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SEVENTEEN HUNDRED AND SIXTY-THIRD MEETING

Held in New York on Wednesday, 20 February 1974, at 3.30 p.m.

President: Mr. Louis de GUIRINGAUD (France).

Present: The representatives of the following States: Australia, Austria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, China, Costa Rica, France, Indonesia, Iraq, Kenya, Mauritania, Peru, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Cameroon and United States of America.

Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/1763)

1. Adoption of the agenda
2. Complaint by Iraq concerning incidents on its frontier with Iran:

Letter dated 12 February 1974 from the Deputy Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/11216).

The meeting was called to order at 4 p.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

Complaint by Iraq concerning incidents on its frontier with Iran

Letter dated 12 February 1974 from the Deputy Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/11216)

1. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): In accordance with the decision taken by the Council at its 1762nd meeting, and with the consent of the Council, I propose to invite the representative of Iran to take a place at the Council table in order to participate in the Council's debate without the right to vote.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. F. Hoveyda (Iran) took a place at the Council table.

2. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): In accordance with the previous decision also taken by the Council at the 1762nd meeting, I propose, in accordance with Article 31 of the Charter, to invite the representative of Democratic Yemen to participate, without the right to vote, in the debate on the item on the Council's agenda.

3. I have also just received letters from the representative of the Libyan Arab Republic and the representative of the United Arab Emirates requesting to be invited, in accord-

ance with Article 31 of the Charter, to participate without the right to vote in the Council's debate on the item on its agenda.

4. If I hear no objection I propose, in accordance with the Council's practice and under rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure, to invite the representative of the United Arab Emirates and the representative of the Libyan Arab Republic to participate, without the right to vote, in the Council's debate. Given the limited number of places available at the Council table, and in conformity with the usual practice, I shall invite the representatives of the Libyan Arab Republic, the United Arab Emirates and Democratic Yemen to take the places reserved for them at the side of the Council Chamber, on the understanding that they will be invited to take a place at the Council table when it is their turn to speak.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. A. S. Ashtal (Democratic Yemen), Mr. S. D. A. Swedan (Libyan Arab Republic) and Mr. A. Humaidan (United Arab Emirates) took places at the side of the Council Chamber.

5. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The first name on the list of speakers is that of the representative of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, whom I now invite to take a place at the Council table and to make a statement.

6. Mr. ASHTAL (Democratic Yemen): Let me at the outset extend my sincere thanks to the members of the Council for giving me this opportunity to address this august body on an item of special significance to my Government.

7. I am particularly pleased to congratulate you, Mr. President, on your accession to the presidency of the Security Council for the month of February. This Council will undoubtedly benefit from your vast experience and wisdom. You are a qualified and tactful diplomat whom we hold in great esteem.

8. I have asked to be allowed to speak, on behalf of my Government, not as a bystander or as a party remotely influenced by or concerned with the latest acts of aggression perpetrated by the Iraqi Armed Forces against a sisterly country—Iraq—but as a party most intimately preoccupied with the self-declared Iranian political and military patronage of our area. After all, according to Iranian military strategists, the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen is within the so-called defence-perimeter of Iran—a euphemism for neo-imperialist aspirations.

9. Indeed, sometimes only brothers can fight ferociously, and for ulterior motives designed by inimical factions and Powers which labour to maintain and enhance their political and economic interests at the expense of almost anything. Throughout the ages the Arab and Iranian peoples have been welded together by bonds of common heritage, religion, history and neighbourliness, and whenever they fought each other it was never in their best respective interest, but because of imperialists' designs and the grandeur of an alienated patron or an interest group. Today, a large number of fellow Iranians are peacefully living in the midst of their Arab hosts in Iraq, Kuwait, Manamah, Dubai, Abu-Dhabi and the rest of the Arab Gulf Area, while Arabs are coexisting with their brothers in Iran.

10. But the affinity of the Arab and Iranian peoples is distasteful to imperialism and its lackeys. In 1969, when Britain contemplated and then decided on withdrawal from the Arab Gulf Emirates and Sheikdoms, Iran at the time declared that there would be no power vacuum in the Gulf area, that it, Iran, was destined to be the guardian of the Gulf and its littoral Emirates, and that stability would prevail under its tutelage. Almost at the same time, it abrogated its border treaty with Iraq, a despicable move aimed at manifesting its military preponderance and might.

11. As if to mark a new era of territorial aggrandizement and political provocation, the Iranian forces have systematically intruded across Iraqi borders and entered into Iraqi territories in an undisguised mission of continued expansionism. The Iranian Army, which is now very offensively over-equipped has been, ever since, deployed and re-deployed in aggressive patterns along the 500-mile Iraqi-Iranian borders.

12. The latest Irani aggression on Iraqi border posts and the penetration of their armed forces 5 kilometres into Iraqi territory could only be regarded as an escalation of tension and an invitation to large-scale hostilities. This time the Iranian armed forces have not only been deployed within Iraqi territories on a war-footing; they have trespassed upon Iraqi sovereignty by crossing the border, while their air force violated Iraqi air space. Those acts of provocation and outright aggression are qualitatively different in magnitude and in their ominous timing. About two thirds of the Iranian armed forces, armed to the teeth as Ambassador El-Shibib said the other day, and deployed in offensive formations along the Iraqi borders, play with fire, thanks to the American military complex which is now searching for another Viet-Nam in the Middle East and an outlet for its military stocks. It is a situation which portends grave risks and bitter hostilities.

