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THIRTY-EIGHTH YEAR

2440th

MEETING: 24 MAY 1983

NEW YORK

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NOTE

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The resolutions of the Security Council, numbered in accordance with a system adopted in 1964, are published in yearly volumes of *Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council*. The new system, which has been applied retroactively to resolutions adopted before 1 January 1965, became fully operative on that date.

2440th MEETING

Held in New York on Tuesday, 24 May 1983, at 10.30 a.m.

President: Mr. M. KAMANDA wa KAMANDA (Zaire).

Present: The representatives of the following States: China, France, Guyana, Jordan, Malta, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Poland, Togo, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Zaire, Zimbabwe.

Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/2440)

1. Adoption of the agenda
2. The situation in Namibia:
Letter dated 12 May 1983 from the Permanent Representative of Mauritius to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/15760);
Letter dated 13 May 1983 from the Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/15761)

The meeting was called to order at 11.20 a.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

The situation in Namibia:

Letter dated 12 May 1983 from the Permanent Representative of Mauritius to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/15760);

Letter dated 13 May 1983 from the Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/15761)

1. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): In accordance with the decision taken at the 2439th meeting, I invite the representative of Mauritius to take a place at the Council table.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Maudave (Mauritius) took a place at the Council table.

2. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): In accordance with the decision taken at the 2439th meeting, I invite the President of the United Nations Council for Namibia and the other members of the delegation of the Council to take places at the Security Council table.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Lusaka (President of the United Nations Council for Namibia) and the other members of the delegation took places at the Council table.

3. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): In accordance with the decision taken at the 2439th meeting, I invite Mr. Nujoma, President of the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), to take a place at the Council table.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Nujoma took a place at the Council table.

4. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): In accordance with the decisions taken at the 2439th meeting, I invite the representatives of Algeria, Angola, Australia, Bangladesh, Benin, Cuba, Egypt, Ethiopia, the Gambia, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Kuwait, Mali, Nigeria, Panama, Romania, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sri Lanka, the Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, Turkey, Yugoslavia and Zambia to take the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Sahnoun (Algeria), Mr. de Figueiredo (Angola), Mr. Joseph (Australia), Mr. Wasiuddin (Bangladesh), Mr. Adjibade (Benin), Mr. Malmierca (Cuba), Mr. Khalil (Egypt), Mr. Ibrahim (Ethiopia), Mr. Blain (Gambia), Mr. Kaba (Guinea), Mr. Rao (India), Mr. Kusumaatmadja (Indonesia), Sir Egerton Richardson (Jamaica), Mr. Abulhassan (Kuwait), Mr. Traore (Mali), Mr. Fafowora (Nigeria), Mr. Ozores Typaldos (Panama), Mr. Marinescu (Romania), Mr. Niassé (Senegal), Ms. Gonthier (Seychelles), Mr. Sallu (Sierra Leone), Mr. von Schirnding (South Africa), Mr. Fonseka (Sri Lanka), Mr. El-Fattal (Syrian Arab Republic), Mr. Slim (Tunisia), Mr. Kirca (Turkey), Mr. Golob (Yugoslavia) and Mr. Goma (Zambia) took the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber.

5. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I should like to inform the members of the Council that I have received letters from the representatives of Afghanistan, Botswana, Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, Kenya, Morocco, Mozambique, Uganda, the United Republic of Tanzania and the Upper Volta in which they request to be invited to participate in the discussion of the item on the agenda. In conformity with the usual practice, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite those representatives to participate in the discussion without the right to vote, in accordance

with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Zarif (Afghanistan), Mr. Legwaila (Botswana), Mr. Pelletier (Canada), Mr. van Well (Federal Republic of Germany), Mr. Wabuge (Kenya), Mr. Mrani Zentar (Morocco), Mr. Lobo (Mozambique), Mr. Otunnu (Uganda), Mr. Rupia (United Republic of Tanzania) and Mr. Bassole (Upper Volta) took the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber.

6. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I should also like to inform the members of the Council that I have received a letter dated 20 May from the Acting Chairman of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, which reads as follows:

“On behalf of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, I have the honour to request, under rule 39 of its provisional rules of procedure, to be invited to participate in the Council’s consideration of the item entitled ‘The situation in Namibia’”.

7. On previous occasions the Security Council has extended invitations to representatives of other United Nations bodies in connection with the consideration of matters on its agenda. In accordance with past practice, therefore, I propose that the Council extend an invitation pursuant to rule 39 of its provisional rules of procedure to Mr. Raúl Roa Kourí, Acting Chairman of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.

It was so decided.

8. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): Members of the Council have before them document S/15784, containing the text of a letter dated 23 May from the representative of India addressed to the President of the Council.

9. The first speaker is the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Cuba, Mr. Isidoro Malmierca, whom I welcome. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

10. Mr. MALMIERCA (Cuba) (*interpretation from Spanish*): Mr. President, I should like, first of all, to express my thanks to you and to the other members of the Council for having given me the opportunity to make a statement during the Council’s consideration of this important question. It is a pleasure, moreover, to do so under the presidency of a representative of an African country, who will undoubtedly guide the work of this organ effectively.

11. Yesterday, on the very day the Security Council began a series of meetings to consider once again the situa-

tion in southern Africa, the racist régime of Pretoria gave a further demonstration of its disdain for the most basic norms of international law by launching an air attack against Mozambique—against the worker population of Maputo—taking many lives and leaving dozens of wounded, including workers, women and children.

12. The seriousness of the situation in Namibia and in southern Africa in general, as well as the need to achieve a prompt resolution of it, arouses the deepest concern of the international community and has compelled the Council, with its commitment to international peace and security under the terms of the Charter of the United Nations, to meet once again in order to try to achieve what has thus far been impossible: the implementation of Council resolution 435 (1978), considered to be the sole legal basis for the achievement of a negotiated, peaceful and just solution of the Namibian conflict.

13. The international community accepted resolution 435 (1978) in spite of everything, on the one hand convinced that the United Nations would veto any other measure and on the other hand seduced by the sirensongs which promised that this time—for the first and, perhaps, the only time in history—the intentions of the colonialists were honest.

14. Then the contact group of five Western countries appeared on the scene. Soon, however—sooner than might have been expected—the racist régime of Pretoria began to impose the most unconscionable conditions, in public and brazen alliance with Washington, which meant the failure of the group’s efforts.

15. Since then, South Africa and the United States have opposed with subtle, tenacious and systematic resistance the United Nations plan for the implementation of resolution 435 (1978), using devious tactics and manoeuvres of all types aimed at delaying the negotiating process and at prolonging indefinitely the illegal occupation of Namibia and the outrageous plunder of its natural wealth.

16. Washington and Pretoria imposed new, tougher conditions one after another until they arrived at the unacceptable idea of linking the independence of Namibia to the withdrawal of the Cuban internationalist forces, which are in Angola at the request of the Government of that country for the very purpose of defending its territory from the aggression of South Africa.

17. South Africa has for many years now refused to comply with the United Nations decisions on the independence of Namibia. Comrade Sam Nujoma, the President of SWAPO, reminded us of his words before the Security Council in 1971 [*1588th meeting*]. When it was the colonialist troops of a member State of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) that were in Angola, north of the Namibian border, South Africa also refused to withdraw from Namibia, although at that time it made no attempt to establish a link between Angola and the independence of Namibia.

