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1926th MEETING

Held in New York on Monday, 14 June 1976, at 4 p.m.

President: Mr. Rashleigh E. JACKSON (Guyana).

Present: The representatives of the following States: Benin, China, France, Guyana, Italy, Japan, Libyan Arab Republic, Pakistan, Panama, Romania, Sweden, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America.

Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/1926/Rev.1)

1. Adoption of the agenda
2. The situation in Cyprus:
Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations operation in Cyprus (S/12093)

The meeting was called to order at 5 p.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

The situation in Cyprus:

Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations operation in Cyprus (S/12093)

1. The PRESIDENT: In accordance with the decisions taken by the Council at its 1925th meeting, I shall now invite the representatives of Cyprus, Turkey and Greece to participate in the discussion without the right to vote.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Christophides, (Cyprus), Mr. Türkmen (Turkey) and Mr. Papoulis (Greece) took places at the Council table.

2. The PRESIDENT: I call on the representative of Turkey.
3. Mr. TÜRKMEN (Turkey): During the last Council meeting I confined myself to a few remarks about our basic position regarding the Council's discussions. With your permission I should now like to explain in some detail the views of my Government on issues that have been raised.
4. At the outset, on behalf of my Government I should like to express gratitude to the Secretary-General and to his dedicated staff for their untiring efforts in connexion with the United Nations activities in

Cyprus. Despite the enormous difficulties he has encountered, the Secretary-General has been able to maintain the negotiating process between the two communities. We are greatly indebted to him, and we should like to reiterate our admiration for his tenacious endeavours, his patience and his skilful diplomacy. Our deep appreciation also goes to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Ambassador Pérez de Cuéllar, whose contribution to the search for peace has already proved extremely constructive, to the commander of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus, Lieutenant-General Prem Chand, and to the Under-Secretaries-General, Mr. Roberto Guyer and Mr. Brian Urquhart, for their efforts.

5. In my previous statement I reaffirmed my Government's unequivocal stand on the representation of Cyprus. The Greek Cypriot representatives have no right whatsoever to speak on behalf of Cyprus.

6. In its moderation and dedication to the search for peace, the Turkish community has refrained from claiming external sovereignty for the administration it set up after the collapse of the constitutional order. It has also taken a commendable and constructive initiative in proposing a provisional joint government. But that proposal has fallen on deaf ears, and the Greek community has chosen to live with the myth that it represents the whole of Cyprus. It can continue to delude itself with that myth, but that cannot and will not change the reality.

7. It is high time for the leaders of the Greek Cypriot community finally to understand that their insistence on posturing as the representatives of the Cyprus State can serve no purpose other than to increase the distrust and further accentuate the cleavages between the two communities. They will have to bear the full responsibility for the consequences which might ensue from that political aberration.

8. It became manifest at the last meeting that our approach to these meetings of the Council is radically different from that of the Greek side. Our position has been a simple one. We were convinced of the imperative need to avoid as far as possible acrimonious debates and an exchange of accusations, because such a course of action would be detrimental to the prospects of reactivating the intercommunal talks initiated on a new basis in February. We were hoping that, despite the discouraging sequence of events since the last

meeting of the Council on the subject, in December, and despite the protracted and unproductive character of the intercommunal talks recently, the Council would best discharge its responsibility by promoting an atmosphere conducive to a resumption of the quest for a peaceful solution. We thought that the preservation of the negotiating process was more important than any other consideration. We failed to see an alternative to dialogue.

9. The statements made by the Greek side have once more shown that we are far apart in our political perceptions and in our approach to the problem. Impervious to reality, imbued with an incredible and frightening fanaticism, inspired by a megalomaniac drive, full of disdain for the rights of people who are not of their creed and race, deprived of any sense of historical perspective, the Greek Cypriot leadership is unable to overcome its yearning for its bygone monopoly of power, power it unscrupulously abused for so long to tyrannize and to oppress the Turkish community. It cannot, and, I am afraid, perhaps never will believe in the virtues of negotiation, compromise and harmonious co-existence.

10. In his statement the representative of the Greek Cypriots echoed the national feelings and aspirations of the Greek people. We appreciate those feelings and have no quarrel with those aspirations as long as they are legitimate and can be reconciled with the respective feelings and aspirations of the Turkish people. But it should be borne in mind that Cyprus is not a Greek island. It never has been. There exists a Turkish community which has lived there for centuries. The aspirations and interests of the two peoples, the two national communities, can be reconciled only if they can succeed in living side by side on a basis of equality. If Greek feelings are hurt today, as is evidently the case, the Greeks should only blame their own leaders and the previous Greek Governments who for years stimulated their imagination with false hopes and impossible dreams.

11. The Greek Cypriot representative has repeated the familiar accusations against Turkey. He spoke of aggression, invasion, military occupation. There were, of course, no references throughout his speech to the tragic events which led to the lawful intervention of Turkey in fulfilment of its commitments under international treaties. He made no mention of the background of the problem, which is the root cause of the situation we face today in the unfortunate island of Cyprus. I have therefore no other choice but to remind him and the Council of the basic developments which brought about the present state of affairs. I shall try to do so as briefly as possible.

12. The essence of the problem of Cyprus is basically a conflict between the Turkish and Greek communities on rules of coexistence as embodied in constitutional principles, and on the very future of Cyprus as a State.

13. The Constitution adopted in 1960, when Cyprus became independent, was based on the principle of equal partnership between the two communities. This was a structure reflecting the realities underlying the relations between the two national groups, a compromise arrangement which struck a balance between the divergent aspirations of the communities. But even then the dangers that lay ahead were obvious. The political struggle waged before 1960 by the Greek community aimed not at independence but, rather, at union with Greece. The Greek Cypriot leadership at that time—which, incidentally, is still the leadership today—had also made clear its political ambition of dominating the Turkish community totally. It therefore became necessary to devise guarantees against attempts to violate the Constitution and terminate the independence of the island.

14. Notwithstanding those guarantees, the Republic of Cyprus barely survived three years; it collapsed in 1963. The reason for that tragic outcome was that the leadership of the Greek Cypriot community considered from the very beginning that independence was only a transitional stage, to be followed at the first opportunity by *enosis*. The loyalty of the Greek Cypriot community was channelled not towards independence, not towards intercommunal partnership and co-operation, but towards racial hatred and *enosis*. The tampering with the Constitution which began very soon after the new State had come into being gradually gained momentum and culminated in a massive and brutal onslaught against the Turkish community in 1963, compelling that community to live under constant deprivation, humiliation and relentless oppression and tyranny for 11 years.

15. During that period, which lasted for 11 years, 2,000 Turks were killed, wounded or maimed, and nearly 30,000 were ousted from their homes. Their constitutional and human rights were outrageously violated. They were subjected to unthinkable cruelty and barbarism. They were discriminated against in every conceivable field. Their homes were looted and destroyed in a frenzy of hatred. The economic restrictions, periodic blockades and prohibition to import the most basic commodities condemned them to live in misery, with degrading, subhuman standards of life, and under the imminent threat of starvation. It was again during that time that Greece, in 1964, openly violated the independence of Cyprus and dispatched 20,000 troops to the island.

16. It should come as no surprise to the Greek Cypriot leaders that the Turks of Cyprus, having had to endure such a tragic fate, opted as soon as they had the opportunity to do so, to move massively to the Turkish area of the island. Practically no Turks remain in the area under Greek control. And yet in his statement, Mr. Christophides had the audacity to associate the Turks of Cyprus with the accusations he has launched against Turkey, asserting that the Greeks and Turks alike are suffering as a result of the Turkish presence

in the island. This was perhaps an attempt to give a semblance of credibility to his claim to represent the whole of Cyprus, but it was pathetically unconvincing. It was, to use his own words, "an offence against the integrity of hundreds of neutral observers and an unconvincing attempt to underestimate human intelligence" [1925th meeting, para. 19].

17. In 1964, the Greek Cypriot leadership had successfully carried out its attempt to crush the State structure and deprive the Turkish Cypriots of their fundamental rights. Greece had established a military supremacy on the island. True, *enosis* was not proclaimed and the fiction of an independent State of Cyprus was maintained. But Archbishop Makarios, while on the one hand posing as a champion of the independence of Cyprus, had not, on the other hand, shrunk from his long-term goal. Here is an extract from the interview he gave to the Greek newspaper *Apogevmatini* on 8 September 1966:

"If I have any ambition, it is to link my name with the union of Cyprus with Greece, with the expansion of Greece's boundaries up to the shores of North Africa through the union of Cyprus. This is my only ambition, for the realization of which I shall continue to struggle till death."

In the same year, in an interview with *The Washington Post*, he reaffirmed his dedication to the goal of *enosis*. He said:

"I want something higher than being a temporary President of Cyprus. My ambition is to connect my name with history as the architect of *enosis*."

18. I know that the dual loyalty of Archbishop Makarios, to *enosis* and to independence, is puzzling. What is the explanation? I think that one previous representative of Greece was correct when he said in the Security Council in the aftermath of the coup of 1974 that Makarios believed that he could fool all the people all the time. Basically, of course, what moved Archbishop Makarios and still does is his undying ambition to extend his power beyond reach. He fervently desires *enosis*, but in conditions which would exalt his power and ego.

19. During the period to which I am referring, between 1963 and 1974, there was an attempt to negotiate a solution. Negotiations between the Turkish and Greek communities were initiated in 1968, following the serious crisis in 1967, when the forces of occupation of Greece had launched direct military attacks against Turkish villages all over the island. That recourse to the use of force in 1967 had provoked an upheaval which eventually compelled the Greek Government temporarily to alter its policy of *enosis* and to accept for the first time direct negotiations between the two communities.

20. These intercommunal negotiations lasted for six years; they were in vain. During all that time it

never occurred to the Greek Cypriot leadership, negotiating then from a position of strength, that time was precious. It is because they face an equal negotiating party today, which is not ready to forego its rights, that they have become so hysterically impatient and are trying to substitute rhetoric and international pressure for negotiations.

21. We all know how the previous negotiation process came abruptly to an end, with the *coup d'état* carried out in July 1974 by the Greek military forces, with the avowed aim of achieving *enosis*. Archbishop Makarios has vividly described the true nature of that undertaking. This is what he said in the Council on 19 July 1974:

"The military régime of Greece has callously violated the independence of Cyprus. Without a trace of respect for the democratic rights of the Cypriot people, without a trace of respect for the independence and sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus, the Greek junta has extended its dictatorship to Cyprus." [1780th meeting, para. 9.]

In the same statement he pointed out:

"The coup did not come about under such circumstances as to be considered an internal matter of the Greek Cypriots. It is clearly an invasion from outside, in flagrant violation of the independence and sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus." [*Ibid.*, para. 18.]

He further stated:

"... the events in Cyprus do not constitute an internal matter of the Greeks of Cyprus. The Turks of Cyprus are also affected. The coup of the Greek Junta is an invasion, and from its consequences the whole people of Cyprus suffers, both Greeks and Turks." [*Ibid.*, para. 32.]

22. Those words eloquently illustrate the justification for the intervention that Turkey was compelled to undertake. They constitute also, I believe, the best reply to the representative of Greece, who, during his statement at the last meeting, regrettably, referred to a Turkish invasion. The only invasion that took place in July 1974 was the invasion from Greece. Turkey was forced to undertake a lawful intervention. The Turkish forces which are now in Cyprus are not forces of occupation. They have been sent there to stop the invasion by Greece, to remove the threat to the independence of Cyprus, to pave the way for a new constitutional order and to protect the Turkish community.

23. The Turkish Government has repeatedly stated that it has no political or territorial ambition and no strategic interest in Cyprus and that its forces will be withdrawn as soon as a settlement has been reached. It has already substantially reduced the numbers of

military units on the island, but a total withdrawal before the two communities agree on a solution is unthinkable. The bloodshed that can occur between communities when they do not agree on principles by which they will coexist and co-operate has been tragically illustrated only recently in another country in the area. The experience in Cyprus would certainly be more dreadful.

24. I can reiterate, on behalf of my Government, that Turkey has no intention of retaining its forces there. Turkey has no intention of partitioning the island. We do not intend a Turkish solution in the island. What we do want for the Turks of the island is that they should feel free from all the threats under which they have lived for so long. We want to rest assured that the island will become what it has never been—a truly independent island, a truly non-aligned island. This is a process which will materialize through negotiations; there is no other way. But negotiations will not start by attempts to return to the situation prevailing before 15 July 1974, when there was no possibility of negotiation.

25. The Greek Cypriot representative, seconded by the representative of Greece, made a series of allegations concerning the freedom of movement of UNFICYP in the Turkish area, the Greek Cypriots living in the north, the so-called colonization policy of Turkey and the problem of refugees, missing persons and certain other aspects of the situation prevailing on the island. The representative of the Turkish Cypriot community will, I hope, be provided again with an opportunity to explain his views on all those points. So far as I am concerned, it is not my intention to engage in an exchange of arguments with the Greek Cypriot representative or with the representative of Greece. I should like, however, to shed some light on the issues raised.

