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NOTE

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Documents of the Security Council (symbol S/ . . .) are normally published in quarterly *Supplements of the Official Records of the Security Council*. The date of the document indicates the supplement in which it appears or in which information about it is given.

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1831st MEETING

Held in New York on Monday, 16 June 1975, at 3 p.m.

President: Mr. Abdul Karim AL-SHAIKHLY (Iraq).

Present: The representatives of the following States: Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, China, Costa Rica, France, Guyana, Iraq, Italy, Japan, Mauritania, Sweden, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania and United States of America.

Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/1831)

1. Adoption of the agenda
2. The situation in Cyprus:
Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations operation in Cyprus (S/11717)

The meeting was called to order at 3.40 p.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

The situation in Cyprus

Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations operation in Cyprus (S/11717)

1. The PRESIDENT: In accordance with the decisions taken by the Security Council at its 1830th meeting, I propose now, with the consent of the Council, to invite the representatives of Cyprus, Turkey and Greece to participate in the discussion without the right to vote.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Clerides (Cyprus), Mr. Olcay and Mr. Papoulias (Greece) took places at the Council table.

2. The PRESIDENT: The first speaker is the representative of Cyprus, on whom I now call.

3. Mr. CLERIDES (Cyprus): I have asked to speak, after another resolution on Cyprus has been adopted by the Security Council [*resolution 370 (1975)*] and after all the members of the Council have made their statements on the issue of extending the mandate of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) and on the report of the Secretary-General. I am indeed grateful to the President of the Security Council and to the members for giving me this opportunity to speak.

4. My purpose is not to accuse, but to state established facts. If the facts point in a certain direction, lead to certain inescapable conclusions or raise certain unavoidable questions which need to be answered, let those questions be answered or else the conclusions should be given due consideration for fruitful action. For only thus can we bring into focus the true picture of the tearing of the fabric of the non-aligned Republic of Cyprus, of the tragedy and continuing suffering of its people, of the anxiety regarding their present survival and of their anguish about their future.

5. On 13 June [*1830th meeting*], during a short statement, I said that all the members of the Security Council had made statements but that, alas, only a few voices had been heard referring to the continuing invasion of Cyprus, the terrible plight of the refugees, the fate of the missing persons, the suffering of their families and the Greek Cypriots in the north in enclaves behind the lines of the Turkish army of occupation, without work, without freedom of movement, without schools, without medical care and under severe restrictions which increase daily. I did not mean to be critical.

6. I understand the reticence of the members of the Council. I understand their silence, based on their wish to have a short and unheated debate in order to contribute positively to a better climate, a climate that would facilitate the negotiating process, in which so many hopes have been placed. As a negotiator, I appreciate the importance of, and need for, a good climate within which to carry out my very difficult task. However, as an ordinary man, who lives daily amidst the pain and suffering of thousands of persons, I cannot bring myself to attach importance to the expediency of silence for the sake of a superficial good climate, at the expense of the continuing human pain and suffering of the people of my country—particularly when no progress has been made towards a solution by the process of negotiation, when no real intention is shown by Turkey for genuine negotiations and when, by a series of calculated faits accomplis, Turkey, ignoring all resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council on the subject, has been using the ensuing time to consolidate its occupation of 40 per cent of the territory of the Republic of Cyprus.

7. I said that my purpose is not to accuse and that I shall state established facts. What are the established facts? It is an established fact that on 15 July

1974 a criminal *coup* was staged in Cyprus by the military dictatorship of Greece.

8. It is also an established fact that shortly after that criminal *coup*—to be more specific, on 20 July 1974—Turkish forces landed in Cyprus, allegedly under the Treaty of Guarantee,¹ which provides that the guarantor Powers have certain responsibilities to prevent the abolition of the independent State of Cyprus and to reinstate the constitutional order established by the Zurich and London agreements.

9. It is also an unquestionable fact that the military dictatorship in Greece was overthrown and the duly elected democratic Government has been established and is now pursuing new policies with regard to foreign and domestic affairs and with regard to Cyprus that are diametrically opposed to those of the dictatorship. In Cyprus also, those brought to power by the military *coup* of the Greek dictatorship have ceased to be in power.

10. Eleven months have passed since the date of the landing of the Turkish forces in Cyprus, and despite the tremendous changes that have occurred both in Greece and in Cyprus, despite the acceptance by all parties concerned of the principle of a peaceful solution of the Cyprus problem through free negotiations on the basis of respect for the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and non-alignment of the Republic of Cyprus, the Turkish forces remain as an occupying force on the island, having under their military control 40 per cent of the territory of the Republic, while one third of the Greek Cypriot population is denied by the military forces of occupation access to their homes, properties, businesses and families.

11. Is what I have said so far fact or fiction? Or is it a mixture of fact and arbitrary conclusions? The criminal *coup* is a fact; the landing in Cyprus 11 months ago of Turkish forces is a fact and not a nightmare; the occupation of 40 per cent of the area of the Republic is a fact, not fiction; so is the displacement by the Turkish forces of occupation of one third of the Greek Cypriot population of the island and their reduction to the states of destitute, homeless refugees.

12. Their continuing tragedy is also an unbearable fact borne out by paragraph 60 of report of the Secretary-General, which says:

“The situation of confrontation resulting from the events of July and August 1974 has persisted. The Turkish armed forces remain in control of the northern part of the island. Nearly one third of the Greek Cypriot population continues to be displaced.”

In this short sentence, with concise accuracy and objective impartiality, the Secretary-General sums up the turbulent events and human suffering of 11 tragic

months in the history of Cyprus and in the life of its people. He does so in conformity with Security Council resolution 367 (1975), which requested him to keep the Security Council informed of the progress made towards the implementation of General Assembly resolution 3212 (XXIX). That resolution urged the speedy withdrawal of all foreign forces and military personnel from the Republic of Cyprus and the taking of urgent measures for the return of the refugees to their homes under conditions of safety.

13. Regrettably, the Secretary-General has not been able to report any progress. Has the Secretary-General reported any progress in the implementation of Security Council resolution 365 (1974), which reaffirms and endorses the previous resolution of the General Assembly calling on all States to respect the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and non-alignment of the Republic of Cyprus and demanding the speedy withdrawal of all foreign forces and military personnel from the territory of the Republic and the urgent return of all refugees to their homes? Regrettably, again the answer is that no progress whatsoever has been made.

14. In paragraph 68 of his report, the Secretary-General has clearly and unmistakably stated:

“It is more urgent than ever that real progress should be made so that the present highly unsatisfactory situation can be brought to an end and the relevant resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly can be fully implemented.”

15. The Council is now informed by the most authoritative report of the Secretary-General that during the past nine months nothing has been done for the implementation of the resolutions of the Assembly and the Council. No one can blame or criticize the United Nations, the General Assembly or the Security Council for failing to adopt resolutions containing the right principles, in conformity with the Charter for the solution of the problem of Cyprus.

16. Both the General Assembly and the Security Council call for respect for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the non-aligned State of Cyprus, but how is that independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity respected by Turkey when it continues to maintain under its control the northern part of Cyprus, preventing the expelled inhabitants from returning to their homes, and when the very existence of the Turkish forces in Cyprus poses a further threat to the rest of the island? How does Turkey respect the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus when so far it has obstinately and persistently refused to make any clear-cut statement to the effect that the Turkish forces will be withdrawn, or at least to give an indication of the time of a total withdrawal? How does Turkey respect the resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly, which have called for the

speedy withdrawal of all foreign forces from the territory of the Republic, when, instead of speedy withdrawal, there is a steady increase in Turkish forces in Cyprus, which, from the level of 35,000 troops in November 1974, have now reached the level of 43,000?

