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THIRTY-THIRD YEAR

2067th MEETING: 14 MARCH 1978

NEW YORK

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NOTE

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Documents of the Security Council (symbol S/. . .) are normally published in quarterly *Supplements of the Official Records of the Security Council*. The date of the document indicates the supplement in which it appears or in which information about it is given.

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2067th MEETING

Held in New York on Tuesday, 14 March 1978, at 3.30 p.m.

President: Mr. Ivor RICHARD
(United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland).

Present: The representatives of the following States: Bolivia, Canada, China, Czechoslovakia, France, Gabon, Germany, Federal Republic of, India, Kuwait, Mauritius, Nigeria, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Venezuela.

Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/2067)

1. Adoption of the agenda.
2. Question concerning the situation in Southern Rhodesia:

Letter dated 1 March 1978 from the Chargé d'Affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Upper Volta to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/12578)

The meeting was called to order at 4.15 p.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

Question concerning the situation in Southern Rhodesia:

Letter dated 1 March 1978 from the Chargé d'Affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Upper Volta to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/12578)

1. The PRESIDENT: In accordance with the decisions taken by the Council at previous meetings, I invite the representatives of Angola, Benin, Botswana, Kenya, Liberia, Mozambique, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, the Sudan, the United Republic of Tanzania, the Upper Volta and Zambia to take the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. de Figueiredo (Angola), Mr. Houngavou (Benin), Mr. Tlou (Botswana), Mr. Maina (Kenya), Mr. Thomas (Liberia), Mr. Lobo (Mozambique), Mr. Baroody (Saudi Arabia), Mrs. Gbujama (Sierra Leone), Mr. Medani (Sudan), Mr. Salim (United Republic of Tanzania), Mr. Bamba (Upper Volta) and Miss Konie (Zambia) took the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber.

2. The PRESIDENT: I should like to inform members of the Council that I have received letters from the repre-

sentatives of Sri Lanka and Yugoslavia in which they request that they be invited to participate in the discussion. In accordance with the usual practice, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite them to participate in the discussion without the right to vote, in accordance with Article 31 of the Charter and rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure.

3. In view of the limited number of places at the Council table, I invite the representatives of Sri Lanka and Yugoslavia to take the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber on the usual understanding that they will be invited to take a place at the Council table whenever they wish to speak.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Fernando (Sri Lanka) and Mr. Mujezinović (Yugoslavia) took the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber.

4. The PRESIDENT: Members of the Council have before them a draft resolution sponsored by Bolivia, Gabon, India, Kuwait, Mauritius, Nigeria and Venezuela [S/12597]. I should also like to draw the attention of Council members to document S/12599, which contains the text of a letter dated 7 March from the representative of Ghana to the Secretary-General.

5. Mr. von WECHMAR (Federal Republic of Germany): Mr. President, I should first like to perform a very pleasant task and extend to you the congratulations of my delegation upon your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council for the month of March. We are convinced that your outstanding qualities as a politician and as a diplomat, together with your particular knowledge of the question on our agenda, will help the Council in performing its present duty. At the same time, my delegation wishes to avail itself of this opportunity to express its gratitude to Ambassador Troyanovsky of the Soviet Union for the skill and the sense of responsibility with which he guided the Council's work last month.

6. I also welcome to our midst our new colleague the representative of Venezuela, Ambassador Rubén Carpio Castillo. My delegation is looking forward to the closest possible co-operation with the Ambassador and his delegation.

7. In turning to the question before us, let me recall that the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany has always regarded the illegal exercise of power by the Ian Smith régime in Zimbabwe to be one of the most burning issues in southern Africa, and has throughout underlined

the urgency of settling this problem. The unilateral declaration of independence by the Smith régime led to a situation which constituted a threat to international peace and security and thus prompted the Federal Republic of Germany, long before its accession to the United Nations as a Member State, to endorse and apply strictly the sanctions imposed by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter. The extent of the danger is evidenced by the series of incidents which led to violation of the territorial integrity of countries bordering on Zimbabwe and also caused loss of human lives. We condemn those incursions.

8. The overriding principle of the Federal Government's policy is the maintaining of peace, and we therefore advocate peaceful settlements also in southern Africa. In a statement made on 24 February 1978, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of my country, Mr. Genscher, described as an aim of that policy "the free and independent development of the African States, without the old colonialism being replaced by another colonialism based on ideology". In a speech which he made at Dar es Salaam on 27 February, our Foreign Minister stated:

"Regarding the conflicts in southern Africa, the Federal Republic of Germany stands unreservedly on the side of those who champion self-determination and the dignity of all human beings regardless of the colour of their skin."

9. A settlement for Zimbabwe based on these principles must, in our view, provide for a genuine transfer of power by the illegal régime and arrangements for an impartially administered transitional period ensuring the conduct of genuinely free elections on a basis of equality and universal adult suffrage, the choice at those elections of the parliament and government of an independent Zimbabwe which will be genuinely representative of the people of Zimbabwe, the final achievement of independence on the basis of a constitution providing for full democratic rights and, in particular, a democratically elected government, the abolition of all forms of discrimination and the protection of fundamental human rights and freedoms.

10. We consider that the provisions of the so-called Salisbury agreement of 3 March 1978 do not sufficiently meet these standards and are therefore inadequate.

11. We continue to believe, on the other hand, that the Anglo-American proposals presented on 1 September 1977 [S/12393] contain the necessary elements for a peaceful transition to majority rule and offer reasonable prospects of political stability. We still consider those proposals to be an appropriate basis for initiating transition to independence. We therefore fully support them and have endorsed Security Council resolution 415 (1977).

12. My Government feels encouraged by the fact that the great majority of speakers in this debate have expressed their appreciation of the Anglo-American proposals. It welcomes the appeal of the United Kingdom and the United States that all parties to the Rhodesian conflict should be invited without delay to take part in talks for the purpose of finding an internationally acceptable solution.

13. The Federal Government calls upon all parties to be aware of their responsibility for maintaining peace and to try jointly, through negotiations, to find solutions to the outstanding problems.

14. Mr. YOUNG (United States of America): Mr. President, let me take this opportunity to express my appreciation of your leadership in this situation, not only in the Council during this month of your presidency but also in the long weeks and months that you spent in the process of bringing the negotiations to the point at which they are now. As we see this as an ongoing process that has led us closer and closer to peace, it gives us some courage and some confidence as we move on and take the coming steps.

15. Rhodesia has been one of the priority issues of United States foreign policy under the Administration of President Carter. Together with the United Kingdom and in co-operation with the front-line States, the United States has worked intensively with the nationalist leaders in an effort to reconcile differences and bring about a peaceful transition to majority rule.

16. We participated in the development of the Anglo-American proposals for Rhodesia because we felt it essential to establish a coherent plan based on the following goals: first, the initiation of an irreversible process leading to majority rule in an independent Zimbabwe; secondly, the creation of a neutral political process which would allow all political factions in Zimbabwe to compete fairly for political leadership through elections which truly reflect the will of the majority; thirdly, an end to hostilities, followed by the maintenance of stability, law and order during the transition period, to ensure the fairness of the process and thus its durability; fourthly, agreement on an independence constitution that provides for a democratically elected government, the abolition of discrimination and the protection of individual human rights, including the rights of the minority as well as of the majority.

17. Having presented a proposal based on these goals to the Security Council, the United States, together with the United Kingdom, undertook a series of discussions and negotiations with all the principal parties concerned. We have been pursuing these efforts vigorously. In particular, we want to engage the Patriotic Front as well as the nationalist parties inside Rhodesia in the negotiating process.

18. We sought and continue to seek the advice and support of the African States concerned, whose views we took into account in initially formulating the proposals. And we met with members of the Smith régime in an effort to bring them into the negotiations within the framework of our proposals. As President Carter confirmed in his press conference of 9 March, we remain firmly convinced that the Anglo-American plan is the best basis for a peaceful, just and prompt transition to an independent Zimbabwe.

19. An internal agreement has now been announced at Salisbury. A new point has been reached in the search for a settlement and we are all, understandably, caught up in measuring details against the standards we have set. But we should not let legitimate concern with detail obscure the

enormous stakes the people of the region and the entire international community have in Rhodesia.

20. This is not a time for attempts to advance personal self-interest or for posturing before the world. This is not a time for Rhodesians, white or black, to think only of defending their partisan interests. This is not a time for outside Powers to be considering what advantage they can extract during the process of transition. This is not a time for those of us who have worked hard to bring about a fair settlement to lay down our burden and turn our backs. Most important of all, we must not resign ourselves to the fact that the birth of a new nation has to be bloody and violent. We see no reason why we cannot find a peaceful settlement of the differences which still exist among the parties.

21. At this crucial juncture in the history of Africa and the world, we must take a longer perspective, looking to the past and recognizing the progress that has been made, while holding up for the future the highest standards, which will ensure that Zimbabwe will enter the community of free and independent nations promptly and peacefully.