26. On UNFICYP's freedom of movement, the Council is aware that discussions are under way between the representatives of the Secretary-General and the Turkish Cypriot community with a view to arriving at an agreement on the stationing, deployment and functioning of UNFICYP in the Turkish area. It is our hope that if the mandate can be renewed it will be possible to conclude that agreement rapidly and to remove the difficulties that may exist owing to a lack of clear guidelines. I am glad that the Secretary-General shares this opinion, as he makes clear in paragraph 66 of his report:

"In this connexion, I should mention that the discussions between Mr. Rauf Denktaş and my Special Representative concerning the stationing, deployment and functioning of UNFICYP in the north in accordance with the *procès-verbal* of 13 December 1975 [S/12093, para. 8] are making progress. It is my hope that once these discussions are completed UNFICYP's functioning in the north may be improved."

27. The allegation that the Turkish Cypriot authorities are expelling the Greek Cypriots from the northern region of Cyprus is totally unfounded. The Greek Cypriots who are emigrating from the north to the south are doing so in accordance with the criteria agreed upon between the representatives of the two communities during the third round of the Vienna talks, held between 31 July and 2 August 1975. Indeed, point 3 of the press communiqué on those talks reads as follows:

"The Greek Cypriots at present in the north who, at their own request and without having been subjected to any kind of pressure, wish to move to the south will be permitted to do so." [S/11789, annex.]

Since then the Turkish Cypriot authorities have been faithful to that agreement. Nobody has been expelled, but written applications which the Greek Cypriots have submitted to the Turkish authorities, either directly or through UNFICYP, have been accepted. The Turkish community has consistently taken the position that it considers it inhuman to compel the Greek Cypriots who wish to go south to remain in the north. This is, of course, in contradiction with the political tradition of the Greek Cypriot leaders who, for so long, prevented the Turkish Cypriots from moving to Turkish areas in order to retain them as hostages and as a means of pressure against the Turkish community.

28. The Turkish Cypriot authorities have in their possession documents and tapes which bear witness to the voluntary nature of the movement to the south. It is true that recently there has been an accelerated tendency among the Greek Cypriots living in the north to move south, but that is not due to any pressure from the Turkish Cypriot authorities. The Turkish Cypriot community would gain no political leverage from such immigration. The accelerated movement to the south is, rather, due to the fact that the forced resignation of Mr. Glafcos Clerides and the statements of the extremist Greek Cypriot leaders advocating a protracted struggle have led the Greeks living in northern Cyprus to become disillusioned as to the outcome of the intercommunal talks. But the Greek Cypriots, once having moved to the south on purely voluntary grounds, see fit to claim that they were expelled from the Turkish zone. They do that to avoid allegations of treason and deprivation of access to the Greek Cypriot refugee fund.

29. In order to find a solution to this problem in a way that would safeguard the legitimate rights of the Greek Cypriots living in the north and prevent misunderstanding and tension between the two communities, the Turkish Cypriot negotiator made a proposal to his counterpart at the meeting on 27 May 1976, held in Nicosia. The Turkish Cypriot representative asked the Greek Cypriot leadership to pledge publicly not to accuse those Greek Cypriots voluntarily moving south of treason and not to deny them access

to the refugee fund. Subject to the approval of that suggestion, he proposed that the Greek Cypriots wishing to move south indicate their desire in the presence of the International Red Cross. The Greek Cypriot representative, however, declined to accept that proposal.

30. We have had extensive consultations with President Denktas on this issue. He has taken it upon himself to investigate any allegation of pressure and he is studying various formulas which would permit the applications to be screened by impartial authorities and thus dispel misgivings expressed in this respect.

31. The assertion that there is a massive immigration of Turkish nationals from Turkey to Cyprus with the purpose of changing the demographic character of the island in order to allow Turkey to annex or to partition the island is contrary to actual facts. The Turkish Government is not following a policy of annexation or partition. The Turkish Government has repeatedly stated its attachment to the principle of independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty of the island, and to a peaceful settlement of the problem through intercommunal talks.

32. As far as the Turkish community is concerned, it is also in no need of an infusion of population to assert its right to an equitable share of territory under a federal solution.

33. But quite apart from these considerations, it should also be borne in mind that the economic situation in the north is not conducive to massive immigration. There are already in the north 60,000 immigrants who came from the south of the island and who should be settled. There is no more room for further immigration under the present economic conditions.

34. What is taking place is that skilled technicians and workers are being imported from Turkey on a temporary basis to meet the immediate needs of the economy. There is no question of those people acquiring Cypriot citizenship or taking up permanent residence in the island.

35. The largest number of people who have come to Cyprus since August 1974 is made up of Turkish Cypriots who had emigrated to Turkey, Great Britain and other Commonwealth countries over the past years under political, administrative, social and economic pressures from the Greek Cypriot administration and are now being given the opportunity to return to their homeland and lead a normal life, under conditions of security, in accordance with the Constitution and the relevant citizenship laws of the Republic of Cyprus. It should also be noted that there is a great number of Turks of Cypriot origin in Turkey alone who are entitled to come and settle in Cyprus under Annex D of the Treaty concerning the Establishment of the Republic of Cyprus signed in 1960.¹

36. I should like now to take up the question of refugees.

37. As has been repeatedly stressed by the representative of the Turkish community during the previous discussions in the Council, the question of refugees is not new to Cyprus. The Turkish community has suffered from a refugee problem for the past two decades. In 1963, as a result of the Greek Cypriot attacks and oppression, 26,000 Turkish Cypriots were uprooted, some of them for the second time, because they had already been uprooted back in 1957. In 1974, more than one half of the Turkish Cypriot community—some 60,000 people—was uprooted from the south and had to flee to the north for safety.

38. We do not know the number of Greek Cypriots who chose to go to the south during the military operations in 1974. The figures cited by the Greek Cypriots vary greatly. As this issue is exploited for propaganda purposes, we have even heard a figure as high as 220,000, which is certainly grossly inflated. The Greek Cypriot Attorney General, in his book entitled *The Legal Aspects of the Problem of Refugees in Cyprus*, asserts that there cannot possibly be more than 120,000 refugees in Cyprus.

39. That the Greek Cypriot side is blowing up the extent of the refugee problem out of all proportion is becoming more and more evident. In an article which appeared in the *Chicago Daily News* on 27 January 1976, Mr. Bruce Love wrote the following:

“Hardly a week goes by without a visit by representatives of Congress and various charitable organizations. They are dutifully shown the 14,000 ‘tent refugees’. They interview the same heart-breaking cases. Needless to say they are not told that the refugees could be housed in some of the solid houses vacated by British troops or in pre-fabricated housing so easy to import. The blunt fact is that Makarios wants at least some refugees under tents. As it is, the authorities have a hard time keeping the 14,000 from ‘defecting’ to more comfortable shelter.”

40. Nobody denies that the refugee problem is an important one. But the solution will have to take into account all the elements of the problem, not exclusively the issue of Greek refugees. The Turkish Cypriot community has 86,000 refugees, some of them still in the process of being rehabilitated. An equal number of Greek Cypriots has been resettled in Turkish houses and on Turkish properties in the south.

41. On the other hand, the scope of the problem has undergone a great change since last year’s agreement in the intercommunal talks on a voluntary exchange of population. As a result of this agreement, all the Turkish Cypriots who were living in the south of the island under the jurisdiction of the Greek Cypriot administration have moved to the north into the

area under the jurisdiction of the Turkish Cypriot administration.

42. The solution of the remaining aspects of the problem is therefore intimately linked to the overall settlement of the Cyprus issue.

43. As regards the question of missing persons, the Turkish side—and I mean the Government of Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot community—has repeatedly stated that no missing Greek Cypriots are in the hands of the Turkish authorities. This fact has also been verified by the International Red Cross, which formally informed President Denktas and Mr. Clerides of its findings. The Greek side, however, continues the attempts to exploit humanitarian feelings by blaming the Turkish side for the losses it suffered during the *coup* of 15 July engineered from Greece. It should be recalled that the international press had reported at the time that the death toll of the supporters of Makarios was "at least 2,000". In his statement to the Council in 1974 [1780th meeting], Archbishop Makarios himself said that the Greek *coup* had "caused much bloodshed" and stressed that the organizers of the *coup* had killed thousands of his supporters. Perhaps the conclusion of the trial of Sampson, that is if it is ever concluded, will throw more light on this issue.

44. Having commented on the issues raised by the Greek side, I wish to reiterate to the Council that the Turkish Government is ready to encourage more frequent and fruitful meetings between the representatives of the two communities on humanitarian questions. Mr. Christophides and Ambassador Papoulias had a great deal to say about the non-implementation of United Nations resolutions on Cyprus by Turkey. I do not accept that charge. If they are studied carefully it will be seen that the substance of all resolutions boils down to urging the solution of the problem through intercommunal talks, notwithstanding certain provisions which Turkey found impossible to accept.

45. I should like now to make a few observations regarding the part of the report of the Secretary-General dealing with the negotiating process. This indeed is the crucial aspect on which we should focus our attention for the settlement of all issues related to Cyprus depends on the outcome of the intercommunal talks.

46. The section of the report of the Secretary-General covering the intercommunal talks retraces the difficult path of bringing together the negotiators and maintaining the momentum of the talks. The Greek side has given a biased interpretation of this section and has twisted the facts beyond recognition. I should like therefore to recall briefly what has happened since the last meeting of the Council on Cyprus, in December.

47. As we all remember, when the Council met six months ago to consider the extension of the mandate of

UNFICYP for yet another period of six months, the negotiations between the two communities under the personal auspices of the Secretary-General were stalled and the political situation had deteriorated after the acrimonious General Assembly debate and resolution on Cyprus. One of the negotiating parties, the Turkish Cypriot community, had rejected resolution 3395 (XXX) for the reasons explained in detail to this Council by its representative, Mr. Çelik, last December [1863rd meeting]. Hence, a new basis for the resumption of intercommunal talks had to be found; a new procedure had to be agreed upon between the negotiating parties.

48. To such an end, the Foreign Ministers of Turkey and Greece agreed upon a new basis for the resumption of the intercommunal talks last December in Brussels and advised their respective national communities in the island to adopt it. The Brussels agreement envisaged the resumption of intercommunal talks without preconditions and with a view to arriving at a package-deal agreement on the outstanding aspects of the Cyprus conflict—namely, on territory, federation and the powers of the central Government—to be negotiated with no priority attached to any particular aspect. The Brussels agreement further foresaw the establishment of two committees, one dealing with territorial questions and the other with constitutional matters, at a certain stage of the negotiating process. This was a practical compromise in the form of simultaneous negotiations on the political demands of the Turkish Cypriot Community, on the one hand, and the territorial demands of the Greek Cypriot Community, on the other, with a view to reaching an overall settlement.

49. After exhaustive consultations with the parties concerned, the Secretary-General appealed to the two communities to resume the talks with no preconditions, in conformity with the Brussels agreement. The Turkish Cypriot community responded favourably to that appeal on 2 February and expressed its readiness to engage in meaningful negotiations.

50. The new negotiating process based on the Brussels agreement, and initiated through the efforts of the Secretary-General, was a commendable step, for it could have generated a shared quest for peace. Yet, the road leading to Vienna was marked by difficulties from the very beginning, for one of the negotiating parties, the Greek Cypriot community, was torn by internal dissent and disunity. Archbishop Makarios, as usual, wanted to play all his cards at the same time and was quite reluctant to engage in meaningful negotiations. The result was that, even before the Vienna meeting, the Greek Cypriot negotiator for the last eight years, Mr. Clerides, resigned and later withdrew his resignation, reflecting the increasing turmoil within the Greek Cypriot leadership. Later Mr. Clerides had to go to the fifth round of talks in Vienna accompanied by a Greek Cypriot delegation composed of members representing the divergent factions among the Greek Cypriots.

51. When finally the Vienna talks got under way the Greek Cypriots failed to make any concrete proposals throughout four days of negotiations. The Turkish Cypriot negotiator, Mr. Denktaş, on the other hand, explained in detail the views of his side on all aspects of the question of Cyprus, as envisaged in the Brussels agreement. At the end, a procedure was agreed upon whereby the Greek Cypriot side would forward its proposals within six weeks and the Turkish Cypriot side would make its counter-proposals within 10 days after the Greek Cypriot proposals were received. In agreeing to such a time-table, Mr. Denktaş hoped that the Greek side would overcome its internal differences and be able to formulate a comprehensive negotiating position. Yet, such hopes did not materialize. Unable to settle its domestic divergencies as to what to propose, the Greek Cypriot leadership seems to have agreed on one thing: to misuse the name of the Secretary-General and his mission of good offices. In utter disregard for the delicate role of the Secretary-General, the Greek Cypriots deemed it convenient to present—or, rather, misrepresent—their proposal as if it were suggested or endorsed by the Secretary-General. It was only long after the Secretary-General had repeatedly repudiated such an allegation that the Greek Cypriot side finally retracted somewhat its unfounded claim.

52. When the negotiators returned to Nicosia after the fifth round of the talks in Vienna, the Turkish Cypriot representative waited in vain for the Greek Cypriot negotiator to forward his proposals as agreed in Vienna. No proposals were forthcoming, and pandemonium erupted in which the Greek Cypriot side at first denied the procedure agreed upon in Vienna, and thereafter came up with the incredible assertion that Mr. Clerides had not communicated the Vienna agreement to his supreme leader. Mr. Clerides was sacrificed on the altar of truth. The last voice of moderation and reason was thus drowned by the opponents of a negotiated settlement.

