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1715th MEETING: 18 MAY 1973

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NOTE

Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures. Mention of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United Nations document.

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The resolutions of the Security Council, numbered in accordance with a system adopted in 1964, are published in yearly volumes of *Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council*. The new system, which has been applied retroactively to resolutions adopted before 1 January 1965, became fully operative on that date.

SEVENTEEN HUNDRED AND FIFTEENTH MEETING

Held in New York on Friday, 18 May 1973, at 3 p.m.

President: Mr. Rahmatalla ABDULLA (Sudan).

Present: The representatives of the following States: Australia, Austria, China, France, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Panama, Peru, Sudan, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America and Yugoslavia.

Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/1715)

1. Adoption of the agenda.
2. Question concerning the situation in Southern Rhodesia:
 - (a) Letter dated 8 May 1973 from the representatives of Guinea and Kenya to the President of the Security Council (S/10925);
 - (b) Second special report of the Committee established in pursuance of Security Council resolution 253 (1968) concerning the question of Southern Rhodesia (S/10920 and Corr.1).

The meeting was called to order at 3.55 p.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

Question concerning the situation in Southern Rhodesia:

- (a) Letter dated 8 May 1973 from the representatives of Guinea and Kenya to the President of the Security Council (S/10925);
- (b) Second special report of the Committee established in pursuance of Security Council resolution 253 (1968) concerning the question of Southern Rhodesia (S/10920 and Corr.1)

1. The PRESIDENT: I wish to recall at this juncture the decision taken earlier by the Council [1713th meeting] to invite the representative of Somalia, at his request, to participate in the discussion under the terms of Article 31 of the Charter. A place has been reserved for that representative in the Council chamber.

2. I wish to draw attention to the two draft resolutions which were introduced yesterday by the representative of Kenya [1714th meeting]. Those draft resolutions have been circulated in documents S/10927 and S/10928. Further, I wish to inform members of the Council that both draft resolutions have additional sponsors. The draft resolution in document S/10927 is now sponsored by the delegations of Australia, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Kenya,

Panama, Peru, the Sudan and Yugoslavia. The draft resolution in document S/10928 is now sponsored by the delegations of Guinea, Indonesia, Kenya, Panama, the Sudan and Yugoslavia.

3. Mr. PEREZ DE CUELLAR (Peru) (*interpretation from Spanish*): Mr. President, I wish to express to you my best wishes and the promise of cordial co-operation in your duties as President of the Council, in which post you are giving us additional evidence of your diplomatic skill and experience and of your particular serenity and sound judgement.

4. My delegation wishes to express its appreciation to the representative of Guinea, Mrs. Jeanne Martin Cissé, for the clear and measured manner in which she introduced [1712th meeting] the second special report of the Committee established in pursuance of resolution 253 (1968).

5. The delegation of Peru in the Committee expressed its support of the proposals originally submitted by the delegations of Guinea, Kenya and the Sudan, because it considered that those proposals were in accord with the terms of reference set out in resolution 320 (1972), particularly in so far as they referred to certain specific situations which constitute the most frequent violation of sanctions, such as, among others, trade and export with Southern Rhodesia through South Africa and the Territories under Portuguese administration, and because they gave the sanctions more effectiveness through clauses applicable to sales contracts with Rhodesia, as well as to insurance companies which cover goods coming from Rhodesia. But my delegation has had to be satisfied with the less satisfactory proposals which were the subject of the consensus and appear in section III of the report—proposals which, in our opinion, would be the very minimum which could be adopted within the mandate contained in resolution 320 (1972).

6. Five years after the adoption of resolution 253 (1968), we note that the sanctions imposed by it, which were supplemented by resolution 277 (1970), have so far failed because, apart from constituting a legal and moral condemnation by the Council of the Smith régime, they have not attained the specific objective, which was to force the usurper government to desist from its rebellion. This failure can be attributed precisely to the weakness, slowness and piecemeal way in which the sanctions were applied.

7. For all these reasons, and with the sole purpose of increasing the effectiveness of the sanctions imposed by the Council and attaining the objective, which is the recogni-

tion of the rights of the people of Zimbabwe, my delegation will support the draft resolutions submitted by Guinea, Kenya and the Sudan, which are contained in documents S/10927 and S/10928. At this time I wish to announce my delegation's sponsorship of the draft resolution contained in document S/10928.

8. My delegation could not let this opportunity pass without expressing in the most forceful manner the solidarity of the Government and people of Peru with the valient struggle of the Zimbabwe people against the régime that usurps its rights, rebels against the authority of the United Nations and defies the condemnation of the international community.

