



SECURITY COUNCIL OFFICIAL RECORDS

THIRTY-EIGHTH YEAR

2448th MEETING: 27 MAY 1983

NEW YORK

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NOTE

Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures. Mention of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United Nations document.

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The resolutions of the Security Council, numbered in accordance with a system adopted in 1964, are published in yearly volumes of *Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council*. The new system, which has been applied retroactively to resolutions adopted before 1 January 1965, became fully operative on that date.

2448th MEETING

Held in New York on Friday, 27 May 1983, at 4 p.m.

President: Mr. UMBA di LUTETE (Zaire).

Present: The representatives of the following States: China, France, Guyana, Jordan, Malta, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Poland, Togo, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Zaire, Zimbabwe.

Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/2448)

1. Adoption of the agenda

2. The situation in Namibia:

Letter dated 12 May 1983 from the Permanent Representative of Mauritius to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/15760);

Letter dated 13 May 1983 from the Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/15761)

The meeting was called to order at 4.40 p.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

The situation in Namibia:

Letter dated 12 May 1983 from the Permanent Representative of Mauritius to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/15760);

Letter dated 13 May 1983 from the Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/15761)

1. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): In accordance with the decision taken at the 2439th meeting, I invite the representative of Mauritius to take a place at the Council table.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Maudave (Mauritius) took a place at the Council table.

2. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): In accordance with the decision taken at the 2439th meeting, I invite the President of the United Nations Council for Namibia and the other members of the delegation of the Council to take places at the Security Council table.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Lusaka (President of the United Nations Council for Namibia) and the other members of the delegation took places at the Council table.

3. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): In accordance with the decision taken at the 2439th meeting, I invite Mr. Sam Nujoma, President of the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), to take a place at the Council table.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Nujoma took a place at the Council table.

4. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): In accordance with decisions taken at previous meetings on this item [2439th to 2444th, 2446th and 2447th meetings], I invite the representatives of Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Australia, Bangladesh, Barbados, Benin, Botswana, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gabon, the Gambia, the German Democratic Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, Guinea, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Japan, Kenya, Kuwait, Liberia, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Malaysia, Mali, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, the Niger, Nigeria, Panama, Qatar, Romania, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, the Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, the United Republic of Tanzania, the Upper Volta, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yugoslavia and Zambia to take the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Zarif (Afghanistan), Mr. Hadj Azzout (Algeria), Mr. de Figueiredo (Angola), Mr. Muñiz (Argentina), Mr. Joseph (Australia), Mr. Hashim (Bangladesh), Mr. Moseley (Barbados), Mr. Adjibade (Benin), Mr. Mogwe (Botswana), Mr. Tsvetkov (Bulgaria), Mr. Pelletier (Canada), Mr. Trucco (Chile), Mr. Malmierca (Cuba), Mr. Moushoutas (Cyprus), Mr. Suja (Czechoslovakia), Mr. Al-Ashtal (Democratic Yemen), Mr. Khalil (Egypt), Mr. Ibrahim (Ethiopia), Mr. Davin (Gabon), Mr. Blain (Gambia), Mr. Ott (German Democratic Republic), Mr. van Well (Federal Republic of Germany), Mr. Kaba (Guinea), Mr. Rácz (Hungary), Mr. Rao (India), Mr. Kusumaatmadja (Indonesia), Mr. Shearer (Jamaica), Mr. Kuroda (Japan), Mr. Wabuge (Kenya), Mr. Abulhassan (Kuwait), Mrs. Jones (Liberia), Mr. Burwin (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), Tan Sri Zainal Abidin (Malaysia), Mr. Traore (Mali), Mr. Marin Bosch (Mexico), Mr. Erdenechuluun (Mongolia), Mr. Mrani Zentar (Morocco), Mr. Chissano (Mozambique), Mr. Oumarou (Niger), Mr.

Bolokor (Nigeria), Mr. Cabrera (Panama), Mr. Jamal (Qatar), Mr. Marinescu (Romania), Mr. Niassé (Senegal), Ms. Gonthier (Seychelles), Mr. Stevens (Sierra Leone), Mr. Adan (Somalia), Mr. von Schirnding (South Africa), Mr. Fonseka (Sri Lanka), Mr. El-Fattal (Syrian Arab Republic), Mr. Slim (Tunisia), Mr. Kirca (Turkey), Mr. Owiny (Uganda), Mr. Salim (United Republic of Tanzania), Mr. Bassolé (Upper Volta), Mr. Martini Urdaneta (Venezuela), Mr. Le Kim Chung (Viet Nam), Mr. Mojsov (Yugoslavia) and Mr. Goma (Zambia) took the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber.

5. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I should like to inform the members of the Council that I have received a letter from the representative of Grenada in which he requests to be invited to take part in the discussion of the item on the Council's agenda. In accordance with the usual practice, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite him to take part in the discussion without the right to vote, under the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Taylor (Grenada) took a place at the side of the Council chamber.

6. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The first speaker is Mr. Salim Ahmed Salim, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the United Republic of Tanzania, to whom I extend a welcome. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make a statement.

7. Mr. SALIM (United Republic of Tanzania): Mr. President, I am grateful to you and your colleagues in the Council for allowing us to participate in this important series of meetings devoted to consideration of the question of Namibian independence. I wish to express to you personally our sincere congratulations on your assumption of the high office of President of the Council for this month. It is a matter of great satisfaction to us in Tanzania that a distinguished son of the sisterly and neighbourly State of Zaire should be President at a time when the United Nations is once again addressing itself to a problem of great importance to our continent and to the international community as a whole.

8. On a more personal level, I am happy to see both the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Zaire and the Permanent Representative of Zaire occupying the position of President in the present deliberations of the Council. I am confident that your rich diplomatic experience and your recognized talents will be put to full use in steering the current proceedings of the Council.

9. This is the sixty-eighth year of South African military occupation of Namibia. It is the seventeenth year since the General Assembly terminated South Africa's Mandate over the Territory and assumed direct responsibility [*resolution 2145 (XXI) of 27 October 1966*]. Yet, despite numerous resolutions of the General Assembly and the Council calling for the withdrawal of the illegal occupying forces of South Africa, the people of Namibia continue to lan-

guish under the tyranny of foreign occupation. Indeed, despite the international consensus that has prevailed in support of Namibia's independence, freedom continues to elude the people of Namibia. Thus the armed struggle forced upon SWAPO, the representative of the Namibian people, has had to be escalated as hopes for a negotiated settlement have continued to dwindle. These hopes have diminished, not for lack of a political framework for negotiations but because of the deliberate efforts of the South African régime to obstruct the peaceful path. Regrettably, this obstruction has also been made possible because of the policies and actions of some Members of the Organization.

10. This series of Council meetings on Namibia is taking place at a time when the efforts of the international community to bring about a peaceful solution are at an impasse. The Council has been convened precisely to address itself to this impasse and how to overcome it.

11. The adoption in 1976 of Council resolution 385 (1976) was hailed as an important opportunity to stop bloodshed in Namibia. To that end, SWAPO and South Africa were called upon to co-operate with the United Nations in the implementation of that resolution, which would have enabled the Namibian people to determine freely their own future through elections under the supervision and control of the United Nations. It is a matter of public record that, while SWAPO pledge its full support for that resolution, South Africa not only refused to do so but continued its repressive activities against the people of Namibia and proceeded to create new *faits accomplis*.

12. The significance of resolution 385 (1976), *inter alia*, lay in the fact that it inspired the initiatives which led to the adoption by the Council of what is now known as the United Nations plan for Namibia. The adoption of Council resolution 435 (1978), containing the plan, ushered in one of the busiest periods in the diplomatic efforts on Namibia. If the closeness to independence of a colonial Territory were measured in terms of the frequency of meetings and diplomatic shuttles and the number of initiatives, Namibia was close to independence on the adoption of that resolution. Indeed, Namibia should have been independent years ago.

13. Unfortunately, it has also been a period of a succession of disappointments. For some of us who have been involved in both private and public consultations leading to and following the adoption of the plan, the experience has been painful indeed. Initiated by countries closely associated with South Africa and therefore with the most leverage and capacity to ensure compliance by South Africa, the plan, which was so detailed, could not but have convinced the world community, as it did, that there was now a serious intention to ensure the decolonization of the international Territory of Namibia.

14. Indeed, the history of the events pursuant to the adoption of the plan is too well known to the Council to need detailed elaboration. At every crucial moment of

the negotiations when the international community was given to believe that the implementation of the plan was imminent, the South African régime invariably came up with new demands and pretexts aimed at effectively obstructing the way to the implementation of the plan. The result has been that we have been subjected to one frustrating experience after another. Throughout these frustrating experiences it has been SWAPO and Africa that have invariably been urged to be realistic and understanding with regard to the demands of the South African régime. Yet with every concession made by SWAPO, supported by the African States, South Africa sought more; and with every breakthrough that transpired, new impediments were created. The Western Five are perfectly aware of this.

15. The examples are many. One is the pre-implementation meeting at Geneva in January 1981. On 19 September 1980, the Secretary-General wrote to the South African authorities proposing that a United Nations mission should visit South Africa to resolve outstanding difficulties [S/14184]. This mission spent a week in South Africa at the end of October 1980.

16. Technical matters appeared to have been resolved and the main obstacle, according to the South African régime, was so-called lack of confidence. The Secretary-General therefore presented, on 24 November 1980, a report [S/14266] to the Council proposing that he convene a pre-implementation meeting to take place from 7 to 14 January 1981. According to the Secretary-General's report, only two outstanding matters were identified: lack of confidence and the composition of the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG). The proposal was acceptable to all parties and arrangements were made for the pre-implementation meeting to be convened at Geneva.

17. That meeting was opened by the Secretary-General on 7 January 1981. In welcoming the two delegations, those of SWAPO and of South Africa, the Secretary-General stressed that the problems remaining related very largely in one way or another to confidence, and especially to confidence in the future. He continued by referring to the settlement proposals and arrangements for a cease-fire and confirmed that the main aim was to get agreement to set that process in train, which would allow for the achievement of Namibian independence before the end of 1981. [See S/14333, para. 5.]

18. The President of SWAPO, Mr. Sam Nujoma, declared his readiness to sign a cease-fire and agreed to the immediate implementation of the United Nations plan. But this was not to happen. The South African Administrator-General of Namibia announced on 13 January that they were not prepared to proceed with implementing the plan. The meeting broke up the following day.

19. There was no mistaking the responsibility for the failure of the Geneva talks. All the members of the contact group in one way or another put the blame squarely

on Pretoria. The deputy of the then British Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and leader of the British delegation to the Geneva talks, Sir Ian Gilmour, told the House of Commons in London on 7 May: "There is no question but that the failure of the conference in Geneva was the fault of the South African Government." South Africa not only torpedoed the meeting at Geneva, but also proceeded with unprovoked attacks against Angola.

20. In the light of this defiance, the African States turned to the Council. We did so conscious of the Council's responsibilities and also in the hope that those members of the Council that were the authors of the plan would fulfil their responsibilities and support Council action aimed at ensuring the implementation of resolution 435 (1978). When the Council met in April 1981, the African countries did not fail to impress upon the three Western permanent members of this body their own responsibility in working for the scrupulous implementation of a plan of which they and their colleagues of Canada and the Federal Republic of Germany are the authors. To our profound regret, the Council was prevented from taking appropriate action owing to the triple veto of the three Western permanent members of the Council.

21. These three major Western Powers chose, therefore, to protect South Africa at this crucial stage in the struggle for Namibian independence. Inevitably, these vetoes were interpreted by the *apartheid* régime as guaranteed protection for South Africa, irrespective of what action it took over Namibia. The Pretoria régime responded immediately. Plans were put into operation for a major invasion of southern Angola. Initial attacks took place in July 1981 and were followed by a full-scale invasion of southern Angola on 23 August. Parts of southern Angola have been under continuous occupation since then.

22. This invasion was not an isolated act. The South Africans had invaded Angola before independence in order to stop the coming to power of a Government which was committed to the welfare of its own people and to the liberation of southern Africa as a whole. On 4 May 1978, South African forces massacred over 700 Namibian refugees at Kassinga, within a few days of South Africa's agreeing to the United Nations plan. In January 1981, they launched a major attack against the Angolan army at Cuamato, near the border with Namibia, timed to coincide with the break-up of the Geneva pre-implementation meeting. The August 1981 invasion, however, represented a major escalation of the *apartheid* régime's war against Angola and against Africa as a whole. It can now be seen as an essential component in a wider strategy of South Africa and some of its supporters to deny the people of Namibia genuine independence and to reverse other victories achieved by the forces of African freedom in the region in the previous decade.

23. All this was taking place during the advent of a new Administration in the United States. We were then told

to be patient and exercise restraint while the new Administration was in the process of reviewing its policies on the southern African situation. The substance of that review was soon to be clear and official. On the one hand, the United States had decided to open a new chapter of co-operation with the South African régime within the context of the so-called constructive engagement, and, on the other, there was to be a review of the United Nations plan.

24. Whatever the intention of the policy of constructive engagement, the fact remains that the South African Government has taken this not only as a certificate of respectability for its policies but also as a means of reinforcing its defiance of world opinion, both in its internal policies of aggression against the African people and in its persistent acts of aggression and destabilization against the African States.