53. That the fanatical winds were blowing strong was borne out by the choice of the new Greek Cypriot negotiator. The person chosen, Mr. Papadopoulos, had been an EOKA partisan who had no qualms about his political aspirations. Here is an extract from a statement Mr. Papadopoulos made in Morphou on 27 October 1967:

“Our national tradition and ancestral endowment have precharted the course of our evolution in history, and no power, no pressure, no threats, no intervention, no sacrifice, no time considerations can divert the course of history from its natural evolution, which leads to freedom and union with Greece... It is high time Cypriots and others made it their conviction that union of Cyprus with Greece is an historical necessity... There can be no freedom for Cyprus outside the boundaries of Greece.”

54. Despite the justified misgivings that such a choice of negotiator created, despite the disturbing turn of

events, despite the legitimate distrust and concern that this has caused in the Turkish community, the Government of Turkey has persistently urged meaningful negotiations. The Turkish community, notwithstanding its serious apprehension that fanatics of Greek nationalism have gained the upper hand within the Greek Cypriot leadership, has accepted the continuation of intercommunal talks and appointed a new negotiator. But this time the Turkish community quite rightly insisted on serious negotiations. The previous talks had degenerated into a profitless propaganda exercise and a procedural wrangle. In order to avoid a repetition of this unfortunate pattern, the Turkish side proposed that the territorial problem be discussed confidentially. What has been the response to this constructive suggestion? A new barrage of accusations and propaganda in the form of a letter by the Greek Cypriot negotiator to the representative of the Secretary-General, as echoed and amplified by the Greek side last Friday.

55. We hope, nevertheless, that this will not be the last word and that the Secretary-General will be able to bring the two negotiators once more to the negotiating table. Despite the totally negative content of his statement, we noted that Mr. Christophides has said that his side:

“continues to regard the intercommunal talks as the best means for the achievement of a peaceful and lasting solution to the Cyprus problem” [1925th meeting, para. 34.]

If we can single out this statement from the rhetoric surrounding it, we are ready to consider it as a positive approach. Ambassador Papoulias has also said that his Government lends its full support to the Secretary-General's mission and will continue to do so in the future. We fully share the view that the talks should be meaningful and productive. I can assure the Council that the Turkish Government is more than willing to exert all its influence with a view to assisting the parties to arrive at a peaceful settlement. We trust that the Secretary-General will be able to reactivate the negotiating process within the framework which was laid down before and during the fifth round of talks at Vienna.

56. I should like to make a final remark. Mr. Christophides has asserted that the Turkish Government is in a position of dominance and retains the main responsibility in the intercommunal talks and that it should therefore be blamed for the lack of progress. Leaving aside the question that he proceeds from the self-righteous assumption that all Greek proposals are constructive and just, and all Turkish proposals unjust and unacceptable, it should be pointed out that his conception of the position and role of Turkey in the intercommunal negotiations is totally erroneous. Turkey has no interest in Cyprus beyond the independence of the island, its non-involvement in any strategic arrangement or power politics, and the well-being and

security of the Turkish community. Therefore, any solution acceptable to the Turkish Cypriot community will unquestionably be acceptable to Turkey as well.

57. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*interpretation from Russian*): Mr. President, in addressing the Council on the item under discussion, I should like, first and foremost, warmly to welcome you, Sir, a prominent diplomat and political figure in Guyana, and to wish you success in the discharge of the responsible functions with which you are entrusted as President of the Council. I should like to express my conviction that your capabilities and rich experience of active work in the United Nations will ensure that due consideration is given to and solutions sought for the complex questions which will have to be taken up by the Security Council in June under your presidency. I am particularly gratified to note that you are the representative of a country which is an active participant in the non-aligned movement, a movement which is an influential force in contemporary international relations and which is making an important contribution towards ensuring international peace and security, détente, and the elimination of hotbeds of tension.

58. In May of this year, the people of Guyana celebrated the tenth anniversary of their independence. During the short period of time that it has been developing independently, Guyana has trod the difficult path of struggle against internal and external reaction, in order to overcome the burdensome consequences of its colonial past. And now Guyana is waging a resolute struggle against imperialist inroads aimed at undermining its independence and sovereignty. The Soviet people has been following with sympathy the efforts being made by the friendly people of Guyana and would like to wish them continued success in the further consolidation of their independence and in their efforts to ensure the social and economic progress of their country. On this tenth anniversary of the independence of Guyana, the Soviet people would like to express their conviction that the friendly relations between our countries will further develop and grow stronger, to the benefit of both the Soviet and the Guyanese people and in the interest of universal peace.

59. The considerable growth in the influence on international relations of liberated States which until quite recently were either colonies or semi-colonies is one of the most outstanding features of the present-day world. Most of them are staunchly defending their political and economic rights, by counteracting imperialism, neo-colonialism and racism, and are striving to strengthen their independence and to enhance the social, economic and cultural development of their peoples.

60. Guided by the principles of its Leninist foreign policy, the Soviet Union has consistently been on the side of those peoples which are struggling to affirm

their national liberty and independence and to ensure their social progress, and lends them support in their efforts to protect their independence and sovereignty from interference by external reactionary forces. The growing mutual understanding between the socialist countries and the non-aligned countries has caused some dissatisfaction in imperialist and certain other circles. Those forces would like to deprive the non-aligned movement of its anti-imperialist, anti-colonial and anti-racist approach and undermine its friendship and co-operation with the socialist community. But these attempts are doomed to failure.

61. The delegation of the Soviet Union would also like to express its gratitude to your predecessor, the President of the Security Council for last month, the eminent representative of France, Ambassador de Guiringaud, under whose skilful guidance the Council discussed a number of important issues.

62. The Soviet delegation would like to take this opportunity to express its great satisfaction at the fact that the positions of the Soviet Union and France on the Cyprus issue coincide. In the joint Soviet-French communiqué, dated 7 December 1974, the following statement was made on the Cyprus issue:

“The Soviet Union and France declare their concern over the continuation of the dangerous situation in Cyprus. They believe that the settlement of the Cyprus problem should be achieved by means of talks and should be based on full respect for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus, on the strict implementation of the decisions of the Security Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations on Cyprus. The Soviet Union and France are in favour of the speedy withdrawal of all foreign armed forces from the Republic of Cyprus and the return to their homes of all refugees in conditions of safety.”

63. On behalf of the Soviet delegation, I should also like to welcome the new representative of Panama, Ambassador Illueca. I should like to wish him every success in his new post and to assure him that the delegation of the Soviet Union in the Security Council will be pleased to co-operate with him in order to strengthen international peace and security and to enhance the effectiveness of the United Nations.

64. Today, the Security Council is once again discussing the question of extending the mandate of the United Nations forces in Cyprus. However, it is quite obvious to all that this is not a question which can be considered as a separate issue, or in isolation from the general situation at present prevailing in Cyprus or from the Cyprus problem.

65. The reasons for the Cyprus tragedy are known to everyone. They are also perfectly well known to the United Nations, and to the Security Council, its chief organ for the maintenance of peace and security.

They are implicit in the continual attempts by aggressive external forces to destroy the independence, freedom and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus, to deprive of it of an opportunity to pursue its policy of non-alignment, and to turn the island into a strategic springboard for NATO [*North Atlantic Treaty Organization*] and an unsinkable aircraft-carrier in the eastern Mediterranean. I hardly need dwell in any detail on the events of the summer of 1974, when, as a result of gross intervention on the part of certain circles, the Republic of Cyprus was involved in a profound crisis and its people was subjected to severe privations and suffering.

66. Almost two years have elapsed since the beginning of the Cyprus crisis, but the situation in Cyprus continues to be complex and explosive. As before, in violation of the decisions of the United Nations, there are still foreign troops in Cyprus—both those that have been there since colonial times and those which recently invaded the island. Many thousands of Cypriots continue to live as exiles and refugees in their own native land. They have no opportunity to return to their homes. We, the Soviet people, who ourselves experienced all the horrors of an enemy invasion and occupation of our country during the years of the Great Patriotic War, understand and sympathize with the sufferings of the Cypriots.

67. The traditional economic links between the various regions of Cyprus have been destroyed.

68. Attempts are continually being made to “solve” the Cyprus problem within the restricted circle of the States belonging to NATO, in Brussels or in Oslo, and behind the backs of the Cypriot people, to the detriment of their vital interests. These attempts are kept secret from the international community and the United Nations.

69. The intercommunal talks, which were resumed pursuant to Security Council resolution 367 (1975), have not resulted in any positive progress towards the conclusion of the necessary agreement. As can be seen from the comprehensive report of the Secretary-General which is before the Council, the situation in Cyprus continues to deteriorate. In paragraph 63 of that report it is emphasized that tension in the island has continued to be high and that the problems resulting from the events of 1974 have remained unresolved. The active participation of the Secretary-General, under whose auspices the intercommunal talks have been held, have not yielded any positive results so far. The reasons for this unsatisfactory situation are discussed in detail in the report of the Secretary-General.

70. The fact that the most important aspects of the Cyprus crisis have not been settled means that the situation is a serious threat to peace and security in the eastern Mediterranean. Because of external forces that

are anxious to maintain tension in Cyprus and the adjacent region, the decisions on the Cyprus question adopted by the Security Council and by the General Assembly have not been implemented. According to those decisions, a settlement of the Cyprus crisis must be based on the preservation of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus, on respect for its policy of non-alignment, the speedy withdrawal of all foreign troops and military personnel from its territory, on non-interference in its internal affairs and on the immediate return of all refugees to their homes in conditions of security. Those are the key provisions of United Nations decisions, the implementation of which would provide an opportunity for a just settlement to be found to the Cyprus problem and for the elimination of this dangerous source of tension.

71. Now it is becoming obvious to everyone—as has been recognized even by *The New York Times* in an editorial of 9 June—that in Cyprus things are moving towards a partition of the island and the destruction of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of a non-aligned State, the Republic of Cyprus. The Council should not close its eyes to the fact that further developments along those lines would represent a serious threat of annexation and even of double *enosis* for the island. This is a threat that should not be overlooked.

72. In these circumstances, the elementary duty of the Security Council is to discuss the substance of the Cyprus question, to identify the reasons why the resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly on Cyprus have not been implemented, and to take steps to prevent the partition of a Member State of the United Nations and avert the destruction of its independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity. It would be incomprehensible, indeed inexplicable, if the Council, after studying the very full and comprehensive report of the Secretary-General and his grave warnings regarding the dangerous turn of events in Cyprus, were to disregard his warnings, pass over the fundamental aspects of the Cyprus problem in silence and confine itself simply to a mechanical six-month extension of the mandate of the United Nations Force in Cyprus.

73. It is natural to expect that the non-aligned countries, both in the Council and outside it, guided by their fundamental position on Cyprus, which has been set in out a number of official documents of the conferences held by those countries, in particular the Declaration of the Lima Conference², will take the initiative regarding the concrete measures which should be taken through the United Nations in order to protect the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus, which is one of the founders of and an active participant in the non-aligned movement.

74. As far as the position of four permanent members of the Security Council is concerned—and I am

referring to the Soviet Union, the United States, France and the United Kingdom—they, together with the non-aligned countries, have also in their joint communiqués assumed the weighty commitment to preserve and respect the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus. I have already quoted from the Soviet-French communiqué. Similar provisions are to be found in the joint communiqués on the Soviet-American talks of 24 November 1974 and in the United Kingdom—Soviet talks of 16 February 1975. Those who participated in those talks also officially stated that they respected the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus. According to the United Kingdom—Soviet statement, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom “recognize the one lawful Government of Cyprus headed by President Makarios” [S/11659, *annex, para. 34.*] In the Soviet-United States communiqué, the parties emphasize that a just solution to the Cyprus question should be based on strict compliance with the decisions of the Security Council and the General Assembly regarding Cyprus. Consequently, four of the permanent members of the Security Council have made those important commitments. The positions defined in those documents on the Cyprus question are fully relevant to the present day and acquire particular significance now in view of the tense situation which continues in Cyprus. What must be done now is to ensure that these promises and commitments are fulfilled without delay.

75. Recently, at its thirty-second session, in Geneva, the Commission on Human Rights itself adopted a resolution³ referring specifically to the need to respect the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity and the policy of non-alignment of the Republic of Cyprus. The Commission also urged all countries to refrain from unilateral actions in contravention of the United Nations resolutions on Cyprus, including changes in the demographic structure of Cyprus.

76. The Soviet Union continues to be firmly in favour of the immediate implementation of the decisions of the Security Council and the General Assembly on the question of a settlement in Cyprus.

77. In the programme of further struggle for peace and international co-operation and for the freedom and independence of the peoples, adopted at the Twenty-fifth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, high priority was given to the need to concentrate the efforts of peace-loving States on eliminating the remaining seats of war. The elimination of the explosive situations which continue in certain parts of the world is dictated by the interests of international peace and security, which in turn accord with the principles and aims of the United Nations and the objectives of the peace-loving Leninist foreign policy of the Soviet Union. The Congress drew special attention to the fact that one of the most complex and dangerous sources of tension was the Cyprus problem.

