



SECURITY COUNCIL
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2100th MEETING: 27 NOVEMBER 1978

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NOTE

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The resolutions of the Security Council, numbered in accordance with a system adopted in 1964, are published in yearly volumes of *Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council*. The new system, which has been applied retroactively to resolutions adopted before 1 January 1965, became fully operative on that date.

2100th MEETING

Held in New York on Monday, 27 November 1978, at 5 p.m.

President: Mr. Léon N'DONG (Gabon).

Present: The representatives of the following States: Bolivia, Canada, China, Czechoslovakia, France, Gabon, Germany, Federal Republic of, India, Kuwait, Mauritius, Nigeria, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Venezuela.

Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/2100/Rev.1)

1. Adoption of the agenda

2. The situation in Cyprus:

Letter dated 7 November 1978 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/12918)

The meeting was called to order at 5.30 p.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

The situation in Cyprus:

Letter dated 7 November 1978 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/12918)

1. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): In accordance with the decision taken by the Council at its 2099th meeting under the provisions of Article 31 of the Charter and rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure, I propose to invite the representatives of Cyprus and Greece to take places at the Council table.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Rolandis (Cyprus) and Mr. Papoulias (Greece) took places at the Council table.

2. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I should like to inform the Council that I have received a letter from the representative of Turkey in which he asks to be invited to participate in the discussion. Following the usual practice, and with the consent of the members of the Council, I propose to invite him to participate in the discussion without the right to vote, in accordance with the provisions of Article 31 of the Charter and of rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Eralp (Turkey) took a place at the Council table.

3. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I should like also to inform the Council that I have received a letter from the representative of Turkey in which he requests that Mr. Rauf Denktaş should be invited to participate in the discussion. If the members of the Council have no objection, I propose, in accordance with rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure, to invite Mr. Denktaş to participate in the discussion.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Denktaş took the place reserved for him at the side of the Council chamber.

4. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): Members have before them document S/12940, containing the text of a draft resolution prepared in the course of consultations among the members of the Council.

5. The first speaker is Mr. Denktaş, whom I invite to take a seat at the Council table and to make his statement.

6. Mr. DENKTAŞ: I thank you, Mr. President, and the members of the Council for having given me this opportunity to make a statement on behalf of the Turkish Cypriots of Cyprus, who were the partner co-founders of the Republic of Cyprus, which was subjected to attacks by Greek Cypriots as far back as 1963. That destruction has continued until today, and the co-founder partner community of the island has to take such opportunities as may be given to it, through your indulgence and that of the members of the Council, to make its case known to the highest body of the world Organization.

7. If I cannot promise to be brief, it is not because of disrespect to you, Sir, and it is not because I am not aware of the hours of frustration which you have spent in trying to bring about an agreement so that these proceedings might go forward speedily. Quite the contrary. It is because I feel that the Turkish Cypriot case has to be restated with vigour, within reason, so that what might follow from now on will not be considered to be the responsibility of the Turkish Cypriot community, which has throughout its life in Cyprus, throughout its struggle in Cyprus, done nothing other than react to what the Greek Cypriots tried to do to Cyprus.

8. I should like to refer to the statement made to the Council by Mr. Rolandis on 15 November when he said: "In Cyprus . . . there is room only for resistance against injustice and brutality" [2099th meeting, para. 4]. He

launched a bitter attack on the representative of Turkey and alleged that there was no Cyprus Government. That statement affects the co-founder partner community of the legitimate Government of Cyprus which, I say on behalf of the Turkish Cypriot community, ceased to exist as a legitimate government on 21 December 1963 when the Greek Cypriots attacked us, when they threw the Turkish Cypriot community out of the Government and rejected the Turkish Cypriot community as a co-founder partner community; they continue to reject us to this very day.

9. I join the voice of the representative of Turkey in repeating before the Council that if there is a Cyprus problem today it is because there is no government by consent in Cyprus. One fourth of the population of Cyprus is not under the jurisdiction of an administration which calls itself the Government of Cyprus but which has nothing to do with the bi-national Government envisaged in the 1960 international agreements. The Greek section of this bi-national Government armed itself and, in accordance with a plan, attacked the Turkish community with a view to Hellenizing Cyprus. After 15 years, after all the trials and tribulations of Cyprus, we heard them speak in the General Assembly, later in the Special Political Committee and still later in the Security Council for and on behalf of Cyprus and attempt to speak for and on behalf of the Turkish Cypriots.

10. If the Charter of the United Nations stands for democracy, if it stands for government under the rule of law, if it stands for governments with the sanction of the governed, if it stands for human rights, if it stands for the sanctity of international treaties, then I have come here to tell you that in 1963 the Greek Cypriot armed elements destroyed all these concepts in their attempt to destroy the Turkish Cypriot community. Since then, the Turkish Cypriot community has ruled itself, defying this jurisdiction in its own areas, in those areas where it was not eliminated. It has lived cut off from all the privileges of a State, cut off from all the rights of any human being. It has defied this jurisdiction because it thought that it was its duty to do so. But Mr. Rolandis by sleight-of-hand has brushed all this aside and has said that for the last 20 years the Turkish community is responsible for all that has happened to it. He has called for measures under the Charter in order to punish Turkey for having saved this according to him guilty community. He has called for measures under the Charter to punish Turkey for having stopped the massacre of the Turks of Cyprus. He has said that such an action is necessary for peace in the island. Yes, for a peace of the graveyard for the Turkish Cypriots this is absolutely necessary. It is absolutely necessary that Turkey which came in at the last hour and saved the Turkish community should be drawn back so that, under the title of the Government of Cyprus, the Greek Cypriots can finish the work they began in 1963.

11. But he did not only say this; he did not only call for measures against Turkey. He tried by a variety of means which by now all members of the Council know very well to stop the Turkish Cypriots from being heard in the Council. But, in case we were heard, he prophesied that the Turkish side would put on a theatrical spectacle in an effort to justify crime. He prophesied that the plight of the

Turkish Cypriots would be mentioned again, and he said that the Turkish Cypriots had been the victims of their leaders and of Turkey for the last 20 years. He warned the Council about newspaper clippings which might be produced by us in proof of events in Cyprus.

12. In other words, Mr. Rolandis tried to change the past. He tried to change the past completely. But a very wise Greek by the name of Aristotle stated that even God cannot change the past. This past can be discovered not only from newspaper clippings, not only from the reports of the Secretary-General, but it can be discovered by a visit to Cyprus. This past is recorded in the household of every Turkish Cypriot in the form of a son or a father or a child, or a 90-year-old grandfather who has been lost to them because Greek Cypriots tried, with grave determination, to Hellenize Cyprus. This past is recorded in mass graves like Aloa, Maratha and Sandallaris, where 16-day-old babies rest in the arms of their mothers, grandmothers and grandfathers; where elementary schools are shut because the whole elementary school population also was lined up and shot and crudely buried. Is it necessary for the Turkish Cypriots to bring newspaper clippings when we know what the facts are? Is it sufficient for Mr. Rolandis to claim that the Turkish Cypriots are responsible for what has befallen them during the last 20 years?

13. The Turkish Cypriots themselves have to be convinced that the people talking on the other side of the bench are people who have changed in heart and who really seek peace, people who are not furthering their policy of Hellenizing Cyprus by hook or by crook.

14. I have tried to alert the Special Political Committee to the fact that the title "Government of Cyprus" was being used as a tool of aggression against a quarter of the population of Cyprus, and that if a resolution along the lines desired by the Greek Cypriots emerged from the General Assembly, the beginning of the negotiations would thereby be hampered instead of facilitated. My prediction came true. The Assembly passed a resolution which the Greek Cypriot side immediately used in order to avoid negotiations and to poison the climate in which the negotiations were to have been started. They immediately boasted that they had got so many votes, and that the Assembly was with them, the reports of the Commission on Human Rights supported the Government of Cyprus and the resolutions of the non-aligned countries were in favour of the Government of Cyprus.

