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1814th MEETING: 21 FEBRUARY 1975

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1814th MEETING

Held in New York on Friday, 21 February 1975, at 3 p.m.

president: Mr. HUANG Hua (China).

Present: The representatives of the following States: Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, China, Costa Rica, France, Guyana, Iraq, Italy, Japan, Mauritania, Sweden, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania and United States of America.

Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/MI)

1. Adoption of the agenda
2. The situation in Cyprus:
Letter dated 17 February 1975 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/11625)

The meeting was called to order at 4 p.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

The situation in Cyprus:

Letter dated 17 February 1976 from the Permanent representative of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/11625)

1. **The PRESIDENT** (*translation from Chinese*): In accordance with the decision taken at the 1813th meeting, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite the representatives of Cyprus, Turkey and Greece to participate in the debate without the right to vote.

At the invitation of the President. Mr. Clerides (Cyprus), Mr. Olcay (Turkey) and Mr. Carayannis (Greece) took places at the Council table.

2. **The PRESIDENT** (*translation from, Chinese*): I call on the Secretary-General, who wishes to make a statement.

3. **The SECRETARY-GENERAL:** The Council has before it my special report on recent events in Cyprus [S/11624], which deals in particular with the talks between Mr. Clerides and Mr. Denktas on the substance of the Cyprus problem and with the develop-

ments which led to the announcement, on 13 February 1975, by the Turkish Cypriot leadership.

4. **As members** of the Council are aware, I had the opportunity to discuss the current Cyprus situation with Turkish and Greek leaders in Ankara and Athens on 19 February.

5. The object of these visits was to get a first-hand impression of the views of the two Governments on the present state of affairs and to examine ways in which progress might be made out of the present impasse towards a peaceful and lasting settlement. In particular, I took the opportunity to discuss the possibility of new approaches to the negotiating process and the conditions required for such approaches to have a chance of success. Needless to say, the positions of the Government of Cyprus and of the two communities in the island were foremost in my mind during my talks in Ankara and Athens.

6. **The leaders** in both capitals gave me a comprehensive statement of their views on the current situation in Cyprus, and their representatives here in the meetings of the Security Council have given the members a full account of these views. I shall therefore confine myself in this statement to my own general conclusions.

7. In the first place, I wish to emphasize the great seriousness of the risk to peace and security in the eastern Mediterranean which the Cyprus situation represents as long as no progress is made in resolving it along the lines laid down in the relevant United Nations resolutions, especially General Assembly resolution 3212 (XXIX), which was endorsed by the Security Council in its resolution 365 (1974). The suffering of the people of Cyprus can only increase the gravity of this situation. It is the duty of the Council, therefore, as well as of the parties directly concerned, to exert all possible efforts to ensure that real and timely progress is made towards a lasting settlement.

8. In all frankness one of the main impressions I have gained in recent days is the expectation of the parties concerned and of the world in general that the United Nations can and should shoulder its responsibilities in this matter. Indeed, the Cyprus problem represents a crucial test of the effectiveness and credibility of the Organization. It is, of course, up to the Council to decide how best to deal with

the present situation, to regain momentum towards a peaceful settlement and to decide on the procedures required to achieve these aims. Needless to say; the good offices of the Secretary-General and his Special Representative are available, as they have always been, to assist the efforts of the parties **themselves** and of the **Council**.

9. As members of the Council know; I have attached great importance to the talks between Mr. Clerides and Mr. **Denktaş**, the negotiators for the two communities in Cyprus. These talks began during my visit to Cyprus last August, dealing first with humanitarian questions and later' also taking up **political** questions. As a result of the recent developments described in my report, these talks are now suspended. The developments have created a new and tense situation, because there is now a vacuum which can all too easily be filled by renewed violence.

10. I still believe that talks between Mr. **Clerides** and Mr. **Denktaş**, in the presence of my Special Representative, could provide a basis, for progress; although I fully **recognize** the need for a new and fresh approach to the negotiating process. The success of such a new approach inevitably depends on the creation and maintenance of conditions in which all parties are prepared to agree to participate. I discussed this problem in some detail during my talks in Ankara and Athens and suggested some new possibilities which might make the resumption of the negotiating process possible.

11. As members of the Council are well aware; there are very great differences between the parties on matters of substance, which are reflected in disagreements over procedure. It is obvious that flexibility and a willingness to make concessions and to avoid unilateral actions are of the utmost importance, if any progress is to be made. I have done my best in my recent talks to urge the necessity of such an attitude on all sides and to suggest ways in which a better atmosphere for serious negotiation might be created. With the same end in view, I have conveyed to the leaders in each capital the main points made to me in the other, in the hope of reducing at least some of the differences between them.