78. From the very beginning of that crisis, the Soviet Union has been a constant defender of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Cyprus and has been in favour of withdrawing all foreign troops from the island and granting its population—both those of Greek and those of Turkish origin—the right to decide on their own future and to manage the affairs of their own unitary State. The Soviet Union has demanded and continues to demand that an end be put to foreign intervention in the internal affairs of the sovereign State of Cyprus, which is a full-fledged Member of the United Nations and an active participant in the non-aligned movement. It has strongly condemned any attempts to annex or partition Cyprus.

79. The consistent and fundamental position of the Soviet Union in the matter of Cyprus was further reaffirmed in the report of the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Mr. Brezhnev, to the Twenty-fifth Congress of the Party. He stated:

“There still exists in Europe, for instance, such a complex and dangerous source of tension as the Cyprus problem. We are convinced that sensible consideration for the interests and rights of both communities in Cyprus will—given unconditional respect for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus, and barring attempts to impose outside solutions alien to Cypriots—pave the way to a settlement of this acute problem to the advantage of peace, security and tranquillity in Europe”.

80. That is the fundamental position of the Soviet Union. It is based on the unshakable principles of our Leninist foreign policy—that is, to protect the sacred and inalienable right of every people, in every country, large and small, to decide its own future, in the interest of international peace and security.

81. The Soviet delegation considers that the nature of the present situation in Cyprus, as well as the situation surrounding the Cyprus problem, bears out once again the validity and timeliness of the main proposal made by the Soviet Union at the very beginning of the discussion of the Cyprus problem in the United Nations. At that time the Soviet Union proposed that the question of Cyprus should be considered in a representative forum of States and for that purpose, that a representative international conference should be convened within the framework of the United Nations [S/11465 of 22 August 1974]. Only that kind of international conference on Cyprus could help to promote a just settlement of this ominous source of tension. Unfortunately, at that time the culprits who were responsible for the Cyprus tragedy, together with those who were longing for another world war and those who were stirring up further tension in all parts of the world, including the Eastern Mediterranean, made it impossible for that proposal to be accepted. The Soviet delegation considers it

imperative to remind the Council of that proposal and, on behalf of the Soviet Government, to reaffirm it and urge its adoption.

82. Why have we come to this conclusion, and why are we thus renewing our proposal? The reason is that the deadlock in the taking of decisions on the Cyprus question and the evident intention, evinced, for example, in Brussels and Oslo, of using the difficulties in the intercommunal talks to benefit NATO have convinced us that a representative international conference on Cyprus could, under present conditions, promote a just settlement.

83. The delegation of the Soviet Union would like to remind members of the Council of another proposal made by the Soviet Union—that is, the proposal that a special mission should be sent to Cyprus by the Security Council [S/11391 of 29 July 1974.]

84. The adoption and implementation of those proposals would undoubtedly help to achieve a just and peaceful solution to the Cyprus problem that would meet the interests of the people of Cyprus and the interests of peace and security in the eastern Mediterranean. It would also help to bring about a reduction of international tension.

85. As to the question of the extension of the mandate of the United Nations Force in Cyprus for a further period of six months, the delegation of the Soviet Union does not intend to object to that extension, since agreement to it has been received from the Government of the Republic of Cyprus. However, it must be understood that the Force will continue to be financed in the same way as before—that is, on a voluntary basis.

86. In conclusion, the delegation of the Soviet Union considers it necessary to point out that the extension of the mandate of the United Nations Force cannot, by itself, bring a settlement of the Cyprus problem any closer. What the Security Council has to do is intensify its efforts to settle this problem in order to guarantee the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the State of Cyprus, and to ensure the implementation of its decisions on Cyprus and those of the General Assembly.

87. The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the Soviet Union for the kind and generous remarks he made about me personally and about my country. I wish to assure him of our reciprocal feelings concerning the further strengthening of relations between our two peoples and countries.

88. Mr. MURRAY (United Kingdom): May I first, Sir, congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council. Were I in your place I would consider myself somewhat unlucky to have assumed the presidency in the month of June. Your immediate successors may have some ground to hope that in the holiday period ahead of us their

tenure of office may be less demanding. You, on the other hand, are obliged to preside over at least two debates. However, the other members of the Council can count themselves fortunate to find that in this busy month our deliberations are taking place under the guidance of an old and respected friend in whose experience and skill we have the utmost confidence.

89. I should like also to associate myself with the compliments that have been paid to your predecessor, the representative of France, for the skill and, above all, the style with which he conducted our deliberations last month.

90. Like other speakers before me, I should like to thank the Secretary-General for another admirably clear report on the United Nations operation in Cyprus. The report brings out very well just how much UNFICYP contributes to the creation of conditions in the island in which the intercommunal talks can continue with some chance of success. It also reflects the untiring efforts which the Secretary-General has exerted in pursuance of the good-offices mission which the Council has entrusted to him.

91. In the view of my delegation the Secretary-General, and his Special Representative in Cyprus, Ambassador Pérez de Cuéllar, as well as the Commander of UNFICYP, Lieutenant-General Prem Chand, and their civilian staff and the soldiers of UNFICYP, deserve the confidence and admiration of us all.

92. In his report the Secretary-General states that in the present circumstances the continued presence of UNFICYP is essential not only to help maintain quiet in the island, but also to facilitate the continued search for a peaceful settlement. My delegation agrees with him that there is a real need for UNFICYP to continue to perform its task, and we support the view that the mandate of the Force should be extended for a further six months.

93. Moreover, I am glad to be able to say that the United Kingdom hopes to maintain the British contingent at its present strength for the coming mandate period. We shall continue to meet the cost of our contingent in full; it is the largest contingent in the Force. We shall also continue to meet a large part of the cost of logistic support to the Force. In the financial year 1975/76 this amounted to 1.7 million pounds.

94. In his report the Secretary-General warns the Council again about the increasingly critical financial situation of the Force. It is indeed highly unsatisfactory that we should give a mandate to the Secretary-General and then fail to provide him with the financial resources to carry it out. The situation is so serious in the view of the Secretary-General that he warns us that if no remedial measures can be achieved, UNFICYP may well one day find itself unable to continue to

function. My delegation considers that the Secretary-General could justifiably hope that in view of the numerous favourable votes in the Security Council by which the UNFICYP mandate has been renewed, the number of States making voluntary contributions in support of the operation would be much greater than has been the case.

95. The immediate objective of the present meeting was to renew the UNFICYP mandate, not to embark upon a detailed discussion of the political situation in Cyprus. I much regret, therefore, that my Soviet colleague should persist in going round in circles and should repeat his preposterous allegation that all the present problems of Cyprus apparently stem from a wicked attempt by NATO to grab an unsinkable aircraft carrier. The Cypriots themselves, both Greek and Turk, know a great deal better than that—and so should my Soviet colleague.

96. But though our immediate objective is to renew the mandate, we must also do our best to promote progress towards a political settlement. The resolution which I hope we shall adopt must, in our view, reaffirm resolution 367 (1975). That resolution contains the basis for the Secretary-General's mission of good offices and asks the representatives of the two communities to accord a high priority to their negotiations.

97. The United Kingdom Government appeals to the negotiators to heed such a request. My Government and our partners in the European Community, for whom the Cyprus problem is a matter of common concern—and I may say, not clandestinely, as has been suggested here, but openly and in co-operation with all concerned—consider that a loss of momentum in the search for a solution to the Cyprus problem represents a danger for peace and security in the eastern Mediterranean. In the view of the Community, conditions are such that negotiations under the personal aegis of the Secretary-General within the framework of his present mandate could now be resumed. We earnestly hope that the parties will not act in such a way as to prejudice this.

98. The United Kingdom delegation, together with its partners in the European Community, is also concerned with the humanitarian problem in Cyprus. They support the efforts of international organizations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. The Nine believe that the parties concerned should assist those organizations to the best of their abilities. A resumption of the intercommunal talks would help towards a solution of the humanitarian problem. Conversely, co-operation based on trust aimed at solving that problem could only improve the atmosphere of the intercommunal talks.

99. The Secretary-General says in his report that tension in the island remains high and the problems

resulting from the events of 1974 have remained largely unresolved. My delegation believes that the Security Council, the UNFICYP troop contributors and, most of all, the people of Cyprus, have a right to expect that the parties to the Cyprus dispute should move with a sense of opportunity and urgency to resolve the problems which divide them. We ask that they make a renewed and sustained effort and, like the Secretary-General, we hope that they will be prepared to show the necessary flexibility to find solutions to a problem which has for so long eluded attempts at settlement.

100. Mr. de GUIRINGAUD (France) (*interpretation from French*): First of all, on behalf of my delegation I should like to congratulate you, Sir, on your assumption of the presidency of our Council. During the one and a half years that you have been here we have all been much impressed with your diplomatic and negotiating skills. Most frequently, together with representatives of the other non-aligned members of the Council, you have made a substantial contribution to our work by producing most of the texts which we have considered. There is no doubt that once again you will have an opportunity to display your talent in the course of the present month, when the Council is called upon to consider some of the most complex and disturbing items on its agenda.

101. I wish also to express my gratitude to the delegations which felt it their duty to express their gratitude to the outgoing President. I am most grateful for their kind words and the special praise that they were so good as to address to me. The co-operation of all members of the Council and that of the Secretariat made my task an easy one, so I feel that all should be included in this tribute of gratitude and in my expression of thanks.

102. I would add a word for Mr. Malik and thank him for having mentioned the 1974 Franco-Soviet joint declaration, which emphasizes that his Government and mine wish to see the restoration of a normal situation on Cyprus.

103. Our examination of the Secretary-General's report on the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus provides the Council with an opportunity every six months to consider the situation on the island and make comments—gloomy ones. The excellent document submitted to us on 5 June hardly inspires us to break with that tradition. The very fact that the Secretary-General considers it necessary to maintain the Force for a further six-month period—a position which my delegation fully endorses—underlines the fact that the problems remain largely unchanged.

104. But it appears from the report that there are two kinds of problems. One is traditional and refers to relations between the two communities wherever they are in contact and, accordingly, to maintaining the cease-fire. Although there has been a marked

reduction in the number of shooting incidents along the cease-fire lines, on the other hand we observe the persistence, already indicated in December last [S/11900], of violations of the cease-fire by forward movement from those lines and the building of new defensive positions. We can only renew our appeal for observance of the cease-fire and of the cease-fire line that was established on 16 August 1974. Preservation of the *status quo* is one of the necessary conditions in seeking a peaceful settlement.

105. But there is another set of problems which is more recent and equally disturbing. I am referring to the obstacles encountered by the Force in carrying out its mission in the northern part of the island. The Secretary-General, notwithstanding the understandable caution with which he usually reports difficulties encountered in the implementation of the Force's mission, is led to note in paragraph 23 of his report that it "has been unable to contribute in any effective way to welfare, well-being and security of the Greek Cypriots in the north." That part of the population which, like the rest of the inhabitants of the island, should enjoy its protection is threatened, it seems. The Secretary-General, while recognizing that the civilian police cannot make inquiries because of the restrictions imposed on it, believes that he should in fact report the serious complaints he has received, namely, of pressures exercised to force the Greek Cypriots to leave the north; if they did not agree, they would be forcibly expelled without being allowed to take their possessions. Similarly, we note that in six months 1,400 Greek Cypriots have moved south. Finally, from Greek Cypriot sources, we learn that it is estimated that 44,000 Turkish immigrants have settled in the north of the island, while the Turkish Cypriot authorities, without giving any figures, affirm that the majority of these Turkish nationals are only temporarily in Cyprus.

106. Those complaints, this information cannot be ignored. The best, the only response is to let the Force bear witness impartially about what is happening. This means that it should be in a position to carry out its mission under the same conditions in the north and in the south of the island. Its function, as stated in resolution 186 (1964) is, furthermore, to prevent a recurrence of fighting, to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions. The parties concerned, which have agreed to the renewal of its mandate, should also ensure that it can carry out its mission fully. We should therefore like to believe that that will be both the purpose and the result of the arrangements now being discussed between the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Mr. Denktas.

107. Another essential aspect of the situation is the mission of good offices of the Secretary-General. It is obvious that the presence of the Force is not an end in itself and that when we consider the renewal of its mandate, we cannot disregard the reasons which justify it, apart from that of maintaining calm.

108. Since our last meeting on this question in December 1975, a fifth round of talks has been held in Vienna. In view of the guidelines that were laid down earlier by the Brussels agreement, there were positive results at that round, in so far as the parties committed themselves to presenting concrete proposals on the various aspects of a political solution to the problem, proposals which were to be included in a "package deal" which would form the basis and the instrument of an effort at settlement. Despite certain vicissitudes noted in the report, a process is under way. Letters have been exchanged through the Special Representative and are published in the annexes to the report. Their significance and scope are still being analysed by the various parties concerned.

109. In our view, there is thus now a basis for negotiations to begin on matters of substance, since all preconditions have been excluded in advance, with the single exception of the exchange of proposals, which has been fulfilled. However far apart the positions of the parties may be, we nevertheless consider that they should be recognized as being sufficient points of departure, it being understood that, in accordance with the commitments entered into at Vienna, none of the points appearing there as a principle can be interpreted as a precondition.

110. We therefore believe that, within the framework of his mandate, which also determines the forms and modalities of the negotiations, the Secretary-General could, on the basis of this observation, proceed to a new round of negotiations, if each of the parties declares that it is prepared to submit to his judgement on this point. That is our hope and that of the other members of the European Community which have a legitimate interest in a situation that implicates countries with which we have ties.

