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**1816**<sup>th</sup> MEETING: 25 FEBRUARY 1975

NEW YORK

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#### NOTE

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Documents of the Security Council (symbol **S/ . . .**) are normally published in quarterly *Supplements* of the *Official Records of the Security Council*. The date of the document indicates the supplement in which it appears or in which information about it is given.

The resolutions of the Security Council, numbered in accordance with a system adopted in 1964, are published in yearly volumes of *Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council*. The new system, which has been applied retroactively to resolutions adopted before 1 January 1965, became fully operative on that date.

## 1816th MEETING

**Held in New York on Tuesday, 25 February 1975, at 3.30 p.m.**

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*President:* Mr. HUANG Hua (China).

*Present:* The representatives of the following States: Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, China, Costa Rica, **France**, Guyana, Iraq, Italy, Japan, Mauritania, Sweden, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania and United States of America.

### Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/1816)

1. Adoption of the agenda
2. The situation in Cyprus:  
Letter dated 17 February 1975 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/1625)

*The meeting was called to order at 4.15 p.m.*

### Adoption of the agenda

*The agenda was adopted.*

The situation in Cyprus:

**Letter dated 17 February 1975 from the Permanent representative of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/11625)**

1. The PRESIDENT (*translation from Chinese*): In accordance with the decision taken at the 1813th meeting, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite the representatives of Cyprus, Turkey and Greece to participate in the debate without the right to vote.

*At the invitation of the President, Mr. Clerides (Cyprus), Mr. Olcay (Turkey) and Mr. Carayannis (Greece) took places at the Security Council table.*

- 2. The PRESIDENT (*translation from Chinese*): In accordance with the decision taken at the 1815th meeting, and with the consent of the Council, I invite the representative of Bulgaria to take the place reserved for him at the side of the Council chamber in order to participate in the discussion without the right to vote.

*At the invitation of the President, Mr. Grozev (Bulgaria) took the place reserved for him at the side of the Council chamber.*

3. Mr. SAITO (Japan): Mr. President, I wish to take this opportunity to congratulate you upon your assumption of the presidency of the Council for February. You have already presided over the Council with great distinction. I am confident, Mr. Huang Hua, that with your great wisdom you will guide our deliberations ably in the days ahead. Nor do I wish to overlook the abilities of Mr. Tchernouchchenko, the representative of the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, who was President of the Council last month. No meeting was held during his presidency, but his diplomatic gifts would have been of great service to the Council if it had met.

4. The delegation of Japan is most grateful for your kind welcome. We feel highly honoured to return to the Council. I wish to express my appreciation also to Mr. Maiik of the Soviet Union for his words of welcome to my delegation. We wish to thank also the representative of France for his delegation's kind offer to collaborate with the delegations taking their seats on the Council this year.

5. We are very conscious of the duties incumbent upon our country as a member of the United Nations organ which is primarily responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security. As an Asian country elected by the General Assembly to a seat for the Asian Members of the United Nations, we shall exert our best efforts to reflect the aspirations and ideals of Asian countries in promoting world peace in this great body.

6. On behalf of my Government I wish to assure the Council that Japan will do everything within its power to co-operate with all members of the Council in helping to solve the international problems that now confront the Council or will be brought before it in the years ahead.

7. Much to the regret of the delegation of Japan, the situation in the Republic of Cyprus has recently taken a turn for the worse. Since the statement of 13 February by Mr. **Denktaş [S/11624, annex II]**, the leader of the Turkish Cypriot community, who announced the establishment of an autonomous Turkish Cypriot structure "on the basis of a secular and federated State" which would be a part of **Cyprus** under a new federal constitution, relations between the two Cypriot communities have seriously deteriorated.

8. The Cypriot representative, in requesting an urgent meeting of the Security Council [S/11625], accused Turkey of violating the provisions of the two recent basic documents which state United Nations policy regarding the Cyprus problem: General Assembly resolution 3212 (XXIX) of 1 November 1974 and Security Council resolution 365 (1974) of 13 December 1974, in which the Council endorsed that resolution and asked the Secretary-General to report on progress in implementing it.

9. The annexes to the Secretary-General's special report on developments in Cyprus, dated 18 February 1975 [S/11624], contain the texts of replies to the Secretary-General from the Cypriot and Greek Governments. These offer assurances that they are working to carry out the terms of the General Assembly resolution. In these circumstances, the delegation of Japan whole-heartedly supported the Secretary-General's initiative in going to Athens and Ankara to discuss the question of Cyprus with the Greek and Turkish Governments.

10. My delegation listened with great interest to the general conclusions formulated by the Secretary-General last Friday in this chamber as a result of his visit to these two countries [1814th meeting].

11. The delegation of Japan gave its whole-hearted support to General Assembly resolution 3212 (XXIX), which was adopted unanimously, and to Security Council resolution 365 (1974), approved with no dissenting vote. It was our considered opinion then, as it is today, that the two Cypriot communities and, needless to say, the States concerned, should do their utmost to comply with the terms of the resolutions adopted by both the General Assembly and the Security Council. The Council resolution urges the parties concerned to implement the Assembly resolution as soon as possible. The Assembly resolution calls upon all States "to respect the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and non-alignment of the Republic of Cyprus and to refrain from all acts and interventions directed against it", and it also states that the "constitutional system of the Republic of Cyprus concerns both the Greek Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot communities".

12. On this last point, I should like to recall a relevant statement I made in the General Assembly on 31 October 1974 during its debate on the Cyprus question. I said:

"It seems to my delegation that although the views of the parties concerned are far apart on many important questions, they are all agreed on the central and most essential principle, that is, that any solution should be based on respect for the sovereignty, political independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus. They are also agreed in opposing any form of partition or annexation of Cyprus, or any of its parts, by

another country. These principles **should** be the starting point for all efforts to bring about a settlement of this complex problem."

13. In the light of the present situation, we consider particularly valuable the General Assembly's commendation of the contacts that were then taking place "on an equal footing" between the **representatives** of the two communities, with the good **offices** of the Secretary-General. The Assembly's further statement that "all the refugees should return to their homes in safety", and the recommendation that **the** parties concerned undertake "urgent efforts to **that end**", also commends itself, in the view of my delegation, to all who seek a humane and lasting settlement for the good of the sorely tried people of the island.