17. Since 1 November 1974, both the General Assembly and the Security Council have repeatedly demanded that the refugees be allowed to return to their homes; but not only have the Turkish forces not permitted the refugees to return but those very same forces have in certain areas in the north evicted Greek Cypriots from their villages and homes and placed them under guard, in conditions which the International Red Cross has described as unbearable, in order to make their houses available to the Turkish Cypriots. In addition to thousands of Greek Cypriot refugees being made homeless by the Turkish forces, this new action creates another category of Greek Cypriot refugees who have been removed from their homes and their villages.

18. Both the General Assembly and the Security Council have called for free and genuine negotiations for the solution of the problem of Cyprus. But how can free negotiations be conducted when there are 43,000 Turkish troops in Cyprus, when these troops create by their action unbearable pressure on one side by preventing the return of 200,000 Greek Cypriot refugees in contravention of the relevant resolutions of the United Nations?

19. How can there be negotiations on an equal footing when the Turkish forces continue to evict Greek Cypriots from their homes, when they create new pressures by daily restricting the freedom of movement of the Greeks in enclaves in the north? How can there be free negotiations when the Turkish army refuses freedom of movement to UNFICYP in the areas under the control of the Turkish forces, thus denying protection to the thousands of Greek Cypriots in enclaves behind the Turkish lines, and when these Turkish forces of occupation are deployed and poised ready to invade the rest of the territory of the Republic unless the views of Turkey with regard to the solution of the problem are accepted? Can negotiations on an equal footing, as provided by the relevant United Nations resolutions, take place under such conditions?

20. In order to demonstrate some of these facts, I can do no better than to quote passages from the report of the Secretary-General which we have before us. On the question of the Turkish forces occupying the northern part of Cyprus and denying the return of the Greek inhabitants to their homes, I quote the following from paragraph 60: "The Turkish armed forces remain in control of the northern part of the island. Nearly one third of the Greek Cypriot population continues to be displaced."

21. On the question of the conditions under which the Greek Cypriots live in the enclaves in the north, I shall quote paragraph 40 of the report:

"The Greek Cypriots in the north continue to live in difficult conditions, with restrictions on their movements outside their own village areas; they are largely dependent on relief supplies for subsistence."

Further, the same paragraph clearly shows that the Turkish forces have evicted Greek Cypriots from their villages since the adoption of General Assembly resolution 3212 (XXIX). I continue quoting from that paragraph:

"Two hundred and fifty [Greek Cypriots] were concentrated in Morphou from surrounding villages; all but 21 of these have been evacuated to the south. Of the 350 who were originally confined to the Dome Hotel in Kyrenia, only 53 remain. Seven were permitted by the Turkish Cypriot authorities to return to their Kyrenia homes."

Seven people were permitted by the Turkish Cypriot authorities, with the consent of the Turkish army, to return to their homes. Permission is now needed for a Greek Cypriot to live in his own home.

22. On the question of the restrictions on the movement of UNFICYP in the areas under the control of Turkish forces, which render the Force incapable of providing the needed security to the Greek Cypriots living behind the Turkish lines, I shall quote paragraph 7 of the Secretary-General's report:

"Owing to the continuing restrictions applied by the Turkish forces to its freedom of movement, UNFICYP has been limited in its ability to provide security to Greek Cypriots living in the north."

Here we are talking about the security of 10,000 human beings living behind the Turkish army.

23. And on the question of new restrictions imposed by the Turkish forces on the Greek Cypriots living in enclaves in the north, I shall quote paragraph 18 of the report:

"In recent months, new restrictions have been placed by Turkish forces on farming, grazing and harvesting in areas where Greek Cypriots had been permitted to carry out normal agricultural activities under UNFICYP escort prior to February 1975. This has caused additional hardship to the population in the forward areas and UNFICYP is continuing its efforts to have these restrictions removed, particularly as no such restrictions are imposed on the Turkish Cypriot villages in the south."

24. By way of contrast, I shall now quote passages from the Secretary-General's report which show how

the Turkish Cypriots in the south are treated by the Government. Paragraph 35 of the report states:

“At the present time, there are some 10,700 Turkish Cypriots in the south, of whom 7,250 are being provided with food and allowances by the Greek Cypriot authorities, who apply the same criteria to them as apply to needy Greek Cypriots.”

25. Paragraph 42 of the Secretary-General's report is also relevant in this connexion:

“Distribution of social welfare benefits and pensions to Greek Cypriots in the north and to Turkish Cypriots in the south was begun in January 1975, and a total of about £160,000 has been paid out in conjunction with the welfare authorities of both sides.”

26. The facts contained in the Secretary-General's report clearly establish that the Turkish forces continue to prevent the return of the refugees to their homes, that they continue to evict from their homes and villages Greek Cypriots who remain behind in Turkish areas, and that they are taking more and more restrictive measures against the Greek Cypriots in the north, refusing freedom of movement to UNFICYP and depriving the Greek Cypriots of its protection; and all this at a time when free negotiations on an equal footing and in a spirit of goodwill have been repeatedly proposed by United Nations resolutions and accepted by all the parties concerned.

27. I have stated that I will not accuse but that I will give undisputed facts which should move the Security Council to take a new and closer look at what is happening in Cyprus. We should examine who is responsible for such happenings and what further measures are needed to remedy this unbearable situation.

28. Perhaps the representative of Turkey will complain that I have called the Turkish forces in Cyprus an army of occupation, when Turkey contends that the Turkish forces in Cyprus constitute a peace-keeping force. Let us examine seriously whether the characterization of the Turkish forces in Cyprus as an army of occupation is warranted by the facts or whether it is an unwarranted, arbitrary conclusion.

29. Does not the fact that Turkey insists on maintaining and strengthening the number and equipment of the Turkish forces in Cyprus and persistently refuses to begin their withdrawal, contrary to the relevant United Nations resolutions, confirm that the Turkish forces are an army of occupation?

30. Does not the fact that the Turkish army in Cyprus has expelled, and prevents the return of, one third of the Greek Cypriot population of the island to its homes prove that this is an army of occupation and not a peace-keeping force?

31. Does not the fact that the Turkish forces in Cyprus carry out, encourage and permit the confiscation of Greek Cypriot property, and the colonization of Cyprus by Turks from Turkey, prove that this is an army of occupation?

32. Does not the continuing eviction of Greek Cypriots from their homes in certain northern areas prove that the Turkish forces are forces of occupation?

33. Does not the fact that the Turkish forces in Cyprus give cover to Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots to consolidate the faits accomplis created by the Turkish invasion prove that these forces are an army of occupation and not peace-keeping forces?

34. From the factual questions I have posed, any reasonable man—any jury of 12 ordinary men—would have reached the decision that the Turkish forces in Cyprus are an army of occupation and not a peace-keeping force.

35. The role of the Turkish army in Cyprus is to occupy 40 per cent of the area of the Republic, to assist in changing the demographic composition of the population of the Republic, to prevent the return of one third of the Greek Cypriot population to their homes, to reserve by force 40 per cent of that area and 70 per cent of the resources of the Republic for the Turkish community, which constitutes only 18 per cent of the population of the island, and finally, by the continuous presence of those forces in Cyprus, to turn that 40 per cent of the area of the Republic into a Turkish province.