111. The Secretary-General, who gives constant proof of his boundless dedication, has spared no effort. In those he has yet to undertake he may rest assured that he will have, as in the past, our complete support. He has the entire confidence of the parties, as they themselves have stated. As he knows, we are also prepared to assist him in carrying out a difficult mission, to which my country attaches the utmost importance. I also wish to pay a tribute to the on-the-spot activities of his Special Representative, Ambassador Pérez de Cuéllar. The Secretary-General has confidence in him and has given him a delicate task; he has justified that confidence fully.

112. Finally, I wish to pay a tribute to the devotion and outstanding ability of the Commander of the Force, Lieutenant-General Prem Chand, and the troops which make up the Force. The Council's wish to renew the mandate of UNFICYP must also be interpreted as being a tribute of high appreciation and encouragement to him.

113. Mr. VINCI (Italy): Mr. President, I should like first of all to congratulate you upon your assumption

of the presidency of the Security Council. Your well-known talents and skills as a diplomat and negotiator are highly appreciated by all your colleagues in the Council and in the other bodies of the United Nations. My delegation and I take great pleasure in welcoming in the Chair the representative of a friendly country with which Italy enjoys cordials relations, relations which have been strengthened on a personal level by our being neighbours at this table, owing to the fortunate circumstances of the alphabetical order.

114. I should like also to associate myself with the well-deserved thanks and congratulations that have been addressed to your predecessor, the representative of France, Ambassador Louis de Guiringaud, for his most successful accomplishments through the whole month of May.

115. I must once again confess that the Italian delegation had very much hoped that it would have been possible to re-examine the question of Cyprus in the Council and the renewal of the mandate of the United Nations Force in Cyprus in the light of constant progress along the lines indicated by pertinent United Nations resolutions. We regret that that does not seem to be the case, as emerges quite clearly from the Secretary-General's commendable report. We read in paragraph 63 of that report that:

"... the situation in Cyprus has been relatively quiet in the sense that there have been no major military confrontations and few cease-fire violations of a serious nature. But tension in the island has continued to be high and the problems resulting from the events of 1974 have remained largely unresolved."

Furthermore, the Secretary-General, referring to the good offices mission entrusted to him by the Council in paragraph 6 of resolution 367 (1975), informs us of the following in paragraph 68:

"The sixth round [of talks] was scheduled for May but had to be postponed because the exchange of written proposals on the territorial issue had not been fully carried out as foreseen in the agreement reached during the fifth round."

116. The Foreign Minister of the Republic of Cyprus and many speakers before me have quoted other paragraphs of the report which are no less dismaying.

117. All this seems to my delegation both unfortunate and disappointing. In the first instance it raises, in our minds, the question of whether one or the other or both the parties directly concerned have really on this occasion exercised all possible efforts to reach that solution of the crisis to which they have publicly committed themselves so often.

118. We find it particularly difficult to accept the disproportionate importance given to procedural

matters at a time when, on the contrary, attention should be focused wholly on the substance of the matter. If I heard well and understood correctly, the representative of Turkey has said exactly the same thing today. The Italian delegation frankly believes that some of the issues raised in the letters appearing in the annexes to the report of the Secretary-General, and in some of the lengthy statements made during this debate, amount to a delaying of the negotiating process which the Council itself has recommended. Now that the text of the Brussels agreement and its authentic interpretation are officially recorded in our verbatim records [*1925th meeting, para. 111*], we cannot fail to notice that what the Council, and the Secretary-General on our behalf, have a right to demand, are negotiations conducted in a business-like way. In other words, the proposals must not be subject to conditions of any nature, substantive or procedural, or followed by too many reservations of one sort or another. However far apart those proposals may be, they can be taken as the basis of discussion. This has always been the purpose of international negotiations since the beginning of human history.

119. The Council is not a court and has not the power to carry out detailed investigations and, having ascertained the facts, to deliver judgements like any national court. We can nevertheless demand full respect for the resolutions of the Council and for the agreements reached at every stage by the parties to a dispute.

120. As far as my delegation is concerned, my predecessors and I have on several occasions stated and restated Italy's position on the basic issues of the Cyprus crisis. As I said at the 1863rd meeting of the Council on 13 December 1975, Italy is firmly convinced that the responsibility for seeking reconciliation lies mainly with the parties directly concerned and, in particular, with the leaders of the two communities. At this stage, when a new stalemate seems to hinder further talks between the two communities, we feel it our duty to emphasize the significance of such a responsibility, and express our trust that the parties concerned and their leaders will duly live up to it.

121. On the basis of the statements made today and at the meeting on Friday, we are glad to note that both parties seem ready now to resume the negotiations on the substance of the problem.

122. Having said that, may I express our belief that the basis for progress in the search for a solution can be found along the lines indicated by the nine member States of the European Community. At the last General Assembly session⁴ those lines were described by myself, in my capacity then as Chairman of the Nine. Allow me to recall and summarize them once again.

123. First of all, we think that the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the Republic

of Cyprus should be reaffirmed. Secondly, we believe that agreement between the two communities composing that sovereign State is essential to the search for a settlement. Finally, we attach particular importance to the distressing question of the refugees, which concerns a sensitive sector of the population of the island. What we heard in this chamber from the main parties concerned raises some better hopes than in the past on this point.

124. Mr. President, I should like to assure you, as well as the members of the Council, that the action of the nine members States of the European Community with regard to the problem of Cyprus is not restricted to the issuance of statements, here or elsewhere. We are, on the contrary, taking an active and open role in promoting a durable peace in the area in the interest of the communities concerned, a role of which the Governments of the parties involved are well aware. To mention just one essential point: in the opinion of the Nine, the long delayed exchange of territorial propositions has indeed taken place as required.

125. That is why, at this stage, my country strongly urges the parties concerned to leave aside, if not forget, past wrongs, to abstain from any further procedural wrangles and to agree to meet again around the table, for the purpose of meaningful and productive talks, at a date that the Secretary-General may deem fittest—talks which can be carried on, as we read in the documents annexed to the report of the Secretary-General, “confidentially and free of propaganda considerations” [S/12093, annex VI, para. 2], as proposed by the Turkish-Cypriot side; and “in an effort to establish a common basis ‘prior to referring the matter to mixed committees in Cyprus’ ” [*ibid.*, annex VII], as advocated by the Greek Cypriot side. At the same time, the parties concerned, following the recommendation of the Secretary-General in paragraph 70 of his report,

“... must be willing to show the necessary flexibility, taking into account not only their own interests but also the legitimate aspirations and requirements of the opposing side.”

126. I need hardly recall the very special interest of Italy in the issue at stake, which amounts to a potentially dangerous situation in Cyprus and in the Mediterranean. Italy being in the heart of the area, this situation is a source of special—indeed, serious—concern to my country, which aims at the restoration of stability in Cyprus and in the surrounding area, both because of its geographical position and because of its friendly relations with all the countries involved.

127. I wish to add a few words on those parts of the report of the Secretary-General which refer to the operations of UNFICYP, and to the humanitarian aspect of the crisis.

128. On the first point, we note with regret and concern that the free and complete functioning of the

Force is still obstructed, since some previous lamented restrictions have been increased instead of being removed, as agreed upon in the third round of the Vienna talks. Such a development is even more regrettable as it has prevented the Force from carrying out to the extent required its humanitarian tasks in needy Greek villages in the north.

129. On the second point, generally speaking, we want to stress the relevance of the humanitarian aspect of the crisis, because the ordeal of thousands of refugees seems to go on indefinitely, adding more injustice and suffering to the real losers in this senseless crisis, namely, the civilian population—thousands of innocent men, women and children.

130. It is with these feelings of anxiety and human understanding for all those involved in the Cypriot drama, together with the hopes I have voiced, and relying on the capacity and the will of the leaders to put their brilliant minds at the service of the common good of their peoples, that my delegation is ready to support an extension of the mandate of the Force and to vote in favour of a draft resolution along the lines that I have indicated. To this effect, my delegation lends its support to the further efforts you, Mr. President, are planning to undertake in order to bring our deliberations to an early and positive outcome.

131. Before concluding, I should like to express my Government's deep appreciation for the untiring efforts undertaken by the Secretary-General. We owe him, for this and for all other well-known personal undertakings of his, a great debt of gratitude. We should like to encourage him to go ahead with the unshaken faith he has displayed. We place our full confidence in Mr. Waldheim, as well as in Ambassador Pérez de Cuéllar, his Special Representative, to whom we wish to convey also our high appreciation for the skill and patience he has shown in circumstances that are rather unusual, even for the most experienced diplomat he is.

132. We wish also to pay once more a well-deserved tribute to the countries which have provided contingents for UNFICYP and to all the personnel of those contingents, who have so efficiently carried out their duties under the respected, efficient command of Lieutenant-General Prem Chand.

133. The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Italy for his kind and generous remarks about me personally and about the cordial relations between our two countries. May I say that it has been my good fortune that an accident of the alphabet has enabled me to benefit, through proximity, by the friendship and advice of my colleague from Italy.

134. Mr. DATCU (Romania) (*interpretation from French*): Mr. President, before going into the subject of our debate, may I be allowed to say how pleased we are to see you presiding over the deliberations

of the Security Council when it has to consider important questions, the solution of which will doubtless advance the cause of international peace and security. Given the essential role of the non-aligned countries in the just solution of these problems and their contribution to that solution, it is a happy coincidence indeed that the presidency of the Council for this month should fall to the illustrious representative of a non-aligned country. The active and positive role played by your country, Guyana, in the United Nations in the establishment of a new kind of relations among all nations is widely recognized and appreciated. We are convinced that under your wise and competent guidance the work of the Council will be crowned with success. In the discharge of your important duties, you can always count on the unreserved support of the delegation of Romania.

135. May I also express my gratitude and pay a warm and well-deserved tribute to the representative of France, Mr. Louis de Guiringaud, for his assiduous and effective guidance of our work last month, which enabled the Council to achieve positive results.

136. May I also avail myself of this opportunity to welcome most warmly Ambassador Jorge Illueca, the new Permanent Representative of Panama, and to wish him every success in this important mission.

137. The delegation of Romania would like to consider the situation in Cyprus in its two essential aspects—on the one hand, the activities of UNFICYP, whose mandate is due to expire tomorrow, and, on the other hand, the status of the intercommunal negotiations, which began last year under the auspices of the Secretary-General, in accordance with the provisions of resolution 367 (1975). These two aspects are for obvious reasons inseparable.

138. The delegation of Romania has carefully studied the reports submitted by the Secretary-General on the basis of resolution 383 (1975) [S/11993, S/12031 and S/12093], and we express our gratitude to him.

139. As regards the first aspect of the problem, I should like to state that my delegation has no objection to extending the mandate of the Force for a further six-month period, particularly since the legal Government of the Republic of Cyprus has agreed to it.

140. As regards the procedures for the political settlement of the situation, the delegation of Romania would like at this stage to make the following comments.

141. General Assembly resolution 3212 (XXIX), which has been confirmed and endorsed by the Security Council [resolution 365 (1974)], states the principles on which the Cyprus crisis must be solved, namely, respect for the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and non-alignment of the Republic of Cyprus; the withdrawal of all foreign armed forces and per-

sonnel and the cessation of all foreign interference in its affairs.

142. Recognizing that the constitutional system of the Republic of Cyprus is a matter for the Greek and Turkish communities to decide, the General Assembly and the Security Council have recommended that the parties concerned start negotiations under the auspices of the Secretary-General so as to arrive at a mutually acceptable political settlement.

143. On the basis of the latest reports of the Secretary-General, no substantial progress has been registered as regards the solution of the fundamental problem of Cyprus. We note with regret that not even the recommendations on Cyprus adopted unanimously by United Nations organs have been implemented. What is more, measures have been taken in the northern part of the island the effect of which is to accentuate the political and demographic division and separation between the two communities.

144. According to paragraph 23 of the Secretary-General's last report, there is a continued outflow of Greek Cypriots from the north of the island. Paragraph 29 of the Secretary-General's report, records complaints that "Greek Cypriots in the north are being subjected to pressure to move to the south and that their property is subject to confiscation".

145. We dwell on this aspect because General Assembly resolution 3395 (XXX) laid down clear obligations for the parties concerned. They must, on the one hand, refrain from any actions that would change the demographic structure of Cyprus, and, on the other hand, they must undertake urgent measures to facilitate the return of all refugees to their homes.

146. It is true that an initial step forward has been made by the Vienna agreements of 2 August 1975; but here again, as we see clearly from paragraph 65 of the Secretary-General's report, these agreements have not been fully implemented.

147. We have approved and encouraged continued negotiations between the two communities under the auspices of the Secretary-General. We rejoiced when last February the representatives of the two communities succeeded in reopening substantive discussions on territorial and constitutional questions and decided that there should be an exchange of written proposals on these fundamental aspects. But on this point, the Secretary-General's report states, in paragraph 68, that "the exchange of written proposals on the territorial issue had not been fully carried out as foreseen in the agreement reached during the fifth round" of talks, and the sixth round scheduled for May had to be postponed.

