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MEETING: 24 FEBRUARY 1975

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Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters **combined** with **figures**. **Mention** of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United Nations document.

Documents of the Security Council (symbol **S/ . . .**) are normally published in quarterly **Supplements** of the **Official Records of the Security Council**. The date of the document indicates the supplement in which it appears or in which information about it is given.

The resolutions of the Security Council, numbered in accordance with a system adopted in 1964, are published in yearly volumes of **Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council**. The new system, which has been applied retroactively to resolutions adopted before 1 January 1955, became fully operative on that date.

1815th MEETING

Held in New York on Monday, 24 February 1975, at 3 p.m.

President: **Mr. HUANG Hua** (China).

Present: The representatives of the following States: Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, China, Costa Rica, France, Guyana, Iraq, Italy, Japan, **Mauritania**, Sweden, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania and United States of America.

Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/1815)

1. Adoption of the agenda
2. **The situation in Cyprus:**
Letter dated 17 February 1975 from the Permanent Representative of **Cyprus** to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/11625)

The meeting was called to order at 3.45 p.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

The situation in Cyprus:

Letter dated 17 February 1975 from the Permanent Representative of **Cyprus** to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/11625)

1. The **PRESIDENT** (*translation from Chinese*): In accordance with the decision taken at the 1813th meeting, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite the representatives of Cyprus, Turkey and Greece to participate in the debate without the right to vote.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Rossides (Cyprus), Mr. Olcay (Turkey) and Mr. Carayannis (Greece) took places at the Security Council table.

2. The **PRESIDENT** (*translation from, Chinese*): May I advise the Council that I have received a letter from the Representative of Bulgaria requesting to be invited under the relevant provisions of the Charter to participate in our discussion without the right to vote. In accordance with rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure and the established practice of the Security Council, I propose to invite the repre-

sentative of Bulgaria to participate in the discussion without the right to vote.

3. In view of the limited number of seats available **round** the Council table, I now invite the representative of Bulgaria to take **the** place reserved for him 'at the side of the Council chamber on the understanding that he will be invited to take **a place** at the Council **table** when he is **scheduled** to speak.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Grozev (&&aria) took the place reserved for him at the side of the Council chamber.

4. **Mr. JACKSON** (Guyana): Mr. President, my first **words** as the **representative** of **Guyana** in the Security **Council** are to express my delegation's particular satisfaction at **seeing** you, Mr. Huang Hua, of the People's Republic of China, presiding over this meeting, and to **offer** my own and my delegation's felicitations. May I also take this opportunity to thank you for the warm words addressed to my delegation and to pledge my full co-operation with you.

5. I would also wish to express my appreciation to Mr. Malik of the Soviet Union for the kind comments he made about my country's modest **contributions** in the United Nations and to the cause of non-alignment, and to indicate our concurrence with his observation about the future possibilities for Guyanese-Soviet relations.

6. I wish, in addition, to associate my delegation fully with the congratulations extended to the delegations of Italy, Japon, Sweden and the United Republic of Tanzania, **the** other Member States which have recently **joined** the Council.

7. This is the first formal series of meetings of the Security Council since my country, Guyana, became a member—the first occasion on which Guyana has served on this Council. In acknowledging this I wish to place on record my Government's deep appreciation of the unanimous endorsement Guyana secured for its candidature from the group of Latin American States and for the positive support received from other Members of the United Nations, support which made a reality of our aspirations.

8. We replace Peru, a sister Latin American republic with which Guyana maintains close ties of friendship

and with which we work in fruitful co-operation in several forums. Peru has made a sterling contribution to the work of this Council in its determination to uphold the precepts of sovereign equality and mutual respect in international relations. My delegation pledges itself to continue in the path set by our distinguished predecessor. Guyana, a developing socialist, non-aligned State, will endeavour to live up to its responsibilities.

9. Guyana assumes its seat on the Council at a time: when changes of deep significance that have far-reaching implications are taking place in the international system. A time when the international community is faced with a full agenda requiring action, is as much a time of challenge as it is a time of opportunity.

10. In this respect the recently adjourned **twenty-ninth** session of the General Assembly registered many positive gains for all of us who have sought the development of 'an **international** order firmly rooted in the principles of freedom and justice. In the course of that session important advances were made that rendered less obscure our vision of the prospects for universal peace and security. Yet, areas of grave political tension remain. The situation in the Middle East and the Palestinian question are two major examples.

11. In **respect** also of our search for **economic** justice, that indispensable element in a regime of true world peace, all too often within the United Nations and outside it has the tune of interdependence been only ritualistically chanted and the rhetoric of change merely reflexively intoned.

12. In the field of **decolonization** there have been notable achievements, particularly in southern Africa. The road ahead is not unpromising, but continued vigilance is required. In the quest for peace our collective efforts will continue to be frustrated as long as concepts of colonialism, both economic and political, persist.

13. This year, 1975, marks the fifteenth anniversary of the adoption of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), a resolution which may, without misrepresentation, be appropriately called the "freedom charter" for colonial peoples. It is a strange irony indeed that as we contemplate the commemoration of that historic charter, the Security Council is deliberating on the future of a Member State which was admitted to the **Organization** in the very year that charter was adopted-1960; for the threats to the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and non-alignment of the Republic of **Cyprus** are real and present today;

14. It is not necessary to recite in full the troubled history of the Republic of Cyprus since it became independent. Its tragic experience is sufficiently well

known. The forging of national unity, in the face of the machinations of colonial and other foreign Powers, is a difficult task which many a State Member of the United Nations has had to undertake. And for some-like **Cyprus**—that task is **as yet** unfinished, for certain events in other parts of the world-Asia, Africa and Latin America-over the **last few** years attest to the dangers confronting small countries while interventionist actions, in pursuit of alien, strategic and other interests, contrary to the rule of **international** law are still within the regular practice of some States. Non-aligned countries have always been and remain unequivocal in their total opposition to all forms of foreign intervention.

15. Thus the question of Cyprus has ramifications well beyond the boundaries of that State. The significance of its experience cannot be lost on members of the non-aligned movement, of which it is a founder member, or on other countries endeavouring to preserve and strengthen their sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity.

16. The history of Cyprus during these past **14** years may well be viewed as a prolonged period of gestation during which the indigenous communities comprising the population of that island have experienced difficulties of immense proportions in their mutual relations. There have been in the past, and there exist today, animosities and mistrust between the two communities, so that the people of Cyprus have been required to bear the lash of countervailing forces, both internal and external.

17. It is against such a background that we should view the collective efforts of the non-aligned movement and the rest of the international community to **find** a framework for a solution to the question of Cyprus, a framework that is as equitable as it is just. And it is **against** this background that the recent decisions of the United Nations-General Assembly resolution 3212 (XXIX) and Security Council resolution 365 (1974) endorsing the General Assembly's action-should be perceived.

18. As will be recalled, prior to the twenty-ninth session of the General Assembly, the non-aligned movement appointed a group of five States: to keep the question of Cyprus under close scrutiny and to be available for contacts or to lend their good offices as required and as appropriate. During the session the group was requested to prepare a draft resolution. It embarked on its work with the co-operation of all the parties concerned. Guyana is one of those **five** States, and we were happy to serve and participate in all the protracted and **complex** negotiations which finally led to the unanimous adoption of a resolution by the General Assembly on this question. It is a resolution the importance, and significance of which have been acknowledged by the fact that every single Member State present—and this included Cyprus, Greece and **Turkey**—

voted in favour of it and have been confirmed by its endorsement by every member of the Security Council. Rarely has the international community, **through** the institutions it has created, pronounced on an issue with such **accord** and with such a coincidence of views and attitudes.

19. The principles adumbrated in those resolutions remain as valid today as they were when adopted. These principles, succinctly stated, are: **respect** for the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and non-alignment of the Republic of Cyprus; the need to refrain from all acts and interventions directed against that Republic; the speedy withdrawal of all armed forces, military personnel and **any** presence alien to it; the cessation of all foreign interference 'in the affairs of the Republic; the return—**an early return**—of all refugees to their homes in safety; the urgent necessity for negotiations on an equal footing between the two communities to reach freely a mutually **acceptable** political settlement.