15. This was a futile attempt to change the past. These resolutions were one-sided resolutions. They cannot change the past. The report of the Commission on Human Rights is a one-sided report which cannot cover up the facts of life in Cyprus. With regard to the resolutions of the non-aligned countries, the representatives of the non-aligned countries came to us soon after their adoption to explain how that had come about. In a bi-national country, where one of the nations—the Greek Cypriot nation—has tried to destroy the Turkish Cypriot nation, all these assemblies, commissions and conferences are closed to the victimized Turkish Cypriots. In an undefended football match the Greek Cypriots score goals by shooting the ball into an open goal undefended by any goalkeeper. Then

they count the scores and tell the world that they are the winners. They have to convince us that they are our partners and that they are willing to play this game with us, not for scoring points in the international field, but for making peace in Cyprus. Scoring points in the international field by propaganda, by resorting to untruths, by misstating facts cannot and will not bring about reconciliation between the two communities. Without reconciliation of the two communities there can be no peace in Cyprus.

16. I was heartened for a moment when I heard Mr. Rolandis refer to Rudyard Kipling's poem, the famous "If". He referred to one part of it which spoke about waiting, and not being tired of waiting and he asked how long Cyprus would be subjected to injustice. It is unfortunate that in Cyprus these terms have two meanings. "Justice" and "injustice" unfortunately do not have the same meaning for the Turks and the Greeks. "Justice" for the Greeks means Hellenization of Cyprus, majority rule in Cyprus, allowing the Turkish Cypriots to go without guarantees, undefended, and to live at their mercy as hostages in what they call "pre-aggression" days, pre-1974 days, when Turkish Cypriots lived from day to day not knowing what would happen tomorrow. He says that Cyprus has been waiting for four years.

17. This statement in itself should tell something to the Security Council, which has been seized of the Cyprus problem not for four but for 15 years. The Turkish Cypriot community has been waiting for justice for 15 years, for the re-establishment of a bi-national Cyprus so that the security of the Turkish community will not be threatened again, so that Greek Cypriots will not have an opportunity of using us as hostages, or blackmailing Turkey by saying that if it dares to come to save the threatened Turks then it will find no Turks to save.

18. Mr. Rolandis read the words which speak of waiting:

"If you can wait and not be tired by waiting, or being lied about, not deal in lies".

I will read another part of this beautiful significant poem:

"If you can dream and not make dreams your master,
If you can think and not make thoughts your aim"

I read these lines in the name of a community that dreamt for 15 years—and keeps on dreaming, without making dreams its master—of a peaceful Cyprus in which Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots would live in harmony. But to achieve it we must stop denying the past, we must stop rewriting the history of Cyprus in assemblies in which the Turkish Cypriot community is not present.

19. In the words of the Secretary-General, Mr. Rolandis wants translation of the United Nations resolutions into reality. Who does not? Where will this world be if the United Nations resolutions are not translated into reality by all the people who are affected by them? But those who manoeuvre by using propaganda to bring about one-sided resolutions which if applied would mean the destruction of the innocent, the destruction of a bi-national country, even the destruction of an independence, have no right to claim

that such resolutions have not been translated into reality, because the translation of such resolutions into reality would mean the destruction of every principle that the Charter of the United Nations was meant to protect and to cherish.

20. We saw Mr. Rolandis in an acrobatic attempt trying to divide the issue into the initial aspect of the problem, namely the constitutional and territorial issue, and the external aspect, namely the question of aggression and foreign interference. It is interference if, under an international treaty, one of the guarantor Powers risks everything in order to honour that treaty for the purpose of saving one of the nations which brought about the Republic of Cyprus.

21. Ponder for a moment what would have happened to Cyprus and to the Turkish Cypriots if Turkey had not moved. If representatives will merely ask themselves that question, I am sure they will see the true picture. If not, then we have the true picture on the soil of Cyprus, I repeat, in the form of mass graves, in the form of young people in their hundreds being called in to police stations to make statements and being destroyed, in the form of people who have been taken off the streets and have not reappeared in 15 years.

22. That is interference. Stopping that kind of conduct for and on behalf of one of the nations which put their signatures to an agreement is interference in the internal affairs of Cyprus.

23. In his statement Mr. Rolandis said: "We are a small country, and our ambitions are not and cannot be greater than our size" [*Ibid.*, para. 18]. I thank God for that, because it appears that uniting Cyprus as a whole with Greece is an ambition compatible with the size of the Greek Cypriot community. Uniting Cyprus as a whole with Greece in spite of the objections of one fourth of the population, if necessary by eliminating the entire Turkish Cypriot community, seems to be no ambition at all. I would refer to a statement made by the late Archbishop Makarios on 21 August 1964, in which he said:

"My ambition is to accomplish the union of Cyprus with Greece. I will unite Cyprus integrally with Greece and then the borders of Greece will extend to the shores of North Africa."

A small country with no ambition, of course, could not do better.

24. It appears that we should see no wrong ambition, no harmful ambition, in the attempt of the Greek Cypriot wing of a bi-national government to project itself for 15 years as the Government of Cyprus. That is no ambition. The assertion that they can talk and defend the Turkish Cypriots also seems to be no ambition. A small defenceless country, we are told, was attacked by a major Power and destroyed, and it is seeking justice from you all. Smallness and strength are comparative terms.

25. When we faced 30,000 fully-armed Greek Cypriots helped by the Greek army from the mainland for years and

years, the strength was massive, with tanks and all possible kinds of arms from all over the world. Turkey came in order to stop those people from destroying Cyprus and from destroying the Turkish Cypriot community. Turkey could not go there with walking sticks; it could not face those armaments without arms. And now we are told that Turkey used force in maintaining the independence of Cyprus.

26. I shall quote another passage by Archbishop Makarios. He said this on 29 July 1970. I quote Archbishop Makarios because the new leader of the Greek community has repeatedly stated that his policy and his way are the policy and way of Archbishop Makarios. The Archbishop said:

"The hearts of the Greeks of Cyprus, of Rhodes, and of all the Dodecanese Islands have a common beat. You have achieved your aspirations, but we, beset by difficulties and frustrated by foreign meddlers, are still struggling for ours. But despite all difficulties Cyprus will march on to Hellenism."

A foreign meddler frustrated this march on to Hellenism. The foreign meddler is none other than Turkey, and the Turkish community, which defended its independence, its inalienable rights and the independence and sovereignty of Cyprus; it was immediately labelled the agent of Turkey, and everything is done in order to stop it from being heard in the international arena. But for this "foreign meddling", Cyprus would have been part of Greece by now. To the Greeks, that is liberty, that is justice, that is freedom, that is a beautiful thing. No one asks what that is to the Turkish Cypriots of Cyprus, and that is the problem of Cyprus.

27. To divide the problem into internal and external factors, which Mr. Rolandis tried to do in the Council, is a new attempt to avoid what they call foreign meddlers, meaning, Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots, from arresting this march forward to Hellenism. There is a Chinese proverb which states "A long journey proves the stamina of a horse; the passage of time tells the heart of men". After having listened to Mr. Rolandis in the General Assembly and to Mr. Michaelides in the Special Political Committee, back to Mr. Rolandis in the General Assembly and later in the Security Council, I can tell members of the Council that after 15 years there is no change of heart in the Greek Cypriot leadership, that the votes which they have contrived to obtain from the Assembly have hardened them on this march forward to Hellenism. The architects of the Akritas Plan have not changed their vision of Cyprus. Even the threats are the same. Mr. Rolandis asked the Council not to forget that volcanoes erupted. He said: "nothing in this world is more dangerous than to push people to the point of desperation" [*ibid.*, para. 20].

28. They are desperate. Why? Because "foreign meddlers" have stopped this spurious march forward to Hellenism; because the agents of "foreign meddlers", the Turkish Cypriot community, have dared to defend their rights in the independence and sovereignty of Cyprus and have refused to succumb to brute force. They do not even want us to talk about our plight from 1963 to 1974. We heard the same threat of volcanoes erupting in the 1955-1958 period. Unless the road to Hellenism, to union with Greece, is opened, the volcano will erupt.

29. We then lived throughout Cyprus among Greek populations, and we suffered because of it. The same threat is the basis of the Akritas Plan. We had the same threat, again from Archbishop Makarios, who spoke at Rizokarpaso on 26 May 1965. He said:

"The whole of Cyprus is to be united with Greece or it will become a holocaust. The road to fulfilment of national aspirations may be full of difficulties, but we shall reach the goal, enosis, alive or dead."