148. We consider that the Security Council should play a more active part in reviewing diplomatic efforts to achieve a solution of the Cyprus problem, par-

ticularly when negotiations are held under the auspices of our Organization. Negotiations between the two parties should be carried out as provided for in resolution 3395 (XXX), namely, "in a meaningful and constructive manner," and that they should be "conducted freely on an equal footing." In this respect we completely agree with the opinion of our Secretary-General, who states in paragraph 70 of his report that for negotiations between the representatives of the two communities "to serve a useful purpose, all the parties concerned must be willing to show the necessary flexibility, taking into account not only their own interests but also the legitimate aspirations and requirements of the opposing side".

149. Since the outbreak of the conflict in Cyprus, Romania has consistently favoured respect for the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus. My country has pronounced itself in favour of the withdrawal without further delay of all foreign armed forces from the Republic of Cyprus, and the cessation of all foreign interference in the internal affairs of that country.

150. We have the highest appreciation for the efforts made by the Secretary-General, and by his assistants and his Special Representative, Ambassador Pérez de Cuéllar, to achieve implementation of the decisions and recommendations on Cyprus. We wish to express our gratitude to them and to encourage them to continue their efforts with the same energy and dedication.

151. We are convinced that these efforts must be continued in order to arrive at a solution to all the controversial aspects of the Cyprus question within the framework of a constructive political dialogue, by means of direct negotiations between the representatives of the two communities, under the auspices of our Organization. The Council should request the Secretary-General to continue to lend his good offices to promote the intercommunal talks and see to it that they are held in good faith and without any external pressures. The Romanian delegation believes that the Council should require respect for and faithful implementation of the agreements previously reached.

152. We are convinced that it is possible to arrive at an equitable solution to the Cyprus problem on the basis of mutual respect and confidence which will ensure the co-existence of the two communities within a single independent State. To that end, any solution reached by the two parties, particularly as regards the constitutional régime and the state structure of the Republic of Cyprus, must be in harmony with the rights and legitimate aspirations of both communities and be based on the United Nations resolutions which have recognized the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and non-alignment of that country.

153. Given the responsibilities incumbent on the Council in correcting situations whose continuation

might threaten international peace and security, it is our view that the Council should remain actively seized of the situation on Cyprus and be ready, if necessary, to consider all ways and means of enabling the United Nations and the international community to contribute to the success of the negotiations between the two parties concerned and to the over-all settlement of the Cyprus problem.

154. In conclusion, I should like to state that, in the future too, Romania is prepared to support any initiative, any sincere effort intended to make the long awaited peace a reality for the Cypriot population, whether Greek or Turkish, and to remove the tension engendered by the Cyprus crisis, so that the Balkan and Mediterranean countries may develop and strengthen relations of friendship and co-operation.

155. The PRESIDENT: I have been informed that Mr. Atalay, to whom the Council has extended an invitation under rule 39 of its provisional rules of procedure, wishes to make a further statement to the Council. If there is no objection, I shall invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

156. Mr. ATALAY: Mr. President, I should like to thank you and, through you, each and every member of the Council for giving me the opportunity to speak for a second time. I have asked to speak in order to address myself to the statement of Mr. Christophides, the Greek Cypriot representative, and to comment on some of the points raised by him and some of the other speakers.

157. The Turkish side has always been criticized and blamed by the Greek side for prolonging the Cyprus problem and not doing its best to find a just and peaceful solution. We deny that. We sincerely believe that we have done and are doing our best to find a just solution to the problem on a realistic basis. It is our view that it is the approach of Makarios, his beliefs and his treatment of the problem, that prolong the situation and cause it to drag on.

158. I will now briefly describe some of Makarios' approaches and his treatment of the problem. First of all, Makarios has for the last 13 years refused to sign any agreement which might close the door to *enosis*. As late as May 1975, through his public information office, he declared:

"If the talks continue... the mistaken impression will be formed that the Cyprus problem is merely a dispute between the two communities and the problem will shift from its international basis, shrinking to the dimensions of an internal problem of the island."

However, before the Turkish peace operation caused by the Sampson coup, the same Makarios was saying that the problem of Cyprus was an internal matter to be settled between the two communities in Cyprus.

159. The insistence of the Greek Cypriot leadership on a solution based on their unfounded and unpromising assumption that the whole island belonged to them is summed up in these words:

“The Greek Cypriot people will plan a struggle on a long-term basis and will continue to resist and struggle until they regain the independence and territorial integrity of their island.”

That reflects how far away they are from a realistic appraisal of the new situation.

160. It is this approach to the problem, it is this belief that the Greek Cypriot people—a projection of the Greek nation on the island—own the independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus which lies at the root of the Cyprus crisis. If the Greek Cypriot leaders believe that Cyprus is the property of the Greek Cypriots to the exclusion of the Turkish Cypriots—a projection of the mainland Turkish nation on the same island—, naturally the idea of continuing negotiations with the Turkish Cypriots is meaningless and even harmful to their cause.

161. It is because of that belief that they continue to give a distorted, one-sided picture of the events in Cyprus. It is that false and harmful belief that binational Cyprus is Greek, and therefore rightly entitled to destroy itself in order to unite with Greece, which caused the Cyprus problem in the past and eventually prevented its speedy solution.

162. I am addressing the Council for and on behalf of the Turkish Cypriot community, which is one of the co-founder communities of the binational independence of Cyprus. I am speaking on behalf of a community which alone has been defending the independence and sovereignty of Cyprus at great cost of life and property for 11 years against attempts by the Greek Cypriot leadership headed by Makarios to hellenize the island by uniting it with Greece, thus dissolving the independent Republic of Cyprus.

163. In the light of the foregoing, I submit, with due respect, that the Council should consider adopting a policy which will discourage Makarios from prolonging the problem at the risk of destroying all chances of meaningful negotiation; and, instead, will encourage the speedy resumption of the intercommunal negotiations with a view to finding a just solution, taking into account the realities of the Cyprus problem.

164. As to the allegations that the independence and territorial integrity of the Cyprus Republic have been violated by the Turkish army, I should like to say that the contrary is true. Any criticism of the stay of the Turkish forces in Cyprus, any call for their withdrawal, directly affects the security of the Turkish Cypriots in Cyprus. Those who indulge in such criticism and ask for the withdrawal of the Turkish forces from Cyprus are under the impression that this

would contribute to peace and normalize the situation on the island. Far from it. I shall reiterate, in a nutshell, the facts which culminated in the intervention of Turkey as a guarantor Power in Cyprus—an intervention which could not have been delayed for another 24 hours. Had Turkey not acted in time, the independence of Cyprus would have been destroyed and all of the Turkish Cypriots would have been massacred.

165. I should like to remind representatives that the Turkish forces had to intervene in Cyprus at the eleventh hour in order to stop Greece from completing its annexation programme, which had been going on for 12 years with the full connivance of Makarios until the coup. The evidence that came to light of the total massacre of the inhabitants of Turkish Cypriot villages by the Greeks and the confession by Makarios that the total destruction of the Turkish community had also been planned—the “Akritas Plan”—is a clear indication of what tragedies the Turkish intervention prevented in Cyprus. To call this legitimate and overdue intervention “an invasion” or “an occupation” is a gross misrepresentation indicating a total lack of understanding of the Cyprus problem. In short, Turkey’s intervention was not an invasion of Cyprus; it was, on the contrary, a peace operation which saved the Turkish Cypriots from annihilation, as well as saving the independence of the Cyprus Republic and effectively closing the door to *enosis*. Previously, the bar to *enosis* was simply a written undertaking not to pursue it, an undertaking which Makarios ignored with great contempt, as was so clearly revealed in the “Akritas Plan”, which came to light through captured documents after the first murderous onslaught against the Turkish Cypriots in December 1963, a few days before Christmas—a holy time when peace on earth is preached.

166. During the Sampson coup of 15 July 1974, in collaboration with the Greek junta, some 3,000 Greek Cypriots were killed. Had Turkey not acted in time, God knows how many more would have been killed. Three thousand were already behind bars, but within a short time they were all pardoned in order to fight the common enemy, the Turk. If Turkey had not acted, within a week union of Cyprus with Greece would have been declared. If we had objected—as we naturally would have done—the world would have been told that the Turkish Cypriots had rebelled against the State, and we would have been mercilessly massacred.

167. The call for the withdrawal of Turkish troops before a final settlement is reached is unrealistic. We, as the Turkish partners of the independent Republic of Cyprus, declare that until a just and lasting peace is reached the maintenance of the Turkish forces in Cyprus is essential for the security and protection of the Turkish Cypriot community, and for the independence of the Republic.

168. For 12 years, from 1963, no mention had been made here of political, social, religious, administrative and economic discrimination and suppression. No mention had been made here of a refugee problem. Why? Because there was a different foot in the shoe. Because then the sufferers were the Turkish Cypriots. In the same way, for so many years there had been no mention of a foreign military presence on the island, because the occupying forces were Greek mainland forces.

169. With your permission, Mr. President, I should like to comment on those charges very briefly.

170. One of the humanitarian issues which has been the target of Greek exploitation is the refugee problem. Highly inconsistent figures have been put out by the Greek Cypriot administration and news media regarding the number of Greek displaced persons, figures ranging from 56,300—as appeared in the Greek Cypriot press on 14 October 1975—to the grossly exaggerated figure of 200,000. Although it is difficult to determine the exact number of Greek Cypriot displaced persons, a census of evacuated Greek Cypriot villages and homes shows that the figure is around 90,000.

171. I am not trying to underestimate the humanitarian problem in Cyprus. Nor is the refugee problem new to us. We have been living with the refugee problem since 1963. Twenty-five thousand Turkish Cypriots who were displaced by force of arms—as confirmed by the Secretary-General's reports—were not allowed to return to their homes and for 12 years were committed to a refugee life in their own lands, under most unhygienic and unbearable conditions. Another 65,000 Turkish Cypriots fled from the south to the north in fear of their lives after the coup of 1974 and the events that followed it, thus bringing the total number of Turkish displaced persons up to about 90,000.

172. It is true that these people have since last year been resettled and rehabilitated in the north in houses and on land abandoned by Greek Cypriots. It is equally true that almost an equal number of Greek Cypriots have been similarly resettled and rehabilitated in the south, in Turkish-owned houses and property. This process of regrouping has been facilitated by the agreement reached at the third round of talks held in Vienna from 31 July to 2 August 1975, as a result of which a voluntary exchange of populations between the north and the south has actually taken place, thus paving the way for a bizonal settlement.

173. As far as the Turkish side is concerned, therefore, we cannot but regard the refugee problem, in its intercommunal context, as having been settled once and for all.

174. Another issue which is grossly exaggerated and harshly exploited by the Greek Cypriot side is the

question of the so-called missing persons in Cyprus. This question was the subject of numerous discussions between Mr. Rauf Denktaş and Mr. Glafcos Clerides, both locally and during the intercommunal talks in Vienna. During these discussions Mr. Denktaş made it clear to Mr. Clerides that there were no missing persons and/or civilian detainees in the hands of the Turkish side. We also made a similar statement to that effect during our speech before the Council on 16 June 1975 [1831st meeting.]. It has also been suggested to the Greek side, with ample justification, that instead of looking for their missing in the Turkish region, they should hold Nicos Sampson responsible for the task of accounting for them—for it was Nicos Sampson who led the coup of July 1974, in collaboration with the Greek National Guard, the Greek mainland officers and EOKA-B. Greek casualties during the coup were estimated to be as high as 3,000 by the Greek Cypriot press itself.

175. Greek Cypriot accusations of the Turks on the question of missing persons, while the leaders of the coup are still freely roaming about in the streets of Nicosia, are no more than an attempt to find a scapegoat for the Greek Cypriots' own crimes.

176. We have repeatedly stated that we have no detainees—political, military or other. The Greek Cypriot leadership knows full well that there are no detainees or so-called missing persons in the hands of the Turkish authorities. None the less, they continue to exploit the issue for two reasons: first, they are trying to discredit the Turkish side by claiming that it has violated the Geneva Convention; secondly, by directing these unfounded allegations against the Turkish side, they are trying to save face at home by hiding their incompetence to deal with terrorism, incompetence to deal with violence, incompetence to deal with their private armies, incompetence to deal with murderous underground organizations, incompetence to deal with those who carried out the coup and causes so much bloodshed and loss of life in Cyprus.

177. The Minister of the Interior of the Greek Cypriot administration, Mr. Benjamin, at a press conference in Nicosia on 22 December 1975, admitted: "It is a fact that large quantities of weapons are still in the possession of illegal elements." This flagrant example of lawlessness, this apathy, is also manifested in the following questions levelled at the Greek Cypriot administration by the chief editor of *Haravgi*, the organ of the arch-communist party of Cyprus, Mr. Costas Partassides:

"1. Since the coup leaders and murderers are roaming the streets freely and, moreover, are still holding their previous posts, what kind of democratic order has been established in the island?

"2. Since we have not yet divorced our responsibility as a State from the heinous crimes committed

by fascism against Turkish Cypriot women and children and thousands of democratic elements within the Greek community, what sort of a democracy do we have?

"3. Since lawlessness is formally accepted and the State lives in harmony with armed terrorists, what kind of justice do we have?

"4. Does a policy of such co-existence between the State and lawlessness ensure the unity and the solidarity of people?

"5. Since the 'coup President' and his ministers can still act and behave in Cyprus as they did during the coup days, has anyone pondered what foreigners must be thinking of us?"