20. **My** Government expected that the principles contained in the resolutions would have been fully respected, and that the actions required by their provisions would have been expeditiously undertaken by all the parties concerned. Not only have the resolutions remained unimplemented, but events since their adoption have **so** disturbed the prospects for a solution that there has developed a mood of uncertainty, disappointment and, indeed, trepidation which has made these meetings urgent and necessary.

21. Whatever the motivations and intentions of the announcement made on 13 February by the Turkish Cypriot leadership, one of its clear effects has been the introduction of an element which has caused a deterioration in the climate in which intercommunal negotiations were being conducted. It is an element which, in the view of my delegation, hinders rather than helps the situation. In this respect, we share the concern of the Secretary-General at this **turn** of events.

22. The task which faces the Security Council is essentially twofold: there is the need to induce those parties on which special responsibilities devolve to proceed urgently with the implementation of the resolutions and to take, if necessary, appropriate steps to produce action towards this end; and there is the need to facilitate the urgent resumption of talks.

23. Meaningful negotiations cannot be conducted under duress. It was in recognition of this fundamental **principle** that paragraph 4 of resolution 3212 (XXIX) **referred** to the continuation of intercommunal talks **on** an equal footing and in conditions which would **permit** a mutually acceptable political settlement to be arrived at freely. My delegation seriously doubts whether such conditions are attainable as long as there is no movement towards the implementation of

paragraph 2 of that resolution. Any of the parties concerned that takes contrary action or refuses to comply with the provisions of the resolution, frustrates the negotiations and disregards the expressed will of **this Organization**.

24. The acquiescence of the Council in the non-implementation of the resolutions would have disturbing consequences both for the future of Cyprus and for the image of the United Nations.

25. It is the view of my delegation that new measures must now be considered—measures designed to ensure the implementation of the resolution and to secure the resumption of talks. In paragraph 6 of resolution 3212 (XXIX) provision is made for such **an** eventuality.

26. Thus, my delegation would not be averse to the institution of a reasonable time frame within which the implementation of the provisions of the resolution can be expected. But parallel action needs to be taken in relation to the resumption of the **intercommunal** talks. There is, as the Secretary-General observed in his address to the Council on 21 February, **“a new and tense situation, because there is now a vacuum which can all too easily be filled by renewed violence [1814th meeting, para. 9]. My** delegation believes that it is now necessary to consider new arrangements which will assist in creating favourable conditions for the continuation and the successful outcome of the intercommunal talks. Action in this respect may take several possible directions and Guyana is willing to consider any reasonable proposal which is susceptible of producing concrete results.

27. On the question of Cyprus, the prime objective remains the development of a harmonious relationship between the communities indigenous to the Republic of Cyprus. None more than the Cypriots themselves desire this. The gropings towards this objective may be arduous, for deeply held feelings deriving from a vivid experience of past reality cannot be wished away. But, in relation to Cyprus, there is a present danger that a too mechanistic harking back to the past, combined with a resort to unilateral action **purporting** to create a new reality, can so imprison us that new opportunities for accommodation and adjustment are allowed to slip from **our** grasp, and new rigidities obtrude in the search for a solution.

28. The leader of the delegation from the **Government** of the Republic of Cyprus observed in his statement on 20 February **[1813th meeting]** that mistakes have been made by all sides. It is important, however, that the nature of those mistakes not unduly impair the prospects for the future of Cyprus. **Difficult** as the circumstances appear at present, there is a clear imperative for forward movement. For its part, my delegation remains ready to participate in any effort designed to foster such a development.

29. I should like to express to the Secretary-General my delegation's appreciation for his special report on developments in Cyprus [S/11624] and for his useful statement of 21 February. My delegation would also like to take this opportunity to commend the Secretary-General for the efforts he has been making, through quiet diplomacy, to nudge the parties concerned towards a resolution of the serious and complex issues dividing them and also to commend, in this connection, Mr. **Weckmann-Muñoz**, for the efforts he has made **carrying** out the onerous task he **has** been performing on **behalf of** the **Secretary-General**.

30. Mr. RYDBECK (Sweden): Mr. President, the Swedish delegation would first of all like to congratulate you on your assumption of the office of President of the Security Council. We also want to thank you for your kind words of welcome to our delegation, as well as to the other new members of the Council.

31. My delegation would also like to take this opportunity to thank Mr. Tchemouchtchenko, the President of the Council during the month of January, for the **efficient** and very cordial manner in which he guided the informal consultations among the Security Council members.

32. I should also like to address some words of thanks to my neighbour, Mr. Malik, for his words of welcome to my delegation the other day.

33. After 16 years, Sweden is again assuming the duties of membership in the Security Council. The Swedish delegation on the Council pledges its full co-operation with all delegations and an active contribution in the creation of a working atmosphere of mutual trust and understanding that is so essential for solving the complex issues that face the Council.

34. When the Security Council, in the fulfilment of its responsibility under the Charter, is faced once again with the duty of seeking ways of contributing to the solution of the grave problems that the situation prevailing in Cyprus presents not only to the people of Cyprus but also to the international community, the point of departure, in the view of my Government, is clear. **General** Assembly resolution 3212 (XXIX), which was adopted unanimously after intensive negotiations and supported by all the parties most closely concerned in the Cyprus conflict, that is, Cyprus; Greece and Turkey, and which was later endorsed by the Council, contains all the essential elements on which a solution to the problem of Cyprus must be founded. First and foremost this means that any solution that is eventually reached must be based on the principle of full respect for the national integrity, sovereignty and independence of the Republic of Cyprus. The goal being to create the foundation for lasting peace and harmonious relations between the communities in Cyprus, it is

clear that neither partition nor *enosis* can **achieve it**. Nor must other extraneous factors, such as /strategic considerations on the part of great Powers, be allowed to interfere with a solution aimed at **safeguarding** the legitimate interests of the people of **Cyprus and** peace in the area. Cyprus must be guaranteed **the** right to continue its policy of non-alignment.

35. It is with regret that my delegation **has** to note that there has so far **been** no substantial **progress** towards the **implementation** of **the** resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security **Council**.

36. The decision of 13 February 1975 by the Turkish Cypriot administration to establish a **Turkish** Federated State of the Republic of Cyprus was **taken** while negotiations were going on between the **representatives** of the two communities for a **political settle-**ment. It has been argued that this measure **in** effect only reflects a position already taken by **the** Turkish Cypriot side during the intercommunal talks. Still, it cannot be denied that the measure had a **negative** impact on the conditions in which negotiations have to be pursued. In fact it led to the **interruption** of the negotiations, which had shown certain **signs** of progress.

37. In -the present situation, Sweden **considers** it to be the duty of the Security **Council** to **concentrate** all its efforts on finding means of bringing about negotiations which can lead to a peaceful, **just** and lasting solution to the Cyprus problem. **No** suggestions should be left untried. Primarily, it is of course for the Cypriot people themselves to find **the** final solution to their **political** problems **through** negotia-tions. However, -given **the** dangers **that** ~~the~~-eaten peace in the island and in the area, if a move **forward** towards a peaceful settlement does not **soon** take place, the Council, which has the responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and **security**, is under an obligation actively to assist the parties in finding new approaches to a peaceful settlement.

38. Having listened carefully to the **statements** of the parties, it seems obvious to my **delegation** **that** what is needed is a new procedure which will **make** it possible to reach a negotiated solution **that** will safeguard both the peace and the prosperity of the Cypriot people and peace and security in the area.

