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2465th MEETING: 12 AUGUST 1983

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NOTE

Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures. Mention of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United Nations document.

Documents of the Security Council (symbol S/ . . .) are normally published in quarterly *Supplements* of the *Official Records of the Security Council*. The date of the document indicates the supplement in which it appears or in which information about it is given.

The resolutions of the Security Council, numbered in accordance with a system adopted in 1964, are published in yearly volumes of *Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council*. The new system, which has been applied retroactively to resolutions adopted before 1 January 1965, became fully operative on that date.

2465th MEETING

Held in New York on Friday, 12 August 1983, at 10.30 a.m.

President: Mr. Luc de La BARRE de NANTEUIL
(France).

Present: The representatives of the following States: China, France, Guyana, Jordan, Malta, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Poland, Togo, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Zaire, Zimbabwe.

Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/2465)

1. Adoption of the agenda
2. Letter dated 2 August 1983 from the Permanent Representative of Chad to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/15902)

The meeting was called to order at 11.15 a.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

Letter dated 2 August 1983 from the Permanent Representative of Chad to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/15902)

1. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): In conformity with decisions taken at previous meetings on this item [2462nd and 2463rd meetings], I invite the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Co-operation of Chad and the representative of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to take places at the Council table; I invite the representatives of Egypt, the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Ivory Coast, Liberia and the Sudan to take the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Korom Ahmed (Chad) and Mr. Burwin (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) took places at the Council table; Mr. Khalil (Egypt), Mr. Rajaie-Khorassani (Islamic Republic of Iran), Mr. Essy (Ivory Coast), Mr. Kofa (Liberia) and Mr. Elfaki (Sudan) took the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber.

2. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I should like to inform members of the Council that I have received letters from the representatives of Benin, Guinea, Kenya, the Niger and the United Republic of Cameroon in which they request to be invited to participate in the dis-

cussion of the item on the agenda. In conformity with the usual practice, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite those representatives to participate in the discussion without the right to vote, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Soglo (Benin), Mr. Kaba (Guinea), Mr. Okeyo (Kenya), Mr. Oumarou (Niger) and Mr. Towo Atangana (United Republic of Cameroon) took the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber.

3. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The first speaker is the representative of Liberia. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

4. Mr. KOFA (Liberia): My delegation wishes most heartily to congratulate you, Sir, on your assumption of the presidency for the month of August. May I also express to you and the other members of the Council the appreciation of the Liberian delegation for acceding to our request to address this body during its consideration of the situation in Chad. It is indeed a source of immense satisfaction that I do so under the presidency of a diplomat of your proven qualities, representing, as you do, a country which has established a reputation as a staunch supporter of the purposes and principles of the United Nations and with which my Government enjoys the most cordial and friendly relations.

5. At this moment international tensions and frustrations are high because of uncertainties in some quarters. The rumble of tanks, the menacing sounds of invading military aircraft and the presence of some 2,000 Libyan troops in Chad have shattered the peace of that small non-aligned nation. By consenting to hold this debate the Council has risen to its responsibilities under the Charter of the United Nations and deserves the appreciation of all States, particularly small ones and those belonging to the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries.

6. This meeting of the Council is taking place against the sombre background of an expansionist policy of Libya, which aims to bring Chad, a sister African State, into its sphere of influence in Africa, which has caused a number of innocent civilians to be killed and valuable property to be wantonly destroyed. That country's attempt to impose its political will upon a sovereign people and its policies of external aggression against

neighbouring States have reached such enormous proportions that they have placed international peace and security in imminent jeopardy. Such a continuing threat to other States cannot be tolerated and should be forcefully addressed by the Council. My Government views the present deteriorating situation in Chad as a gross violation of the territorial integrity of that country and expresses its regret at the intensification of Libya's intervention and the escalation of the fighting in our sister African nation.

7. The fundamental principle of international law that binds all members of the international community is respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all States. Accordingly members of the community of nations, and particularly those of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), have an obligation to uphold that sacred principle and to contribute to a peaceful resolution of the conflict in Chad and preserve Chad's sovereignty and territorial integrity.

8. Since the Government of President Hissein Habré has been recognized by the United Nations, the OAU and the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, all Member States have an equal obligation to lend their undivided support to that Government at the time of its greatest need.

9. Liberia therefore frowns upon any attempt by any State to undermine the security of the Chad Government, to subvert Chad's sovereignty and to impose its will on the Chad people. We request that peace be restored to Chad at all costs and that all uninvited foreign forces be withdrawn immediately and unconditionally from that troubled African country.

10. The international community can no longer remain indifferent to all the inhuman crimes being perpetrated by the Government of Libya. Nor can we remain mute spectators of the endless travail and trauma suffered by the people of Chad. In the name of that people, whose rights and precious peace have been trodden underfoot and whose land has been laid waste, the aggressor must be called to account by the international community. The present brutal threat to peace precipitated by the hegemonic policy of Libya is both totally inadmissible and unworthy of a modern-day State. Therefore the failure of the Council to act firmly and decisively will not only encourage Libya to intensify its aggression against Chad but will also increase the risk that the current conflict will spread and attain broader proportions. In this connection my delegation calls upon the Council to proceed urgently, with all the authority at its command and all the resources at its disposal, to take effective and concrete measures which will bring about the cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of Libyan forces from Chad.

11. Mr. OVINNIKOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*interpretation from Russian*): The Soviet delegation deems it necessary at this stage to state its view on the item on the agenda. In essence, it is the question of the recent serious worsening of the situation around Chad, a country situated in the centre of the continent of Africa. As the Council is aware, the armed conflict taking place between the opposing political groupings of that country

is witnessing ever more open interference by certain States members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

12. The cynical forms and the increasing magnitude of that imperialist intervention in Chad are today clear to every impartial person. An airlift has been set up between Paris and N'Djamena for the stepped-up delivery of sophisticated weaponry and military *matériel* to the Chad capital. The overall cost of this operation already amounts to \$40 million. A fresh step in the escalation of foreign military interference in Chad was the decision urgently to send to that country 500 French paratroopers.

13. In turn, new units of mercenaries and regular troops of foreign interventionists accompanied by American military advisers are being sent to Chad on American military planes. There is an increasing flow of American weapons to Chad, the overall cost of which is already more than \$25 million.

14. Finally, the Western Powers are trying to embroil certain African countries in the conflict, using for that purpose all available means of pressure. Thus, interference by the imperialist forces in the events taking place in Chad is becoming ever more broad-based and dangerous in character. New colonialist régimes are openly being imposed on the people of Chad. They want to transform the territory of that sovereign State into a new imperialist bridgehead in the African continent. It is becoming quite clear that an attempt is being made to use the internal conflict in that African country to implement the far-reaching political aims and designs directed against the peoples of Africa as a whole.

15. That is why certain Western Powers cynically disregard the position adopted by the OAU on the question of the events in and surrounding Chad. It is well known that in the middle of July, the Bureau of the nineteenth session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU adopted a special communiqué which contains an appeal to all States, both African and non-African, to refrain from any interference, whether direct or indirect, what might exacerbate the situation in Chad. However, despite the appeal of the OAU, interference by the United States, France and certain other countries in the internal events in Chad continues and is becoming even worse.

16. That increasing imperialist interference in the internal affairs of Chad is impudently being covered up by a pretentious propaganda campaign against Libya. Under that diversionary noise of the drums of propaganda, they are trying to expand their punitive expedition by the colonizers in Chad and against Libya.

17. We must call a spade a spade here. The military involvement by a number of Western Powers in the affairs of Chad and the acts of provocation against Libya present a danger that is being pursued by imperialist forces. We are speaking here about an attempt by the West to return to the last century when the colonialists believed it to be the norm to send their troops to Africa, to set up their

puppets and to carve and to recarve the African continent as they saw fit.

18. Yesterday, in speaking to journalists, the President of the United States gave an example of the type of thinking in which certain circles in the West were engaged. With respect to Chad, his words were: "It is not our main sphere of influence; it is the main sphere of influence of France." But those words are a direct challenge to all non-aligned countries which have spoken so often about the fact that they categorically reject that imperialist argument of dividing the third world into spheres of influence.