13. As for the timing, it is no coincidence that Iraq is being subjected to Iranian military pressure at a time when it is courageously depriving the proponents and underwriters of Israel from plundering its natural resources. Iraq, moreover, is dedicated to defending the legitimate national rights of the Palestinian people—a fact which naturally worries American imperialism and its extended arms in the Middle East. In its attempt to disrupt Arab solidarity and mitigate the over-all Arab power by exerting pressure on Iraq, Iran is doing a great service to the Zionist aggressors.

14. Now, in the best tradition of a self-styled mini-super-Power, Iran is not only engaged on one front. Its avarice for armaments of all sorts can only be paralleled by its thirst for territorial expansion and its lust for regional overlordship. The fiasco of American imperialism in Viet-Nam is too recent to be overlooked by Irani militarism. On 13 February 1974, John Kroley wrote in the *Christian Science Monitor*:

"In an interview with the London *Daily Telegraph*, the Shah of Iran disclosed that the Iranian Rangers were fighting the guerillas in the Omani Province of Dhofar. The forces are estimated at three battalions of Iranian Sea-Rangers"—that is, 3,000 marines—"supported by helicopters"—25 helicopters.

The paper went on to say:

"The Omani army, already officered by senior officers from Britain and the Commonwealth countries, apparently welcomed the Iranian assistance which was regarded by Arab radicals as 'an invasion'."

15. What else can one call such a brazen and outright incursion? Is it a goodwill visit to Oman, or a picnic with bombs? Or is Iran only testing its newly acquired weapons on a people already plagued by repression and colonialism in disguise? "Military invasion" is what it is—an invasion not, of course, of the Sultan's palace and his imported army of mercenaries, but of Oman and its valiant people.

16. On 10 February 1974, the Iranian paper *Kayhan* boasted in bravado: "Iranian soldiers in Oman have fought valiantly—like lions—thus demonstrating their resolve and ability to help a friendly country in need of support against international conspiracies." "Like lions". By indulging in arrogant self-praise the Iranian paper is merely trying to boost the morale of an invading army, now confronted not by a few thousand freedom fighters, but by the whole Omani people, whose pride is being insulted. Colonialists of the past have tried such ventures, "like lions", but they were compelled to retreat in disarray.

17. The nine-year-old Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Arabian Gulf, which is the target of Irani invasion, now controls the whole Province of Dhofar save for the beleaguered capital City of Sallalah, a prototype of Phnom Phen under constant fire. As the vanguard of the Omani people, they are exercising their right to self-determination. They do not aspire to build an empire, nor do they claim to interfere in the internal affairs of Iran. They serve not the interests of "international conspiracies" but the welfare of the impoverished Omani people. They are the real representatives of the Omani people, and to uproot them Iran will have to obliterate the whole Omani people.

18. When, on 30 November 1971, Iranian troops invaded the Arab islands of Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tumbs, the delegation of Democratic Yemen addressed a pertinent question to this Council on 9 December 1971 [*1610th meeting*]. What are the long-term goals of Iran, Ambassador Ismail asked at the time? Well, it is now established that the three captured islands, which were immediately transformed into military bases, became the

launching-pads for further aggression. For the invading Iranian forces in Oman took off from those very islands, whose occupation is both illegal and condemnable. Now have we not reason to anticipate that the invasion of Oman is only a prelude to further aggression in the Arabian Peninsula?

19. At a time when the fashionable word "détente" is gradually replacing "confrontation" and the "cold war", Iran is apportioning a substantial part of its resources for military build-up. With the billions of dollars spent on arms procurement it has now become a garrison State. Is it the trend that the designs of imperialism are being materialized by local foremen? And are we small States going to be deprived of the fruits of the relaxation of tension in the international arena? I am here to draw the attention of this Council to the fact that the Iranian invasion of Oman endangers the security and territorial integrity of my country. The appetite for Irani expansionism will not stop along the borders of Iraq, nor at the frontiers of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen. Its military tentacles are already feeling out way beyond its borders and well into the high seas. In the words of Hans Morgenthau:

"A nation that throws into the scales of international politics the maximum of material power it is capable of mustering will find itself confronted with the maximum effort of its competitors to equal or surpass its power. It will find that it has no friends, but only vassals and enemies."

20. In addressing this Council on 9 December 1971 [*ibid.*], Mr. Afshar, the representative of Iran, referred to the question of the Irani occupation of the three islands as "miniscule to the point of embarrassment". By what standard is the encroachment on others' territories an *ad minimis*? There are no exceptions to the observation of the rules of law and the principles and purposes of the Charter. Seen from the perspective of the victims of aggression, those are acts of violence endangering peace and security in our area. The responsibility of this Council does not start once the flames of war have faded away and an injustice has been done. Its moral and political obligations warrant its immediate action to extinguish the first sparks of hostilities.

21. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The next name on the list of speakers is that of the representative of the United Arab Emirates, whom I now invite to take a place at the Council table and to make a statement.

22. Mr. HUMAIDAN (United Arab Emirates) (*interpretation from French*): Mr. President, I cannot disguise my pleasure at seeing you preside over this important Council, for you represent France, a nation that is friendly not only to the United Arab Emirates but to the entire Arab world. We cannot but admire the wise policies of your Government, which never ceases to work for peace and justice in the Middle East. May I therefore congratulate you, Sir, and thank you as well as the members of the Council for having allowed me to participate in this debate on a conflict that affects two great countries of our region. One is a brother with which we have a joint destiny; the other is a neighbour with which we enjoy good relations and for which we have

only feelings of friendship and a desire to work together in order to safeguard both the independence and the territorial integrity of all countries of the region.