9. Mr. HUANG Hua (China) (*translation from Chinese*): The Chinese delegation has pointed out on many occasions that the white racist régime in Southern Rhodesia is a direct product of the British colonialist policy and a criminal tool of imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism in suppressing the Zimbabwe people and opposing independent African countries and peoples. The only solution to the question of Rhodesia is to respect the Zimbabwe people's right to self-determination and to let them achieve complete national independence free from any outside interference. The daily-awakening Zimbabwe people are uniting with other African peoples in waging unremitting heroic struggles. Confronted with ever greater internal and external contradictions and difficulties, the racist régime in Southern Rhodesia is tottering on its last legs. The Southern Rhodesian racist régime can eke out a precarious existence, cling to its perverse course, frantically repress the Zimbabwe people and even brazenly carry out provocations against neighbouring independent African countries, such as its recent grave provocation against Zambia, precisely because it has the connivance and support of imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism. However, the frantic repression and provocation by the reactionaries can only arouse still more vigorous resistance on the part of the Zimbabwe and other African people. Consequently, they will end up by dropping on their own feet the rock they have lifted. The Zimbabwe people who have already taken up arms in their struggle will surely finish the Southern Rhodesian racist régime with their own hands and mete out due punishment to it.

10. The Chinese Government has consistently stood for strict sanctions against the Southern Rhodesian authorities, for we consider it the least the Security Council should do. Nevertheless, we have to point out that the previous Council resolutions on sanctions against Southern Rhodesia have not been earnestly implemented. A document of statistical data on the Southern Rhodesian economy prepared by the Secretariat not long ago indicates that the imports and exports of Southern Rhodesia have shown a yearly increase and that the total volume of foreign trade of Southern Rhodesia in 1971 was 15 per cent bigger than in 1970, amounting to \$749 million. It is known to all that the South African and Portuguese authorities not only have refused to implement the relevant Security Council resolutions on sanctions against Southern Rhodesia but have even worked hand in glove with the Southern Rhodesian authorities in undermining sanctions against Southern Rhodesia by every means. In covert collusion with Southern Rh-

desia, South Africa and Portugal, some big Powers are abetting and supporting them on the one hand, and on the other hand are blatantly violating the relevant Council resolutions and openly undermining sanctions against Southern Rhodesia. Ample evidence can be found in the fact that the United States Government has openly imported chrome and nickel from Southern Rhodesia under the pretext of importing strategic material. After the Council had adopted the resolution on strengthening sanctions against Southern Rhodesia, there occurred the recent incident in which Southern Rhodesian authorities imported three Boeing 707 jet aircraft from a so-called "unidentified source". This is all the more a gross mockery of the Council resolution.

11. Last year, in response to the initiative of African countries, the Security Council adopted resolution 320 (1972), which requests the Security Council Committee established in pursuance of resolution 253 (1968) concerning the question of Southern Rhodesia

"to undertake, as a matter of urgency, consideration of the type of action which could be taken in view of the open and persistent refusal of South Africa and Portugal to implement sanctions against the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia".

Thereafter, three African Member States, the Sudan, Guinea and Kenya, put forward a series of concrete proposals in the spirit of the aforementioned resolution in that Committee. The Chinese delegation supported the initiatives of the African countries, although it considered at the same time that the proposals were only the minimum and preliminary measures to strengthen sanctions against Southern Rhodesia, which were not completely satisfactory. Regrettably, however, in the course of the discussion in the Committee, certain big Powers still refused to accept certain reasonable proposals by the three African countries under this or that pretext.

12. The second special report of the Committee submitted to the Security Council reflects this actual situation. It is not difficult for people to see from an abundance of facts that although some countries ceaselessly talk about their being in favour of strengthening sanctions against Southern Rhodesia their actual deeds have proven contrary to their pious statements.

13. The Chinese delegation holds: first, apart from the recommendations unanimously adopted by the Committee, the Security Council should also accept certain reasonable proposals put forward by the three African countries as preliminary and minimum measures to strengthen the sanctions against Southern Rhodesia and urge those concerned earnestly to carry them out; secondly, in view of the fact that over a long period of time the South African and Portuguese authorities have made every effort to undermine the sanctions against Southern Rhodesia by various means, the Council should adopt a resolution sternly condemning them and extend these sanctions to cover South Africa and Portugal; thirdly, in view of the continued flagrant importation of chrome and nickel as well as other products from Southern Rhodesia by certain big Powers in violation of the relevant resolutions on sanctions against Southern Rh-

desia, the Council should sternly condemn them and enjoin them to cease forthwith such acts of violation.

14. The Chinese Government has never had any diplomatic contact with the white racist régime of Southern Rhodesia, and has long since severed all direct and indirect economic and trade relations with it. The Chinese Government will, as always, give resolute support to the Zimbabwe people in their just struggle to oppose colonial rule and racial discrimination and to win national independence.

