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SEVENTEEN HUNDRED AND EIGHTY-EIGHT MEETING

Held in New York on Wednesday, 31 July 1974, at 3 p.m.

President: Mr. Javier PÉREZ de CUÉLLAR (Peru).

Present: The representatives of the following States; Australia, Austria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, China, Costa Rica, France, Indonesia, Iraq, Kenya, Mauritania, Peru, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Cameroon and United States of America.

Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/1788)

1. Adoption of the agenda
2. The situation in Cyprus:
 - (a) Letter dated 16 July 1974 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council (S/11334);
 - (b) Letter dated 16 July 1974 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/11335);
 - (c) Letter dated 20 July 1974 from the Permanent Representative of Greece to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/11348);
 - (d) Letter dated 28 July 1974 from the Acting Permanent Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/11389)

The meeting was called to order at 6 p.m.

Adoption of the agenda

1. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): I propose that a new sub-item *e*, entitled "Letter dated 30 July 1974 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council [S/11398], be added to the provisional agenda. If there are no objections, I shall take it that the Council adopts the revised agenda.

The agenda, as revised, was adopted.

The situation in Cyprus:

- (a) Letter dated 16 July 1974 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council (S/11334);

- (b) Letter dated 16 July 1974 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/11335);
- (c) Letter dated 20 July 1974 from the Permanent Representative of Greece to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/11348);
- (d) Letter dated 28 July 1974 from the Acting Permanent Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/11389);
- (e) Letter dated 30 July 1974 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council (S/11398)

2. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): In accordance with decisions taken at previous meetings [1779th-1781st meetings], I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite the representatives of Cyprus, Turkey, Greece, Yugoslavia, Romania, India and Mauritius to participate in the discussion without the right to vote.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Rossides (Cyprus), Mr. Olcay (Turkey) and Mr. Carayannis (Greece) took places at the Council table.

3. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): In view of the limited number of places available at the Council table, I propose to invite the representatives of Yugoslavia, Romania, India and Mauritius to take the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber, on the understanding that they will be invited to come to the Council table when it is their turn to address the Council.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Job, (Yugoslavia), Mr. Dăcu (Romania), Mr. Jaipal (India) and Mr. Ramphul (Mauritius) took the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber.

4. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): I should like to inform members that the draft resolution in document S/11399 has been withdrawn.

5. I call on the Secretary-General.

6. The SECRETARY-GENERAL: As members of the Council are aware, at 5 p.m. New York time on 30 July, that is, yesterday, I received a communica-

tion from Mr. Callaghan, the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom, on behalf of the three Foreign Ministers who had been negotiating at Geneva, communicating to me the text of the Declaration and statement which have been agreed to by the Foreign Ministers of Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom [S/11398]. I am sure the members of the Council will wish to give their urgent consideration to that document. I hope that the agreement reached at Geneva on the cease-fire will be a first step towards the full implementation of resolution 353 (1974). Members of the Council will note that the Declaration envisages certain tasks for the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP). In particular, the Declaration calls for action in consultation with UNFICYP to determine the size and character of the security zone, which will be entered by no forces other than those of UNFICYP. Other important functions are also foreseen for UNFICYP.

7. I wish to inform the Council that I have requested my Special Representative and the Force Commander of UNFICYP to give me a preliminary assessment of the practical implications of the Declaration as far as UNFICYP is concerned. I shall report to the Council on the practical consequences involved.

8. The total strength of UNFICYP as of 31 July is 3,484 men. That total comprises 3,332 military personnel and 152 from the civilian police element of the Force (UNCIVPOL). By 7 August the total strength of UNFICYP will, it is estimated, be 4,238 men. When all the reinforcements currently pledged have arrived—by about 12 August—the total strength of UNFICYP will be approximately 4,443.

9. I take this opportunity to draw the attention of members of the Council to the question of the nature of UNFICYP's continued presence in the Turkish area of control, which I mentioned to the Council on 29 July and which needs clarification. As you know, UNFICYP has been playing, and should continue to play, a most useful humanitarian role in all parts of the island of Cyprus in assisting the civilian population—Turkish and Greek Cypriots alike—who have been afflicted by the recent hostilities. This matter is now under discussion by UNFICYP with the Turkish Military Command in Cyprus. I am confident that these discussions will enable UNFICYP to continue to perform its role in all parts of the island with the full agreement of all the parties concerned.

10. I think that is as much as I should say at this stage. I am sure that the members of the Council are fully aware of the complexity of the situation. I do not have to say that I and my colleagues in the Secretariat, both here and in Cyprus, are prepared fully to co-operate with the parties in order to restore peaceful conditions in the island, so that negotiations

can continue and resolution 353 (1974) can be fully implemented.

11. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): As a result of conversations and consultations, a document containing a draft resolution is being circulated [S/11400]. The text of that draft reads as follows:

"The Security Council,

"Recalling its resolutions 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964, 353 (1974) of 20 July 1974 and 354 (1974) of 23 July 1974,

"Noting that all States have declared their respect for the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus,

"Taking note of the Secretary-General's statement made at the 1788th meeting of the Security Council,

"Requests the Secretary-General to take appropriate action in the light of his statement."

12. I call upon the representative of Greece.

13. Mr. CARAYANNIS (Greece): While we now have the Geneva agreement, it finally came before us in the form of a Declaration and a statement of the three Foreign Ministers participating in the conference.

14. We have been one of the architects of that agreement, and we feel we owe an explanation to the Council.

15. In Geneva we did our best to help Cyprus. All we could achieve was this agreement. We regret we could not do better. The British have helped, and they earnestly tried to be constructive. In spite of that help we could not do better. But under the present circumstances we believe that what we did in Geneva may be a step in the right direction.

16. The Geneva agreement takes the present situation as a starting-point and resolution 353 (1974) as a goal, and lays down the process for the implementation of that resolution. It contributes to the reaffirmation, ensurance and protection of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus.

17. It will now be up to the Security Council to give its guidance and to take constructive steps with a view to covering the remaining distance to the full implementation of resolution 353 (1974). The sooner that distance is covered and the resolution implemented, the better it will be for the Council; it will also be better for Cyprus and for Greece, and it will be better for Turkey.

18. In the meantime, there are some very urgent problems, and I am grateful to the Secretary-General for having reminded us of them. Reports from the island this morning were not encouraging: some 20 hours after the signing of the Declaration in Geneva, serious violations were reported. Such reports are still coming from Cyprus.

19. This morning, at 10.45 a.m., a Turkish infantry unit was moving from Ayios Pavlos neck heading towards the village of Karavas.

20. At 11 a.m., Turkish troops attacked the villages of Lapithos and Karavas. They also attacked the villages of Ayios Ermolaos and Skylloura.

21. Reports received this afternoon say that in two villages inhabited only by Greek Cypriots, all those inhabitants left and there is an imminent threat that the Turkish army will occupy those two villages.

22. I have complained several times at this table of the fact that Turkey has not been complying with the cease-fire. Well, now we have a signed document, and almost 24 hours after the signing of that document Turkey still is not complying. I only hope that this is the result of a lack of communications.

23. Then there is another fact, to which the Secretary-General drew our attention: the Turkish military authorities have indeed asked the United Nations Force in Cyprus to withdraw from Cyprus territory occupied by Turkey. The Secretary-General is, I understand, now engaged in consultations with the Turkish Government to work out a practical arrangement. I only hope that he will find it easier than we found it in Geneva.

24. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): I now call on the representative of Turkey.

25. Mr. OLCAY (Turkey): I am very grateful to the Secretary-General for his report, which squarely indicates the most urgent problems faced by the international community in relation to the situation in Cyprus.

26. I have listened with great care to what my colleague from Greece has just said about the military situation on the island. I am not in a position either to confirm or to deny what he has said, but I am sure he will also realize that at this very moment, probably because of the same lack of communications, the beleaguered Turkish villages remain under the threat of Greek forces on the island.

27. I really do not want to start an argument, but for the benefit of those members of the Council who may not know all the details of the military situation in Cyprus I should like to say that when I speak of "Greek forces" I do not necessarily mean forces from

Greece. For the past 10 years there has been an enormous number of Greek forces—a strong army constituted against and in violation of agreements—in Cyprus. As the Council knows, article 129 of the Cyprus Constitution of 1960, which has been torn to pieces, provides that the Cyprus Army shall comprise 2,000 men, 60 per cent of whom shall be drawn from the Greek community, and 40 per cent from the Turkish community. I have come across a letter published in *The Times* of London from a former British High Commissioner in Cyprus—a neutral source—in which it is said that in 1964 the Cyprus Government formed its National Guard; despite protests from the representatives in Cyprus of the British and Turkish Governments and of the United Nations, that wholly Greek organization was built up to a strength which at the time—1964—was estimated to be over 20,000, some 5,000 of which, including the officers, came from outside the island. That, I believe, goes far to explain the situation we are in now.

28. The Turkish policy on Cyprus has remained the same from the very outset of the intercommunal talks. I can say today that the position of the Turkish Government in 1960 and 1964 was the same as it is in 1974, despite all that has happened—and there are probably very few round this table who can make similar statements about the positions of their Governments. Turkey's preoccupation with Cyprus is primarily and foremost with the security, rights and legitimate interests of the Turkish community in Cyprus and, of course, of Turkey itself, which is a signatory to the treaties giving birth to the Republic of Cyprus. Turkey has never acquiesced in violations of the international treaties; it has always drawn attention to the dangerous consequences of such violations, and always deplored the fact, which we continue to deplore, that no one other than itself has ever protested or reacted in an effective manner against these developments which have led to the present situation; and Turkey has never taken any action in contravention of any treaty it has signed.

29. However, I suppose that by now everybody knows who has destroyed the integrity of the State of Cyprus by violating its Constitution. I suppose that everybody around this table knows who has tried to pave the way to enosis, although this was clearly ruled out by international treaties. And I suppose everybody knows why for more than 10 years the Turkish community, which represents one fifth of the population, lived as refugees in their own land and were encouraged to emigrate if conditions did not suit their aspirations.

30. Everybody knows who since 1964 has turned the island into a huge depot of armaments and armed forces, against which the Turkish forces that have entered into the action about which you all know were fighting a few days ago.

31. In response to all these developments the international community has not up to now done anything, because our appeals called for action and it was considered so much more difficult to take action than to remain silent as long as the Turkish community itself was not reacting.

32. This situation continued until Turkey was left without any alternative but to take the initiative foreseen in the international treaties. But even at this stage Turkey has not exceeded the purposes defined at the outset of the military operation. This operation placed humanitarian considerations above all, as witnessed by reports of the international news media. Before and during the operation all peaceful methods of solution continued to be sought.

33. Now the first step towards such a peaceful solution seems at long last to have been found yesterday in Geneva. It took the form of a text which in our view totally in keeping in letter and in spirit with the purposes and principles that we have defined from the very outset.

34. I have nothing else to add to what I have just said but my hope that we are going to continue, with the help of the Greek Government, with the help of the United Kingdom Government and, when the time comes, with the help of the duly accredited representatives of the two communities, to find a lasting solution to the problem. I have nothing to add, and I hope that I shall not have anything to add during this meeting.

35. Mr. RICHARD (United Kingdom): I should like to confirm for the purposes of the record that as far as the United Kingdom is concerned we would wish to withdraw the draft resolution in document S/11399, in view of the fact that the draft resolution to which the President referred [S/11400] is in fact being circulated at this moment.

36. Paragraph 5 of resolution 353 (1974) called on Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom to enter into negotiations without delay for the restoration of peace in the area and constitutional government in Cyprus and to keep the Secretary-General informed. The Council will remember that when we adopted resolution 353 (1974) the invitation to the talks had already been submitted by the United Kingdom Government, and indeed we were at that moment waiting for a reply, so that that resolution sanctioned the holding of the talks. I hope that the Council would feel that the talks which began on 25 July in response to this resolution were indeed a speedy implementation, as far as we were concerned, of that call.

37. It was, as the Council will know, a difficult set of negotiations. I gather from those who took part in them that they did not get very much sleep and that the bargaining was hard. But at the end of the day they did emerge with a declaration.