The fact that on this march to the goal Turkish Cypriots would suffer and would die was, of course, irrelevant. The Greek Cypriots do not like the fact that we objected to being killed in the name of that glorious march.

30. But now such threats do not affect us because, thanks to our redemption, thanks to the exchange of population which we carried out in the last phases with the help of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus, we now live in our own sector, and if the Greek Cypriots erupt, they will have to suffer the consequences. We shall wait in our sector until that eruption ends. They will probably again fill lorries with their dead, killing each other as they did during the coup, taking them to the priests to have them buried at gunpoint, even when some of the presumed dead were still breathing.

31. But we hope that common sense and the long years of suffering and experience will teach them a few lessons. I hope the lesson that they learn is that Cyprus is not destined to become a Greek Cypriot island. It is destined to become a Cypriot island on which Greeks and Turks live side by side and co-operate. The two communities shall live side by side and co-operate until a state of affairs is reached in which trust and confidence begin to grow.

32. Will this be understood by the Greek Cypriot side? I do not know. This long journey, this long struggle, I believe, has proved the stamina of the Turkish Cypriot horse, if I may refer again to the Chinese proverb, and this passage of time tells us that the hearts of the Greek Cypriot leaders, unfortunately, have not changed.

33. It was with great regret that I listened to the statement by Mr. Rolandis. I have come here in order to help to create an atmosphere and to work for a resolution which would help in the settlement of the Cyprus problem by enhancing the changes of a resumption of the intercommunal negotiations. But Mr. Rolandis thinks otherwise. He believes that the resolutions of the United Nations have given him the mandate to speak for the whole of Cyprus, including the Turkish community, which he has already equated with a small minority community of 2,500 in a Greek Cyprus. Government by consent means nothing to him. What they tried to do in 1963 and continued to do until 1974 is evidence of "good government". What happened to the Turkish Cypriots during that time was the fault of the Turkish Cypriot community. He does not understand that the 1963 armed onslaught against the Turkish Cypriots was an attempted coup against the bi-nationality of Cyprus and that that coup did not succeed fully because the Turkish Cypriot community continued to defend its rights, and continues to defend its rights. He thinks that the coup was

successful, that the bi-nationality of the Government is at an end, that the Greeks of Cyprus represent the Republic of Cyprus fully and that, therefore, the Cyprus problem is almost ended and will be completely disposed of as soon as resolutions demanding the withdrawal of Turkish troops from Cyprus are implemented. Then the ground would be free for the Greek Cypriots to finish the work which they have set themselves to do under the Akritas Plan, namely, to free what they see as Greek Cyprus from the Turkish Cypriots. This is the problem of Cyprus; this is where we are all interlocked.

34. The Turkish Cypriot community, reacting to all that was done to it during the years when it was ejected from the bi-national Government, formed its own administration. It was called the transitional Cyprus Turkish administration. We had to govern ourselves; we could not live in a vacuum. In time this administration developed and, after the Turkish intervention—which was a godsend and saved Cyprus from utter calamity—the Turkish Cypriots claimed their right in the independence of Cyprus and tried to show this to the world and to the Greek Cypriots by forming a State, which they named the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus. We hoped that within a few months the Greek Cypriots would join hands with us and bring about the Federal Greco-Turkish Republic of Cyprus. Four years have elapsed and the Greek Cypriots have preferred to go around collecting votes and resolutions from international forums in which the Turkish Cypriots are not represented.

35. What then is our remedy? I am appealing to the members of the Council as one of a people which has an inalienable right to the independence and sovereignty of Cyprus and whose right is being prejudiced through and by the resolutions of the world assembly because equal hearing is not given to the Turkish community. Are we going to succumb? Are we going to put our neck into the noose? Are we going to say that we give up defending our basic rights in the bi-national Republic of Cyprus? Is this what is expected of us, because this is what Mr. Rolandis and his leaders expect of us?

36. I can do no better on this vital question than refer the Council to a historic document:

“When in the Course of human Events, it becomes necessary for one People to dissolve the Political Bands which have connected them with another, and to assume among the Powers of the Earth, the separate and equal Station to which the Laws of Nature and of Nature’s God entitle them, a decent Respect to the Opinions of Mankind requires that they should declare the causes which impel them to the Separation.”

In this case, the Turkish Cypriot people has not chosen separation. It has been ejected from the Government of Cyprus by brute force. It has been kept out of it for 15 years. It has been denied all the rights and privileges of a government and of a State. Those who call themselves “the Government of Cyprus” have tried to destroy this co-partner community, and all this is in the records of the Security Council. If the Council is not aware of the truth, then there is no justice in this world. But I know that members are aware of the truth; I know that they are aware

of what is happening in Cyprus. So what can we do? I quote:

“We hold these Truths to be self-evident, that all Men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights. . . . That to secure these Rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just Powers from the Consent of the Governed, that whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these Ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its Foundation on such Principles, and organizing its Powers in such Form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness. Prudence, indeed, will dictate that Governments long established should not be changed for light and transient Causes; and accordingly all Experience hath shewn that Mankind are more disposed to suffer, while Evils are sufferable, than to right themselves by abolishing the Forms to which they are accustomed. But when a long Train of Abuses and Usurpations, pursuing invariably the same Object, evinces a Design to reduce them under absolute Despotism, it is their Right, it is their Duty, to throw off such Government, and to provide new Guards for their future Security.”

37. I have no government, the Turkish community has no government to overthrow. Those who call themselves “the Government” have kept the Turkish community out by force for 15 years, and they come here to get a mandate from the Council for tying the hands of this community so that they can finish what they started in 1963 and continued relentlessly until 1974. Will the Council give them this mandate? If it does, then we shall not be defying the Council—God forbid—but we shall be using our rights, as the American people used theirs and put them in the Declaration of Independence, by not recognizing an evil force as the Government of Cyprus. We are left with no alternative.

38. Need I at this stage go into pages and pages of what was done to us? I shall not take up the Council’s time. I shall merely refer to a letter which was written by Mr. Fazil Küçük, the then Vice-President of Cyprus, to all heads of State in December 1963, because that also has become part of the past and because there has been an attempt to change that also:

“To all Heads of State,

“The Greeks of Cyprus, taking advantage of, and abusing their majority strength in the Government and Security Forces of the Republic, have planned and put into execution an organized armed attack by the Greek Police and civilians on the Turks and Turkish property in towns and villages, including my own residence and office, since the night of 20 December 1963.

“These attacks continued in a most brutal and barbarous manner until the intervention of the three Guaranteeing Powers. During these attacks, Turkish houses in Nicosia and elsewhere have been broken into and many innocent Turks, including women and children, have been murdered in cold blood in their houses or driven away as hostages.

"The Greek leaders, who are misrepresenting to the world the true facts, have, in complete disregard of our Constitution and Laws, illegally armed with heavy weapons the Greek members of the Security Forces and also thousands of Greek terrorists while Turks holding political posts have been prevented deliberately from exercising their powers and functions and Turkish members of the Security Forces have been disarmed and placed under detention.

"At the same time, Turkish citizens have been labelled by the Greek leaders as rebels to be shot dead on sight if seen outside their houses or sectors.

"Despite the cease-fire agreement, Turkish life and property are still in great and imminent danger in Cyprus.

"Even after the cease-fire, Turks have been killed and kidnapped and many Turkish houses have been looted or maliciously set on fire by the Greeks. Turks both in towns and villages are still besieged and all means of communication have been cut off to them. Also, the normal supply of foodstuffs to Turkish citizens is no longer possible.

"Reliable reports reaching us indicate that, even now, the Greeks are arming and preparing another onslaught for a general massacre on a larger scale than before.

"The Greek leaders have made it abundantly clear that at the impending London conference they will not back an inch from their policy of complete domination of the Turks and of placing them at their mercy. For this purpose Archbishop Makarios has already made it public that he is determined to abrogate the Treaty of Guarantee. His ulterior motive in so doing is clearly to prevent Turkey from coming to the rescue of the Turkish Community in Cyprus when the ultimate Greek design of complete domination or extermination of Cypriot Turks is finally put into execution.