15. Southern Rhodesia has entered into a reactionary military alliance with the colonialist authorities of South Africa and Portugal in their joint repression of the national liberation movements of the people in southern Africa, thus menacing the independence and security of the countries in southern Africa. As a result, the national liberation movements of the entire southern African people have been linked together even more closely, and the flames of the southern African people's armed struggle have raged with increasing vigour. At present, an excellent situation prevails in Zimbabwe and the whole of southern Africa. No force on earth can turn back the wheel of history and prevent the people in this region from attaining complete national independence, so long as the people in this region get further mobilized and organized and wage unremitting struggles. "He who plays with fire gets burned." The colonialist authorities of Southern Rhodesia, South Africa and Portugal as well as all those colonialists and neo-colonialists who are abetting and supporting them in their perverse course from behind the scenes are sitting on a volcano; the more energetically they try to suppress the national liberation struggles in southern Africa, the more will they hasten their own total destruction. Southern Africa will give new evidence to the working of the inexorable law of history.

16. The Chinese delegation will vote in favour of the two draft resolutions before us as preliminary measures to strengthen and expand the sanctions against Southern Rhodesia.

17. Sir Colin CROWE (United Kingdom): Before I begin, Sir, may I just congratulate you upon your elevation to the office of President and say how pleased we are that you should be occupying it, express our confidence in your ability, devotion and fairness and assure you of our co-operation.

18. I should like also to extend our congratulations to our President for last month, the Ambassador of Peru, for the skilful and extremely patient and devoted manner in which he conducted our proceedings last month.

19. It is perhaps unnecessary to remind ourselves that sanctions against Southern Rhodesia are not an end in themselves: they are a means to an end. Their purpose is to help to bring about a just and acceptable settlement of the problem of Southern Rhodesia and the end of the illegal rebellion. I agree with other speakers that we should not underestimate the effects of sanctions so far. Even with the present defects in their application, they have had some effect on the economy of Rhodesia and on the thinking of the illegal régime. But they have not yet pinched hard

enough to bring it to contemplate a settlement which is acceptable to the Rhodesian people as a whole. We have to consider why this has been so.

20. The existing sanctions in themselves are comprehensive in scope. My delegation has no doubt at all that if they had been fully and conscientiously applied by all States professing to support sanctions, the trade conducted through South Africa and the Portuguese Territories would have been drastically reduced, and the effect on the régime's willingness to come to a just and acceptable settlement would have been that much greater.

21. In considering what should be done now, therefore, the touchstone—the criterion—must be the effectiveness of what is proposed as a means towards stopping the illegal trade which continues and, therefore, towards promoting the chances of a just and acceptable settlement in Southern Rhodesia. Paper sanctions are useless; political gestures do not get us anywhere. What is required, rather than a paper extension which amounts to a declaration of economic warfare against the whole of southern Africa and which my Government, for one, could not countenance, is the proper application of the existing comprehensive sanctions.

22. I join with others in paying tribute to the three African delegations that drafted the original proposals on which the sanctions Committee worked. Their purpose is one which we fully share. The plain fact is that, as the statistics reveal, far too much trade in Rhodesian products is continuing under the guise of exports from Rhodesia's neighbours. The essential is to ensure that all countries' imports from, as well as exports to, Rhodesia's neighbours are confined to what is legitimate trade and are not disguised trade with Rhodesia.

23. But this is easier said than done. International commerce is a complex affair. Two things flow from this. The first—and here I have to part company with those who complain that the sanctions Committee has become too technical—is that those who are responsible for the development of illegal trade with Rhodesia have resorted to complex technical means of evasion of sanctions. To take one aspect of this, trade with Rhodesia is not just a matter of whether or not a country trades with any southern African country or Territory. The illegal deals which are set up seldom if ever involve direct trade of this sort, but involve indirect trade. Indeed, a good deal of the world's legitimate trade is of the indirect nature. These illegal deals are nearly all arranged by a middleman who may be a national of virtually any country in the world. He buys the Rhodesian goods and—sometimes not until they are on the high seas—arranges a contract with a buyer, declaring the goods, of course, as being of any origin other than Southern Rhodesian.

24. It is perhaps this belief—a belief that all that is involved is direct trade with southern Africa—that leads some Governments which have no trade with that area to think that they have no problems as far as sanctions are concerned. This is just not so. In my own efforts to understand how the trade is arranged I have found it useful to examine some of the cases which figure in the annual reports of the sanctions Committee; and one in particular,

No. 112, is relevant. This is particularly relevant because in it the Government of Malawi assured the Committee that the sugar involved in the deal, which had been described as Malawi sugar, was definitely not of Malawi origin. We can therefore be pretty certain that a breach of sanctions had taken place, albeit perhaps unwittingly as far as the importer was concerned. Now, in this case the sugar, which was shipped from Lourenço Marques, was at some stage bought by a firm in Switzerland. The only contract which the end-buyer had—the buyer, incidentally, was a firm in a country in the Gulf—was with this Swiss firm, not with any firm in southern Africa. The Swiss intermediary of course never saw the sugar; it was shipped direct to the buyer. And, incidentally, in view of what has been said about actions which “facilitate” illegal transactions, it is perhaps worth pointing out that the payment for the sugar by the importer to the Swiss firm was by means of a letter of credit issued by a branch of the Moscow Narodny Bank: not, I hasten to add, that I am suggesting that the bank, in issuing the letter of credit, was itself a party to the breach of sanctions.