38. Now may I perhaps put that declaration into its context. No one is suggesting for one moment that the Declaration is either a perfect document of that it provides a blueprint for the future of the island of Cyprus. What we say about it is quite simply this—that it was the best response which the three Powers sitting down in Geneva were able to make to the request which had been placed before them by the Security Council resolution 353 (1974).

39. As regards the immediate steps to maintain security in Cyprus, the three countries agreed in Geneva that the areas controlled by the opposing forces would not be extended. I quite understand that the views of some people around this table will be that that agreement is not enough and that to have emerged with a declaration that the areas controlled would not be extended is something different from an agreement that the areas controlled should be diminished. And of course I accept that distinction. But I must emphasize to the Council that after the negotiations had gone on for some days it did become apparent that the best response that we were going to get, if I may echo the words of our colleague from Greece, was that initially the areas controlled by opposing forces would not be extended.

40. Secondly, there was an agreement that all forces, both regular and irregular, should desist from hostile activity, and again, to try to freeze the situation, that a security zone should be established by the representatives of Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom, in consultation with the United Nations force.

41. Speaking in the House of Commons this afternoon, the Foreign Secretary, Mr. Callaghan, said:

“That is a necessarily incomplete summary of the main provisions of the Declaration. It is not a perfect document.”—I think we could all echo that.—“But Greece and Turkey have, I believe, been brought back from the brink of war, and what we have done in Geneva will help to keep the peace and give everyone a chance of moving on to the second and more important phase of making a peace—a peace which will last and which will create the essential confidence among the communities which has been lacking. The immediate aim had to be to remove the risk of war, but our abiding concern is the welfare of the people of Cyprus. Cyprus will not flourish as long as it remains and armed camp. We must do our utmost to secure compliance with resolution 353 (1974) of the Security Council in all its aspects, including its military provisions, as well as the resolution of the constitutional problems of Cyprus, in such a manner as will command the confidence of all its peoples.”

42. That was Mr. Callaghan speaking this afternoon in the House of Commons, and it is against that background and in that context that I would commend

this Declaration to the Council and that I would urge the Council to adopt the draft resolution in document S/11400 which is now before us.

43. What it is important to realize is that the Declaration was seen as a first step and not as a last step. What is significant is that if one actually looks at the terms of the Declaration itself one finds there set out in its preambular parts a firm statement by the three Foreign Ministers that resolution 353 (1974) is to be implemented, and also that while they are seeking more long-term solutions in more general terms, there are certain urgent and immediate matters which have to be dealt with. It is those urgent and immediate matters which are set out in the Declaration.

44. We believe that it is important because it produces conditions for making the cease-fire in Cyprus stick. I think this is the vital point for peace and security in the area and above all for the people of Cyprus themselves. If the cease-fire does not stick it is those people in Cyprus who will suffer. It is not we in the Security Council. It is the ordinary people, both Greek and Turk alike. Therefore the role of an impartial umpire or intermediary is clearly going to be a vital one. We believe that the United Nations should not hesitate to fulfil this role, particularly in view of United Nations association with Cyprus in the immediate past and indeed the presence in Cyprus at the moment of UNFICYP. The situation is such that if the United Nations does hesitate to fulfil this role, if somehow or other this cease-fire which we have managed to attain with such difficulty is allowed to slacken, then the sufferers, as I say, will be the people of Cyprus and perhaps even the peoples of Greece and Turkey.

45. I should like to say a word about the next stage as we see it. Mr. Callaghan said that when he first went to Geneva the first words he said were that they should not forget the people of Cyprus, whose island it is and who live there. He said to the people of Cyprus yesterday that the agreement that had been reached was a first step towards the creation of the confidence and the security which they must have if they are to have a stable and peaceful future. He went on to say:

“We all know that the Declaration is but a first step on what is going to be a long road to the recreation of confidence and stability in the Republic, not only for its own sake but also to avoid embittering relations between Greece and Turkey. I certainly do not under-estimate the difficulties which lie ahead, particularly in finding a just and lasting answer to the constitutional problems of the island, but without the cease-fire and without a general agreement to ensure that it is stable we could not go on as we plan to do.”

46. It might also be worth while looking at how the various leaders in Cyprus themselves seem to have

received this declaration. Archbishop Makarios was guarded and cautious, as perhaps one would expect him to be in the circumstances, when he commented on the declaration, but he welcomed it. He said this:

“I am pleased that the discussions at the Geneva conference have resulted in an agreement for a cease-fire in Cyprus which will put an end to the terrible loss of human life and suffering. I cannot say, however, I am satisfied with the whole contents of the agreement. In its most important part, which is the withdrawal of the Turkish troops from Cyprus, the agreement is very vague.”

He went on to say:

“In any case I hope that the agreement will be the first step towards the full implementation of the Security Council resolution of 20 July.”

Mr. Denktas commented today in Cyprus in favourable terms upon the achievement of this declaration and this cease-fire. Mr. Clerides said that Greeks and Turks will have to live side by side in future, and the longer the bloodshed went on the more difficult it would have been to arrive at a peaceful solution.

47. It is in this spirit that the United Kingdom, on which resolution 353 (1974) placed a special responsibility in the light of our existing international treaty obligations, proposes the adoption of the draft resolution now before the Council, as a matter of urgency. The delineation of the limits of territory at present occupied by Turkish forces, which are referred to in the declaration, constitutes urgent work. None of the political issues are dealt with in the declaration. None of the major political issues that may have to be dealt with in the future can be dealt with in the draft resolution before the Council tonight. But what is essential, in our view, is that the Secretary-General should be in a position to take the action that is required to enable UNFICYP to play its part in the arrangements that are clearly necessary to stop the bloodshed in Cyprus and to establish the basis for a peaceful resolution of Cyprus's problems.

48. Our choice here today is not whether we believe in one particular solution for Cyprus or in a different one. That is a matter for the Cypriots themselves to decide. Our choice is whether we are prepared to assist in the establishment of a cease-fire and a standstill—no more than that. I have no doubt that all the anxieties that are felt around this table will be expressed in the next week or so and in the months to come, but without a cease-fire which is effective we do not believe that conditions can exist for the political decisions which are yet to come, and without the use of UNFICYP we do not believe that the cease-fire can be made as effective as we think it needs to be.

49. Mr. de GUIRINGAUD (France) (*interpretation from French*): My delegation cannot but express its

gratification at the outcome of the negotiations which went on for almost a week in Geneva and which have made it possible to take a first step towards a solution of the painful crisis which since 15 July has pitted two Member States against each other, a crisis which has occasioned great suffering to a third Member State, the Republic of Cyprus. I should pay a tribute here to the patience and perseverance and the extraordinary efforts of the Geneva negotiators, and particularly the United Kingdom Foreign Secretary, Mr. Callaghan, who presided over the proceedings.

50. We hope that the practical arrangements agreed upon by the negotiators will be implemented and that the situation on the spot will be very quickly stabilized. I think that there is a very precise moral significance to this idea of stabilization. Each of the adversaries of today and yesterday must henceforth do everything possible to ensure that the populations that have so grievously suffered from the events of the past weeks may experience a less precarious existence and may be spared any trials and ordeals. It is high time the spirit of vigilance gave place to that of reconciliation.

51. My country is particularly gratified at the provisions in the Geneva agreement which call for the participation of representatives of Cyprus in the talks which will resume on 8 August. It is certainly essential, it is obviously essential, that the principal parties involved should indicate how they mean to coexist within the framework of a stabilized constitutional order, an order which remains still to be specified.

52. For the time being, however, what remains most important is that the material arrangements should be made without delay for the first stage of a return to security and tranquillity. The United Nations Force is called upon to play an important role in that respect. We are gratified that the Secretary-General has been able to make a statement to us today summarizing the tasks that will devolve upon UNFICYP. They are arduous tasks, and there are a great many of them; they will not always be easy to accomplish. But I do not see who could take on those tasks, and take them on very quickly, if not the "blue helmets". Once again, what is at stake is the lives of thousands of men, women and children, and it is no accident that some of the zones in which UNFICYP must operate are now described as security zones.

53. There was therefore a note of urgency in the Council's agreeing on and approving in a resolution the arrangements that the Secretary-General proposes to make. I would note as a particularly important factor the Secretary-General's determination to act only in full agreement and constant liaison with the parties concerned, whose spirit of moderation does, however, remain indispensable. May I once again appeal for that moderation and point out that, failing

a spirit of moderation, all our efforts and the efforts of the international community will remain vain.

54. In view of those considerations, my delegation will vote in favour of the draft resolution in document S/11400, which seems to us to meet both the concerns of the majority of the members of the Council and the interests of the peoples of Cyprus, for which, as I have already repeatedly said, we feel particular sympathy.

55. Mr. MAINA (Kenya): My delegation has followed with a concern that has increased each day the events that have taken place in Cyprus since 15 July 1974.

56. We witnessed early in the morning of 15 July an act of aggression against the Republic of Cyprus engineered and directed by the Greek military officers attached to the Cypriot National Guard. Everybody in this Council has had an opportunity to condemn that interference in the internal affairs of a Member State. My delegation noted the admission by the representative of Greece of that involvement of the Greek officers in the military coup d'état in Cyprus. The Council was convened on 16 July, at the request of the Secretary-General, to consider the serious situation that had been created by that coup d'état. Indeed, it was right that the Council should meet to discharge its obligations in the maintenance of international peace and security.

57. As if the Republic of Cyprus had not had enough, we witnessed after a few days another act of aggression against that State Member of the United Nations, this time by the intervention of Turkey, on the pretext that it was only fulfilling its duty and obligation, as required of it by the agreement of 1960.

58. Kenya, as a peace-loving Member of the Organization, cannot but be very disturbed when events threatening the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of a Member State with which we have the closest relationship take place, with the apparent complicity of certain Member States. Because of our desire to see peace and security speedily restored in Cyprus, we voted in favour of the draft resolution that became resolution 353 (1974), although we had serious reservations regarding the holding of talks on the affairs of a sovereign State Member of the United Nations by third parties without the participation of that Member State. We had hoped that by the unanimous decision of the Council on 23 July our desires regarding a free and independent Cyprus would be fulfilled without delay. While it is accepted that the magnitude of the loss of life has to a certain degree been diminished, the ingredients for a lasting peace are still far from being present.

59. In view of the grave situation still existing and in view of the very unsatisfactory methods by which certain members are proposing to settle the intricacies

of the Cyprus question, I find it necessary to restate, and probably elaborate a little more on, my Government's position on this crisis.

60. As I stated earlier, the Council met initially to try and restore peace and security to the Republic of Cyprus. We believed that by so doing we would be restoring normal conditions in Cyprus, including its independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity. The events that have taken place so far have not convinced us that the Council's initial understanding and actions have been fulfilled or are even likely to be fulfilled. We have found manoeuvres that definitely threaten the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of a Member State.

61. I should like to state quite categorically that my Government will not support any move that will involve the United Nations in the illegal removal or imposition of governments in territories of Member States. To do so would be contrary to the spirit and letter of the Charter of the United Nations. My Government will also not support any moves that would involve the United Nations in any arrangements that had any colouring of a colonial or imperial nature, such as the arrangements to dismember a Member State like Cyprus.

62. As I stated on 20 July [1781st meeting], it is the hope of my delegation that the future Government of Cyprus will take all measures necessary to reconcile the people of Cyprus to the fact of their being an independent nation made up of different peoples and that their energies should be directed towards the building of one nation. It has also been accepted and emphasized by all Member States that independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity must be respected. The Council on 20 July unanimously adopted resolution 353 (1974), paragraph 5 of which called on the guarantor Powers to enter into negotiations without delay for the restoration of peace in the area and constitutional government in Cyprus. We have now received a declaration and a statement agreed by the Foreign Ministers of Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom and resulting from talks which, I must emphasize, were conducted without the presence of the Republic of Cyprus, the party most directly involved.

63. The agreement that was reached in Geneva, while attempting to solve some of the problems, is far from satisfactory as far as my delegation is concerned. We have noted, for example, that whereas resolution 353 (1974) demanded an immediate end to foreign military intervention in the Republic of Cyprus and the withdrawal of all foreign military personnel in excess of those permitted by international agreements, the Declaration merely talks of what measures should be elaborated which will lead to the timely and the phased reduction of the number of armed forces and the amounts of armaments, armour and other war material in the Republic of Cyprus. This is

very unsatisfactory and does not reflect resolution 353 (1974) in this crucial matter of the withdrawal of foreign military personnel. Indeed, it negates the Security Council resolution.