12. Despite their basic differences, I believe that there is a desire in both capitals to find peaceful solutions to their respective difficulties, and 'a keen realization of the dangers of a failure to do so, dangers that are not confined to Cyprus alone. I do not have' to stress here what a further deterioration of the situation in Cyprus could mean for international peace and security. I am Sure that the desire for a peaceful solution is shared by the leaders and the people of Cyprus. It is on this basis that we must build. Peaceful settlement is an urgent necessity if we are to avoid further tragedies and disasters, and it is to that end that our best efforts must be made.

It seems to me that the best way to attain this end is for the parties to make renewed and sincere efforts for the full and speedy implementation of General Assembly resolution **3212** (XXIX) and Security Council resolution 365 (1974) and, as a part of that endeavour, to find ways of reactivating the negotiating process on a new agreed basis. Obviously **any** solution must be based on the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and non-alignment of the **Republic** of Cyprus, as stipulated in the General Assembly resolution.

13: I do not **believe** that it would be appropriate for me to enter into greater detail at this stage; I would merely wish to repeat that it is vitally important to, create as soon as possible conditions in which meaningful negotiations for a settlement can **proceed**. I earnestly hope that the deliberations of the Council **will** be 'helpful in attaining this objective.

14. 'The **PRESIDENT** (*translation from Chinese*): I now call on the representative of Greece.

15. **Mr. CARAYANNIS** (Greece): The **Secretary-General** has **just returned** from a very long and possibly very tiring trip, which he unfortunately had to shorten in order to be here for these discussions. I should like to thank him very much, for doing that, and I wish to express the appreciation of my Government. During his trip the Secretary-General **stayed** for a night in Athens. We have always been very happy to receive him in Athens and this time we had special reasons to appreciate greatly, his efforts with respect to the question of Cyprus.

16. Since I have been called- on to speak and in order not to take the time of the Council on another occasion, I should like to refer to the statement made yesterday [*1813th meeting*] by the representative of the Soviet Union. Mr., Malik referred in his statement to what the Foreign Minister of Greece had said at the twenty-ninth session of the General Assembly about the position of Greece on the question of the union of Cyprus with Greece. In referring to that, I believe that the representative of the Soviet Union implies a desire-to hear that **position** again, if possible. I have no difficulty at all in **reiterating** the position of my Government, **which** is against the union of Cyprus with Greece and against partition.

17.. The **PRESIDENT** (*translation from Chinese*): I now call on the representative. of Cyprus.

18. **Mr., CLERIDES** (Cyprus): I have found it necessary to ask to be allowed to speak in [order to correct some inaccurate statements made by **Mr. Çelik**, who I believe **was not** correctly briefed on a number of facts. Before, going to that part of my **statement**, I should like to comment upon the remarks made by Mr. **Çelik** to the effect. that the **Cyprus** delegation here does not represent Cyprus **and that that is the** reason why he was- allowed to **speak**. I

should like to remind **representatives** that Mr. Celik was allowed to speak under rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure, which gives any person the right to speak if invited by the Security Council, a rule which existed long before the Cyprus problem arose.

19. Mr. Celik immediately **asked why** it was necessary to bring this matter before the Security Council. He went on to give a most inaccurate description of the intentions of the Cyprus Government in bringing this matter before the Council. I shall answer Mr. **Celik's** question why it was necessary, although I did so extensively in my last statement.

20. The reason why it **was** necessary to bring this matter before the Council was, first, because there has been no implementation of General Assembly resolution 3212 (XXIX) or of the relevant resolutions of the Security Council. The only real fact that Mr. Celik contributed in his statement yesterday was the frank admission, for **which I** am grateful to him, that indeed there has been no implementation of those resolutions: he gave an interpretation to the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council to the effect that the withdrawal of the Turkish forces from Cyprus and the return of the refugees to their homes were intended to take place after a peaceful solution of the Cyprus problem had been reached. I do not agree with that interpretation, but I am sure that the Council **is** in a better position than I to determine whether resolution 3212 (XXIX) and the relevant resolutions of the Council, while speaking of respect for 'the independence, sovereignty territorial integrity and non-alignment of the Republic of Cyprus,' were intended to convey that foreign forces of occupation were to remain on the island until a solution of the 'Cyprus problem was found.