19. The Soviet Union decisively condemns the escalation of imperialist meddling in the internal affairs of Chad. Those actions are illegal and are a threat to international peace and security. The Soviet Union fully supports the efforts of the OAU which seek to bring about a peaceful settlement to the situation in that country. The Soviet Union demands an immediate cessation of interventionist actions undertaken to the detriment of the national unity of the Republic of Chad and the cause of peace in Africa and throughout the world. Such actions and hegemonistic claims are in flagrant violation of the fundamental principles of the Charter of the United Nations and other international documents signed by both the United States and France.

20. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The next speaker is the representative of Guinea. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

21. Mr. KABA (Guinea) (*interpretation from French*): Sir, it gives me pleasure to congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency for the month of August. I am convinced that, thanks to your long years in an outstanding diplomatic career, your experience in the conduct of international affairs and your personal qualities, the current deliberations on this painful problem—the situation in Chad—will at last fulfil the legitimate desire for peace and security throughout this country racked by 17 years of fratricidal war. In any case, the people of Chad and all the other peoples of Africa, as well as the forces that cherish peace and justice throughout the world, are closely following the deliberations of this lofty world forum, which is entrusted with the maintenance of international peace and security. This demonstrates, Mr. President, just how important your responsibilities are at this particular tense period in African history.

22. I should like, through you, to express my delegation's gratitude to Mr. Ling Qing, representative of the People's Republic of China, for the exceptional way in which he guided the Council's work during the month of July.

23. I wish to thank all the members of the Council for having given me an opportunity to make my country's contribution to these deliberations by inviting me to make a statement.

24. On 14 October 1982, the head of the Guinean delegation and Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Abdoulaye Touré made a statement in the general debate of the thirty-seventh session of the General Assembly, in which he pointed out, with some optimism, his satisfaction at seeing the beginning of an internal improvement in Chad that might lead to political stability and the strengthening of national unity. On that occasion, from the rostrum of the General Assembly he launched a resounding appeal to all men of goodwill to support the efforts of the then Council of State of the Republic of Chad, so that the work of national reconciliation could be completed.¹

25. While at that time we hailed the beginning of a resumption of normal life in Chad, already in January 1983 hostilities had resumed in that martyred country—hostilities which this time have taken on even more alarming proportions.

26. Thus, at the nineteenth session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU, held at Addis Ababa in June, the Supreme Leader of the Revolution, President Ahmed Sékou Touré, called upon the OAU to shoulder its historic responsibility and affirmed that the OAU was the pride of Africa and that, without it, African States—individually or collectively—would be deprived of their means of struggle.

27. I wish to reaffirm here that Guinea has never hesitated to support just causes. Whenever it is a case of defending just causes throughout the world, and in particular in Africa, Guinea does not engage in polemics, let alone does it pit peoples one against the other or hurl abuse. Our abiding wish is that, together, the international community go beyond what divides it and hence reflect the higher interests of our peoples and begin seeking sound solutions to the problems facing our nations.

28. In June when the war seemed to challenge the very existence of Chad as a State, the Current Chairman of the OAU, with the consent of his colleagues, convened a meeting of the OAU Bureau, which took place on 15 and 16 July at Addis Ababa. Also at that meeting Guinea, through its leader, President Ahmed Sékou Touré, reaffirmed its position on the painful problem of Chad, recalling that, although the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU, at its nineteenth session, unanimously adopted strongly worded resolutions on Chad, the conflict in that country nevertheless had several dimensions to it, including in particular, a political dimension stemming from alliances with various external Powers.

29. While the Council cannot take up and resolve all the problems of Chad aspect by aspect, my delegation believes it is nevertheless duty bound to refer to the Charter of the United Nations, which is its strength and which remains the only legal power of the international community.

30. If there is one incontrovertible fact, it is that Chad has been a sovereign State since 1960.

31. Through the voice of its highest competent authority, that of President Ahmed Sékou Touré, Guinea recalled the following at Addis Ababa last July:

"The Charter of the Organization of African States also forbids that, in another country of the OAU, there should be constituted a force for destabilizing another country member of the OAU."

And the Supreme Leader of the Revolution went on to say:

"The principle is not valid for the national liberation movements because these movements are directly opposed to imperialism, and the mission of the independent States of Africa is to support the national liberation movements. But when it is a question of a political struggle in support of one or another faction, no African State is entitled to harbour a group of people arming themselves with a view to attacking another independent member State."

32. It is no secret to anyone that the OAU has already set up several standing committees on the problem of Chad, namely, an *Ad Hoc* Committee to resolve the conflict among Chadians and a second Committee to settle the border dispute between Chad and Libya.

33. Not only does Guinea abide by all appeals for national reconciliation in Chad but it is also at one with these appeals.

34. My Government has entrusted me with the explicit task here of expressing before representatives the concern of my country at the worsening situation in Chad; we are determined to join our efforts to those of the international community in order that the most emphatic measures be taken to bring about an immediate cessation of hostilities in Chad.

35. However, we believe it is imperative to bear in mind one basic fact, namely, that there are not two governments in Chad. There is but one Government in Chad, that formed by Hissein Habré. Guinea therefore believes that to tell a leader who has constituted a legal government to lay down his arms while he is busy regaining the whole of the territory of his country is inadmissible.

36. That is why Guinea hopes that these present deliberations of the Council will reach conclusions expressing the determination of the people of Chad and of Africa as a whole to see a cessation of that war and to put an end to all foreign intervention.

37. I shall conclude my brief statement by stressing, on behalf of my country, the approach to be adopted in due course by members of the Council. We ardently hope that the Council, after these debates, will do some good work by not equating a Government with those who violate the legality of the country.

38. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The next speaker is the representative of the Niger. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

39. Mr. OUMAROU (Niger) (*interpretation from French*): Thank you, Mr. President, for allowing my delegation to participate in this debate. I extend my thanks also to the members of the Council whose hard work we praise, as well as their readiness to consider the events which disturb the world, on different continents perhaps, but always with the potential for anguish and the same risk of grave prolongation of conflict.

40. We extend our congratulations to Mr. Ling Qing of China, who presided so well over the Council during the month of July and whose diplomatic tact, perspicacity and courteous firmness were appreciated by all.

41. We congratulate you, Mr. President, as well, you who from the very beginning of your office inherited a very difficult dossier on the question of the Middle East and who succeeded so strikingly in drawing the needed balance between reason and emotion.

42. Now once again you have another issue before you that is of concern to Africa and to the entire international community and in which, we might add, French sensitivity is particularly sharp, and legitimately so. There can be no doubt that thanks to your outstanding qualities you will be able once again to guide the Council on the course of wisdom, correctness and a sense of responsibility. This is an opportunity for me to say how pleased my country, the Niger, is at the privileged ties, both multifaceted and long-standing, which unite it to the French Republic, ties that are the more especially exemplary and appreciated as they become further strengthened in mutual respect, in the observance of high standards and in a fruitful and beneficial co-operation.

43. It was in April of this year that the Council last discussed the question of Chad [2430th meeting], whose coexistence with its neighbour to the north seemed particularly difficult; I refer to Libya. It was at the time a very thorny border question and the Council in its wisdom found the proper words to allay what seemed to be the beginning of a dangerous storm. It indicated a good framework for restoring calm in the relations between the two countries and solemnly urged them to conduct a dialogue for the peaceful settlement of the dispute. It also prescribed resort to the OAU in order to restore understanding between them on the basis of the sacred principles of respect for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the countries [see S/15688].

44. Since then, four months have gone by and, needless to say, not only have matters not been resolved between those two countries but the meeting that the Council is holding today is unfortunately the result of sharp deterioration of relations between them. Suspicion has yielded to rancour and dialogue to confrontation.

45. In the Niger we have been particularly attentive to this situation and we are deeply distressed to see our region serve as an arena for troubles which we hoped it would be spared; and because of the magnitude of these events and of the daily destruction, we are obliged to assert that the combat now taking place in Chad extends

far beyond the framework of a simple internal rebellion. Indeed, if our brother Goukouni Weddey—whom, I must stress, the Niger actively supported in the past and actively provided with fraternal co-operation and disinterested support in order to promote the national reconciliation sought by all Chadians—had had resources to obtain in a few months an air squadron, tanks and armoured cars, Stalin organs, and all sorts of bombs and artillery, as well as all the personnel recently thrown into the retaking of Faya-Largeau, he certainly would not have left N'Djamena in June 1982 in the circumstances with which we are all familiar, and Chad's name would long before June 1982 have come off the all-too-lengthy list of poorest and least-developed countries.