64. Another matter that is of great concern to my Government is that of the participation of the Republic of Cyprus in all matters affecting it. My delegation, right at the beginning, had expressed an opinion favouring the participation of the Republic of Cyprus in the negotiations in Geneva. We are convinced that we were right in considering that the participation of Cyprus was vital. The Declaration we have just received clearly demonstrates the need for Cyprus to participate in any future negotiations and talks affecting its vital interests. We are not satisfied with the provisions of the Declaration in this crucial matter of participation by the Republic of Cyprus. In our opinion, no outsider should determine who will represent Cyprus at the talks. My delegation, therefore, will support only a draft resolution or proposals that will give to the Republic of Cyprus its rightful place in the negotiations that are envisaged to take place in the future.

65. Earlier on I stated that my Government will not accept any measures that will involve the United Nations in imposing governments in territories of Member States. I think my delegation is fully entitled to hear from the guarantors the interpretations they gave to the invitation to the talks contained in paragraph 5 of the Declaration. We would also like to know what they actually mean by the words "constitutional legitimacy" in paragraph 5.

66. We consider that it will be the duty of the Council to initiate measures that will help Cyprus regain its total independence and sovereignty after the outrage of the last few weeks. We consider that the agreements of 1960 were completely unequal. We are therefore looking forward, indeed, to calling upon the guarantor Powers to review their agreements with Cyprus with a view to making it possible for the Republic of Cyprus to exercise without fear its rights, sovereignty and independence.

67. I should like to make very brief concluding remarks with regard to what the Council is expected to do in respect of the implementation of further measures to restore peace and security in Cyprus. We noted that the Declaration made in Geneva requires the Secretary-General to take certain measures for its implementation. Specifically, I refer to the role of UNFICYP. The Council definitely has to give this Force a new mandate in addition to the one envisaged in resolution 186 (1964). It will be necessary to expand this Force and probably to equip it more than at present.

68. My delegation would also like to propose that the United Nations should be given a much more direct role in the talks that are envisaged to start on

8 August. We were not satisfied with the observer status given to the United Nations. As we heard from the Secretary-General before, this made it impossible for the Secretary-General's representative to attend any significant meetings in the recent talks. If the role of the United Nations, and especially of this Council, is to maintain peace and security, surely it is desirable that the United Nations should be involved in discussions that will require the services of the Organization in the future. Otherwise, the United Nations is being used only as a tool.

69. My delegation is very hesitant about supporting any moves that will tend to make the Council and the United Nations subordinate to other groups discussing international peace.

70. My delegation will continue to consult with other members of the Council with a view to making proposals that we hope will assist in solving the present crisis and restoring to the Republic of Cyprus peace, security, independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity.

71. In view of what I have said, and without being associated with the moves envisaged by Powers which are violating the independence of Cyprus, I would support the request of the Secretary-General for the continued use of UNFICYP for humanitarian purposes without even noting the declarations referred to in his report. We are being asked to adopt a draft resolution which begins with the words: "Noting that all States have declared their respect for the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus" [S/11400]. I should be happy to go along with that draft resolution, but I should like to know whether that is a fact. Is it a fact that, as of now, the independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus is respected by the Member States, including the ones I have referred to, which have taken measures in the last few weeks to dismember Cyprus? It would be very important if the declarations we are assuming in this draft resolution were made positively, at least by the two major Powers involved in this conflict.

72. Mr. EL HASSEN (Mauritania) (*interpretation from French*): The crisis in Cyprus has deeply concerned my country and continues to disquiet it. In fact, this is a crisis which has taken place in a particularly sensitive region and which threatens a fragile balance. Only the efforts of the Security Council and the United Nations have succeeded in maintaining that balance so far. This is also a crisis which seriously affects peace and security in the eastern Mediterranean and which also endangers the independence, the sovereignty and the territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus.

73. It is the awareness of this situation which prompted my delegation to associate its efforts with those of other members of the Council in order to prepare and to adopt resolution 353 (1974). That text

defined—and this has to be acknowledged—the framework for a solution to the problem of Cyprus. In particular it posed a series of principles to which my delegation attaches the highest importance. Among those principles, I should like to cite respect for the territorial integrity and independence of Cyprus. That principle should be the prerequisite for any solution of the Cyprus problem.

74. Another principle laid down in this resolution is the need to restore a constitutional régime based on taking into account the interests of all Cypriots.

75. My delegation therefore believes that the Security Council has assumed its full responsibilities by defining so precisely the framework for a solution to the problem in Cyprus and the principles which should constitute the basis for that solution. Today my delegation, at least, can be gratified that the action of the Council led the three guarantor Powers to undertake commitments which, if they are respected, as we hope they will be, and entered into as they should be entered into, could lead to a global solution of the problem that is acceptable and perhaps definitive.

76. Allow me to express the thanks of my delegation to the three Foreign Ministers—those of Greece, the United Kingdom and Turkey—for their constructive spirit and contribution to peace. We hope that the future negotiations will lead to more thorough and more positive results, but we firmly believe that the Cypriots should be closely associated with those negotiations, which directly involve their future. We should also like to point out very clearly that in our estimation that would only be a first step in the implementation of the provisions of resolution 353 (1974).

77. In the light of those considerations, my delegation is fully prepared to support any action by the Council which would enable the Secretary-General and the United Nations to play a still more active role in consultation with all the parties involved. We are certain that the action provided for in the draft resolution in document S/11400 would render easier a peaceful and global solution to the problem.

78. Before concluding, I should once again like to express to the Secretary-General our very deep appreciation for the manner in which he has constantly kept the Council informed of developments in this problem. We should also like to thank him for his efforts since 15 July to bring peace to Cyprus and to alleviate the sufferings of the population of that republic.

79. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): I call upon the representative of Cyprus.

80. Mr. ROSSIDES (Cyprus): We have before us the Declaration by the Foreign Ministers of Greece,

Turkey and Great Britain arrived at in the Geneva conference. That conference, it may be recalled, was set up in virtue of operative paragraph 5 of resolution 353 (1974). Paragraph 2 of the Declaration of the Foreign Ministers stipulates a cease-fire as of 30 July. Although the date is different from that contained in resolution 353 (1974), it is nonetheless in compliance with that resolution, which provides for a cease-fire "as a first step".

81. The President of Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios, expressed his satisfaction with the agreement on the cease-fire, which, he said, "will put an end to the further loss of human life and suffering", and he also expressed the hope that the relevant agreement would be "the first step towards the full implementation of resolution 353 (1974)". However, the President of Cyprus said that he was not satisfied with the entire text of the agreed Declaration, particularly its most important part, namely, the part concerning the withdrawal of the Turkish troops from Cyprus, which is left rather vague, to say the least.

82. May I now, in this respect, make certain comments on the Declaration which I think are pertinent and should be brought to the attention of the Council.

83. Regarding the withdrawal of foreign troops from Cyprus, paragraph 4 of the Declaration contains what I would call an over-riding clause reaffirming resolution 353 (1974), which the paragraph provides should "be implemented in the shortest possible time". That is also consistent with the said resolution. In its sequence, however, the Declaration seems to follow a completely contradictory course, contradicting what it has itself already said. For, whereas operative paragraph 3 of the resolution demands an "immediate end to foreign military intervention in Cyprus", the Declaration is so drafted as to convey the firm impression of foreign military intervention being indefinitely extended, as though it was to become almost perpetual. And whereas paragraph 4 of the resolution calls for the withdrawal of all foreign military forces "without delay", paragraph 4 of the Declaration—although its beginning is consistent with that provisions of the resolution—goes on to make the withdrawal conditional upon the conclusion of "a just and lasting solution acceptable to all the parties concerned" and states that:

"as peace, security and mutual confidence are established in the island, measures should be elaborated which will lead to the timely and phased reduction of the number of armed forces and the amounts of armaments, munitions and other war material in ... Cyprus".

That is so different from the resolution that it is almost, as the representative of Kenya has said, a negation of the resolution.

84. Incidentally, I wonder of which country of our world of today it can be said that there is this Utopian condition of mutual confidence. Mutual confidence is a two-way affair. If the country which is occupying part of Cyprus by military force wishes there to be no such confidence so that it will never leave the island, it can very easily achieve that. And, in any case, who is going to be the judge that there is such a degree of confidence that it will induce the occupying Power to withdraw its forces if it does not wish to do so? This is such a vague and indefinite provision of withdrawal as to amount to continued military occupation by foreign troops of a part of Cyprus in violation of its sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity, to which so much dedication is expressed in the Security Council resolution and in the Declaration of the Foreign Ministers. It would also be in direct contravention of the Council resolution, which is so emphatically affirmed in the same paragraph of the Declaration.

85. So how could my President find this paragraph satisfactory? How could any member of this Security Council find those parts satisfactory? Would it be satisfactory to the concept of the Council that its resolution is directly contradicted and negated by the body that is set up to carry it out? I can understand a delay or difficulty in implementation—but direct contradiction of it?

86. Now, that is the situation with regard to paragraph 4, and I do not think I need say any more. The rest is for the members to consider, because, really, this concerns not only Cyprus, but the United Nations as a whole, international peace and security, the small countries particularly, and the non-aligned countries, of which Cyprus is one.

87. Now, with regard to paragraph 5, first of all it contains certain statements that are not correct. It says here that the representatives of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities should be invited to participate in the talks. We had understood here in the Council that it had been stated that the Government of Cyprus, through its President, would be asked to participate, and that was even more definitely stated by the representative of the United Kingdom.

88. Now, here we have a situation which again is peculiar. Even if the text were to say that first of all the Government of Cyprus should be invited to participate—and how it would participate is another matter, as is clearly stated—and even if they wanted to specify how the Turkish Cypriot community should be represented, it should read "the Government of Cyprus and the Turkish Cypriot community", not "the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities".

89. All the reports of the Secretary-General during all these years have been calling the Government of

Cyprus the Government recognized by all States as the Government of Cyprus, and have called the Turkish Cypriots the "Turkish Cypriot leadership" or the "Turkish Cypriot community". But they have never ignored or bypassed the Government of Cyprus.

90. Also, it is stated in paragraph 5 that:

"The Ministers noted the existence in practice in the Republic of Cyprus of two autonomous administrations, that of the Greek Cypriot community and that of the Turkish Cypriot community."

That, again, is factually completely incorrect, and a glance at the reports of the Secretary-General will show that what is recognized is the Government of Cyprus, and there is no question of autonomous administration. The reference is again to the areas under the control of the Turkish Cypriot leadership.

91. Recently, as I have verified from the Secretariat, the Turkish Cypriot leadership has called itself the "Turkish Cypriot administration", but this document refers only to the attitude taken by the "Turkish Cypriot leadership". Therefore, this question of the two autonomous administrations is decapitating Cyprus and separating it from its Government, depriving it of the identity of a country with a government, rendering it simply a territory with two separate autonomous administrations.

92. That again is one of the things that are unsatisfactory. I very well understand the circumstances of pressure and of time and of negotiations carried out until the last minute under the gun and under the threat, "Either you complete it now or we occupy" or "continue the war"—with 25,000 to 30,000 troops imported into Cyprus unhindered, and with the air space of Cyprus violated and Cyprus bombed by airplanes, also unhindered. No one has moved to stop it, even though the conference was expected to put an end to this situation in Cyprus.

93. Therefore it was a gigantic, a titanic task for those who were negotiating, having the burden of carrying out the responsibility of the Security Council in preserving peace and security in Cyprus. It is a peculiar situation. I commented on it before, and we now see the fruits of that situation. It is the Council that has the responsibility of preventing aggression and stopping aggression, and no one else. Thus we now have a situation in which we are to look forward to the positive side of it. And the positive side of it is the cease-fire, for which we are grateful and which we appreciate and which we want to help towards materializing.

94. Therefore we believe that the draft resolution before us is a constructive one in that direction. Of course, we have no voice in the matter, but I should like to put it on record that this is a constructive draft resolution.