22. We must examine the so-called internal settlement dispassionately. I am the first to recognize that anything that Mr. Smith has negotiated merits the most careful scrutiny. But I am also willing to credit good faith to the participating nationalist leaders. They, as much as the other nationalist leaders of Zimbabwe, want freedom and independence for their country and full political equality for all the people of the country. It is fair, then, to ask what they have achieved at Salisbury. Compared with the kind of settlement proposals which Smith has entertained in the past, the Salisbury agreement marks some progress. The nationalist leaders have secured Mr. Smith's agreement to the principle of universal adult suffrage. Smith's signature has been obtained to a commitment eventually to step down. There is still, however, no ironclad assurance that he will do so. Finally, there is recognition that during the transition period some sharing of power must take place among the participating groups.

23. That being said, there is much in the Salisbury agreement which raises questions regarding the ability to withstand the political pressures which have built up over the past few years.

24. Perhaps more importantly, we must consider whether the agreement announced at Salisbury takes sufficiently into account the enormous difficulty of managing the transition period. That crucial watershed must be handled in such a way that the violence of the present struggle for liberation can be transformed into an irreversible political process which will result in the approval by all the people of Rhodesia of their own form of government and the selection of their own leaders.

25. In his press conference of 9 March, President Carter described the Salisbury proposal as not adequate. I believe that I can demonstrate its inadequacies by comparing the Salisbury agreement with the principles of the Anglo-American proposals.

26. First and foremost, the Anglo-American plan is based on the principle of participation by all factions. The internal settlement does not include all the nationalist leaders. Thus it threatens to divide further rather than unify the people of Zimbabwe and threatens to prolong the violence rather than end it.

27. Secondly, the Anglo-American proposals recognize that transitional political institutions must not be subject to control by the existing illegal régime or any one of the parties to the conflict. The Salisbury plan would introduce a transitional arrangement of shared responsibility subject to the rule of unanimity and the ultimate authority of the present parliament. This would allow Smith to hold effective power and to wield a veto. For, as he himself said in an interview in *The Times* of London on 2 March, whether people liked it or not the present parliament was the sovereign body under the existing constitution and only an election could change that. That is what Smith said. He also said that he was the Prime Minister, and nobody in the world could do anything about it. In other words, although others may be associated with him, Smith and his largely white parliament are still in control of the processes of government, including security functions, the civil service and the passage of legislation.

28. Thirdly, free and fair elections must be ensured in which all elements of the population and all Rhodesian political factions would participate equally. The Anglo-American proposal addressed itself to this principle by proposing that the British Resident Commissioner should help to ensure that result, as should the presence of impartial observers. Under the Salisbury agreement there appears to be no provision for international outside participation in these elections which would ensure their fairness or impartiality.

29. Fourthly, in order to ensure the fairness and irreversibility of a transition process, it is essential to maintain law and order in Zimbabwe. The record of civil strife over the past dozen years precludes reliance on the Rhodesian army for this essential purpose. Consequently, it had been suggested that a United Nations peace-keeping force should assist the Resident Commissioner and the police force in maintaining tranquility during the transitional period and in ensuring the impartiality of the political process. The Salisbury agreement would rely on the existing Rhodesian army, absorbing into it those guerrillas capable of passing a screening test. We cannot but conclude that such a provision fails to take into account the history of bloodshed which makes the Rhodesian army as now constituted an unsatisfactory guarantor of the rights of all Zimbabweans, black and white.

30. Fifthly, provision must be made in Rhodesia for a constitutional system which protects the rights of all. The Anglo-American proposal provides for an independent judiciary and an entrenched bill of rights. The bill of rights is protected against change in order to reassure all that their freedom will not be taken away. But the remainder of the constitution can be changed by the process of law. The constitution outlined at Salisbury also envisages an independent judiciary and the protection of certain rights. However, for a period of approximately 10 years, changes in all

entrenched aspects of the constitution could come about only with the concurrence of all the black members and six of the white members of parliament. Indeed, there is no guarantee that this system will not carry over after the initial 10-year period. This limitation of the ability of the new government to bring about necessary change and meet the aspirations of the majority appears inconsistent with the full exercise of sovereignty by an independent government representing all the people of Zimbabwe.

31. I have gone into some detail in describing what we think should go into a viable plan for transition. I do not believe, however, that our debate should begin and end on this theme. My Government hopes that these Council meetings can serve as a catalyst to a renewed effort to bring the nationalist forces together in a new attempt to achieve a settlement which includes all and which is based on the principles of the Anglo-American plan. We are prepared to join with the United Kingdom, all the parties and the concerned African States in a new effort to make progress and remedy the inadequacies of the Salisbury settlement plan. We have no illusion that this will be a simple task, particularly in light of the evidence that the Rhodesian armed forces are continuing the arrogant practice of raids across the borders of neighbouring countries. The recent Rhodesian ambush of a patrol of the army of Botswana well within the borders of Botswana and the Rhodesian raid into Zambia are the latest examples of the behaviour of the Smith régime that must be halted if we are to believe that any kind of agreement involving him is feasible.

32. Success in a new effort would also require the support of the Council and of the African States most directly involved. We would need a consensus of responsible opinion that this was not the time for actions in the United Nations or elsewhere which would further polarize the situation but the time for keeping all channels of communication open. Our goal would be to build on what has gone before, to produce a just and lasting settlement for Zimbabwe, whose people would at last know the blessings of independence, freedom and peace.

33. The PRESIDENT: The next speaker is the representative of Liberia. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

34. Mr. THOMAS (Liberia): My delegation associates itself, Sir, with the preceding speakers who have paid you highly deserved compliments and extended felicitations on your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council at this particular time.

35. Throughout the past week we have listened day after day to the many persons who have made statements on the question of Rhodesia, a question very dear to our hearts that is still being debated in the Council. The representatives who have spoken so eloquently and expressed the views of their respective Governments were in most cases extremely severe—and probably rightly so—in denouncing and condemning Mr. Ian Smith and the internal settlement concluded with the three black leaders of Rhodesia. We also listened to the two leaders of the Patriotic Front [*2064th meeting*], who vehemently and acrimoniously decried the Smith régime and the internal settlement and reaffirmed

their resolute decision to persevere in the armed struggle if the internal settlement were recognized. In a word, practically all the statements that were made last week tended to regard the Smith régime and those involved with the internal settlement as anathema.

36. My delegation wishes at this time only to re-emphasize a statement found in excerpts from a message from the President of Liberia, Mr. William R. Tolbert, Jr., to the Secretary-General. I now repeat the passages in the message which touch on the question of Zimbabwe:

[The speaker read out the fourth to eleventh paragraphs of the message contained in document S/12590 of 9 March 1978.]

37. My delegation must candidly state that it does not entirely agree with those who have advocated an outright and complete condemnation and rejection of the recent Salisbury talks with black leaders. While we do not say that the Salisbury formula is the most acceptable formula, we do believe that it may contain certain useful and positive elements that are worthy of consideration and should not be overlooked. My delegation believes in pragmatic diplomacy. Consequently we support the Anglo-American proposal as forming a good basis for negotiation towards a just and peaceful settlement. My delegation further agrees with the position of President Carter to the effect that the internal settlement is not adequate for the solution of this problem. In fact, President Tolbert has strongly insisted that all parties, including the Patriotic Front and all the nationalist leaders inside and outside Rhodesia, should in a spirit of goodwill and understanding participate in trying to reach an equitable solution that will once and for all avert continued needless bloodshed, violence and untold suffering. We insist that in order to arrive at any peaceful settlement there must be flexibility. Every effort must be put forth to avoid a tone that is bellicose and positions that are irreconcilable.

38. My delegation would like to feel that the early transfer of power to the black majority and a peaceful resolution of the problems of Zimbabwe are not beyond the realm of possibility. There is cause to feel that the promised land, now in sight, at long last is attainable. Though our ideologies may differ, may we appeal to the Council to avoid negativism and pessimism. It is imperative that our brothers and sisters—the poor, the weak and the innocent people who have for a long time been victims of violence within and outside their homeland, fighting and even dying for their God-given right to enjoy human dignity and self-determination—should have speedy relief. They are anxious to end this present state of anguish and inhuman suffering. This can, however, be achieved only if a spirit of brotherhood and goodwill is exhibited by all concerned and if the desire for genuine peace is demonstrated regardless of whatever may have happened in the past.

39. My delegation believes that in the final analysis no party stands to gain anything by persistent recrimination and avoidance of peaceful negotiations. What was a fact yesterday might not necessarily be a fact today. Everything is constantly undergoing change. Many have expressed unwillingness to consider and accept the promises of

Mr. Ian Smith as worthy of confidence or validity because of his previous record. There is perhaps every good reason and justification for this. But let us not despair. With renewed optimism let us persevere unrelentingly until the goal is reached.