46. As was the case with Mr. Goukouni Weddey in the past, the legitimacy of Mr. Hissein Habré at the head of the State of Chad is for us today undeniable and it is on behalf of that legitimacy recognized and respected by all the States of the Franco-African union, by the Organization of African Unity, by the Organization of the Islamic Conference and by the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries that his combat today is the struggle of all peoples dedicated to the rule of international law for the safeguarding of a peaceful and fruitful coexistence among nations. It is not a matter of liking or not liking Mr. Hissein Habré; it is a matter of defending—all of us together—a certain order which makes the world what it is today, an order which would not have the peace and calm of any country fall prey to the whims of its neighbours. The time of the law of the jungle and of imperial conquest is past; at least that is what is proclaimed in the Charter of the United Nations and what justifies our presence here.

47. We cannot fail, thus, to conclude—and to deplore—that in the affair before the Council the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Chad have been violated and that there has been a deliberate attempt to take away from the people of Chad the opportunity one day to choose its own government and institutions. It must even be added that armed penetration into the territory of Chad—both in principle and on the ground—gravely disturbs the peace and stability of our region to the extent of being an inadmissible precedent in Africa, where the full weight of our efforts must be oriented rather towards consolidating the independence of our continent, organizing our solidarity, and the waging of a fierce struggle against everything that hinders freedom, dignity and the harmonious flourishing of Africans.

48. Now, in response to those who see everywhere the poisonous tentacles of the imperialist hydra I would simply say that it is by avoiding ill-feeling and conflict—whether open or hidden—among its States that Africa will be able effectively to bar the way to foreign intervention. Very well: Africa for the Africans. But that does not mean that Africans should go for each other with impunity. Here as elsewhere, aggression always calls for a counter-offensive. Whoever finds his rights threatened in a conflict which he has not provoked should be able to rely on his friends—indeed, on all generous parties ready

to be of assistance. We have a saying that “when you see a mouse running towards a flame it means that the pursuit is hotter than the fire.” I put that to the Council for reflection, while I urge it speedily to see to it that Chad can regain its territorial integrity and peace so that its hard-working and innocent population can return soon to the tasks which bring it the pittance it needs for the already difficult job of survival.

49. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The next speaker is the representative of Benin. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

50. Mr. SOGLO (Benin) (*interpretation from French*): First of all, Sir, I should like to convey to you the great satisfaction of the delegation of Benin at seeing you presiding over the work of the Council. No one is better qualified than you to do so at the precise moment when the Council is discussing the thorny question of Chad. Not only are your competence and human qualities universally admired, but you are the representative of a great country, France, whose vast work has not been limited to its own “hexagon” of territory, but has extended throughout all the continents, especially in Africa and in Chad. We are therefore convinced that the present debate cannot fail to have a successful outcome.

51. I would be remiss in my duty if I did not take this opportunity to thank the representative of China, who with his customary skill presided so well over the work of the Council last month.

52. Four months ago, those who have come again today to complain to the Council against Libya would have had us believe that the present régime in N'Djamena had brought peace and harmony to Chad. The delegation of Benin was among those who did not share that point of view, and now reality has imposed itself on us, with all its brutal force. It is a reality composed of bloody confrontations which have caused the death of thousands of our Chadian brothers.

53. Thus, the return of Mr. Hissein Habré to N'Djamena did not bring with it that desired peace. The combat which now rages in that country, with the participation of non-African forces, was foreseeable. The facts are there: undeniable, stubborn facts. Did not the Armed Forces of the North enter N'Djamena by force, despite and counter to repeated appeals for national reconciliation?

54. Did they not chase out by force the leaders of the Transitional National Union Government, on which the OAU had conferred uncontested legitimacy through the Lagos Accord [S/14378, annex I]? How can one be surprised, then, if the leaders of the Transitional National Union Government are now trying by force to restore the power which had been taken away from them by force? That was only too foreseeable, since it is legitimate. As far as we know, no organization has denied the Transitional National Union Government its legitimacy, and precisely because it still represents the people of Chad no one can

call into question its right to ask for assistance wherever it sees fit to do so.

55. Who is the rebel? That is a question that most of the speakers who preceded us did not venture to raise. Who is rebelling against whom? Is it Mr. Goukouni Weddey? Is it Mr. Hissein Habré?

56. There are those to whom the answer is not obvious and who refer to the nineteenth session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU, held at Addis Ababa last June as having restored the virginity of the new leaders in N'Djamena, and for them it will suffice to recall that the refusal of the Transitional National Union Government to recognize the *fait accompli* was clearly within the framework of the legitimacy of the Lagos Accord—predating by far the convening of the Assembly.

57. All those elements clearly show the true nature of the combat now taking place in Chad: it is a fratricidal struggle. But unfortunately there has been an attempt to see in this conflict between enemy brothers an outside hand, that of Libya. In politics—and not only in politics—it is true that looking for a scapegoat has often been a clever strategy.

58. The statement here by the special envoy of Mr. Hissein Habré was studded with too many inaccuracies, untruths and lies [2463rd meeting].

59. Thus it is that my country, the People's Republic of Benin, a country which has always and in every way shown solicitude and compassion towards the martyred people of Chad, is accused of being a transit point for mercenaries said to be recruited to the service of Libya. That is a gratuitous, false accusation which my delegation rejects with all the scorn it deserves. The only interference which the People's Republic of Benin would allow itself in the internal affairs of Chad would be to continue as in the past to be as concerned as it can be about the fraternal people of Chad.

60. But, above all, Libya has been accused of aggression against Chad and of being the cause of all the misfortunes affecting Chad for over 20 years. On that point I could say a great deal; however, we shall confine ourselves to a few comments. Did King Idris have some plan of aggression that he bequeathed upon his downfall to President Qaddafi? Has irrefutable proof been offered by those who make such accusations? Is Mr. Goukouni Weddey a Libyan because he asked for and received Libya's support? If that were so then countries which served as sanctuaries for Mr. Hissein Habré and gave him armed support when he was fighting against the Transitional National Union Government, which was legitimately in force in N'Djamena, should be the first to be brought before the Council for having supported aggression against the legitimate Government of Chad.

61. No, we should not allow the trees to hide the forest or appearances that result from a certain state of affairs to conceal the true situation in Chad. Chad's real problems

are those inherited from colonization and are the ills of young independence, exacerbated by a desire for personal power.

62. It is highly regrettable that this fratricidal conflict could not be restricted to internal dimensions and that forces outside Africa saw fit to become involved. The reasons invoked for that intervention cannot, unfortunately, convince my delegation. Were the agreements on the basis of which intervention was decided invalid at the time when the Transitional National Union Government, legal and legitimate, underwent Mr. Hissein Habré's assaults? What is the unconfessed goal of such intervention? Is it likely to establish that much-desired peace in Chad? Can it make the two enemy brothers sit down at the negotiating table? Has it not been undertaken solely with the sinister intention of some to destroy the Libyan Revolution, which struggles daily for the progress and independence of its people and other oppressed peoples, in genuine defiance of the forces of international imperialism?

63. The only real enemies of the African peoples against which we call for general mobilization are those who deny them the exercise of their most basic rights. Those who uphold racism, *apartheid* and colonialism, those who exploit and plunder them and keep them in poverty: they are the real enemies of Africa, and it is against them that punitive expeditions should rally. Today, once again, the entire province of Cunene in Angola is occupied by Savimbi's puppet troops assisted by the regular army of South Africa. This act of war, like all other acts of aggression, has not attracted as much solicitude from those who are today rushing to the aid of Hissein Habré.

64. A double standard. In imperialist logic, whether a victim or the aggressor, you will be supported or fought against, according to whether you are a puppet or responsible.

65. The vast sums so generously devoted to weaponry in Chad will unfortunately not go to feed what remains of its population. Such generosity is sinister indeed.

66. The People's Republic of Benin has stated and states once again that a solution to the problem of Chad must be national and African. The People's Republic of Benin is in favour of holding a national conference or reconciliation under the auspices of the OAU, the only body really in a position to consider the problem of Chad. The Council, while making an appeal for an end to the fratricidal combat, should also call upon forces from outside Africa to withdraw their contingents and deadly weapons from that country.

67. Ready for the revolution. The struggle continues.

68. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The next speaker is the representative of Kenya. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

69. Mr. OKEYO (Kenya): On behalf of my delegation and on my own behalf, I wish to express my sincere congratulations to you, Sir, on your assumption of the presidency for the month of August. My delegation is pleased to see France, the country which you represent in the United Nations and which enjoys good relations with my country, presiding over this body's deliberations. My delegation is confident that your vast diplomatic experience will enable the Council to discharge its responsibilities to the international community.