95. Mr. BENNETT (United States of America): The United States is deeply gratified by the agreement reached in Geneva among the Foreign Ministers of Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom. In that connexion, I should like to read a statement issued yesterday by the White House in Washington:

"The United States welcomes the announcement in Geneva of the agreement reached by the Foreign Ministers of the United Kingdom, Greece and Turkey. We consider this an important step toward the restoration of peace and stability in Cyprus. We commend the intensive and patient efforts of the three Governments concerned which brought about this achievement. In particular, we wish to pay tribute to the skill and persistence of Mr. Callaghan, the Minister of State of Great Britain, who as leader of the conference deserves great credit for its success, and to the Foreign Ministers of Greece and Turkey."

96. We believe this agreement justifies the wisdom of the Council in adopting resolution 353 (1974), and thereafter in supporting the intensive efforts in Geneva to negotiate the serious issues involved in this Cyprus crisis. I want to reiterate the view of my Government that we consider this agreement an important step toward the restoration of peace and stability in Cyprus.

97. We particularly welcome the recognition by the three Foreign Ministers in their Declaration of "the importance of setting in train, as a matter of urgency, measures to adjust and to regularize within a reasonable period of time the situation in the Republic of Cyprus on a lasting basis", having regard to the international agreements of 1960 and resolution 353 (1974). My Government wants to see strict maintenance of the cease-fire in the area and the prompt implementation of other portions of the agreement signed in Geneva. My Government very much hopes that this agreement foreshadows a quick return to more normal conditions in Cyprus—conditions which will bring to all the people of Cyprus a return to constitutional government and a new measure of political stability and general well-being.

98. We note that the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus is asked to undertake certain responsibilities under the terms of the agreement of 30 July. UNFICYP has been on duty now for more than 10 years, and we may recall that Security Council resolution 186 (1964) recommended, in paragraph 5

"that the function of the Force should be, in the interest of preserving international peace and security, to use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of fighting and, as necessary, to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions".

We consequently believe it appropriate to urge the Secretary-General to take immediately any necessary

steps to this end. Consistent with this view, my delegation supports the draft resolution before the Council requesting the Secretary-General to take appropriate action, and we urge its adoption without delay.

99. An important first step has been taken towards the normalization of conditions in Cyprus and it points the way towards the full implementation of resolution 353 (1974). We believe it is now the obligation of this Council to maintain and encourage the momentum towards peace which has been generated. We strongly urge members of the Council to support the efforts of the parties and to place no doctrinal or procedural barriers in their way. Our individual and collective support for this Geneva agreement and its continuing implementation will be our most important contribution to the maintenance of international peace and security in the area.

100. Mr. ANWAR SANI (Indonesia): It is not my intention to make a long statement. I have not much to add to the basic views which I already expressed in my first statement on the Cyprus matter during the meeting on 20 July last [1781st meeting]. I shall limit my intervention mainly to the role UNFICYP is expected to play in the developments in Cyprus.

101. My delegation is happy that the three guarantors of Cyprus's sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity have succeeded in agreeing on a declaration aiming at the restoration of peace and constitutional order in Cyprus. My delegation would have been much happier if the declaration had been achieved with the active participation of the representatives of Cyprus. As a matter of principle it is extremely difficult for us to accept the fact that discussions which affect directly the vital interests of Cyprus should have been held without the participation of Cyprus itself. My delegation therefore notes with appreciation that Cyprus is to be represented by the leaders of the two communities of the countries in the negotiations that are going to start on 8 August.

102. My delegation has tried to understand the implication of paragraph 3 of the Declaration, which refers to the role which UNFICYP is expected to play. As UNFICYP is expected to be active in Cyprus to help maintain the cease-fire, my delegation considers it necessary to know first of all the reaction of the parties on the island itself with regard to the Declaration—whether or not they have endorsed it. My delegation, of course, expects that the Turkish military forces on the island will respect the provisions of the Declaration, as Turkey was one of the participants in Geneva. But as UNFICYP is expected to situate itself not between the Turkish forces and the military forces of Greece or the United Kingdom on the island, but between the Turkish forces and the Greek Cypriots or National Guard and between Greek and Turkish Cypriots elsewhere, it would be easier for my delegation to agree on the role of

UNFICYP on the basis of paragraph 3 of the Declaration if we could be given the assurance that the Greek Cypriot forces and the Turkish Cypriot forces have indeed accepted the Declaration and are prepared to respect its provisions and cooperate with UNFICYP. The representative of the United Kingdom gave an indication in that direction in his statement when he referred to the reaction of President Makarios, of Acting President Clerides and of Vice-President Denktas. My delegation does not think that UNFICYP should be involved in the implementation of paragraph 3 of the Declaration without that assurance, as we cannot take the responsibility of UNFICYP's getting involved in fighting with Cypriot forces on the island, whether Greek or Turkish Cypriots.

103. Another clarification that we would like to seek is: what will be the status of UNFICYP vis-à-vis the three guarantors if it is going to act on the basis of their Declaration? Will UNFICYP become *de facto* an instrument of the three guarantors, with all the consequences that such a relationship involves? In the opinion of my delegation, UNFICYP can only operate solely as the instrument of the United Nations and responsible only to the United Nations with regard to its activities.

104. As I stated in my intervention on 20 July, Indonesia attaches great importance to the fact that the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus as a non-aligned country shall be respected. We must confess that we know very little not only about what is actually happening in Cyprus, but also about what is actually developing outside Cyprus with regard to Cyprus. We are of the view, however, that any involvement of the United Nations in the Cyprus problem should be directed to assisting and speeding up the process towards the restoration of peace and constitutional order in Cyprus on the basis of respect for its sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity as a non-aligned country.

105. It is with this in mind that my delegation is evaluating the Geneva Declaration and the role that has been reserved for UNFICYP and, therefore, the United Nations, in that Declaration.

106. In conclusion, let me express once again to the Secretary-General, his representative in Cyprus, the Commander of UNFICYP and the men under his command the high appreciation of my delegation for the role they have played in restoring peace and tranquillity in Cyprus and for the efforts they have made in the humanitarian field to lessen as much as they can the suffering of the population caught in the fighting, whether Turkish or Greek Cypriots. I think we should stress this humanitarian aspect of the activities of UNFICYP in Cyprus, performed under most difficult and dangerous conditions, for which UNFICYP certainly has earned our praise and thanks.

107. My delegation recognized the danger of the situation in Cyprus which required action from this Council. My delegation is prepared to vote in favour of the draft resolution in document S/11400, stressing, however, that the activities of UNFICYP should continue to be guided by the provisions of resolution 353 (1974).

108. Mr. NJINÉ (United Republic of Cameroon) (*interpretation from French*): I have had the occasion to state the position of my Government since the beginning of the debate on the drama of Cyprus. At this stage my delegation would like once again to express its appreciation to the Secretary-General for his report, which has been especially clear and useful.

109. The delegation of Cameroon is gratified, in the light of the views it has expressed here on this very same subject, by the very clear commitment of the honourable negotiators in Geneva to respect the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus. My delegation hopes that this commitment, of which we are taking note, will become a living reality.

110. In our view, it would be desirable to encourage the efforts undertaken to implement resolution 353 (1974), which in our view constitutes the beginning of progress. The sooner the Council encourages the Secretary-General to act in the best and clearest interests of the Cypriots, all Cypriots, the better it will be.

111. In view of all those considerations, my delegation is prepared to support all efforts designed to bring about a durable peace in Cyprus, in the whole of the region, and thus it will vote in favour of the draft resolution contained in document S/11400 under consideration.

112. Mr. JANKOWITSCH (Austria): My delegation has listened with the greatest attention to the previous speakers, who have given us a very concise impression of the view the Council is taking of the latest developments in Cyprus, and we have listened with particular attention to the statement of the Secretary-General. We should like to express to him our appreciation for the full and comprehensive analysis of the situation he has provided.

113. We believe that the time for action has come and that the urgency is undebatable. We believe that on the basis of the statement the Secretary-General has made to the Council, important action can be taken to proceed further with the implementation of resolution 353 (1974), a process to which the conference at Geneva, set in motion by the Security Council, has been called upon to furnish an important contribution. Indeed this contribution is not a negligible one. Irrespective of results, all participants in the conference deserve high tributes for their patience,

perseverance and willingness to come to an agreement—an agreement which, being a compromise, and a compromise to be achieved under most difficult and trying conditions, could obviously not be a perfect one.

114. As the Secretary-General has pointed out, the agreement and the Declaration submitted to us yesterday constitute the first step, and an indispensable first step, for strengthening and stabilizing the ceasefire and ending the hostilities and all further acts of violence such as those which have occurred in the Republic of Cyprus. That is a most important contribution to the implementation of some, if not all, of the military provisions of resolution 353 (1974). The urgency of this action need not be stressed again here, in the light of all the recent developments, including what has apparently occurred in recent hours. The urgency of the action is further underlined by the necessity to provide UNFICYP and other United Nations organs in the island with a clear and agreed basis for the performance of their tasks. We for our part are particularly impressed by the humanitarian dimension of these tasks, which became fully visible and fully understandable from the latest report, which the Secretary-General provided yesterday. Above all it is the helpless and defenceless men, women and children in the island, whether of the Greek or of the Turkish Cypriot community, that urgently need the help of UNFICYP.

115. As I have said, a first step has been taken towards the implementation of resolution 353 (1974) in Geneva, and it was a considerable step. However, continued and much greater efforts will be necessary to implement the resolutions of the Council on the basis of the generally agreed principles of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Cyprus. Acting in this manner and acting with this goal in mind, it is a matter of course that the people of Cyprus, the representatives of both communities, should be closely associated with any further political efforts to be undertaken to solve the crisis. It is a matter of satisfaction to us that such representation will be provided in the future talks in Geneva.

116. We deem it necessary that any further negotiations on the restoration of peace and constitutional government, and indeed on any matter affecting the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Cyprus, should not be conducted without the participation of representatives of the Republic of Cyprus. In all these negotiations the fate of the people of Cyprus will be at stake, as it has been at stake in past negotiations. It is our firm belief that in the end only the people of Cyprus themselves can decide on their fate and on their future and that nobody should disenfranchise the people of Cyprus.

117. The tasks of the United Nations and in particular of UNFICYP in the coming days and weeks will be difficult indeed. We believe that these efforts deserve

all our support and we hope they will receive our unanimous support. We continue to believe, as we have believed in the past, that the United Nations is called upon to play a central role in all efforts to protect and maintain the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of a fellow Member State, the Republic of Cyprus, and that in everything we do, in everything that should be done, in the coming days that goal should never be lost sight of.

118. In view of those considerations, my delegation will support draft resolution S/11400.

119. Sir Laurence McINTYRE (Australia): I am sure that my Government would wish me to express its own gratification and the gratification of the people of Australia at the fact that the three Foreign Ministers in Geneva have been able to reach the agreement that was presented to us late yesterday in the form of the Declaration. It is indeed a tribute to the tremendous patience and pertinacity of the three Foreign Ministers and of their Governments that this result has come about, a result which may not be satisfactory to all the members of the Council but which I believe, and indeed am convinced, we must persuade ourselves is the best that could be obtained, as the representative of Greece has said.

120. We fully recognize that this is, as has been said this evening, only the first step towards the full implementation of resolution 353 (1974), which all of us are convinced must be implemented in all its parts. We fully recognize that difficult, indeed formidable, problems lie ahead and remain to be settled before constitutional government, which has been so tragically disrupted in Cyprus, can be restored, the constitutional government which will meet the wishes and the needs of the people of Cyprus and which ultimately can be determined only with the full participation and the full consent of the people of Cyprus.

121. But the immediate task, as we must again all recognize, is to stop the fighting, to stop the bloodshed and to stabilize the situation on the ground in Cyprus, and to prepare an atmosphere in which future negotiations—lengthy and arduous as they will have to be—can, as we hope, make progress towards a final agreement that would in truth embody the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus on a lasting basis and at the same time remove what we must recognize to be a long-standing impediment to the harmonious relations between Greece and Turkey. In that task the United Nations must inevitably play a vital part, and for that purpose it is obvious that an immediate instrument at hand is the United Nations Force in Cyprus.

122. For that reason, and in view of the urgency of the situation—an urgency that has been made clear by the Secretary-General himself—my delegation fully supports the draft resolution before the Council

and will vote in favour of it. We hope that it can be adopted unanimously as a matter of urgency.

123. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): I should now like to make a settlement as representative of PERU.

124. In the first place, I should like to thank the Secretary-General for the tireless efforts he has been making for peace in Cyprus, efforts to which circumstances have made me an exceptional witness. I should like to thank him also for his important statement, containing valuable information on and an evaluation of future action devolving upon the United Nations in the maintenance of peace and security in the area.

125. I should like to state that my delegation, in a spirit of realism, has a favourable attitude towards the results achieved yesterday in the negotiations carried out by the representatives of Greece, the United Kingdom and Turkey in Geneva, in compliance with the express request of the Security Council in paragraph 5 of resolution 353 (1974), which this Council adopted unanimously 11 days ago.

126. Our favourable reception of that agreement is based on the fact that it constitutes an initial and urgent step, but my delegation feels only limited satisfaction. We believe that the true nature of the problem remains to be solved and that the full exercise of its sovereignty and independence should be restored to Cyprus. In other words, the members of this Council still have very wide latitude for work and efforts to restore peace to the Republic of Cyprus and guarantee its sovereignty and territorial integrity.

127. In that connexion, my delegation wishes to express its very deep concern that the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus should be respected, as I have already said, not only because my country has traditionally upheld the full implementation of those principles, but also because the country involved is one with which Peru is very closely linked within the non-aligned movement.

128. The delegation of Peru would also like to make it clear that, although we are aware of the circumstances that made it impossible for the Republic of Cyprus to participate in the negotiations, we deeply regret that it was not able to do so and we express the firm hope that the Republic of Cyprus will be directly involved in any new phase of the negotiations, and particularly in everything relating to the restoration of the *status quo* prior to the overthrow, by means of a deplorable foreign intervention, of Archbishop Makarios.

129. In the same spirit of realism to which I referred at the beginning of this statement, my delegation will vote in favour of draft resolution S/11400.

130. Speaking as PRESIDENT, I now call on the representative of Cyprus.

131. Mr. ROSSIDES (Cyprus): I wish to express my thanks to you, Mr. President, for the devoted efforts you have been making in this case and for your statement in favour of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Cyprus. I am grateful also to the other members of the Council who have emphasized the necessity of respect for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Cyprus—something which is really threatened at this time, as everyone here knows.

132. I wish to address a particular word of thanks to the representative of Kenya for his most constructive, lucid and far-sighted statement.

133. But the main purpose of this statement is to express our gratitude to the Secretary-General for the great efforts he has been exerting throughout these recent days in connexion with the question of Cyprus. He has a formidable task before him in preserving peace in Cyprus through UNFICYP. We should like to see the United Nations more directly involved in the talks in Geneva.

134. Mr. SAFRONCHUK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translation from Russian*): Pursuant to the first paragraph of rule 33 of the provisional rules of procedure, the Soviet delegation proposes that this meeting of the Council should be suspended for two hours. The Soviet delegation needs this time in order to receive instructions.

135. For more than two weeks, we have awaited the document to which representatives have been referring today in their statements. I trust that members of the Council will accede to our request for a postponement of the vote and a suspension of the meeting for two hours.

136. During both the informal and the formal consultations, my delegation listened carefully to and took into account the views of other members of the Council regarding the drafting of the text of the draft resolution which we are now discussing. The Soviet delegation hopes that the members and the President of the Council will accede to this request.

137. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): Are there any objections to the proposal made by the representative of the Soviet Union?

138. Mr. RICHARD (United Kingdom): I object to that motion. This is a matter of great urgency. The outlines of the issue have been known for some days. I do not think it would be right in these circumstances for the meeting to be suspended.

139. Mr. de GUIRINGAUD (France) (*interpretation from French*): We have been here since 10 o'clock this morning, with a break for lunch only. For almost seven hours, then, we have had under review the situation in Cyprus, which is of an urgency that no

one disputes. We now have before us a draft resolution which was drafted in the past few hours, which has been the subject of thorough discussion with all delegations. The representative of Cyprus, Mr. Rossides, unquestionably one of those more immediately concerned who have spoken, recognizes that the draft resolution is constructive in nature and he has himself expressed the wish that we should act without delay.

140. The problems that confront us are of unquestionable urgency. What we must do is take practical measures to ensure effective observance of the ceasefire. Only a few hours ago the agencies brought us news from Nicosia indicating that the fighting is still going on in some parts of the island. I think therefore that the situation is clear. It is that that fighting must be brought to an end, and I do not think that any member of the Council will wish to take upon himself the responsibility of making possible, be it only for a few hours, the continuance of such action. Like the representative of the United Kingdom, therefore, I am opposed to any further delay. We have only one task ahead of us this evening and that is to vote on the draft resolution. Let us therefore do so immediately.

141. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): I should like to remind the members of the Council that the second paragraph of rule 33 of the provisional rules of procedure states: "Any motion for the suspension or for the simple adjournment of the meeting shall be decided without debate".

142. Since an objection had been raised, I shall immediately put to the vote the motion for suspension of the meeting.

A vote was taken by show of hands.

In favour: Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Indonesia, Iraq, Kenya, Mauritania, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Republic of Cameroon.

Against: None.

Abstentions: Australia, Austria, China, Costa Rica, France, Peru, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America.

The result of the vote was 7 in favour, none against, with 8 abstentions.

The motion was not adopted, having failed to obtain the affirmative vote of nine members.

143. Mr. SAFRONCHUK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translation from Russian*): In accordance with rule 31 of the provisional rules of procedure, the Soviet delegation submits a formal amendment¹

¹ Subsequently circulated as document S/11401.

to the operative part of the draft resolution contained in document S/11400. I shall read out the amendment. After the words "Requests the Secretary-General to take appropriate action in the light of his statement", we would add the following: "taking into account the fact that the cease-fire will be the first step in the full implementation of Security Council resolution 353 (1974)".

144. In introducing this amendment, the Soviet delegation is proceeding on the basis of paragraph 2 of resolution 353 (1974), which calls upon all parties to the conflict and to the fighting as a first step to cease-firing—and I stress "as a first step". In putting forward this formal amendment, my delegation also proceeds on the basis of the statement of President Makarios as transmitted by Reuters from London on 30 July. In that statement, President Makarios emphasizes that a cease-fire agreement can only be a first step towards full implementation of the Security Council resolution of 20 July. That is why we have introduced this formal amendment to the draft resolution which has been circulated and is now under discussion.

145. In accordance with rule 46 of the provisional rules of procedure, my delegation requests that this formal amendment which I have just read out should be circulated in all of the official languages.

146. Mr. RICHARD (United Kingdom): I would not dream of doing anything this evening to upset the good humour that the Council has been in so far. I would merely observe that as far as my delegation is concerned, I am perfectly happy to accept the amendment. If it would assist the representative of the Soviet Union, I am quite happy that the amendment should be accepted by the Council and that we should proceed to the vote on the draft resolution as amended.

147. Mr. de GUIRINGAUD (France) (*interpretation from French*): I am entirely in agreement with this amendment, which seems to me not to conflict with the spirit of the draft resolution before us. I am prepared to vote on the amendment without having a French translation circulated.

148. Mr. MAINA (Kenya): I am in a little difficulty here as I do not have any copy of the amendment being talked about. If it has been circulated I would be grateful to have a copy. I have not seen a copy so far.

149. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): Perhaps the representative of Kenya would be satisfied if the representative of the Soviet Union would be so kind as to read out his amendment slowly.

150. Mr. SAFRONCHUK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translation from Russian*): Mr. President, the Soviet delegation, acting in full accordance with rule 46 of the provisional rules of procedure, has

requested that its amendment should be circulated in all of the official languages. We have every right to do so, and this request has been made by other members of the Council as well; we are therefore surprised that you have not yet printed our request.

151. Mr. RICHARD (United Kingdom): Mr. President, there is nothing in rule 46, as I see it, that says that a draft resolution or an amendment has in fact to be published in the official languages of the Security Council before the Council has dealt with it.

152. Now, we are here in the position—thanks to the representative of the Soviet Union—of knowing what his amendment is. Everyone around this table has heard it. He cannot complain that it has not been translated into Russian, because it is his amendment. Therefore, we have a simple situation in which there is an amendment—one that is acceptable, it would seem, to the majority of the members of the Council—merely adding the words "taking into account the fact that the cease-fire will be the first step in the implementation of Security Council resolution 353 (1974)", which is a matter on which we are all in accord. It would seem unfortunate if any undue technicality should hinder the Council from putting into legislative effect the common view of us all.

153. Indeed, I am grateful to my colleague from the Soviet Union for proposing the amendment. To a certain extent, it underlines the point I was seeking to make.

154. Therefore, given all the circumstances, I would hope we can now proceed to the vote.

155. Mr. TCHERNOUCHTENKO (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) (*translation from Russian*): I have sat in the Security Council for only a short time, but I can frankly state that my experience with the United Nations covers more than one decade. Since 1951, I have participated in the work of various organs and of the General Assembly. I am surprised at some of the methods used by members of the Council today in their attempt to impose—even contrary to the provisional rules of procedure—an immediate vote. Moreover, I believe it is a long-standing practice of the United Nations, and not one just introduced today, that the request of a Member State for the circulation of a particular document, especially amendments to a draft resolution, is binding and that the Member State has the right to insist. I therefore support the request that the amendment be translated into all of the languages and circulated. The representative of the Soviet Union is not the only representative of a Member State making this request. I ask that the rules of procedure be followed. We have always abided by them. We could go very far astray and set a bad precedent for our future work if we failed to accede to this request.

156. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): I should like to draw the attention of members

to rule 31 of the provisional rules of procedure, which states: "Proposed resolutions, amendments and substantive motions shall normally be placed before the representatives in writing."

157. Mr. BENNETT (United States of America): We have been talking here about the independence of States. I am sure we have been glad to hear from the representative of the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic.

158. He says he has been around the United Nations a long time, and he does not know of any single previous example of our acting without having texts in writing. I believe he has not been a very constant observer of the Council or, for that matter, of committees and other bodies of the United Nations.

159. I think we all know the reasons for this delay. We have this amendment before us; it has been accepted. It is acceptable to my delegation. We have, as our French colleague has told us, been waiting here all day, and I think we should proceed to the vote.

160. Mr. SAFRONCHUK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translation from Russian*): I, too, should like to draw attention to rule 31 of the provisional rules of procedure, according to which proposed resolutions and amendments are normally submitted in writing. Therefore, if my request is not granted—and I insist on it—that will be a flagrant violation of the rules of procedure.

161. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): I should like to call the attention of the representative of the Soviet Union to the fact that the word "normally" is used in rule 31.

162. Mr. RICHARD (United Kingdom): On a point of order I should like to say, with great respect for my colleague from the Soviet Union, that it really does not lie in his mouth now to complain that the amendment is not in writing, when the reason it is not in writing is that he held it up his sleeve until after his motion to suspend had in fact failed.

163. He will have observed that I have been sitting next to him throughout the evening. It is not a question of a sudden amendment taking him by surprise in the course of the debate. The representative of the Soviet Union, for perfectly good purposes of his own—I make no complaint about it—is entitled to use the provisional rules of procedure as he likes; indeed, he gave me a lecture about them the other night, as the Council will remember. So I am perfectly satisfied to see him using them with the skill he is displaying at the moment. But, with great respect, he cannot at one and the same time hold the amendment up his sleeve until he thinks it is convenient to produce it and then complain that because he has delayed in producing it the Council is not entitled to deal with it.

164. Mr. BENNETT (United States of America): Mr. President, I was merely going to point out what you have called to our attention. Certainly, rule 31 says that motions shall "normally" be placed before representatives in writing. I would submit that this is not a normal situation. We are dealing with a first-rate crisis, and I would again urge that we move on to the vote.

165. Mr. de GUIRINGAUD (France) (*interpretation from French*): I should like to point out the paradox we are facing. The representative of the Soviet Union has himself proposed an amendment. The sponsors of the draft resolution, those who worked on it, most of the members sitting around this table, feel that that amendment follows the same lines as the draft resolution, which means it is not necessary to circulate the amendment in writing. I am astonished that the representative of the Soviet Union insists on making us waste two hours in order that his own amendment may be circulated in writing, an amendment he has had up his sleeve since 4 o'clock this afternoon.