39. Mr. Clerides, explaining why in his **opinion** it is essential to find such a new procedure, has **appealed** to the Council to assist the parties in this **endeavour**. Mr. **Celik** has, it is true, not found any need **for** a new procedure, but he has, on the other hand, **told** the Council that his side is interested in **continued** talks with the Greek Cypriot side. While in no **way** under-estimating the **difficulties**, my delegation **considers** that we thus have before us the basic **elements** which should form the point of departure for **action** on the part of the Council and which could lead to a **resump-**tion of negotiations.

40. In this context, the Swedish delegation wants to call to the attention of the Council the important role the Secretary-General has played in getting the parties together in -the last year and the significant role that, in our opinion, he could and should play in the search for new procedures acceptable to all parties concerned. My delegation wants to pay a sincere tribute to the Secretary-General for his very constructive contributions up to now, and we invite the members of the Council to consider the role that the Secretary-General personally could play in creating the new setting that is obviously needed to set the machinery of negotiations in motion. During the consultations that will undoubtedly take place before the Council reaches a decision, my delegation will be interested in exploring with other delegations the possibilities of enlarging the role of the Secretary-General in promoting the resumption and pursuance of talks and providing a new framework for them.

41. The conflict in Cyprus **has** created extremely serious humanitarian problems. The response of the international community to the appeals of the Secretary-General for assistance in alleviating them has certainly been positive. However, the need for continued emergency relief operations in accordance with, inter *alia*, Security Council resolution 361 (1974) remains.

42. One deplorable consequence of the discontinuation of the talks between the parties has been that efforts to solve acute humanitarian problems in consultation have also been discontinued. The Swedish delegation, well aware of the fact that lasting solutions to the humanitarian problems can be found only in connexion with the solution of the political questions, nevertheless wants to stress the importance of finding as soon as possible means of alleviating here and now the suffering of a large part of the population of Cyprus. The solution of the acute problems must not wait until agreement is reached concerning the form that the resumed negotiations should take, let alone until a political solution has been achieved. It is therefore important that in dealing with the Cyprus problem the Council take into consideration the immediate humanitarian problems.

43. The new political situation that has arisen means an increased risk of **conflicts** in Cyprus. The United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), which even at this stage has a very difficult task to fulfil, should in our opinion be maintained without force reductions. The parties should be urged to facilitate the activities of UNFICYP. Among other things, this concerns the right of the forces to free movement in the area. The report of the Secretary-General [*ibid.*] describes the specific problem concerning movements within the area under Turkish rule. The Swedish delegation hopes that the parties will make efforts to facilitate the activities of the forces.

44. Relations between the two communities in Cyprus have a long and bitter political history. We are aware that many of the claims and complaints put forward by the two sides are justified. Therefore only solutions which take into account the rights and duties of both parties, and which are freely accepted by them, can last. The goal must be to arrive at a solution whose only necessary guarantee would be the Charter of the United Nations:

45. Mr. LECOMPT (France) (*interpretation from French*): Mr. President, may I first convey to you my delegation's congratulations on your presidency. At this time, when this body is concerned with a particularly difficult question, your great qualities are certainly necessary for the task. I would therefore, also as a representative of my country, **offer** my sincerest good wishes to you as the representative of China, a country with which the France of General de Gaulle, President Pompidou and President **Giscard d'Estaing** has had relations of trust and friendship that it wishes to maintain. I should also like to convey to the representative of the **Byelorussian SSR** an expression of our deep appreciation of his work as President of the Council, which was associated with a much calmer period no doubt but one which was none the less marked by useful consultations.

46. Since this is the **first** time my delegation has spoken in the Council, this year, I have the pleasant duty of extending a welcome to the new members of the Council with whom my delegation is pleased to take **up—or**, in the case of some, to resume—a task of collaboration, which we hope will prove fruitful.

47. It also devolves upon me to express our regret and our thanks to the delegations of those States which left the Council on 31 December last. Together, we had to cope with certain major crises, and no one has any doubt that we shall all derive the greatest benefit from maintaining the closest possible contacts with those delegations, which have a wealth of experience.

48. Since 16 July last, the Security Council has devoted about 18 meetings to the Cyprus crisis; it has adopted 10 resolutions, some reflecting the needs and circumstances of the hour and others sketching out, for the future, the principles of a solution which, above all, should consist in a reconciliation between the two communities. For its part the General Assembly brought together the various components of a possible settlement in a single resolution, resolution 3212 (XXIX), which the Council later endorsed. That basic text, the result of the efforts of a group of non-aligned countries, was adopted unanimously. Each of the parties—the Republic of Cyprus, Greece and **Turkey**—has therefore accepted its provisions.

49. None the less, weeks and then months have gone by, and today we note that despite the resolutions of the United Nations, negotiations between the

representatives of the two communities towards a political settlement were broken off before they had ever really begun, that foreign armed forces are still on the territory of the Republic of Cyprus and that **the** refugees have been unable to return to their homes. We note that the **suffering** has not diminished and that the crisis goes on, threatening the peace and security not only of the island but also of that particularly sensitive region, the eastern Mediterranean.

50. **What** is more, whereas any solution must be based, as we have steadily asserted, on the search for **an** agreement between the two communities making up the Republic of Cyprus, one of them, by a unilateral decision, is creating a serious obstacle to the necessary dialogue.

51. We can only disapprove of an initiative that obviously undermines paragraph 4 of General Assembly resolution 3212 (XXIX), which provides that negotiations between the two communities 'should continue "with a view to reaching freely a mutually acceptable political settlement, based on their **fundamental** and legitimate 'rights*'.⁶

52. How can anyone deny that the fait accompli is prejudicial to the political settlement that should be the outcome of the negotiations? How can anyone claim that one of the parties is not deprived of the freedom required by the foregoing resolution? How can anyone fail to see that one of the fundamental points of a solution is not, in these circumstances, mutually acceptable?

53. We **shall** doubtless be told, in reply, that this is an internal matter and that what has been created is not a separate entity of the Republic of Cyprus but only the Turkish part of a Cypriot federation made up of two States. But, whatever may be the assurances that people wish to give us with respect to the sovereignty and independence of the Republic of Cyprus, we deplore an action that leads one of the communities to attempt to impose on the other the terms of a settlement which the General Assembly and then the Council said must be the fruit of free negotiations. Does not the constitutional regime of the Cypriot State concern the two communities equally, as indeed resolution 3212 (XXIX) spells out?

54. But peace in the eastern Mediterranean is essential, and since it depends to a large extent on relations between Greece and Turkey, we must hope that those two very important States members of our international community will display equal moderation; that could only have consequences favourable to the search for a solution in Cyprus itself.

55. In view of that situation, so fraught with danger, what should our attitude be? First of all, we must recall the standing principles to which we have adhered since the outset of the crisis. Those principles have been defined progressively by our resolutions.

The nine members of the European Community expressed in the General Assembly their common position, which fits into this framework. I shall recall that position. **First**, we are devoted to the [idea of the maintenance of the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of **Cyprus**. In our opinion, that rules out a settlement leading to a partition or an annexation of all or part of the island. It implies the application of the provisions of the resolutions of the Organization, which in particular call for the withdrawal of foreign forces from the territory of the Republic of Cyprus. **Secondly**, we attach special importance to the painful **question** of the refugees, a question affecting about one **third** of the population of the island. This is a humanitarian question, and on that ground alone 'it is incumbent upon the international community to deal with it. But it is a political question also because **it** ties at the very heart of a settlement and because, if it is not solved quickly, it can degenerate into a serious international problem. **Thirdly**, with **regard** to the modalities of a settlement of the Cyprus question, we feel that the agreement of the two communities making up the Republic of Cyprus is an essential condition. Obviously, it is their legitimate interests and the protection of their identity that are involved. Hence, we feel that this settlement, if it is to be lasting, equitable and mutually acceptable, should be achieved through negotiation. In that connection, we would reject any unilateral action which, departing from that course, would be likely to worsen the situation and delay a solution of the problem. Moreover, we would remind the Council that we do not **recognize** the existence in Cyprus of any **Government** other than that of the Republic of Cyprus.