25. With respect to the review of the United Nations plan, the series of consultations among the members of the five Western States produced notions such as that of strengthening resolution 435 (1978). In their consultations with us, we expressed our concern that such proposals invited the danger of revising the plan. Such was the concern of the front-line States that, at the meeting of the leaders of the front-line States held at Luanda, in April 1981, the summit expressed its apprehensions at the disquieting signals which suggested that there was an attempt to reverse the sequence of the independence process agreed to in resolution 435 (1978). Conscious of the fact that such an exercise would provide the Pretoria régime with an excuse for more delay, the leaders of the front-line States reaffirmed their firm support for the plan and underlined the urgent need to implement it without further delay, prevarication, qualification or modification. At the same time, they stressed the responsibility of the five Western States to ensure the implementation of the plan and underscored the latter's special obligation to exert the necessary pressure on South Africa to comply with Council resolution 435 (1978).

26. In our consultations with the Western Five we made it clear to them that they were addressing themselves to the wrong issues. What was needed, we pointed out, was not the strengthening of the United Nations plan but rather its implementation. We cautioned that South Africa had one objective in mind, namely, the prevention of free and fair elections, which they knew SWAPO would win. We pointed out that the Pretoria régime is a past master in the game of prevarication and certainly did not need any assistance from the Western Five.

27. Our apprehensions and reservations notwithstanding, the Western Five persistent in their approach. By September 1981 they announced their new initiative. It envisaged three phases. Phase one was designed to commit the parties concerned to a set of constitutional principles for the election of a constituent assembly. Phase two was concerned with specific arrangements for the ceasefire, UNTAG and agreement on United Nations impartiality. Phase three was a public commitment by all parties

to a date for the beginning of the implementation of Council resolution 435 (1978).

28. On 25 October 1981, representatives of the Five flew to Nigeria on the start of a tour of the front-line States and South Africa to present the contact group's constitutional principles. These proposals were widely interpreted as designed to minimize the influence of SWAPO, however great its electoral strength. A key principle stated that "the future Constitution of an independent Namibia would have to be approved by a two-thirds majority of the Constituent Assembly". Another principle stated that "fair representation of the different political groups will be achieved" through an appropriate electoral system.

29. This new initiative represented a deviation from the sequence of events envisaged under the United Nations plan. The United Nations plan envisaged that the Constitution for Namibia would be drawn up by a Constituent Assembly to be elected under United Nations supervision and control. Under this new proposal, however, South Africa was in effect given an effective veto over the framework of the principles of the Constitution for an independent Namibia. Yet, characteristic of Africa's commitment to pursue a negotiated settlement, SWAPO, supported by the rest of the independent States of Africa, decided to respond constructively to the contact group's proposal.

30. A meeting of SWAPO and the front-line States, together with Nigeria and Kenya, held at Dar-es-Salaam on 17 November 1981, prepared a detailed response based on the contact group's proposals. Our objective was to facilitate a quick agreement. We did not, therefore, reject any of the controversial proposals such as those relating to the two-thirds majority, "guarantees of property and minority rights" and so forth. The Five, however, on 17 December published their revised proposals and produced what SWAPO described as a "unique and undemocratic electoral system" based on a principle of "one person, two votes". In a memorandum explaining this electoral procedure it was proposed that each voter would cast two votes, one to be counted on the level of a single national constituency and the other one on the basis of the voter's local constituency. Those with knowledge of the demography of Namibia were convinced that this proposal was aimed at minimizing the electoral influence of SWAPO and at exaggerating the electoral strength of both the white community and the tribally-based "internal" elements.

31. The front-line States, Nigeria and SWAPO firmly rejected these electoral proposals during our meeting on 23 January 1982, and we called for a clear and simple electoral process. The contact group, however, instead of taking these reservations seriously, sent a delegation to Angola in early April to propose that, as an alternative to the "one person, two votes" system, there should be a "one person, one vote, counted twice" type of system. SWAPO responded with a very detailed analysis, pointing out that the proposed electoral process was designed

to deny it a two-thirds majority of the seats in the Constituent Assembly, which would enable Pretoria's allies to block the independence of Namibia by starting an endless debate on the constitution of the Constituent Assembly. The electoral process was designed, SWAPO explained, "on the one hand, to ensure guaranteed representation for the white minorities On the other hand, the choice of such an electoral double standard is aimed at giving Pretoria an opportunity to use and accentuate tribal or ethnic factors against SWAPO." SWAPO's statement went on to say that "the experience of the last six months has shown that the phased approach to the negotiations is being used to force SWAPO, step by step, to make concessions, sometimes irreversible ones, while South Africa is yielding practically nothing."

32. It is pertinent to mention here that, when the Western Five submitted their original constitutional proposals, they suggested an electoral system based on one of three options, namely, a single-member constituency, proportional representation or a combination system. SWAPO accepted two of those systems, namely, proportional representation or a single-member constituency. Yet the Western Five insisted on a complex electoral process using a combination system—which was, incidentally, preferred also by South Africa.

33. That, then, is the background to the meeting of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the front-line States held at Dar-es-Salaam on 4 May 1982, which endorsed the rejection by SWAPO of this complex voting system and agreed that all outstanding issues should be discussed together in a comprehensive manner in order to resolve them as a package. "Such negotiations should take place in a Geneva-type conference under the auspices of the United Nations", we proposed, "but other means of achieving that objective are not excluded". This firm stand resulted in the contact group abandoning its electoral proposals and suggesting that the matter be deferred. But soon new obstacles were to emerge.

34. The Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the five Western States met in Luxembourg on 17 May 1982, a few days after a lengthy meeting in Paris of the African directors of the contact group countries. It is widely assumed that it was at these crucial meetings that agreement was reached on a "summary of points" to be presented by the contact group to all the parties. Representatives of the Western Five visited Africa from 7 to 12 June to present those points. Most of the points concerned the items which had previously been identified as needing to be resolved, that is, the cease-fire, United Nations impartiality and UNTAG. These and no other points were later to form the basis of the proximity talks.

35. These talks were initiated by the contact group in response to the decision of the front-line States and SWAPO on 4 May 1982 to reject the phased approach to the negotiations and also because, according to the British Foreign Office briefing, "the Five have been encouraged by signs of greater flexibility on the part of the South Africans". An impression was thus conveyed that agree-

ment could be reached rapidly on the choice of the electoral system, the deployment of UNTAG and the question of United Nations impartiality. It was claimed that South Africa was no longer raising obstacles. The front-line States and SWAPO, therefore, responded positively at their summit meeting held at Dar-es-Salaam on 14 June and agreed to participate in the proximity talks. Meetings took place during most of July here in New York.

36. From the very start of these proximity talks there was a firm understanding among the contact group, the front-line States, SWAPO and Nigeria that these points would not be considered outside the framework of resolution 435 (1978) and that therefore, in reality, there was nothing particularly new in the subject-matter of the negotiations.

37. South Africa, we were given to understand, wanted to be reassured that when the elections commenced SWAPO would not be at an advantage as compared with other elements within Namibia. For that purpose, South Africa insisted—we were told—that, effective from the time the Security Council adopted the resolution to trigger the implementation of the plan, the United Nations and all bodies within the United Nations system should refrain from providing any assistance to SWAPO and that in their activities those bodies should equally refrain from showing their support for SWAPO. Not to leave any stone unturned, SWAPO went to the extent of making far-reaching concessions.

38. In this spirit, compromises were also made with regard to the constitution and deployment of UNTAG as well as to the logistics of the cease-fire. The Western Five assured us, as the negotiations progressed, that the agreement of South Africa was obtained on the compromises. It was therefore possible, at the conclusion of the negotiations, to visualize the quick implementation of the United Nations plan. This explains the enthusiasm which was generated at that time in the world community.

39. Since then the world has waited anxiously to see the Council meet and UNTAG go into Namibia. But instead the world has been presented with a completely different problem, entirely unrelated to Namibia. For now the international community is aware that one of the members of the Western Five insists on holding the independence of Namibia hostage to the presence of Cuban forces in Angola. Not only is this insistence on linkage of breach of good faith with SWAPO and all those who helped achieve the compromises which SWAPO has conceded to, but it is in fact in defiance of international law and values because, the rights of the Namibian people apart, the linkage is an attempt to interfere in the sovereign right of Angola to determine its friends and determine its security requirements.

40. The idea of linkage, like many other irrelevant issues, came up soon after the meeting of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Five in May 1982, under the heading of the so-called other regional issues. Right from

the start, this irrelevancy was rejected outright, not only by SWAPO and Angola but also by the front-line States. Since then it has also been rejected and condemned by the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the Seventh Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries and the General Assembly. In fact, except for the United States, the members of the contact group themselves have made it clear that they do not believe that the withdrawal of the Cuban forces can be made a pre-condition for a Namibian settlement. An eloquent statement to this effect was made by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of France when he addressed the International Conference in Support of the Struggle of the Namibian People for Independence, in Paris,¹ and a similar position was taken here by the representative of France when he addressed the Council this morning [2447th meeting]. All in all, it is this extraneous issue which has now fundamentally changed the course of the negotiations and is responsible for the total impasse which we now face.

41. If the background which I have related—the saga of the tortuous history of the pursuit of a peaceful settlement—is of any use, it is, I believe, to confirm that the people of Namibia, through their representative, SWAPO, have left no stone unturned and have shown that no serious request for flexibility and patience was beyond their capacity for tolerance. SWAPO has also demonstrated that it is not their preference to resort to armed struggle, with its attendant destruction, if peaceful means for the attainment of their independence are feasible. The Namibian people, under the leadership of SWAPO, have therefore made every concession humanly possible for a peaceful alternative. They have agreed to a prior determination of their constitutional system; they have accommodated a number of demands to be embodied in their constitutional principles. This is, in fact, a determination of their socio-economic system by external parties. They have given the benefit of the doubt to the *apartheid* régime. South Africa demanded that provision be made for so-called trust and confidence. Ridiculous as the demand was, SWAPO agreed to a pre-implementation meeting. South Africa demanded guarantees on a number of issues. SWAPO conceded to those demands. South Africa prevaricated on the electoral system and SWAPO was willing to allow time for South Africa's latest decision.

42. It must therefore be amply evident that, if a peaceful settlement to the Namibian question is not feasible, the burden of responsibility has absolutely nothing to do with SWAPO. It must be placed squarely on somebody else. It is also clearly evident that there is absolutely no legitimate issue whatever pending to which the failure to implement Council resolution 435 (1978) can be attributed.

43. It is, needless to say, obvious that the *apartheid* régime of South Africa is primarily responsible for the colonial situation in Namibia. The policies of South Africa, well known and condemned by the world community, are by nature colonial, aggressive, racist and totally incompatible with the ideals, values and principles of the Organization. If no serious action on the part of the inter-

national community is taken against such a régime and, worse still, if some Members of the Organization extend any form of comfort to it, that régime cannot be expected to work for the efforts of the decolonization of Namibia and the furtherance of any United Nations principles.

44. This history of negotiations is also in some ways an indictment of some of the very authors of the plan for the independence of Namibia. For one of the things we cannot fail to observe is that, whereas it was expected that the members of the contact group should have demonstrated a sense of commitment and urgency, it has always been necessary to remind them that they were the authors of the plan and that it was their initiative which created the momentum for a negotiated settlement. If today we have to repeat this reminder, it will not in any way be for the first time. But what we have been getting in response all along from the Western Five has been a plea for flexibility, a plea for patience and a plea for realism. Indeed, when the Council was forced to meet in 1981 under similar circumstances, that was the response of the Western Five to our appeal.

45. If the Council is to make an important and relevant contribution to eliminating the present impasse, it is important to bear in mind the historical facts. It is particularly important to separate fact from fiction. I should therefore once again like to recapitulate the facts in brief.

46. First, since the adoption of the United Nations plan, the African States have done everything possible to facilitate its implementation. Secondly, throughout the process of negotiations, the African States, in support of SWAPO, have never been found wanting in flexibility and compromise. Thirdly, as a result of the mature and responsible approach adopted by SWAPO and supported by the African States, through the front-line States and Nigeria, the South African régime's pretexts for prevarication have been exhausted. Fourthly, with the exhaustion of those pretexts the introduction of a totally unrelated issue has given that régime a completely new excuse to defy the international community.

47. In this respect, it is important to stress that when the Western Five were preparing their proposals for a settlement, which ultimately emerged as the United Nations plan, this preparation was done in intensive consultations with the South African Government. At no point in the course of these consultations was the issue of the Cuban presence in Angola raised. At any rate, on all occasions when the Western Five had consultations with us prior to the adoption of resolution 435 (1978), they never raised the question of the Cuban presence in Angola. Yet it is a matter of record that resolution 435 (1978) was adopted in 1978 and the Cuban forces had been in Angola since the end of 1975. It is also significant that for three years subsequent to the adoption of resolution 435 (1978) and, indeed, even at the Geneva pre-implementation meetings, the South African régime never raised the question of the Cuban presence in Angola. We therefore wonder why, if the issue of Cuban forces in Angola was such a vital one for the South Afri-

can régime, it was not raised in all the five years we have referred to.