166. I would request that we proceed to the vote.

167. Mr. SAFRONCHUK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translation from Russian*): In connexion with the point of order raised by the representative of the United Kingdom, I should like to remind him that before the start of the voting any member of the Security Council may at any time introduce any amendment he deems necessary. Accordingly, the remarks he made in raising the point of order are entirely out of place.

168. I insist that my amendment be circulated officially in all of the official languages.

169. Mr. BENNETT (United States of America): If there are no further speakers, it seems to me that the normal thing—and in this abnormal situation even more so—is to proceed to the vote.

170. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): Does any one else wish to speak now?

171. Mr. TCHERNOUCHTENKO (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) (*translation from Russian*): If some members of the Council find it difficult to accept the idea of an amendment being circulated as a separate document in all of the official languages, then perhaps we could take a different approach to this question. Since, as I understand it, the members of the Council most directly interested in draft resolution S/11400 have accepted this amendment, perhaps it would be appropriate to issue a revised text of the resolution. But in that case we, for our part, would request that the document be circulated in all of the official languages. I would ask, Mr. President, that you act in accordance with the provisional rules of procedure.

172. Mr. RICHARD (United Kingdom): I am sorry to keep coming in, but, really, is it seriously being suggested that the Security Council has no emergency procedure and that in any case in which an amendment is being proposed to a draft resolution the Council, even in a matter of extreme urgency, shall adjourn so that the provisions of rule 46 shall be complied with?

173. Even from my limited knowledge of the Security Council—and of course I defer to my colleague on the right when it comes to a knowledge of the rules of procedure—it cannot be right that the Council cannot act quickly. Of course it can. The whole object of the Council is to act quickly. And if the interpretation that our Byelorussian colleague and the representative of the Soviet Union are putting on these rules is correct, the Council would not be able to proceed immediately in any emergency situation, no matter how grave, because as soon as an amendment is proposed we would then suddenly have to adjourn so that it should be published in all of the languages of the Council.

174. It is only necessary, I say with respect, to analyse the proposition to realize that it cannot in fact be right. Indeed, if we look at rule 46 in the context of rules 45 and 47, we find that rule 45 says that verbatim records of meetings shall be kept, rule 46 that all resolutions shall be published, and rule 47 that documents shall, if the Council so decides, be published in any language other than the languages of the Council.

175. As to rule 31, the use in it of the word “normally” illustrates, if it needs illustrating, the fact that there is an emergency procedure in which the Council can proceed to look at an amendment when it is not in writing but is oral. Otherwise, there would be no need in that rule 31 for the use of the word “normally”. And it clearly is an emergency situation, because if it were not an emergency situation the representative of the Soviet Union would no doubt have produced his amendment earlier on for us to consider. The fact that he felt it necessary to keep it until ten past eight at night obviously illustrates that it is an emergency situation which should be dealt with, in my submission, in an emergency way.

176. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): It is my view that since rule 31 is not mandatory, and since rule 46 refers to resolutions which have already been adopted, I would respectfully request the representative of the Soviet Union not to press his request for distribution of the amendment in the official languages so that we may proceed immediately to the vote. If the Soviet delegation feels that it should not accede to my request, then I would have to consult the Council on the decision it wishes to take concerning its procedure in this regard.

177. Mr. SAFRONCHUK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translation from Russian*): Pursuant to

rules 31 and 46 of the provisional rules of procedure, my delegation insists that its formal amendment be circulated in all of the official languages. We are demanding just one thing: strict and unswerving compliance with the provisional rules of procedure. The attempts by some members of the Council to interpret these rules in their own way and even to sidestep compliance with them cannot deprive us of the right to apply the rules of procedure as they should be applied.

178. Mr. de GUIRINGAUD (France) (*interpretation from French*): Combat is still raging in Cyprus; we have been discussing the situation for more than 10 hours. An amendment on which almost everyone agrees has just been put forward. One delegation, however, insists on dragging things out for at least another two hours by means of a procedural trick. You stated, Mr. President, that if that delegation did not withdraw its request you proposed to ask the Council to decide. I propose that we take a vote on your proposal.

179. Mr. EL HASSEN (Mauritania) (*interpretation from French*): May I just say that my delegation was one of those which voted for a suspension of the meeting because we thought that a delegation has every right to ask for a few hours' suspension so that it can receive instructions. We did so in good faith, and the representative of the Soviet Union has put forward an amendment which we have well understood. We find it a very felicitous amendment.

180. We should like to say to all concerned that these procedural manoeuvres certainly do not help the Cypriot cause and do not redound to the prestige of the Security Council. And whatever vote may now be taken on this procedural matter, my delegation will abstain.

181. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): I now put to the Council the proposal to proceed immediately to a vote on the draft resolution in document S/11400, as amended by the delegation of the Soviet Union.

182. Mr. SAFRONCHUK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translation from Russian*): In accordance with rule 31 of the provisional rules of procedure, my delegation would like to introduce a second amendment,¹ this time to the preamble of draft resolution S/11400. The amendment relates to the second preambular paragraph of the draft resolution. After the words “Noting that all States have declared their respect for the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus,” the following words should be added: “as a State not belonging to any military alliance”.

183. In accordance with rule 46 of the provisional rules of procedure, I insist that this amendment, too, be circulated in all of the official languages.

184. Mr. BENNETT (United States of America): I should like to be helpful in clearing up this confusion, if I may. I move that we accede to the Soviet request that both its amendments be put in writing. And if I may be permitted an observation, I hope there will be enough negative votes or abstentions to clear up this matter.

185. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): I shall now put to the vote the motion of the representative of the United States that the two amendments of the Soviet Union to the draft resolution in document S/11400 be circulated in writing in all the working languages of the Council.

A vote was taken by a show of hands.

In favour: None.

Against: Australia, Costa Rica, France, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America.

Abstaining: Austria, China, Indonesia, Iraq, Kenya, Mauritania, Peru, United Republic of Cameroon.

The result of the vote was no votes in favour, 5 against, with 8 abstentions.

The motion was not adopted, having failed to obtain the affirmative vote of nine members.

Two members (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republics and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) did not participate in the voting.

186. Mr. RICHARD (United Kingdom): Mr. President, is not the situation now that there is before the Council one amendment and a draft resolution? It has been agreed that the amendments should not be reduced to writing. The are no other speakers and I move that we vote on the draft resolution.

187. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): It is my understanding that we must vote first on both amendments and then on the draft resolution.

188. Mr. BENNETT (United States of America): Could we please have the second amendment read out for us again?

189. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): I should like to ask the representative of the Soviet Union to be so kind as to read out once again his second amendment to draft resolution S/11400.

190. Mr. SAFRONCHUK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translation from Russian*): I shall wait until the amendment is available in writing in all of the official languages. I have already read it out.

191. Mr. BENNETT (United States of America): Does that mean that the representative of the Soviet Union has withdrawn his amendment?

192. Mr. SAFRONCHUK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translation from Russian*): Not at all.

193. Mr. BENNETT (United States of America): Then I shall be glad to read it out, if it will help other representatives.

194. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): I should like to ask the representative of the Soviet Union kindly to read out his second amendment as a contribution to the work of the Council.

195. Mr. SAFRONCHUK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translation from Russian*): Mr. President, yielding to your urgent request and out of respect for all the members of the Council, I shall now for the second time read out the amendment, although I do not rule out the possibility that if this amendment is not circulated in all of the official languages, so that the members of the Council may read it, I shall have to read it out several times more, perhaps even for each member of the Council individually. Nevertheless, I shall now read out this amendment which, in our opinion, is of fundamental importance.

196. The amendment is to the second preambular paragraph of the draft resolution contained in document S/11400. The amendment would add, after the words "Noting that all States have declared their respect for the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus," the words "as a State not belonging to any military alliance".

197. Once again I propose, in order to facilitate and expedite the work of the Council and so that members of the Council may take a definite decision on this amendment, that it be circulated in all of the official languages of the United Nations, as required by the provisional rules of procedure.

198. Mr. CHUANG Yen (China) (*translation from Chinese*): In voting on resolution 353 (1974), the Chinese delegation made reservations on its provisions concerning UNFICYP. Since the present draft resolution mainly concerns the question of UNFICYP and the Chinese delegation has always held different views on the question of the dispatch of United Nations forces, the Chinese delegation, based on our principled position, will not participate in the voting on the draft resolution contained in document S/11400. For the same reason, we shall also not participate in the voting on the two related amendments.

199. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): I shall now put to the vote the first amendment put forward by the Soviet Union to the draft resolution in document S/11400, which would add at

the end of the operative paragraph the following wording: "taking into account that the cease-fire will be the first step in the full implementation of Security Council resolution 353 (1974)."

A vote was taken by show of hands.

The amendment was adopted by 14 votes to none.

One member (China) did not participate in the voting.

200. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): I shall now put to the vote the second amendment submitted by the delegation of the Soviet Union, to add at the end of the second paragraph of the pre-ambule the following words: "as a State not belonging to any military alliance."

A vote was taken by show of hands.

In favour: Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Against: None.

Abstaining: Australia, Austria, Costa Rica, France, Indonesia, Iraq, Kenya, Mauritania, Peru, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Cameroon, United States of America.

The result of the vote was 2 in favour, none against, with 12 abstentions.

The amendment was not adopted, having failed to obtain the affirmative vote of nine members.

One member (China) did not participate in the voting.

201. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): Before putting to the vote the draft resolution, as amended, I shall call on the representative of Kenya, who wishes to explain his vote before the vote.

202. Mr. MAINA (Kenya): I wish to explain my delegation's vote before voting. We have very serious reservations about the declaration under discussion, on which the Secretary-General based his report.

203. We deplore in particular the discussion of the affairs of Cyprus by those guilty of creating these tragic conditions without the participation of Cyprus. We deplore the fact that there is apparently no machinery for making Greece and Turkey pay for UNFICYP, which they are calling upon to maintain the peace which they have sought to destroy by their military adventures. However, as we are seeking a speedy return of peace to Cyprus, we shall vote for the draft resolution contained in document S/11400

because we do not wish to delay any measures that may lead to that goal. In so doing, we should like to stress that we consider the measures envisaged in the draft resolution to be but the first steps towards a full implementation of resolution 353 (1974) and the restoration in Cyprus of full independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity.

204. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): I shall now put to the vote the draft resolution — I call on the representative of the Soviet Union.

205. Mr. BENNETT (United States of America): Point of order. The Soviet representative can speak only in explanation of vote. We are in the voting process.

206. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): I should like to ask the representative of the Soviet Union whether he intends to explain his vote before the vote.

207. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translation from Russian*): If I say something more, is there anything to prevent me from doing so? May I speak?

208. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): The voting procedures have already commenced. That is why, out of deference to the Soviet delegation, I was going to call on the Soviet representative to explain his vote before the vote. I shall now put the draft resolution to the vote.

209. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translation from Russian*): Point of order. I am asking for the floor so that I may speak in explanation of vote.

210. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): I call on the representative of the Soviet Union.

211. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translation from Russian*): The situation that has arisen is most unusual. There is a Russian proverb which says: "Straight from the ship to the ball". Unfortunately, I am in a somewhat different situation in this instance: I came off an airplane straight into a meeting of the Security Council.

212. However, the question now under consideration by the Council and on which a vote is about to be taken, is a very serious one. Documents concerning the question under discussion have been received today; the draft resolution was submitted today, only a few hours ago. Not a single delegation, apart from those that are geographically close to their Governments, has had an opportunity to receive instructions. The Soviet delegation has not yet received instructions.

213. The fundamental question is that of a cease-fire. That is the decisive question. Both parties to the conflict in the region which is the subject of the item before the Security Council have formally undertaken to implement the Security Council decision on the cease-fire. Judging from the newspapers—and, unfortunately, I have not had an opportunity to familiarize myself with the official text of the Geneva Declaration—both parties, with the participation of a third party, the United Kingdom, have reaffirmed their position concerning compliance with the Council cease-fire decision. Consequently, this question may be regarded as settled and accepted.

