

UNITED NATIONS 0064110



# SECURITY COUNCIL OFFICIAL RECORDS

THIRTY-FIRST YEAR

UN LIBRARY

# 1963<sup>rd</sup>

MEETING: 19 OCTOBER 1976 1986

UN/ A. COLLECTION

NEW YORK

## CONTENTS

	<i>Page</i>
Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/1963) .....	1
Adoption of the agenda .....	1
The situation in Namibia .....	1

#### NOTE

Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures. Mention of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United Nations document.

Documents of the Security Council (symbol S/ . . .) are normally published in quarterly *Supplements* of the *Official Records of the Security Council*. The date of the document indicates the supplement in which it appears or in which information about it is given.

The resolutions of the Security Council, numbered in accordance with a system adopted in 1964, are published in yearly volumes of *Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council*. The new system, which has been applied retroactively to resolutions adopted before 1 January 1965, became fully operative on that date.

## 1963rd MEETING

Held in New York on Tuesday, 19 October 1976, at 3 p.m.

*President:* Mr. Iqbal A. AKHUND (Pakistan).

*Present:* The representatives of the following States: Benin, China, France, Guyana, Italy, Japan, Libyan Arab Republic, Pakistan, Panama, Romania, Sweden, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America.

### Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/1963)

1. Adoption of the agenda
2. The situation in Namibia

*The meeting was called to order at 3:45 p.m.*

#### Adoption of the agenda

*The agenda was adopted.*

#### The situation in Namibia

1. The PRESIDENT: In accordance with the decisions previously taken by the Council [1954th and 1956th to 1961st meetings], I shall now invite the President and other members of the United Nations Council for Namibia, and the representatives of Algeria, Bangladesh, Botswana, Burundi, Cuba, Democratic Kampuchea, Egypt, Ethiopia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Poland, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Yemen, Yugoslavia and Zambia to participate in the Council's discussions without the right to vote.

*At the invitation of the President, Mr. Kamana (President of the United Nations Council for Namibia) and the other members of the delegation took places at the Council table and Mr. Rahal (Algeria), Mr. Kaiser (Bangladesh), Mr. Mogami (Botswana), Mr. Bwakira (Burundi), Mr. Alarcón (Cuba), Mr. Keat Chhon (Democratic Kampuchea), Mr. Abdel Meguid (Egypt), Mr. Wodajo (Ethiopia), Mr. Florin (German Democratic Republic), Mr. Felli (Ghana), Mr. Cissoko (Guinea), Mr. Maina (Kenya), Mrs. Brooks-Randolph (Liberia), Mr. Rabetafika of (Madagascar), Mr. Muwamba (Malawi), Mr. Ramphul (Mauritius), Mr. Bengelloun (Morocco), Mr. Chissano (Mozambique), Mr. Djermaakoye (Niger), Mr. Garba (Nigeria), Mr. Jaroszek (Poland), Mr. Baroody (Saudi Arabia),*

*Mr. Minah (Sierra Leone), Mr. Hussen (Somalia), Mr. Kanakarathne (Sri Lanka), Mr. Sallam (Yemen), Mr. Petrić (Yugoslavia) and Mr. Mwale (Zambia) took the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber.*

2. The PRESIDENT: The Council has before it the seven-Power draft resolution [S/12211] introduced yesterday by the representative of Guyana [1962nd meeting].

3. Mr. LECOMPT (France) (*interpretation from French*): Mr. President, it is a pleasure for the French delegation and an honour for me to be able to congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency of the Council. Your remarkable qualities, your competence and your sense of what is appropriate—guarantee that our work will be conducted to a successful conclusion with wisdom and efficiency.

4. I should also like to express to the outgoing President, Ambassador Kikhia, the thanks and profound gratitude of the French delegation for the outstanding manner in which he discharged his duties last month.

5. The French delegation has followed this new debate on Namibia with the greatest attention. It wishes to pay a tribute to the high level which the speakers have maintained in expressing their positions and that of their Governments. The presence among us of many Ministers for Foreign Affairs has emphasized the scope of our work and the importance of the role of the Council—in a word, the responsibilities which are ours. These responsibilities, of which each one of us is aware, are even more important when the Council is considering the situation in a Territory having international status, like Namibia, where the presence of South Africa no longer has a legal foundation.

6. The efforts of the world community to induce South Africa to comply with its obligations are of long standing. France has participated in these efforts. On a number of occasions it approached the Government of Pretoria, bilaterally or jointly with the Government of the United Kingdom and the United States. It also associated itself, as a member country, with the positions taken by the European community. I wish merely to recall the most recent relevant dates: the joint démarche of 26 January [S/11945], the declaration of 23 February and that addressed on

26 August last to the Secretary-General on the occasion of Namibia Day.

7. The policy of my country on the question of Namibia is clear. It has already been presented here in the Council. Mr. de Guiringaud recalled it a gain, as Minister for Foreign Affairs, before the General Assembly. I should like to quote that part of his statement which was devoted to the subject:

“It is a matter of urgency that Namibia should in accordance with United Nations resolutions accede to sovereignty and independence under the supervision of our Organization after a constitutional process in which the political groups, the principal one being SWAPO [*South West Africa People's Organization*], should participate.”<sup>11</sup>

I would add that Mr. de Guiringaud also took a stand on one of the problems which are of particular interest to the Council in view of the close interrelation of the general affairs of southern Africa, the problem of arms sales. He said:

“The French Government's condemnation of racial discrimination and other aspects of the policy followed by Pretoria led it to adopt an increasingly restrictive policy with regard to the delivery of arms and ultimately to prohibit any new contracts or further sales.”<sup>12</sup>

8. My country's position on the question of Namibia is based directly on the provisions of resolution 385 (1976) which the Council adopted on 30 January this year. My delegation continues to feel that “it is imperative”, to use the words of paragraph 7 of that resolution, that “free elections under the supervision and control of the United Nations be held for the whole of Namibia as one political entity”. I would recall that that proposal to hold free elections was put forward for the first time by my delegation during the debate held in June 1975 on the question of Namibia. My delegation then expressed the opinion that

“one of the most appropriate means to attain [the independence of Namibia with respect for its territorial integrity and unity] lies in the organization, under international supervision, of general elections throughout the Territory on the basis of universal suffrage”. [*1824th meeting, para. 102.*]

That proposal, which the Council endorsed, appears to us to be just as relevant now. In our opinion there is no alternative to the free expression of the will of the peoples.

9. What has been South Africa's reply to these repeated demands of the Council and to the questions put by Member States? Many speakers here have already deplored the silence of the South African Government, and we in turn must note that silence.

10. The only new elements that we have at hand are those contained in a statement by the Constitutional Committee of the Windhoek Conference [*S/12180, annex*]. As we said in our last statement [*1883rd meeting*], that conference cannot be recognized as representative. Limited as it is to ethnic groups and excluding the political groupings, in the full sense of the word, it does not guarantee the democratic character that we are entitled to expect of any process of self-determination. The proposals which the conference has formulated cannot therefore meet my country's concerns.

11. Having thus drawn attention to our basic objections to the composition and functioning of the Windhoek Conference, I must add that the material it provides by way of information is in any event particularly disappointing. No information is given concerning the date and organization of general elections, concerning the place to be given to the political groupings, particularly SWAPO, concerning the role of the United Nations, or concerning the electoral and constitutional process. The only new facts relate to the indication of a date—in the far distant future—for independence, and the recognition that negotiations will have to be undertaken directly with South Africa on a certain number of questions, including that of Walvis Bay.

12. I readily agree that none of that is satisfactory. But does that mean that there is no longer any hope that the situation may improve? That is not the opinion of my delegation. Prospects were opened up last summer when the United States Secretary of State proposed to the interested Governments in southern Africa, including that of Pretoria, certain ways of approaching the problems in the region. Our Foreign Minister indicated, when he spoke before the General Assembly on 29 September last, that that difficult undertaking had our encouragement<sup>3</sup>. I repeat that encouragement here, for the benefit of the United States delegation.

13. The progress that now seems possible should induce the Council to use the language of urgent appeals rather than that of sanctions. We must again emphasize the principles on which any settlement must be based, in particular, the cardinal principle of any democracy: the rapid and unswerving acceptance of the rule of the majority, through the intermediary, in Namibia, of free elections under the control and supervision of the United Nations.

14. While it is not for the Council to go into details concerning a negotiation that falls within the framework of quiet diplomacy, it seems to be its duty to encourage a peaceful evolution in every way possible whenever chances for progress seem to exist along that path and whenever there is the beginning of change, as seems to be the case now. That evolution, however fragile it may be—and I say this all the more freely because my country is not associated with the present

negotiations, because it has had no special information concerning any progress that may have been made, and because the Council itself has been kept in ignorance in this respect—should prohibit us from resorting to Chapter VII of the Charter. In the present state of affairs, we must simply note that there is no situation which is a threat to peace.

15. The fact that my delegation at present prefers the diplomatic path does not mean that it no longer condemns South Africa's attempt to settle the Namibian question by artificial procedures, without SWAPO, the principal political group, and without the United Nations, which in respect of this Territory has a paramount responsibility that has been affirmed here for many years. My delegation strongly disapproves of this refusal to take into account the political facts and the legal requirements. We fully associate ourselves with the solemn warnings that have been addressed in this respect to South Africa by the majority of speakers. We cannot rule out the possibility of further restrictive measures to demonstrate our condemnation of South Africa's policy in Namibia if the hoped-for progress does not come about because Pretoria is once more dragging its feet. A settlement in Namibia must not be delayed any longer. The South African authorities must understand that.

16. Mr. RYDBECK (Sweden): First of all, I should like to ask the delegation of the Libyan Arab Republic to convey the thanks of the Swedish delegation to Ambassador Kikhia for the efficient, objective and pleasant way in which he conducted our deliberations last month.

17. Our congratulations go also to you, Sir, on your assumption of the office of President. You have already had ample opportunity to display the great personal qualities and the very wide range of experience which you bring to your task. We pledge you our full co-operation and support.

18. Council resolution 385 (1976), which was adopted unanimously, contained a strong and clear demand that South Africa use the time given—up to 31 August last—to comply with the provisions of that resolution. The Council demanded of South Africa a solemn declaration that it would accept the provisions of that resolution concerning the holding of free elections in Namibia under United Nations supervision and control and also an undertaking by South Africa that it would comply with all other resolutions and decisions of the United Nations and with the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 21 June 1971<sup>4</sup> and recognition by South Africa of the territorial integrity and unity of Namibia as a nation. However, no declaration has been made by South Africa in response to resolution 385 (1976) and no measure has been taken by South Africa towards ending its illegal occupation, towards abolishing its discriminatory and repressive laws in Namibia, towards releasing Namibian political prisoners towards withdrawing its

troops from Namibia or towards the holding of free elections.

19. On the contrary, the South African Government has tried further to strengthen its hold on Namibia by arranging so-called constitutional talks with some of the various groups in Namibia while excluding SWAPO, the principal representative of those Namibian forces seeking independence in a unitary Namibia. Those talks have rightly been condemned by the international community. South Africa has intensified its military build-up in Namibia and has also staged outright aggression against Angola from Namibia.

20. In its resolution 366 (1974), the Council had already decided to consider appropriate measures to be taken under the Charter in the event of non-compliance with that resolution by South Africa. When South Africa's response to resolution 366 (1974) was considered by the Council in June 1975, none of the Council members was of the opinion that South Africa had complied with it. However, because of a triple veto, it was not then possible for the Council to take a decision on mandatory sanctions against South Africa for flagrantly neglecting to comply with the resolution. For its part, Sweden voted in favour of a mandatory arms embargo.