14. My delegation wishes to confirm also its support of Security Council resolution 353 (1974), [adopted on 20 July 1974, at a time when the outbreak of serious violence and bloodshed was already **creating**, as it stated, "a most explosive situation in the whole eastern Mediterranean area". The **unfortunate** occurrences at that time led the **Security Council** to include in the resolution a call for a cease-fire, and a request that all States refrain from any action which might further aggravate the situation. In addition, its resolution requested the States concerned - Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom - to enter into negotiations without delay "for **the** restoration of peace in the area and constitutional **government** in Cyprus".

15. Indeed, in this new and dangerous **phase of the** problem, my delegation wishes to endorse all the relevant resolutions adopted by the Security Council, beginning with resolution 353 (1974). **We would** urge the Council to take all feasible measures to bring about the resumption of negotiations so **that** the full implementation of these resolutions may be achieved.

16. With regard to the resumption of negotiations, I wish to emphasize, in the first place, our firm belief that whatever framework of negotiations is agreed upon, the core of the **negotiations** must be the direct talks between the two communities. Unless full communication is maintained by **the** two communities, a mutually acceptable political settlement cannot be arrived at. There has been a suggestion that the forum of the negotiations should **be enlarged**, to enable third parties to participate. **In considering** the feasibility of this approach, the **views of the** Secretary-General, who has been **playing a key role** in mediation efforts, should be given great weight, and the agreement of the two sides would naturally have to be sought. In any event, we **urge all the** States concerned not to jeopardize the **dialogue**, but to help it to produce results and to **respect the** results spontaneously reached in the **negotiations**.

17. In the second place, the United Nations must recover the ground lost by the **suspension** of the

talks and help the communities to find ways to resume the negotiations. But while it is easy to express our hopes for the resumption of the talks, we **all** know that the disentanglement of the knotty problems which have produced their suspension is arduous and difficult.

18. It is of the utmost importance, therefore, to create a climate conducive to the resumption of constructive negotiations. Since the fundamental spirit of the relevant resolutions is reconciliation and mutual understanding, we wish to express our sincere hope that the communities will do their utmost, with the active encouragement of the other parties concerned to pave the way for the reopening of the dialogue and explore mutually acceptable methods of safeguarding the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus.

19. All representatives will, I am sure, agree with the Secretary-General's statement to the Council last week that "a new and fresh approach to the negotiating process" [*ibid.*, *para. 10*] is needed for the achievement of this goal. I hope that all of them will join in proposing a new approach, which perhaps could include new modalities, for carrying out the **Secretary-General's** valuable suggestion. The following ideas might be considered by the Council.

20. First, it may be worth while to explore the reactivation of the negotiating process at a place outside Cyprus, in a different atmosphere, if that is agreeable to the parties concerned.

21. Secondly, it is the sincere hope of my delegation that the Council will request the Secretary-General to intensify his endeavours to help renew such talks between the two communities and that the Council will follow this up by fully supporting these endeavours. Of course, the talks should be conducted in the presence of the Secretary-General or his Special Representative.

22. Thirdly, my delegation considers it important also that the Secretary-General be requested to report back promptly to the Security Council the results of the negotiations, including progress in the implementation of the relevant resolutions, and that the Council should evaluate the information contained in his report as soon as possible.

23. Given the nature of the circumstances with which the Council is confronted, talks between the parties concerned would now centre on political questions. However, I share the view of the representative of Sweden, who stated that the solution of the acute humanitarian problems "must not wait until there is agreement concerning the form that the resumed negotiations should take, let alone until a political solution has been achieved" [*1815th meeting, para. 42*]. It is the conviction of my delegation that both aspects of the Cypriot problem should be

fully considered. Let us hope that the Council will make clear that the plight of the unfortunate refugees should be given timely consideration in any talks between representatives of the communities.

24. We place high hopes in the role of the United Nations, as exemplified by the latest efforts of the Secretary-General, in providing good offices and assistance for the reduction of tension and the eventual solution of the Cyprus question.

25. In the days ahead, we strongly urge all the parties and States concerned to exercise restraint and moderation, avoiding any expansion of the dispute. We request all Members of the United Nations--and, in particular, all members of the Security Council--to help the parties and States concerned to **realize** the United Nations goals as effectively and smoothly as possible. On behalf of my Government I wish to give an assurance that Japan will welcome and support all sincere efforts for the solution of the urgent phase of the Cyprus problem, which will be followed, let us hope, by a permanent settlement in accordance with the significant United Nations resolutions I have mentioned.

26. Mr. BOOH BOOH (United Republic of Cameroon) (*interpretation from French*): Mr. President, on behalf of my delegation I should like to extend to you our warm congratulations on your assumption of the important post of President of the Security Council for February and to wish you every success in the performance of your delicate task.

27. It is my pleasure also to convey to Mr. **Tchernouchtchenko**, of the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, the great appreciation of my delegation for the tact and efficiency with which he discharged his functions as President of the Council last month.

28. My delegation would like also to take this opportunity to pay a well-deserved tribute to Mr. McIntyre of Australia, Mr. Jankowitsch of Austria, Mr. **Anwar Sani** of Indonesia, Mr. **Maina** of Kenya and Mr. Perez de **Cuellar** of Peru, who in the course of their terms of office on the Security Council have contributed with intelligence, competence and devotion to the search for appropriate solutions to the difficult problems facing this body.

29. My delegation wishes also to bid a warm welcome to the representatives of Guyana, Japan, Italy, Sweden and the United Republic of Tanzania, whose countries have just been elected to the Security Council. I can tell them right away that the co-operation and understanding which they will **find** forthcoming from my delegation in our future work will be a reflection of the excellent relations which so fortunately exist between their respective Governments and the Government of the United Republic of Cameroon.

30. When, on 13 December 1974 [1810th meeting], the Security Council last examined the question of Cyprus, there were some grounds for believing that the difficult problems that had been facing the island for 10 or more years were soon going to be solved once and for all in a peaceful fashion. Indeed, the General Assembly had just unanimously adopted resolution 3212 (XXIX). In the view of my delegation, that resolution contained provisions which, if faithfully applied by the interested parties, were likely to bring about a rapid return to peace. Furthermore, the constitutional head of State of Cyprus had just returned to his country at a time when the inter-community talks had in certain respect taken an encouraging turn.