21. Mr. Celik stated that if the Turkish forces were to be withdrawn from Cyprus there would be no security for the Turkish **Cypriots**. In my statement of yesterday I said that, long before the 'second invasion of **Cyprus**,—after the first invasion had established a short beach-head in July—I had proposed that the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus' (UNFICYP), enlarged **as** necessary, could undertake the protection of the Turkish Cypriots, and all Government forces could be withdrawn from areas in which Turkish Cypriots **were** living. I am very happy' the Secretary-General is here at **this** meeting, because I will refer to a conversation I had with him during the second Geneva conference. Not only did I make' the **afore** mentioned statement; when I was told that, because UNFICYP contained troops only from non-Moslem countries; it might be helpful if I accept the principle that **contingents** from Moslem countries be included in it and that areas inhabited **by** Turkish Cypriots be placed **under** the protection **of** Moslem contingents in Cyprus, I immediately answered affirmatively, and I **said** that because we were a non-aligned country, because we believed in **non-align-**ment, we would very **much** like to see contingents

from -non-aligned countries—Moslem, African, Asian—join UNFICYP. And yet that proposal was not accepted, and immediately upon the failure of the second Geneva conference the Turkish forces advanced and occupied 40 per cent of the territory of the Republic and furthermore devastated that area, expelled its Greek inhabitants and looted and destroyed their properties. That is the operation that the Turkish side and **the** Turkish Government call a peace-keeping operation to save the independence of Cyprus.

22. I now state that I am **willing** and propose, if the Turkish forces withdraw from Cyprus, to dismantle the National Guard, to hand over its arms to an enlarged peace-keeping force, agreeing also to the expansion of that force by the addition of non-aligned contingents, Moslem and others. At the same time I also propose to begin serious negotiations in Cyprus or to continue the intercommunal negotiations in Cyprus for the purpose of arriving at a solution freely—but not at gun-point.

23. Mr. Celik alleged that in 1963, we had expelled the Turkish members from the Government. That is far from the true situation. In 1963 there was regrettable intercommunal violence. As a result of that violence, the Turkish members of the Government, including the then Vice-President, Mr. **Küçük**, left the Government. Mr. **Küçük** himself publicly proclaimed that he was no longer Vice-President of the Republic of Cyprus but the President of the Turkish Cypriot community and its administration. Therefore it is quite clear that **Mr. Küçük**, the Vice-President, and **his** ministers were not expelled by the Cyprus Government.

24. Furthermore, it has been alleged that the Greek Cypriot members of the House of Representatives expelled the Turkish members and that they had laid down conditions for their return that were unacceptable because the Turkish members were in fact expected to ignore the 1960 Constitution. The fact is that the Turkish members of the House of Representatives left it of their own free will. As soon as the fighting **ceased** and a peace-keeping force was established, one of the first things I did as President of the House of Representatives was to invite the Turkish members **to** a meeting in the presence of the Commander of the Force, the late General Thimayya, and 'at that meeting the following arrangement was arrived at. First, the Turkish members would for safety reasons be escorted to the House of Representatives by UNFICYP. Secondly, while they were within the precincts of the House of Representatives, I and the Greek members of the House of Representatives would accept full responsibility and take the necessary measures for their protection. Thirdly, I explained to the Turkish members that as long as Mr. **Küçük**, the then Vice-President of the Republic, maintained the position that he was not the Vice-President of the Republic, I would not send him any laws enacted by the House for promulgation by him, as provided in

the 1960 Constitution, because I could not accent promulgation of laws of the House of Representatives by a person who had abandoned the title of the office of Vice-President of the Republic.

25. Those were the facts, and to show, that they were the facts I wish to state now, and have it noted, that since 1963, despite repeated elections in the House of Representatives, we have kept the places of the Turkish Cypriots vacant and have not taken unilateral action to fill those vacancies by electing Greek Cypriots. That is the reality of the situation.

26. Mr. Celik objected also that even now, at this moment, there are no Turkish Cypriots in the Government of Cyprus. Again I am happy the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Weckmann-Muñoz, is in this chamber; he can correct me if what I say does not correspond to the truth.

27. As soon as the Sampson Government was forced to resign I asked Mr. Weckmann-Muñoz, together with General Prem Chand, to accompany me to the house of Mr. Denktas, which they very kindly did, while firing was still continuing in the Nicosia area.

