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NOTE

Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures. Mention of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United Nations document.

Documents of the Security Council (symbol S/ . . .) are normally published in quarterly *Supplements* of the *Official Records of the Security Council*. The date of the document indicates the supplement in which it appears or in which information about it is given.

The resolutions of the Security Council, numbered in accordance with a system adopted in 1964, are published in yearly volumes of *Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council*. The new system, which has been applied retroactively to resolutions adopted before 1 January 1965, became fully operative on that date.

1908th MEETING

Held in New York on Monday, 12 April 1976, at 3.30 p.m.

President: Mr. HUANG Hua (China).

Present: The representatives of the following States: Benin, China, France, Guyana, Italy, Japan, Libyan Arab Republic, Pakistan, Panama, Romania, Sweden, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America.

Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/1908)

1. Adoption of the agenda
2. The situation in Timor:
Report of the Secretary-General in pursuance of Security Council resolution 384 (1975) (S/12011)

The meeting was called to order at 4.15 p.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

The situation in Timor:

Report of the Secretary-General in pursuance of Security Council resolution 384 (1975) (S/12011)

1. The PRESIDENT (*translation from Chinese*): Letters have been addressed to the President of the Council by the representatives of Australia, Indonesia and Portugal which contain requests to be invited to participate in the discussion of the question on the agenda in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure. Pursuant to the usual practice, I propose, if I hear no objection, to invite those representatives to participate in the discussion without the right to vote.
2. In conformity with the procedure followed during the Council's consideration of this question last December, I invite the representatives of Indonesia and Portugal to take seats at the Council table.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Anwar Sani (Indonesia) and Mr. Galvão Teles (Portugal) took places at the Council table.

3. The PRESIDENT (*translation from Chinese*): Because of the limited number of places available at the Council table I invite the representative of Australia

to take the place reserved for him at the side of the Council chamber, on the usual understanding that he will be invited to take a place at the Council table when he wishes to speak.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Harry (Australia) took the place reserved for him at the side of the Council chamber.

4. The PRESIDENT (*translation from Chinese*): I should like at this stage to draw the attention of members of the Council to documents S/12043 and S/12045, which reproduce the texts of letters from the representative of Indonesia and from the representative of Guinea-Bissau requesting that the Council extend invitations under rule 39 of its provisional rules of procedure.

5. In the course of informal consultations, the members of the Council took note of those requests and agreed that, in the light of the procedures followed during the Council's consideration of this question last December, they favoured extending the invitations as requested in the letters I have just cited. Therefore if I hear no objection I shall take it that the Council decides to extend the invitations in question.

It was so decided.

6. The PRESIDENT (*translation from Chinese*): At the appropriate moment, I shall invite those persons mentioned in documents S/12043 and S/12045 to take places at the Council table and make their statements.

7. In addition, I should like to inform members of the Council that I have received this afternoon a letter from the representative of Mozambique in which he requests that the Council extend an invitation under rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure. That letter has been reproduced in document S/12047. I propose, if no member of the Council raises any objection, that the Council agree to this request.

It was so decided.

8. The PRESIDENT (*translation from Chinese*): I shall invite that person to take a place at the Council table and make his statement.

9. It may be recalled that after having discussed the item entitled "The situation in Timor" in the course of

five meetings, the Council on 22 December 1975 adopted resolution 384 (1975). In pursuance of that resolution, the Secretary-General submitted a report on 12 March this year [S/12011].

10. In accordance with the procedure agreed upon during prior consultations, the first speakers will be those to whom the Council has just agreed to extend invitations to address it in conformity with the provisions of rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure.

11. The first speaker is Mr. José Ramos Horta, whose invitation was requested in document S/12045. I request him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

12. Mr. HORTA: On behalf of my delegation, I wish to thank the Council for giving us this opportunity to present our views.

13. Our statement comprises two parts. The first part I shall deliver now; the second will be delivered if we are forced to do so by circumstances.

14. Our message is the voice of a whole nation, 60,000 of whose people have just been slaughtered by the Javanese troops. The Chairman of UDT, the ex-União Democrática de Timor—also known as the anti-communist movement—Francisco Lopes da Cruz, said in Djakarta that more than 60,000 people, mainly women and children, had been killed in the six months of war in East Timor. Francisco Lopes da Cruz, Vice-Chairman of the puppet Provisional Government set up by the fascist Javanese generals in Dili, may be expected to minimize rather than exaggerate the toll. His statement merely confirms long-standing reports of FRETILIN [*Frente Revolucionária Timor Leste Independente*] indiscriminate pillaging, shooting and outright massacring of the population of Dili by Javanese troops. In fact, the Indonesian invasion stands revealed as a concerted act of genocide against the East Timorese people. One tenth of the population has been slaughtered in six months—more than the total number killed during the entire Japanese occupation during the Second World War.

15. The people of the Democratic Republic of East Timor are conscious that their only crime, for which they have been sentenced by the fascist régime of Djakarta and its allies, is their desire to be free and to build a new society in which everybody shares responsibility, rights and benefits, without a privileged minority exploiting the majority.

16. The people of East Timor have shown their unshakable will to continue the struggle against the invading forces of the Suharto Government and for the defence of the territorial integrity of their fatherland. In spite of that, there are still certain countries and organizations that intend to propose Utopian resolutions for the conflict for which the Democratic Republic of East Timor is the stage.

17. East Timor, which was a colony, became an independent State on 28 November 1975. Less than 20 per cent of the territory is under abusive military occupation by Indonesian military forces. An independent country is under military aggression. The people are subjected to repression and massacre by an invading army. Who is committing the crime? Who has broken and abused the principles of non-interference? Would it be the aggressor or the victim of the aggression? We believe that those are questions that are easy to answer. Nevertheless, there are still those who intend to legalize and legitimate the aggression. When it is demanded that an independent and sovereign nation should return to the condition of a colony in order to satisfy the expansionist and neo-colonialist aggressor, that is no less than demanding the acceptance of aggression and legalizing it as a force to intimidate and to persuade a people to accept a situation of new slavery and to remain in such a situation forever. When it is recognized that the aggressor has the right to intervene militarily and decimate tens of thousands of East Timorese patriots or those of any other country, that is a blatant attempt to legitimize aggression, repression, domination and violation. It is an attempt to accept and legitimate genocide and neo-colonialism.

18. We are well aware that because of our physical isolation, because of the great difficulties of our struggle, and also because of the speed of events in the revolutionary process of our movement, many brotherly countries have been cautious about supporting the cause of the people of East Timor under the correct leadership of FRETILIN. Our struggle is not only a military one; it is also a political and diplomatic struggle. It is a war of resistance and of liberation of a whole nation. Ours is not a war of aggression, domination and violation. Therefore, we are sure that the success of our struggle will widen along with the march of history, since the balance of power in the international political arena is in our favour.

19. Indonesia has spat upon the United Nations. It was on 22 December 1975 that the Security Council, at its 1869th meeting, unanimously adopted resolution 384 (1975): In paragraphs 1 and 2 the Council clearly:

“Calls upon all States to respect the territorial integrity of East Timor as well as the inalienable right of its people to self-determination in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV)”

and

“Calls upon the Government of Indonesia to withdraw without delay all its forces from the Territory.”

In paragraph 5 the Council

“Requests the Secretary-General to send urgently a special representative to East Timor...”

20. In our letter of 2 January 1976 we welcomed the appointment of Mr. Vittorio Winspeare Guicciardi. We warned the Special Representative of the Secretary-General that he would meet a number of difficulties and obstacles to his mission. Our letter read as follows:

“(a) The Indonesian forces, who occupy the main part of the city of Dili, are likely to do whatever they can to delay your arrival in Dili.

“(b) After arriving in Dili, the Indonesians will try to restrict your movements. You may not be driven to many places in the countryside or be able to talk to the people in the mountains, where, without the presence of Indonesian forces, the people can feel free to express themselves.

“(c) The Indonesians are likely to organize a rally in places under military occupation, where people will be forced to show their ‘support’ for integration in Indonesia.”

21. In his report to the Secretary-General Mr. Winspeare Guicciardi stated that he went to certain places only and was unable to travel widely. Indeed, he visited only the enclave of Ocussi, the little island of Ataúro, Dili, the capital of East Timor, and Manatuto and Baucau. He travelled only by helicopter and aircraft. It is quite clear that the Javanese colonialist authorities and their lackeys did not want the United Nations mission to travel further into the countryside, where the large masses of the people live, to meet leaders and members of the Government of the Democratic Republic of East Timor.

22. For our part, we insisted that the representative of the Secretary-General should have direct contact with our leaders and our Government in East Timor. We suggested that the United Nations mission could fly in a lighter craft from Darwin, Australia to any of the four airstrips in areas under the control of our patriotic forces. But the Australian Government refused to allow any aircraft to take off from Australia. The Indonesian air force also launched bombing raids against those airstrips.

23. The Portuguese Government made available some corvettes to carry the United Nations mission to any landing place in East Timor. The fascist military junta of Java, which has made a mockery of the United Nations, imposed some conditions: “the Special Representative of the Secretary-General would notify in advance the ‘Provisional Government of East Timor’ of the time and place of landing” [S/12011, *annex, para. 30*]. In a vicious manoeuvre to capture FRELITIN leaders, the colonialist Javanese were trying to get United Nations connivance. The Portuguese Government, the mysterious administering Power of nothing, very humbly bowed to the conditions imposed by the Javanese generals. Faced with this ridiculous and unacceptable game, FRELITIN leaders, who are

courageously and correctly leading the people of East Timor in the struggle for national liberation, were led to believe that the only alternative was to continue the armed struggle.

24. The unanimous Security Council resolution reflected the strong condemnation by the third world countries and other progressive forces of Indonesian criminal aggression and Indonesia’s attempt to annex the territory of the Democratic Republic of East Timor. In spite of this unanimous vote, the fascist military junta of Djakarta spat at the resolution and intensified the armed aggression against the people of East Timor. It was just three days after the adoption of the Council resolution that the Nazi Javanese generals launched another monstrous wave of assault against East Timor. Desperate because of the heavy losses of their forces since 7 December, the Javanese military junta intensified the war. It was on Christmas day that more than 20,000 paratroops and marines were dropped in East Timor. The Indonesian military presence in the Democratic Republic of East Timor numbers 30,000 at this moment.

25. The types of weapons being employed by the Javanese troops in themselves constitute evidence of war crimes. Desperate because of the failure of the invasion to crush the Democratic Republic of East Timor, the fascist Javanese generals have resorted to the use of chemical and biological warfare against the heroic people of East Timor, with the intention of immobilizing the population and destroying the food base. The Air Force has dropped napalm on villages and cultivated areas, killing women and children and destroying crops. Hundreds of people have died in the region of Los Palos as a consequence of the deployment of biological bombs which cause intense diarrhoea and diseases as yet unidentified by FRETILIN health authorities. There have also been reports of the calculated decimation of the remaining male population in the Indonesian occupied towns. A former Australian Consul to East Timor, currently a director of a foreign affairs group in the Parliamentary Library of Australia, Mr. James Dunn, has stated publicly:

“The admission by the Timorese leader that 60,000 people have died in the civil war needs to be viewed in its full horrifying perspective.

“In fact, the civil war, as such, ended in September and, according to the estimates of the International Red Cross and the Australian Council for Overseas Aid team, it accounted for between 2,000 and 3,000 deaths.”

Mr. Dunn went on:

“FRETILIN authorities treated their captives and political opponents, including APODETI [*Associação Popular Democrática Timorense*] supporters, surprisingly well.”