214. The question arises as to what functions should be entrusted to the United Nations in the situation that has arisen. What is at issue here is, apparently, new functions and a mandate for the United Nations force in Cyprus. This question needs further study and requires the Council to take appropriate measures. The question also arises whether some changes should not be made in the composition of the Force in Cyprus. This is not to prejudge the question, but it does unquestionably arise and the Council will have to give some thought to it. There is a need for more detailed study of the Geneva agreement, especially for those who are interested in the preservation of peace and security in the eastern Mediterranean.

215. In the light of all the foregoing considerations, the Soviet delegation makes a formal procedural proposal that we postpone the vote and that appropriate consultations be undertaken among members of the Council.

216. That is essentially what I had to say in explanation of vote.

217. Mr. RICHARD (United Kingdom): Mr. President, I wish to speak on a point of order. With great respect to the representative of the Soviet Union who has just come in, we fully appreciate his difficulties. He possibly does not know, for the reasons which he gave us, that this issue was in fact put before the Council about half an hour ago and was voted upon—the proposal by the Soviet delegation to postpone discussion of this item; and this proposal has in fact already been voted on and has in fact already been rejected. In those circumstances, particularly since we were in the voting process when the representative of the Soviet Union arrived hot-foot, if that is the right word, from Kennedy Airport, I really would suggest, Mr. President that we go back to the position that we were in when he came among us, or upon us. In those circumstances, what we should do is to continue with the vote that you were in fact proceeding with.

218. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): The representative of the Byelorussian SSR has asked to be allowed to explain his vote before the vote. Since I made an exception in the case of the

representative of the Soviet Union, I shall do the same for him, despite the fact that the voting procedure had already started.

219. Mr. TCHERNOUCHTENKO (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) (*translation from Russian*): Mr. President, we are now precisely at the stage where explanations of vote are being made. You have given the floor in explanation of vote to a number of representatives. I believe that all members of the Council have the right, before the vote, to explain the reasons why they take this or that position. Of course, because of a violation of the provisional rules of procedure and because certain procedural decisions were imposed upon us, some members will now find it difficult to define their position on the substance of this question. Nevertheless, we should like to draw the Council's attention to a number of considerations relating to the draft resolution, and we should like to state our views on these matters.

220. The first preambular paragraph of the draft resolution refers to resolution 353 (1974). We all know very well that the Security Council unanimously adopted and endorsed that resolution, stressing that it represented a positive contribution by the Council to a solution of the urgent problems that had arisen in connexion with the events in Cyprus. We shall not, of course, dwell on the substance of the question, since what we are now doing is explaining our vote. Nevertheless, we should like to note the importance of the reference to resolution 353 (1974).

221. As the Council will clearly recall, the point is that resolution 353 (1974) calls for respect for the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus. We would also note that the resolution calls for an immediate end to foreign military intervention, a cease-fire and a number of other important steps, the full implementation of which is the main task facing us at this stage. It is precisely that resolution and the reference to it that requires us to take special action to ensure that the provisions of the earlier resolution are fully implemented.

222. At the same time, we are constrained to note the fact that as a result of the imposition on us as a matter of urgency—but when it is not strictly necessary, as I must candidly point out—of the adoption of the draft resolution which is now before us, we are damaging the authority of the Council as well as doing harm to the very important and serious decisions adopted earlier on the item under discussion.

223. However, the positions taken by some countries obliges us to appeal to the members of the Council once again to give serious thought to the situation that has arisen, to refrain from taking steps which might be somewhat unilateral in nature and to postpone the vote for the period of time requested by the Soviet Union, since, as is known, this has to do with the determination of our position. And it is not only the delegation of the Soviet Union that is concerned.

224. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): I shall now put to the vote draft resolution S/11400.

225. I call on the representative of the Soviet Union.

226. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translation from Russian*): I very much regret that the United Kingdom representative did not heed my reasonable arguments and is adamant in calling for a vote on the draft resolution. This calls to mind the very worst times of the cold war, when decisions of the Security Council were forced through by a mechanical majority of votes I would not wish to recall those melancholy times; neither would I wish to see such methods practised again.

227. It was stated very reasonably that the Soviet delegation did not have instructions. That is a procedural consideration. Of late, and even in the worst times of the cold war, such considerations were taken into account; if delegations had no instructions, the vote was postponed. I recall how frequently both the United Kingdom delegation and the United States delegation, as well as others, demanded postponement of a vote for this reason.

228. Mr. BENNETT (United States of America): Point of order.

229. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): I call on the representative of the United States on a point of order.

230. Mr. BENNETT (United States of America): May I state that the representative of the Soviet Union has, so to speak, dropped straight out of heaven to join us here. He is not speaking to explain his vote. He has already done that. We are in the midst of voting. We have done the Soviet delegation the courtesy of voting on its two amendments, as is the proper procedure, and I insist that we follow proper procedure and continue the vote.

231. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translation from Russian*): I asked to speak in order to explain my vote. As I see no reason for haste, I should like to state...

232. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): It was my understanding that the Soviet delegation has already explained its vote before the vote.

233. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translation from Russian*): I would like to explain; let me explain the substance of the matter. I am stating that we have no instructions, and I am going to vote against the draft resolution.

234. Mr. RICHARD (United Kingdom): The representative of the Soviet Union came and said he

wished to explain his vote. You called upon him, Mr. President. He made a speech. Now, with respect, we have not yet voted. I do not see how he can twice explain the vote he has not yet cast. Once, with respect, is enough.

235. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translation from Russian*): I wish to state that if the desire of the USSR delegation to postpone the vote is not respected and the draft resolution is put to a vote before the Soviet delegation receives instructions, my delegation will be unable to support the draft resolution and will be obliged to vote against it. If those who are trying to impose the draft resolution upon us want that to happen in the voting, then let them pursue their tactic of imposing things and let them take full responsibility for the results.

236. I do not see what the great hurry is. A matter of a few hours is not going to decide the issue. The cease-fire has gone into effect in accordance with both the Security Council resolution and the Geneva agreement. Hence, there is no particular haste; it is only the United Kingdom delegation's stubborn desire to impose the resolution on us that is prompting it to insist on a vote and to disregard the practice that has developed over the whole existence of the United Nations whereby resolutions are voted upon not less than 24 hours after they are submitted and not after only a few hours. That is the established practice in the work of the Security Council. In view of these procedural considerations I insist that the vote be postponed, and if this request is not heeded I shall have to vote against the draft resolution.

237. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): I shall now put to the vote the draft resolution in document S/11400, as amended through the adoption of the first Soviet amendment.

A vote was taken by show of hands.

In favour: Australia, Austria, Costa Rica, France, Indonesia, Iraq, Kenya, Mauritania, Peru, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Cameroon, United States of America.

Against: Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

The result of the vote was 12 in favour and 2 against.

The draft resolution, as amended, was not adopted, one of the negative votes being that of a permanent member of the Council.

One member (China) did not participate in the voting.

238. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): I give the floor to the Secretary-General.

239. The SECRETARY-GENERAL: In my statement earlier this evening I mentioned the question of UNFICYP's continued presence in the Turkish area of control. I stated that that matter was under discussion with the Turkish military command in Cyprus. In the meantime; I have received from my Special Representative in Cyprus the text of a message received on the night of 31 July from the Turkish military command. The message reads as follows:

"Turkish Peace Force Commander is of the opinion that the United Nations forces in the area have successfully completed their functions and now should move outside the Turkish-controlled area to the locations where their mandate is most needed. Such a move is felt to be also consistent with the Geneva cease-fire agreement signed on 30 July. Therefore I kindly request your consideration of giving necessary instructions to the elements of UNFICYP and UNCIVPOL to leave the Turkish-controlled area within the earliest time possible. I must reiterate on this occasion my sincere appreciation and gratefulness for the efficiency and spirit of co-operation shown by your forces in my area of responsibility during the accomplishments of their duties. I hope our relations with the United Nations forces along the security areas, when established, would be as best as ever. I would be most happy if I could help United Nations-supported humanitarian activities in Turkish-controlled area in the future."

That is the message our Force Commander received today from the Turkish Force Commander.

240. I felt it my duty to inform the Council of the foregoing and of my intention to give appropriate instructions to the Commander of UNFICYP, keeping in mind that the Force can operate successfully only if it has the full support of all parties concerned.

241. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): I call upon the representative of Cyprus.

242. Mr. ROSSIDES (Cyprus): This move by the Turkish Commander violates all the agreements with regard to the presence of the United Nations Force in Cyprus and renders the work of that Force very difficult because it must occupy the positions it has held before in order to protect the population on both sides.

243. Why do the Turkish Commander and the Turkish Government ask for the removal of that Force? The impression is created that they want the Force not to see what they are doing there and therefore not to be able to afford protection. Even if there is no such intention, that impression is created, and that creates suspicion and lack of confidence—but the Turkish Foreign Minister in Geneva said that mutual confidence is an important element towards the removal of the

Turkish forces. So every move they make is towards increasing the tension and not relieving it, and therefore not towards confidence.

244. Also, there is the connotation that the territory occupied by the Turkish forces is no longer the territory of Cyprus: it is now part of Turkey, and therefore the United Nations Force is on Turkish territory, not Cyprus territory.

245. A very serious situation arises from that attitude, and it reveals a great deal that should be revealed.

246. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): I call upon the representative of Greece.

247. Mr. CARAYANNIS (Greece): In my first statement I brought to the attention of the Council that 24 hours after the signing of the Geneva agreement the firing had not stopped in Cyprus, and in fact two Greek Cypriot villages were threatened with occupation by the Turkish army.

248. Now, after what we heard from the Secretary-General, I consider that we find ourselves in a very serious situation, and I should like to ask my honourable colleague from Turkey: What is really the intention of the reply of the Commander of the Turkish forces in Cyprus? Is it that UNFICYP will operate in the territory which is not occupied by the Turkish forces and that it will not operate in the territory occupied by the Turkish forces? Is it, by any chance, the intention that this territory should become something other than what it is now? Is there any intention that this territory should no longer be Cyprus territory? I should appreciate an answer to that.

249. Mr. PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): I call on the representative of Turkey.

250. Mr. OLCAY (Turkey): I have listened with great attention to what the Secretary-General has said concerning the communication the Commander of UNFICYP in Cyprus seems to have received from the Commander of the Turkish armed forces over there. We have been haggling since yesterday afternoon or yesterday evening about the necessity of entering into a more definite relationship between UNFICYP and the Turkish forces. We have tried since yesterday to establish the relative legal positions of UNFICYP and the Turkish forces. So far, I suppose because the Secretary-General—and I appreciate his position—has not been able to receive a clear mandate from this Council, the situation has remained, to say the least, explosive, and this has been expressed around this table.

251. Now, in paragraph 3 (a) of their Declaration the three Foreign Ministers agreed that:

"A security zone of size to be determined by representatives of Greece, Turkey and the United

Kingdom in consultation with UNFICYP should be established at the limit of the areas occupied by the Turkish armed forces at the time specified in paragraph 2 above. This zone"—that is to say, the security zone between the areas—"should be entered by no forces other than those of UNFICYP, which should supervise the prohibition of entry. Pending the determination of the size and character of the security zone, the existing area between the two forces should be entered by no forces."

But nowhere is it stated in that paragraph that within the zones UNFICYP should operate.

252. Now, as will be realized, I am without instructions on the matter referred to earlier and just now by the representative of Greece, and I am not therefore in a position to say what has happened. There is one thing I do know for certain, and that is the legal positions with regard to the various zones: the zone occupied by the Turkish forces and the zone between the areas occupied by other forces and the Turkish forces have not yet been clarified. And that is why since yesterday I have been insisting that the position of UNFICYP with regard to those areas and the relationship between UNFICYP and the Turkish command need to be established.

253. I very much hope that when the Secretary-General finds that he is in a position to give instructions to the Force to enter into some kind of negotiations with regard to the implementation of this paragraph 3 (a) of the Declaration, the situation may be clarified. At this stage I cannot say more than that.

254. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): I call on the representative of Greece.

255. Mr. CARAYANNIS (Greece): Again without having any instructions from my Government, I am in about the same position as my colleague from Turkey on this matter, but I note that paragraph 3 (c) of the Geneva Declaration reads: "In mixed villages the functions of security and police will be carried out by UNFICYP." Are there not any mixed villages in the Turkish sector right now? What about Kyrenia, for instance?

