

UNITED NATIONS



# SECURITY COUNCIL OFFICIAL RECORDS

THIRTIETH YEAR

**1818**<sup>th</sup> MEETING: 4 MARCH 1975  
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UNITED NATIONS

## 1818th MEETING

Held in New York on- Tuesday; 4 March 1975, at 3 p.m.

**President:** Mr. **Gonzalo J. FACIO** (Costa Rica).

**Present:** The representatives of the following States: **Byelorussian** Soviet Socialist Republic, China, Costa Rica, France, Guyana, Iraq, **Italy**, Japan, Mauritania, Sweden, Union of Soviet **Socialist** Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania and United States of **America**.

### Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/1818)

1. Adoption of the agenda
2. The situation in Cyprus:  
Letter dated 17 February 1975 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/11625)

*The meeting was called to order at 3.45.p.m.*

### Expression of thanks to the retiring President

1. The **PRESIDENT**. (*interpretation from Spanish*): I wish to express the gratitude of the **Security Council** to Mr. **Huang Hua**, the representative of China, for the services he rendered the Organization during the month of February 1975, when he presided over the Council with such competence and skill.

### Adoption of the agenda

*The agenda was adopted.*

The situation in **Cyprus**:  
**Letter dated 17 February 1975 from the Permanent representative of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/11625)**

2. The **PRESIDENT** (*interpretation from Spanish*): In accordance with the decision taken at the 1813th meeting, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite the representatives of Cyprus, Turkey and Greece to participate in the debate without the right to vote.

*At the invitation of the President, Mr. Clerides (Cyprus), Mr. Olcay (Turkey) and Mr. Carayannis (Greece) took places at the Security Council table.*

3. The **PRESIDENT** (*interpretation from Spanish*): In accordance with the decisions taken at the 1815th to 1817th meetings, and with the consent of the Council, I invite the representatives of **Bulgaria**, Saudi Arabia and Romania to take the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber in order to participate in the discussion without the right to vote.

*At the invitation of the President, Mr. Grozev (Bulgaria), Mr. Baroody (Saudi Arabia) and Mr. Datcu (Romania), took the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber.*

4. **Mr. RICHARD** (United Kingdom): Like other speakers before me in this debate, and with no less sincerity, I should like to welcome the five new members of the Security Council to our deliberations. Their Permanent Representatives are all distinguished diplomats with whom my delegation has been privileged to work in other aspects of United Nations affairs. For this reason we are in no doubt that their presence here will make a substantial contribution to our work. I should also like to thank the delegations of the five outgoing members of the Security Council for the talents and the spirit of co-operation which they brought to the Council's affairs.

5. May I also, Mr. President, congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency of the Council. It is, I think, a signal honour to the Council that the Government of Costa Rica should decide that, during Costa Rica's tenure of the presidency, its **Foreign Minister** should exercise that office personally. I am confident that the Council will benefit amply from this decision and that under your wise guidance our deliberations will reach a successful conclusion.

6. I should also like to congratulate the representative of China, who conducted our affairs so skilfully in February, and the representative of the **Byelorussian SSR**, whose conduct of the Council's affairs in January was so skilful that we never had to meet at all.

7. I need not remind Council members of the United Kingdom's long historical association with the island of Cyprus. Many Cypriots live in Britain and many British people live in the island of Cyprus. We know each other well and we in Britain have a concern for the well-being and the prosperity of all the people of Cyprus which derives from this close connection.

Nor need I remind the Council that the Government of the United Kingdom is a guarantor of the Constitution of Cyprus; we are fully conscious of our obligations. It was because of these responsibilities that in the immediate aftermath of the tragic fighting last summer the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth **Affairs** met at Geneva with the Foreign Ministers of Greece and Turkey to agree a joint declaration [S/11398] as a framework for the solution of the island's problems.

8. Because of our responsibilities and because of our concern, the United Kingdom Government warmly welcomed the agreement between the Greek Cypriot community and the Turkish Cypriot community to hold talks under the auspices of the **Secretary-General's** Special Representative. We remain firmly of the view that a lasting settlement to the problem of Cyprus is only likely to be achieved when the Cypriots themselves agree upon the nature of a constitutional settlement. These talks provide the people of Cyprus, of both communities, with this opportunity. We were encouraged also that at these talks the two **communities** were represented by Mr. Clerides and by Mr. Denktag, both highly distinguished and experienced men with the mutual respect for each other needed for the delicate negotiations which the situation on the island demands.

9. It goes without saying that the need for a solution to the Cyprus tragedy is urgent. I need not remind members of the Council of the pathetic plight of those Turkish and Greek Cypriots who lost their homes and livelihoods in the fighting last summer. I need not remind them either that the problem is urgent for economic and political reasons also: the island's economy has been devastated; and, as our own resolutions make clear, there is always the potential threat to peace in the eastern Mediterranean. Moreover, we view with the deepest concern the effect of the situation in Cyprus on relations between Greece and Turkey, two countries that are linked to my own by deep and long-standing ties of friendship and of alliance. If a solution is to be reached, it is, **in** the view of the United Kingdom Government, of the utmost importance that the talks should be allowed to proceed undisturbed by any unilateral action which could frustrate the search for a peaceful settlement.

10. Now, the Council has met **because** of action by one party to the talks which, whatever interpretation is put upon it, has in fact put those negotiations in jeopardy. We have read with care the text of the resolution of the Council of Ministers and the Legislative Assembly of the autonomous Turkish Cypriot administration adopted on 13 February [S/11624, annex ZZ]. We have noted that this resolution refers to resolute opposition to all attempts against the independence of Cyprus and its partition or union with any other State. We have seen that the declaration also expresses belief in the necessity of the **non-**

aligned status of the Republic of Cyprus and that it reaffirms that the final objective of the Turkish Cypriots is to unite with the Greek Cypriot community within the framework of a biregional federation.

11. But in spite of these words we can only regret the unilateral declaration of a Turkish Federated State of Cyprus. It prejudices the intercommunal talks, since the concept of such a State contains elements which, if the Greek Cypriot side could accept them, would render the intercommunal talks almost superfluous. To that extent, that action represents an attempt to obtain by declaration objectives which, in our view, should properly be the subject of negotiation between the two sides. Moreover, its timing was such that it led to the suspension of the intercommunal talks at the precise moment when, for the **first** time, alternative constitutional plans were on the table and real negotiation could have begun. That is one reason why the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs said in the House of Commons on 14 February that the United Kingdom deplored Mr. **Denktas's** statement.

12. The second reason is that, as my Government has repeatedly said—and it has underlined this view by its support for successive Security Council resolutions—we support the sovereignty, the independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus. The United Kingdom Government condemns all moves which would further divide Cyprus. We regard Mr. **Denktas's** proclamation as likely to have such an effect. We welcome, however, his statement and that of the Turkish Prime Minister emphasizing that the proclamation is not a unilateral declaration of independence on the part of the Turkish Cypriots and that it precludes partition or annexation.