31. These favourable circumstances unfortunately seem to be gravely jeopardized today because of the increasingly marked interference of certain foreign Powers in the internal affairs of the Republic of Cyprus.

32. The excellent report that the Secretary-General made available to the Council [S/11624] and the important statement he made here on 21 February [1814th meeting], together with the versions of recent events given here by the parties directly concerned, clearly demonstrate that no progress has been achieved in recent months towards a political settlement of the Cyprus crisis.

33. Quite the contrary: the statement of Mr. Denktas of 13 February last [S/11624, annex II], concerning the autonomous Turkish Cypriot administration, seems to many States to represent a serious and direct threat to the independence and territorial integrity of a State Member of the United Nations. And the statements made by Mr. Çelik in the Council on 20 and 24 February [1813th and 1815th meetings] were not such as to reassure members of the Council on this subject.

34. In the face of the extreme gravity of these events, I should like to restate my Government's position of principle on this question of Cyprus. The United Republic of Cameroon firmly supports the lawful Government of Archbishop Makarios and the entire Cypriot people in the valiant and just struggle that that people is waging to safeguard the fundamental right to independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus. My Government cannot, therefore, sanction any attempt to partition that country which is not based on the free and explicit wish of the entire Cypriot people. My Government remains convinced that scrupulous respect by all States for the independence and the non-alignment policy of Cyprus and the withdrawal of all foreign forces from the island are necessary pre-conditions for serious negotiations on the substance of this distressing matter.

35. It is exclusively the Cypriots of the two communities, Greek and Turkish, who have the crucial role of determining, in total freedom and on a footing of equality, the constitutional form of their State that would best promote their well-being and respect for their fundamental and lawful rights. That is why my delegation, in a friendly way, calls upon them, as has already been done here, not to reopen old wounds but, rather, to make extra efforts! to find a constructive, just and mutually acceptable solution to the constitutional problem of their country. No other State, no bloc of States, can usurp the inalienable right of the people of Cyprus in this respect.

36. The conviction that Cyprus, a non-aligned country, can preserve its right to an independent existence led my delegation unreservedly to support resolution 3212 (XXIX), adopted by the General Assembly unanimously and hence with the consent of the Governments of Greece, Turkey and Cyprus and endorsed, also unanimously, by the Security Council on 13 December 1974 in its resolution 365 (1974). The provisions of those resolutions, which are still relevant today, provide a serious basis for discussions by the parties concerned, provided, of course, that the good will and the political determination finally to settle this question prevail over the forces of national selfishness.

37. It is high time that the unspeakable suffering of the people of Cyprus stopped; it is high time that true peace returned to that country. The territorial dismemberment of the Republic of Cyprus by force would be a real tragedy not only for the people of that country but also for all the small Powers. Members of the Organization that wish to live in freedom and independence, without falling prey to the whims and aggression of countries that are militarily and technically better equipped than they are. That is why, in my delegation's opinion, the principle of the non-acquisition of the territory of a State by force should be unambiguously reaffirmed in the present case.

38. The confidence that the peoples of the world have placed in the United Nations would be rudely shaken if specific and effective measures were not taken by the Security Council to ensure the full and rapid application of the relevant resolutions and thus to safeguard the independence of one of the States Members of the Organization.

39. We whole-heartedly endorse, in this respect, the opinion expressed by the Secretary-General in the Council that "the Cyprus problem represents a crucial test of the effectiveness and credibility of the Organization" [1814th meeting, para. 8].

40. The Security Council is in a position today to discharge effectively its responsibilities in settling the Cyprus crisis. Indeed, General Assembly resolution 3212 (XXIX) and Security Council resolution 365

(1974), which lay down the fundamental principles for a negotiated solution of the Cyprus crisis, were both adopted unanimously by the Members of the Organization. That fact in itself should encourage the Council to be bolder at this stage of its intervention.

41. Although my delegation has not at this stage any clear-cut ideas about what specific action should be taken, it is none the less ready to support any appeal that the Council might make to the parties to refrain from proclaiming unilateral acts that prejudice the outcome of future negotiations. My delegation would similarly support any formula drawn up by the Council, in agreement with the parties, laying down the practical arrangements for the withdrawal of foreign forces from the island, an essential pre-condition for the continuation by the parties of negotiations that are genuinely free and on a footing of equality, as recommended in resolution 3212 (XXIX). My delegation again expresses its confidence in the **Secretary-General**, and we encourage him to continue his **good-offices** mission in the Cypriot matter, in accordance with any new arrangements worked out by the Council,

42. Of course, we are prepared to examine any other measures that may be proposed by members of the Council with a view to creating conditions favourable to a resumption of constructive negotiations on the question of Cyprus.

43. In conclusion, I should like it to be clearly understood that my Government's position of principle on the Cyprus question, which I have just explained, is free of any prejudice vis-a-vis any of the parties directly or indirectly concerned; the legitimate interests of all of them deserve the same consideration.

44. My Government's concern in this matter is based essentially upon considerations relating to the maintenance of peace and justice. Indeed, that is what **was** stated by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the United Republic of Cameroon in his statement at the **twenty-ninth** session of the General Assembly. He said:

"... my delegation, aware of the tense situation which continues to prevail in Cyprus and, if truth be told, throughout the eastern Mediterranean, would look favourably upon and support any initiative from no matter what quarter tending definitively to restore peace to the island and to resolve no less definitively, in the interests of the Greek and Turkish communities of the island, the political problem posed by an arrangement whose failure all **deplore**".<sup>2</sup>

45. **Mr. PLAJA (Italy) (interpretation from French):** Mr. President, may I be permitted first of all to convey to you my delegation's congratulations on your accession to the presidency of the Council and to recall on this occasion the friendly relations that my country maintains with your own. You can rely on the sincere support of my delegation in

the exercise of your responsibilities. I should also like to associate myself with the thanks that have been addressed to your predecessor, Mr. **Tchernouchchenko** of the **Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic**.