28. What was the object of my visit? In the presence of Mr. Weckmann-Muñoz and of General Prem Chand, I saw Mr. Denktas—at that time I was the Acting President of the Republic—and made the following offer to him: that, together, we should form a Government, consisting of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, to occupy ministries in accordance with the provisions of the 1960 Constitution. Mr. Denktas, I must confess, showed interest in my proposal, but he informed me then and there that this was a matter on which he would have to consult with Turkey. He told me that he was flying to Turkey by helicopter next morning and that I would have the reply on his return. And indeed I got the reply on his return, which was that what I was proposing was not possible for the time being.

29. So why does Mr. Çelik complain that there are no Turkish members in the Government of Cyprus, when the fact is that the offer was made but was not accepted and we were told that it was not the time to do what we were proposing?

30. Mr. Celik attempted to convince us that the Turkish Cypriots were the co-founders of the independence of Cyprus and that in fact they are the defenders of that independence now. Let me refresh his memory.

31. It is a fact—and I shall not deny it, because I do not wish to state anything before the Security Council that is not accurate—that the struggle of the Cypriot people in 1955, which is known as the EOKA struggle, was waged for the purpose of obtaining independence and the union of Cyprus with Greece. It is a fact also—and Mr. Celik cannot deny it—that the Turkish

position was that the colonial status should be maintained or that if the British were to leave, Cyprus must be partitioned. So I fail to see the difference between our position regarding union with Greece and their position regarding partition or, as the best alternative, remaining under colonial rule.

32. It has been said that the Turkish side is defending the independence and the non-alignment of the Republic. I do not think I shall be misstating the facts if I say that the Turkish side has never been in favour of non-alignment. Indeed, I can establish that that is the position by referring to the concrete action taken by the then Vice-President of the Republic, Mr. Küçük, when the Archbishop decided, as President of the Republic of Cyprus, to participate in the First Conference of Heads of States or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, which took place at Belgrade. Mr. Küçük threatened to use, and he actually did use, his right of veto on foreign policy to prevent the participation of Cyprus in the non-aligned group.

33. With regard to Mr. Çelik's allegation that the Turkish side has been the defender of the independence and territorial integrity of the Republic, let me refer to certain statements made by important Turkish politicians while they were in office as Foreign Ministers or Prime Ministers of the Republic of Turkey.

34. As long ago as 1955 the then Foreign Minister of Turkey, the late Mr. Zorlu—unfortunately he was executed, for crimes he had not committed—made no secret, at the Tripartite Conference on the Eastern Mediterranean and Cyprus held in London in August and September 1955, of the fact that Turkey had claims on Cyprus. Mr. Kemal Satir, a former Minister of Turkey, said in a public statement in 1964: "Cyprus will be divided into two sections, one of which will join Turkey". In June 1964, Mr. Erkin, then Foreign Minister of Turkey, spelled it out clearly when he said during an interview with a newspaper: "The radical solution would be to cede one" part of Cyprus to Greece and the other, closest to the Turkish Asiatic coast, to Turkey". Hardly three months later, on 8 September 1964, the former Prime Minister of Turkey, the late İsmet İnönü, addressing no less august a body than the Turkish National Assembly, said the following with reference to the Geneva talks of that year: "Officially we promoted the federation concept rather than the partition thesis so as to remain within the provisions of the Treaty". On 18 April 1964, a secret document was issued by the then Prime Minister, the same Mr. İnönü, in which the partitionist plan of Turkey, the well-known Attila Plan which we know has now been applied; was set out.

35. It would be strange if either Turkey or the Turkish Cypriots, who have been committed to a policy of partition—which means that one part of Cyprus would become Greek territory and another part of Cyprus would become Turkish territory—were to be the defenders of either the independence of Cyprus or the non-aligned policy.

36. I should now like to deal briefly with some minor points made by Mr. Celik. Before I do so, I should like to repeat what I said in my statement yesterday: that my purpose here is neither to apportion blame nor to be sidetracked from the main issue that is before the Security Council and must remain before the Council; that is, the non-implementation by Turkey of resolution 3212 (XXIX). I stated yesterday that I would not be sidetracked from that issue. Despite Mr. Çelik's attempts to sidetrack me, I shall stick to my original statement that, if necessary, I would reply briefly to Mr. Çelik and that I would be brief not because of lack of proven facts or because of lack of convincing arguments but because I intend to try to maintain the crucial issue before the Council -that is, whether resolution 3212 (XXIX) has been implemented or whether 'new procedures are needed.

37. I would add at this point that my statement yesterday that the situation in Cyprus has been aggravated, that there has been no implementation of resolution 3212 (XXIX) and that new procedures are needed has been borne out by the statement made today by the Secretary-General.