13. The United Kingdom indeed hopes so, for partition would not be in the interests of either community, and a unilateral declaration of independence could have the gravest consequences, not only for the island of Cyprus, but also for the situation in the eastern Mediterranean as a whole. I should like to make it clear that, as far as we are concerned, Mr. **Denktas's** declaration does not alter our attitude towards the legitimate Government of Cyprus, **nor** towards our obligations under the **1960** Treaties. There is only one legitimate Republic of Cyprus, and there is only one Government.

14. In these circumstances, we believe that the Council has a clear and straightforward duty, that is, to deplore any action inconsistent with respect for the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus and to call for the continuation of negotiations between the representatives of the two communities.

15. As far as the latter is concerned, I should like to draw the attention of Council members to the

letter of 19 February addressed to the Secretary-General by the representative of Ireland [S/11629]. This letter contained the text of a statement issued in Dublin on 13 February by the Ministers of the nine member States of the European Economic Community in which they recalled the association agreements between Greece, Turkey and Cyprus with the Community and stated that they continued to regard as highly desirable the search for a negotiated solution by way of consultation between the two communities in Cyprus.

16. On the crucial question of those negotiations between the two communities, may I draw the attention of members of the Council to the special report of the Secretary-General on developments in Cyprus circulated on 18 February [S/11624]. This report records that on 10 February the Greek Cypriot written proposals for the solution of the Cyprus problem were conveyed to Mr. **Denktaş** by the Secretary-General's Special Representative. On 13 February—that is, three days later—Mr. **Denktaş** handed to the Special Representative a note containing a set of principles proposed by the Turkish Cypriot side on the constitutional aspect of the Cyprus problem. These documents appear as annexes I and III to the Secretary-General's report. It is true that they contain a number of proposals which are at first sight mutually incompatible; but there is a good deal of common ground. I have no doubt that these documents can yet provide the basis for fruitful negotiation. My delegation was confirmed in this view when we heard on 20 February both Mr. Clerides and Mr. **Çelik** read out the proposals of their respective communities *in extenso*. Mr. Clerides said that the Greek Cypriot proposals envisaged a substantial area in the north of Cyprus under Turkish Cypriot control. Mr. Celik said that nothing in his side's proposals should be interpreted as being the last word. He added that: "since negotiations are going on, proposals and counter-proposals will be negotiated, and the final settlement will be mutually agreed upon" [1813th meeting, para. 152].

What is needed is surely for both sides to appreciate that, although there are great differences of emphasis between the two sets of proposals, there is nevertheless a good deal of common ground upon which they can build.

17. The Secretary-General's report reminds us that the first meeting on the substance of the Cyprus problem took place as recently as 14 January and the proposals of the two sides to which I have just referred were exchanged only a few days ago. The problems of Cyprus are not easy; they never have been and they probably never will be. But a long-term settlement of the many humanitarian, social and political difficulties of the Republic as a whole can only be found by patient and flexible discussion. **The** talks between the communities concern the

shape of a nation's future structure, one might almost say its very existence.

18. May I address myself directly to the representatives of the parties who are attending these meetings of the Council. My Government believes that it is hardly surprising if progress is **slow**, but we also believe that it would be a tragic mistake to assume too quickly that the talks have become irrevocably deadlocked at any one point. It is true that there are deep divisions between the two sides, divisions that spring from fear and from mistrust, from past history and from remembered injustices. But if the two communities, with all their gifts and traditions, can put past wrongs behind them and think and work for the future, then, despite the differences between them, the proposals that the two sides have put forward may yet prove to be the basis on which a solution will be reached.

19. The Council has now been considering the question of Cyprus since 20 February. Progress has been slow. All of us are aware of the differences between the two sides which make acceptance of a draft resolution hard to achieve. However, as members of the Council know, a number of informal papers containing wording which might form the basis of a possible draft resolution have been circulated. Like Mr. Clerides' and Mr. **Denktaş**' constitutional proposals, these contain many common elements which we believe could form the basis of agreement, in this case agreement on a draft resolution which could have the effect—and this is the aim for which surely all of us round this table are working—of enabling the parties to return to the conference table.

20. In these working papers there is, for example, general recognition of the importance of the Secretary-General's role in the search for a negotiated settlement. We warmly welcome this, for the Secretary-General and his Special Representative have played an important part in this process since 1967. Since last year Mr. **Weckmann-Muñoz** has been instrumental in bringing the intercommunal talks to a position which, as I have already indicated, could in my delegation's view form the basis for real progress. We welcomed the statement by the Secretary-General to the Council on 21 February [1814th meeting], in which he said that he still believed that the talks between Mr. Clerides and Mr. **Denktaş** could provide a basis for progress and that he **recognized** the need for a new and fresh approach to the negotiating process. We think that the exercise of the personal experience, the talents and the prestige of the Secretary-General himself can contribute to this process and, in the words of his statement of 21 February, help to ensure "the creation and maintenance of conditions in which all parties are prepared to agree to participate" [*ibid.*, para. 10]. We believe that he would be prepared to put himself personally at the disposal of the parties to facilitate

the resumption and the progress of the negotiations. For our part, my Government would **warmly** welcome the good offices of the Secretary-General in a new attempt to reach agreement between the parties: a new impetus in which- the Secretary-General himself was directly involved, with the backing of the Security Council behind him. He could count on the **whole-hearted support** of the Government of the United Kingdom.

21. It would not, I think, be appropriate for me to comment on other aspects of the working papers to which I have already referred, since **agreement** has yet to be reached **on** all the elements **which a** draft resolution should contain. But **my** delegation does believe that it should now **be** possible to **agree on** a text which is acceptable both to the Council and to the parties, and I should like to assure the Council that, for my part, I am ready to consider positively the introduction into such a draft of any provisions which would have the effect of enabling the **inter-communal** talks to be restarted on a practical and an effective basis.

22. This has been a long debate; but we should not forget that as time passes here in New York the two communities of Cyprus grow apart, and the prospects for a negotiated settlement decrease. I have already said that the need **for a** solution of the Cyprus tragedy is urgent. I have already: appealed to the parties not to assume that negotiations have become irrevocably deadlocked. I now make the same appeal in respect of our discussions here. In our view; the time has come for the Security Council **to accept** its responsibilities and to assert its view on how the parties can best be **brought** together again. It is time, I think, for the parties to heed this call by the Security Council and to **recognize** that in the view of the international community it is in this way that the **settlement** of the Cyprus problem will be achieved. I do not underestimate what **we are** asking of them; It demands remarkable qualities of statesmanship and generosity, but unless these talks are restarted and unless they are given a fresh impetus; I confess that for my part I see no easy, or indeed early, resolution of the problems of Cyprus.

23. Mr. **TCHERNOUCHTENKO** (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) (**interpretation from Russian**): I should like, first, to express my satisfaction that the Security Council's discussion of the Cyprus question is continuing under the leadership of a Costa Rican statesman who occupies the **important post of** Minister for Foreign Relations. **As everyone** is well aware, persistent efforts are now under way to produce a decision in the **interests** of the people of Cyprus, a decision consistent with **the** task of finding a lasting and just settlement of the Cyprus problem. **Our** delegation would like to wish **you, Mr. President,** success in that work.