46. In addition, Mr. President, I should like to address a special word of thanks to you and the other representatives who have expressed themselves similarly in welcoming my country and myself on the occasion of the beginning of Italy's new term of office in the Security Council. My country is pleased to commence this term in the company of Guyana, Japan, Sweden and the United Republic of Tanzania -countries to which we are bound by special ties of friendship and co-operation-and I should like to convey to their representatives, as well as to those of the permanent members, words of welcome and my best **wishes**. I should also like to associate myself with the well-deserved tribute paid to the outgoing members-Australia, Austria, Indonesia, Kenya and Peru-and to their representatives, who have earned the gratitude of the Organization by their constructive contribution to the work of the Council.

47. As my Government has always emphasized, Italy attaches fundamental importance to the **Organization**. My country is therefore well aware of the responsibility inherent in membership of the Security **Council** and participation in its work. It is the Council which is called upon to play the primary role with regard to crises which **unfortunately** continue "to plague the whole world; for it is the Council that must discharge the task of seeking, through the concerted action of States-and in particular of those which are in a position to offer the most effective contribution-lasting solutions founded on right and justice, in an international climate **characterized** by far-reaching change, and by growing interdependence among nations.

48. Guided by the principles of the Charter, Italy is determined to make the most effective and most sincere contribution possible to the work of the Council, pursuing its diplomatic activities, which are geared to the quest for peace throughout the world by eliminating the deep-rooted causes of international disputes. I should like to assure you, Mr. President, that the Council can rely on the most active and serious co-operation of the Italian delegation in the discharge of this task..

49. Italy has always followed the situation in Cyprus with deep concern. This situation entails -a continuing danger for stability in the eastern part of the Mediterranean, an area very close to my own country. It fosters serious tension among countries which have close ties with my own country as a result not only of the links forged by history, but also of the association of those countries with the European Community. Lastly, it imposes on the friendly people, of the island

of Cyprus grave sufferings and severe loss of human life and property.

50. The causes of the strife that is raging in Cyprus have been repeatedly examined by the Council and I shall not dwell on those points. Unfortunately, history has left a heritage of division and suspicion on the island, separating the two communities that make up its population; and reconciliation efforts heretofore have not achieved the results that we should have wished to see.

51. The events of last summer have deepened our concern. New problems have been piled upon the old. I shall confine myself here to recalling that of the refugees-and not only its humanitarian aspect.

52. What is the most constructive contribution that the Security Council can make to the solution of the crisis in Cyprus? So far as my delegation is concerned, the answer to this question is dictated by the very characteristics of the situation in the island. These characteristics indicate that the responsibility for seeking reconciliation-which alone can lead to a lasting solution-lies solely with the parties directly concerned, and in particular with the leaders of the two communities.

53. The Italian delegation is convinced that the **Cyprus** crisis can be resolved only by negotiations carried out by those parties in an atmosphere of freedom and good faith, and in a spirit of compromise. Such a solution should be based on two fundamental elements.

54. First, it should ensure full respect for the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus. It is indeed encouraging to note that this fundamental principle is recognized by all, as has once again been demonstrated by the statements of the representatives who have spoken in the course of this debate; and, in addition, I am pleased to remind the Council in this connection of the commitments made by the representatives of Greece and Turkey from the rostrum of the General Assembly.

55. Secondly, the solution will have to safeguard and thoroughly reconcile the rights, interests and legitimate aspirations of the two communities.

56. In my opinion, therefore, the task and duty of the United Nations is to encourage these negotiations by helping to create conditions favourable to the pursuit of a dialogue between the two communities. This is the course that has been followed heretofore through the resolutions adopted by the Council and by the Assembly. We shall have to continue to follow this road, without allowing ourselves to become discouraged, by reaffirming those resolutions, and in particular Assembly resolution 3212 (XXIX) and Council resolution 365 (1974), which endorsed that Assembly resolution, and by implementing them.

57. My delegation has carefully examined **the special** report of the Secretary-General [S/11624] and listened with great interest to the statements that he made to the Council. I should like to pay a **particular** tribute to the Secretary-General for his tireless efforts. I would remind the Council that he has played an important role in bringing about meetings between the leaders of the two communities; and, **therefore**, we are entitled to hope-and the Italian delegation does most warmly hope-that his action can lead to other encouraging results. Accordingly the Italian delegation wishes to associate itself with the ideas put forward by other representatives who have spoken in this debate and who envisage a renewed role for the Secretary-General designed to facilitate the resumption and progress of the negotiations.

58. I should also like to express my very warm appreciation to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Weckmann-Muñoz, who is carrying out a delicate and **difficult** task in a quite remarkable way.

59. And, lastly, on this occasion I should like to pay a tribute to the United Nations **Peace-keeping** Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), whose courage, dedication and high professional competence have made it possible to avoid even more **tragic** suffering for the people of Cyprus.

60. I have also listened to and examined with great interest the statements made in the course of the debate by the representatives of the Governments of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey, as well as by the representative of the Turkish Cypriot community, Mr. **Çelik**. Above and beyond recriminations and polemics, it seems to me that in those statements I can discern a recognition of the fact that dialogue between the parties still remains the key to the problem and the only hope of emerging from the impasse and resuming the search for a peaceful solution. Even on certain substantive positions, it seems to me that I see emerging some indication of a more flexible attitude, and no matter how slight this change may be it should be recognized and encouraged.

61. Since the events of last summer **opened** up a new and critical phase in the situation in Cyprus, Italy has worked steadily to encourage the parties to be moderate, to reflect and to negotiate a solution of their differences. These bilateral approaches, undertaken in the light of the excellent relations that we have with the countries concerned, have gone hand in hand with the positions taken jointly within the framework of political co-operation **by** the nine countries of the European Community. Even quite recently, indeed as a matter of fact on 13 **February**, the nine Ministers for **Foreign** Affairs, **who** met in Dublin, recalling the relevant resolutions of the United Nations, stated:

"They continue to regard as highly desirable the search by way of consultation between the two

communities in Cyprus, for a negotiated solution which would be both durable and equitable;

“To facilitate the realization of this objective, the nine are willing to **hold** discussions with representatives of all the interested parties.” [See *S/11629*.]