Mr. Dunn, who visited East Timor in November 1975, during FRETILIN control of the capital, visited many parts of the territory and contacted countless people. He also said in his statement to the press:

“One can only conclude therefore that the appalling casualty list mentioned by da Cruz (and one would expect him to minimize it, not exaggerate it) is nothing less than an indiscriminate killing of 10 per cent of the entire population of East Timor by Indonesian troops.”

Mr. Dunn concluded:

“It must be condemned for what it is—an atrocity against a people, ranking with such crimes as the rape of Nanking and the wanton killings by Nazis in the occupied States of Europe during the Second World War.

“It is one thing to understand and even accept the Indonesian objective of bringing about the integration of East Timor, and perhaps, for the pragmatists, to accede to the pursuit of this objective by military means. It is another to remain silent, as compliant witnesses, while the worst atrocity in the recent history of South East Asia is being committed.”

26. It also brings to our minds the barbarous massacre of more than half a million Indonesians in the first six months of the Suharto régime in 1965-1966. Such atrocities will never be forgotten by the people of Indonesia. Thousands of entire families in East Timor were slaughtered too. The years 1965 and 1966 were those in which the Indonesian people came to be dominated and oppressed by a military fascist and expansionist Government which incarcerated in subhuman conditions in concentration camps nearly 100,000 political prisoners and kept them waiting indefinitely for their trials.

27. Before the invasion of Dili on 7 December, many foreign observers representing the International Red Cross, aid organizations, religious groups, the press and the Australian Parliament, witnessed and confirmed the moderation, responsibility and effectiveness of the FRETILIN administration of East Timor. Since the invasion, under threat of death and following the execution of six foreign journalists by Javanese troops, all foreign observers have been removed from East Timor, and none has been allowed to return in spite of repeated appeals by the Government of the Democratic Republic of East Timor and international aid organizations. The Indonesian blockade has prevented any medical help, food-stuff or other humanitarian assistance from reaching our people.

28. The world cannot remain silent while the worst atrocity in the recent history of South East Asia is taking place. Sixty thousand people have been slaughtered; many more thousands will follow if the

Nazi army of Java does not withdraw from the territory of the Democratic Republic of East Timor, as has been demanded by the United Nations. This is a people's war of resistance. In the face of Indonesian naval bombardment, aerial bombing with napalm and biological weapons and the slaughter of one tenth of the population, the nationalist forces of the Democratic Republic of East Timor still control more than 80 per cent of the territory. Ninety-five per cent of the population is within unoccupied territory. Javanese forces control only town centres, the small permanent populations of which have either fled from the invaders or been massacred.

29. Following the invasion of Dili on 7 December, some leading members of FRETILIN were killed, though most of the Government is safe in East Timor. The President of the East Timor Popular Women's Organization, Rosa Bonaparte, was captured and later executed by a firing squad. Before the execution, she was taken to the Indonesian warship and violated for two days by Indonesian naval officers. Isabel Barreto, 27 years old, also a member of the East Timor Popular Women's Organization and wife of our beloved Prime Minister, Nicolau Lobato, was executed by a firing squad in Dili on 10 December.

30. In December 1975, the Indonesian military junta brought here an unknown man, José Martins, as leader of an unknown party. José Martins never saw East Timor in his life, but he came here as a Timorese representative. The Indonesia military junta also brought a film, a film of their own atrocities. After killing hundreds of people and throwing them in common graves, they made a film of it and presented it as a FRETILIN atrocity.

31. It is very strange that FRETILIN should have executed all the prisoners but saved the most important one—the leader, Arnaldo Araujo. Araujo has been in gaol since the abortive coup on 11 August. He was not killed. Would it not be logical that the Government of the Democratic Republic of East Timor should execute the main figure? After all, who is Arnaldo Araujo? An Australian journalist, Ken White, on 5 February wrote:

“In 1946 a *catequista*, or religious teacher, was brought before a civilian court in Dili and accused of war crimes against the Timorese people.

“Evidence was given that he had collaborated with the Japanese... against Australia's 2/2 Commando Squadron and Timorese sympathetic to the Allied cause.

“At the end of the trial Arnaldo dos Reis Araujo was sentenced to nine years' exile on the island of Ataúro.”

That report appeared in the *Northern Territory News* of Darwin, Australia.

32. The Permanent Mission of Indonesia to the United Nations has been very active over the past week, handing out a pamphlet publicizing what they classify as FRETILIN atrocities, together with photographs. Surely this pamphlet and these photographs can only remind us of the barbarous massacres committed by the fascist régime of Djakarta in 1965 and 1966. The Indonesians have on page 22 of the pamphlet asked us to believe that the skeleton photographed is that of a Timorese patriot who died in the last few weeks. Perhaps, in fact, this is the skeleton of an Indonesian murdered in 1966 by the specialists in massacre. On page 12 of this pamphlet, the Indonesians report that "an automatic Seiko watch was also found" in a grave. It is really very strange that the so-called FRETILIN terrorists did not take the belongings of the victims—as, for instance, a valuable Seiko watch. Surely people who are desperate enough to kill and terrorize their own people, as the Indonesians would have us believe, would not hesitate to take the possessions of their victims?

33. The same pamphlet refers to the death of some APODETI leaders—Casimiro Araujo and Osorio Soares, but elsewhere in the pamphlet these two men are listed among "victims who have still not been found and who are still being searched for". It is very odd that one of the lists includes the name of a young man called Arsenio Horta. He happens to be my brother, and he is in the mountains operating the radio station of the patriotic forces of the Democratic Republic of East Timor. It is also very interesting to note that many of the names listed are those of people who fled to Australia as refugees back in August 1975.

34. It is also mentioned in the same pamphlet that a certain Syddell has reported that "about thirty white people were executed by FRETILIN last December". It is very interesting to note that the only white Portuguese under arrest by FRETILIN was a lieutenant colonel who engineered the attempted UDT *coup d'état* in August. Back in September 1975, the FRETILIN Central Committee handed over to the International Red Cross 28 Portuguese military men who were detained after the abortive coup by the UDT. Those men reached Australia safely under the auspices of the International Red Cross and are now in Portugal. However, the anti-communist movement kept in detention 23 Portuguese citizens who have not been heard of since. I wish to remind the Council that in October 1975 five Australian and British newsmen were captured and executed by Indonesian forces in an invasion of the village of Balibo that resembled that of My Lai. The following day the Indonesian Government-operated Radio Kupang, in the voice of the president of the so-called anti-communist movement, Lopes da Cruz, announced very proudly that the anti-communist forces "had taught a lesson to five Australian communist journalists". These broadcasts were heard by several foreigners, journalists, aid officers and an Australian diplomat,

who were in Dili at that time. A tape of that broadcast was sent to the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs. According to the Australian press, Australian intelligence, monitoring Indonesian communications, confirmed the murder of those journalists. Another Australian journalist, Roger East, my Press Secretary, was killed in Dili, on 7 December by Indonesian troops.

35. Knowing the criminal record of the fascist régime of Djakarta, one can hardly doubt that the Indonesian invasion of East Timor was followed by a horrifying atrocity paralleled only by the massacres in Indonesia itself in 1965-1966. But we challenge the Indonesian military junta to give free entry into East Timor to foreign observers, journalists, the International Red Cross and diplomats. They will assess the situation and will tell what they have seen. Why does the Indonesian Government stop press people and other independent observers from visiting the country? If truth and justice are on their side—well, why are they so worried about bringing outside witnesses to East Timor?

36. When the Portuguese empire fell as a result of the heroic struggle of the people of Mozambique, Angola, Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde, Sao Tome and Principe and East Timor, the Nazi military junta of Java tried to impose another colonialism on the heroic people of East Timor. But following the path of the people of Indonesia, who also heroically struggled for their own independence 30 years ago, the people of East Timor are determined never to surrender their independence, which was proclaimed on 28 November 1975 by the Central Committee of FRETILIN, the only nationalist movement of East Timor. While the progressive forces throughout the world accepted and declared their unconditional support for the legitimate aspirations of the heroic people of East Timor, the fascist military junta of Java refused to accept this declaration of independence. Portugal, up to that time the administering Power, also refused to accept the declaration of independence by the people of East Timor through their revolutionary vanguard, FRETILIN. After 500 years of colonialism, oppression and exploitation of the people of the colonies, the Portuguese Government had an opportunity to free itself from a shameful past. But instead, it connived with the neo-colonialist and imperialist forces in a criminal attempt to suffocate the will of the people of East Timor to be free and independent.

37. The people of East Timor, after defeating the internal enemies, proclaimed their political independence. Therefore, the Central Committee of FRETILIN and the Government of the Democratic Republic of East Timor reject strongly any suggestion of East Timor's being a colony. Further, any suggestion by the United Nations that Portugal is still "the administering Power" is a blatant contradiction of all United Nations principles. Indeed, it is a unique situation, in which the people of a colony courageously declared their political independence and the United Nations still recognized the legality of colonial power

over the territory and the people. The Central Committee of FRETILIN no longer recognizes Portuguese sovereignty over East Timor but is willing to establish bilateral dialogue as between Government and Government, State and State.

38. I come to the question of ethnic and cultural origins. In my first statement in this chamber on 15 December 1975 [*1864th meeting*], I referred very briefly to the question of the ethnic and cultural origins of the people of East Timor. Since it is an equation of extreme importance, I ought to give a deeper consideration to this subject. I say extreme importance for one fundamental reason: the Javanese leaders, in their attempts to mislead the less informed people and divert their attention from their real expansionist intentions, claim constantly that the people of East Timor have the same cultural and ethnic origins as the people of the whole archipelago; therefore, East Timor must be integrated into Indonesia.

39. Before referring specifically to the question of the cultural and ethnic origins of the people of East Timor, I should make reference at some length to this matter as far as Indonesia itself is concerned.

40. The Secretary of State of the United States has written:

“Indonesia... was nothing but a geographic expression until the Dutch found it more efficient to unite the islands of the Indies under a single administration.”¹

He went on:

“The collection of islands called Indonesia is meaningful only in terms of the history of Dutch rule; its frontiers follow precisely the frontiers of empire and so does its national consciousness. Because West New Guinea was part of the Dutch East Indies, Indonesia has laid claim to it although it is inhabited by people as different from the Polynesian stock of Indonesia as the Dutch themselves.”²

41. Indonesia as it exists today was spawned by Dutch, Portuguese, French and English colonialism; Indonesian nationalism was finally forged in the years of Japanese imperialism in South East Asia.

42. The early history of the archipelago over which the Javanese now claim hegemony in the name of Indonesia is one of external invasion and imperialism. In the first 700 years A.D. the Hindu cultural, religious and political influence spread south into the archipelago. This influence is still a major part of the cultural and religious life of the peoples of this area today. The next cultural and religious invasion of the archipelago was that of Islam; around 1290 A.D. the first town in the island of Sumatra, Perlak, was converted to Islam. Many of the existing kingdoms in

the archipelago succumbed to this influence—the history of the culture of this area has been the history of syncretist adaptation to external powers.

43. Anthropologists and sociologists generally agree that there are over 300 different ethnic groups in Indonesia, each with its own cultural identity, which speak more than 250 distinct languages. This diversity of ethnic origins and cultural identity is particularly evident in the eastern part of the archipelago, in the area known as Nusatenggara, which includes Timor. Here the separate islands have different cultures. The people come from different ethnic stocks, speak different languages and express themselves in different cultures. In fact, there is good reason to think of these islands as having more ethnic and cultural affinity not with Java to the west, but with Papua and New Guinea to the east, while their natural ecology—their climate, vegetation, flora and fauna—has a pattern more akin to that of northernmost Australasia and New Guinea. This eastern section of the archipelago is a distinct area, an area unlike the Javanese axis. The languages of these islands reflect this difference: they are considered more Papuan than Malayo-Polynesian, and this is particularly true of Timor.