40. Those of us who are inclined to be rigid in our attitude and opinion must not forget that we are not infallible; if we remain sane, and live long enough, some day we may have a change of heart. Let us not forget that Saul, once the great persecutor of the Christian Church, was converted and became Paul, the pre-eminent apostle and loyal defender of Christianity. Let us therefore not close the door but leave open all options that would provide any opportunity to bring about a lasting peaceful solution to the problems of Zimbabwe and southern Africa and to all the other problems of Africa.

41. Finally, my delegation closes with words of admonition offered by President Tolbert, an apostle of peace and an advocate of justice. He feels that the international community should utilize every effort and take decisions that would aid in bringing together all the parties in seeking a solution to this and to all important questions.

42. The PRESIDENT: The next speaker is the representative of Sri Lanka. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make a statement.

43. Mr. FERNANDO (Sri Lanka): Mr. President, first of all I should like to thank you and the other members of the Council for giving me the opportunity of addressing the Council today.

44. My delegation is happy to see you, a distinguished fellow member of the Commonwealth representing a country with which we have excellent relations, presiding over this important debate. It is significant that the United Kingdom should preside over the debate since Southern Rhodesia is, after all, still a British colony and the United Kingdom is its legal administering Power. I am sure your personal diplomatic experience and your negotiating skills will be a great asset in the work of the Council.

45. Last week, after the Government of Zambia, through its Permanent Representative in New York, formally briefed me as Acting Chairman of the Co-ordinating Bureau of Non-Aligned Countries on the latest act of aggression committed by the illegal minority régime in Southern Rhodesia against the Republic of Zambia, a communiqué was issued on behalf of the Bureau condemning the Smith régime and expressing our solidarity with the Government and people of Zambia. That communiqué is before the Council as a document S/12595. I do not propose to elaborate on this reprehensible act of aggression itself, since it will be considered by the Security Council at another meeting. What most concerns us regarding the present subject matter is the motive behind that act, its timing and its relation to developments in the southern African region, developments whose gravity extends far beyond the region.

46. The United Nations has repeatedly condemned the continued oppression of the people of Zimbabwe by the illegal racist minority régime, the arbitrary imprisonment

and detention of political leaders and others, the illegal execution of freedom fighters and the continued denial of fundamental human rights, including, in particular, criminal measures of collective punishment, as well as the measures designed to perpetuate an *apartheid* State in Southern Rhodesia.

47. On the day the Smith régime promulgated it, the unilateral declaration of independence was condemned by the General Assembly [*resolution 2024 (XX)*]. The following day, the Security Council condemned the racist minority régime [*resolution 216 (1965)*]. Since then the Council has adopted more than 15 resolutions on the subject, and for the first time in the history of the United Nations it has even called for the application of sanctions.

48. The problem of Southern Rhodesia has consistently been viewed as being one of the necessity of removing the racist régime and of not compromising with it, if a just and lasting answer is to be found by the international community. The General Assembly has resolved that the national liberation movements of Zimbabwe are the sole and authentic representatives of the true aspirations of the people. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Sri Lanka, in the course of his statement in the general debate in September 1977,¹ welcomed the recognition of the Patriotic Front of Zimbabwe by the front-line States and the Organization of African Unity as a notable development towards a solution of the Rhodesian problem. The United Nations has repeatedly affirmed the principle that there should be no independence before majority rule in Zimbabwe and that any settlement with regard to the future must be reached with the full participation of the genuine political leaders and the leaders of the national liberation movements. The Organization has also desired that such a step should be endorsed freely and fully by the people. Those are laudable principles not to be negotiated away in the face of the exigencies of any situation.

49. The United Kingdom as the colonial Power is obliged as the legal administering Power to hand over power to the Zimbabwe nationals. This obligation cannot be entrusted to the illegal régime of Ian Smith who has continued to ignore the United Nations. The attack on Botswana on 27 February and the attack on Zambia from 6 to 8 March are demonstrations by Smith that he can not only ignore but even act with impunity towards the international community. Surely it is inconceivable that we should compromise with such an attitude. The Security Council, as the custodian of world peace and security, is obliged not only to take the correct path but to do so quite expeditiously.

50. Have we considered the Salisbury agreement or deal in the light of the principles we have hitherto considered as necessary? According to such principles, the Salisbury deal is untenable and ought to be forthwith declared as unacceptable. The defects and the intrinsic dangers in that agreement are too numerous to be even considered by the international community. The participation of all parties concerned in a conference convened by the administering Power with the assistance of the United Nations is a prerequisite condition for reaching an amicable settlement.

¹ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-second Session, Plenary Meetings*, 12th meeting.

The Salisbury deal is in contradiction to the Anglo-American proposals and to the communiqué of the June 1977 Conference of Commonwealth Heads of Government. That communiqué recognized the need for a negotiated settlement to involve not only the removal of the illegal Smith régime but also the dismantling of its apparatus of repression, in order to pave the way for the orderly and effective transfer of power. The Salisbury deal will perpetuate that apparatus of repression and also make a complete mockery of the Decade for Action to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination.

51. For over a decade the Security Council has denounced the situation in Rhodesia as not only morally indefensible but also as constituting a threat to international peace and security. All along we in the United Nations have desired a genuine transfer of power from the minority régime to majority rule. For this purpose, the consensus of opinion has been that the illegal régime of Ian Smith must be removed and the participation of the various African groups, including the Patriotic Front, obtained together with the views of the front-line States. Why are we now reluctant to denounce the so-called Salisbury deal and the attacks by Ian Smith? Has the Smith régime undergone a genuine change of heart or merely a change of tactics or have some of us undergone a change of heart or even of tactics? Or has that illegal Government suddenly become deserving of international acceptability?

52. The conduct of Ian Smith regarding the attacks on front-line States and other manoeuvres unmistakably prove that this is an effort by the minority régime to nullify the Anglo-American proposals and to accommodate the interests of the Smith régime. On the other hand, it may be the view of some of us that temporarily to accommodate the Salisbury deal or agreement and the Smith régime would be a practical way out of this dangerous situation and that we should regard it as transitional, on the way to more definitive majority rule in the future. I am afraid that compromising in this manner the ideals we have cherished for so long would only encourage the Ian Smith régime to attempt the perpetuation of the minority racist régime. It would also result in the local African population's being manoeuvred into a situation of internal disputes and tensions amongst brothers. The situation in that continent would become even more painful and sad. Further, any compromising attitude on the part of the Security Council might also set a dangerous precedent.

53. I am convinced that any compromise of the past resolutions of the General Assembly and Security Council would lead to a bitter struggle and violence in that continent. I urge the Council unequivocally to declare the Salisbury deal unacceptable and condemn the violent aggressions committed by the illegal Smith régime. That is the only way to achieve an honourable and just solution of this problem which has plagued the Organization for over a decade. The United Nations resolutions, the Colombo Declaration of the Non-aligned Countries, the Maputo Declaration and the Lagos Declaration have all reaffirmed the inalienable right of the people of Zimbabwe to self-determination, freedom and independence and the legitimacy of their struggle to secure by all means at their disposal the enjoyment of that right as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations.

54. On behalf of my own delegation and in Sri Lanka's capacity as Chairman of the Group of Non-Aligned Countries, let me reaffirm this right and the principle that there should be no independence before majority rule in Zimbabwe and that any settlements relating to the future of the colony must be worked out with the full participation of all the people of Zimbabwe and in accordance with their true aspirations. Any settlement reached under the auspices of the Ian Smith régime is illegal and unacceptable.

55. The PRESIDENT: I am sure that I speak on behalf of all the members of the Security Council when I welcome the representative of Sri Lanka to his post at the United Nations and say how much we look forward to working with him in friendly collaboration in the future.

56. The next speaker is the representative of Yugoslavia. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

57. Mr. MUJEZINOVIĆ (Yugoslavia): First of all I wish to express our thanks to you, Mr. President, and the other members of the Security Council for having enabled the Yugoslav delegation to participate in this important debate on the question concerning the situation in Southern Rhodesia. May I also avail myself at the same time of the opportunity to congratulate you as President of the Council for the month of March and to wish you success in carrying out this responsible duty. My delegation is particularly pleased to see you presiding over the Council's meetings as the representative of a country with which Yugoslavia has long-standing traditionally friendly relations.

58. The Yugoslav delegation has asked to be allowed to participate in this debate in order to voice its solidarity with the authentic aspirations of the people of Zimbabwe embodied in the statements delivered by the leaders of the Patriotic Front, Mr. Mugabe and Mr. Nkomo [2064th meeting]. Their firm stand, their realistic analysis of the so-called internal settlement, their deep conviction of the justice of their struggle and their vision of the future of independent Zimbabwe, the fact that they are devoid of any racial prejudice with regard to the problem despite the terrible suffering inflicted by the racist régime on their people, the calm with which they are looking the stark reality in the face and, above all, their broad statesmanlike wisdom and readiness to continue the dialogue with the United Kingdom as the administering Power—all this has confirmed my delegation in its profound belief that the world Organization has every reason for exerting maximum efforts in the search for a solution of the problem of Zimbabwe along the lines indicated by the leaders of the Patriotic Front.