25. I make no apology for referring to a concrete case, because cases—concrete cases—are what the sanctions Committee’s work is all about. We have to understand how the business is carried out, and the case I have quoted provides a partial illustration of that.

26. And this brings me to the second consequence of the complexity of international commerce, something which also has a bearing on what has been called the “technicalization” of the sanctions Committee. Very briefly it is this: given the methods to which sanctions busters resort, if the Committee is to succeed in its task of detecting sanctions evasions and of assisting Governments which profess to support sanctions in their task of detecting evasions, the Committee cannot ignore the technicalities. There is indeed a lot of hard, down-to-earth technical work to be done. Despite the complexities, however, one thing which is clear is that as far as goods imported from Southern Rhodesia are concerned there is one place where an evasion of sanctions can be firmly and definitively established and that is at their port of final destination. The same principle is true of goods exported to Southern Rhodesia; it is in their country of origin that the investigations have to be made.

27. The representative of Somalia referred to the 143 cases of what he called violations as being only the tip of the iceberg. But though there are undoubtedly many more cases which go unreported and undetected, and even unsuspected, not even all the 143 cases are proved. This, incidentally, is why figures showing the number of times a country has been mentioned in a report are in themselves meaningless. They are only reports of suspected breaches. And the plain fact is that with few exceptions neither the Government of the importing or exporting country nor the sanctions Committee has, on the basis of the information supplied, been able to establish definitively that a breach had taken place, whether knowingly or unknowingly.

28. This is the crucial problem to which we as the international community have to address ourselves. Some of the proposals which figure in section IV of the report assume that it is an easy matter to establish that an evasion

has taken place. But in fact if these proposals were adopted, the sufferer would be the *bona fide* trader. Unless there were a marked improvement in the detection of breaches—and these proposals do not help on this—the man who is determined to evade sanctions would be able to rely on not being found out; and unless he were found out the measures would be inoperative. Such proposals would indeed be paper sanctions, and my delegation could not endorse them. To give one example, all those who have participated in the work of the sanctions Committee know well that time out of number the Committee receives replies from Governments stating that the contract or the bill of lading or some other document they had examined had been specifically endorsed to the effect that the goods must not be or were not of Southern Rhodesian origin. I am not saying that in all these cases an evasion had in fact taken place. But one must have one’s doubts about the efficacy of such a proviso when the odds are strongly against the perpetrator of an evasion being found out. I must repeat, therefore, that it is at the point of arrival of goods that action has to be taken; and there are effective methods which, provided they are properly applied, can help the authorities in their detection of falsifications.

29. The view of my delegation, therefore, is that the proposals in section III of the report provide a workmanlike and effective programme of action. The Chairman of the Committee, the Ambassador of Guinea, in introducing the report [1712th meeting] analysed these proposals in an admirable manner. I should like for my part to draw attention to what I think are three essential elements. First, there is what one might call publicity for the problem: the bringing to the notice of Governments and of world opinion the considerable discrepancies which emerge from the statistics and the request to Governments to comment on the discrepancies and on the precautions they are taking. Secondly, there is the clear call to Governments to institute the proper checking procedures at the time of arrival of goods; and to back up this request there is, in particular, the proposal for the preparation by the Committee of a manual of guidance. Thirdly, there is the proposal in paragraph 19 for the improvement of the Committee’s own working methods. I share the view of the representative of Kenya [1714th meeting] that it is right to take stock of the way the Committee has worked; and I believe that the proposal in paragraph 19 for the appointment within the Secretariat of an expert would be the most effective means of helping the Committee to discharge its tasks more satisfactorily. In saying this I in no way wish to criticize the existing secretariat of the Committee—indeed all concerned have done an excellent job. But the fact is that, as I have said, this is a complex business that the Committee has to deal with. When the Committee receives reports, when it receives comments and replies from Governments, my delegation has the feeling that, for lack of expertise, the Committee does not always take the right follow-up action or indeed take it fast enough. I think it is highly probable that one of the reasons for the Committee’s lack of success is simply that it has not asked the right questions of Governments. The recommendation for the appointment of an individual with personal experience of trade, and particularly of trade conducted through third parties, would provide the necessary expertise. My delegation hopes that if this recommendation is adopted, the Secretary-

General will be able to find an individual with the necessary qualifications.