23. If I am constrained to speak in this debate it is only because I feel I must make the position of my Government very clear on a subject which is of direct and considerable interest to us—namely, the sovereignty over the three islands of Abu Musa, Greater Tumb and Lesser Tumb.

24. In the statement he made on 15 February last [*1762nd meeting*], the representative of Iran said that those islands are Iranian islands over which Iran has re-established its sovereignty, exercise of which had according to him been interrupted during the colonial period.

25. On this point, the position of the Government of the United Arab Emirates has been made clear repeatedly, and I wish to state it again here. We recognize no sovereignty over those islands other than that of the State of the United Arab Emirates.

26. In so saying, I must add that our regional policy, our policy towards our neighbours, is very clear. Furthermore, it was spelled out by our Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Ahmed Khalifa Al-Soweidi, when he addressed the General Assembly on 27 September 1972, in the general debate. He said:

"Our geographical position in the Gulf has given us a vital interest in the maintenance of peace and stability in that important economic and strategic area of the world. . . . It is our firm belief that the peace and stability of the Gulf region can be maintained only with the co-operation of its States and their respect for one another's independence and territorial integrity. Whatever disputes or differences exist at present or may arise in the future can and must be resolved by peaceful means and in a manner that will recognize and preserve the legitimate rights of all parties concerned and without prejudice to their basic national interests. . . ."¹

27. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The next name on the list is that of the representative of the Libyan Arab Republic, whom I invite to take a seat at the Council table and to make a statement.

28. Mr. SWEDAN (Libyan Arab Republic): Mr. President, first I should like to congratulate you on your assumption of the duties of the presidency of the Security Council. Not only are you yourself endowed with the requisite qualities to undertake these duties; you also come from a country with a long history in diplomacy and the pursuit of freedom, a country with which my own country maintains close ties of friendship and co-operation.

29. As is well known in this chamber, my Government has in the past avoided coming to the Security Council in the hope of obtaining justice or of obtaining effective concrete measures against injustice and aggression, even when such injustice and aggression have directly concerned and af-

¹ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-seventh Session, Plenary Meetings, 2043rd meeting, para. 154.*

fects my country and people. We have refused to seek or resign ourselves to mere paper resolutions designed not to counteract dangerous situations but only to condemn to oblivion and sidetrack those victims of aggression and injustice.

30. I need not, however, dwell on the poor record of this Council in taking effective measures to cope with international situations either in my part of the world or anywhere else. Many other representatives have voiced their opinions, cast their doubts and spelled out their disappointments in the vain hope that this Council would at least once overcome the dominance of power politics and meet its prime responsibility on the basis of objectivity and the merit of the issue in question.

31. To turn now to the issue of which the Council is at present seized, there is no need for me to dwell on the record of the events that have taken place as a result of the premeditated Iranian aggression against its neighbour in defiance of the Charter of the United Nations and the principles governing friendly relations among neighbouring States.

32. Everyone can attest to the fact that the latest act of aggression is but one manifestation of a policy of expansion and domination by Iran over the entire Arabian Gulf area. Perhaps the most perfidious chapter of this policy of the Shah and his régime was opened when, in December 1971, the Iranian Government staged a military aggression and illegally occupied three Arab islands in the Arabian Gulf.

33. As is well known, this was done with the connivance and collaboration of the British Government in blatant betrayal of its treaty obligations with the Arab States, which since the dawn of history has had legal sovereignty over these islands. This policy of aggression and expansionism directed against the Arab people does not, however, reflect the true aspirations and sentiments of the Iranian people, with whom we Arabs have the closest bonds of common history, civilization and religion. Quite the contrary, the policy of aggression and expansionism is merely an integral part of the imperial dream and mythology entertained by the Shah to resurrect the ancient Persian empire.

34. Moreover, the forces of imperialism and neo-colonialism have found in this dream, as in the Zionist dream, a golden opportunity to exploit the entire area—an area of vital strategic and economic significance. These forces of imperialism and neo-colonialism, while using the pretext of attempting to safeguard the security and stability of the area, have sought to perpetuate their domination over it. One of their most blatant tactics in this their policy of perpetuating domination and exploitation has been the establishment of the so-called Central Treaty Organization, known as CENTO, encompassing Iran and other States in the region, as well as the United Kingdom and the United States. During the meeting of CENTO members in Teheran in June 1973, Mr. William Rogers, former United States Secretary of State, defined the role of CENTO as a defence system devised to maintain the security of the area of the Arabian Gulf. "If"—said Mr. Rogers—"the Persian Gulf becomes an area of conflict, it would be a matter of

concern to CENTO." Referring to the policy of the United States of providing Iran with huge amounts of the most modern American armaments, Mr. Rogers said that this policy would be "a stabilizing influence for peace in this rich oil-producing area".

35. Indeed, this policy of arming Iran has met its real objectives, although, as is all too apparent, peace does not prevail in the area. But peace was never the objective anyway. The real objective of American policy was to make of Iran a new force in the area—a force capable not only of encroaching upon the rights and sovereignty of its neighbours, but also of meddling in the internal affairs of other States, and even intervening militarily when instructed to do so by its patron.

36. The expansionist policies and dreams of the Shah faithfully serve the interests and the strategy of international colonialism in the area of the Arabian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. That strategy of the United States, based as it is upon establishing military outposts in the heart of the Arab world, also seeks to devise and cement a link between the American military presence in the Mediterranean and in Palestine, on the one hand, and the Arabian Gulf and the Indian Ocean, on the other.