59. Further, the united stand of African and other non-aligned countries which have, together with other speakers in the Council, rejected in their statements in this debate the so-called internal settlement in Zimbabwe is the best guarantee that the problems of the continent will be solved on the basis of the principles adopted by the Organization of African Unity and by the non-aligned movement, as well as in the spirit of the Charter of the United Nations. In such a resolute stand, we have again discerned Africa's firm resolve not to allow the neo-

colonialist and racist forces to slow down the irrepressible march towards the definitive decolonization of southern Africa, the overthrow of the policy of *apartheid*, the establishment of the rule of the majority and the immediate independence of Zimbabwe. However, the problem that we are now discussing in the Council has been on the agenda of the United Nations and the international community for more than 12 years. The more its solution is postponed the more dangerous for peace and security it will become, not only in the region of southern Africa but also more widely in the world.

60. The international community, the United Nations and the administering Power have rejected the unilateral proclamation of the independence of Zimbabwe by the racist Smith régime as an illegal, unlawful act, and as such they have never recognized it. Appraising the grave situation and the conditions that Smith's racist régime has imposed on the African majority, the Security Council, in view of the threat to peace and security in the world, voted sanctions with the aim of bringing about the downfall of the illegal régime of Ian Smith.

61. It has been stressed in the current debate—both in the statements of the Co-leaders of the Patriotic Front and in those of other representatives—that the signing of the so-called agreement at Salisbury is aimed merely at preserving the existing privileges and institutions of Smith's racist régime. By that action, Smith is trying to confront the United Nations and the international community as a whole with a *fait accompli*.

62. The recent attacks perpetrated by Smith's racist régime against Zambia, Botswana and Mozambique also reveal the true nature of that régime. Actions against the innocent civilian populations of neighbouring African States, including women and children, have become a daily practice. That amounts to a disturbance of peace and security on a wider scale. Consequently, the Security Council should take resolute steps in condemning such inadmissible acts.

63. In its statement issued on 10 March, the Co-ordinating Bureau of Non-Aligned Countries strongly condemned the acts perpetrated by the Smith régime in the territory of Zambia as follows:

"The Co-ordinating Bureau most strongly condemns this latest ignominious act by the illegal racist minority régime of Southern Rhodesia against the freedom-loving and peace-loving people of non-aligned Zambia. The non-aligned movement is firmly convinced that the continuance of such barbaric acts by the racist minority régimes in southern Africa against neighbouring independent African countries contributes to the deterioration of the tense situation in the southern Africa region and constitutes a further threat to international peace and security." [See S/12595, annex.]

64. Socialist and non-aligned Yugoslavia expresses its solidarity with Zambia, Mozambique, Botswana and other African front-line countries in the struggle against the racist régime of Ian Smith. We also feel that it is important at this moment for the Security Council to condemn and not to

recognize the internal settlement, because it is not in harmony with the principles of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.

65. I am convinced that you, Mr. President, as an experienced parliamentarian and diplomat understand, as we do, the aspirations of the martyred and oppressed people of Zimbabwe. I believe that both in your capacity as representative of the United Kingdom, which bears a special responsibility for solving this question, and in that as President of the Security Council you will fully contribute to the solution of this urgent problem.

66. Although Yugoslavia is not a member of the Council, I wish to point out that, in the view of our delegation, the proposals contained in draft resolution S/12597, introduced at the last meeting by the representative of Mauritius on behalf of the non-aligned countries members of the Council, are realistic and provide a solid basis for a further acceleration and intensification of efforts in the search for a solution meeting the demands of the people of Zimbabwe for national independence and for the abolition of the racist régime. The proposals countenance the continuation of dialogue between the parties concerned, taking into account the Anglo-American plan, which has been supported by the Patriotic Front and the neighbouring States as a basis for the search for a solution. The abandonment of that basis would jeopardize action to find a peaceful solution, with all the negative implications likely to arise therefrom.

67. Mr. RAMPHUL (Mauritius): First, permit me to congratulate you, Sir, on your assumption of the high office of the Security Council presidency—or perhaps I should commiserate with you, for there can be nothing more difficult than to have to preside with the most scrupulous objectivity over an issue involving the vital interests of one's own country. It is a tribute to the United Nations, which has, on the whole, produced that kind of a presiding statesman.

68. Addressing the plenary meeting of the twenty-fifth session of the General Assembly on 13 October 1970 on the item "Admission of Fiji to membership in the United Nations", I stated the following:

"On this occasion it is fitting to recall that Fiji's accession to sovereignty is the latest step in the remarkable march to independence which has taken place in a large number of those Territories which used to be under British administration. During the 25 years of existence of the United Nations, 29 Territories formerly under British responsibility, all of them now represented in this Assembly, have become independent, sovereign States. In addition, the four Trust Territories for which Britain was responsible to the United Nations under Trusteeship Agreements have all attained independence. These 33 former British Territories have a total population of over 800 million.

"This is, on all accounts, a remarkable record in the field of decolonization. But this record is somewhat marred by Britain's failure to bring freedom to the people

of Zimbabwe in ensuring that majority rule prevails in that Territory.”²

69. Seven and a half years have since passed and we are, alas, still debating the question of Zimbabwe, currently known as Southern Rhodesia. I wish I could say with some confidence that this was the last time we shall be debating the question of the decolonization and independence of Zimbabwe.

70. As the representative of Mauritius, I will not burden the Council with what would be a repetition of what all Africans who have preceded me have said on the Rhodesian issue in our long and dramatic general debate. I can very easily dispose of that by merely stating that my Government can subscribe to virtually all the major principles enunciated, especially by our African brothers and sisters, on the question of Salisbury’s so-called internal settlement. My statement will, therefore, deal mainly with the question of the immediate future.

71. In regard to what I may perhaps call the “Smith constitution”—and that is what it essentially is, a “Smith constitution”: Africans may have signed it, but no African could possibly have written it—, I would only note its complete illegality and its total not inadequacy but irrelevance. It is a trick card pulled out of Smith’s sleeve in an attempt to take in all the chips in one sweep, in what is for him a 13-year-old Rhodesian poker game. And, if he has in the past invariably won, I do not believe it has been just plain luck.

72. The “constitution” is likewise immaterial, because it does not create a truly democratic State with majority rule. It is illegal because it has not been approved by the administering Power, and runs counter to the decisions of the Security Council. It is irrelevant because it was hammered out in an effort to by-pass all the decisions of the United Nations, of the administering Power, of the Organization of African Unity, of the Anglo-American negotiators, of the non-aligned countries and the Commonwealth nations and without the participation of the Patriotic Front.

73. Never has a political document come into the world so completely isolated from the approval of the totality of the international community. The only thing that can be said to its credit is that it has been able to create an almost unmatched unanimity in the Council, which had become notorious for lack of it. I do not refer to the upcoming draft resolution—that is a different matter. But it is an astonishing fact—and perhaps the first time—that in contrast to the debates on all other issues before the Council there was not a single statement for the other side. To be sure, there are two big Powers which, for some reason or other, chose to see some beauty in this strange document, but it did not gain their actual acceptance. None claims this “child”, and none respects its parentage.

74. To what has already been said I would add only one more point. Many speakers referred to the “constitution”

and its black co-authors as a “betrayal”, saying that it was a betrayal of the black people of Zimbabwe. But little was noted about another aspect of that “betrayal”. The document was signed by Smith, Sithole, Muzorewa and Chirau. But in a matter of days, the Smith forces launched a violent attack on Zambia, with simultaneous attacks on Mozambique and Botswana, leaving many civilians dead and wounded. When Muzorewa was asked on Channel 13 of United States television whether he, a signatory of the so-called constitution, was consulted before the attacks were launched, his reply was: “No, I was not consulted.” But he obviously thinks he probably will be consulted in the future.

75. Thus, in a matter of days after the signing of the so-called internal agreement, Smith betrayed all three African parties to the agreement. Many speakers referred to Sithole and Muzorewa as “puppets” of the Smith régime, and this may or may not be altogether true. But this single incident establishes the fact that at least Smith regards them as puppets—puppet accomplices in his repeated acts of aggression.

76. All speakers have pointed out that, under the “constitution”, Smith will have the power to make military decisions. Here, in this attack, we have the acid test of his ability—and will—to use that power, and of the inability of the black leaders to stop him from using it against neighbouring States. Here, in these attacks, we have early premonitions that that new State, controlled by white hegemony, would be an aggressor State planted in the heart of Africa, augmented by over 6 million blacks and ready to wage war on other blacks.