38. Mr. Celik, referring to a recent statement by Archbishop Makarios, said that the latter had publicly stated that he would not lower the standards of the struggle. It is the easiest thing in the world to take statements out of context and pretend to make something out of them. He omitted the first part of the statement in which Archbishop Makarios said that we would not accept faits accomplis nor agree to solutions at gun-point, and that we would not lower the standards but would continue to fight until it was possible freely to reach a solution.

39. Mr. Celik also complained that a national council had been set up, and he thought that was another piece of Greek Cypriot chauvinistic patriotism. The council which has been set up, and of which I am an *ex officio* member, is a council on which all the leaders of political parties in Cyprus are represented. And I must say that all those who were invited and have agreed to participate were given the terms of reference for the solution of the Cyprus problem, which are these: we accept independence, we accept non-alignment, we accept a federal solution of the problem of Cyprus, and we accept a bicomunal federation. And that is another answer to Mr. Çelik's allegation that all we intend to do is treat the Turkish community as a mere minority:

40. Offering 18 per cent of the population of Cyprus a national community, offering them participation in the Government in a federal system, offering them a substantial area in the north which would be predominantly Turkish, to be governed by them, offering them other areas-I ask you, is that the way in which minorities have been treated? Or have we gone beyond that and reached the point where we are no longer taking into consideration the actual

size of the Turkish minority-which is only 18 per cent of the population of Cyprus-but, for the sake of good faith, of peace, of security and of stability in our area, are offering far beyond what an 18 per cent minority deserves?

41. Mr. Celik complained that I have not been honest in not disclosing that I had contacts with Athens. Every time I have contacts with Athens a public statement is made, and I have no objection if Mr. Denktas has contacts with Ankara. I consider it natural, just as I consider it natural for me to have contacts with the Greek Government. What I consider unnatural, what I would never permit, is Greece dictating the solution to me or dictating what I am to do on each item-something that is happening on the Turkish side. I could give examples here that can be borne out not only by my own statements but by statements of other independent personalities.

42. An agreement was reached between Mr. Denktas and myself on the release of all prisoners of war; the agreement was concluded, it was being implemented, when, suddenly, the implementation of the agreement stopped. Mr. Denktas was very embarrassed, because when I asked him about it during the Cyprus talks in the presence of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, he said that he wanted to stick by the agreement he made with me, that he had difficulties, with Ankara and that he was trying to clear the matter with Ankara. It took him one whole month before he could clear that matter.

43. Mr. Celik referred to another inaccuracy: to the "fact" that since we started the intercommunal talks in Cyprus on the substance of the Cyprus problem the following priorities had been on the agenda: first, airport; secondly, seaports; thirdly, discussion of the powers and functions of the federal Government in a federated State. I did not prepare the agenda; the agendas were always prepared by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Weckmann-Muñoz. There are many copies of those agendas. The agendas were agreed to by Mr. Denktas and me, and the order of discussion was: first, powers and functions of the central Government; secondly, airport; and at a later stage seaports were also added. So his statement is completely inaccurate. The reason why powers and functions were not discussed was Mr. Denktas's repeated refusal to discuss them, on the ground that he was not ready for such discussion. Because of that we dealt with such other problems as the airport, and at this point I wish to state what the Turkish position was with regard to even the temporary reopening of the airport.

44. The Turkish position was this: first, it did not want the airport to operate under United Nations control or supervision. Why? Because, in their opinion, the airport should be controlled and supervised by the three guarantor Powers, or at least-as Mr. Denktas

stated-by two of the guarantors, Greece and Turkey. He then went on to propose that there should be two managers of the airport, one Greek Cypriot and one Turkish Cypriot, and that there should be a board on which there would be equal representation of both communities; any decision taken by the board, though it had equal representation, would have to be ratified by the two managers, one Greek Cypriot and one Turkish Cypriot, and in case of disagreement the matter had to be referred to the guarantors to be decided. Furthermore, they demanded that the entrance to the terminal building be controlled by the guarantor powers. Two separate entrances would have to be made, one from the Greek area and one from the Turkish area, to be controlled separately by the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots. And, as if that were not enough, there was the most peculiar proposal regarding the FIR (Flight Information Region) system, by which aircraft are guided to the airport, helped to land and to take off.