70. I should also like to thank your predecessor, the representative of China, for the excellent manner in which he conducted the business of this Council during the preceding month.

71. This year, during the month of March [2419th meeting], the Council was seized of the problem of the border dispute between the two sister countries of Chad and Libya. Although my country did not participate at that time in the debate, it has always been Kenya's position that the border dispute should be settled with the guidance of resolution AHG/Res.16 (I), adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU at its first session, held at Cairo from 17 to 21 July 1964, which states that all member States should respect the borders existing on their achievement of national independence. That decision was reached after realizing that nearly every African country was vulnerable to border disputes. Had we participated in the debate we would have encouraged that territorial disputes be solved within the spirit of the Cairo decision.

72. In this respect it is my delegation's view that all international agreements concluded earlier in relation to border conflicts were superseded by Article III of the Charter of the Organization of African Unity.²

73. My delegation has decided to take part in this debate because of the flagrant manner in which the territorial integrity of Chad has been flouted by Libya, and also because of our deep concern at the deteriorating security situation in the northern part of Chad. We decided to participate in this debate so as to assist the Council to find a solution to the problem threatening the peace and security of the people of Chad.

74. The Council has a big responsibility and should take swift steps which would stabilize the explosive situation in Chad. The international community should act so as to bring about an atmosphere of good neighbourliness between two OAU member States, namely Libya and Chad.

75. My delegation finds it quite unacceptable for any State to violate the principles of territorial integrity of another State and, therefore, interfering in the internal affairs of that particular State. We also reject outright the settling of conflicts by threats and/or use of force among States.

76. We believe these are the basic principles of international relations between States and should be the guiding

force of general conduct of member States in relation to each other. These basic principles are also embodied in the Charter of the Organization of African Unity and in the Charter of the United Nations.

77. The Council should, therefore, examine the facts involved in the conflict and make recommendations that will lead to the peaceful settlement of the problem currently created in Chad. The Council should not fail to discharge its responsibility to maintain peace and security in the world. It should address that responsibility in this particular case also.

78. The case before the Council today was also seized by the OAU during the eighteenth session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, at the time that my President, Mr. Daniel Arap Moi, was Chairman of the Organization of African Unity. At that time, during the Assembly, held at Nairobi from 24 to 27 June 1981, the OAU called for assistance to Chad for it to establish a national army.³ The African leaders wanted Chad to re-establish the administrative machinery which had been destroyed during the 17 years of fighting. It was the hope of the OAU to set up a formula that was to contain the two forces of President Hissein Habré and Mr. Weddey. What African leaders had in mind was to conduct a national referendum and national elections that would ensure an atmosphere of reconciliation and negotiation. The African leaders also wanted the OAU to assume the responsibility of raising funds for the reconstruction of Chad's economy. This was to be achieved through a pledging conference organized by both the OAU and the United Nations.

79. With all these African good intentions enumerated above, we still find the civil war waging seriously in Chad. It is now the responsibility of this body to find the causes of these disruptions and bring them to an end. The intervention by Libya in this situation has not made it easier, and, in fact, has complicated it.

80. The OAU's efforts to bring a spirit of reconciliation in Chad were frustrated by the negative attitude of the former President, Mr. Weddey, when he turned down the OAU's idea of holding national elections. It is, therefore, Kenya's view to suggest the following steps be taken in the circumstances.

81. First, to condemn Libya's incursion into Chad's territory and ask the Government of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, in the spirit of compromise, to withdraw its forces from Chad Territory, immediately and without any conditions.

82. Secondly, the Council should make every effort to devise ways to bring about a government of national unity in Chad, arranging negotiations that could be undertaken, knowing full well that the Government in Chad is that of Mr. Habré. My Government feels that in the circumstance of events in Chad, Mr. Habré has control of the country as a Government, and we recognize his Government in that respect.

83. Thirdly, Kenya strongly opposes the use of force as a means of settling disputes; therefore, the Council should condemn the acts of aggression against Chad.

84. Fourthly, the Council should employ all means available to halt any further hostilities in Chad and endeavour to restore order and to ensure the safety of civilians.

85. Fifthly, the Council should respond to Chad's appeal for assistance in recovering its territorial integrity in order that it may resume its development programmes for the people of Chad.

86. Sixthly, Libyan military forces in the Aouzou area should be withdrawn entirely from Chad, and those that are currently in Faya-Largeau must also be withdrawn.

87. It is Kenya's contention that we cannot live in a world in which States that consider themselves militarily equipped to do so can at their own wish, whenever they like, invade their neighbours and over-run their territories whenever they feel it in their interest to do so. This behaviour would suggest anarchy and in effect the law of the jungle, as previous speakers have said.

88. It is inconceivable that an African State can deliberately, without provocation and without being threatened in any way, literally invade another State by entering its territory openly, as has been done so far by the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. Kenya cannot be silent on this kind of behaviour. We therefore condemn Libya's attack on Chad and in this case support President Habré's Government and request the international community, and the Council in particular, to accept their responsibility by calling the Government of Libya to order.

89. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I should like to inform members of the Council that I have just received a letter from the representative of Senegal in which he requests to be invited to participate in the discussion of the item on the agenda. In conformity with the usual practice, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite that representative to participate in the discussion without the right to vote, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Sylla (Senegal) took a place at the Council table.

90. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I invite the representative of Senegal to make his statement.

91. Mr. SYLLA (Senegal) (*interpretation from French*): Allow me, Sir, before I get down to the matter in hand, to extend to you on behalf of the delegation of Senegal our heartfelt congratulations on your assumption of the presidency for the month of August. The long tradition of historical and cultural bonds between our two countries, France and Senegal, as well as the excellent relations that unite them, amply justify the pleasure that we feel in seeing you discharging these lofty functions. Our pleasure is

all the greater since your competence, your qualities as a diplomat experienced in international relations and your talents as a seasoned negotiator strengthen our conviction that the discussions of the Council under your guidance will be successful. Your concern for justice and your perfect knowledge of international politics, and in particular of the question of Chad, which is before the Council today, bode well for a happy conclusion to this debate for the martyred people of Chad.

92. I should also like to express the appreciation of the delegation of Senegal to Mr. Ling Qing, representative of the People's Republic of China, that great country with which my country enjoys relations of cordial co-operation, for his wisdom and the effective and commendable way in which he conducted the Council's work last month.

93. Finally, may I thank you very sincerely and all members of the Council, for the honour you are all paying me by inviting the delegation of Senegal to participate in this debate. In doing this, you have given my delegation an opportunity to make its contribution to the discussion of this important item on the agenda, a matter which is of great concern not only to Africans, because they are directly involved, but also to the whole of the international community, since failure to resolve this question would doubtless constitute a serious threat to the stability of the region and a real danger to international peace and security.

94. As many previous speakers have said, the situation now prevailing in Chad is clearly a serious threat to peace and security in that part of the continent. Indeed, at the same time as seriously threatening the very existence of Chad as a sovereign State, it could, because of its possible consequences, basically challenge the fragile balance on which our States have been based for more than two decades.

95. For reasons of principle, African solidarity and humanitarian concern, the dark times through which is passing the fraternal people of Chad—who has known practically no civil peace for more than 20 years—are for my country a constant cause of concern. The important issues at stake in the conflict prevent our remaining passive or indifferent to that painful problem.

96. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Co-operation of Chad yesterday [2463rd meeting] presented a clear outline of the situation prevailing in his country. Therefore, our purpose will not be to go into the background of what has now become a war sustained by flagrant interference in the internal affairs of the people of Chad.

97. Rather, our contribution will be to take the opportunity given to us by this debate to identify, on the basis of the *de facto* situation, the principles which we believe must be respected if peace is to be restored to that martyred country. To put it in its simplest term, the problem of Chad can be summed up as follows. A sovereign country led by a legitimate Government, recognized by the OAU and a member of the United Nations, has been the victim of an attack from outside.

98. The subtle nature of the interference and the protestations of innocence can in no way change the nature of the problem. Certainly, citizens of Chad who are opposed to their Government are participating in this interference. But, as far as we know, this painful conflict is basically being sustained from outside.