18. Then, in 1975, when the colonialist troops withdrew from Angola, South Africa invaded the territory of independent Angola, and it was at that time that the Cuban internationalist fighters went to Angola to contribute to the defence of its independence and territorial integrity.

19. Since then, South Africa has committed constant acts of aggression against Angola and for almost two years it has occupied part of Angolan territory.

20. South Africa has no claim to anything; it must withdraw from Angola and it must withdraw from Namibia.

21. In recent days, various press sources have affirmed that it is the United States rather than South Africa that is insisting on linking the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola to the independence of Namibia. That position by a member of the contact group—supposedly established to facilitate negotiations, not to complicate them with new demands—also indicates designs that originate further away than Pretoria and are aimed at perpetuating the very profitable exploitation of the Namibian people and its territory.

22. In this connection, Cuba has always rejected the idea of linking the independence of Namibia to the presence of the Cuban internationalist forces in Angola. I should like to refer here to the first and ninth points of the Cuban-Angolan statement of 4 February 1982:

“The presence and the withdrawal of the Cuban forces stationed in Angola constitutes a bilateral question between two sovereign States, the People’s Republic of Angola and the Republic of Cuba, in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.

“If the self-sacrificing struggle of SWAPO, the sole legitimate representative of the Namibian people, and the demands of the international community succeeded in bringing about a genuine solution to the problem of Namibia, based on strict compliance with United Nations Security Council resolution 435 (1978), and led to a truly independent Government and the total withdrawal of the South African occupying troops to the other side of the Orange River, thus considerably diminishing the danger of aggression against Angola, the Angolan and Cuban Governments would consider the resumption of the implementation of the programme for the gradual withdrawal of the Cuban forces within a time-frame to be agreed upon by both Governments.”

23. How ironic it is that it is the self-proclaimed “champions of human rights” that are the firmest strategic ally of the Pretoria racists! How can they be allies of those who constantly violate the most basic human rights? What is *apartheid* if not the most brutal violation of human rights?

24. The strategic alliance between Reagan and Botha is only conceivable because they share the same interests.

That strategic alliance has encouraged the Pretoria racists, who openly proclaim their right to attack and destabilize the States of southern Africa and refuse to free Namibia and to stop oppressing 20 million South Africans simply because they are black.

25. The Namibian people are certainly not prepared to stand by passively while others settle their future. The Angolan people are not prepared to allow their territory to be attacked and occupied by the Pretoria racists and their counter-revolutionary followers. The international community is not prepared to allow its laws to be violated with impunity. The gravity of the situation in Namibia and throughout southern Africa in general and its harmful consequences for world peace make that impossible.

26. Many resolutions, agreements, statements, measures and plans of action have been adopted by the international community within the framework of international bodies, but the United States imperialists and the South African racists have disregarded all of them.

27. The non-aligned countries, since the First Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Belgrade in September 1961, have defended the inalienable right of the Namibian people to self-determination and national independence in a united Namibia, including Walvis Bay, the Penguin Islands and the other offshore islands, in accordance with the resolutions of the United Nations and of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and with their own agreements.

28. The Fifth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Colombo in August 1976

“congratulated the Government and people of Angola for their heroic and victorious struggle against the South African racist invaders and their allies, and commended the Republic of Cuba and other States which assisted the people of Angola in frustrating the expansionist and colonialist strategy of South Africa’s racist régime and of its allies.”¹

29. That strategy, given new life today by the Pretoria racists, is inexorably doomed to failure.

30. At the Sixth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Havana in September 1979, the Heads of State or Government:

“stated once again that the continued illegal occupation of Namibia by the racist régime of South Africa constitutes an aggression not only against the people of Namibia but also against all the independent and sovereign peoples and States of Africa and the world and represents a threat to international peace and security and open defiance of the decisions and resolutions of the United Nations on Namibia.”²

31. Similarly, the Seventh Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, meeting at New Delhi in March of this year,

“most categorically rejected the linkage or parallelism being drawn by the United States Administration between the independence of Namibia and the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola”, considering that “This continued insistence constitutes an unwarranted interference in the internal affairs of the People’s Republic of Angola,” and “strongly supported the position taken by the Front-Line States in this regard, as contained in the Lusaka communiqué of 20 February 1983” [see *S/15675 and Corr.1 and 2, annex, sect. I, para. 48.*]

32. We have strongly denounced the illegal exploitation of the natural resources of Namibia and declared that the plundering of those resources by transnational companies constitutes a grave violation of the Charter, and we have requested the colonialist exploiters to put an end to such activity, both in the continental Territory and in the islands and adjacent waters.

33. Our countries have pledged to give moral, material, financial, military, political, humanitarian and diplomatic support to SWAPO, the sole legitimate representative of the Namibian people, so that it may intensify its struggle on all fronts, especially the armed struggle, and we have set up a Solidarity Fund for Namibia and encouraged all the members of the Movement to make or increase contributions.

34. The non-aligned countries have likewise denounced the repression unleashed by the racist régime of South Africa against the SWAPO freedom fighters and have demanded the immediate and unconditional release of all political prisoners in Namibia and that they be recognized as prisoners of war, under the provisions of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of 12 August 1949³ and the Additional Protocol thereto.⁴

35. The General Assembly, the International Conference in Support of the Struggle of the Namibian People for Independence held in Paris in April and a series of international, regional, governmental, non-governmental and other organizations demonstrating solidarity on this issue have spoken out in similar terms. This is a unanimous and universal demand for rejection of the so-called linkage or parallelism which it has been sought to establish, for the liberation of Namibia and for peace in the southern part of the African continent.

36. Hence the appeal by the Heads of State or Government of non-aligned countries, at their Seventh Conference, to the Security Council to meet, as soon as possible, in order to consider further action on the implementation of its plan for the independence of Namibia, thereby assuming its primary responsibility for the implementation of resolution 435 (1978). [*Ibid.*, para. 49.]

37. Cuba, faithful to its principles and as a member of the Non-Aligned Movement, is fulfilling the agreements adopted at the New Delhi summit in speaking out here.

38. We sincerely believe that the crucial time has come for the Namibian people. Either the Council must fulfil its duties *vis-à-vis* Namibia or the Namibian people will continue and intensify the armed struggle, so greatly feared by the imperialist countries, convinced as the Namibian people are that their victory is certain. That is not a threat but rather an ineluctable and irreversible law of the history of mankind.

39. If we really want to help the Namibian people, the front-line States and the South African people who are being subjected to the most abominable policy of racial discrimination, if we want to make a contribution to international peace and security, the Council must fully assume its responsibility for the implementation of resolution 435 (1978).

40. The Council must set a deadline for the implementation of the new measures to be adopted to implement that resolution.

41. If the fascist arrogance of the United States Administration and the racist intransigence of the South African régime persist in preventing a solution to the conflict, then Chapter VII of the Charter provides for the necessary sanctions to compel the racist transgressor to implement the decisions of the Council, which reflect the demand of all peoples.

42. The United States may time and again veto attempts to resolve the Namibian problem, it may engage in all sorts of manoeuvres, but what it will not be able to do is prevent the triumph of the Namibian people sooner or later.

43. May this series of meetings of the Council not become just one more to study the question of Namibia and the implementation of resolution 435 (1978). Let us heed the demands of the peoples, who anxiously wait for us to fulfil our duty, by contributing to freeing the Namibian people from their bloody and cruel Calvary and by tying the hands of the Pretoria racists; who in their madness are attempting to drag the people of southern Africa into their new order of plunder and extermination.