"It is inconceivable that such brutal atrocities could have been committed and that such a state of affairs can be allowed to continue at this advanced stage of civilization.

"I, therefore, appeal to you and through you to all peace-loving nations of the world who believe in the inviolability of human rights and liberties and who disapprove of racial discrimination, violence and genocide to give their support, both material and moral, to the Turkish Cypriot Community in their struggle for survival against very heavy odds."

39. That was in late 1963. The Turkish Cypriots resisted all the evil forces of the Greek Cypriot leadership until 1974. Today, our life, our liberty, our rights in the independence and sovereignty of Cyprus are still at stake. I hope the Security Council will show Mr. Rolandis and, through him, the Greek leadership that the votes of the General Assembly and of the Council do not entitle anyone to destroy one fourth of the population of a country, whatever name that sort of activity may be given.

40. I shall not take the Council's time any longer. I hope that we shall be given an opportunity to give our views on

the draft resolution which the Council may adopt. If this is the time to give it, I shall do so. But I do not know whether it is submitted or not. I wish to state the views of the Turkish Cypriot community on that draft resolution. Is this the time? I do not know.

41. With these words I should like once again to thank you, Mr. President, for your patience and to thank the Secretary-General, his Special Representative in Cyprus, Mr. Galindo Pohl, and all his associates and assistants, the UNFICYP Commander and his men for doing an excellent job for Cyprus and for trying their best to bring about the resumption of the intercommunal talks. It is only through the intercommunal talks that we see a hope for final peace in Cyprus and we hope that the resolution of the Council will not, like the resolution of the General Assembly, hinder the resumption of these talks, but will facilitate their resumption.

42. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I now call on the representative of Turkey.

43. Mr. ERALP (Turkey): Since this is the first time I am speaking in the Security Council after long years, I should like to start by expressing to you, Mr. President, the congratulations of my delegation upon your assumption of the presidency of the Council for the month of November. In paying tribute to you for your diplomatic skills and the efficient and tactful manner in which you have conducted the consultations I should like also to stress the satisfaction we feel in seeing as President of the Council a representative of a country with which Turkey enjoys friendly relations.

44. Mr. President, you were kind enough this afternoon to confer with me and to give me the text of a draft resolution. For the first time I have been officially seized of such a draft. I therefore requested you and the Council to give me sufficient time to refer the draft to my Government and to receive instructions. This has not been done. It should, of course, be understood that my Government cannot consider itself bound by a resolution on which it has not had the occasion to express its reaction.

45. I had a prepared statement to make if I had had the opportunity of addressing the Council earlier. But now I think it has been outdated. There is a draft resolution before the Council on which I understand agreement has been reached. So whatever I may have to say can have no effect on the substance of the draft resolution. Therefore, I shall refrain from making that statement.

46. As for the attacks on my Government, the invectives freely hurled at it by Mr. Rolandis, I need not go into them. I do not condescend to answer them because I do not consider Mr. Rolandis a valid interlocutory. Furthermore, President Denktaş has fully and eloquently answered a number of the arguments, in fact all the arguments put forward by Mr. Rolandis. When I called the so-called Government of Cyprus a non-government, it was based on the premises which have just been fully explained by Mr. Denktaş.

47. Having said that, I cannot refrain from making a few remarks on the text before us, which I understand is to be

adopted whether we agree with it or not. This is the first time that the Security Council, since 4 March 1964, has discussed fully the substance of the question of Cyprus. It has now come out with a draft resolution which, in my view, is not conducive either to the resumption of the negotiations or to the implementation of resolutions. For the first time, a confusion is created in this text as to the relation between the resumption of negotiations and the implementation of resolutions.

48. Now, it should be perfectly clear that this whole exercise is one and the same thing. Negotiations will lead, within the general framework of a settlement, to the implementation of resolutions. My Government has pronounced on many an occasion that it is ready to implement these resolutions once an agreed settlement is reached in Cyprus. It is unfortunate in a sense that this text is not of a nature to encourage negotiations. Of course, it is up to the Turkish community to decide on that point. But, in my view, it would be rather difficult for the Turkish community to come back to the negotiating table under such a resolution, which carries in itself a veiled threat. This was not what we expected from the Security Council. We expected a brief resolution encouraging the parties to go back to the negotiating table, talk in a peaceful manner and achieve a solution. Since this has not been achieved, my Government, I am sure, will not consider itself bound by the resolution.

49. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I take it that the Council is now ready to take a decision on the draft resolution in document S/12940 and wishes to adopt it by consensus. If I hear no objection, I shall declare the draft resolution adopted by consensus.

The draft resolution was adopted.¹

50. Mr. BISHARA (Kuwait): My delegation supported the draft resolution just adopted because, in our view, it holds out hope for some future negotiations between the two communities under the auspices of the Secretary-General. The problem in the question of Cyprus is that realism is blurred by emotions, and because of that the needed constructive approach becomes elusive. It is true that there is a great deal of frustration in Cyprus, but the only way to overcome such frustration lies in the resumption of meaningful talks among the parties concerned.

51. My Government supports the principles laid down in Security Council resolution 365 (1974). The independence of Cyprus, the preservation of its territorial integrity and its non-aligned character are prerequisites for the achievement of a solution of the problem. The people of Cyprus, Greeks or Turks, are entitled to the United Nations involvement in their common search for a just and equitable solution of the issue.

52. What can the United Nations do in this atmosphere of suspicion and mistrust? First and foremost, it should not weaken its support for the principles whose observance and promotion is essential for the success of any effort. Both sides should be encouraged to undertake talks under United

Nations auspices and should be discouraged from using the debate in the United Nations as a convenience for scoring points. It occurs to my delegation that sometimes the parties concerned give the impression that they find more comfort in the accumulation of United Nations resolutions than in engaging in direct talks based on the many resolutions of the Council and the guidelines adopted and accepted by them.

53. For the solution of the problem of Cyprus there is no alternative to direct talks. We must acknowledge that talks held for the sake of talks, with no will for accommodation and co-operation, give rise to despair and antagonism. It is obvious that the climate that characterizes the relations between the two parties concerned makes the involvement of a third party imperative. My delegation commends the Secretary-General for his unsparing effort to promote a constructive dialogue among the parties concerned. My delegation also learned with gratification of the newly initiated efforts of the United States to be made in conjunction with the United Nations for the attainment of a just and durable solution.

54. My delegation has noted the intensity of emotions involved in this problem. The fear of one party pushed it to seek protection from one of the guarantors. The bitterness of the other party has made it unable to see that the problem arose from within and that foreign intervention came about as a consequence.

55. Both parties have legitimate rights to live together as equal citizens of the island without a threat from any outside force. Nothing inflames a situation more than the belief of one party that it can rely on outside assistance at the crucial hour. For the talks to be successful there must be a sense of security for the two communities. This sense of security will not come about overnight, but should remain the objective of the United Nations, and therefore should be nurtured and encouraged. Kuwait believes that the resolution just adopted contributes towards this spirit.

56. Poems, poetry, proverbs and wise expressions being cited by the parties concerned were admittedly beyond the comprehension of my delegation, and had little, if any, relevance to the substance. It is unfortunate that the tribulations of the past are allowed to haunt the present and so are bound to spill over to dim the prospects in the future.

57. My delegation, finally, would like to express its unhappiness over the unpleasant procedural difficulty that crippled the Council. It did not contribute towards creating a better atmosphere for the inevitable talks among the parties concerned. It has shown how costly bitterness can be at the expense of the substance.

58. Mr. HULINSKÝ (Czechoslovakia) (*interpretation from Russian*): The Czechoslovak Socialist Republic has consistently favoured the immediate peaceful settlement of the Cyprus question on the basis of complete respect for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus. My delegation is profoundly convinced that a just solution to the Cyprus question can only be achieved if the fate of the people of Cyprus is determined

¹ See resolution 440 (1978).

not by outside interests but by the people of that country itself without any outside interference.