48. Africa and the Non-Aligned Movement have made it very clear that the issue of the Cuban presence is a false issue. It is immoral to hold the independence of Namibia hostage to a matter which is entirely within the sovereign right of an independent African State. We remain convinced that the insistence on linkage is not only counter-productive but inimical to the collective efforts made by the world community, including those by the Western Five, in an attempt to secure the implementation of the United Nations plan.

49. It is incorrect to allege that South Africa has been constructive and co-operative in the efforts to ensure the implementation of the plan for Namibia. Even today South Africa does not accept that its occupation of that Territory is illegal. From the statements made by the leaders of the *apartheid* régime it is obvious that they are not interested in a genuinely free election; for how else can we explain the tantrums they persistently throw in the face of the possibility of an election victory by SWAPO?

50. There is one other element which I am obliged to point out in my statement in view of the events of the past few days. South Africa is facing increasing resistance to its policies of *apartheid* within the country. Its outward manifestation of the arrogance of power is in reality an expression of its vulnerability to the forces of resistance from within South Africa. Those forces represent an irresistible tide of history which cannot be stopped. Talk of non-aggression pacts in that context is therefore a lot of nonsense. For, as the President of the United Republic of Tanzania succinctly put it in his address to the General Assembly in 1970, "It is impossible for us to sign a non-aggression treaty with aggression itself".²

51. The real threat against the South African régime does not come from outside South Africa. The authorities in Pretoria know that perfectly well. It is an accepted fact that South Africa has the most powerful military machine in our continent. No front-line State, no combination of front-line States or, for that matter, of independent States in southern Africa at present, poses a military threat to South Africa. In any case, the struggle for freedom in South Africa can and will be won by the people of South Africa themselves. And in this context South Africa is currently facing mounting opposition to its policies of *apartheid* within the country itself. Indeed, the *apartheid* régime is undergoing a security crisis caused by its own anachronistic internal policies, which have made its own perceived invincibility and security as a military power become vulnerable.

52. It is therefore pure fantasy for the *apartheid* régime to claim that its criminal acts of aggression and destabilization against Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Seychelles, Zambia and Zimbabwe, are provoked by any external threat. Indeed, if it were not for the tragedy caused to thousands of innocent people by these acts of aggression, as well as the havoc and destruction in which

such acts result, one would have laughed at South Africa's spurious claims. For how can one possibly rationalize the claim that the small, proud, peaceful nation of Lesotho could be such a threat to South Africa as to warrant the carnage that that régime imposed on it last December? And how can one possibly assert that the islands of Seychelles, which were the victim of a South African mercenary invasion constitute a threat to the security of South Africa?

53. The arrogance and the threatening language to which we were subjected in the Council by the representative of the *apartheid* régime do not in any way alter the basic fact of South Africa's lawlessness in the region—lawlessness which was most recently manifested on 23 May in the criminal bombing of Maputo by the South African Air Force. The history of the world is rich in information on the fate of tyrants. The authorities in South Africa will be deluding themselves if they believe they can fare any better.

54. We have come to the Council because we are seriously concerned at the present impasse on the Namibian question. We are particularly saddened by the fact that what had appeared to be a great opportunity to put an end to the bloodshed in that international Territory through a process of negotiation is tragically slipping away. We seek of the Council no more than a firm commitment to the implementation of the United Nations plan—a plan which the Council itself, in its wisdom, adopted some five years ago.

55. As the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Zambia, my colleague, brother and friend, Mr. Lameck Goma, said a few days ago in the Council [2440th meeting], we have not come here to seek a confrontation with anyone. But we do ask that the Council confront and overcome the challenge with which the *apartheid* régime has faced the international community. For the continued obstruction of the implementation of resolution 435 (1978) is an act of defiance of the Council.

56. It is not just the credibility of the Council that is at stake, not just the suffering of the people of Namibia, but, indeed, the peace and security of the entire southern African region. As the Secretary-General aptly observes in his report, "the settlement of the Namibian question is of overriding importance for the future peace and prosperity of the entire region" [S/15776, para. 20].

57. At this juncture I wish to register the appreciation of my Government for the efforts of the Secretary-General, to bring about the implementation of the United Nations plan. We are inspired by his commitment and very impressed by the lucid and objective report which he has submitted to the Council. As the international community intensifies its efforts to ensure the independence of Namibia, it is most reassuring to note the firm and unequivocal commitment of the Secretary-General to that objective. My Government fully shares and, indeed, endorsed the following assertion of the Secretary-General in his report: "I regard the problem of

Namibia as a special responsibility . . . in view of the unique relationship between the United Nations and the people of Namibia." [*ibid.*] Indeed, the very least that the Council can do is to enhance his role by giving him all possible support in his efforts towards the implementation of the United Nations plan.

58. My statement will not be complete if I do not pay SWAPO a tribute that it so much deserves. For let us not forget that, but for the armed struggle of the Namibian people, under the leadership of SWAPO, conditions would not have been created for efforts to reach a negotiated peaceful settlement. SWAPO deserves every commendation, for the statesmanship it has demonstrated throughout these negotiations, for the patience it has demonstrated and for the extraordinary and indeed the utmost degree of flexibility and accommodation that it has been prepared to show for the sake of a peaceful settlement in the interest of the Namibian people. The United Nations in particular, whose responsibility it is to free Namibia from South Africa, is indebted to SWAPO.

59. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The next speaker is the representative of Ethiopia. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

60. Mr. IBRAHIM (Ethiopia): I am pleased to see this important debate on Namibia presided over by you, Sir, a distinguished son of Africa whose country's struggle for independence from colonial rule uniquely qualifies it to champion the cause of the Namibian people, namely, freedom and independence. We are confident that under your presidency the Council will not only respond to the yearnings of Namibians for freedom and human dignity but will also take meaningful steps to bring to an end the intransigence of the racist oligarchy of South Africa.

61. Through its membership in the League of Nations, the OAU and the Non-Aligned Movement, my country, Ethiopia, has a long-standing and very close association with the question of Namibia. My delegation is therefore participating in this debate to underline the great importance that we attach to the early independence of Namibia and, at the same time, to discharge a responsibility assigned to my country to represent the Non-Aligned Movement in this debate together with 30 other non-aligned States.

62. -Since their very inception, the OAU and the Non-Aligned Movement have championed the cause of the Namibian people. The United Nations, on which the legal responsibility for the Territory rests, has also contributed in no small measure to the reaffirmation and universal recognition of the inalienable right of the Namibian people to freedom and independence. The role played in this regard by both the principal and subsidiary organs of the United Nations can hardly be underestimated. Numerous other intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations have also kept the issue in the forefront of their preoccupations. Indeed, today hardly a week passes without the issue of an official communiqué by

Governments—be it individually, bilaterally or collectively—reaffirming support for and expressing solidarity with the liberation struggle waged by the gallant people of Namibia under the wise and courageous leadership of SWAPO, their sole and authentic representative.

63. All those activities and pronouncements by both Governments and organizations are of course a source of satisfaction and encouragement to all those who stand at the side of the oppressed people of Namibia. Yes, there is no gainsaying the fact that, as a direct result of these efforts, the question of Namibia has been kept high on the international agenda. Yes, people all over the world, including the public in the Western countries are, as a result, increasingly aware of and sympathetic to the cause of the Namibian people. Moreover, material and financial assistance rendered by the international community has enabled SWAPO to sustain the armed struggle ever since 1966. South Africa has also, by and large, been isolated from the family of nations and at present has hardly any contact with the overwhelming majority of States.

64. Yet, the racist régime of South Africa survives—indeed, it thrives—and the people of Namibia still languish under its rule of oppression and exploitation. Through fraudulent elections, unrepresentative institutions and, above all, the introduction of racist laws and decrees, the *apartheid* régime continues in its attempts to perpetuate and even legitimize its occupation of Namibia. Hand in glove with imperialist monopolies and in open defiance of Decree No. 1 for the Protection of the Natural Resources of Namibia, enacted by the United Nations Council for Namibia³ and numerous other decisions, Pretoria exploits avariciously the human and natural resources of Namibia. While, through such exploitative and plundering activities, the racist régime and its collaborators reap super-profits, the present generation of Namibians is deprived of a fair return for its labour and future generations are denied the benefit of their natural heritage. Furthermore, Namibians both inside and outside the Territory are not only denied their political freedom but are also deprived even of the basic right to life and limb. Acts of aggression against Angola and the other States in the region have become all too frequent, thus plunging the entire southern Africa in turmoil. The policy of illegal occupation has also been extended from Namibia into the territory of Angola.

65. That Pretoria has been able to occupy Namibia this long with impunity, in open defiance of the will of the international community and in clear contravention of the rules of international law, must seem rather intriguing at first glance. But to us in Africa the reason for this seemingly curious situation is crystal clear. In two simple but eloquent words, it is Western collaboration. Over the past several decades, Pretoria has enjoyed a very close co-operation with the Western countries. The West has built itself a large stake in the South African economy through direct investment and the provision of credits and loans. Trade between the West and South Africa is allowed to flourish while Western technology in its entirety is put at Pretoria's disposal. Moreover, South

Africa is considered in the West not merely as an active business partner but as a political and military ally as well, perhaps even as the last bastion of "Western civilization" on the African continent. As a result, it should not be difficult to discern where the sympathy of much of the West lies, its verbal condemnation of *apartheid* notwithstanding. That South Africa has both a strong industrial economy and a powerful military machine, with both conventional and possibly even nuclear capabilities the like of which can be found nowhere else in Africa, cannot but be attributed to this long-standing and continuing Western collaboration. Ironically, it was because of this close relationship between the West and Pretoria—and not in spite of it—that SWAPO, Africa and, indeed, the whole world in 1978 accepted the initiative of Canada, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States of America [S/12636] ostensibly to lead Namibia to independence through free and fair elections under the supervision and control of the United Nations.

66. Since that time, all peace-loving and freedom-loving people everywhere have been working for the full and speedy implementation of the plan which resulted from that initiative, whereas the South African régime has left no stone unturned to frustrate, at every stage and turn, this laudable effort. In fact, all the elements in the plan have at one stage or another been raised as thorny topics for negotiation by Pretoria, with the deliberate intention of delaying its implementation. At a time when all the elements have been clarified and agreed upon, Pretoria, pursuing its policy of intransigence and prevarication, now insists on introducing into the consideration of the plan new and totally extraneous issues that have no bearing on the independence question.

67. Since we had known all along that the racist régime was not yet ready or willing to relinquish its hold over Namibia, its delaying tactics do not come as a surprise to us. What surprises us, however, is the singular lack of commitment and political will on the part of the contact group of the five Western countries which initiated the plan and on whose political and economic leverage its implementation was predicated.

68. Not only have the Five failed to press South Africa to co-operate with the United Nations but they are indeed, regrettably, collaborating with Pretoria in its attempt to undermine and modify the United Nations plan. In this connection we cannot help recalling what a member of the contact group, in presenting the settlement proposal and speaking on behalf of all five States, stated at the ninth special session of the General Assembly on 26 April 1978:

"The proposal must be seen as a balanced package, the individual parts of which should neither be changed nor burdened with new conditions so as not to jeopardize the feasibility of the settlement as a whole."⁴

69. The extent to which the Five have failed to keep their word since then is a matter of record. As we all

know, even today the United States is actively striving to make the implementation of the plan conditional upon the realization of some of its strategic objectives in southern Africa, particularly the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola. Again, we cannot help contrasting the position currently held by the United States with the position its representative took in the debate during the ninth special session:

"Unlike Rhodesia, Namibia is a direct responsibility of the United Nations. It is our responsibility to ensure that the people of Namibia achieve their independence. That is our primary task and it cannot be subordinated to ideological differences"—

I repeat, "cannot be subordinated to ideological differences"—

"or to any special relationship which any of us may hope to have with an independent Namibia."⁵

70. At this juncture I cannot fail to register Ethiopia's deep regret at the present position and conduct of the Western Five. To us, not only is the legitimate presence of Cuban internationalist forces in Angola irrelevant to the implementation of the plan but to raise this issue is nothing but an unwarranted and arrogant interference in the domestic affairs of Angola as well as a breach of the solemn commitment the Five had entered into during the adoption of the plan by the Council in resolution 435 (1978).

71. The desire for peace and the flexibility and statesmanship of SWAPO, have allowed us to come this far with the plan, but we must recognize that it is South Africa's intransigence and the lack of political will on the part of the Western Five that is preventing us from moving forward with its implementation. In fact, at this stage we cannot be wrong if we conclude that neither Pretoria nor the contact group has any interest in the implementation of the plan and that perhaps the negotiating process itself is being deliberately used to delay further the very independence of Namibia.

72. What must the international community do in the circumstances? I submit we all know what has to be done; it is only the will to do it that continues to elude some of us. To most of us, the primary responsibility for the implementation of the United Nations plan for the independence of Namibia rests on its original sponsors, namely, the contact group of the five Western countries. But as the Five have failed to discharge that responsibility we should all call upon the United Nations to shoulder fully its legal and moral responsibilities to the Namibian people. Furthermore, since we believe that the contact group has outlived its usefulness and since there is an imperative need for the United Nations to reassert its central role in the matter, we urge the contact group to consider seriously the desirability of disbanding itself and joining the rest of the world in pursuit of the sacred goal of Namibia's genuine independence.