That is from a speech delivered at the Nicosia Club on 21 November 1975.

178. In connexion with the accusations regarding colonization, I should like to quote our answer from the annex to document S/11859 of 24 October 1975:

"The allegation that there is a massive immigration of Turkish nationals from Turkey to Cyprus with the purpose of changing the demographic character of the island within a pre-planned partition project, is not only completely contrary to the truth but also a distortion of the actual facts. All that is taking place is that skilled technicians and workers are being imported from Turkey on a temporary basis as 'guest workers' to meet the immediate needs of the economy and improve the economic lot of the Turkish Cypriots who had suffered untold discrimination and exploitation for the last 12 years at the hands of the Greek administration. It will be recalled that all Turkish villages in the north as well as in the south had been overrun and devastated by Greek armed elements between the first and second Turkish Peace Operation [in 1974] and all economic activity in the north halted.

"In order to meet the labour shortage that exists in industry, agriculture and tourism and reactivate the economy, therefore, skilled labour is being imported from Turkey on a seasonal basis, but there is no question of these people acquiring Cypriot citizenship or taking up permanent residence in the island.

"By far the biggest number of people who have come to Cyprus since August 1974 are Turkish Cypriots who had emigrated to Turkey, Great Britain and other Commonwealth countries in past years under political, administrative, social and economic pressures by the Greek Cypriot administration and are now being given the opportunity to return to their homeland and lead a normal life under conditions of security, in accordance with the Constitution and the relevant citizenship laws of the Republic of Cyprus.

"It would be useful to note that there are more than 300,000 Turks of Cypriot origin in Turkey alone who are entitled to come and settle in Cyprus under Annex D of the Treaty of Establishment (1960)¹ not to mention the thousands of Turkish Cypriots in other countries. There are more Turkish Cypriots presently living abroad who are willing and ready to return to Cyprus, now that conditions of security have been restored, than we can possibly house on the island.

"There is therefore no need for the Turkish-Cypriot authorities to draw on Turkish nationals in order to change the population ratio on the island as alleged by the Greek side."

179. It will be recalled that during the third round of the intercommunal talks held in Vienna, the representatives of the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot communities reached agreement, *inter alia*, on a voluntary population exchange between the two sides, paving the way for a biregional federal system of government for Cyprus. However, the Greek Cypriot interlocutor, Mr. Glafcos Clerides, eventually denied—we presume under pressure from Makarios—the fact that agreement in principle had been reached on a biregional federation. This was the first indication that the Greek Cypriot side did not intend to remain faithful to the third Vienna agreement. During the months which followed, the Turkish side indeed witnessed numerous violations of that agreement by the Greek Cypriot side.

180. For the latest manifestation of Greek Cypriot violations of agreements already reached, we can quote what Mr. Clerides said only a few days ago when some circles of the Greek Cypriot Parliament pressed the placing on the agenda of the so-called Clerides affair in order to remove him from the presidency of the House. *The Cyprus Mail* of Friday 11 June reported the following:

"House President Glafcos Clerides told the House of Representatives yesterday that he would defer putting his personal case on the agenda until after the forthcoming Security Council meetings.

"This is to consider the extension of the UNFICYP mandate in particular, and it is thought that the Cyprus problem in general may be debated as well.

"Mr. Clerides told members at the last meeting that if they insisted on a debate about his handling of the Vienna talks he would put the matter on the agenda, but he warned them that what he would be obliged to say might harm the national cause and they would have to bear the consequences.

"He offered to lay before any member the documents which he had available."

I am sure that the members of the Council will consider it worth while to ponder the significance of that most recent disclosure on the part of Mr. Clerides.

181. As another example of violations, mention may be made of the fact that Turks stranded in the Greek-controlled south were not allowed to take with them their tractors and other vehicles during their transfer to the Turkish region. The same has been true for the Turkish-owned tractors, lorries, buses, automobiles and other property which remained in the British Sovereign Base Areas, where the Turks sought refuge on account of Greek and Greek Cypriot armed attacks during 1974. The Greek side has so far refused to allow their transportation to the north.

182. Not only was the Greek side unfaithful to the Vienna agreement but it also attempted to exploit certain of its provisions as a means of smuggling ex-EOKA-B members into the Turkish region under the guise of "doctors" and "teachers". When the Turkish side carried out investigations regarding the background of those people and refused to allow their entry into the Turkish region by virtue of the provisions of the third Vienna agreement, the Greek side embarked upon a false propaganda campaign to present the Turkish side to the world as the real violator of the agreement. That was demonstrated in the statement made by the Greek Cypriot representative on Friday [1925th meeting] in which, again, various false charges and allegations were made against the authorities of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus concerning the implementation of the third Vienna agreement.

183. The following deals with the specifics of these charges and constitutes an answer to the baseless and unfounded Greek allegations contained in that statement.

184. The Greek Cypriot side is insinuating that proper medical care is not being extended to the Greek Cypriots residing in the Turkish region. All Greek allegations regarding this matter are baseless, since the Turkish doctors are taking care of their Greek Cypriot patients in the best way possible, and every medical facility is being extended to the Greek Cypriots by the Turkish side. Arrangements were even made for certain Greek Cypriots to receive medical treatment at the Greek General Hospital in the south and return to their homes in the north.

185. The United Nations Force officials stationed at the village of Vatilaka in the Karpas region have put on record once again that they are fully aware of the voluntary desire of the Greek Cypriot residents of the village to move to the southern part. These residents applied to President Denktas last Monday and informed him that they had received no reply to their months-old applications for permission to be transferred to the south. The information was brought to the President's notice while he was passing through the village. After having listened to their wishes, the President told the villagers:

"We are not preventing you and we do not want to create difficulties for you. However, every time you cross to the south, the Greek Cypriot leadership accuses us and exploits the situation for propaganda purposes. The delay for a positive reply to your applications may be due to this."

Greek Cypriot residents of the village told President Denktas that the Greek Cypriot leadership had no right whatsoever to prevent them from moving south and added:

"We want to cross to the south of our own free will. Our desire to cross to the south must be met with understanding since the island has been separated into Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot regions. We are quite satisfied by the treatment accorded to us by you and your administration, but we wish to live on the Greek Cypriot side."

186. Following his conversation with the Greek Cypriot residents of the village, President Denktas visited the headquarters of the United Nations forces stationed in the village. He asked the United Nations officials whether they were aware of the residents' desire to move to the south. After giving a positive reply, the United Nations authorities made an official record of the fact that the Greek Cypriots had made a voluntary application to President Denktas to be allowed to move south. The President stated that he would do all he could to facilitate the speedy movement of these Greek Cypriots to the south.

187. On the other hand, during his tour of the Karpas area last Monday, President Denktas also visited Boltasli, where a Greek Cypriot told him:

"I am quite happy here and I have no family in southern Cyprus. I listen to your statements over the radio. You declare that you will continue to treat us on equal terms within the laws and to extend us state protection. You further state that those who wish may stay where they are. I am one of those who wish to remain and I am very happy."

President Denktas reassured that Greek Cypriot that those who wished to remain could do so and that there was nothing for him to worry about.

188. The Greek Cypriots in the Karpas area also protested against the Greek Cypriot leadership's propaganda about them. A Greek Cypriot family in Boltasli said:

"If the Greek Cypriot leadership believes that they are helping us through their false propaganda, they are wrong. For years they deceived us through such false propaganda against the Turks and brought the Cyprus problem to its present stage."

In reply, President Denktas told that Greek Cypriot family:

"There is no problem as long as you are not poisoned or influenced by this propaganda. You should continue with your daily occupation."

189. The security, welfare and well-being of the Greek Cypriots who choose remain in the Turkish-controlled north of Cyprus is the responsibility of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus. During the past 12 years UNFICYP's practice has been to regard the security, welfare and well-being of the Turkish Cypriots living in the areas under Greek Cypriot control as the responsibility of the Greek Cypriot administration. Therefore, UNFICYP's claim of responsibility for ensuring the security, welfare and well-being of Greek Cypriots in the north appears to be contrary not only to UNFICYP's mandate but also to the established practice. Furthermore, if this claim were accepted, it would amount to the abolition of the Turkish Cypriot-controlled area as well as the denial of the authority of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus.

190. Now, I should like to refer to the question of the freedom of movement of UNFICYP in the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus.

191. The Turkish Cypriot side had all along maintained that the status of forces agreement [S/5634, annex I] which provides for the stationing, deployment and functioning and the freedom of movement of UNFICYP was not binding on the Turkish side as it had been unilaterally negotiated and signed by the then Secretary-General in March 1964 with Mr. Kyprianou representing only the Greek Cypriot side. If there have been some restrictions in these matters in practice, they were due to the lack of an agreement regulating the freedom of movement of UNFICYP in the Turkish-controlled part of the island. It is hoped that the agreement envisaged in the procès-verbal dated December 1975 [S/12093, para. 8] will be signed soon and the situation will be clarified.

192. Finally, once again, I should like to reiterate our position. We are ready to negotiate. We have not left the negotiating table, but we are not to have the method of negotiations dictated to us. We are not going to be hurried through the negotiations and leave room for the Greek Cypriot leadership to attack us anew in the future. For the last two decades we have relentlessly waged a struggle against union with Greece. Our children were born and have lived through fear, bloodshed and destruction. There is not a single Turkish Cypriot home which has not suffered, in the most terrible way, because of this *enosis* policy of the Greek Cypriot leaders. It is enough. We do not want to be any part of this struggle again. We do not want to see death and destruction, just because one side refuses an honourable compromise and to accept the realities as they are. Unless the Greek Cypriot leadership abandons its policy of sabotaging the intercommunal talks, the negotiations will not bear fruit. Unless the Greek Cypriot leadership and Greece

clearly state to the Greek Cypriots that *enosis* is out, negotiations aiming at binational, bizonal federalism cannot bring results.

193. Calling upon Cypriots to settle their problem on the basis of equality is a laudable action. We are all for it. But we pray that the leader who created the problem artificially should not be encouraged in his belief that Cyprus is Greek and that therefore Greek Cypriots have more say in and over Cyprus than have Turkish Cypriots. Political equality, especially when relating to the inalienable rights of the two communities in the independence and sovereignty of Cyprus, cannot be apportioned. We are fully entitled to defend our independence and sovereignty against anyone who wants to destroy it. We accept no argument in justification of such a move. We want the world to understand and to underwrite the fact that in Cyprus two national communities share the sovereignty and independence of the island and that the United Nations Charter and its principles cannot be converted to provide that the Turkish Cypriot community is a second class community in Cyprus.

194. By this statement are we demanding too much? Certainly not. We are merely asking the world to look at the facts with realism. We are asking the world totally to reject the thesis that there is a Turkish occupation of Cyprus. But for the intervention of the Turkish troops in Cyprus, a total massacre of the Turkish Cypriots, and even a section of the Greek Cypriots, would certainly have been carried out. Even Makarios had to testify to the existence of this dastardly plan. And the men who planned it, the very men who caused the death of 2,000 Greek Cypriots and forced Turkey to intervene in Cyprus are all free in Cyprus and fully armed, roaming about with their gunmen, and publishing papers advocating union with Greece "after throwing the Turks into the sea".

195. We therefore state our position in the clearest of terms: we are prepared to continue the negotiations on the basis of equality with the Greek Cypriot side for the establishment of a central Government between the existing Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot administrations so that this 13-year-old *de facto* position may be justly and peacefully settled within the context of a bizonal Federal Republic of Cyprus. We are also ready to negotiate all matters auxiliary or appertaining to such a solution.

196. I shall not take any more of the Council's time. As I stated on Friday I say now that we, as the Turkish side, still continue to believe that the intercommunal talks under the auspices of the Secretary-General, constitute the only way to find a peaceful solution to the Cyprus problem.

197. The PRESIDENT: The next name is that of the representative of Greece, on whom I now call.

198. Mr. PAPOULIAS (Greece): I shall deal briefly with only two points from among those which were

touched upon by the representative of Turkey during his speech.

199. First, Ambassador Türkmen said—this time quoting Archbishop Makarios positively—that the Turkish forces had carried out a lawful intervention in Cyprus on 20 July 1974. He omitted to state that article IV of the Treaty of Guarantee,⁵ which Turkey invokes, provides that any action by the Guarantor Powers should have as its sole aim the re-establishment of “the state of affairs created by the present Treaty”. What happened afterwards is hardly consistent with the text of the Treaty of Guarantee. He omitted also to recall—and I understand that—the statement made by the representative of Turkey to the Security Council on 19 July 1974—that is, on the eve of the Turkish invasion of Cyprus: “the duty of the world community [is] to restore the *status quo ante*” [1780th meeting, para. 55] meaning in Cyprus.

200. The Council knows full well that the Turkish invasion took place on 20 July 1974, that the military dictatorship in Greece collapsed only three days later, on 23 July 1974, and that constitutional order was immediately re-established in Cyprus and in Greece. Therefore, the way was open for a peaceful settlement.

201. So apart from the fact that any use of force flagrantly violates the Charter of the United Nations, nothing—especially after 23 July 1974—justified the renewed use of force by Turkey against the Republic of Cyprus, particularly after the restoration of constitutional order and the disappearance of any threat to the independence and sovereignty of Cyprus, as had been specifically demanded by Turkey according to the official statements of its Government, and when negotiations were being conducted in Geneva for the purpose of finding a satisfactory settlement.