21. The South African Government has refused to respond to resolution 385 (1976). In paragraph 12 of that resolution the Council decided that it would remain seized of the matter and that in the event of non-compliance by South Africa it would meet to consider appropriate measures under the Charter. The Council is now confronted with repeated flagrant non-compliance with its unequivocal demands. South Africa's repeated refusal to heed those demands gives the Council little alternative but to take action in accordance with the Charter. This is the logical consequence of resolutions 366 (1974) and 385 (1976) and of developments during the last two years.

22. It can hardly be questioned that the situation in southern Africa, including Namibia, constitutes a threat to international peace and security. The continued occupation of Namibia and the military build-up in the Territory, together with the tension in the area as a whole, which is the result of South Africa's policies with regard to Namibia and in South Africa itself, has served further to aggravate the dangerous situation. Last week, in the General Assembly,<sup>5</sup> the Swedish Foreign Minister stated that the situation in southern Africa must be characterized as a threat to peace.

23. In August of this year the Nordic Foreign Ministers agreed on certain guidelines for the policies of the Nordic Governments with regard to Namibia. The Ministers adopted, *inter alia*, the following principles:

"... condemnation of the continued occupation of Namibia by the Republic of South Africa, which is in violation of the opinion handed down by the International Court of Justice, and of South Africa's refusal so far to comply with the demands set out by the Security Council for, among other things, the holding of free elections. In view of the desire for peaceful development in the area, it is crucially important that the SWAPO liberation movement fully take part in the independence talks.

"... making use of all opportunities to work for an effective sanctions policy within the framework of the United Nations. Especially, the Ministers would welcome a decision by the Security Council on a compulsory arms embargo against South Africa."

The necessary criteria for a decision on mandatory sanctions are at hand. Therefore, the question now confronting the members of the Council is the following: could sanctions support the effort to reach a peaceful solution of the Namibian problem?

24. Although South Africa's reaction has been far from encouraging, the Swedish Government supports efforts from all sides to create momentum towards a negotiated solution of the question of Namibia. We listened attentively to the statement by the President of SWAPO, Sam Nujoma, in the Security Council on 28 September [1956th meeting]. In his important and constructive declaration Mr. Nujoma stated the basic conditions under which SWAPO would be prepared to negotiate the future of Namibia. SWAPO is prepared to talk directly with South Africa regarding the modalities of transferring power to the people of Namibia. Any talks between South Africa and SWAPO must be held under the auspices of the United Nations. As a precondition for talks, SWAPO demands the release of all Namibian political prisoners, and also demands a commitment by South Africa to withdraw its armed forces from Namibia. In the view of the Swedish Government those demands are reasonable and they must obviously be considered important elements in the search for a negotiated solution.

25. South Africa has recently made some concessions as a result of efforts by third parties. The South African Government does not, however, appear to be prepared to give up its resistance to talking directly with SWAPO, a necessary element in any process towards a solution.

26. The people of Namibia has long patiently awaited a change of mood in Pretoria, but so far in vain. Against the background of the diplomatic efforts to achieve a solution through peaceful means, the Council members must now, before any vote is taken, very carefully consider the best way to proceed. For its part, the Swedish delegation considers that the history of southern Africa and the attitude so far adopted by the South African Government are strong arguments in favour of a policy of strong diplomatic

and political pressure. So far, a lenient attitude towards the *apartheid* régime has not resulted in any significant progress.

27. Support from all members of the Council for mandatory sanctions against South Africa would amply demonstrate the isolation of the Pretoria Government and assist in pressing South Africa towards making the concessions which would be necessary to get proper negotiations under way. All States Members claim to be observing a voluntary arms embargo, and it is therefore difficult to see how anyone could be negatively affected by transforming that embargo into a mandatory arms embargo. On the other hand, an embargo would represent a considerable political and diplomatic setback for South Africa and would contribute towards pressing it to enter into meaningful negotiations.

28. The Swedish Government therefore appeals to all members of the Council to support the draft resolution [S/12211] before us. A decision to do so would represent an important element in support of efforts to find a negotiated solution leading to our common goal: a free, independent and unitary State of Namibia.

29. Mr. ABE (Japan): Sir, I should like first of all to congratulate you on your assumption of the high office of President of the Council for the month of October. Being assured of the great competence, diplomatic skill and wide experience for which you are so well known among us, my delegation believes that the Council, under your presidency, can achieve meaningful results in regard to the problems of which it is seized this month.

30. It is also my pleasant duty to express the thanks of my delegation to the President of the Council for the month of September, Ambassador Kikhia of Libya, for what he accomplished so brilliantly during that month.

31. Since the Council unanimously adopted resolution 385 (1976) in January this year, it has watched with vigilance and anxiety to see how the South African Government would respond to that resolution. By 31 August last, which was the deadline for compliance with the resolution, we had seen no development that would indicate what one might call the result of serious consideration by that Government. We reiterate our deep disappointment and regret.

32. According to press reports, however, it seems that the Government of the United States, taking an initiative, and certain African countries, responding to that American initiative, have been in negotiation with the Government of South Africa with a view to working out a solution along the lines of resolution 385 (1976). We are not very well informed about the negotiations but, again according to press reports, it seems that negotiations are still under way in spite of many difficulties. My delegation feels it is regrettable that the Council, which is seized of this matter, is not

sufficiently provided with information on the ongoing negotiations, while some of its members are themselves directly involved in the negotiations. But we understand that this is because of the consideration that the negotiations are at too delicate a stage for it to be disclosed how they stand. In any event, if the negotiations have not failed and if there is still room for their continuation, I believe that the Council should refrain from taking drastic measures at this stage.

33. It is true that South Africa has continued its illegal occupation of Namibia and persistently defied the responsibility of the United Nations for the Territory for many years. I share the frustration and irritation which African countries may most justifiably feel over the failure to produce meaningful results on the Namibian problem all these years, but I still appeal to our African friends for further patience and moderation, as I believe that our purpose is to solve the problem in a peaceful manner, and not with bloodshed.

34. My delegation appeals to the Government of South Africa to appreciate that our patience and moderation are barely maintained by hope for the success of these negotiations. We also appeal to it to give serious thought to the possibility that the present negotiations may prove to be the last chance for a peaceful solution and to achieve a negotiated settlement at the earliest possible date for the benefit of all the people concerned—namely, the people of Namibia, the people of South Africa and the peoples of Africa at large.

35. My delegation is afraid that since the negotiations are still under way so drastic a decision as that foreseen in the proposed draft resolution [S/12211] might adversely affect the delicate process of the negotiations. My delegation considers that the currently proposed step would not be instrumental in an effective solution of the problem. Therefore, my delegation will have to abstain if the draft resolution is put to the vote.

36. In this connexion, however, I should like to make it clear that the Government of Japan has for years effectively enforced, and will continue to enforce, an arms embargo against South Africa.

37. I should like to take this opportunity to deal with certain points raised by the representative of Mauritius at the 1956th meeting of the Council. He stated that the Organization of African Unity had called upon several countries, including Japan, to terminate all nuclear collaboration with South Africa, and also that certain countries, including my own, were deeply involved in promoting the exploitation of the Rossing uranium mine.

38. First, with regard to the so-called nuclear collaboration with South Africa, I can assure the representative of Mauritius that Japan has never been

engaged or involved in any nuclear collaboration with that country. My delegation has made this clear on various occasions, including the session of the General Assembly last year. Secondly, with regard to the Rossing uranium mine, I should like to state that my Government has prohibited investment by Japanese nationals or corporate bodies in any field in Namibia. As a result, there is no Japanese national taking part in the management of the Rossing uranium mine; there is no Japanese national or firm which has a mining concession in the Rossing uranium mine. While Japanese industries purchase uranium entirely from abroad, the Japanese authorities have been taking measures so that the industries should make maximum efforts to diversify further the sources of uranium supply and pay regard to the proclamation by the United Nations Council for Namibia.<sup>6</sup>

39. Mr. VINCI (Italy): Mr. President, since this is the first time I am speaking after a long silence, let me first of all congratulate you most warmly on behalf of my delegation also, on your assumption of the presidency of the Council for this month. We feel confident that under your experienced guidance the Council will continue its work both constructively and effectively. Allow me also to express my personal pleasure at seeing our meetings presided over today by the representative of Pakistan, a country with which Italy enjoys most cordial and fruitful relations.

40. I wish to take this opportunity to voice my delegation's appreciation, as well as my own, to Ambassador Kikhia, who led the work of the Council during the month of September with competence and skill. I also wish to extend my personal gratitude and that of my delegation to Ambassador Abe for the wise leadership he provided and the expeditious manner in which he carried out our business during his presidency in August. I should like also to convey my sincere thanks to him and to all my other colleagues who have been so generous in their references to my term of office as President.

41. We have heard the very interesting and revealing statements delivered in this chamber by many Foreign Ministers of African countries, by the leader of SWAPO and by several delegations. From the way this debate has been developing and from recent events in southern Africa, my delegation is indeed convinced that the Council took the right decision last January when, in a heartening show of solidarity, it adopted resolution 385 (1976). We were—all the members of the Council—unanimously moved by the same feeling that we were undertaking a timely and well-inspired action. May I be allowed to recall that that resolution came about as the reflection of the bitterness, the disappointment, and the determination for action which all 15 members of the Council felt when considering the policy of the Government of South Africa towards Namibia.

42. When we adopted this text, I believe that we all shared the distinct feeling which I then felt myself,

that is to say, the feeling that the Council effectively exercised its rights and duties in presenting the Government of Pretoria with an ultimate time-limit for the fulfilment of its obligations. What I mean is that last January we all felt that the pace was indeed set, that patience and acceptance of the wrongdoing was definitely over. To sum up, independence for Namibia was definitely decided upon and, failing complete adherence, Pretoria would have to be confronted with an adequate response. A time-limit had indeed been set, and in accordance with the decision then taken we have been meeting since 31 August in order to consider what next to do after that date. And here I share to a certain extent the views expressed by Ambassador Rydbeck just a few minutes ago.

43. Although what has occurred since January is far from meeting our expectations and although the South African Government has not ceased its obstructive manoeuvres, it is only fair to acknowledge that some changes have taken place. I refer to changes in the area close to the international Territory, changes in the Territory itself and changes, however slim, in Pretoria which at least indicate that the ruling circles in South Africa are beginning to have some second thoughts.

44. In our view, what is really at stake is something broader than the issue of Namibia itself. Besides the international Territory, another land is involved; the whole area is involved in a struggle against time and against history because of some white minority régimes which are trying to perpetuate their racial supremacy, resorting to all sorts of repressive measures, including the use of force. We speak not in anger but in sadness, stated Ambassador Kanakarathne at our 1960th meeting. We could not agree more with our colleague from Sri Lanka. In fact, only someone out of this world could not be aware of two simple truths: any fight against the right of self-determination is hopeless; in the long run, the repression of freedom, national or individual, is bound to fail. Actually, the more recent trends in southern Africa itself are the best evidence of how fast history runs. Let us just recall the liberation of the Portuguese colonies, the consolidation of the freedom-fighters and the growing resistance in areas still under the old racist rulers.