24. Since this is the first time this year that the delegation of the Byelotussian SSR has spoken at an

**official** meeting of the Council, we should like to congratulate **the** new members **of** the Council--the representatives of Guyana, Italy, Japon, Sweden and the United Republic of Tanzania--on **their participation** in the work of this major organ of the United Nations, which bears the primary responsibility for the maintenance -of international peace and security.

25. The enhanced role and influence of the non-aligned States in the solution of complex international problems ' and their positive actions within the framework of the United Nations in the interests of just and lasting peace, that appear **inter alia, in the** results of the twenty-ninth session of the General **Assembly**, all give us **grounds for** believing that Mr. Salim and Mr. **Jackson**, the representatives of the United Republic of Tanzania and Guyana, two countries which are taking an active part in the **non-aligned** movement, will make an important contribution to the work of the Council.

26. Our delegation would also like to express its satisfaction at the fact that the experienced representatives of Italy, Japan and Sweden-Mr. **Plaja**, Mr. Saito and Mr. Rydbeck-are now taking part in the work of the Council and to wish them success in their work on behalf of universal peace and international **security** and in **the** pursuance of the lofty goals and **noble** principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

27. The Byelorussian delegation would also like to express its good wishes and gratitude to the delegations- of Australia, Austria, Indonesia, Kenya and Peru for their efforts over two years to enable the Security Council to discharge its lofty duties with regard to the strengthening of peace and international security.

28. More than six months have elapsed since, as a result of outside intervention in the internal- affairs of Cyprus, the peaceful life of the people of the Republic of Cyprus 'was disrupted. However, the situation in Cyprus during this period has not returned to normal; by the recent separatist action of the leadership ' of the Turkish community it has been rendered even more tense and dangerous for the fate of the Republic of Cyprus. As we know, ' that was the result of steps taken by the leadership of the Turkish community to create a separate state structure in the northern part of the territory of Cyprus occupied by Turkish forces.

29. In actual fact, those steps were designed to make permanent a state of affairs which arose as a result of armed intervention from outside in the affairs **of** the Republic of Cyprus. A new blow was dealt to the sovereign Republic of Cyprus, a Member of the United Nations and an active participant in the non-aligned movement. Contrary to the interests of the people of Cyprus, a new attempt has been made to partition the island; the internal Cyprus talks between

representatives of the two **communities, which** gave certain grounds for hope for a **solution** to the Cyprus problem by peaceful means, were dealt a serious blow, and we cannot disregard that fact.

30. In this regard we **must** stress that **all** these actions are in flagrant violation of well-known decisions of the Security Council and the General Assembly on the Cyprus question. They are **contrary** to decisions which express support for the **lawfully** elected Government of Cyprus, decisions designed to ensure the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus, decisions which provide for the immediate withdrawal of foreign troops and the provisions of opportunities **for** the Cypriots themselves to settle the question of the internal structure of Cyprus. These provisions; which are contained, *inter alia*, in General Assembly **resolution 3212 (XXIX)** of 1 November 1974, received the favourable votes of **all** Member States of the United Nations, including Cyprus, Greece and Turkey. Furthermore, on 13 December 1974 that resolution was endorsed by the Security Council [**resolution 365 (1974)**], thus receiving new binding force; The Security Council called upon the interested parties to implement it as soon as possible.

31. In another decision-resolution 364 (1974)—the Security Council urged

“the parties concerned to act with **the** utmost restraint and to continue and accelerate determined co-operative efforts to achieve the objectives of the Security Council”.

But, **in fact**, certain circles, interested not in a peaceful and just settlement of the Cyprus problem but rather in the attainment of other goals, have acted contrary to the provisions of these decisions of the United Nations which were quite rightly viewed and continue to be viewed as a basis for a apolitical settlement.

32. The Soviet Union, at the beginning of the **discussion** of the situation in Cyprus in the Security Council, in July and August 1974, put **forward** proposals for the convening of an international conference [**S/11465**] on Cyprus and the dispatch of a Security Council mission [**S/11391**]. By that time, after the failure of the Geneva talks, it had become perfectly clear that the system of guarantees imposed upon **Cyprus** by the Zurich and London agreements of 1959 was not working, and a situation had arisen which called for a radically new, just and democratic approach. In the view of the Byelorussian delegation, the Soviet proposals are just as timely today because they indicate a just and constructive approach to a solution of the Cyprus **problem**. An international conference on **Cyprus** could provide new opportunities for a settlement of the Cyprus problem in the interests of the whole Cypriot people and in the interests of peace and security in the eastern Mediterranean. If

the Security Council were to send a special mission to Cyprus, it would have a favourable impact on the situation in and around Cyprus; it would enhance the role of the Council in maintaining the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of a non-aligned Member State of the United Nations, the Republic of Cyprus.

33. The Byelorussian delegation endorses the view of other delegations whose representatives have **spoken** in the Security Council that the situation in Cyprus has deteriorated and is now extremely dangerous for peace in the eastern Mediterranean. In this regard, **we** think it would be appropriate to **refer** to the views expressed by the Secretary-General, Mr. Kurt Waldheim. In his statement to the Security Council on 21 February 1975 he said:

“In the first place, I wish to **emphasize** the great seriousness of the risk to peace and security in the eastern Mediterranean which the Cyprus situation represents.” [**1814th meeting, par-a. 7**].

Our delegation **entirely** agrees with the assessment of the latest events in and around Cyprus made in the TASS communication of 16 February 1975 [**S/11627**], and also shares the views expressed by the majority of the members of the Security Council who have spoken, as well as the representatives of other States who have taken part in the discussion of this matter in recent days.

34. We **must** see that certain forces which oppose the easing of international tension and the strengthening of peace and international co-operation have deliberately been creating a situation of tension and uncertainty in Cyprus. They are attempting to exploit for their **own** selfish interests **any** exacerbation of the situation.

35. There are continual attempts on the part of certain circles in the North Atlantic Treaty **Organization** to put into effect their far-reaching plans and to bring Cyprus within the orbit of their own ambitions, which run counter to the maintenance of the Republic of **Cyprus** as a non-aligned State. This is a very dangerous trend for the cause of peace and international security, because all this is occurring in an area which is near the Middle East, where the situation is even more complicated and explosive.

36. The Byelorussian delegation has already expressed, and wishes once again to express, its concern at the difficult economic situation which has arisen in Cyprus. Serious damage has been done to the country's economy. Normal living conditions have been disrupted for all sectors of the population, Greek and Turkish alike, and the problem of refugees is extremely serious and difficult. The provision of General Assembly resolution 3212 (XXIX) which states that **all** the refugees should return to their homes

in conditions of security has also not been implemented.

