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1820'' MEETING: 12 MARCH 1975

NEW YORK

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NOTE

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1820th MEETING

Held in New York on Wednesday, 12 March 1975, at 3.30 p.m.

President: Mr. Fernando **SALAZAR** (Costa Rica).

Present: The representatives of the following States: Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, China, Costa Rica, France, Guyana, Iraq, Italy, Japan, Mauritania, Sweden, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania and United States of America.

Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/1820/Rev.2)

1. Adoption of the agenda

2. The situation in Cyprus:

Letter dated 17 February 1975 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/11625)

The meeting was called to order at 4.15 p.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

The situation in Cyprus:

Letter dated 17 February 1975 from the Permanent representative of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/11625)

1. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): In accordance with the decision taken at the 1813th meeting, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite the representatives of Cyprus, Turkey and Greece to participate in the debate without the right to vote.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Clerides (Cyprus), Mr. Olcay (Turkey) and Mr. Carayannis (Greece) took places at the Security Council table.

2. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): In accordance with the decisions taken at the 1815th to 1817th meetings, and with the consent of the Council, I invite the representatives of Bulgaria, Saudi Arabia and Romania to take the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber in order to participate in the discussion without the right to vote.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Grozev (Bulgaria), Mr. Baroody (Saudi Arabia) and Mr. Datcu (Romania) took the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber.

3. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): Members of the Council have before them a draft resolution which has been issued as document S/11657. As all members know, this draft resolution has been prepared in the course of protracted consultations. In my capacity as President, I am now submitting this draft resolution, which is the fruit of prolonged efforts, to the Council. The members of the Council agreed at our consultations that statements would be made after the adoption of the draft resolution. Accordingly, I now propose to the Council that it adopt this draft resolution without a vote. If I hear no objections, I shall consider that the draft resolution is adopted without vote.

The draft resolution was adopted.'

4. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): Before calling on the first speaker, I should like to make a statement in my capacity as President of the Security Council.

5. In the resolution just adopted, the Council requests the Secretary-General to report to it whenever he considers it appropriate, and taking account of the views of the parties concerned, on additional new elements which he believes might facilitate the early and successful conclusion of the negotiations in fulfilment of the provisions of the resolution.

6. I believe I speak also for the Council in noting that the most practical arrangement would be if the talks between the parties were normally to take place at the Headquarters of the United Nations. I understand that it is the Secretary-General's intention to consult with the parties on all the modalities of the talks.

7. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*interpretation from Russian*): The Security Council is now completing its consideration of the question of the situation in Cyprus, brought before the Council by the Government of the Republic of Cyprus. Today, in view of the Council's adoption of the resolution on this question, my delegation considers it necessary to make a statement in explanation of its vote and, at

the same time, to **take** stock, as it were, of the discussion of this item in the Council.

8. All the members of the Council, the parties concerned, other States Members of the United Nations and the Secretary-General took an active part in **the** discussion of this question. In their statements, the members of the Council, the **Secretary-General**, and the majority of the speakers from other countries emphasized the gravity of the **Cyprus** crisis, which was engendered by foreign military intervention, by flagrant foreign political interference in the domestic **affairs** of Cyprus, by the failure to comply with the resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly on the question of Cyprus and by the unilateral actions of the Turkish **community**.

9. As almost all the speakers noted, the situation in and around Cyprus remains tense indeed and fraught with **the** danger of a further explosion, **thus** representing a direct threat to peace and security in the eastern Mediterranean. Contrary to the clear and unambiguous decisions on this matter by the Security Council and the General Assembly, foreign military intervention against the Republic of **Cyprus** continues. Cyprus is a full-fledged Member of the United Nations and an active participant in the non-alignment movement. **Yet** foreign troops continue to be present on the territory of the Republic of Cyprus, to flout its sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity and to violate the **recognized** rules of international law and the fundamental purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. **Flagrant** external interference in the domestic affairs of the **Republic** of Cyprus continues. The United Nations, and in particular the Security Council, are kept out of direct participation in the settlement of the question.

10. At the same time, almost **all** the members of the Security Council and other speakers noted that the unilateral action by the leadership of the Turkish community in setting up a separate State structure on the part of the territory of the Republic of **Cyprus** occupied by Turkish troops has **led** to an even more dangerous situation in and around Cyprus. It is not **difficult** to see that all of this was aimed at consolidating the state of affairs resulting from **the** external interference in **the** affairs of the Republic of Cyprus.

11. Almost all the members of the Council and others who participated in the discussion noted that the action by the leadership of the Turkish community has jeopardized the process of intercommunal **talks** in conditions free from external interference and **diktat**, conditions envisaged in General Assembly resolution 3212 (XXIX). A majority of speakers described that action as a violation of that resolution and of **the** Council's own resolutions on Cyprus. Those United Nations resolutions, as everyone knows express support for **the lawful** Government of Cyprus and **emphasize** the need to ensure the sovereignty,

independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus. They contain a demand that foreign troops be immediately withdrawn and that the people of **Cyprus** be given an opportunity to solve the questions of the Republic's internal structure themselves.

12. During the discussion, members of **the** Council and representatives of other States **reaffirmed** their recognition of a sole Government in Cyprus: the lawful Government of the Republic of Cyprus, headed by President **Makarios**. As was rightly noted in the statement by the President of **the** Council in the statement he made as representative of Costa Rica [**1819th meeting**], there is a consensus among the members of the Council that the Government of **Cyprus** headed by President Makarios is the only **lawful** Government of the Republic of Cyprus. The Security Council really cannot seriously talk about or take a decision concerning the sovereignty, independence and **territorial** integrity of the Republic of **Cyprus** without **recognizing** the **lawful** Government of Cyprus, even though it is not to the liking of some.

13. All the members of the Council and other speakers, and particularly the parties concerned —**Cyprus**, Greece and Turkey—have firmly declared the need to protect the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus and the inadmissibility of any acts aimed at partitioning Cyprus or uniting it with any other State.

14. The present discussion of the question of Cyprus in the Security Council has again shown and reaffirmed the urgent necessity for a settlement of the Cyprus crisis on the basis of the earliest possible effective implementation of the United Nations decisions on the question. It has also shown the necessity for participation by the United Nations through its principal organ for the maintenance of international peace and security—the Security Council—in negotiations regarding Cyprus. The negotiations, as has been noted in statements by members of **the** Council, must be carried on in an atmosphere free from external pressure and **diktat**.

15. Most of the Council's members have unambiguously condemned the practice of unilateral and separate actions, as a result of which **the** talks have been deadlocked and undermined. As has been rightly noted here by members of the Council—and, first of all, by the representatives of the non-aligned countries, the United Republic of Cameroon, Guyana and the United Republic of Tanzania—an important and essential prerequisite for a solution of the Cyprus question based on the lofty principles of the Charter must be the earliest possible withdrawal of all foreign troops from the territory of **Cyprus** and an end to all foreign interference in **the** domestic affairs of **the** people of Cyprus.

16. One cannot but agree with the view of the Secretary-General that the whole world expects

“that the United Nations can and should shoulder its responsibilities in this matter. Indeed, the Cyprus problem represents a crucial test of the effectiveness and credibility of the **Organization**” [1814th meeting, para. 8].

17. The Soviet delegation is still firmly convinced that a genuine and lasting settlement of the Cyprus crisis is possible only in a broad and representative international forum within the framework of the United Nations.

18. With regard to the resolution just adopted by the Council, my delegation considers it necessary to make the following statement.

19. We would unquestionably have preferred the draft resolution which was drafted and circulated by the delegation of Cyprus. If that text had been adopted by the Council, it could have served as a useful basis for a rapid and just settlement of the Cyprus question in accordance with the principles of the Charter and the decisions of the Council and the Assembly on Cyprus.

20. The preliminary draft resolution prepared by the group of members of the Council from the non-aligned countries was, however, weaker, although it preserved a sound basis for a **just** settlement of the Cyprus crisis with direct participation of the Security Council on the basis of *its well* known resolutions.

21. The delegation of the USSR and other delegations in the Security Council and in the United Nations as a whole naturally expected-and not without reason-that there would have been a more active and purposeful initiative from the sponsors of that draft resolution, an initiative that would have really helped towards a solution to the dangerous and critical situation in Cyprus and that would have protected the Republic of Cyprus, an active participant in the non-aligned movement, from the continuing foreign, military intervention and the flagrant external interference in its domestic affairs.

22. We listened with great interest to the closely argued and substantial statements by the representatives of non-aligned States members of the Council. Those statements stressed the deep concern felt by the non-aligned countries at the continuing external interference and the force being brought to bear against the defenceless Republic of Cyprus. Everyone was entitled to expect from the Security Council some concrete ideas and steps towards resolving the Cyprus crisis that would **come** from the substantial force in the United Nations which is now represented by the non-aligned movement, in which the Republic of Cyprus is an active participant. Unfortunately, however, these did not **materialize**. The draft resolution of the non-aligned countries did not even **officially** see the light of day-and that is something which we cannot but regret.

23. The initiative was therefore seized by the Western countries. The draft resolution which was mainly prepared by them is, for obvious reasons, even weaker than the text of non-aligned countries would have been, particularly with regard to the question of negotiations concerning Cyprus.

24. The resolution we have adopted naturally gives due credit to the positive elements, such **as**, for example: the reaffirmation of the recognition of the Government of Cyprus as the sole lawful **Government** of the Republic of Cyprus; the provision concerning the inadmissibility of any acts detrimental to the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and non-alignment of the Republic of Cyprus; and the inadmissibility of any attempts to partition the island, to merge or unite it with any other country. It also contains-if only in the form of a regret-a virtual condemnation of the unilateral act by the leadership of the Turkish community in Cyprus in proclaiming a separate state structure in the part of the island occupied by the Turkish troops. There is also a provision to the effect that that separatist action must not prejudice any final political settlement in Cyprus, and an appeal for urgent and effective implementation of General Assembly resolution 3212 (XXIX), which was endorsed by the **Security** Council.

25. My delegation notes these important provisions of principle which correspond to the position taken by the USSR on the Cyprus question. At **the** same time, however, this resolution has a number of serious failings that considerably weaken it. We are referring mainly to the provision relating to the question of the resumption of talks on Cyprus. As I have already noted, my delegation continues in its deep conviction that a settlement of the Cyprus **problem** can and must be achieved only in a broad, representative international forum within the framework of the United Nations, with the participation of all members of the Security Council and a group of the non-aligned States. Only such an international **forum** within the framework of the United Nations can ensure an objective, effective and fair resolution of this question in the interests of the people of Cyprus. We regret that this just proposal of the USSR has encountered such stubborn resistance from the countries of the North Atlantic Treaty **Organization** (NATO) and from China.