45. I should like to stress that in our opinion the problem of Namibia should be viewed in the context of a geographical area currently subject to a serious reassessment of the many forces at play, subject to their substantial readjustment to the realities of our own times. At the centre of these two processes of reassessment and readjustment is the contest between racial supremacy and majority rule, between racial predominance on the one side and self-determination, freedom, equality and democracy on the other. Given such a set-up, what we should really investigate at this stage in the Council is whether or not there has been since last January a departure by South Africa from its well-known and outdated positions, a

departure from traditional policies of prevarication as regards the populations mainly concerned. In short, there should be such a substantial modification as to allow us to believe in the quick change which would foreshadow the prompt accession to independence of the Territories in question. We believe that, should we be able to spot a change in political philosophy, this would apply to both Rhodesia and Namibia, where the racial and political set-up is basically the same.

46. For this purpose the Italian delegation has most carefully considered the very recent events in southern Africa. In particular, we believe that the acceptance by Mr. Ian Smith of majority rule in Rhodesia is an event of paramount importance. We feel, at the same time, that the instrumental role played by Prime Minister Vorster to this effect should not be underestimated. Whether big or small, it is in turn indicative of a change, if not of heart certainly of policy.

47. I should like to elaborate a little more on this topic. In our view the acceptance of majority rule in Rhodesia by the white leaders, under the concurrent pressure of many countries, including my own and, more recently and more spectacularly, the United States, the United Kingdom, the five front-line States and South Africa, marks a turning point in the future of the whole area. We believe that its impact extends far beyond local boundaries and in fact has far-reaching consequences with regard to Namibia also.

48. The messages exchanged between the Secretary of State of the United States and the Presidents of the front-line States and the meetings with the leadership of SWAPO are all common knowledge in their general outlines, if not in detail. We do not fail to note some promising, even if so far uncertain, moves within Namibia itself.

49. Given the situation as described, we ask ourselves seriously whether at this stage it is politically wise to take a decision, however well founded in principle, such as the one suggested by the seven sponsors of the draft resolution submitted yesterday to the Council [S/12211]. Ambassador Jackson of Guyana, in introducing the text, very clearly and correctly summarized the main chapters of a long and sad history of the attempts and failures of the United Nations in dealing with the question of Namibia. But are we to conclude out of despair that since previous attempts have failed a new attempt would have no better chance? This is my first question. My second question, which is connected with the first one, is whether we should not suspend our judgement until we know a little better what has been going on behind the scenes and how far and how consistent is South Africa's apparent move in the direction that we all advocate and favour.

50. I have no hesitation in acknowledging that the Council would have had no other choice than to adopt measures under Chapter VII of the Charter had the

situation in southern Africa been the same as it was last January. At this stage, however, we feel doubts about the timing and the appropriateness of the proposed measures. In our opinion they could produce effects contrary to those we have in mind: on the one hand, they might introduce a disturbing factor in a complex and intricate process of negotiation covering the whole region; on the other hand, they might strengthen the hard-liners and encourage them to break their silence, raise their voices and work again in favour of a collision course rather than of talks in Rhodesia, Namibia and South Africa. That is why, in full fairness, we are not in a position to support at this stage the draft resolution, not because of its contents, which raise no problems for my country, but, I repeat, because of the timing.

51. I need hardly, in fact, reiterate here the position of my country in regard to Namibia. For that purpose, I would simply refer to the 1884th meeting of the Council, at which I spoke at length on the subject. So far as the provision on the arms embargo against South Africa is concerned, I can assure the Council of the fullest compliance of Italy with the provisions of resolution 311 (1972). My Government—and I emphasize this point—long ago took such a decision of its own free will, and I had the privilege of voting in favour of that resolution in 1972.

52. Before concluding, I should like briefly to cite another personal recollection. It goes as far back as 1967, when the meetings of the *Ad Hoc* Committee for South West Africa were held. I had something to do with the setting up of the Committee. Italy was a member of that body and at one point in the deliberations my delegation took a stand that had something in common with and something different from that of the majority. I personally submitted a plan containing a proposal that went beyond the one that eventually led to the establishment of the United Nations Council for Namibia. I did this on 15 March 1967, on behalf of my own delegation and the delegations of Canada and of the United States, which was represented on the *Ad Hoc* Committee by William Rogers, who shortly afterwards became Secretary of State.

53. The document we submitted<sup>7</sup> contained the following main proposals, consistent, in our view, with resolutions 1514 (XV) and 2145 (XXI) of the General Assembly: a United Nations Council for South West Africa would be established and a Special Representative of the Secretary-General would be appointed; the Special Representative would be entrusted, *inter alia*, with setting up, in close co-operation with the Council, an interim governing body assembling all sections of the local population, thus enabling the people themselves to administer the Territory in accordance with their own expressed wishes.

54. This last idea has apparently been resumed now, nearly 10 years later, by the South African authorities

in a form which is still unclear, at least to me. Anyhow it shows that ideas, even if they take a very long time—too long—and go in retrograde circles, finally get across.

55. This leads to my last question and the conclusion of my statement: have we used our imagination to the utmost? I personally feel that we have not. The reason for this, as I see it at the end of this debate, is that there is an increasing reluctance to leave the old paths and try a new one. I personally believe we should fight against such a trend, which reflects a sort of bureaucratic way of thinking and acting. At the same time, we should not be afraid to consider new ideas and work on them if they can provide short-cut solutions. We can still try. All we need is confidence in the United Nations and in our own convictions.

56. Mr. ILLUECA (Panama) (*interpretation from Spanish*): Yesterday we had the opportunity of hearing a statement of great depth made by Mr. Jackson of Guyana [1962nd meeting] as spokesman for the delegations of Benin, Guyana, the Libyan Arab Republic, Pakistan, Panama, Romania and the United Republic of Tanzania, which jointly sponsored the draft resolution contained in document S/12211. In essence, his dramatic presentation referred to the crisis existing today in southern Africa. As Mr. Jackson said, it is a crisis affecting human dignity. It is not only a crisis that concerns all the States that have pledged themselves to abide by the standards of the United Nations Charter but is also one which is a physical threat to international peace and security in the area. In our opinion, it is a matter of urgency that the Council should perform its functions and take immediate and effective action to put an end to this situation, which is as reprehensible as it is intolerable from every point of view.

57. Within the United Nations system the people of Namibia have the right to independence and to the exercise of their right of self-determination politically and economically. The statements made yesterday in Pretoria by the Prime Minister of South Africa, Mr. Vorster, reported in today's issue of *The New York Times*, show, for the benefit of international public opinion, that South Africa continues to be an obstacle to the liberation and genuine national independence of Namibia, and that the spokesmen of SWAPO were right when they asserted that no real progress had been made on the question of Namibia. Those statements also show that at this stage there is no consensus among the three main parties to the conflict, that is, the United Nations, SWAPO and South Africa.

58. In Mr. Vorster's statements there may be found the most shocking contradictions. He says, for example, that South West Africa—that is, Namibia—“does not belong to South Africa and that the Government of South Africa does not claim that Territory as

its own." However, the Government of South Africa does not withdraw its illegal administration from Namibia. In the same statement, Mr. Vorster says that Namibia, which he calls South West Africa, belongs to the "various peoples of South West Africa", and he adds: "Our attitude all along has been that it is for those peoples whose land it is to decide their own future". That is nothing more nor less than a flouting of the United Nations and an insult to one's intelligence, for the Pretoria régime has in fact repeatedly side-stepped the demand of the United Nations that free elections be held in Namibia under the supervision and control of the United Nations.

59. Mr. Vorster goes on to say: "The peoples"—for him they are not one but several peoples, in Namibia—"are now gathered in a conference, mostly through elected and properly elected leaders"—he says they are properly elected under a state of siege and a savage colonial war—"and, in a few cases—the minority—by their natural leaders". One wonders what, in Mr. Vorster's mind, "natural leaders" may be. Those leaders, anyway, as Mr. Vorster goes on to say, "will decide on their own procedures and their own venue, without any interference on the part of the South African Government".

60. Can there be democratically elected leaders under a racist régime which openly defies United Nations resolutions, where the people have suffered the devastation of a savage colonial war waged against them by South Africa, where the Namibian people are virtually in a state of siege, and the electorate there is subject to action by military forces against the civilian population and also to the use of torture and intimidation by the military forces of the *apartheid* régime against the people of Namibia? I repeat, can there be, in these circumstances, democratically elected representatives?

61. I think it can safely be said that Mr. Vorster's position is very clear and very cynical. That statement is an indication of what, in his own political dictionary, the term "elections" means.

62. Mr. Vorster's defiance of the United Nations was made manifest once again when he said—and again I quote directly from his statement—"I have nothing to talk to SWAPO [about] at all. Nujoma is neither a natural nor an elected leader of any of the peoples of South West Africa." Persisting in his attitude of open defiance, he continued: "I don't recognize his rights [Nujoma's rights] or the right of his organization [SWAPO] to be the only representative of South West Africa, as has been decided by various world bodies." That means that Vorster realizes that the Council and the General Assembly recognize SWAPO—and therefore Nujoma—as the authentic representative and legitimate spokesman of the people of Namibia, but he says that Nujoma is neither a natural nor an elected leader and so he has nothing to say to him or to SWAPO. And yet there are people here who continue

to be optimistic—and how I envy them!—despite Mr. Vorster's arrogant, absurd, arbitrary and defiant attitude, an attitude which gives no hope or sign of reaching an eventual understanding.

63. Not only does Vorster refuse to recognize Sam Nujoma, the President of SWAPO, as the true spokesman of the Namibian people—as the Council has done officially—he persists in making all sorts of totally unfounded claims which have no connexion whatever with reality, such as this statement, which he made yesterday in Pretoria:

"South Africa is not, as has often been stated, the colonial Power *vis-à-vis* South West Africa. We are also not an occupation Power. We are an administrative Power, and our powers of administration were conferred upon us by the League of Nations."

That is already part of the political history of our era, and it gives us some indication of the mentality of the leader of the Pretoria régime. Obviously, he is not on the same wave-length as the Council, and so there can be no agreement, no communication between us.

64. Do Mr. Vorster's words have more weight or more force, than the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 21 June 1971?<sup>4</sup> That advisory opinion not only said the exact opposite of what Mr. Vorster says but led to the conclusion in that South Africa was under the obligation to withdraw its administration from the Territory of Namibia, which it was occupying illegally owing to the reprehensible action of the South African Government.

65. Under Article 25 of the Charter, when South Africa became a Member of the United Nations it agreed to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council. Now that the Council has adopted resolutions 264 (1969), 269 (1969), 366 (1974) and 385 (1976) demanding the withdrawal of the illegal administration that South Africa maintains in Namibia, how is it possible for Vorster to say the following: "We will end that administrative task if and when requested to do so by the peoples of South West Africa through their rightful representatives." And he adds: "All over the world it is recognized that the peoples have the right to decide their own future". Then he goes on to say, with a cynicism which is unprecedented in the history of mankind and which I doubt can be matched by future generations: "I fail to understand why this same right—the right to decide their own future, the right of self-determination—cannot be granted to the peoples of South West Africa". We are really in another world here.

66. The efforts made by South Africa to destroy the national unity and territorial integrity of Namibia by means of its bantustan and so-called homelands policy and by the supposed constitutional conference of Turnhalle are abominable and perfectly obvious. That

is why all that Vorster's statements have done is to make clear to the Council and to world public opinion that the régime in Pretoria wants to place itself above the authority of the Council, above the authority of the General Assembly, above the authority of the International Court of Justice and, indeed, above world public opinion, and to maintain its colonial domination over Namibia and its harmful influence in southern Africa.