36. What is the remedy for this grave situation? There is only one remedy, and this can only be the urgent implementation of the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council.

37. I have already stated that no one can criticize the United Nations for failure to adopt resolutions and take decisions in accordance with the principles of the Charter. On the other hand, no one can conceal the fact that Turkey has ignored all such resolutions, and has indeed acted contrary to them. If this situation is allowed to continue, the effectiveness of the United Nations, in which so many hopes for peace and international law and order have been placed, will suffer an irreparable blow, and the world will be fast returning to the era of premeditated aggression, occupation, annexation, colonization and the destruction of the independence of small States.

38. The representative of Guyana has stated [*1830th meeting*] that Turkey bears a heavy measure of responsibility for the non-implementation of the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council. He has rightly warned that, should the Secretary-General be unable to report any progress in his next report to the Council and the Assembly, which would be in session at the time, will be required to

take a new look at the situation, and perhaps to participate more directly in the search for peace in Cyprus.

39. I agree fully with that view. Three resolutions of the Council have called in clear terms for the implementation of the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council. All three resolutions have been ignored by Turkey.

40. It has been established beyond doubt that no progress whatsoever has been made in the implementation of the relevant resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly, and that responsibility for their non-implementation rests on Turkey. It is now pertinent to examine whether there has been any progress in the negotiating process called for by repeated resolutions of the Council. As the Secretary-General stated in paragraph 66 of his report: "the deadlock over the fundamental basis of a settlement persists." He further stresses, in paragraph 67: "It seems to me essential that the negotiating process between the community representatives should be maintained and, if possible, accelerated".

41. The question which arises is whether it is possible to maintain or accelerate the negotiating process when the Turkish side has no real intention of negotiating but, on the contrary, by a series of faits accomplis, intends to consolidate its position.

42. I do not wish to appear pessimistic, but as a realist I have to face reality. There has been no real intention on the part of the Turkish side to negotiate, unless by negotiation the Greek side will be brought to accept the Turkish terms. In other words, negotiations, from the Turkish point of view, are tantamount to accepting, or surrendering to, the Turkish demands. The Greek Cypriot side, during the negotiations, stated clearly and fully its views on the solution of the Cyprus problem. It proposed a bi-communal multiregional federation and elaborated its views on its proposals. The Turkish side proposed a biregional federation, but has persistently refused to submit or explain in detail what that means and what the various aspects of the federation would be.

43. Despite the fact that it was agreed to hold talks in Vienna and the first round of those talks was held between 28 April and 3 May 1975, Mr. Denktas, who attended the talks, alleged that the Turkish side was not ready to state its case but had merely come to hear what Mr. Clerides had to say. Surely Mr. Denktas knew, from 12 March 1975, when Security Council resolution 367 (1975) was adopted, that negotiations under the auspices of the Secretary-General would take place. He further knew, weeks in advance, that a date had been fixed for those negotiations. Yet he alleged that he came unprepared and not ready to state the Turkish Cypriots point of view.

44. Do these facts show any serious intention, or any intention at all, of negotiating? Furthermore,

although the previous negotiations were interrupted because of the unilateral action taken by the Turkish side in declaring a Turkish Federated State in Cyprus, and despite the fact that resolution 367 (1975) rejected the declaration of a Turkish Federated State in Cyprus and asked the parties to refrain from any action which might jeopardize the negotiations between the representatives of the two communities, the Turkish side proceeded, after the time for the second round of talks was agreed upon, to fix a date on which the Turkish referendum on the so-called Turkish constitution would be held; and that date coincided with the time for the second round of the Vienna talks.

45. Is this indicative of a good will to negotiate? Does it demonstrate a will to find a negotiated solution of the Cyprus problem, or, really, does it clearly show that the Turkish side, encouraged by Turkey, is attempting to consolidate an illegal position and make the *de facto* situation, by a series of faits accomplis, an unavoidable and inescapable conclusion of those negotiations?

46. During the first round of talks at Vienna, certain suggestions were made for the return of the refugees to their homes under conditions of safety in four areas in Cyprus. Mr. Denktas promised to study the suggestions and, after consulting his military experts, give the views of his side at the second round of the Vienna talks.

47. When the second round of the Vienna talks started, Mr. Denktas informed us that all the Turkish side would do at that stage was permit 10,000 Greek Cypriot refugees to move south, on the understanding that the Greek Cypriot side would also permit 10,000 Turkish Cypriot refugees to move north. In other words, in the view of Mr. Denktas, the return of the refugees called for by the Security Council was equivalent to an exchange of populations—an exchange of populations which is contrary to the letter and the spirit of all the resolutions of the Security Council.

48. In fact, if it had not been for the great skill, persistence and patience of the Secretary-General, the talks carried out in Vienna would have been impossible to maintain and would have been terminated. A just tribute must be paid to the Secretary-General for all his efforts with regard to finding a peaceful solution of the Cyprus problem, but it is important to remember that, with all the skill, ability and persistence of the Secretary-General, the Security Council must not feel that it has placed on his shoulders the entire responsibility for the solution of the problem. Measures are needed from the Council to strengthen the process of negotiation by making possible the implementation of its various resolutions and those of the General Assembly, the implementation of which would create a new situation, a new climate in Cyprus which would facilitate the task of finding a peaceful solution to the problem.

49. I recollect that during the examination of the problem by the Security Council on 12 March 1975 I warned the Council that the measures it had adopted were inadequate to prevent the destruction of the Republic of Cyprus. I stated then:

“We believed that the situation was such that certain urgent measures had to be taken to protect the existence of Cyprus as an independent State. We regret that despite the fact that we have outlined with clarity the measures which we considered necessary they have not been adopted by the Security Council. The Security Council, in its wisdom, has adopted measures which are less effective in our opinion. We bow to the wisdom of the Security Council. We however point out that the Security Council, in its desire to compromise, to take measures which would offend nobody, may have compromised the very existence of the Republic of Cyprus. We hope and we earnestly pray that we may be proved wrong.” [1820th meeting, para. 205.]

50. The question is: have we been proved wrong? Have the 11 months which have elapsed shown any improvement in the situation? Have they removed the danger of the destruction of the independence, the sovereignty, the non-alignment of the Republic of Cyprus? Is it not clear to all that Turkey does not intend to withdraw its forces from Cyprus? Is it not clear to all that there has been an increase both in numbers and in strength of weapons in the hands of the Turkish forces in Cyprus? Is it not really clear that no effort has been made by the Turkish side to assist in finding a solution of the problem? If the Secretary-General in his next report does not report any real progress either towards the implementation of the Council resolutions or towards finding a solution through his negotiations, it will be very urgent and important for the Security Council to take another close look at the situation in Cyprus and to act, and to act decisively, before the independence of Cyprus is totally destroyed.

51. I should like to pay a tribute to the work done by UNFICYP. I must, however, stress that this work falls short of its requirements, not because of any inability on the part of UNFICYP but because of the restrictions imposed on its movements by the Turkish forces in Cyprus. I believe it is really a paradox that UNFICYP, legally and authoritatively established by resolutions of the Security Council, should be prevented by an army of occupation from carrying out its full task.