56. Having thus spelled out the principles on which the search for a settlement should be based and which call for the speedy and complete implementation of the **resolutions** of the Organization, I would ask: what action can we take to overcome the present crisis and create conditions propitious to a **resumption** of negotiations? Constitutional proposals have been put forward by the two negotiators. They contain important differences on certain fundamental points; on other points they are close together. But they are all within the framework of the same perspective -namely, that of a federal State-and what remains to be done is to define the juridical and territorial structures of that federal State. Therefore, there seems to exist a useful basis for resuming **negotiations**, on condition that **they** can be carried out on a footing of equality and **in** complete freedom. **That** presupposes a readiness on both sides not to take as definitive the situations existing at the outset. Is that not, moreover, the very meaning of the word "**proposal**" used by the two negotiators to **define** the concepts included in the documents **exchanged** two weeks ago?

57. Moreover, to assist the parties to return to the negotiating table-for they must of **necessity** return

to that table, relations between the two communities being the very crux of the problem—we might invite our Secretary-General, within the framework of a new good-offices mission, to make himself available to the parties. His persevering efforts and those of his Special Representative*, as well as the devotion with which UNFICYP is discharging its tasks, guarantees to him the necessary confidence, and that would be strengthened by the backing and authority of the Security Council. This mission, in which we place all our hopes, in no way affects the readiness that some of us, linked to the parties by special relations, have shown to be of service in due course, if that should prove necessary. In that connection, I should like to remind the Council of the statement which the nine members of the Community made in Dublin on 13 February 1975 and which the representative of the current President of the Community has placed before the members of the Council. The members of the Community, which have a common tie to the countries directly concerned, declared themselves “willing to hold discussions with representatives of all the interested parties” [S/11629]. May they see in this offer evidence of the quite natural interest and solidarity linking countries belonging to the same continent, peoples with traditional friendly relations, States bound by ties of association.

58. We are not unaware of the ‘difficulties of the task, having regard to a legitimate resentment aroused by the present situation. None the less, we have observed the agreement of the international community as a whole, including the Member States directly concerned, with the principles which should guide the settlement. We have noted also the reaction produced by the unilateral decision which is the root cause of the crisis. And, lastly, we have noted the will expressed here to assist the parties to renew the dialogue. On that basis, and in accordance with terms that we shall have to define, we would like to believe that it would be possible to resume and to conclude successfully the search for a mutually acceptable political settlement which we are longing for with all our hearts.

59. Naturally I cannot conclude this statement without expressing the full thanks of the French delegation for the efforts already made by the Secretary-General and by his Special Representative, Mr. Weckmann-Muñoz, to facilitate a rapprochement between the parties. We have already had since last summer definite evidence of the favourable influence which the Secretary-General has been able to wield to promote the opening of a dialogue, and then the second series of talks which he has just conducted in that part of the world has had a marked effect on the process which we would all like to see resumed and concluded.

60. The PRESIDENT (translation from Chinese): Mr. Çelik ‘has informed me of his wish to make a further statement. In conformity with the Council’s

decision taken at the 1813th meeting. I now invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

61. Mr. ÇELİK: I have found it necessary to ask to be allowed to speak for a second time in order to comment on some of the remarks made by Mr. Clerides during his statement to the Council on 21 February [1814th meeting]. Although at the beginning of his statement on 20 February [1813th meeting] Mr. Clerides stated that it was not his intention to “apportion blame”, during both his statements before the Council he went to extremes to do that; and the Turkish side has been presented as being wholly responsible for what has been going on in Cyprus for the last 12 years.

62. It is not my intention to enter into unproductive and definitely unnecessary dialogue with Mr. Clerides, but with the Council’s indulgence I feel it necessary to touch upon the main issues raised by him and to put the record straight regarding some points of substance which will help to clarify the position of the two sides and enable the members of the Council to make a better and healthier appraisal of the whole situation.

63. Mr. Clerides started his statement by repeating the well-known Greek Cypriot claim that the Greek Cypriot delegation to the United Nations can and does represent Cyprus as a whole. But Mr. Clerides, as an able lawyer, should know better.

64. The 1960 Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus, which is based on the Zurich and London agreements of February 1959, provides for the establishment of a binational State in which the two founder communities, namely, the Turkish and Greek communities, share in the independence, sovereignty and administration of the State. It is for this reason that the Constitution contains express and categorical provisions for the participation of both communities in the administration of the State and in all its organs and at all levels. Ever since the Turkish Cypriot partners in the binational Republic of Cyprus were ousted from the administration of the State by force of arms on 21 December 1963, the so-called Cyprus Government has comprised Greek Cypriots only.

65. Article 46 of the 1960 Constitution provides, *inter alia*, that the Council of Ministers, through which the executive power is ensured shall be composed of seven Greek ministers and three Turkish ministers. It follows, therefore, that in the absence of the three Turkish ministers, for this reason alone the Greek Cypriot Council of Ministers has not been constituted and could not be regarded as functioning since 21 December 1963 as the Council of Ministers of the Republic, in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. Therefore, in the absence, of a constitutional Council of Ministers and a government composed of both the Turkish and Greek elements

of the binational State, the Greek Cypriot delegation cannot in any circumstances represent the Republic of Cyprus as a whole and in particular the Turkish Cypriot community.

66. As regards the title under which I take the floor, let it suffice to remind Mr. Clerides that this has been decided by the General Assembly and has been acted upon.

67. Mr. Clerides attributed the "regrettable inter-communal violence" to the "unworkable Constitution imposed on the people of Cyprus by the Zurich and London agreements", when in fact it was due to the armed onslaught on the Turkish Cypriot community of December 1963, which was organized and carried out with the sole objective of achieving enosis—union of Cyprus with Greece.

68. As regards the "unworkable" Constitution of Cyprus, I can only say that before a constitution is branded "unworkable", it has to be implemented, it has to be tried, it has to be given a chance. This was never done with the Cyprus Constitution. It should suffice to quote Professor Forstoff, the eminent German jurist who was President of the Constitutional Court of Cyprus from 1960 to 1963. Professor Forstoff said:

"The crisis was the result of President Makarios' anti-Turkish policy. I myself was convinced that if the Government of Cyprus had been able to stick to the Constitution for five years, most of the problems would have been mastered. I have told Makarios that time and again. Every constitution has its peculiar problems. There is no constitution in the world which has not got its particular difficulties and problems. This is primarily a question of good will. If there is good will a constitution can be implemented, and this Cypriot Constitution is capable of being implemented.*"

I do not think this needs any further comment.

69. Mr. Clerides rejected my statement that the Turkish members had been expelled from the Government in December 1963 and claimed that Mr. Küçük, the then Vice-President, had left the Government of his own accord and proclaimed that he was no longer the Vice-President of the Republic of Cyprus. That this is not so is obvious from the very records of this Council.

70. Mr. Küçük continued to be the Vice-President of the Republic of Cyprus until February 1973; he was known and recognized as such by the Secretary-General, by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Cyprus and by the Commander and officers of UNFICYP, as well as by foreign Governments, which continued to have official dealings with him in his capacity as the Vice-President of the Republic of Cyprus until he retired on 28 February 1973.

71. The Secretary-General, in his report to the Security Council of 1 December 1972 that was the last report before Mr. Küçük's retirement—refers to Mr. Küçük as the Vice-President [S/10842, para. 52]. The same thing applies to the Turkish Cypriot members of the House of Representatives.

72. As a matter of fact, Mr. Clerides confirmed my statement that the Turkish members were kept away from the House of Representatives when he stated:

"First, the Turkish members would for safety reasons be escorted to the premises of the House of Representatives by the United Nations Peace-keeping Force; second, within the precincts of the House of Representatives, I and the Greek members of the House would accept full responsibility and take the necessary measures for their protection." [1814th meeting, para. 24.]