67. With those profound convictions, Vorster was moved to say the following—and I think this is an insult to the Council—which is published in today's *New York Times*. Asked whether he thought the United Nations might impose sanctions on South Africa since a group of third world countries is calling for measures to force it to abandon *apartheid*, Mr. Vorster said "I don't see that as a possibility at all." In other words, he is not at all afraid of any thing the Council may do, and that is for reasons of his own, reasons that I would hardly venture to try to analyse here—because they are too insulting to the intelligence of the members of the Council. Furthermore, he got hogged down in contradictions which are too absurd to be offensive to anyone, however insulting they may appear when they are read.

68. It is therefore understandable that Prime Minister Vorster should have said that South Africa was not prepared to participate in an international conference to deal constitutionally with the independence of Namibia to be held at a neutral location under the auspices of the United Nations. But in response to a question from a newspaperman, he said that, if South Africa was invited as an observer, he would give serious consideration to that possibility. But if he accepted, that would be tantamount to inviting an accused man to witness the autopsy of his victim without having to answer questions or to assume any responsibility, confident that among his judges he would find allies to ensure his acquittal.

69. Prime Minister Vorster said the following about what he called Mr. Kissinger's peace efforts, according to the report in today's issue of *The New York Times*: "His peace efforts... were motivated by a common desire to halt the spread of Soviet influence in the area." And he added:

"Part of the world domination aspect is the Soviet's aim to dominate southern Africa. If the world ignores this, they will do so at their own risk. Not only will a bastion of the West be lost"—if Vorster and his men represent Western culture, I hardly wish to belong to "Western culture"—"but the sea route round the Cape and through the Indian Ocean will be at the mercy of the Soviets."

70. It is obvious that what Mr. Vorster wants to do by making statements of this kind is to divert world attention from the colonial problem of Namibia and to find political allies elsewhere in the world by reviving

the cold war and conflicting ideologies. His methods are familiar. He is trying to fish in troubled waters and delude the unwary. However, the problem of decolonization in Africa, as in Latin America and elsewhere, does not brook any delay for the exercise of the right of self-determination can never be subordinated to conflicting ideologies, whether real or imaginary. Much less can decolonization and self-determination be subordinated to unilateral claims by any Power wishing to control the great shipping routes of the world. That belongs to the past. Mr. Vorster, in his absurd outbursts, now wishes to involve the Western Powers and set them against certain other Powers in order to satisfy his desire to control the shipping route round the Cape and through the Indian Ocean. For this purpose, he is trying to stir up hostility against the Asian and non-aligned countries which wish, as was stated at the Fifth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries in Colombo a few weeks ago, the Indian Ocean to be a zone of peace free from Great Power rivalry. In the political declaration of the Conference the right is asserted of ships of all nations:

"... to free and unimpeded use of the Indian Ocean by their vessels in conformity with international law as long as such vessels pose no military or strategic threat to the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the littoral and hinterland States."<sup>8</sup>

71. That system, which doubtless will apply to all international shipping routes and waterways, is valid for the Cape route as for the Suez Canal, the Panama Canal, the Kiel Canal, the Bosphorus, the Dardanelles or any other maritime transport route. There is nothing new about that. At the Potsdam Conference, the President of the United States, Mr. Harry S. Truman, suggested that to safeguard future peace and world security international waterways should be open to free and unrestricted use by all the nations of the world.

72. We repeat, the right of self-determination and the process of decolonization cannot be stopped in Africa or anywhere else in the world because of the desires of a colonial Power to control the territories of other peoples or nations on the pretext of national security, which has no place in this discussion and which has no relation in our world of nuclear, interspatial and other technology. Claims with respect to the Cape route and access to the Indian Ocean cannot be used as an excuse to oppose the liberation of Namibia, and the same applies to using that excuse with respect to the Panama Canal as a pretext for not ending the colonial enclave under the jurisdiction of a foreign Power on the sovereign territory of Panama.

73. History is on the side of decolonization. The Suez Canal has been under the sovereign control of Egypt, with the support of the major Powers, since 1956, and the Canal Zone in Panama should as soon as possible be under the full sovereignty and jurisdiction of the State of Panama.

74. Mr. Vorster, in his absurd efforts to assert what cannot be upheld, tries to play the role of the advocate of an ideological war for his own interests. From time to time we hear about ideological aggression and the need to protect oneself against that type of attack, the results of which do seem to hurt not the body but the minds of people. Can there be ideological aggression on the part of those who advocate respect for the principle of equal rights, on the part of those who advocate the exercise of the right of self-determination as a means of promoting among nations those very friendly relations which serve to create a climate favourable to universal peace? On the contrary, we believe that there can be genuine international co-operation, as the Charter states, unless we promote development and respect for self-determination, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all, without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion.

75. Those who advocate those ideals, the ideals set out in the Charter, are not committing ideological aggression. Those who advocate the defence of transitory political interests are accomplices in acts of colonial exploitation and usurp the riches and the natural wealth of other countries. As a matter of fact, they are committing ideological suicide, eroding their national image and undermining their ability to have a positive influence on world events.

76. The facts show that the Pretoria régime is not prepared to put an end to its colonial domination of Namibia. It is well known that the United Nations Council for Namibia has reported that South Africa has granted further mining concessions to a number of Western companies from the United States, Canada, France and the United Kingdom, and the same reports estimate that foreign investments in South Africa amount to \$10,000 million and represent primarily interests in the United States, the United Kingdom and West Germany. Furthermore, South Africa, according to reliable data, is continuing to try to attract further foreign investment to explore the resources of diamonds, copper, lead and uranium in the Territory of Namibia.

77. The General Assembly has proclaimed in resolution 1314 (XIII) that: "... the right of peoples and nations to self-determination... includes 'permanent sovereignty over their natural wealth and resources' ". The General Assembly has stated also that it believes that no people can be considered independent if its economic order is subjected to foreign domination.

78. It is the duty of the Security Council to support the inalienable right of the weak nations of the world over their resources and to protect that right from interference and usurpation by individuals, corporations or foreign States.

79. In summary, both as regards South Africa's violation of the rights of the people of Namibia to political and economic self-determination and as

regards the growing threat to international peace and security posed by South Africa's brazen attitude, the delegation of the Republic of Panama, with all due respect, insists that we adopt the draft resolution sponsored by Benin, Guyana, the Libyan Arab Republic, Pakistan, Panama, Romania and the United Republic of Tanzania, which recommends that the necessary measures be taken under Chapter VII of the Charter to put an end to the tragic suffering of the Namibian people and to restore peace and tranquillity in the area.

80. The PRESIDENT: There are no further speakers. If no other representative wishes to speak at this stage, I should like to make a statement in my capacity as the representative of PAKISTAN.

81. During the Council's consideration of this question in January this year, I made a statement on Pakistan's position [1883rd meeting] on the substance of the issue. I shall confine myself on this occasion to stating the views of my delegation on the developments which have taken place since the meetings in January.

82. Council resolution 385 (1976) in its principal demand called upon South Africa to withdraw from Namibia and to transfer power to the people of the Territory with the assistance of the United Nations. The Council has been meeting now to consider whether South Africa has complied with those demands and, if not, what appropriate measures it might take under the Charter to bring about such compliance.

83. It is suggested that the so-called constitutional talks which are taking place at Windhoek on the initiative of South Africa somehow constitute a step towards compliance with the Council resolution. In support of this contention, it is pointed out that the declaration of intent issued by the Constitutional Committee of the South West African Constitutional Conference [S/12180, annex] has in fact set a date—31 December 1978—for the independence of Namibia.

84. As regards the constitutional talks, the position of my delegation is that they have no legal validity in view of the Council's own unanimously adopted resolutions. Why otherwise should the Council have declared it to be imperative that the people of Namibia be enabled freely to determine its own future in elections held for the whole of Namibia and that those elections be held under the supervision and control of the United Nations?

85. Furthermore, in order to put matters in perspective, to evaluate the real significance of the Windhoek talks and of South Africa's policies, we are entitled to ask a series of specific questions about the situation in the Territory. Has South Africa lifted the racially discriminatory and repressive laws and practices applied to the Territory? Have political prisoners and

those detained under so-called internal security laws been released? Has South Africa facilitated the return of Namibians in exile?

86. The situation prevailing in the Territory was succinctly described by the leader of SWAPO in his address to the Security Council on 28 September [1956th meeting]. Mr. Nujoma gave the Council a graphic account of South Africa's continuing repression of the indigenous people of Namibia, of its stepped-up military presence and activity, of the proclamation of martial law in northern Namibia, of the uprooting of whole communities from their homes and their transfer to concentration camps, and of the use of Namibia as a springboard for attacks against the neighbouring States of Angola and Zambia. In short, far from taking measures to withdraw from Namibia, South Africa has tightened its grip on that Territory and turned it into a virtual police State.

87. The Council has on this occasion heard the views of no less than 40 countries, many of them having been represented here by their Ministers for Foreign Affairs. This attests to the importance the whole world attaches to the question of Namibia and the crucial stage which it has now reached. Nor can the Council overlook the significance of the fact that the representatives of so many countries, coming from all parts of the globe, have been unanimous in their analysis of the situation and in their expectations regarding action by the Council.

88. Since the passage of Council resolution 385 (1976) at the beginning of this year, the question of Namibia has been debated in many international conferences which have without exception expressed their full support for the people of Namibia in its struggle for independence and territorial integrity. During the seventh Islamic Foreign Ministers' Conference, held in May this year in Istanbul, the Islamic countries adopted a decision, which my country had the honour to propose, reiterating their commitment to the struggle against racism in South Africa, Namibia and Zimbabwe. The Conference called upon all member States and the international community to implement fully the United Nations resolutions on the elimination of racial discrimination and to decide to expand and intensify support for those peoples and recommend application of sanctions under Chapter VII of the Charter in order to secure implementation of the resolutions on this subject. The Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held in Colombo in August this year, similarly declared its unreserved support for the cause of the Namibian people in its just struggle for freedom and independence and called for similar action.

89. Pakistan's position on this issue is unequivocal and has been consistent from the very beginning. In his message on the occasion of Namibia Day this year the Prime Minister of Pakistan, Mr. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, observed, *inter alia*, that

"Counsels for patience no longer carry conviction with the Namibian people. A régime which has so clearly manifested its cruel features in the massacres of Sharpeville and Soweto and in wanton aggression against its neighbours can hardly be expected to bring justice to the people of Namibia. Their freedom will have to be achieved through militant struggle and further sacrifice.

"Political manoeuvres cannot succeed in subverting this struggle. The so-called constitutional arrangements promoted by the Pretoria régime are neither legal nor acceptable to the people of Namibia. South Africa's obligation is to withdraw forthwith from the Territory. It is only under the auspices of the United Nations that the people of Namibia will be able to institute a free and representative Government."

90. This morning's press contains a restatement by Mr. Vorster of South Africa's policy towards Namibia. Mr. Vorster concedes that South West Africa does not belong to South Africa and that the future of the Territory must be decided by its people. He disclaims the idea that South Africa is a colonial Power or, indeed, that it is occupying Namibia. The powers of administration which Mr. Vorster considers his country still continues to enjoy—despite the categorical opinion to the contrary given by the International Court of Justice more than five years ago<sup>4</sup>—will be laid down, Mr. Vorster tells us, only when and if a request to that effect is made by the people of South West Africa through their rightful representatives. However, these rightful representatives are apparently not to be elected in a free election, but selected under the aegis of South Africa itself.