52. I should like also to pay a tribute to the work of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Cyprus and also to that of the Commander and all the officers and men of UNFICYP and to those countries that are continuing either to maintain contingents in Cyprus or to provide funds for their maintenance. It is, in my opinion—and, I think, in the

opinion of any reasonable man—time to agree that the problem has reached the cross-roads and that new ways of solving the problem, including the Soviet proposal for an international conference on Cyprus, should be accepted, if we are to get out of the deadlock brought about by the Turkish occupation of Cyprus.

53. In conclusion, I should like to state that, despite the unwillingness of the Turkish side to negotiate, despite the fact that the Turkish forces continue to be in Cyprus, we shall attend the next round of talks fully prepared to discuss every aspect of the problem but we expect—in fact we have the right to demand—that the Turkish Cypriot side will come to the talks also prepared to discuss every aspect of the problem, which includes the question of the return of the refugees to their homes, the question of the withdrawal of the Turkish forces from Cyprus and the extent of the area that the Turkish Cypriot side wants to be placed under its administration.

54. If these aspects are not discussed in the negotiations in July, then I am afraid that we shall be convinced beyond any doubt that by continuing the process of negotiations we simply subscribe to the consolidation of the *de facto* occupation of Cyprus; but we shall never accept or comply with that.

55. The PRESIDENT: The members of the Council will recall that it was decided at the 1830th meeting, in accordance with the understanding reached during prior consultations, to extend an invitation under rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure to Mr. Vedat Çelik. In accordance with that decision, I propose at this time, with the consent of the Council, to invite Mr. Çelik to take a place at the Council table in order to make a further statement.

56. Mr. ÇELIK: Mr. President, I should like to thank you and, through you, each and every member of the Council for having allowed me to speak for a second time. I have asked to speak in order to comment on some of the points raised by Mr. Clerides and some of those who spoke last Friday [1830th meeting], and to express the views of the Turkish Cypriot side on the political problem of Cyprus.

57. Last Friday, when I said that I was speaking for and on behalf of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus, Mr. Clerides questioned my status and accused me of having created yet another *fait accompli*, as he put it. I do not intend to go into all that again, because I am sure that both Mr. Clerides and all the members of the Council know very well what my status is and whom I represent. I do represent one of the two sides to the Cyprus problem, one of the two national communities in Cyprus, the Turkish Cypriot community, which has recently been restructured as the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus to constitute the Turkish wing of the future, and I hope not-too-distant future, Federal Republic of Cyprus.

58. Every time the problem of Cyprus comes up for discussion at the United Nations in the General Assembly or the Security Council—and it comes up very often, in fact it recently started coming up practically every other month—the debate, instead of exploring the avenues of an early peaceful settlement, immediately takes the form of a futile struggle of mutual accusations, which seems to us barren and definitely very harmful. I do not intend, therefore, to enter into polemics with Mr. Clerides. I was in fact quite prepared to be satisfied with the short statement that I made last Friday, 13 June, not because I had nothing much to say, but because my side does not believe in the usefulness of such a debate at a time when the two sides are engaged in negotiations. My side does not believe in the exploitation of the political problem in various international forums simply for the sake of political propaganda. We do not believe that an expression of solidarity or support that one side may obtain from some international conference *sui generis*, which most probably feels more compassion for, than it has knowledge of, Cyprus, can possibly contribute to the acceleration of a peaceful solution.

59. We do not believe that even the best of the international forums—these very chambers—can do much to solve the problem of Cyprus if we, the interested parties, do not get down to some serious business, and in a spirit of goodwill and co-operation negotiate a peaceful settlement with mutual concessions and accommodations.

60. In my brief statement today, therefore, I shall try to examine how much we have done during the intercommunal talks, what we must do and how it must be done if we are to solve this very difficult and complex problem in the foreseeable future.

61. We must bear in mind what the problem is, when and why it started, and decide on what we must do in order to speed up a settlement.

62. We have heard the statement of Mr. Clerides. Although I must reject much of what he said, I understand why he came to New York and why he said what he did. I do appreciate that he may have some internal problems in Cyprus, but with all due respect I do not share his pessimism and I cannot possibly share his line of thought and his, or his side's, approach to the problem. Although a solution has not yet been found to the problem of Cyprus, although we have not yet managed to break the ice, the Vienna talks are going on. Serious and constructive negotiations are continuing on important matters of substance and I am sure that with patience and goodwill, with mutual concessions and accommodations, a peaceful and just solution can and must be found.

63. We have heard Mr. Clerides accuse Mr. Denktas, the representative of the Turkish Cypriot community at the talks, of going to Vienna unprepared. This, I must

say, is most unfair. Mr. Denktas, whom, incidentally, I accompanied to Vienna on both occasions, attended the talks well prepared and with a full mandate. It may be that what he gave Mr. Clerides did not satisfy the latter or the Greek Cypriot side, which he represents, but it would be incorrect to say that Mr. Denktas was unprepared and that Mr. Clerides today, after having attended two rounds of talks in Vienna, does not know the Turkish Cypriot position.

64. Mr. Clerides knows our views regarding the structure of the State—that is, for example, that we stand for biregional federation. He knows our views regarding the powers and functions of the central Government. He also knows the Turkish Cypriot position regarding the geographical and humanitarian aspects of the problem. He has our proposal for a transitional joint central Federal Government.

65. Let us examine the developments during the first and second rounds of the Vienna talks. During the first Vienna talks held from 28 April to 3 May 1975—and here I quote from the final communiqué issued at the end of the first round:

“There was an exchange of views on the powers and functions of the central government, and certain papers were submitted.”

—Those papers were submitted by Mr. Clerides—I continue:

“In order to facilitate further consideration of this matter, it was agreed to set up an expert committee of the two parties to examine detailed proposals and to report back to the negotiators at their next meeting with the Secretary-General in Vienna.” [S/11684, annex.]

66. What happened? As soon as we returned to Nicosia we appointed the Turkish members of the Committee of Experts, and the first joint meeting of the Committee was held on 12 May 1975. Unfortunately, however, we ran into difficulty at the very first meeting. The Greek Cypriot side, instead of carrying out serious negotiations with us in Nicosia, preferred to run to Strasbourg and to have recourse to the European Commission of Human Rights, where it submitted an application against Turkey, which was scheduled to be heard on 22 and 23 May.

67. Mr. Denktas spoke to Mr. Clerides and asked for a postponement of the Strasbourg hearing, informing him that otherwise we would have to send our experts to Strasbourg and the Committee would therefore be unable to complete its work and draw up the required report on the purpose and functions of the central government of the future Federal Republic of Cyprus in time for the second round of Vienna talks.

68. I regret to say—and here I would like to clear Mr. Clerides of any personal responsibility, because

I am sure he must have tried his best to keep his promise—that, despite a promise by Mr. Clerides that the Strasbourg case would be postponed, we were double-crossed by the Greek side. We found out in due course that, contrary to their promises, the preliminary hearing of the case would be held as planned.

69. Mr. Denktas again contacted Mr. Clerides, who said that Mr. Loucaides, their legal counsel, had acted without authority and that the matter would be rectified. Until the last moment we were given the impression that the case had been postponed; at the last moment, we were informed again that the case was on, but that someone would be sent to Strasbourg to ask the Chairman of the Commission for a postponement. But, to our great surprise, when the time came a whole team of Greek Cypriot legal experts clandestinely rushed to Strasbourg for the hearing—in fact, they rushed so fast that they had an accident and suffered a couple of broken limbs, unfortunately.