73. We also invite the Five and the other Western countries to weigh carefully their interest in southern Africa from both the short-term and the long-term perspectives. Inasmuch as Namibia's independence is intimately linked with the freedom and dignity of the rest of Africa, we further invite them to evaluate their relations with Africa on the one hand and the racist régime on the other. We urge them also to examine their consciences to find out whether it is the precepts of justice and legality or the logic of the pocket-book that deserve primacy in the consideration of the national rights of the Namibian people. We venture to hope, perhaps against hope, that the lofty ideals of justice and human rights—which they so often advocate—will guide them to take the side of the oppressed and dispossessed rather than that of the oppressor and exploiter in southern Africa.

74. That direct and primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security lies with the Security Council has now become a cliché, but according to the Charter of the United Nations it still is an obvious truth. Through its continued illegal occupation of the international Territory of Namibia, the racist régime in Pretoria not only challenges the authority of the United Nations but also threatens the peace of Africa in general and that of southern Africa in particular. Its unprovoked and all too frequent acts of aggression and destabilization in the front-line States have breached the peace of the entire area. Indeed, by its open and blatant aggression against Angola and its illegal occupation of that country's southern province, the racist régime continues to threaten international peace and security. Are these not the very acts referred to in Chapter VII, Article 39, of the Charter and which should form the basis for enforcement measures by the Council? Yes, they are indeed.

75. Ethiopia therefore believes that it is incumbent upon the Council to consider measures against South Africa under Chapter VII of the Charter sooner rather than later, for later might be too late for many Namibians. Those who fail to heed the law should be brought to suffer its sanctions. The Council must act promptly and decisively. If it fails to act in the clear-cut case of Namibia—a Territory over which the legal authority and responsibility of the United Nations are universally recognized—very few would expect it to discharge its Charter responsibilities in other situations where the constituent elements are at once less clear and more disputable. If by its action, or rather, its inaction, the Council abdicates its responsibilities, not only will its authority continue to be eroded but indeed its very *raison d'être* will be seriously brought into question. The independence of Namibia, I submit, is the litmus test of both the effectiveness and the relevance of the Council. We in Ethiopia trust and hope that it will not be a test failed.

76. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The next speaker is the representative of Liberia, whom I invite to take a place at the Council table and to make her statement.

77. Mrs. JONES (Liberia): Mr. President, I wish to express my appreciation to you and the members of the

Council for the invitation extended to my delegation to participate in this most important debate. Your skilful leadership and renowned ability displayed during this crucial session of the Council on the fate of Namibia should provide the Organization and the world community with an opportunity to achieve a breakthrough in the present deadlock in the negotiations for a peaceful Namibian settlement leading to the independence of Namibia.

78. Through you, Mr. President, I wish also to express to your predecessor, Mrs. Jeane Kirkpatrick, the representative of the United States, the satisfaction and commendation of my delegation in regard to her exemplary conduct of the meetings of the Council in the month of April.

79. Liberia's decision to participate in this debate has been motivated not by an impulse of blind solidarity but by a sense of profound responsibility which dates back to nearly 20 years ago when Liberia and Ethiopia instituted proceedings against South Africa in the International Court of Justice to free Namibia. We are participating in this meeting with the serious commitment of the Government of Liberia to make its due contribution to the achievement of Namibia's independence, within the context of Council resolution 435 (1978), at the earliest possible date. It should be well noted that the convening of the Council on the question of Namibia at the initiative of the non-aligned countries at this time is most opportune. The case of Namibia has brought an upsurge of sympathy for Namibia, the front-line States and the neighbouring African States. The assumption by South Africa and its allies that if independence were achieved for Namibia today the result would be anarchy has no sound and justifiable precedent in the liberation struggles of the African peoples for independence. The lesson has been that too many extraneous conditions and too much interference tend to provoke anarchy, but there is overwhelming evidence that when the Africans have been left to themselves the results have been relative peace and tranquillity after independence.

80. The international community has long realized that such smear tactics have been used to cast doubts on the integrity of the Namibian people. The generous contributions and the effectiveness of the nationhood programmes hold promise that the results will not be as stated. The excellent research and training programmes carried out by the United Nations Institute for Namibia at Lusaka are also significant contributions to bringing about a peaceful Namibia after independence.

81. My delegation would like to see the settlement plan for Namibia's independence remain within the framework of the United Nations. Therefore, without pressure on the contact group and a new set of commitments from that group to work more in harmony with the Secretary-General the results would look grim indeed. That group should be given the opportunity for reorientation.

82. The Secretary-General deserves our commendation, for he has demonstrated his good will and his capability

to bring about Namibia's independence if only his efforts are not frustrated and sabotaged. It would indeed appear from the evidence before us that progress was made towards Namibia's independence and that we were well on our way to achieving our goal of Namibia's independence when certain extraneous conditions were placed in the way. The task that confronts us all is crucial but not hopeless. Along with the present frustrations which all freedom-loving peoples feel in regard to Namibia's present fate, we also face more opportunities for the achievement of Namibia's independence.

83. My delegation supports any action which would give the Secretary-General a mandate to continue to take the leading role in the implementation of resolution 435 (1978) and appeals to each and every Member of the United Nations to give him full and unconditional support.

84. The lines become more clearly drawn each time the question of Namibia comes up for debate. On one side are the proponents of materialism, and on the other the proponents of humanism, each seeking to teach the other the value of its ideology. It is in this light that the sincerity of the contact group may be questioned. The credibility of these nations as genuine peace-brokers and freedom-brokers will soon be cast into the dustbin of history unless they can redeem their reputations as self-appointed ombudsmen of the United Nations, as they have so far only preserved the *status quo*.

85. The delay factor has also become crucial in the implementation of resolution 435 (1978). In September 1978, the contact group made a proposal with the intention of breaking the impasse, in which we still find ourselves. They certainly stood to gain much in undertaking that initiative. It may also be noted that their offer to assist the Council was made because it was expedient for them to do so. With few exceptions, they are also well experienced in handling delicate colonial issues. Indeed, almost all the members of the contact group are experienced colonial midwives. If at this point in time they fail to live up to their good intentions and credentials and the impasse still exists, with the independence of Namibia still uncertain, then it can certainly be concluded that the contact group all along had ulterior motives, before 1978 and up to the present time. They have not told us the full story. The whole story will unfold before the world in agonizing bits and pieces. We have been told only what is considered enough for the present condition and time. What is quite clear is that the situation in Namibia is, by far, bigger than Namibia itself and certainly the most challenging in the entire liberation struggle of Africa.

86. There are so many stakes and risks involved in Namibia's struggle to become like the rest of Africa. Indeed, Namibia is a very special case. Namibia is undoubtedly the richest African colony to fight for its independence and its riches and resources are vital for the preservation and advancement of Western civilization. It would indeed appear as if there is a master plan in which Namibia has been programmed to play a key and vital part.

There is also nostalgia, it seems, about letting go this last of the African colonies, nostalgia at seeing the end of an era at last.

87. The election, the Constitution and the linkage factors are said to be the remaining issues to be negotiated for Namibia's independence. Let us hope that this is the case, for there may be other linkages in the making which are at present kept hidden from the world. We appeal to South Africa and the contact group and assure them that the world will be a happier and better place if the evil system in southern Africa is put to rest and when Namibia becomes independent. The world is always a better place when an evil system has run its course. The world was a better place with the end of the slave trade, and better still with the end of colonial rule. We envisage the same happy prospect for a free and independent Namibia.

88. What is needed today is encouragement for more positive measures for the furtherance of the negotiations on Namibia's independence. The efforts of the Secretary-General need to be further strengthened and his role and prestige further enhanced to enable him to fulfil speedily and effectively the obligations of the Organization concerning the freedom of Namibia. My delegation expresses its appreciation to the Secretary-General for his untiring efforts to make resolution 435 (1978) a living reality.

89. The OAU and SWAPO continue to demonstrate restraint. Aggression should be restrained at this late and crucial hour. SWAPO has also indicated its readiness to sign a cease-fire agreement and to accept a timetable for the deployment of UNTAG in furtherance of the electoral process under the supervision of the United Nations.

90. The intervention of the President of SWAPO in this debate [2439th meeting] also demonstrated restraint. His agreement to consider the proposals for the electoral system and Constituent Assembly for Namibia is heartening. His further assurance that the white minority and their property in a free Namibia will be protected should allay many fears and doubts on this matter.

91. South Africa, too, has told us that it is capable of self-restraint and good will and it will not accept the charge that it is opposed to freedom for Namibia.

92. How long South Africa will indeed march with a rhythm that is out of step with the rest of the world is unknown. If, after more than 300 years, the whites of South Africa have not learned the lesson of good-neighbourliness, when will they ever learn? They must cease to be distrustful of the efforts of their own kind even when the latter would persuade them that the earth is the common heritage of all mankind, where all mankind, including white South Africans, can find security and be understood, accepted, forgiven and loved. With honesty to ourselves and the Namibian people, the political will, moral courage and a determination on the part of the

entire membership of the United Nations, it should be possible for Namibia to achieve its independence in the immediate future.

93. If Namibia is not free today it is because it is a pawn on the international chessboard. Negotiations should proceed in good faith so that distrust and suspicion give way to the prospect of lasting good will and friendship in the years ahead, with a free Namibia contributing its full share to universal peace and brotherhood.

94. We must all work in harmony to put to rest the fears and suspicions of South Africa. Friendship, however, cannot be cultivated at the point of a gun. The whites in South Africa must also know that, while there may be a diversity in the races of mankind, the one thing that they all hold dear and in common is their love of freedom, which even man's Creator cannot take from him. The love of freedom is universal. It is as vital to life as the breath of life that man breathes. Man not only sheds his blood for freedom; he gives it a place of immortality to preserve it long after it has been achieved.

95. Mr. TROYANOVSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*interpretation from Russian*): After a lengthy interval, the Council has met once again to consider the question of Namibia and the situation concerning the implementation of the Council's decisions regarding the early achievement of independence by the people of that country.

96. We welcome the participation in the meetings of the Council of the ministers for foreign affairs of a large number of African and other non-aligned States Members of the United Nations.

97. We also welcome the presence, at these meetings of the Council of Mr. Sam Nujoma, the President of SWAPO, which for so many years has led the heroic struggle on the part of the people of Namibia for their national liberation. Mr. Nujoma set forth most clearly and carefully the position of SWAPO on the item under discussion [*ibid.*].

98. The convening of the Council at the present time has been occasioned by profound concern on the part of African, but by no means only African, countries at the lack of progress in resolving the problem of Namibia, and the serious overall deterioration of the situation in the south of Africa. I would go even further and say that the whole of Africa is up in arms and furious about the situation that now exists. The Soviet people share this anger and indignation.

99. The report submitted to the Council by the Secretary-General rightly expresses serious concern at the delay in the implementation of Council resolution 435 (1978). The report states that:

"the delay in implementing resolution 435 (1978) is having a destructive impact not only on Namibia itself but also on the prospect of a peaceful and prosperous future for the region as a whole. The delay also has an

adverse effect on international relations in a wider sphere, adding to the prevailing sense of frustration and mistrust, with all that that implies for peace and security in the region." [S/15776, para. 16.]

100. In recent days the whole world has witnessed yet another act of aggression: the barbarous raid by the South African Air Force on Maputo. This is not a link in any kind of cycle of violence, as certain speakers have tried to present it here; no, it was an unprovoked attack on a sovereign State: the sovereign State of Mozambique, a Member of the United Nations. In the statement on this event issued on 27 May by TASS, reference is made to the solidarity of the Soviet Union with the people of Mozambique and its unswerving and unfailing support for the people of Mozambique in its unremitting struggle against the forces of imperialism, colonialism and racism.

101. I doubt that anyone would deny that Namibia's winning of independence and its liberation from the colonial and racist yoke constitute today one of the most urgent of international tasks. The development of the situation, not only in southern Africa but far beyond the confines of that region, will depend on the justice and speed with which that task can be completed.

102. The United Nations bears a direct responsibility for the political fate of Namibia, for its decolonization and for its attainment of independence. Taken together, United Nations decisions, including Council resolution 435 (1978), set out the ways and means for ensuring Namibia's transition to independence as well as the role of SWAPO as the sole authentic representative of the Namibian people. These United Nations decisions and the Organization's position cannot be diminished by any political intrigues.

103. In this regard, the Soviet delegation would like to mention the great work done by the United Nations Council for Namibia, presided over by the representative of Zambia, Mr. Paul Lusaka. The Council for Namibia has done a great deal to defend the interests of the Namibian people and to assist the noble cause of the liberation of Namibia.

104. One would have to be extremely naïve in political affairs to believe that the Pretoria racist régime could possibly have acted so provocatively as to have persisted in its occupation of Namibia and in its aggressive actions against neighbouring African States were it not for the fact that it is aware of the direct and indirect military, economic, political and diplomatic backing and protection of the United States and certain other countries members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). This has been often repeated, but the obvious must be repeated because there is no getting away from it. Nor can there be any doubt that, were it not for that support, the representative of the Pretoria régime would not have dared to speak here in the Council in such a provocative way, threatening African States with all manner of reprisals.