37. Perhaps the clearest evidence of American policies and designs for the Arab area was revealed by Senator Fulbright in a statement he made during the discussions in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the energy crisis. In that statement Mr. Fulbright confirmed the designs of the United States, Israel and Iran towards two of the major oil-producing States—namely, Kuwait and Libya—when he declared:

"There is no question of our ability forcibly to take over the oil-producing States of the Middle East. We might not even have to do it ourselves—with militarily potent surrogates in the region. The Shah of Iran is known to aspire to a protecting role in the Gulf region."

38. Perhaps it is appropriate to refer, in this context, to the other end of the axis of American attempts at domination of the Arab area through the establishment of strategic military outposts in the heart of the Arab world. I refer to the so-called State of Israel, which was artificially planted in the midst of the Arab nation and has been forcibly maintained through huge military and financial support, amounting to many thousands of millions of dollars—not to mention the latest cash payment of \$2.2 billion. There is little doubt that this latter payment to the Zionists is but part of an over-all military plan that encompasses not only support for the so-called State of Israel but also similar and analogous payments to the Shah of Iran. These huge American financial and military outlays are designed to enable America's clients in the Arab area more fully and effectively to serve American interests.

39. Whatever the rhetoric used by the Shah of Iran to justify his latest premeditated act of aggression against the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iraq, this must all be understood and evaluated in the context of the dream of the Shah to dominate and exploit the entire Arabian Gulf area. We therefore declare before this august Council that

unless the international community can halt this expansionism and this aggression, the area will witness in the not-too-distant future an explosive and endless conflict with global dimensions and implications.

40. My Government, convinced of the seriousness of the situation in that part of the world, therefore strongly condemns the aggression of Iran against the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iraq and requests the Council to meet, if only this once in its lifetime, the responsibilities which it has up to now failed to fulfil in many parts of our troubled world.

41. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I call upon the representative of Iran, who has asked to speak in exercise of his right of reply.

42. Mr. HOVEYDA (Iran) (*interpretation from French*): The fact that the representative of Southern Yemen has ventured to abuse the Council's practice in order to interfere in an affair which is of no concern of his—I refer to the complaint concerning a purported Iranian aggression against Iraq—is in itself symptomatic of bare-faced, habitual conduct which has resulted in the sowing of terror and devastation among its own neighbours. Must I remind the Council of the acts of aggression perpetuated by that country against, *inter alia*, Oman or its neighbour to the north? Must I reiterate here the objective openly proclaimed by its own leaders to liberate the whole region of the Persian Gulf—that is to say, nothing less than the overthrow of the lawful régimes of those countries?

43. The insistence of the representative of Southern Yemen, and also of the representative of Libya a few minutes ago, on using a fictitious term to refer to the Persian Gulf—an expression historically established and universally recognized—is vivid proof of the spirit of systematic distortion that characterized the remainder of their remarks. And when those two delegations venture to talk of dreams of hegemony and expansion on the part of Iran, do they not realize that in thus distorting this historical expression they are in the process of building an empire, happily fictitious?

44. The tissue of lies and insults which we have just heard directed at my Government in fact merits no reply. Nevertheless, mention has been made here by the representative of Southern Yemen of the assistance granted by my country to the Sultanate of Oman. I must in this respect recall that this assistance was furnished at the actual request of the lawful Government of that friendly country, and the Sultan of Oman recently publicly expressed his gratitude to Iran in an interview with the Lebanese newspaper *Al Hawadess*. In any event, I am not surprised to see the representative of Southern Yemen fly to the succour of his Iraqi colleague—and this comment is equally applicable to the representative of Libya. When the October war broke out in the Middle East the Libyan authorities, despite their proximity to the region, remained steadfastly silent and refrained from making any gesture vis-à-vis the countries involved in the conflict. And now a representative of Libya all at once comes here to speak of a conflict which is taking place very far from his region. He says that Iran has perpetrated an act of aggression. What would he know

about it? Has the representative of Iraq brought before the Council even the beginnings of proof? All the representative of Libya does is repeat what the representative of Iraq maintains. What is more, has the representative of Libya forgotten that in his country there are training camps for terrorists who are subsequently sent far off to other countries, and even to my own region, my own country? Has he forgotten the "VIP" treatment that Libya accords terrorists who come from the four corners of the world?

45. The representative of the United Arab Emirates saw fit to repeat in the Council the position of his Government. I shall reply by saying that I myself stated the position of my Government on this subject at the last meeting of the Council and that this position was also stated by the representative of Iran in the Security Council on 9 December 1971 [*1610th meeting*]. The representative of the United Arab Emirates talked about the friendly relations between our two countries. I can assure him that we have the same feelings towards his country. He said that the security of the region must be ensured by co-operation among all the States of the region. That is in fact the position that has always been maintained and proclaimed by my country.

46. Regarding the subject of this debate, on which the preceding speakers have touched, my Government's position remains the same. Despite the Iraqi aggression, despite the complaint brought before this Council, despite the insults and the appeals to subversion contained in the Iraqi mass media, we are, as we have always affirmed, ready to sit down at the negotiating table with a view to the complete normalization of our relations and the resolution of all our differences.

47. Since I have the floor, and since the preceding speakers have thought fit to make comments about the subject now before the Council, I should like to mention a number of new developments since last Friday which render even more curious the present attitude of Iraq.

48. First, last Saturday the Iraqi Ambassador in Teheran presented his credentials and on the same day air links between the two countries were resumed. Today—indeed at this very moment—for the first time in three years an aircraft of Iran Air is landing in Baghdad with the new Iranian ambassador to Iraq on board. Thus everything seems to indicate that diplomatic relations and communications between the two countries are again becoming normal. Nevertheless, the delegation of Iraq refuses to have recourse to these normal means.