91. South Africa refuses to recognize that SWAPO is an organization representing the people of Namibia. Mr. Vorster says he has nothing to discuss with SWAPO. Instead, South Africa continues to keep SWAPO leaders in gaol or exile.

92. Mr. Vorster's views could be considered ingenuous if they did not so grotesquely distort the truth. The most charitable description of Mr. Vorster's utterances is that they are an exercise in self-delusion. At any rate, they dash the expectations which were aroused by the recent effort to bring about a peaceful settlement in Namibia, negotiated between its illegal occupants and Namibia's rightful representatives.

93. To ask the people of Namibia to exercise further patience, to ask the Council to hold its hand, amounts in the circumstances to a plea to allow South Africa to set the pace and direction of events.

94. The draft resolution before the Council [S/12211] speaks for itself. In the circumstances prevailing in Namibia today it can be described as limited in its aim and the least that the Council can do at this stage. My delegation hopes that the draft resolution will be

adopted. We consider that those who have uttered warnings about the danger of a prolonged guerrilla war in the Territory will nevertheless stand in the way of a decision to prevent the means of war from reaching the party which, by its defiance of international law and the will of the international community, bears the responsibility for the violence which prevails and the conflict which looms. Failure by the Council to act will affect its own authority and prestige; it cannot prevent the ineluctable course of history.

95. Speaking as PRESIDENT, I take it that the Council is ready to proceed to a vote on the draft resolution in document S/12211.

96. I shall now call on those representatives who wish to speak in explanation of their vote before the voting.

97. Mr. SCRANTON (United States of America): We rejoice, Sir, in your presidency, with its marked evidence of sterling leadership. We are grateful, also, to Ambassador Kikhia for his presidential guidance of the Council during the month of September.

98. The United States' concern with the Namibian problem has been demonstrated dramatically by the continuing efforts of Secretary of State Kissinger to assist the parties involved in finding a peaceful solution to the problem. As the Council knows, Mr. Kissinger outlined the United States position on the Namibian and the Rhodesian negotiations in a speech two weeks ago to the General Assembly. On the question of Namibia he said:

"In recent months, the United States has vigorously sought to help the parties concerned speed up the process towards Namibian independence. The United States favours the following elements: the independence of Namibia within a fixed, short time-limit; the calling of a constitutional conference at a neutral location under aegis of the United Nations; and the participation in that conference of all authentic national forces, including specifically SWAPO. Progress has been made in achieving all those goals. We will exert our efforts to remove the remaining obstacles and bring into being a conference which can then fashion, with goodwill and wisdom, a design for the new State of Namibia and its relationship with its neighbours. We pledge our continued solicitude for the independence of Namibia so that it may, in the end, be a proud achievement of this Organization and a symbol of international co-operation."

99. It is my firm belief that while the sensitive process of consultation is going on it does not serve a useful purpose for the Council to take new initiatives on the Namibian question. After many years of frustration in trying to bring Namibia to independence, we have now for the first time the prospect of results.

Substantial progress has been made toward reaching a peaceful settlement to the Namibian problem in consultation with South Africa and the interested African parties. We have in sight the possibility of independence for Namibia, which the Council has sought so persistently for so many years. We do not feel that the measures called for in the draft resolution before us will improve the chances to gain a free and independent Namibia. In fact, they could do just the opposite. It would be tragic if the delicate fabric of negotiations were to be torn asunder by any precipitate move at this time. For those reasons my delegation will vote against the draft resolution.

100. At this point I want to cover very briefly one element of the draft resolution. The United States has continued to enforce its own arms embargo against South Africa. We initiated this embargo in 1962, even before the Council called for a voluntary embargo the following year.

101. In closing, I want to emphasize, and emphasize strongly, to the Council that the United States has made clear to South Africa the urgent need for unqualified independence for Namibia. We are keeping the Secretary-General, Mr. Waldheim, informed of the progress of our negotiations and shall continue to do so, and we are in regular contact with the front-line Presidents. The United States, I pledge to the Council, will not flag in these efforts.

102. Mr. MURRAY (United Kingdom): Let me congratulate you, Sir, on your assumption of the presidency of the Council. You bring to the office wide experience of the chairmanship of international bodies and sensitive diplomatic skill. I should like also to associate myself with the tributes paid to Ambassador Kikhia for the competent and good-humoured way in which he presided over our deliberations last month.

103. I should like briefly now to explain the attitude of my delegation to the draft resolution before us.

104. My Government stands unequivocally for the achievement of independence by Namibia as a single State with its territory intact and within the shortest possible time. We have said so on many occasions, both publicly and in private to the South African Government and other interested parties. While we believe that the Windhoek Conference has served to demonstrate the need for rapid change both to the South African Government and to the white population of Namibia, we have said often that we do not regard the Conference as representative, nor can we agree that its decisions represent the full exercise by the people of Namibia of their right of self-determination. We have consistently urged that SWAPO should be brought into any discussions which may be held on an early transfer of power from South Africa to the elected representatives of the Namibian people. We therefore support any discussions between

South Africa, SWAPO and the other interested parties to that end.

105. We continue to support the important provisions of resolution 385 (1976), and in particular its call for free elections in the Territory under United Nations supervision and control. We also believe that free elections require the fulfilment of certain other measures, such as those specified in paragraph 11 of resolution 385 (1976), which are reproduced in operative paragraph 10 of the draft resolution before us. We call particularly upon South Africa to release all political prisoners at an early date, so that they can participate in the political life of Namibia and in any further negotiations or constitutional discussions that may take place.

106. There is no doubt that South Africa has disregarded the provisions of resolution 385 (1976). We deplore that because we believe that that resolution set out a series of steps for the achievement of independence which were and remain both just and realistic. South Africa must realize that Namibia is an international problem, whatever view one may take of the way in which South Africa's Mandate came to an end. It follows that some form of United Nations involvement in the steps leading to independence is indispensable if the world community is to be satisfied that the people of Namibia have freely exercised their right of self-determination.

107. At the same time, we should not ignore the fact that some progress has been made. Important discussions have been going on with a view to bringing together the parties most immediately concerned, and in particular SWAPO and the South African Government. We unreservedly support those efforts since we believe that the discussions envisaged may pave the way for the peaceful and democratic implementation of resolution 385 (1976). We believe that a great deal can still be achieved by quiet diplomacy.

108. It is for this reason above all that my delegation believes that the draft resolution before us is inappropriate both in timing and in substance. We recognize the feelings of impatience and frustration which prompted the presentation of the draft. The question of Namibia has been before the United Nations for some 30 years, and it is only in the last year or two that there have been any signs of progress towards the goal of independence. Now that progress is being made, however, and now that there is some hope of substantive discussions on a transfer of power, we believe that the Council should not be asked to vote for a determination that the situation in Namibia constitutes a threat to international peace and security under Chapter VII of the Charter. We made our position clear on this to all concerned at the outset of our deliberations here. It is well known that we do not supply arms to South Africa, and we have taken pains to ensure that our export licence system is effective. We are not prepared, however, to support a Chapter VII determination.

109. My delegation wanted a constructive resolution built upon the foundations laid in resolutions 366 (1974) and 385 (1976) which could have been adopted unanimously and which could have served to increase the pressures on the South African Government. For the reasons I have explained we cannot regard the present text as constructive in this respect, and my delegation will vote against it.

110. Mr. LECOMPT (France) (*interpretation from French*): It is with great regret that the French delegation will have to oppose the adoption of the draft resolution submitted for our consideration.

111. As is clear from the general statement I made at the beginning of this meeting, we are not opposed to the substance of the text, most of the provisions of which my delegation is prepared to accept. Nor are we opposed to the request for an embargo on weapons. The reason for our vote concerns the application of Chapter VII of the Charter, which we consider to be inappropriate. We would have preferred a text that could have been adopted unanimously.

112. My Government hopes there will be an early settlement of the Namibian question. It is ready to renew the pressures it has exerted upon the Government of South Africa on numerous occasions, and it is ready to make them more effective still. We merely consider that under the present circumstances, the conditions justifying the application of the measures provided for in Chapter VII of the Charter are not present. At present discussions are taking place the purpose and scope of which are important and perhaps decisive for the future of southern Africa. We should let them take their course and promote peaceful solutions when they are possible. That is one of the roles of the United Nations and of the Council.

113. France, I would again repeat, does not intend to protect South Africa. In condemning the policy of that country it expects, on the contrary, that as a result of the efforts and pressures now being exerted from various quarters the Government of Pretoria will cease to persist in its negative attitude and will soon show the necessary realism.

114. The PRESIDENT: I call on the representative of Panama on a point of order.

115. Mr. ILLUECA (Panama) (*interpretation from Spanish*): I have listened very carefully to the statements that have been made in explanation of vote, and I note that according to rule 32 of the provisional rules of procedure,

“Parts of a motion or of a draft resolution shall be voted on separately at the request of any representative, unless the original mover objects.”

I think that the preambular part of the draft should be voted on separately, and we should then vote on the operative part.

116. A number of representatives have expressed great concern at the situation. I think separate votes would make it very clear that the Council is concerned at the situation, and those who are not in favour of the measures could vote against them. But if we are in favour at least of the considerations contained in the preambular part, I think that that would constitute a clear message to world public opinion.

117. The PRESIDENT: I call on the representative of the United Republic of Tanzania, who wishes to speak on this point of order.

118. Mr. SALIM (United Republic of Tanzania): My delegation will have something to say concerning the statements of the United States, the United Kingdom and others in explanation of vote. But at this time I should like to address an appeal to my colleague of Panama—much as I understand the spirit in which he has made it—not to insist upon his proposal.

119. For very obvious reasons, the main thrust of the draft resolution before the Council—and, in fact, the purpose of the draft—is contained in its operative paragraphs. The many preambular paragraphs of the text have already been voted upon by the Council on a number of occasions in one form or another. In view of the importance we attach to the situation as a whole and the nature of the text itself, we would hope that the draft will be voted upon as a whole.

120. It is rather embarrassing for me to have to address this appeal to the representative of Panama because, first, Panama's commitment to the struggle of our brothers in Namibia is well known; secondly, my delegation is aware of Ambassador Illueca's own personal commitment and efforts which have led to the presentation of the draft; and, thirdly, Panama is one of the sponsors of the draft. For the reasons I have cited I am sure my friend, colleague and brother the representative of Panama will understand and appreciate my appeal to him and respond to it, so that we need not proceed to vote separately upon the parts of the draft.

121. The PRESIDENT: I gather that the representative of Panama, one of the sponsors of the draft, does not insist on his motion. Accordingly, I shall now put to the vote the draft resolution sponsored by Benin, Guyana, the Libyan Arab Republic, Pakistan, Panama, Romania and the United Republic of Tanzania contained in document S/12211.

*A vote was taken by show of hands.*

*In favour:* Benin, China, Guyana, Libyan Arab Republic, Pakistan, Panama, Romania, Sweden, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Republic of Tanzania.

*Against:* France, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America.

*Abstaining:* Italy, Japan.

