millions of the oppressed; however, the number of times that the oppressed have been able to overcome their weakness and destroy their oppressors are incalculable indeed.

80. For a peaceful solution to be found to the question of Namibia, this august body has only to invoke the sanctions provided for in Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations. The sooner that is done, the less will be the human suffering, in particular that of the people of Namibia, whose future is the subject of the present debate.

81. We hope that action of the Council will no longer be confined to condemnation or to allowing further time for the implementation of its resolutions. We call for the imposition of comprehensive, mandatory sanctions—today, not tomorrow—for the reasons already given. The imposition of such sanctions would not affect in any way the strengthening of the ability of SWAPO to continue its national struggle in every field and by every means.

82. Furthermore, we know in advance that the United States, which has adopted a policy of delaying tactics and perfidy but which offers wonderful slogans, such as “constructive engagement”, uses high-sounding words, not to defend freedom and not to defend independence in the

Council, but rather to defend racism and tyranny. The United States is the enemy of peace in southern Africa. Unfortunately, the United States is proud of that position and supports it economically, politically and militarily. I should like to cite what the representative of the United Republic of Tanzania, one of the front-line States, said when he spoke before the Council:

“There can be no doubt that those who seek to pervert logic, falsify the truth and trample on the rights of peoples for ideological expediency, do not want peace in southern Africa. Those who go to great lengths to manufacture for South Africa excuses with which to justify aggression, even more than the *apartheid* authorities themselves, cannot claim to be agents of stability in the region. Rather, their actions seek to perpetuate instability and violence.” [248<sup>th</sup> meeting, para. 38.]

83. I should like to conclude by recalling the statement, in 1971, by the representative of SWAPO, which he repeated in the Council on 23 May this year:

“I wish to declare, in the name of the people of Namibia, that unless this august body acts decisively to secure the withdrawal of South Africa from the international Territory of Namibia, we shall have no alternative but to continue the armed struggle with greater intensity. We do not love bloodshed, but when we are dealing with a Government like that of South Africa, which believes in violence and bloodshed, we must be prepared to meet it on its own terms. Our struggle may be long and protracted; our struggle may be bloody and costly in terms of human life; it is a price we are prepared to pay for our independence.” [243<sup>rd</sup> meeting, para. 153.]

#### Statement by the representative of Nicaragua

84. Mr. TINOCO FONSECA (Nicaragua) (*interpretation from Spanish*): In view of the lateness of the hour, and since members of the Council are aware of the letter that Nicaragua submitted this morning requesting an urgent meeting of the Council [S/16067], I wish to announce that we are now proceeding to submit a new letter, in which we request an immediate meeting of the Security Council in view of the serious situation now prevailing in Grenada. We believe it of the utmost urgency for the Council to meet—if possible, this evening—in order to consider the serious situation now prevailing in Grenada as a result of an invasion. Therefore, we formally request an immediate meeting of the Council.

85. I should like to take this occasion to alert the members of the Council to the possibility of our meeting this evening and also to request the President to use his good offices and, with his customary wisdom, to guide our procedure towards that end during our consultations.

86. Mr. KARRAN (Guyana): The delegation of Guyana would like to associate itself with the request just made by the representative of Nicaragua. As a Latin American country and as a member of the Caribbean community, Guyana is very concerned about the events taking place in

Grenada and is of the view that the issue is sufficiently urgent to engage the immediate attention of the Council. The situation is critical and has serious implications for international peace and security. Grenada is a sovereign, independent country and there appear to be serious violations of its territorial integrity and independence.

87. In the circumstances, my delegation will support the request made by the representative of Nicaragua and ask that immediate consideration be given to this matter.

88. Mr. MASHINGAIDZE (Zimbabwe): I had not intended to speak on this issue now because I thought it would be unnecessary to do so. On an earlier occasion and outside this chamber, I communicated to the President the concern of my delegation and indeed the concern of those whom we represent concerning the very critical and immensely disturbing situation in Grenada. We had even thought that at some stage this afternoon the Council would consider that situation. However, we shall be guided by your wisdom, Mr. President, in considering the question of the situation in Grenada as soon as possible, and preferably immediately.

89. Mr. OVINNIKOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*interpretation from Russian*): In a statement in the Council some months ago, the Soviet delegation drew attention to the fact that preparations were under way by the United States to commit its 82nd act of aggression against Latin American countries. That act of aggression has now taken place.

90. In the circumstances, the Soviet delegation supports the request by the delegation of Nicaragua for an urgent and immediate meeting of the Council in connection with the act of armed aggression by the United States against Grenada.

91. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Arabic*): I should like to inform members of the Council that in the letter addressed to me by the representative of Nicaragua there was a request for an urgent meeting of the Council—not an immediate meeting. It is my intention to raise this matter during the formal consultations that are now to be held. All members will be able to state their positions during those consultations. I should also like to say that I have received several requests in connection with this matter.

92. Mr. TINOCO FONSECA (Nicaragua) (*interpretation from Spanish*): I apologize for speaking again, but I should like to explain the following: As you have said, Mr. President, this morning we submitted a letter calling for an urgent meeting of the Council. But we have now submitted another letter asking for an immediate meeting in connection with the serious situation in Grenada [S/16072]. We merely wished to confirm this, in order to emphasize the importance of this matter.

93. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Arabic*): I thank the representative of Nicaragua for that clarification. I have just received the letter to which he has referred. It will be before us in the formal consultations that are to take place forthwith.

*The meeting rose at 6.10 p.m.*

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NOTES

<sup>1</sup> *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-seventh Session, Supplement No. 1, p. 3.*

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid., Thirty-eighth Session, Plenary Meetings, 8th meeting, para. 140.*

<sup>3</sup> *Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1971, p. 16.*