99. In fact, some countries which for ideological reasons—and more likely, for unadmitted interests—have chosen to challenge the legitimacy of those people of Chad who are governing their country, in order to benefit other people of Chad who are refugees abroad, using the latter to intervene in the country under the cover of a war that is apparently a civil war but is in fact much more than that. Information given us by the Government of Chad and by various independent press bodies confirm this argument about interference.

100. Of course any sovereign State can recognize or not recognize the Government of another sovereign State, but it would at the very least be dangerous and reprehensible to use failure to recognize a country as a convenient alibi for flouting the sacrosanct principle of non-interference.

101. Tolerance of such an attitude in the African context would have consequences that are easy to predict: chaos and war would for a very long period of time reduce to nothing the desperate efforts we are conducting to ensure a decent future for our countries.

102. Thus, since it is concerned with the preservation of peace and security in our continent, the action of the Council should, we feel, be aimed at putting an end to foreign interference and restoring Chad's sovereignty and territorial integrity.

103. The national reconciliation that some have mentioned is doubtless a necessary condition for a return to peace and stability, but it cannot be brought about—and we insist on this—without prior respect for the sovereignty of Chad.

104. While ideological divergencies and ethnic and regional rivalries do exist in Chad, they should be considered purely internal matters.

105. The Bureau of the OAU, which met on 16 July last at Addis Ababa, said as much when it expressed its conviction that the future of Chad should be determined solely by the people of the country.

106. Once foreign interference has been established, the international community is, we feel, duty bound to assist the Government of Chad and help it restore the sovereignty of the State so as to make possible effective exercise of the country's sovereignty.

107. Taking up the recommendations of the Bureau of the OAU, some countries have here proposed dealing with the most urgent thing first: the cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of foreign troops from Chad. My country feels that these are constructive proposals, but in the light of experience they can be effectively implemented

only if those now guilty of interference formally go along with them. That is another line for Council action.

108. Then we could, as has been requested by the Government of Chad, reactivate the *Ad Hoc* Committee of the OAU on the Chad-Libya dispute, a dispute that we feel has considerable weight in the present conflict.

109. The lot of the people of Chad is a very sad one. For more than 20 years they have languished under the yoke of many bloody struggles, which have been worsened by foreign interference. Other African countries may share their lot if the Council does not discharge its responsibility to see to it that legality is respected in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations. Today Chad is playing an important part *vis-à-vis* the future of the continent. The challenge is too serious not to be taken up.

110. Some believe that partition of Chad could provide a solution to the conflict in that country. My country, faithful to the principles to which it has subscribed within the OAU and the United Nations, would like to stress here the particularly serious and dangerous nature of this current of opinion. We have done so in the past, and we do so again today. In no circumstances can we go along with the idea of any partition of an African country. Chad must be restored to itself and enjoy full territorial integrity and sovereignty so that finally its people can enjoy its inalienable right to live in peace and to build a future on the basis of its own options.

111. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The next speaker is the representative of the United Republic of Cameroon. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

112. Mr. TOWO ATANGANA (United Republic of Cameroon) (*interpretation from French*): It is, Sir, with great pleasure that my delegation greets you as President at a time when this prestigious body is considering, for the second time in less than six months, the painful problem of Chad, which is for your Government and mine a source of serious concern. Given your talents as an outstanding diplomat, your dedication to the independence of States and to peace, and your dynamic commitment to the defence of the freedom of peoples, these deliberations will, we are convinced, have a positive outcome consistent with the requirements of law and international ethics.

113. Please allow me also most sincerely to congratulate the representative of the People's Republic of China, Mr. Ling Qing, for the excellent way in which he guided the work of the Council last month.

114. I should also like to thank you and the other members of the Council for the honour you have bestowed on my delegation by inviting it to participate in this debate, which began on 3 August [2462nd meeting] following a letter dated 2 August addressed to the President of the Council by the representative of Chad to the United Nations. In that letter the Government of Chad accused its neighbour to the north of having undertaken a destabil-

izing action against it by launching a wide-ranging armed attack that led to the conquest of several towns in the north and east of the country. A statement to the same effect was made here yesterday by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Co-operation of Chad, who in the course of that statement described in detail the seriousness of the situation now prevailing in his country [2463rd meeting].

115. The Council therefore has before it a particularly distressing situation which pits two fraternal countries against each other, two neighbours that on 6 April last were invited to resolve their disputes through negotiations [see S/15688]. We are certain that all the members of the Council are aware of the importance that the international community attaches to this debate, taking into account the concern of many States and above all the weakest among them, which view with concern the increased tendency to use force and the threat of force in international relations.

116. We also hoped that the decisions taken at the nineteenth session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU, held at Addis Ababa last June, set the most appropriate framework for the search for a just solution to this painful problem. The heads of State and Government of Africa unanimously asked all the parties to refrain from any action that might further worsen the situation. They also asked the Ad Hoc Committee specially established for this purpose to continue its activities in order as soon as possible to find ways and means of resolving the dispute.⁴ But today we see that, on the contrary, the situation has dangerously deteriorated to the extent that we are once again witnessing on Chad territory a real war with international ramifications that are highly disturbing as regards the peace, security and stability of the region.

117. The event now taking place in Chad bear no relation to guerrilla operations that sowed destruction and distress in that country for many years.

118. Today the rebellion, which is taking place against the legal power in force in N'Djamena, has embarked on a real conventional war with the use of massive sophisticated weaponry, including different means of assault by land and air. It goes without saying that this type of rebellion can only use such an impressive arsenal of weapons with the aid of a foreign Power with large resources. That unreserved external support for the rebellion, which gravely undermines the efforts at national reconciliation supported by the OAU and the Council, has been recognized.

119. Mr. President, I welcome the clarification that you made yesterday concerning the legitimacy of the present Government of Chad. I shall not deal with the allegations of some speakers on this point. For my delegation, there is only one Government in Chad. As was stated on 31 March last in the Council [2428th meeting] by Mrs. Simone Mairie, our representative, Cameroon maintains the best relations of friendship and co-operation with the Government of President Hissein Habré, which is pursu-

ing commendable efforts to restore the national unity and peace which Chad so dearly needs.

120. As regards the serious situation now prevailing in Chad, my Government had foreseen such developments from the beginning and expressed its position in a communiqué by the President of the Republic on 8 July, which reads as follows:

"The Government of Cameroon is profoundly concerned at the grave developments in the military situation in Chad, an African country neighbour of Cameroon. In the face of this new situation, the Government of Cameroon, loyal to the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of African States as proclaimed by the Charter of the Organization of African Unity, reaffirms its conviction that the problem of Chad must be resolved without foreign interference, by peaceful means and in respect of lawfulness. It solemnly appeals to the international community, especially to the members of the OAU, to give the legal Government of Chad all the support it needs to safeguard the national sovereignty, territorial integrity and stability of Chad and so that all efforts can be made for the restoration of peace, national reconciliation and the reconstruction of that torn country."

121. We expect that the Council will fully shoulder its responsibilities pursuant to the Charter of the United Nations and that it will rapidly consider ways of responding to the hopes placed on it by the people of Chad.

122. Sir John THOMSON (United Kingdom): Mr. President, I have no doubt that in my absence on holiday my delegation expressed to you our congratulations and our admiration for the way in which you have conducted the affairs of this Council. May I, on my return, express to you personally both those congratulations and also perhaps I may be allowed to add my sympathy and commiseration. I do so because I had the experience of presiding over the Council when it last discussed this question at the end of March. At that time we had a long, difficult and contentious debate in which, I must say, the non-aligned members of the Council played a notable and constructive part. We reached a conclusion. It is, I am sorry to say, symptomatic of the state of the world and of the attitude of the world towards the operations of the Council that that conclusion seems to have been of no effect whatsoever.

123. Here we are some four months later with exactly a repetition of the earlier situation—only more so, a worse situation. And perhaps it is simply because I have had the good fortune to be away on leave and not been bothering myself about the detailed affairs of the world, but I come back to the comments of the Secretary-General in his report on the work of the Organization⁵ for 1982 about the responsibilities of the Council and about the way in which we must all take those responsibilities very seriously. It is something more than just our own national interests. We have a collective responsibility, if possible, to solve problems, but, at any rate, to try to ameliorate them. We cannot expect to do that—and I think this is in

the spirit of the Secretary-General's report—unless we use words honestly.