62. That statement, which was repeated on 21 February in the communique which concluded the meetings between the Foreign Ministers of Italy, Mr. **Rumor**, and the Federal Republic of Germany, Mr. Genscher, in Rome, testifies to our continued readiness—a readiness that the Council should bear in mind—to render service to the countries which are parties to the Cypriot crisis, because of the special ties which, as I have already said, exist between them and the European Community.

63. Believing, as I have just emphasized, that the solution of the problem of Cyprus can emerge only from negotiations between the two communities, my Government continues to be opposed, as it always has been, to any unilateral action which would be likely to prejudice the very options on which negotiations should be based, and which, therefore, would complicate the search for the negotiated solution. **We** have expressed this conviction in connection with unilateral actions which have in the past created situations of acute crisis in the Cyprus problem, **and we** state this position today in view of the recent decision taken by the leaders of the Turkish Cypriot community which, although presented as an internal development, has led to the breaking off of negotiations. The Italian delegation wishes, in this context, to recall the statements made by Mr. **Denktas** in Cyprus and by Mr. **Çelik** here, to the effect that that decision created no final situation that might make it impossible to resume negotiations; and we hope that the statements they have made will be confirmed by deeds.

64. My delegation would like to express the hope that all the parties concerned will be ready to show the right amount of good will and flexibility for a resumption of **negotiations** between the two communities. In the face of the tragic prospect of new mourning and suffering for their populations, I am convinced that the leaders of the two communities will be guided by the realism, the spirit of compromise, and the imagination that are needed to reach a general agreement, within a reasonable time, on all the aspects of the problem.

65. I should like to conclude by emphasizing that in this matter time is of the essence, for a prolongation of the present state of affairs can only be prejudicial to the resumption of negotiations and make those negotiations even more **difficult**.

66. **The PRESIDENT** (*translation from Chinese*): At this juncture, may I advise the Council that I have received a letter from the representative of Saudi

‘Arabia, requesting to be invited under the relevant provisions of the Charter to participate in our’ discussion **without** the right to vote.. In accordance with rule 37 of the provisional rules of **procedure** and the established practice **of the Council**, I propose to invite him to participate in the discussion **without** the right to vote.

*At the invitation of the President, Mr. Baroody (Saudi Arabia) took a place at the Council table.*

67. **The PRESIDENT** (*translation from Chinese*): I now call on the representative of Saudi Arabia.

68. Mr. BAROODY (Saudi Arabia): **Mr. President**, and members of the Council, may I thank you for allowing me to appear before you to speak on, the question under consideration. Mr. President, as an Asian, I should like to say that **I congratulate myself** at seeing you occupy the presidency ‘of the Council. With your lucidity of thought and composure; and drawing on the quintessence, of a **civilization** that has made a tremendous contribution **not only** to Asia but to the whole world, I am sure. that ultimately you may be able to orient members of **the** Council towards doing what is necessary to find a practical solution to this intractable question.

69. Needless to say, as one who **has been here** since the beginning, I wish to laud all **members who** have occupied the presidency recently, and **previously**, for their dedication to **the work of the Council**, without having to name each one of them separately.

70. **why** did I take the floor? Just to add **to what** has already been said? I must be frank with’ my colleagues here. I think they have to a large extent been dealing in platitudes. We have listened to a lot about what should be done in connexion with the resolution that was adopted on this question **and that** had the concurrence or acceptance **of the parties** immediately concerned. It goes without saying that they should observe the provisions of that resolution.

71. The problem lies not only in the interpretation of the resolution, but also in the set of circumstances which has occurred to make ‘certain **parties feel that** that resolution is just a sort of **tranquillizer** and does not go to the root of the question. Now it **so happens** that Cyprus is in the region to **which I belong**. With your permission, Mr. President, and with the **permission** of the members of the Council, I **shall give you** a little of the background of the Cyprus question. I shall not, as some may be thinking, **go back to** the days of the **Canaanites**, who were called Phoenicians by the Greeks, or further, back **before** that era when even the Assyrians and **the Pharaohs** occupied Cyprus at one time. That is way **back**. We will go back only to 1877. I think some of my colleagues have an idea of what I mean by **1877**.

72. It was the advent of effective intervention by European Powers in the affairs of the Ottoman Empire. Of course, some might say that the Ottomans, who came from Asia and occupied **Anatolia** and reached the gates of Vienna at one time, spread too far. But let us also not forget that all Europeans came originally from Asia; they are of **Indo-European** origin. So we cannot say that the Ottoman Empire, which was the first commonwealth without any charter to that effect, had no right to what at that time was considered to be under its supremacy. I am not blaming the Europeans, because now it is hindsight to say what I am about to say, but it will give the Clues as to why we are now suffering from what we witness; and, as my colleague on my **left**, the representative of Sweden, rightly said, we should concentrate on the humanitarian question rather than on the political question.

73. But it is useful to know not **the** ancient roots of the trouble but the genesis of this question as to the year -1877, when Tsarist Russia tried to occupy Serbia and Bulgaria, which constituted part of the Ottoman Empire in the Balkans. Now, you might say: "What has this got to do with the problem?" Of course it has a lot to do with the problem. Whose ire **was** roused but that of the Government of an island known as the United Kingdom. They wanted to make sure that Russia would not come through the **Dardanelles** to the Mediterranean. So what did they do? They sent warships to the Sea of Marmara. In other words, they gave the Russians notice that they would go to war if the **Russians came to the warm waters** of the Mediterranean.

74. Sultan Abdul **Hamid**, who was called the Red Sultan, the Bloody Sultan-which was propaganda, and propaganda is nothing new-was a man trying to preserve his empire, just as the kings and queens of England or the Bourbons in France tried to do. I would not say more, or less. Why did our good British friends of those days-I should say our friends of these days and not of those days, because then they were colonialists-want to stop the Russians coming to the Mediterranean? It was because they had under their control a subcontinent-known as India-and they wanted an Ottoman Empire that was weak, although not too weak, but also not too strong. They were afraid that if it were too weak the Russians might grab it. If it were too strong-as at one time it appeared to be, when Mohamed **Ali**, the Khedive in Egypt, sent Ibrahim Pasha and he almost took Konya-it would have been galvanized by new blood.