44. We have, at this series of meetings of the Council, heard praise of South Africa; we have even heard talk of nut trees [2439th meeting, para. 64]; but we cannot close our ears to the appeal of the people of Namibia, to the demands of those who are fighting for the most precious of possessions—freedom—or to those who are taking up the weapons of those who have fallen in the battle and are fighting so that there may be no more victims of *apartheid* either in Namibia or in southern Angola.

45. Cuba hopes that the Council will fulfil its historic duty by contributing to the rapid and unconditional independence of Namibia, thereby making an inestimable contribution to peace.

46. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The next speaker is the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Zam-

bia, Mr. Goma, whom I welcome. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

47. Mr. GOMA (Zambia): Mr. President, on behalf of the Zambian delegation, I wish to thank you and the other members of the Council for giving us the opportunity to participate in this important debate on the question of Namibia. May the Council, under your able guidance, make real and significant progress on this matter so that the freedom and independence of Namibia can be secured without further delay.

48. This series of Council meetings on Namibia has been convened in response to a virtually universal demand. For quite some time now, there has been a strong international demand for action by the Council to ensure the early implementation of its resolution 435 (1978) on the independence of Namibia. The world community is exasperated, anxious and concerned over the delay in implementing this resolution, which provides a solid basis for a peaceful negotiated settlement of the Namibian problem. It wants movement and not continued stagnation on this issue. It wants Namibia to be free and independent now and the sad chapter of the outrageous illegal occupation of that Territory by South Africa to be brought to a close.

49. This position of the international community has been eloquently articulated at three recent major international conferences, namely, the Seventh Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at New Delhi in March, the International Conference in Support of the Front-line States, held at Lisbon, also in March, and the International Conference in Support of the Struggle of the Namibian People for Independence, held in Paris in April. All these conferences requested that the Council meet on Namibia in order that it might reassert itself and properly assume its full responsibilities for the implementation of its resolution 435 (1978). The Secretary-General, in his report to the Council [S/15776], also expressed his deep concern at the delay in implementing resolution 435 (1978).

50. Our main objective at this meeting is thus clear: we want to find ways and means of securing the immediate and unimpeded implementation of resolution 435 (1978), in letter and in spirit. We are not seeking a confrontation with any country or group of countries that, like ourselves, genuinely want to see Namibia free and independent quickly, and we hope that there will be none. We are here not to embarrass anybody but to state the facts as we know them and to press for real progress in the efforts for the liberation and genuine independence of Namibia.

51. Resolution 435 (1978) was adopted by the Council some five years ago. It was intended to be the basis for Namibia's independence within a period of one year. The Namibian people should thus have been celebrating this year the fourth anniversary of its independence.

52. The adoption of resolution 435 (1978) was significant not least for the fact that it was inspired, negotiated

and pressed before the Council by five prominent Western countries with close political, economic and strategic relations with South Africa. These countries have come to be known as the Western contact group on Namibia. The international community had repeatedly called upon these countries to use their considerable leverage on South Africa to bring about the independence of Namibia. Their initiative in respect of resolution 435 (1978) was therefore interpreted as a response to the numerous demands of the international community and a demonstration of their willingness and readiness, at long last, to take meaningful and practical action, within the framework of the United Nations, to compel South Africa to end its illegal occupation of and stranglehold on Namibia.

53. We in Zambia welcomed this apparent change of heart on the part of the most important allies of South Africa. Together with the other front-line States, Nigeria and SWAPO, we agreed to co-operate with them in order to ensure the success of their initiative. The record of our co-operation and constructive attitude is there for everyone to see; it speaks for itself. We did not despair or give up even in the face of the most arrogant, provocative and savage attitude of and actions by South Africa. Instead, we persevered right up to the round of talks involving senior officials of the contact group, on the one hand, and those of the front-line States, Nigeria and SWAPO, on the other, which took place here in New York in July and August 1982, with the objective of accelerating the process of implementing resolution 435 (1978). The impression we had at that time was not only that the discussions were constructive, but also that significant progress had been made. As a consequence, the parties to the talks held further discussions with the Secretariat with regard to the size, composition and deployment of the military component of the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG). The only major issue which remained unsettled was that of the electoral system which was to be used in the United Nations-supervised Namibian elections. We were, however, informed that this too would be made known soon. But what has been the outcome?

54. There is at present an impasse in the efforts to secure Namibia's independence. This impasse has been caused by the injection by the United States of a linkage between Namibia's independence and the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. We cannot but view with grave concern and dismay the injection of this linkage issue just at a time when the parties to the conflict had resolved major misunderstandings and optimism concerning a settlement was at its highest. It is this linkage which has blocked progress in the implementation of resolution 435 (1978), thus thwarting the United Nations mandate and the aspirations of the Namibian people. It is ironic that a member of the contact group is responsible for the present impasse. Rather than press for progress in the implementation of its own resolution, it has introduced an extraneous issue which has had the very opposite effect.

55. The South African régime is a master of prevarication, procrastination and intransigence with regard to the question of the freedom and independence of Namibia. Time and again it has pretended to be interested in a negotiated settlement, only to use the negotiations to buy time. Not unexpectedly, therefore, it has capitalized on the linkage issue. Thus, the linkage issue has provided the régime with yet another pretext for continuing its illegal occupation of Namibia and thereby perpetuating the oppression and repression of the innocent Namibian people and the plunder of their natural resources.

56. We in Zambia, the rest of the front-line States, other African States, the non-aligned countries and other progressive countries and forces have categorically rejected the claimed linkage between Namibia's independence and the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola because the issue is extraneous to and can only have a diversionary impact on the Namibian question. We also reject it because it introduces an ideological element into what is plainly a decolonization question.

57. The question of Namibia is not about ideology. It is not about an independent Namibia being close to or falling under the sphere of influence of one or the other super-Power. The Namibian people are simply fighting for their freedom and independence and not to become communist or capitalist. Their struggle is legitimate and in conformity with the letter and spirit of the Charter of the United Nations. It is most outrageous to distort the purpose and meaning of this struggle and to perceive and project it in an ideological context. Namibia and its people should not become a pawn in the super-Power rivalries for spheres of influence.

58. It is necessary to underscore the gravity of the present lack of progress on the Namibian question. The continued illegal occupation of Namibia by South Africa is one of the principal elements in that régime's total strategy, which it is pursuing in defence of *apartheid*. This entails, with respect to Namibia, procrastination and prevarication in regard to the implementation of resolution 435 (1978); continued bloodshed as men, women and children are killed, maimed or seriously injured in the armed conflict; continued savage oppression and repression of the Namibian people as evidenced by the innumerable Namibian patriots who are continually subjected to harassment, arrest, imprisonment and torture by the illegal occupying authorities in a vain attempt to stifle their resolve to be free and independent. In addition, vast numbers of Namibians are victims of homelessness, as they are obliged to flee their country to live as exiles or refugees elsewhere.

59. This is not all. The continued illegal occupation of Namibia by South Africa also has an external dimension. The Pretoria régime repeatedly commits wanton acts of aggression and destabilization against independent African States in southern Africa from Namibian territory, in the false hope of frustrating the support, based on principle, that these States give to the oppressed peoples of Namibia and South Africa in their liberation struggles.