44. Timor was undoubtedly peopled in successive migrations from the Asian continent, from Melanesia and, subsequently, by proto-Malays from the west. As such, it manifests an ethnic heterogeneity that characterizes the entire region, from the Philippines to Australia and from the islands east of Papua New Guinea to the Malagasy Republic. Early Indo-Javanese and Islamic influences can be barely noted, except in so far as Dutch hegemony later spread some ideas, particularly in the political domain, to western, now Indonesian, Timor. East Timor, under Portuguese rule, was largely exempt from these influences.

45. Linguistically, too, East Timor differentiates itself from Indonesian Timor, while manifesting some of the same complexity that marks some of the islands to the north. There are 32 distinct dialect groups in East Timor, which can be reduced to two dominant language families, Malayo-Polynesian, or Austronesian, and Papuan, or non-Austronesian. Until adequate glottochronological research is undertaken, the exact precedence of these languages and their relationship to others in the region can only be speculative. Aside from some word borrowing, there is little direct connexion between the Austronesian languages spoken in East Timor and Indonesian. The degree of cognation between those and related languages in Indonesian Timor is not precisely known; however, except for one or two idioms, it does not appear to be particularly close.

46. Traditionally, the general phenomenon of ethno-linguistic diversity has been heightened in East Timor, where groups were further differentiated into atomistic political units comprising lineages and clans. Alliance and warfare characterized the relationships

between these groups. Such super-local unity as existed probably resulted from the establishment over time of trade partnerships. Certainly, no general unity among these peoples was achieved before the coming of the European Powers, when two overarching "kingdoms" were created largely in the interest of Dutch and Portuguese political expediency. It is interesting to note that these two kingdoms, Belu and Servião, correspond to the post-colonial division of Timor into East and West.

47. In brief, the geo-political boundaries of our modern era have been imposed upon areas of tremendous historical diversity. Contemporary national configurations cannot mask the extraordinary ethnolinguistic differences that mark them. Certain cultural similarities can, of course, be found among the diverse groups, but these in no way justify the superimposition of a political unity over the region as a whole. If anything, the unity imposed in the colonial era has provided for a somewhat different form of demarcation which distinguishes, historically, one micro-region from another, as for example, the former Dutch colonies from the Portuguese. It is, in fact, this cultural overlay which now more than anything else marks the East Timorese quest for self-determination. It is time, after centuries of interference, that the right to that self-determination be restored.

48. How can such an artificial nation, a babel of such various ethnic origins, claim that the people of East Timor have the same cultural and ethnic origins as the people of Indonesia? It is necessary also to draw your attention to the fact that 500 years of Portuguese colonialism separated the people of East Timor physically, socially, economically and politically from the rest of the archipelago. Therefore, the culture of the people of East Timor experienced an independent development, particularly over the last 200 years. Above all, we cannot turn back the wheel of history, neither can we deny the law of social dynamism.

49. Therefore, the attempt to annex East Timor can only be explained in the light of Javanese expansionism and Stone Age imperialism. But if all Governments throughout the world followed the logic of the Javanese leaders, we would have most countries trying to annex each other. For instance, the newly independent Papua New Guinea would claim West Irian—and, surely, President Suharto would not like it; Spain would attempt to annex Portugal, as it in fact did in the fifteenth century; and the Italian Government would annex the Vatican.

50. The boundaries of the countries around the world have been imposed upon the people by centuries of a dramatic political process. It is a gross mistake to try to change the course of history according to our own caprices. This would inevitably cause other dramatic developments. It is more positive and realistic if we learn to live in peace and love with our neighbours.

51. With regard to concepts of self-determination, the historic Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, adopted by the General Assembly on 14 December 1960 [*resolution 1514 (XV)*], states:

"1. The subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation constitutes a denial of fundamental human rights, is contrary to the Charter of the United Nations and is an impediment to the promotion of world peace and cooperation.

"...

"5. Immediate steps shall be taken, in Trust and Non-Self-Governing Territories or all other territories which have not yet attained independence, to transfer all powers to the peoples of those territories, without any conditions or reservations, in accordance with their freely expressed will and desire, without any distinction as to race, creed or colour, in order to enable them to enjoy complete independence and freedom."

In recent decisions concerning the implementation of the Declaration, the General Assembly has reaffirmed its recognition of the legitimacy of the struggle of colonial peoples and peoples under alien domination to exercise their right to self-determination and independence by all the necessary means at their disposal.

52. The final communiqué of the Asian-African Conference held at Bandung from 18 to 24 April 1955, and sponsored by Burma, Ceylon, India, Indonesia and Pakistan, stated that

"The right of self-determination must be enjoyed by all peoples, and freedom and independence must be granted, with the least possible delay, to those who were still dependent peoples. Indeed, all nations should have the right freely to choose their own political and economic systems and their own way of life in conformity with the purposes and the principles of the Charter of the United Nations."³

53. The declaration adopted at the First Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held from 1 to 6 September 1961 at Belgrade, stated, in section III, item 2:

"The participants in the Conference demand that an immediate stop be put to armed action and repressive measures of any kind directed against dependent peoples to enable them to exercise peacefully and freely their right to complete independence and that the integrity of their national territory should be respected. Any aid given by any country to a colonial power in such suppression is contrary to the Charter of the United Nations.

"The participating countries respecting scrupulously the territorial integrity of all States oppose

by all means any aims of annexation by other nations.”⁴

54. These principles were indeed inspired by the heroic struggles for national liberation of the oppressed peoples of the colonies. The brotherly peoples of Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique and Sao Tome and Principe took up arms to exercise their right to self-determination because it had been denied by the colonial Power. The people of East Timor also have a history of heroic resistance to foreign domination. The wars of Cova Lima in 1719, Cova Cotubaba in 1868-1869 and Manufahi in 1912 are chapters of the history of our people in their constant struggle for the right to self-determination, independence and freedom. Dom Boaventura, the great nationalist leader, led his people in a long bloody struggle against the Portuguese colonialists which lasted for 17 years—from 1895 to 1912. Speaking about Dom Boaventura, I pay a tribute of homage to Her Majesty Queen Maria de Manufahi, his widow, who is still alive and is 80 years old. Her Majesty Queen Maria is a militant of FRETILIN.

55. Therefore, we cannot speak of the present resistance of our people as though it was a spontaneous event without political consistency. The East Timorese people have always shown their aversion to any type of domination, exploitation or oppression. Thus, from the history of colonization and imperialism in East Timor, we can verify the heroic resistance of our people. It has been such that several times our people have resorted to armed struggle to break out of their chains and free themselves from colonial domination.

56. We have sufficient documentation to prove this reality, though there are still people who want to hide the truth and demonstrate the contrary. The historian Artur de Sá, in his book *A Planta de Cailaco*, stated:

“Timor was the last of the Portuguese colonies to be completely pacified. In 1912 Portuguese authority still ran a heavy risk, threatened by the revolt of Dom Boaventura, the greatest native King, who cunningly influenced the other chiefs and clans.”

He went on:

“Since then, the history of East Timor is a history of long, hard campaigns, continuous change, constant watchfulness in order to establish, to consolidate and defend the Portuguese rule in this island.”

57. The last revolt, which many people classified as a pro-Indonesian movement, took place in May and June 1959 in Viqueque, Uato Lari and Uato Carbau, where the population was massacred by colonialist forces. This movement had the support of the same Moluccan soldiers and officers who became refugees there after the declaration of independence of the South Moluccas, one of the provinces that constitute

the Indonesian Republic today. I must stress the fact that in May of the same year there also took place in West Timor a rebellion against the Javanese Government. Perhaps this was the reason why the Indonesian Government had only apathy to show in the face of the massacre that was perpetrated in the same year in East Timor by the Portuguese colonialist Government's forces.

58. I think that these are sufficient examples to confirm that the East Timorese people have always wanted to free themselves from any type of domination and exploitation.

59. In the face of the aggression to which the East Timorese people are being subjected, it has once more been confirmed that oppression, domination, violation, exploitation and all types of corruption are the result of a social, political and economic system that is deeply incorrect, unjust and decaying.

60. These things are not the result of a struggle between different races. It is the constant and continuous action of one class upon another, where consciousness has become the main element of all the antagonistic interests. These conflicts are not only at the national level but also at the international level.

61. Seldom in the world's history has a country of 600,000 people successfully resisted a powerful aggressor of 130 million, which still receives millions of dollars of military and economic aid from the United States, Australia, the United Kingdom, Canada and so on. Against 30,000 paratroopers and marines, against chemical and biological warfare, against tanks and warships, the people of the Democratic Republic of East Timor, under the correct leadership of FRETILIN, have, during the eight months of heroic struggle against the neocolonialist and reactionary forces and the Javanese army, shown their unshakable will to be free and to be master of their own country.

62. What, in the final analysis, is an act of self-determination? When a whole nation for many centuries heroically resists the colonialists in such an unequivocal way, as is displayed in the bloody pages of the history of Timor, is this not an act of self-determination? When a whole nation—men, women and children—engage in a people's war of resistance against the foreign aggressor, is this not a supreme act of self-determination? When a whole nation pays with blood and lives for each inch of its soil in the struggle against the foreign aggressor, is this not a noble act of self-determination? When one tenth of our population has been massacred by the Nazi army of Java, in spite of which the whole nation continues the struggle for liberation, is this not a sublime act of self-determination?

63. The war of national liberation in East Timor against the Indonesian Nazi army has been going on

for eight months. Facing massive Indonesian military strength, the people of East Timor have resisted heroically, thus showing the world their determination never to surrender their newly gained freedom and independence.

64. The military forces of the Government of Indonesia invade our territory. They destroy everything and kill everybody that they find in their way. They have massacred tens of thousands of the East Timorese people. When their thirst for blood has been satisfied, then they will offer the people an "act of free choice". After all, if the choice is to be a real "act of free choice" it must be made by free people. Therefore it ought to respect and honour the freedom of the people of East Timor which they have obtained with centuries of suffering, blood and death at the hands of the colonial Power. To respect this freedom that has been seized by the people of East Timor it is necessary to recognize the right of the people to be independent, and this must lead to the recognition of the Democratic Republic of East Timor. Only after such recognition can we say that the people are free and sovereign in having the minimum condition to make whatever decisions concerning their future they may desire. Otherwise, it would be a blatant contradiction, because no colonial person can be free. Not being a free man he cannot by himself decide his future, and in this condition he can never exercise his right to self-determination. Therefore, it is necessary to recognize and to support his right to be free, his right to form an independent nation. Only if political, social, economic, cultural and historical conditions favour the union of two independent States will both peoples be able to assess carefully the advantages and disadvantages of a union in such a way that it will not jeopardize or adversely affect either part. Finally, we may say that the union of two States would be achieved with equal benefit.

65. The Political Constitution of the Democratic Republic of East Timor states that elections should take place in the near future for a people's assembly, which is to be the supreme organ of the legislative power of the State. Such a people's assembly—for which all East Timorese, enjoying all their constitutional, political rights may vote and become candidates—will be the supreme organ which decides the future status of the Democratic Republic of East Timor.

66. We have told how the army of the Indonesian fascist Government controls militarily less than 20 per cent of our national territory despite the fact that for eight months they have used against our people all of their military apparatus, from the most sophisticated and criminal weaponry prohibited by international conventions right up to their best paratroops and marines.