*The result of the vote was 10 in favour, 3 against, and 2 abstentions. The draft resolution was not adopted, the negative votes being those of permanent members of the Council.*

122. The PRESIDENT: I shall now call on those members of the Security Council who wish to speak in explanation of vote.

123. Mr. BOYA (Benin) (*interpretation from French*): On 28 September, Comrade Michel Alladaye, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Co-operation of the People's Republic of Benin, speaking in the Council on the question of Namibia, stated *inter alia*:

“If the imperialist West sincerely wants peace to be restored to that part of the world, without further pointless bloodshed, we are certain that the peoples of southern Africa are ready to study with it the conditions for that restoration of peace. But, first and foremost, NATO [*North Atlantic Treaty Organization*] and the States members of that organization must stop supplying war material to the Fascist and racist Vorster régime; France must stop delivering nuclear reactors to South Africa; the United Kingdom must stop supplying military electronic material to the Fascist and racist Vorster régime.” [*1956th meeting, para. 46.*]

124. The result of the vote which has just been held is very clear: those who, by their veto, have just blocked the adoption of the draft resolution of which the People's Republic of Benin was a sponsor have indicated unambiguously their unshakable determination to support, economically and, above all, politically, Vorster's Fascist and racist régime. Those who, by their veto, have just prevented the adoption of this draft resolution have shown that their clamouring for a peaceful settlement and for an end to bloodshed in South Africa is nothing but pure hypocrisy.

125. However, the vote has also shown that the support for the struggle of the people of Namibia by the peoples of the world that cherish peace and justice is constantly increasing. How could it be otherwise, for the cause of the Namibian people is a just cause? Freedom fighters throughout the world, especially in southern Africa, will not be at all surprised by the result of the vote. Freedom fighters in southern Africa have come to understand that it is only by persisting in their armed struggle and by making enormous sacrifices that they will eliminate all the monsters and all evil influences. It is only by persisting in a long struggle that the people of Namibia will finally win their freedom and independence. The people of Namibia are well aware of the fact that theirs will be a long, hard struggle, but that victory is certain. Therefore the struggle will continue.

126. Mr. SALIM (United Republic of Tanzania): My delegation very much regrets the triple veto imposed today by the delegations of the United States, the United Kingdom and France. This is a sorrowful repetition of the 1975 performance. Perhaps the only new element to be noted is that this time some of those who have found it prudent to block the decision of the Council have come out with a new rationale to justify their veto. And yet, one would have thought that events in southern Africa, as well as the Council's own previous actions on this matter, would have dictated wiser counsels.

127. We have listened with the utmost interest and attention, as always, to the statements explaining the respective votes of the delegations which have once again abused—and I emphasize the word “abused”—their right of veto. I do not intend to dwell at length on any of the exposés that have been given here, but it is essential, if only for the purpose of the record and for the benefit of world public opinion, to put the situation in its proper perspective.

128. I must say, first and foremost, that I was amazed and astonished to hear in the Council a repetition of an argument which must amaze everyone who wishes to view the situation in southern Africa with the seriousness that it deserves. I refer to the argument that the situation in Namibia does not constitute a threat to international peace and security. Of course, there is nothing new in that assertion, but what is disturbing is that such an assertion could be made today after all that has happened in southern Africa.

129. The argument that the situation in Namibia does not constitute a threat to international peace and security was advanced in June 1975, when the representatives of three permanent members of the Council vetoed the then very reasonable draft resolution [S/11713] presented to the Council. But in the intervening period, both by the many statements made by responsible leaders of those very countries and by the evolution of events, one would have thought that that argument had been put to rest. I need hardly go over the grounds which have been so eloquently explained by my colleague, friend and brother, the representative of Guyana who introduced the draft resolution on our behalf [1962nd meeting]. But is it really seriously asserted that the situation in Namibia does not pose a threat to international peace and security? Do those who make this assertion seriously believe that to be the case? Let us examine very briefly what has happened since June last year. In fact, I do not see the need of going back as far as June of last year; let us just examine the situation since the beginning of this year.

130. The *apartheid* régime in South Africa, utilizing the international Territory of Namibia, mounted naked aggression against the People's Republic of Angola, a point which was also rightly stressed by the representative of Sweden when he explained his delegation's

vote [1906th meeting]. For the first time in the history of this Organization a Member State was specifically condemned as an aggressor. And as if that were not sufficient, the Council also specifically condemned South Africa's aggression against the Republic of Zambia. This was as recently as July this year.

131. And yet there is one common factor in both condemnations and in both situations, and that is that in the perpetration of the aggression the South African régime used the Territory of Namibia to mount such aggression. Yet we are told today by responsible spokesmen that the situation in Namibia does not constitute a threat to international peace and security.

132. I also need hardly repeat what is obvious, and that is that the South African Government has proceeded with an incredible military build-up in Namibia itself, thus not only continuing its role of repression against the people of Namibia but—of no less importance and concern particularly to us in Africa—posing a constant threat to the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of African States. Yet we are told that the situation does not pose a threat to international peace and security.

133. I should really like to be educated by those who have made such statements as to what in their judgement would constitute a threat to international peace and security. A full-scale, bloody racial war in the region? An all-out confrontation? Or is it, in their judgement, only when a situation threatens certain areas or certain States that it can be presumed that a situation threatens international peace and security?

134. Some have found it wise, in explaining and rationalizing their non-support of the draft resolution before this Council, to allude to press reports to the effect that the United States Government is taking some initiatives. I do not have to deal at length with this argument because those who read press reports should also find it convenient to read today's press reports.

135. The representative of Panama, with his characteristic wisdom and attention to the subject, has done the necessary homework and has briefed the Council on what the state of play is so far as the South African position is concerned. But a more important element is involved here. Even granted that a member of the Council or a Member of the United Nations is involved in some sort of an initiative, what has that to do with the Council's fulfilling its responsibilities? To my knowledge—and I must admit that my delegation was actively involved in the formulation of the draft resolution which was adopted in January of this year—there is nothing in resolution 385 (1976) which says that the Council will meet on or about 31 August to determine the appropriate measures to be taken, but will not do so in the event that one member decides to take some initiative. In fact, I find this logic particularly pathetic, especially when I remem-

ber that in the course of the discussion last January on the question of Namibia we were informed by none other than the representatives of the European Economic Community (EEC) that they, on their own, were also taking initiatives, that they had made an approach to South Africa, that they would continue to take some initiatives in respect of the necessity for South Africa to comply with the decisions of the Council. At that time, we were not informed that because of such initiatives the Council should not adopt any resolution or should not fulfil its responsibilities.

136. I am even more disturbed by the explanation given by the representative of the United States, who seemed to have rationalized his country's opposition to the draft resolution as being partly because of the continuing consultations that Secretary Kissinger and his Government are having with a number of front-line States. I am disturbed because, if consultations or contacts between a particular Government and other Governments are being used as a justification for inaction or for blocking action, then a time may come when people will be sceptical or over-cautious about indulging in any consultations.

137. At any rate, I submit to the Council that whatever consultations the United States may undertake with respect to Namibia, whatever consultations the EEC may undertake with respect to Namibia, whatever pressure they may put on the Government of South Africa, the fact remains that the Council has a clear responsibility to undertake and to fulfil, notwithstanding such consultations.

138. When the Council adopted resolution 385 (1976) it did so in the hope that more time would be given to the South Africans so that they might yet see the light. Some have talked in the Council of the need for moderation and patience. I do not know to whom this appeal for moderation and patience is addressed. All the members of the Council were members of the Council in January and they know what patience and moderation were demonstrated by—to begin with—the authentic representative of the people of Namibia, SWAPO, and the representatives of the Group of African States, as well as the African representatives in the Council, which in fact led to the resolution that was adopted in January. That type of moderation, that type of patience, was demonstrated as another sign of goodwill, particularly on the part of the African members of Council, to those who kept telling us that *there would be movement on South Africa* and that they would try to do their utmost to change the situation and to ensure that South Africa complied with the decisions of the United Nations. However, since that resolution was adopted more than eight months ago it is clear that the South Africans have remained as intransigent as ever, as recalcitrant as ever. Those who still entertain any doubts I would advise to read again *The New York Times* to see whether what Mr. Vorster has to say is not a clear demonstration

of the height of arrogance on the part of the rulers in Pretoria.

139. The fact remains that since the Council adopted that resolution the South Africans have continued to do everything they were doing before in Namibia and in fact to make things worse in that Territory. The Council has called upon South Africa to cease the repressive measures. Rather than ceasing those measures, the South Africans have intensified their repressive measures. The Council has called upon South Africa to stop the bantustanization of the Territory. The South African response has been to proceed with further bantustanization. The Council has called upon South Africa not to evade its clear call in respect of the holding of free elections under United Nations supervision and control. The South Africans have proceeded to the puffing up of their puppets in the Territory with a view to trying to give them a semblance of legitimacy. In short, none of the demands made by the Council have been complied with by the South African authorities. What is perhaps even worse is that the South African régime, with its usual characteristic contempt for the Organization, has not even bothered to reply to the Council or to state anything to the Council in respect of its demands.

140. This is the situation we are confronted with. Yet, instead of the Council's assuming its responsibilities, as it should, we have the spectacle of a repetition of the triple veto. What does the veto imply? I have said before, and I wish to stress again, that we do not make it a point to doubt the motivations and the sincerity of Governments. But there can be no doubt that this triple veto is yet another demonstration of their insensitivity to African aspirations. There can be no doubt, despite claims to the contrary, that the veto cannot but give comfort and support to the South African Government. There can also be no doubt that the veto cannot but serve to erode further the credibility of the United Nations. For it is quite clear, and in fact it is only logical, that the South Africans cannot be expected to take Council seriously, to take this Organization seriously, if every time we discuss a problem in relation to South Africa we end up with a formulation which threatens, warns, gives ultimatums collectively agreed upon; but when it comes to final action, that action is blocked by those who consider it prudent to block it.

141. There is one more aspect which particularly worries the Tanzanian delegation in respect of yet another demonstration of solidarity—unfortunately, for a wrong cause—by the United States, France and the United Kingdom. To veto a draft resolution on an arms embargo against South Africa at a time when the people in South Africa are subjected to the most inhuman brutalities, whether it be in Soweto or in other places, at a time when the South African aggression against African States has become more a rule than an exception, at a time when South Africa's defiance of United Nations decisions has become

legendary, is, I submit, to give tacit support to the South African authorities. In our opinion, to provide a situation in which South Africa can depend on the continued inflow of arms not only is contrary to the proclamations of moralities and principles expounded by those countries but, above all, does tremendous damage to their own reputation.

142. Where do we go from here? As my brother, the representative of Benin, rightly pointed out, we, the African members of the Council, have no illusion that it is the Council's decisions which will bring independence to Namibia. We have no doubt that, in the final analysis, it is up to the people of Namibia themselves to continue their struggle until final victory is won. However, the veto does a few things. It enhances the degree of frustration and indignation of the people of Namibia. It encourages and promotes cynicism on the part of those who would really wish to see a less violent solution to the problem of Namibia. It certainly provides additional ammunition to the South Africans in their war of aggression against the people of Namibia. Therefore those who have found it prudent once again to impose their veto would be well advised to consider the consequences of their action. They would be well advised to understand that, as a result of their action in thus preventing the Council taking meaningful action, they are preparing the ground for more bloodshed and more frustration in Namibia and, for that matter, in southern Africa.

143. I cannot conclude my statement without expressing our regret that the delegations of Japan and Italy saw fit once again to abstain in the vote on the draft resolution. Again, we do not doubt their sincerity, but we believe that their action too, in the present circumstances, can only be helpful to the illegal South African occupiers of Namibia.

144. Mr. KHARLAMOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*interpretation from Russian*): After the two previous statements by members of the Council, that by the representative of Benin and the clear, convincing statement by the representative of Tanzania, I have very little to say; but in this situation I must give the position of my delegation.