26. The discussion in the Security Council, as has become obvious to us all, revealed an understanding among members of the Council of the necessity for a search for a new procedure for the resumption and continuation of the Cyprus talks. An overwhelming majority of the members of the Council gave direct support to the view and the proposal of the **Secretary-General** concerning the need to seek a new procedure for the negotiations. And, as has already been noted, the talks cannot be continued or lead to any positive results on the previous footing, that is to say, one to **one** between the representatives of the two **com-**

munities. And even if representatives of Greece and Turkey were to join these two parties, the character of the procedure and the substance of the negotiations would in no way be changed. Everything would remain as before, and a second collapse of such negotiations would be inevitable.

27. The resolution provides for the participation in the talks of the Secretary-General, although it does not make this sufficiently clear. We regard that as a serious weakness in the resolution. However, the Secretary-General, in accordance with the formula adopted, is, on instructions from the Security Council, to direct these negotiations. Thus, despite the general terms and the weakness of the formulation, through the Secretary-General, who has been empowered by the Security Council, the United Nations will play an important role in the resumed negotiations on **Cyprus**.

28. The President of the Security Council, the Foreign Minister of Costa Rica, in summing up the discussion of the question of Cyprus here, rightly noted the agreement which emerged among members of the Council to the effect that it should not only help to create an auspicious atmosphere for the resumption and the progress of negotiations, but also "has the duty to superintend their progress and in so far as possible ensure that the parties will find new ways to reach a peaceful settlement*'. [1819th meeting, para. 25].

29. The participation of the **Secretary-General** in the talks and his obligation under the resolution to report to the Security Council on the progress of the negotiations will give the Council a chance to follow the negotiations and to take any necessary steps in good time.

30. It must be noted here that the NATO countries excluded from the original draft resolution of the nonaligned countries a provision for the creation of a group of members of the Council to take part in the Cyprus negotiations. What does this tell us? This is further vivid testimony to the fact that certain NATO circles are continuing their attempts to exclude the United Nations and its main organ for the maintenance of international peace and security, the Security Council, from participation in the settlement of the Cyprus question, despite the fact that the **Council** has been discussing the **Cyprus** question for many years now.. This question has been continually on the Council's agenda.

31. One gets the impression that these circles are so afraid of United Nations involvement in the Cyprus question that they are intimidated by even a modest proposal suggesting that the Security Council resolution should include a direct provision to the effect that the Secretary-General should personally preside over the **Cyprus** talks.

32. All of this fully **reaffirms** the correctness of the view concerning the situation in and around **Cyprus** which **was** presented at the very beginning by the Soviet Union. There is still a desire to resolve the problem of **Cyprus**, not within the framework of the United Nations, nor with the participation of the Security Council, but in the narrow circle of NATO, behind closed doors, behind the back of the United Nations and to the detriment of the interests of the Republic of **Cyprus** and of its people.

33. The Soviet delegation, in conclusion, considers it appropriate, to stress once again that the USSR is **firmly** convinced that a genuine, just and lasting settlement of the **Cyprus** crisis can and must be found only in a broad and representative international forum within the framework of the United Nations, and not in the narrow circle of NATO.

34. Mr. RICHARD (United Kingdom): Mr. President, when I addressed the Council on 4 March, I said that this had then been a long debate. It is today 12 March, and I do not think anyone could describe me as extreme if I were now to categorise our discussions as having been protracted. But perhaps unlike some delegations, I do not believe that the last three weeks have been wasted. They have been devoted to exhaustive and sometimes exhausting consultations between the parties, the members of the Council, and the Secretary-General, to discuss how much common ground there actually was on which a **draft** resolution might be based. The Council's primary responsibility in this matter remains exactly the same, namely, to do its utmost to ensure the resumption of the intercommunal talks under the best possible conditions, which I believe is reflected in the resolution that we have just adopted.

35. Unfortunately, as members of the Council are well aware, it has not been possible to agree on a text which commands the full assent of all the parties. But three weeks' debate and the tireless efforts of so many are surely an indication of how we in the Council have tried to be fair and to produce a draft resolution which does not jeopardize the essential interests of any of the parties.

36. My delegation supported this resolution because, in our view, it succeeds in this primary aim; even if the parties still have difficulties with some parts of it. Moreover, my delegation supported this resolution because we believed that these difficulties do not and should not be regarded as **jeopardizing** the vital interests of any of the parties most directly concerned.

37. With regard to paragraph 6 of the draft resolution which, as we know, has been the main point of disagreement among the parties, I regret that in spite of all our efforts,- we have not been able to find a formula acceptable to all. Nevertheless, the final text does meet the main requirement for a new negotiating

framework permitting the direct involvement of the Secretary-General, while at the same time it does not in our view detract from the principal role which only the representatives of the two communities can fulfil. It is after all they alone who can and must agree upon a constitutional settlement for Cyprus.

38. As for the venue of these talks, it is clear from your statement, Mr. President, that it appears to the Council that the most practical arrangement would be if the talks were normally to take place at the Headquarters of the United Nations, and it is right that we should draw specific attention to this fact. But we must **recognize** also that there are other matters which have to be resolved in the holding of these talks, and we therefore believe that it is right that the Secretary-General should consult the parties on the venue and on the other modalities, as we understand he has undertaken to do.

39. All the members of the Council have made their distinctive contribution to the achievement of his resolution. The three members here of the European Economic Community (EEC) have together been active. We have thereby tried to **reflect** the continuing concern of the heads of Government of the nine countries of the Community, expressed again as recently as yesterday in Dublin. But I do think that some special tributes are required.

40. First, I should like to say **that**, in the view of my delegation, the non-aligned members of the Council have played a major role in a co-operative endeavour which led to the adoption of the draft, and for our part we are grateful. I believe, too, that our joint activity at these first meetings of the Council in 1975 has set a happy precedent.

41. Secondly, I wish to pay a tribute to the Secretary-General who, in the tireless manner to which we have become accustomed, has sought -vigorously and skilfully to narrow the differences-between the parties. If he failed to bridge the gap entirely, I believe none the less that he succeeded in reducing it to a point where we could see clearly what was and what was not **essential** to the two **sides**, and as a result he enabled those who formally drafted the resolution to be confident that the final text took proper account of the views of the two sides.

42. Finally, Mr. President, I address myself to you. It is uncommon indeed for a Council member to make available to our deliberations the talents of its Minister for External Relations. On this occasion my delegation believes that by coming to New York, Mr. **Facio** made an important contribution to our endeavours. He was able to bring a fresh and imaginative approach to the conduct of the presidency as well as a dedication which greatly helped the efforts to achieve a generally acceptable resolution.

43. **I wish** to address my last word to the parties to the dispute. The last few days have been a testing time for Council members and for the parties alike. Sometimes it may have appeared that while with every passing day the problems of Cyprus became more urgent, we here in New York **have** been wasting our time debating the finer points of the English language. If this is so, we must all share that responsibility, for I do not believe the world would have easily understood if, over a question of semantics, the principal body of the United Nations concerned with world security had failed to reach an agreement. That is why I appeal to the **parties** today to look beyond the mere language of this resolution and to consider instead the realities behind it. I think we should all now put our dictionaries away. Perhaps they have had too much use rather than too little in the last week or so. The responsibility of those most directly involved is indeed a very heavy one, but in so far as the international community is capable of speaking with one voice, I believe that it is today asking those who are to negotiate to do so **seriously** and urgently. That is surely the message of the resolution we have just adopted, and it is in that sense that I commend it.

44. Mr. SAITO (Japan): Mr. President, I should like to begin- by expressing my great satisfaction at seeing you preside over the Council this month. The decision of the Government of Costa Rica that its Minister for External Relations should hold the presidency during the first week of Costa Rica's tenure did honour to the Council. My delegation wishes to extend its congratulations to you, Mr. President, for continuing the distinguished role played by your Minister for External Relations in helping to formulate the resolution adopted by the Council.

45. I wish to express my admiration for the Secretary-General, who has devoted so much effort to narrowing down the differences between the parties concerned.

46. **I wish** to take this **opportunity** to thank Mr. **Huang** Hua of China for **presiding so** ably over our deliberations in February.'

47. The delegation of Japan is most **satisfied** with the adoption of the resolution by consensus, since it has been carefully drafted, in a balanced manner, to accommodate as much as possible the views of the parties **concerned** and since the **members** of the Council have made exhaustive efforts to achieve a break-through in the complex situation resulting from the present crisis in Cyprus. We had some hesitation as a result of the fact that some of the parties directly concerned were not fully satisfied. However, we Sincerely hope that **all** the parties concerned will be co-operative and that our decision today will lead to the resumption of talks between representatives of the two communities, under the auspices and with the direction, as appropriate, of the Secretary-General.

48. We feel that this increased role for the **Secretary-General**, and the resolution as a whole, will help create the new atmosphere that is certainly necessary if the intractable obstacles to a fair and lasting settlement are to be overcome.

49. Whatever the result, my delegation believes that all the authors of the draft resolution, in particular those who took active roles in its formulation deserve the gratitude of the other members for their unremitting efforts to devise the new approach that has at last been accepted by the Council.

50. Members may recall that in my statement to the Council on 25 February I stated that "it may be worth while to explore the reactivation of the negotiating process at a place outside Cyprus, in a different atmosphere" [*1816th meeting, para. 20*].

51. It has to be conceded, of course, that the unfortunate events which led to the present situation in Cyprus took place last July, and that the last meeting of the negotiators between the two communities was held nearly one month ago. Since the Council's first meeting on this new phase of the problem took place on 20 February, there was a feeling that the time for a decision was **running out**. We note that the Secretary-General and the President of the Council, and other members of the Council as well, have done their utmost, under heavy schedules, to conduct efficient deliberations in the Council to help defuse the tense situation on the island of Cyprus.

52. My delegation, as the representative of a **peace-loving State** and a loyal member of the Council, entertains the hope that the resolution adopted today will put us back on the road to the confirmation of the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus. But I think we should bear in mind the necessity to take the time required for fuller consideration of the fundamental aspects of the question of Cyprus. Needless to say, under the resolution the Council will remain actively seized of the Cyprus question.

53. Mr. JACKSON (Guyana): The resolution we have just adopted comes after three weeks of lively and informed debates and after three weeks of intensive and protracted negotiations. During this period the Council's activities were guided by Mr. Huang Hua, who was President during the month of February, and by your own Minister for External Relations and yourself, Mr. President, during the current month. My delegation wishes to express its admiration of the skilful manner in which Mr. Huang Hua guided the Council and of the determined and patient efforts of your Minister for External Relations and yourself in an effective and efficient discharge of the responsibilities of the office of President.

54. As is well known, the Council was called into session as a result of the complaint made by the

Government of the Republic of Cyprus concerning the unilateral declaration of a *Turkish Federated State of Cyprus by the leadership of that community on 13 February 1975. In considering this specific complaint of Cyprus, the Council has been obliged to undertake a review of progress made towards the implementation of its resolution 365 (1974), by which it endorsed resolution 3212 (XXIX) adopted unanimously on 1 November 1974 by the Assembly at its twenty-ninth session.