60. Angola and my own country, Zambia, which do not share a common border with South Africa, have been and are victims of the South African régime's acts of aggression launched from Namibia. In this manner, South African military forces occupied parts of Angolan territory in the south and have remained there up to now in spite of a world-wide demand for their withdrawal. South Africa's acts of aggression against other independent States in the region are a direct breach of international peace and, thus, a violation of the Charter.

61. In order to appease its supporters in the West and the principal shareholders and profit-makers in Namibia and South Africa, who all come from the West, the South African régime continues to create a false alarm about a so-called communist onslaught in southern Africa and that a SWAPO Government in a free and independent Namibia would be a Soviet puppet. Regrettably, some have been duped by this propaganda or have taken advantage of it for their own global or domestic purposes.

62. Related to the actions designed to ensure South Africa's continued stranglehold on Namibia is the incidence of plunder and exploitation of the Territory's rich natural resources. There would appear to be a conscious decision by South Africa, in collusion with powerful Western economic enterprises, to deplete the rich natural resources of Namibia before conceding its independence.

63. When all those circumstances are considered, we are left with no other conclusion than that there is no intention whatsoever on the part of South Africa to withdraw from Namibia and to see that Territory become free and independent soon. Can the international community stand by and simply watch the South African régime defiantly thwarting the United Nations mandate, blocking the freedom and independence of Namibia, continuing to kill, maim and torture the innocent Namibian people, wantonly committing gross violations of human rights and arrogantly degrading fellow human beings on grounds of colour and race in a Territory for which the United Nations has direct responsibility until independence and, with impunity, committing international crimes by engaging in acts of aggression and destabilizing front-line and other independent African States in the region and thereby seriously endangering international peace and security? This is an intolerable situation and it must be brought to an end quickly.

64. This series of meetings of the Council is taking place against the sombre background of a criminal South African attack against Mozambique in which innocent civilians have been killed and valuable property wantonly destroyed. Zambia most strongly condemns this South African aggression against Mozambique. South Africa cannot and will not solve its internal problems by committing acts of aggression against neighbouring African States. The oppressed peoples of South Africa are struggling and will continue to struggle within South Africa itself until the abominable system of *apartheid* and minority rule is eliminated. We therefore say the follow-

ing to the South African régime: "End your system of *apartheid* and minority rule and your problems will be over."

65. At this juncture, I should like to pay a tribute to the Secretary-General for his lucid report to the Council concerning the question of Namibia. We also commend him for his efforts in the quest to bring early independence to Namibia. His report agrees with the aforementioned thesis in the following words:

"It is evident that the delay in implementing resolution 435 (1978) is having a destructive impact not only on Namibia itself but also on the prospect of a peaceful and prosperous future for the region as a whole. The delay also has an adverse effect on international relations in a wider sphere, adding to the prevailing sense of frustration and mistrust, with all that that implies for peace and security in the region." [*Ibid.*, para. 16.]

66. There is therefore an urgent need to break the current stalemate over Namibia which has been brought about by the linkage issue. It cannot be over-emphasized that resolution 435 (1978) provides a valid and adequate basis for a peaceful and negotiated settlement of the Namibian problem. We call upon the Council to recommit itself to resolution 435 (1978) and to take decisive action aimed at the speedy and scrupulous implementation of that resolution. We further call upon all States to strive for its immediate implementation in letter and in spirit. It is also important that the central role of the United Nations to ensure that Namibia attains its freedom and genuine independence should not be undermined under any pretext. Accordingly, it is essential that the hand of the Secretary-General be strengthened so that he can move expeditiously and effectively with regard to the process for implementing the resolution. We appeal to all States to give him their full co-operation.

67. As I said at the beginning of my statement, we have not come here to provoke any confrontation with any country or group of countries. We are not here to make any exaggerated demands on the Council and its members. We have come to have the Namibian question placed in its proper perspective and to generate a momentum for real progress in the implementation of resolution 435 (1978). It is therefore our hope that, at the end of the day, this will have proved to be a fruitful Council meeting characterized by a constructive spirit, realism and great courage to take those steps that can and will truly advance the freedom and genuine independence of Namibia.

68. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The next speaker is the representative of South Africa. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

69. Mr. von SCHIRNDING (South Africa): I should like to join preceding speakers in congratulating you, Sir, on your assumption of the office of President of the Council and to express our confidence that you will conduct these proceedings with due impartiality.

70. The purpose of this series of meetings is not the promotion of a peaceful settlement of the question of South West Africa. On the contrary, its main objective is to undermine the delicate negotiations that are currently under way.

71. The time has come to remind the United Nations that South Africa has never accepted the United Nations view that South Africa's presence in the Territory is illegal, nor has the International Court of Justice ever delivered a binding judgement to the effect that South Africa's right to administer the Territory has been terminated. As far as South Africa is concerned, it continues to administer the Territory legally and in conformity with the spirit of the lapsed Mandate from the League of Nations. However, as a purely practical political consideration, in the search for an internationally acceptable settlement South Africa agreed with the proposition put to it by the contact group in March 1978 that all sides, including the United Nations, should "set on one side the long-standing legal disputes that have bedevilled consideration of this question for 30 years". It would seem that the United Nations, by its spurious claims, wishes to revert to the legal arguments that characterized the first 30 years of this dispute.

72. During the past five years, South Africa has persistently continued the search for an internationally acceptable settlement. It was South Africa which, on 25 April 1978, first accepted the Western proposal, some months before the equivocal response of SWAPO, which contained conditions that almost wrecked the settlement initiative at its very commencement.

73. It was South Africa which, on 22 December 1978, after having first consulted with the elected representatives of the people of the Territory, informed the Secretary-General of its decision "to co-operate in the expeditious implementation of Security Council resolution 435 (1978)". [*S/12983, annex I.*]

74. It was South Africa which, on 6 February 1979, advised the Secretary-General that early implementation was imperative, and which urged the United Nations that the emplacement of UNTAG, even if it only involved certain advance units, should commence not later than the end of February 1979.

75. It was not South Africa which created the obstacles that have, since February 1979, frustrated agreement on a peaceful settlement.

76. It was not South Africa which brazenly altered the independence proposal on 26 February 1979 to remove basic guarantees for the security of the people of South West Africa. It was officials of the Secretariat who did this, at the insistence of SWAPO and with the connivance of representatives of certain countries. My Government has in its possession the documentary evidence to substantiate this claim. It will be recalled that, on 21 February 1979, telegraphic clarifications were despatched from the Secretary-General's office to a number

of Governments which conflicted directly with the express understandings that had previously been reached between South Africa and the contact group. In terms of these clarifications, SWAPO would be given bases inside South West Africa which it had never had, and the military component of UNTAG would no longer be required to monitor the restriction of SWAPO to bases outside South West Africa. Apparently SWAPO now accepts restriction as to base and monitoring by UNTAG, but in February 1979 its refusal to do so directly impeded the negotiations and led to an impasse of long duration.

77. It was not South Africa which created well-founded doubts in the minds of the people of the Territory concerning the United Nations bias in favour of SWAPO. It was the United Nations itself, through the massive material, political and propaganda assistance it extended—and indeed continues to extend—to SWAPO. Indeed, this series of meetings of the Council is a cynical demonstration of United Nations bias in favour of SWAPO. However, I should like to add that the more constructive tone reflected in the Secretary-General's report [S/15776] has not gone unnoticed.