37. We cannot fail to see that the proclamation of the northern areas of Cyprus-which possess the principal economic resources-as a separate federated Turkish State of the Republic of Cyprus makes even more complicated an already **difficult** economic situation in the country and increases the **sufferings** of the population. We in the Byelorussian SSR who suffered through the years of the Second World War the indescribable tragedy of the total destruction of the national economy, a tragedy in which **practically** the whole population was without a roof or a home, are profoundly moved by the situation which now prevails in Cyprus and **affects** both communities. The sympathies of our delegation are with the people of Cyprus. What we want is for measures to be taken which will put an end to the endlessly protracted crisis in Cyprus, which is doing so much harm to the normal foundations of life in that country.

38. The Byelorussian delegation wishes to express its serious concern at the unilateral actions which threaten the prospects for the intercommunal talks on Cyprus, engender new elements of hostility and separateness, and create additional complications and barriers to a just settlement, which so many speakers have already mentioned here in the Council.

39. The **Byelorussian** delegation opposes any actions which might lead to the partition of Cyprus, whatever their shape or form. We consistently and firmly favour and support the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus, and we oppose the partition of the island. We are against **enosis** or **so-called** double **enosis**.

40. The discussion has shown that almost all members of the Security Council share this view. It is important that four permanent members of the Council share this view too: the USSR, the United States of America, France and the United Kingdom. This emerges clearly from the joint bilateral communiques and statements of these countries, as has already been mentioned in the Council, and also **from** the statements of their representatives here in the Council. Greece and Turkey hold similar views. All this, in our view, should promote the search for solutions in the interests of a just and lasting settlement.

41. As to a possible positive solution by the Security Council resulting from a discussion of the Cyprus question, the delegation of the Byelorussian SSR, like other delegations, attaches the greatest possible importance to that. In the view of our delegation, a solution by the Security Council **should** be designed to bring about immediate and full compliance with earlier resolutions adopted by the Security Council and the General Assembly on Cyprus. We must provide for strict compliance with the observance of the

sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of **Cyprus** and the inadmissibility of any actions leading to a partition of Cyprus.

42. The resolution should squarely and unambiguously state support for the lawfully elected **Government** of the Republic of Cyprus. The Security Council should take new steps to call a halt to all foreign intervention in the **affairs** of the State of Cyprus, and they should be designed to bring about the withdrawal of all armed forces and foreign military personnel from Cyprus. If the Council really wants to make a new contribution to the settlement of the **Cyprus** problem, it must come out categorically in favour of a new approach and express the wish that the Cyprus question should be considered in a broad international forum within the framework of the United Nations.

43. The Byelorussian delegation is firmly convinced that, in the settlement of the Cyprus problem, an important role could be played by the initiative of the non-aligned countries, which could take positive action. All the necessary conditions must be created for the Cypriots-the Greek and Turkish communities-to resolve their own internal **affairs** without **foreign** intervention, taking into account the interests of both communities and the need for preserving peace and security in this area.

44. In conclusion, I should like to thank **all** the members of the Council who, at previous recent meetings, have addressed warm words to me as the representative of the Byelorussian SSR, which occupied the presidency of the Council in January of this year.

45. For us Soviet people, 1975 is a special year. It is the year of the thirtieth anniversary of the victory of the Soviet people in the great patriotic war of 1941-1945. That was a period of terrible suffering-the **worst** suffering ever experienced by our country. In that war there was at stake not only the fate of the Soviet people but the future of world **civilization**, progress and democracy. At the cost of millions upon millions of lives, the Soviet people defended their freedom and made a decisive contribution to the victory over fascism and saved the world from the deadly danger of this **terrible** plague. We should also properly point out the great contribution made to this victory by the peoples and arms of the anti-Hitler coalition.

46. In that war it was the Byelorussian people which suffered worst as compared with all the other nations of Europe. Every fourth inhabitant of the Republic perished. Towns and villages lay in **ruins**. The economy of Byelorussia was set back by almost 30 years. By its unparalleled heroism and selfless and dedicated struggle against fascism, **along** with the other peoples of the Soviet Union, the Byelorussian people earned the respect of many countries and peoples. And, as President of the Security Council in January of

this year, having heard so many words of gratitude addressed to me and so many expressions of friendship, I would first of all like to take them as being directed to the **Byelorussian SSR** and to the **Byelorussian** people, whose contribution to the victory over fascism and whose active struggle in the United Nations for peace and international co-operation have won broad international recognition.

47. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): The next speaker is the representative of Cyprus, on whom I now call.

48. Mr. CLERIDES (Cyprus): Mr. President, on behalf of my delegation and on my own behalf I should like to welcome your presence here, that of the distinguished Minister for Foreign Relations of the Republic of Costa Rica, and to wish you success in the duties you have now assumed as President of the Security Council.

49. I have asked to speak in order to reply, to some extent, to certain allegations and contentions made by the representative of Turkey in his last statement to the Security Council on 27 February 1975 [*1817th meeting*].

50. In his address to the Council the representative of Turkey, following the method of sidetracking from the main issues, attempted to set the clock back by 11 years and tried to establish that responsibility for what is happening today in Cyprus lies totally with the Greek Cypriots and with Greece.

51. One could easily remind the representative of Turkey that such attempts have been made in the past **during** repeated debates before the Council and the General Assembly and that accusations of bad intentions, insincerity, ulterior motives, bad faith and so on have been made by both sides. Nevertheless, this state of affairs has not led to the solution of the Cyprus problem, but **only** to greater confusion.

52. It is for this reason, and not because of lack-of proven facts, that in my opening address on 20 February [*1813th meeting*] I stated frankly that mistakes had been committed in the past by both sides and then proceeded to establish at once that, in view of the rapidly deteriorating situation in Cyprus, it was **necessary to** consider what measures were urgently needed in order to save the situation.

53. In my opening address to the Council I established the following facts.

54. Fact 1: on 1 November 1974 the General Assembly unanimously adopted resolution 3212 (XXIX), which Turkey also supported, calling for respect for the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-alignment of the Republic of Cyprus; as well as for the speedy withdrawal of foreign armed forces from the territory of the Republic, the

return of the refugees to their homes in safety and talks between the representatives of the two communities for the purpose of finding a political solution to the Cyprus problem.

55. Fact 2: between 1 November 1974, when resolution 3212 (XXIX) was adopted, and 20 February 1975, when I addressed the Security Council, almost four months elapsed without Turkey implementing or showing any intention of implementing resolution 3212 (XXIX) by withdrawing its forces from the territory of the Republic, by allowing the refugees to return to their homes or by releasing from its military occupation 40 per cent of the territory of the Republic. In this way Turkey showed utter disregard for the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-alignment of the Republic and for General Assembly resolution 3212 (XXIX).

56. Fact 3: the intercommunal talks on the substance of the problem, which commenced on 19 December 1974, made no progress at all because the Turkish side deliberately and repeatedly refused to discuss items on the agenda pertaining to the substance of the problem.

57. Fact 4: on 13 February 1975 the Turkish side, by a unilateral, arbitrary act, proclaimed, with the approval of Turkey, a separate Turkish State in that part of the territory of the Republic which is under Turkish occupation.

58. On the basis of those four facts, which are the substance of this recourse to the Security Council, I invited the representative of Turkey to join issue. It is pertinent, therefore, to examine what his position is.