67. If it were not for the total support of the people of East Timor, how could FRETILIN have defeated

the "anti-communist movement" in two weeks in August? How could it have been possible otherwise for the heroic people to resist the Indonesian army for eight months?

68. The Indonesian Government claims that the heroic struggle of the people of East Timor for national liberation is being run by a professionally trained army left over from the colonial days. This is a gross insult to the people of East Timor. The origin of the army of the struggle for national liberation of the people of East Timor is the same as the origin of the army that achieved the liberation of the people of Indonesia from colonialism at the end of the Second World War. The first army of the Republic of Indonesia was built from men trained in the Dutch Indies army and the army of the Japanese occupation forces. So, many of our heroic soldiers received their first military training as conscripts in the Portuguese colonial army. But the peasants who were conscripted were conscious that their ultimate mission was the liberation of their people. The guns that were left behind by the Portuguese, and those that we have captured or bought from the Indonesians, are now being used for the only legitimate purpose—the liberation of the people.

69. One of the greatest revolutionary leaders of the world today, Comrade President Samora Machel of the People's Republic of Mozambique, has said: "A gun in the hands of a colonialist is to oppress; a gun in the hands of a revolutionary is to liberate the people".

70. My Government respects the territorial integrity of the Republic of Indonesia. We admire the great and heroic nation that was born and forged in a long and heroic struggle that transformed the map of South East Asia and changed the balance of power in the world. The wonderful people of Indonesia rewrote their history with suffering and blood. The people of East Timor in the future might decide to seal their destiny with the destiny of the people of Indonesia. But such cannot be achieved with armed aggression. It is with profound sadness that we see Indonesia today so different from the Indonesia of 15 years ago. It is with profound sadness that we see a country of the third world now aligned with the forces of exploitation and oppression. We hope anxiously that Indonesia will find its way again and will again become a voice and a force for the liberation of the third world countries.

71. East Timor is an independent and sovereign State. We belong to the third world and we are a non-aligned country. The aggression against the Democratic Republic of East Timor is contrary to peace, which it is our duty to build up actively and in solidarity with all peace-loving countries and nations.

72. We cannot be a source of instability because we are committed to contribute to a real and long-lasting stability in our geographical region and in the world.

But nobody should expect us to sell our principles. The President of FRETILIN and the President of the Democratic Republic of East Timor have said that: "Our enemy is no more than a hungry giant, a crippled monster, a volcano that has erupted and that will extinguish itself". Eight months of heroic struggle have passed. It might be necessary to fight for another eight months or eight years before the nationalist forces defeat the enemies of the people. The resistance will be as long as necessary. We have attained independence from the colonialist Portuguese, who for almost 500 years oppressed our people. The people of East Timor have been tempered sufficiently by the anti-colonial struggle to continue the resistance indefinitely.

73. On 16 March 1976, I informed the Secretary-General about my Government's stand on the question of Indonesian aggression against the Democratic Republic of East Timor. I wish to read out the relevant paragraphs of my letter:

"On 28th of November 1975, the Central Committee of FRETILIN, vanguard of the people of East Timor, declared independence of the so-called 'Portuguese Timor' and constituted the Democratic Republic of East Timor. The Democratic Republic of East Timor is governed according to the political programme of FRETILIN and by the Constitution of the Republic.

"The Central Committee of FRETILIN, therefore, considers as terminated any political ties between East Timor and Portugal. Therefore, the Central Committee of FRETILIN and the Government of the Democratic Republic of East Timor repudiate any suggestion that Portugal is still the administering Power. Indeed, it is a unique situation in which the people of a colony declare their political independence and the United Nations still recognizes the colonial legality over the territory and the people. This is a blatant contradiction of all United Nations principles.

"The Central Committee of FRETILIN and the Government of the Democratic Republic of East Timor regret that the United Nations has not been able to implement paragraphs 1 and 2 of Security Council resolution 384 (1975). The Indonesian fascist army continues the war of aggression against the Democratic Republic of East Timor. Therefore, the people of East Timor, under the leadership of FRETILIN, continue the war of resistance and national liberation, and they will resort to all means necessary to counter Javanese expansionist designs. The Central Committee of FRETILIN and the Government of the Democratic Republic of East Timor consider that to speak of self-determination before the Indonesians withdraw is a blatant hypocrisy, against all precepts of international law and its universal moral foundations. Therefore, for the United Nations there are only two alternatives:

(a) either recognize the legitimacy of the struggle of the people of East Timor under the leadership of FRETILIN for national liberation and consolidation of the Democratic Republic of East Timor, or
(b) connive with and legalize Indonesian aggression against the territory and the people of East Timor.

"The Central Committee of FRETILIN and the Government of the Democratic Republic of East Timor call on the United Nations to use all necessary means to honour the unanimous resolution of the Security Council. Should Indonesia refuse to be bound by the resolution, economic sanctions should be applied forthwith."

74. We have stated our Government's stand on the question. We believe that the members of the Council will be able to reach a certain degree of agreement along the lines of resolution 384 (1975). We are firmly committed to our principles and, according to our Government's instructions, we are willing to co-operate fully with the United Nations in order to find a just solution to the war in East Timor. My Government is ready for talks under the auspices of the United Nations, as we believe that through dialogue it will be possible to find a solution which will be in everybody's interest. Whatever the outcome of this session, we shall bear in mind that the members of the Council could not have done better. The duty to bring peace where there is war and aggression is not an easy one.

75. As I have mentioned, our statement comprises two parts. We shall respectfully request permission to deliver the second part if circumstances force us to do so. Our second statement will be a brief one. It is a dramatic account which exposes human suffering, evil and sinister events.

76. The PRESIDENT (*translation from Chinese*): The next speaker is the representative of Portugal, on whom I now call.

77. Mr. GALVÃO TELES (Portugal) (*interpretation from French*): Mr. President, permit me first to thank you and the other members of the Council for giving the Portuguese delegation the opportunity to explain here once again its position on the question of Timor, which is today again on the Council's agenda. Permit me also to add that it is a particular pleasure for me to pay a sincere tribute to Ambassador Huang Hua of the People's Republic of China, whose turn it is in April to preside over the Council and who brings to this task his particular experience and competence. I am sure that our two Governments, pending the restoration of relations between our two countries, will do everything in their power to ensure the strengthening of international peace and security, the application of the fundamental principles of decolonization and implementation of the right of peoples to self-determination and independence. This series of meetings of the Council, I am sure, will provide striking proof of this.

78. On 22 December last the Security Council met at the request of the General Assembly and Portugal to consider the situation created by the invasion of Timor by Indonesian armed forces on 7 December and adopted resolution 384 (1975). In this resolution the Council called upon all States to respect the territorial integrity of East Timor as well as the inalienable right of its people to self-determination in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). It called upon the Government of Indonesia to withdraw without delay all its forces from the Territory and called upon the Government of Portugal as administering Power to co-operate fully with the United Nations so as to enable the people of East Timor to exercise freely their right to self-determination. It urged all States and other parties concerned to co-operate fully with the efforts of the United Nations to achieve a peaceful solution to the existing situation and to facilitate the decolonization of the Territory. Furthermore, the resolution requested the Secretary-General to send urgently a special representative to East Timor to make an on-the-spot assessment and to establish contact with all the parties in the territory and all States concerned in order to ensure implementation of the resolution.

79. The Council is meeting again today, almost four months after the adoption of resolution 384 (1975), in order to assess the present situation on the basis of the report of the Secretary-General and that of his Special Representative, Mr. Winspeare Guicciardi [S/12011]. The Council, therefore—and this is the sole purpose of this meeting—should take cognizance of the events which have occurred in the Territory since the adoption of resolution 384 (1975) and, in the light of the present situation, take the measures necessary to ensure the implementation of this resolution. Consequently it should, in our view, avoid becoming involved in sterile discussion about the situation in the Territory before 22 December, so that debate can proceed pragmatically, in order to bring about concrete and genuine solutions for existing problems. For its part, it is in this spirit that the Portuguese delegation has asked to speak, aware as it is particularly of the time already lost and of the fact that it is imperative to find without delay a balanced, concrete and realistic solution to the problem of the decolonization of Timor. In other words, we must take into account the true interests of the people of Timor, even if at the expense of long demagogic tirades by some or the Utopian positions of others.

80. The Secretary-General, who has spared no effort to find a solution to the Timor problem, and whom I should like to thank on behalf of my Government, has sent his Special Representative in accordance with paragraph 5 of resolution 384 (1975) to undertake an on-the-spot assessment and to establish within the Territory the contacts suggested in the text of that paragraph. I should like in that regard to recall here that my Government, in the letter addressed to the Secretary-General on 24 December

1975 [S/11922], reaffirmed that it was ready to co-operate with the United Nations to the fullest possible extent so as to enable the people of East Timor to exercise freely their right to self-determination and independence and reaffirmed that it was available to the Special representative to hold consultations at Lisbon within the framework of his mission and to provide him with the necessary assistance.

81. Mr. Winspeare Guicciardi and I also had the opportunity to meet here in New York at the beginning of January, just before he left for Lisbon, where he was subsequently received by Major Melo Antunes, the Foreign Minister, Commandant Victor Crespo, Minister of External Co-operation, and Colonel Lemos Pires, the Governor of Timor, as well as other high-ranking Portuguese officials.

82. Transmission facilities on one of the two corvettes which my Government keeps in the Timor Sea were made available to Mr. Winspeare Guicciardi, and the authorities also offered him the use of one of these vessels, if necessary, to travel to a point on the coast of Timor where it would be possible for him to disembark in order to get into direct touch in the Territory with FRETILIN elements.

83. On 10 February, on his return from his mission to Timor, the Special Representative once again met at Lisbon with the Foreign Minister, the Minister of External Co-operation and the Governor of Timor.

84. My Government would like to pay a tribute to Mr. Winspeare Guicciardi for the diligence and determination with which he undertook his mission to Timor and for the good will and devotion he demonstrated in overcoming all the obstacles and difficulties he encountered in the performance of his task. The contacts he made with the various interested parties, including the Indonesian Government, which are dealt with in his report, have turned out to be of undeniable usefulness. It is to be hoped that they have opened the road to a solution to the problem guaranteeing respect for the territorial integrity of Timor and the expression of the genuine will of its people.

85. However, my Government deplores the fact that it was not possible for the Special Representative to undertake as complete a concrete examination of the present situation as was to be desired. My Government deplores in particular the fact that it was not possible for him to get into direct contact in the Territory with the leaders of FRETILIN, despite all efforts made to that end, efforts with which the Portuguese authorities co-operated as far as they were able. In that regard I cannot refrain from recalling what Mr. Winspeare Guicciardi himself wrote in paragraph 36 of his report:

“... I went to certain places only and was unable to travel widely. Quite apart from the general difficulty of communications, security reasons were

advanced by the 'Provisional Government' as well as by the representatives of the 'Government of the Democratic Republic of East Timor' against my going to other centres of population or moving about the countryside."

And he concludes in the next paragraph, "Any accurate assessment of the situation as a whole remains elusive."

86. The examination or assessment of the situation on the basis of this report, in the period between the Security Council's last meeting on the question of Timor and today's meeting, can, frankly, only be pessimistic, from all points of view, including the pragmatic. Indeed, almost four months have elapsed since the resolution's adoption, and my delegation can only deplore the fact that so little has been done to end the foreign military occupation of Timor and to prepare the people of the Territory for the genuine exercise of their inalienable right to self-determination.