78. I should also like at this stage to register my appreciation for the reference yesterday [2439th meeting] by the representative of the United Kingdom to South Africa's positive role in the negotiations leading to the independence of Zimbabwe.

79. It was not South Africa which aroused fears that the people of South West Africa would be subjected to intimidation during the election campaign. It was SWAPO which did so through its cold-blooded campaign of terrorism, which has left more than 1,300 civilians dead and at least 25 prominent local politicians assassinated. SWAPO has added to these apprehensions with statements which it has made over the Voice of Namibia in which it has declared that "the liquidation of traitors may have to be intensified if the revolution is to succeed". In addition, the instructions issued to terrorists who recently attempted to infiltrate into the Territory included orders to kill members of the civilian population indiscriminately, to kill political leaders opposed to SWAPO and to lay landmines as widely as possible.

80. It was not South Africa which created the deepest misgivings among the people of South West Africa concerning the continuation of fundamental constitutional rights after independence. It was SWAPO with its terrorist practices and Marxist principles and threats to discipline political opponents that has done so. As Mr. Nujoma has said in recent years:

"We do not fight for majority rule, we fight in order to take over the power in Namibia for the benefit of the people of Namibia. We are revolutionaries.

"We believe that a really socialistic State in Namibia can only be enforced by means of violent revolution.

"Cuba is the example for revolution. The Cuban revolution is our revolution. It is the revolution of suppressed people."

81. In the mean time, another threat to the stability and the process of self-determination in South West Africa—and indeed throughout southern Africa—is casting its ominous shadow across our subcontinent, yet another peril for the peace of southern Africa, which is growing with each passing month and which has not been of South Africa's making. I refer to the increasing and threatening presence of the surrogate forces of an expansionist and imperial super-Power in our region. As the Minister of Foreign Affairs of South Africa recently stated in the South African Parliament:

"There is an unquestionable *de facto* linkage between the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola and the settlement of the South West African question. It is ludicrous to suggest that the introduction of the hostile and expansionist surrogates of a super-Power into the southern African region will not have the most far-reaching implications for the security of all of the countries of the region, particularly when one considers:

"(1) The doctrine of the super-Power, the Soviet Union, which openly proclaims the necessity for the world-wide exportation of communism;

"(2) The record of the surrogate, Cuba, for subversion and the fomentation of revolution in Central America, South America and Africa;

"(3) The threat which Soviet- and Cuban-supported elements have already posed to a country in the region, that is, the Shaba invasion of Zaire."

82. It was these concerns which ultimately led to the impasse at the Geneva pre-implementation meeting in January 1981 and which for some time left the whole settlement concept dead in the water.

83. It was against this background that the United States Government approached the South African Government in the early part of 1981 to learn whether the South African Government would be prepared to participate in a new initiative in search of a settlement based on resolution 435 (1978). It will be recalled that the United States proposed a phased initiative in an attempt to address these concerns and to dismantle the obstacles. There is a widespread misapprehension in the international community that there has been some form of collusion between South Africa and the United States over South West Africa. Nothing could be further from the truth. It was only with considerable apprehension that South Africa agreed to certain proposals which were put to it by the current United States Administration. However, despite its deep-seated misgivings, it agreed to adopt a flexible approach with a view to finding peaceful solutions to the problems of South West Africa and southern Africa.

84. On 26 January 1982, South Africa informed the contact group that it had accepted the revised constitutional principles which the five had presented to it on 17 December 1981. On two subsequent occasions, in an attempt to expedite the independence process, South Africa agreed to amendments to the proposed electoral system which other parties had demanded. Nevertheless,

owing to SWAPO intransigence, it was not until 12 July 1982 that the contact group was able to report to the Secretary-General that all parties had accepted the principles. [See S/15287.]

85. There should be no mistake concerning the seriousness of South Africa's attitude to these negotiations. South Africa does not regard the proposals which have been made and the undertakings which have been given as so many pieces of paper to be blown away willy-nilly by SWAPO and the international community when they have served their propaganda purpose.

86. As a result of its bitter experiences in the past, South Africa has developed a deeply sceptical attitude towards the United Nations in its dealings with the international community over South West Africa. South Africa will, accordingly, not be content with words and paper undertakings. It is seeking firm and concrete signs that the United Nations is prepared to give serious attention to the justifiable concerns of the people of South West Africa and to the legitimate interests of South Africa in a stable and peaceful southern Africa.

87. How can we reconcile the supposed commitment of SWAPO to the constitutional principles with its totalitarian rantings at the recent Paris Conference and, what is more, with the expulsion of a representative of one of the South West Africa political parties from that Conference?

88. How can we reconcile the search for peace implicit in these negotiations with the unilateral escalation by SWAPO of its terrorist attacks against the people of the Territory? Only last February, SWAPO launched its largest-ever offensive against the people of the Territory, despite the fact that intensive efforts were at that very time under way to try to bring peace to the region. The SWAPO attack, which failed in all its objectives, involved 600 to 850 specially trained terrorists, divided into 12 to 14 groups. Despite the failure of its last initiative, SWAPO is even now in the process of mustering its forces for yet another desperate attack against the civilian population of the Territory.

89. How can we reconcile the requirement of impartiality with the continuing United Nations activities in support of SWAPO as most recently manifested at the Paris Conference?

90. South Africa has also attempted to play a constructive role in removing the last major obstacle to the realization of a peaceful settlement: that is, the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola. South Africa felt that it could make a positive contribution in this regard by attempting to establish peace in the border area between South West Africa and Angola.

91. Members of the Council will recall that representatives of South Africa and Angola met at ministerial level in the Cape Verde Islands on 7 and 8 December 1982, and during that meeting South Africa made certain practical proposals for the establishment of peace in the border area. A second round of talks, also at ministerial level,

was arranged for 23 February 1983, but a week before the discussions were due to take place, SWAPO launched its largest-ever offensive against South West Africa, with the knowledge and support of the Angolan Government. South Africa nevertheless decided to send a delegation to the Cape Verde Islands, led by the South African Director-General for Foreign Affairs and Information, to make it clear to Angola that it and SWAPO would have to reciprocate the military restraint which had been manifested by South Africa if there was to be any progress with the peace initiative.

92. The South African delegation also emphasized that a lasting settlement would require the withdrawal of Cuban forces. Within this context, South Africa is prepared to hold further talks with Angola. Indeed, South Africa is still awaiting Angola's reaction to a recent letter in which this position was set out.

93. Much has been said of South Africa's armed forces along the borders of South West Africa. Once again, the situation which has arisen has not been of South Africa's making. We would much prefer peaceful coexistence with all our neighbours. We have repeatedly invited our neighbours to enter into non-aggression pacts and we have suggested that they discuss with us matters of mutual concern.

94. As the Council is no doubt aware, the Governments of Mozambique and South Africa agreed to follow up bilateral ministerial talks which had taken place on 17 December 1982 with a second round of ministerial discussions on 5 May 1983. However, the Government of Mozambique deemed it fit to send a propaganda story into the world a few days prior to the scheduled meeting to the effect that the South African Government had trained and instructed a South African citizen by the name of Petrus Benjamin Schoeman, *inter alia*, to assassinate the President of Mozambique. It must be assumed that this story was intended to give substance to allegations which the Council has already heard this morning, that South Africa was destabilizing its neighbours in southern Africa.