49. The other recent news I should like to share with the Council concerns the bloody incident of 10 February. First of all, I should like to inform the Council that a documentary film containing sequences showing the clash between Iranian and Iraqi forces on the frontier on Sunday, 10 February, was shown the very next day on Baghdad television with a commentary accusing Iran of being the first to attack. On the same day the same film was broadcast by the television network of another capital. I wonder by what divination the Iraqi television cameramen knew in advance where this incident was going to take place so that they could go to film it, for it is impossible to

maintain a television crew all along a 1,200 kilometre frontier. The documentary even showed the very first moments of the clash. Technically, this must mean that there were several cameramen and even a whole television crew present, in very remote areas of the two countries. Must we not, therefore, conclude that everything was planned well in advance if this film was to be shown only a few hours later on Baghdad television? Is this not evidence that this incident was premeditated by the Iraqis?

50. That was the first fact which I wished to bring to the Council's attention. The second development concerns the corpses of Iraqi soldiers which were left behind on our territory after the withdrawal of the invading forces. Since, in his letter of today's date [S/11224], the representative of Iraq has mentioned this question, I find myself obliged to submit to the Council's attention the following information. On 14 February 1974, the Iraqi frontier guards were invited by their Iranian opposite numbers to a meeting on the frontier line in order to discuss procedures with a view to transferring the 29 Iraqi dead who lost their lives in Iranian territory on 10 February—2 officers and 27 soldiers or frontier guards. The Iraqi frontier guards, although they accepted this Iranian offer of a meeting and attended the meeting, refused to sign the minutes concerning the transfer. They refused a reference to the fact that these corpses were in Iranian territory. They refused to take delivery of the bodies of their own soldiers. In its letter of today's date, the delegation of Iraq again mentions the presence of Iranian forces on the frontier. Of course, it omits to mention the presence of Iraqi forces on the other side of the frontier. I should like here to repeat what I said last Friday in the Council. I said then:

“...I wonder what a responsible Government is expected to do following upon an incident as regrettable as that of 10 February last? Is it not normal for any country to adopt the measures dictated by its defence needs?” [1762nd meeting, para. 75].

51. At that time I gave the Council information concerning a number of Iraqi divisions which were massed on the frontier prior to 10 February, and this very morning I received information indicating that the Iraqis were continuing to send forces and to mass them along the frontier with Iran.

52. I have also received information concerning the new incidents mentioned in this letter. Those incidents, which are not specified in the letter from the Iraqi delegation, consist of five rounds of cannon fired from the Iraqi side in the same region as the incident of 10 February. To this let us add the fact that Iraq has now resumed the expulsion of Iranian nationals from its territory, this time attacking the religious authorities and theological students in the Najaf region. Attached to the letter from the representative of Iraq is a map which as a matter of fact was circulated to the members of the Council last Friday. I must draw the attention of members of the Council to the fact that no treaty delimiting the land frontier between Iraq and Iran is in existence. What is more, there is an arrow on this map. I wonder whether in the mind of the representative of Iraq an arrow, drawn by hand by his cartographers, is supposed to prove anything at all?

53. One of the preceding speakers referred to the fact that Iranian troops were in Iraqi territory. Here I must revert to what the representative of Iraq told us last Friday—that the Iranian troops were supposed to have advanced “5 kilometres inside Iraqi territory” [*ibid.*, para. 10], an argument which does not appear in the letter of complaint addressed to the Security Council by the Iraqi delegation. The representative of Iraq will perhaps say that he was not in the possession of detailed information at the time he sent his letter to the Security Council. In that case, whom are we to believe? Are we to lend our ear to the statement of the representative of Iraq when he talked about Iranian forces which had purportedly occupied Iraqi frontier areas on 10 February 1974, or are we rather to believe the reports from Iraqi Government controlled radio and television, quoting communiqués from their Chief of Staff which boasted of the victories won over the purported Iranian aggressors on 10 February 1974?

54. Did the Iranian troops enter Iraq, or was it rather, as the communiqué declares, that they were severely punished and that they were thrown back with losses?

55. I am in possession of news reports and bulletins issued by Basra and Baghdad radio and newspaper cuttings from those cities. They speak in general terms of Iranian aggression, but hasten to add that the Iraqi forces made short shrift of the aggressive ambitions of the Iranian forces. Now, either our troops were victorious or they were repulsed, in accordance with the Iraqi story.

56. The facts that I have mentioned—the television, the refusal to take delivery of the bodies, the contradiction between the statements by the representative of Iraq and the communiqués from his Chief of Staff concerning the same incident—cast serious doubt on Iraq's claims that we were the first to attack. These facts constitute evidence, they constitute proof; besides, the campaign of hatred orchestrated by the radio, television and press in Iraq on a wide scale from 10 February onwards suffices to show the Council where the truth really lies. And since in regard to this incident, the representative of Iraq thought fit to mention in his statement of Friday last, quoting a United States newspaper, the so-called Iranian “armaments shopping list”, I think I might give the Council some clarifications concerning this.