55. The discussions in the Council, both formal and informal, have confirmed the fact that resolution 3212 (XXIX), which was sponsored by non-aligned countries and which involved much patient and arduous negotiation, remains a valid basis for constructive efforts in the search for a solution to the **difficult** and complex question of Cyprus. The review also confirmed-and this is acknowledged in the resolution just adopted-that no progress has been made towards the implementation of the provisions of those resolutions. Foreign armed forces and foreign military presence and personnel have not withdrawn from the Republic. Foreign interference in the affairs of the Republic continues. The refugees are no nearer to returning to their homes in safety, and bi-communal negotiations towards reaching a mutually acceptable political solution have broken down.

56. The essential prescriptions of the resolution just adopted by the Council are twofold. First, General Assembly resolution 3212 (XXIX) and Security Council resolution 365 (1974) must be urgently and effectively implemented. Secondly, new efforts and new measures are required for the resumption of the negotiations in a climate which would be compatible with the freely expressed will, not only of the Council, but also of the General Assembly, that such negotiations should be conducted on an equal footing.

57. For the achievement of these objectives, my delegation would have preferred the Council to have agreed upon measures which would have made the resolution just adopted less unclear in its terms and more specific in its provisions.

58. Speaking in the debate of 24 February [*1815th meeting*], we indicated that we would not be averse to the institution of a reasonable time-frame within which the implementation of the provisions of resolution 3212 (XXIX) could be expected. My delegation still holds this view. However, in the light of the situation which the Council now faces, my delegation expects that those of the parties on whom special responsibilities devolve in this regard, **will** begin to take action which will convince the Council and the international community that the implementation of the relevant resolutions will be pursued with seriousness and with a sense of urgency. In our earlier statement as well, we had expressed our

readiness to have recourse to the provisions of paragraph 6 of resolution 3212 (**XXIX**), which anticipated the possible need for a more active and direct involvement of the United Nations in finding a solution to the problems of Cyprus. In the view of my delegation, it is indeed unfortunate that **agreement** could not be reached on the utilization of the opportunities which that paragraph afforded the Council for constructive action.

59. The *Council* has **recognized** that new efforts under new agreed procedures are now required to assist the resumption of negotiations between the two communities and has, towards this end, given an important new mandate to the Secretary-General to assist in the advancing of this process. In order to ensure that the required degree of urgency be maintained, the Council has asked the **Secretary-General** to report to it on his discharge of this new mandate whenever he considers it appropriate and, in any case, before 15 June 1975; and in the meantime, to remain actively seized of the matter. Here again, my delegation would have preferred some more clarity and precision with regard to the role of the Secretary-General.

60. Despite our reservations, we nevertheless supported the resolution. For, confident as we are of the Secretary-General's abiding dedication to the cause of peace, we believe that he will *spare* no effort to make a success of his new mission. Furthermore, my delegation trusts, and expects, that the **parties** concerned will not place any hindrance in the way of the Secretary-General as he carries out this new mission, and that they will co-operate with him actively and positively.

61. My delegation, working together with other non-aligned countries and other members of the Security Council, has sought to make a positive contribution to the outcome of our deliberations and consultations. It is not my intention here to engage in polemics on the role of the non-aligned countries in the outcome of the resolution we adopted. The consideration of that role is not within the jurisdiction of the Council. It is a matter for us, the non-aligned countries, to discuss and decide upon. We shall not be deflected from our chosen principles. We shall continue to act in a manner which is consistent with those principles and in accordance with our own independent judgement.

62. Speaking for Guyana, I should be less than candid if I did not express my Government's disappointment that more effective measures for a solution to the question of **Cyprus** could not have been agreed upon in our collective search for a way out for the people of Cyprus. I should be less than candid as well if I did not express my delegation's concern at the intrusion of interests alien to those of the people of Cyprus in the determination of the Security Council's decisions on this matter.

63. The fate of Cyprus, and the way in which the Council responds to it in its prolonged anguish, are matters of deep interest to all non-aligned countries, and Guyana cannot be indifferent to them.

64. We look forward to receiving a report from the Secretary-General, whenever he considers it appropriate, on the progress made in his new mission. However, should the decisions we have taken today make it necessary in the future to turn to additional specific measures, including those I cited earlier, my delegation hopes that the Council will not hesitate to shoulder its responsibilities and will take the appropriate steps which would then be required.

65. Mr. BOOH BOOH (United Republic of Cameroon) (*interpretation from French*): Mr. President, allow me first of all to extend to you the warm congratulations of my delegation on your accession to the presidency of the Security Council. Your wealth of experience of United Nations problems, the effectiveness and impartiality with which your Minister for Foreign Relations and you have carried out your functions will, in our view, be valuable assets conducing to smooth progress in our work this month. You may be sure of the complete co-operation of my delegation in promoting the successful accomplishment of your important mission.

66. I should also like at this time to congratulate Mr. Huang Hua of China, who presided with great skill over the work of the Council last month.

67. In supporting the draft resolution which the Council has just adopted, my delegation wished to indicate once again the importance that it attaches to the return of peace to Cyprus so as to enable the entire Cypriot people to devote itself to the task of the reconstruction and development of its country.

68. It is clear that such a result can be attained only if the Greek and Turkish communities on the island agree to resume negotiations without delay so as to resolve the difficult constitutional problem before their country. It is the duty of the Council to encourage by every means in its power the resumption and continuation of such negotiations in an atmosphere of freedom, equality and mutual respect between the parties concerned. Any delay in resuming negotiations can only have harmful effects, because, as the Secretary-General clearly stated before the Council on 21 February last, the recent developments which have taken place on the island "have created a new and tense situation, because there is now a vacuum which can all too easily be filled by renewed violence" [*1814th meeting, para. 9*].

69. It was in that constructive spirit that during the first days of our consultations my delegation and other delegations from non-aligned countries that share our views on the question of Cyprus drafted a working document that would be an adequate

response to the distress and anguish of the people of Cyprus. It was a matter of actively and closely associating the Council and the highest official of the **Organization**, who enjoys the confidence of all States, with the quest for effective means of implementing the resolutions adopted by the two main organs of the United Nations.

70. In that undertaking, the position of my delegation was always inspired by those principles of objectivity and independence and a free assessment of the international situation that are the permanent basis of the foreign policy of the United Republic of Cameroon, and by our constant solidarity with the people of the Republic of Cyprus who have in the last few months been the undeserving -victims, in succession, of a *coup d'état* plotted abroad and a foreign military invasion.

71. The hesitations that the initiative taken by the non-aligned countries aroused and **the long and difficult** consultations which the members of the Council have been engaged in for three weeks should not give rise to bitter statements or to an erroneous judgement of the action of the non-aligned countries but should rather strengthen the conviction of **all** of us that the Cyprus question cannot be finally and peacefully solved save at the cost of substantial concessions, patience and extreme tolerance on the part of all the parties concerned. It is difficult completely to satisfy everyone in this complex affair, in which the often contradictory yet legitimate interests of the parties deserve equal consideration and in which the basic **principles** of the Charter to which the small countries attach particular importance, are also at stake.

72. Thus, mindful of the difficulties whose magnitude we have all fully appreciated in these last few days, my delegation thinks that the draft resolution that has just been adopted, which takes into account certain ideas cherished by the non-aligned countries, constitutes a reasonable and acceptable compromise. Faithful observance of it by the parties **could** give a new impetus to the intercommunal talks, which we all sincerely hope will be resumed shortly and will be brought to a successful conclusion as soon as possible.

73. My delegation is extremely pleased that in paragraph 1 of the resolution the Security Council calls upon all States to respect the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and non-alignment of the Republic of Cyprus. It is of the utmost importance that the inhabitants of Cyprus be protected from external military interference and **faits accomplis** so that the resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly on the subject may be **implemented** effectively.

74. Once the members of the Security Council had acknowledged the competence and devotion with which the Secretary-General has lent his good offices

in this matter, it was appropriate for our Council to request him, as the highest official of the **Organization**, once again to continue his peace efforts by making himself personally **available** to the parties so as to facilitate the resumption, intensification and progress of the negotiations. Paragraph 6 of the resolution, which was the subject of protracted debate, seems to us acceptable in its final wording. My delegation interprets it as making the Secretary-General an active figure in the negotiations between the two communities, because, in being personally available to the two parties, he will invite them to resume negotiations as soon as possible under his personal auspices and under his direction, whenever necessary.

75. **My** delegation continues to believe that, while the Security **Council** and the Secretary-General can create propitious conditions for the resumption of negotiations, it is up to the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities to play a crucial role in the **final** solution of their problems. No **resolution** of the Council, however perfect, can be an effective substitute for good will and a spirit of compromise on the part of those concerned, attributes that seem to us essential to the success of any negotiations.

76. That is why my delegation once again makes a friendly appeal to the Greek and Turkish Cypriots to refrain at this stage from aggravating the suspicions and recriminations of the past and rather to approach the negotiations in a constructive spirit and in an atmosphere of confidence in the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-alignment of the Republic **of** Cyprus.

77. Mr. LECOMPT (France) (*interpretation from French*): Having actively participated in the drafting of the resolution the Council has just adopted, my delegation appreciates the resolution's merits while being fully aware of the constraints that long hampered its final drafting. We had to take into account the situation that led to the convening of the Security Council, and at the same time to avoid any initiative that might have caused either party to reject **out-of-hand** any **formula** that might, in their opinion, jeopardize their essential interests. In order best to meet those two requirements it was necessary, on the one hand, to have a rather large and diverse group of Security Council members prepare the draft resolution, and on the other to maintain permanent contact with the parties concerned. It seems to me that these two conditions were fulfilled. No doubt the results of the efforts we made over more than three weeks could not fully respond to the expectations of either of the parties concerned. Everyone here knows that very well. Nevertheless, as the consensus of members of the Council shows, those results do offer a reasonable and practical basis for the resumption of negotiations, giving a better guarantee of a free and equal quest by the two communities for a mutually acceptable political and constitutional settlement. That guarantee is essentially

contained in the new mission entrusted to the Secretary-General, who, as we know, enjoys the full confidence of the parties and -will **thus be able to** exercise the authority given him **by the Council**. We would like to think that the **parties will** co-operate **with** him and will become convinced that the formulas 'approved by the Council in **no** way jeopardize their essential concerns.

78. As the Council is aware, Italy, the, United Kingdom and France have been determined to do their duty in recent weeks. Together with the delegations of five other countries, the three. delegations have attempted to hit on a wording that would cover certain of the most essential points. **We are most** gratified at the co-operation we achieved. Even though the three and the five came from different regions, the eight of us were able to propose procedures that we hope will assist an island under duress, and a population for which the United Nations should have all the more care since it belongs to a small country. I also wish to pay a tribute to the other delegations which proposed useful additions to the text drafted by the eight of us.