95. When confronted by the South African Government's determination not to continue with bilateral discussions before the facts regarding Mr. Schoeman had been established, the Mozambique delegation agreed to a team of South African policemen proceeding to Maputo to obtain Mr. Schoeman's fingerprints. These fingerprints established beyond any doubt whatsoever that the person held by the Mozambican authorities had a criminal record spanning a period from 22 March 1961, when he was 14 years of age, to 5 January 1976, when he was declared a habitual criminal. Mr. Schoeman was released on parole by the South African authorities on 20 January 1982, but he broke his parole conditions soon after his release and has subsequently been sought by the South African police in this connection as well as in connection with allegations of theft allegedly committed after his release.

96. By their own admission, the Mozambique authorities had detained Mr. Schoeman in custody for more than a year, since approximately the time when he was being sought by the South African police. It is clear that Mr. Schoeman could have been paraded before the international press at any time over a period of more than a year, and it is equally clear that Mr. Schoeman is one of life's unfortunate cases in urgent need of sympathetic and human care.

97. But despite the irrefutable evidence that Schoeman is nothing more than a common criminal and despite Maputo's unambiguous acknowledgement of this fact, the Government of Mozambique nevertheless had the gall to use him in yet another of its propaganda set-pieces, this time by displaying him in its capital, as recently as last Saturday, before a crowd of 50,000 people as a "member of the Mozambique National Resistance". This charade has exposed to the world community the lengths to which certain elements will go to smear South Africa with the label of destabilization.

98. However, an attitude has developed in the international community, largely as a result of the perverse positions adopted by the Organization, that South Africa and those who are under its legitimate protection may be attacked across international borders with impunity. Let there be no mistake about South Africa's reaction. We shall defend ourselves and the people of South West Africa with all the means at our disposal. Those who harbour terrorists, those who attempt to destabilize our society, must understand that South Africa will not take this lying down. We would not have it so, but the choice is theirs.

99. From the foregoing it should be clear that the obstacles to an international settlement of the South West Africa question have not been of South Africa's making. On the contrary, South Africa has consistently worked for the creation of circumstances which will permit the people of South West Africa to determine their own future in conditions of impartiality, secure from terrorist and other forms of intimidation, confident of the continuation of their basic constitutional and civil rights, and assured that their country will not fall prey to the predatory expansion of the Soviet Union and its surrogates. South Africa has no intention of deviating from this course.

100. The recent terrorist outrage in Pretoria and South Africa's subsequent retaliation against African National Congress of South Africa targets in Mozambique graphically illustrate the urgency of the choice which must be made in southern Africa between the dangers of escalating confrontation and the benefits of peace and co-operation. As the South African Minister of Foreign Affairs stated in Parliament on 17 September 1981:

"We therefore all have a dilemma, the rest of Africa and South Africa, and the time is approaching that we must face the facts as they are, without demanding confessions. Southern Africa is not a house of confession. What is required is a realistic appraisal of the

dilemmas in which we find ourselves. If we fail to do this, the drift towards confrontation and conflagration in southern Africa will become inevitable. Invective and acrimonious exchanges and eventually hatred, suspicion and mistrust will accumulate and will become a driving force towards a situation of general war in southern Africa, and no winner will emerge from such a conflict situation."

"That is why to my mind the choice is quite clear. It is imminent. South West Africa is only a part of the southern Africa scene. It is, as far as I am concerned, the tip of the iceberg. The bulk is underneath and much more dangerous. I believe the Angolans, the Zambians, the people of Zimbabwe and the people of Mozambique are tired of the turbulence of our region. If that is the case, then I believe that there rests an historic responsibility on all the leaders of southern Africa to get together and objectively and constructively review the whole situation in southern Africa. I believe the time for this is ripe."

101. Now that choice still exists. I trust and hope that the Security Council will not consider any action or set any deadlines which might force southern Africa in the direction of confrontation and of an escalation of conflict. The Council should be under no illusions as to who would suffer most. It would not be the super-Powers or the United Nations which would have to pay the price for unleashing the dogs of war upon our region. It would be all the peoples of southern Africa, of all the countries of our region.

102. But the world must also understand that the South African Government will not bow to threats. We shall not be bound by deadlines or held hostage by intimidation. We shall make our own decisions according to our perception of our responsibilities and interests and this means that in our international dealings we shall continue to deal fairly with all nations in a spirit of good-neighbourliness and respect for the rights of all peoples to self-determination. We shall continue to make our essential contribution to international commerce. We shall meet our obligations and we shall pay our debts. Where we can, we shall continue to help our neighbours who commit themselves to peaceful coexistence and constructive co-operation. Inside our country we shall continue to maintain order and stability and we shall carry on with the process of controlled reform. We believe that there are more than enough moderate people and people of good will within our country, within South West Africa and within our region to assure us all of peace and prosperity.

103. But at the same time we shall continue to resist radical alien and malevolent interference in our affairs. We shall not permit surrogate forces to influence developments in our region and we shall not tolerate the expansion of Soviet imperialism on our borders. We have lost patience with those in the international community who incessantly work for our destruction, who call for our isolation and incite terrorist violence against us and who then throw up their hands in amazement and

horror when we have the temerity to defend ourselves. We shall continue to work for peace, prosperity and self-determination in our own country and in South West Africa. But let there be no doubt: those who threaten us increase the chances of confrontation and conflict throughout our region and those who attack us, or who assist others to attack us, do so at their most dire peril.

104. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The next speaker is the representative of Kenya. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

105. Mr. WABUGE (Kenya): I wish to take this opportunity to convey greetings and best wishes to all the members of the Council from Mr. Daniel arap Moi, President of the Republic of Kenya and current Chairman of the OAU. It is his hope that the Council will with firmness take the necessary steps to ensure that its resolution 435 (1978) is fully implemented.

106. At this juncture permit me to express Kenya's gratitude to the Council for agreeing to extend an invitation to my country to address the Council on such an important issue as the one under discussion.

107. I am happy to be addressing the Council at a time when you are presiding over its deliberations, particularly since the issue under consideration is of capital importance to Africa, a region of which your country is an eminent member. I am confident that your distinguished career as a diplomat and statesman and your wealth of experience in tackling difficult issues will greatly assist the work of the Council in making realistic and genuine progress towards the final solution of the problem of the total decolonization of Namibia. Allow me also to express Kenya's thanks to the other members of the Council for their great devotion and dedication in discharging the enormous responsibilities in connection with Namibia's independence entrusted to them by the international community.

108. The Council has been convened at the request of the non-aligned countries. When the Seventh Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries met at New Delhi in March this year, it called upon the Security Council to meet as soon as possible in order to consider further action on the implementation of the plan for Namibia's independence. It made that call because it believed that the situation in Namibia had reached a critical stage and that the international community must discharge its obligation under the Charter of the United Nations to ensure the implementation of the Council resolution on Namibia, which has been too long delayed.

109. In the 37 years of United Nations history, voluminous records have accumulated of continued aggression by South Africa against the people of Namibia and the neighbouring countries. The United Nations also has voluminous records of its resolutions, decisions and recommendations on the decolonization of Namibia. It is

not our intention in this debate to dwell on the history of South Africa's aggression in southern Africa. The records of that aggression speak for themselves and we do not need to labour the point. Even friends of South Africa agree with us on this sad history of the racist régime. We have come here with one main objective—the implementation of resolution 435 (1978) on the independence of Namibia.