45. That proposal really shows the true facts of the situation. The FIR was to be under two managers, one Greek and one Turkish. If planes came to land at the Lamaca airport, which was under the control of the Greek Cypriots, the Greek staff of the FIR would deal with them. If aircraft came to the Turkish airport, which the military had established in the area controlled by the Turkish forces, the Turkish members would deal with such aircraft. If there was an international aircraft landing at the airport, there would be a joint staff; and in the event of disagreement, while the aircraft was flying around the airfield we would have to ask the guarantor Powers to tell us what to do.

46. Now that was the proposal which I had to reject. But, furthermore, there was this point—a very interesting point. If there were not sufficient Turkish Cypriots expert in the work of the FIR, we could not use Greek Cypriots but should allow a number of experts from Turkey to come and work at our airport. That was the proposal which was put before me in all seriousness, and I was expected to accept it.

47. But that Proposal was not the original four principles which Mr. Weckmann-Muiioz had submitted to us, and which both—and I say it in front of him—Mr. Denktas and I accepted as a basis for negotiation. It was a completely new situation after Mr. Denktas had asked for an adjournment—to discuss the matter further because, as he informed us, he was expecting an expert from Turkey to advise him on this issue.

48. At the second meeting, after his expert arrived, he put before us the proposals which I have explained to the Council. It is true that subsequently Mr. Denktas said that though he would not accept United Nations supervision of the airport, he was prepared to agree that a manager from abroad—neither Greek nor Turkish nor British—could be brought in, but that, again, he would have to work under the supervision of the guarantor Powers. I again rejected that proposal.

49. But what surprised me most was that when the Special Representative of the Secretary-General proposed that at least, until a solution was to be found, there was preliminary work that had to be done; such as searching the airport for explosives, clearing debris, repairing the electricity system of the airport and repairing the runways—a suggestion which I welcomed and accepted immediately—Mr. Denktas said: “I cannot answer. I must get instructions”. And after getting instructions, whether from Mr. Çelik or somebody else, he came back and said: “No, I cannot agree to this”. It is not my purpose to answer every point that Mr. Çelik made, but there is one point which, despite my desire to be brief, I cannot resist replying to. And that is his statement; in the presence of so many experts from the United Nations in this hall, that 13,000 Greek Cypriot refugees have been allowed to return to their homes.

50. That is a figment of his imagination. What actually happened is this. The small town of Athienou was abandoned by the Greek Cypriots as the Turkish forces were approaching. There was then a de facto cease-fire. The United Nations had placed posts between the small town or village and the Turkish forces. And the inhabitants—encouraged, they return. Athienou is in the area under the control of the Government.

51. The Turkish generosity & this: They say: “Yes, they are in your area, but they are within range of our guns. And because we are not firing our guns we have allowed you to go back to your homes”. That is the fact of the matter on the question of the so called return of 13,000 Greek Cypriots to their homes. In fact it is not 13,000; it is simply 5,000 inhabitants of a town which has been spared the catastrophe of being looted because of a de facto cease-fire; because of the generosity of UNFICYP in placing posts between the Turkish line and this village. And if we are back—and I must say that I am grateful—it is because the Turks are not firing their guns. If, on the basis of that philosophy, anything which is within range of their guns is really under their control, then we should evacuate the whole town of Nicosia. Indeed, we should evacuate the whole of Cyprus, because Cyprus is a small island and heavy calibre artillery could easily hit targets from one side almost to the other:

52. Now I come to what I have to say with regard to Mr. Celik's questioning why we speak of Greek Cypriot missing persons, and how we know that they were not killed during the coup. My answer is this. We know the persons who were killed in the coup, because they were killed fighting. There were other people near them. We have statements from them. Those we want are the people who have not been killed in the coup and about whom there is positive evidence that they have been arrested or taken prisoners by the Turkish side and have never been found since.

53. I shall give only three examples. The first example is the following. One hundred and forty people from

the small village of Achna, mostly old men and young boys, **not** in military uniform, either too old, or too young to be soldiers, were forcibly removed by the Turkish **forces** and brought to the Nicosia garage of Pavhdes, which was the centre where all prisoners were **brought**. This fact can be established by indisputable evidence. They were seen there. In some cases, the International Committee of the Red Cross even has their names.

54. Then one good morning Turkish lorries came. Forty names were called out. Those **so** named were taken to an unknown destination, and the Turkish side has not been able to **give** an account of where they are or where **they can** be found.