87. The Portuguese Government, as the administering Power—a capacity it is recognized as having in General Assembly resolution 3485 (XXX), of 12 December 1975, and Security Council resolution 384 (1975)—solemnly reaffirms here its intention to do everything in its power to safeguard the legitimate right of the people of Timor to self-determination. That attitude, which in my Government's view is the most elementary duty of a Power responsible for a Territory that is still non-self-governing, is entirely in keeping with resolution 1514 (XV) and other relevant United Nations resolutions, particularly the resolution 3485 (XXX), which explicitly bears on the question of Timor.

88. However, the armed forces of the Republic of Indonesia continue, without any doubt, to be illegally present in the Territory of Timor, thus contravening the provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2 of resolution 384 (1975) and paragraph 5 of resolution 3485 (XXX). The presence of Indonesian armed forces in East Timor is openly acknowledged by the Government of Indonesia, which stated to the Special Representative, according to paragraph 39 of his report, that the presence of the so-called volunteers in East Timor was the result of a request made first by the APODETI, UDT, KOTA [*Klibur Oan Timor Aswain*] and Trabalhista parties and then by the so-called Provisional Government of East Timor, and that those "volunteers" would leave East Timor only upon the request of the so-called Provisional Government.

89. My delegation would like in this respect to draw the Council's attention to the fact that the so-called Provisional Government of East Timor is not recognized either by the United Nations or by the administering Power of the Territory and that it consequently cannot claim the slightest legitimacy—any more than can the political parties to which it has alluded—for

requesting foreign troops to intervene militarily in East Timor and to remain there in violation of East Timor's territorial integrity.

90. Furthermore, my delegation would also point out that the armed struggle is continuing in the Territory, between, on the one hand, the Indonesian troops and the elements of the so-called Dili Government—which favours the integration of East Timor with Indonesia—and, on the other, the troops of FRETILIN, which demands independence for the Territory. As is clear from certain passages of the Special Representative's report, there is still fighting in the Territory, which the two warring factions say they control. Portugal condemns all the crimes and all the atrocities of which the people of Timor have been the victim during the struggle taking place there.

91. The naval units that my Government maintains in the region of Timor have also detected the presence of Indonesian warships in Timor's territorial waters. My Government informed the Council of this at the time [S/11955]. The occupation forces have also continued to unload war matériel of various types in East Timor.

92. Many communiqués and reports published in the international press have noted the continued presence of Indonesian armed forces in East Timor and the military actions undertaken by those forces, in constant violation of General Assembly and Security Council resolutions.

93. Portugal calls to the Council's attention all the difficulties with which it has been confronted in its efforts to obtain information on the situation of Portuguese citizens in Timor and to obtain the release and repatriation of those being held by the warring factions.

94. In that respect I should like to draw the Council's particular attention to the fact that 23 Portuguese soldiers have been held in the Territory since August 1975 by the so-called Provisional Government of East Timor. They are still being held there despite all the efforts deployed by my Government to free them from such unjustifiable captivity. It should be noted that five of those soldiers asked for asylum in Indonesian territory and that the Indonesian authorities turned them over to the UDT even though their repatriation had been authorized by the Djakarta Government. Furthermore, despite all the initiatives taken, the International Red Cross has been prevented from acting on the territory of Timor, which has rendered impossible any humanitarian assistance to those being held and to the refugees and any channelling to Timor of international assistance, including that of Portugal, under the auspices of the Red Cross.

95. In those conditions, East Timor's isolation from the rest of the world—with the exception, of course, of the close relations it is forced to maintain with

Indonesia—is almost complete. That is a situation which the international community has the duty to denounce.

96. That, then, in broad outline and in the most salient aspects, is how matters now stand in the question of Timor, more than four months after the invasion by the Indonesian armed forces. In view of the situation described, it is necessary to consider what measures the Council can take now to establish in East Timor the conditions necessary for the true self-determination of its people.

97. The presence of the Indonesian armed forces in East Timor, in violation of East Timor's territorial integrity and contrary to the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council, is an undeniable fact, and the Council cannot tolerate such a situation any longer.

98. No serious process of decolonization, effectively respecting the inalienable right of any colonized people to self-determination and independence, can take place while foreign troops are on a Territory, distorting any manifestation of the true will of the people. The Indonesian armed aggression is the main obstacle to any serious act designed to determine the form desired by the people of Timor to decide on their future. The Government of Indonesia must therefore again be persuaded to withdraw immediately and unconditionally the armed forces it maintains in East Timor. This it has publicly refused to do so far, on the fallacious pretext that those forces are made up of volunteers.

99. Such an attitude can only be interpreted as a clear, formal and inadmissible refusal by the Indonesian Government to implement the relevant General Assembly and Security Council resolutions on the question. Moreover, in this refusal, the Indonesian Government manifestly has no other intention than to confront the Council with an actual *fait accompli*. That is precisely why it will certainly not fail, in the course of the present series of meetings, to go one step further in its policy of *faits accomplis* and underrate its role by overrating that of the so-called Provisional Government of East Timor. The Council cannot, however, allow matters to take this course. That would constitute a most dangerous precedent, not only for the decolonization of small territories but for international relations in general.

100. In our opinion, accordingly, a cease-fire should immediately be established so as to put an end to the fratricidal struggle being waged in the Territory, causing substantial human and material losses to the people of Timor, and so as to make it possible to create that atmosphere of peace which is essential for a genuine consultation of the will of the people.

101. Furthermore, consistent with the principle we have always maintained, that increased United Nations participation in the decolonization process in Timor

is essential, my Government expresses its agreement to a possible prolongation of the mandate conferred by the Council on the Secretary-General in paragraphs 5 and 6 of resolution 384 (1975). Portugal, indeed, is particularly aware of the need for urgent international action to prevent, by rapid and effective measures, the consolidation of an abnormal situation which deprives an entire people of the opportunity to exercise its right to self-determination. We therefore consider it desirable that the consultations between the Secretary-General, or his Special Representative, and all the parties concerned should continue so as to ensure the implementation of resolution 384 (1975).

102. May I therefore be allowed to draw the Council's attention to the usefulness of having a more concrete and specific definition of the mandate of the Secretary-General to enable him to undertake more speedily and effectively the consultations provided for with the interested parties, thus avoiding delays and hesitations the only effect of which would be to consolidate the inadmissible *status quo*. My Government would consider very favourably the convening of a conference under United Nations auspices with the participation of all interested parties, as a means to facilitate the holding of those consultations and of giving them some force. The conference would have the advantage of bringing together, at a given time and in one place, in addition to representatives of the United Nations and of Portugal, the administering Power, those who have intervened directly in the conflict, thus forcing each of the interested parties clearly to assume its responsibilities before the international community as far as developments in the issue of Timor are concerned.

103. Furthermore, considering that the process of decolonization of Timor, like any other socio-political process, cannot be arbitrarily divided into totally distinct phases, and considering that we must now take an over-all approach to the problem without thereby excluding the possibility of developing the process by stages, that conference could have as its main purpose to seek agreement on the following points: first, control over the withdrawal of Indonesian forces from the Territory of East Timor and the simultaneous establishment of a cease fire; secondly, a civilian and military administration of the Territory during the period between the withdrawal of the Indonesian forces and the effective exercise by the people of Timor of its right to self-determination; and thirdly, forms and conditions for the exercise of the right to self-determination by the people of Timor.

104. Nevertheless, taking into account the existing separation, which must be respected, between the competence of the General Assembly and that of the Security Council and the close link between the withdrawal of foreign troops and the establishment of conditions that would enable the people of Timor actually to exercise its right to self-determination,

the active participation of the Committee of 24,⁵ beginning with this first phase in the solution of the problem of Timor, would be of utmost interest and usefulness. Thus, if the Council considered this useful and possible, the Secretary-General and the Committee of 24 would certainly be in a position to guide the scheduled consultations or the proposed conference towards a reactivation of the decolonization process in Timor without any interruption.

105. Portugal has no political, strategic or economic interest as regards Timor, a Territory of which we continue to be the administering Power. Portugal, furthermore, has already given the international community sufficient proof of its impartiality, sincerity and determination in the difficult task of decolonization, which we have endeavoured to complete successfully. Thus, although we are, *de facto*, prevented from exercising our powers and attributes as administering Power, Portugal considers that in this case too it is its duty to do battle for respect for the free exercise by the people of Timor of its right to self-determination, without outside interference or pressure. Accordingly, Portugal continues to feel in complete solidarity with the people of Timor. We feel very deeply the struggles taking place among the Timorese themselves and the divisions which have been created among them, and we are making every effort to contribute to a peaceful solution to the conflict.

106. It is in this spirit that my Government reaffirms here, before the Council, that it is prepared, to give the United Nations, in so far as it is able, its full co-operation for a solution to the problem of Timor.

107. It remains for me to voice the hope that the Council, in exercising the competence it holds under the Charter, will take the measures essential to safeguard this inalienable right of the people of Timor, whose cause is that of all peoples struggling for the right to decide their own fate, a cause which has always been the major concern and has mobilized the most sustained efforts of the Organization.

108. The PRESIDENT (*translation from Chinese*): I should like to inform the Council that I have received a letter from the representative of the Philippines in which he requests to be invited to participate in the Council's discussion of the item inscribed on our agenda, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure. I therefore propose, with the consent of the Council and in accordance with our usual practice, to invite the representative of the Philippines to participate in our debate, without the right to vote.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Reyes (Philippines) took the place reserved for him at the side of the Council chamber.

109. The PRESIDENT (*translation from Chinese*): The third speaker is Mr. Guilherme Maria Gonçalves,

whose invitation was requested in document S/12043. I invite him to take a seat at the Council table and to make a statement.

110. Mr. GONÇALVES: The Provisional Government of East Timor has placed upon me and my three colleagues present here the heavy burden of representing it and explaining its views to the members of the Council.

111. Mr. President, permit me at the outset to thank you and the other members of this august body for the opportunity given to me and to my colleagues to address the Council in the course of its consideration of the situation in Timor. I would certainly be remiss in my duties if I did not avail myself of this opportunity to express, on behalf of the Provisional Government of East Timor and on behalf of the East Timorese people, their deep respect for you, Mr. President, and for all the members of the Council, as well as our firm conviction that, under your wise and competent leadership, the Council will be able to make a constructive contribution to the solution of the question before it and, by so doing, create an atmosphere of peace and tranquillity in the region.

112. When I spoke in the Council last December [*1865th meeting*], I spoke on behalf of APODETI. Mr. Mario Viegas Carrascalão, who is also present here as a member of my delegation, represented UDT, and Mr. José Martins spoke on behalf of his party, KOTA. This time, however, as Chairman of the Advisory Council, I am entrusted with my delegation to represent the Provisional Government of East Timor. As for myself, I am a man with very little education and experience, and the trust which the Provisional Government has placed on my shoulders is really a heavy burden to carry.

113. The four parties—UDT, APODETI, KOTA and Trabalhista—have dissolved themselves, and their members are now united in a new party, which we call the National Front, which forms the Provisional Government. Former members of FRETILIN also hold posts in the East Timor administration—for instance, the district chiefs of Dili and Ocussi and many other districts throughout East Timor.