105. But since that is the case, can one be surprised at the fact that the so-called Western contact group—which Mr. Nujoma referred to here as self-appointed—should have finally succeeded after five years of effort in leading the Namibian settlement process into a deadlock? Could one really have expected any effective assistance in the matter of liberating Namibia from those countries, which are so closely linked with South Africa, which consider it a long-standing ally and which themselves have an interest in seeing the continuation of the colonial economic exploitation of Namibia?

106. In the course of the five years that have elapsed since the Council's adoption of resolution 435 (1978), one artificial obstacle after another has constantly been raised to the implementation of that resolution. In the beginning, as we know, the major obstacle to the independence of Namibia was said to be the absence of guarantees for the white minority. Then we had the question of the electoral system. Later we heard about the so-called problem of the impartiality of the United Nations. Very recently a new condition has emerged: linkage between the settlement for Namibia and the withdrawal of the Cuban military contingent from Angola, a contingent which is there at the request of the Angolan Government and on the basis of an agreement between Angola and Cuba. This unlawful demand is aimed at a clear and obvious target: blockage of a Namibian settlement. At the same time it has a hidden purpose: to weaken Angola in the face of the military threat from the South African aggressors. Obviously, this is nothing but flagrant, inadmissible intervention in the internal affairs of the sovereign State of Angola. In spite of the serious losses it has sustained, Angola, which is at the very forefront of the struggle against colonialism and racism, continues to defend the cause of the freedom of peoples and peace in the African continent. This has earned it great authority in and beyond Africa. It is not for nothing that this notorious linkage has been repudiated by the entire world community. It is not for nothing that, in this very chamber, one speaker after another has rejected the linkage between the question of Namibia and the withdrawal of the Cuban military contingents from Angola.

107. The question arises: What other rabbits are the Western illusionists going to pull out of the hat in order to prevent a settlement of the Namibian problem?

108. The representative of Western countries are continuing to express forced optimism and to give their assurances that, if they are given just a little more time, the problem will be solved and everything will be fine. Even now, at these meetings of the Council, we are hearing once more the voices of the North Atlantic sirens repeating the same words of comfort and encouragement.

109. But SWAPO and the States of Africa have learned from their own bitter experience the real value of those assurances and those promises. It was for good reason that Mr. Nujoma stated here frankly that SWAPO believes the role of the so-called contact group to be over. It is for this very reason that African States and non-

aligned countries took the initiative of calling for the convening of the Council. The United Nations—its Security Council and its General Assembly—have given a mandate to no one to take over their role and responsibility in the matter of bringing about a political settlement of the problem of Namibia.

110. Every year we witness the growth and the broadening of international support for the just struggle of the Namibian people to rid its homeland of the colonial yoke. Striking testimony to this is found in the documents adopted recently by a number of international conferences and meetings. The Seventh Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at New Delhi from 7 to 12 March this year, adopted important decisions relating to the just struggle of the people of Namibia [see S/15675 and Corr. 1 and 2, annex, sect. I, paras. 40-51]. The Conference expressed firm support for the demand for the granting of independence to Namibia and called for the elimination of the *apartheid* régime in South Africa. The Political Declaration adopted at that Conference condemns the lawlessness of the South African racists, their connivance with Western Powers and demands the earliest possible implementation of Council resolutions on the granting of independence to Namibia. It confirms wholehearted solidarity with the oppressed people of South Africa and demands a comprehensive boycott of South Africa and condemns the support for Pretoria given by the United States [*ibid.*, paras. 52-59].

111. Of great significance too was the International Conference in Support of the Struggle of the Namibian People for Independence, held in Paris this April.⁶ The decisions of the Conference and the statements made by its participants demonstrated the determination of the world community to put an end as soon as possible to the colonial occupation of Namibia by the racist régime and to enable the people of Namibia to exercise their inalienable right to independence. The Conference unambiguously rejected the manoeuvres of the United States aimed at linking the problem of Namibia with the withdrawal of Cuban military personnel from Angola.

112. The Soviet Union categorically condemns the continuing illegal occupation of Namibia by the racist régime of Pretoria and favours the immediate granting of genuine independence to Namibia, in accordance with the decisions of the United Nations in their totality, including Council resolution 435 (1978), which define the basis for a peaceful settlement of the problem of Namibia.

113. The Soviet Union favours the earliest possible exercise, by the Namibian people, of their inalienable right to self-determination and independence on the basis of the preservation of the unity and territorial integrity of Namibia, including Walvis Bay and the offshore islands and favours the immediate and total withdrawal from Namibia of the troops and administration of South Africa.

114. The Soviet Union favours the strengthening of the role of the United Nations in a Namibian settlement by means of ensuring effective control by the Council—and I mean the Council and not some group of States—over the implementation of all aspects of the attainment by Namibia of genuine independence, including, of course, matters pertaining to the formation, composition, leadership, deployment and activities of UNTAG, mentioned in paragraph 7 of the report of the Secretary-General [S/15776]. We believe it is necessary to lay down a clear-cut time-frame for carrying out further measures designed to ensure independence for the people of Namibia.

115. It is the bounden duty of the Council to take all necessary measures to see to it that as soon as possible implementation of its resolutions on the question of Namibia is secured.

116. In this regard, our own country supports the demands for the Council to impose comprehensive, mandatory sanctions on the Pretoria régime, in accordance with Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations. It is important to ensure that all States observe the embargo decreed by the Council on arms deliveries to South Africa [resolution 418 (1977)] and halt co-operation with South Africa in the political, economic and military fields, including the nuclear field. The Council must take measures to prevent access by South Africa to the possession of nuclear weapons.

117. Solidarity with the people struggling against the vestiges of colonialism, racism and *apartheid* for the attainment of independence is one of the fundamental principles of Soviet foreign policy. The Soviet Union has given and will continue to give consistent support for the just struggle of Namibia against colonial domination, a struggle it has been waging, under the leadership of SWAPO, its sole authentic and legitimate representative. We have supported and will continue to support the front-line States in their efforts to bring about a Namibian settlement on the basis of implementation of the decisions of the United Nations on that subject.

118. Mr. AMEGA (Togo) (*interpretation from French*): Two years ago, on 22 April 1981 [2269th meeting], addressing the Council on the question that remains before it today, the question of Namibia, the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Co-operation of the Togolese Republic, Mr. Anani Kuma Akakpo-Ahianyo, denounced the decline of moral values in our time which enables the racist régime of Pretoria, with the undisputed support of certain States Members of the Organization, to continue with impunity its illegal occupation of Namibia. Then, turning to the crux of the problem, namely, the means of rapidly securing the independence of Namibia, the Minister declared that South Africa's friends were facing a fundamental choice, namely, to continue to seek satisfaction of their short-term interests by supporting South Africa in its illegal occupation of Namibia and thus to alienate the rest of Africa or, on the other hand, to abandon this short-sighted and hopeless policy and contribute positively to the advent of an

independent Namibia and thus earn the recognition and friendship of eternal Africa.

119. The thrust of that statement and the clear-cut nature of the choice proposed clearly reflect the very great importance that the Togolese Government and its leader, General Gnassingbe Eyadéma, attach to the independence of Namibia.

120. We know, Sir, that that unwavering devotion of the Togolese Government and people to the cause of Namibia is also shared by the Government and people of Zaire. You will therefore understand my delegation's satisfaction at seeing the worthy son of a great African country presiding over the Council when it is once again considering the question of Namibia. We are convinced that under your wise guidance the Council, at the conclusion of this debate, will adopt the measures long awaited by the immense majority of the international community to hasten the long-delayed independence of Namibia.

121. Until the very last moment, the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Co-operation of Togo hoped to participate personally in these very important meetings of the Council on the question of Namibia. However, events beyond his control unfortunately prevented him from being present here today. He asked me to convey to you, Sir, to his colleagues who came here expressly to demonstrate the importance that Africa attaches to the settlement of the question of Namibia and to the members of the Council his appreciation, encouragement and best wishes for success.

122. My delegation takes this opportunity to pay a well-deserved tribute to Mr. Sam Nujoma, the President of SWAPO, for the political wisdom and great qualities he has demonstrated in the quest for a just solution to the Namibian question.

123. Inscribed on the agenda of the General Assembly ever since the creation of the United Nations, the question of Namibia is so well known to the members of our Council and the participants in this debate that there is no need for any historical account to be given. The history of this question has, moreover, been lucidly presented by the United Nations Council for Namibia in its report to the International Conference in Support of the Struggle of the Namibian People for Independence, which was held in Paris from 25 to 29 April.⁷

124. However, my delegation would like briefly to present the situation in Namibia. On the one hand, there are the Namibian people, a people who love freedom and peace, unfortunately driven to armed struggle for the exercise of their inalienable and sacred rights to freedom and independence—rights recognized for all peoples by the Charter of the United Nations and other international legal instruments. On the other hand, there is the abject *apartheid* régime, condemned by the international community, continuing its illegal occupation of Namibia despite General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960, containing the Declaration on the Grant-

ing of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples; despite General Assembly resolution 2145 (XXI) of 27 October 1966, which terminated the Mandate of South Africa over Namibia and placed the Territory under the direct responsibility of the United Nations; despite the advisory opinion handed down in 1971 by the International Court of Justice, declaring South Africa's presence in Namibia illegal and that that country was obliged to withdraw from Namibia;⁸ and, finally, despite numerous resolutions of the General Assembly as well as of the Security Council, which required South Africa to withdraw from the Territory. That is the nature of the problem which is once again before the Council.

125. To resolve the problem that I have just described, the Council, on 29 September 1978, in which it approved the proposal for a settlement of the Namibian situation [S/12636], urging the conclusion of a cease-fire agreement, the creation of a demilitarized zone, the deployment of UNTAG and the holding of free and fair elections under United Nations supervision and control. All of the interested parties accepted that resolution, including South Africa, and the five member countries of the contact group undertook the task of securing the implementation of that resolution from the parties concerned.

126. The Council is once again seized of the question of Namibia because, nearly five years after its adoption, resolution 435 (1978) has not even begun to be implemented. In the view of my delegation, this resolution has not been implemented for four reasons.

127. First, the so-called acceptance of this resolution by South Africa was in reality merely a ruse to gain time so that it could continue the racist régime's domination of Namibia. How else can we explain the fact that, after having declared that it accepted the United Nations plan for Namibia, the *apartheid* régime sought to impose on the Namibian people and upon the international community an alleged internal settlement, the objective of which was to extend the shameful system of *apartheid* definitively to the Territory? How else can we explain the fact that, despite its acceptance of resolution 435 (1978), South Africa continued and stepped up its dilatory and diversionary tactics, declaring, at the pre-implementation meeting held at Geneva in January 1981, that it was premature to discuss the implementation of that plan, when SWAPO was prepared to negotiate a cease-fire agreement and to set a date for the holding of free and fair elections?

128. Secondly, it is due to the insolent intransigence of South Africa. That intransigence is demonstrated at the internal level by relentless oppression, whose main features and methods I described in the statement I made at the thirty-seventh session of the General Assembly.⁹ Externally, the intransigence and insolence of South Africa may be seen in its repeated acts of aggression against neighbouring countries, namely, Angola, Lesotho and Mozambique, in flagrant violation of the principles of the non-use of force in international relations and respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of

States. The intransigence of South Africa would not be possible without the extremely regrettable support that country continues to receive from certain States Members of the Organization.

129. Thirdly, it is due to the fact that not all the members of the contact group have exerted all the pressure they could bring to bear on the Government of Pretoria in view of the enormous influence they enjoy with that Government and of their real weight in the international community.

130. Finally, the fourth reason is the linkage that has been established between the independence of Namibia and the withdrawal of foreign forces which are present in Angola at the express request of the Government of that sovereign State. In order to establish that linkage, it was first necessary to distort the question of Namibia. The problem of Namibia—which is, as we have demonstrated, a simple problem of decolonization—was turned into a complex ideological problem. This was followed by a feigned ignorance of the fact that the foreign forces are in Angola precisely because of the repeated acts of aggression on the part of South Africa against that country. As I said in my statement to the General Assembly on 14 December 1982:

“The question of the withdrawal of foreign troops in Angola is a matter exclusively within the competence of that country. The withdrawal of those foreign troops, which is desired by certain parties, would, in fact, be greatly helped by South African military disengagement in Namibia and the granting of independence to that Territory. Eliminate the cause and the effects disappear.”¹⁰

131. My delegation thus deeply regrets the linkage that has been established between the independence of Namibia and the withdrawal of foreign troops from Angola. We address an urgent appeal to the allies of South Africa to place the Namibian problem back in its proper context. The question of Namibia is a question of decolonization and nothing else. It concerns the inalienable rights of a people to self-determination, freedom and national independence. If we return the Namibian problem to its proper context, we are obliged to recognize that resolution 435 (1978) provides an equitable basis for its solution. That is why, in conformity with the Paris Declaration on Namibia and the Programme of Action on Namibia, adopted by the International Conference in Support of the Struggle of the Namibian People for Independence,¹¹ and in conformity with the recommendations of the Seventh Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries [see S/15675 and Corr. 1 and 2, annex, sect. I, paras. 40-51], my delegation requests the Council to take the necessary steps to secure South Africa's immediate implementation of resolution 435 (1978).

132. It is time that the Council remembered that the question of Namibia is the direct responsibility of the United Nations and that it is incumbent upon the Council

to use every means to prevail on South Africa to implement resolution 435 (1978). In so doing, the Council will finally do justice to the oppressed people of Namibia, who continue to place their trust in the United Nations.