73. It is obvious from this statement that the Turkish members could not, for a period of time, go to the House of Representatives for fear of their lives. At this point I should like to remind the members of the Council that these were the dark days of early 1964 when the Turkish Cypriots were being shot at sight. The security risk involved becomes all the more obvious by Mr. Clerides's confirmation that the lives of the Turkish members were in danger even within the precincts of the House, and that he had undertaken to take special security measures to protect them. That was the situation prevailing during the period that the Turkish members stayed away—they had to stay away from the House.

74. When, however, later on, things seemed to be relatively quieter and the Turkish members thought they should take the chance and return to the House, Mr. Clerides in my first statement I avoided mentioning his name, to save embarrassment—as the President of the House of Representatives refused to allow them to do so, and presented them with an ultimatum to the effect that unless they agreed to the abrogation of the Constitution and endorsed the unconstitutional laws enacted in their absence, by their Greek Cypriot counterparts, their return to the House would be prevented by physical force. This incident was related in the Secretary-General's report to the Security Council of 29 July 1965 [St6569 and Add.1].

75. Mr. Clerides, who is here at the Security Council, protesting most eloquently against "negotiations at gun-point", should not expect the Turkish Cypriot representatives to attend meetings of the House at "gun-point".

76. Mr. Clerides very generously proposed to dismantle the Greek National Guard and hand over its arms to an enlarged United Nations peace-keeping force. Now, with all due respect to Mr. Clerides, this is a political statement, and I have a few questions

to ask on the subject. What proportion of the armed elements in Cyprus does the Greek National Guard represent? Who is going to disarm or disband Sampson's army or **Lyssarides's** army that everybody knows exist? Who is going to disarm EOKA? Who is going to disarm EOKA-B, EOKA-C, EOKA-D, and God knows how many EOKAS there are underground, ready, at the push of a button, to resort to arms and embark upon completing the half-finished job? Who is going to do this? **Mr. Clerides** personally? Or Makarios's administration?

77. I am sorry to have to observe here, both for the sake of the Turkish Cypriot community and for the sake of Cyprus as a whole, that the record of **Makarios's** administration in this respect is not very bright. They have failed to prevent the secret importation of arms and the establishment of clandestine armies - unless, of course, they allowed this knowingly, hoping that they would be used against the common enemy, the Turkish Cypriot community. But he who sows the seeds of war reaps havoc. These armies were used later on to depose Makarios himself, as he himself stated in these very chambers.

78. **Despite** apparent efforts, Makarios's administration had failed to disband and dissolve EOKA-B. They failed to disarm "illegal groups" and the so-called Government's proclamations calling on people and setting deadlines for the handing in of **illegally**-held arms and ammunitions never received any response. But why go into details?

79. Despite a few attempts on his life, Makarios did not dare stand up against the armed groups responsible for those attempts. Even Sampson and his men and all those responsible for the **coup** of 15 July are immune from any action or prosecution; they roam around freely, writing their memoirs of the coup in the daily papers, and boasting about how they spared Makarios's life and gave him the opportunity to leave the island - not failing meanwhile to sing hymns to **enosis**.

80. Now, these being known to be the facts, I have serious doubts as to how **seriously** one can take Mr. Clerides' proposal. Nevertheless, I should like to inform the members of the Council that I shall be the first heartily to congratulate Mr. Clerides on his success if he succeeds in disarming the Greek Cypriots and to assure him publicly that the Turkish side will not be found slow or lacking in readiness to respond.

81. I shall even go one step further and officially propose to Mr. **Clerides**, here and now, **the** establishment of a **de facto** demilitarized zone along the **Greek** and Turkish regions of the island as a first step towards bringing normality to the island.

82. Regarding the enlargement of UNFICYP, I should like to place on record once more what is

already on record in the United Nations archives, namely, that the Makarios' administration - that is, until July 1974 - **not** only failed to assist and co-operate with UNFICYP in its difficult task of peace-keeping but, by flagrant exploitation of **governmental** authority, constantly resorted to the secret **importation** of arms and ammunition in violation of the status quo ante and made UNFICYP's task difficult, not to say impossible.

83. The famous Czechoslovak arms and the armoured vehicles from Great Britain, **despatched** under the guise of agricultural equipment, which were secretly imported by Makarios, but when detected, and upon protestation by us, were placed in UNFICYP's custody, are only minor examples of how insincere and **unco-operative** the Greek Cypriots were in their dealings with UNFICYP. Unless there is a change of attitude, a change of mentality, unless there is a new and sincere intention and desire to live and let live, the size of UNFICYP will not change things much.

84. We have great respect for UNFICYP and we deeply appreciate its valuable contribution and efforts for the maintenance of peace on the island. But I cannot help nothing with regret the occasions when Makarios's armies **unheedingly** overpowered UNFICYP and attacked **innocent Turkish villages**. **Erenköy** (Kokkina) in 1964, and Gecitkale (Kophinou) in 1967, are only two examples of many similar incidents on record in the United Nations files.

85. Again, when the Turkish army intervened in Cyprus last July, occupied Greek Cypriot military positions were found to be full of United Nations military uniforms, which were used by Greek forces to infiltrate Turkish-controlled areas.

86. Although I should like to clear UNFICYP of all **responsibility** in this matter, I have to put on record that such exploitation by the Greek Cypriot administration of UNFICYP's presence on the island is not conducive to the Force's success or to peace in Cyprus.

87. Regarding Mr. Clerides' suggestion that Moslem countries might also contribute to UNFICYP, -although we would welcome contingents from Moslem countries, I should like to make it most emphatically clear that we have nothing against the present contingents, in which we have great faith and trust, and I would like to avail myself of this opportunity to express our gratitude and appreciation to all contributing countries. Nevertheless, this is a political **matter** which has to be negotiated between the interested parties and cannot be decided upon here today.

88. In response to my statement that there was not a single Turk in Makarios' recently reconstituted Cabinet, Mr. Clerides said:

“As soon as the Sampson Government was forced to resign I asked Mr. **Weckmann-Muñoz**, together with General Prem Chand, to accompany me to the house of Mr. Denktag, which they very kindly did, while firing was still continuing in the Nicosia area.

“What was the object of my visit? In the presence of Mr. **Weckmann-Muñoz** and of General Prem Chand. I saw Mr. Denktag—af that time I was the Acting President of the Republic—and made the following offer to him: that, together, we should form a Government, consisting of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, to occupy ministries in accordance with the provisions of the 1960 Constitution.” [1814th meeting, paras. 27 and 28.]

89. Mr. Clerides went on to say that Mr. Denktag showed interest in his proposal but that after consultations with Turkey he had informed him that the proposition “was not possible for the time being” *ibid.*, para. 28].

90. Some parts of the story are true. Mr. Clerides did make that proposal and Mr. Denktag did say that the proposition was not possible for the time being. But Mr. Clerides’ proposition was rejected by the Ministerial Council of the Autonomous Turkish Cypriot Administration and not by the Turkish Government, which to date may or may not know about the proposal.

91. The following are the true facts regarding this matter: first, as stated by Mr. Clerides, the visit took place at a time when fighting was still going on in Nicosia, and it will be appreciated that a time of fighting is not the most opportune time to set up a joint Government between two communities which have been separated and in a state of conflict for the past 12 years. Secondly, although Mr. Clerides said “as soon as the Sampson Government was forced to resign”, I must recall that it was not the Sampson Government but Sampson personally who resigned. Sampson’s Cabinet, which was appointed by the junta, remained in office, and it was this same Cabinet that Mr. Clerides headed. Thirdly, and most important, we had serious doubts about Mr. Clerides’ position as President, because, although he said in his statement that he was then the Acting President, things were not all that clear.

92. Mr. Clerides, upon Sampson’s resignation, was sworn in as President by a bishop who incidentally, had previously been deposed by Archbishop Makarios but who had been reinstated by the junta after the coup, perhaps for this particular purpose. The ceremony did not even take place at the House of Representatives, where it normally should. Had Mr. Clerides been the Acting President, as he says he was, there was no reason for him to be sworn in as President. All indications were that the junta, under pressure, dismissed Sampson, who proved to

be unacceptable to everybody both within and outside Cyprus, and called in Mr. Clerides to fill his place as the head of the same Cabinet.