70. That naturally led to our experts going to Strasbourg as well, so the work of the Committee of Experts was disrupted and the report which we had promised to submit on the views of the Turkish Cypriot side regarding the powers and functions of the central federal government could not be prepared in time. Nevertheless, we went to Vienna, and Mr. Denktas, despite the absence of a concrete paper, presented to Mr. Clerides the Turkish Cypriot position on the matter. For example, Mr. Clerides knows in broad outline our position on the powers and functions of the central government; he knows what we mean by political equality in federation; and he knows how strong a central government we would like to have and why we ask for it.

71. During the first round of the talks in Vienna, among other things, agreement was also reached in principle on the reopening of the Nicosia airport: "A joint committee will be set up in Cyprus by the leaders of the two communities for the purpose of opening the airport for full civilian use" [*ibid.*]. That committee has not yet been set up. Why? In Makarios' own words: "Because the Turkish side insists on equal representation which, if accepted, would create a bad precedent for the powers and functions of the central government which are currently being negotiated".

72. We are negotiating federation. This is obvious from the official proposals exchanged between Mr. Denktas and Mr. Clerides which are mentioned in the report of the Secretary-General of 18 February 1975 [S/11624]. This was also confirmed by the Secretary-General in his last report, paragraph 66 of which reads: "The discussions concentrated in particular on the powers and functions of the future central government of a federal State of Cyprus, the structure of that State, the territorial extent of the zones which constitute it...".

73. Now, if we are negotiating federation—and we are—the interested parties should accept at least the

principle of political equality that federation implies. We have made it abundantly clear to the Greek Cypriot side what we mean by political equality. We are not after numerical equality at each and every level of the central government set-up. We ask for equality at the policy-making level; we ask for equality at the managerial level; we ask, in other words, for an equal say and effective representation on such questions as our security, the independence of the island, and equal status for the two national communities. But, unfortunately, our Greek friends still cannot abandon the 80 per cent—20 per cent complex, which led to the collapse of the first attempt to create a livable State of Cyprus.

74. If we are negotiating federation, the head of the Greek Cypriot community should stop speaking of a unitary State—no matter how strong an expression of solidarity he may receive for his present so-called Government from some conferences or organizations. Instead of making misleading statements about a unitary State, Makarios should start talking to his people about federation in a realistic way so that the people start finding out for themselves what federation means. They should know what is meant by political equality in a federation, what the system of rotation and how states are represented in the federal set-up.

75. If Makarios rejects federation—and from his statements it appears that he does—then a serious question arises about Mr. Clerides' mandate.

76. This is, I think, the most important factor holding back a quick settlement. Does the Greek Cypriot side accept a biregional federation? Does the Greek Cypriot side accept political equality? These are fundamental issues which have to be cleared up first, before any meaningful negotiations can proceed on matters of detail.

77. "I shall never sign an agreement", says Makarios, "which will give legality to the Turkish Cypriot position within its present context." What is the present Turkish position? It is the unavoidable position which has emerged because of the illegal and unconstitutional efforts of the Greek side to violate Turkish rights and unite Cyprus with Greece. It is a *de facto* separation, a regrouping of the communities, forcibly imposed on us by the Greeks.

78. I do not think that anyone in these chambers expected an overnight solution of the problem of Cyprus. The problem with which the United Nations has been burdened for the last two decades is a complex one. The past 11 years and especially the *coup* of 15 July 1974 have made it even more complicated.

79. In the first round of the talks it was hoped that we would find the avenue which would lead us in the right direction towards a just and lasting solution. Great patience and very good statesmanship are needed for any headway to be made. It appears that the Greek

Cypriot side needs some time to rethink; it may need some time to readjust.

80. What is more important, we need to have a suitable atmosphere in which to negotiate and to realign ourselves to present realities and circumstances. I do not think that one could possibly claim that the present atmosphere and the circumstances prevailing in the island today are the best and are what are needed for this purpose.

81. Another important point is that we should choose between serious negotiations and propaganda. I hope that the Greek side will realize that it cannot put up a political fight at each and every international forum to which it can possibly gain access and at the same time carry on meaningful negotiations with us in Vienna. It cannot, for example, be in Strasbourg and Nicosia at one and the same time because things said and done in one forum are bound to have adverse effects in the other.

82. We need a political truce. We have to have one if the negotiations are to succeed, for peaceful negotiations are incompatible with mutual accusations. Unilateral actions by the Greek Cypriot administration in international forums and conferences should cease. Otherwise, forces will continue to be constantly put in action between the two sides, forces which it will be very difficult, if not impossible, to reverse later on. Positions become very rigid and the negotiators gradually lose their flexibility.

83. That is why we officially proposed at the second phase of the Vienna talks the formation of a joint transitional federal government. What is this joint interim federal government expected to achieve? It will halt further separation between the two national communities, a separation that unfortunately is becoming wider and wider each day, and will help, we hope, to introduce an element of co-operation between the two communities. People, I regret to say, are beginning to think that two homes of love are better than one home of hatred. That is a notion we must dispel and dispel very quickly.

84. It will, we hope, establish a process of consultation between the two sides. It will run common services and normalize life in some fields, with the obvious effect on the people. Cyprus will be represented outside as one body, and we hope that the political struggle will cease and rigidity will be prevented.

85. All this will bring some elasticity and flexibility into the negotiations and make a solution easier.

86. That was a very serious proposal, very seriously made; it should be very seriously considered. Unfortunately, it has not been very seriously considered. A very serious proposal has been taken very lightly—so much so that before Mr. Clerides, the Greek

Cypriot negotiator at the talks, replied to Mr. Denktas's proposal, Makarios's spokesman in Nicosia came out with a statement which was tantamount to a refusal.

87. Our offer still stands, and we hope that it will receive serious consideration by the Greek side.

88. The Turkish side is constantly being criticized by the Greeks for not respecting or for not having implemented the United Nations resolutions. That is most unfair and unjust. I think that we are more justified in criticizing them for the very same offence. I think it would be more true to say that they are blocking the way to the implementation of the United Nations resolutions by insisting on not seeing reality and by not accepting a realistic solution to the problem of Cyprus.

89. I shall not enter into polemics here on this issue. But it is obvious that the two sides have very widely differing views on this matter. There is definitely no Turkish defiance of or reluctance to implement the United Nations resolutions. The question of the implementation of the United Nations resolutions is a matter of practicability; it is a matter of approach; it is a matter of priorities. Resolutions can be implemented only with reasonable practicability: 100 per cent of the refugees cannot go back tomorrow, for obvious security reasons. Turkish withdrawal before settlement is impossible. The main idea of the resolutions is the call for agreement between the two national communities. Otherwise, it would mean the end of the Turkish territory; it would mean the end of our security; and it would mean the complete hand-over of the Turkish Cypriot community to the Greeks again and therefore the end of Cyprus independence in the long run.

90. There is a difference in the approaches of the two sides to the problem. For the Greek Cypriots the Cyprus problem is a question of "Turkish aggression" or "Turkish occupation" which started in July 1974. So for them a solution of the problem relates to how to achieve or how to negotiate a Turkish withdrawal. For us that is not so. For us there is no aggression; there is no occupation. The Turkish troops came to Cyprus under international treaties, not to annex territory, but to protect the independence of the island and the security of the Turkish Cypriot community. The presence of the Turkish troops on the island is not an aggression but an attempt to prevent consolidation of an aggression that was already put in motion in 1963 and was accelerated by the 15 July *coup* engineered by the junta against Makarios, the aim of which was to end the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-alignment of the island.