59. In this connexion I should like to state immediately that my delegation rejects the attempts—which, furthermore, have recently been stepped up—to carry out negotiations regarding the fate of Cyprus by circumventing the well-known decisions of the United Nations and going outside its framework. It is hardly a secret that certain outside forces, which furthermore could at one time have prevented the present grievous plight of the Cypriot people, are making efforts in an attempt to decide the question within a narrow group of States belonging to NATO. The Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, like other Members of the United Nations, could never agree to an attempt to ratify the present division of the island or to efforts to annul the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Cypriot State.

60. In a joint communiqué published during the recent visit to Czechoslovakia of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cyprus, Mr. Rolandis, it is stated that both sides

“support the convening of an international conference within the United Nations which, on the basis of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, would lead to a speedy implementation of the resolutions adopted by the United Nations on the question of Cyprus”.

in particular General Assembly resolution 3212 (XXIX) and Security Council resolution 365 (1974).

61. I should like to draw the attention of the members of the Security Council, at this meeting which has been convened to discuss the question of the speedy implementation of the relevant resolutions of the Council and the Assembly, to the proposal for the convening of an international conference on the question of Cyprus within the framework of the United Nations. That proposal is as relevant now as it was in 1974, when it was put forward by the Soviet Union. The source of tension in the strategically important area of the Mediterranean represents a serious threat to peace and security. A conference organized under the aegis of the United Nations would promote the adoption of measures which would guarantee the existence of Cyprus as an independent, sovereign and unitary State in accordance with the interests of both national communities on the island.

62. My delegation also fully shares the view stated in the Declaration of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Non-Aligned Countries meeting at Belgrade which emphasized the need for carrying out purposeful and constructive talks on the basis of the resolutions of the United Nations.

63. The present meeting of the Security Council should bring closer a peaceful settlement of the problem of Cyprus and should help, through its decisions, to create favourable conditions in which the realistic forces of both national communities could jointly proceed to the calm and consistent elaboration of an internal State structure, due account being taken of the interests and rights of both communities living in a single Republic of Cyprus. In this

connexion my delegation has once again drawn attention to the proposal made by the President of the Republic of Cyprus, Mr. Kyprianou, regarding the full demilitarization and disarmament of Cyprus.² The implementation of such a proposal together with the withdrawal of all foreign troops from the island would not only help the Cypriot people but would also be a vital factor for stabilization throughout the entire eastern Mediterranean area.

64. The Czechoslovak delegation continues to be convinced that the Organization is in a position to help the Cypriot people find the path to a tranquil life, to maintain and preserve the unity of their State and to overcome the obstacles placed in their path by foreign interests. Czechoslovakia, together with other States, will continue to participate in the efforts to try to find a solution to the problem which would fully reflect the spirit and the letter of the United Nations resolutions.

65. My delegation approved of the resolution just adopted, which could constitute a step in that direction and which at the present time represents for all members of the Council, without exception, the limit of what is generally recognized as being possible.

66. Mr. LEPRETTE (France) (*interpretation from French*): Since I am speaking in the Council for the first time this month allow me, Mr. President, to congratulate you on your assumption of the high office which you hold today, as well as on the skill and authority which you have shown thus far in guiding our work. My delegation has tried and will continue to try to give you its full co-operation in the carrying out of your task and we are pleased that we can thus bear witness to the importance we attach to the ties of friendship that bind our two countries.

67. During the consultations we held last June with a view to the renewal of the mandate of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus, several delegations indicated that they felt it desirable that this issue should henceforth be dissociated from political debates which the Security Council would conduct on the development of the situation in Cyprus. That is why my delegation, although it abstained, on 9 November, in the vote on paragraph 8 of General Assembly resolution 33/15,³ appreciated the reasons which prompted the Government of Cyprus to seize the Council of this issue and pronounced itself unreservedly in favour of that step being taken at the appropriate time.

68. Today, the Council has adopted another resolution, by consensus. I should like to congratulate you, Mr. President, on the role that you played in the fortunate outcome of our debate. I should like also to thank my colleagues who initiated this compromise and participated in its preparation. The text which we adopted does indeed seem satisfactory to my delegation. It does not violate the legitimate rights of either of the parties concerned, while it indicates more clearly than in the past the Council's concern in respect of the implementation of its previous resolutions and the search for a negotiated settlement.

² Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, Plenary Meetings, 2nd meeting.

³ Ibid., Thirty-third Session, Plenary Meetings, 49th meeting.

69. I should like to emphasize how important the spirit of compromise of the two parties has been, at certain moments, for the positive conclusion of our work. We cannot fail to congratulate the two parties, while inviting them not to attempt to profit from the concessions granted them but rather to try to develop the spirit of compromise without which it will not be possible to find a just and negotiated solution.

70. My delegation urges both parties to benefit from the six months agreed upon in order to render possible the resumption and meaningful development of discussions between the representatives of the two communities. The interests of both communities require that. Those same interests require also that both sides should demonstrate moderation, lest they seriously fail to fulfil their responsibility.

71. In conclusion, I should like to reiterate to the Secretary-General the confidence which my Government places in him in the exercise of the mission entrusted to him. My delegation hopes that it will be crowned with success in the near future.

72. Mr. KHARLAMOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*interpretation from Russian*): The present discussion in the Security Council of the question of Cyprus is taking place shortly after the General Assembly called upon the Council [resolution 33/15] once again to examine the question of the implementation, within a time-frame, of its relevant resolutions on Cyprus. In its resolution the Assembly affirmed the fundamental principles underlying the Cyprus problem that the United Nations has always advocated since the crisis arose in Cyprus. These principles, as members know, are the strict respect for the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-aligned status of the Republic of Cyprus, the cessation of any foreign intervention in its internal affairs, and the immediate withdrawal from the island of all foreign troops. As we see it, the confirmation at the present session of the General Assembly of the important provisions which should determine the basis for a settlement of the Cyprus problem would be both timely and justified.

73. More than four years have elapsed since, as a result of external armed intervention, the Republic of Cyprus was plunged into a profound and lengthy crisis. Despite the efforts of the United Nations—the General Assembly and the Security Council—no real progress has been made in settling the problem. The development of the situation in Cyprus and around it has shown that the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus are still threatened. There continues to be an abnormal situation in Cyprus which has been caused by the artificial delays in a political settlement of the Cyprus question, the presence in the island of foreign troops, and continuing foreign intervention in the affairs of the Republic of Cyprus.

74. Attempts are being made to use the difficulties which have arisen in the intercommunal talks in order to impose upon the Cypriot people decisions which are alien to it, and which are aimed at maintaining the NATO presence in the island, and to create one further beach-head for NATO in the eastern Mediterranean area.

75. Cyprus, economically and politically, has been split into two separate parts. The historic links between the two Cypriot communities have been broken. All this has an extremely negative effect on the situation of both the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots and has complicated an already acute situation in Cyprus. In this light, the General Assembly has been quite justified in expressing deep concern in connexion with the ongoing Cyprus crisis, which continues to represent a serious threat to international peace and security.

76. The position of the Soviet Union which has always aimed at eliminating the explosive situation in Cyprus and achieving a just settlement of the Cypriot question, is well known to members of the Security Council. Today, we should like once again to declare that the Soviet Union has favoured and will continue to favour a settlement of the complex problems of Cyprus on the basis of the guaranteeing of the genuine independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and inviolability of the Republic of Cyprus. The Soviet Union has consistently favoured strict respect for the policy of non-alignment which is pursued by the Republic of Cyprus, and considers it absolutely essential to ensure the withdrawal from the island of all foreign troops and the dismantling of all foreign military bases to be found there.

77. The Soviet Union condemns outright any foreign intervention in the internal affairs of Cyprus and any manoeuvres which are aimed at undermining the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus. The Soviet Union is against anyone having imposed their own plans and decisions on Cyprus. The Cypriots should be guaranteed their sovereign right to decide independently, without any pressure or intervention from outside, questions relating to the internal structure of the Cypriot State, taking into account the interests and the rights of both the Greek and the Turkish community in the island. The achievement of a genuinely durable and just settlement in Cyprus is only possible if these basic principles are observed, and if judicious account is taken of the interests and rights of both communities. Under present conditions the Soviet Union considers that it is important that further efforts should be made in order to restore a spirit of mutual trust and co-operation between the two communities in Cyprus.