30. In short, my delegation fully supports the proposals in section III of the report. Since, after exhaustive discussion extending over several months, the Committee was able to agree on these proposals, it has come as some surprise to my delegation that the draft resolution in document S/10927 goes beyond them and incorporates proposals on which there has not been agreement. This almost makes the work of the Committee seem wasted since the position of my delegation and of others was made fully clear during the Committee's discussions. One would have hoped that there would be a draft resolution, confined to the agreed proposals, which this Council could adopt unanimously. To the extent that the draft resolution incorporates the agreed proposals my delegation warmly supports it; to the extent, however, that it goes beyond these agreed proposals and beyond the position taken by my delegation in other parts of the report we are unable to support it. Since the United Kingdom would not think it right to vote for a draft resolution which incorporated proposals which we regard as inappropriate and are not prepared to put into effect, my delegation will have with regret to abstain on that draft resolution.

31. Mr. TOURE (Guinea) (*interpretation from French*): The introduction of the draft resolution in document S/10928 on behalf of the African members of the Council by the representative of Kenya during our meeting yesterday [1714th meeting] requires, in our view, that we make some remarks about the value and practical effectiveness of sanctions imposed pursuant to Security Council resolution 253 (1968) against the rebel colony of Ian Smith resulting from the initiative of the administering Power, which is and remains the United Kingdom.

32. It has become apparent with time, and because of the behaviour of a number of States which deliberately chose to violate the economic blockade, that it has become necessary to strengthen the provisions of resolution 253 (1968), which would remain inoperative if sanctions were not extended to South Africa and Portugal. It is therefore essential that those who affirm their support for the principles of self-determination of the Zimbabwe people should cease to practise a two-faced policy consisting of affirming their adherence to the principles of self-determination of peoples—which in Rhodesia implies the overthrow of the racist minority—and, on the other hand, to foster the maintenance in power of this minority racist rebel régime by systematically opposing the application of Chapter VII of the Charter to Portugal and South Africa. This is nothing but the policy of the ostrich. As long as sanctions are not extended to Pretoria and Lisbon, *de facto* allies of Salisbury, the provisions of resolution 253 (1968) will be a mere illusion. We must impose upon the advocates of racism and *apartheid* in southern Africa, in addition to the weapons embargo, the compulsory sanctions provided for in the draft resolution in document S/10928.

33. In the light of repeated violations of sanctions since their institution in 1968, States Members of the United Nations must take every necessary legislative measure to

put an end to a prohibited trade that only increases the export earnings of Rhodesia, which last year reached the record figure of £138 million. Among those States one cannot gloss over the attitude of the Government of the United States of America which, by resuming the import of chrome and other strategic minerals, opens the way for other States to practise, with the racists of Southern Rhodesia, a trade disapproved of by the international community. It is inconceivable that the Government of the United States, one of those mainly responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security, should claim the right of the strongest to breach a principle unanimously approved by the Security Council.

34. The colonial Power, on the other hand, in addition to proposing the palliative of economic sanctions against the Salisbury rebels, should have urged and must still urge Washington to abrogate this outrageous decision. Great Britain has been able, in other places, to resort to repression. It has the responsibility of using that same force in its colony of Southern Rhodesia and to restore, through universal suffrage, the rule of the African majority. But, from Cecil Rhodes to Ian Smith, the British tactic of duplicity has not changed in Rhodesia. Whilst on the one hand it appeases the Africans and the international community, it also, on the other hand, strengthens the power of the whites. Thus, in 1961, the Under-Secretary of State for Commonwealth Affairs declared to Mr. Joshua Nkomo that there were too many investments in Rhodesia for its economy to be placed in inexperienced hands.

35. This is the very foundation of British policy in Rhodesia, where British colonialism, allied with the white minorities of southern Africa, hypocritically strives to perpetuate an imaginary hegemony in Africa. It goes without saying that the initiative of engaging the United Nations in this blockade is nothing but subterfuge, whilst, on the very eve of the unilateral declaration of independence in Rhodesia in 1965, the same British Government had given firm assurances to Ian Smith that it would never resort to force in Rhodesia against British businessmen.

36. This is how the Pearce Commission was conceived to give legitimacy to the rebellion of the British settlers. Against all predictions, the test of the proposals for an alleged settlement in Rhodesia paradoxically led to the categorical expression by the Zimbabwe people of its will to determine its fate by rejecting, through an historical "no", the proposed referendum.

37. Great Britain, like its rebel protégés, should now confront the popular struggle which has replaced the apparent calm of which Mr. Smith was so proud. The liberation struggle, waged under a unified military command of the liberation movements of Zimbabwe, which has started and which the Organization of African Unity will support until final victory, will burn not only in Rhodesia but in the whole of southern Africa, and in the Portuguese Territories of Africa, to shatter the unholy alliance of racism and imperialism.