91. For the Turkish Cypriot side, therefore, the problem started, not in 1974 as claimed by our Greek friends, but in 1963. For us it is a matter of negotiating coexistence between the two national communities which are the co-owners of the island and partners in

its independence. It is a matter of finding a just and permanent solution. The right exercise, therefore, would be a sincere effort to find a settlement, to rearrange our home. We must rearrange it in such a way that the Greek Cypriot leadership will not be in a position to usurp all governmental powers again and to treat the Turks as unwanted aliens.

92. We must re-establish communal equality and provide for absolute security of life and property so that the past cannot repeat itself. We must have actual and physical guarantees. We have to prevent misuse of power by one side against the other.

93. The humanitarian problem, as we have repeatedly stated on previous occasions in this very chamber, is common to both communities. In fact we have lived with a refugee problem for the last two decades and we know how a refugee feels.

94. With regard to numbers, it suffices to restate the known fact that more than one third of the Turkish Cypriot population on the island has been displaced since the *coup* of July 1974. Paragraph 36 of the Secretary-General's last report refers to this. One thing that that report does not elaborate upon, naturally, is the fact that for most of the Turkish refugees, unlike the Greek Cypriots, this is the fourth displacement in the last two decades.

95. We appreciate the solution of the refugee problem from the humanitarian point of view. We appreciate the importance of the problem from the point of view of the economy of the island as a whole. But, unfortunately, we cannot put the cart before the horse, as the Greek Cypriots want to do. That should never be a pre-condition to negotiations or settlement. And that is where we differ from the Greek side.

96. For the Greeks the question of refugees is a question of a house or some property they left in the north. For the Turks the question is a matter of life and death; it is a matter of security, and therefore a matter of a political settlement.

97. Property loss can be regained; it can be compensated for. But security, if lost, cannot easily be regained, and life, once lost, is irreplaceable. That is what our Greek Cypriot friends seem to be finding difficult to understand.

98. We should first have a peaceful settlement. We should restore peace, security and confidence. Then the humanitarian problem and the question of the withdrawal of Turkish troops would be settled without difficulty.

99. Why is it that the Greek Cypriot displaced persons want to go to the north despite the Turkish military presence? Why is it that the Turkish displaced persons in the south want to go to the north? Why is it that displaced persons in the north refuse to go to their

houses in the south? This, I think, is the problem of Cyprus.

100. At the root of all this lies the feeling of insecurity of life and property caused by the policy and practice of the Greek Cypriot leadership of the last 11 years. If I may quote from paragraph 11 of the report of the Political Affairs Committee of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, adopted by the Assembly on 24 April 1975,

"Economic, social and educational inequality, as well as insecurity for personal life during the last 11 years, were the origins of intercommunity mistrust and fears, of political tension, and regional as well as communal isolation between the minority Turkish Cypriot and the majority Greek-Cypriot populations... it was a fact which created in the Turkish-Cypriot community a feeling of being underprivileged and oppressed."²

The Committee visited Cyprus in September 1974 and carried out an on-the-spot investigation of the situation on the island.

101. Allegations that there is importation of population from Turkey with a view to changing the demographic character of the island are completely baseless and untrue. It will suffice here to quote from an official letter addressed to the Secretary-General by the President of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus, Mr. Denktaş, [S/11718], dated 9 June 1975. He wrote:

"... allegations that there is massive emigration from Turkey to Cyprus and a deliberate policy to change the demographic character of the island... are not only completely contrary to the truth but also a distortion of the true facts. All that has occurred is that skilled technicians and workers have been imported from Turkey on a temporary basis as 'guest workers', and Turkish Cypriots who had previously been denied the right to live in their own country by the Greek Cypriot administration are now being given the opportunity to return."

That official statement, a very recent one, still stands, and I do not think it needs any further clarification. Incidentally, over decades I have never heard of any obstacles preventing any mainland Greek, in or out of uniform, from coming and settling in Cyprus.

102. The referendum held in north Cyprus on 8 June 1975 is not a new fait accompli, as the Greek side calls it. It is a completely internal affair of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus and has nothing to do with the other side. It is part and parcel of the proclamation of the Turkish Federated State, which took place on 13 February 1975 and was exhaustively debated in these chambers late last February and early in March [1813th—1820th meetings].

103. When the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus was proclaimed, a legal working programme was drawn

up whereby a new constitution would be drafted within so many days; it would be adopted by the Constituent Assembly within a specified period; it would be reported in the official gazette by the President within 10 days after adoption and would then be presented to the people through a referendum within 15 days of publication in the official gazette.

104. This is a legal working programme which cannot be halted. The referendum has given legality to the Constitution of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus as far as the Turkish Cypriots are concerned, but we cannot see why it has caused so much excitement and alarm among our Greek Cypriot compatriots. It is not a new development. It brought nothing new. It did not change the status of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus. On the contrary, the referendum brought a new element which should please the Greek Cypriots.

105. The new Constitution of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus, which was voted upon by the Turkish Cypriot community last week, contains a basic article which provides that, after agreement has been reached on a federal constitution, this Constitution will be amended accordingly.

106. Transitional article 2 of the Constitution reads as follows: "When the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Cyprus comes into force, the necessary amendments shall accordingly be made to the Constitution of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus".

This gives Mr. Denktas, the Turkish negotiator in the talks, a mandate freely to negotiate a federal constitution which may embody articles different from the provisions of the present Constitution of the Federated State. It does not, therefore, prejudice or prejudice the final federal constitution.

107. It is worth noting that the question of the referendum was never raised with us as an issue in Nicosia. We were never approached for a postponement. But unfortunately it became an issue all of a sudden in Vienna at the beginning of the second round of the talks, and it is being exploited here in New York, after it has taken place.

108. Mr. Clerides has claimed that the situation of the Greeks in the north is unbearable. This is what Mr. Clerides said to the press on 25 April of this year, after his joint visit with Mr. Denktas to the Greek villages on the Karpas peninsula:

"I can say that they were very happy to see me, and I was very happy to see them; they had no major problems. There are one or two minor problems which Mr. Denktas and I can discuss and I feel sure that we can find a solution."

I wish Mr. Denktas could have made a similar statement after the subsequent joint visit to Paphos, where they visited the stranded Turkish Cypriots.

109. What were and still are a few minor problems in Cyprus became an unbearable situation in New York. I do not think I need elaborate further.

110. On Friday we were criticized by Mr. Clerides for having set up a new communications system whereby north Cyprus will be communicating with the outside world through Turkey by telephone and in every other way. It is easy for Mr. Clerides to raise this matter here in the Security Council for propaganda purposes. But I wonder whether it has occurred to Mr. Clerides to wonder how the Turkish Cypriot community managed for the last 12 years without telephones, without postal services and without communications with the outside world. It would be more helpful if, instead of criticizing a situation which they themselves caused, the Greek Cypriot leadership would realize their mistakes and take urgent measures to rectify them.

111. Establishing communications with the outside world cannot possibly be regarded as a *fait accompli*. We have to survive; we have to carry on our economic life, and we must have communications with the outside world. We cannot sit back and wait for another 12 years for the Greek side to give us basic fundamental rights, including the right to communicate with the outside world.

112. We have also heard statements to the effect that the Turkish Cypriots in the south are enjoying the same social benefits and receive equal treatment as the Greeks, and that they enjoy full freedom of movement and security.