256. In any case I should like to draw the attention of the Council to the very serious situation in which the Council and all of us find ourselves. I do not know what my Cypriot colleague thinks—if he would be disposed to permit the operation of UNFICYP in the Turkish enclaves in all the rest of the island when those forces cannot operate on the territory occupied by the Turkish forces. If that is the case, then I do not see any future for the United Nations Force in Cyprus. I think that would be unfortunate.

257. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): I call on the representative of Turkey.

258. Mr. OLCAY (Turkey): I would certainly not jump to the conclusion that the future of UNFICYP seems hopeless as a result of the situation which has arisen before what UNFICYP can or cannot do on the island has been the subject of a thorough study among all the parties involved, as indicated in paragraph 3 of the Declaration.

259. In reply to what my colleague from Greece has said about the mixed villages, the mixed villages mentioned here are certainly not mixed villages that might be in the security zone. Otherwise, this paragraph 3 (c) would not be a separate paragraph.

260. As far as I can judge, not knowing the military situation and not having been a party to the negotiations which led to the adoption of the Declaration, there is in fact in Cyprus right now, as a result of the military operation and as a result of the encirclement of the Turkish villages, the following situation. There is a security zone, which is the zone in which the operation took place, which is under the control of the Turkish armed forces, and this is dealt with in subparagraph 3 (a).

261. The second category is dealt with in paragraph 3 (b); it is that of the Turkish enclaves. Everybody familiar with the pre-war situation in Cyprus knows that the Turks used to live in enclaves.

262. The third category is the mixed villages, for which a special provision has been designed. The main problem that confronted the negotiators in Geneva—and again I am drawing conclusions on the basis of what I have read—was the non-existence of a definite mandate of UNFICYP covering the new situation which arose as a result of the military operation. This is precisely why this Council has been trying all day today to arrive at a resolution, that is, in order to allow the Secretary-General and his representatives to come to what would be the beginning of an arrangement.

263. That is the sum of what I can say at this time, having no instructions.

264. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): I call on the representative of Cyprus.

265. Mr. ROSSIDES (Cyprus): The representative of Turkey speaks about the security zone. The security zone was supposed to be a buffer zone that would be operated by UNFICYP irrespective of its other operations on the island. Therefore, in the area outside the security zone, within the territory occupied by the Turkish forces, UNFICYP is now operating. And it will have to operate, particularly in mixed villages, as provided for in paragraph 3 (c). And there are mixed villages, among them the town of Kyrenia, which has a mixed population. So, this concept of reversing and disrupting the whole function of UNFICYP in Cyprus is not a hopeful sign. It is an ominous indication of the intentions of Turkey in respect of its occupation

of this territory in Cyprus, coming immediately after the much vaunted agreement in Geneva. It really comes as a contradiction for those who expressed the hope that now we are entering a period when there will be confidence and trust in Cyprus. It comes from the very source which is going to be the trouble and which causes the lack of confidence and trust in Cyprus—as a matter of fact, the source of the projected partition of Cyprus. With the phantom of partition, how can there be peace in Cyprus? With division, parcellation and further parcellation as envisaged, what can be the future of Cyprus? One of peace and quiet? We see the results from the statements now made by the representative of Turkey.

266. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): I call on the representative of Turkey.

267. Mr. OLCAY (Turkey): I am not going to speak on the issue of partition. We have dealt at length in the past and recently, and probably shall deal at length in the time ahead, with the future of Cyprus on the basis of what its past has been. The constitutional aspects of Cyprus will be decided upon by those who at the time will represent the community of Greek Cypriots and the community of Turkish Cypriots, along with the three countries that are scheduled to meet in August. That is a totally different matter. Now when it comes to the question of the mixed villages, I can only repeat again that there is a question of a zone of occupation. There is the zone of occupation for which a special situation will arise if UNFICYP is going to have anything to do with that part of the island because, as the Secretary-General has indicated, the Turkish commander has already said that he is ready to give him all the facilities for humanitarian purposes. But the area as it now stands is a military zone. All the references to the possible activities of UNFICYP on the basis of this paper are between zones, as indicated by the representative of Greece and also as referred to by Mr. Rossides. The problem with which we are confronted, I repeat, is the question of the mandate of UNFICYP, which obviously is insufficient as it stands to cover all the situations. The Secretary-General has had ample opportunity to indicate to the Council that if he is to operate on behalf of peace he needs something more than he has at present. That is the crux of the matter. The sooner this problem is solved the better we shall all be. I still do not see any reason to infer that this arrangement, which has had no chance of being applied in its simplest form, is doomed to failure.

268. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): If there are no further comments it will be my understanding that the Council has heard the statement of the Secretary-General and agrees with the attitude which he proposes to adopt and of which he informed us.

269. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translation from Russian*): I regret that the

Soviet delegation has been unable today to support the draft resolution so hurriedly imposed upon the Security Council without giving the USSR delegation an opportunity to study the substance of the draft properly, and the Geneva agreement as well, and to receive instructions on this question from the Soviet Government. This practice of imposing urgent, hasty draft resolutions on the Council has, it seems, not been particularly popular in recent times.

270. There have been many occasions when the delegation of the United Kingdom, for example, not having instructions, has requested postponement of a vote in order to telephone London to get instructions from its Government, and the Council has been accommodating in such cases. In the present instance, the United Kingdom delegation acted directly counter to this established practice in the work of the Council by insisting on an immediate vote on the draft resolution. Of course, it was not possible to go along with this. We all recall that other delegations, in particular the United States delegation, have found themselves in similar situations where the Council has suspended meetings or postponed voting because the United States delegation had no instructions; the United States representative, Mr. Scali, and his predecessor would call the State Department while the Council waited until the United States delegation received instructions or postponed the voting. That is the generally accepted and long-established practice in the work of the Security Council. The delegation of the USSR cannot but express its regret that at this meeting both the representative of the United Kingdom and the representative of the United States did not take this into account and, contrary to the established practice of the Security Council, insisted on a vote. For the record, we note this as an instance which in recent times is without precedent.

271. Furthermore, the exchange of views among delegations has even more convincingly shown that the Soviet delegation acted quite correctly in objecting to the hasty adoption of the resolution. As a result of the exchange of views among the delegations of the parties directly concerned in this matter, it is perfectly obvious to the Council and to all members that there are a great many unresolved problems on which the Council needs to reflect, to consult and to give new instructions to the Secretary-General. I very much regret that the Secretary-General made his statement after the vote. Before the vote it would have convinced the Council even more that there are many matters that are not yet clear and require further consideration by the Council. A new situation is developing. After a brief exchange, the parties state that some new functions are required for the United Nations Force. This, too is something that should be pondered; moreover, the two representatives of the parties directly involved have declared that as yet they cannot make any official statements because they have not received instructions. Here is a vivid example of the difficult situation in which delegations find themselves

when, because of the hasty consideration of a question, they do not have instructions. Why were the legitimate requests of the Soviet delegation not to rush into a vote but to postpone voting until it had received instructions not taken into account—requests which were in accordance with the Charter, the provisional rules of procedure and the long-established practice of the Security Council?

272. I must stress, in the light of the situation that has arisen, that when we receive instructions the Soviet delegation will be prepared to resume consideration of this question forthwith and to adopt an appropriate draft resolution which takes into account both the provisions and concerns of the earlier draft resolution and the provisions which must be reflected in the resolution and the decisions of the Council in the light of current developments in Cyprus. We should like particularly to stress that there is a need for a new decision by the Council underscoring the importance of strict observance of the Council's cease-fire decision. If there is even the slightest violation of the cease-fire, the Council must emphatically demand that there should not be any violation, however small, by any of the parties. The Council should reflect on this and consider the question without delay tomorrow morning; its consideration should not be put off until evening.

273. The Turkish representative raised the question of the functions of the United Nations Force. If that question arises, then it, too, must be considered by the members of the Council and by the Council as a whole. The Council must have detailed consultations on all these questions and issue new instructions to the Secretary-General or ask him for his views and suggestions as to what the Council and the United Nations in general should do in present circumstances.

274. That is why the Soviet delegation did not find it possible to accept this draft resolution, which was put forward in undue haste. We object as a matter of principle to attempts by any delegation or group of delegations to impose such a decision upon the Council in haste when certain delegations have not received instructions from their Governments and when time is so short it would have been physically impossible for their Governments to study the new documents—which are of great international importance both at the present juncture and because of the possible consequences—in order to determine their position on the item under discussion.

275. Mr. RICHARD (United Kingdom): I do not wish to engage in recrimination with the representative of the Soviet Union about what happened this evening. I would only make two observations upon it, since he was kind enough to make some observations upon me.

276. First of all, he is without instructions. We have been told that on a number of occasions this

evening. If I may say so respectfully, it is strange to be without instructions but nevertheless to veto an important draft resolution of this sort.

277. Secondly, the draft resolution that we were considering this evening was not in fact a new one. It has been known, certainly in the corridors of this building, since early this morning, You, Mr. President, will know that intensive consultations took place. You will also know that, as a result of those intensive consultations, broadly speaking, if I may summarize the view of the Security Council—at least as we felt it—it seemed that most members were agreed that the Secretary-General should in fact be in a position to respond at any rate to the minimal calls which were made upon him by the Declaration issued by the three Foreign Ministers.

278. We have been considering this matter now for some weeks. It is not a new issue. The fact that UNFICYP might be involved in an eventual declaration coming out of Geneva is something which, I should have thought, has been in the minds of most people, and certainly it has been in the minds of my delegation and, I think, of many other delegations around this table. I regret very much that the Soviet Union felt it necessary to cast the vote it did this evening. I hope that, as I think the representative of the Soviet Union seemed to be indicating, a period of reflection—perhaps overnight but at any rate a period of reflection—may enable the Soviet Union to join in what were, after all, the wishes of not only my delegation but, if I remember the vote correctly, no less than 12 members of the Security Council, with only one delegation not participating.

279. I take mild objection—not strong objection at this hour of the night but mild objection—to the allegation that I and my delegation were trying to steamroller a draft resolution through the Council against the wishes of the members. With great respect I must say that the votes on the whole indicated that that was not the position. I fully understand that it may perhaps be easier to obtain instructions from London than it is to obtain instructions from Moscow. If that is the position one must of course accept what the representative of the Soviet Union has said to us this evening and hope that a period of reflection—a period of rest perhaps after his journey and our exertions—may mean that the Security Council tomorrow, when, as we hope, this draft resolution or something like it will be introduced, will come to a different conclusion from the somewhat extreme one it came to this evening.

280. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translation from Russian*): I should like once again to explain to the United Kingdom representative that the USSR delegation was unable to support the draft resolution for procedural reasons having nothing to do with the substance.

281. As I have repeatedly stated, my delegation has not yet received instructions. It is now night in Moscow, and it is not possible to call a meeting of the Government to discuss the question.

282. I would like to clarify the issue. The United Kingdom representative, in insisting that a vote was essential, was in effect trying to impose a decision, contrary to Security Council practice and to common sense. I am not afraid to call such behaviour irresponsible.

283. As for his remark about "reflection", I can assure the United Kingdom representative that it is not a matter of reflection but of having to obtain official instructions from our Government. There is a big difference. Reflection has its place, as it has always had and will continue to have. But the absence of Government instructions made it impossible for our delegation to support your draft resolution, which you tried hastily to ram through the Council.

284. The United Kingdom representative raised the question of my needing some rest. As you see, I am hale and hearty; I do not need any rest. I have been

resting at an excellent sanatorium for a month, and I feel just fine. That is why I am able to come straight from a plane to a meeting of the Security Council and take part in it. I am not sick; I am not tired. The plane flew perfectly well, the food was excellent, and I had all I wanted to drink. So I had a fine rest on the plane. I am full of energy, and we can continue meeting until morning if you like; when midnight comes, I shall be moving to the President's Chair, because I am to be President of the Council as of 1 August. I am prepared to continue working until morning. I do not need any rest. That is why I did not support the draft resolution which you tried today to force through the Security Council, not because of any need for reflection and not because I was tired. No, not for those reasons, but exclusively for procedural reasons. You must not impose a resolution after it has been before the Council only a few hours. The established practice requires at least 24 hours if one of the delegations in the Council so requests. You did not heed my request, and this is what comes of such an unyielding attitude. So the responsibility rests with you, not with me.

The meeting rose at 9.35 p.m.