57. I do not claim to be familiar with the “shopping list” of the Iraqis, but I do have some specific information concerning the present state of Iraqi armaments, and I am going to mention them to you—not all of them, rest assured, since that would take hours. The representative of Iraq talked about tanks, naval forces and air forces. I shall confine myself to these three elements. Iraq now has more than 150 T-26 tanks, 400 T-55 tanks, 600 T-54 tanks, 72 T-34 tanks, 66 T-76 tanks, 36 M-24 tanks, and a large number of Centurion tanks. I shall omit mention of a whole series of armaments and I shall now go on to the Iraqi Air Force: 80 Sukhoi fighter bombers, 81 MIG-21's, 25 MIG-19's, 25 MIG-17's, 36 MIG-15's, 33 Hunters, 12 Ilyushin-28 bombers, 16 Tupolev-16 bombers, 16 Tupolev-22 bombers—and I should like to draw the attention of members of the Council to the destructive power of the Tupolev-22 bombers—3 AN-2 air transports,

16 AN-12's, 11 AN-24's, 3 Tupolev-124 air transports, 4 Bristol air transports, 6 Dove transports, 2 Hern transports, 34 MI-4 helicopters, 12 MI-6 helicopters, 31 MI-8 helicopters, 12 Vessox helicopters, 12 Alouette helicopters, and so on and so forth.

58. I might also mention the fact that among these most sophisticated armaments, apart from the TU-22 bombers that I mentioned, Iraq has all kinds of SAM missiles—SAM 2, 3, 6 and 7 missiles.

59. I shall refrain from continuing this list any further. The Council can see that it goes on and on. I do not wish to dwell further on this point, but if the Council wished me to do so it would be my pleasure to read out the list in its entirety. The representative of Iraq, like certain others, accuses us of arming to the teeth, yet Iraq does likewise and has done so for a long time.

60. In concluding this statement, I wish only to reiterate the position of my Government. Despite the fact that we are the victims, despite the many unfriendly acts on the part of our neighbour, and despite its intransigent refusal to negotiate with us, once again we should like to say clearly that we are prepared to embark on direct negotiations using the normal diplomatic channels in order to settle this question and all others. As of April 1973, before the resumption of our diplomatic relations, our Foreign Minister conveyed to his Iraqi opposite number various alternative methods of negotiation and improvement of relations between our two countries. The Foreign Minister of Iraq has not replied to this day. Before 1973, as well as since 1973, we have repeatedly offered to enter upon direct negotiations. I reiterated this position last Friday and I reiterate it once again today.

61. I should like in conclusion to ask the representative of Iraq whether he does not believe that the path of negotiation, opened up when we resumed our diplomatic relations, is the best way of easing tensions and settling our problems.

62. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The representative of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen has asked to be allowed to speak in exercise of the right of reply. I now invite him to take a place at the Council table for that purpose.

63. Mr. ASHTAL (Democratic Yemen): The representative of Iran made a number of allegations against my Government and I should like to take this opportunity to reply to them. He said at the beginning of his remarks that the participation of the delegation of the Democratic Republic of Yemen in this Council debate was an interference in the Council's affairs. If I remember correctly, he even said that it was a sort of encroachment. To us this is not new, because for Iran, which has attempted to deprive us of the right to exercise our sovereignty in our area, such remarks are to be expected. Again in the best tradition of a sub-imperialist Power, they would like us to sit by quietly and watch them invade our area.

64. The representative of Iran said that the objective of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen was to liberate

the Persian Gulf. First of all it is the Arabian Gulf, and I should like to say to him that the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen is engaged in liberating itself from the remnants of colonialism. We have no ambitions in any of our neighbouring countries and, at the same time, we think it is the right of the peoples in the different countries to exercise their self-determination. We are not there to build an empire, as he said. It is very ironic that the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, a very small country of 2 million people, should be accused of wanting to build an empire. The representative of Iran is probably speaking of the Persian Empire, and not of any other empire.

65. He also said that the Iranian forces went to Oman to assist Oman at the invitation of the Sultan of Oman. It would be well to recall that this kind of justification is not new to imperialist and sub-imperialist Powers. We can only recall here that when the United States forces went to South Viet-Nam it was at the invitation of South Viet-Nam, but they did plunder and that is what the Iranians are doing in Oman.

66. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The representative of Iraq wishes to speak in exercise of the right of reply, and I now call on him.

67. Mr. EL-SHIBIB (Iraq): It was my intention to participate in today's debate merely to bring to the attention of the members of the Council my letter dated 20 February 1974 [S/11224] relating to increased tension on the border and other recent shooting incidents and to point out the fact that the Iranian authorities are holding for ransom the dead bodies of Iraqi soldiers—the Iraqi authorities must agree to the Iranian claim that the bodies fell in Iranian territory. This fact needs no elaboration as testimony to the humanitarian and civilized attitude of the Iranian authorities when dead bodies are used as bargaining chips.

68. However, we were led again by the remarks of the Iranian representative through the same maze of confusion, false accusations and unsubstantiated claims which can only serve to divert this debate from taking a constructive course. I am sure that the members of the Council, have seen the Iraqi delegation's restraint and its effort to see that this debate should not degenerate into rhetoric and accusations, but should go along a constructive path that would lead to the establishment of peace in our region and a settlement of the dispute which is the subject of this meeting of the Council. However, I deem it my duty to reply to some of the remarks made by the representative of Iran.

69. First of all he disputed the fact that Iraq had stated that Iranian forces had made an incursion and had occupied a post which was 5 kilometres inside Iraqi territory. I need only refer to the verbatim record of the Council meeting on 15 February 1974 [1762nd meeting, para. 10] to show that at the outset I stated this fact very clearly. I wonder whether he is disputing my claim to represent my country, but my country, through me, as its representative, has made this claim and it stands by it.