113. The unfounded nature of this allegation is obvious from the following statements made by Mr. Clerides himself in a panel discussion on the Greek Cypriot television on 29 May 1975, in which other Greek Cypriot party leaders also participated. I quote Mr. Clerides:

"We must, in a practical way, solve the problems of the Turkish Cypriots in the south. This we should have done long ago.

"The budget of the Republic, for example, should include a provision for improving the living conditions of the Turks living under 'government' control. This was not done in the past. The Turkish Cypriots must feel that they enjoy security of life and property. But this is not enough. They must also work. They must be given an opportunity for economic development. They must enjoy freedom of movement in the region under the control of the Republic, because they should be able to sell their produce.

"The State should solve these fundamental problems of the Turks. We should educate"—maybe he should have said, "We should re-educate"—"our National Guard soliders so that they should not look upon the Turkish Cypriots as the national enemies"—or natural enemies—"of the Greeks."

114. Does this show that the Turks are fairly treated in the south? If I may quote, from another party leader, Mr. Papaionnou, leader of AKEL, the Communist Party in Cyprus:

“Turks in the south should be given a feeling of security, so that they can consider themselves as equal citizens of the Republic.

“We must begin, as a State, to treat them in the same way as we treat the Greek Cypriots.

“Practical measures are required to gain the confidence of the Turks.

“First of all, the State should set a good example.

“Then our Ministers should set a good example. The Ministers should not forget that they are the Ministers not only of the Greeks but of the Turks as well. They should visit the Turkish villages and take interest in the problems of the Turkish villages.

“The Turks must enjoy the same rights as the Greeks. When their security is endangered, those who violate the laws, those who are involved in the activities against the Turkish Cypriots, must be severely punished.”

Are they not 15 years late?

115. In their statements last Friday, some of the members of the Security Council used the term “Cypriot people”, implying that there is a Cypriot nation in Cyprus. Not only is the concept totally opposed to what we Turks in Cyprus consider as an acceptable definition of the word “people”, but it is also one of the rare occasions where we happen to find ourselves in agreement with the highest authority of the Greeks, on the Greek conception of nationhood: no less a person than the Ethnarch himself, Archbishop Makarios, whose views in this respect has been quoted several times and can be found in the past records of the Council.

116. The question of missing persons has again been raised today, despite official statements made by both sides—at least by my side—to the effect that there are no prisoners of war or detainees in the hands of the Turkish authorities. We do believe that this humanitarian issue should not be exploited any further.

117. Again, Mr. Clerides has elaborated in detail on the number of the Turkish troops in Cyprus and on their actions and behaviour, but he failed to refer to Greek mainland military presence in Cyprus. What their number is, how long they have been in Cyprus and for what purpose, we do not know. Or are they not considered to be foreign troops at all?

118. I shall not take any more of the time of the Council. We do believe that the intercommunal talks

are the best and only way to solve the problem of Cyprus. We stand for the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-alignment of the island.

119. My side still will continue to do its best to reach a just and lasting solution within this framework, and in our efforts to do so we hope that we shall receive the necessary co-operation from the Greek Cypriot side. We fully agree with what the Secretary-General said during the recent talks, that:

“It is essential to maintain the negotiating process and not to allow the search for a settlement to lapse, even if we are fully aware that the time may not as yet be ripe for a breakthrough.”

120. Peace talks cannot and should not be abandoned under any pretext whatsoever.

121. The PRESIDENT: I now call on the representative of Cyprus, who has asked to speak.

122. Mr. CLERIDES (Cyprus): I fully concur with the last statement of Mr. Çelik that the talks should not be abandoned and that an effort should be made through the talks to find a solution. But I wish to add that negotiations should not be protracted, as he stated in the beginning of his speech, when there is really no intention of negotiating and when the time set aside for the protracted negotiations is used for the consolidation of the *de facto* partition of Cyprus.

123. Mr. Çelik has said a few things which, as they were taken out of their context, required some detailed clarification. Mr. Çelik had said that Mr. Denktas, during the first round of the Vienna talks, came fully authorized and fully prepared to explain the position of his side. Perhaps Mr. Çelik means that he had full authorization to take copious notes of what I was saying, because I asked Mr. Denktas the following question: “Are you ready to tell me what are the powers and functions of the central government in a federated bicomunal State, or are you not?”

124. Mr. Denktas’ answer was: “I am not ready. I came to hear what you have to say.” To show both my willingness to negotiate and my readiness to negotiate, I then handed Mr. Denktas a paper containing a list of powers and functions I propose for the federal government, a list giving in detail the functions I proposed for the regional governments or authorities. Mr. Denktas said: “Well, I cannot discuss it now, I need expert advice”.

125. I asked Mr. Denktas the question: “What is your side’s position with regard to the extent of the area that should come under Turkish administration?” Mr. Denktas said: “I am not in a position to give you my side’s views on this issue”.

126. I asked Mr. Denktas: “What is your view with regard to the return of the refugees to their homes,

either as a preliminary step or in connection with the solution of the Cyprus problem?" Mr. Denktas majestically said that he was not prepared to state the percentage of refugees, or the areas to which they could return, either as a preliminary gesture or in connection with the solution of the Cyprus problem.

127. I asked Mr. Denktas what his side's views were on the question of the foreign forces in Cyprus, in connexion with the final solution; and Mr. Denktas looked at me in amazement, saying that he was not prepared to state his position.

128. In fact, Mr. Denktas took pages of notes of what I had to say, and yet Mr. Çelik will tell us that Mr. Denktas came to Vienna, during the first round, to negotiate seriously, and with full authority to do so. I take it that his authority was to take notes.

129. Now, Mr. Çelik has told us a long and, if I may say so, tedious story about the Greek "double-faced" action with regard to our recourse to the European Commission on Human Rights. First he tried to present that as a recent development. However, the recourse which we have had to the Commission was filed in September 1974, before either the inter-communal talks or the talks under the auspices of the Secretary-General were accepted or commenced. It is a fact that the Turkish side said that, since this recourse was to be had on the date fixed by the Commission and not by us, their experts in the Committee of Experts which had been set up to study the powers and functions of the central government would have to attend, and therefore the work of the Committee would be delayed.

130. We immediately cabled, requesting an adjournment. The Turkish side—the Turkish Government—was informed by the European Commission of our request for an adjournment. However, the Turkish Government insisted on a hearing. We then received a telegram from the President of the Commission in which he stated that in view of the confused situation of the parties, he would maintain the hearing.

131. We then sent only a junior member of the staff of the Attorney-General's office to request an adjournment; but again we were informed that the Commission would maintain the hearing. Consequently, we sent, not merely a team of great experts—neither hurriedly nor furtively—but, in addition, the Attorney-General.

132. That hearing lasted only two days. Despite that fact, 10 days after the hearing was over, the Turkish Cypriot members of the Committee of Experts on the powers of the central Government had not returned to Cyprus, but had disappeared. When I asked Mr. Denktas where they were, he said he would try and contact them and tell them to return to Cyprus so that the Committee could proceed.

133. These are the details. I come now to the substance of the problem. Mr. Çelik says that there have been no faits accomplis during this period. I therefore asked Mr. Çelik: "Does not the proclamation of a so-called separate State and the subsequent holding of a referendum constitute a fait accompli?" The Turkish side had, years ago, established a separate administration; it had established so-called Turkish laws under which this separate Turkish administration was working and operating.