79. Moreover, I wish to **emphasize** that the three delegations I have mentioned worked in harmony with the nine members of EEC. In the course of the **meeting** of heads of Government of the Community in Dublin, Ireland, yesterday and the day before, the wish was unanimously expressed that the efforts of the Council should be crowned with success. That is yet another indication of the great attention with which the nine members of EEC are following the situation in Cyprus and their hope that **within** a short time they shall witness the resumption of negotiations on the Cyprus problem within the framework of the discussions that have been held in the United Nations.

80. May I once again express our regret -that the many duties of the Secretary-General have prevented him from **being** with us today. He has very closely followed the efforts of the Council, and in recent days has played a most helpful role. Now **he** will **have to determine, together with the parties: the necessary** arrangements so that the negotiations may resume without delay and in conditions which are convenient to each of the participants.

81. The **French** delegation has taken note of the statement which you, Mr. President, made on behalf of the entire Council, to the effect that, for practical reasons, negotiations should normally take place at United Nations Headquarters [see **para. 6 above**]. That would certainly ensure the personal participation of the Secretary-General in the new efforts.' to be undertaken.

82. I would add that the **Secretary-General's** vast personal knowledge of the Cyprus problem will enable him to discharge his duties while respecting the legitimate concerns of the negotiators-namely, the

representatives of the two communities. I would urgently **appeal** to -those communities to facilitate to the maximum the task of the Secretary-General, as defined, in particular, in paragraph 6 of the resolution we have just adopted.

83. This resolution provides them with specific indications of the framework and atmosphere in which the negotiations should be resumed with the participation of the **Secretary-General**. The terms "the intensification and the progress of comprehensive negotiations", "**reciprocal** spirit of understanding", and "high priority" to be given by the parties all cover what we consider should be the realities of the future negotiations, constituting the psychological basis for the new approach for which the **Secretary-General** appealed in the statement he made before the Council at the outset of our work.

84. Mr. President, this evening we are coming to the end **of** a **difficult** undertaking which the skill and devotion of your predecessor, Mr. **Huang** Hua, effectively charted for us. In patiently allowing the question which has been before us for more **than** three weeks to follow its normal **course**, Mr. Huang demonstrated great wisdom. Mr. **Facio**, the minister for External Relations of your country, Mr. President, and you yourself were no less **well** advised in calling on us to accelerate our work a little. The French delegation would like you to convey to Mr. **Facio** its gratitude and appreciation of his contribution **to the** presidency of the Council. We hope that after having guided us so skilfully to the close of this series of meetings, you will be less burdened and will give us less to do for the rest of the month.

85. Mr. HUANG Hua (China) (*translation from Chinese*): At the meeting of the Security Council on 27 February [**1817th meeting**], **the Chinese** delegation further expounded its stand on the question of Cyprus. In view of the fact that the draft resolution just adopted by the Council is basically in accord with General Assembly resolution 3212 (XXIX) and the consistent stand of the Chinese delegation, we supported it.

86. We have also noted that in order to achieve **-its** expansionist aim, one super-Power did not hesitate to exert gross pressure on many third world Member States **in** an attempt to obstruct the resumption of **the** intercommunal -talks and to meddle further and intervene in Cyprus, and that its scheme has failed and has been seen through by the great majority of -member States **of** the Council more and more clearly. It is our sincere hope that the parties concerned+ firmly doing away with super-Power meddling **and** intervention; will resume negotiations speedily and arrive at a reasonable settlement of the Cyprus question through **consultations** on an equal footing and in a spirit of mutual understanding and mutual accommodation.

87. Finally, I should **like** to express sincere thanks to the representatives of some friendly countries for the sentiments of friendship towards the People's Republic of China they expressed in their statements.

88. Mr. **PLAJA** (Italy): The debate we are concluding today has been a very long one indeed. The **draft** resolution we have just adopted has required **time-consuming** efforts, diplomatic **skills**, and patience on the part of **all** members of the Council, through consultations among themselves, with **all** the parties and with the Secretary-General. In paying a tribute to those who have contributed to the result, I should like to refer, in the first place, to the Chair. Mr. Huang Hua presided with his well-known ability and courtesy over the beginning of our debates. Then the Council was able to take advantage, in its deliberations, of the most able guidance of the Minister for External Relations of your country, Mr. President, Mr. **Facio**, to whom my delegation wants to address a special expression of gratitude and appreciation; and now your personal action has made a most important and conclusive contribution to our endeavours.

89. As you know, my delegation had, since the very outset, been involved in the elaboration of the text we have just adopted, together with a number of friendly delegations. If I may be permitted to make a personal remark, this is my first experience in the Council, and I wish to express my gratification at the co-operation which it has been possible to develop between my delegation, together with the other delegations of States members of the EEC, and the friendly delegations of the non-aligned members of the Council in the search for what we believe to be a constructive conclusion to our debates.

90. My delegation, in participating in the elaboration of the text we have just adopted on the **Cyprus** question, was guided by its desire to contribute to the maintenance of the peace in the area and to the fulfilment of the paramount interests of the Cypriot people. My delegation has kept in mind, to the best of its ability, and with **all** objectivity, the points of view and the positions of **all** the parties concerned, as well as the responsibilities which the Charter entrusts to the Security Council.

91. **Of** course, **I realize** that a compromise text such as the one we have adopted has parts which are not fully satisfactory to all the parties concerned, and that therefore they maintain reservations. **Still**, I am sincerely confident that our efforts have not been in vain and that the decision we have adopted **will** consistently contribute to putting the **search** for a solution to the **Cyprus** crisis on the right path. As a matter of fact, my delegation is convinced that we have managed to draft a document which is fair and does not jeopardize any fundamental position or interest of the parties concerned.

92. In fact, in my opinion- the resolution has revealed some basic elements for the solution of the Cyprus crisis.

93. **Fiit**, there is the reaffirmation that a peaceful solution of the Cyprus question must respect the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus.

94. Then comes the renewed appeal for the full implementation of previous Council resolutions and, in particular, of General Assembly resolution 3212 (**XXIX**), endorsed by the Security Council in resolution 365 (1974). This is a comprehensive document which takes in to -account both political and humanitarian aspects of the situation. The Italian delegation wishes to express the hope that **this** renewed appeal of the Council **will** be heeded in all good faith and earnestness by **all** the parties concerned.

95. **Finally** there is the request of the Council for a fresh attempt to **find** a solution to the fundamental problems of Cyprus through negotiations freely conducted between the representatives of the two communities, with the objective of reaching a **mutually** acceptable political settlement not prejudged by past attitudes or decisions. The Security Council has, in our opinion, provided this new opportunity and has asked the Secretary-General to undertake a new mission of good offices. We know that we have thus put a heavy burden on Mr. Waldheim. But the Italian delegation is sure that he **will** carry out his new responsibilities to the best of his **well-known** ability and with his well-known dedication -which he has shown again in the course of the consultations during our debate-and therefore is confident that positive results will soon ensue from his efforts. As for the modalities of the talks, my **delegation** wishes to place on record its agreement with the statement you made at the beginning of this meeting, Mr. President.

96. The Italian delegation remains firmly convinced that the **only** way to restore peace and tranquillity to the people of **Cyprus** is through the negotiating process. The heads of Government and Foreign Ministers of the nine countries members of the EEC again stressed this view only yesterday, in concluding their meeting in Dublin, and recalled the statement of the nine countries issued on 13 February [11629].

97. However **difficult** may be the issues at stake, no goal is beyond the scope of negotiators ready to engage, in good faith and in a spirit of mutual understanding and accommodation, in talks aimed at a 'settlement based upon the real interests of the populations involved. What is of the essence now for the two communities in Cyprus is to look to the future and **draw** from the past the conclusion that nobody can really take their place in the search for an agreed solution to the problems of their country.

98. Mr. RYDBECK (Sweden): First of all, I wish to pay a sincere tribute to the President of the Council for this month—that is, to Mr. **Facio**, the Minister for External Relations of Costa Rica and to you, Sir, personally. I wish at the same time to express my warm thanks to the President for the month of February, Mr. Huang Hua. The Presidents for these two months have had to shoulder a very **difficult** and important burden, and it has been fulfilled in a manner that has made a vital contribution to the fulfilment of our task.

99. In speaking at this stage of our debate, I perhaps cannot contribute much that is new. However, my delegation can, and is very anxious to, give added emphasis to some of the vital points already touched upon by others.

100. The decision on the question of Cyprus just taken without a vote by the Council marks, as many speakers have noted, the end of a long and arduous process of negotiations and informal consultations, both multilateral and bilateral. This process has certainly been slow. However, in the view of the Swedish delegation it was necessary for the Council to proceed as it has done. The parties had to be carefully sounded out in order to give the Council as complete and detailed a picture as possible of their respective positions. This was so since, in the view of most delegations—and certainly, as I stated on 24 February [1815th meeting], in the view of the Swedish delegation—a main task of the Security Council was to try to provide a new procedure that would lead to the resumption of the talks between the parties in Cyprus. To find a solution that would be acceptable to all parties that are involved in the Cyprus problem was therefore the natural aim of the Council. It was to that end that it carefully investigated a great number of solutions with a view to finding one that would command the support both of the members of the Council and of the parties.

101. Yesterday it became clear that it was not possible to find a solution to which the parties were prepared to give their support, at least not in advance. The obvious duty of the Council then became to take a decision which was acceptable to its members and which would best further the resumption of talks between the parties.

102. The draft resolution just adopted is thus a compromise product, where elements are lacking that in the view of some **delegations** should have been included—this applies to my delegation, for **instance—and** where other elements are included which some delegations would have wished to delete. The resolution has, however, been adopted without **a** vote by the Council, and it is my delegation's hope that the parties **will** look and act upon the resolution in the construction spirit in which it was drafted, a spirit of co-operation and understanding.

103. All through the deliberations of the Council there has been a wide measure of agreement that the new procedure for negotiations would give a larger role to the Secretary-General personally. The Secretary-General enjoys the full confidence not only of the Council but also of the parties. Thus, my delegation expresses the sincere conviction that his new mission of good **offices** will provide the new procedure needed to bring the parties together and to promote progress in their resumed talks. In this context my delegation wants to pay a warm tribute to the Secretary-General for his untiring efforts during these past weeks to help find a new starting point for talks between the parties in Cyprus. The extent to which there has been a narrowing of positions is in no little degree attributable to him.

104. After long deliberations and taking into account to the maximum extent possible the views of the parties, the Council has carried out its duty and has taken a new decision on the Cyprus question. As a friend of the Cypriot people, Sweden urgently appeals to the parties now to make use of the procedure adopted in order to safeguard a just and stable peace and harmonious relations in Cyprus.

105. Mr. SCALI (United States of America): My delegation joined in adopting the draft resolution because from the outset we **firmly** believed that the primary goal of the Security Council should be to encourage the resumption of **talks** between the two communities in Cyprus. Along with members of the Council, other Governments and the Secretary-General, Secretary of State Kissinger devoted his personal efforts to contribute to this objective.