75. So both Tsarist Russia and the United Kingdom -perhaps it was Palmerston at the time-sent separate warnings to Mohamed **Ali** in Egypt, who was the Viceroy, the Khedive, so to speak, of the Sultan, saying: "If you do not withdraw your troops we shall wage war against you." What they wanted was to maintain the balance of power. I hope that you

follow me; you will see how it applies to **the situation** today.

76. Wisdom prevailed among the **Russians** of those days and they did not go to seize the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles and the Sea of **Marmara**. After arranging many conferences or, rather, **private** talks, which finally culminated in the Congress of Berlin in 1878, and because of the good offices **exercised** by the British, the Sultan leased Cyprus to the British for the time being, so to speak, without **forfeiting** Ottoman sovereignty. The Sultan thereupon received a certain sum annually for the use of **Cyprus**. At one time it was **£50,000**; at another it was **£90,000**. Correct me if I am wrong. But the British were affluent in those days, and I do not think that they **collected** that much in taxes from the people. And the balance of power was preserved.

77. But four years later-in **1882**-**the** British occupied Egypt. Of course there was a pretext-Ibrahim Pasha and so on. Egypt became a **Protectorate**. **Now** this had nothing to do with the Lab&r Party. There was no Labour Party at that time. There were imperialists. We were imperialists too **when** we had an empire. I mean the Arabs. Let us put **the** cards on the table. Perhaps it was a good thing; it activated Arab nationalism from that date, 1882. **Jamal** ud Din al Afgani was an Afghan who resided in Egypt. An Afghan started this sort of Moslem-Arab **nationalism** after the occupation of Egypt by the British;

78. **And then** **who** was alienated from **the** British? The Turks, naturally. After all, we leased Cyprus to them and now they occupied Egypt. **This** is all in my region; I was born an Ottoman **subject** in **1905** in the reign of Sultan **Abdul Hamid**. I **researched** this not only from books but from **people** who were contemporaries of the **Sultan**-*inter alia*, his own nephew, his own niece, whom I knew very **well** along with her family, none other than the **widow** of Enver Pasha of the Young Turks. I also use my own judgement. I was an Arab and the **Turks** were Turks, and sometimes there was a sort of **suspicion** between Turk and Arab, which is **natural** because there were many kinds of communities **inside** the Ottoman Empire.

79. So what happened? Wilhelm II, the **Emperor** of Germany, began to flirt with the Sultan. [His first visit was in **1889**-**correct** me if I am mistaken. His second visit was in 1898. You know all that happened with regard to building a Berlin-Baghdad railroad going to the Persian Gulf. That upset **the** British, who said, "If they go to the Gulf **and** then to Suez, good **Lord**, the Germans"--it was **the** **Germans** then, not the Russians-"can cut off **our** route to India, and if they cut off our route to India, what will happen? Our interests will suffer." So **there** was great rapport between the Germans and **the** **Turks**-more precisely, the Sultan.

80. Then the Sultan was deposed in 1908. We do not have to go into Turkish history now with respect to the emergence of the Young Turks. They had cells in France. Some of them were what could be called, in a sense, the spiritual sons of the French Revolution, and they wanted a change. Anyway, the Sultan was deposed in 1908.

81. Then came the bickering between the European States. For what? Against German militarism? No, sir. France was the biggest military Power then, with all the discipline for which the emerging Germans in the post-Bismarck period and in Wilhelm's period were known, and the biggest naval Power was the United Kingdom. The United States was not known at that time as a great Power. It minded its own business. This was before 1917, because then the United States was railroaded into the world war, and I do not have to tell you by whom. But the United Kingdom had the biggest naval power. I do not think the Germans were saints. They were also trying to use the old colonial methods to gain more territory. Where? In Africa and also, if possible, in Asia. The British Empire then had over 4 million square miles, the French Empire had **3,600,000** square miles, and the Germans had the left-overs-about 1 million square miles, mostly in South-West Africa, which we **now** call Namibia, and which was then a German territory, and a few places where Kenya and certain other countries are located today. That is what happened.

82. So the Germans wanted a place in **the** sun-to use that simile. They wanted grandeur, and the war was fought not so much against German militarism but against German mercantilism, because they were making incursions into the markets of India and Latin America. And wars, as we all know, to a large extent revolve around economics. At one time my good friend, Ambassador Malik, told me **this** was Marxism. -This was before Marxism, long before Marxism. Wars are mostly economic. Once in a while you have men like Alexander the Great and Napoleon who are imbued with the love of power, but basically wars are economic. This does not rule out the love of power and glory.

83. **The** United States made it possible for the Allies, meaning Britain and France and the others, to win the war over Germany. And *ipso facto* in 1914 this lease changed hands and Cyprus passed into the hands of **the** British. It became a British colony. No more sending **£50,000** or **£90,000** to the Porte-meaning to Istanbul-by the British. It became an integral part of the Empire, with a Governor. I remember the Governors of Cyprus in the **1920s**—I was a young man then, directly governed by the British.

84. This is objective history, with nothing added or subtracted. Maybe we can add a few things, but they might embitter some here unnecessarily, so I shall not mention those embittering facts.

85. Finally, the League of Nations did not do anything. Mr. Wilson, the President of the United States, went back from Versailles a sad man. He declared the principle of self-determination of peoples and nations, and no less a person than Mr. Clemenceau took him by his tie and almost strangled him. Someone who was in Versailles told me that. Clemenceau told Mr. Wilson, "You go back where you came from"—I am paraphrasing. They forgot that, had it not been for the United States, they would have lost the war. There would not have been any Hitler. There would have been the Germans and then the various European nationalities would have rebelled against them. But that was not written in the books. It was the United States that won the war for the Allies.

86. Where does Cyprus come in? This is the background. We, including myself, who was an *ex-officio* observer of the League of Nations, discovered the deception. We discovered that the war was fought not to save democracy but to preserve empire. Have we forgotten that even in the 1950s the late Mr. Churchill said, "I was not appointed His Majesty's Prime Minister to preside over the liquidation of the British Empire"? Where is democracy there? Where is **self-determination**? We woke up. Many of us had awakened before. So it fell to someone like Baroody, in his modest way, in 1948 and 1949, starting from the Palais de Chaillot, to elaborate the principle of **self-determination** enunciated by the late Mr. Wilson of the United States into a full-fledged right, and it now constitutes the **first** article of both International Covenants on Human Rights, on which we worked for over 10 years. And we had to cross swords with our good friends and colleagues, the British and the French, and finally they had to give in. We were heartened. At one time I had been told by none other than Sir Samuel **Hoare**, "This is a vague principle; it cannot be enunciated as a human right". Years, later, in London, I reminded him that in the British Parliament the words "right of self-determination of peoples and nations" were mentioned, as they were in the Chamber of Deputies of our French friends.