114. The composition of my delegation is as follows: Mr. Mario Viegas Carrascalão, an engineer in forestry, former prominent member of UDT and now a member of the National Front, in charge of protocol and liaison in the Provisional Government. Another member of our delegation is Mr. José Gonçalves, an economist, formerly the Minister of Economics and Statistics in the self-styled FRETILIN Government, which lasted only four days. Mr. Gonçalves is certainly in a position to tell the Council about FRETILIN practices when they were in power. All the lies and distorted facts about East Timor which Mr. Horta has fabricated and disseminated all around the world can now be checked with Mr. Gonçalves, who left Dili

just a few weeks ago. The fourth member is Mr. João Pedro Soares, former secretary of FRETILIN in the district of Manatuto and former commander of FRETILIN there. He can provide the Council with details of FRETILIN's operations, their methods and tactics designed to annihilate their enemies, UDT and APODETI. On the other hand, Mr. Soares also is certainly in a position to report how former FRETILIN members or supporters are being treated by the Provisional Government. Mr. Soares entered the Portuguese colonial army in 1967. He served four years and seven months as a first-line soldier and reached the rank of sergeant—the highest rank permitted a native. He left the colonial army in 1972. He joined FRETILIN in the Manatuto area, with 1,200 militia men equipped with some 70 guns under his command.

115. It will take too much of the Council's time if I have to repeat all our statements delivered here when the question of Timor was discussed last December. All those statements are still valid now. Nevertheless, I should like to touch upon the main events in East Timor as they have developed.

116. Before the fall of the Caetano régime there was only one party—the Acção Nacional Popular—which provided the essential support for the colonial régime. After the fall of the Caetano régime, brought about by the military coup of 25 April 1974, three political parties were formed in Timor, each having its own programme and its own viewpoint on the political future of East Timor. Later on, two more parties, KOTA and Trabalhista, were formed during the internal struggle. UDT was formed on 11 May 1974—presumably the most popular party in Timor, since it counted on the support of 236 of the 472 existing *sucos* in Timor, which comprised about 50 per cent of the population of the territory. At that time, UDT favoured gradual independence, since prevailing conditions did not warrant immediate independence. Even FRETILIN recognized the strength of UDT at that time. FRETILIN, formerly the ASDT, advocated immediate and total independence and claimed to be the second strongest party. APODETI since its inception has favoured integration with Indonesia and has based its strength on the loyalty and support of 95 *sucos*, or about 20 per cent of the entire population. KOTA, founded 10 November 1974, has about 28,000 members. It advocated independence and integration with Indonesia, while supporting the continuation of the *lurais* as the traditional leaders of the people. Trabalhista was founded in October 1974 with a membership of 25,000, composed mostly of labourers in the harbours and common workers in the villages; this party also called for independence and integration with Indonesia.

117. After the coup and counter-coup mentioned in paragraph 15 of the report of the Special Representative, FRETILIN regained control of Dili and immediately implemented the first priority on its programme, the elimination of all its adversaries, UDT in particular. Thousands upon thousands of UDT members and their

supporters fled Dili and surrounding areas and sought refuge towards the Indonesian border. Later APODETI members were included in the massive FRETILIN man-hunt. In their flight to safety the refugees were harassed by FRETILIN gangs, villages were looted and burned down, even women and children were ambushed, so that hundreds of these refugees perished before they reached the safety of Indonesian Timor. The number of refugees in West Timor swelled to 50,000 people. But the Lord is merciful; He gives the refugees comfort—food, shelter, clothing and medical care and friendship as bestowed by the Indonesian people and Government. Thousands of our families, fellow party members, friends and other fellow Timorese were not so lucky as to escape. Many were thrown in jail, tortured, murdered and buried in shallow mass graves. I will come later to this tragic and almost unbelievable story.

118. Council members may recall that before the coup last August several efforts had been made to arrange talks between the political parties in Timor. It is also to be recalled that FRETILIN was the only party which boycotted the Macao meeting, which discussed the decolonization programme for East Timor. When FRETILIN and the former colonial troops had occupied many parts of East Timor they again ignored the invitation of the Portuguese Government to have another round of meetings with all the other political parties.

119. On 28 November 1975, FRETILIN unilaterally proclaimed its independence and formed its self-styled republic, thereby trying to impose its will by force upon the majority of East Timor. It was only logical that the four other parties should respond to the challenge immediately. On 30 November they stated their desire to be independent and to be integrated with the Republic of Indonesia. Now that we have witnessed the practices of FRETILIN when they were in power, we are absolutely certain that the totalitarian methods and practices it imposed on East Timor cannot be tolerated by our people. The dignity, honour and traditions of the people of East Timor have to be defended at all costs. Force was imposed upon us and we were forced to defend ourselves, whatever the consequences. We declared the independence of the whole former Territory of East Timor and its integration with the Republic of Indonesia on 30 November, and on 17 December the Provisional Government of the Territory of East Timor was established.

120. As representatives of the majority of the people of East Timor, we have the moral duty and obligation to do what is right to defend the interests of our people. Therefore, on behalf of the people of East Timor, on 30 November the four political parties asked the Indonesian Government and the Indonesian people for assistance in the restoration of peace and security. We invited the Indonesian people to help us in our just struggle and to defend and protect the dignity and the interests of the people. On 18 December the Pro-

visional Government sent a cable to the Chairman of the Committee of 24,⁵ informing him that the Provisional Government of East Timor had requested the Government of the Republic of Indonesia to render assistance so that a condition of peace and order in the Territory of East Timor could be restored, free from the disturbances and threats of the terrorist remnants left by the Portuguese Government.

121. What were the practices of the FRETILIN terrorists? As soon as the Portuguese Governor had abandoned Dili, the FRETILIN leadership consolidated their military power in Dili and other areas of East Timor. They undertook a massive hunt for all UDT and APODETI members. Thousands were thrown in jail in Dili and other towns under the control of FRETILIN for the simple reason that they happened to be members or supporters of APODETI and UDT. Leaders and functionaries of these two parties were humiliated and tortured in their prisons; many of these patriots never saw their families again.

122. The FRETILIN leadership instructed their branches and district commanders, like FRETILIN Commander Soares, now a member of our delegation, to round up all members and supporters of UDT and APODETI and to throw all of them in gaol. Illiterate and innocent people fell victim to the totalitarian methods of the FRETILIN leadership. To enlarge its following, FRETILIN forced 200 men in every *posto* to enlist in their militia. Boys of 12 and 13 years of age were recruited and provided with weapons but with very little or no training. These militia were later moved from one part of East Timor to another where they would have difficulty in communicating with the local population because of the differences in dialect. This was to make it easy for the FRETILIN leadership to give whatever orders they liked and have them executed promptly. Villages were looted for food and cattle and houses were burned down on orders. This systematic reign of terror was implemented without hesitation so as to intimidate the people and to enable FRETILIN to rule the country through fear.

123. Let us examine for a moment the experience of Mr. Pedro Soares, a member of our delegation. As I said earlier, he was secretary of FRETILIN in Manatuto; he had 1,200 militia under his command with only 70 guns. These 1,200 troops were dispersed in the six *postos* of Manatuto. As a FRETILIN commander, Mr. Soares got instructions straight from FRETILIN military headquarters to round up all UDT and APODETI members in his district. He did not even know how many UDT and APODETI members were in his area. He had room for only 70 people in his prison, and there were no supplies for more than that number. That was no problem. FRETILIN members in his area rounded up all suspected APODETI and UDT members and brought them to the Manatuto commander to be put into prison without

prior interrogation. He did not even know how many were put in gaol. The families of the detainees were instructed to feed their relatives in gaol. If a prisoner had no family in the vicinity of the prison, then he had to survive on his own somehow. Mr. Soares later surrendered to the forces of the Provisional Government with the available FRETILIN forces under his command because he realized, however late, that to follow the instructions of his military superiors meant that he had to put many innocent and illiterate people in gaol, many of whom he knew were good and hard-working villagers.

124. Mr. Soares' testimony makes clear that the world outside Timor has been misled by FRETILIN propaganda. There has been no widespread heavy fighting or ill-treatment of FRETILIN members since December. In most cases the FRETILIN forces just fled or surrendered to the joint forces of the Provisional Government, putting up little or no resistance. In some cases, FRETILIN units did retreat to the hills, often taking with them women and children as hostages, with the threat that all hostages would be killed if the joint forces of the Provisional Government tried to capture them. The joint forces therefore have to manoeuvre very carefully so as not to endanger the lives of these hostages.

125. After the liberation of Manatuto, all FRETILIN members were duly registered, and within a week they were allowed to go back to their own communities or villages. No FRETILIN militia is kept in gaol by the Provisional Government. Reprisals against FRETILIN members or supporters are prevented by the joint forces of the Provisional Government. In fact, many former members of FRETILIN have asked to be put in gaol in order to protect themselves from the revenge of the angry masses.

126. These are the confessions of a FRETILIN commander, Mr. Soares himself, now a member of our delegation. With the Council's indulgence, I should like to acquaint the Council with the experience of another former member of the FRETILIN leadership, Mr. José Gonçalves. He is an economist who graduated from the University of Liège, Belgium, in 1968 and worked in a private enterprise in Madrid until 1974, at which time he returned to Dili. The Portuguese Government appointed him as inspector, and later he was promoted to be Chief of the Provincial Economics Department. After an absence of almost 26 years, he found in East Timor the same semi-feudal system, the same method of indirect rule governing the islands, an illiteracy rate of 90 per cent, a 40 per cent mortality rate for children and an average lifespan for the common Timorese of only 40 years. As an economist, he saw the dangers of the monoculture—coffee. Rice and maize, the main food products of the island, still had to be imported.

127. At first Mr. Gonçalves made several efforts to convince the party leaders in Dili to unite and align

themselves in a common front to strengthen themselves in their negotiations with the Portuguese, but his efforts failed because, according to him, at that time the political leaders were more concerned with party interest than the interests of the people as a whole. Although reluctant in the beginning, he joined FRETILIN, thinking it was democratic, but later he became disillusioned by events. He was in Dili when FRETILIN proclaimed its independence on 28 November 1975. On 2 December a "cabinet" was formed, to which he was appointed as a minister. He accepted the job for the simple reason that by so doing he thought he could do something to rectify the bad situation.

128. The first meeting of this "cabinet", at which Mr. Horta was also present, was held on 2 December and was presided over by Francisco Xavier do Amaral, President of FRETILIN. Decisions on the general policies of the "new government" were taken. Several ministers were instructed to go outside Timor; Mr. Horta was instructed to join Araujo in Lisbon and to proceed to the United Nations to obtain recognition of the "new republic" and to influence public opinion in Australia and other countries. Mr. Rogerio Lobato was instructed to visit certain socialist countries to ask for financial and military assistance. Mr. Alkatiri, Minister of Politics, was instructed to go to Africa and request recognition of the "new government" and take with him the credentials of Mr. Roque Rodrigues, who was appointed ambassador to an African country. Mr. Gonçalves was completely surprised at the general policies adopted by the "new government" and at the way decisions were reached. These certainly reflected a system unfamiliar to the traditional East Timorese, where consensus plays an important if not a dominant role in the tribal society.

129. A second meeting was held on 6 December, at which time there were complaints from the people's militia of shortages of ammunition and food. They threatened to surrender in an eventual attack if their demands were not met. Mr. Gonçalves himself was not familiar with weapons, but he certainly knew that the food supplies for the troops were enough for about two months only. Meanwhile, food supplies for the population were fast becoming a big problem since they could not import any more rice for lack of money.