93. I know—I was present, and Mr. Clerides can correct me if I am wrong—that when Mr. Clerides sent word and expressed the desire to meet Mr. Denktas, Mr. Denktas called him by telephone personally and politely asked him to clarify his position with regard to his presidential status, saying that otherwise there would be no point in meeting. Although Mr. Clerides had made a statement in that regard, his position remained ambiguous and, especially in view of his Cabinet, it was decided not to respond to his proposals for the time being.

94. The fighting that had been going on at the time of the visit was a fight to overthrow the junta and not to form a coalition Government with it. If Mr. Denktas was not so explicit with Mr. Clerides, in reply, most probably it was because he did not want to embarrass him.

95. Mr. Clerides did not like my claim that we are co-founders in the independence of Cyprus and that we are the real defenders of the independence and non-alignment of the island. On the contrary, he went so far as to accuse us of being in favour of colonial rule and to say that we opposed Cyprus’s participation in the First Conference of Heads of States or Government of Non-Aligned Countries in Belgrade.

96. That we did not favour colonial rule is obvious from the fight we put up against the British and the number of people we lost during the 1957-1959 crisis. As regards the Turkish Cypriot position concerning partition, it has always been frank and crystal clear. For us partition was the antidote to enosis, an enosis which was wanted by all—I repeat; all—the Greek Cypriots, President, leadership and people. This has been placed on record many times, and it has been placed on record by the Greek Cypriots themselves with the publication of their infamous Akritas Plan.

97. The plan, published on 21 April 1966 by the Greek Cypriot daily *Patris*, which was the organ of General Givas, provides incriminating evidence against Archbishop Makarios, who as Head of State is shown to have set up armies and plotted for the destruction of the State of Cyprus. According to the Akritas Plan, Makarios, who took up the task of military preparation, entrusted his then Minister of the Interior, the late Mr. Yorgadjis, who took up the code name Akritas, with the task of establishing the organization. His Minister of Labour, Mr. Tassos Papadopoulos, a member of the Greek Cypriot delegation here today, was appointed as Deputy Chief of the organization and Mr. Glafcos Clerides became Chief of Operations.

98. The authenticity of this plan, which has been given very wide coverage in both the Greek C & r i o t

and the Turkish Cypriot press, not to mention the foreign press, has never been challenged by the Greek Cypriot leadership. They merely said that it was a "contingency plan". What sort of a "contingency plan" it was, the Turkish Cypriot community found out through bitter experience during the years 1963-1967.

99. But in his statement before the Council on 21 February [1814th meeting], Mr. Clerides declared that he was a man committed to **independence**. We welcome the change of heart and assure Mr. Clerides that as long as the Greek Cypriot side sticks faithfully to independence we shall not resort to partition. In fact, we shall not allow partition under any circumstances.

100. Mr. **Küçük's** alleged opposition to Cyprus's participation in the first conference of non-aligned countries, which took place in Belgrade, was not an opposition in principle to non-alignment but a protestation against the violation of the constitutional rights of the Turkish Cypriot community by the Makarios regime. According to our Constitution, the **Vice-President** should have been consulted on all foreign matters, and he was not. The, protestation was made on legal **and** constitutional grounds and had nothing to do with the Turkish Cypriot community's dedication to the policy of non-alignment. The Turkish Cypriot community's devotion to non-alignment is clear both from official statements and from our dealings and relations with non-aligned countries.

101. Although we were ousted from the Government in 1963 and have not been allowed to participate and officially raise our voice in international forums and conferences since, we have constantly applied for observer status for non-aligned conferences and, although we could not get in for obvious reasons, we attended the conferences even in an unofficial capacity. To give but one example, I personally represented the Turkish Cypriot community at the Conference of Ministers for Foreign **Affairs of Non-Aligned Countries**, held at Georgetown, Guyana, in 1972, in an unofficial capacity. There was no other alternative .

102. The belief of the Turkish Cypriot community in the necessity of the non-aligned status of the Republic of Cyprus **and** its determination not to allow the island to become subservient to any foreign interest was incorporated as a basic article in the proclamation of the Turkish Federated State of the Republic of Cyprus on 13 February 1975.

103. As regards Mr. Clerides' objection to my claim that the Turkish Cypriot community is the real defender of the independence, territorial integrity and non-alignment of Cyprus, I shall only ask Mr. Clerides one question: had it not been for the Turkish Cypriot community, would there be an independent Cyprus today and would he be here to represent it, or

would he be a member from southern Greece in the Greek delegation to the United Nations?

104. Regarding my statement on the subject of the return initially of about 13,000 Greek Cypriot refugees to the Turkish-controlled area, I can only say that the offer still stands. I understand that about 8,000 Greek Cypriot refugees have already returned to Athienou. The remaining 5,000 can also return to villages to be agreed upon. If the Greek Cypriot side, instead of running to New York, had chosen to continue negotiations in Nicosia, these people would probably have returned to their homes by now.

105. On the question of missing persons, I am afraid Mr. Clerides was not very convincing when he said that they know the persons who were killed in the **coup** "because they died fighting". But the whole world knows of the house-to-house hunt for the leftists carried out by the junta, and the mass arrests of people who were taken away never to return again.

106. Again, Sampson, who was one of the leading "heroes" of the **coup**, is world famous not as a fighter but as a cold-blooded killer who always shoots in the back.

107. Mr. Clerides alleged that 140 Greek Cypriots from the village of Akhna were taken to the Nicosia garage of **Pavrides** from where they disappeared; he claims to have indisputable evidence of this, but we are given none. Secondly, he referred to another instance where 13 people were said to have been arrested at Yialousa, and alleged that Mr. Denktas had admitted the arrests. I have been instructed by Mr. Denktas to deny most emphatically this allegation, which is untrue and unfounded.

108. I have also been instructed and **authorized** to state officially in this Council that there are no Greek Cypriot prisoners of war and/or civilian detainees held by the Turkish side. Mr. **Denktas** has more than once informed Mr. Clerides officially of this, and offered to make an official statement to that effect, but Mr. Clerides requested him not to do so, because, he said, it would have political implications for him. Mr. Clerides was informed about this both by Mr. **Denktas** personally, and through Mr. Gorge, the senior political and legal adviser of UNFICYP in Cyprus. Can Mr. Clerides make a statement, here and now, to the effect that no Turkish Cypriot prisoners of war and/or civilian detainees are being held by the Greek Cypriot administration?

109. Mr. Clerides disagreed with me over the priorities of the agenda of the intercommunal talks. Although this is a minor point, I should like to put the record straight. Although at the outset, when the agenda was first prepared, the order of priorities ran: power and functions of the central Government; airports; and seaports, both sides needed time to

prepare for the exchange of documents, both sides needed expert advice from abroad on the constitutional problem, which was not immediately available, so the agenda, by mutual consent, was amended accordingly and negotiations started on the airport and the seaports. What I had stated was the last form of the agenda.

110. This brings me to the question of the airport. The Turkish Cypriot position concerning the reopening of the Lefkose (Nicosia) Airport is clear. We proposed the reopening of the airport to international traffic under the following conditions: the airport would be managed jointly by the two communities, on an equal footing; there would be two co-managers; there would be equal representation of both communities on the board of directors, and at all levels of the administrative set-up; and in order to facilitate an agreement, we further agreed to a neutral foreign airport manager, with two deputy managers, one Turkish Cypriot and one Greek Cypriot.

111. But Mr. Clerides rejected our proposals and insisted that the airport would be reopened with the Greek Cypriot staff, which was on their payroll as of 15 July 1974, and a number of Turkish Cypriots would also be employed. According to the Greek Cypriot press, the Turkish Cypriot offer was rejected because it would destroy the Greek image of the *de facto* Greek Cypriot Government of the last 12 years.