70. Then we heard the charge again of Iraqi aggression. Now Iraq must really be a brazen aggressor—first of all to

commit aggression against Iran, to complain about it to the Security Council, to insist, on having the Security Council meet, despite the efforts of my Iranian colleague and his friends not to have the Council meet and then to frustrate this debate so that it will not arrive at any conclusion, and to ask the Council to investigate this matter. We must be either mad people or truly very brazen. I believe that the conduct of my delegation and the conduct of the representative of Iran attest clearly to the true situation, to the true intentions and to the facts. I cannot take this Council bodily and place it on the spot in Iraqi territory where the dead bodies of Iraqi soldiers are still piled in order for members to see the true nature of the aggression. But the conduct of Iran in trying to prevent the facts from coming before the Council, in trying to prevent a debate from taking place and in trying to prevent a resolution of this debate attests to the true facts.

71. My Iranian colleague has been generous enough to furnish us with a list of Iraqi armaments. I shall not dwell upon this point. I only wish to say that it is not the arms that matter, but the way in which they are used and the objective for which they are used. Iraq has never used its arms except to defend its territory and the territories of sister Arab States under foreign occupation. I do not need to elaborate upon the use of the arms and the might of Iran. There is enough in the records of this Council to dispel any doubts.

72. The representative of Iran has brought up a point and has rather strangely presented another claim to substantiate exactly the opposite. Let me elucidate. First of all, he spoke about increased concentration of Iraqi troops along the border and said that Iraq was bringing more units to the border area. We have not told the Council that the situation was all calm and quiet. Indeed, we said exactly the opposite—that the situation was tense, that the situation was dangerous and that it could explode at any moment unless speedy and effective action was taken. But at the same time he went on to say that the Iraqi Ambassador had arrived and presented his credentials, that aircraft were flying again and so on, that everything was peaceful. I cannot understand the purpose of all this. Then he asked me if it was not better to resolve these matters through direct negotiation.

73. Now, let me say this. Prior to the arrival of our Ambassador, we had diplomatic relations with Iran; we had a chargé d'affaires. Secondly, our Ambassador did not arrive in Teheran on Saturday last; he was there on 3 February, and Iraqi positions were attacked on 4 February. He was there on 10 February. I wonder if that is the welcome Teheran has prepared for him.

74. Not only have ambassadors been exchanged between us and Iran; we have a border more than 1,000 kilometres long; we have historical ties between our peoples which are unbreakable; we have a common culture; our histories are interwoven. We want those relations to continue, we want to preserve them, we want to cherish them—but on the basis of justice, on the basis of respect for our sovereignty and territorial integrity, through a process of respect for law, international law, which specifies the sanctity of treaties and the fulfilment by States of their obligations under such treaties.

75. Now for the last point I should like to bring before the Council. It may seem a little frivolous, but since my colleague from Iran decided to bring the matter up, I must reply to him. I refer to the famous film that Baghdad television cameramen are supposed to have shot of the events of 10 February. I knew the story of that film because I was in possession of a story which was published on 13 February by the well-known Iranian propaganda sheet *Kayhan*. Indeed, I was praying that he would not fall into the trap of simplistic propaganda. The film shown was of the events of 4 February, and the facts themselves will tell my colleagues very clearly how impossible it was for us to have shot the film on 10 February. Let me elaborate a little on this point.

76. According to Iranian claims, we have committed aggression against Iranian territory, and we have been repulsed and have left behind us armaments and dead bodies. And yet our cameramen were apparently not only present at the scene of the battle—for, according to the newspaper, they filmed the scene of the battle from all points—but they had the alacrity to evacuate the position faster than our soldiers; our army had to leave its dead bodies and armaments on the spot. I feel that if my colleague had thought that point over a little longer he would not have been a victim of that propaganda.

77. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I call on the representative of Iran, who wishes to exercise his right of reply.

78. Mr. HOVEYDA (Iran) (*interpretation from French*): I shall not take too long in replying to the representative of Democratic Yemen because it appears to me that he did not quite follow what I said at the very beginning of my statement. What I said will appear in the verbatim record of this meeting of the Security Council; the representative of Democratic Yemen will be able to consult that record and will realize that he failed to understand what I said.

79. However, when he says that we invaded Oman and that region, I must observe that I have already stated that it was at the request of the legitimate Government of Oman. And when he says his country has no ambitions, I would reply that doubtless it is not Southern Yemen but Iran that aids the rebellion in Dhofar and elsewhere.

80. With regard to liberation—and I deliberately use the word "liberation"—of the entire region, I would remind him that it is his country that protects and eggs on the so-called Front for the Liberation of the Arab Gulf.

81. Let me reply to my colleague from Iraq very rapidly. He spoke of the question of the transfer of the bodies of Iraqi soldiers. But I want to know what those bodies were doing on Iranian soil. Why do they refuse to accept the fact that the transfer is from Iran to Iraq? It was the representative of Iraq who came before the Security Council and submitted what I would call a very strong complaint against my country. Yet he speaks of self-control. It is very strange moderation—to come here to the Council and accuse a neighbour of aggression. Furthermore, he accuses me of evading certain questions and of dwelling on others. I did not make the complaint: I am the object of

the complaint. And should I not have the right to go into certain points?

82. As far as armaments are concerned, it was not I who opened up that subject. It was he who read out his first Iranian "shopping list". I wanted to prove to him that I was not aware of the contents of his "shopping list", but I did know what sophisticated weapons, and how many, are possessed by his country.

83. The representative of Iraq says that in this Council I am trying to stand in the way of a resolution. How can I do that? I am not a member. I have met with the Ambassadors members of the Council, and I have explained to them the views of my Government and expressed my feelings.