130. Mr. Gonçalves was in Dili when the joint forces of the four parties, assisted by the Indonesian volunteers, attacked Dili on 7 December at 5.30 in the morning. The attack was in fact expected both by the FRETILIN leadership and the people of Dili, and therefore the population was not allowed to leave town. UDT and APODETI prisoners were transported secretly out of Dili a few days before the attack. Not one single bomb was dropped on Dili; there was no naval bombardment; there was only a short exchange of fire accompanied by the sound of mortars exploding. FRETILIN forces and leaders fled in great disorder in

the direction of Aileu, 30 miles away. By noon the whole town was controlled by the joint forces and the volunteers. Later in the afternoon, however, FRETILIN forces fired mortars into Dili for about half an hour; they fell in the business and residential areas of the town. Mr. Gonçalves discovered later that about 200 FRETILIN troops had been killed during the short fight and about 100 civilian casualties had been reported treated in the hospital. There was no massacre. The next day, 8 December, Mr. Gonçalves was arrested by the joint forces and detained. According to him, he intentionally stayed in town, having gleaned from the two meetings he attended that FRETILIN was planning to establish a totalitarian State with a foreign ideology. He was and he is against such a system. His decision was also influenced by the many reports from other districts telling about overloaded prisons, mistreatment and torture of prisoners.

131. After Dili fell into the hands of the joint forces, an open-arms policy was announced through Radio Dili. Any member of FRETILIN who surrendered with his weapons would get fair treatment and would be allowed to return to his own community. They surrendered by the hundreds; it was reported that many of them went quietly back to their own villages, deserting their units and abandoning their weapons. The members of the popular militia who surrendered were registered and later sent back to their respective communities. Many of them were very young—12 and 13 years old—and had received one or two months' training, mostly political indoctrination. Those with a criminal record have been detained for eventual court proceedings. A few former leaders of FRETILIN are now in custody, often at their own request, in order to protect them from the revenge of those UDT or APODETI members who had been imprisoned or who lost families in the mass murders.

132. East Timor is a small territory with a small population. Every crime committed can easily be recorded by the people themselves, and therefore the Provisional Government has a very difficult task in preventing retaliatory acts or acts of vengeance by certain segments of the population that have been victimized by FRETILIN. With patience, persuasion and good information the Provincial Government has thus far been successful in convincing certain segments of the people to accept former FRETILIN members without any criminal record into the local government. This may at times sound strange until one understands Timorese customs. But we have to accept existing traditions and values; we have to accept the fact that the Timor problem is a complex one. For example, Mr. Horta of FRETILIN is related by marriage to a brother of Mr. Mario Viegas Carrascalão of the Provisional Government, and so are many others. The return of the remnant of FRETILIN now still in hiding can be brought about through the intermediary of family or tribal members. Hundreds of FRETILIN troops have already surrendered, after they saw for themselves how their comrades who gave themselves up were set free immediately.

133. It is a fact, which everybody can check, that the Provisional Government has appointed former FRETILIN members to responsible positions. Those FRETILIN members who realized their mistake and who of their own free will decided to join the Provisional Government in its programme of reconstruction and development were given a fair deal. This was done because, in the final analysis, while they may have behaved like wild animals and hungry beasts, they are still our own brothers, and family ties are very strong in East Timor. If we do not solve our problem right now, it may perhaps never be resolved. For instance, the current head of the district of Dili, Mr. Mario Sanches, is a well-known former FRETILIN member; so is Mr. Jaime Oliveira, head of the district of Ocussi. The secretary of the district of Baucau is also a former FRETILIN member. After they pledged their loyalty to the Provisional Government, former FRETILIN members with administrative capability and experience were appointed to top-ranking administrative positions in Manatuto, Aileu, Maliana, Suai, Viqueque and Atauro. Many former FRETILIN members and supporters are also working in the offices of the Provisional Government and in Radio Dili.

134. The Provisional Government has done everything in its power to create favourable conditions in East Timor so as to bring about a peaceful settlement of our dispute and, by so doing, to prevent a never-ending conflict between relatives in the next generation. It was therefore a tremendous shock for the Provisional Government and for people of East Timor when we received the tragic news that mass graves had been discovered in the vicinity of Aileu and Same. Allow me to go into more detail about this mass murder.

135. The Council may recall that the FRETILIN leadership has put thousands of UDT and APODETI members in prison all over East Timor. When the Provisional Government took Dili, most prisoners had been removed, probably to other places still in the hands of FRETILIN. When we took Aileu, about 30 miles away, a known stronghold and the headquarters of the FRETILIN forces, we still found no trace whatsoever of the prisoners. When almost all the towns had fallen into our hands, there was still no evidence of these prisoners. On 3 January 1976, the Provisional Government requested the Indonesian Red Cross to look for them.

136. The Indonesian Red Cross team and the attached group of officials, including the Executive Chief of the Provisional Government and a priest, on 15 February discovered a sand heap which looked recently disturbed. Upon excavating the spot, they discovered a grave cavity which turned out to be 3×3 metres in size. At a depth of 80 centimetres they came across decaying human corpses. These had been put in a heap, unarranged and interlaced with wire so that no one of them could be released from the others. Most

of the victims buried in the said mass grave were UDT adherents, numbering approximately 40 to 50 persons. Among them was the corpse of Lions. Riberlo, who was identified by the purse found in his shirt jacket. A certain villager from Maulau Rita named Francisco Pereira, who happened to witness the excavation, explained that he, himself, had witnessed the slaughter by FRETILIN members, and amongst the victims he mentioned Victor Santa, the deputy head of local authority of Dili, and seven others. The report of the Indonesian Red Cross concerning its findings has been circulated as document S/12040. I should like to submit as documentation to the Council the pictures of the mass graves and the films made during the digging. Another mass grave was discovered one and a half kilometres from the first one. Sixty bodies, all those of APODETI members, were found in the second grave, which was 6×9 metres in size. The details are given in the report of the Indonesian Red Cross.

137. On 16 February another mass grave was discovered two and a half kilometres south of Aileu in the neighbourhood of the road from Aileu to Maubesi. In a grave cavity of 5×6 metres and at a depth of 60 centimetres, around 45 damaged and decaying corpses were found. An automatic Seiko watch was also found, evidently stopped on the 7th of the month. It was supposed that these victims died before 7 February.

138. A fourth mass grave was discovered on 17 February in the upper part of the town of Same, 95 kilometres south of Dili. The grave was approximately 1.5×15 metres and at a depth of 30 centimetres another pile of corpses was found. According to the information of the local inhabitants who were present at the moment of excavation, the slaughter was carried out by FRETILIN members on 29 January. Escaped witnesses identified 14 of the victims. It was estimated that no less than 40 corpses were piled, unarranged, one on the other. According to information gained from the local people, all these victims had been prisoners of war of FRETILIN.

139. Near the Concelho Office in Same there was a school building where bands of FRETILIN members has shot down individuals from the local community, numbering about 34. Among the victims of the cruelty demonstrated by FRETILIN was the prominent APODETI figure, Osorio Soares. Osorio, who had studied philosophy and the history of politics in Macao, once held the office of General Secretary of APODETI when the process of decolonization in East Timor was about to begin. Osorio Soares, aged 35, his hands tied behind his back, was shot by the FRETILIN terrorists on 28 January in a village called Holarua, together with his two younger brothers and four of his followers. Osorio Soares was an idealist, and until the last moments of his life was still of the conviction that the process of decolonization of East Timor would take place in an orderly and peaceful manner. May his soul rest in peace.

140. One hundred and sixty-eight members of APODETI who were detained in Dili and taken away by FRETILIN gangs are still being sought. Ten members of APODETI died while in FRETILIN detention in Dili. Twenty-one members of APODETI and UDT detained in Los Palos were taken away by FRETILIN gangs, and we are still searching for them. Sixty-six members of UDT, KOTA and Trabalhista detained in Dili were taken away by FRETILIN gangs. The names of all these missing persons have been communicated to the Secretary-General [S/12044].

141. I thank you, Mr. President, and all members of the Council, for your indulgence. I have presented to the Council evidence and documents of the mass murders committed by FRETILIN. It is my sacred duty to mention all the names of our fallen heroes. Their sacrifice will not be in vain, for the heroic struggle of the people of East Timor cannot be extinguished by any force or power whatsoever. We will fight for our beliefs until the end.

142. Lies and slanders were fabricated by Mr. Horta for the outside world in order to hide FRETILIN's crimes. He may succeed in deceiving the world for a time, but he cannot fool the world all the time. Mr. Horta and other FRETILIN members outside East Timor who have sold themselves to foreign interests are still trying to bring foreigners into Timor. The people of East Timor will not be caught napping another time.

143. On 17 December 1975, a Provisional Government was set up in Dili. All former members of the civilian administration were instructed to report for work, including former FRETILIN members. With the help of the civilian volunteers some order was brought to the chaos and anarchy left by FRETILIN. The local government in all 13 districts has now been reactivated, schools have been reopened and hospitals and clinics are back providing services with the assistance of Indonesian doctors and nurses. The Provisional Government has responded positively to the request of the Indonesian Red Cross to invite a representative of the International Committee of the Red Cross to visit Dili. Broken communications have been restored and food supplies can be provided to the people, and a general return to normal is beginning to take place.

144. On 31 January 1976 all political parties dissolved themselves and a new unified party, called the National Front, was created on which the Provisional Government is now based. A deliberative council was established to help the Provisional Government reach important decisions. Representatives of former political parties together with prominent leaders of society and religion are included in this council, which performs the functions and has the responsibilities of a provisional assembly. Preparations for a people's assembly based on consultations and tradition have reached an advanced stage. An advisory council has

also been created to provide technical and administrative advice to the Provisional Government. The structure of the Provisional Government is being maintained for the time being, and, whenever it deems necessary, innovations are introduced to increase efficiency in the bureaucracy.

145. Although calm has largely been restored to East Timor, the brutal killings and mass murders have shocked the traditional society. Scattered FRETILIN gangs led by former colonial regular troops are still roaming the isolated villages. However, the growing numbers and the increasing strength of the security forces of the Provisional Government have enabled it to cope with the threat posed by these FRETILIN gangs and to prevent a bloody mass revenge from being carried out by those who have been victimized by the FRETILIN régime. The violence and bloodshed systematically committed by the FRETILIN leadership in the tribal society of East Timor might otherwise cause a never-ending conflict in the island. The Portuguese cannot wash their hands in innocence and plead not guilty before the international jury, for the simple reason that they are the ones who handed over their arsenal and their former colonial troops to FRETILIN. The thousands of innocent lives which have been taken away by Portuguese weapons will remain their moral responsibility.

146. Requesting aid from brothers is not a monopoly of the people of East Timor. Neither is the sending of volunteers in compliance with such a request a complete novelty. Indeed, many instances can be cited in which aid has been supplied over vast distances, even spanning oceans and continents. Let me remind those who wish to deny the people of East Timor their right to request aid from their Indonesian kin and those who so strongly censure Indonesia for giving aid to us, who are bound by such strong ties of blood and culture, of the biblical words: "Let those who are without sin cast the first stone". As far as the people of East Timor are concerned, they have declared themselves independent and integrated with Indonesia and therefore as Indonesians they have the right to be protected by fellow Indonesians. The presence of Indonesian volunteers in East Timor is at the urgent request of the majority of the people of East Timor through the four political parties and later formally repeated by the Provisional Government of East Timor. The text of this request has been communicated to the Committee of 24 and to the Security Council.

147. In discussing the problem of East Timor, many people seem to forget that FRETILIN never represented the majority of the people. The Portuguese Government itself recognized the fact that FRETILIN was a minority in East Timor, and that was the main reason why Portugal found it impossible to relinquish power to FRETILIN. The legitimate representatives of the majority of the people, therefore, are the four political parties which now form the Provisional

Government. When FRETILIN imposed its will by force upon the people of East Timor with its so-called proclamation of independence, it was only logical that the genuine representatives of the people of East Timor should defend the interests of the majority. The wish of the majority, announced on 30 November 1975 through the four political parties, was clear-cut: to be independent through integration with Indonesia.