112. During his statement before the Council, Mr. Clerides, while dealing with the question of the airport, instead of putting forward constructive proposals for the solution of the problem, in an effort to accuse the Turkish side of intransigence chose to exaggerate and in a derisive manner **dramatize** the whole situation. These are serious matters which should not be taken lightly. It is this tendency to take serious matters lightly which has led Cyprus to the present impasse.

113. Mr. Clerides, while citing the generous proposals of the Greek Cypriot side, went out of his way to stress how magnanimously the Turkish Cypriot community, which was only 18 per cent of the population, was offered: **bi-communal** federation; a substantial area in the north; and other cantons, and asked if that was the way minorities have been treated.

114. I should like to place on record once more that the problem of Cyprus is, not a problem of majorities and minorities. Minorities can only exist within a nation, and as there is no Cypriot nation--and we have it from one of the highest authorities on the matter, the Archbishop himself--there can be no minority community in Cyprus. The fact is that we have in Cyprus two distinct national communities, which are equal partners and co-founders in the independence of Cyprus, and this has also been confirmed by General Assembly resolution 3212 (XXIX).

115. The **Cyprus** problem is much more serious than the Greek Cypriot side tries to make **out**: it is the fate of the independence and nonalignment of the island, and it is the question of survival, of the very existence, of the Turkish-Cypriot community.

116. This problem is too serious to be **reduced** to simple arithmetic. The Turkish Cypriot community cannot be offered 18 per cent of this right or 18 per cent of that right. It needs an equal **right to live** and to exist; it needs an equal right to prosper **economically**; it insists on equal rights in the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-alignment of the island. These basic fundamental rights cannot and shall not be reduced to simple numerical proportions.

117. If for the last 12 years the Greek Cypriot administration has persistently tried to **reduce** the Turkish Cypriot community to second-class citizenship; if for the last 12 years the Greek Cypriot administration has chosen to subject the Turkish Cypriot community to untold economic, social, administrative and political discrimination; if for the last 12 years the Greek Cypriot administration has tried, through the use of armed force, and for obvious reasons, to subjugate, expel or annihilate the whole of the Turkish community; if it has turned the Turkish enclaves into virtual prisons; if, through its policies and actions it has succeeded in **terrorizing** all the Turkish Cypriots and chasing them away from it, it has no one to blame but itself.

118. To quote Mr. Clerides himself: "Greek Cypriot thinking on **Cyprus** before the Turkish invasion was based on false assumptions, terrible mistakes and illusions".

119. This is exactly why we insist on equal rights. This is why we insist on a bi-regional federation. This is why we demand actual and physical guarantees. Not because Turkey wants it to be so, **but** because the events of the last 12 years have proved beyond the shadow of doubt that the very existence of the Turkish Cypriot community and the salvation of independence depend on such a solution.

120. With this understanding, I also extend my hand in friendship to Mr. Clerides--I **wish** he were here today--and assure him that the Turkish Cypriot community is willing and ready to resume negotiations immediately and to co-operate with the Greek Cypriot side in building a new, peaceful and prosperous Cyprus.

121. The **PRESIDENT (translation from Chinese)**: The next speaker is the representative of **Bulgaria**. In accordance with the decision taken at the outset of the meeting, I now invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his **statement**.

122. Mr. GROZEV (Bulgaria) (*interpretation from Russian*): Mr. President, first of all I **should** like to

thank you personally and the members of the Security Council for giving me the opportunity to speak in this highly responsible organ of the United Nations.

123. I should like to explain the views of the People's Republic of Bulgaria on the Cyprus question, which has come up for discussion once again, a question to which my Government, for reasons that are obvious to all, attaches particular importance, and the development of which it has been following with the greatest attention.

124. I should like to remind members that on 15 February, in Sofia, a communication from the Bulgarian News Agency on the latest events in Cyprus was published. That communication is contained in a document circulated on 18 February [S/11626].

125. The People's Republic of Bulgaria, as is well known, is not far from Cyprus. It ~~is~~ **is** the immediate neighbour of Turkey and Greece. It is therefore easy to understand our concern regarding the development of the Cyprus crisis and in particular the unilateral proclamation of a separate State structure by the leaders of the Turkish Cypriot community. These actions are without any doubt a direct infringement of United Nations resolutions, and in particular of General Assembly resolution 3212 (XXIX) and Security Council resolution 365 (1974).

126. The gravity of the situation which has recently arisen should not and cannot be underestimated. This problem is not only of local significance, it is also of the utmost fundamental importance, since it directly affects the very foundations of our Organization. We have here a direct threat to eliminate a non-aligned sovereign and independent State Member of the United Nations. If the international community permits this threat to materialize, it may prove to be an extremely dangerous precedent, particularly for certain non-aligned countries in the vicinity and for more distant countries, with very serious consequences for their independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity. Therefore it is only natural to expect those countries now to make an active and concrete contribution to a just settlement of the Cyprus question in accordance with the Charter and the decisions of the General Assembly and the Security Council.

127. The People's Republic of Bulgaria, situated as it is at the centre of the Balkan peninsula, has always attached and continues to attach the greatest importance to problems of peace, security and co-operation in that part of Europe. The Bulgarian Government has exerted and continues to exert every effort to create an atmosphere of trust and good-neighbourliness among Balkan countries and peoples. This is not a transitory policy. The facts show that we have been pursuing that policy consistently and unswervingly for more than 30 years.

128. The position of the Bulgarian Government on the Cyprus question and on the question of relations among Balkan countries was confirmed most clearly and unambiguously by the Chairman of the State Council of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, Comrade Todor Zhivkov, on 8 September 1974, when, in his speech on the occasion of the thirtieth anniversary of the socialist revolution in Bulgaria, he stated:

"We stress respect for the sovereignty and independence of the friendly country of Cyprus and most sincerely express the hope that our neighbours Greece and Turkey can live in peace and understanding with each other and with an independent Cyprus."

There has been no change whatsoever in this policy of the Government of the People's Republic of Bulgaria. That is why it is no mere coincidence that the Bulgarian Government has unswervingly supported every effort designed to bring about a peaceful and just settlement of the Cyprus problem.

129. In the course of the crisis that arose in the summer of 1974, it welcomed and endorsed the decisions of the Security Council. Somewhat later, in the course of the twenty-ninth session of the General Assembly, it actively supported the actions and efforts designed to bring about the adoption of decisions in keeping with the Charter and the interests of the peace and security of that area with the aim of preserving the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus. Those decisions call for a cessation of foreign intervention in the internal affairs of Cyprus, the withdrawal of all foreign troops **from** the island, ensuring the immediate return of refugees to their homes and granting the Greek and Turkish Cypriots the right and opportunity themselves to resolve through negotiation the questions of the constitutional structure of their Republic.

130. More than six months have elapsed since Security Council resolution 353 (1974) was adopted, and more than three months since the adoption of resolution 3212 (XXIX) by the General Assembly. We can only regret that even so, the necessary progress towards a just and durable solution of the Cyprus crisis has not been achieved.

131. An objective analysis of the events of last summer, and particularly of recent developments, leaves no room for doubt that the decisions of the Organization have **not been** put into effect. And that is the case primarily because of the continuing tendency to disregard United Nations decisions, to remove the Cyprus problem from the competence of the Security Council and to have it decided within the narrow confines of a closed military political grouping. It is precisely those actions on the part of certain circles in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

which have brought about a deterioration of the situation in Cyprus and which have been holding up the process of a peaceful solution, fair to all, of the problems on the basis of the preservation of the independence and territorial integrity of the State of Cyprus.