110. It is now five years since the United Nations plan for the independence of Namibia was endorsed by the Council in resolution 435 (1978). At the time, we hoped that South Africa had regained its senses and was ready to co-operate in arranging for the peaceful transition to independence of Namibia. Instead of moving towards the implementation of the United Nations plan, South Africa has intensified its war against the liberation forces, the forces of SWAPO and the neighbouring States, particularly Angola and Mozambique. Instead of implementing the United Nations plan, South Africa has moved in to convert Namibia into an armed camp, a military base and a springboard from which it has carried out unprovoked attacks against neighbouring countries.

111. The events of yesterday are a vivid example of what we have been saying over the years. The air attack carried out in the early hours of yesterday morning against Mozambique clearly shows how the racist régime is responding to the international demand for its withdrawal from Namibia. The air raids against Mozambique stand condemned by the entire world community. Such acts of aggression will only harden the resolve and the determination of the freedom fighters to continue the armed struggle. Indeed, Africa and the entire world community are bound to ask what it is that South Africa wants.

112. As I have said, we have come before the Council with one main objective: the implementation of the United Nations plan as called for in its resolution 435 (1978). We have all agreed that this plan remains the only basis for peaceful transition to independence by Namibia. Since the adoption of the plan in 1978, Africa and, indeed, the rest of the world have waited with anxious impatience for the implementation of the plan. We were told by those close to South Africa and by those who had offered themselves as negotiators for that country that it was ready to accept the implementation of the United Nations plan.

113. For our part, we had no illusions about South Africa's sincerity in all these negotiations. The African States, together with SWAPO, had serious doubts regarding South Africa's sincerity in these negotiations. Our fears and apprehensions were proved right only last summer when we thought that the contact group had prevailed upon South Africa to accept the plan. Last summer, our hopes were raised and there were great expectations that at last the plan would be set in motion. We were told by those negotiating for South Africa, namely, the contact group, that finally an agreement had

been reached to begin the implementation of the United Nations plan. We were not surprised at all when, soon after the so-called negotiations with South Africa, we began to get signals of something different from what we had been given to understand by the contact group. It became clear that, as before, South Africa was playing its usual game of delaying tactics. Instead of implementing the plan, South Africa is now making an unrealistic, unrelated and unacceptable demand of an independent neighbouring State, Angola.

114. It is very pertinent at this time to say that Africa welcomed the initiatives of the contact group in our negotiations with South Africa. We, however, should like to stress the point that those who have assumed the responsibility for negotiating with South Africa and have received co-operation and support from SWAPO should do so genuinely and stop sending confusing and conflicting signals to South Africa.

115. We are discussing the implementation of the United Nations plan according to resolution 435 (1978). This plan needs no other modifications or conditions on the part of any other State. We therefore cannot and will not accept any notion of linking the implementation of this plan with the internal affairs of Angola. Namibians are fighting for self-determination, to liberate their own country. Angolans are fighting to preserve their own territorial integrity and sovereignty against the brutal aggression by South Africa. We must concede to the Angolans the right to seek help whenever they feel they need it. In fact, it is our view that when Namibia becomes independent, the threat to Angola's sovereignty coming from South Africa will be removed. We therefore urge the contact group, particularly those of its members with power and influence over South Africa, not to encourage it to erect unrelated and unjustifiable obstacles to the implementation of the plan. Let it be understood by South Africa and the contact group that at the time resolution 435 (1978) was debated and adopted and during the subsequent negotiations under United Nations auspices, Angola, as a sovereign State, had welcomed Cuban troops and no one at that time raised the question of linkage. Let the contact group, if it is serious and honest about the implementation of the plan, drop the idea in order to enable the Secretary-General to implement resolution 435 (1978).

116. We have come here today before the Council to urge the international community to renew our mandate to the Secretary-General for the speedy implementation of the long-overdue plan for the independence of Namibia. In our view, the time has come for the United Nations to act decisively; the time is now. In all our deliberations for the liberation of Namibia, we have been patient. We have been flexible enough. We have been reasonable. We have made significant concessions in order to accommodate South Africa. And what has South Africa done in return for all these genuine gestures? It has taken advantage of our patience and moderation by escalating the conflict. It is, therefore, not difficult to see the cause of our frustration and the reasons for our impatience.

117. The international community must continue its onerous responsibility for Namibia. It is precisely for this reason that we are meeting here to request the Security Council to renew—not to change or modify—its mandate to the Secretary-General and to proceed with the task of implementing resolution 435 (1978) and the plan approved therein. We feel compelled to demand at this meeting that a draft resolution be adopted by the Council in which the Secretary-General will be requested to submit his report on the progress of the implementation plan before the opening of the thirty-eighth session of the General Assembly. We make this demand in view of the fact that the problem of Namibia has been stalemated since 1978. It is our belief that the Council should now move to implement its own resolution, a move which is much overdue. Our special appeal goes to those States which have the power and the means to influence South Africa to assist us and the Secretary-General in this exercise of implementation without complicating an already complex problem.

118. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The last speaker is the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Indonesia, Mr. Mochtar Kusumaatmadja. I welcome him and invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

119. Mr. KUSUMAATMADJA (Indonesia): I should like to express my sincere appreciation to you, Sir, and to the members of the Council for giving me the opportunity to participate in the present deliberations on the question of Namibia. In congratulating you, Sir, on your assumption of the presidency of the Council for this month, I should also like to assure you of my delegation's high regard for your qualities of statesmanship and diplomatic skill, which will certainly be indispensable to the success of our common efforts. Indeed, it is most fitting that an eminent son of Africa is presiding over this important series of meetings, the outcome of which will no doubt decisively affect the course of future events in the long-troubled region of southern Africa.

120. This series of meetings of the Council were called to consider an issue of crucial importance, an issue which has long been a major preoccupation of the Organization and especially of the Council.

121. Over the past 35 years, the international community has been addressing itself to the cause of self-determination and independence of the Namibian people. Throughout those years, it has pronounced itself on this question in no uncertain terms and always in the hope that legitimacy will supersede illegality, that collective efforts will replace unilateral actions and that international law will prevail over arbitrary rule. It would seem redundant to recall the multitude of resolutions passed by the General Assembly and this very Council, the various advisory opinions of the International Court of Justice, the decisions of the United Nations Council for Namibia and the actions of other authoritative international forums, such as the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries and the OAU. In addition to these, numerous

extraordinary international meetings have been held, among which were the ninth special session of the General Assembly, held from 24 April to 3 May 1978, the International Conference on Sanctions against South Africa, held in Paris from 20 to 27 May 1981, and the recently concluded International Conference in Support of the Struggle of the Namibian People for Independence.

122. My delegation, therefore, is not in this chamber to reiterate in any great detail the case for Namibian independence; nor are we here solely to reaffirm the established and unambiguous stand of the overwhelming majority of mankind on this issue. Our purpose is to apprise the Council of our considered view that the last opportunity to effect an orderly and peaceful transfer of sovereign power to the Namibian people in the context of the independence of Namibia may soon be forgone unless the Council decides to act here and now.

123. Indonesia is not alone in this view, as 101 Heads of State or Government at the Seventh Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, meeting at New Delhi in March 1983, unanimously underscored the imperative need to bring this critical question before the Security Council for an expeditious resolution.