59. The representative of Turkey, in his attempt to avoid replying on the issues I raised-probably because he had no reply to give-stated: "I should like to adhere to the policy of my delegation of answering only representatives of Governments whose legitimacy we recognize" [*1814th meeting, para. 68*].

He thus implied that he was inhibited from replying to the points I raised by virtue of the fact that his Government did not recognize the Government of the Republic of Cyprus despite its universal recognition by the United Nations and by all the Member States of the Organization except Turkey. Immediately, in order to facilitate his replying, and in my desire to have a constructive debate on the points I raised, I invited him to ignore my capacity of representative of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus and to treat me as an ordinary individual.

60. With the representative of Turkey thus freed from his inhibition, we heard after some delay and, I must confess, with amazement, his reply.

61. The representative of Turkey disputed the need to have a Security Council meeting. He stated:

“this is one of the rare meetings or probably the first meeting of the Security Council held to consider the question of Cyprus without an emergency situation, without a crisis and . . . without, as far as we are concerned, a sound and solid reason.

“We are here as a result of an attempt on the part of those who see fit, in spite of clearly serious consequences, to create confusion and crisis.” [1817th meeting, paras. 35 and 36.]

62. One need not have judged the representative of Turkey harshly if what he stated **constituted** an error of judgement with regard to the seriousness of the present situation in Cyprus. Mistakes are human and forgivable, but **the** representative of Turkey went further and alleged that, not only was there no crisis in Cyprus, but that calling the Security Council was an attempt by the Government of Cyprus to create confusion and an **artificial** crisis.

63. In order to establish his allegation that there was neither a need for a Security Council meeting nor for any action to be taken with regard to Cyprus, the representative of Turkey, in a feeble attempt to persuade the Security Council that the Government of the **Republic** of Cyprus had staged the whole show, purported to give in chronological order a number of alleged events from which, in his opinion, the bad intentions of the Government of Cyprus could be inferred.

64. I could examine here with members one by one the alleged facts which the representative of Turkey enumerated and easily establish that neither a single one of them taken separately, nor all of them taken collectively, establish any evidence of bad intentions to create an artificial crisis in order to bring the matter before the Council. **The** only deduction that can be reasonably drawn is that the representative of Turkey has an unusually suspicious mind. Fortunately, however, I need not unnecessarily waste the time of the Council by such an elaborate and detailed analysis of the alleged facts paraded and wrongly interpreted by the representative of Turkey. Instead, I can quote authoritative views expressed here in the Council by representatives which repudiate the contentions of the representative of Turkey and stress that indeed there is a grave and disturbing situation and a crisis in Cyprus, that there is an emergency and that there is a very sound and solid reason for the Council to meet.

65. The Secretary-General, **who returned** on 20 February from a visit to the area, stated:

“In the first **place**, I wish to **emphasize** the great seriousness of the risk to peace **and** security **in** the eastern Mediterranean which the Cyprus situation represents as long as no progress is made in resolving it along the lines . . . endorsed by the

Security Council in its resolution 365 (1974). **The** suffering of the people of Cyprus can **only** increase the gravity of this situation. It is the duty of the Council, therefore, as well as of the parties directly concerned, to exert all possible efforts to ensure that real and timely progress is made towards a lasting settlement.” [1814th meeting, para. 7.]

66. The **representative** of France, on 24 February, having **referred** to the non-implementation of **resolution** 3212 (XXIX), stressed that, contrary to that resolution, foreign armed forces were still on the territory of the Republic of Cyprus, that refugees had been unable to return to their homes and that, by a unilateral decision of one of the parties, a serious obstacle had been created in finding a solution to the problem. The representative of France went on to describe the situation in the following words:

“We note that ‘the suffering has not diminished and that the crisis goes on, threatening the peace and security not only of the island but also of that particularly sensitive region, the eastern Mediterranean.’ [1815th meeting, para. 49.]

67. The representative of Bulgaria, the same day, after referring to the unilateral act of the Turkish side to establish a separate state in Cyprus, said:

“These actions are without any doubt a **direct** infringement of . . . General Assembly resolution 3212 (XXIX) and Security Council **resolution** 365 (1974).

“The gravity of the situation which has recently arisen should not and cannot be underestimated. This problem is not only of local significance, it is also of the utmost fundamental importance, since it directly affects the very foundations of the Organization. We have here a direct threat to eliminate a non-aligned sovereign and independent State Member- of the United Nations.” [Ibid., paras. 125 and 126.]

68. The representative of Romania, on 27 February, after referring to the non-implementation of resolution 3212 (XXIX), stated:

“Today, four months later, we note with **regret** that resolution 3212 (XXIX) has not been respected or applied. What is worse, the leaders of the Turkish Cypriot community have decided to proclaim the northern part of the island an autonomous and federated State, a measure which is in **contradiction** with the resolutions of the General Assembly and of the Security Council. This decision has complicated the situation in Cyprus even further.\*” [1817th meeting, para 115.]

69. The representative of the Soviet Union, ‘on 20 February, after referring to the unilateral actions taken by the Turkish side, stated:

“The delegation of the USSR wishes to express its serious concern over the unilateral actions I have mentioned, which have been taken by the leadership of the Turkish community in Cyprus. It is quite clear that such actions threaten the prospects for the achievement of agreement in the intercommunal talks. The steps taken by the leadership of the Turkish community in **Cyprus** will inevitably lead to a separation of the **Cyprus** communities from each other and to their estrangement. Those steps, which will lead to the *de facto* partition of the **Cyprus** State, are in direct contravention of the **decisions** of the Security Council and the General Assembly.” [1813th meeting, para. 182.1

70. I could go on reading extracts from the addresses of representatives which establish beyond doubt that there has been no implementation by Turkey of General Assembly resolution 3212 (XXIX), that there has been no progress in the intercommunal talks and that the Turkish side, by an arbitrary, unilateral act, has created faits **accomplis** acting contrary to and in violation of resolution 3212 (XXIX).

71. Despite the fact that Turkey has not complied with resolution 3212 (XXIX), that it has not withdrawn its forces **from** the territory of the Republic, that it **has** not allowed the refugees to return to their homes, and that no progress has been made in the talks in Cyprus, and despite the fact that the Turkish side on 13 February arbitrarily and unilaterally proclaimed a separate state in Cyprus, destroying thus the free negotiating process for a solution to the **Cyprus** problem-realities which have not only been established by my address to the Security Council but also by the addresses of so many representatives-the representative of Turkey- tells us that there is no sound and solid reason for convening the Council and that we are here as a result of a staged plan prepared by the Government of the Republic of **Cyprus** in order to confuse us all and to create an artificial crisis.

72. The Government of the Republic of **Cyprus** has no reason to create confusion in what is a **crystal-clear** case both of non-compliance by Turkey with General Assembly resolution 3212 (XXIX) and also of taking actions contrary to it.