106. Nearly a month ago, when our deliberations began, a broad chasm separated the parties. In the course of these strenuous consultations this chasm has narrowed, but has not been bridged completely. However, when this was clear, eight delegations representing a broad spectrum of the Council membership, acting in co-operation with the Secretary-General, worked out a constructive compromise. We all owe a deep debt of gratitude to those eight delegations for their imaginative, constructive and courageous drafting of yesterday, which produced the positive result before us.

107. All of us at this table can take satisfaction in the seriousness and the sense of responsibility which have generally **characterized** the Council's efforts in the weeks just past. The outcome, I believe, is a victory of patience, reason and compromise over confrontation. As is frequently the case when an attempt is made to bridge the gap between strongly held views of contending parties, none of the parties may be entirely satisfied with our result. This is natural. At the same time, no one has suffered a defeat.

108. We urge the parties to respond positively and co-operatively to the initiatives the **Secretary-General** must take in pursuance of today's resolution.

109. It now becomes the duty of each of us and of the Governments we represent to do our utmost to help **realize** the progress which is represented in the resolution we have adopted. We shall fulfil this duty by doing whatever we can to promote the resumption of talks between the communities-talks looking to a peaceful resolution of the conflicts that have **afflicted** the people of Cyprus during this generation.

110. Mr. KANE (Mauritania) (*interpretation from French*): After several weeks of meetings and patient search for a solution, we are now coming to the close of our work. The draft resolution which has just been adopted by the Council by consensus will unquestionably have a decisive impact not only on the resumption of **negotiations** but also, and above all, on the political future of the Republic of Cyprus.

111. We would, of course, have liked to achieve perfection by adopting a resolution which would have reflected the feelings and the concerns of each of the parties. But we found that such a solution, no matter how ardently desired, was virtually impossible given the present state of affairs in Cyprus. The time devoted by the Security Council to the consideration of the new situation in Cyprus is eloquent testimony of that. However, despite the positions of the parties involved, hope remains.

112. It is because they are convinced that there is hope that the members of the Council agreed to entrust to the **Secretary-General** a further mission which has as its main objective the bringing of the parties to meet across the table once again. My delegation, in lending its support to this new mission for the Secretary-General, is firmly convinced that it is through candid and genuine dialogue that the parties will be able to remove the obstacles that now impede the path to peace. The problems of Cyprus continue to be a main concern of my Government, because the situation in that country cannot but be of concern to any peace-loving and justice-loving country. The people of Cyprus have suffered too much for there to be any let-up in the search for peace in that part of the world.

113. I should also, like to refer to the friendly relations and fruitful co-operation that exist between my own country and the two countries concerned, Turkey and Greece.

114. With respect to Turkey, let me recall the visit by the President of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania to Turkey, a visit in the course of which many ties of co-operation were strengthened. I might also say that we have many ties with Turkey, the most important of which is the Islamic bond that is a fundamental feature of our countries' culture.

115. immediately following its accession to **independence**, Mauritania initiated fruitful relations with Greece that my Government wishes to see strengthened to the benefit of our two countries.

116. What could be more normal therefore than for the people and the Government of Mauritania to feel concern about the drama now being played out in Cyprus and in the subregion?

117. Before I conclude, I should like to pay a well deserved tribute to you, Mr. **President**, for your work, whose results are now visible. While your Minister for External Relations outlined the framework in which our debate might go forward in the best possible conditions, you yourself, thanks to your qualities as a diplomat and statesman, have succeeded in bringing the work of the Council to a successful conclusion, and I would ask you to accept my delegation's congratulations for the valuable work you have done, not only for the benefit of the Security Council but also for the benefit of the international community at large.

118. Mr. TCHERNOUCHTENKO (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) (*interpretation from Russian*): After many weeks' work the Security Council has adopted a new resolution on the question of Cyprus and my delegation, like other members of the Council, considers it necessary to make a statement in explanation of its vote.

119. Our delegation has already had an opportunity to set forth its views on the question. We should just like to reiterate that the serious crisis in **Cyprus first** arose and has since continued mainly because of external interference in the domestic affairs of the Republic of Cyprus. The further exacerbation of the circumstances was brought about by the unilateral actions of the Turkish community's leadership in setting up a separate State structure in the part of the territory of Cyprus occupied by Turkish troops.

120. The situation in an around Cyprus continues not only to be serious but also to represent a threat, visible to all, to peace and security in the eastern Mediterranean. In this connexion, one cannot but agree with the concern about this expressed by the representatives of non-aligned countries.

121. The delegation of the Byelorussian SSR is firmly convinced that a solution of the problem of Cyprus must be sought through the immediate and full implementation of all provisions of previous Security Council and General Assembly resolutions on Cyprus, that we must press for strict respect for the independence, the territorial integrity and the non-alignment of the Republic of Cyprus. Nothing must be allowed which would lead to the partition of Cyprus. We believe that support should be given to the lawfully elected Government of the Republic of Cyprus.

122. Our delegation continues to favour further steps by the Security Council aimed at halting all foreign interference in the affairs of the State of Cyprus. We continue to favour the immediate withdrawal of all armed forces and foreign military personnel from the territory of Cyprus. There still remains the urgent problem of preventing any further action which may lead to the partition of Cyprus, the more so as the press is filled with talk about a "political partition in Cyprus", and this at a time when there is a unanimous view in the Security Council about the need for strict respect for the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus, the inadmissibility of any partition, and the need to **recognize** the lawfully elected Government of Cyprus. In pointing this out to the Security Council, my delegation would like once again to stress that it regards as inadmissible any acts leading to the partition of Cyprus.

123. Our delegation notes that the resolution adopted today reflects provisions the importance of which we have mentioned earlier. These provisions, as everyone knows, underlay General Assembly resolution 3212 (XXIX) and the pertinent decisions of the Security Council. Their importance lies in the fact that they represent a basis for a political settlement in Cyprus. No less important is the fact that the resolution that we have just adopted envisages the urgent and effective implementation of resolution 3212 (XXIX), as endorsed by the Council in its resolution 365 (1974).

124. But there is another aspect of the matter too, which is, how and by what means may this just settlement be brought about. This aspect of the case now becomes of very great importance. My delegation has already spoken in favour of a new approach to the settlement of the Cyprus question by having it considered in a broad international forum, because this would do most to speed a solution of the problem in the interests of the people of Cyprus and of both communities in Cyprus, Greek and Turkish.

125. At the same time, one cannot but note that in the course of the Council's discussion an overwhelming majority spoke in favour of having a new negotiating procedure so as to get the inter-communal talks moving again, to create auspicious conditions for those talks and to help bring about positive results. In this connexion, the non-aligned States put forward the idea that, a group of members of the Council, however small, should take part in the talks.

126. -Finally,- when this provision too met with no support, the idea was put forward that the negotiations should take place under the direct chairmanship of the Secretary-General. But all those proposals met with objections on the part of certain forces and did not receive fair treatment. The opponents of the proposals say that they are opposed to any "**internationalization**" of the problem of Cyprus. But surely

the very nature, the very essence, of the problem is already international, and surely its consideration has long since ceased to be a matter of concern solely to the two communities in Cyprus, that is, the Greek and Turkish parties.

127. It must be said that all of this has to be regarded as merely the latest attempt on the part of certain forces to conceal their wish to exclude the United Nations, and the **Security** Council in particular, from the solution to this question and, as before, to have it settled in the narrow behind-closed-doors circle of NATO, **and to** the detriment **of** the people of Cyprus.

128. In the course of the discussion much has been said about a new negotiating procedure, about a new approach, but with what result? As now drafted, paragraph 6 of the resolution, in our opinion, will not give the necessary impetus to these negotiations and will not inject the necessary new element. This paragraph is so drafted that it weakens the resolution. At the same time, one cannot help seeing that, even if couched in very weak terms, paragraph 6 did reflect the generally **recognized** fact that the negotiations cannot now be resumed on the previous basis and be expected to produce any results. The paragraph provides, although in **insufficiently** clear form, for a mission of good **offices** for the Secretary-General and for his direction **of** the negotiations.

129. We realize that this is a complex and responsible mission entrusted to the Secretary-General by the Council and would like once again to express our respect for him, our trust and our support. The participation of the Secretary-General in these negotiations, on instructions from the Council, will unquestionably enable him to follow the progress of the negotiations and to inform the Council of the progress of implementation of resolution 365 (1974) and of the resolution which we have just adopted. Thanks to the participation of the Secretary-General, the Council will thereby be enabled to play an important and positive role in the negotiations. The Council will also be enabled, if necessary, to take appropriate measures in the interests of overcoming obstacles to a just and lasting settlement of the problem.

130. Although we have noted certain positive provisions in the draft resolution just adopted, and some opportunities, albeit weak ones but nevertheless positive, our delegation would like to stress that the quickest and the most genuinely fair and lasting solution to the problem of Cyprus can unquestionably be found in a broad international forum within the framework of the United Nations.

131. Our delegation strongly sides with the people of Cyprus in wishing to see the problem of Cyprus solved in the interest of both communities-Greek and Turkish-and it favours the elimination of tension in the region and the strengthening of peace and security in the eastern Mediterranean.

132. Mr. SALIM (United Republic of Tanzania): After a prolonged series of meetings **characterized** by protracted and at times strenuous consultations, the Security Council has just adopted a draft resolution on the question of Cyprus pursuant to the complaint submitted to it by the Government of Cyprus.

133. The adoption of this resolution has not been an easy exercise. For almost a month members of the Council have been actively considering this question. Consultations have been comprehensive -both within the Council membership and between members of the Council and the parties concerned. My delegation, in concert with our colleagues, the non-aligned members of the Council, has been very much involved in the negotiations which possible made the drafting of the resolution adopted today. Those who wish objectively to **recognize** realities will not fail to see that the present text contains a number of important provisions which were originally contained in the informal working paper prepared by the non-aligned members of the Council. Naturally, it does not contain all the important elements of the non-aligned text. But then it is obvious that the resolution which has been adopted is a Security Council resolution and not a non-aligned document.

134. I should perhaps add that this is not the first time-nor, for that matter, will it be the last-in the Council or in other forums of the United Nations that the efforts of the non-aligned movement have not met with total and absolute success. **Of** course, **difficulties** have been forthcoming from one or another quarter. But then, is it really possible to expect any country or group of countries to have everything it wants in an **organization** of such diversity as our own? Yet, despite such difficulties, we have never been deterred from pursuing initiatives which in our own collective and independent judgement serve the best interests of peace and security. And I might add that we have throughout **recognized** that whatever contribution we can make-either individually or collectively-in the cause of peace, we can make it by not insisting on imposing our own way.