134. Why was it necessary, at the most crucial point in the negotiations, to declare a separate State and then to proceed to prepare, as he calls it, a legislative programme for a referendum on that constitution? And how can he state that this does not affect the Greek side, when that very constitution, which is alleged to have received the consent of the Turkish Cypriots, contains provisions by virtue of which the confiscation of Greek properties in the north would be legalized—and that in addition to their *de facto* confiscation and exploitation. Mr. Çelik would have us believe that this does not affect us. He tells us: "Do not worry: there is a provision that this constitution will be amended when a federal government is agreed upon."

135. But the negotiation is not only on the powers and functions of the federal government: it is also for the powers and functions of the other authorities. Yet Mr. Denktas and the Turkish community, under guidance from Turkey and with experts from Turkey, have decided unilaterally to define what the powers and functions of the regional governments or regional authorities would be, and he is surprised to hear that we think that this is another fait accompli.

136. Mr. Çelik tells us our only concern about the refugees is that they return to their homes, whereas the Turkish Cypriots are actually concerned not only about their property but about the safety of their lives. We are very much worried about the safety of the lives of Greek Cypriots. If we were to cite facts, we could demonstrate clearly that in recent months—if we accept what Mr. Çelik has now stated, that there are no prisoners in the hands of the Turkish side or of Turkey—2,700 people have been brutally murdered since their captures, for there is ample, irrefutable evidence, borne out by independent witnesses, that thousands of people who were arrested by the Turkish forces have not been accounted for. Yes, our concern is not only to return the Greek Cypriots to their homes; it is to return them under conditions of safety, as the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council require.

137. Mr. Denktas has quoted me as saying, after a visit to the north, that the people were happy to see me and I was happy to see them. Yes, they were happy to see me because for 11 long months they had not been allowed to see anybody, either from their own community, their own Government or even their own

relatives. It is a fact that I stated that they had some problems which Mr. Denktas and I could solve, but those problems cannot be solved, and Mr. Denktas cannot solve them, because the Turkish army would not agree to their solution. What they had were small problems. Freedom of movement from their villages to other villages and to the rest of the island—that is a small problem. What were their other problems? Medical services did not exist. Hundreds of sick people had no access to medical services. What were their other small problems? Their children could not go to school, because no schools were allowed to be operated in the Turkish area. What were their other tiny problems? The fact that they were penniless, because they could not sell their produce. What was another problem? The fact that there was no freedom at all, and arbitrary arrests were being made of those people. If I said publicly—and I did say publicly—that they had some problems, it was to pacify public opinion, which would have revolted, and to avoid creating tension at a time when it still seemed possible to have some negotiations. Remember, my visit to the Karpas peninsula took place only a few days before the first Vienna talks. I did not wish to create anxiety and I did not wish to create tension before the first Vienna talks, where I had hoped Mr. Denktas would come to negotiate and not to take notes.

138. Mr. Çelik has said that we are not psychologically ready to accept the realities of the situation. What are the realities of the situation? The fact that 200,000 people have been evicted from their homes by the Turkish Army. I state positively and categorically that we are not now prepared to accept that these 200,000 people should remain permanent refugees and will never be prepared to accept such a dreadful reality. If negotiations in the Turkish mind mean the acceptance of this fait accompli at the expense of one third of the Greek Cypriot population, if it means the usurpation of their property, if it means the restriction of their freedom of movement in their own country, then we might wait a thousand years but we shall never accept this as a reality we shall have to live with—not because we are unrealistic, but because we are against unjust solutions.

139. Mr. Çelik reported a debate on the Cyprus radio in which all the leaders stated clearly what our policy should be in the future towards our Turkish Cypriot compatriots. I regret that I cannot say that a similar debate has taken place on the Turkish Cypriot radio, but what we have said was not an accusation, that in the past we have suppressed the Turkish community, but merely a demonstration of what our policy should be in the future, and the fact that the Turkish Cypriots live in the south and receive the same treatment as the Greek Cypriots who live in the south is clearly borne out by the report of the Secretary-General. The Turkish Cypriots are not restricted in their freedom of movement, and this is stated in the report of the Secretary-General. They receive the same social benefits from the Greek Cypriot taxpayers as the

Greek Cypriots, while the Turkish Cypriots are not contributing at all in the taxation of the country. Furthermore, they have not only freedom of movement but they have also employment in the south.

140. It would be an acrimonious debate if I were to answer every statement of Mr. Çelik's and I do not want such a debate. What I can say to Mr. Çelik, and through Mr. Çelik to the Turkish Government and the Turkish Cypriot people, is that, if they want a solution on the basis of a bicomunal federated State, we are ready to negotiate such a solution, to look forward to it and to be constructive, but if what they want is the acceptance of the so-called realities of the occupation of Cyprus by 43,000 Turkish troops, of the restrictions preventing 200,000 Greek Cypriots from returning to their homes, then we are quite open: we are not prepared to negotiate a solution on these realities. In so saying, we are not trying to hide—as the Turkish side is doing instead of negotiating—behind excuses that it is not ready to put its case. If the case they wish to put before us, and they dare to put before the world, is that the present reality is that 40 per cent of the island will be reserved for 18 per cent of the population, that 200,000 people will remain refugees and that the Turkish forces will remain indefinitely in Cyprus, then let them state their case clearly here and now, and if that is their case, then there is no point in returning to the negotiating table.

141. I feel sorry, and I was the first to state that mistakes have been committed in the past by both sides. But those mistakes cannot and will not be rectified by accepting the so-called realities of the new situation. The acceptance of such realities is impossible. If it were possible for the negotiators to accept them—which it is not—it would be the beginning of a final and bitter war between the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots, which would lead to the destruction of both communities.

142. What are the present realities that we have to look at? One of the present realities is that Cyprus is a country where two different national communities exist. One of these communities constitutes 80 per cent of the population of the Republic, and the other constitutes 18 per cent. Both communities can live peacefully and amicably in friendly partnership in a federated bi-communal State. They can work together and prosper in the context of a federal bi-communal State. What is important is to define the extent of the area or areas to be administered by the Turkish Cypriots and the extent of the areas to be administered by the Greek Cypriots, and finally to decide what the powers and functions of the federal central government would be. Those are the realities, and not the fact that by sheer force 40 per cent of the territory of the Republic, representing 70 per cent of its total production, has been grabbed by the Turkish army and reserved for the 18 per cent minority community.

143. What is also important is for the Turkish side to realize another reality, namely, that subjugation by force by virtue of the presence of the Turkish army in Cyprus is not a solution but a call for war.

144. I said that I did not wish to have an acrimonious discussion. I repeat that we shall attend the Vienna talks on 25 July ready to discuss every aspect. But I express the warning that we cannot go on appearing at the talks when the Turkish side is not prepared to disclose its case with regard to all the issues which I have enumerated and, in particular, with regard to the extent of the area that it thinks it should administer. We cannot go on pretending to be negotiating while 200,000 refugees remain homeless, prevented from returning to their homes, deprived of their businesses

and, in particular, deprived of the very means of their existence.

145. If the Turkish side comes prepared for talks in Vienna, it will find that we are ready to talk. But if the Turkish side comes with the theory of accepting realities, which means accepting faits accomplis, then obviously the Turkish side would not be ready to negotiate.

The meeting rose at 5.45 p.m.

Notes

¹ United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 382, p. 3.

² *Documents of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Twenty-seventh Ordinary Session (First Part)*, vol. II, doc. 3600, p. 9.

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