87. Now, what constitutes a people? That is the essence of the right of self-determination. A people has a common interest. Sometimes it is the language; usually it is the same language. Sometimes it is the same way of life, geography, food. All contribute to constituting a distinct people. They do not have to be all uniform, homogeneous. No, no small region is homogeneous. You **find** dialects; you find different ways in city people and the people who live in the hills. But what constitutes a people, aside from a common way of life, if not common interests? Take **the** United Kingdom. You have the **Scots**; you have the Welsh; you have the Comish people. And at one time you had the Irish people, but we shall not talk about Ireland now; there is a problem there. But let us take those I have cited. They had common interests. They constituted a nation.

88. I was talking to our Belgian colleague today. I said, "How are the Walloons doing in Belgium?" They and the French-speaking people have common interests, and they constitute a people, the Belgian people.

89. Now, Cyprus is a conglomeration of people. Do not think there are only Turks and Greeks. Some were "Turkified" and some were 'Greekified', maybe. We know there are Maronites from Lebanon and Syrians from Syria who became Cypriots; there are Greeks who became Cypriots and there are Turks. They acquired a sort of way of life, a community of interests, which formed a people. It was on that basis that we in the United Nations were approached about the question. It fell to me, not by choice but through someone seeking my advice. Here I want you, Mr. President, and the members of the Council, to note this very carefully: none other than the gentleman sitting behind Mr. Clerides, Mr. **Zenon** Rossides, came to me clamouring-in the early 1950s—for the independence of Cyprus. We heard. I said, "Now, is anyone going to play the role of Venizelos?" You know who Venizelos was. He as an idealist imbued with what is called Greek nationalism, egged on by whom? By the late Mr. Lloyd George, in order further to weaken Turkey. He fired the imagination of many Greeks, misguided them into thinking they could carve off a part of Anatolia and re-form the ancient Greek empire. Well, there was no Greek empire in ancient times; there were city States, as we all know, but there was no sort of Greek empire, with the exception of Alexander's and he died at the age of 32 in India.

90. That dream became a nightmare. Many of the Greeks lived peacefully as Ottoman citizens and, before there was an Ottoman empire, had preceded even our Ottoman friends, who came, as I said from the northern tier of Asia. They lived at peace with the Ottomans. And, for your information, to show that the Turks were not bigoted and had much religious tolerance, Ibrahim Pasha-correct me if I am wrong-the Prime Minister of Suleiman the **Magnificent**, as he was called, was a Greek. Ibrahim Pasha. He was a Greek. I believe Suleiman married **his** sister or something.

91. And there were many Armenians who became Ministers of State. There was someone from Lebanon called Suleiman **el** Bustani, a Christian Maronite, who became Minister of Posts and Telephones. Then there was **Faris** Bey el Khouri, who later became Premier of Syria. He was a member of the Chamber of Deputies. I knew him personally. There was no such thing as exaggerated religious intolerance, until the Armenians fared badly because they were activated by the European countries. Some of the Lebanese Christians were also activated by the European countries so that the Ottoman Empire could be partitioned. I challenge anyone to refute what I have said. But we do not say this with bitterness

now. We say it to provide a background to the situation in Cyprus.

92. Now there exists a people known as the Cypriot people. In the late 1950s or early 1960s—I have forgotten precisely when—there was the late Mr. Zorlu, the Foreign Minister. If the Turks did anything wrong it was to hang that gentleman with Menderes. I knew him very well. He was a very fine man. He invited us to the house of Ambassador Essin—instead of you talking in platitudes, I am giving you facts—in Sutton Place. There **were** other Ambassadors. Ambassador Essin told me, "The Minister would like to see you after **coffee**." I stayed behind. He said, "I know you are among those who elaborated the principle of self-determination into a full-fledged right in the United Nations. Tell me, what do you think about the Cypriot question?" I said, "I have no directives from my Government." "No," he said, "as a person." I said, "No partition, no **enosis**"; **enosis** means union with Greece, "Let the Cypriot people decide their fate, their destiny, their life". That is the objective. But out of enlightened self-interest we, the Arabs, do not believe in partition. We had a tragedy in the partition of Palestine; we do not think Korea should have been partitioned; we do not believe Germany should have been partitioned. It creates trouble. It serves the interests of **the** major Powers.

93. We personally believe that the cohesive factor should be enough to create a people in a region and make it independent, in accordance **with** the right of self-determination of peoples.

94. That is what I said. He asked, "What about the Turkish community?". I said, "Do you want them in Turkey?". He said, "No, but they are Turks. You know, people get emotional, and that is quite **natural**". I said, "Well, what I have said is based on the assumption that no one will hurt anyone **else** and that religious tolerance will prevail, as it prevailed in the days of the Ottoman Empire. We are in the region. We do not want to see Cyprus become a base for the major Powers"—and I do not **have** to name them; everyone **knows** who they **are**—"in the Mediterranean".

95. He told me that he thought what I **had** said was quite reasonable. I told him, "Do not **take** what I have said as the policy of the Government of Saudi Arabia, because I have **had** no directives, **no** instructions on this question". He said, "For you< information, what you have said coincides with the policy of His Royal Highness, Prince Faisal"—he was not the King then; he was the Minister for; Foreign Affairs. I said, "I am happy to hear that".

96. On that basis, negotiations went on with our friends the Greeks, with our friends the Turks; indeed, I personally participated in **some** of the negotiations. At one point someone said to me—1

am not letting any secret out; I have forgotten the name of the person involved; it was a long Greek name: "You know, sometimes our Greek Cypriot brothers give us more headaches than the Turks do". So you see how well disposed they were to you Turks.

97. If these people had been left alone, without any outside interference, nothing would have happened. Who was this Sampson who activated this renewed idea of enosis? "Sampson" is an Anglo-Saxon name. Is he a Greek, or what? I do not know who he is.