77. These multiple aggressions give some credibility to the warnings issued in the Council by my beloved African brother Joshua Nkomo [2064th meeting] that the “Smith constitution” is one more step towards what has been shaping up for years as the “Smith-Vorster axis”, groomed for eventual war against the many surrounding States in southern and central Africa. South Africa is already the strongest military State in all of Africa, with nuclear materials in its cellars stored away for the day when it may explode its first nuclear bomb. The “Smith constitution” is paving the way for a Rhodesian State called Zimbabwe, armed with similar power. Some will say Nkomo is indulging in flights of fancy. But why, if Hitler in a similar situation could have conquered all of an unarmed Europe, as well as an armed Russia, does it seem so far-fetched that a Smith-Vorster axis could sweep through Africa, with its string of militarily puny States?

78. This is what the “Smith constitution” in the broader perspective could mean to Africa. What we see now in Namibia, in Angola, in the other States, may be the same skirmishes we saw in Spain as a prelude to the Second World War, and in China as a prelude to the attack on Pearl Harbor—which, it will be recalled, was also preceded by the strategy of protracted negotiations. It may never happen, but in order to make sure it does not it is necessary to press for an early resolution of the Namibian and Rhodesian issues. There must be dead-lines for talks, if talks are not to become deadly. Peace negotiations between the strong and the weak in open-ended time are an invitation to disaster.

² *Ibid.*, Twenty-fifth Session, Plenary Meetings, 1863rd meeting, paras. 36 and 37.

79. Permit me to add another note. The Council has been attacked by certain segments of the press for not hearing Bishop Muzorewa's side of the issue. Since he made no request to be heard, certain correspondents engaged in corridor nose-counting of possible votes and, unfortunately encouraged by corridor remarks of some delegations, they concluded that Muzorewa's failure to make the request anticipated an almost certain snub by the Council.

80. This is a contrived explanation. We would suppose that if the Bishop felt he had a right to speak before the Council, he would assert that right, regardless of any opposition. There was a fair chance he might have won. Then why did he choose to capitulate? Is it because he was embarrassed to appear, in the face of the universal sentiment against him, or because of an innate inclination to easy retreat as manifested at Salisbury? And how do we know it was not the other way about—that it was he who chose to snub the Council? Had he not already done so when he put his pen to that universally condemned so-called internal agreement?

81. Since we must make a fresh start, no one will deny that it will be a most difficult task, made all the more complex by the crisis of confidence and credibility generated by the action at Salisbury.

82. We have heard some brutally frank statements about the administering Power. A lack of confidence in the British and American negotiators was expressed by many, especially by my African brethren, Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe, leaders of the Patriotic Front [*ibid.*].

83. These are facts that will not easily go away with time; they are wounds that will not quickly heal, even with the most determined resolve to come to terms.

84. Should we be surprised at African suspicions when the British and American partners have themselves expressed suspicions about each other's motives? The latest agreement between Mr. Owen and Mr. Vance cannot cover up the new development: Britain's apparent threat to run out and leave the United States holding the bag, even if, as reported in *The Times* of London, the statement in question was apparently later withdrawn.

85. These are appalling divisions within divisions as we hoist our sails for a new journey into the Rhodesian whirlpool. I mention them not in a spirit of pessimism but so that we may have a realistic reading of the possible storms ahead, as a guide to the kind of resolution we are about to consider.

86. So where do we go from here? Apparently we have no choice but to revert to the Anglo-American plan, to the same ship—to pursue our analogy—that seems to have so far remained grounded. What is the plan, following the Salisbury development? Is it to maintain its original configuration, or is it being groomed for change?

87. Following Mr. Owen's talks in Washington on Wednesday and Thursday of last week, President Carter, in his press conference on Friday, maintained that the Anglo-American plan was still the best basis for a permanent

resolution of the Zimbabwe question, although he added that it had not been completely accepted by Nkomo and Mugabe. Here I quote the President, who said:

"We hope now that we can have a conference of all the interested national leaders to try to work out the disparity between the internal settlement proposal, which is not adequate, and the so-called Anglo-American plan, which we believe is adequate.

"We have not rejected the individual component parts of the so-called internal settlement plan. To the extent that they are consistent with the over-all Anglo-American plan provisions, they are a step in the right direction."

88. There we have two major premises: first, a partial acceptance of the Salisbury agreement; secondly, the introduction of that agreement as a basis for resumed negotiations, and the borrowing or adoption of some of its provisions.

89. Now beautified with the make-up of reasonableness, it was referred to by Ambassador Young last Sunday as being essentially what he called a "neutral" approach. But what this amounts to is a recognition of the validity of the so-called Salisbury internal settlement, which has been referred to with such hatred by previous African speakers in their statements. Whether taken as a whole or in part, it amounts to the crowning of the "Smith constitution" with an implied legality. It seems to us to be unbalanced to equate the two as bargaining plans. The Anglo-American plan is a plan for negotiations; the other is a constitution, a fait accompli, and presumably not subject to negotiation, if we are to judge from Reuters news reports from Salisbury. Surely the signatories to it did not draft a working paper; they drew up a "constitution" for a new State and States do not subject themselves lightly to a negotiation of their sovereignty. To see the two as being mutually negotiable is to introduce a confusing and dangerous incongruity—assuming that almighty Smith will permit himself to bow to any such endeavour. Frankly, my delegation must express surprise that the two Powers could even think in such terms, following the sharp reaction to their first flirtation with the constitution as a "first step in the right direction".

90. The "Smith constitution"—we insist on this label for we cannot make ourselves believe that any son of Africa could have drafted such an un-African document, this constitution roundly condemned by previous speakers as being one of the most wicked betrayals in the history of African decolonization—cannot be thrust under the noses of African liberationists as a book of virtues to be emulated, as a whole or even in its tiniest part. It has been rejected by one African after another as a betrayal comparable only to the shame of Munich, while its black signatories have been compared to the quislings under Hitler. Some may dub this as sheer emotion and anger, but our Western colleagues of the biblical faith should know that there is such a thing as "righteous anger".

91. I do not believe that it would be wise to flaunt this Smithian constitution in the face of those who consider it trickery and a betrayal. And in purely juridical terms, how can an illegal agreement, manufactured by an illegal head of

an illegal régime, become a prestigious and hopeful basis for negotiation?

92. Having studied the Smith document, we wonder what brilliant ideas the two Powers can find in it that are indispensable to their own plan? The vetoed majority? The white-controlled councils? The white-controlled armed forces? The infinite economic guarantees for white-owned properties? The phased reduction of racism? Or the prospective short-lived duration—10 years—of the so-called independent State?

93. If the devil had written his own bible, would God's followers in the Council ask for negotiations in the hope that they might adopt some of his provisions? Almost any layman unversed in law could point out the fallacy of culling a part of a document without risking recognition of its legality.

94. Unless Nkomo and Mugabe have changed since last week, they have already categorically rejected the Smith ruse as "null and void" and unthinkable as a basis for resumed negotiations. To disregard their views from the beginning is to start on the wrong foot and to hamstring the talks at the outset.

95. If the Anglo-American team has some improvements in mind to add to their plan, there is nothing to stop them from proposing an acceptable addendum. If it is taken from the Smith epic, the rebel will, I am sure, forgive them for a bit of well-intentioned plagiarism.

96. For my part, I am puzzled at the hesitancy of some of the Western Powers to declare the so-called internal settlement unacceptable. We are not asking that they strongly condemn it, or even reject it; only that they declare it unacceptable since it is admitted by all to be illegal. Certainly, Smith did not hesitate summarily to snub their plan; and, incidentally, since he has done so, which of their provisions will he relish? Smith is a fox, but at least a self-respecting fox. Should the British lion be more subservient?

97. In conclusion, the whole concept of acceptable provisions is unnecessary. It is confusing. It condemns the new talks to months of protracted debate about selective provisions—which provisions are acceptable and which are not—and we have seen how similar lost months were exploited in the wrong direction. Worse still, it would give Smith a legality he has never previously enjoyed. For the Patriotic Front it would literally add insult to injury. It is contrary even to President Carter's own concept that the new talks will be between the national leaders. To bring in the so-called constitution is to bring in the unacceptable. On the other hand, there is nothing to prevent Sithole and Muzorewa from bargaining on the basis of some elements incorporated in their constitution.

98. Finally, in drawing up a viable resolution for fruitful negotiations, it is essential to take into account the psychological factor. As the two Powers resume their homework, we discern a tendency to treat the Patriotic Front as the weaker side at the negotiating table, the outsiders trying to placate the insiders, who have pre-

sumably gained an advantage. This would be a tragic misinterpretation of the realities of the Rhodesian situation. The Patriotic Front is not wringing its hands, pleading for negotiations. If we read deep into the minds of its leadership, we see that they have little confidence in the entire negotiating process as it is practised in Africa, in Namibia, and especially in Rhodesia with its long history of Machiavellian negotiations, sham proposals, transparent betrayals and the use of negotiations to gain time for each of those pantomime operations.

99. Indeed, we have heard many Africans at this table share their bitter doubts about peaceful negotiations. For them, the imperial Powers now worship at the icons of peace because it is the fetish of peace and not of war that has come to symbolize the new strategy for resurgent colonialism. Thus we seem to have the paradox that when colonialists talk of peace it is a sure signal to Africans that they must think in terms of war.