202. It should be added that Turkey undertook its second invasion of the Republic of Cyprus after and although the Security Council had been seized of the problem, in open violation of Security Council resolutions 353 (1974) of 20 July; 354 (1974) of 23 July 1974, ordering a cease-fire; and 357 (1974) of 14 August 1974, which once again ordered a cease-fire which was, in turn, once again grossly violated by Turkey, and so on. It is clear with whom responsibility rests for the tragic and dangerous situation in Cyprus today.

203. Turning to my second point: in order that there might be no further distortions of the Brussels agreement, on Friday I read out before the Council the full text of that agreement [1925th meeting, para. 111.] The text is fully self-explanatory, as proved by what was said today by the representative of Italy, to whom I extend my thanks. None the less, Ambassador Türkmen came back to it today, inserting, among other things, the phrase “basis of negotiation” with reference to the Brussels agreement. I have to point out again that nothing of the sort is contained in that agreement. The Brussels agreement was purely

procedural, and its sole purpose was to encourage the representatives of the two communities and give new impetus to the negotiations, which had reached an impasse.

204. The subsequent resumption of the inter-communal talks under the auspices of the Secretary-General resulted in the agreement between the two communities in Vienna, contained in the communiqué issued at the conclusion of the fifth round, which states:

“The representatives of the two communities will meet again under the auspices of the Secretary-General in Vienna in May, with a view to establishing a common basis prior to referring the matter to mixed committees in Cyprus.” [S/11993 of 24 February 1976, annex.]

So the basis had still to be determined, as is clearly stated in that communiqué. And the communiqué was issued by agreement between the representatives of the two communities primarily concerned. It would be incorrect, to say the least, to maintain that the basis had already been laid before they met in Vienna.

205. The indisputable fact that a common basis has still to be found is reflected in paragraphs 68, 69 and 70 of the Secretary-General's report; and it is needless to add that preconditions of the kind contained in the letter dated 25 May 1976 from the representative of the Turkish Cypriot community addressed to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Cyprus [S/12093, annex VI] are far from helpful.

206. The PRESIDENT: I now call on the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Cyprus.

207. Mr. CHRISTOPHIDES (Cyprus): In the course of the debates last Friday and tonight, the Turkish side has made a number of false allegations. I do not propose to reply to each and every one of them, since most of them have been dealt with in my statement before the Council on Friday. Furthermore, the report of the Secretary-General gives silencing replies to a number of those allegations. There are, however, certain issues to which I should like to refer, briefing the Council on the true facts.

208. It has been alleged, among other things, that the Turkish Cypriots own 32.8 per cent of all private land in Cyprus, as though such a figure, even were it correct, which it is certainly not, could be any justification for the invasion of Greek Cypriot lands, and the expulsion from them of the Greek Cypriot population. But, furthermore, the figure is false.

209. Since the days of British administration there has operated in Cyprus a Lands and Survey Department, which has one of the best land registry systems in the world and whose records cover fully and analytically the registration of all land property in

Cyprus. According to available and indisputable data, the Turkish Cypriots are the owners of 12.3 per cent of the privately owned land of Cyprus. In this respect, I should also like to quote from a secret telegram dating back to 23 January 1958 which the then British acting Governor of Cyprus sent to the Colonial Office and which proves that at least since 1958 the percentage of Turkish Cypriot ownership has remained constant. It states:

“For our study on partition, an estimate was made of the proportion of land owned by main communities. These showed: Crown, 28 per cent;”—“Crown” means the Government—“Greeks, 58 per cent; Turks, 12 per cent; others, 2 per cent.”

I will not make any comment as to the reason for the study. I think that it is quite obvious that it was done with a view to partition.

210. The Turkish aim in inflating the figure is obvious; it is an effort to justify an unreasonable stand to the effect that they should not make any territorial concessions.

211. It has also been stated that the number of Greek Cypriot refugees is only around 90,000. A glance at the Secretary-General's report is enough to refute this lame allegation. The number of Greek Cypriot refugees as given in the report is 184,143, an increase of 1,143 persons since the Secretary-General's report of 8 December 1975 [S/11900.]

212. In an effort to mislead world public opinion and shift Turkey's responsibility for the stalemate in the talks, an attempt has been made by Ambassador Türkmen tonight to accuse the Greek Cypriot side of undermining the talks. It is indeed ironic that while Ankara does everything possible to undermine prospects for the intercommunal talks through a series of *faits accomplis* and broken promises and agreements, it endeavours to shift responsibility for the stalemate in the talks to the Greek Cypriot side.

213. Turkey's attitude towards the talks is one of manifest duplicity, for behind the frequent statements of support for the talks lies a complete absence of intent to enter into serious negotiations. Turkey's statements in support of the negotiating process are only a smoke-screen that is intended to mislead the world and give Ankara time to consolidate its position in the occupied area through the creation of *faits accomplis*. It may be recalled that, using as a pretext the reference made by the Greek Cypriot side to the procedural suggestion of the Secretary-General during the fifth round talks in Vienna, the Turkish side refused to accept the Greek Cypriot proposals on the territorial aspect of the Cyprus problem, obviously for the purpose of evading its commitment to submit its own proposals on territory.

214. Beyond this evasion, the Turkish side has now shifted to yet another position, as is clearly shown by

Mr. Onan's letter of 25 May 1976 [S/12093, annex VI], that the crucial territorial aspect must be referred to committees straightaway despite the unambiguous terms of the Vienna communiqué of 21 February 1976, which states:

“The representatives of the two communities will meet again under the auspices of the Secretary-General in Vienna in May, with a view to establishing a common basis prior to referring the matter to mixed committees in Cyprus.” [S/11993, annex.]

215. Ankara's aim is obvious—to avoid submitting concrete proposals, and instead to have the committees occupy themselves with long and fruitless discussions. The only explanation for such shifting of positions is that Ankara is not prepared to make any territorial proposals, simply because it has no intention of making any territorial concessions. At this point, I might perhaps be permitted to quote from an editorial in *The New York Times* of 9 June:

“On a visit to West Germany last month, Rauf Denktaş... said flatly that the Turkish side was not prepared to make any territorial concessions.”

216. Since the hour is late, I will not reply in detail now to what the representative of Turkey has said, but, with your permission, Mr. President, I will reserve the right to do so tomorrow. I shall restrict myself to saying that I have heard the attempt at an apology of the representative of Turkey for the deeds, misdeeds and non-deeds of his country in Cyprus. If one took his allegations at face value, one would think that the tragedy of Cyprus is only a mirage, that the Turkish forces of occupation are but friendly visitors on a peaceful visit, and that the grim facts of the thousands of dead, the refugees, the missing persons, the expulsions, the colonization and everything else that makes up the tragedy of Cyprus today are mere figments of the imagination in which Turkey takes only a benevolent and academic interest.

217. All this surely strains the truth, as all who know anything about Cyprus are only too well aware, and is an insult to the intelligence of the members of the Council and to all to whom these ludicrous claims are addressed. If the situation in Cyprus were not so tragic, the clumsy statement of the representative of Turkey might even have been funny, but regrettably the situation in Cyprus is not a laughing matter.

218. As I said earlier, I reserve the right to speak at a later time in reply to what the representative of Turkey said. For the moment I shall do no more than bring reality into focus by simply reading from an article from the 29 May last issue of *The Economist* of London, which no one can accuse of being an instrument of Greek Propaganda. I quote:

“The evidence suggests that Turkey has no interest in a negotiated settlement. During a visit to

West Germany a couple of weeks ago the Turkish Cypriot leader, Mr. Rauf Denktaş, was urged to come up with proposals for a possible withdrawal by the Turkish army from part of the area it has held since 1974. He bluntly told his German interlocutors that 'the Turkish side will not make any proposals on territory'. Although it was reported from Ankara on Monday that the Turks would be putting forward some ideas within the next 10 days, these are believed to be hedged around with the sort of conditions that Greek Cypriots will not accept and are unlikely to involve more than the tiniest changes to the present dividing line. Indeed, the expulsion of those Greek Cypriots who remain in the area occupied by the Turks is being speeded up. Bellapais should be cleared of all Greeks in a few weeks' time and the 7,000 or so still left in the Karpas peninsula are expected to be out by the end of the year. Even the Maronite villages, hitherto immune, are being forcibly emptied.

"The mainland Turks, who are now in charge of northern Cyprus, say frankly that the area is being absorbed into, but not annexed by, Turkey. They claim that the experiment of letting the Turkish Cypriots run their own affairs has failed—a failure that was at least partly due to the fact that the Turkish Cypriots, cleverer and more efficient than the mainlanders, were never given a free hand. Be that as it may, the decision has been taken that from now on northern Cyprus is to be run openly and officially by mainlanders.

"One curious new development is that Varosha, the modern Greek Cypriot quarter of Famagusta, is being picked clean. For about 18 months the Turkish army kept this area intact as proof of its probity and discipline. This has now changed: for the past few months 'official requisitioning', as well as permitted private looting, has been going on. The 'requisitioning' is carried out by Turkish army units operating from a small fleet of trucks. Day after day they methodically empty shops, hotels and houses and then carefully sort out the contents into separate warehouses for furniture, clothing and household appliances."

The article proceeds to refer to the lootings and to the waves of Turkish immigrants pouring into Cyprus, and adds:

"Many of the larger towns and villages in the north stand in ghostly emptiness; this is true of Kyrenia, Bellapais, Karmi, Karavas, Lapithos and others. Since these places cannot be left empty indefinitely, the question is raised whether the contents of the warehouses outside Famagusta are to be used to make these places habitable again. And, if so, for whom? Since it is unlikely to be for Turkish Cypriot refugees from the south, who have already been settled elsewhere, it must presumably be for still more newcomers from the mainland."

219. I believe this will help perhaps even the representative of Turkey to see matters in perspective, as they are in fact and not as he would falsely have us believe. But as the Turkish representative at least appears to have a different conception of the situation in Cyprus, would he agree to the dispatch of a fact-finding sub-committee consisting of representatives of the Security Council in order to ascertain what the facts really are? For our part, we would welcome such an investigation. If the situation in Cyprus is as the Turkish representative says, he would have no difficulty in agreeing to such a proposal, as Turkey would have nothing to hide. Would Turkey agree to such a course of action?

220. The PRESIDENT: I call on the representative of Turkey.

221. Mr. TÜRKMEN (Turkey): I should like to reply to Ambassador Papoulias, the representative of Greece. He is, of course, in a very comfortable position. There is a Greek Government which undertakes an invasion of Cyprus, thus creating a stir in the whole region of the Mediterranean; the peace of the world is endangered. And then that Government crumbles, and all the responsibilities of Greece are washed away. There is no such thing in international relations. All Governments are responsible for the acts of the preceding Governments.

222. Furthermore, he said that the Treaty of Guarantee stipulates that any intervention should be for the sole purpose of restoring the *status quo ante*. I do not quarrel with that assertion. The Turkish forces went to Cyprus for the purpose of trying to restore the *status quo ante*, but that was impossible precisely because of the *de facto* situation on the island. They have therefore tried by their presence to pave the way to a new constitutional order, and the two communities are now in the process of negotiating it.

223. Ambassador Papoulias also made some reference to the Brussels agreement. I note that whenever we mention that agreement he becomes very legalistic, and he now objects to the use of the words "basis of an agreement." Perhaps it was wrong to use those words. It was the framework or the procedural basis, but what the agreement says is in the papers, and we do not claim that that agreement has to be interpreted differently.

224. As to what the representative of the Greek Cypriot community has said—that the ratio of land ownership mentioned by the representative of the Turkish community was not right, that it is not 32 per cent but 12 per cent—I cannot argue with him on that. I am sure that the representative of the Turkish community, if he is given an opportunity, will straighten out this matter.

225. He accused Turkey of undermining the inter-communal talks. I think that is a very unjust accusation.

After all, who took the initiative in Brussels to work out a new framework for agreements? We have always been in constant contact and consultation with the Secretary-General in every phase, and each time we have tried to prevent a break-down in the talks. We have stated here that the only thing we wish to do is to encourage the talks, and that is our position.

226. The representative of the Greek-Cypriot community has also said that the figure that I quoted or that the representative of the Turkish community quoted was wrong, and that in his report the Secretary-General himself said that the total number of refugees is 184,000. But I think he omitted to mention that the report says that government statistics show that the number is 184,000. It does not affirm it on its own authority; it affirms it on the authority of the Greek Cypriot statistics.

227. I do not think I should give an answer to the last point raised by the representative of the Greek

Cypriot community. The Security Council's involvement, the Council's political concept regarding the Cyprus question is there. It is in the resolutions. Our position is clear, and it is not only our position but also the position of many other representatives in the Council. So I think it would be utterly unnecessary to enter into any exchange or argument with him on this subject.

The meeting rose at 8.10 p.m.

Notes

¹ United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 382, p. 8.

² See A/10217 and Corr.1.

³ *Official Records of the Economic and Social Council, Sixtieth Session, Supplement No. 3*, chap. XX, resolution 4 (XXXII).

⁴ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirtieth Session, Plenary Meetings*, 2405th meeting.

⁵ United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 382, p. 3.