135. The same consideration has guided our role in the question currently before the Security Council. Throughout the consideration of the complaint submitted by the Government of Cyprus and all through the protracted private consultations my delegation's overriding consideration has been to find a way in which the present tragedy in Cyprus can be brought to an end. As I said in my statement before the Council on 27 **February [1817th meeting]**, **the only** effective way to do this is through the scrupulous and speedy implementation of General Assembly resolution 3212 (XXIX), which was endorsed by the Security Council in resolution 365 (1974). We are glad to note that the current resolution **affirms** this position.

136. Like almost all other delegations that have taken part in our proceedings, we expressed our serious

concern at the interruptibn of the intercommunal talks and the circumstances which led to that interruption. We believed then-as we do now-that it is of imperative urgency that these talks be resumed and that the necessary atmosphere be created to facilitate their resumption. In short, a fresh approach is needed, and it is satisfying to my delegation that this new approach is clearly reflected in the resolution that we have adopted. Paragraphs 5 and 6 specifically relate to this matter.

137. It is our hope-indeed our confident hope-that armed with this new and important mandate the Secretary-General will convene the parties to the negotiating table and under his direction as appropriate, given the co-operation of all the parties concerned, the present impasse may be broken and a new road carved out towards peace and justice. My delegation solemnly appeals to all the parties to extend their full co-operation to the Secretary-General as he undertakes this new and important mission of good offices so **that** peace and justice, which we all desire to see prevail in Cyprus, can be achieved by strict observance of and respect for the island's sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and policy of non-alignment.

138. In my statement on 27 February I expressed my Government's support for the idea of a time-frame within which the provisions of resolution 3212 (XXIX) should be implemented. The resolution we have adopted does not specifically address itself to this question. We note with some satisfaction, however, that the Secretary-General has been requested to submit progress reports whenever he considers it appropriate and that at any rate the Council will have his comprehensive report on the implementation of resolution 365 (1974), as well as on that of the current resolution in about three months' time. This, in our opinion, is a positive approach to the problem, because it reflects the Security Council's determination to follow closely the implementation of its resolutions.

139. I stated earlier that this resolution has been a product of prolonged consultations and negotiations. We are gratified to have taken part in the process leading to this result. It should therefore not be surprising to any one-whether in the Council or outside it-that the resolution represents a compromise and, in my opinion, the best possible compromise under the circumstances. My delegation would have preferred a clearer text devoid of unnecessary ambiguities. We would have preferred stronger language in some of its provisions. And, most certainly, we would have been much happier with a more explicit elaboration of the role of the Secretary-General in facilitating and carrying out the negotiations between the parties concerned.

140. Yet at all times we have borne in mind the importance of taking into consideration the legitimate positions of all the parties concerned. This is only

natural since in the **final** analysis the success or failure of the negotiations depends squarely on the degree of co-operation and understanding the two communities can show each other as well as on the co-operation which all the parties concerned can extend to the Secretary-General. **Taking** these factors into consideration, my delegation believes that the resolution adopted by the Council represents an important step forward in the efforts of the United Nations, and *in particular* of the Council, to promote **peace**, justice and understanding in **Cyprus**. Accordingly, the Tanzanian delegation associated itself with its adoption.

141. I should like to observe that in the course of the consultations a number of proposals and ideas were put forward. **My** own delegation in co-ordination with others had concrete ideas relating to the framework in which the new initiative for the resumption of inter-communal talks was to take place. Many of these proposals were not pressed so as to make way for the present compromise. Naturally, my delegation, as a non-aligned member of the Council, reserves its right to revive some of these proposals should circumstances so necessitate.

142. I cannot end my statement without paying a tribute to the important role played by the President, both in the personality of the Minister for External Relations and the representative, in the achievement of the decision which the Council has just adopted. The President's patience, initiative and drive have certainly enabled the members of the Council to pursue their consultations with determination and optimism even when the situation appeared to be rather frustrating, to put it mildly.

143. I should also like to place on record our greatest appreciation for the untiring efforts made by the Secretary-General during the whole period of the Security Council's consideration of this question. His personal and close involvement in the search for an **acceptable** solution reinforces our confidence that under his direction the talks between the parties concerned, when resumed, **will** have an invaluable asset militating in favour of their success.

144. Finally, I wish to join those of my colleagues who have paid a well-deserved tribute to Mr. Huang Hua of China, the President of the Council last month.

145. Mr. ZAHAWIE (Iraq): **My** delegation did not intend to ask to speak today. We were indeed trying to urge other members of the Council to refrain from speaking in explanation of their votes, since the draft resolution was adopted by the Council without being put to the vote. It was not the **first** time that my delegation had tried to cut down the number of statements to a minimum. Obviously, we have failed in our efforts so far.

146. My delegation was among the last to speak in the debate on the present item, and it was only last week [**1819th meeting**] that we stated our views on the subject. I can therefore be brief in making the following comments on the results of our deliberations.

147. My delegation, as a member of the non-aligned group in the Council, had tried in good faith and in a genuine effort to find the right formula that would facilitate the resumption of negotiations between the parties. We were ready to consider all practical and feasible proposals and try to incorporate them into a working paper, if necessary a draft resolution, which would achieve the desired outcome. We were willing, *inter alia*, to consider the establishment of a group—not necessarily a non-aligned group, as some members seemed to believe, but a group for a mission of good **offices**—if the parties concerned agreed that the formation of such a group would indeed be useful and would meet with the co-operation of the parties. That idea was discarded when it became obvious that the formation of the group was considered to be premature at the present stage.

148. Thereafter my delegation, again along with the other members of the non-aligned group, was ready to co-operate with the other members of the Council in order to find a way out of the deadlock. No matter what outsiders may think or imagine, the non-aligned group continued to act in good faith and in absolute freedom in trying to determine what was the best possible formula according to their own individual and collective judgements.

149. We hope that the present resolution will genuinely contribute to the improvement of the situation in Cyprus and will alleviate the sufferings of the people of the island.

150. Mr. President, my delegation already had the opportunity to extend its welcome to your Minister for External Relations. I should like now, before concluding my statement, to commend your own outstanding contribution to the arduous consultations which took place before we arrived at the draft resolution adopted by the Council today.

151. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): The members of the Council whose names were on the list of speakers have addressed the Council, and I should like now to make a statement as representative of COSTA RICA.

152. With the adoption of the draft resolution that was before us, the Security Council has concluded the consideration of an item which, in public meetings—and in private consultations, absorbed the attention of the members of the Council for several weeks, an action which is the best proof of the concern and the efforts of this body in connexion with the uncertain fate of a small nation in the eastern Mediterranean.

153. While it is true that the United Nations had been dealing with the stormy events which had shaken Cyprus even before that country attained its independence, we must point out that there was a comparatively long period when it was possible to lessen the conflict between the two communities which inhabit the island. Regrettably, that period was interrupted as a result of the **events** which took place beginning in July 1974, and since then my delegation has devoted considerable attention to the tragic events afflicting Cyprus.

154. Our position in the Council has enabled us to make known our points of view, which had always been in accord with the feelings of the people of Costa Rica **and** the conduct observed by their representatives internationally.

155. We have repeatedly affirmed our solidarity with the entire Cypriot people against any attempt to undermine its independence, as well as its sovereignty and territorial integrity. We have been deeply worried about the consequences which the war has brought to thousands of human beings and which have taken the form of loss of life, people being incapacitated as a result of military action, people being uprooted from their homes and land, and the existence of thousands of refugees who are a human problem that has not yet been resolved.

156. But, together with the reaffirmation of the genuine national values of Cyprus and our concern for the **human** suffering of its inhabitants, my **delegation** has charted its **unswerving course** in support of any effort that might be undertaken, in the Security Council, to find constructive solutions, starting from the point of view that any action agreed upon by the Council must respect the sovereignty of the Cypriot people.

157. We have maintained, accordingly, that it is primarily the Cypriot parties themselves which must resolve their differences.

158. **It** is a fact that the treaties whereby independence was achieved for the island involved other Powers as guarantors. And it is also true that one cannot fail to assign some responsibility to two of those Powers—Greece and Turkey—for a major part of the causes which broke the precarious peace on Cyprus in July 1974.

159. My delegation has adhered to all appeals to the effect that foreign interference should not hamper possible arrangements which the international community hopes will be carried out directly and through negotiations by the two communities which inhabit the island. As soon as the events which occurred in July 1974 were placed on record, the Security Council endeavoured to ensure that, together with the cease-fire and the withdrawal of all foreign troops from the island, direct negotiations would be started

between the two **parties** to the conflict so that they themselves might agree on the future status of the country.

160. The resolutions of the Council met with unanimous support in the General Assembly, which endorsed the validity of those procedures in resolution 3212 (XXIX), adopted on 5 November 1974.

161. A break in the talks which were barely getting started, resulted from the unilateral **declaration** which proclaimed the existence of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus on 13 February 1975, and the matter was brought before the Council again on the initiative of one of the parties.

162. Although the Turkish Cypriot side made it clear that its action was not intended to jeopardize the independence, sovereignty or territorial integrity of Cyprus, or to prejudge the final result of future negotiations, the fact is that the debate between the parties, which in no way contributed to calming the situation, has been going on in the Council for the last three weeks.

163. My delegation can fully bear witness to the great efforts made by the Council to find texts that would take the interests of the parties into account. After patient consultations, though it did not satisfy all the aspirations of the parties concerned, it drew up a text the essential aim of which is the intensification of negotiations within a new procedural framework that **will** assign a more active role to the Secretary-General. On this occasion we must **recognize** his profound interest and his strenuous endeavours to find a satisfactory solution to the **Cyprus** question.

164. My delegation fully supported the draft resolution that has now been adopted in the certainty that a new mission of good offices by the **Secretary-General** would lead the Cypriot parties to determine the future of their country in the new framework in which negotiations are to be undertaken. The international community trusts that this new opportunity will remove old rancour and will usher in the dawn of a new Cyprus.

165. Finally, my delegation wishes to express its sincere gratitude for the words of praise of the members of the Council for the participation of Mr. Gonzalo **Facio**, the Minister for External Relations of Costa Rica, during the first week of the meetings of the Council under the presidency of Costa Rica this month. His presence in guiding the debates, as the Minister for External Relations himself said **in** his statement of 5 March [**ibid.**], was in recognition of the paramount importance Costa Rica attaches to the presidency of the Council and particularly to the problem of Cyprus which was being debated then and has today closed with the resolution we have adopted.

166. I also wish to express my gratitude for the kind words which members of the Council have addressed

to me, now that I have the honour of presiding over this important body of the United Nations.

167. Speaking again as PRESIDENT, I call on the representative of Greece.

168. Mr. CARAYANNIS (Greece): The meetings of the Security Council on Cyprus have been particularly difficult and long. They have lasted for more than three weeks, and in their protracted and tiring consultations Council members have been confronted with problems some of which were sensible and logical and others less so.