100. This is what constitutes the rationale of the Patriotic Front. With its modest guerrilla army of an estimated 10,000—not a mighty army by European standards—it is in a position to negotiate from a position of strength, strength that is certain to be augmented by those who are in a position to supply arms and men if necessary. We have all heard the pledges and the commitments by Council members—I need not mention the delegations—who have the power to give power and know-how.

101. Africans are not allowing themselves to be brainwashed by the self-serving sophistry that there are arms of varying degrees of morality—bad arms from bad people and good arms from good people, who unfortunately give them to our enemies. To Africans generally all arms seem to be good if they are to be used for freedom and for their liberation. There is no end to the sermons we hear about the sin of taking arms from the Soviet Union or Cuba, ironically delivered by those same Western Powers which made the USSR their ally when they desperately needed Soviet power in their losing battles against Hitler. To allay Western fears, we have heard some outright offers of military aid also from African States.

102. The Mauritian position now with regard to Rhodesia is one of outright preference for peaceful negotiations. We call for further talks between the parties concerned. We will pursue this course, exhausting patiently every possibility of resolving vital differences by peaceful means, and we will counsel our brothers accordingly. We prefer and counsel the wisdom of statesmanship and the skill of diplomacy.

103. In this spirit we see the new start being made, not at Salisbury, but where negotiations were wantonly left off, in Malta. It is our understanding that both Nkomo and Mugabe accepted this formula and the Anglo-American plan as a promising basis for the negotiations which were so rudely upset by what happened at Salisbury. It may not be easy to induce the Patriotic Front leaders to consent to sit with their opponents at this stage, but this obstacle can be overcome. There will be many other difficulties ahead. But, in any case, we Africans cannot encourage any solution which even remotely or indirectly or obliquely recognizes the legality of the Smith constitution and the Salisbury surrender.

104. Our brother from Nigeria, Commissioner for External Affairs Garba [2065th meeting], made an important observation about the new negotiations. He said that the political action would be complemented by armed struggle. The siren-song of cease-fire will not enchant the African Ulysses. Africans are beginning to understand full well the signal that our Chinese colleague tried to convey to us on Friday [*ibid.*]: that only by armed struggle can one go into negotiations for peace. I hope I got it correctly.

105. In conclusion, I have pointed out some of the difficulties that beset the new negotiations. There seem to be a lack of confidence and a great deal of suspicion on all sides. To my African brothers and sisters I say, let us not judge our brother Bishop Muzorewa too harshly. Not every bishop can aspire to be of the political stature of the late Archbishop Makarios. So, if Bishop Muzorewa has made a mistake, let us retrieve him and educate him rather than chastise him and treat him like a pariah. He may have acted in sincerity but also in naivety. Let us be compassionate. After all, he commands some significant support in the cities of Zimbabwe and it may be necessary, if not essential, to bring him together with the other parties concerned at a conference table for a peaceful settlement sooner rather than later.

106. Perhaps it would be insurance and wisdom to give a role in these delicate negotiations to the Secretary-General, whose sagacity and wisdom have proved themselves so brilliantly on similar crucial issues. His diplomatic skill, the confidence of all which he enjoys universally, make up the one element that is now lacking and that is essential if things are to move well, or indeed if they are to move at all.

107. The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Mauritius for the kind words he addressed to me. I am also grateful that he pointed out the decolonization record of my country over the last 30 years. It is with a sense of at least historical achievement that I look at the United Nations today and see, I think, no less than 34 countries which are ex-colonies of the United Kingdom—35, if I include the United States, but even if one is a little more contemporary it is perhaps an astonishing record. I must, however, take issue with him on one point. Without going into the details, I think his version of the circumstances in which Bishop Muzorewa did not address the Security Council was somewhat eccentric and inaccurate.

108. I should like now to make a statement in my capacity as the representative of the UNITED KINGDOM.

109. I would begin by paying my compliments to my neighbour and colleague, Ambassador Trojanovsky, who was President of the Council in February. I can think of no greater compliment than to say that he exercised his authority that month with the skill and goodwill we have come to expect of him.

110. I have sat through the past seven days of debate in comparative silence, muzzled partly by my role as President and partly because I wished to listen carefully to what was said in the Council before making my own statement. I think now that, after everything has been said, I can see clearly the main points of concern expressed by those who

have spoken. I can also now identify and shall try to discount those occasional expressions of suspicion, even irritation, regarding my country's role and future intentions, and to focus on what I believe are the main concerns of the world community in the present situation.

111. I should perhaps begin by stating a basic principle which has been expressed so often that I would have thought it had by now become universally recognized and accepted. Some of the statements made during this debate, however, have shown me that my expectation was false. The question was asked by a number of speakers whether the United Kingdom continued to accept the legal responsibility for the colony of Southern Rhodesia. The answer is yes, of course we do. And, quite frankly, I am very surprised that anyone should doubt it.

112. The extent to which we have accepted our responsibility is, I would have thought, amply illustrated by the events of the last 12 months. I do not propose this afternoon to deliver an extended version of the history of the Rhodesian problem. I suspect that most of us who have sat in this room have heard quite enough about the background of this problem. Moreover, we have dealt with the events of recent years in innumerable statements in this and other forums of the United Nations. But I fear that I must go back to the launching of what has become known as the Anglo-American proposals, more precisely entitled "Rhodesia: proposals for a settlement", circulated as documents S/12393 and S/12395 in September last year.

113. The package of ideas contained in those proposals was the result of long, hard and serious work. They attracted a generally favourable reaction from the world community when they were first launched. Indeed, when we had our debate here at the end of September—the debate which led to the adoption of resolution 415 (1977)—, very few of those who spoke in this room then seemed fundamentally opposed to the general content of those proposals. In the view of the authors, they represented and represent a genuine attempt to find a fair and reasonable solution to the Rhodesian problem, to secure the key objective of a transfer of power from the minority to the majority, whilst at the same time taking account of the legitimate fears and interests of all the parties concerned. During the past few days I have heard many speakers react favourably to the Anglo-American proposals. They seem to be attracting adherents rather than the opposite. Indeed, I believe that there may be more awareness of the positive virtues in our proposals now than there was in September. Many speakers asked whether the United Kingdom had abandoned the proposals of which it was part author. I am delighted that I can now respond to those questions. In the view of my Government, the Anglo-American proposals remain very much alive and continue to represent the best and the fairest basis for a peaceful settlement.

114. That questions such as this have been asked not once but repeatedly has brought home to me the fact there is widespread misunderstanding of what the Governments of the United Kingdom and the United States have been doing in recent months. I fear too that there has been a great deal of unquestioning acceptance of newspaper reports. I have

of course the highest regard for the press and believe that generally they have done a remarkably good job in following a complex and difficult story, which, from its very nature, has often been only half in the open. But, even if by definition journalists can never make mistakes, they do occasionally allow their fictional fancies a little too much freedom.

115. The Commissioner for External Affairs of Nigeria himself repeated a story which had appeared in some newspapers and which is totally inaccurate. He seemed to believe reports that my Secretary of State, Mr. David Owen, "ran away" from this meeting because of a remark made by my friend and colleague the representative of the United States [see 2065th meeting, para. 9]. In the interests of truth and historical accuracy, may I say that such a version is completely false. The fact is that the comments which were supposed to have induced Mr. Owen to return to London did not come to the attention of the United Kingdom Permanent Mission to the United Nations or to our Embassy at Washington until after Mr. Owen had boarded an aeroplane at Washington en route back to London. Mr. Owen himself has made clear that he returned to London after having spent hours in detailed talks with his United States opposite number, Mr. Vance, and with President Carter. Having reached agreement with the United States authorities on a number of important decisions for the future handling of the problem of Rhodesia, he decided to return immediately to London to inform his Cabinet colleagues on the following day. At no time had a decision been taken that the Secretary of State was definitely to attend this debate. Indeed, quite the contrary is the case. It is, to say the least, unfortunate that the Commissioner for External Affairs of Nigeria should have encouraged this canard. I hope that this will be a definitive end to some of the sillier stories which have been circulated on this subject.

116. But the fact that a number of such misunderstandings have gained currency does suggest to me that there may be a need to recount briefly some of the events which have taken place since the publication of our proposals last September. The most immediate action was to bring to the Council the request that the Secretary-General should be authorized to nominate a representative to enter into discussion with the British Resident Commissioner designate. The upshot of that request was the adoption of resolution 415 (1977) and the consequent appointment of Lieutenant-General Prem Chand. The task we faced thereafter was clear. We had to persuade all the parties to recognize that our proposals represented a package containing elements which were distasteful to them but essential for others and elements which were essential for them and distasteful to others. From the start, all the parties indicated a readiness to treat our proposals as a framework for negotiation, although it was clear from both their public and their private statements that some of them had major reservations. Indeed, we have now reached the point where none of the parties directly concerned seems willing to accept the Anglo-American proposals in all their essentials.