148. The Provisional Government has communicated the sacred wishes of the people of East Timor to the Government of Indonesia. Indonesia has accepted in principle our request for independence and for our integration with the Republic of Indonesia. The reason for this attitude was made known here when our delegation appeared before the Council. Indonesia has asked the Provisional Government to ensure that the implementation of the right to self-determination is carried out properly, namely, that the decision is ratified by all our people in the presence of the United Nations.

149. Life has now returned to normal in East Timor, except for a few disturbances caused by FRETILIN gangs in isolated locations. It is our hope that the people's assembly can be established within the next two or three months.

150. With your permission, Mr. President, and because it is so important to an understanding of the basis of Timorese life, I want to elaborate further on the social structure in my country.

151. First, the chief of the *cnua* is the head of the family; a family means man, wife, children and those relatives with blood ties up to a certain degree. The chief of the *cnua* is responsible for the welfare of the family and represents the family in all external affairs. Secondly, a certain number of *cnuas* form a *suco*. The chief of the *sucos* is elected for life; he is responsible for the welfare of all the *sucos* and represents them in all their external affairs. There are about 472 *sucos* in East Timor. Thirdly a number of *sucos* form a *reino*, headed by the chief of the *sucos* who is called a *liurai*. There are circumstances where the *sucos* are placed directly under an administrative *da posto*—the "divide and rule" policy in practice. All decisions within the family are taken by the chief of the *cnua*, after consultations with the members of his family. The *suco* chief makes the decisions for the *suco*, after consultations with the members. The *liurai* makes decisions for the council after consultations with the members. The *liurai* is responsible to the administrative *da posto*, who is the lowest official of the Governor in the province of East Timor.

152. It is our belief that this method of taking decisions through consultation is most appropriate to East Timorese society and the Timorese people. We fervently hope that these traditional values of the people will be seriously considered and accepted in the exercise of their right of self-determination. It would

also be in line with law no. 7/75 of July 1975 promulgated by the Government of Portugal.

153. I wish for your information to state here that many *suco* chiefs were killed during the turmoil in the island. The Provisional Government is now making preparations for the elections of new *suco* chiefs to replace those who have been killed. In population centres like Dili and Baucau where the people have some education, preparations for the elections of their representatives of the people's assembly are in an advanced stage. The Provisional Government of East Timor and representatives of the United Nations will meet to discuss what type of role the United Nations will play in the electoral process. In another stage, all the *suco* chiefs, with other prominent figures in society and religion, would form the people's assembly in Dili with the determination of the future political status of East Timor as its primary duty. We are preparing this difficult and time-consuming task because we have a high respect for the principles of the United Nations and its Charter. How difficult this task is can be understood only if the members of this Council can visualize the existing social and cultural realities in the island.

154. There were other situations in the past where the Portuguese Government simply handed over independence to one liberation movement or another without any consultations whatsoever with the people. In fact, there was one instance when the Portuguese Government assumed it had fulfilled its duties as administering Power when it declared the independence of a certain country without handing over the administration to any existing body or organization. Nevertheless, the Provisional Government of East Timor has decided that it will follow the right procedure as far as possible, and it is our earnest hope that the United Nations will send its observers to witness the exercise of the right of self-determination by the people of East Timor concerning their future political status. Every East Timorese outside the island is welcome to come to East Timor and participate in the proceedings. Mr. Horta and his friends are welcome to return to Dili, and their safety will be guaranteed by the Provisional Government; but we are not going to talk to them as representatives of FRETILIN. The reason for this I have already explained—namely, that as of today prominent members and supporters of FRETILIN inside East Timor are already represented and already participate in the Provisional Government. If the United Nations, this Council or the Committee of 24 desires to send a mission to the Territory to witness the real situation in East Timor, it is welcome to do so. The Provisional Government will do its utmost to facilitate such a visit.

155. The representative of Portugal has referred to the 23 Portuguese prisoners now held by the Provisional Government of East Timor—not by Indonesia. My delegation finds it difficult to understand the attitude of the Portuguese Government in this matter, because

it has kept silent about other Portuguese killed and murdered by FRETILIN. The Provisional Government accepts the responsibility for these 23 people. They are detained in East Timor and enjoy good care. They have complete freedom of movement within the borders of the village where they are held, although a few of them have confessed to having committed criminal acts against the people, acts punishable under the existing laws of East Timor. Although we recognize the humanitarian aspects of the question, this is not and never has been primarily a humanitarian problem. It is and should be treated as a political problem.

156. After the Portuguese Government deliberately abandoned the Territory and its own responsibilities as administering Power, much suffering and misery afflicted the people of East Timor. Many lost their lives to Portuguese weapons, while thousands more lost their homes, were separated from their families and became refugees. At one point 50,000 of these unfortunate people had fled to Indonesian Timor, and 15,000 of them still remain there, still unable to return to their homes, which were burned to the ground by FRETILIN forces. In addition, cattle and foodstocks were dispersed and savings and valuables were looted, all as a consequence of the disorder which resulted from Portugal's abandonment of the Territory.

157. The life and livelihood of an East Timorese are surely as valuable as those of a Portuguese. The Provisional Government has demonstrated that it respects the human rights of the Portuguese equally with those of its own people. The Portuguese Government should now show that it no longer follows its old colonialist habits but, instead, is prepared to acknowledge its responsibility for the injuries committed with its weapons in East Timor and to embark upon a policy of equal treatment for the East Timorese.

158. If Portugal truly wants to obtain the release of the prisoners it should address itself to the Provisional Government, which has them in its hands. This question should not be dealt with as an isolated problem but rather as part of the overall political and humanitarian problem of East Timor. The Provisional Government is willing to discuss this question, together with all other relevant problems, at any time the Portuguese Government finds it opportune to do so. If a spirit of conciliation and responsibility prevails, such questions as have been raised here will shortly be settled to the benefit of both peoples.

159. My delegation has studied the report of the Secretary-General and its annex, and I should like to take this opportunity to make a few observations on it.

160. Pursuant to Security Council resolution 384 (1975), the Secretary-General dispatched his Special Representative, Mr. Winspeare Guicciardi, to East Timor to make an on-the-spot assessment of the

existing situation and to establish contact with all the parties in the Territory and all States concerned in order to ensure the implementation of that resolution. The Provisional Government and the people of East Timor are not happy with resolution 384 (1975), but we have co-operated as far as possible with the Special Representative.

161. My delegation would like to express its appreciation to the Special Representative for the manner in which he tried to implement the task entrusted to him by the Secretary-General. He tried to be as factual as possible, with his characteristic objectivity. Had there been more time available to him and had he come in the dry season, he certainly would have produced a more comprehensive report, more satisfactory to everybody.

162. In paragraph 15 of his report, the Special Representative failed to mention the goodwill and the offer of the Indonesian Government in September 1975 to the Portuguese Government to provide assistance for the sole purpose of restoring peace and order in East Timor. Had Lisbon accepted that offer at that time, thousands of lives could have been spared. Furthermore, the withdrawal of the Portuguese Governor and the garrison to Ataúro should have been explained in more detail, because this was a betrayal of the innocent majority of East Timor. In fact, the Governor's abandonment of his post was a full mandate for FRETILIN to consolidate its position and to expand its power throughout the Territory with the arms given to them by the Portuguese. The Portuguese Government has never explained the transfer of its colonial troops to FRETILIN and how thousands of weapons and tons of ammunition could have been acquired by FRETILIN. It is hard to believe that such an experienced colonial régime as Portugal's could be intimidated by such an upheaval while in the past it could quell more serious rebellions in East Timor and elsewhere easily.

163. The Special Representative visited Ocussi, Ataúro, Dili, Baucau and Manatuto. It is true that Mr. Winspeare Guicciardi had made known his desire to visit as many places as possible. For technical and security reasons it was impossible at that time to visit other places: impassable roads, the lack of bridges and airstrips and the unpredictable weather conditions were some of the difficulties that hampered his visit to other places. In fact, it was suggested that Mr. Winspeare Guicciardi go on horseback to those places, but this became impractical because of lack of time. When the Provisional Government suggested he go on horseback, it was not a joke; the horse in Timor is like the Cadillac in New York, because the only other alternative is to go by foot. Thanks to the "efficiency" of the Portuguese Government in East Timor, it is now possible to cover a distance of about 120 miles within 48 hours, assuming that the rivers are passable. In addition to these difficulties, our intelligence sources received

information that FRETILIN men disguised as Indonesian volunteers were planning to ambush the Special Representative either in the area of Los Palos or some other place in Ermera. This information was later confirmed by captured FRETILIN members. The ambush party even found time to hold a rehearsal of the planned assault. We did not want to be held responsible for a repetition of the murder of Count Bernadotte. However, since then such favourable conditions have been created for the maintenance of peace and security that the Provisional Government communicated by cable to the Secretary-General on 17 March an invitation to the Special Representative to make another visit to East Timor and to discuss further the implementation of its decision with a view to a solution of the question of East Timor.

164. The position of the Provisional Government is clear, as it is stated in the report; we have nothing new to add to it. As far as my Government is concerned, the question of Timor has already been solved by the East Timorese themselves. There is no Portuguese administering Power any more in Dili or in Ataúro. It has deliberately abandoned the Territory. The existence of FRETILIN has become a completely irrelevant question. Former prominent members and supporters of FRETILIN have joined the Provisional Government to build up their country; many former leaders of FRETILIN were invited and have accepted various assignments in the Provisional Government. It is because of these developments and the gradual return to normal that the Provisional Government decided to allow volunteers to return to their places of origin. This return had already started in February, and it continued in March. It is to be expected that the return of the armed volunteers will be completed within a short time.

165. Remnants of the FRETILIN leadership, who have caused so much misery and suffering to our people and still refuse to be reconciled, cannot escape the hour of judgement of the people. We have nothing to say to Mr. Horta; we will forgive him for his blind acceptance of his foreign advisers, but we cannot forget that he has sold out his countrymen.

166. It is our sincere hope that the Council will come up with constructive decisions which take into account the sacred wishes of the majority of the people of East Timor and the realities now prevailing in the island. We feel deep gratitude to the Indonesian Government and our fellow Indonesians, who have given us the opportunity to regain our dignity, honour and pride, which for almost five centuries were trampled on by colonialism. The knowledge that economically we will be an extra burden for Indonesia makes us all the more grateful for our spontaneous acceptance and reception by the Indonesian people. We fully understand that certain formalities have to be met to make our independence and integration with Indonesia effective, but the people of East Timor—and they alone—should decide on the procedure for the exercise of the right of self-determination.

167. In closing, we appeal to the members of the Council to embark on a constructive, future-oriented course of action taking into account the misery and the suffering experienced by the people of East Timor in the past. It is our fervent hope that the value systems practised by the people of East Timor can also make their humble contribution to the solution of the Timor question.

168. I should like to reserve the right to speak again on this matter when my delegation deems it necessary.

The meeting rose at 7.00 p.m.

Notes

¹ Henry A. Kissinger, *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy*, New York, Harper and Brothers, 1957, p. 256.

² *Ibid.*, p. 259.

³ *Asian-African Conference, April 18-24, 1955*, New Delhi: Government of India Press, 1955, p. 36.

⁴ *Documents of the Gatherings of Non-Aligned Countries, 1961-1973*, Secretariat for Information of the Federal Executive Council, Belgrade 1973, p. 17.

⁵ Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.