124. I had not intended to speak this morning. But I cannot help feeling, as I have listened to some of the debate, that we do very readily slide into clichés without considering what they actually mean and without really thinking about whether we may be applying double standards or different statements to different parts of the world.

125. My Soviet colleague urged us all to call a spade a spade. I think that is an excellent principle. But I should like to recall that at one and the same time he also said that his Government fully supported the OAU but did not, it seemed to me, quite support the decision of the nineteenth session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU, held at Addis Ababa last June, on the question of which is the legitimate Government of Chad. If we are to support fully the OAU, then let those words mean what they plainly do mean.

126. Then he went on to talk about how his Government fully supported the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, which he rightly said categorically rejected the idea of spheres of influence. Well, that is an important statement, but does it apply also to Eastern Europe and to Afghanistan? Spheres of influence are spheres of influence.

127. And then he went on to condemn the interference by the United States and France in the affairs of Chad, neglecting, I think, to mention that they had been invited by the legitimate Government of that country. He described as imperialist those actions by those two Governments and as amounting to the imposition of a neo-colonial régime. I would have to ask the members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, which voted by an overwhelming majority for the resolution on Afghanistan—I think 118 votes in favour—whether they do not feel that to be a rather accurate description of the situation in Afghanistan.

128. There was not a word about Libyan intervention in Chad.

129. I was prompted on the spur of this movement to make this intervention not so much because of the substance of the situation that we are discussing under this agenda item, to which I may recur at a later point, but because, if the Council is to function in the way in which its founding fathers intended and to which we were called to our responsibilities by the Secretary-General's annual report on the work of the Organization, we really must use words honestly.

130. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I shall now make a statement in my capacity as the representative of FRANCE.

131. Yesterday the Council heard the statement made by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Co-operation of the Government of Chad [2463rd meeting].

Need we recall that his is the Government of a State Member of the United Nations, that his Government has been recognized by the OAU and by the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, that its representative is seated here at the United Nations and that the Council itself recognized its legitimacy in its statement of 6 April last [S/15688].

132. The legitimate Government of Chad has unceasingly expressed its intention to settle by peaceful means the disputes it may have with its neighbours. Now, it has just become the victim of outright aggression by a foreign Power, evidence of which has been clearly submitted, being subjected, in particular, to repeated heavy bombing directed not only at military targets but also at the civilian populations, resulting in many casualties.

133. The military aggression to which Chad has fallen victim is of course followed by its aftermath of victims and destruction. The moving and often staggering description of these events has been provided to me by the Secretary of State of Chad upon his arrival in New York.

134. In the face of the tragic nature and the extreme seriousness of the situation, the Government of Chad, headed by Mr. Hisssein Habré, appealed to the French Government for implementation of the provisions of the co-operation agreement signed by the two countries in 1976.

135. In keeping with the commitments it undertook at that time, and as it was duty bound to do, France responded to this appeal according to the conditions that had been laid down, by adapting and apportioning its assistance in a manner consistent with the fighting.

136. By respecting its commitments and shouldering its responsibilities, the French Government is pursuing no other goal but that of allowing Chad to exercise fully its right to self-defence, in full conformity with international law, as enshrined in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations.

137. Indeed, France hopes that the problems of Chad may be resolved peacefully among Chadians. Hence, we believe that any foreign intervention directed against the Government of Chad must come to an end and, consequently, that armed intervention from outside must cease. Such intervention could lead to internationalization of the situation, something which France has always wished to avoid. It is in this way that it will be possible for the OAU once again to play its rightful role in this issue, in accordance with the resolution adopted by the Heads of State and Government at the nineteenth session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU, held at Addis Ababa last June,⁴ a resolution inviting the two parties at war today, which are named in it, to seek through negotiation a solution of their dispute within the framework of the *Ad Hoc* Committee of mediation, established by the OAU.

138. The Government of Chad has urgently appealed to the Security Council, the organ primarily responsible for

the maintenance of international peace and security. This appeal must be taken into very serious consideration.

139. I now resume my functions as PRESIDENT.

140. The time is now 1.05 p.m. It was agreed yesterday that the debate on the complaint by Chad would be considered at this morning's meeting and that this afternoon we would resume our consideration of the Libyan complaint. I understand that the representatives of Chad, the Soviet Union and the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya have all asked to speak on the present item. As everyone knows, I have invited the members of the Council and the Secretary-General to a luncheon; hence I believe it might be more consistent with the way we should act towards the Secretary-General and representatives for us to meet at 3.30 this afternoon in order to hear these three speakers.

141. I believe the representative of the Soviet Union would like to speak on the proposal I have just made, and I call on him on this point.

142. Mr. OVINNIKOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*interpretation from Russian*): Mr. President, I think that as an objective person you will allow me to speak in response to the statement just made by the representative of the United Kingdom.

143. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): My only concern is to ensure that the debates may remain within the time-limits set yesterday, bearing in mind also what I have just recalled. So I believe it would be more appropriate for us to resume at 3.30 this afternoon, for I do not see why I should treat differently the representatives of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, the Soviet Union and Chad.

144. Nevertheless, if the representative of the Soviet Union has but a few words to say, I shall not deprive him of the pleasure of saying them.

145. I call on the representative of the Soviet Union.

146. Mr. OVINNIKOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*interpretation from Russian*): When I listened to the statement of the representative of the United Kingdom, I was amazed at how the member countries of NATO pass the football from one to the other. It seems the representative of the United States was exhausted enough by the fight to allow Sir John to enter the game full of fresh vigour after his vacation. I must say that the representative of the United Kingdom did not deny that the policy of the West in Africa was one of dividing Africa into spheres of influence. Indeed, it would be difficult to deny it now after yesterday's acknowledgement of it by the representative of the supreme power, the United States. However, the United Kingdom representative tried to attribute these intentions of dividing the world into spheres of influence to some one else and of course immediately departed from the agenda of the Council.

147. I shall speak strictly on the agenda item. If we are talking about spheres of influence in Africa, this tradition-

ally is the policy of the United Kingdom. The United Kingdom divided Africa into spheres of influence, giving itself the biggest chunks. Nor did the United Kingdom want to leave Africa voluntarily. The Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Sir Winston Churchill, said that he had not become Prime Minister to preside over the dismemberment of the British Empire, and we saw the atrocities perpetrated by the United Kingdom in Africa when it did not wish to leave Africa. Suffice it to recall what the British colonists did in Kenya.

148. Lastly, I take today's statement by the United Kingdom representative as a manifestation of that country's renewed interest in imperialist spheres of influence in Africa.

149. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I shall now suspend this meeting until 3.30 p.m.

150. I recall that the Council agreed to resume consideration of the complaint by the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya today at 4 p.m. We will resume its consideration immediately after we complete our list of speakers on the complaint by Chad this afternoon.

The meeting was suspended at 1.15 p.m. and resumed at 4.20 p.m.

151. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I call on the representative of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

152. Mr. BURWIN (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) (*interpretation from Arabic*): Yesterday and again today I asked to be called upon to exercise my right of reply, but regrettably I was not able to do so because the meeting was adjourned. Since I am making a statement now, I should like to present the following observations.

153. Hissein Habré's spokesman stated that his presence here was an indication of legitimacy, but we say that one of the reasons for raising the question of the situation in Chad was to endow Habré's régime with legitimacy by having the Council consider the question. The second reason was to obtain an opportunity to extend the virulent media campaign that is being waged by the United States Administration, the Zionist organizations and South Africa against the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, using Mr. Habré as a tool for that campaign. The Libyan Arab Jamahiriya pursues a non-aligned policy and supports liberation movements, especially those against the two racist régimes in South Africa and Palestine. That will certainly not please the United States.

154. We should like to repeat: if Mr. Hissein Habré is popular in Chad, why is it necessary for him to be guarded in N'Djamena by thousands of troops from the United States, France, Zaïre and by European mercenaries? Why are certain eastern areas under his control guarded by troops and mercenaries from the Sudan that have left Khartoum to be guarded by Egyptian troops who are there to protect the régime from the fury of the

Sudanese people? Those mercenaries and Sudanese forces were organized and transported to Chad with the help of the United States.

155. Who was it that occupied Abéché and Oum Chalouba? None other than the Chad nationalist forces under the leadership of Goukouni Weddey.

156. The situation in Chad serves only to justify the return of the colonial Powers to Africa in order to pursue their policies of hegemony. The tragedy of Chad is a direct consequence of French colonialism, under which the people of Chad have languished, as well as a result of the continuation of France's policy of intervention.