78. The Soviet Union is in favour of the immediate and integral implementation of the decisions of the United Nations on Cyprus and is prepared, for its part, to do everything it can to promote such a settlement of the Cyprus problem, a settlement which would mean that the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus would not suffer.

79. Being guided by the interests of peace and international security, the Soviet Union, as members know, has proposed that within the framework of the United Nations an international conference should be convened to consider the Cyprus question. Such a conference would help to strengthen the independence, the sovereignty and the territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus. It would help in bringing the two sides together swiftly in creating suitable conditions for fruitful talks between the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots regarding the structure of

their State. It would also help the Cypriots themselves to reach mutually acceptable decisions so as to re-establish trust and co-operation between the two communities in the island.

80. The delegation of the Soviet Union considers that the Security Council should avail itself of every opportunity to promote the immediate and just settlement of the question of Cyprus in all its aspects, in the interests of the entire Cypriot people and in order to maintain the Republic of Cyprus as a sovereign, independent and territorially integral State, on the basis of the relevant decisions of the Security Council and the General Assembly.

81. In view of the position I have just expounded, the delegation of the Soviet Union agreed with the adoption of the draft resolution on a consensus basis. We should like to congratulate the President for his skill, tact and ability in having helped us to reach such a successful solution to this question today. Since it is almost the end of the month, Mr. President, this decision will obviously be the last during your excellent tenure of the presidency.

82. Mr. CHEN Chu (China) (*interpretation from Chinese*): On 9 November when the question of Cyprus was considered in the plenary meeting of the General Assembly, the Chinese delegation expounded⁴ the consistent position of the Chinese Government on this question. The Chinese Government and people are very much concerned over the prolonged failure in reaching a settlement of the question, and we deeply sympathize with the sufferings of the Cypriot people. We maintain that, in order to realize an early peaceful settlement of the Cyprus question, it is imperative, first of all, to do away with super-Power interference. In particular, it is imperative to guard against the schemes of that super-Power which has been sowing discord and creating a split among the parties, aggravating the differences and trumpeting the "internationalization" of the Cyprus question with a view to fomenting turmoil in the eastern Mediterranean so as to facilitate its infiltration and expansion there. We firmly hold that the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Cyprus must be respected.

83. We sincerely hope that the Greek and Turkish Cypriots and the parties directly concerned, taking to heart the over-all interests of unity against imperialism and hegemonism, will gradually eliminate their differences and work for a fair and reasonable settlement of the Cyprus question through patient negotiations on an equal footing and in a spirit of mutual understanding and mutual accommodation in the interests of the prosperity of Cyprus and the well-being of its people and thus contribute to the security of the eastern Mediterranean and the peace of the world. This is not only in full accord with the fundamental interests of the two communities of Cyprus and the parties concerned, but also represents the common aspirations of the peoples of the world who are genuinely concerned about the destiny of the Cypriot people.

84. In the spirit of the foregoing, the Chinese delegation supports the draft resolution contained in document

S/12940. It must be pointed out that Security Council resolution 410 (1977) referred to in the draft mainly concerns the question of the United Nations Force and that the Chinese delegation did not participate in the voting on that resolution.

85. Mr. JAIPAL (India): The General Assembly, in its resolution 33/15 adopted on 9 November this year, recommended that the Security Council should examine the implementation of its relevant resolutions within a time-frame and consider and adopt thereafter such appropriate and practical measures under the Charter of the United Nations as might be necessary for ensuring their implementation. This is the immediate mandate before the Council and it is for this purpose that we have been convened here at the request of the Government of Cyprus.

86. To enable us to consider this mandate, the delegation of Cyprus has circulated a draft resolution which gives us an idea of how Cyprus looks at the question of implementing the Security Council's resolutions. The time-frame that the Government of Cyprus has suggested is six months, and in the event of non-implementation the Government of Cyprus seeks some form of new action by the Council thereafter to secure the implementation of its resolutions.

87. The draft resolution just adopted by consensus adequately meets the requirements of the present situation. My delegation considers that a specific time-frame for the implementation of agreed resolutions is a good thing in itself, provided, of course, that it is accepted by the parties concerned. In the absence of any pressure that may be generated by the time factor alone, it is likely that resolutions will remain unimplemented. It should be possible, therefore, for the Security Council itself to propose a specific time-frame, but in our view it would be more desirable for the parties concerned to agree on one.

88. I must point out, however, that the reason for non-implementation of agreed resolutions is not always the absence of a time-frame or a time-limit. Disagreements do arise during the process of implementation, and they tend to become entrenched. The Security Council agenda, in fact, is a long list of entrenched disagreements and unimplemented resolutions. In our view, it is a mistake to think that in such cases the answer lies in resorting to action under Chapter VII of the Charter. We must look for other ways of resolving outstanding disputes and meanwhile agree to maintain peace.

89. Often, circumstances compel one to acknowledge the distinction between the will to solve a question and the capacity to do so. In Cyprus, it would seem that if both the will and the capacity had been present there would have been progress by now. We are acutely aware of the complex nature of the Cyprus problem, the inevitable involvement of outside forces, the intensity of the two conflicting nationalisms, the apparent insolubility of the constitutional dilemma, the plight of the refugees, and so on. There is, however, a definite interrelationship between the so-called internal and external factors and this unfortunate fact cannot be wished away.

90. Perhaps progress has to be made on both fronts simultaneously, and if the momentum of progress should

⁴ *Ibid.*, 48th meeting.

turn out to be encouraging a time-frame could be envisaged for reaching the final stage of the solution of the problem. I cannot say whether the first step should fall in the internal or the external sector, but I hope that it can be taken simultaneously in both sectors. It seems to us that certain members of the Security Council can plan a helpful role in this process and so, indeed, can the Secretary-General and his representatives, by probing various possibilities through persistent and discreet diplomatic efforts. One thing is clear—and in this regard I find myself in agreement with the representative of Kuwait—and that is that the active assistance of a third party may well have to be tried out, since the two communities have not been able to make any progress by themselves. Their frequent appeals to the United Nations are symptomatic of their need for third-party assistance.

91. The nature of this assistance is a matter for exploration. I rather think it would depend on the answer to the question of whether there was a viable *modus vivendi* for the coexistence of two conflicting nationalisms in one State under a democratic constitution of the Western type. If the answer should be in the negative, I am afraid other searching questions may have to be asked. I am not suggesting that the intervention of a third party will do the trick; the problem is not that easy. Trying to contain conflicting nationalisms within a democratic constitution is rather like trying to keep eagles in cobwebs. If the Security Council is to help in finding the right path to peace with justice, then it has to play an active role in ascertaining the wishes of the people of both communities and exploring various viable solutions; otherwise the Council will tend to be used as a public convenience for political frustrations.

92. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I call now on the representative of Greece.

93. Mr. PAPOULIAS (Greece): Taking into consideration the wish of the Security Council not to prolong the discussion any further, and inasmuch as the Foreign Minister of Cyprus, Mr. Rolandis, will be presenting the position of his Government, I shall only state very briefly that my delegation is very appreciative of the constructive action taken by the Council in adopting the present resolution. It is an encouraging fact that the Council responded positively to the recourse made to it by the Government of Cyprus, and deemed it necessary to pronounce itself on the substance of the Cyprus problem. We should like to believe that this resolution will help in promoting a peaceful and just settlement of the Cyprus problem in accordance with the principles of the Charter through the resumption of intercommunal talks on an agreed basis by the two Cypriot communities and the implementation of the relevant General Assembly and Security Council resolutions.

94. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I call on the representative of Cyprus.

95. Mr. ROLANDIS (Cyprus): First of all, I do not intend to refute the various unfounded and recycled allegations of Mr. Denktas. Those allegations were answered very amply by Mr. Michaelides in the Special Political Committee. After all, I am not Mr. Denktas's interlocutor;

Mr. Michaelides is his interlocutor. I was invited here under rule 37, representing a Government, and I intend to answer only statements made by Governments. While I am on the subject, though, I could point out the following. Mr. Denktas, who was invited here to address the Council under rule 39, took the opportunity to call the decisions of Council members and of their colleagues in the United Nations and in the non-aligned movement one-sided and unfair. He also pointed out indirectly that he might not respect those decisions. I do not want to comment. I leave the matter to the Council and to Mr. Denktas.