98. I happened to be in the region at the time. They wanted to kill the head of State. Grivas had just died. And then somebody emerged and created all this trouble for the Greeks, for the Turks, for the Greek Cypriots, for the Turkish Cypriots. One man and a group around him were so mischievous as to create an international incident.

99. But who was behind them? I am not going to say. Why? Because the wound is there. What good would it do to pour salt on it? In any case, what purpose is served by recriminations and accusations? I have listened to such discussions and sometimes have even participated in them. They get us nowhere. Some people were pulling the strings. I happened to be in Lebanon at the time, and I kept my ears open. Cyprus is not very far from Lebanon, you know.

100. It was a mischievous scheme, whoever initiated it, an inhuman scheme. Why inhuman? Because I am thinking of the refugees, to whom the representative of Sweden referred. Those who pull the strings are safe. Who suffers? The people. I do not care what their national origin is; they are human beings; they are all our brothers under the skin.

101. How is this question going to be solved? The basis—no **enosis**, no partition—cannot be changed, because if it is changed the mischief of yesterday will continue in the future; it will be a festering wound. Who are we to tell our Turkish brothers or our Greek brothers, "You should do this"? Beware, you who pull the strings. Stop pulling the strings. Is not what we have witnessed in Viet Nam enough? Is not what we have witnessed in Cambodia, and are still witnessing there, enough? Is not what we have witnessed in Laos enough? Is it not enough that people are suffering?

102. We have here a Commission on Human Rights and we elaborate a Universal Declaration of Human Rights and International Covenants on Human Rights. "Read and thou shalt be happy; try and thou shalt be saddened".

103. The Powers that are vying for power in the Mediterranean are resorting to the old game. At my advanced age I warn their leaders not to go on trying these things, because anything that is based on injustice

will sooner or later totter and fall. I have seen empires fall because of injustice. Nothing can be greater than what is prescribed by justice.

104. We ask the Secretary-General—this gentleman who is becoming the Marco Polo of modern **times**—what purpose is served by going from one place to another. What can he do? I am not at all questioning his good faith. He comes from one of the most **civilized** countries in the world. At one time I had thought, "Good Lord, this sprawling Austro-Hungarian Empire has been reduced to little Austria". But it is to the real glory of Austria that it has retained its humanitarianism and is not drunk with the vainglory of past centuries. But what can our Secretary-General do? Just shuttle between the Greek leaders and the Turkish leaders, between Mr. **Denktas** and Archbishop Makarios or Mr. Clerides, or whoever represents the communities? Nothing can be done without the required good faith and good will.

105. Let me warn those who pull the strings—and I am not going to name them: you will hurt your fingers with your strings, and you may finally find that you have no fingers to pull anything with, because of the mischief you have sown. I would say the same thing to the Arab people if they were pulling any strings; do not think that I am trying to be supercilious. The old, antiquated approach to solving these problems has backfired. Some historians, mainly European, said that the Congress of Vienna had brought peace. When I was in England, and elsewhere, I used to say, "Peace? The Congress of Vienna?". An eminent gentleman by the name of Henry Kissinger now says that detente brings peace. But detente brings no peace unless there is good will and good faith. What did Talleyrand and Mettemich do? They divided Europe into spheres of influence. And then what happened? Was everything hunky-dory—as the Americans say? No, sir.

106. There followed the revolutions of 1830 and 1848, then the France-Prussian War, then the war between Turkey and Tsarist Russia—which the Russians stopped, taking Cyprus as a commission for the settlement. Then Fashoda, then the Balkan War of 1911, after Fashoda, and then the Boer War—I am not giving them in chronological **order**—then in 1905 the Sino-Japanese War, which was also manipulated by some outside Powers. And then, before the hundred years were over, that century of peace, 1815-1914-99 years to be precise—one of the two major global wars.

107. Detente without justice is like trying in modern times to treat a certain virus with—as we say in Arabic—a watermelon-rind poultice. The sickness is in the blood, you have to use antibiotics; a **watermelon-rind poultice** is not the cure.

108. Now you Powers—one or more Powers—no matter of what nationality, which are pulling the

strings for the sake of "balance of power" and "spheres of influence\*", learn something new. You cannot blame the Turks, on the one hand, for asking for a federation or whatever the name is-I do not go by these names- because I know that many Turks have been massacred; likewise, I cannot blame the Greeks for having fears that if there is partition they will be weakened.

109. But I ask both parties to give a little attention to the fact that they should not be **manceuvred** today by gun-boat diplomacy; that has gone. Why should there be gun-boat diplomacy when intelligence agencies can covertly subvert and plant activists inside any country? Let them see to it that-I am not **criticizing** or prescribing any formula-they do not become victims of the antiquated approach of power politics and spheres of influence, but instead live like brothers just as they-the Greek, the Turk, the Christian Lebanese and the various denominations-lived in the days of the sultanate, before the intervention of the Western Powers and Tsarist Russia in their affairs. Of course there were **excesses**. The nineteenth century was not the golden era of history, not even in the West where they brag about "**civilization**".

110. For years I used to stay at the Savoy researching England in Victorian days. The gentry, the ruling circles, the aristocracy did not know what happened on the left-hand side of the Strand where Covent

Garden is-or was, because I think they are moving it just as the French have moved Les Halles. They knew nothing of the misery, the slums. Honestly, they did not know; or, if they knew, they closed their eyes.

111. On this basis only, on the basis of **good faith** and of reestablishing confidence between the communities, regardless of what each one wants, please, both of you-and I am addressing both parties-do not act rigidly. And above all see to it that no one pulls the strings to hurt-not you people sitting here, you can always manage, like all Governments-but to hurt the people there and make them miserable.

112. I must thank you again, Mr. President, for your indulgence and you, gentlemen, for your patience. But, after all, I thought that, with all the eloquence manifested in the diction and presentation of the statements made here without exception, **we** should ginger ourselves up and try to find a new approach. But, above all, let those who pull the strings beware, because in the long, long run they will **totter** and fall, like others who have done the same thing.

*The meeting rose at 6 p.m.*

*Note*

<sup>1</sup> See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-ninth Session, Plenary Meetings, 2273rd meeting.*

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, 2257th meeting.



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