145. The delegation of the Soviet Union deeply regrets that the lengthy and comprehensive consideration of the question of Namibia did not lead to the only legitimate and positive result: a solution of that question in the interest of the people of Namibia. The Council's decision was blocked by those States which, in accordance with the Charter, bear, along with other States, the major responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security and for promoting the principles of equality and self-determination for all peoples.

146. Today, once again, we have witnessed a flagrant injustice done to the Namibian people as they struggle for their freedom and independence and an injustice

to the African and other States whose representatives have spoken in the Council in favour of the immediate granting of independence to the people of Namibia. The Ministers for Foreign Affairs and representatives of more than 30 countries have spoken out unconditionally in favour of the earliest possible implementation of the provisions that are clearly set forth in the seven-Power draft resolution submitted to the Council.

147. That draft resolution did not appear yesterday for the first time; it was submitted to all members of the Council some time ago. It would have been possible to introduce amendments to the draft resolution to enable us to adopt unanimously a new decision which would speed up Namibia's liberation from the racist colonial yoke of South Africa. Nevertheless, no one expressed a wish to add anything in order to achieve such a decision. We felt that the draft resolution was the minimum that the Council could adopt after such a lengthy discussion; it should have been adopted unanimously; in that way, the Council would have contributed to the solution of that problem which is so pressing not only for the peoples of Namibia and South Africa but for the whole of Africa.

148. What reasons did those who voted against and, those who, regrettably, abstained—as mentioned by the representative of Tanzania—put forward in explanation of their positions? They said that they would not want to interfere in the negotiations, that we should not endanger the tenuous contacts that had taken place. They claimed that some progress had been made in the situation in Namibia and that something positive was happening in Namibia. The representatives of Panama and Tanzania told us in detail what is taking place today in southern Africa, where the Namibian people have been oppressed worse than since the events of January. Not only has the position not become better, it has grown worse; not only has the ruthless exploitation of Namibia by transnational corporations, which are firmly established there, not stopped, it has been intensified; not only have the South African troops not been withdrawn, they have been so strongly reinforced that their numbers are a threat to the independent States of Southern African the whole African continent, which are rightly concerned for their own safety. I am convinced that if that draft resolution had been adopted today it would have been correctly understood not only here in the United Nations but also throughout the world.

149. We are surprised at the attitude of those delegations which have prevented the Council from taking a useful decision today. It cannot be regarded as anything but an attempt to sabotage the application of the principles of the Charter to Namibia, an attempt to perpetuate the illegal and shameful occupation of that African territory and to prevent the people of Namibia from achieving real freedom and independence.

150. The intentions behind high-sounding phrases in favour of freedom and independence for the Namibian people are becoming increasingly clear. Actions show that we are not speaking of the liberation of Namibia or of South Africa but of a strengthening of the existing colonial domination. Here is a map of Namibia. It shows convincingly what Vorster wishes to do: the same thing as Hitler wanted to do to the whole world—establish a state of slavery and nothing else.

151. The fact that we have not been able to adopt a resolution today shows that the Council has gone back on its earlier resolutions. Paying lip service to freedom and justice, some Western States are really plotting with the South African authorities against the African peoples in order to perpetuate the colonial domination of Namibia and to maintain in South Africa the racist yoke inherited from the past colonial empires. That, in fact, explains their refusal to support the draft resolution.

152. The course of events on the African continent and the discussion of the question of Namibia in the Council have shown that the African countries, more than ever before, have adopted constructive positions and shown flexibility. The draft that was submitted is, I repeat once again, the very minimum that could be proposed. Its sponsors had shown tolerance and wisdom, and they expected positive results from the Council. But even that minimum of very just demands was rejected.

153. This attitude is surprising but it is not a new departure. We saw what took place once before in the Council when there was a triple veto. We are convinced that such actions undermine the prestige of the Council and of the United Nations, not only here but also beyond the United Nations. An overwhelming majority of the Member States have recognized their responsibility for the fate of the people of Namibia, as the logical result of a Council decision. That is why all States that are sincerely interested in preserving peace on the African continent and in eliminating the remaining hotbeds of colonialism and racism must promote the adoption of effective measures against the régime of South Africa, which is illegally occupying Namibia. There can be no proposals based on expediency in this case.

154. The Soviet delegation for its part has set forth its position quite precisely and clearly. The delegation of the Soviet Union fully supports the just demands made here by the representatives of African and other countries and it feels that they represent the minimum that should be done to achieve the earliest possible solution to the problem.

155. The Soviet Union will continue, as it always has done, to support the just cause of the African peoples struggling for freedom and independence and it will not slacken its efforts to achieve a just solution

to the question of Namibia. Speaking on 7 October at a reception in the Kremlin in honour of the President of the People's Republic of Angola, the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Comrade Brezhnev, stated:

“We now hear voices which are demanding an end to colonial and racist domination in Southern Africa, voices which are ever louder and more insistent. This is dictated by the times in which we live.

“As regards southern Africa, our position is very clear: as we have stated on many occasions and as we state again, we have no special interests either in the south or in the north or in any other part of Africa. We are not seeking any advantages there for ourselves. We want recognition of the sacred right of every people to determine its fate, its right to determine its own development. That is an immutable principle from which our Party and the entire Soviet people have never swerved.

“We proceed on the premise that a free people must support freedom for other peoples and the struggle of real freedom fighters, and we are certain that if all the peoples of Africa and all oppressed peoples without exception achieve freedom and independence, peace and security on earth will thereby triumph.”

156. The delegation of the Soviet Union is deeply convinced that no attempts to interfere in the efforts of the Council to solve the problem of Namibia will impede the struggle of the people of Namibia for full freedom and independence. We are convinced that the just cause of the Namibian people will triumph.

157. The PRESIDENT: I shall now call on the President of the United Nations Council for Namibia.

158. Mr. KAMANA (President of the United Nations Council for Namibia): Another disappointing chapter in the efforts of the United Nations to support the struggle of the Namibian people for self-determination and independence has just been closed. The negative votes of the United States, France and the United Kingdom reveal their support for the racist and colonialist policies of South Africa. Those countries underestimate the commitment of the African and other peace-loving peoples to the eradication of racism and colonialism from the continent.

159. Africa has, on innumerable occasions, reaffirmed its support for the armed struggle until independence and majority rule are fully achieved in southern Africa. The world will witness the intensification of the armed struggle by Namibian patriots who have fully accepted the fact that their freedom and independence can be won only through the selfless sacrifice of thousands of men, women and children, for their birthright, a free and independent Namibia.

160. In the United Nations, the United Nations Council for Namibia will continue to exercise its responsibilities in support of the self-determination and independence of Namibia. No manoeuvres and no sophistry will be able to deter the Council from the discharge of the mandate established by the General Assembly in resolution 2248 (S-V) of 1967. In spite of the negative votes of France, the United States and the United Kingdom, an increasing number of countries have recognized the legitimacy of the struggle of the Namibian people and are giving material and moral support for their struggle. The United Nations Council for Namibia will continue to devise and promote all forms of programmes in support of Namibian patriots in the certainty that the legitimate and just cause of the Namibian people will prevail.

161. The current discussions in the Council abound in lessons for the leaders of the liberation struggle and for all those who support the just cause of the Namibian people. The enemies of the self-determination, freedom and independence of the Namibian people have shown themselves capable of resorting to stratagems to mislead Namibian patriots and to confuse the supporters of the cause of Namibian independence. It is clear that the leadership of SWAPO, the liberation movement of the Namibian people, by firmly standing on principle has unmasked the treacherous manoeuvres of the Pretoria régime. The recent public statements by Mr. Vorster show again his racist and colonialist ambition to promote his hand-picked tribal puppets and defenders of *apartheid* as spokesmen for an independent Namibia. Vorster persists in his delusion that the world will be so naive as to accept such false shadows, when the sacrifice of Namibian patriots is paving the way for the fulfilment of the legitimate aspirations of the Namibian people.

162. In the name of the United Nations Council for Namibia, I declare that, by reason of their negative votes, France, the United States and the United Kingdom must assume full responsibility for the inevitable escalation of the war of liberation by the Namibian patriots in their struggle for self-determination, freedom and national independence in a united Namibia.

163. The PRESIDENT: The representative of Saudi Arabia has expressed a wish to address the Council at this stage. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

164. Mr. BAROODY (Saudi Arabia): Mr. President, I must thank you for the arduous efforts that you have exerted in presiding over the Council during the discussion of this nettlesome question.

165. I should have liked to see different results. I am not going to go into the genesis of the question. I believe my good brother or if I may call him so, my son from Tanzania presented an analysis on which

no one could improve. Neither could anyone improve on the logic with which he treated this question, especially with respect to the expected veto that was exercised by three major Powers of the Council. Of course, we should not blame the representatives of those countries, since they have received their instructions from their leaders back home. We are reducing ourselves, as I have said on previous occasions, to peddlers of words without action. We are losing our credibility with the people who have pinned their hopes on the United Nations, and particularly on the Security Council.

166. It behoves me to make a few remarks not so much in a spirit of criticism as for the purpose of posing the question, to put it in Latin, *quo vadis*—whither goest thou?

167. The draft resolution which some gentlemen here have vetoed happens to be the thirtieth or fortieth on the subject, counting all those that were submitted to the General Assembly—whether in plenary meetings in 1966 or in the Fourth Committee—and to the Council. Where shall we go from here?

168. As my colleague from the United Republic of Tanzania said, those who cast a veto have probably succeeded in enhancing the frustration and bitterness in the hearts not only of Africans but of all those who support the freedom and liberation of peoples still suffering under a foreign yoke.

169. South West Africa was a Mandated Territory. I remember when in 1922 many of us rebelled against mandates, knowing full well that they were nothing but colonialism in disguise, the Mandatory Powers, faced by our protests, assured us that their presence in the Mandated Territories was meant to prepare the indigenous peoples for self-rule and ultimate freedom. All the Mandated Territories have been liberated. Why does South Africa still cling to that Mandate? It is because those in the Council who exercise world power support it—neither more nor less.

170. I should not like to go so far as to say that this is hypocritical, but it amounts to being hypocritical. All the members talk about freedom and democracy in the Council and in the General Assembly, and here they are the trustees of democracy, liberty and freedom. What are they doing about it? I was not here when the vote on the draft resolution was taken. I anticipated that it would be vetoed. I heard that one or two who cast a veto said that this question does not endanger or threaten world peace. But I say that it is paving the way to a threat to world peace. Should we wait until we are confronted with war before we act? There is already guerrilla warfare.

171. Some of the Western Powers are supporting another Western Power in its submission of an item before the current session of the General Assembly dealing with terrorism and the taking of hostages.

I ask: what else can the peoples which are denied their freedom do? Must they just submit?

172. I once said, and I repeat it from experience—and I would not want the Council to misunderstand me or the outside news media to misinterpret me—that had it not been for Hitler many of those Mandated Territories would still be under a foreign yoke. It was when empires tottered and fell, it was when those peoples which ruled others could no longer foot the bill that the process of ceding those Territories to their inhabitants was put into motion. We should not have to have another Hitler in order to liberate Namibia.

173. Why, not very long ago, was there a great deal of commotion about the Cubans having gone to Angola and having been financed by the Soviet Union? I do not know if that was so; I was not there to witness it. Well, somebody I do not know who, should now do the financing. If I held the purse strings and owned the moneybags, I would not finance mercenaries but I would finance every freedom-loving person to go to Namibia and subvert South Africa.