157. We wonder about the statement concerning the sending of 680 paratroopers from France for the sole purpose of training, since all available information indicates that the forces of Hissein Habré do not exceed 3,000 men, who are outside N'Djamena. It seems that in the French military system it is necessary for every four soldiers to have one member for training. The sending of those troops cannot be viewed within the framework of the agreement of co-operation between France and Chad and is nothing but stark military intervention in the civil war which is taking place. Why did the French troops not intervene to stand by the Transitional National Union Government led by Goukouni Weddey when he was fighting against Hissein Habré? Why did the French Government state that it would not furnish any help to Chad before the withdrawal of the Libyan troops which were in Chad, at the formal request of a legitimate Government and according to a treaty with this Government? Why did France provide Hissein Habré with equipment and *matériel*? It was so that Habré could usurp authority after the departure of the Libyan troops. The information available to us confirms the fact that French troops were sent to Chad to lead the troops of Zaïre in their push towards the north of Chad in order to confront the forces of the Transitional National Union Government, after Hissein Habré lost most of his troops and had only a handful of mercenaries left.

158. Mr. President, I should like to comment now on the statement that you made in your capacity as President of the Council. I wonder whether your statement had been approved beforehand by all the members of the Council. As President of the Council, you can quote any statement or resolution of the Council, but it is not your right to give any explanations of those quotations or statements in your capacity as President of the Council and as an impartial person. You can, of course, freely express the point of view of your country as the representative of France and we would respect it.

159. I should like to state here that my country does not recognize the observations that you made yesterday as President; we consider those observations to represent the point of view of France only.

160. In this respect, would a statement from the Council mentioning African countries and South Africa mean that

the racist régime in South Africa is a legitimate one for those countries? Of course not.

161. Consequently, the Council does not compel any State to recognize the Government of another, because that is the sovereign right of States, and we in Libya recognize but one Government in Chad—that is, the Transitional National Union Government, led by Goukouni Weddey.

162. Our position concerning the situation in Chad is clear in this respect. However, we are still neutral, as far as the civil war is concerned. We still stand on the side of national reconciliation on the basis of the Lagos Accord [S/14678, annex I], which has the blessing of the OAU. We still support the efforts of the OAU in this respect. We call for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Chad and for a halt in the flow of arms to the rebel, Hissein Habré.

163. We must rectify the records of the Council with regard to claims of the downing of a Libyan aircraft and the capture of its pilot. The pilot of that aircraft was actually a member of the Libyan Aviation Club; his aircraft was downed over Chad territory in 1981, and Hissein Habré was able to imprison him. This news was actually disseminated by N'Djamena Radio and the Sudanese news agency at the time. Hissein Habré then freed that pilot from prison in order to support his allegation about Libya's intervention.

164. I should like now to refer to those statements in the Council attempting to conceal the facts and portray this incident as a dispute between Libya and Chad. Otherwise, how could these delegations speak of a Libyan intervention that has not been proved so far and avoid speaking of the presence of foreign troops belonging to various States that explicitly declared their intervention in Chad? But it seems that principles have been ignored because of greed for American dollars and pressure from the United States, France and other countries.

165. The Chadian people is not in need of imperialist interventions. It needs a sincere initiative towards achieving its national reconciliation and putting an end to the rebellion led by Hissein Habré, supported by mercenaries from all over the globe.

166. As for the observations and criticisms of the representative of Zaïre, he made inappropriate references to thievery and thieves. In this respect I shall quote from certain Western sources, which will serve to give him a crystal-clear answer.

167. From *Time* magazine of 10 January 1983:

"... much of the loan money that flowed in was not spent wisely ...

"Worse still, corruption percolates through the régime. 'It is widely accepted', a U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff report completed in March noted, 'that he [Mobutu] has managed to amass a

legendary personal fortune at the nation's expense.' Kickbacks are the order of the day, with the President's cronies controlling significant slices of the economy. 'It's the greed of a handful at the top that keeps this country in an economic mess', says one Belgian businessman. Complains one of Zaire's former financial advisers: 'We had great hopes but they are all gone. It is a country that makes people dream and then makes them go crazy.'

"Businessmen are not the only people to despair. In 1978, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) sent Erwin Blumenthal, formerly a top official of West Germany's Bundesbank, to take over as the director of Zaire's central bank. *Time* has obtained a copy of the secret report he wrote to IMF Managing Director Jacques de Larosière early last year. In it, Blumenthal describes refusing high officials' requests for bundles of cash of up to \$50,000, finding a government payment of \$4 million to a Belgian professor who was the guardian of Mobutu's son, and uncovering a discrepancy of \$32.6 million between what was supposed to be in the government's bank accounts abroad and the money that was actually there.

"Blumenthal left Zaire in 1979. But he continued his investigations in Western Europe, obtaining from former Zairian Prime Minister Nguza Karl-I-Bond, now living in exile, the estimate that Mobutu's private fortune exceeds \$4 billion. Most of it was said to be held in Swiss bank accounts . . ."

168. From *The Wall Street Journal* of 26 June 1980:

"David J. Gould, a University of Pittsburgh professor who did a 1977 field study here, says he interviewed businessmen large and small who were paying a total of \$100,000 a month in bribes to the regional commissioner of Shaba Province. The man's salary was \$2,000 a month.

"So the commissioners stay loyal. High-ranking officers in the military are said to have their arrangements too. At the lower levels of the military, soldiers are more or less licensed to steal."*

169. From *The New York Times* of 11 November 1979:

"Essay question for student diplomats: 'You are the ambassador to a large, once-prosperous African State run by a dictator installed with the help of the Central Intelligence Agency. Widely feared, he presides over corruption and mismanagement which have brought his people to the brink of starvation' . . .

" . . .

"The economy is a shambles, with foreign debts of nearly \$4 billion, more than 100 per cent inflation and an annual *per capita* income under \$160 . . . His many critics charge the President with personal corruption,

favouritism to cronies and to members of his minority tribe, profligate spending and indifference to the plight of his people. 'He has been head of State for 14 years, and how many hospitals has he built? Not one', said a Zairian businessman.

"Instability is a way of life. Twice in the past three years Zairian exiles in Angola—supported by Cuba and Russia—invaded Shaba. The Zairian Army pilfered and ran. Only with the help of Belgian, French . . . [and other] troops were the invaders repulsed."*

170. That is the subject of thievery and corruption imputed to the leadership in my country by the representative of Zaire. In this respect I wish to say that Colonel Muammar Qaddafi, Leader of the Revolution in my country, does not have special private accounts in Switzerland or in any other country and does not tour the capitals of Europe and America accompanied by concubines, but devotes his time to the interests of the Revolution and of his people.

171. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The Council has heard the statement of the representative of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, who challenged the comments of the President of the Council. This is a serious matter. Nobody has the right to call into question the acts of the Council.

172. As President of the Council yesterday, I only reminded you of the reality of the acts of the Council, and all members of the Council can bear witness to this. Consequently I cannot possibly, as President of the Council, accept the statement made on this subject by the representative of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya.

173. I should also like to point out that a statement of this kind made in a debate on a complaint by the Government of Chad calling into question the legitimacy of that Government leads to an absolute internal contradiction.

174. Speaking now as the representative of FRANCE.

175. I will not dignify with a reply any shameless falsehoods that call into question acts of the Council.

176. I now resume my function of PRESIDENT.

177. Mr. NGUAYILA MBELA KALANDA (Zaire) (*interpretation from French*): We have just heard the representative of interventionist Libya, which is meddling in the affairs of Chad and which wants to reach out and meddle in the affairs of Zaire too.

178. I challenge anyone who read the verbatim record to show me any reference on my part to "theft" in Libya. Yet the representative of Libya comes to the Council like a snake cut in half—the head on one half and the tail on the other. The head cries out: "I am going to bite you, I am going to bite you"—even though a dead snake cannot bite. That is all the Libyan representative is doing; he has no arguments. He talks about corruption in my country,

* Quoted in English by the speaker.

about foreign accounts, the unequal distribution of goods and property in my country. I ask him simply: Are Zairian troops in Chad at the request of the Government at N'Djamena or not? What about the Libyan troops: Are they in Chad at the request of the N'Djamena Government? He will not be able to reply to that. I will give him time to think it over; perhaps he will send a cable to Tripoli so that we can have a reply.