96. Regarding the statement made by Mr. Eralp that he does not recognize me, I shall answer very quietly and very calmly that I could not care less whether Mr. Eralp recognizes me or not. I have the recognition of 150 Governments and that is enough for me.

97. Before I proceed to make my comments on the resolution I should like to mention that, on 15 November, my delegation filed an application for Mr. Michaelides to address the Council. In the meantime, after various deliberations, a resolution was agreed upon and Mr. Michaelides considered it superfluous to make a statement. Consequently today a letter was sent to the President, which I shall now read out for the record. It is signed by Ambassador Rossides, and reads:

"With reference to my letter of 15 November 1978 regarding the participation in the Security Council by Mr. Alecos Michaelides under rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure, I wish to inform you that, in view of the fact that the resolution has already been agreed upon and will be formally adopted, Mr. Michaelides considers it superfluous to speak on the subject and therefore his request to participate under rule 39 is without prejudice hereby withdrawn."

98. I shall now proceed to give the Council my comments on the resolution that has been adopted.

99. When I addressed the Council on 15 November [2099th meeting], I stated that Cyprus and its people had been waiting patiently for a long time for the implementation of Security Council and General Assembly resolutions and that I was fully entitled to ask members of the Council, for the first time in the history of the question of Cyprus in the United Nations, to consider measures under Article 41 of the Charter.

100. Today the Security Council has considered it appropriate at this stage to provide instead for a specific time-frame within which Turkey should comply with its decision on Cyprus. While we maintain our view that a stronger resolution was warranted by the situation, we nevertheless respect this decision of the Council. I hope that when the Council is called upon in the future to review the situation in my country, as provided for in this resolution, enough progress will have been achieved towards the implementation of the resolutions on Cyprus. If not, I confidently trust that this body will not fail in its responsibility expeditiously to take the long overdue measures under the Charter, and particularly enforcement measures, to remedy a condemnable situation of aggression

and continuing military occupation that has been going on for more than four years in complete defiance of the decisions of the United Nations.

101. Referring more specifically to the provisions of the resolution the Council has just adopted. I wish to state that we welcome as a positive element the reference in the third preambular paragraph to the relevant General Assembly resolutions on Cyprus, namely the landmark resolution 3212 (XXIX), and the subsequent resolutions 3395 (XXX), 31/12, 32/15, and, more significantly, resolution 33/15 of this year. By this last resolution, *inter alia*, the General Assembly deplores the continued presence of foreign armed forces on the territory of the Republic of Cyprus and the fact that part of its territory is still occupied by the Turkish army, demands the immediate withdrawal of the foreign forces from the Republic of Cyprus, and recommends to the Security Council the adoption of the necessary measures under the Charter within a time-frame to ensure the implementation of the resolutions of the United Nations on Cyprus.

102. Paragraph 1, reaffirming resolution 365 (1974), by which the Council endorses the unanimously adopted General Assembly resolution 3212 (XXIX), is important inasmuch as the Council thereby affirms once again its clear position on the termination of the aggression by Turkey against the Republic of Cyprus. In reaffirming further its resolution 367 (1975) the Council emphatically states its rejection of and opposition to the purported setting up of the so-called Turkish Federated State of Cyprus and all other unilateral actions committed against the Republic of Cyprus and its people by Turkey in pursuit of its partitionist and annexationist designs. The reaffirmation of this resolution indicates also the Council's support for the intercommunal talks under the auspices of the Secretary-General as an appropriate process for resolving the internal aspects of the Cyprus problem.

103. The most significant part of the resolution is paragraph 2, which calls upon the parties to implement the Council's resolutions within a specific time-frame. Evidently this reference to a specific time-frame must be read together with the dates set out in paragraphs 4 and 5, namely, 30 May 1979, which is the outer limit for the report by the Secretary-General, and June 1979 for the full review of the situation by the Council.

104. Thus the resolution, properly construed on the basis of its own provisions and in the light of General Assembly resolution 33/15, which is noted in the preamble, can only mean that such a time-frame must not extend beyond 30 May 1979. This interpretation is further reinforced by the express reaffirmation of Security Council resolution 365 (1974), under which, *inter alia*, the speedy withdrawal of the foreign forces was called for.

105. As shown in paragraphs 4 and 5, the Council will review the situation and further promote a just solution to the problem not later than June 1979, following a relevant report by the Secretary-General to be submitted not later than 30 May. The Secretary-General is expected to report fully on the implementation of the resolutions, particularly as regards the issues of the withdrawal of the Turkish forces

of occupation, the cessation of interference in the affairs of the Republic, and the return of the refugees to their homes in safety, as well as on the outcome of his efforts to resume the intercommunal negotiations for the solution of the internal aspects of the problem, as provided for in paragraph 3. It should be emphasized that, as is clearly provided in paragraph 3, such negotiations should be conducted on an agreed basis and within the context of the relevant resolutions on Cyprus.

106. It may be recalled that it has been the absence of this common basis that has prevented the meaningful resumption of the intercommunal talks, as indeed was recognized by the Secretary-General in his latest report on Cyprus to the General Assembly.⁵

107. I repeat that the merits of the Cyprus situation would have warranted stronger action by the Security Council. However, we are fully conscious of the circumstances which dictated the adoption of a more moderate course, as the Council has seen fit to adopt. We trust that when the time comes for the Council to review afresh the substantive aspects of the Cyprus problem, as provided for in the resolution just adopted, more effective steps will be taken with a view to ensuring compliance with resolutions and the repeatedly stated objectives of the Council.

108. It remains for me, Mr. President, to express my Government's appreciation to you, to the Secretary-General, and to all the members of the Council for the understanding, sympathy and support demonstrated for the cause of Cyprus, which continues to constitute a test case for the United Nations and the principles of the Charter.

109. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The next speaker is Mr. Denktaş. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

110. Mr. DENKTAŞ: Mr. Rolandis again spoke about unilateral action and about how that is disliked here in connexion with the resolution which has just been adopted. I should like to state for the record that each time the Greek Cypriot section of the bi-national Government of Cyprus refers to itself as "the Government" and takes any action as "the Government", especially in international forums, against the Turkish Cypriots, we regard it as a unilateral action, and we consider that we are quite entitled to take a counter action for our protection. I think I gave sufficient notice of what that is to be in my first statement.

111. As regards the resolution which has just been adopted, I should like to underline that it makes reference to resolutions to which the Turkish Cypriot community has never been a party and on which it has not been heard. Those resolutions, therefore, were adopted in its absence. They have no bearing on the realities of the Cyprus situation and they contravene bilateral agreements which had been arrived at in the presence of the Secretary-General. Therefore, the implementation of those resolutions would mean undoing certain things which have been done and which have affected the lives of thousands of people, in compliance with other United Nations decisions,

⁵ A/33/348.

through the Secretary-General and through other officers. In that regard they are unrealistic and cannot be implemented. For example, the Turkish community cannot, just because a resolution says so, uproot itself for the fourth time in Cyprus and go back and become hostages in Greek Cypriot areas. That is utterly impossible and unrealistic and the Greek Cypriots should not deceive themselves that this can be done just because they have managed to have a one-sided resolution in their favour adopted at a time when we were not heard.

112. The time-limit is continually underlined by the Greek Cypriot side, which forgets that when the Cyprus problem was brought to the Security Council in February and March 1964 the time-limit which was then foreseen was three months. It was then extended for another three months and everybody thought that would be the end. We prayed that it would be the end because we were really suffering. But we have now come to the fifteenth year, and the time-limit is extended from six months to six months.