169. **The** meetings and consultations were presided over by three consecutive Presidents, which in itself is a record. I wish to pay a tribute to all three of them, as well as to the Secretary-General, who from the height of the 38th floor has worked more than anybody else on this subject.

170. We appreciated the perfect objectivity of the representative of China, the human approach and dedication to international duty of the Minister for External Relations of Costa Rica, Mr. **Facio**, and your own patience and **skill**, Mr. President. My Government is especially grateful to your Minister for External Relations for his unusual gesture of coming to New York and presiding personally over our meetings.

171. If, after all that has been said around this table during the last three weeks, I am now to express the opinion of my Government on the resolution just adopted, I shall be very brief and confine myself to saying that we have no **difficulty** whatsoever in accepting everything contained in that resolution. However, we regret what has been left out. In its wisdom, the Council has decided that this much is sufficient for progress and eventual solution of the Cyprus problem. **We** only hope it is right. As far as the Greek Government is concerned, it will do everything in its power to prove the Council right.

172. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): I should like to inform the Council that Mr. **Çelik** has asked to be allowed to make a further statement. In conformity with the Council's decision taken at the 1813th meeting to extend an invitation under rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure to Mr. **Çelik**, I now invite him to take a **place** at the Council table and to make a statement.

173. Mr. **ÇELIK**: Mr. President, I have asked to **be** allowed to speak in order to express the views of the Turkish Cypriot side regarding the resolution just adopted. But before I do so I should like to express **gratitude** to you and to every member of the Security Council, for the Council's arduous efforts and contributions which have culminated in the adoption of the present resolution.

174. Our deep appreciation and gratitude **also go** to Mr. Huang Hua, the representative of the People's Republic of China; and to Mr. **Facio**, the Minister for External Relations of Costa Rica, who preceded you, as President of the Security Council, and **to** the Secretary-General, for their untiring efforts and their invaluable contributions in this regard.

175. I will not elaborate on each and every paragraph of this resolution. The first preambular paragraph makes reference to the so-called Government of Cyprus, which we do not **recognize** and which in fact does not exist. That reference alone makes the resolution unacceptable to us. How can a community which is a party to a conflict in a bi-communal State come here to the Security Council, where the very conflict itself is being discussed, and pretend to be the Government of Cyprus as a whole, and pretend to represent us, the Turkish Cypriot community, which is the second party to the conflict? That is contradictory, it is paradoxical, it is unrealistic, and therefore it is unacceptable.

176. We cannot, then, accept any resolution which refers to the Greek Cypriot administration **as** the Government of Cyprus. Nevertheless I should like to confirm once more that we remain faithful to General Assembly resolution 3212 (XXIX). We also find the basic principles embodied in the present resolution acceptable. In view of that, and out of respect for the Security Council, we are ready and willing to continue negotiations with the Greek Cypriot community under the new procedures that will be mutually agreed upon by the two sides with the good offices of the Secretary-General.

177. In fact, we have never left the negotiating table. Our **main** objective is to create a new constitutional basis for the Republic of **Cyprus** which will bring peace and prosperity to the island.

178. As regards the suggestion that United Nations Headquarters in New York should be the new venue of the talks, I should like to **state** that, for the Turkish Cypriot side, Nicosia **is**, for practical as well as political reasons, the most appropriate venue. But, as all the new procedures and modalities will have to be negotiated and mutually agreed upon by both sides, this question also will be taken up and settled within that framework.

179. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): The next speaker is the representative of Saudi Arabia, whom I invite to take a place at the Council table and to make a statement.

180. Mr. BAROODY (Saudi Arabia): The **Council** is to be applauded for a consensus resolution which is notable for its well-ordered phrases and precise wording, on the one hand, and its noble purposes on the other. But I am **afraid that you** shifted the responsibility for **finding a solution to the Secretary-**

General, who should not have been **solely** burdened, as it looks to me, with the task without your setting up for him the proper machinery for obtaining practical results.

181. Some of you may be thinking that it is unfair on my part to engage in any criticism of your endeavours, which from my humble experience, I must say, may prolong the plight of the people of Cyprus, regardless of their national origin or political persuasions.

182. I do sincerely hope that my remarks will not be misconstrued, but I must be frank with you. After three weeks of intensive deliberations and unflinching consultations, you produced a well-worded document, but one that will not quench the thirst of the people of Cyprus for genuine peace, or allay their fears about future communal eruptions or political conflicts.

183. I am certain that the representatives of members of NATO in the Council tried their **best** to compose the cardinal differences between the parties concerned, no doubt within the framework of the instructions that each of those NATO representatives had received from his Government. But I suspect that those instructions were not well-orchestrated on account of the divergent views of the policy-makers. So you chose the lowest common denominator and worked out a consensus which, in spite of simulated verbal harmony, is, in fact, cacophonous, thereby reflecting the lack of determination on the part of the NATO members to find a drastic solution which would benefit the people of Cyprus.

184. Of course, we do not expect the Council to produce a panacea, but the draft resolution adopted today may be likened to a multi-coloured quilt to which each has contributed his patch; but this cover is so thin as to bring no warmth to the people of Cyprus, who are left in the cold.

185. These are the facts. Why am I excited? I am excited because of the plight of the people. I do not care about our Governments: they come and go—and I have seen them come and go, everywhere. I am concerned about the people, and we should be concerned about the people if we go by the old adage, “The leaders of a people are their servants.”*

186. The small States represented in the Council, finding that they were politely listened to but ignored by those who actually sewed the quilt, had finally to agree to the consensus resolution because they **must** have been persuaded that the **flimsy** quilt was better than no cover whatsoever. These are the facts; shall we fool ourselves?

187. At least the resolution enabled the Council to save face, in that it finally produced a consensus. I who decried the veto have a nostalgia for it nowadays:

at least we knew where we stood when there was a veto. But no one outside the Council, nor inside it for that matter, is fooled—least of all the people of Cyprus and the other parties directly concerned.

188. Should we allow ourselves to drift here in the United Nations, to make ourselves the laughing-stock of the peoples of the world? We must not forget that the peoples of the world are becoming more and more cynical about the Organization. No, we **cannot afford** to let the United Nations drift on the turbulent ocean of conflict and dissent, lest inadvertently or aimlessly it should hit the rocks that will destroy it. That is what happened to the League of Nations, for the simple reason—and the same reason applies today—that its members served their own petty national interests.

189. Is this a homily, a sermon? No, it is a warning. How can we get out of this impasse?

190. Let us admit that the members of **NATO—and** two of the parties concerned in this question are members of NATO—have failed so far to come up with a satisfactory solution, despite the fact that, so far as I know, both Greece and Turkey have been staunch members of that alliance. What is the alternative? The representative of the Soviet Union made a suggestion. I believe that in part it was that the permanent members of the Security Council should try to save the situation. I was not surprised that others did not agree with him. I am talking objectively. This is nothing new. Indeed, as the hackneyed saying goes, most often we agree to disagree.

191. Let us go a little deeper into the situation. Why have the members of NATO failed to compose the differences? Because those who formulate the policies in their respective Governments are like the representatives in the League of Nations—I observed them *ex officio* in the late twenties and thirties: they served their petty national interests without due regard for the interests of the other member States. How can we get out of the difficulty?

192. There are only three months between now and 15 June. Three months of **1975** have already passed, and yet it seems that 1975 began only yesterday. What will the people of Cyprus, whether of Greek or of Turkish origin, think of us? Three months will pass like nothing. Why should you encumber the Secretary-General with this thankless task without, as I have said, establishing the proper machinery or giving him, as we say here, precise terms of reference? You leave the whole thing floating in this draft resolution—and I am talking in technical terms now.

193. Even our colleague and brother from China, Mr. Huang Hua, said that he had no alternative but to agree to this text because it refers to General

Assembly resolution 3212 (XXIX); **and** he said, as the representative of a responsible Government, "Well, if those people in the area cannot solve the problem, how can we solve it by remote control from China?". So you cannot blame, Mr. **Huang** Hua. Nor can you blame Mr. Malik. That does not mean that I blame the others-although they do have a special responsibility, and this is true particularly of the United Kingdom. I am sure that not only Mr. Richard but also his aides have tried, and that our good **friend** Mr. **Scali** and his aides have tried-and we should not leave out the others: the representative of France and the representative of Italy. But the result is zero. Shall we settle for zero after three weeks of deliberations here? I did not go away last weekend; I was watching the members of the Council going in and out, shuttling like a weaver-but weaving nothing, no thread, no cloth.

194. I suppose that all of you want to go to dinner. We are well fed and well dressed here. But the people of Cyprus are suffering. We are representatives of Governments; we are the extensions of the rulers in our respective countries.

195. I believe that we should help the **Secretary-General** by providing him with experts, not the classical-and I am not speaking in musical terms-or antiquated experts in the chancelleries, but experts on **Cyprus** and on the Mediterranean, experts from among the permanent members of the Council who are above politics. Is that possible? Of course it is. When there is a will on the part of our Governments, everything is possible; when there is no will, nothing is possible. Let us ask such experts to look deeply into this question and help the Secretary-General in the task with which you have entrusted him in this paper. That was my first point.

1%. The second point is to try and work out what I might call a "**neutralization** of Cyprus" by a pact signed not only by the parties directly concerned, but also by the major Powers and all the Powers in that area. To make it valid it would have to **be** registered here at the United Nations, so that no one could pull the strings.

197. When, in my first statement, I gave the Council the historical background it was to show how strings have been pulled with regard to Cyprus since 1878, the 'year of the Berlin Congress. The *dramatis personae* have changed, but still somebody is pulling **the** strings. I do not know to what extent the British have been pulling the strings in our modern day. They have responsibilities there and that **is** the reason they are still there, in accordance with the Zurich agreement. But who are pulling the strings now? And who are **watching** those who are pulling the strings so that **they** can perhaps have a couple of strings to pull? I do not want to mention names. What for? It would be embarrassing. They are sitting around here, they are my good friends, despite their ideologies and political persuasions.

198. Can you give the Secretary-General terms of reference so that he may explore the possibility of devising with the experts I mentioned in the first point a plan for neutralizing Cyprus by a pact signed by the major Powers which have had special interests and perhaps still have strategic and other interests in the area? We people of Asia will not be fooled. Cyprus is part of western Asia. You cannot play havoc with our destiny any more. Not we Governments-we do not wield power; we are weak. The people will topple us, all Governments. Who are we? And, since I have been given the right to speak, I must give a warning because it is "irrelevant". I think there was somebody who said-the newspapers published it: "Now, if those certain people in the Middle East"-you know who they are-"do not behave and try to strangle us, we have plans." It is in one of the **magazines—Harper's** magazine. The Governments may not be able to resist, but every interest of that Power will be destroyed by the peoples of Africa and Asia. They will destroy the Governments to boot. And if I am one of the Governments and they destroy me, I will say: "Hosannab, I'll die for the sake of the people."* So, you major Powers, do not play with fire-and Cyprus is part of the "fire".