73. I think it a much simpler course for the representative of Turkey to have taken would have been to admit frankly that Turkey has not complied with resolution 3212 (XXIX), instead of protesting and professing to establish that the whole issue before us is nothing more than a hoax played on the Council by the Government of the Republic of Cyprus;- Had Turkey intended to comply with the resolution, the representative of Turkey could have been constructive by elaborating on the fact that Turkey intends to withdraw its forces and, having regard to the fact that resolution 3212 (XXIX) urges the speedy with-

**drawal** of foreign forces, he could perhaps have enlightened us as to what period of time constitutes, in the opinion of the Turkish Government, a speedy withdrawal of the Turkish forces of occupation from the Republic of Cyprus. He could have further indicated what urgent measures the Turkish side proposes to take in order to permit the 200,000 Greek Cypriot refugees, under conditions of safety, to return to their homes in the area of the Republic from which they have been forcibly expelled by the Turkish forces of occupation.

74. In his statement the representative of Turkey attempted a second method of trying to confuse the real issues and to sidetrack them. He alleged that the Greek Cypriot side is responsible for what is happening today in Cyprus, and in order to support his theory, he alleged, *inter alia*, the following: first, that the leaders **of the** Greek Cypriot side were opposed to the independence of Cyprus and were not sincere when they spoke of their desire for an independent and non-aligned State, and that their real intention was to destroy the independence of Cyprus in order to achieve *enosis*; secondly, that by a coup in December **1963** the Greek Cypriot side ousted the Turkish members of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus and the Turkish members of the House of Representatives; thirdly, that the Greek Cypriot leaders had forced **the** Turkish Cypriots to live in armed enclaves in order to protect their lives and properties; fourthly, that the Greek Cypriot leaders planned the economic subjugation of the Turkish Cypriots; **fifthly**, that on 15 July 1974, by a military *coup* by Greek officers of the military junta which temporarily ousted the Government of Archbishop Makarios, an attempt was made to bring about *enosis*.

75. In order to establish his **first** point-that the Greek Cypriots are opposed to independence **and** are working for its destruction-the representative of Turkey quoted out of context certain statements of President Makarios made to the press, to the effect that he preferred *enosis* to independence. In answering the representative of Turkey and Mr. **Çelik**, I maintained that the Turkish Cypriots were opposed to independence and non-alignment and that they were always, prior to and after independence, **in** favour of the partition and double annexation of Cyprus, and I quoted statements by Turkish leaders from which their preference for and their commitment to partition could be clearly established. In fact, on the first of March the leading Turkish newspaper in **Cyprus**, *Halkın Sesi*, explained the position of the Turkish Cypriot side very clearly, as follows:

“We put forward the demand for a federal State based on geographical separation because, as it appears, Turkey does not consider a **complete** political integration advisable under the present international situation. The total political integration

with the motherland implies the return of **Cyprus** to its real owner and its coming under Turkish sovereignty. This is our final aim. However, since we have no plan at present to **realize** our **final** aim, we must **realize** integration in other fields. We must achieve integration up to the stage before the final integration. Without economic integration, there can be no political integration.\*

It must not be overlooked that the newspaper *Halkin Sesi*, which contained that article, is owned by and expresses the political views of Mr. **Küçük**, the **ex**-Vice-President of the Republic.

76. The representative of Turkey and Mr. Celik contend that it was the Greek Cypriot side that, in a coup in **1963**, ousted the Turkish ministers from the Government and the Turkish members from Parliament. We contend that it was the Vice-President and the Turkish ministers who deliberately left the Government-and the same applies to the Turkish members of the House of Representatives-after some intercommunal friction and violence, in order to create the necessary pre-conditions for a *de facto* separation that would lead to the partition of the island.

77. The representative of Turkey and Mr. Celik contend that after the intercommunal violence in December **1963** the Greek Cypriot side forced the Turkish Cypriots to take refuge in armed enclaves for their safety. We contend that the Turkish Cypriots did form enclaves and remained confined within them in order to create separate areas and to establish the basis of a separate Turkish geographical region in preparation for the partition of the island. In support of that, we point out that in 1964, shortly after the intercommunal violence incurred in December 1963, the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in **Cyprus (UNFICYP)** was established, that the Turkish Cypriots had complete freedom of movement in all territory of the Republic under Government control, which they freely exercised without fear or any danger to their life and property, while at the same time the Turkish leadership prevented Greek Cypriots from entering or travelling through areas under its control. In his reports to the Security Council the Secretary-General has repeatedly deplored those measures of the Turkish leadership, which he describes as contrary to the efforts being made to return to normality.

78. The representative of Turkey and Mr. Celik alleged that the Greek Cypriot side planned the economic subjugation of the Turkish Cypriots. We contend that the economic plight of the Turkish Cypriots was the result of their policy of **self**-segregation and self-enclavement in armed enclaves for the purpose of preparing the ground for the partitioning of Cyprus.

79. I could cite innumerable extracts from the Secretary-General's reports to the Security Council.

I shall, however, confine myself to only two extracts, taken at random. The first is from the **Secretary-General's** report of 11 June 1968:

"Moreover, despite the Government's **normalization** measures and their beneficial effects on the Turkish Cypriot population, their leadership has not yet found it possible to respond with measures of its own so as to further a steady movement towards normality.\*\* [S/8622, *para. 95.*]

The second extract is from the Secretary-General's report of 3 June 1969:

"On the other hand, some major anomalies persist, including the policy of the Turkish Cypriot leadership-instituted at the time of the disturbances of **1963-1964—of** denying to Greek Cypriot civilians access to a number of public roads. I express again the hope that this policy may now be reconsidered, particularly in view of the fact that Turkish Cypriots have for more than a year enjoyed full freedom of movement over the whole island ..." [S/9233, *para. 79.*]

80. The representative of Turkey and Mr. Celik accuse the Greek Cypriot side of bad faith and of a desire to destroy the independence of **Cyprus** because Greek officers belonging to the ousted military dictatorship of Greece, aided by some Greek Cypriots belonging to EOKA-B, by an unlawful military coup temporarily forced out of **office** the Government of Archbishop Makarios in an attempt, the representative of Turkey alleges, to bring about *enosis*.

81. They forget that the Government of Cyprus **called** at once for an urgent meeting of the Security Council and sought to protect the independence of Cyprus. The representative of Turkey and Mr. Celik, who in this Council stated that the Turkish forces were not aggressors because they had been invited to **Cyprus** by the Turkish community, overlook the fact that the Turkish forces, using the military *coup* as a pretext, landed in Cyprus, not for the purpose of defending the independence of Cyprus and restoring the 1960 Constitution, as provided by the Treaty of Guarantee, but for the purpose of occupying a large part of the island and imposing the "**Attila Plan**", which had been conceived in Turkey many years before the *coup*.

82. Are the assertions of the Turkish side and the counter-assertions of the Greek-Cypriot side of any relevance to the present issues? If they are not relevant, why did the representative of Turkey and Mr. Celik raise them, instead of joining issue on whether resolution 3212 (**XXIX**) had been implemented or not?

83. In my opinion, all these allegations and **counter**-allegations have no bearing on what the Security Council has been called on to consider. Moreover, they do not constitute anything new, because the

same allegations have been made with increasing monotony at every Council meeting except the formal ones for extending the mandate of **UNFICYP**. Moreover, I frankly stated at the beginning of my opening address on 20 February [1813th meeting] that mistakes had been committed by both sides, and as a result the representative of Turkey later grudgingly admitted that there had *been* mistakes but he said that Turkey and the Turkish side were not the first to make them.