133. To conclude, my delegation wishes to reaffirm the complete support of the Government and people to Togo for the heroic struggle being waged by the Namibian people for their independence, under the wise and responsible leadership of SWAPO, its sole and authentic representative. My delegation wishes also to reiterate to the Secretary-General and to the United Nations Council for Namibia—so effectively presided over by my colleague and brother, Mr. Paul Lusaka—the appreciation of the Togolese Government for their tireless efforts to hasten the advent of a free and independent Namibia.

134. Mr. SALAH (Jordan) (*interpretation from Arabic*): I should like to congratulate you, Sir, on your assumption of the presidency of the Council for this month and to express our confidence that your experience and diplomatic talents in conducting the deliberations will lead to the results that we all desire.

135. I should also like to avail myself of this opportunity to welcome the ministers for foreign affairs who have come here to participate in this important debate on Namibia, despite the urgent political tasks awaiting them in their countries. The presence in New York of this impressive number of ministers for foreign affairs bears witness to the critical nature and importance of the stage which the question of Namibia has reached. It also emphasizes the need for the international community to take effective and urgent action to ensure the implementation of Council resolution 435 (1978), which provides for Namibia's independence. It gives me pleasure also to welcome Mr. Sam Nujoma among us during these deliberations and I should like to reaffirm to him Jordan's solidarity with the people of Namibia in their struggle to exercise their right to freedom and independence.

136. The question of Namibia is one of a people under foreign rule. That foreign domination has been perpetuated by the illegal hold on Namibia by South Africa, which received a Mandate from the League of Nations to help the Namibian people achieve sovereignty and independence within the framework of the full exercise of their right to self-determination. The situation has been complicated by the continuation of the policies of racial segregation and discrimination of South Africa, so that the Namibian people, together with other peoples of southern Africa, are the victims of foreign occupation and the policies of racial segregation and discrimination.

137. I shall not dwell at length on the ethical and legal aspects that have been ignored by South Africa. I do not think that there is any controversy within the Council over the justice of the cause of the Namibian people. However, I realize that we live in a world in which having rights and a just cause is not enough to check oppression and deter aggression. I represent a country and belong to a people which have legal instruments and ethical justifi-

cation for terminating foreign occupation of our land. However, force prevents the exercise of our rights there, as it does in southern Africa.

138. Fortunately, there is unanimity about the justice of the cause of the Namibian people—despite differences concerning the way to redress the wrongs visited upon them—and I consider that to be real progress.

139. We understand the political obstacles that block the implementation of the United Nations plan for the independence of Namibia. Most of them are the result, first, of the continuing South African occupation of Namibia and, secondly, of the strange political nature of the South African system. These have spilled over into the neighbouring region. South Africa's prevarication concerning allowing the people of Namibia to exercise their right to self-determination, and its racist policy have complicated the social and political problems in southern Africa, and this has led to the emergence of a condition of instability that has increased the level of extremism, violence and resistance in the area.

140. Hence, it is clear that tackling the question of Namibia first and that of southern Africa second will lead to an amelioration of the situation in the area and, as a corollary, to some sort of stability. To consider the cause as the effect will not help the advocates of realism, pragmatism and moderation. We believe in realism and moderation in dealing with international political problems, provided this is preceded by an exact and realistic diagnosis of the principal cause. My delegation believes that the circumstances which led to the emergence of the so-called linkage cannot be separated from the foreign occupation of the Territory of Namibia and the policies of *apartheid* of the State responsible for that occupation. We believe that, if the question of occupation is resolved first and that of the policy of *apartheid* afterwards, the concern that some feel about the matter of linkage may automatically be dispelled, because the circumstances that led to it will have been eliminated.

141. The adoption of Council resolution 435 (1978) was a turning-point in the road leading to Namibia's independence. In this respect, we note with satisfaction the convergence of views on the need to bring about the implementation of resolution 435 (1978) as the only acceptable framework. We cannot fail to mention also the important recommendations adopted by the International Conference in Support of the Struggle of the Namibian People for Independence, held recently in Paris.¹¹

142. My delegation welcomes the response of the front-line States and their co-operation with the Western contact group in the search for the best and most effective way to ensure the implementation of resolution 435 (1978). We pay particular tribute to the positive and realistic spirit shown by SWAPO, the sole legitimate representative of the people of Namibia, to facilitate the implementation of that resolution. We welcome its willingness to sign the cease-fire agreement and its commitment to co-operation with the Secretary-General and the

United Nations machinery with a view to bringing about a peaceful transition to independence.

143. We avail ourselves of this opportunity to commend the extent of the progress achieved among the various parties through the Western contact group. However, the prevarication of South Africa and its obstruction to the process of the independence of Namibia are evident; it has introduced extraneous conditions that have not been part of the negotiations concerning the implementation of resolution 435 (1978) and have nothing whatsoever to do with the resolution itself. As the Secretary-General stated in his recent report:

“These issues now apparently constitute the main reason for the delay in the implementation of the United Nations plan. I am deeply concerned that factors which lie outside the scope of resolution 435 (1978) should hamper its implementation.” [S/15776, para. 19.]

144. We share the Secretary-General's concern over this situation. We share his view that the essential issue of Namibian independence should be dealt with speedily. We believe that the settlement of the question of Namibia would have a positive effect in lessening tension in the area and creating circumstances conducive to reinforcing the opportunities for stability and security in the area.

145. My delegation wishes to commend the persistent efforts of the Secretary-General in his attempt to accelerate the implementation of the plan for Namibia's independence in accordance with resolution 435 (1978). The Secretary-General has fulfilled his role with dedication, as is clearly reflected in his report. We wish to express our gratitude to the Secretariat, which has worked with efficiency and speed to launch UNTAG and thus help to implement the settlement plan.

146. More than ever before, the Council is required to shoulder its responsibilities for the implementation of resolution 435 (1978), especially in view of recent events in the area which led to loss of life and material damage and of the aggression to which Mozambique has been subjected. All these may have grave implications for security and safety in the area. If the Council does not deal effectively with the matter and discharge its responsibilities, the situation in southern Africa will deteriorate beyond control.

147. In conclusion, we are confident that the Namibian people's dream of independence and sovereignty under the leadership of their sole legitimate representative, SWAPO, will soon come true. However, the Council and all concerned should contribute to hastening the coming of that day so that the Namibians can build and develop their country and enjoy security and a better life.

148. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The next speaker is the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Botswana, Mr. Archibald Mogwe, to whom I extend a welcome. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

149. Mr. MOGWE (Botswana): Even as delegations from different parts of the globe were arriving in New York to participate in the Council's debate on the situation in Namibia, South African military aircraft were violating the territorial integrity of Mozambique, strafing innocent civilians and spreading death and destruction. The raid was not the first one into Mozambique, nor is Mozambique the only State in the region to have been so brutalized. Such raids are undertaken to kill, maim, terrorize and destabilize local populations. They are undertaken in retaliation for acts of sabotage carried out in South Africa by South African nationals. The raid into Mozambique during the present debate illustrates forcefully the danger to which States in the region are exposed on account of South Africa's intransigence and its contempt for resolutions calling for the dismantling of *apartheid* and the granting of freedom to its oppressed peoples. South Africa alleges that States in the region harbour, train and arm the freedom fighters. This is quite often the pretext for attacking refugee camps.

150. The economic circumstances of our countries are such that they allow us to spend our limited resources only on the development of our countries and not on training and arming freedom fighters. We are not at war with South Africa nor do we pose any danger to its security. SWAPO is waging a liberation war and has long declared its readiness to sign a cease-fire agreement with South Africa; but rather than respond favourably to SWAPO, South Africa wants non-aggression pacts signed with countries with which it is not at war. South Africa's acts of aggression must be condemned.

151. The explosion which took place in Pretoria last week, resulting in suffering and serious loss of life, should be a matter of profound concern to the international community as it vindicated equally forcefully the fears which have been expressed by our leaders over a long period but which have gone unheeded. The attack was not an accident, an aberration or a hideous dream to be wished away or ignored. It was a fact of the unfolding tragic situation in southern Africa. It is regrettable that the terrorism of *apartheid* and all it stands for has driven man to violence. It has taken 70 years to make this hard choice.

152. Faced with a similar problem Brutus said to Cassius:

“We all stand up against the spirit of Caesar;
And in the spirit of men there is no blood:
O! then that we could come by Caesar's spirit,
And not dismember Caesar.”

That is our prayer too.

153. Mr. President, my delegation congratulates you on your conduct of the proceedings of the Council. I have had the privilege of knowing you and working with you over a long period of time, and your impartiality has

never been called in question. That also goes for your country, Zaire.

154. Contrary to what Mr. von Schirnding, the representative of South Africa, said the other day, the purpose of these meetings of the Council is to promote a peaceful settlement of the question of Namibia. Almost five years ago, the Council adopted resolution 435 (1978). Since 1978, the front-line States, the Secretary-General, the Security Council, the General Assembly, the OAU, the Non-Aligned Movement and, recently, the International Conference in Support of the Struggle of the Namibian People for Independence have all made every endeavour to facilitate the implementation of the resolution, but to no avail. Angry speeches and declarations, solidarity rallies, resolutions, programmes of action, contemplated sanctions, negotiations and even more patient negotiations, supplicatory pilgrimages to Pretoria and Cape Town and every mode of gentle persuasion—all have failed to induce South Africa's co-operation in the implementation of a plan it accepted in 1978. The plan remains unimplemented. South Africa maintains its illegal and unwanted presence in Namibia with defiant impunity.

155. The statement made before the Council by the representative of South Africa [2440th meeting] was a brutal revelation of South Africa's contempt for the United Nations and its resolutions. The statement was depressing and a source of much frustration. It harks back to the Mandate of the League of Nations and underlines, with typical Boer frankness, South Africa's non-acceptance of the termination of its League of Nations Mandate and its contemptuous refusal to recognize resolutions passed and action taken consequent upon the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice.⁸ The statement gave a catalogue of allegations against the United Nations itself and accused its officials of duplicity and partiality towards SWAPO. The statement accused SWAPO of embracing Marxist principles, of deriving its inspiration from the Cuban Revolution and of some mission to kill and to impose itself by force on the people of Namibia. The statement was a display of the arrogance that is a common attribute of the strong and powerful. The statement contains a fundamental contradiction, for, while South Africa alleges that it accepts the right of all peoples to self-determination, it says in the same breath that it will "not tolerate the expansion of Soviet imperialism" on its borders.

156. I have already stated that the objective of this series of meetings is to remove such obstacles as impede the way to a peaceful settlement of the question of Namibia. We have come here because we remain steadfast in our commitment to the implementation of resolution 435 (1978). We have come here because Namibia continues to be a candidate for General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960 and because the Territory is a direct responsibility of the United Nations in accordance with General Assembly resolution 2145 (XXI).

157. We continue to proclaim our devotion to the efficacy of peaceful change. We have come because we

believe that the birth of independent Namibia, long overdue, need not continue to be violent and as such to be a source of international anxiety and concern. We are satisfied that the United Nations plan for Namibia provides, in spirit and design, the right conditions for peaceful change. Yet the plan has been sidetracked and rendered ineffectual by insistence on the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola as a pre-condition for its phased implementation.

158. In January 1981, the Geneva pre-implementation talks were held to advance the negotiations to a stage for determining the date for the implementation of resolution 435 (1978). The failure of the meeting to achieve its objectives resulted from South Africa's expressed distrust of the United Nations, and progress towards the implementation of the resolution could only follow the restoration of mutual trust and confidence among the parties. No other reason was given, not even the presence of Cuban forces in Angola. The challenge and the defiance had to be met and obstacles and impediments to the solution of the Namibia problem removed. Principles to be inscribed in the independence Constitution of Namibia were formulated and, after careful and deliberate consideration, accepted by SWAPO. We were close to an agreement on the implementation of the United Nations plan—a fact Mr. Bush, Vice-President of the United States, acknowledged at Nairobi in November 1982.

159. Having progressed so far, it is not only surprising but distressing that South Africa should do precisely what it accuses the United Nations of doing, that is, return to the threadbare arguments of the past. South Africa still seeks "firm and concrete signs" that the United Nations has terminated what it regards as bias in favour of SWAPO. The United Nations, through the report of its Secretary-General [S/15776], has demonstrated its seriousness of purpose in advancing the peaceful solution of the problem. The United Nations, by giving some measures of recognition to the role played by the Western contact group in the settlement process and by going along with the constitutional principles formulated by the group [S/15287], has demonstrated its desire to dispel any of South Africa's concerns that might hinder peaceful negotiations. Our presence here and the large number of meetings held on this one subject also provide firm and concrete proof, not merely a sign of our concern for the people of Namibia.

160. Resolution 435 (1978) is not being implemented yet—not because there are any major outstanding issues still to be resolved but because the United States and South Africa have decided to subordinate Namibia's progress to freedom and independence to the removal of Cuban forces from Angola.

161. The representative of South Africa, having recounted what, in the view of his Government, were the reasons for the non-implementation of the resolution, added:

"In the meantime, another threat to the stability and the process of self-determination in South West Africa

. . . is casting its ominous shadow across our subcontinent, yet another peril for the peace of southern Africa which is growing with each passing month and which has not been of South Africa's making. I refer to the increasing and threatening presence of the surrogate forces of an expansionist . . . super-Power in our region." [2440th meeting, para. 81.]