38. This action of the Zimbabwe people, which will inevitably lead to victory, was reaffirmed when Ian Smith, in a suicidal act of economic blackmail, closed the borders

between Rhodesia and Zimbabwe. But such a decision will very soon lead him to shorten the days of the white settlers in Rhodesia. The courageous decision of President Kaunda, approved by the Security Council through the assistance rendered by a peace mission sent to Zambia, is the best proof of the support which the Council and the international community give to Zambia.

39. I would not wish to conclude without expressing the satisfaction my delegation feels in conveying to Mrs. Jeanne Martin Cissé, Chairman of the Committee, the words of praise expressed here about the work done by the Committee as reflected in the proposals contained in document S/10920 and Corr.1. I shall transmit to her the feelings of all those who have congratulated our delegation, and I am sure Mrs. Jeanne Martin Cissé will not be surprised to hear those compliments.

40. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translation from Russian*): I shall be brief. I am moved to reply by the mention the United Kingdom representative made in his statement of the Moscow Narodny Bank. I can only regard his reference to the Moscow Narodny Bank in connexion with the violation of Security Council sanctions against Rhodesia by one of the Western European countries as an example of the tactic and practice, usual in British diplomacy, of obscuring clear issues with a cloud of anti-Sovietism.

41. Moreover, Sir Colin Crowe cannot fail to be aware of two very important and vital facts. In the first place, despite the fact that it is called the "Moscow" Bank, the Moscow Narodny Bank cannot export a single pound sterling, even to the Soviet Union, without the sanction and approval of the British authorities. Thus, even if the Moscow Narodny Bank, which is located in London and subject to English law with which it complies fully, firmly and unswervingly, had financed a violation of sanctions, the basic guilt would in that event lie with the British Government, since its laws and regulations are complied with by all banks in England, including the Moscow Narodny Bank in London. In the second place, Sir Colin Crowe is perfectly well aware that when this question was raised in the Security Council Committee on Southern Rhodesia, that Committee officially established that there was absolutely no suspicion of a violation of sanctions by this bank. In the light of these two facts, I am at a loss to understand why Sir Colin Crowe found it necessary to mention the Moscow Narodny Bank in this connexion. I can only assume that he simply wished to shift the blame from the guilty to the innocent. But the facts are not on his side, and to distort facts never reflected credit on anyone.

42. Sir Colin CROWE (United Kingdom): If I may quote myself, I simply said that I was not suggesting that the bank—and incidentally, it was the Beirut branch—was itself a party to the breach of sanctions. I was just trying to show that these matters are extremely complicated and that they cover a very, very large area. I even suspect that the payment may have been in Swiss francs and not in sterling. I was merely trying to show how complicated these transactions are.

43. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translation from Russian*): I wish only to add to what I said that the United Kingdom delegation in the Security Council and Sir Colin Crowe know perfectly well that the Security Council Committee on Southern Rhodesia considered this question and firmly rejected the idea that any suspicion attached to the Moscow Narodny Bank. In the light of that decision by the Committee, Sir Colin Crowe had absolutely no justification for bringing the subject up.

44. Mr. ODERO-JOWI (Kenya): I would add one or two thoughts by way of comment on what has been said during the debate this afternoon.

45. I should like to point out that in some parts of the world, in some countries and some circles, the situation in southern Africa is perhaps still regarded as a joke. In some parts of the world, the situation in southern Africa is still being debated in the way the slave trade was debated during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, when there were interests and people in high places supporting the slave trade. But those who spoke against the slave trade had all virtue and right on their side, and in the end their proposals and the stand they took triumphed. It looks as though in some countries there are still influential people in government, commerce and industry who benefit from the suppression of the African people in southern Africa, and that is why they are opposed to the extension of sanctions to cover those countries of southern Africa that are openly aiding and abetting the violation of Security Council sanctions against Rhodesia. We know who these people are. We know their motives. But the Security Council was set up for a purpose and it works on principles which we cannot sacrifice because of the selfish interests of certain countries and certain individuals. We must stick by the principles and support the sanctions which have already been approved by this Council. There is no going back on the question of sanctions against Southern Rhodesia.

46. That is why I wished to speak in order to thank those countries which have courageously spoken out in vindication of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and in support of decisions already taken by this Council. We are grateful for the support they are lending to the cause of the freedom of our brothers and sisters in Zimbabwe and in other parts of southern Africa. One thing is clear—that, come what may, our brothers and sisters in Zimbabwe will be free. It is only a matter of time. And those who are currently trying to belittle the rights of the people of Zimbabwe are only doing it now, but they will not be able to do it for all time because in the long run freedom and justice will triumph.

47. The PRESIDENT: I have no further speakers at this time and I shall, therefore, with the Council's consent, speak in my capacity as the representative of the SUDAN for the purpose of stating the position of my delegation on the item before the Council.