174. Some of the Council's members said that there was no threat to international peace. But what about justice? Why do they not mention justice? Forget about international peace. Is it just that after some 50 years South Africa should still be lording it over the indigenous people of Namibia? On what basis? There is no basis whatsoever. Even those so-called head-hunters in Papua—or wherever it was—are now free and sitting among us. They are human beings. Who prepared them? Extensions of those Western Powers—Australia and New Zealand—and I raise my hat to them. Why should southern Africa be treated differently?

175. All right, I ask those who vetoed the draft resolution: what have you done? Did you reach in to your pockets and present an alternative draft resolution aimed at solving the problem? Come out with it, I tell them; you merely want to protract the situation, to maintain the *status quo*. But remember that history has no *status quo*. That is but a Latin phrase. Nothing remains the same.

176. We want peace, but you are encouraging the Africans to go to war; not against you, because you exercise world power and the Africans cannot beat you. But there are ways and means. There is guerrilla warfare; there is terrorism and the taking of hostages, which we all abhor. You are playing into the hands of those who would seek to take hostages, and perhaps justifiably.

177. What are the causes of revolution? Injustices. To my French colleagues I would say that if the people in the streets of Paris had been able to reform the Bourbons before 1789 there would have been no revolution. They had to revolt. Danton, Robespierre

and Mirabeau became heroes. They were revolutionaries. When in 1917 the aristocracy of Russia was gallivanting in the capitals of Europe—Vienna, Paris, London—hobnobbing with the other aristocrats, and their foremen were using the Russian people like slaves, there was a revolution. Had there not been a revolution, they would still be slaves. But they liberated themselves. Now do not tell me that they are not democratic. Democracy has become a ritual—I say this parenthetically—everywhere.

178. I ask those of you who have vetoed this draft resolution: What alternative are you offering the Council?

179. And now I have a question to put to my African colleagues on the Council, to my colleagues from what is called the non-aligned or third world: Why did you not ask for an alternative draft resolution?

180. I ask those who vetoed the draft resolution why they did not submit amendments here in the Council, in public, not behind closed doors. I do not know what goes on behind the doors of the Council. They say "consultations". I say "abortive consultations". These are not consultations.

181. The United States has stood for the liberty of colonial peoples since the days of the late President Woodrow Wilson. Wilson came back from Europe a sad man because the British and the French had told him to mind his own business and not talk about liberating peoples. I ask this question: Has the United States forgotten its high ideals and principles? The Americans had to fight the British to gain independence. Are they not now celebrating the Bicentennial of their liberation from the British?

182. Why has the United States adopted this position? Because it buys gold in South Africa? Why does it not mine gold here? Does it buy diamonds there? Today there are zircons being sold that look like diamonds. Diamonds are for the rich and the super-rich, so that they may look like aristocrats.

183. I ask my friends in the British delegation here: What are your leaders waiting for? You are in the throes of a recession and you should improve your relationships with the third world—with the African world, with the Asian world. Have you been blinded by the glory of centuries past? All that is finished. And it is a good thing, because you have become more reasonable, more human. Actually, there are no people more reasonable than the British. But what happened? There must have been some quirk in the minds of those who formulated the policy that caused this veto today.

184. France always stood for liberty, for revolution against the tyrants. What does France consider the South Africans to be? Philanthropists? Has South Africa prepared the people of Namibia for self-rule?

What has South Africa done? Nothing. What has happened to France's tradition? Its leaders are acting like politicians. They base their policies on expediency, rather than hoisting the flag of freedom and liberation as France always used to do.

185. And I would say to my good friends from Italy and Japan that I am reminded of an Arabic proverb which, in English, would go something like this: "You are neither believers nor heathens; you are in between". Why do you not come out and help to liberate these people? What is your excuse?

186. Is world peace threatened? What about justice? Again and again I must refer to the justness of this cause. Are we to keep on going round in circles?

187. I have always said that Namibia could in the future have good relations with South Africa, could trade with South Africa, because of South Africa's experience. I know of many Mandated Territories which after liberation did business with those who at one time had ruled them. If it makes good economic sense, I do not see why South Africa should not have a privileged position because of its experience in the area.

188. Are we to be told that there are strategic reasons for the position that has been adopted today? If so, we can only say this: Strategic reasons in the days of intercontinental ballistic missiles! The large nations can destroy each other without having bases anywhere. Is there fear that the Russians might establish a base there? We read in the papers these days that the Russians have more than twice as many ships as the Western nations. Come out with it, instead of leaking these stories to the newspapers and fomenting suspicion and perhaps hatred between countries. Do not talk about *détente*. It is all so theatrical. We do not believe these things any more. You have lost your credibility.

189. But I have a responsibility as a human being, apart from my responsibility as the representative of a Member State that signed the Charter. We are all human beings. The major Powers that exercise the veto should assume their responsibilities and not make laughingstocks of us all before the people of the world.

190. It is too late now for me to submit a draft resolution. Perhaps my friends from Africa remember the occasions when I have submitted one-page draft resolutions. I am not criticizing the wording of the draft resolution that has now been vetoed; but I would say that some of my colleagues here gave the major Powers an excuse to veto that text. I would have called their bluff. I would have submitted a very simple, one-page draft resolution that they could not have vetoed. I would have put them on the spot. I would have asked them: Do you want to help liberate

Namibia or do you want to maintain the so-called *status quo*? Of course, there is no *status quo*.

191. Well, this question will be discussed—I believe soon—in the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly. I promise that I will submit a draft resolution there and, shall ask that the Council be convened, if possible to approve it. I promise those who vetoed the draft resolution today that my text will mention nothing about any threats to international peace. My text will say "on the basis of justice". Either the major Powers will help to liberate Namibia or they will choose to continue the partnership for the domination of the indigenous people of Namibia. If they choose the latter course, God help them. For I shall come out with certain facts that will make the hair of some representatives here turn white overnight.

192. The PRESIDENT: I wish to inform members of the Council that I have received a letter from the representatives of Benin, the Libyan Arab Republic and the United Republic of Tanzania [S/12216] which reads as follows:

"We have the honour to request that in the course of the consideration by the Security Council of the question 'The situation in Namibia', an invitation under rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Council be extended to Mr. Theoben Gurirab of the South West Africa Peoples' Organization (SWAPO) of Namibia."

If I hear no objection, I shall take it that the Council accedes to that request.

*It was so decided.*

193. The PRESIDENT: I invite Mr. Gurirab to take a place at the Council table and to make a statement.

194. Mr. GURIRAB: I want to state here before this Council for the whole world to hear that SWAPO of Namibia condemns in the strongest terms the infamous and undemocratic act just committed in the Council by the three imperialist Powers. Those three Powers—namely, the United States of America, the United Kingdom and France—have always acted, in word and in deed, as the collaborators and defenders of the illegal racist and colonialist régime of South Africa in Namibia. We have pointed this out time and again here and elsewhere. They have tried to deny this and have offered all kinds of flippant and deceptive excuses. Their action today goes a long way in demonstrating the extent to which they are prepared to go in order to defend their vested interests in Namibia as well as in southern Africa in general. It also assures their kith and kin there of their continued commitment to maintaining the domination and exploitation of our people and of our natural resources.

195. This is the second time in the last 16 months that those Powers have combined in the arrogance of

their power in the Council to block the wishes of the democratic majority on the question of Namibia.

196. The Council has been meeting this time pursuant to resolution 385 (1976) which was adopted unanimously early this year. That resolution demanded of South Africa a solemn declaration in which that régime would accept the authority of the United Nations and make a firm commitment to withdraw its illegal administration from Namibia. That was yet another opportunity for that régime to accept a basis for a peaceful settlement in Namibia. As always, the South African régime stubbornly remained intransigent. Once again, the illegal régime of Pretoria has posed a direct challenge to the United Nations. Once again it has posed a direct challenge to the Council. What is at issue here is the question of morality, justice and human rights, on the one hand, and, on the other, the selfish, narrowly conceived, national interests of those Powers. It is a question of human life, on the one hand, and profits and a greed for dominance, on the other. What is oppression and exploitation to us is wealth and prosperity to those greedy capitalists.

197. The issue of Namibia is clear and straightforward, particularly here at the United Nations. South Africa's presence in Namibia is illegal. The United Nations has assumed direct responsibility for Namibia. The struggle of the people of Namibia is legitimate. SWAPO represents the interests and aspirations of the people of Namibia for freedom and genuine national independence. We are therefore all agreed that South Africa must get out of Namibia forthwith.

198. We expected the Council to proceed logically this time and adopt punitive measures to compel the occupation régime of South Africa to withdraw from Namibia. As a matter of fact, that was the logic and purpose of the draft resolution so comprehensively, eloquently and convincingly introduced yesterday by Ambassador Jackson of Guyana on behalf of the sponsors.

199. We were not surprised by the triple veto cast a moment ago, because, for one thing, we were threatened with this by those same Powers all along during the consultations on the draft. But, most important, the decision to cast vetoes was, it appears to us, agreed upon in advance between those Powers and the racist Vorster régime.

200. I should like to illustrate this point by quoting an item from today's *New York Times* to which you, Mr. President, and other representatives have already referred:

"Asked whether he thought the United Nations might impose sanctions on South Africa since a group of third-world countries is calling for measures to force it to abandon *apartheid*, Mr. Vorster said 'I don't see that as a possibility at all'."

We see here the element of duplicity despite all the false promises, unfounded claims and double-talk about progress regarding the question of Namibia.

201. I want to declare here that the capacity of the Africans—indeed, of the Namibians—to be patient must not be insulted and abused with empty diplomatic rhetoric.

202. The position of SWAPO was stated clearly by our President, Sam Nujoma, the national leader of our people, when he addressed the Council on 28 September [1956th meeting]. Therefore there is no need to elaborate further on our position.

203. The issue is very clear. I want to say this to the three States I mentioned. They can veto resolutions now and in the future, as they have in the past, but they cannot veto the will and the determination of the people of Namibia to achieve liberation in our country. Equally, veto our no veto, Namibia remains a direct responsibility of the United Nations. We shall therefore continue to utilize all the options that exist in the United Nations system, within the other competent organs of the United Nations, until liberation and national independence are achieved in Namibia.

204. We take this opportunity also to express our thanks and appreciation to you, Mr. President, and to the other members of the Council who sponsored and voted in favour of the draft resolution and also to the other representatives who have always supported our struggle in other forums here and elsewhere.

205. SWAPO, as a liberation movement engaged in a struggle to liberate our country, will for ever remain committed to waging that struggle until its logical conclusion. To this we are committed: to this we are dedicated. *A luta continua.*

206. The PRESIDENT: There are no further names on the list of speakers. The Council has therefore concluded its consideration of this item at this stage.

*The meeting rose at 6.55 p.m.*

#### Notes

<sup>1</sup> *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-first Session, Plenary Meetings, 9th meeting, para. 113.*

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 112.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 114.

<sup>4</sup> *Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970). Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1971, p. 16.*

<sup>5</sup> *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-first Session, Plenary Meetings, 29th meeting.*

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, Twenty-ninth Session, Supplement No. 24A, para. 84.

<sup>7</sup> A/JAC.129/L.6.

<sup>8</sup> A/31/197, annex I, para. 124.

<sup>9</sup> *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-first Session, Plenary Meetings, 11th meeting, para. 177.*