84. As far as the massing of troops is concerned, he tosses the ball back into my court.

85. As far as the arrival of his Ambassador on 3 February and the presentation of credentials two weeks later are concerned, need I recall that my Sovereign was not in Iran at the time? I think that was common knowledge. Certainly, it was no secret to the Iraqi Government.

86. The representative of Iraq speaks of certain documents dating back to the colonial era. I do not quite understand why his Government is eager to adopt the colonial ideas set out in those documents.

87. I do not know whether the film to which he referred was made on 4 February or 10 February, but the commentary accompanying the film spoke of the "invasion of Iraqi territory by Iranians". I did not read the article in the newspaper he showed. It was on the basis of diplomatic reports that I raised that aspect of the question.

88. In conclusion, I would point out that the representative of Iraq, in his reply, adduced no tenable argument against the holding of direct negotiations.

89. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I call on the representative of Iraq, who has asked to speak in exercise of his right of reply.

90. Mr. EL-SHIBIB (Iraq): Mr. President, I wish to assure you that I do not wish to expose the Council to a "swinging-match" between me and the representative of Iran. I should like to say only one thing to bring the debate back to its constructive path and to put before the Council the true facts of the situation. Since 10 February, and to this very moment, Iranian troops have been occupying territory within Iraq, a distance of five kilometres from the border.

91. This is not the first Iranian transgression or incursion into Iraq. In fact, since Iran unilaterally abrogated a valid and binding border treaty between the two countries, incursions upon our territory, violation of our air space and violation of our territorial waters have been taking place. We have been patient; we have been restrained; we have tried every possible venue, from direct contacts to the use of the good offices of friends, many of whom are probably present in this chamber. But all that has been a failure, in

fact, there has been a worsening of the situation, an escalation of the incidents, to the point that my Government felt we were facing an untenable and intolerable position which threatens the peace and security of our region, and as a State bound by the Charter of the United Nations our first resort should be to this Council to see that justice is done and that peace is achieved. This is our course; this is our purpose in being here.

92. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I call upon the representative of Iran, who has asked to speak in exercise of his right of reply.

93. Mr. HOVEYDA (Iran) (*interpretation from French*): If anyone here is trying to stop the debate from progressing, it is the representative of Iraq. He just mentioned the intervention of friendly nations to try to solve our problems. I want to draw the attention of members of the Council to the letter addressed by the representative of Iran on 17 February 1970 to the Secretary-General. I should like to quote only the following lines:

"I should like to recall that in its consultations with various friendly Governments which endeavoured to mediate between Iran and Iraq, my Government welcomed the idea of a simultaneous troop withdrawal and even agreed to a tentative date for such withdrawal. However, the efforts of these Governments were frustrated by the Iraqi authorities."²

I shall not read the rest of the letter; the letter stands as an official document and is in the archives of the Secretariat.

94. Once again the representative of Iraq brought up the question of frontiers. Well, I have a whole file on this matter, Sir, but I see that you glance at the clock every now and again and I shall therefore postpone this part of my statement to some future meeting. But I would ask you to allow me personally to give each member of the Council some documents that set forth the entire background of the boundary question. I shall also ask you to allow me at some future meeting to give the necessary explanations.

95. With regard to our offers of negotiation, I repeat that they still have had no answer on the part of the Iraqi Government. Since the representative of Iraq claims that we have launched an aggression against his country and that we are occupying his territory, and since as representative of Iran I refute his argumentation, is not the best way to solve the problem for someone to go to the battlefield of 10 February and try to find out wherein lies the truth and then report back to you? That is a very constructive idea that I had the honour to suggest in my private talks with all the members of the Security Council. We are not opposed to such a step being taken. All the members of the Council can attest to the fact that the day after the Iraqi complaint had been submitted, this was the idea that I had the honour to propose to them.

96. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I call on the representative of Iraq, who has asked to speak in exercise of his right of reply.

² Quoted in English by the speaker.

97. Mr. EL-SHIBIB (Iraq): I shall take only one minute, to set the record straight and put things in their true perspective. The Iranian representative speaks of direct negotiations. Iraq has never refused, and would welcome, direct negotiations. But, as I have said to the representative of Iran, if we are to negotiate regarding difficulties and disputes on our borders, then Iran must declare before this Council that it is willing to fulfil its international obligations under a valid and binding border treaty which Iran unilaterally abrogated.

98. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I call on the representative of Iran, who has asked to speak in exercise of his right of reply.

99. Mr. HOVEYDA (Iran) (*interpretation from French*): My colleague from Iraq refuses to understand certain things. He refers to existing valid treaties. I am unaware of any such treaties. Allow me, therefore, to explain the situation to members of the Security Council. I must say

that this reminds me of something else. Since I have been the Permanent Representative of Iran in this Organization, I have been present at all meetings of the Security Council in the place reserved for Iran at the back of the chamber, and the attitude of the representative of Iraq reminds me of the attitude of a certain representative of another country that wishes to impose prior conditions on negotiations.

100. Mr. EL-SHIBIB (Iraq): Instead of making a lengthy statement regarding the claims of my Iranian colleague, I wish to append to my statement before the Council the text of the Treaty of 1937 between Iraq and Iran [*S/9323, annex IV*], for the information of the members of the Council.

101. Mr. HOVEYDA (Iran) (*interpretation from French*): I wish to assure my colleague from Iraq that he does not have to do that. I have just done it myself.

The meeting rose at 5.45 p.m.