117. The Resident Commissioner designate, Field-Marshal Lord Carver, set off for Africa at the end of October, accompanied by Lieutenant-General Prem Chand. By mid-

November he had completed his tour. He had one short session with Mr. Mugabe and Mr. Nkomo, the joint leaders of the Patriotic Front, at Dar es Salaam. At Salisbury he held two long sessions with Bishop Muzorewa and with the Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole. While at Salisbury, Lord Carver and Lieutenant-General Prem Chand had several meetings with Mr. Smith's senior civilian and military officials and one meeting at which Mr. Smith was present. Apart from these contacts with the parties directly concerned, there were also meetings with a number of the Presidents of the front-line States and with the head of State of Nigeria. Since then there have been several contacts with all the parties at working level and, together with our United States colleagues, we have been very active in keeping the representatives of the front-line States fully informed.

118. Within two or three weeks of Lord Carver's return to London, Mr. Smith announced his intention of beginning negotiations with Bishop Muzorewa, the Reverend Sithole and Chief Chirau in the hope of reaching what has come to be called the internal settlement. On 4 and 5 December the Reverend Sithole travelled to London for discussions at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. At about the same time, Mr. Mugabe and Mr. Nkomo were invited to come to London for talks on 13 December, but the leaders of the Patriotic Front refused that invitation.

119. We continued our efforts to prevent the Anglo-American initiative from losing momentum. Those efforts were successful in that we arranged for Lord Carver and Lieutenant-General Prem Chand to go to Maputo early in January to see President Machel of Mozambique, with whom it had not been possible to arrange a meeting in November. Those talks proved positive and useful. Taking advantage of his presence in southern Africa, Lord Carver also had brief discussions with the South African Foreign Minister at Johannesburg and with Ministers of Botswana at Gaborone.

120. It was not until towards the end of January that we were able to obtain from the Patriotic Front leaders a favourable response to our invitation to a meeting in Malta from 30 January to 2 February. The United Kingdom was represented there by Mr. Owen and the United States by Ambassador Young. These talks have been referred to both by Mr. Nkomo and by Mr. Mugabe as well as by other speakers. They have been characterized as useful in allowing the parties to achieve a greater understanding of each other's positions. In his statement to the House of Commons after those talks, Mr. Owen pointed out that, although the necessary element of compromise between the parties was lacking at present, we would continue to work within the framework of the proposals for a peaceful settlement, and that we had agreed with the Patriotic Front to meet again at a time and place to be decided. Much has been made of the fact that there has been no meeting since the talks in Malta. The representative of Mauritius indeed referred to it in the statement which he has just made. This has been adduced as evidence of our "paralysis". The fact is that we offered to the Patriotic Front a follow-up meeting here in New York on 10 February and that this was not taken up.

121. I find it impossible, having listed all the foregoing contacts, to accept the conclusion that the United Kingdom and the United States, the authors of the Anglo-American proposals, have been guilty of any reluctance to sustain momentum. It is just not true. The front-line States themselves know how often the Ambassadors or other diplomatic officials of the United Kingdom or the United States have been in contact with them over the last few months in endless efforts to keep the initiative alive and in motion. We cannot accept that the fault is ours if the proposals have not so far resulted in a compromise agreement.

122. Into this situation another element was then introduced. Mr. Smith back in December had begun his negotiations with those African leaders inside Rhodesia. These talks had continued in the background as a kind of counterpoint to our own negotiations. We were not privy to them; we were not in any way involved in them; we did nothing to encourage them at the expense of our proposals. But whether we like it or not, an agreement was signed at Salisbury on 3 March between Mr. Smith, Bishop Muzorewa, Chief Chirau and the Reverend Sithole and that agreement undoubtedly represents a new element in the situation. The internal agreement, as it has come to be called, is not adequate. It leaves many major issues still to be resolved, and is seriously defective in a number of areas to which we attach great importance: in particular, the need that in any transition there should be adequate agreement on how to deal with the critical issue of law and order, and on the necessity of ensuring that control during this period is not left in the hands of the illegal régime.

123. As President Carter has said:

"We have not rejected the individual component parts of the so-called internal settlement plan. To the extent that they are consistent with the over-all Anglo-American plan provisions, they are a step in the right direction."

These words seem to have caused great unhappiness among the leaders of the Patriotic Front, and among a number of those who have spoken during this debate. I really cannot see why. The fact is that there are elements in the internal settlement as it has been reported which correspond to what the United Nations has been calling for for many years. These elements include agreement on a universal franchise, on the acceptance that a government elected by the majority of the people shall run the country, and acceptance that at long last Mr. Smith will have to step down. Whether or not there are other provisions which derogate from those concessions, whether or not other parts of the internal settlement are to say the least unappealing to the international community, it is undeniable that there are concessions which represent a move in the right direction.

124. There is no inconsistency between our support for our own proposals—which we believe represent the best way forward—and our recognition that there are some elements in the internal agreement which reflect aspirations which are universally approved. We therefore find ourselves in a situation where some of the parties with whom we have been negotiating have signed an agreement of sorts, which is

however seriously defective in terms of what we believe to be necessary for a lasting and just solution to the problem. But we must face the fact too that, from the time we first put these proposals forward, neither the Patriotic Front nor the régime at Salisbury accepted them as anything more than a basis for negotiation; and, in the negotiations we have had with them, it is clear that, in practice, they reject elements in our proposals which go to their very heart. In Malta some progress was made, but even there the Patriotic Front was asking for a dominant role in government during the transitional period which would have been inconsistent with our responsibility to ensure fair and free elections in which all could take part on an equal footing.

125. The question we must now face therefore is how to proceed from here. On 9 March, at his regular press conference, the President of the United States announced that, following the meeting between the United States Secretary of State and Mr. Owen, our two Governments intended to call a conference to try to work out the disparity between the provisions of the internal agreement, which are inadequate, and the Anglo-American plan, which we believe to be adequate and sensible. The following day, Mr. Owen himself reiterated that our aim was to secure a genuine and irreversible transfer to majority rule. We have therefore decided, with our United States partners, that we should now attempt to bring together all the parties to the Malta and the Salisbury talks with a view to widening the areas of agreement.

126. Our decision to take this step seems to me to reflect a wish which has often been expressed in this chamber over the past few days. Many speakers have urged that the United Kingdom and the United States should make further, urgent efforts to get the parties back into negotiations. We believe that, to make any progress, we have to involve the parties engaged in the Salisbury talks, as well as those engaged in the Malta talks, since whatever we may think of them the former are a reality.

127. To avoid any possible further misapprehension, I repeat that in the view of Her Majesty's Government the agreement signed at Salisbury earlier this month is, as things stand, seriously defective and inadequate and cannot be endorsed. But I repeat, too, that it is a reality and it makes no sense to pretend that it is not there.

128. We do not delude ourselves that the Patriotic Front would wish to involve itself in the Salisbury arrangements, nor would we seek to persuade it to do so, given our own view of the nature of those arrangements. But we do believe that by bringing together all the parties there might be ways of widening the areas of agreement. We do not ask that the parties invited to meet us should concede in advance their previous positions. Attendance at these discussions would not entail recognition by any party of the positions or claims of others. It would confer no legality on what has always been and remains illegal. But we do hope that the parties will be prepared to put the future of Zimbabwe first, and to examine the issues objectively in a genuine search for peace. We ourselves will be holding to the Anglo-American proposals, which we continue to believe offer the best chance of a peaceful settlement.

129. The key question which has to be considered by all parties is that of the transfer of power from the minority to the majority by free and fair elections which are manifestly seen to be so. At the risk of repeating myself, I would say that there are elements of common ground between the different positions held by the participants in the Salisbury talks, by the Patriotic Front, and by the authors of the Anglo-American proposals. Those common elements are: that Zimbabwe should become independent in 1978; that the Government of Zimbabwe should be elected by universal suffrage; that the elections so held have to be free and fair. That is already an important area of agreement. Of course there remain great difficulties in trying to bring about a peaceful settlement. But we must not allow those problems to deter us from pursuing the objective of achieving an agreement which will enable the transfer of power to take place peacefully rather than leaving it to a contest of arms which will inevitably cost many lives and may set back the whole future of Zimbabwe. We therefore hope that all those we have invited will accept the seriousness of our intentions and will come to a meeting as we have proposed. Whatever happens, our offer remains on the table and we will not be deflected from our efforts to bring all the parties together.

130. I now resume my function as PRESIDENT of the Council.

131. There are no other names on the list of speakers. The Council will therefore proceed to the voting on the draft resolution contained in document S/12597. A number of representatives have indicated their wish to speak in explanation of vote before the voting. I shall therefore now call on them.