179. There was talk of hunger and famine in Zaire, of a debt of \$4 billion. I do not know whether he has followed the evolution of the world's economy or reads the reports of the IMF to learn how many countries have debts of that magnitude. Is Zaire at the top of the list? Does he want to be given a list of the African countries that are in debt? What about friends of Libya? How much does Libya give those countries to pay off their debts? Evidently, it is the Islamic Legion. In fact, he is right.

180. Reference was made to a mansion built by my President with national funds. I thought he wanted to talk about Libyan funds and not about national funds, but I shall not reply to him: it would not be of any use.

181. He likes to use newspaper clippings, as he did yesterday, from certain years. Well, in 1979, which is a year he mentioned, did Zaire interfere in the affairs of Chad? When he spoke of what was described in a 1979 article in *The New York Times*, was that supposed to mean that Zaire was in Chad then to occupy a part of it, looking for money there—that because we have debts we went to Chad to exploit that country's riches? He cannot say that. We are paying our debts. As my representative said on 3 August, "when you want to stop a naked madman, you must be dressed yourself because if you are not you will be considered a madman yourself" [2462nd meeting, para. 62].

182. That, I think, is my last response to the representative of Libya.

183. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The representative of Chad has asked to speak in exercise of the right of reply, and I now call on him.

184. Mr. BARMA (Chad) (*interpretation from French*): Indeed, the representative of Libya mocks the Council, which, under the terms of the Charter of the United Nations, however, is the principal body responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security. I think that it is serious that the representative of a Member State of the United Nations should be able with impunity to mock such a prestigious body charged with maintaining peace the world over. Newspapers are read by everyone and the representative of Libya is not telling us anything new by reading out selected cuttings. I do not think the members of the Council need the representative of Colonel Qaddafi to play the role of press attaché. I think that all missions here in New York have their own press attachés who deal with this.

185. This being the case, it will be recalled that when the representative of Qaddafi yesterday ran out of arguments he confined himself [2463rd meeting] to reciting out of hand, as he has just now done again, a series of articles from United States newspapers which, he claims, deny that his country has directly intervened militarily in Chad. As far as I am concerned, I will not subject the Council to such a boring exercise. I will simply quote a small passage from an article in this morning's edition of *The New York Times* which says exactly the opposite of what he claimed. The passage reads as follows:

"A Western military expert said that 50 Libyan planes had strafed the oasis [of Aouzou], pinning down its defenders, as troops supported by armoured vehicles pushed toward the town."*

186. This is what it says in *The New York Times*, which, according to the representative of Libya, should be denying the participation of his country in the genocide it is now committing against the people of Chad. The article casts a bright light on the overt, unprovoked aggression by Libya against Chad.

187. I turn now to the matter of the Libyan aeroplane which was shot down on 5 August 1983, at Faya-Largeau, whose pilot was presented to the public on 8 August at a press conference. During that press conference, the pilot stated clearly before the international community that his plane had been shot down at Faya-Largeau during a 12-plane bombing raid on Faya-Largeau [S/15928, annex]. The Libyan representative should not come here and mock us by echoing his country's official press agency, which said that the pilot had supposedly been captured during fighting in 1981. Where did this fighting take place in 1981? And why would the Government of Chad present the pilot to the public only now if the fighting was in 1981? Did this pilot tell the members of the press where he had been kept for those two years? No, I do not believe this is a serious matter. It is well known that he was a member of an aviation club and that he was a combat pilot who had been trained in a number of countries. How could he not be a military man? He named the countries where he had been trained. He also stated that he had been taken prisoner during the Faya-Largeau operation during the present month of August. We can make available recordings of this press conference; they prove the level of the Libyan representative's mendacity.

188. This morning the representative of the Soviet Union too made a statement concerning the complaint of Chad. I did not really intend to reply to his statement, but I should like to point out to him that the Soviet Union at present maintains military bases in a dozen countries, and that it is basing its nuclear missiles in countries bordering on the West and stockpiling large numbers of MiGs, artillery and other conventional weapons in countries where it has been able to impose its authority so as to make them the spearheads of social-imperialism. The Soviet Union will tell the Council that this is merely the result of agreements of friendship and defence it has concluded with those countries. We would reply to it, then, that it is the result of those same types of agreements that

* Quoted in English by the speaker.

we have appealed to friendly countries, which have been kind enough to respond to our appeals. We are not surprised that the Soviet Union can completely gloss over the genocide now being committed by Libya against the people of Chad. It's a secret to no one that Colonel Qaddafi is only stirring up trouble on behalf of Soviet expansionism in Africa.

189. I should like to refer to the statement made by the representative of Benin. As he unfortunately did last March the representative of Benin, my brother, Mr. Soglo, has once again taken up the cause of Libya, and he is the only one to do so. This is understandable once we know the nature of the relations between his country and Libya. We can see that Colonel Kérékou, who came to power and stays in power by force, and his representative might advocate the use of force to destabilize Chad. This is truly an unfortunate, sad thing from an African country.

190. At any rate, the representative of Benin is not in a very good position to speak of legitimacy, and the Council is not here to discuss the legitimacy of the Government of Chad. That is a question which does not arise here; the very serious matter before the Council concerns open aggression in flagrant violation of the Charter of the United Nations, of the Charter of the Organization of African Unity and of the principles of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries. That is what the Council is discussing, not legitimacy. The representative of Benin has been unable to call into question the legitimacy of the Government of Chad either in the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries or in the OAU, so he ought not to try to do so here in an attempt to divert the attention of world public opinion from the real problem: Libyan aggression. The Council should take appropriate steps to put an end to that aggression.

191. President Kérékou, his tutor Qaddafi and their *maître-chanteur* here—an instrument of blackmail, unfortunately: the representative of Benin—have no business trying to teach us lessons about legitimacy. All Africa—generous, humanitarian Africa—is ashamed of the representative of Benin and history will judge him and the other so-called revolutionaries.

192. As we have already stated, Libya excels in the art of falsehood and diversionary tactics. If lies were eliminated, there would be no more Qaddafi, and no more of his representatives.

193. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The representative of the Ivory Coast has asked to make a statement. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

194. Mr. ESSY (Ivory Coast) (*interpretation from French*): In his statement yesterday evening [2463rd meeting], the representative of Libya observed that the Ivory

Coast is experiencing economic difficulties and asserted that its position regarding the question of Chad was formed by some sort of promises of assistance from the United States. I should like simply to ask the representative of Libya to name some developing countries—or even developed countries—which are not experiencing economic difficulties right now. We could, as a matter of fact, begin with Libya itself.

195. Libya was a very poor country, and we know that its financial resources are not the result of any effort on the part of its people. That is the reason why it can be so lavish in its generosity to others. The Ivory Coast knows the value of effort.

196. The Ivory Coast co-operates with all countries of the world: with Western countries, with the United States and with others—we have no reproach to make—including Arab countries which co-operate in the building of hydro-electric dams in the Ivory Coast. Moreover, the Ivory Coast is not a country which accepts political strings when it receives co-operation.

197. There is a wise man in Africa who says there are two kinds of incurable madness. The first is that of a rich man who suddenly becomes poor: he becomes incurably insane. The second is that of a very poor man, who has no resources whatsoever and suddenly becomes a millionaire or a billionaire: he becomes incurably insane. Unfortunately, it is the second case which has occurred on African soil, which explains the support for so-called national liberation movements in Asia, in Latin America—more or less everywhere.

198. I think, as the representative of Chad said yesterday [*ibid.*], Libya is trying to divert the Council's attention from the true subject of debate. How can this man who left N'Djamena without even a suitcase and apparently crossed the frontier explain that a few months later he returns with a squadron of aircraft, MiGs, and an armada of tanks? That is what we should like to find out here.

199. I think everything is quite clear. What we have to do is identify an act of aggression. I think there is irrefutable proof of that, of Libyan aggression against Chad. What we are asking is that this be recognized by the Council and that we not put on the same footing the aggressor and the victim of aggression.

The meeting rose at 5.05 p.m.

NOTES

¹ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-seventh Session, Plenary Meetings*, 32nd meeting, para. 210.

² United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 479, No. 6947.

³ A/36/534, annex II, resolution AHG/Res.102 (XVIII)/Rev.1.

⁴ A/38/312, annex, resolution AHG/Res.106 (XIX).

⁵ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-seventh Session, Supplement No. 1* (A/37/1).

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