132. If attempts to bring about the *de facto* partition of the island and to eliminate the sovereign State of Cyprus are not halted in time, they will in practice lead to the reconversion of Cyprus into a bulwark for the aggressive plans of certain imperialist circles in the eastern Mediterranean. Such a development would increase tension in a region of the world that is in any case extremely sensitive. This was confirmed just a few days ago by the Secretary-General when he spoke in the Council. He said:

“I wish to **emphasize** the great seriousness of the risk to peace and security in the eastern Mediterranean which the Cyprus situation represents as long as no progress is made in resolving it along the lines laid down in the relevant United Nations resolutions, especially General Assembly resolution 3212 (XXIX), which was endorsed by the Security Council in its resolution 365 (1974). **The suffering** of the people of Cyprus can only increase the gravity of this situation.”* [1814th meeting para. 7.3

133. Of particular concern are the continuing attempts, in flagrant violation of United Nations resolutions, to impose **unilateral** decisions, to pursue a policy of fait accompli and of dealing from a position of strength. Such actions, no matter what their source, must be condemned. They are all the more reprehensible now, at a time when the European peoples are on the eve of concluding their work on the principles- and rules to govern the conduct of States on that continent. **Of** particular importance is the recognition of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of all States, non-intervention in their internal affairs, and the permanent renunciation of the use of force or the threat of the use of force in resolving disputes. Can we now permit Cyprus, a country that from the beginning has participated most actively in the work of the all-European forum, to become the victim of a policy and methods condemned by all States participating in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe?

134. The most recent developments **have** made it even more obvious that the Cyprus question can be solved on a lasting and just basis if it is discussed in a representative forum **within** the framework of the United Nations, with the participation of members of the Security Council, interested countries and certain other non-aligned countries. It would be precisely such an authoritative forum that could not

only promote a peaceful **and** just settlement of the Cyprus problem but also ensure stable guarantees of the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the **Republic** of Cyprus.

135. There is no doubt but that the **practical** implementation of the Soviet proposal to **send** a special mission of the Security Council to Cyprus **to** study the situation and submit a report on it would give, a boost to the implementation of United Nations decisions on Cyprus.

136. There exists a sovereign, independent Republic of Cyprus, a State Member of the United Nations, and there exists a lawful Government of that Republic. The People's Republic of Bulgaria has always **firmly** and consistently supported and will continue to support the preservation of the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus. It opposes the partition of the island and is against any form of **enosis** or double **enosis**. **Now** more than ever it is essential for the Security Council to take active measures to implement its decisions and to ensure the implementation of **the** relevant General Assembly resolution. In our view, **that** means the immediate cessation of foreign intervention and the withdrawal of all foreign armed forces from the island. Only then shall we have created the pre-conditions enabling the Greek Cypriots and **the** Turkish Cypriots themselves, without any intervention from outside, to solve the problem of the internal structure of the Cypriot State on a **mutually** acceptable basis **and** by means of negotiations.

137. In the Bulgarian delegation's view, the question of the creation of such conditions brooks no further delay. In this connection it would be advisable for the Security Council to establish a time-table for the earliest possible withdrawal of **all** foreign armed forces from the island, as a practical, specific measure for the implementation of its relevant resolutions and the relevant General **Assembly** resolution. And here we must agree once again with Mr. Waldheim. He said: “Indeed, the Cyprus problem represents a crucial test of the effectiveness **and** credibility of the **Organization**”* [ibid. **par** 8.1

138. One of the most important **achievements** of mankind since the victory of the anti-Hitler coalition -and the thirtieth anniversary of that victory will be celebrated by all the peoples of the world **very** soon, on 9 May this year-has been the maintenance of universal peace. That has made it possible for the Balkan peoples ‘finally to live in peace and develop co-operation. The People's Republic of Bulgaria sincerely hopes that this spirit of mutual understanding and good neighbourliness will be **strengthened** even further, because that is in keeping with the interests of all the peoples of the Balkans, and also of the people of Cyprus.

139. I should like to state that, for its part, the Government of the People's Republic of Bulgaria

* Quoted in English by the speaker.

will continue to make its **contribution** to the efforts to achieve a **peaceful** and just settlement of the Cyprus question. We have always stood for and we still **stand** for respect for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of all States, **as** indeed we are **enjoined** to do by the Charter and a number of **important** decisions of the United Nations.

140. The PRESIDENT (*translation from Chinese*): I call on the representative of Greece.

141. Mr. CARAYANNIS (Greece): On 21 February, while -we were deliberating here, a unit of Turkish **soldiers** in Cyprus advanced about 300 metres into the no-man's **land** in the **region** of Athienou and started to entrench itself in battle positions. On 22 February, forces of UNFICYP moved into the same **position**. Despite all the efforts that have been made so far, the Turkish unit has not been persuaded to go back to its former position. I have today addressed a letter to the Secretary-General [S/11640], to that effect.. Nevertheless.. **on** the **basis** of past **experience** and of the **fact** that bad news from Cyprus has a tendency to develop with a speed that is very much in contrast to the slow movement of any **promising** efforts, I thought it would be prudent and helpful if I immediately informed the members of the Council of this new development.

142. The PRESIDENT (*translation from Chinese*): I call on the representative of Turkey.

143. Mr. OLCAY (Turkey): I have not been personally informed of the event just mentioned by the representative of Greece. I would only appeal to him not **to** give that kind of publicity to the many events that do take place in Cyprus, especially at this time, since it gives the impression that he is trying to obtain some kind of political advantage through this. In fact, if I were to speak on the question of cease-fire violations I would have to say that many of those that occurred in the course of the week that preceded the proclamation of the Turkish Federated State of the Republic of Cyprus tended to have one single source, that is, a Greek Cypriot source. We **have not** made a point of this, knowing full well why those cease-fire violations were taking place at a time when it was expedient for the Greek side to prove something to the United States Congress, which was already considering cutting aid to Turkey. That was a way to try to influence public opinion in this country in an effort to prove that Turks were trying to create **trouble in** Cyprus and not co-operating in the search **for a solution**. Therefore, I think that this moment is **particularly** ill-chosen to put so much emphasis on individual cases. It may give the impression that a political end **is** being sought-namely, to try to influence the present meeting of the **Security Council**.

144. Furthermore, I should like once more to **draw** attention to the fact that there are as many complaints on the part of the **representative** of Greece regarding a problem which should be one for the Greek Cypriots as there are complaints on the part of the Greek Cypriots themselves. Now who is speaking on behalf of whom has always been, for me, the basis of the Cypriot problem, and I will-when I have an opportunity to make a statement on the subject-try to indicate the kind of collusion that has been going on all the time.

145. The PRESIDENT (*translation from Chinese*): I call on the representative of Greece.

146. Mr. CARAYANNIS (Greece): I have **only** one remark to make: that the report of the **Secretary-General** which is before the Council [S/11624] speaks only of Turkish violations of the cease-fire; it does **not** speak of any 'Greek Cypriot violations.

147. As far as, the appeal of my colleague from -Turkey is concerned, I shall certainly try to respond **if only** he will help me through his army in Cyprus.

148. The PRESIDENT (*translation from Chinese*): I call on the representative of Turkey.

149. Mr. OLCAY (Turkey): Just a brief remark about the latest report of the Secretary-General concerning the cease-fire situation in Cyprus. I shall have to indicate, when I make a statement on the subject as a whole, that I do not agree with certain of the conclusions included in that latest report, indicating what my reasons are, and that will be especially true with regard to the reporting of the cease-fire situation in the past fortnight.

150. The PRESIDENT (*translation from Chinese*): I call on the representative of Cyprus.

151. Mr. ROSSIDES (Cyprus): I should like just to make a remark with regard to this movement* of Turkish forces in the area of Athienou, **and to remind** the Council that Athienou is the township village where it was claimed that they allowed the **Greek** Cypriots to return, although it was in the area under the control of the Government and there was therefore no question of their allowing refugees to return. **It** is because of the return of those who had fled for fear of the situation in the Greek Cypriot area controlled by the Government that they have now made this threatening move in order to force them to go away again. That was the only point I wanted to make. This is not unrelated to the return of the inhabitants of Athienou to their village.

The meeting rose at 5.40 p.m.

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