132. Mr. BARTON (Canada): In considering the draft resolution before us, the Canadian authorities have been guided by the key principle I enunciated in my statement of 13 March [2066th meeting], that is, that Southern Rhodesia must be returned to constitutional government and that this must include the transfer of effective power to a government based on majority rule. In that statement I also said that in the Canadian view the agreement signed at Salisbury did not provide for such a transfer and that we therefore regarded it as inadequate.

133. The problem we have faced in this debate is how to express the strong concern of the Security Council over developments arising out of the signing of the agreement at Salisbury. We think that the debate has demonstrated high degree of common interest and purpose and it is therefore a matter of considerable disappointment that, notwithstanding the best efforts of many delegations, we were unable to arrive at a text which acceptably reflected the wide area of agreement. For its part, my delegation has reluctantly come to the conclusion that it cannot support the draft resolution in the terms in which it has been drafted. Nevertheless we shall indeed maintain our efforts to promote an early resumption of negotiations based on the Anglo-American proposals, which have now attracted wide support. We are confident that all members of the Council and, indeed, all Members of the United Nations will continue in their common efforts to bring freedom and genuine majority rule to Zimbabwe.

134. Mr. LAI Ya-li (China) (*interpretation from Chinese*): In its statement made on 10 March [2065th meeting], the Chinese delegation expounded its views on the situation in Southern Rhodesia and expressed its firm support for the Zimbabwe people's struggle against racist rule and for national independence and liberation. Accordingly, we favour in principle the draft resolution contained in document S/12597 and we shall vote in favour of it. However, we hold that there are some parts of the draft resolution that are not satisfactory. It fails explicitly to reaffirm support for the just struggle of the people of Zimbabwe in accordance with the relevant United Nations resolutions. In its operative paragraph 4, the holding of elections on the basis of universal suffrage "under United Nations supervision" is referred to. With regard to the question of "United Nations supervision", the Chinese delegation has always held a different position in principle. In the first preambular paragraph, resolution 415 (1977) is mentioned. As is known to all, when the Council adopted that resolution on 29 September of last year, the Chinese delegation fully stated its views on the relevant questions and did not participate in the voting [2034th meeting].

135. The PRESIDENT: I shall now put to the vote the draft resolution in document S/12597.

A vote was taken by show of hands.

In favour: Bolivia, China, Czechoslovakia, Gabon, India, Kuwait, Mauritius, Nigeria, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Venezuela.

Against: None.

Abstaining: Canada, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America.

The draft resolution was adopted by 10 votes to none, with 5 abstentions.³

136. The PRESIDENT: I shall now call upon representatives who wish to speak in explanation of vote after the vote.

137. Mr. HARRIMAN (Nigeria): Since my Commissioner for External Affairs has already spoken extensively here [2065th meeting], it is not my intention to go into the substance of the debate.

138. I am happy that a unanimous decision has been taken here which declares illegal and unacceptable any internal settlement arrived at under the auspices of the illegal Salisbury régime. I have searched for a basis for seeing anything like good faith on the part of those, particularly the United Kingdom, who have on principle abstained on an issue they have taken up with my Government and concerning which we gave them all the support possible. It is quite disquieting to my delegation that by their actions over the past few weeks, particularly since Malta, they have stalled, and consciously stalled, the reconvening of the meetings with the Patriotic Front.

³ See resolution 423 (1978).

139. It is all well and good for the representative of the United Kingdom to say that the matter was not taken up. Taken up by whom? Did they follow up on the Malta talks? We should not distort the facts. As a matter of fact, as it turned out, nobody invited the Patriotic Front to a meeting on the fixed date that had been determined and, even if they had received that invitation and had not responded, nobody would have urged members of the front-line States and Nigeria to prevail on the Patriotic Front.

140. As we speak now, 33 very important top officials of transnational corporations here are planning to go to Rhodesia. During the last week, while we were debating in this Council chamber, large transnational companies were fêting and dining Muzorewa and his rebel group.

141. To my delegation, the Salisbury talks and the pattern of voting of the Western Powers here clearly indicates that they have not been serious with us, and we shall decide whether we shall take them seriously in future in talking about peace proposals. The principles for the determination of the Rhodesian situation and other situations in southern Africa will in future be dictated not by those Powers but by Africa.

142. Mr. HUSSON (France) (*interpretation from French*): Yesterday [2066th meeting] the French delegation stated its position on the question before the Council. It is therefore not necessary for me to revert to the matter today. I shall be brief.

143. I would simply explain that throughout the debate my delegation hoped that we could unanimously agree on a text. Unfortunately it has not been possible to agree on wording, and that is why we abstained in the vote.

144. The lack of unanimity is regrettable, because we all seem to share the feeling that the document signed on 3 March at Salisbury is an unsatisfactory answer to the Rhodesian question and that efforts should be continued tenaciously under the leadership of the United Kingdom and the United States towards a comprehensive settlement. In particular, we hope that all who have a decisive role to play in the future of the country, and particularly the nationalist leaders, will agree to set aside their rivalries and join with the administering Power in the interests of building an independent Zimbabwe in conditions of peace.

145. Mr. TROYANOVSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*interpretation from Russian*): The Soviet delegation would have preferred to vote in favour of a resolution which condemned more decisively the manoeuvres of the racists and their henchmen and which determined more clearly ways and means of ensuring the right to self-determination and independence of the people of Zimbabwe. However, in the light of the position taken by the Patriotic Front of Zimbabwe and by the African and non-aligned countries members of the Council, and also taking into account the fact that even in its present form the resolution, in particular, declares as illegal and unacceptable any internal settlement arrived at under the auspices of the illegal régime of Salisbury and calls upon all States not to recognize such a settlement, the Soviet

delegation found it possible to vote in favour of it. It is our belief that the condemnation contained in the resolution of all attempts and manoeuvres on the part of the illegal régime designed to preserve power for the racist minority and aimed at preventing the achievement of independence by Zimbabwe naturally applies to the deal which was recently concluded at Salisbury between Smith and the African collaborationists.

146. In voting last September on resolution 415 (1977), the Soviet delegation expressed its objections to the United Nations' becoming involved in any way in measures which might be prejudicial to the national liberation struggle of the people of Zimbabwe [2034th meeting]. The Soviet delegation would like to stress once again that no provisions of the present resolution should be used to involve the United Nations in the Rhodesian affair in order to cover up neo-colonialist plans to settle the problem or to prevent the elimination of the remnants of racism and colonialism on the African continent.

147. Mr. RAMPHUL (Mauritius): It is not my intention to explain my vote after the vote, but I do wish, on behalf of the sponsors of the draft resolution which has just been adopted, to thank the members who voted in favour of it. I regret that the five Western members of the Council did not find it possible to vote in favour of it, but rather abstained. However, we hope that they will join the international community in the implementation of the resolution.

148. Mr. President, I warmly thank you personally. In your capacity as President of the Council you have conducted the affairs of the Council with great talent and integrity. I take into consideration that during the last few days you must have been faced with some very difficult moments.

149. The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Mauritius. He is quite right.

150. I should like now to make an explanation of vote in my capacity as representative of the UNITED KINGDOM.

151. We have abstained on this draft resolution because we do not believe that it would help to bring about what everyone wants, namely, a peaceful settlement, if the United Kingdom, with its special responsibilities as the administering Power, were to vote in favour of a text which could be open to misconstruction in a number of important respects.

152. I should add that we regret very much that the sponsors of the draft resolution were not able to give fuller consideration to the alternative formulations which we and other members of the Council offered to them during consultations.

153. I made clear the United Kingdom's position in my statement earlier today. We have made clear that we will neither accept nor condemn the outcome of the recent discussions at Salisbury. We have also made clear that we regard that outcome as seriously defective and inadequate as a basis for a settlement. The outcome of the talks is not a settlement, nor is it even a full agreement, as there are still

major outstanding issues, particularly relating to law and order, which have to be resolved. These are among the issues which are at the heart of the present conflict.

154. As members of the Council know, it is our aim, in co-operation with the Government of the United States, to bring all the parties together to resolve all the issues which stand in the way of ending that conflict. In advance of such discussion with the parties, it is right that the United Kingdom should maintain a position in which we can bring the parties together and it is important to maintain such a position, in circumstances in which a vote for the draft resolution could be seen as a condemnation of the outcome of the recent discussions at Salisbury and a vote against the draft as an endorsement of it.

155. My Government considers that some of the formulations used in the resolution are obscure and, rather than

have any misunderstanding, we wish to place on record our interpretation of the resolution. We regard its primary purpose as being to indicate clearly that a settlement which leaves the position substantially as it is at present, with an illegal régime retaining power on behalf of a minority community, is unacceptable to the international community and not one which will or can be recognized. We have no hesitation in endorsing that, for that has been our consistent position, and it would be totally incompatible with our own proposals not to do so. We do not interpret the operative paragraphs as precluding the acceptance and recognition of an independent Government of Zimbabwe chosen by a manifestly democratic process of the people of Zimbabwe as a whole. That has consistently been the principle on which my Government has taken its stand and we cannot and will not depart from it.

The meeting rose at 6.30 p.m.

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