162. "In the meantime" South Africa says. Yet the Cuban forces have been in Angola for the past eight years. South Africa says: "another threat", "another peril", "not of South Africa's making". SWAPO is waging the war of liberation and the people of Namibia are struggling for their independence because South Africa as the then administering Power resolutely refused to comply with Article 77 of the Charter of the United Nations to place South West Africa, a non-self-governing Territory, under the trusteeship system; refused to transmit information on its administration of the Territory; refused to take due account of the political aspirations of the people and to assist in the progressive development of their free political institutions. South Africa says: "another threat", "another peril", "not of South Africa's making".

163. In a major speech in Nairobi last year, the Vice-President of the United States declared that: "The withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola in a parallel framework with South Africa's departure from Namibia is the key to the settlement we all desire." The implication of this statement is that the withdrawal of South African troops from Namibia, as scheduled in the United Nations plan, must take place at the same time as the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola. The condition vitiates the United Nations plan accepted by both South Africa and the United States and has been responsible for the present impasse and for the continuing loss of human life in Namibia.

164. Repeat assurances by Angola that the Cuban presence in Angola implies no offensive designs against any States have failed to dissuade the United States and South Africa from their obstructive role. Cuban forces in Angola are seen as a threat to South Africa's security despite the fact that they have neither invaded Namibia nor, to our knowledge, have they at any time ever engaged the South African occupying forces. Reasons for the United States/South African obstructive collaboration, known euphemistically as constructive engagement, should therefore be sought elsewhere.

165. First, the independence of Namibia is seen as a decisive step in the encroachment of African nationalism into areas hitherto preserves for white domination and racism. The question to be asked is: Would it be far wrong to assume that South Africa is playing for time until, in its opinion, SWAPO will have lost the support of the electorate? Secondly, Cuban forces were invited into Angola because of South Africa's invasion of that territory. This was done with the knowledge and tacit support of the United States. May we not therefore surmise that the United States considers it its bounden obligation to get the Cuban forces out of Angola and by that

means reverse the situation they helped to create? Thirdly, South Africa's act of aggression against Angola was condemned by Council resolution 387 (1976). South Africa must have felt betrayed by its allies, including the United States, because, instead of opposing the resolution outright or using their power of veto, the United States and others opted for abstention. Would it be wrong therefore to assume that the United States insistence on linkage is atonement for that seeming betrayal and an attempt to restore mutual confidence?

166. United States officials tell the world of some empirical relationship existing between the removal of South Africa's occupation army from southern Angola, its forces from Namibia and the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola. We are told that the introduction of Cuban forces in the area "has torn the fabric of reciprocal restraint between the United States and the Soviet Union". We are told that the dissident National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) movement is an entity to bear in mind in the search for a peaceful settlement. East-West ideological rivalry is the altar on which the people of Namibia are being sacrificed.

167. We reject the view that Namibia's concerns are subordinate to those of South Africa and that the latter's preoccupations must be considered so overriding that the former's must be compromised, sacrificed or reduced to the level of a mere cold-war issue. The presence of Cuban troops in Angola is irrelevant to the search for a solution to the Namibian problem. Their future stay in Angola is a matter to be decided solely by the Governments of Angola and Cuba.

168. Namibia is a United Nations Territory. Resolution 435 (1978) approves a plan to be implemented under the authority of the Council. We cannot over-emphasize the role of the Secretary-General in this regard. As he himself rightly points out in his report, he regards "the problem of Namibia as a special responsibility of the Secretary-General in view of the unique relationship between the United Nations and the people of Namibia" [S/15776, para. 20]. We support the Secretary-General in the discharge of that responsibility.

169. Botswana recognizes that, contrary to accusations of gross interference often levelled against them, the involvement of the members of the contact group in the Namibia question is in compliance with the role Africa has long envisaged for them as friends of South Africa. We recognize that their role can only be ancillary to that of the Council and the Secretary-General. Their private national interests should not be allowed to delay or divert the course of Namibian independence.

170. We are here to seek peaceful ways of facilitating the implementation of the plan for Namibia. As the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Zambia stated the other day: "We are not seeking a confrontation with any country or group of countries . . ." [2440th meeting, para. 50]. Our mission is a limited one. It is to promote the peaceful

settlement of the Namibia question through the implementation of resolution 435 (1978) and to require the Council and the Secretary-General to assume fully the responsibilities laid down for them.

171. Our political responsibilities, however, compel us to register our opposition to what we seriously consider to be a determined effort by the authors of the linkage and parallelism problems to subvert resolution 435 (1978), employing it to serve purposes and interests at variance with the objectives of the resolution. Resolution 435 (1978) is not a comprehensive plan for the solution of South Africa's regional problems or an excuse to serve United States global strategy. It is a United Nations plan for the settlement of the Namibian question. We therefore urge the United States and South Africa to co-operate fully with the international community in the settlement of the issue.

172. This is our modest contribution to this debate. We cannot brandish arms to instil fear in the hearts of those who obstruct the progress of Namibia to independence, for we do not have any. What we have is the moral courage to speak out against injustice.

173. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The next speaker is the representative of Malaysia. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

174. ZAINAL ABIDIN (Malaysia): At the outset, I should like to congratulate you, Sir, on your assumption of the presidency of the Council for the month of May. We are pleased to see in the Chair a person of your stature, experience and ability. My delegation is confident that, under your able guidance, the Council will achieve constructive and positive results. At the same time, I should like to take this opportunity to express my sincere appreciation to you, and through you to the other members of the Council, for giving me the opportunity to participate in these important deliberations.

175. The Council is meeting at a very crucial time. As everyone is aware, the situation in and around Namibia today has been greatly aggravated, basically because of South Africa's continued illegal occupation of that Territory and its belligerent policy, which threatens the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the front-line States. It is not an exaggeration to say that the atmosphere in southern Africa is charged and tense and that it poses a serious threat to regional and world peace. If Namibian independence does not become a reality soon, the consequences may be too frightful to contemplate. It is therefore the solemn duty of all of us here, in particular the members of the Council, to facilitate the termination of South Africa's horrifying policy of violence, which undermines the foundations of peace in that region, and to put an end to South Africa's persistent and blatant disregard of the inalienable right of the Namibian people to independence.

176. The presence of an impressive number of ministers for foreign affairs from non-aligned countries, who have come to address the Council, underscores the importance

that the Non-Aligned Movement attaches to this question. It should be sufficiently clear that the issue of Namibia is becoming more and more intolerable to the members of the international community, irrespective of their political persuasion or their stature. It is in this regard that my delegation would like to appeal to the Council to be more alive to and conscious of its inherent responsibility to the people of Namibia in their struggle for freedom and dignity.

177. It is quite obvious that the Namibian question is one of the most urgent questions confronting the United Nations. It is a problem in which the Council bears direct responsibility. In this context, my delegation welcomes the report of the Secretary-General [S/15776] and appreciates the interest being shown by him in trying to resolve the problem. He has accorded the Namibian question a high priority, as is shown by the visits he has undertaken to all the front-line States and the contacts he has made with the parties involved. While the Secretary-General and his team have exerted considerable constructive efforts, there seems to be a lack of political will and a reluctance on the part of some members of the Council to co-operate in the necessary speeding-up of the process of independence for Namibia. Such an attitude is indeed regrettable as it will only contribute to perpetuating the misery and frustration of the people there and will further aggravate the security situation in the region.

178. It must be noted with concern that since the adoption in 1978 of resolution 435 (1978), the credibility of the Council has been undermined, as the Council has been utterly ineffective in implementing its own recommendations, although we are constantly told that discussions outside the framework of the United Nations are continually being held. These discussions, initiated by the Western contact group, could have complemented efforts by the United Nations to seek a negotiated settlement of the Namibian problem. Unfortunately, issues that are extraneous to the United Nations plan have been introduced into these discussions, and this has only served to prolong the domination of South Africa over Namibia. As the prospect of independence through the process of negotiation becomes increasingly dim, the frustrations and anger in Namibia become more marked. The level of tension in the region has heightened, and we can envisage greater bloodshed and difficulties for the people in the area in the days to come.

179. For the past two decades, SWAPO has borne the burden of fighting for the inalienable right of the Namibian people to freedom and independence. Since its inception in April 1960, SWAPO has become a truly nation-wide movement, representing all sectors of Namibian society and incorporating the various anti-colonial forces in Namibia. From a humble beginning, SWAPO has today become the embodiment of the Namibian struggle for freedom and independence. The United Nations recognition of SWAPO as a national liberation movement and the representative of the Namibian people reflects the extensive support and confidence SWAPO now enjoys.

180. My Government wholly identifies itself with the struggle of SWAPO against oppression and for the liberation of its land. We believe that no nation, in any circumstances, notwithstanding its size and power, should interfere in the affairs of other States. It is clear that peace can be preserved only if nations steadfastly abide by the ideals and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

181. We cannot deny the fact that South Africa has been somewhat emboldened in its continued intransigence on the question of Namibia by the wilful and flagrant violation by some countries of the mandatory arms embargo imposed under resolution 418 (1977). Such disregard and the collaboration of these States with South Africa have only served to bolster that country's war machine and dampen the incentive to resolve the Namibian question. It is thus imperative for the Council to ensure scrupulous compliance with the mandatory arms embargo and to take measures to prevent any such violations. In addition, any links that may exist, particularly in the realm of commerce and industry, between some States or their transnational corporations and the Pretoria régime should be severed in order to exert greater pressure on and isolate South Africa.

182. The policy of my Government on the question of Namibia is well known. We view developments there with grave concern and attach considerable urgency to the resolution of the problem. The Council therefore must live up to its responsibility and ensure the implementation of its resolutions forthwith. My Government has extended and will continue to extend its fullest support to the people of Namibia in their valiant struggle to free themselves from the yoke of South Africa's oppression and domination. We shall continue scrupulously to observe the mandatory arms embargo, the oil embargo and all voluntary sanctions and boycotts against South Africa. We shall continue to condemn South Africa's policy in Namibia and its acts of defiance of the will of the international community. South Africa cannot and should not be allowed to procrastinate and to entertain the illusion of perpetual domination of a land and people that do not rightfully and legally belong to it.

183. We are convinced that the irresistible forces of nationalism that dismantled the great colonial empires of the past will prevail again, in Namibia. In this regard, the Government and the people of Malaysia wish to reaffirm their unequivocal support for SWAPO, the sole legitimate representative of the Namibian people themselves, in their firm and courageous struggle to achieve freedom and independence. We are confident their sacrifice, dedication and devotion will not fail them. The inevitability of Namibian independence is beyond doubt.

184. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The next speaker is the representative of Afghanistan. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

185. Mr. ZARIF (Afghanistan): I should like at the outset, Sir, to congratulate you warmly on your assump-

tion of the high office of President of the Council. Well acquainted as we are with your outstanding professional and human qualities, we are confident that, under your able guidance, the present discussions of this body will be crowned with great success.

186. Almost 17 years have elapsed since the General Assembly, in its resolution 2145 (XXI) of 27 October 1966, terminated South Africa's Mandate over the Territory of Namibia and decided that henceforth the Territory would become under the direct responsibility of the United Nations; on 19 May 1967, by its resolution 2248 (S-V), it established the United Nations Council for Namibia as the sole legal Administering Authority to guide the people of the Territory towards the achievement of full independence.

187. In the face of the arrogant defiance of the occupying Power, namely, the racist régime of South Africa, an advisory opinion was sought from the International Court of Justice to verify whether or not the United Nations was legally and politically authorized to assume direct responsibility for the Territory by terminating South Africa's Mandate conferred upon that country by the League of Nations. The International Court of Justice, in its advisory opinion of 21 June 1971,⁸ stated in unambiguous terms that the decisions of the General Assembly in its resolution 2145 (XXI) and its resolution 2248 (S-V) were in full conformity with the principles of the international legal system.

188. While the repeated calls of the international community went unheeded, the South African authorities lost no time in tightening their grip on Namibia. The abhorrent faces of colonial occupation and racist oppression manifested themselves in the most blatant manner. The plunder of the human and natural resources of the Territory by the occupying Power and by transnational corporations of its allies assumed an ever-increasing pace, in open defiance of Decree No. 1 for the Protection of the Natural Resources of Namibia,³ enacted by the United Nations Council for Namibia, on 27 September 1974.

189. To suppress the struggle of the Namibian people the racist régime of South Africa embarked upon the path of heavy militarization of the Territory in a manner that could also serve its aggressive and hegemonic designs in the whole of southern Africa. Thanks to these plans, the racist régime is capable of launching piratical attacks against the sovereign and independent States of Angola, Botswana and Zambia, with a view to intimidating those countries and to stopping the support they render the national liberation struggle of the people of Namibia.

190. These acts, coupled with repeated acts of aggression against other neighbouring States, such as Lesotho, Mozambique, Seychelles and Zimbabwe, apart from their immediate consequences, constitute a grave threat not only to the African continent but to the security of the entire world.