55. I shall give another small example. In the village of **Yialoussa**, 13 people were arrested. The fact that they were arrested has been admitted by Mr. Denktag, and there is other independent evidence. Amongst them there was a **Greek Cypriot** judge who was holidaying in that area. "From there they were moved, under escort of Turkish police; to a nearby Turkish village. Up to that point there is ample evidence that they were in the **hands of** the Turks. But now, when I ask for them, I am told: "We do not have them".

56. And then let me refer to **one** most pathetic and regrettable incident-if incident is the right word for it. A family of **Greek Cypriots**-that is to say, a father, a mother and three daughters, one of whom was married and had a **12-month-old** baby in her arms-were shot in **cold blood**. The child was killed; the mother is **now an** invalid for life because her spine was injured. Although the girl and one of the others who was wounded were in a Turkish military hospital for months, **their names** were never given to us. I must say here frankly that I am grateful to Mr. **Denktas**, who found them and returned at least the crippled **young lady, who** is now in hospital abroad undergoing treatment.

57. Finally, one more incident, that of a young boy who has been **missing**, like many young boys, and who we were told recently is in a Turkish hospital.

58. Whether the **Turkish side** has honestly declared all the prisoners it **has and** not only those it freed -because between the, number of those they took and those they freed there is a very wide gap-can be established by another fact. On one occasion I received information that in a **police** station near Mr. **Denktas's** office there were **five** undeclared prisoners of war-Greek Cypriots. I immediately telephone+ the Secretary-General's Special Representative and, accompanied by him, I went to Mr. **Denktas's** office. I gave him the **information** and he went, to the Turkish police station. Although the Red Cross had repeatedly visited the **police** station, no trace had ever been found of the **persons** concerned-because the Red Cross cannot **move freely**. It has to give 48 hours' notice in advance, and **during** those 48 hours the

persons were moved. They were 'finally **found** after months of captivity and turned over to me.

59. This is the kind of missing persons I **am** after; this is the kind of missing persons, concerning whom I want freedom of movement for **UNFICYP**.

60. Now. Mr. Celik has told us **that** we want' to internationalize the Cyprus problem., that we want 'a committee of the Security **Council** to go **there** to establish the realities, the true facts.' He says that we are campaigning-as if we were committing a crime-to internationalize the Cyprus problem. Mr. Celik's statement suggested that the Turkish side are the angels and that we are the devils. If we' are the devils, why does he object to **having a fact-finding** commission of the Council go there and establish the facts and report to the Council? What **do** they have to hide that they do not permit the Red Cross to move freely, as we have allowed it to move freely on our side? Why do they not permit UNFICYP to have the same freedom of movement as that which we have given on our side?

61. These are questions that can only lead **to** 'one conclusion-that those who fear not the light-of day, that those who are in favour of a fact-finding commission., have nothing to hide, or very little to hide, and that those who try to oppose it have a lot to hide.

62. I should like now to deal briefly with. another contention of Mr: Celik's. He complains that we want to internationalize the Cyprus problem., Do we **not** believe in the United Nations? Do we not believe in the Security Council? Why is **internationalizing** the Cyprus problem by bringing it to the **world** Organization such a crime that it annoys Mr. Celik or offends Turkey? Why **is** there such objection to coming before the Security Council and informing **it** that General Assembly resolution 3212 (XXIX) has not been implemented, that it will be necessary for a **fact-finding** commission to go there and see "for itself whether it has been implemented or. **not-who** 'has implemented it and who has not?

63. And then, finally, why -does Mr. Celik want the talks in Cyprus to continue without the resolutions of the Security Council and the General: **Assembly** being implemented? The reason to me is **obvious**. It is because with the presence' of the **Turkish** forces in Cyprus holding 40 per cent **of the** territory of the Republic, he and the Turkish side have the ability to create faits **accomplis** which would prejudice the **final** outcome of the solution of the Cyprus problem: And, again, could the Turkish side afford to permit a fact-finding mission to visit Cyprus? I say no, it could not afford it, because **the picture** which it is **presenting** to the world-a picture of Turkey having undertaken a peace-keeping operation-would be destroyed immediately when, it **was** established **beyond** reasonable doubt by an independent inquiry from, this

Security Council that this peace-keeping operation in Cyprus, this Turkish peace-keeping force in Cyprus, has looted 200,000 Greek homes, and has not even respected the summer residences of ambassadors in Cyprus. I am glad that there are so many representatives at this meeting of the Council whose countries have ambassadors in Cyprus, and I would request them to telegraph their embassies in Cyprus and ask them whether or not their residences in Kyrenia have been looted. Of course the Turkish Cypriots cannot afford to permit an independent inquiry, because an independent inquiry would establish not only that 200,000 Greek Cypriots have been turned into refugees but also that their properties have been grabbed and there is no other word to describe it-illegally by a force purporting to be a peace-keeping operation force, and given to Turkish Cypriots. Not only their homes but their places of work, their shops, their offices, their clinics-everything has been taken over. In fact, such a commission of inquiry would establish beyond doubt the rape of Cyprus.