84. If Turkey or the Turkish side is really interested in establishing who is responsible for the Cyprus situation, or if they are interested in apportioning blame, why do they oppose so vigorously, obstinately and with such absolutism proposals made by representatives for a United Nations fact-finding commission to visit Cyprus, to make its findings and to report to the Security Council, establishing thus, once and for all, the facts?

85. Why, in replying to a simple question, which is whether General Assembly resolution 3212 (XXIX) has been implemented, or whether Turkey has any intention of implementing it, is it necessary, instead of replying openly and directly to it, first to adopt the position that there was no need for a Council meeting to examine these issues, and then to resort to the past, making assertions which have been made time and time again and which were well known to all members of the Assembly on 1 November when they were voting in favour of resolution 3212 (XXIX), and more particularly to the representatives of the interested parties, who also cast their votes in favour of that resolution?

86. The representative of Turkey, in a further effort to confuse what is a simple issue, raised the question and challenged the constitutionality of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus. I do not propose to turn the Security Council into a constitutional court and argue the issue before it. It is **sufficient** to point out that the Government of the Republic of Cyprus, under its President Makarios, is recognized universally by all States Members of the United Nations except Turkey, and that all the representatives who spoke before the Council reiterated this fact. All I propose to do in this **connexion** is to point out that, while the representative of Turkey raised this issue and alleged that the Government of Cyprus was unconstitutional, he criticized other representatives who stated that they recognized the Government of the Republic, and described such statements as an interference in the internal affairs of Cyprus. For the sake of complete accuracy, I quote here his own words:

“There have been several statements indicating the preference that the speakers’ countries had with regard to which is the legitimate Government in Cyprus now; sometimes they went so far as to name its head. My country’s description of interference in the internal affairs of others would

cover such statements. We consider that it is not for anyone except those who live in the country to decide which is the Government of that country, and that is especially true when it comes to naming names. But everyone has the liberty of deciding on his own action and his *own* conception of what is or is not intervention in the internal affairs of others.” [1817th meeting, para. 91.]

87. I agree fully with the statement of the representative of Turkey that it is not for anyone except those who live in the country to decide which is the Government of that country. All I wish to point out is that he first broke this wise rule by alleging that the Government of the Republic of Cyprus was not a constitutional one, and that because of this he could not recognize me as representing a **Government** which his country did not recognize; but when he failed to convince anyone and other representatives made their positions clear regarding the recognition of the Cyprus Government, he remembered the correct rule at the wrong time, namely the rule that the question whether a Government is a constitutional one or not is an internal affair of the country concerned.

88. There is a further very serious matter which has brought us here before the Security Council, and that is the arbitrary and unilateral act taken on 13 February by the Turkish side to declare a separate Turkish State in Cyprus. This action of the Turkish side has been criticized by the representatives who have so far addressed the Council. Some of them have **characterized** it as an act contrary to Assembly resolution 3212 (XXIX). Let us examine what is the attitude of the representative of Turkey on this issue. I quote his own words:

“The proclamation of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus contains nothing that goes against the principles set out in the resolutions of the United Nations.\*” [Ibid., par. 76.]

I propose to search diligently, and with a magnifying glass, in order to find whether there is even a grain of truth in the statement of the representative of Turkey.

89. In paragraph 4 of resolution 3212 (XXIX) the General Assembly states that it:

“**Commends** the contacts and negotiations taking place on an equal footing, with the good **offices** of the Secretary-General, between the representatives of the two communities, and calls for their continuation with a view to reaching freely a mutually **acceptable** political settlement, based on their fundamental and legitimate rights”.

90. Does the unilateral and arbitrary creation of faits **accomplis** by one of the parties during the process of negotiations, prejudging thus the issue of the

negotiations, constitute a proper negotiation to arrive freely at a mutually acceptable solution, as provided by paragraph 4 of resolution 3212 (XXIX)?-

91. That this was the true intention of the Turkish side can be established by the following statement of the representative of Turkey:

“For **the** Turkish side, **and by that** I mean Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots, there are two principles on which a compromise is out of the question. Those two principles are, first, that Cyprus should be a biregional and bicomunal federation and, secondly, that the existing guarantees, as set forth by the international agreements; should prevail. The rest are matters which are negotiable . . .”  
[1817th meeting, para. 78].

92. The Turkish side was perfectly free to have its views on the nature of the solution of the Cyprus problem. It could have come to the negotiations and put its views for discussion. But it had no right to impose those views by declaring a separate State in the areas under Turkish military occupation by Turkish forces, which, contrary to resolution 3212 (XXIX), were not withdrawn. Such action or behaviour is clearly and undeniably a violation of paragraph 4 of resolution 3212 (XXIX). It establishes beyond doubt that since the Turkish side has not expressed any regret or remorse for such action but has sought to justify it, a new procedure of negotiations is needed.

93. The second objective of the Turkish side in creating a separate State is the destruction of the independence and non-alignment of Cyprus, despite **assurances** to the contrary given to the Security Council by the representative of Turkey, and the creation of a Turkish protectorate in Cyprus. The Turkish separate State would continue to exist and Turkish forces would continue to remain in Cyprus until a solution of the **Cyprus** problem had been found. In the meantime, or in the absence of a solution, the international personality of Cyprus would have been destroyed, or at least would be nonexistent; it would have been reduced to that of two separate regions, neither seeking, requiring nor deserving international recognition as independent States, but existing and operating as autonomous administrations under the control and supervision of Greece and Turkey, the two guarantors.

94. It is for that reason that the Turkish side opposes any reference to the Government of the Republic of Cyprus or to the recognition of that **Government**. It is for that reason that the Turkish side wants all references in any resolution of the Security Council to be references to the representatives of the two communities. It is for that reason that the Turkish side insists that any provisional arrangement pending the finding of a solution, such as that regarding the international airport of Nicosia, the port of Famagusta, and so forth, must be under the control and supervision of the two guarantors.

95. The Turkish position with regard to free negotiations is as follows.. “ . . .”

96. First, Turkish forces occupy 40 per cent of the territory of the Republic and will not be withdrawn despite General Assembly resolution 3212 (XXIX).

97. Secondly, by a unilateral act the Turkish side on 13 February established a separate Turkish State in Cyprus in the area under the control of the Turkish forces of occupation.

98. Thirdly, there is no Government of the independent Republic of **Cyprus** and none should be mentioned in or **recognized** by any United Nations resolution.

99. Fourthly, there is no legal personality of the independent, non-aligned State of **Cyprus**, but only two separate, regional, autonomous administrations operating in their respective regions created artificially by the force of Turkish arms, neither requiring nor having international recognition but operating under the control and supervision of the two guarantors.