191. At times we wonder how it is possible for an outlawed régime to fly in the face of the overwhelming majority of mankind and act in total defiance of the verdict of the international community. Afghanistan believes that this would not have been possible had it not been for the political, economic and military co-operation extended to the racist régime by certain Western States, first and foremost, the United States. Only with the assistance of these countries was the *apartheid* régime able to build its monstrous, oppressive, warmongering machine.

192. Council resolution 418 (1977) on a mandatory arms embargo against South Africa is being consistently violated by some of the very same countries that voted in favour of that resolution in the Council. There are persistent reports of the existence of secret military and security arrangements between the Government of South Africa and some Members of the United Nations, which run counter to the obligations assumed by those countries under the Charter of the United Nations.

193. The collaboration of the Zionist régime of Israel and the Governments of some other countries in the fulfilment of the nuclear ambitions of the *apartheid* régime has given rise to legitimately grave concern over the security of Africa and of the world at large. The dangers of arming the arrogant régime of South Africa with the atomic bomb will no doubt go beyond the limits set by the wishful thinking of the partners of that régime.

194. Facts have also surfaced concerning the continued attempts by the United States and certain other countries to establish a "South Atlantic treaty organization" that would include the racist régime of South Africa and have the task of defending imperialist interests in the southern hemisphere. Were this plan to materialize, the threat posed by the South African régime to the security of the whole area would acquire a new and far-reaching dimension that would inevitably result in the serious deterioration of the international security climate.

195. Some rather recent developments have already served as obstacles in the way of reaching a settlement on the question of Namibia. The United States Administration's policy of so-called constructive engagement with the Government of South Africa has given enough political support to that régime for it to resist the pressure of the international community for a speedy settlement of the problem. The decision of members of the European Community to extend economic assistance to the occupying Power in Namibia and the International Monetary Fund's loan of over \$1 billion to the racist régime of South Africa would not only help the overwhelming majority of South Africans and Namibians but would logically result in the diversion of greater amounts of resources to the further militarization of the *apartheid* régime.

196. If the present trend is not stopped, the international community will ultimately have to face a situation where the achievement of a settlement will be far less possible than it may appear to be today.

197. There are certain elements which lie at the core of this unfortunate problem. I should like to underline these elements here.

198. First, the question of Namibia is, in the full sense of the word, a decolonization problem. To portray it in the context of East-West confrontation would be a futile attempt to diminish the importance of the right of all nations to self-determination and independence.

199. Secondly, on the basis of the Definition of Aggression contained in General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX) of 14 December 1974, the continued occupation of Namibia by the racist South African forces constitutes a clear act of aggression. The people of Namibia are thus entitled to all forms of struggle, including armed struggle to rid their Territory of the forces of occupation. At the same time, all patriots who have been captured in the course of this struggle by the racist occupying Power must enjoy the status of prisoners of war in conformity with the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of 12 August 1949.¹²

200. Thirdly, SWAPO is the sole legitimate and authentic representative of the people of Namibia and the vanguard of their struggle for total independence. Thus, any attempt to gain recognition or legitimacy for the puppet subservient local authorities in Windhoek or to establish the so-called council for constitutional development totally violates the provisions of Council resolutions 385 (1976) and 435 (1978).

201. Fourthly, Council resolution 435 (1978) constitutes the only basis for the settlement of the Namibian problem. Any attempt by the so-called contact group or from any other quarter to sidetrack the issue from its original course is a violation of Council resolutions. The United States and South Africa's designs to tie the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola to the Namibian settlement is therefore aimed at injecting extraneous and irrelevant issues with a view to prolonging the search for a solution to the problem.

202. Fifthly, the United Nations Council for Namibia is the sole legal Administering Authority of Namibia, and thus the issue of Namibia is an issue between the South African racist régime on the one hand and the international community on the other. This fact belies South Africa's attempt to portray the question of Namibia as a regional issue.

203. Sixthly, under Council resolution 432 (1978) and General Assembly resolution S-9/2 of 3 May 1978, the territorial integrity and unity of Namibia unquestionably imply the inclusion of Walvis Bay, Penguin Island and other offshore islands. Any attempt to secede those areas from mainland Namibia are thus null and void.

204. Seventhly, since the Government of South Africa has consistently defied the resolutions of the Security Council and those of the General Assembly and has thus violated the obligations it assumed under the Charter of

the United Nations, the Council should, in our view, adopt without any further delay comprehensive and mandatory sanctions against that Government under Chapter VII of the Charter and set its own timetable for the implementation of the United Nations plan for Namibia.

205. The Government of Afghanistan believes that the international community should allow no further time for the dilatory tactics of the racist régime of South Africa and its imperialist collaborators. All-round co-operation and assistance should be extended to SWAPO and to the front-line States with a view to enabling them to intensify their struggle against racist occupation and subjugation and to resist acts of aggression and destabilization.

206. In conclusion, I should like to express our gratitude to the Secretary-General for the lucid and comprehensive report which he submitted to the Council, as well as for his extensive endeavours on behalf of finding a speedy solution to the problem. Our thanks and appreciation also go to the United Nations Council for Namibia which, under the able presidency of Mr. Paul Lusaka of Zambia, has been discharging its responsibilities successfully. Finally, Sir, I should like to thank you and, through you, the Council, for the time you have given my delegation to express our views on the issue before us.

207. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The last speaker is Mr. Lesaoana S. Makhandia, to whom the Council extended an invitation at the 2447th meeting. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

208. Mr. MAKHANDIA: First and foremost, Sir, allow our delegation warmly to congratulate you for the second time on your assumption of the presidency of this important body for the month of May. We are confident that under your able leadership the Council will make a valuable contribution to the cause of justice and peace. Allow me also to thank you and the members of the Council sincerely for giving the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC) this opportunity to address the Council.

209. It is said that where there is a will, there is a way. In the opinion of PAC, the custodian of the legitimate aspirations of the oppressed, exploited and dispossessed people of Azania, these urgent meetings of the Council have been called to ascertain that will.

210. As far back as 1966, the United Nations correctly terminated South Africa's Mandate in Namibia [*General Assembly resolution 2145 (XXI) of 27 October 1966*] and thereafter considered racist South Africa's presence in the Territory illegal. Since 1966, what has been required is that the United Nations should exercise full responsibility for the Territory and lead the people of Namibia to genuine independence. However, because the United Nations failed to live up to the responsibility entrusted to it, we are meeting here today.

211. Namibia is a United Nations responsibility and, for the sake of its own credibility and effectiveness, for the

sake of world peace, the United Nations is duty-bound to carry out faithfully its sacred responsibility in occupied Namibia.

212. We, the oppressed, exploited and dispossessed peoples, whether in occupied Namibia, Palestine or colonized Azania, regard the United Nations as an organization committed to upholding the inalienable right of dispossessed peoples and, more important, of righting the wrongs committed against peoples. We believe that the overwhelming majority of the Members of the United Nations are firmly committed to the lofty principles of the Organization. For instance, speaker after speaker has declared that he fervently upholds the right of the people of Namibia to genuine independence; and yet the realization of that overwhelming wish does not appear to be imminent. It is incumbent upon us to investigate why.

213. The naked truth is that a mere handful of régimes—out of greed, out of expansionist tendency and out of blind pursuance of racist policies—have been flagrantly violating all the principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, all internationally accepted norms of behaviour and all resolutions adopted by international organizations. The most guilty in this respect have been the racist régime of South Africa and the Zionists in occupied Palestine. It is also a fact that successive United States Administrations have encouraged those racist entities in their acts of aggression, expansion and intransigence.

214. Given these realities, one is tempted to ask: What wisdom prevailed that led to asking the so-called contact group, which includes and is invariably led by the United States, to act as an "honest broker" when the collusion and collaboration between racist South Africa and successive United States Administrations are so well known?

215. Today we acknowledge an impasse in the Namibian independence issue. However, the nature of this impasse too is no secret. It is the introduction of an extraneous and totally unrelated issue of the internal affairs of Angola, namely, the presence of Cuban forces in Angola.

216. The introduction of this totally unrelated issue is a grave and gross misuse of the Namibian cause to promote super-Power rivalry and extension of the so-called spheres of influence. Consequently, the introduction of this totally unrelated issue has not only led to the holding of the Namibian people hostage in the cold-war game but also to manipulation of the United Nations in this game.

217. The Council must make it abundantly clear to all that the United Nations will not shirk the responsibility entrusted to it in respect of the people of Namibia and, more important, will not allow any Power to hijack the Namibian issue to further its global ambitions. This categorical declaration is important both for the credibility of the United Nations itself and for the continued faith placed in it by the peoples of the world, especially the oppressed, exploited and dispossessed peoples. Such a

resolution would also clear the mist that now hovers over the Namibian issue. The Council must give practical effect to this will and do so urgently.

218. As a national liberation movement committed to the complete overthrow of the Fascist, colonial, *apartheid* system in South Africa itself, we of PAC cannot help but draw parallels. There exists evidence galore of racist South Africa's persistent insincerity and obvious reluctance to end its illegal occupation of Namibia. The racists have openly flouted every international resolution and appeal. The overwhelming consensus here is that racist South Africa is intransigent.

219. The existing state of affairs poses very pertinent questions. What should the United Nations, especially the Council, do in the face of this blatant intransigence? Should it capitulate or should it firmly meet this challenge? We of PAC do not believe this particular point is debatable or even negotiable.

220. The Council has no alternative but to meet this intransigence firmly and squarely. Moreover, it has the power and the instrument which can be most effectively used to end racist South Africa's illegal occupation of Namibia. The power is the collective will of all the members of the Council, especially the five permanent members. However, it is incumbent upon us to draw the attention of the Council to the fact that one of its permanent members, the United States, has a very special role in giving the Council a decisive collective will in the Namibian issue. The instrument is the imposition of mandatory and comprehensive sanctions under the provisions of the Charter. This is the sole, the most effective path open to the Council to bring a speedy end to this fundamental problem which has been before this world body for over two decades. For the sake of the continued credibility of the United Nations, for the sake of justice, for the sake of world peace and in the name of humanity, the Council must unanimously decide, at the end of this crucial and timely debate, to put an end decisively to racist South Africa's intransigence, its war of aggression and deliberate delaying tactics and forthwith implement resolution 435 (1978)—the only legitimate basis for leading the people of Namibia to genuine independence. The Council must act decisively now because time is running out.

221. However, we feel duty-bound to remind Council members, especially the United States, that, should the Council fail to take this decisive action and unduly prolong racist South Africa's continued illegal occupation of Namibia, or introduce the already discredited bantustan-type policy or extraneous and irrelevant issues into the question of Namibia's independence, the people of Namibia, acting through their national liberation movement, SWAPO, will leave no stone unturned to regain their usurped motherland and inalienable rights. About this there should be no doubt. Moreover, independent Africa and progressive and peace-loving peoples the world over will render every possible assistance to the people of Namibia in their just struggle. About this also there should be no doubt.

222. The era of colonialism is over. The growth of the United Nations in the past two decades is living testimony to that fact. The fact that you, Mr. President, distinguished representative of once-colonized Zaire, are presiding over the highest United Nations organ for peace and security testifies to that fact. Only recently, the heroic people of Zimbabwe convincingly demonstrated, in a difficult situation which duplicated present-day racist South Africa, that seemingly innocuous statements about the orderly transfer of power, or the linkage issue in the case of Namibia, are, in fact, excuses for holding on to power for the benefit of colonialist or imperialist nations; that, in fact, no obstacles can suppress the will of a people to be free; that delays only prolong suffering.

223. Nevertheless, there are those who still live in the past, and those who simply refuse to change with time. These are the moribund forces of history. The Council has a singular responsibility to drum sense and reality into them in order to avert a repetition of the grave tragedies of the past and so that the future may be viewed with a sense of security and justice. The Council, moreover, must act decisively against these moribund forces and firmly implement the provisions of the Charter, so as to build a world based on justice and respect for human dignity and the right of peoples to live as free men, women and children. Although the topic is Namibia, the issue is whether the United Nations, and especially the Council, has the will to uphold and implement its declared principles. We sincerely hope the Council will not fail, because the alternative would be war. And, if the moribund forces believe that through such a war they could perpetuate their occupation, oppression and naked exploitation, they are very much mistaken.

The meeting rose at 8.05 p.m.

NOTES

¹ See *Report of the International Conference in Support of the Struggle of the Namibian People for Independence, Paris, 25-29 April 1983* (A/CONF.120/13), annex II, sect. A. 3.

² *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fifth Session, Plenary Meetings*, 1867th meeting, para. 52.

³ *Ibid.*, *Thirty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 24*, vol. I, annex II.

⁴ *Ibid.*, *Ninth Special Session, Plenary Meetings*, 5th meeting, para. 103.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 14th meeting, para. 140.

⁶ See *Report of the International Conference in Support of the Struggle of the Namibian People for Independence, Paris, 25-29 April 1983* (A/CONF.120/13).

⁷ A/CONF.120/11.

⁸ *Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970)*, *Advisory Opinion*, I.C.J. Reports, 1971, p. 16.

⁹ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-seventh Session, Plenary Meetings*, 104th meeting.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, para. 147.

¹¹ See *Report of the International Conference in Support of the Struggle of the Namibian People for Independence, Paris, 25-29 April 1983* (A/CONF.120/13), part three.

¹² United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 75, No. 972.

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