124. The Secretary-General in his report [S/15776] has equally underlined the destructive impact which any further delay in the achievement of Namibian independence will have not only on Namibia itself but also on the wider prospects of peace and security for the region as a whole. I should like here to express Indonesia's deep appreciation to the Secretary-General for his dedicated efforts and the strong personal commitment he has shown to the Namibian cause.

125. It could be recalled that, after so many arduous years of effort, a peaceful and comprehensive settlement appeared temptingly within our reach when, in 1978, agreement was achieved on a United Nations plan for Namibia, in accordance with resolutions 385 (1976) and 435 (1978). The optimism that accompanied that major breakthrough was soon to dissipate, however, upon realization that South Africa's initial acceptance of the plan was cynically based on *mala fide* intent. Indeed, since the plan's inception, South Africa has used every dilatory manoeuvre to obstruct and thwart progress towards its implementation. It is no exaggeration to state, therefore, that the situation in Namibia today is significantly more oppressive and volatile than it was five years ago.

126. We do not fail to note the insidious array of measures and policies instituted by the Pretoria régime to perpetuate its illegal control over the Territory. All of these have been comprehensively detailed in the Paris Declaration on Namibia and the Report of the Committee of the Whole and Programme of Action adopted by the International Conference in Support of the Struggle of the Namibian People for Independence, held just last month.⁵ At this time, however, I shall limit my remarks to some salient decisions adopted by that Conference which my delegation believes should form the basis of our delibera-

tions and subsequent actions. All those decisions are aimed at compelling South Africa to comply with its obligations under the Charter of the United Nations and are directly addressed to the Security Council.

127. One of the most important conclusions which emerged from that Conference was that South Africa's colonial domination and exploitation of Namibia, its attempts to impose fraudulent constitutional and political schemes and its policies of internal repression and external aggression against neighbouring States have reached such proportions that they have placed international peace and security in imminent jeopardy. The front-line States—Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe—have borne the brunt of South Africa's repeated acts of armed aggression and attempts at military, political and economic destabilization, and even Seychelles has been the target of a crude armed intervention by a mercenary force. In fact, only yesterday, South Africa again unleashed a military attack against Mozambique. Such a continuing threat to the States of the region cannot be tolerated and should be forcefully addressed by the Council.

128. We are of the firm view that the only way to make progress towards peace and stability in the region is through the expeditious implementation of resolutions 385 (1976) and 435 (1978). Any further delay or vacillation in opposing South Africa's manoeuvres to obstruct the implementation of the United Nations plan can only lead to further escalation of violence and bloodshed. The Council must unambiguously make it clear that the question of Namibia is one of decolonization and reject any attempt to link Namibian independence to extraneous issues, as that will not only retard but also distort the decolonization process. Given the continuing deadlock in the implementation of the plan, owing to South African intransigence and the apparent inability of the contact group to overcome the obstacles in its path, the Council should now resume its central role in putting into effect resolution 435 (1978). It should do so by establishing its own time-frame for action and by charging the Secretary-General with a greater and more direct role in the negotiations among the parties concerned.

129. Another pernicious development that the Council must also effectively address is the flagrant and wilful violation by certain States of the mandatory arms embargo against South Africa imposed by resolution 418 (1977). What is particularly ominous is the continuing collaboration between some Member States and the racist régime in the nuclear field. Such assistance has contributed substantially to bolstering the South African war machine and has enabled it to proceed with the total militarization of the Territory.

130. Strict compliance with the arms embargo against South Africa must be ensured. This can best be achieved through an already existing Council mechanism established under resolution 421 (1977) but which, regrettably, has remained ineffective. I am referring to the Committee

of the Security Council, the specific mandate of which is to ensure scrupulous compliance with the mandatory arms embargo against South Africa. Its work must be enhanced, more resources should be provided to it and, above all, detected violations must be acted upon as a matter of priority by the Council.

131. In addition to the use of overt military force against the front-line States and SWAPO, the sole and authentic representative of the Namibian people, South Africa has continued its attempts to destroy the territorial integrity and undermine the economic viability of Namibia. The Council must therefore take firm action against the continuing economic collaboration between certain States or their transnational corporations and the South African occupation régime which has accelerated the already extensive illicit plundering of Namibia's natural wealth, in complete violation of Decree No. 1 for the Protection of the Natural Resources of Namibia.⁶ Equally, the status of Walvis Bay and the Penguin and other offshore islands should not be questioned or be open to negotiation. They are an integral and inseparable part of Namibian territory, the integrity of which must be maintained.

132. The racist régime's illegal occupation of Namibia has also been further entrenched through a sinister policy of internal social and political fragmentation and by the imposition of puppet régimes. At the same time, South Africa's inhuman practice of *apartheid* has been consciously and ruthlessly extended to Namibia, immeasurably increasing the degradation and suffering of the people.

133. My Government views the disastrous developments in southern Africa with such concern that we have made it a matter of urgent national policy to seek immediate and effective Council action against South Africa. The support of my Government for the valiant struggle of the people of Namibia, under the leadership of SWAPO, and for the front-line States has never been in doubt. We have always scrupulously abided by the mandatory arms embargo, the oil embargo and all voluntary sanctions and boycotts against South Africa. Indonesia has not established, nor will it establish, relations of any kind with the racist Pretoria régime until Namibia and the people of South Africa have fully achieved true emancipation and independence and the odious policy of *apartheid* is for ever abolished. We continue to view the United Nations plan as the only viable and comprehensive framework for a peaceful transfer of power to the Namibian people and we call for its immediate implementation without any further modifications or qualifications.

134. Developments in southern Africa are fraught with dangerous consequences, not only for Namibia and the region but also beyond. For this reason the Paris Conference held last month adopted a Declaration and Programme of Action⁵ which, in the view of my delegation, are as rational as they are realistic. We firmly believe that the Council should respond positively to all of the provisions in these documents addressed to it, since the unmistakable reality is that the threat of sanctions and the invocation of partial or voluntary sanctions have proved to be insufficient, and the only course left open is the imposition of comprehensive mandatory sanctions by the Council in accordance with Chapter VII of the Charter.

135. The obdurate refusal by South Africa to comply with its obligations under the Charter has not only undermined the credibility of the United Nations; it poses a challenge to the international legal system as well. The question of the decolonization of Namibia, therefore, transcends the achievement of the legitimate national rights of the Namibian people and impinges upon the principles and cherished values of all civilized nations.

136. This series of meetings of the Security Council is a pivotal one. The decisions that will be taken here will undoubtedly have a decisive impact on the future course of events in southern Africa, as the spectre of intensified armed conflict is looming ominously on the horizon.

137. The inevitability of Namibian independence is beyond any doubt. Our fervent hope is that it will come about through a process of negotiation rather than after prolonged and uncontrollable upheaval and confrontation. As I stated in the beginning, the prospect for a peaceful transition towards Namibian independence is within our reach, but only if the Council lives up to its responsibility under the Charter and decides to act decisively and act now.

The meeting rose at 1.20 p.m.

NOTES

¹ A/31/197, annex I, para. 44.

² A/34/542, annex I, para. 63.

³ United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 75, No. 972.

⁴ *Ibid.*, vol. 1125, No. 17512.

⁵ *Report of the International Conference in Support of the Struggle of the Namibian People for Independence, Paris, 25-29 April 1983* (A/CONF. 120/13), part three.

⁶ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 24, Vol. I, annex II.*