48. Last Monday [*1712th meeting*], Mrs. Jeanne Martin Cissé of Guinea, in her capacity as Chairman of the Committee established in pursuance of Security Council resolution 253 (1968) concerning the question of Southern Rhodesia, so ably introduced the second special report of

the Committee which is now the subject of our deliberations. She, and her two Vice-Chairmen and the Secretariat, deserve our gratitude for such a comprehensive report. Our thanks also go to the members of those delegations who shared the views of the African members and whose suggestions have positively improved on the original working paper. It is most regrettable, however, that those genuine efforts have been frustrated by views which provide additional loop-holes for flouting sanctions against the illegal régime of Ian Smith instead of attempting to tighten the existing measures as directed by the Council in paragraphs 4 and 5 of resolution 320 (1972). As was rightly pointed out by the Soviet delegation [1714th meeting], the Committee has failed to comply with the key directive of the Council in paragraph 4 of that resolution, by failing to agree on

“the type of action which could be taken in view of the open and persistent refusal of South Africa and Portugal to implement sanctions against the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia”.

49. It is true that unanimous agreement has been reached on section III of the report, but this is no more than a minor improvement on the routine and the closed-door procedure of the Committee.

50. The African suggestions, as improved by those delegations which share their views as enumerated in sections IV and V, would have provided all the necessary elements required by paragraphs 4 and 5 of resolution 320 (1972) had the Committee reached full agreement during those long and laborious discussions. Unfortunately, this was not the case.

51. The Committee should have been aware of the numerous suspect cases where South Africa and Portugal, overtly and covertly, helped unscrupulous dealers to smuggle goods to and from Southern Rhodesia. It should have been aware of the fact that the British naval patrol, at Beira Port, has not only been relaxed but that Lourenço Marques and Durban Ports have extended their port facilities in the service of contraband trade from and to Southern Rhodesia. Petrol is now piped in sufficient quantities from Lourenço Marques to Southern Rhodesia.

52. The Committee should have taken into serious consideration the fact that the United States is now in a position to sell part of its over-stocked chrome to other countries, and to extend its purchases of minerals, other than nickel and chrome, from the illegal régime. The case of the purchase by Southern Rhodesia of Boeings is still very fresh in the news. We are disturbed by certain information that the office of Air Rhodesia in New York is conducting secret negotiations with an American company to buy more Boeing aircraft.

53. Because of so many examples of flagrant irregularities which keep the illegal régime going, and indeed make it more than ever oppressive towards the millions of Africans in Zimbabwe and more than ever aggressive towards sovereign neighbouring countries, the Committee should have agreed to recommend the expansion of sanctions to South Africa and Portuguese Territories, as in paragraphs

23, 31 and 34 of section IV and paragraph 37 of section V. Complementary to those measures are the practical and feasible measures in section IV: paragraphs 24 and 25 on contracts, paragraph 26 on denial of landing rights to the national carriers of countries which grant landing rights to aircraft from Southern Rhodesia or operate air services to Southern Rhodesia, and paragraph 27 demanding legislation to forbid insurance companies from covering air flights, and indeed, any other suspect carriers of goods to and from Southern Rhodesia. My delegation, among others, is fully convinced that such legislation is a vital deterrent to evasion of sanctions and that it should be immediately applied. Year after year we used to hear voices saying with authority that it was not practicable to do so, that it was technically impossible, and that any attempt in that direction should be forsaken. Not only so, but every attempt in that direction was obstructed and defeated in the Committee. Yet, when finally the expert opinion in this matter was sought by the Committee, it became abundantly clear, and beyond doubt, that all previous pleas for inaction had no justification whatsoever, other than to keep the insurance industry away from the hand-reach of sanctions.

54. Let me reiterate, therefore, that the African proposals on insurance remain, in the opinion of my delegation, especially after the appearance of the insurance experts before the Committee at its 135th meeting, realistic and necessary, and that the action envisaged therein should constitute an important contribution to the effectiveness of sanctions. The regrettable failure of the Committee to adopt them unanimously, for reasons we all know, should never deter this Council from the discharge of its duty in this respect.

55. My delegation will, therefore, fully support the two draft resolutions so ably and clearly introduced by my friend and colleague, Mr. Odero-Jowi of Kenya [*ibid.*], which between them attempt to comply with the requirements of paragraphs 4 and 5 of resolution 320 (1972), and make up for the Committee's failure to reach total agreement on what we consider to be necessary action and measures aiming at improving the effectiveness of sanctions against Southern Rhodesia.

56. Having said all this, my delegation maintains its firm conviction that sanctions—which hitherto have remained with little effect, for reasons we are all aware of—neither are an end in themselves nor can by themselves expedite the result which they are intended to serve, namely, the end of the illegal racist régime of Ian Smith.