199. You dismembered the Ottoman Empire during the First World War. Where are your empires now? They are gone. Anyone who may be drunk with power and has no empire, on the same pattern of the old empires, will totter and fall. So, not only for our sake do not think we shall be happy if you empire-builders or empire-worshippers totter and fall-but also because we shall feel sorry for the people of those who wield power; they would pay as stiff a price as we would.

200. For my last point I will go back to the concluding appeal I made to both my Greek and my Turkish brothers. Please, until we do something else here in the United Nations, do not be too rigid. I must congratulate you both on how calmly and dispassionately you have treated this question here in the Council. You have acted like brothers who have a difference. I could never see any hatred in your faces, and that is laudable. That has made me feel that I should say this. So project, please, this good attitude to one another, this good rapport, because you are not each one party but several parties.

201. I hope that with those suggestions-whether they are acted upon or cast by the wayside-three-months from now we shall see peace reign in that island and amity finally triumph between our Greek and Turkish brothers.

202. The **PRESIDENT** (*interpretation from Spanish*): The representative of **Cyprus** has asked to be allowed to speak and I now call on him.

203. Mr. **CLERIDES** (Cyprus): I noted that on the list of speakers there was the name of the represen-

tative of Turkey, who had asked to be allowed to have the last word. When he saw that I had placed my name after his on the **list** of speakers, he withdrew his name—obviously bent on his intention of having the last word. It seems to me that it is a Turkish habit to demand to have the **last** word. But I will accommodate him this time, because to me it is not important who speaks last but who will say what is necessary to save Cyprus.

204. Twenty days ago my delegation and I came before the Security Council anxious about the independence of our country, its territorial integrity, its non-alignment—indeed, **anxious about** its very existence. The representative of Turkey would have us believe that there was no reason for a ‘meeting of the Council, that there was no reason for a resolution; that the arbitrary, unilateral act undertaken by the Turkish side **really** did not alter the situation; and that we should go back to negotiate under the pressure of a Turkish occupation of 40,000 troops, under the pressure of **200,000 destitute** refugees and under the pressure of the **Turkish** will to impose its own solution. For me and my delegation, these long deliberations of the Council have been a time of anxiety because during that time the very existence of my country has been at stake.

205. We believed that the situation was ‘such that certain urgent measures **had to** be taken to protect the existence of Cyprus as an independent State. We regret that despite the fact that we have outlined with clarity the measures which we considered necessary, they have not been adopted by the Security Council. The Security Council, in its wisdom, has adopted measures which are less effective in our opinion. We bow to the wisdom of the Council. We however point out that the Council, in its desire to compromise, to take measures which would offend nobody, may have compromised the very existence of the Republic of Cyprus. We hope and we earnestly **pray** that we may **be** proved wrong.

206. But at the same time we wish emphatically to state that if these measures—taken after your long deliberations and in your attempt to offend **nobody**—prove inadequate, an increased responsibility lies on the shoulders of the Council for what may follow. The destruction of the independence of a non-aligned country will be the entire responsibility of the **Security Council**.

207. At this stage we are willing to follow the consensus which has **been** established here without in any way believing that the measures which have been taken are effective or sufficient to protect the independence of Cyprus. These measures have certain points, which of course we do not overlook. Despite the **effort** of the representative of **Turkey** to establish here that there is no Government of **the Republic of Cyprus**—an effort which, as I **have** explained, was merely **intended** to reduce Cyprus to a State

of two autonomous communities, without an **international** personality, and thus put the seal on the death of the independence of **Cyprus**—**despite** this elaborate effort, it is gratifying to see that **in** the resolution of the Security Council it is clearly stated that there is a **Government** of the **Republic of Cyprus** and that its recognition is maintained **in the Council**.

208. It is equally gratifying to establish the fact that, despite the efforts which have been made to show that there has been no reason for this recourse to the Security Council, it is the unanimous consensus of the Council that resolution 3212 (XXIX), which provided for the withdrawal of foreign forces from the territory of the **Republic** and for the return of the refugees, has not been implemented.

209. It is further gratifying to note that **the Secretary-General** has been given the responsibility, within a fixed time, to report to the Council on what progress is being made or will be made in **the implementation** of resolution 3212 (XXIX). Despite this we still feel anxious about the **security, the independence and the** very existence of our country.

210. We are, however, intending to be **constructive and, in** the spirit of this constructiveness, I declare here, and **declare it officially** that we **will** co-operate with the Secretary-General in **his effort in this new** procedure to give a new impetus, a new momentum, to free negotiations for the solution of the Cyprus problem.

211. We believe that the Secretary-General, **in** the wording of the resolution as drafted and as adopted has now an increased responsibility. He has a **direct** involvement. He has the responsibility of directing and participating in the negotiations, because to **us** it is unthinkable that such direct involvement should be, as some people would have us think, by remote control. We **believe** that his very presence in the **talks**, and his chairmanship of the talks, are the necessary elements which can give a new momentum to the effort on which all of us place so much **importance**, the effort to solve the Cyprus problem, through a freely agreed solution between the **parties**.

212. I have said that I would not speak last. I should have added equally that I would not speak for long, for this indeed has been a very exhaustive deliberation. Despite the results achieved—and I have already stated that so far as the concrete measures are concerned to preserve **the** independence of **Cyprus**, I consider them unsatisfactory—despite all this, I wish to express my sincere thanks to all the members of the Security Council for the attention with which they have listened to the problem of Cyprus, **and** for their many and **long** deliberations. I would **like** also to express my thanks to all those who presided so **ably** over these deliberations.

213. This debate is over, but it is **only, so in so** far as a draft resolution has **been adopted, and I am**

particularly gratified that in the last paragraph the Security Council “*Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter”. I believe that the Security Council should keep the situation in Cyprus under permanent observation. I trust that the Secretary-General will find an equal co-operation in his effort to bring about a solution of the Cyprus problem from the representative of Turkey and from his Government.

214. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): I call on the representative of Turkey.

215. Mr. OLCAY (Turkey): I prefer to be the last speaker so that I can hear the representatives of the two communities before expressing my Government's views. We had heard Mr. Çelik and it was only natural that we should hear Mr. Clerides. I considered it a manifestation of courtesy to yield to the parties. All those familiar with Security Council debates know that it has always been almost impossible for me to have the last word when my counterpart occupying the Cypriot seat was Mr. Rossides. Therefore, I am not personally in the habit of having the last word. I repeat that this is just a matter of courtesy.

216. The Council has now heard how this was received. It has also heard the tone and the style. They reflect the tone and the style of the Greek Cypriots and their leaders and their press. Despite this, we hope to be able to negotiate with them.

217. My intention in asking for the floor was to make certain remarks which are essential from the point of view of my Government's policy regarding the problem of Cyprus. These I have to make, with your permission, Mr. President. But I shall be very brief.

218. Much has been said during these three long weeks on the subject of the “Government of Cyprus”. The Turkish Government's view continues to be that there has been a Government of Cyprus in the past and that no effort should be spared to establish one in future. This is, I understand and I believe, one of the aims of the intercommunal talks.

219. As the resolution stands now with a reference to a Government of Cyprus, it is unacceptable to Turkey, as I had occasion to say previously.

220. My Government views the present resolution of the Security Council as a renewed appeal by the members of this body to the parties concerned to solve the problem of Cyprus in the only logical way, by means of negotiations between the parties. The Turkish side stands ready to discuss with the Secretary-General, who is asked by the Council to undertake a new mission of good offices to facilitate the resumption and progress of the talks by the most appropriate ways and means which would be acceptable to all the parties concerned.

221. During the long debate and the lengthy informal consultations we made our views clear on the modalities that could be considered as the beginning of a successful series of negotiations.

222. May I, with your indulgence, Mr. President, despite the appeal made by the representative of the United Kingdom, draw the Council's attention to the fact that my understanding of the text differs somewhat from the French version where there is a reference to “*nouvelles procédures agréées*” in paragraph 6. Having taken part in all the phases of the negotiations, I think that the Secretary-General's next step should be to see to it that “new procedures are agreed upon”.

223. We also made our views regarding the venue of the talks known to all. Suffice it for me to say at this stage that we maintain these views as well as the views which were repeatedly explained to the Secretary-General himself and the members who drafted the various texts, when there was time enough to consult with us. I need not repeat what whose views are, but I suppose that the representative of the Turkish Federated State of the Republic of Cyprus, Mr. Celik, has indicated what would be the preference of their side, as they are the negotiations. None of us around the table, except for the representative of the Greek Cypriot community, is at this stage.

224. We are ready and willing to submit all our views concerning the other matters referred to in paragraph 6 to the Secretary-General-who, I must say, enjoys the full confidence of the Turkish Government-so that his task of finding an agreed basis for the talks may be facilitated.

225. In conclusion, I should like to express our appreciation to you, Mr. President, and through you to your predecessors, the representative of China and your own Minister for External Relations, as well as to all the representatives of the member countries, who worked so hard and so effectively, with such patience and understanding, to reach an acceptable solution. My country for its part will spare no effort to ensure the achievement of this aim.

226. I should like now to say a few words to my colleague from Mauritania.

[The speaker continued in French.]

227. I would not wish to conclude my statement without reciprocating the friendly sentiments just expressed by the representative of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania. They are inspired by cultural and historical ties to which the visit of President Moktar Ould Daddah last year gave renewed vigour and they are dear to the heart of all Turks.

228. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): I call on the representative of Greece.

229. Mr. CARAYANNIS (Greece): I hate to have the last word over my Turkish colleague, but I must make a comment on what the representative of Turkey said.

230. He told us that he found it better before speaking to wait and hear what the two parties in the dispute would have to say. Well, I have to remind Mr. Olcay that throughout **all** these deliberations he has been the **principal** party in the dispute in so far as he is the representative of a country occupying foreign territory.

231. The **PRESIDENT** (*interpretation from Spanish*): The representative of Turkey has asked to speak again. I **call** on him.

232. Mr. **OLCAY** (Turkey): Much as I hate to have to speak after my colleague from Greece, I should like to say that his qualification about the occupation of Cyprus by a Turkish force compels me to remind the Council that I have always said that there has been a state of permanent occupation of Cyprus for the past **15** years-not ended, as far as I know, even

today-by the forces of the country of my **colleague** across the table.

233. The **PRESIDENT** (*interpretation from Spanish*): I call on the representative of Cyprus.

234. Mr. CLERIDES (Cyprus): Perhaps the dispute between the representative of Turkey **and the** representative of Greece about who is in occupation in Cyprus could be easily solved by the removal of their forces from Cyprus.

235. The **PRESIDENT** (*interpretation from Spanish*): I **call** on the representative of Turkey.

236. Mr. OLCAY (Turkey): May I say that Turkey is **and will** be faithful to the terms of resolution 3212 (XXIX) when all its terms are applied.

The meeting rose at 7.25 p.m.

Notes

¹ See resolution 367 (1975).