100. Fifthly, if these views are accepted, there can be negotiations for the rest-that is, the details. If not, the independent State of **Cyprus** does not exist and will not exist. What will remain will be a Turkish protectorate, Turkish forces on the territory of the Republic, Turkish occupation of 40 per cent of the territory of the Republic, and 200,000 suffering Greek refugees.

101. That is what, according to the Turkish representative, constitutes negotiations on an equal footing in order to arrive at a freely and mutually agreed solution, as provided by General Assembly resolution 3212 (XXIX).

102. Can it be denied that Turkey landed forces in Cyprus under the pretext of defending it from the illegal coup carried out by the military forces of the ousted Greek military Government and that, having done so, it is using such forces to impose its own solution to the Cyprus problem?

103. Can it be denied that Turkey, by occupying and continuing to occupy 40 per cent of the territory of the Republic, by permitting, encouraging, accepting and condoning the setting up of a separate Turkish State in the area under its military control and occupation, while objecting to the recognition of the Government of the Republic, has attempted to extinguish the independence of **Cyprus**, which it was bound as a guarantor to protect, and seeks to impose on the people of Cyprus a solution of its own choosing?

104. Can it be denied that unless Turkey's conditions are accepted by the Greek Cypriots, who constitute the majority of the population of Cyprus, there will

be no solution of the Cyprus problem and therefore no independent non-aligned State?

105. Can it be denied that Turkey has not complied and does not intend to comply with Assembly resolution 3212 (XXIX)?

106. In view of all that, is the Security Council to remain idle, as Turkey wishes it to be?

107. Turkey does not agree that there was need for the Security Council to meet and alleges that there was no sound reason for convening it. Turkey alleges that there is no need for a resolution because nothing has happened which has changed the situation. Turkey objects to any reference in the resolution to the Government of the Republic of Cyprus. Turkey objects to condemning, deploring or even expressing regret about the arbitrary unilateral action taken by the Turkish **side** in setting up a separate State in Cyprus while the negotiating process continued. Turkey wants us to go back and continue the **inter-**communal talks as if nothing had happened.

108. If I were gifted, I would draw the following cartoon. I would have Turkey sitting at the dining table eating a non-lean or non-aligned chicken called "Cyprus". I would show myself approaching the dining table and asking, "Can we talk about Cyprus?". To which Turkey would reply, "Yes, by all means. But do you mind if I go on eating my non-aligned chicken?".

109. We are not here to decide what Turkey wants or agrees to nor what the Government of Cyprus requests. We are here to examine and adopt the measures needed to save the sovereignty, the independence, the territorial integrity and the non-alignment of Cyprus and the principle of respect for and compliance with the resolutions of the United Nations, without which the world will revert to the rule of the jungle, where the strong devour the weak.

110. Measures are needed. They are needed now. They are needed urgently. They must be effective to protect the weak from the strong. They must aim at bringing about the implementation of General Assembly resolution 3212 (XXIX), thus restoring free negotiations for the solution of the Cyprus problem.

111. In my opening address I stated that a **time-**limit must be set within- which full implementation of General Assembly resolution 3212 (XXIX) must be carried out. Nothing has been said since my statement **by** the representative of Turkey that indicates any willingness on the part of Turkey to proceed with the speedy withdrawal of its forces from Cyprus and to take urgent measures for the **return** of the refugees. **On** the contrary, from what has been said it is clear that Turkey does not intend to comply with either requirement of resolution 3212 (XXIX) and only

promises to do so in the context of a final solution to the Cyprus problem.

112. There is therefore an urgent need, in addition to setting a time-limit, to create a United Nations committee consisting of members of the Security Council to keep under observation the implementation of General Assembly resolution 3212 (XXIX), to participate in and lend its good offices in a wider forum in which a solution of the Cyprus problem can be worked out, not under duress nor as a result of faits **accomplis** but by the process of a freely negotiated and commonly agreed solution of the Cyprus problem.

113. If such decisions are not taken by the Security Council, the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Cyprus and its non-alignment will be left in deadly peril. It will be a sad result for Cyprus, but a sadder- day for the United Nations and the entire world.

114. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): I call on the representative of Turkey.

115. Mr. OLCAY (Turkey): I just want to say that I did not start the exchange of **allegations**, neither did Mr. Celik, as far as I can recollect, and I do not intend to continue it.

116. The sad history of Cyprus is known to all concerned. It is the history of a State whose President's first official action was to proclaim that he had signed the very act registering its birth under duress; a President whose 15 years in office were devoted to achieving union with another country and the elimination of one of the founding communities of his State. That is what, in our eyes, transformed him into the head of only one of the communities and that is why we consider that he has forfeited his right to pretend to be the head of both.

117. An in-depth analysis has been made of my motives and those of my Government in the Council during the negotiations around the table here. I think that my position, the position of my Government, has been made clear. I can give further explanations about it, if that is felt necessary, at any stage during this debate.

118. With regard to the past history of Turko-Greek relations in Cyprus, however I am sure that Mr. **Celik** is in a much better position than I am to give the necessary answers.

119. Just to put the record straight, nowhere in my statement have I or could I have mentioned the "Government of the Republic of Cyprus". If I have done so, please consider it now and in future a **lapsus linguae**.

120. Again, to set the record straight, I should like to say that with regard to who in Cyprus **poke**

of, worked for or plotted for *enosis*, and when and how, I would prefer Mr. **Çelik**, if he so desires and with the Council's indulgence, to present a brief *aperçu* of the **file** on the subject.

121. I shall say only one thing in conclusion-and I believe this also constitutes an answer: Turkey continues to believe that a solution to the problem can only be found at the negotiating table, which I think should never have been abandoned.

122. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): I call on the representative of Greece.

123. Mr. CARAYANNIS (Greece): The last remark of the representative of Turkey gave me a little hope. He spoke of "the negotiating table"; does he mean with *faits accomplis* or without?

124. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): I call on the representative of Turkey.

125. Mr. OKAY (Turkey): In answer to my friend and colleague from Greece, I would say that there have been so many *faits accomplis* before and during the negotiating process in Cyprus-that is during the past seven or eight years that negotiations have been taking place-that I consider his question a bit irrelevant, because negotiations in Cyprus started as

a result of *faits accomplis*'. The *faits accomplis* go back, as I have had occasion to say, to the time when it was discovered that there were a few thousand-I do not know how many **thousands—illegal** Greek forces of occupation in Cyprus, whose departure in **1967** was the beginning of one series of negotiations. Then those troops have returned many times and there have been the **Grivas** episode, attempted murders, foiled **coups**, there have been many things in Cyprus, but negotiations continued. The Secretary-General has had many representatives, and the Ambassador now present here is the second in the series of representatives of the Secretary-General who have taken part in these negotiations; and I believe that the records of the Security Council are full of what may, in one form or another, be considered *faits accomplis*. There has been the *fait accompli* of illegal importation of arms, **recognized** by the Security Council. There have been a lot of *faits accomplis* and unilateral actions.

126. Therefore, I believe that none of them should put an end to the negotiating process which is, I repeat, the only way out of the **Cyprus** crisis.

*The meeting rose at 530 p.m.*

*Notes*

<sup>1</sup> United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 382, pp. 3 and 8.