113. We want to abide by the resolutions of the Security Council and those of the General Assembly. However, to accomplish that, others should not seek and obtain resolutions which may not be in full accord with the realities appertaining to the problem. I do not want to go into the details of this, but I wish to say that this resolution will not be conducive to the beginning of the intercommunal negotiations. Indeed, we have the atmosphere reflected by what Mr. Rolandis has just said, namely, that when the time is up and when we come back here he is hopeful of obtaining a stronger, more effective resolution. Those who aim at that goal will naturally spend their time, as they have spent it in the past, not in negotiating a settlement but in finding flimsy excuses for prolonging the issue.

114. In the meantime, the Turkish Cypriot community looks upon Turkey as the motherland and as a guarantor and begs and demands that its protection should not be withdrawn from us. That is our request and I pass it on and place it on record with all the feeling in my heart.

115. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The next speaker is the representative of Turkey, on whom I now call.

116. Mr. ERAIP (Turkey): I shall be very brief in replying to Mr. Rolandis. He indulged in a bit of mathematics, saying that his Government was recognized by 150 Governments. Of course, it is 149. I think it is more a question of algebra than of pure mathematics. It is up to them to decide which carries more weight: 149 recognitions or non-recognition by one party without whose co-operation and concurrence the solution of the Cyprus problem cannot be reached. That is an algebraic equation.

117. It is quite obvious that the Greek Cypriot administration prefers to parade in international forums under the name of the Government of Cyprus to sitting down at the table and arriving at a solution. That is their prerogative. I have always said that they do not seriously want a solution to the Cyprus problem. They are quite happy with things as they are. They take every opportunity to use propaganda measures in all the international forums, including the United Nations.

118. I observed that Mr. Rolandis refrained very carefully from referring to another resolution of the Security Council, namely, resolution 410 (1977). That is the resolution in which reference is made to the agreement of 12 February 1977 between Makarios and Denktas. It is a lacuna of this present resolution that that reference was not made more clear. In our view, that agreement was the greatest breakthrough in the negotiations between the two communities. It was hailed by the Greeks and the Turks alike at the time as a great breakthrough. Now I understand that the Greek Cypriot Government has reneged on that resolution and has chosen the path of long-range struggle. If they renege on a solemn resolution, on an agreement reached in the presence of the Secretary-General, how can we count on their compliance with any agreement which may be reached in the future?

119. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I call on the representative of Cyprus.

120. Mr. ROLANDIS (Cyprus): I should like to say that, if it gives Mr. Eralp any comfort to be a minority of 1 out of 150, I concede this, that the number is 149.

121. Regarding his statement on the guidelines, I should like to repeat once more that I did not refer to them because it was clearly mentioned by Mr. Michaelides in the Special Political Committee that my Government backed, supported and accepted the guidelines in the agreement reached between Makarios and Denktas. Furthermore, I should like to mention that my Government not merely intends but is committed to work very hard for a just and lasting solution of our problem within the framework of the United Nations.

122. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): There are no further speakers and, with the Council's consent, I should like now to make a statement in my capacity as representative of GABON.

123. Once again, despite its resolutions 365 (1974) and 367 (1975), the Security Council has been obliged to reopen the question of Cyprus, thus responding to the concern expressed by the Secretary-General in his report on the work of the Organization, as follows:

"Despite numerous efforts and contacts, it has not been possible to find an agreed basis for a meaningful resumption of the intercommunal talks, and the situation in the island has not improved, although, owing in large measure to the United Nations Peace-keeping Force, it has remained peaceful."⁶

He added:

"Until it is solved it remains not only a threat to stability and good relations in the eastern Mediterranean."⁶

124. Hence the General Assembly in paragraph 8 of its resolution 33/15 explicitly recommends

⁶ Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-third Session, Supplement No. 1, p. 4.

"that the Security Council should examine the question of the implementation, within a time-frame, of its relevant resolutions and consider and adopt thereafter, if necessary, all appropriate and practical measures under the Charter of the United Nations for ensuring the implementation of the resolutions of the United Nations on Cyprus".

125. The persistent problem of the implementation of the resolutions and decisions of the Organization has arisen more acutely than ever in an area of the eastern Mediterranean where tension and human misery prevail and threaten international peace and security.

126. Everyone recalls General Assembly resolution 3212 (XXIX), which was endorsed by Security Council resolutions 365 (1974) and 367 (1975). That resolution called for respect for the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and non-alignment of Cyprus and a cessation of all foreign intervention in its internal affairs. The adoption of that resolution gave rise to a great deal of justified hope that an end would be put to the sufferings of the Cypriot people. But we had not taken into account some people's malicious enjoyment of others' misfortunes.

127. The Republic of Gabon, whose national political party, the Democratic Party of Gabon, has as its motto "Dialogue, Tolerance, Peace", cannot remain insensitive to the sufferings of the Cypriot people. We feel that only frank and sincere intercommunal talks can put an end to this human tragedy, which has created a genuine feeling of distrust and animosity not only between the two communities composing the Cypriot population but also between two countries that have friendly relations with mine—Greece and Turkey.

128. Hence my Government attaches great importance to a prompt solution of this painful and thorny problem of Cyprus within the framework of intercommunal talks under the auspices of the Secretary-General, to whom I take pleasure in paying a tribute for all his efforts to bring the positions of the protagonists closer together. I should also like to address a tribute to the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus, a buffer force between the two communities, for its devotion in the service of peace.

129. We in the delegation of Gabon believe in the virtues of dialogue, and that is why we supported the resolution which the Council has just adopted. We feel that wide-ranging dialogue on the intercommunal level is the only method that offers prospects of a negotiated solution. We are firmly opposed to a solution imposed from outside, because that is not in keeping with the interests of the Cypriot people. We should not lose sight of the fact that many States voted for resolution 3212 (XXIX) because they quite rightly felt that primary responsibility for that problem resided first and foremost with the parties concerned, that is, the two Cypriot communities, which are now pitted against each other. The two Cypriot communities, destined as they are to live together, must transcend their mutual acrimony and make a serious effort to reach an acceptable solution guaranteeing the equality of all and harmonious relations.

130. In this respect the Security Council, which has primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, should see to it that its own resolutions are respected and effectively implemented, thus preventing any unilateral action and enhancing the prospects of a just and lasting solution.

131. In conclusion, I should like to reaffirm that, in my delegation's view, only the resumption of intercommunal talks under the auspices of the Secretary-General can ensure the independence, territorial integrity and non-alignment of Cyprus.

132. Speaking now as PRESIDENT, I shall call on those representatives who have expressed the wish to speak in exercise of the right of reply.

133. Mr. KHARLAMOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*interpretation from Russian*): It was not my intention to speak again, but I cannot leave unanswered the statement by one member of the Council. I had thought that this time at least the representative of that country would forgo such clumsy statements distorting the position of the Soviet Union as he made today in connexion with the discussion of the Cyprus problem.

134. I do not intend to repeat what I said in my earlier statement. Our policy is quite clear. As far as the Cypriot issue is concerned, we have no special interest. On no point could the Chinese representative deny the nobleness and scrupulousness of what we said. Nor do I intend to analyse the policy of the Chinese representative's country. Its policy is quite clear: to pit two major Powers—the United States and the Soviet Union—against each other in a new military conflict, to increase tension where it exists and to create tension where it does not exist. All this with the sole aim of bringing to fruition the power plans of that country and its leaders.

135. I do not think the representative of China will get much benefit from playing this record cut in Peking, but undoubtedly he will receive many thanks from the imperialists and the leaders of NATO for what he has said. I have no doubt about that at all.

136. Mr. CHEN Chu (China) (*interpretation from Chinese*): The Security Council has already spent a good deal of time on the consideration of the question of Cyprus and it is already 8 o'clock. Therefore, I do not intend to spend much time on refuting the sophistry of the Soviet representative and his slander against China. There is a saying in China to the effect that facts speak louder than words. There is another saying to the effect that it is impossible to cover the whole sky with one hand. The role played by the Soviet Union in the Cyprus question, in the eastern Mediterranean and in the Middle East is best depicted by its own actions. Resort to sophistry cannot cover up the real situation.

137. The foreign policy of China and the position of China on the question of Cyprus are open and above board, reasonable and fair. The position of China will not be slandered, just as the sun cannot be covered up by the wing of a single crow.

The meeting rose at 7.55 p.m.