57. We have consistently maintained, as we maintain now, that the United Kingdom Government, which is the administering Power of Southern Rhodesia, cannot be absolved, despite the lapse of time, of its moral and political duty to end the rebel régime of the racist minority in Zimbabwe and to lead the country to self-determination and majority rule. The general will of the people of Zimbabwe has been long established by no less than the findings of the Pearce Commission appointed by the United Kingdom Government itself. In our view, the application of sanctions can be meaningful only when the Government of the United Kingdom decides to carry out its obligations towards the majority of the people of Zimbabwe.

58. Taking advantage of the reluctance of the United Kingdom Government to act and with the military and material assistance of the racist régimes of South Africa and Portugal, Ian Smith has proved to be not only reckless but surely to be leading the country to a blood bath. Because of his blind obstinacy in refusing to acknowledge the African demand for peaceful constitutional settlement, and by the application of more discriminatory laws and mass repressions, Ian Smith has forced the Zimbabwe liberation movement to meet force with force.

59. The Government of the United Kingdom, as administering Power, is duty bound to interfere by all means available to it—and it has them if it wishes to use them—to set the country on the path of majority rule before any further deterioration takes place in the situation, a situation which has already reached a very dangerous stage.

60. The Security Council, facing this situation created by the alliance of the rebel régime of Ian Smith, the racist régime of South Africa and the colonial domination of Portugal, must also act in order to break this dangerous ring and assist in the establishment of peace in that part of the world.

61. In our view, the two draft resolutions now before the Council would provide practical steps in the right direction with respect to the application of sanctions, but the ultimate goal of self-determination for Zimbabwe can only be achieved peacefully, and before it is too late, if the Government of the United Kingdom decides forthwith to carry out its responsibility towards all the people of Zimbabwe. In the prevailing situation in Zimbabwe, any delay of such action would lead to unnecessary bloodshed and misery, and neither the United Kingdom Government nor the Security Council could be justifiably acquitted of the responsibility for that. In this conviction and with the full realization of the ineffectiveness of the measures so far adopted and deliberately evaded by Member States and non-Member States, my delegation appeals to all members of the Council to adopt unanimously the two draft resolutions under consideration.

62. Speaking now as PRESIDENT, I should like to say that I have no further speakers on my list. If no delegation wishes to speak at this stage, I would suggest that the Council now proceed to vote on the two draft resolutions before it in accordance with rule 32, first paragraph, of the provisional rules of procedure, that is, in the order of their submission.

63. Mr. ODERO-JOWI (Kenya): I should like to seek the permission of the Council for a suspension of the meeting to enable us to discuss these two draft resolutions with a view to avoiding the veto which is hanging like a bomb over our heads.

64. I have explained the feelings of my delegation in detail on this subject. It is one to which we attach a great deal of

importance. It is a matter of life and death for our brothers and sisters in Zimbabwe, and in southern Africa generally. I would appreciate an opportunity to exchange views on these two draft resolutions with my colleagues in the Council behind closed doors, because we would like to make our feelings on them quite clear. I think a veto can be avoided. These two draft resolutions contain matters of vital principle, matters on which this Council has pronounced itself, and we see no room for unnecessary differences over them. We would appreciate an opportunity to consult further with our colleagues before they are put to the vote.

65. The PRESIDENT: The representative of Kenya has suggested that we should suspend the meeting briefly to permit consultations. If I hear no objection, I shall take it that the Council agrees to that course.

The meeting was suspended at 5.05 p.m. and resumed at 5.55 p.m.

66. Mr. ODERO-JOWI (Kenya): I should like to ask the Council, through you, Mr. President, to agree to the adjournment of this meeting and to the postponement of the voting on the two draft resolutions until Tuesday morning.

67. Earlier this afternoon I made clear our anxiety over the fate of the two draft resolutions. We have been given a firm indication that at least one of the two draft resolutions will be vetoed. I also made clear our strong feelings over the manner in which this Council has handled the affairs pertaining to enforcement of sanctions against the rebel régime of Southern Rhodesia. Arising out of this anxiety, my delegation and other delegations have decided that it will be necessary for us to prepare ourselves fully to challenge the impending veto against one of the draft resolutions. We feel this is necessary because, as I pointed out earlier, these two draft resolutions contain matters of principle which cannot be sacrificed in silence. We therefore need time to prepare ourselves to answer the violations of these principles by resort to the veto. We think that if we allow ourselves to be pushed around when principles of the Charter and decisions of the Council are being set aside, we will be sacrificing the purposes and principles for which this Organization was set up. We are therefore asking for time to enable us to prepare for a full-scale debate in challenge of the impending veto and the sacrifice and violation of decisions of the Council and the principles of the Charter.

68. The PRESIDENT: The representative of Kenya has formally moved that we adjourn this meeting and resume our work on Tuesday morning, 22 May. As I hear no objection, I declare the Council adjourned until Tuesday morning next.

The meeting rose at 6.05 p.m.

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