64. I am a man who has committed himself to the independence of Cyprus, to its territorial integrity, to its non-alignment and to the principle of peaceful coexistence on the island of Cyprus. Not only because that is the only way that Cyprus can survive but also because, bearing in mind the tremendous risks of further tension in Cyprus for the peace of the eastern Mediterranean and in fact for the whole Mediterranean, I believe that there is an urgent need for the Security Council to take steps so that a reasonably early solution of the Cyprus problem may be found, a solution freely negotiated and freely accepted. I do not consider that our responsibilities concern Cyprus only; they also concern the peace of the world.

65. Even at this tragic period through which my country is going and my country includes Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots-I am willing to stretch out my hand and take the hand of Mr. Çelik and say: "Let us, without gun-point diplomacy and without armies of occupation, place our Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots under the protection of a peace-keeping force-remove the national contingents, remove the armies, remove the foreign interference, and let us, as true Cypriots, find that solution to the Cyprus problem that will bring about harmony, prosperity, peace and co-operation between my compatriots the Turkish Cypriots and my compatriots the Greek Cypriots".

66. The PRESIDENT (*translation from Chinese*): The next speaker is --the representative of Turkey, on whom I now call.

67. Mr. OLCAY (Turkey): I asked to speak after I had seen the representative of Greece ask to speak in order to make a statement that would not be longer than the one he made. It will be only slightly longer now as a result of the fact that one more Greek statement has been made. The representative of the

Greek Cypriots, Mr. Clerides, has proved **once more** the strange duality of his words and deeds. Having insisted since yesterday that he would **not** be side-tracked into apportioning blame, he made two remarkable statements, one, yesterday and one today, in which he did nothing but viciously attack Turkey and the Turkish community in Cyprus, which he generously, at the end of his statement just now, called his compatriots. So much for that double talk.

68. On the other hand, I should like to adhere to the policy of my delegation of answering only **representatives** of Governments whose legitimacy we recognize. It gives me pleasure to be able to say that I could repeat word for word what my **colleague** of Greece said a few moments ago, even those remarks made in response to the representative of the Soviet Union. But that is a matter that I shall deal with when I have the opportunity to make my statement on matters of substance.

69. I should **like** it to be recorded that my Government attaches the greatest importance to the invaluable efforts undertaken once more by the Secretary-General in the course of this week to **help** the parties **concerned** on the Cyprus issue. His visit to Ankara is **considered** most fruitful by my Government and I wish to thank him publicly for it.

70. Many revelations of off-the-record, **on-the-record**, secret, confidential, private and public conversations regarding many issues made by Mr. Clerides in reply to what the representative of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus, Mr. Çelik, said yesterday will no doubt have to be answered by Mr. Çelik, When the time comes, Mr. President, I hope that you will kindly give him an opportunity to do so.

71. I had hoped that the Security Council would deal with matters of a loftier nature than gossip-type statements. Unfortunately, Mr. Clerides' appearance here has not changed, as I had hoped it **would**, the form in which the Greek Cypriot side conducts the debates in the Council, and I am the first to regret it.

72. Despite all provocations, which unfortunately these days extend also to an unbelievably **crude anti-Turkish** publicity campaign that I am **told** is going on in **the press** in Greece, my delegation will continue all its efforts to maintain a dignified level of debate in this chamber. I hope to be able to maintain this stand up to the end of this series of meetings of **the** Council.

73. The, PRESIDENT (*translation from Chinese*): I call on the representative of Cyprus.

74. Mr. CLERIDES (Cyprus): It was **not my** intention, and it is not my intention now, to reply to the comments made by Mr. Olcay. However, I should like to inform him that if his difficulty in answering me stems from the fact that he does not wish to recognize

me as the reoresentative of the Government **of Cyprus**. I should be very happy, since I dislike **preventing** anyone from answering me, if he could answer my points by treating me as an individual. That might facilitate the matter and Mr. Olcay could reply to the

substantive points that **I** have **made—not** to the gossip, as he has described it-without **having** any inhibitions concerning his recognition of me.

*The meeting rose **at** 5.20 p.m.*

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